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crs_RL33485 | crs_RL33485_0 | The act includes $6.3 billion for global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria initiatives, of which $5.8 billion is appropriated to international HIV/AIDS initiatives, including $840.3 million for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria. Congress exceeded the President's FY2008 request for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs by $570.1 million (most of which was provided to the Global Fund) and by $4.7 billion for PEPFAR's entire five-year term. U.S. contributions to the Global Fund and the launching of two initiatives—the Prevention of Mother and Child Transmission Initiative and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—have contributed to this growth. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
On January 28, 2003, during his State of the Union Address, President Bush proposed that the United States spend $15 billion over the next five fiscal years to combat HIV/AIDS through PEPFAR. The President proposed channeling $10 billion to prevention, treatment, and care services in the 15 Focus Countries through GHAI, $4 billion to existing bilateral HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs and research conducted in more than 100 non-Focus Countries, and $1 billion to the Global Fund. 108-25 , the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (the Leadership Act). Between FY2004 and FY2008, PEPFAR programs aim to support care for 10 million HIV-affected people, including children orphaned by AIDS; support the prevention of 7 million new HIV infections; and help 2 million people receive ARVs. Congress appropriates the bulk of PEPFAR funds to the GHAI account. In FY2008, the President proposed that the United States contribute $300 million to the Global Fund through Labor/HHS Appropriations. Congress provided $8.0 million, however, for the activities. | On January 28, 2003, during his State of the Union Address, President George Bush proposed that the United States spend $15 billion over five years to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The President proposed that most of the spending on PEPFAR programs be concentrated in 15 countries. Of the $15 billion, the President suggested spending $9 billion on prevention, treatment, and care services in the 15 Focus Countries, where the Administration estimated 50% of all HIV-positive people lived. The President also proposed that $5 billion of the funds be spent on existing bilateral HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs and research, and $1 billion of PEFPAR funds be reserved for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund). Between FY2004 and FY2008, PEPFAR aims to have supported care for 10 million people affected by HIV/AIDS, including children orphaned by AIDS; prevented 7 million new HIV infections; and supported efforts to provide anti-retroviral medication (ARV) to 2 million HIV-infected people.
From FY2004 through FY2008 Congress provided almost $20 billion to fighting the global spread of HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, some $5 billion more than the President proposed. The President's FY2008 budget request included about $5.8 billion for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria efforts. The Administration proposed that the bulk of the funds, about $5.0 billion, be provided through Foreign Operations appropriations and that about $800 million be provided through Labor/HHS appropriations, of which $300 million would be reserved for a U.S. contribution to the Global Fund. Congress exceeded the President's request by some $560 million, providing $6.3 billion for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria efforts, including some $840 million for a U.S. contribution to the Global Fund. This report reviews U.S. appropriations for treatment and prevention of the three diseases from FY2004 through FY2008. The report will not be updated; PEPFAR authorization expires in FY2008. Subsequent reports will analyze additional funding should the initiative be reauthorized. |
crs_R43303 | crs_R43303_0 | Introduction
This report provides a concise, chart- and table-based introduction to China's political institutions and current leaders. The report is intended to assist Members and their staffs seeking to understand where political institutions or individuals fit within the broader Chinese political system and to identify which Chinese officials are responsible for specific portfolios. The information may be useful for Members and staff visiting China, hosting visitors from China, preparing for China-related hearings, or drafting China-related legislation. For a detailed discussion of the Chinese political system, see CRS Report R41007, Understanding China's Political System , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Its third chapter, entitled "Structure of the State," describes China's unicameral legislature, the National People's Congress (NPC) , as "the highest organ of state power." This political power structure is illustrated in Figure 1 . The Communist Party of China is not mentioned in Chapter 3 of the state constitution, although Communist Party leadership is mentioned in passing five times in the state constitution's preamble. As noted above, it is China's dominant political institution, exercising leadership over the entire political system. The Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee
The Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) serves as China's most senior decision-making body. The second-ranked PSC member serves as Premier of the State Council, which manages the state bureaucracy. The seven State positions that confer Politburo membership are the State President and Vice President, the Premier of the State Council, and the four State Council Vice Premiers. The Communist Party's Military
The Party's Central Military Commission (CMC) exercises unified command over China's armed forces, consisting of the active and reserve forces of China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA); a paramilitary force, the People's Armed Police Force (PAP); and a militia. In addition to the Premier, the Vice Premiers, the State Councilors, and a Secretary General, it also includes the ministers of China's 20 ministries, the chairmen of three ministerial-level commissions, the governor of the central bank, known as the People's Bank of China, and the head of the National Audit Office. Officials Whose Portfolios Include Foreign Affairs
Several members of the 25-person Party Politburo have portfolios that include foreign affairs. | This report provides a snapshot of China's leading political institutions and current leaders in the form of nine organization charts and three tables. The report is a companion to CRS Report R41007, Understanding China's Political System, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], which provides a detailed explanation of China's political system. This chart-based report is intended to assist Members and their staffs seeking to understand where political institutions and individuals fit within the broader Chinese political system and to identify which Chinese officials are responsible for specific portfolios. The information may be useful for Members and staff visiting China, hosting visitors from China, preparing for China-related hearings, or drafting China-related legislation.
Figures 1 and 2 depict China's political power structure as it was envisioned in Chapter 3 of the 1982 state constitution, and as actually implemented. The key difference is that while Chapter 3 of the state constitution identifies the National People's Congress as the highest organ of state power, the Communist Party of China exercises leadership over the entire political system.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 provide information about the Communist Party's leadership. Figure 3 presents the Party's hierarchy. Figure 4 lists the members of the Party's most senior decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee, and their portfolios. Figure 5 lists all 25 members of the full Politburo and their principal areas of responsibility.
Figure 6 lists the members of the Central Military Commission, a Party body that exercises unified command over the armed forces, known collectively as the People's Liberation Army.
Figure 7 shows where the largely honorary office of the State President sits within the state hierarchy, according to the state constitution. The president's authority actually derives from his concurrent post as General Secretary of the Communist Party.
Figure 8 presents the hierarchy of the State Council, a cabinet-like entity which is tasked with implementing Party policies and managing the state bureaucracy. China conducts its relations with most of the world through the State Council. Table 1 introduces the 10 members of the State Council Executive Committee, listed by rank, with information about each official's portfolio.
Figure 9 depicts the organizational structure of China's unicameral legislature, the National People's Congress.
Table 2 lists leading Party, military, and State officials with portfolios that include foreign affairs. Table 3 lists the top officials of China's Foreign Ministry, with information about each official's portfolio. |
crs_RS22838 | crs_RS22838_0 | Federal civilian employees may be compensated for periods of illness, disability, or injury through one of three systems: paid sick leave, disability retirement, or workers' compensation benefits for injuries sustained at work. Sick Leave
Workers who experience short-term illnesses or injuries can use paid sick leave to take time off from work. If an employee has exhausted his or her accrued sick leave balance, the worker's employing agency can advance up to 30 days of sick leave per year. Disability Retirement
Civil Service Retirement System6
Eligibility
A federal employee enrolled in CSRS is eligible for a disability retirement if
he or she has completed at least five years of creditable civilian service; the employee has a disability that results in deficient performance, conduct, or attendance or that is incompatible with the individual continuing to perform useful and efficient service in his or her job; a physician certifies that the disability is expected to last a year or more; the worker's employing agency is unable to accommodate the disability in the worker's current job or in an existing vacant position at the same grade or pay and in the same commuting area; and an application for disability retirement is filed with the employing agency before separation or with the Office of Personnel Management within one year of the date of separation from employment. Federal Employees' Compensation Act13
Eligibility
The Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) provides benefits to federal employees who suffer a partial or total disability as the result of an injury incurred at work. Benefits
FECA benefits consist of cash compensation, payment of medical expenses related to the illness or injury, vocational rehabilitation assistance, and payment for attendant care services. An injured employee may elect to receive a disability retirement annuity instead of FECA benefits, but may not receive both simultaneously. | Paid sick leave, disability retirement, or workers' compensation may provide benefits for federal civilian employees during periods of illness, disability, or workplace injury, respectively. Federal civilian employees earn 13 days of paid sick leave per year. Sick leave can be used because of the worker's own illness or injury or to care for an ill or injured family member. A worker's employing agency can advance up to 30 additional days of sick leave to an employee who has exhausted his or her accrued sick leave. A federal worker with a long-term disability can separate from service through a disability retirement. A federal employee who sustains a disabling injury on the job can receive benefits under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), the workers' compensation program for federal employees. FECA benefits consist of cash compensation, payment of medical costs related to the injury, vocational rehabilitation assistance, the cost of attendant care services, and burial benefits. A disabled federal employee may not receive a disability retirement annuity and FECA benefits simultaneously. |
crs_RS21453 | crs_RS21453_0 | How Amber Alerts Work
Amber Alerts (also referred to as AMBER ) use technology to disseminate information about child abductions in a timely manner. Research has found that most abducted children murdered by their kidnappers are killed within three hours of the abduction. Prompt response to child abductions is therefore deemed critical by many. A number of counties and cities have Amber Alert programs that notify local residents using e-mail or telephone alert systems to aid in the recovery of abducted children. Alerts can also be sent by text messages to cell phones and other wireless devices. Emergency Alert System (EAS)
The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is jointly administered by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in cooperation with the National Weather Service (NWS), an organization within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).The EAS sends emergency messages with the cooperation of broadcast radio and television and most cable television stations. Congress has encouraged federal support for other alert programs as well. The Office of Justice Programs, at the Department of Justice, includes an Amber Alert division, the National AMBER Alert Initiative. Kristen's Act authorized the Attorney General to make grants to public agencies or not-for-profit organizations to perform these functions:
to assist law enforcement and families in locating missing adults; to maintain a national, interconnected database for the purpose of tracking missing adults who are determined by law enforcement to be endangered due to age, diminished mental capacity, or the circumstances of disappearance, when foul play is suspected or circumstances are unknown; to maintain statistical information of adults reported as missing; to provide informational resources and referrals to families of missing adults; to assist in public notification and victim advocacy related to missing adults; and to establish and maintain a national clearinghouse for missing adults. State Initiatives
All 50 states operate Amber Alert programs for missing children. Many states have extended their Amber Alert programs to include missing adults or participate in other alert programs. Silver Alert programs, for example, are operated for the benefit of those with Alzheimer's Disease and other cognitive impairments. One of the new alert technologies that will use the gateway is the Commercial Mobile Alert System (CMAS). Another investment in emergency communications infrastructure that will likely benefit Amber Alerts and similar programs is for the transition to Internet protocols in 911 call centers and networks. The scope of the plan, however, may not be wide enough to include the type of technology-policy decisions that would ensure that all facets of emergency communications are developed in concert. | Amber Alerts (also referred to as AMBER plans) were created to disseminate information about child abductions in a timely manner. Research has found that most abducted children murdered by their kidnappers are killed within three hours of the abduction. Prompt response to child abductions is therefore deemed critical by many. Amber Alert plans are voluntary partnerships including law enforcement agencies, highway departments, and companies that support emergency alerts. Technologies used for alerts include the Emergency Alert System (EAS), highway message boards, telephone alert systems, the Internet, text messaging, and e-mail. All 50 states have statewide Amber Alert programs.
Because kidnappers can cross state lines with their victims, the Department of Justice will often be involved in responding to an abduction. For this and other reasons, there is increased federal involvement in and support of Amber Alert plans. The National Center for Missing Adults is another example of an alert program that receives support from the U.S. Department of Justice.
Amber Alert and related technologies are in place for other at-risk programs as well. For example, a number of states have created Silver Alert programs to assist in locating missing adults with cognitive impairments.
Government, non-profit, and volunteer programs use alert technologies as tools to meet their larger goals. Participants choose among the tools available to them. From the perspective of technology policy, more thought might be given by the various program managers, and policy-makers in general, as to how to ensure that the development paths of these technologies mesh. Ideally program alerts should be interoperable – able to exchange information seamlessly across different systems. Planning for state and national emergency alert systems might provide gateways that would ensure access for alerts from all certified programs. Among the new systems being developed, with federal support, that could provide such gateways are the Commercial Mobile Alert System, for cell phone alerts, and new networks using Internet protocols to support 911 call center and other non-commercial communications needs. |
crs_RL34511 | crs_RL34511_0 | To date, Congress has directed its attention particularly to three topics that may affect the United States' realization of this hoped for potential: federal research and de velopment (R&D) investments under the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI); U.S. international competitiveness in nanotechnology; and environmental, health, and safety (EHS) concerns. This report provides a brief overview of these topics and two others of interest to Congress: nanomanufacturing and public attitudes toward, and understanding of, nanotechnology. Nanotechnology R&D is directed toward the understanding and control of matter at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers. At this size, the physical, chemical, and biological properties of materials can differ in fundamental and potentially useful ways from both the properties of individual atoms and molecules, on the one hand, and bulk matter, on the other hand. In 2003, Congress enacted the 21 st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act ( P.L. 108-153 ). Congress has played a central role in the NNI, providing appropriations for the conduct of nanotechnology R&D, establishing programs, and creating a legislative foundation for some of the activities of the NNI through enactment of the 21 st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act of 2003. In the 114 th Congress, Subtitle B of H.R. 1898 , the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2015, would reauthorize the NNI. The American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (S. 3084) would modify certain NNI statutory reporting requirements. Efforts to enact comprehensive NNI reauthorization legislation in the 110 th Congress, 111 th Congress, and 113 th Congress were unsuccessful. The FY2016 appropriation is also down $478.1 million (25.0%) from the regular appropriation peak in FY2010 (see Figure 1 ). President Obama has requested $1.443 billion for nanotechnology R&D in FY2017, little changed from the estimated total appropriated for FY2016. Accordingly, measures such as revenues, market share, and global trade statistics—which are often used to assess and track U.S. competitiveness in more mature technologies and industries—are generally not available for assessing the U.S. position internationally in nanotechnology. An alternative mechanism for gauging a nation's competitive position in emerging technologies—in the absence of periodic, comprehensive, and reliable economic output data (e.g., revenues, market share, trade)—is the use of inputs (e.g., public and private research investments) and non-financial outputs (e.g., scientific papers, patents). However, R&D investments, scientific papers, and patents may not provide reliable indicators of the United States' current or future competitive position. Lux Research estimated total public nanotechnology R&D funding in 2014 at $7.9 billion. According to Lux Research, corporate nanotechnology R&D in 2014 was $9.8 billion of which the United States accounted for $4.0 billion (41%), Japan for $2.5 billion (25%), and Germany for $0.8 billion (8%). Many stakeholders believe that concerns about potential detrimental effects of nanoscale materials and products on EHS—both real and perceived—must be addressed for a variety of reasons, including the following:
protecting and improving human health, safety, and the environment; enabling accurate and efficient risk assessments, risk management, and cost-benefit trade-offs; creating a predictable, stable, and efficient regulatory environment that fosters investment in nanotechnology-related innovation; ensuring public confidence in the safety of nanotechnology research, engineering, manufacturing, and use; preventing the negative consequences of a problem in one application area of nanotechnology from harming the use of nanotechnology in other applications due to public fears, political interventions, or an overly broad regulatory response; and ensuring that society can enjoy the widespread economic and societal benefits that nanotechnology may offer. Nanomanufacturing is the bridge connecting nanoscience and nanotechnology products. To make their way into safe, reliable, effective, and affordable commercial-scale production in a factory environment may require the development of new and unique technologies, tools, instruments, measurement science, and standards for nanomanufacturing. The products that emerge from these efforts may bring significant economic and social benefits to the United States and to the world; however, substantial research, development, and innovation-related hurdles remain before many of these benefits might be realized. Congress may play an active role in addressing some or all of these hurdles. The issues Congress may opt to consider include budget authorization levels for the covered agencies; R&D funding levels, priorities, and balance across the program component areas; administration and management of the NNI; translation of research results and early-stage technology into commercially viable applications; environmental, health, and safety issues; ethical, legal, and societal implications; education and training for the nanotechnology workforce; metrology, standards, and nomenclature; public understanding; and international dimensions. | Nanoscale science, engineering, and technology—commonly referred to collectively as "nanotechnology"—is believed by many to offer extraordinary economic and societal benefits. Congress has demonstrated continuing support for nanotechnology and has directed its attention particularly to three topics that may affect the realization of this hoped for potential: federal research and development (R&D) in nanotechnology; U.S. competitiveness in the field; and environmental, health, and safety (EHS) concerns. This report provides an overview of these topics and two others: nanomanufacturing and public attitudes toward nanotechnology.
The development of nanotechnology has been fostered by significant and sustained public investments in R&D. Nanotechnology R&D is directed toward the understanding and control of matter at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nanometers. (One nanometer is equal to a billionth of a meter. A human hair is 80,000 to 100,000 nanometers wide.) At this size, the properties of matter can differ in fundamental and potentially useful ways from the properties both of individual atoms and molecules, on the one hand, and of bulk matter, on the other. Since the launch of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in 2000, Congress has appropriated approximately $21.8 billion for nanotechnology R&D through FY2016. President Obama has requested $1.443 billion in NNI funding for FY2017, little changed from the FY2016 level of $1.435 billion, but down $478.2 million (25.0%) from its regular appropriation peak of $1.913 billion in FY2010.
According to one estimate, worldwide public sector investment in nanotechnology R&D in 2014 was $7.9 billion and private sector investment was an estimated $9.8 billion. The United States is estimated to account for approximately one-third of total global nanotechnology R&D funding. Data on economic outputs used to assess competitiveness in mature technologies and industries, such as revenues and market share, are also not broadly available for nanotechnology. As an alternative, data on inputs (e.g., R&D expenditures) and non-economic outputs (e.g., scientific papers or patents) may provide insight into the current U.S. position and serve as bellwethers of future competitiveness. By these criteria, the United States appears to be the overall global leader in nanotechnology, though some believe the U.S. lead may not be as large as it was for previous emerging technologies. In recent years, China and the countries of the European Union have surpassed the United States in the publication of nanotechnology papers.
Some research has raised concerns about the safety of nanoscale materials. There is general agreement that more information on EHS implications is needed to assess and manage risks to the public and the environment; and to create a regulatory environment that fosters prudent investment in nanotechnology-related innovation. Nanomanufacturing—the bridge between basic nanoscience and nanotechnology products—may require the development of new technologies, tools, instruments, measurement science, and standards to enable safe, effective, and affordable commercial-scale production of nanotechnology products. Public attitudes may also affect the environment for R&D, regulation, and market acceptance of nanotechnology products.
In 2003, Congress enacted the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act (P.L. 108-153), providing a legislative foundation for some of the activities of the NNI, addressing concerns, establishing programs, assigning agency responsibilities, and setting authorized funding levels for some agencies. Certain provisions of this act authorizing specific appropriations have expired; other provisions have not expired. In the 114th Congress, Subtitle B of the America Competes Reauthorization Act of 2015 (H.R. 1898) would reauthorize the NNI. The American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (S. 3084) would modify certain NNI statutory reporting requirements. Efforts to enact comprehensive NNI reauthorization legislation in the 110th Congress, 111th Congress, and 113th Congress were unsuccessful.
The products that emerge from these efforts may bring significant economic and social benefits to the United States and to the world; however, substantial research, development, and innovation-related hurdles remain before many of these benefits might be realized. Congress may play an active role in addressing some or all of these hurdles. The issues Congress may opt to consider include budget authorization levels for the covered agencies; R&D funding levels, priorities, and balance across the program component areas; administration and management of the NNI; translation of research results and early-stage technology into commercially viable applications; environmental, health, and safety issues; ethical, legal, and societal implications; education and training for the nanotechnology workforce; metrology (the science of measurement), standards, and nomenclature; public understanding; and international dimensions. |
crs_R43707 | crs_R43707_0 | Elder abuse is a complex issue that often requires a multifaceted policy response which combines public health initiatives, social services programs, and criminal law enforcement for abusive behavior. To address this complexity, the Elder Justice Act was enacted on March 23, 2010, as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 , as amended). It attempts to provide a coordinated federal response by emphasizing various public health and social service approaches to the prevention, detection, and treatment of elder abuse. It also represents Congress's first attempt at comprehensive legislation to address abuse, neglect, and exploitation of the elderly at the federal level. This report provides a brief legislative history of the Elder Justice Act, summarizes elder justice provisions enacted as part of ACA and any administrative efforts related to implementation and funding. The report then describes several issues for Congress with respect to the act's reauthorization. Prior to enactment of the Elder Justice Act as part of the ACA, Congress took a number of steps towards addressing elder abuse, including authorizing federal assistance to state Adult Protective Services (APS) programs through the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) program and amendments to the Older Americans Act (OAA) to provide separate funding for elder abuse prevention and vulnerable elder rights protection activities, including establishment of the Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program (LTCOP). Enactment of the Elder Justice Act under the ACA contains provisions that address certain public health and social services approaches to prevention, detection, and treatment of elder abuse primarily under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) authorities and administration. Congress provided $4.0 million in discretionary funding for FY2015 and $8.0 million for FY2016 through the annual appropriations process for these activities. For the first time, Congress appropriated $4 million for Elder Justice/Adult Protective Services activities in FY2015. Despite the lack of discretionary appropriations, in FY2012 and FY2013 some elder justice activities received funds transferred from mandatory appropriations to the Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF; see Table 1 ). Projects included using forensic accountants to prevent elder financial exploitation, increasing medication adherence to prevent elder self-neglect, and developing screening tools to identify elder abuse. For FY2013, $2.0 million was transferred to ACL from the PPHF for elder justice activities which funded development of the National Adult Maltreatment Report System (see text box below). No PPHF or other funds were transferred to ACL for elder justice activities for FY2014 or subsequent fiscal years. For FY2017, the President's budget requested $10 million in discretionary funding for Elder Justice/Adult Protective Services, which would be used to fund implementation of a nationwide Adult Protective Services data system, research, and evaluation activities. The 2017 budget request did not specify an intended transfer of funding from the PPHF to ACL for elder justice activities. For FY2017, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $10.0 million for the Elder Justice Initiative in its FY2017 Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. The House Appropriations Committee recommended $8.0 million in its FY2017 LHHS appropriations bill. Neither House nor Senate floor consideration of the bill occurred in the 114 th Congress. Since the start of the fiscal year (October 1, 2016), funding for LHHS programs and activities has been provided by two continuing resolutions (CR; P.L. 114-223 and P.L. The second FY2017 CR provides continuing appropriations for LHHS appropriations through April 28, 2017, or until full year appropriations are enacted. | Elder abuse is a complex issue that often requires a multifaceted policy response that combines public health interventions, social services programs, and criminal law enforcement for abusive behavior. To address this complexity, the Elder Justice Act was enacted on March 23, 2010 as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended). The act attempts to provide a coordinated federal response by emphasizing various public health and social service approaches to the prevention, detection, and treatment of elder abuse. The Elder Justice Act also represents Congress's first attempt at comprehensive legislation to address abuse, neglect, and exploitation of the elderly at the federal level.
To date, most activities and programs authorized under the Elder Justice Act have not received federal funding through the annual appropriations process. For the first time, Congress appropriated $4 million for a new Elder Justice Initiative in FY2015 and $8 million in FY2016. However, the authorizations of appropriations for most provisions under the act expired on September 30, 2014. Despite the lack of discretionary appropriations prior to FY2015, some elder justice activities have received funding from mandatory funding appropriated through the ACA Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF). As a result of this limited federal funding, the federal government has not substantially developed and expanded its role in addressing the prevention, detection, and treatment of elder abuse.
For FY2012, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) transferred $6.0 million to the Administration for Community Living (ACL) from the PPHF for new grants to states and tribes to test elder abuse prevention strategies. Funded projects included using forensic accountants to prevent elder financial exploitation, increasing medication adherence to prevent elder self-neglect, and developing screening tools to identify elder abuse. For FY2013, $2.0 million was transferred to ACL from the PPHF for elder justice activities, which funded development of the National Adult Protective Services Data Reporting System Project. No PPHF funds were transferred to ACL for elder justice activities for FY2014 or subsequent fiscal years.
For FY2017, the President's budget request included $10.0 million in discretionary funding for Elder Justice/Adult Protective Services (APS) that would be used to fund APS, research, and evaluation activities. The 2017 budget request did not specify an intended transfer of funding from the PPHF for elder justice activities. For FY2017, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $10.0 million for the Elder Justice Initiative in its FY2017 Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. The House Appropriations Committee recommended $8.0 million in its FY2017 LHHS appropriations bill. Neither House nor Senate floor consideration of the bill occurred in the 114th Congress. Since the start of the fiscal year (October 1, 2016), funding for LHHS programs and activities has been provided by two continuing resolutions (CR; P.L. 114-223 and P.L. 114-254). The second FY2017 CR provides continuing appropriations for LHHS appropriations through April 28, 2017, or until full-year appropriations are enacted.
This report provides a brief legislative history of the Elder Justice Act, summarizes elder justice provisions enacted as part of ACA, and administrative efforts related to implementation and funding. The report then describes several issues for Congress with respect to the act's reauthorization. |
crs_RL33599 | crs_RL33599_0 | For the Environmental Protection Agency's Climate Protection (energy efficiency) Programs ( H.R. 5386 ), the Senate Appropriations Committee approved $105.8 million. 5522 ) fund energy efficiency programs. As a result, energy efficiency can reduce resource use and environmental impacts. To support this initiative, the DOE FY2007 request for energy efficiency programs proposes major funding increases for hydrogen and fuel cell technology programs. Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT, P.L. 6 , concern had been raised about delays in the implementation of previously enacted laws that had directed DOE to establish energy efficiency standards for certain equipment. On January 31, 2006, DOE released a report to Congress with a schedule for setting new appliance efficiency standards. 109-58 (§101) calls for the implementation of a plan for congressional buildings to meet the energy efficiency goal for federal agencies noted above. In late July 2006, a group of more than 50 organizations including the Edison Electric Institute, more than 20 electric and gas utilities, the president of the National Association of Regulatory Commissioners (NARUC), and 16 state regulatory agencies issued a National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency , calling on the electric power industry to pursue a major effort to improve energy efficiency. The regulation of automobile fuel efficiency to curb petroleum use has been one of the most controversial aspects of energy efficiency policy. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program for new cars and light trucks achieved significant energy savings through 1985 but has remained relatively flat since then. Critics say that recent CAFE increases for light trucks are too small, given concerns about high gasoline prices, air pollution, and CO 2 emissions. Proponents contend that larger CAFE increases would compromise safety and cause hardship for manufacturers. Bush Administration and expanded by the Clinton Administration. Further, it encourages incentives for energy efficiency in vehicles, biofuels, fuel cells, and air transportation. Foreign Assistance Programs
The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2006, provided $100 million for "energy conservation, energy efficiency, and clean energy" to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in developing countries. Because of the lack of justification in the DOE FY2007 budget request, both the House and Senate appropriations committees declined to provide funding for APP in the FY2007 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill ( H.R. 5427 ). H.R. First, the program for Energy, Biodiversity, and the Environment would, according to the Committee report (p. 65), provide $180 million "to support policies and programs in developing countries that promote energy efficiency, renewable energy, and cleaner energy technologies...." Also, $3 million would be provided for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) partnership with DOE for the hydropower Clean Energy Technology Exports Initiative (CETEI). | Energy efficiency issues include research and development (R&D) priorities, funding for climate-related efficiency programs, implementation of equipment efficiency standards, regulation of vehicle fuel efficiency, and electricity industry ratemaking for energy efficiency profitability. The Bush Administration has proposed an Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI) to accelerate hydrogen programs. For the Department of Energy's (DOE's) energy efficiency R&D programs, the Administration seeks $484.7 million, with increases for Hydrogen and Hybrid/Electric Propulsion. The request would cut $74.8 million from the Weatherization Program and eliminate controversial funding earmarks. The House-passed version of the FY2007 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill (H.R. 5427) would fund AEI and cut earmarks. The Senate Appropriations Committee has also approved AEI funding and would cut earmarks even further than the House.
Energy efficiency programs have long been justified for the ability to reduce petroleum use and curb environmental impacts such as air pollution. This made it economically and administratively convenient to have them also serve as part of a low cost "no regrets" policy to reduce greenhouse gas (especially CO2) emissions. In addition to DOE funding, H.R. 5386 would provide about $100 million for the Environmental Protection Agency's energy efficiency program, and the Senate Appropriations Committee's version of H.R. 5522 would provide about $200 million for energy efficiency-related programs in developing countries.
DOE's implementation of equipment efficiency standards has been a subject of some congressional criticism. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT, P.L. 109-58) directed DOE to report to Congress on actions taken to address the concern. In response, DOE issued a schedule for rulemakings on 30 products. EPACT also raised the goals for energy efficiency in federal agencies and provided modest tax incentives for efficiency in certain vehicles and buildings.
Automobile fuel efficiency regulation has been one of the most controversial aspects of energy efficiency policy. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program for new cars and light trucks achieved significant energy savings through 1985 but has remained relatively flat since then. Critics say that recent CAFE increases for light trucks are too small, given concerns about high gasoline prices, air pollution, and CO2 emissions. Proponents counter that larger CAFE increases would compromise safety and cause hardship for manufacturers.
The National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency aims to defer the need for 20,000 megawatts of new electric power plant capacity. Its success will depend mainly on the ability of state regulators to make energy efficiency profitable for electricity companies, by addressing the link between profits and sales.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33396 | crs_RL33396_0 | Background
In January 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund) was established as an independent foundation in Switzerland to support country efforts to curb the number of illnesses and deaths caused by HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria. Each year, the three diseases kill some 6 million people, mostly in Africa. Global Fund Progress to Date
As of July 11, 2008, the Global Fund has approved proposals for 519 grants in 136 countries totaling $10.8 billion ( Table 1 ). Funding Procedure
In 2005, the Fund approved Round 5 grants in two tranches, because there were no sufficient donor pledges to support all recommended proposals at the time of grant approval. The policy is designed to avoid disruptions in funding that might interrupt project activities. Senegal
On March 1, 2005, the Global Fund announced that it would not approve funding for the second phase of Senegal's malaria project, which was originally funded in Round 1. Ultimately, the Fund approved a grant proposal that Senegal submitted for malaria projects in Round 4. Congress has consistently provided more to the Fund than the Administration has requested through PEPFAR, appropriating some $3 billion from FY2004 through FY2008 ( Table 3 ). In FY2008, Congress appropriated $840.3 million for a U.S. contribution to the Fund, the single largest U.S. contribution to date. Of those funds, $545.5 million would be funded through the State Department, and $294.8 million through the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The President requested $500 million for FY2009. The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations required that 20% of U.S. contributions to the Fund be withheld until the Secretary of State certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that the Global Fund
releases incremental disbursements only if grantees demonstrate progress against clearly defined performance indicators; provides support and oversight to country-level entities; has a full-time, independent Office of Inspector General who is fully operational; requires LFAs to assess whether a principal recipient has the capacity to oversee the activities of sub-recipients; is making progress toward implementing a reporting system that breaks down grantee budget allocations by programmatic activity; makes the reports of the Inspector General publicly available; and tracks and encourages the involvement of civil society, including faith-based organizations, in country coordinating mechanisms and program implementation. Some Global Fund supporters contend, however, that such action is unnecessary in light of the strides that the Fund continues to make in improving its reporting and monitoring practices. Opponents to the 33% restriction contend that the requirement is harmful to the Fund, because the U.S. fiscal year concludes some three months before the Fund's. In that fiscal year, nearly $88 million of the U.S. contribution was withheld from the Fund to prevent the funds from exceeding 33%. Since its inception, the Fund has struggled to secure support from non-government donors. Some Fund supporters had hoped that the Product Red campaign, launched in January 2006 by co-founder Bono, would lead to significant increases in contributions made by the private sector. Consider Proportion of Support for the Fund to Support for Other Bilateral Programs
The Administration has argued that any amount that Congress provides to the Global Fund in excess of its request skews the appropriate balance of aid that the United States should provide to the Fund and other bilateral HIV/AIDS efforts. Fund supporters counter that appropriations made to the Fund in excess of requested levels better reflect what the United States should provide and complement U.S. bilateral HIV/AID programs, particularly since the Administration and the Fund have strengthened their coordination. | The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, is an independent foundation that seeks to attract and rapidly disburse new resources in developing countries aimed at countering the three diseases. The Fund is a financing vehicle, not an implementing agency. The origins of the Fund as an independent entity to fight the three diseases lie partly in a French proposal made in 1998, in ideas developed in the 106th Congress, and in recommendations made by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in April 2001. Though the Global Fund was established in January 2002, President Bush pledged $200 million to such a fund in May 2001.
As of July 17, 2008, donors have pledged more than $20.2 billion to the Fund, of which more than $10.2 billion has been paid. The fund has approved support for more than 500 grants totaling some $10 billion for projects in 136 countries. Each year, the Fund awards grants through Proposal Rounds. The Fund launched its eighth Round on March 3, 2008. In 2005, the Fund approved Round 5 grants in two tranches, because initially there were insufficient donor pledges to approve all the recommended proposals. The Fund approved the first group of Round 5 proposals in September 2005 and the second in December 2005, after donors pledged to make additional contributions. The Global Fund only approves proposals if it has sufficient resources on hand to support the first two years of a proposed project. This policy is designed to avoid disruptions to projects due to funding shortages. Funding lapses can cause interruptions in treatment regiments, which could lead to treatment-resistant strains of the diseases or death.
The United States is the largest single contributor to the Global Fund. From FY2001 through FY2008, Congress has made available an estimated $3.6 billion to the Fund, including $840.3 million in FY2008, the single largest U.S. contribution to date. Of those funds, $545.5 million would come from the State Department, and $294.8 million from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The President requested $500 million for a FY2009 contribution to the Global Fund.
There has been some debate about the level of U.S. contributions to the Fund. Some critics argue that the United States should temper its support to the Fund, because the Fund has not demonstrated strong reporting and monitoring practices; because contributions made to the Fund in excess of the President's request are provided at the expense of U.S. bilateral HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs; and because they maintain that the Fund needs to secure support from other sources, particularly the private sector. Supporters of current funding levels counter that the Fund has improved its reporting and monitoring practices, greater U.S. contributions to the Fund parallel increases in U.S. bilateral HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs, and the Fund has attempted to raise participation of the private sector through the launching of Product Red™. This report, which will be periodically updated, discusses the Fund's progress to date, describes U.S. contributions to the organization, and presents some issues Congress might consider. |
crs_RL32235 | crs_RL32235_0 | Overview
Four major principles currently underlie U.S. policy on legal permanent immigration: the reunification of families, the admission of immigrants with needed skills, the protection of refugees, and the diversity of admissions by country of origin. These principles are embodied in federal law, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) first codified in 1952. As defined in the INA, immigrants are synonymous with legal permanent residents (LPRs) and refer to foreign nationals who come to live lawfully and permanently in the United States. Immigrant admissions and adjustments to LPR status are subject to a complex set of numerical limits and preference categories that give priority for admission on the basis of family relationships, needed skills, and geographic diversity, as discussed below. FY2010 Admissions
During FY2010, a total of 1,042,625 foreign nationals became LPRs in the United States. Of the total LPRs in FY2010, 66.3% entered on the basis of family ties. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens made up the single largest group of immigrants—476,414 as Figure 5 indicates. Additional major immigrant groups in FY2010 were employment-based preference immigrants (including spouses and children), who comprised 14.2%, and refugees and asylees adjusting to LPR status, who comprised 13.1%. Substantial efforts to reform legal immigration have failed in the recent past, prompting some to characterize the issue as a "zero-sum game" or a "third rail." The challenge inherent in reforming legal immigration is balancing employers' hopes to increase the supply of legally present foreign workers, families' longing to re-unite and live together, and a widely shared wish among the various stakeholders to improve the policies governing legal immigration into the country. Whether the Congress will act to alter immigration policies—either in the form of comprehensive immigration reform or in the form of incremental revisions aimed at strategic changes—is at the crux of the debate. Addressing these contentious policy reforms against the backdrop of economic crisis sharpens the social and business cleavages and may narrow the range of options. Family-Based Preferences
Proponents of family-based migration point to the significant backlogs in family based immigration due to the sheer volume of aliens eligible to immigrate to the United States and maintain that any proposal to reform immigration levels should also include the option of family-based backlog reduction. Citizens and LPRs often wait years for their relatives' petitions to be processed and visa numbers to become available. Some proponents of immigration reform argue that the immediate relatives of LPRs should be treated as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are treated under the INA. Other options would scale back family-based immigration levels, including the option of limiting family-based LPRs to the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. Even as U.S. unemployment levels remain high, employers assert that they continue to need the "best and the brightest" workers, regardless of their country of birth, to remain competitive in a worldwide market and to keep their firms in the United States. While support for the option of increasing employment based immigration may be dampened by the economic recession, proponents argue it is an essential ingredient for economic growth. | Four major principles underlie current U.S. policy on permanent immigration: the reunification of families, the admission of immigrants with needed skills, the protection of refugees, and the diversity of admissions by country of origin. These principles are embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA specifies a complex set of numerical limits and preference categories that give priorities for permanent immigration reflecting these principles. Legal permanent residents (LPRs) refer to foreign nationals who live permanently in the United States.
During FY2010, a total of 1.0 million aliens became LPRs in the United States. Of this total, 66.3% entered on the basis of family ties. Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens made up the single largest group of immigrants—476,414—in FY2010. Other major categories in FY2010 were employment-based LPRs (including spouses and children) and refugees/asylees adjusting to LPR status—14.2% and 13.1%, respectively. About 13.3% all LPRs come from Mexico, which sent 139,120 LPRs in FY2010.
Substantial efforts to reform legal immigration have failed in the recent past, prompting some to characterize the issue as a "zero-sum game" or a "third rail." The challenge inherent in reforming legal immigration is balancing employers' hopes to increase the supply of legally present foreign workers, families' longing to re-unite and live together, and a widely shared wish among the various stakeholders to improve the policies governing legal immigration into the country. Whether the Congress will act to alter immigration policies—either in the form of comprehensive immigration reform or in the form of incremental revisions aimed at strategic changes—is at the crux of the debate. Addressing these contentious policy reforms against the backdrop of high unemployment sharpens the social and business cleavages and may narrow the range of options.
Even as U.S. unemployment levels remain high, employers assert that they continue to need the "best and the brightest" workers, regardless of their country of birth, to remain competitive in a worldwide market and to keep their firms in the United States. While support for the option of increasing employment-based immigration may be dampened by the level of unemployment, proponents argue it is an essential ingredient for economic growth. Other possible options are to admit LPRs on the basis of a point system comprised of education and needed skills or to establish a independent agency or commission that would set the levels and types of employment-based immigrants.
Proponents of family-based migration alternatively point to the significant backlogs in family based immigration due to the sheer volume of aliens eligible to immigrate to the United States and maintain that any proposal to increase immigration levels should also include the option of family-based backlog reduction. Citizens and LPRs often wait years for their relatives' petitions to be processed and visa numbers to become available. Possible options include treating the immediate relatives of LPRs as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are treated under the INA, (i.e., not held to numerical limits or per-country ceilings).
Against these competing priorities for increased immigration are those who offer options to scale back immigration levels, with options ranging from limiting family-based LPRs to the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens to confining employment-based LPRs exceptional, extraordinary, or outstanding individuals. |
crs_RS21655 | crs_RS21655_0 | Political, Security, and Economic Conditions
FMLN Victory
On June 1, 2009, Mauricio Funes of the leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), a party that was formerly an armed revolutionary movement, was inaugurated to a five-year term as president of El Salvador. Funes, a former television journalist and the first FMLN presidential candidate without a guerilla past, defeated Rodrigo Ávila of the conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) 51%-49% in a March 2009 election. Funes' presidential victory was a first for the FMLN, which fought a 12-year civil war against the U.S.-backed Salvadoran government before officially transforming into a political party following the signing of a peace accord in 1992. Funes' election has been described as a watershed moment in the history of El Salvador. Funes Administration
President Funes has generally pursued moderate policies since taking office. This has caused some friction between him and more radical members of the FMLN, including Vice President Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a former guerrilla leader who is the party's 2014 presidential candidate. Although his government has struggled to improve the weak economic conditions and to address the serious security challenges it inherited, President Funes has maintained high approval ratings (75% in March 2013). As noted above, the ARENA party picked up a number of seats and displaced the FMLN as the largest party in the Assembly in March 2012 legislative elections. The legislature also rejected that ruling. Norman Quijano, recently selected to serve as ARENA's 2014 presidential candidate, won reelection for mayor of San Salvador in March by 35 percentage points over his FMLN opponent. The FMLN hopes that the party's selection of Oscar Ortiz, the popular mayor of Santa Tecla, to serve as Vice-President Sánchez Ceren's running mate will boost the party's support among moderate voters. Former President Tony Saca has also entered the race representing a center-right "Unity Movement" coalition composed of GANA, the National Coalition party (CN), and the Party of Hope (formerly the Christian Democratic Party or PDC). The truce is not without its skeptics. With U.S. support through the Partnership for Growth initiative, the Funes Administration is seeking to attract foreign investment (see " Partnership for Growth Initiative "). Relations with the United States
Throughout the last few decades, the United States has maintained a strong interest in political and economic developments in El Salvador. During the 1980s, El Salvador was the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in Latin America as its government struggled against the FMLN insurgency. After the 1992 peace accords were signed, U.S. involvement and assistance shifted toward helping successive ARENA governments rebuild democracy and implement market-friendly economic reforms. In 2011, President Obama highlighted the importance of U.S.-Salvadoran relations by selecting El Salvador as the only Central American country to be included in his March 2011 tour of Latin America. In September 2012, both governments celebrated the completion of El Salvador's first MCC compact; a second compact proposal is currently being developed by the Salvadoran government. Both governments aim to involve the private sector and other donors in the PFG. Advances included:
Reducing Crime and Insecurity
the enactment of an access to public information law and the drafting of an asset forfeiture law; the establishment of an elite anti-gang unit in the PNC, the expansion of U.S. funded model precinct programs, the provision of community policing training to more than 10,000 police, and justice sector training provided to 389 officials (including public defenders); the inauguration of a Family Law Center and Mediation Center for child victims of domestic Violence; the creation of one task force to combat crimes against small businesses and progress towards creating another to combat crime on public transit; and the expansion of temporary employment, training, and job placements programs for at-risk youth; the expansion of full-time schools nationwide; and the opening of low-security prison farms for low-risk inmates. El Salvador is receiving an estimated $28.2 million in U.S. aid in FY2012. As previously mentioned, U.S. bilateral assistance to El Salvador is being realigned to focus on reducing insecurity and boosting productivity in the country. Since FY2008, Congress has appropriated nearly $500 million for Central America through Mérida/CARSI. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
In November 2006, El Salvador signed a five-year, $461 million compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to develop its northern border region, where more than 53% of the population lives in poverty. Anti-Gang Efforts and the Designation of the MS-13 as a Major Transnational Criminal Organization
Since the mid-2000s, several U.S. agencies have been actively engaged on the law enforcement and preventive side of dealing with Central American gangs; many U.S. anti-gang efforts in Central America have begun in El Salvador. | Congress has maintained a strong interest in developments in El Salvador, a small Central American country with a population of 6 million. During the 1980s, El Salvador was the largest recipient of U.S. aid in Latin America as its government struggled against the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgency during a 12-year civil war. A peace accord negotiated in 1992 brought the war to an end and formally assimilated the FMLN into the political process as a political party. After the peace accords were signed, U.S. involvement shifted toward helping successive Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) governments rebuild democracy and implement market-friendly economic reforms.
Funes Administration
Twenty-one years after the signing of the peace accords, El Salvador is governed by an FMLN Administration. In March 2009, Mauricio Funes, a former television journalist and the first FMLN presidential candidate without a guerilla past, defeated Rodrigo Ávila of the conservative ARENA party for a five-year presidential term. President Funes has generally pursued moderate policies that have enabled him to form cross-party coalitions in the National Assembly, but caused periodic friction with more radical members of his party.
Now in his fourth year in office, President Funes still has high approval ratings, but faces a number of serious challenges. His political influence has weakened since ARENA replaced the FMLN as the largest party in the legislature and the attention of both parties has turned to the 2014 presidential contest, which President Funes is constitutionally barred from contesting. Nevertheless, Funes successfully mediated a resolution to a months-long standoff between the Salvadoran judiciary and legislature over the composition and power of the Supreme Court in August 2012. In the economic realm, the Funes Administration is seeking to boost investment and growth, which has been inhibited by low productivity, natural disasters, and insecurity. In an attempt to address insecurity in the country, the Funes government endorsed a historic—and risky—truce involving the country's largest gangs. The truce has contributed to a large reduction in homicides since March 2012.
2014 Elections
Political attention in El Salvador is turning toward the country's March 2014 presidential elections. ARENA has selected Norman Quijano, the popular second-term mayor of San Salvador, as its standard bearer. His running mate is Rene Portillo Cuadro, a lawyer. The FMLN has chosen Salvador Sánchez Cerén, the current vice president and a former guerrilla leader, and Oscar Ortiz, the popular mayor of Santa Tecla. Former President Elías Antonio "Tony" Saca has also entered the race on a "Unity Movement" coalition ticket, but has yet to name a running mate. Saca could potentially force a runoff election.
U.S.-Salvadoran Relations
Congress has maintained an interest in events in El Salvador as well as bilateral relations, particularly in the security realm. During a March 2011 visit to El Salvador, President Barack Obama and President Funes pledged to strengthen cooperation through the new Partnership for Growth (PFG) initiative. The PFG commits both governments to work closely together to boost competitiveness and reduce insecurity in El Salvador. Congress has provided bilateral assistance, which totaled $28.2 million in FY2012, as well as aid provided through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), in support of PFG priorities. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) recently completed a five-year, $461 million program that helped develop El Salvador's northern border region. MCC has determined that El Salvador is eligible to submit a second compact proposal to develop its southern coastal region. It is as yet unclear how the U.S. Treasury Department's recent designation of the MS-13 gang as a major transnational criminal organization whose assets will be targeted may affect bilateral anti-gang efforts.
This report examines current conditions in El Salvador as well as issues in U.S.-Salvadoran relations. For related information, see: CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress and CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America. |
crs_RL33904 | crs_RL33904_0 | 99-514 ) to provide an incentive for the acquisition and development or rehabilitation of affordable rental housing. Proponents of the LIHTC view the credit as highly efficient and effective. As evidence of effectiveness, advocates state that the LIHTC is responsible for producing 50% of all multifamily housing starts annually, and virtually all affordable rental housing in the United States since the credit was introduced. Additionally, the credit is perceived as more costly and less efficient than demand-side subsidies like the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program. As policymakers begin to address affordable housing issues, modifications to the LIHTC will likely be considered. This report discusses some fundamental public-policy questions that have not received much attention. Is the lack of affordable housing a result of a housing-market failure? And is the LIHTC efficient, or can it be improved? Despite the significance of the tax credit in housing finance markets, these questions are not definitively answered in economics literature. To the extent that tax credits are awarded to projects not at the margin (i.e., inframarginal projects that could proceed without tax credit financing), it could be argued that the LIHTC does not add to the housing stock. Aside from the impact of the LIHTC on the stock of housing, the determination of whether the LIHTC addresses the affordable housing problem also requires an assessment of the "affordability" of the tax credit units. A criticism of the LIHTC program has been that the program, by its design, does not serve very-low-income households—those most in need of affordable housing. Projects may include more than one building. Is the Value to Investors too High? Advocates of the LIHTC program, however, argue that the program is cost effective and that deep subsidies for projects are required because of the demands of the affordable housing market, not the LIHTC program. The effectiveness of the LIHTC relies on the ability of state housing authorities to select marginal projects (those projects that, if not for the LIHTC, would not be developed). Therefore, it would be useful to know whether states are indeed selecting marginal products. Examining the applicants who fail to win credit awards may provide important insights. Do these failed applicants subsequently build housing without the tax credit? Congress may not alter the LIHTC program. As a tax expenditure, the program does not require an appropriation or reauthorization. Alternatively, Congress might modify the LIHTC program. More recently, some attention has focused on the issue of examining the rules of the LIHTC program to determine where its compatibility with other housing-finance programs can be increased. Policymakers have also discussed whether the LIHTC program could be modified to target affordable housing production for households with very-low income. Another option is to repeal the LIHTC program. | The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is an economic incentive to produce affordable rental housing. These federal housing tax credits are awarded to developers of qualified projects, who either use or sell the credits to investors to raise capital (or equity) for real estate projects. The tax benefit reduces the debt and/or equity financing that the developer would otherwise have to obtain. With lower financing costs, beneficiaries of tax credits can offer lower, more affordable rents. See CRS Report RS22389, An Introduction to the Design of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, by [author name scrubbed] for a detailed description of how the LIHTC program works and an overview of legislative developments.
Proponents of the credit view the LIHTC as highly effective because of the more than one million rental units already financed by the credit. Proponents also emphasize that the credit is responsible for the production of up to 50% of all multifamily housing starts in any given year. Opponents argue that the LIHTC is not effective or, at a minimum, far less effective than supporters claim because LIHTC units have supplanted other affordable rental housing and because the supply-side credit program is more costly than demand-side subsidies like the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program. Opponents also argue that the LIHTC program does not serve very-low-income households, who are often most in need of affordable housing.
As policy makers begin to address affordable housing issues, modifications to the LIHTC could be considered. This report, which will be updated in the event of significant legislative events, discusses some fundamental public policy questions—questions neither extensively explored nor resolved. Is the lack of affordable housing a result of a housing-market failure? Does the LIHTC address the affordable housing problem? And, is the LIHTC efficient, or could it be improved? These questions are not definitively answered in economics literature.
Determining the size of the affordable housing market may be of value. A national inventory system could be created to record information about the net gains (or losses) of affordable rental units. Also, to the extent the effectiveness of the LIHTC relies on the ability of state housing authorities to select marginal projects (those projects that, if not for the LIHTC, would not be developed), it could be useful to know whether states are selecting these projects. Do applicants who fail to win credit awards subsequently go on to build housing without the tax credit?
Congress may not alter the LIHTC program. As a tax expenditure, the program does not require an appropriation or reauthorization. Alternatively, Congress might modify the LIHTC program. Some attention has focused on examining the rules of the LIHTC program to determine where its compatibility with other housing finance programs can be increased. Policymakers have also discussed whether the LIHTC program could be modified to target affordable housing production for households with very low income. Another option is to repeal the LIHTC program. |
crs_R41221 | crs_R41221_0 | On April 23, 2010, Arizona enacted legislation (commonly referred to as S.B. 1070 argue that federal enforcement of immigration law has not adequately deterred the migration of unauthorized aliens into Arizona, and that state action is both necessary and appropriate to combat the negative effects of unauthorized immigration. Opponents argue, among other things, that S.B. 1070 will be expensive and disruptive, will be susceptible to uneven application, and can undermine community policing by discouraging cooperation with state and local law enforcement. In part to respond to some of these concerns, the Arizona State Legislature modified S.B. 1070 on April 30, 2010, through the approval of H.B. Following the enactment of S.B. 1070 but prior to its scheduled date to go into effect (July 29, 2010), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and a number of private entities filed separate lawsuits challenging the legislation. 1070 pertaining to (1) immigration status determinations during stops, detentions, or arrests by state law enforcement; (2) the imposition of state criminal penalties for certain violations of federal alien registration requirements; (3) the criminalization of the solicitation or performance of work by unlawfully present aliens; and (4) the authorization of state law enforcement to make warrantless arrests for public offenses which constitute grounds for deportation under federal immigration law. Arizona appealed the district court's decision, and on April 11, 2011, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a decision affirming the district court's decision to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of those provisions of S.B. Arizona petitioned the Supreme Court to hear an appeal of the panel's decision and, on December 12, 2011, the Court granted certiorari. The Court's decision could determine the permissibility not only of the challenged provisions of S.B. 1070 but also of subsequent measures enacted by Alabama, South Carolina, and Utah, which the federal government has also challenged on the grounds that they are preempted. 1070, As Modified
Section 1 of S.B. 1070, which can arguably be characterized as falling into two categories: (1) those provisions that seek to bolster direct enforcement of federal immigration law, including through the identification and apprehension of aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States, by state and local law enforcement; and (2) those provisions that criminalize conduct which may facilitate the presence of unauthorized aliens within Arizona. Additionally, S.B. Section 5 also makes it an Arizona crime for an unlawfully present alien to apply for or solicit work in the state, or work as an employee or an independent contractor in the state. As discussed previously, Section 2 requires state and local law enforcement officials to facilitate the detection of unauthorized aliens in their daily enforcement activities, presumably so that these aliens may be transferred to federal custody for removal. In addition, S.B. An issue which may arise in litigation concerning state efforts to enforce federal immigration law is whether the "cooperation" contemplated under INA Section 287(g)(10) requires states and localities to consult and coordinate their immigration enforcement efforts with federal authorities, or whether "cooperation" may also be interpreted to permit states and localities to independently enact measures that are consistent with, and arguably further, federal policies related to the detection and removal of unauthorized aliens. 1070 that raised preemption issues. The implications of this provision may depend on how broadly it is interpreted and applied. 1070 criminalizing immigration-related conduct have been subject to legal challenge. The requirement in S.B. It is possible that Arizona's criminalization of alien smuggling might nonetheless be subject to preemption challenges on other grounds which have not been directly opined upon by federal courts which have reviewed either S.B. 1070, as amended by H.B. | On April 23, 2010, Arizona enacted S.B. 1070, which is designed to discourage and deter the entry or presence of aliens who lack lawful status under federal immigration law. Potentially sweeping in effect, the measure requires state and local law enforcement officials to facilitate the detection of unauthorized aliens in their daily enforcement activities. The measure also establishes criminal penalties under state law, in addition to those already imposed under federal law, for alien smuggling offenses and failure to carry or complete alien registration documents. Further, it makes it a crime under Arizona law for an unauthorized alien to apply for or perform work in the state, either as an employee or an independent contractor.
The enactment of S.B. 1070 has sparked significant legal and policy debate. Supporters argue that federal enforcement of immigration law has not adequately deterred the migration of unauthorized aliens into Arizona, and that state action is both necessary and appropriate to combat the negative effects of unauthorized immigration. Opponents argue, among other things, that S.B. 1070 will be expensive and disruptive, will be susceptible to uneven application, and can undermine community policing by discouraging cooperation with state and local law enforcement. In part to respond to these concerns, the Arizona State Legislature modified S.B. 1070 on April 30, 2010, through the approval of H.B. 2162.
Whenever states enact laws or adopt policies to affect the entry or stay of noncitizens, including aliens present in the United States without legal authorization, questions can arise whether Congress has preempted their implementation. For instance, Congress may pass a law to preempt state law expressly. Further, especially in areas of strong federal interest, as evidenced by broad congressional regulation and direct federal enforcement, state law may be found to be preempted implicitly. Analyzing implicit preemption issues can often be difficult in the abstract. Prior to actual implementation, it might be hard to assess whether state law impermissibly frustrates federal regulation. Nevertheless, authority under S.B. 1070, as originally adopted, for law enforcement personnel to investigate the immigration status of any individual with whom they have "lawful contact," upon reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence, could plausibly have been interpreted to call for an unprecedented level of state immigration enforcement as part of routine policing. H.B. 2162, however, has limited this investigative authority.
Provisions in S.B. 1070 criminalizing certain immigration-related conduct also may be subject to preemption challenges. The legal vulnerability of these provisions may depend on their relationship to traditional state police powers and potential frustration of uniform national immigration policies, among other factors. In addition to preemption issues, S.B. 1070 arguably might raise other constitutional considerations, including issues associated with racial profiling. Assessing these potential legal issues may be difficult before there is evidence of how S.B. 1070, as modified, is implemented and applied in practice.
S.B. 1070, as amended, was scheduled to go into effect on July 29, 2010. However, the U.S. Department of Justice sued to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of certain sections of S.B. 1070. On July 28, 2010, a federal district court enjoined enforcement of those provisions pertaining to immigration status verifications, among other things. Arizona appealed, and on April 11, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion affirming the district court. Arizona then appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on December 12, 2011. The Court's decision could determine the permissibility not only of the challenged provisions of S.B. 1070 but also of subsequent measures enacted by Alabama, South Carolina, and Utah. |
crs_RL31919 | crs_RL31919_0 | Introduction 1
According to the Federal Trade Commission, identity theft is the most common complaint from consumers in all 50 states, and accounts for over 35% of the total number of complaints the Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse received for calendar years 2004, 2005, and 2006. As a result of identity theft, victims may incur damaged credit records, unauthorized charges on credit cards, and unauthorized withdrawals from bank accounts. Sometimes, victims must change their telephone numbers or even their social security numbers. Victims may also need to change addresses that were falsified by the impostor. This report provides an overview of the federal laws that could assist victims of identity theft with purging inaccurate information from their credit records and removing unauthorized charges from credit accounts, as well as federal laws that impose criminal penalties on those who assume another person's identity through the use of fraudulent identification documents. This report will be updated as warranted. | According to the Federal Trade Commission, identity theft is the most common complaint from consumers in all fifty states, and complaints regarding identity theft have grown for seven consecutive years. Victims of identity theft may incur damaged credit records, unauthorized charges on credit cards, and unauthorized withdrawals from bank accounts. Sometimes, victims must change their telephone numbers or even their social security numbers. Victims may also need to change addresses that were falsified by the impostor.
This report provides an overview of the federal laws that could assist victims of identity theft with purging inaccurate information from their credit records and removing unauthorized charges from credit accounts, as well as federal laws that impose criminal penalties on those who assume another person's identity through the use of fraudulent identification documents. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40855 | crs_R40855_0 | Introduction
The widely reported increase in federal contract dollars awarded to Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) and their subsidiaries in recent years has generated congressional and public interest in the legal authorities governing contracting with these entities. 598 , S. 236 ) that would generally subject ANC-owned firms participating in the 8(a) Program to the same treatment as individually owned firms. Among other things, this legislation would preclude ANC-owned firms from receiving sole-source awards valued in excess of $4 million ($6.5 million for manufacturing contracts) under the authority of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act. These include (1) the general contracting authorities, (2) the general small business authorities, (3) Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, (4) authorities pertaining to Native Americans, and (5) various appropriations riders. General Contracting Authorities
The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, give defense and civilian agencies, respectively, broad authority to contract for goods and services. This includes ANCs and their subsidiaries. Contracting officers must generally justify such sole-source awards in writing and obtain approval of these justifications from their superiors. Section 15 of the Small Business Act of 1958, in conjunction with Sections 2711 and 2723 of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, provides agencies with special authorities for contracting with small businesses. Under these authorities, agencies may "set aside" contracts for small businesses—by conducting competitions in which only they can compete—when certain conditions are met. Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act
Agencies can also contract with ANC-owned firms, although not necessarily ANCs themselves, under the authority of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act of 1958, as amended. However, agencies also have special authority to make sole-source awards to ANC- or other group-owned firms under Section 8(a) in circumstances when they could not make awards to individually owned 8(a) firms (e.g., when the contract exceeds the "competitive threshold," and there is a reasonable expectation that at least two eligible and responsible 8(a) firms will submit offers at a fair market price). However, justifications, approvals, and notices are still not required for sole-source contracts valued at between $4 million ($6.5 million for manufacturing contracts) and $20 million awarded under the authority of Section 8(a). These provisions create incentives for agencies to contract with ANCs or their subsidiaries by, for example, allowing contracts with "large" ANCs to count toward federal prime contractors' goals for subcontracting with small businesses. All 8(a) firms were deemed to be SDBs, but other firms at least 51% unconditionally owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals or groups could also obtain certification. Appropriations Riders Allowing Direct Conversion of DOD Functions
The Department of Defense (DOD) can contract out functions performed by government employees to ANCs or ANC-owned firms without going through the competitive sourcing process normally required under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. Legislative Activity in the 112th Congress
Members of the 112 th Congress have introduced legislation ( H.R. The proposed legislation would also amend Section 8(a) to (1) prevent ANC-owned firms from receiving additional sole-source awards when the total amount of competitive and sole-source awards they have received in any year exceeds the total amount of competitive and sole-source awards that individually owned firms may receive (currently, $100 million); (2) prohibit the SBA from exempting ANC-owned firms from any time limitations on participation in the 8(a) Program to which individually owned 8(a) firms are subject; and (3) require ANCs to report annually to the SBA on their total revenue, the amount of this revenue attributable to the 8(a) Program, and the "total amount of benefits paid to shareholders." Under the new rules, ANC-owned 8(a) firms (1) may not receive a sole-source 8(a) contract that is a follow-on contract to an 8(a) contract that was performed immediately previously by a firm owned by the same ANC; (2) must report annually to the SBA on the benefits provided to Alaska Natives from the ANC's participation in the 8(a) Program; and (3) may be found to have potential for success if the ANC pledges to use its resources to support the firm and to not allow the firm to cease operations. | The widely reported increase in federal contract dollars awarded to Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) and their subsidiaries in recent years has generated congressional and public interest in the legal authorities that govern contracting with these entities. Currently, federal agencies may contract with ANCs or their subsidiaries under several different statutory authorities. These include (1) the Armed Services Procurement Act (ASPA) and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA); (2) Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act; and (3) Section 15 of the Small Business Act. The identity of the procuring agency and the size of the ANC or ANC-owned firm, in part, determine which authority is used in particular circumstances.
ASPA and FPASA, for example, generally give defense and civilian agencies, respectively, broad authority to contract with any qualified, responsible source, including ANCs and their subsidiaries. Contractors do not need to be "small" in size, or for-profit entities, as they generally must be to receive contracts under the Small Business Act. ASPA and FPASA also authorize agencies to make sole-source awards in certain circumstances (e.g., unusual and compelling urgency), although such awards must be justified in writing and approved by agency officials.
Two sections of the Small Business Act also permit contracts with certain ANCs or their subsidiaries. Section 8(a) of the act authorizes agencies to contract with small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals or groups participating in the "8(a) Program." ANCs are deemed to be socially and economically disadvantaged, and ANC-owned firms may participate in the 8(a) Program. Under Section 8(a), agencies may conduct competitions in which only 8(a) firms may compete (i.e., set-asides), as well as make sole-source awards in circumstances where such awards would not be permitted under ASPA or FPASA. 8(a) contracts valued in excess of $4 million ($6.5 million for manufacturing contracts) must generally be competed among 8(a) firms. However, Section 8(a) authorizes sole-source awards of such contracts to 8(a) firms if (1) the contracting officer does not reasonably expect that at least two 8(a) firms will submit offers at a fair market price; or (2) the Small Business Administration accepts the requirement on behalf of an 8(a) firm owned by an ANC or other disadvantaged group. Sole-source contracts under the authority of Section 8(a) historically did not need to be justified or approved. However, since 2009, agencies have been required to justify and obtain approval for sole-source 8(a) contracts valued in excess of $20 million (base plus options). Section 15 of the Small Business Act also authorizes set-asides (but not sole-source awards) for various types of small businesses. ANC-owned small businesses not participating in the 8(a) Program could receive awards under the authority of Section 15.
In addition, several other statutes create incentives for agencies to contract with ANCs or their subsidiaries by, for example, allowing contracts with "large" ANCs to count toward federal prime contractors' goals for subcontracting with small businesses. Similarly, various appropriations riders permit the Department of Defense to contract out functions performed by government employees to ANCs without going through the customary competitive sourcing process.
Members of the 112th Congress have introduced legislation (H.R. 598, S. 236) that would generally subject ANC-owned firms participating in the 8(a) Program to the same treatment as individually owned firms. Among other things, this legislation would limit the circumstances in which ANC-owned firms could receive sole-source awards valued in excess of $4 million ($6.5 million for manufacturing contracts) under the authority of Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act. |
crs_R43005 | crs_R43005_0 | This Clause contains the Constitution's principal safeguard of private property rights against the actions of government, mandating "just compensation" when property is "taken" by the government. In June 2010, the Court decided one taking case, followed by two non-taking but property-rights-related decisions in the Court's 2011-2012 term, followed by no less than three takings decisions in the just-concluded 2012-2013 term. The taking case decided in 2010 is Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection . There, a four-Justice plurality concluded that courts, just as other branches of government, could be subject to taking liability, as when they change the law in a manner that divests existing property rights. The other decision is Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency , holding that when property owners receive an administrative order from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Water Act, they may challenge at least the jurisdictional basis of that order, and likely any other legal inadequacies therein, right away—before EPA seeks to enforce the order in court, requesting the court to impose potentially large penalties. The three property-rights-related decisions during the Court's 2012-2013 term, all takings cases, began with Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States . There, the Court jettisoned its long-standing rule that when a government project induces flooding of private property, only flooding that is continual or at least "intermittent but inevitably recurring" can result in takings liability. Temporary flooding, the Court now says, may also in appropriate cases subject the government to takings liability. Next, the Court decided Horne v. Department of Agriculture , ruling that a takings defense may be raised in federal district court—rather than the usual Court of Federal Claims—to federal administrative penalties imposed under a Depression-era commodity-price-support statute. Last, the Court decided Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District , holding that its previously announced test for when exaction conditions on land development approvals constitute takings applies even when a permit is denied because the landowner refused to accede to the conditions, and to monetary exactions as well as land-dedication conditions. For property-owner-petitioners in five of the six cases, this meant that the Supreme Court had to remand the case to the lower courts to determine, based on the Court's ruling, the merits of the property owner's particular claims. This report discusses each of these decisions in turn, noting their importance for federal programs. Decided During the Supreme Court's 2009-2010 Term
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection: "Judicial Takings"
Facts : Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. consists of a handful of beachfront property owners on the Gulf Coast of Florida. Therefore, it held that pre-enforcement review of CWA ACOs is available in district courts under the Administrative Procedure Act. Finally, the United States still retains several defenses in flooding-taking cases—first, that the property injury is noncompensable "consequential damages" (the United States argued before the Supreme Court in this case that all downstream damage from dam operation is merely consequential, but the Court's decision expressly did not reach the issue); second, that the flooding was no worse than if the dam had not been built; and third, that the flooding was not caused by the dam. First, the court held, there can be no Nollan/Dolan taking when, as in this case, the property owner refused to accept the offered conditions and as a result the permit was denied. Nonetheless, an informed guess can be made as to the Court's motives. In all six of the cases discussed here, the decisions below were against the private property owner. This suggests that the Justices (or at least some Justices) are looking for circumstances where property rights are unfairly burdened. And indeed, in five of its six decisions, the Court reversed, ruling (in four cases unanimously) for the aggrieved property owner. | In 2010, the Supreme Court ended a five-year period when it accepted no property rights cases, granting certiorari in no less than six such cases between 2010 and 2012. This large number of cases suggests a renewed interest by the Court in property rights, and particularly in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause at issue in four of the cases. The Takings Clause is the Constitution's principal protection of property rights, promising just compensation when property rights are "taken" by government for a "public use."
The first case, decided in 2010, was Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Environmental Protection. There, a four-Justice plurality endorsed the idea that courts, just as other branches of government, could be subject to takings liability. This question of "judicial takings" often arises when courts articulate new principles of common law that extinguish existing property rights.
The next two cases were decided during the Court's 2011-2012 term. In PPL Montana LLC v. Montana, the Court fleshed out its test for "title navigability"—important because title to only streambeds under "navigable" waters passes to a state upon its admission to the Union. In Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency, enforcement of the wetlands permitting program in the Clean Water Act was at issue. The holding was that when property owners receive an order from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the act, they have a right to "pre-enforcement review"—that is, a right to judicially challenge the order right away, before EPA seeks to enforce it and impose potentially large penalties. The number of other federal programs that, due to this decision, must now afford pre-enforcement review of agency orders is unclear.
Finally, the Court decided three takings cases during its 2012-2013 term. In Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, the Court jettisoned its long-standing rule that when a government project induces flooding of private property, only flooding that is continual or at least "intermittent but inevitably recurring" can result in takings liability. Temporary flooding, the Court now says, may also subject the government to such liability. In Horne v. Dep't of Agriculture, the Court held that penalties imposed under a Depression-era statute for the support of agricultural commodity prices may be challenged on the ground that they punish a person's refusal to accede to an unconstitutional taking. Broad issues radiate from this narrow ruling—such as the availability of takings defenses in enforcement actions generally when the compensation remedy has been withdrawn. In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, the Court addressed its previously announced test for when exaction conditions on land-development permits constitute takings. The Court clarified that this test—viewed as more favorable to property owners than the alternative—applies even when the landowner refuses the exaction conditions imposed and, as a result, the permit is denied. It also covers not only land-dedication exactions, the context in which the test was originally articulated, but purely monetary exactions as well.
Typically, one can only speculate why the Supreme Court takes a case; the Court's reasons generally are not easily discerned. Still, an informed guess can be made that the six cases discussed in this report point to a reawakened interest by the Court in property rights. In all six cases, the decision below had been against the property owner, suggesting that the Justices (or some of them) are looking anew for circumstances where property rights are unfairly burdened. And indeed, in five of the six decisions rendered by the Court, the private property owners were vindicated. Decisions yet to be rendered on remand, however, may not necessarily go their way. |
crs_R44294 | crs_R44294_0 | Introduction
Ecuador is a small nation situated along the Pacific coast of South America (see Figure 1 ). Located between Colombia and Peru, two major cocaine-producing countries in the Andean region, Ecuador is strategically important to the United States. Belt-tightening measures taken by the government in response to a significant decline in oil revenues had exacerbated political tensions, and President Correa struggled with low approval ratings in 2016, when Venezuela and Bolivian leftist populist leaders in South America and President Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua also faced greater internal and external criticism. Former Vice President Lenín Moreno won a narrow victory in April 2017 presidential elections on the Alianza País (AP) party ticket. Correa—who returned from Europe, where he was living for a period with his Belgian wife, to fight the referendum advocated by President Moreno—managed to convince about a third of AP members of congress to join him in forming a new party. The Correa government effectively used petroleum exports to invest in infrastructure and economic development. President Correa's Citizens' Revolution, as he called his ideology, incorporated themes of economic justice and Andean pride with a critique of the traditional partisanship of Ecuadorian politics. In mid-November 2015, President Correa made a surprising announcement that he and others who had already served two terms would not be eligible to benefit from the constitutional change to allow for indefinite reelection and compete in the 2017 elections. 2017 Elections and the Moreno Government
The 2017 elections were the first in a decade in which Rafael Correa did not run for president, but his two former vice presidents both ran. Lenín Moreno served as vice president under Correa from 2007 to 2013, and Jorge Glas was Correa's most recent vice president until he left office to become Moreno's vice-presidential running mate. Jorge Glas ran on the same ticket as Moreno's vice president, but Glas turned out to be an unpopular running mate. On April 2, 2017, Moreno narrowly won in the runoff for the presidency with a margin of slightly more than 2% of the vote, according to Ecuador's National Election. Those divisions sharpened after Vice President Glas was impeached in January 2018 following his conviction for taking a $13.5 million bribe from the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht and his sentence to six years in prison in late 2017. In 2000, Ecuador adopted the U.S. dollar as its national currency following a major recession in 1999. However, in the middle of 2014 after the price of oil declined significantly, Ecuador's oil earnings fell. However, as of July 2016, only one-fifth of this amount had been received from donor countries, including the United States. According to press reports, some private sector analysts question whether Ecuador will be able to meet its debt obligations given two strains on the country's public finances: the slump in oil income due to the commodity's low price and the strong U.S. dollar, which, as a result of Ecuador's dollarized economy, makes the country's exports less globally competitive. U.S. Relations
Through the two terms of former president Correa, Ecuador's relations with the U.S. government were frequently tense. In 2014, the Correa government imposed restrictions on the work of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which resulted in the agency closing its offices in Ecuador after 60 years of operating in the country. In December 2017, however, the GSP was not renewed. Outlook
Ecuador is a more divided and polarized nation than in the years when Correa won elections by a landslide. How the historically close ties between Ecuador and the United States may fare under President Moreno's leadership remains to be seen, following his successful consolidation of power and declaration of independence from his one-time mentor and predecessor with a victory in the February 2018 public referendum. | Ecuador is a small, oil-producing country of 16 million inhabitants located on the west coast of South America between Colombia and Peru. In 2017, Ecuador was considered to have the third-largest proven reserves of crude oil in South America, with 8.3 billion barrels. It is the smallest member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Petroleum is Ecuador's largest export to the United States, the country's top trade partner. With the reduction in crude oil price since 2014, Ecuador's earnings have fallen after years of strong growth.
Former President Rafael Correa (2007-2017), a leftist populist leader, was elected and reelected over a decade, bringing stability to Ecuador. In 2015, his popularity began to decline; he dropped in the polls to a 35% approval level by the middle of 2016. A recession brought on by low oil prices had diminished government revenues, and President Correa had adopted many unpopular budget-tightening measures. Protests from diverse groups—indigenous people, trade unionists, environmentalists, and critics from the right and center-right—became more frequent. Correa's critics accused him of constraining freedom of assembly and association, stifling freedom of the press and expression, and restricting independence of the judiciary.
On April 2, 2017, presidential candidate Lenín Voltaire Moreno of the Alianza País (AP) party narrowly won a runoff election in Ecuador, with a margin of slightly more than 2% of the vote. The 2017 election was the first in a decade in which Rafael Correa did not run for president. His two former vice presidents both ran on the same ticket: Moreno, who served six years as Correa's vice president, was at the top of the ticket, and Jorge Glas, Correa's most recent vice president, left the Correa Administration in 2016 to become Moreno's vice presidential running mate. Once in office, Vice President Glas remained close to Correa, whereas President Morena moved quickly to adopt a more moderate and conciliatory position and shifted away from Correa's abrasive style. In October 2017, President Moreno suspended Glas from the vice presidency due to accusations of "illicit association" with the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht. In December 2017, Glas was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison for taking more than $13 million in bribes from Odebrecht executives. Out of office for 90 days, Glas was impeached in January 2018 and replaced by acting Vice President Maria Alejandro Vicuña, who is close to Moreno.
Correa's party, the AP, had retained a majority in the February 2017 legislative elections but split as Moreno was accused of being a traitor and of undermining Correa's reform approach, which he called the "Citizens' Revolution." Many observers thought that Correa planned to return in 2021 to be easily reelected. Correa had pushed through legislation in the National Assembly allowing for indefinite reelection, and many assumed he would avail himself of this option after his former vice presidents served a term as caretakers. However, President Moreno set a public referendum for February 4, 2018, to limit the presidency to two terms, among other measures. The referendum was approved by a large margin, thus consolidating Moreno's control and making Correa's return to power unlikely.
Under Correa, relations between Ecuador and the United States were strained, but the two countries maintained close economic ties. Following a period of currency turmoil, Ecuador adopted the U.S. dollar as its currency in 2000. Ecuador receives significant remittances from Ecuadorans living in the United States and abroad. Ecuador also has become a popular destination for U.S. tourists and retirees.
This report examines the political and economic conditions in Ecuador and U.S.-Ecuadorian relations. |
crs_96-548 | crs_96-548_0 | Thus, the legislative procedures on the Senate floor reflect a balance—and sometimes an uneasy balance—between the operation of its rules and the principles they embody, on the one hand, and pragmatic arrangements to expedite the conduct of business, on the other. In addition, by custom, only the majority leader (or another Senator acting at his behest) typically makes motions or requests affecting when the Senate will meet and what legislation it will consider. In fact, there are few Senate rules that limit the right to debate, and no rules that permit a simple majority of the Senate to end a debate whenever it is ready to vote for a bill, amendment, or most other questions being considered. Filibusters and Cloture
The dearth of debate limitations in Senate rules creates the possibility of filibusters. Even the additional 30 hours allowed on a bill under cloture is quite a long time for the Senate to devote to any one bill, especially since Senators may not be willing to invoke cloture until the bill already has been debated at considerable length. Furthermore, all Senators have legislation they want to promote. When a Senate standing committee reports a bill back to the Senate for floor debate and passage, the bill is placed on the Senate's Calendar of Business (under the heading of "General Orders"). To avoid this possibility, the majority leader attempts to get all Senators to agree by unanimous consent to take up the bill he wishes to have debated. Unanimous Consent Agreements
The Nature of Unanimous Consent Agreements
Just as the right of extended debate encourages Senate committee and party leaders to bring up bills for consideration by unanimous consent, the right to debate combined with the right to offer non-germane amendments encourages the same leaders to seek unanimous consent agreements limiting or foreclosing the exercise of these rights while a bill is being considered. Ordered further , That upon the use of yielding back of time, the Senate vote in relation to the amendments in the order listed; provided, that no second degree amendments be in order to any of the amendments prior to the votes; provided, that no motions to commit be in order; provided further, that upon disposition of the Toomey amendment, the bill, as amended, if amended, be read a third time and the Senate vote on passage of the bill, as amended, if amended; further, that the vote on each amendment and the vote on passage of the bill be subject to a 60 affirmative vote threshold; provided further, that the Secretary be authorized to make technical changes to amendments if necessary to allow for proper page and line number alignment. Senators also may agree to time limits on individual amendments before offering them. | The standing rules of the Senate promote deliberation by permitting Senators to debate at length and by precluding a simple majority from ending debate when they are prepared to vote to approve a bill. This right of extended debate permits filibusters that can be brought to an end if the Senate invokes cloture, usually by a vote of three-fifths of all Senators. Even then, consideration can typically continue under cloture for an additional 30 hours. The possibility of filibusters encourages the Senate to seek consensus whenever possible and to conduct business under the terms of unanimous consent agreements that limit the time available for debate and amending.
Except when the Senate has invoked cloture or is considering appropriations, budget, and certain other measures, Senators also may propose floor amendments that are not germane to the subject or purpose of the bill being debated. This permits individual Senators to raise issues and potentially have the Senate vote on them, even if they have not been studied and evaluated by the relevant standing committees.
These characteristics of Senate rules make the Senate's daily floor schedule potentially unpredictable unless all Senators agree by unanimous consent to accept limits on their right to debate and offer non-germane amendments to a bill. Also to promote predictability and order, Senators traditionally have agreed to give certain procedural privileges to the majority leader. The majority leader enjoys priority in being recognized to speak, and only the majority leader (or a Senator acting at his behest) is able to successfully propose what bills and resolutions the Senate should consider.
Thus, the legislative process on the Senate floor reflects a balance between the rights guaranteed to Senators under the standing rules and the willingness of Senators to forego exercising some of these rights in order to expedite the conduct of business. |
crs_RL31116 | crs_RL31116_0 | Introduction
Drinking water and wastewater treatment systems treat and safeguard the nation's water resources. More recently, water infrastructure issues have been receiving increased attention by policymakers and legislators. The renewed attention is due to a combination of several factors. For both wastewater and drinking water systems, a key concern is that EPA's funding programs, the largest sources of federal assistance, do not, in the main, support repair and replacement; their focus is upgrades and new construction needed to achieve wastewater and drinking water standards. This report identifies a number of issues receiving attention in connection with water infrastructure. It begins with a brief review of federal involvement, describes the debate about funding needs, and then examines key issues, including what is the nature of the problems to be solved; who will pay, and what is the federal role; and questions about mechanisms for delivering federal support, including state-by-state allotment. Recent congressional and Administration activity on these issues also is briefly reviewed. Background: History of Federal Involvement
The federal government has a lengthy history of involvement with wastewater and drinking water systems. EPA has the most significant role, both in terms of regulation and funding. Context for the Water Infrastructure Debate: Investment Needs
Some of the factors that have led to increased attention to water infrastructure reflect long-standing concerns (for example, how cities will meet federal regulatory requirements), while others are more recent (such as analyses of broader funding needs, including maintenance and repair of older systems). Consequently, stakeholders continue to press Congress to reauthorize and increase appropriations for the DWSRF program. CBO Reports
A 2002 report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) also contributes to the discussion about water infrastructure investment needs. For example, CBO's reports and EPA's Gap Analysis caution that projections of future costs associated with water infrastructure are highly uncertain and could lie outside of the ranges that they present. However, these funds are used primarily to comply with Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean Water Act requirements, and it is uncertain how readily these funds might become available for security measures. Legislation intended to provide such an exemption has been introduced in each Congress since the 109 th . Such technologies have the potential to significantly reduce treatment costs and needed infrastructure investments. Congressional and Administration Activity
Momentum in Congress to consider the issues discussed in this report has grown since the 107 th Congress, partly in response to urgings of stakeholder groups, but no legislation other than appropriations has been enacted. During this period, the Administration has promoted a number of steps to ensure that investment needs are met in an efficient, timely, and equitable manner. Building on these concepts and on a request in the President's FY2010 budget, in October 2010 EPA issued a "Clean Water and Drinking Water Infrastructure Sustainability Policy" addressing management and pricing of infrastructure funded through SRFs to encourage conservation and provide adequate long-term funding for future capital needs. The Obama Administration shifted the debate from its predecessor in regard to federal budgetary resources for water infrastructure investments. | Policymakers are giving increased attention to issues associated with financing and investing in the nation's drinking water and wastewater treatment systems, which take in water, treat it, and distribute it to households and other customers, and later collect, treat, and discharge water after use. The renewed attention is due to a combination of factors. These include financial impacts on communities of meeting existing and anticipated regulatory requirements, the need to repair and replace existing infrastructure, concerns about paying for security-related projects, and proposals to stimulate U.S. economic activity by building and rebuilding the nation's infrastructure.
The federal government has a long history of involvement with wastewater and drinking water systems, with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) having the most significant role, both in terms of regulation and funding. The U.S. Department of Agriculture also plays an important role in rural communities through its water and wastewater loan and grant programs. These programs have been popular; however, states, local communities, and others have asserted that program gaps and limitations may diminish their potential effectiveness. They also point to the emergence of new infrastructure needs and issues, while federal resources for these programs have declined.
Reports on infrastructure funding needs and related policy issues have been issued by interest groups, EPA, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). They present a range of estimates and scenarios of future investment costs and gaps between current spending and future costs. EPA and CBO, in particular, caution that projections of future costs are highly uncertain, and that funding gaps are not inevitable. Increased investment, sought by many stakeholders, is one way to shrink the spending gaps, but so, too, are other strategies such as asset management, more efficient pricing, and better technology.
Congressional interest in these issues has grown for some time. In each Congress since the 107th, House and Senate committees acted on legislation to reauthorize and modify infrastructure financing programs in the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act, but no bills other than appropriations were enacted. EPA's recent initiatives support strategies intended to ensure that infrastructure investment needs are met in an efficient, timely, and equitable manner. The Obama Administration has focused attention on providing increased federal budgetary resources for water infrastructure investments and on encouraging sustainable water infrastructure policies.
This report identifies issues that continue to receive attention in connection with water infrastructure investment. It begins with a review of federal involvement; describes the debate about needs; and then examines key issues, including what is the nature of the problems to be solved, who will pay, what is the federal role, and questions about mechanisms for delivering federal support. Congressional and Administration activity on these issues since the 107th Congress also is briefly reviewed. |
crs_RL34036 | crs_RL34036_0 | Overview
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. Subtitle E of the commodity programs title (Title I) of the enacted 2008 farm bill contains the authority for two major ongoing dairy policy tools used by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to support the prices and incomes received by dairy farmers—the dairy price support program (DPSP) and the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program. The DPSP provides indirect price support to dairy farmers through government purchases of surplus dairy products at statutory prices. A third federal dairy policy tool, federal milk marketing orders, requires dairy processors to pay a minimum price for farm milk depending on its end use. Federal orders are permanently authorized and hence do not require periodic reauthorization. Instead, changes are generally made administratively by USDA and approved by farmer referendum. However, issues such as the proposed authority for processors to be exempt from federal order minimum prices processors when they forward contract with dairy farmers were brought to the attention of Congress in the farm bill debate. Separately, the 2008 farm bill reauthorizes the Dairy Export Incentive Program. This provision was included to allow USDA to implement a 2002 farm bill-mandated extension of this assessment to imported dairy products. This provision was supported by most milk producer groups, but opposed by dairy importers and processors. See the Appendix at the end of this report for a side-by-side comparison of the enacted 2008 farm bill with previous law and the House and Senate farm bill dairy provisions. 2008 Farm Bill Provisions and Issues
Under the now-expired 2002 farm bill authority for the MILC program, participating dairy farmers nationwide were eligible for a federal payment whenever the minimum monthly market price for farm milk used for fluid consumption (Class I) in Boston fell below $16.94 per hundredweight (cwt.). The payment percentage rate will revert to the 34% level for the final month of the program (September 2012). Since the inception of the MILC program, large dairy farm operators expressed concern that the 2.4 million lb. The final 2008 farm bill includes a provision that adjusts upward the $16.94 target price in any month when feed prices are above a certain threshold. The International Dairy Foods Association (IDFA), the largest trade association of dairy processors, opposed extension of the MILC program, contending that it works at cross purposes with the dairy price support program and contributes to the overproduction of milk and to high government costs. target price. Falling milk prices in recent months, however, have raised the likelihood of MILC payments in 2009. 110-246 ) extends the dairy support program for five years (through December 31, 2012), but modifies the program so that it directly supports the prices of manufactured dairy products at mandated levels. Under previous law, the support price for farm milk was statutorily set at $9.90 per cwt., and USDA was given the administrative authority to establish a combination of dairy product purchase prices that indirectly supported the farm price of milk at $9.90. The enacted 2008 farm bill also reduces the assessment on imports from 15 cents to 7.5 cents. The import assessment is supported by most dairy producer groups. | Two ongoing federal programs that support the price and income received by dairy farmers—the dairy price support program and the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program—were reauthorized with modifications in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246, the 2008 farm bill).
The MILC program allows participating dairy farmers to receive a government payment when the farm price of milk used for fluid consumption falls below an established target price. The enacted 2008 farm bill extends the MILC program through FY2012 at the existing level of support, but increases the payment percentage rate and the amount of eligible production. The target price also can be increased in any month that feed costs are above a certain threshold. The MILC program is supported by milk producer groups in the Northeast and the Upper Midwest. Large farmers, particularly in the West, contend that the program payment limit is biased against them. Market prices for farm milk have recently declined to levels near the target price, increasing the likelihood of MILC payments in 2009.
Separately, under previous farm law, the dairy price support program indirectly supported the farm price of milk at $9.90 per hundredweight (cwt.) through government purchases of surplus dairy products from dairy processors. The 2008 farm bill extends the dairy support program through December 31, 2012, but modifies the program so that it directly supports the prices of dairy products at mandated levels. This program shift was designed to help reduce the program's exposure under World Trade Organization limitations. Most dairy farm groups and the Administration view the program as a necessary safety net in a market that is frequently characterized by volatile prices. Dairy processors consider the price support and MILC programs to operate at cross-purposes, which they say contributes to surplus milk production. A recent milk product price decline has resulted in government purchases of nonfat dry milk.
A third federal dairy pricing policy tool, federal milk marketing orders, requires dairy processors in many regions to pay a minimum price for farm milk depending on its end use. Federal orders are permanently authorized and most changes are made administratively by USDA through the rulemaking process. However, a number of federal order issues were brought to the attention of Congress for the farm bill debate. Included in the final bill is a provision that exempts dairy processors from paying the federal minimum price whenever they forward contract prices with dairy farmers for milk used in manufactured products.
Separately, the enacted 2008 farm bill reauthorizes the Dairy Export Incentive Program, which subsidizes dairy product exports. The program was created in the 1985 farm bill and was particularly active during the 1990s.
The enacted 2008 farm bill also contains a provision that allows USDA to implement a 2002 farm bill-mandated assessment on imported dairy products, but reduces the import assessment to 7.5 cents per cwt. The import assessment is supported by most milk producer groups, but opposed by dairy importers and processors.
See the Appendix at the end of this report for a side-by-side comparison of the enacted 2008 farm bill dairy provisions with previous law and the House- and Senate-passed versions of the farm bill. |
crs_R44896 | crs_R44896_0 | I nfrastructure investment has received renewed interest as of late, with both President Trump and some Members of Congress discussing the benefits of such spending. In general, the term refers to longer-lived, capital-intensive systems and facilities. Infrastructure is beneficial for both businesses and households and for the economy broadly. Infrastructure Investment in the United States
Nondefense gross government investment (federal, state, and local) in the United States has largely been in decline since the 1960s, falling from above 4% of GDP to about 2.5% in 2016, as shown in Figure 1 . Direct federal investment, which refers to spending that occurs at the federal level rather than transfers to state and local governments, peaked in the 1930s as a percentage of GDP, and again in the 1960s before beginning to gradually decline over the next several decades, falling from about 1.4% of GDP in 1966 to about 0.7% of GDP in 2016, as shown in Figure 2 . As shown in Figure 4 , in 2016, state and local governments directly invested funds equivalent to about 1.8% of GDP, but the federal government also transferred funds equivalent to 0.4% of GDP to state and local governments for capital investments in that year. The Economy and Infrastructure Investment
Infrastructure is generally understood to be a critical factor in the economic well-being of a country, enabling private businesses and individuals to produce goods and services in a more efficient manner, although there is debate about the optimal amount of infrastructure investment. The impact of these investments is likely to differ with respect to a few key considerations, including the way in which the investments are financed, the timing of the investments with respect to the business cycle, and the type of infrastructure being created. The short-term impact of infrastructure investment can differ significantly depending on the type of financing used. Alternatively, deficit-neutral infrastructure investments are unlikely to affect economic output in the short term. Although deficit-neutral public investments are not expected to have any significant impacts on short-term economic output, they are less likely to result in crowding out of private investment. As such, additional deficit-neutral investments are expected to have a larger positive impact on long-term economic output than deficit-financed investments, all else equal. Current economic theory suggests that in the short term, if public investments are made during a recession, the impact on economic output will be larger than if the same investments were made during an economic expansion. Core infrastructure includes roads, railways, airports, and utilities. This definition excludes some broader types of infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, and other public buildings. Researchers with the IMF looked at the impact of increased public investment on the unemployment rate depending on the mode of financing, finding a significantly larger impact on short-term unemployment when the spending was deficit financed rather than deficit neutral. Deficit-financed investments would be expected to reduce the long-term unemployment rate, but to a lesser degree, as some amount of crowding out of private investment is likely to occur, resulting in a smaller increase in productivity growth and therefore a smaller decrease in the long-term unemployment rate. | Infrastructure investment has received renewed interest as of late, with both President Trump and some Members of Congress discussing the benefits of such spending. Infrastructure can be defined in a number of ways depending on the policy discussion; in general, however, the term refers to longer-lived, capital-intensive systems and facilities, such as roads, bridges, and water treatment facilities.
Over the past several decades, government investment in infrastructure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) has declined. Annual infrastructure investment by federal, state, and local governments peaked in the late 1930s, at about 4.2% of GDP, and since has fallen to about 1.5% of GDP in 2016. State and local governments consistently spend more on infrastructure directly than the federal government. In 2016, direct federal spending on nondefense infrastructure was less than 0.1% of GDP, whereas state and local spending was about 1.4% of GDP. However, the federal government transfers some funds each year to state and local governments for capital projects, which includes infrastructure projects, equaling about 0.4% of GDP in 2016. The United States also lags many other developed countries with respect to annual infrastructure spending. Spending on infrastructure, as a percentage of GDP, is higher in all G7 countries, except for Italy and Germany, than in the United States.
Infrastructure is understood to be a critical factor in the health and wealth of a country, enabling private businesses and individuals to produce goods and services more efficiently. With respect to overall economic output, increased infrastructure spending by the government is generally expected to result in higher economic output in the short term by stimulating demand and in the long term by increasing overall productivity. The short-term impact on economic output largely depends on the type of financing (whether deficit financed or deficit neutral) and the state of the economy (whether in a recession or expansion). The long-term impact on economic output is also affected by the method of financing, due to the potential for "crowding out" of private investment when investments are deficit financed. The type of infrastructure is also expected to affect the impact on economic output. Investments in core infrastructure, defined as roads, railways, airports, and utilities, are expected to produce larger gains in economic output than investments in some broader types of infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, and other public buildings.
Changes in economic output are expected to have subsequent effects on employment; as such, infrastructure investments are likely to impact employment as well. Recent research suggests modest reductions in the unemployment rate in response to increased infrastructure investment. Again, it is expected that the method of financing and state of the economy will alter these impacts. Recent research has suggested that deficit-neutral investments are less likely to affect employment, whereas deficit-financed investments are expected to reduce unemployment in the short term. Additionally, recent economic research suggests that during an economic expansion, with a relatively strong labor market, infrastructure investments are unlikely to have any sustained impact on the unemployment rate. However, during a recession, the same investment is likely to reduce the unemployment rate to some degree, research suggests. |
crs_RL34662 | crs_RL34662_0 | Purpose and Scope
This report provides a simplified explanation of the meaning of "tax basis," the factors that determine a taxpayer's tax basis, and some of the ways in which tax basis is used. The basis rules are found in the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) However, the general rule is that when property is inherited, the recipient's basis in the inherited property is the fair market value of the property on the date of death. However, a number of laws were introduced in the 110 th Congress that would have changed this. However, if the sales price is lower than the donor's adjusted basis, the FMV at the time the gift was received will be the recipient's initial basis in the property for determining the amount of loss from the sale. How Is Basis Adjusted? A taxpayer's basis in property may be increased or decreased after the property is acquired. Personal-use Property
A taxpayer may need to reduce the basis in either business- or personal-use property if that property is damaged (a casualty loss) and the taxpayer receives an insurance settlement or other payment for the damage. Each of the proposals would require buyers to reduce their basis in the residence by the amount of the credit. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( P.L. However, taxpayers taking advantage of this provision must reduce their basis in their principal residence by the amount of the debt cancellation income that was excluded from income. The Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-289 ) provides a refundable tax credit to first-time homebuyers who purchase a principal residence after April 8, 2008, and before July 1, 2009. However, if the property is sold before the credit is fully repaid, the taxpayer generally must repay the remaining amount in the year of the sale. This reduction in basis is used only to determine repayment of the credit. For business-use property, basis is one factor used to determine allowable depreciation. | "Tax basis" is one factor used to determine the income tax consequences when an item is disposed of, whether by sale, abandonment, or contribution. The initial basis is usually cost; however, the basis of a gift is related to its basis in the donor's hands, and the basis of inherited property is generally the property's fair market value on the date of death. The taxpayer's use of the item and subsequent events may require adjusting the original basis, which leads to the term "adjusted basis." Adjustments may either increase or decrease the taxpayer's basis in the property.
On July 30, 2008, Congress passed the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008 as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-289 ). It includes a refundable credit for first-time homebuyers. Unlike other proposals for homebuyer tax credits considered by the 110 th Congress ( H.R. 5565 ; S. 12 , S. 2566 , S. 2734 ), taxpayers generally are not required to reduce their basis in their newly acquired property by the amount of the credit, but are required to pay the credit back. There is a provision for reducing the basis by the credit if the taxpayer sells the property before repaying the credit. In this case, the reduced basis is used to determine whether the taxpayer must repay the remaining credit.
Other recently passed legislation requires reduction in the basis of a taxpayer's principal residence if the taxpayer has cancelled mortgage debt that is excluded from gross income ( P.L. 110-142 ). The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) has a number of provisions that require taxpayers to reduce their basis in property and others that allow them to increase their basis in property. |
crs_R42552 | crs_R42552_0 | Many provisions of the current farm bill (the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 ) expire this year. The Senate Agriculture Committee approved its version of the 2012 omnibus farm bill on April 26, 2012 (Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2012), and officially filed the measure, S. 3240 , on May 24, 2012. The full Senate approved S. 3240 , as amended, by a vote of 64-35 on June 21. The House Agriculture Committee completed markup of its version of the farm bill ( H.R. 6083 , the Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of 2012) on July 11, 2012, and approved the amended measure by a 35-11 vote. Within their 12 titles, the five-year House and Senate farm bills would reshape the structure of farm commodity support, expand crop insurance coverage, consolidate conservation programs, revise the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly food stamps), and extend authority to appropriate funds for many U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) discretionary programs through FY2017. Following are summaries of the major similarities and differences within each of the 12 titles of the respective versions of the House Agriculture Committee-approved and Senate-passed 2012 farm bills. Budgetary Impact1
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the programs of the 2008 farm bill, if they were to continue, would cost nearly $1 trillion over the next 10 years. Compared to this "baseline," the Senate-passed farm bill, S. 3240 , would reduce spending by $23.1 billion (2.3%); and the House Agriculture Committee-reported bill, H.R. 6083 , would reduce it by $35.1 billion (-3.5%). Both bills borrow conceptually from current programs, revising (and renaming) them to enhance price or revenue protection for producers. The House bill is similar to the current mix of farm programs in that it retains producer choice between a counter-cyclical price program (renamed Price Loss Coverage or PLC) and a revenue program (renamed Revenue Loss Coverage or RLC). In contrast to the House bill, the Senate bill provides for only a revised revenue program called Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC). CBO estimates total 10-year budget savings of $4.0 billion in the Senate bill and $16.1 billion in the House bill. Farm Bill Title IX, Energy12
An energy title first appeared in the 2002 farm bill, and was both extended and expanded by the 2008 farm bill. The primary difference between the House and Senate bills is in the source of funding. These include programs in the research, nutrition, and trade titles, among others. | Congress periodically establishes agricultural and food policy in an omnibus farm bill. The 112th Congress faces reauthorization of the current five-year farm bill (the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246) because many of its provisions expire in 2012. The 2008 farm bill contained 15 titles covering farm commodity support, horticulture, livestock, conservation, nutrition assistance, international trade and food aid, agricultural research, farm credit, rural development, bioenergy, and forestry, among others.
The Senate approved its version of the 2012 omnibus farm bill (S. 3240, the Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2012) by a vote of 64-35 on June 21, 2012. Subsequently, the House Agriculture Committee conducted markup of its own version of the farm bill (H.R. 6083, the Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of 2012) on July 11, 2012, and approved the amended bill by a vote of 35-11. Floor action on the House farm bill is pending.
Within the 12 titles of S. 3240 and H.R. 6083, both farm bills would reshape the structure of farm commodity support, expand crop insurance coverage, consolidate conservation programs, revise the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps), and extend authority to appropriate funds for many U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) discretionary programs through FY2017. Among the major differences in the two farm bills is how each would restructure the farm safety net. Both farm bills borrow conceptually from current programs, by revising (and renaming) them to enhance price or revenue protection for producers. The House farm bill is similar to the current mix of farm programs in that it retains producer choice between a counter-cyclical price program and a revenue enhancement program, while the Senate farm bill provides for a revised revenue program with a slightly higher guarantee than in the House farm bill.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the programs of the 2008 farm bill, if they were to continue, would cost nearly $1 trillion over the next 10 years. Compared to this "baseline," the Senate-passed farm bill would reduce spending by $23.1 billion and the House Agriculture Committee-reported farm bill would reduce it by $35.1 billion, both over the same 10-year horizon. Explaining much of the $12 billion difference in estimated savings between the two farm bills are provisions in the nutrition title of the House bill that would affect program eligibility for SNAP.
This report contains a detailed summary of the major similarities and differences between the House and Senate 2012 farm bills and also provides a side-by-side comparison of every provision in the two farm bills and how these provisions relate to current federal law or policy. |
crs_RL32926 | crs_RL32926_0 | This report examines Congress' legislative authority with respect to the Judicial Branch. While Congress has broad power to regulate the structure, administration and jurisdiction of the courts, its powers are limited by precepts of due process, equal protection and separation of powers. Usually congressional regulation of the judicial branch is noncontroversial, but when Congress proposes to use its powers in a manner designed to affect the outcome of pending or previously decided cases, constitutional issues can be raised. For instance, Congress has in recent years considered using or has exercised its authority in an attempt to affect the results in cases concerning a number of issues, including abortion, gay marriage, freedom of religion, "right to die" and prisoners' rights. This report addresses the constitutional foundation of the federal courts, and the explicit and general authorities of Congress to regulate the courts. It then addresses Congress' ability to limit the jurisdiction of the courts over particular constitutional issues, sometime referred to as "court-stripping." The report then analyzes Congress' authority to limit the availability of certain judicial processes and remedies for constitutional litigants. Congressional power to legislate regarding specific judicial decisions is also discussed. Much of the material in the section on congressional power over court jurisdiction is also included in CRS Report RL32171, Limiting Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Constitutional Issues: " Court-Stripping " , by [author name scrubbed]. For instance, in July 2003, an amendment was passed by the House to limit the use of funds to enforce a federal court decision regarding the Pledge of Allegiance. Then, in July 2004, the House passed H.R. 3313 , the Marriage Protection Act, which would have limited Federal court jurisdiction over questions regarding the Defense of Marriage Act. Finally, in September 2004, the House passed H.R. 2028 , the Pledge Protection Act, which was intended to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear cases regarding the Pledge of Allegiance. A. | This report examines Congress' legislative authority with respect to the Judicial Branch. While Congress has broad power to regulate the structure, administration and jurisdiction of the courts, its powers are limited by precepts of due process, equal protection and separation of powers. Usually congressional oversight of the judicial branch is noncontroversial, but when Congress proposes to use its oversight and regulatory powers in a manner designed to affect the outcome of pending or previously decided cases, constitutional issues can be raised. In recent years, Congress has considered using or has exercised its authority in an effort to affect the results in cases concerning a number of issues, including abortion, gay marriage, freedom of religion, "right to die" and prisoners' rights.
This report addresses the constitutional foundation of the federal courts, and the explicit and general authorities of Congress to regulate the courts. It then addresses Congress' ability to limit the jurisdiction of the courts over particular issues, sometimes referred to as "court-stripping." The report then analyzes Congress' authority to regulate the availability of certain judicial processes and remedies for litigants. Congressional power to legislate regarding specific judicial decisions is also discussed.
Recent laws which are relevant to this discussion include the Prison Litigation Reform Act Legislation and a law "For the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo." Various proposals were also passed by the House, but not the Senate, in the 108th Congress. For instance, starting in July 2003, an amendment was passed by the House to limit the use of funds to enforce a federal court decision regarding the Pledge of Allegiance. Then, in July 2004, the House passed H.R. 3313, the Marriage Protection Act, which would have limited Federal court jurisdiction over questions regarding the Defense of Marriage Act. Finally, in September 2004, the House passed H.R. 2028, the Pledge Protection Act, which was intended to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear cases regarding the Pledge of Allegiance.
Much of the material in the section on congressional power over court jurisdiction is also included in CRS Report RL32171, Limiting Court Jurisdiction Over Federal Constitutional Issues: "Court-Stripping", by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL30662 | crs_RL30662_0 | Background
U.S. embassy security needs have evolved and expanded over recent decades. The issue of embassy security again gained focus and urgency after the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon in April 1983, the bombing of the Marinebarracks in Beirut in October 1983, and the bombing of the embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Some of the recommendations by the Inman Panel included (1) a reorganization of the offices in the Department of State that are primarily responsible for securityand counter-terrorism and consolidation of operational security offices into a new bureau for Diplomatic Security;(2) improvements in State's protectiveintelligence, threat analysis, and alerting procedures; (3) improvements in the Department's training of ForeignService personnel and dependents to deal moreeffectively with terrorist threats; (4) improvements in contingency planning at the posts; (5) assigning MarineSecurity Guard detachments to all highly sensitiveposts; (6) revising the Diplomatic Security Service physical security standards; (7) pursuing a substantial buildingprogram to correct security deficiencies; and (8)initiating a capital budgeting procedure to avoid security improvement delays due to budgetary reasons. The panelalso offered a number of classifiedrecommendations. Given that the assessed threat levels of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzaniawere medium to low, the State Department isreviewing its methodology for evaluating threat levels and the significance the Administration places on threatassessments in its allocation of security resources. The levels Congress enacted in the omnibus appropriation emergency supplemental provisionsto the Department of State follow:
Congress provided $790.8 million for the Diplomatic and Consular Programs Account , $748 million for reestablishing embassy functions inKenya and Tanzania and for security improvements overseas, as requested. The Administration had testified that much of the emergencysupplemental funds was still in the pipeline to bespent on security needs. State's FY2000 Diplomaticand Consular Programs account included $254 million for worldwide security upgrades, and the Embassy Security,Construction and Maintenance (ESCM)account contained $313.6 million for worldwide security upgrades. 3427 ), which authorizes $900 million for overseas security from FY2000through FY2004-a total of $4.5 billion. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress passed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act forRecovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, FY2001 ( P.L. The report recommended that the U.S. government spend $1.4 billion a year over 10 years to improvesecurity at U.S. overseas facilities. (12) Additionally, the Secretary of State establishedthe OverseasPresence Advisory Panel on February 23, 1999 to make recommendations on the organization of U.S. overseasposts. Administration Request. | The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon led to the closing the following day of 50 of the nearly 260 U.S. embassiesand consulates worldwide. A week later, however, all U.S. facilities were open for business. Additionally, threeembassies - in Pakistan, Yemen, andTurkmenistan - allowed for voluntary evacuations immediately after the attack. In the months prior to the attack,travel warnings were issued and embassies wereput on high alert as Osama bin Laden had issued vague, but credible, threats against Americans and Americaninterests around the world.
Earlier this year, Secretary of State Colin Powell had testified before Congress that embassy security is among his highest priorities. He made the case that theU.S. government owes State Department personnel on the front lines of diplomacy the same high level of tools andsecurity given to our military on the front lines. The Administration requested a total of $1.3 billion for embassy security and worldwide security upgrades forFY2002. The House concurred; the Senate passed atotal of $1.07 billion.
Throughout the summer 2001, the United States received credible threats against American embassies and tourists overseas. The Department of State respondedby issuing a worldwide travel warning to American citizens and cancelling Independence Day celebrations atAmerican overseas facilities.
In June 2000 the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan was put on full alert after receiving "credible evidence" that Osama bin Laden followers were planning toattack it. Additionally, the Department of State advised American travelers to be mindful of the August7th anniversary of the bombing of U.S. embassies inKenya and Tanzania. Then, in September 2000, terrorists attacked the U.S.S. Cole Navy destroyer.
The August 7, 1998 terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania resulted in a number of actions by the Administration and Congress. Withevidence that bin Laden was involved in the attacks, the Administration, on July 4, 1999, imposed sanctions on theTaliban government because it refused tocooperate in his arrest. In October 1999, the UN Security Council imposed limited sanctions on the Taliban, andin August 2000 both the United States andRussia agreed to work together to tighten the sanctions.
Embassy security budget ramifications of the 1998 bombings continue. In November 1999, Congress expanded authority for State's FY2000 through FY2004expenditures on overseas security within the Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance (ESCM)account to $900 million annually, in addition to securityfunds in the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account (D&CP) for FY2000-FY2004 ( P.L.106-113 ). |
crs_R41927 | crs_R41927_0 | Introduction
Savvy criminals constantly develop new techniques to target U.S. persons, businesses, and interests. Individual criminals as well as broad criminal networks exploit these realities and often leverage the unique characteristics of one against the other to dodge law enforcement countermeasures and efforts to disrupt illicit activity. Further, the interplay of these realities can potentially encumber policing measures. In light of these interwoven realities, policy makers may question how to best design policies to help law enforcement combat ever-evolving criminal threats. They thrive on their ability to illicitly cross borders and provide illegal products or services. Some larger criminal groups even establish their own operational "borders" by defining and defending the "turf" or territories they control. In the virtual realm, criminals can rely on relative anonymity and a rather seamless environment to conduct business. Finally, U.S. law enforcement often remains constrained by geographic and legal boundaries or even its own notions of "turf"—partly defined in terms of competing agency-level priorities and jurisdictions. Criminals have creatively circumvented both geographic borders and law enforcement jurisdictions. Challenges for U.S. Law Enforcement
While criminals may operate across jurisdictional boundaries, law enforcement cannot. However, many crimes—particularly those of the cyber nature—have become increasingly transnational. For one, an illegal action in one country may not be prohibited in another. Cyberspace and Advancing Technologies
Globalization and technological innovation have fostered the expansion of criminal (and legitimate) operations across physical borders as well as throughout cyberspace. Advanced, rapid communication systems have made it easier for criminals to operate remotely not only from other members of their illicit networks, but from their victims as well. In the rapidly evolving digital age, law enforcement may not have the capabilities to keep up with the pace of criminals. While some crimes are investigated under the jurisdiction of a proprietary agency (e.g., the FBI is the lead federal agency responsible for terrorism investigations), other crimes are not investigated under such clear lines. U.S. Law Enforcement Efforts to Overcome Barriers
Modern-day criminals take advantage of geographic borders, criminal turf, cyberspace, and law enforcement jurisdictions. Legislatively, Congress may consider whether law enforcement has the existing authorities, technology, and resources—both monetary and manpower—to counter 21 st century criminals. In exercising its oversight responsibilities, Congress may examine whether law enforcement is utilizing existing mechanisms to effectively coordinate investigations and share information. U.S. law enforcement has, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increasingly relied on intelligence-led policing, enhanced interagency cooperation (through formal and informal interagency agreements as well as fusion centers and task forces), and technological implementation to confront 21 st century crime. Nonetheless, there have been notable impediments in implementing effective information sharing systems and relying on up-to-date technology. | Savvy criminals constantly develop new techniques to target U.S. persons, businesses, and interests. Individual criminals as well as broad criminal networks exploit geographic borders, criminal turf, cyberspace, and law enforcement jurisdiction to dodge law enforcement countermeasures. Further, the interplay of these realities can potentially encumber policing measures. In light of these interwoven realities, policy makers may question how to best design policies to help law enforcement combat ever-evolving criminal threats.
Criminals routinely take advantage of geographic borders. They thrive on their ability to illicitly cross borders, subvert border security regimens, and provide illegal products or services. Many crimes—particularly those of a cyber nature—have become increasingly transnational. While criminals may operate across geographic borders and jurisdictional boundaries, law enforcement may not be able to do so with the same ease. Moreover, obstacles such as disparities between the legal regimens of nations (what is considered a crime in one country may not be in another) and differences in willingness to extradite suspected criminals can hamper prosecutions. The law enforcement community has, however, expanded its working relationships with both domestic and international agencies.
Globalization and technological innovation have fostered the expansion of both legitimate and criminal operations across physical borders as well as throughout cyberspace. Advanced, rapid communication systems have made it easier for criminals to carry out their operations remotely from their victims and members of their illicit networks. In the largely borderless cyber domain, criminals can rely on relative anonymity and a rather seamless environment to conduct illicit business. Further, in the rapidly evolving digital age, law enforcement may not have the technological capabilities to keep up with the pace of criminals.
Some criminal groups establish their own operational "borders" by defining and defending the "turf" or territories they control. Similarly, U.S. law enforcement often remains constrained by its own notions of "turf"—partly defined in terms of competing agency-level priorities and jurisdictions. While some crimes are worked under the jurisdiction of a proprietary agency, others are not investigated under such clear lines. These investigative overlaps and a lack of data and information sharing can hinder law enforcement anti-crime efforts.
U.S. law enforcement has, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increasingly relied on intelligence-led policing, enhanced interagency cooperation, and technological implementation to confront 21st century crime. For instance, enforcement agencies have used formal and informal interagency agreements as well as fusion centers and task forces to assimilate information and coordinate operations. Nonetheless, there have been notable impediments in implementing effective information sharing systems and relying on up-to-date technology. Congress may question how it can leverage its legislative and oversight roles to bolster U.S. law enforcement's abilities to confront modern-day crime. For instance, Congress may consider whether federal law enforcement has the existing authorities, technology, and resources—both monetary and manpower—to counter 21st century criminals. Congress may also examine whether federal law enforcement is utilizing existing mechanisms to effectively coordinate investigations and share information. |
crs_RL34009 | crs_RL34009_0 | Most Recent Developments
The FY2008 Energy and Water Development bill was enacted as Division C of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ). The omnibus funding measure was passed by Congress December 19, 2007, and signed by the President December 26, 2007. The act provides $31.4659 billion for Energy and Water programs, about $1 billion below the FY2007 appropriation and about $500 million above the Administration's request. The House Appropriations Committee reported out its FY2008 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill, H.R. 2641 , on June 6, 2007. The bill as reported did not contain indications of funding for specific projects. On June 20 the bill was debated on the House floor, but was not voted on pending submission by the Appropriations Committee of a supplement specifying funding for individual projects. That supplement was voted out by the committee July 12, and the House approved the bill July 17, 2007. The Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Appropriations approved its version of the bill, S. 1751 , on June 26, and the full Senate Appropriations Committee approved it June 28. Status
Overview
The Energy and Water Development bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). Title I: Army Corps of Engineers
P.L. H.Rept. The appropriation bill, as passed, provided no funds for MPF. | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies.
Key budgetary issues involving these programs include
the distribution of Army Corps of Engineers appropriations across the agency's authorized construction and maintenance activities (Title I); support of major ecosystem restoration initiatives, such as Florida Everglades (Title I) and California "Bay-Delta" (CALFED) (Title II); funding for the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and proposals to store nuclear spent fuel temporarily (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal); and the Administration's proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership to supply plutonium-based fuel to other nations (Title III: Nuclear Energy).
The FY2008 Energy and Water Development bill was enacted as Division C of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161). The omnibus funding measure was passed by Congress December 19, 2007, and signed by the President December 26, 2007. The act provides $31.4659 billion for Energy and Water programs, about $1 billion below the FY2007 appropriation and about $500 million above the Administration's request.
The House Appropriations Committee reported out its FY2008 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill, H.R. 2641 (H.Rept. 110-185), on June 6, 2007. The bill as reported did not contain indications of funding for specific projects. On June 20 the bill was debated on the House floor, but was not voted on pending submission by the Appropriations Committee of a supplement specifying funding for individual projects. That supplement was voted by the committee July 12, and the House approved the bill July 17, 2007.
The Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Appropriations approved its version of the bill on June 26, and the full Senate Appropriations Committee approved it June 28, 2007 (S. 1751, S.Rept. 110-127). |
crs_R41875 | crs_R41875_0 | Canada is the single largest foreign supplier of petroleum products, natural gas, and electric power to the United States—and the United States is the dominant consumer of Canada's energy exports. The value of the energy trade between the two countries totaled nearly $100 billion in 2010, helping to promote general economic growth and directly support thousands of energy industry and related jobs on both sides of the border. Increased energy trade between the United States and Canada—a stable, friendly neighbor—is viewed by many as a major contributor to U.S. energy security. The U.S.-Canada energy relationship is increasingly complex, however, and is undergoing fundamental change, particularly in the petroleum and natural gas sectors. Congress has been facing important policy questions in the U.S.-Canada energy context on several fronts, including the siting of major cross-border pipelines, increasing petroleum supplies from Canadian oil sands, increasing natural gas production from North American shales, and the construction of new facilities for liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. Legislative proposals in the 112 th Congress could directly influence these developments. H.R. 909 would encourage petroleum and natural gas production on the outer continental shelf, would prescribe requirements for coordination with adjacent states regarding associated pipeline construction, and would allow production of petroleum and natural gas from the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, among other provisions. S. 304 would support a program to train workers in the construction, operation, maintenance, and performance of all related environmental processes involving oil and gas infrastructure in Alaska. Other proposals in Congress affecting hydraulic fracturing operations for natural gas production, offshore drilling, or U.S. oil shale development could also affect the U.S.-Canada energy trade. H.R. Considerations for Congress
The United States and Canada, while independent countries, effectively comprise a single integrated market for petroleum and natural gas. Traditionally, the energy trade between the United States and Canada, while intertwined, has been uncomplicated—taking the form of a steadily growing southward flow of crude oil and natural gas to markets in the U.S. Midwest and Northeast. Consequently, while energy policies in one country have always inevitably affected the other, their cross-cutting effects in the future may not be widely understood and, in some cases, may be largely unanticipated. For example, policies affecting U.S. shale gas production could affect North American natural gas prices overall, and thus, the costs of producing petroleum from oil sands (which requires large volumes of natural gas for heating). Changing oil sands costs could, in turn, affect Canadian petroleum supplies to the United States, affecting north-south pipeline use and changing U.S. petroleum import requirements from overseas. Changing natural gas prices would also change the economics of Arctic natural gas, however, and influence the development of the Arctic natural gas pipelines, which could provide an alternative source of economic natural gas for oil sands production in Alberta. How such scenarios could play out in reality is open to debate, but they illustrate the tangled web policymakers in both countries must navigate as they consider future energy, environmental, and transportation decisions. As Congress debates legislative proposals affecting the petroleum and natural gas industries, it may be helpful to consider these proposals in the broadest possible North American context, recognizing that the energy sector in Canada may be moved in one direction or another based on policies in Washington, DC. To date, the judgment of Congress has favored a growing U.S.-Canada energy partnership—but ensuring that this relationship continues to be as mutually beneficial as possible will likely remain a key oversight challenge for the next decades. | The United States and Canada, while independent countries, effectively comprise a single integrated market for petroleum and natural gas. Canada is the single largest foreign supplier of petroleum products and natural gas to the United States—and the United States is the dominant consumer of Canada's energy exports. The value of the petroleum and natural gas trade between the two countries totaled nearly $100 billion in 2010, helping to promote general economic growth and directly support thousands of energy industry and related jobs on both sides of the border. Increased energy trade between the United States and Canada—a stable, friendly neighbor—is viewed by many as a major contributor to U.S. energy security. The U.S.-Canada energy relationship is increasingly complex, however, and is undergoing fundamental change, particularly in the petroleum and natural gas sectors.
Congress has been facing important policy questions in the U.S.-Canada energy context on several fronts, including the siting of major cross-border pipelines, increasing petroleum supplies from Canadian oil sands, increasing natural gas production from North American shales, and the construction of new facilities for liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. Legislative proposals in the 112th Congress could directly influence these developments. These proposals include H.R. 1938, which would expedite consideration of the Keystone XL pipeline proposal; H.R. 909, which would encourage petroleum and natural gas production on the outer continental shelf and in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge; and S. 304, which would support a program to train workers involved with oil and gas infrastructure in Alaska. Other proposals in Congress affecting hydraulic fracturing operations for natural gas production, offshore drilling, or U.S. oil shale development could also affect the U.S.-Canada energy relationship.
Traditionally, the energy trade between the United States and Canada, while intertwined, has been uncomplicated—taking the form of a steadily growing southward flow of crude oil and natural gas to markets in the U.S. Midwest and Northeast. But recent developments have greatly complicated that energy relationship, creating new competition and interconnections. Consequently, while energy policies in one country have always inevitably affected the other, their cross-cutting effects in the future may not be widely understood and, in some cases, may be largely unanticipated. For example, policies affecting U.S. shale gas production could affect North American natural gas prices overall, and thus, the costs of producing petroleum from oil sands (which requires large volumes of natural gas for heating). Changing oil sands costs could, in turn, affect Canadian petroleum supplies to the United States, affecting north-south pipeline use and changing U.S. petroleum import requirements from overseas. Changing natural gas prices would also change the economics of Arctic natural gas, however, and influence the development of the Arctic natural gas pipelines, which could provide an alternative source of economic natural gas for oil sands production in Alberta. How such scenarios could play out in reality is open to debate, but they illustrate the tangled web policymakers in both countries must navigate as they consider future energy, environmental, and transportation decisions.
As Congress debates legislative proposals affecting the petroleum and natural gas industries, it may be helpful to consider these proposals in the broadest possible North American context, recognizing that the energy sector in Canada may be moved in one direction or another based on policies in Washington, DC. To date, the judgment of Congress has favored a growing U.S.-Canada energy partnership—but ensuring that this relationship continues to be as mutually beneficial as possible will likely remain a key oversight challenge for the next decades. |
crs_RL34163 | crs_RL34163_0 | Legislation to amend federal capital punishment law introduced in the 110 th Congress included proposals to amend the Constitution to remove impediments to imposition of the death penalty, to abolish the federal death penalty, to increase the number of federal capital offenses, and to adjust the procedure under which capital cases are tried and sentencing determinations are made. None were enacted. H.J.Res. H.J.Res. H.J.Res. 80 (Representative McCollum), in contrast, would have abolished capital punishment as a sentencing alternative for either state or federal crimes. Procedural Changes
During the 110 th Congress, proposals were offered that would have modified existing law relating to:
- where a capital offense may be tried,
- the appointment of counsel in capital cases,
- the pre-trial notification which the parties must exchange in capital cases,
- the procedures that apply when the defendant claims to be mentally retarded,
- adjustments in the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
- jury matters, and
- the site of federal executions. Several bills – e.g., H.R. 880 (Representative Forbes), H.R. 3150 (Representative Keller), H.R. 3156 (Representative Lamar Smith), and S. 1860 (Senator Cornyn) – would have created a new federal crime, one that would have prohibited the commission of a crime of violence "during and in relation" to a drug trafficking offense, proposed 21 U.S.C. 880 (Representative Forbes), H.R. H.R. 851 (Representative Gohmert), H.R. 1914 (Representative Carter), H.R. One of the bills, H.R. 3150 (Representative Keller), H.R. The murder committed during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense appeared as a capital offense in other bills as well ( H.R. 1118 (Representative Keller); H.R. 2376 (Representative Franks), H.R. 3147 (Representative Wilson), H.R. 3156 (Representative Lamar Smith), S. 1320 (Senator Kyl), and S. 1860 (Senator Cornyn) would have proscribed overseas kidnaping of Americans by terrorists and propose the death penalty as a sentencing option when a death results. 1645 (Representative Gutierrez), S. 330 (Senator Isakson), S. 1348 (Senator Reid) – would have proscribed evasion of border inspection and made the offenses punishable by death, imprisonment for any term of years, or for life if death results from a violation, proposed 18 U.S.C. 855 (Representative Lungren), H.R. Capital Punishment for Existing Non-Capital Offenses
H.R. Abolition of Capital Punishment
S. 447 (Senator Feingold)/ H.R. 6875 (Representative Kucinich) would have eliminated the death penalty as a sentencing option for federal and military capital offenses. | Most capital offenses are state crimes. In 1994, however, Congress revived the death penalty as a federal sentencing option. More than a few federal statutes now proscribe offenses punishable by death. A number of bills were offered during the 110th Congress to modify federal law in the area. None were enacted. One, S. 447 (Senator Feingold)/H.R. 6875 (Representative Kucinich), would have abolished the federal death penalty. Another, H.J.Res. 80 (Rep McCollum), would have amended the Constitution to abolish capital punishment as a sentencing alternative for either state or federal crimes. Other proposed amendments would have eased constitutional limitations on the death penalty as a sentencing option, particularly in cases involving the rape of children, H.J.Res. 83 (Representative Broun), H.J.Res. 96 (Representative Chabot).
Several bills would have increased the number of capital offenses to include one or more newly created offenses or existing non-capital offenses newly designated as capital offenses, e.g., H.R. 855 (Representative Lungren), H.R. 880 (Representative Forbes), H.R. 1118 (Representative Keller), H.R. 1645 (Representative Gutierrez), H.R. 2376 (Representative Franks), H.R. 3147 (Representative Wilson), H.R. 3150 (Representative Keller), H.R. 3156 (Representative Lamar Smith), S. 330 (Senator Isakson), S. 607 (Senator Vitter), S. 1320 (Senator Kyl), S. 1348 (Senator Reid), and S. 1860 (Senator Cornyn).
Numbered among the new capital offenses and newly designated capital offenses were murder related to street gang offenses or Travel Act violations, murder committed during and in relation to drug trafficking, murder committed in the course of evading border inspection, murder of disaster assistance workers, and various terrorism-related murders.
A third category of proposals would have adjusted in one way or another the procedures used to try and sentence capital defendants, including those relating to where a capital offense may be tried, the appointment of counsel in capital cases, the pre-trial notification which the parties must exchange in capital cases, the procedures that apply when the defendant claims to be mentally retarded, adjustments in the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, jury matters, and the site of federal executions. Among the bills offering one or more of these proposals were: H.R. 851 (Representative Gohmert), H.R. 880 (Representative Forbes), H.R. 1645 (Representative Gutierrez), H.R. 1914 (Representative Carter), H.R. 3150 (Representative Keller), H.R. 3153 (Representative Gerlach), H.R. 3156 (Representative Lamar Smith), S. 1320 (Senator Kyl), and S. 1860 (Senator Cornyn).
An abridged version of this report – without footnotes, appendices, and most citations, is available as CRS Report RS22719, Capital Punishment Legislation in the 110th Congress: A Sketch, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40175 | crs_R40175_0 | Technological advancements and tax incentives have driven a global expansion in the development of renewable energy resources. Wind energy, in particular, has been cited as the fastest-growing source of new electric power generation, and U.S. wind energy production capacity has been increasing consistently over the past several years. Currently, unlike much of Europe, all wind power facilities in the United States are based on land. However, multiple offshore wind and related infrastructure projects have been proposed in recent years to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM). The CZMA also requires that the federal government and federally permitted activities comply with state programs. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct)
Prior to enactment of EPAct in 2005, the Army Corp of Engineers (Corps) took the lead role in the federal offshore wind energy permitting process, claiming jurisdiction pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), as amended by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). The Corps has jurisdiction under these laws to permit obstructions to navigation within the "navigable waters of the United States" and on the OCS. Section 388 of EPAct sought to address some of the uncertainty related to federal jurisdiction over offshore wind energy development by amending the OCSLA to specifically establish legal authority for federal review and approval of various offshore energy-related projects. A memorandum of understanding between the Department of the Interior and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) signed in April of 2009 confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, exercised through the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEM), an agency within DOI, over "the production, transportation, or transmission of energy from non-hydrokinetic renewable energy projects on the OCS." Further, states also may claim a role in the permitting of offshore wind energy development pursuant to authorities granted under existing federal law. | Technological advancement, financial incentives, and policy concerns have driven a global expansion in the development of renewable energy resources. Wind energy, in particular, is often cited as one of the fastest-growing commercial energy sources in the world. Currently, all U.S. wind energy facilities are based on land. However, multiple offshore projects have been proposed and are at various stages of the federal permitting process.
The United States has the authority to permit and regulate offshore wind energy development within the zones of the oceans under its jurisdiction. The federal government and coastal states each have roles in the permitting process, the extents of which depend on whether the project is located in state or federal waters. Currently, no single federal agency has exclusive responsibility for permitting related to activities on submerged lands in federal waters; authority is allocated among various agencies based on the nature of the resource to be exploited and the potential impacts incidental to such exploitation. The same is true for the offshore wind energy context, where several federal agencies have a role to play in permitting development and operation activities.
Section 388 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct; P.L. 109-58) amended the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) to address previous uncertainties regarding offshore wind projects. This provision retained a role for the Army Corps of Engineers in permitting under the Rivers and Harbors Act but grants ultimate authority over offshore wind energy development to the Secretary of the Interior. The statutory authority granted by Section 388 is administered by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), an agency within the Department of the Interior (DOI). Since the passage of EPAct, BOEM has promulgated rules and guidelines governing the permitting and operation of offshore wind facilities. |
crs_R43206 | crs_R43206_0 | Introduction
Energy tax policy involves the use of one of the government's main fiscal instruments, taxes (both as an incentive and as a disincentive) to alter the allocation or configuration of energy resources and their use. In theory, energy taxes and subsidies, like tax policy instruments in general, are intended either to correct a problem or distortion in the energy markets or to achieve some economic (efficiency, equity, or macroeconomic) objective. In practice, however, energy tax policy in the United States is made in a political setting, determined by fiscal dictates and the views and interests of the key players in this setting, including policymakers, special interest groups, and academic scholars. As a result, enacted tax policy embodies compromises between economic and political goals, which could either mitigate or compound existing distortions. Several expired energy tax incentives were extended through 2016 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. The President's FY2017 budget proposed a number of changes to energy tax policy. Specifically, the Obama Administration has proposed repealing a number of existing tax incentives for fossil fuels, while providing new or expanded incentives for carbon sequestration, alternative and advanced technology vehicles, renewable electricity, energy efficiency, and advanced energy manufacturing. The FY2017 budget also proposes imposing a per-barrel fee on oil. The economic rationale for interventions in energy markets helps inform the debate surrounding energy tax policy. Tax policy, as it relates to energy, can be used to address these market failures. Current Status of U.S. Energy Tax Policy26
Current U.S. energy tax policy is a combination of long-standing provisions and relatively new incentives. Provisions supporting the oil and gas sector reflect desires for domestic energy production and energy security, long-standing cornerstones of U.S. energy policy. Incentives for renewable energy reflect the desire to have a diverse energy supply, also consistent with a desire for domestic energy security. Incentives for energy efficiency are designed to reduce consumption of energy from all energy sources. Incentives for renewable energy, energy efficiency, and alternative technology vehicles reflect environmental concerns related to the production and consumption of energy using fossil-based resources. The fossil fuels related incentives listed in Table 1 are estimated to reduce federal tax revenues by $21.5 billion between 2015 and 2019. Thus, the cost of tax expenditure and excise tax incentives for renewables is estimated to be $46.5 billion between 2015 and 2019. Between 2015 and 2019, the total cost of tax expenditures related to energy efficiency is estimated to be $3.1 billion. The incentive is also scheduled to expire at the end of 2016. Most energy-related provisions were extended for two years, through the end of 2016. Incentives for wind and solar were given longer-term extensions, with credits scheduled to phase out over a multi-year period in the future. One issue is whether energy-related tax incentives currently scheduled to expire at the end of 2016 will be further extended. Expiring Energy Tax Provisions
Several energy-related tax provisions are scheduled to expire at the end of 2016. 114-113 ). 114-113 . | Current U.S. energy tax policy is a combination of long-standing provisions and relatively new incentives. Provisions supporting the oil and gas sector reflect desires for domestic energy production and energy security, long-standing cornerstones of U.S. energy policy. Incentives for renewable energy reflect the desire to have a diverse energy supply, also consistent with a desire for domestic energy security. Incentives for energy efficiency are designed to reduce use of energy from all energy sources. Incentives for renewable energy, energy efficiency, and alternative technology vehicles reflect environmental concerns related to the production and consumption of energy using fossil-based resources.
Many energy-related tax provisions are temporary, with a number scheduled to expire at the end of 2016. Most recently, expired energy tax incentives were extended as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). Most energy-related provisions were extended for two years, through the end of 2016. Incentives for wind and solar were given longer-term extensions, with credits scheduled to phase out over a multi-year period in the future. One issue is whether energy-related tax incentives currently scheduled to expire at the end of 2016 will be further extended.
Energy-related tax incentives reduce the amount of federal tax revenue collected. Between 2015 and 2019, it is estimated that incentives for fossil fuels will reduce revenues by $21.5 billion. For renewables, the cost of energy-related tax incentives is an estimated $46.5 billion over the same time period. The cost of tax incentives for energy efficiency is estimated to be $3.1 billion in federal revenue loss between 2015 and 2019. These estimates reflect the recent extensions enacted in P.L. 114-113. However, further extensions of energy-related tax provisions currently scheduled to expire would increase the cost of these incentives.
The Obama Administration has also proposed a number of changes to energy tax policy as part of its annual budget proposal. Similar to past budgets, the FY2017 proposal suggests repealing a number of existing tax incentives for fossil fuels, while providing new or expanded incentives for carbon sequestration, alternative and advanced technology vehicles, renewable electricity, energy efficiency, and advanced energy manufacturing. The FY2017 budget also proposes a per-barrel fee on oil.
Energy tax policy involves the use of one of the government's main fiscal instruments, taxes (both as an incentive and as a disincentive) to alter the allocation or configuration of energy resources and their use. In theory, energy taxes and subsidies, like tax policy instruments in general, are intended either to correct a problem or distortion in the energy markets or to achieve some economic (efficiency, equity, or even macroeconomic) objective. The economic rationale for government intervention in energy markets is commonly based on the government's perceived ability to correct for market failures. To correct for these market failures governments can utilize several policy options, including taxes, subsidies, and regulation, in an effort to achieve policy goals. In practice, energy tax policy in the United States is made in a political setting, determined by fiscal dictates and the views and interests of the key players in this setting, including policymakers, special interest groups, and academic scholars. As a result, enacted tax policy embodies compromises between economic and political goals, which could either mitigate or compound existing distortions. |
crs_RL30395 | crs_RL30395_0 | In 1986, for example, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, P.L. 99-603 ) to curb the presence of unauthorized aliens in the United States by imposing sanctions on employers who knowingly hire individuals who lack permission to work in the country. In addition to a general legalization program, P.L. 99-603 included two industry-specific legalization programs—the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program and the Replenishment Agricultural Worker (RAW) program —that were intended to compensate for the act's expected impact on the farm labor supply and encourage the development of a legal crop workforce. These provisions of the act have not operated in the offsetting manner that was intended, however, as substantial numbers of unauthorized aliens have continued to join legal farm workers in performing seasonal agricultural services (SAS). Farm worker advocates assert that crop producers prefer unauthorized employees because they have less bargaining power with regard to wages and working conditions than other employees. Growers counter that they would rather not employ unauthorized workers because doing so puts them at risk of incurring penalties. They argue that the considerable presence of unauthorized aliens in the U.S. farm labor force implies a shortage of legal workers. Farm worker groups and some policy analysts contend that even if the previously mentioned DHS and SSA activities were to deprive farmers of many of their unauthorized workers, the industry could adjust to a smaller supply of legal workers by (1) introducing labor-efficient technologies and management practices, and (2) raising wages which, in turn, would entice more authorized workers into the farm labor force. Grower advocates respond that further mechanization would be difficult to develop for many crops and that, even at higher wages, not many U.S. workers would want to perform physically demanding, seasonal farm labor under variable climactic conditions. These remain untested arguments as perishable crop growers have rarely, if ever, had to operate without unauthorized aliens in their workforces. Trends in the farm labor market generally do not suggest the existence of a nationwide shortage of domestically available farm workers, in part because the government's statistical series cover authorized and unauthorized workers. This overall finding does not preclude the possibility of spot shortages of farm labor in certain areas of the country at various times of the year. In contrast, the various measures of farm worker employment fluctuated erratically between the two recessions and generally ended the period down from their initial level. The substantial growth rate suggests that California growers faced a tighter labor market in July 2007. Whether more U.S. workers would be willing to become farm workers if wages were raised and whether the size of the wage increase would make the industry uncompetitive in the world marketplace also remain open issues. | The connection between farm labor and immigration policies is a longstanding one, particularly with regard to U.S. employers' use of workers from Mexico. The Congress periodically has revisited the issue during debates on guest worker programs, increased border enforcement, and employer sanctions to curb the flow of unauthorized workers. Two decades ago, the Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, P.L. 99-603) to reduce illegal entry into the United States by imposing sanctions on employers who knowingly hire persons who lack permission to work in the country. In addition to a general legalization program, IRCA included legalization programs specific to the agricultural industry that were intended to compensate for the act's expected impact on the farm labor supply and encourage development of a legal crop workforce. These provisions of the act have not operated in the offsetting manner that was intended: substantial numbers of unauthorized aliens have continued to join legal farm workers in performing seasonal agricultural services (SAS).
A little more than one-half of the SAS workforce is not authorized to hold U.S. jobs. Crop growers contend that their sizable presence implies a shortage of native-born farm workers. Grower advocates argue that farmers would rather not employ unauthorized workers because doing so puts them at risk of incurring penalties. Farm worker advocates counter that crop growers prefer unauthorized workers because they are in a weak bargaining position. If the supply of unauthorized workers were curtailed, it is claimed, farmers could adjust to a smaller workforce by introducing labor-efficient technologies and management practices, and by raising wages, which, in turn, would entice more U.S. workers to accept farm jobs. Growers respond that further mechanization would be difficult for some crops, and that much higher wages would make the U.S. industry uncompetitive in world markets without expanding the legal farm workforce. These remain untested arguments because perishable crop growers have rarely, if ever, operated without unauthorized foreign-born workers.
Trends in the agricultural labor market generally do not suggest the existence of a nationwide shortage of domestically available farm workers, in part because the government's databases cover authorized and unauthorized workers. While total nonfarm wage and salary employment generally increased between the two recessions of the current decade, for example, the number of farm jobs fluctuated erratically and ended down for the period. The length of time hired farm workers are employed has changed little or fallen over the years as well. Their unemployment rate has varied slightly and remains well above the U.S. average. Underemployment among farm workers also remains substantial. In addition, the earnings of farm workers has changed little over time relative to other nonmanagement employees in the private sector.
This assessment does not preclude the possibility of labor shortages in particular geographic areas at particular times of the year. Some statistical evidence suggests that California growers experienced a tighter labor market in July 2007 compared to peak harvest season a year earlier, for example. |
crs_RL32607 | crs_RL32607_0 | Immediately after the September 11 th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Bush Administration found itself in, not only a military, but also a public diplomacy war on terrorism. Public diplomacy was viewed as having a lower priority than political and military functions, and received less funding, while more money went to other activities deemed more important or more popular with constituents. After the 2001 attacks, people around the world expressed shock and support for the U.S. government. The 108 th Congress weighed in on the importance of public diplomacy by including public diplomacy measures in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. Favorable opinions of the United States have fallen in most of the 15 countries surveyed." On October 1, 1999, as a result of legislation initiated by Senator Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to reorganize the foreign policy agencies (largely for streamlining and budget saving purposes), USIA was abolished and its remaining functions (information programs and the educational and cultural exchanges) were transferred back to the State Department, as exchanges had been prior to 1977. Supplemental funding has become a standard practice for funding public diplomacy activities. In times of crisis, such as in Kosovo in the 1990s, after the 2001 terrorist attacks, or during the war in Iraq, U.S. international broadcasting goes into "surge broadcasting" mode which may include Expanded coverage of events as they unfold and in the languages of the populations being affected; creating a new broadcast medium, such as satellite TV, in an area where the U.S. previously did not operate one; increasing interviews with U.S. government officials, Congress and experts from think-tanks giving the American perspective of the situation; and cooperating with other countries' broadcast operations to achieve a 24 hour-a-day broadcasting operation into a region being affected. The 9/11 Commission Report stated that the U.S. government must use all its tools to win the war on terrorism. Both are equally important." Among the specific recommendations, the 9/11 Commission suggested giving the Broadcasting Board of Governors increased funding to do more broadcasting to Arab and Muslim populations. The 9/11 Report recommended that, just as the United States did during the Cold War, this country should identify what it stands for and communicate that message clearly. Other Options
Prior to establishment of the 9/11 Commission, several organizations studied public diplomacy in order to improve international goodwill and America's image, as well as to combat terrorism. The Council on Foreign Relations, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, in addition to some Members of Congress and congressional committees, offered suggestions intended to elevate public diplomacy and make it more effective. Some options follow:
Create a Corporation for Public Diplomacy with tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. tax code, that would receive private sector grants and coordinate private and public sector involvement in public diplomacy; Reconstitute USIA or some other entity that would have U.S. public diplomacy as its sole mission; Increase the emphasis on public diplomacy throughout all U.S. government agencies, with organizational changes in the White House, National Security Council, and the State Department; Require all foreign policy agencies to train key staff in public diplomacy and languages; and Measure the success of public diplomacy efforts by blending the best practices used in the public and private sectors, and improve public diplomacy program effectiveness with the knowledge attained. Furthermore, they say, if U.S. foreign policy is the primary cause of negative foreign opinion, then public diplomacy may be less effective than lawmakers would like. 108-458 ( S. 2845 )
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. | While the 9/11 terrorist attacks rallied unprecedented support abroad for the United States initially, they also heightened the awareness among government officials and terrorism experts that a significant number of people, especially within Muslim populations, harbor enough hatred for America so as to become a pool for terrorists. Over time it became clear that for the global war on terrorism to succeed, sustained cooperation from around the world would be required.
In the years prior to September 11th, both Congress and the various administrations downplayed the importance of funding public diplomacy activities, and in 1999 abolished the primary public diplomacy agency—the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). Public diplomacy often was viewed as less important than political and military functions and, therefore, was seen by some legislators as a pot of money that could be tapped for funding other government activities.
Even prior to the 2001 attacks, a number of decisions by the Bush Administration, including refusing to sign onto the Kyoto Treaty, the International Criminal Court, the Chemical Weapons Ban, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, damaged foreign opinion of the United States. After the decision to go to war with Iraq, foreign opinion of the United States fell sharply, not only in the Arab and Muslim world, but even among some of America's closest allies. Some foreign policy and public diplomacy experts believe that using public diplomacy to provide clear and honest explanations of why those decisions were made could have prevented some of the loss of support in the war on terrorism.
Many U.S. policymakers now recognize the importance of how America and its policies are perceived abroad. A former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and both chairmen of the 9/11 Commission expressed the view that public diplomacy tools are at least as important in the war on terrorism as military tools and should be given equal status and increased funding. As a result of the 9/11 Commission recommendations, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (S. 2845, P.L. 108-458) which included provisions expanding public diplomacy activities in Muslim populations.
At the same time, some believe that there are limits to what public diplomacy can do when the problem is not foreign misperception of America, but rather disagreements with specific U.S. foreign policies. A major expansion of U.S. public diplomacy activities and funding cannot change that, they say.
This report presents the challenges that have focused renewed attention on public diplomacy, provides background on public diplomacy, actions the Administration and Congress have taken since 9/11 to make public diplomacy more effective, as well as recommendations offered by others, particularly the 9/11 Commission. It will be updated if events warrant. |
crs_RL34635 | crs_RL34635_0 | The Controlled Substances Act (CSA or the act) is the statutory framework through which the federal government regulates the lawful production, possession, and distribution of controlled substances. The CSA places various plants, drugs, and chemicals (such as narcotics, stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids) into one of five schedules based on the substance's medical use, potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability. Further, the act requires persons who handle controlled substances or listed chemicals (such as drug manufacturers, wholesale distributors, doctors, hospitals, pharmacies, and scientific researchers) to register with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the U.S. Department of Justice, which administers and enforces the CSA. Controlled Substances Analogues
Controlled substance analogues are substances that are not controlled but are structurally or pharmacologically similar to substances found in Schedule I or II and have no accepted medical use. All registrants are required by the CSA to maintain complete and accurate inventories and records of all regulated transactions involving controlled substances and listed chemicals, as well as provide adequate security controls to prevent their diversion. Registration
The CSA defines who must register with the DEA in order to handle controlled substances. Certain DEA regulations implementing the CSA also apply to listed chemicals. Because controlled substances classified as Schedule I drugs are deemed to have no accepted medical purpose in the United States, they may only be used for research, and they may not be dispensed to patients. Under the CSA, only licensed medical practitioners are authorized to prescribe controlled substances listed in Schedules II-V to patients. Only with respect to this provision of the Controlled Substances Act, a "valid prescription" means a prescription that is issued for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice by a practitioner who has conducted at least one medical evaluation of the patient in the physical presence of the practitioner. By regulation, the Administrator must consider the following factors in making his quota determinations: (i) the total disposal of the controlled substance during the current and two preceding years; (ii) trends in the national rate of new disposal of the controlled substance; (iii) total inventories (actual or estimated) of "the class and all substances manufactured from the class [of controlled substances listed in Schedule I or II];" (iv) projected demand for a particular controlled substance; and (v) other relevant factors affecting the use of controlled substances including, changes in the currently accepted medical use of a controlled substance, the economic and physical availability of the raw materials necessary to produce a controlled substance, and recent unforeseen emergencies (i.e., natural disasters). Penalties
While the criminal provisions of the CSA focus mainly on the illicit possession, manufacture, and distribution of controlled substances, there are a few noteworthy penalty provisions applicable to persons registered with the DEA. The CSA sets forth certain offenses involving listed chemicals, DEA registration, and other prohibited acts related to registrants who manufacture, distribute and dispense controlled substances. | This report highlights certain non-criminal regulatory requirements of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The CSA and its implementing regulations establish a framework through which the federal government regulates the use of controlled substances for legitimate medical, scientific, research, and industrial purposes, and prevents these substances from being diverted for illegal purposes. The CSA assigns various plants, drugs, and chemicals (such as narcotics, stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids) to one of five schedules based on the substance's medical use, potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability. Schedule I contains substances that have no currently accepted medical use and cannot safely be made available to the public under a prescription, while Schedules II, III, IV, and V include substances that have recognized medical uses and may be manufactured, distributed, and used in accordance with the CSA. The order of the schedules reflects substances that are progressively less dangerous and addictive. To restrict access to chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of certain controlled substances, the CSA also regulates 40 "listed chemicals." Furthermore, the CSA regulates controlled substance "analogues," which are substances that are not controlled but are structurally or pharmacologically similar to substances found in Schedule I or II and have no accepted medical use.
Unless specifically exempted by the CSA, any person who handles controlled substances or listed chemicals (such as drug manufacturers, wholesale distributors, doctors, hospitals, pharmacies, and scientific researchers) must register with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the U.S. Department of Justice, which administers and enforces the CSA. Registrants must keep accurate and complete records of all transactions involving controlled substances, maintain detailed inventories of the substances in their possession, and periodically file reports with the DEA, as well as ensure that controlled substances are securely stored and safeguarded in accordance with DEA regulations.
Between 10%-11% of all drug prescriptions written in the United States are for pharmaceutical controlled substances. Only licensed medical practitioners (who are registered with the DEA) are authorized to prescribe controlled substances listed in Schedules II-V to patients; such prescriptions may only be issued by a practitioner who is "acting in the usual course of his professional practice," and for a "legitimate medical purpose." The CSA authorizes the DEA Administrator to suspend or revoke a physician's prescription privileges upon a finding that he has "committed such acts as would render his registration ... inconsistent with the public interest."
While the CSA provides criminal sanctions for illicit possession, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances, the statute also contains a few noteworthy penalty provisions that are specifically applicable to persons who are authorized by the DEA to handle controlled substances lawfully. The CSA sets forth certain offenses involving listed chemicals and DEA registration and other prohibited acts relating to registrants who manufacture, distribute, and dispense controlled substances. |
crs_R40854 | crs_R40854_0 | A-76 states that, whenever possible, and to achieve greater efficiency and productivity, the federal government should conduct competitions between public agencies and the private sector to determine who should perform the work. The A-76 Competition at the U.S. Army Walter Reed Army Medical Center
It should be noted that the public debate over A-76 policy was further ignited in February 2007 as a result of a series of published articles in the Washington Post on reportedly poor conditions at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, DC. The ensuing public debate led to several investigations, resignations of some senior Army officials, congressional hearings, and legislation passed by Congress to prohibit the conduct of A-76 competitions at military medical facilities. The Current Moratorium on the Conduct of Circular A-76 Competitions
Currently, there is a moratorium on the conduct of OMB Circular A-76 competitions that has been extended through FY2012. The moratorium was extended through the passage of Section 733 of H.R. 2055 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ). Legislative History on the Moratorium on Circular A-76 Competitions
Congress passed legislation in January 2008 to suspend DOD public-private competitions under OMB Circular A-76 and again in March 2009 to halt the beginning of any new A-76 competitions throughout the rest of the federal government. Since 2008, the moratorium has been extended. No new competitions have taken place since the moratorium has been in place. The effect of this provision was that no funds could be used to begin or announce a public-private competition under OMB Circular A-76; In Section 735 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act FY2010, Congress imposed a government-wide moratorium, prohibiting certain federal agencies from initiating or announcing a new public-private competition under OMB Circular A-76 through September 30, 2010; In Section 325 of the NDAA for FY2010, Congress suspended all ongoing public-private competitions being conducted by the Department of Defense pursuant to OMB Circular A-76 , and established a review and approval process for recommencing such competitions; In Sections 322(c) and 325 (c) of the NDAA for FY2010, Congress required GAO to assess DOD's report on public-private competitions under Circular A-76, and DOD's use of its authority to extend the 24-month time limit on the conduct of A-76 competitions; In Section 8117 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY2010, Congress prohibited the spending of any FY2010 funds to conduct public-private competitions under OMB Circular A-76 through September 30, 2010; In Section 323 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011, Congress prohibited the Secretary of Defense from establishing any quotas or goals for converting functions performed by DOD civilian employees to performance by contractors, "unless such goal, target, or quota is based on considered research and analysis, as required by section 235, 2330a, or 2463 of Title 10, United States Code;" Additionally, Section 323 also required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees, no later than March 31, 2011, a report on the conversion of functions to performance by DOD civilian employees made during FY2010, including the basis and rationale for decisions reached, and the number of contract employees whose functions were converted to performance by DOD civilian employees (an inventory of contracts for services for FY2010); Section 323 also required GAO to complete an assessment of DOD's report, and report to Congress no later than 120 days after DOD submitted its related report to Congress. The moratorium on the conduct of A-76 competitions cannot be lifted until all of these reports have been completed. Other Issues Raised in DOD's Report on Section 325 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. To what degree have the problems that led to the moratorium been resolved? 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (P.L. 2647 (P.L. Legislation Passed in the 110th Congress
P.L. The amendment failed to pass, 199-211. | This report discusses the status of the ongoing moratorium on the conduct of Department of Defense (DOD) public-private competitions under Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, and potential issues for Congress.
OMB Circular A-76 is a federal executive branch policy for managing public-private competitions to perform functions for the federal government. A-76 states that, whenever possible, and to achieve greater efficiency and productivity, the federal government should conduct competitions between public agencies and the private sector to determine who should perform the work.
Congress passed legislation in P.L. 110-181, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2008 to suspend DOD public-private competitions under OMB Circular A-76. A government-wide moratorium on the conduct of Circular A-76 competitions was extended through FY2012 through Section 733, Title VII (General Provisions, Government-wide Departments, Agencies and Corporations) of Division C (Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2012) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of FY2012, P.L. 112-74. This moratorium extended through September 30, 2012. The government-wide moratorium has been in place since the passage of P.L. 111-8, the Omnibus Appropriations Act for FY2009.
There were at least two legislative amendments introduced during the 2nd session of the 112th Congress that sought to suspend the moratorium on the conduct of future Circular A-76 competitions. Both amendments failed to pass.
Public debate over A-76 policy ignited in February 2007 as a result of a series of articles in the Washington Post on the conditions at the former Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, DC. The articles led to several investigations, resignations of some senior Army officials, congressional hearings, and legislation passed by Congress to prohibit the conduct of A-76 competitions at military medical facilities. Congress passed legislation in P.L. 110-181, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2008 to suspend DOD public-private competitions under OMB Circular A-76. Congress also passed legislation in P.L. 111-8, the Omnibus Appropriations Act for FY2009, to halt the beginning of any new A-76 competitions throughout the rest of the federal government. The government-wide moratorium has continued to the present.
Congress had directed the completion of several reports before the moratorium can be lifted. The congressionally required reports were the "Section 325" report which DOD was required to submit to Congress within 30 days of the enactment of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, the DOD Inspector General's report on issues involving DOD's conduct of A-76 competitions, and two Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports: one on DOD's conduct of public-private competitions, and the other on DOD's inventory of service contracts. These reports have been completed. Still, the moratorium has not been lifted.
Some policymakers have advocated for an end to the moratorium on the conduct of DOD Circular A-76 competitions. Questions about the moratorium are largely centered around to what extent the problems identified with Circular A-76 have been corrected, and the extent to which the issues raised in the reports have been resolved to the satisfaction of Congress. |
crs_RL33206 | crs_RL33206_0 | Introduction
Critical infrastructure is so vital to the United States that its incapacity would harm the nation's physical security, economic security, or public health. When infrastructure is physically concentrated in a limited geographic area it may be particularly vulnerable to geographic hazards such as natural disasters, epidemics, and certain kinds of terrorist attacks. In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated this kind of geographic impact by disrupting a substantial part of the national U.S. energy and chemical sectors, both heavily concentrated in the Gulf of Mexico. 109-58 ) facilitated the construction of new liquefied natural gas import terminals in diverse ports by granting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission exclusive siting approval authority (Section 311). Provisions in the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-468 ) require periodic studies to identify geographic areas in the United States where unplanned loss of oil pipeline facilities may cause oil shortages or price disruptions (Sec. The 110 th Congress is overseeing implementation of these measures and considering additional policies which may affect critical infrastructure concentration. Prominent among these are legislative proposals such as H.R. 6566 , H.R. 6709 , S. 3202 , and S. 3126 , which would lift federal moratoriums on, or otherwise encourage, offshore oil and natural gas development outside the western Gulf of Mexico. It reviews several ways in which the federal government has also influenced critical infrastructure, such as prescriptive siting, economic incentives, environmental regulation, and economic regulation. They have developed for multiple reasons—typically some combination of market influences, including resource location, agglomeration economies, scale economies, community preferences, and capital efficiency. These influences often have been in place for decades, gradually driving critical infrastructure development to its geographic configuration today. Federal Policies and Infrastructure Concentration
Although market forces have been the primary influence on critical infrastructure development, especially in the private sector, Congress and federal agencies historically have, from time to time, adopted policies intended to affect the capacity and location of critical infrastructure in the national interest. More recently, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. Some analysts may argue that little government intervention in infrastructure concentration is necessary because the private sector will appropriately adjust its infrastructure practices out of its own financial interest. If Congress concludes that more federal intervention is needed to alleviate vulnerabilities due to geographic concentration, it may employ a number of policy options to encourage geographic dispersion (including eliminating policies that encourage concentration ), ensure survivability, or ensure that effective infrastructure recovery capabilities are in place to mitigate impacts of concentrated infrastructure disruption. Because geographic hazards exist today, and geographic dispersion would likely take decades to achieve, addressing geographic vulnerabilities may call for a combination of options. As Congress evaluates diverse proposals with the potential to affect critical infrastructure development—directly or indirectly—Congress may consider whether such proposals are likely to relieve or exacerbate geographic vulnerability. Fiscal implications, especially related to the economic efficiency of public critical infrastructure and the efficient use of federal funds for infrastructure projects, may also be an important consideration. | "Critical infrastructure" consists of systems and assets so vital to the United States that their incapacity would harm the nation's physical security, economic security, or public health. Critical infrastructure is often geographically concentrated, so it may be distinctly vulnerable to events like natural disasters, epidemics, and certain kinds of terrorist attacks. Disruption of concentrated infrastructure could have greatly disproportionate effects, with costs potentially running into billions of dollars and spreading far beyond the immediate area of disturbance. Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and Hurricane Ivan in 2008, have demonstrated this kind of geographic vulnerability by disrupting much of the U.S. energy and chemical sectors.
Congress has been examining federal policies related to the geographic concentration and vulnerability of critical infrastructure. In the 109th Congress, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) facilitated the construction of new liquefied natural gas import terminals in diverse ports. Provisions in the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-468) require studies to identify geographic areas in the United States where unplanned loss of oil pipeline facilities may cause oil shortages or price disruptions. The 110th Congress is considering additional policies which may affect critical infrastructure concentration. Prominent among these are legislative proposals such as H.R. 6566, H.R. 6709, S. 3202, and S. 3126, which would lift federal moratoriums on, or otherwise encourage, offshore oil and natural gas development outside the western Gulf of Mexico.
Geographic concentrations of U.S. critical infrastructure typically have developed through some combination of market influences, including resource location, agglomeration economies, scale economies, community preferences, and capital efficiency. Congress and federal agencies also have adopted policies affecting the capacity and location of critical infrastructure, including prescriptive siting, economic incentives, environmental regulation, and economic regulation. Some federal policies have been developed specifically to address perceived threats to critical infrastructure. These influences often have been in place for decades, gradually driving critical infrastructure to its geographic configuration today.
Some analysts may argue that little government intervention is necessary to alleviate geographic vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure because the private sector will adjust its practices out of its own financial interest. However, if Congress concludes that federal intervention is needed, it may employ a number of policy options to encourage geographic dispersion (including eliminating policies that encourage concentration ), ensure survivability, or ensure that effective infrastructure recovery capabilities are in place to mitigate impacts of concentrated infrastructure disruption. Addressing geographic vulnerabilities may call for a combination of options. Congress may also consider whether other legislative proposals with the potential to affect critical infrastructure development—directly or indirectly—are likely to relieve or exacerbate geographic vulnerability. The economic efficiency of public critical infrastructure and the efficient use of federal funds for infrastructure development may also be important considerations. |
crs_RL34638 | crs_RL34638_0 | The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates more than $1 trillion worth of products annually. FDA's annual funding is provided in the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies appropriations bill, and is handled by the corresponding appropriations subcommittees in the House and Senate. Not having completed the normal appropriations process, Congress acted in the final days of FY2008 to provide appropriations for the start of FY2009 as part of the larger Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. The annualized amount at this rate would provide FDA with $2.42 billion in total program level for all of FY2009. The FY2009 Request
The Administration's FY2009 budget request for FDA (FY2009 request) was $2.676 billion, an increase of $256 million (10.6%) over FY2008. The requested user fee amounts included $609 million in currently authorized fees. This included $14 million in new fees for the advisory review of direct-to-consumer (DTC) television advertisements, a program authorized in the FDA Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA, P.L. In addition to the authorized fees, the FY2009 request included $21 million in proposed new user fees for generic human and animal drugs, pending authorizing legislation. It described another $27 million in proposed fees for reinspections and food and animal feed certification, but did not include them in the budget request totals. The committee did not follow the agency's request for user fees: the Senate committee recommendations did not include the proposed human or animal generic drug user fee programs, or the FDAAA-authorized program to collect user fees for the advisory review of DTC television advertisements of prescription drugs. The Continuing Appropriations Resolution allowed agencies to spend, until March 6, 2009, at the rate of their FY2008 appropriations. It specified that, for FDA, this base would include the $150 million from the FY2008 supplemental. | Food and Drug Administration (FDA) funding for the first five months of FY2009 is provided in the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009 (the CR), which is Division A of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329). It allows most agencies to continue at the same rate of spending as set by the FY2008 appropriations. For FDA, the base includes the mid-year FY2008 supplemental. The CR carries through March 6, 2009. If Congress chooses to continue at that rate for the remainder of FY2009, FDA would receive $2.42 billion, 10.6% ($256 million) less than the Administration's FY2009 amended budget request of $2.676 billion.
The Administration FY2009 request (as amended), according to budget documents, would provide for expanded activities to ensure the safety of foods and drugs, enhance workforce development and recruitment, and accelerate the availability of new medical products. The request included $609 million in currently authorized user fees (including $14 million for the advisory review of direct-to-consumer [DTC] television prescription drug advertising) and $21 million in proposed user fees for the review of generic human and animal drugs. It described another $27 million in proposed fees for reinspections and food and animal feed certification, but did not include them in the budget request totals.
The Senate Committee on Appropriations, in S. 3289, recommended an FY2009 total of $2.646 billion for FDA. It did not include the requested user fees for generic drug review, reinspection and certification, or DTC advertising review. The full Senate did not consider S. 3289. There was no FY2009 agriculture appropriations action in the House committee.
Updates to this report will track legislative activity as the fiscal year continues. |
crs_RS20668 | crs_RS20668_0 | Unanimous Consent
A large majority of measures reach the floor of the Senate when the Senate accepts a unanimous consent request to proceed to consider them made by the majority leader (or his designee). Under certain circumstances the motion to proceed is not debatable. Notifications of prospective objections to requests to take up a measure are referred to as "holds." If the motion provides that the Senate go into executive session to consider a specific piece of executive business, the effect is to raise executive business for consideration by non-debatable motion. Although infrequent in current practice, the Senate may also agree to a request or motion to go into executive session without an item of executive business being specified. | Two basic methods are used by the Senate to bring legislation to the floor for consideration: (1) The Senate, at the majority leader's request, grants unanimous consent to take up a matter, or (2) it agrees to his motion to proceed to consider it. Because the motion to proceed is subject to debate in most circumstances, it is less frequently used. Both methods are derived from the basic premise that the Senate as a body may decide what matters it considers. The Senate may also use the same two methods to bring up executive business (nominations and treaties).
This report will be updated to reflect changes in Senate practice. |
crs_RL32656 | crs_RL32656_0 | Health care Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs) are employer-established benefit plans to reimburse employees for specified health care expenses as they are incurred. FSAs can be used for unreimbursed medical expenses, and contributions to FSAs have tax advantages. However, FSA contributions are generally forfeited if not used by the end of the year, although employers may extend the deadline for using unspent balances up to 2½ months after the end of the plan year (i.e., March 15 for most plans). It also includes a discussion of the changes made to FSAs by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). With respect to health care FSAs,
the maximum amount of reimbursement (reduced by any benefits paid for covered expenses) must be available throughout the coverage period; coverage periods generally must be 12 months (to prevent employees from contributing just when they anticipate having expenses); reimbursements must be only for medical expenses allowable as deductions under Section 213 of the Code; claims must be substantiated by an independent third party; expenses must be incurred during the period of coverage; after year-end forfeitures, any "experience gains" (the excess of total plan contributions and earnings over total reimbursements and other costs) may at the employer's discretion be returned to participants or used to reduce future contributions, provided individual refunds are not based on participants' claims; and health care FSAs must exhibit the risk-shifting and risk-distribution characteristics of insurance. According to the BLS survey, 39% of all workers in 2010 had access to a health care flexible spending account. When viewed by firm size, 56% of workers in firms with more than 100 workers had access to one. The accounts were not as common for workers in small businesses. In establishments with fewer than 100 employees, 20% of the workers had access to a health FSA. As of September 2008, there were about 240,000 federal health care FSAs. According to the Mercer Survey, 37% of employees offered an FSA chose to participate in 2009. The average annual contribution was $1,420. The IRS imposes no specific dollar limit on health care FSA contributions, though plans typically have a dollar or percentage maximum for elective contributions made through salary reductions. Beginning in 2013, contributions to FSAs will be limited to $2,500, and adjusted for inflation in subsequent years. However, beginning in 2011, over-the-counter medications (except those prescribed by a physician) are no longer considered a qualified medical expense. Employers are permitted but not required to allow these withdrawals. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-432 ) provided that individuals may make limited, one-time rollovers from balances in their FSAs to Health Savings Accounts (HSAs). A federal health care FSA is also available to federal employees, though not to annuitants. Recent Legislative Activity
On June 7, 2012, the House passed H.R. 436 , the Health Care Cost Reduction Act of 2012, which would allow up to $500 of unused balances in health FSAs to be distributed back to the account holder after the plan year ends and to allow over-the-counter prescriptions to be a qualified medical expense (thus repealing the provision introduced in ACA). The bill has been sent to the Senate for its consideration. In the Senate, two similar bills have been referred to the Senate Finance Committee. | Health care Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs) are benefit plans established by employers to reimburse employees for health care expenses such as deductibles and copayments. FSAs are usually funded by employees through salary reduction agreements, although employers are permitted to contribute as well. The contributions to and withdrawals from FSAs are tax-exempt.
Historically, health care FSA contributions were forfeited if not used by the end of the year. However, in 2005, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) formally determined that employers may extend the deadline for using unspent balances up to 2½ months after the end of the plan year (i.e, until March 15 for most plans). The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-432) allows individuals to make limited, one-time rollovers from balances in their health care FSAs to Health Savings Accounts (HSAs).
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics National Compensation Survey, 39% of all workers in 2010 had access to a health care flexible spending account. When viewed by firm size, 56% of workers in firms with more than 100 workers had access to a health care FSA. The accounts were not as common for workers in small businesses. In establishments with fewer than 100 employees, 20% of the workers could choose to participate in an FSA. Not all employees offered an FSA chose to participate. According to a 2010 Mercer Survey, 37% of employees offered an FSA chose to participate and the average annual contribution was $1,420. In 2003, FSAs became available to federal employees for the first time. In September 2008, about 240,000 federal employees had health care FSAs.
These other points might be noted about health care FSAs:
FSAs are limited to employees and former employees. The IRS imposes no dollar limit on health care FSA contributions, but employers generally do. FSAs generally can be used only for unreimbursed medical expenses that would be deductible under the Internal Revenue Code, but not for health insurance or long-term care insurance premiums. Employers may impose additional restrictions.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148), some provisions of which are amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152), modified the definition of qualified medical expenses to exclude over-the-counter prescriptions (not prescribed by a physician) as a qualified expense effective 2011. In addition, ACA limits the annual FSA contributions to $2,500 beginning in 2013.
On June 7, 2012, the House passed H.R. 436, the Health Care Cost Reduction Act of 2012, which would allow up to $500 of unused balances in health FSAs to be distributed back to the account holder after the plan year ends and to allow over-the-counter prescriptions to be a qualified medical expense (thus repealing the provision introduced in ACA). The bill has been sent to the Senate for its consideration. Similar bills in the Senate have been referred to the Senate Finance Committee (S. 1368 and S. 1404). This report discusses these bills in greater detail.
This report will be updated for new data or as legislative activity occurs. |
crs_RL34729 | crs_RL34729_0 | Some analysts contend that the U.S. policy of engagement with China has failed to produce meaningful political reform, and that without fundamental progress in this area, the bilateral relationship will remain unstable. Others argue that U.S. engagement has helped to accelerate economic and social change and build social and legal foundations for democracy and the advancement of human rights in the PRC. Some analysts also blame decreasing leverage by the United States on Chinese human rights policies. These changes have come about through both government policies and the development of civil society. Nonetheless, the Internet has made it impossible for the government to restrict information as fully as before. The U.S. government has developed a comprehensive array of tactics and programs aimed at promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in China, but their effects have been felt primarily along the margins of the PRC political system. Congressional committees, the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, and other congressionally mandated bodies and fora have investigated, publicized, and reported on human rights conditions in China. Recent Developments
Crackdown on Dissent
In the winter and spring of 2011, the PRC government intensified efforts to suppress China's increasingly active civil society, including rights defenders, activist lawyers, bloggers and other critical voices, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), independent churches, restive ethnic minority groups, and others whom it deemed threatening to social and political stability. Moreover, the official press has become more critical of some human rights abuses. Major Human Rights Issues
Major, ongoing human rights violations in China include the following: excessive use of violence by security forces and their proxies; unlawful and abusive detention; torture; arbitrary use of state security laws against political dissidents; coercive family planning policies; state control of information; harassment and persecution of people involved in unsanctioned religious activities, including worship in unregistered Protestant "house churches" and Catholic churches that express loyalty to the Pope; and mistreatment and deportation of North Korean refugees. Many Tibetans, Uighurs, and Falun Gong adherents have been singled out for especially harsh treatment. According to some analysts, legal reforms may ultimately provide foundations for far-reaching social and political change in China. In recent years, the government has attempted to impose greater surveillance upon Internet users. Nonetheless, government efforts to suppress the group continued. The developing rights awareness of many Chinese citizens, combined with small but passionate networks of lawyers, journalists, and activists, suggests that social pressures for advancing human rights are likely to continue. U.S. Efforts to Advance Human Rights in China
In the past two decades, successive U.S. administrations have developed a comprehensive array of tactics and programs aimed toward promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in China, but their effects have been felt primarily along the margins of the PRC political system. Policy tools include private discussions; sanctions; open criticism of PRC human rights policies; coordinating international pressure; support of and contact with dissidents; bilateral dialogue; human rights, democracy, and related programs in the PRC; promoting Internet freedom; public diplomacy efforts; and monitoring and highlighting human rights abuses. | This report examines human rights conditions in China, including the 2011 crackdown on rights activists and dissent; ongoing human rights abuses; recent PRC efforts to protect human rights; and the development of civil society. Ongoing human rights problems in China include the excessive use of violence by public security forces, unlawful detention, torture of detainees, arbitrary use of state security laws against political dissidents, coercive family planning policies, state control of information, and religious and ethnic persecution. Tibetans, Uighur Muslims, and Falun Gong adherents have been singled out for especially harsh treatment. For additional, comprehensive information about human rights conditions in China, see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2010, and the U.S. Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report: China.
The Chinese leadership's resistance to major political reform and fuller support of civil liberties has been driven largely by its fears of social unrest and political instability. Moreover, some public opinion surveys suggest that many Chinese people, while wanting greater freedoms, do not support rapid political change. Nonetheless, Chinese society has become more assertive. Incidents of social protests are frequent, numerous, and widespread. Economic, social, and demographic changes have given rise to labor unrest. PRC citizens have become increasingly aware of their legal rights, while emerging networks of lawyers, journalists, and activists have advanced the causes of many aggrieved individuals and groups. The mass media continues to push the boundaries of officially approved discourse, and the Internet has made it impossible for the government to restrict information as fully as before.
The PRC government has attempted to respond to some popular grievances, develop the legal system, and cautiously support the expansion of civil society, while suppressing activists who attempt to organize mass protests and dissidents who openly question sensitive policies or call for fundamental political change. This approach has produced modest improvements in some human rights conditions, but also allowed for continued, serious abuses. In recent months, the government has intensified efforts to suppress legal activists, rights defenders, and other individuals and groups whom it has deemed to be threatening to social and political stability.
The United States government has developed a comprehensive array of policy tools aimed toward promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in China, but their effects have been felt primarily along the margins of the PRC political system. U.S. government efforts to promote human rights in China have included sanctions; openly criticizing PRC human rights policies and calling for the release of political prisoners; bilateral dialogue; "quiet diplomacy;" and hearings and investigations. The U.S. Congress has appropriated funding for democracy, human rights, rule of law, environmental, and other programs in China, including Tibet, and supported Internet freedom and public diplomacy efforts aimed at the PRC. Some policy makers contend that U.S. engagement with China has failed to produce meaningful political reform and improvements in human rights conditions. Other experts argue that engagement has helped to advance economic and social change in China, to develop social and legal foundations for democracy and human rights, and to open channels through which to directly communicate U.S. concerns. |
crs_RL32275 | crs_RL32275_0 | Some policy issues seem fixed on Congress's legislative agenda. A case in point is the taxation of small firms and its effect on their rate of formation, economic performance, and prospects for growth. Nonetheless, some lawmakers say existing tax relief for small firms is inadequate; thus, they favor the adoption of further targeted reductions in the tax burden on small business owners. Most take the form of deductions, exclusions and exemptions, credits, deferrals, and preferential tax rates. Existing small business tax benefits also differ in scope and economic importance. Significant Legislative Proposals in the 110th Congress
A growing number of proposals to enhance existing small business tax preferences or create new ones have been introduced in the current Congress. Several such proposals merit discussion because they played a central role in congressional approval of legislation to increase the federal minimum wage. The Senate responded by passing an amended version of H.R. S. 349 paired the same increase in the federal minimum wage with a package of tax benefits intended to mitigate the impact of the increase on the financial conditions of small firms. 2 , the House passed H.R. 976 would have provided five business tax benefits: (1) a one-year extension of the WOTC (through 2008), an expansion of the credit to include disabled veterans, and an increase from 25 to 40 in the age limit for eligible employees living in empowerment zones and enterprise and renewal communities; (2) a one-year extension of the expensing allowance (through 2010), an increase in the maximum allowance to $125,000 and the phaseout threshold to $500,000 starting in 2007, and an indexation of both amounts for inflation; (3) a freeze in the minimum wage at the current level of $5.15 for the purpose of determining the tax credit that employers in the restaurant business may claim for federal payroll taxes paid on employee tips above the federal minimum wage; (4) a permanent waiver of the limitations under the individual and corporate alternative minimum tax on claims for the WOTC and the business tax credit for federal payroll taxes paid on employee tips; and (5) a revision of current tax filing requirements to allow a married couple who owns an unincorporated business to file as a sole proprietorship, instead of a partnership, without incurring a penalty, and to allow both spouses to receive credit for payroll taxes paid. The House passed the measure on March 23. It included the minimum wage provisions from H.R. 1591 contained the same business tax benefits as H.R. The estimated revenue cost of the business tax benefits in the Senate-passed version of H.R. House and Senate leaders agreed to a conference to resolve the differences between the two versions of H.R. On April 24, House and Senate negotiators filed a conference report ( H.Rept. 110-107 ) that included a package of business tax benefits with a projected revenue cost of $4.8 billion from FY2007 through FY2017 and a package of revenue raisers designed to offset that cost. The House approved the report on April 25, and the Senate did likewise on the following day. But President Bush vetoed the measure on May 1, mainly because it contained a timetable for withdrawing U.S. combat troops from Iraq that he deemed unacceptable. A second bill to provide supplemental appropriations for FY2007 ( H.R. It omitted any timetable for withdrawing troops from Iraq but included the same packages of business tax benefits and offsetting revenue raisers from the version of H.R. President Bush signed the measure on May 25. | Some policy issues seem fixed on Congress's legislative agenda. One such issue is the taxation of small firms and its effects on their formation, performance, and growth. In the view of some lawmakers, the current federal tax burden on small firms, though smaller than it could be because of existing small business tax benefits, should be reduced further because it hinders their formation and retards their growth. Others find it difficult to justify on economic grounds additional tax relief for small business owners.
The federal tax code offers numerous benefits of varying importance to small firms, regardless of their lines of business. Most of these benefits take the form of deductions, exclusions and exemptions, credits, deferrals, and preferential tax rates.
A growing number of proposals to expand certain existing small business tax preferences, or create new ones, have been introduced in the 110th Congress. Several related bills are worth noting because they played a central role in congressional approval of legislation to increase the federal minimum wage.
Early in the current Congress, the House and Senate passed differing versions of legislation (H.R. 2) to raise the federal minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25 over two years. The House version included no tax benefits intended to soften the impact of the increase on the financial condition of small firms, whereas the Senate version contained a set of such benefits and a package of revenue raisers intended to offset their revenue cost over 10 years.
With negotiations over moving to a conference on minimum wage legislation stalled, the House passed on March 23 a FY2007 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 1591) that included the minimum wage provisions from H.R. 2 and the business tax benefits from a bill it approved in February (H.R. 976). The Senate responded by passing an amended version of H.R. 1591 on March 29 that included the same minimum wage increase and an expanded version of the business tax benefits from H.R. 2. Differences between the two versions of H.R. 1591 led to the formation of a conference. A conference report (H.Rept. 110-107) was filed on April 24 that combined a set of business tax benefits with a package of revenue raisers intended to offset their estimated 10-year revenue cost of $4.8 billion. The House approved the report on April 25, and the Senate did likewise the next day. But President Bush vetoed the bill on May 1, mainly because it included a timetable for removing U.S. combat troops from Iraq that he opposed.
The House and Senate then passed a second FY2007 supplemental appropriation bill (H.R. 2206) that omitted any such timetable but contained the same business tax benefits and revenue raisers. President Bush signed the measure on May 25.
This report describes significant proposals in the 110th Congress to create new tax benefits for small firms across all industries, or to enhance existing such benefits. It will be updated to reflect recent legislative activity. |
crs_RS22151 | crs_RS22151_0 | Legislative Proposals in the 109th Congress
In the 109 th Congress, two proposals have been introduced to regulate more strictly certain long-range .50 caliber rifles. The FCSA maintains that long-range .50 BMG caliber rifles were first developed for marksmanship competitions and, then adopted by the military as sniper rifles. One of the rifles adopted by the U.S. Army is the M-107 Long Range Sniper Rifle. Potential Deadly Misuse of Long-Range Fifty Caliber Rifles
Gun control advocates have reported that long-range .50 caliber rifles could be used by terrorists in several deadly scenarios. According to the Violence Policy Center, given the range and power of a .50 caliber BMG round, a rifle chambered to fire this round could be used to bring down a slow/low-flying aircraft. Given the potential destructiveness of these rifles, one option for Congress to consider is more strictly regulating these firearms under the National Firearms Act. National Firearms Act (NFA), As Amended
Two major statutes regulate the commerce in, and possession of, firearms: The National Firearms Act of 1934 and the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended. Seven, Congress could consider setting ballistic performance standards that would benchmark the outward limit for .50 caliber rifle ammunition considered acceptable for sporting, hunting, or recreational purposes. | In the 109th Congress, legislation has been introduced to more strictly regulate certain .50 caliber rifles, some of which have been adopted by the U.S. military as sniper rifles. These rifles are chambered to fire a relatively large round that was originally designed for the Browning Machine Gun (BMG). Gun control advocates have argued that these firearms have little sporting, hunting, or recreational purpose. They maintain that these rifles could be used to shoot down aircraft, rupture pressurized chemical tanks, or penetrate armored personnel carriers. Gun control opponents counter that these rifles are expensive, cumbersome and rarely, if ever, used in crime. Furthermore, they maintain that these rifles were first developed for long-range marksmanship competitions and, then adopted by the military as sniper rifles. Related amendments may be offered during Senate-consideration of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (S. 397). (For further information, see CRS Report RS22074, Limiting Tort Liability of Gun Manufacturers and Gun Sellers: Legal Analysis of P.L. 109-92 (2005), by [author name scrubbed].) The issue for Congress is whether to regulate these firearms more stringently based on their destructive potential in a post-9/11 environment. And if regulation is pursued, what measures seem most effective and appropriate. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R43177 | crs_R43177_0 | Title VII provides support to both institutions and individuals. It supports institutions to expand the capacity to build and sustain the health workforce through training programs, mainly through grant awards and contractual agreements. For example, institutions may receive Title VII grants to implement residency programs at medical and dental schools; recruitment and retention initiatives in community-based educational settings; and health workforce data collection activities within state health departments. Many Title VII programs and activities were reauthorized in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended). Health policy experts expect this mandate combined with additional changes will increase health insurance coverage to be accompanied by a likely increased demand for health services and health care providers. Title VII represents one among several federal efforts to support the development of the health workforce. References to "the Secretary" mean the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) unless otherwise specified. Appendix A summarizes two ACA provisions that are Title VII-related. Individuals who are employed or studying in the health professions may be eligible for Title VII support, either directly or indirectly. Detailed Description of Title VII Programs and Activities
Title VII authorizes a broad range of programs and activities to develop and sustain the education and training pipeline for the health care workforce. Subpart 1: Health Professions Workforce Information and Analysis (§§761-763)
This subpart establishes a center to encourage states, health professions organizations, and other public and private groups to collect and analyze health workforce data; and establishes an advisory council to make recommendations to the Secretary and Congress on graduate medical education. In addition, ACA created Section 5103, which was enacted as Section 761, Health Professions Workforce Information and Analysis, within the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and is described in the body of this report. Among the specific topics to be reviewed are: the current health care workforce supply and demand, and projections for the next 10 and 25 years; the current health care workforce education and training capacity, and projected demands for such education and training over the next 10 and 25 years; education loan and grant programs authorized in Titles VII and VIII of the PHSA and whether they should be authorized under the Higher Education Act; the implications of new and existing federal policies on the health care workforce; the health care workforce needs of special populations; and recommendations for creating or revising loan repayment and scholarship programs to require low-income minority medical students to serve in their home communities, if designated as a medically underserved community. | Title VII of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) supports health professions education and training through grants to and contractual agreements with institutions, and direct assistance to individuals. Institutions may receive Title VII support for such activities as residency programs at medical and dental schools, recruitment and retention initiatives in community-based educational settings, and health workforce data collection and analysis within state health departments. Individuals typically receive direct assistance through scholarships, loans, loan repayments, or fellowships. Title VII authorizes several advisory groups to make recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and Congress on various health workforce programs and Title VII functions. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), oversees programs authorized in Title VII.
The health care workforce—the backbone of the health care delivery system—includes physicians, nurses, dentists, therapists, and others who deliver health services to individuals in physicians' offices, health centers, clinics, and other community-based health care settings. In 2010, Congress reauthorized Title VII health workforce programs and activities in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended). The ACA also added several new authorities that aim to build and sustain the health care workforce alongside other provisions for health reform, including health insurance expansion.
The 113th Congress has held hearings and introduced legislation to address the adequacy of the health care workforce. Health policy experts anticipate that ACA provisions for health insurance expansion could lead to an increased demand for health service utilization, and they expect that this increased demand for services could prompt increased demand for health providers, including physicians and nurses. Other factors causing concern about the adequacy of the health workforce include uneven provider distribution, attrition and retirement, and demands of the aging population. Legislative interest or action may focus on the impact of Title VII programs on education and training in the health professions.
This report describes and summarizes Title VII programs. It describes federal support for institutions and individuals in efforts to expand and sustain the pipeline for health professions education and training. Appendix A summarizes ACA initiatives for health workforce provisions related to Title VII. |
crs_R44893 | crs_R44893_0 | These programs provide support to state, local, and tribal governments and nonprofit organizations for a variety of criminal justice-related purposes, such as combatting violence against women, reducing backlogs of DNA evidence, supporting community policing, assisting crime victims, promoting prisoner reentry, and improving the functioning of the juvenile justice system. These programs are funded through five accounts in the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations act:
Violence Against Women Programs; Research, Evaluation, and Statistics; State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance; Juvenile Justice Programs; and Community Oriented Policing Services. The report also provides information on FY2017 appropriations for DOJ's grant programs. Office on Violence Against Women (OVW)
The Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) was established to administer programs created under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 ( P.L. Congress and the Administration provided, relative to FY2017 funding, an additional $5.0 million for transitional housing assistance grants, an additional $5.0 million for grants to assist victims of domestic violence in rural areas, and an additional $0.5 million for research related to violence against women. The Administration's FY2018 request for the Research, Evaluation, and Statistics account was $22.0 million greater than FY2017 funding. For FY2017, Congress and the Administration provided funding for the RISS program under the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) account. The House declined to adopt the Administration's proposal to fund RISS through the Research, Evaluation, and Statistics account (funding for this program was provided under the Community Oriented Policing Services account). Congress and the Administration funded the Research, Evaluation, and Statistics account at $90.0 million for FY2018, an amount that is $1.0 million more than FY2017 funding, but $21.0 million less than the Administration's request. State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance
The State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance (S&LLEA) account includes funding for a variety of grant programs to improve the functioning of state, local, and tribal criminal justice systems. For FY2018, the Trump Administration requested $940.5 million for the S&LLEA account, which included a proposed $73.0 million transfer from the Crime Victims Fund. The House-passed bill included $1.189 billion for the S&LLEA account. The House declined to adopt many of the Administration's funding proposals, such as supplementing funding for the account with a transfer from the Crime Victims Fund, increasing funding for Project Safe Neighborhoods, and eliminating funding for the SCAAP and Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation programs (funding for the latter is provided under the Community Oriented Policing Services account and is $7.5 million less than FY2017 funding). Congress and the Administration provided $1.680 billion for the S&LLEA account for FY2018. In general, Congress declined to adopt the Administration's funding proposals for the S&LLEA account, including supplementing appropriations from the General Fund of the Treasury with a transfer from the Crime Victims Fund, eliminating funding for SCAAP and the Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation program, and cutting funding for JAG, DNA initiatives, and the Comprehensive School Safety Initiative relative to FY2017 funding. For FY2017, Congress and the Administration authorized DOJ to use up to 7% of the funding available under the State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance, Juvenile Justice Programs, and Community Oriented Policing Services account, with a few exceptions, for tribal justice assistance programs. The $229.5 million the Trump Administration requested for this account included a transfer of $92.0 million from the Crime Victims Fund. The House-passed bill included $175.5 million for the Juvenile Justice Programs account. The bill reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations included a $13.0 million increase for the Juvenile Justice Programs account ($260.0 million). FY2018 enacted funding for the Juvenile Justice Programs account is $282.5 million, which is $35.5 million greater than FY2017 funding and $53.0 million greater than the Administration's request. Every program was funded at or above the FY2017 level. | Each year, Congress and the Administration provide funding for a variety of grant programs through the Department of Justice (DOJ). These programs are used to fund state, local, and tribal governments and nonprofit organizations for a variety of criminal justice-related purposes, such as efforts to combat violence against women, reduce backlogs of DNA evidence, support community policing, assist crime victims, promote prisoner reentry, and improve the functioning of the juvenile justice system. These programs are funded through five accounts in the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations act: Violence Against Women Programs; Research, Evaluation, and Statistics; State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance; Juvenile Justice Programs; and Community Oriented Policing Services.
For FY2018, the Trump Administration requested a total of $1.979 billion for the five DOJ grant accounts, which included $480.0 million for the Violence Against Women Programs account; $111.0 million for the Research, Evaluation, and Statistics account; $940.5 million for the State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance account; $229.5 million for the Juvenile Justice Programs account; and $218.0 million for the Community Oriented Policing Services account. To achieve these funding levels the Administration proposed transferring a total of $610.0 million from the Crime Victims Fund to three accounts: $445.0 million to Violence Against Women Programs, $73.0 million to State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance, and $92.0 million to Juvenile Justice Programs. The transfers would have supplemented appropriations from the General Fund of the Treasury for the three accounts.
In H.R. 3354, the House recommended a total of $2.215 billion for DOJ's grant accounts, which included $527.5 million for the Violence Against Women Programs account; $83.0 million for the Research, Evaluation, and Statistics account; $1.189 billion for the State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance account; $175.5 million for the Juvenile Justice Programs account; and $240.5 million for the Community Oriented Policing Services account. The House bill would not have transferred funding from the Crime Victims Fund to the Violence Against Women Programs, State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance, and Juvenile Justice Programs accounts.
In S. 1662, the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended a total of $2.226 billion for DOJ's grant accounts. This amount included a $379.0 million transfer from the Crime Victims Fund to the Violence Against Women Programs account. Within the amount that would have been provided, $483.5 million was for the Violence Against Women Programs account; $85.0 million was for the Research, Evaluation, and Statistics account; $1.171 billion was for the State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance account; $260.0 million was for the Juvenile Justice Programs account; and $226.5 million was for the Community Oriented Policing Services account.
Congress and the Administration funded DOJ's five grant accounts at $2.820 billion for FY2018. This amount includes $492.0 million for the Violence Against Women Programs account; $90.0 million for the Research, Evaluation, and Statistics account; $1.680 billion for the State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance account; $282.5 million for the Juvenile Justice Programs account; and $275.5 million for the Community Oriented Policing Services account. Total funding includes $492.0 million that is to be transferred from the Crime Victims Fund to the Office on Violence Against Women. In general, most DOJ grant programs were funded at or above the FY2017 level. Many of the programs that received the largest increases in funding are related to combatting opioid abuse. Congress also largely declined to accept the Administration's proposals to eliminate funding for several grant programs, such as the State Criminal Alien Assistance program, and to decrease funding for other programs. |
crs_RL33680 | crs_RL33680_0 | On September 26, 2006, President Bush signed into law S. 2590 , the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act ( P.L. 109-282 ). To that end, the legislation required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish a publicly available, online database containing information about entities that are awarded federal grants, loans, contracts, and other forms of assistance. Three of the primary categories of federal expenditures and obligations to be included in the database—federal grants, loans, and contracts—represent a significant element of federal spending. According to the most recently published Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR), federal agencies award over $880 billion in those three categories of financial assistance alone: $470 billion in grants, $381 billion in contracts, and $29 billion in direct loans. OMB launched the database, USAspending.gov , on December 13, 2007. While the new database has been praised as a step toward a worthy objective—enhancing the transparency of government expenditures—government officials and members of the public have expressed concern about the quality of the data it provides, and about the cost of enhancing and expanding data collection efforts. This report initially discusses the background of S. 2590 , noting in particular how it compared to similar legislation in the House of Representatives. It then discusses the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act's provisions, noting what types of assistance are to be part of the new database, the primary sources of the data, and deadlines for implementation. Finally, the report identifies and discusses issues that might affect the act's implementation, and that therefore might prove to be areas for future congressional oversight. Three major financial assistance databases were identified in the act as likely sources of information for the new website—the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), the Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS), and Grants.gov . | On September 26, 2006, President Bush signed S. 2590, the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act, into law (P.L. 109-282). In an attempt to expand oversight of federal spending, including earmarks, the new law required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish a publicly available online database containing information about entities that are awarded federal grants, loans, contracts, and other forms of assistance. Federal agencies award over $880 billion dollars annually in three of the primary categories of financial assistance to be included in the database—$470 billion in grants, $381 billion in contracts, and $29 billion in direct loans. The FFATA was endorsed by leaders of both parties and an array of business, union, and watchdog organizations.
OMB launched the new database, USAspending.gov, on December 13, 2007. While the database has been praised as a step toward a worthy objective—enhancing the transparency of government expenditures—government officials and members of the public have expressed concern that issues surrounding its implementation have not been adequately addressed. In particular, many observers question the reliability of information taken from the Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS) and the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which are important sources of information for USAspending.gov. They note that information in FAADS and FPDS is often incomplete and inaccurate, and therefore might limit transparency. Some observers also believe that the cost of establishing and maintaining the new database might grow as agencies seek to improve data quality and collect new information on subawards.
This report initially discusses the background of S. 2590, noting in particular how it compared to similar legislation in the House of Representatives. It then discusses the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act's provisions, noting what types of assistance are to be part of the new database, the primary sources of the data, and deadlines for implementation. Finally, the report identifies and discusses issues that have been raised regarding the act that might affect its implementation, and that therefore might prove to be areas for future congressional oversight. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41814 | crs_R41814_0 | Introduction
Almost all borrowing by the federal government is conducted by the Treasury Department, within the restrictions established by a single, statutory limit (ceiling) on the total amount of debt that may be outstanding at any time. By law, the Treasury cannot exceed federal debt limits, so the Treasury periodically has had to ask Congress to enact new debt limits so it can fulfill its financial commitments. Since 1978, 58 measures adjusting or suspending the statutory debt limit either as stand-alone legislation or as part of legislation dealing with other matters have been enacted into law. | Almost all borrowing by the federal government is conducted by the Treasury Department, within the restrictions established by a single, statutory limit (ceiling) on the total amount of debt that may be outstanding at any time. By law, the Treasury cannot exceed federal debt limits, so the Treasury periodically has had to ask Congress to enact new debt limits so it can fulfill its financial commitments. Since 1978, 58 measures adjusting or suspending the statutory debt limit either as stand-alone legislation or as part of legislation dealing with other matters have been enacted into law.
This report provides roll call vote data identified by the Congressional Research Service for measures to adjust the statutory debt limit. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL31367 | crs_RL31367_0 | Background
The U.S. Supreme Court decided at the end of its 2003-2004 term that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges on behalf the approximately 550 persons who were detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in connection with the war against terrorism. Circuit, which had accepted the Administration's argument that no U.S. court has jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas corpus by or on behalf of the detainees because they are aliens and are detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States. Congress approved the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA, or Graham-Levin Amendment) to establish standards for interrogation and to deny detainees access to federal courts to file habeas petitions but allow limited appeals of status determinations and final decisions of military commissions in the D.C. The Bush Administration deems all of the detainees to be "unlawful combatants," who may, according to Administration officials, be held indefinitely without trial or even despite their possible acquittal by a military tribunal. The 9/11 Commission, apparently finding the international discord over the treatment and status of the detainees to be harmful to the U.S. effort to thwart terrorism, recommended the development of a common coalition approach toward the detention and humane treatment of captured terrorists. Critics' Views
Some allied countries and human rights organizations criticized the President's decision as contrary to international law, arguing it relied on an inaccurate interpretation of the Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). The U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCR) and some human rights organizations argue that all combatants captured on the battlefield are entitled to be treated as POWs until an independent tribunal has determined otherwise. The President's decision to apply the Geneva Conventions to the Taliban but deny their application to Al Qaeda as a non-party may be an implicit recognition that the armed conflict is an international one, at least with respect to the Taliban. Prisoners of War
The privileged status of prisoners of war grew from the concept of military necessity. Treatment of Detainees at Guantánamo
The Department of Defense defends its treatment of the detainees at the Guantánamo Naval Station as fully complying with the principles of the Geneva Convention, and view the treatment as compliant with Common Article 3 as well as standards set by Congress in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Under the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act, the detainees have limited recourse to federal courts to challenge their status as "enemy combatants," but they are prohibited from invoking their rights under the Geneva Conventions in connection with such a challenge. 108th Congress
Several measures were introduced during the 108 th Congress to address the detention of persons detained in connection with the war on terrorism. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, P.L. H.R. | In June 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v. Bush that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges on behalf of persons detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in connection with the war against terrorism. The Court overturned a ruling that no U.S. court has jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas corpus on behalf of the detainees because they are aliens detained abroad, but left questions involving prisoners' rights and status unanswered. The 9/11 Commission recommended a common coalition approach to such detention. Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), P.L. 109-148, to establish standards for interrogation and to deny detainees access to federal courts to file habeas petitions but allow limited appeals of status determinations and final decisions of military commissions. Congress approved the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), P.L. 109-366, to authorize military commissions for the prosecution of detainees for war crimes.
The Bush Administration earlier deemed all of the detainees to be "unlawful combatants," who may, according to Administration officials, be held indefinitely without trial or even if they are acquitted by a military tribunal. Fifteen of the detainees were designated as subject to the President's Military Order of November 13, 2001, making them eligible for trial by military commission. In answer to the Rasul decision, the Pentagon instituted Combatant Status Review Tribunals to provide a forum for detainees to challenge their status as "enemy combatants." The Pentagon had earlier announced a plan for annual reviews to determine whether detainees may be released without endangering national security.
The President's decision to deny the detainees prisoner-of-war (POW) status remains a point of contention, in particular with respect to members of the Taliban, with some arguing that it is based on an inaccurate interpretation of the Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), which they assert requires that all combatants captured on the battlefield are entitled to be treated as POWs until an independent tribunal has determined otherwise. The publication of executive branch memoranda documenting the internal debate about the status of prisoners evoked additional criticism of the Bush Administration's legal position. Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld determined that persons captured in Afghanistan in connection with the "Global War on Terrorism" are entitled at least to the minimum set of protections accorded by Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
This report provides an overview of the law of war and the historical treatment of wartime detainees, in particular the U.S. practice; describes how the detainees' status might affect their rights and treatment; and summarizes activity of the 108th and 109th Congresses related to detention in connection with the war against terrorism. The report also summarizes legislative proposals in the 110th Congress, including H.R. 1 and H.R. 267. |
crs_RL31311 | crs_RL31311_0 | This reduces total Foreign Operationsfunding to roughly $16.18 billion. The enacted Foreign Operations appropriation provides $700 million for the Andean Regional counternarcotics initiative. (Note: This report does not discuss or include $7.48 billion in Foreign Operations funding approved in P.L. Introduction
The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislativevehicle through which Congress reviews and votes on the U.S. foreign assistancebudget and influences major aspects of executive branch foreign policy makinggenerally. (1) It contains the largest share -- abouttwo-thirds -- of total internationalaffairs spending by the United States (see Figure 1 ). On February 13, Congress approved the conference report for theOmnibus Appropriation, and the President signed the measure on February 20 ( P.L.108-7 ). 108-11 , the Iraq War Supplemental. 4775 ), bringing amounts for FY2002 to $16.54 billion. Foreign Operations, the FY2003 Budget Resolution, and Sec. Foreign Operations received a $16.35 billion allocation from eachCommittee, about $230 million higher than the President's request at that time. Other bilateral reconstruction support for Kabul, they said, would bedetermined later. Other Key Elements of the FY2003 Request. Table 4. 107-206 ). Conference Agreement. The Foreign Operations portion,one of 11 regular appropriation measures included in the omnibus measure, setsfunding at $16.3 billion for FY2003, about $150 million less than requested and $125million and $250 million less than bills recommended earlier by the Senate andHouse, respectively ( H.J.Res. In order toreduce the total cost of the omnibus bill, conferees further added an across-the-boardrescission of 0.65% of all discretionary budget authority in the legislation. But conferees did not include an earmark for an additional $200million antiterrorism request. Supplemental FY2002 Foreign Operations Funding
The Administration sought $1.28 billion in additional FY2002 ForeignOperations funding, primarily to increase economic, military, and counter-terrorismassistance to so-called "front-line" states in the war on terrorism. a Enacted amounts include those provided in the regular FY2002 Foreign OperationsAppropriation ( P.L. security assistance. Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA). Terrorist Financing. The total U.S. As enacted, the FY2003 Foreign Operations provides roughly $2 billion for global health programs across all accounts, about $210 million, or 12% more thanrequested. 108-7 ). Other Colombian aid conditions provided in the enacted appropriation include: the continuation, as proposed in both House and Senate bills, of the cap of 400 on thenumber of U.S. civilian contractors and on the number of U.S. military personnel thatcan be funded during FY2003; requirement for the return of any helicopter procuredwith funding from this bill if it is used to aid or abet the operations of any illegalself-defense groups or illegal security cooperatives; and the requirement, similar tothe Senate-passed joint resolution, that the Secretary of State and the EPAAdministrator submit a report on the usage and safety of chemicals used in the aerialcoca fumigation program in Colombia before FY2003 funds can be used to purchasethose chemicals. Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy. Multilateral Development Banks: Issues for the 107th Congress . Congress adjourned, however,before completing action on these measures. d. On September 3, 2002, the Administration amended its original request, proposing additional fundsfor three accounts: development aid, from $2.86billion to $2.96 billion for HIV/AIDS programs; international disaster assistance, from $235.5 million to $285.5million for humanitarian aid forthe Palestinians; and the Economic Support Fund, from $2.29 billion to $2.49 billion for anti-terrorism aid to Israel. | The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. foreign aid budget and influences executive branch foreign policymaking generally. It contains the largest share -- about two-thirds -- of total U.S. internationalaffairs spending.
President Bush requested $16.45 billion (amended on September 3, 2002) for FY2003 Foreign Operations, an amount 7% higher than regular FY2002 appropriations, but slightly less than enactedFY2002 foreign aid appropriations when amounts ($1.2 billion) allocated from two supplementalappropriations are included. Combined with funds provided in the regular appropriation ( P.L.107-115 ), enacted Foreign Operations spending for FY2002 totaled $16.54 billion.
The FY2003 Foreign Operations proposal increased bilateral U.S. development assistance by $348 million (+13%), including an additional $230 million, or nearly one-half more for globalHIV/AIDS programs. Other major additions in the FY2003 budget included 15% more for the PeaceCorps, 17% more for the Andean Counternarcotics Initiative, 22% more for contributions tomultilateral development banks, and 11% more for military assistance, primarily to support countriesfacing terrorist threats. Overall, the FY2003 request included $4 billion in aid for "front-line" statesin the war on terrorism. In a few areas, the President's request cut spending: Export-Import Bankappropriations would fall by nearly one-quarter while assistance to Eastern Europe would drop by20%.
The 107th Congress adjourned before completing action on Foreign Operations and 10 other funding measures. On February 13, Congress agreed to a $16.3 billion Foreign Operations measure( H.J.Res. 2 ; P.L. 108-7 ). As enacted, Foreign Operations is about $150 million lessthan requested and $125 million and $250 million less than bills recommended earlier by the Senateand House, respectively. The conference agreement further provides for an across-the-boardrescission of 0.65% of all discretionary budget authority in the bill. This reduces total ForeignOperations funding to roughly $16.18 billion. (Note: This report does not discuss or include $7.48billion in Foreign Operations funding approved in P.L. 108-11 , the Iraq War Supplemental.)
Key Foreign Operations issues that attracted considerable debate included: size and composition of aid to help combat terrorism, including an FY2002 supplemental; development aid fundingpriorities, especially the adequacy of U.S. support for international HIV/AIDS programs andproposed reductions for other global health programs; funding for family planning programs andeligibility of the U.N. Population Fund; and assistance to Colombia, especially proposals to expandaid beyond counter-narcotics to a broader counter-terrorism focus.
Key Policy Staff |
crs_RL34479 | crs_RL34479_0 | Introduction
On October 16, 2008, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson announced his final approval of a more stringent National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for lead. Leaded gasoline was gradually phased out in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, and both emissions and concentrations of lead in the air plummeted. These developments led some to suggest that there was no longer a need for an ambient air quality standard for lead. Others, including the independent scientific advisory panel that advises EPA's Administrator, concluded that the 1978 NAAQS was far too lenient, that lead in ambient air still poses a threat to public health, and that the NAAQS needed to be significantly strengthened as the result of the recent review. In promulgating a new standard, the Administrator agreed with his scientific advisers, lowering the standard to 90% below the 1978 standard and setting new requirements for monitoring. Thus, in addition to strengthening the lead standard, the Administrator expanded the requirements for lead monitoring. Lead Emission Reduction: Success, but Not Generally Due to NAAQS
The reduction of lead emissions is often described as one of the key successes of the Clean Air Act and of the Environmental Protection Agency. In 1970, emissions of lead totaled 224,100 tons. By 2007, emissions had been reduced more than 99%, to 1,300 tons. So, in general, the reduction of lead in ambient air did not come about as a result of the 1978 NAAQS, or in the manner prescribed by Title I of the Clean Air Act, wherein nonattainment areas are identified and the states or areas in which they are located submit to EPA State Implementation Plans that identify local and national measures that will be implemented to help such areas reach attainment. The Primary Standard
The primary (health-based) standard, promulgated in 1978, was 1.5 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m 3 ) averaged over three months. CASAC concurred, stating in a January 22, 2008 letter that it "... unanimously affirms EPA staff's recognition of the need to substantially lower the level of the primary NAAQS for Lead, to an upper bound of no higher than 0.2 µg/m 3 ...."
The Administrator agreed that the primary NAAQS should be substantially lowered, choosing a level of 0.15 µg/m 3 . The Secondary Standard
As part of its current review, EPA also assessed the secondary (public welfare) NAAQS for lead. Twenty-four entire states, including some with major sources of lead emissions, had no lead monitors. The agency also proposed to require a small network of monitors to be placed in urban areas with populations greater than one million to gather information on the general population's exposure to lead in the air. In the final rule, the Administrator chose thresholds different than proposed: he set the source threshold at one ton of emissions rather than 200-600 kilograms, and required monitors in urban areas with populations of 500,000 or more rather than one million. The monitoring decision was challenged by the Natural Resources Defense Council, Missouri Coalition for the Environment Foundation, and two other groups: they petitioned the agency for reconsideration of the monitoring requirements, in January 2009. EPA agreed to a reconsideration in July and proposed changes to the monitoring rule on December 23. The agency also proposed eliminating the required monitoring in areas with populations of 500,000 or more, in favor of a network of approximately 80 multi-pollutant monitoring sites known as NCore. Rather than support the deletion of lead from the list of criteria pollutants, they concluded that lead in ambient air still poses a threat to public health, that the old NAAQS (established in 1978) was far too lenient, and that the 1978 NAAQS needed to be significantly strengthened. Given uncertainties in the science (particularly the estimated correlation between airborne lead and blood lead levels and the uncertainties in the concentration-response functions—i.e., the effect that changes in blood lead levels have on IQ), the Administrator stated in the May 2008 proposal that his decision would be supported by the science at any point in the proposed range of 0.10 to 0.30 µg/m 3 . | The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under a court order to review the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for lead, announced his decision October 16, 2008, reducing the standard by 90%, from 1.5 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) to 0.15 µg/m3. EPA also promulgated new monitoring requirements at that time, requiring monitors downwind of any source emitting one ton or more of lead per year and in urban areas with populations of 500,000 or more. In January 2009, the Natural Resources Defense Council and three other groups petitioned EPA for a reconsideration of the monitoring requirements. EPA granted the petition and, in December 2009, proposed changes in the monitoring requirements, notably lowering the source-oriented emissions threshold from one ton to 0.50 tons per year.
NAAQS are standards for outdoor (ambient) air that are intended to protect public health and welfare from harmful concentrations of pollution. In strengthening the lead standard, the Administrator has concluded that protecting public health and welfare requires much lower concentrations of lead pollution in ambient air than the level previously held to be safe. Lead particles can be inhaled or ingested, and, once in the body, can cause lower IQ and effects on learning, memory, and behavior in children. In adults, lead exposure is linked to increased blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, and decreased kidney function.
Regulation of airborne lead is often described as one of the key successes of the Clean Air Act and of the Environmental Protection Agency. In 1970, when lead was widely used as a gasoline additive, emissions of lead nationwide totaled 224,100 tons. Lead was also present then in many consumer products, and thus was emitted to the air from industrial processes and waste incinerators. The phasing out of lead from gasoline, paint, and other products, as well as stricter controls on industrial emissions, reduced lead emissions more than 99%, to 1,300 tons in 2007.
The reduction in lead emissions and ambient concentrations led some to suggest that there was no longer a need for an ambient air quality standard for lead. Others, including the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC), an independent panel of scientists who advise the EPA Administrator, concluded that the old NAAQS (established in 1978) was far too lenient, that lead in ambient air still poses a threat to public health, and that the NAAQS needed to be significantly strengthened. CASAC recommended that the standard be reduced from 1.5 µg/m3 to no higher than 0.2 µg/m3. In promulgating a more stringent NAAQS, the Administrator agreed with the scientists' recommendation, rejecting the argument that the standard is no longer needed.
The Administrator's decision followed a multi-year review of the science. To implement the new standard, EPA and the states will first identify nonattainment areas (expected to occur no later than January 2012), following which there will be a 5-10 year-long implementation process in which states and local governments will identify and implement measures to reduce lead in the air. As noted earlier, EPA also promulgated changes to the monitoring requirements for lead as part of the NAAQS decision. As of 2008, at least 24 of the 50 states, including some with major sources of lead emissions, had no lead monitors at all. Under the 2008 regulations, all 101 metropolitan areas with populations greater than 500,000 would be required to have monitors as would the estimated 135 areas that have sources of lead emissions greater than or equal to one ton per year. In December 2009, EPA proposed further changes, lowering the source-oriented emissions threshold from one ton to 0.50 tons per year, while eliminating the urban area monitoring requirement. In place of the latter, lead monitoring would be added to a national network of 80 sites that will monitor multiple pollutants. |
crs_R41905 | crs_R41905_0 | Introduction
With a campaign to significantly reduce the budget deficit, some in the 112 th Congress see foreign affairs funds, particularly for foreign aid programs, as expenditures that can be cut in order to reduce the deficit. Foreign affairs spending typically amounts to about 1% of the total budget. Others, including some Members of Congress in both political parties and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, view a robust foreign affairs budget as essential to promoting U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, perhaps even saving long-term spending by preventing the much costlier use of troops overseas. The bill does not align perfectly with the international affairs budget, however. This report focuses on only the accounts funded through the State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill, but provides appropriations figures for the entire international affairs (Function 150) budget in Appendix E .
Recent Developments
Recent events and congressional activity related to the State-Foreign Operations appropriations include the following:
Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( H.R. 112-25 ). 95 ( P.L. 2017 ( P.L. On September 22, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its State-Foreign Operations bill ( S. 1601 ; S.Rept. This is 14% more than the House funding level. Congress approved and the President signed into law the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( S. 365 / P.L. These figures exclude funds for overseas contingency operations, which do not count toward the 302(b) allocation. 34 ) recommending $36.6 billion in new budget authority for the International Affairs account, and an additional $8.7 billion in overseas contingency funds for State Department and foreign operations programs accounted for under a separate "Global War on Terrorism" budget function. The FY2012 Request
On February 14, 2011, the Obama Administration sent its FY2012 budget request to Congress, with a total of $59.65 billion requested for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. The Administration's priorities on foreign affairs funding for FY2012 as compared with those in FY2011 would have State Department Administration of Foreign Affairs funding increase from 22% in the FY2011 request to 25%, Bilateral Economic Aid funding decrease from 46% in the FY2011 request to 39%, and Security Aid funding increase from 12% in the FY2011 request to 19%. FY2012 Budget Request: State Department and Related Agencies
The Administration's FY2012 budget request for the Department of State, international broadcasting, and related agencies is $19.52 billion, a nearly 10.8% increase over the FY2010 enacted level of $17.62 billion (which includes $1.52 billion in supplemental funds) and 22.4% more than the FY2011 enacted level of $15.95 billion. In addition, the Administration's FY2012 request proposed a cut of 13.2%, compared to FY2010 funding levels, for the U.S. Institute of Peace; however, the budget request of $42.7 million is 8.4% more than Congress appropriated for FY2011. FY2012 Budget Request: Foreign Operations
The Foreign Operations budget comprises the majority of U.S. foreign assistance programs, both bilateral and multilateral. The request was released in February, before final FY2011 appropriations were enacted and before the current emphasis on budget reductions developed in Congress. | Some in the 112th Congress view the foreign affairs budget as a place to cut funds in order to reduce the budget deficit. Foreign affairs expenditures typically amount to about 1% of the annual budget. Others, including Members of Congress of both political parties, view a robust foreign affairs budget as essential for America's national security and foreign policy interests.
The State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies appropriations bills, in addition to funding U.S. diplomatic and foreign aid activities, have been the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. international affairs budget and influences executive branch foreign policy making in recent years. (Congress has not amended foreign policy issues through a complete authorization process for State Department diplomatic activities since 2003 and for foreign aid programs since 1985.) After a period of general decline in the late 1980s and 1990s, funding for State Department operations, international broadcasting, and foreign aid rose steadily from FY2002 to FY2010, largely because of ongoing assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan, new global health programs, and increasing assistance to Pakistan. It declined again in FY2011 when Congress passed a continuing resolution (P.L. 112-10) significantly reducing U.S. government-wide expenditures, including foreign affairs.
On February 14, 2011, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2012 budget proposal before enactment of the final FY2011 appropriations and the current congressional emphasis on budget reductions. The FY2012 request sought $61.5 billion for the international affairs budget, including a core State-Foreign Operations budget of $59.65 billion plus $8.70 billion for extraordinary Overseas Contingency Operations in frontline states. The total request represented an increase of 21.8% over the enacted FY2011 funding level for State Department and Foreign Operations accounts and sought significant increases for State Department's administration of foreign affairs accounts, security assistance, and various multilateral environmental accounts.
Funding for international affairs programs was expected by many to decline in FY2012 as the 112th Congress focuses on budget reduction measures to meet objectives in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). The House subcommittee mark of the FY2012 State-Foreign Operations appropriation recommended $47.58 billion in total funding, and the Senate committee-passed bill (S. 1601) recommended $53.97 billion. The enacted total funding level of $53.88 billion is nearly 10% less than the Administration's request, but is 10% more than the enacted total for FY2011. However, $11.20 billion of the FY2012 enacted total is designated for Overseas Contingency Operations (more than the $8.70 billion requested by the Administration) and does not count toward enacted discretionary spending caps.
This report analyzes the FY2012 request and congressional action related to FY2012 State-Foreign Operations legislation. The Summary, "Introduction" and "Recent Developments" sections, and appendix tables in this version of the report have been updated to reflect enactment of P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2012. |
crs_R43288 | crs_R43288_0 | Advertising generates more than 80% of total revenue at Internet companies such as Google, Yahoo, and Facebook, and covers the cost of many of the free "apps" consumers download to increase the functionality of their smartphones and tablet computers. Smartphones, tablets, and other mobile devices give advertisers greater access to more consumers for more hours of the day. Digital Advertising
The most recent structural changes affecting advertising began around 1995, as consumers started to migrate from traditional media sources to online platforms. In 2012, online ad revenue made up 15% of total newspaper advertising revenues, compared with 7% in 2007. In 2012, the top 10 sellers of advertising space on websites accounted for more than 70% of online ad revenue, and the top 50 for nearly 90%, according to IAB. Some established companies say online advertising networks and exchanges affect prices for all ad-dependent companies because they can buy up blocks of residual or less attractive ads and release them on the market at fire-sale prices, in some cases for as little as 5%-10% of what the publisher might charge for the exact same ad space on a direct buy from an ad agency. Social networks . Two-thirds of online adults in the United States use social networking sites, including networking tools such as Facebook and Twitter; social sites such as Reddit, Digg, and propeller; photo and video sharing sites such as Flickr and You Tube; and social bookmarking sites such as Delicious. Digital Video . Separately, mobile devices use location-based services to track consumers' whereabouts. A 2012 survey by the Pew Research Center found that 68% of Americans did not like having their online behavior tracked and analyzed. Behavioral tracking remains largely unregulated in the United States, although some researchers point to a strong domestic regime of corporate "privacy on the ground." The growing use and power of tracking technology have raised regulatory concerns. Several web browsers have adopted "do not track" features, but some privacy experts question their effectiveness. Policy Issues Affecting Digital Advertising
Congress has been involved in regulating advertising since at least 1914, when the Federal Trade Commission Act made unlawful "the dissemination or the causing to be disseminated of any false advertisement" that might affect commerce." More recently, Congress, regulators, and the courts have turned their attention to digital advertising. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enforces the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (P.L. A patchwork of state regulations also affects online advertising. At least nine states, including California, Maryland, and New York, have introduced legislation on consumer or child online privacy. The IAB also has set guidelines for advertising in social media and on mobile platforms. Concerns About Online Privacy
Even though many U.S. consumers are concerned about online privacy and many actively avoid companies they do not trust, only 38% of consumers claim to know how to limit information collected on them by a website, according to Pew Research. These differences may raise significant compliance challenges for U.S. companies doing business in Europe—including those transacting with European nationals solely through the Internet without a physical presence in Europe. The FTC recommended a Do Not Track framework in 2012 and provided recommendations on privacy protections for mobile services in 2013. Besides privacy, the FTC updated its Dot.com disclosures for online advertising to give businesses examples and direction on how to avoid unfair or deceptive business practices in their online ads. | The United States is the world's largest advertising market. According to one estimate, domestic advertising revenue totaled $219 billion in 2012, accounting for about 1% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Almost every major medium of information, including the press, entertainment, and online services, depends on advertising revenue. Advertising accounts for 60%-80% of total revenue at many newspapers and magazines and for most revenue at search engines and social networking sites.
Television still remains the main choice for advertisers, with ad revenue at almost $76 billion in 2012. However, spurred by the growth of paid search, online video, social networks, and mobile devices, advertising is moving to online platforms. Digital advertising revenue is estimated to have reached $36 billion, or 16% of total ad revenue, in 2012.
Companies can more easily track and measure consumer behavior online, which allows them to develop detailed profiles of their customers. Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about the business practices of online advertisers, particularly since their activities are largely unregulated in the United States. Digital publishers favor targeted consumer tracking because it allows them to provide free or low-cost ad-supported content. Without it, they argue, their ad-supported businesses could be harmed or possibly destroyed. Yet more than two-thirds of Americans do not like having their online behavior tracked and analyzed, according to a recent Pew Research Survey. Privacy and consumer advocates argue for more expansive federal regulations to protect consumers' online privacy.
Because of these concerns, recent Congresses, including the 113th, have focused on issues relating to digital advertising. They have held hearings on data privacy and proposed legislation including "Do Not Track" to give consumers the online equivalent of a "Do Not Call" option. In addition, lawmakers have proposed legislation to protect consumers from unlawful geolocation tracking of mobile devices. Congress is also looking at search advertising (where companies sell ads around consumer-initiated search results on web browsers) and fraudulent marketing over social networks.
The growing use of online and mobile tracking has raised regulatory concerns. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has published updated "Dot Com" disclosures for online ads; recommended a voluntary Do Not Track (DNT) function; and released new guidance on mobile advertising. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is studying pharmaceutical marketing in social media, with guidance required by June 2014. Since 2012, the Obama Administration and the FTC have introduced new privacy frameworks.
Other countries are debating, and some already have and others might adopt, new privacy laws. In particular, digital advertising in the European market is becoming more challenging as European lawmakers consider much stricter DNT rules, raising ever greater compliance hurdles for U.S. businesses. A patchwork of state regulations, including California's eraser law, also affects online advertising. |
crs_RL34202 | crs_RL34202_0 | Federal law has prohibited state-inspected meat and poultry plants from shipping their products across state lines, a ban that many states and small plants have long sought to overturn. Both the House and Senate versions of the omnibus farm bill ( H.R. 2419 ) included amendments to the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) that would permit interstate shipment of these products if USDA approves and certain requirements are met. The conference farm bill, cleared in May 2008, generally opted for the Senate approach, viewed by many on both sides of the issue as an acceptable compromise. Proponents of ending the current ban have long argued that limiting state-inspected products to intrastate commerce is unfair. Many state agencies and state-inspected plants have argued that their programs by law already must be, and are, "at least equal" to the federal system. While state-inspected plants cannot ship interstate, foreign plants operating under USDA-approved foreign programs, which are to be "equivalent" to the U.S. program, can export meat and poultry products into and sell them anywhere in the United States. Advocates for change have contended that that they should not be treated less fairly than the foreign plants, and that foreign programs are not as closely scrutinized as state programs. Opponents of allowing state-inspected products in interstate commerce have argued that state programs are not required to have, and do not have, the same level of safety oversight as the federal, or even the foreign, plants. For example, foreign meat and poultry products are subject to U.S. import reinspection at ports of entry, and again, when most imported meat is further processed in U.S.-inspected processing plants. Opponents also contended that neither the USDA Inspector General (OIG) in a 2006 report nor a relevant 2002 federal appeals court ruling would agree, without qualification, that state-inspected meat and poultry were necessarily as safe as federally inspected products. Current Federal-State Cooperative Inspection Program
Approximately 2,100 meat and poultry establishments in 27 states are subject to state-conducted rather than federal inspection programs. Unlike the provisions in the House bill, the conference-adopted Senate language would not replace Title III (federal-state cooperation) in the current FMIA. Restrictions on Size of State-Inspected Plants
The conference (and Senate ) bill would limit eligible establishments to those with 25 or fewer employees. Selected Policy Issues
Under the new farm bill, for the first time in 40 years, meat and poultry that is not federally inspected could be shipped across state lines. Such advocates continue to assert that state standards are not as strong as federal standards, regardless of the "equal to" determination. If the bill becomes law, stakeholders will turn their attention to USDA, which will be required to implement the new provisions. | Federal law has prohibited state-inspected meat and poultry plants from shipping their products across state lines. The final conference version of H.R. 2419, the omnibus farm bill, amends the Federal Meat Inspection Act and the Poultry Products Inspection Act to permit such interstate shipment under certain conditions.
Limiting state-inspected products to intrastate commerce is unfair, many state agencies and state-inspected plants have long argued, because the 27 currently state-operated programs by law already must be, and are, "at least equal" to the federal system. Meanwhile, foreign plants operating under U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)-approved foreign programs, which are to be "equivalent" to the U.S. program, can export meat and poultry products into and sell them anywhere in the United States. Advocates for change have contended that they should not be treated less fairly than the foreign plants which, they say, are not as closely scrutinized as state plants.
Opponents have argued that state programs are not required to have, and do not have, the same level of safety oversight as the federal, or even the foreign, plants. For example, foreign meat and poultry products are subject to U.S. import reinspection at ports of entry, and again, when most imported meat is further processed in U.S.-inspected processing plants. Opponents also have contended that neither the USDA Office of Inspector General in a 2006 report nor a relevant 2002 federal appeals court ruling would agree, without qualification, that state-inspected meat and poultry were necessarily as safe as federally inspected products.
The Senate-passed farm bill—the approach ultimately adopted by conferees—supplements the current federal-state cooperative inspection program with a provision whereby state-inspected plants with 25 or fewer employees could opt into a new program that subjects them to federally directed but state-operated inspection, thus allowing them to ship interstate. The Senate version reportedly was developed as a compromise by those on both sides of the issue.
The House-passed farm bill would have replaced (rather than supplemented) the current federal-state cooperative inspection programs with a new program to enable meat and poultry that is not federally inspected to be shipped across state lines, so long as the state programs adopted standards identical to those of USDA along with any additional changes USDA required. The House bill also would have enabled many plants currently under federal inspection to apply for state inspection and continue to ship interstate. Opponents of this change feared that many would seek to opt out of the federal system if they believed that could receive more lenient oversight by the states—an assertion that state proponents dismissed.
If the conference farm bill becomes law, as many anticipate, stakeholders will next turn their attention to USDA, where implementation details will be determined through the rulemaking process. |
crs_R45440 | crs_R45440_0 | Cryptocurrencies are digital representations of value that have no status as legal tender and are administer ed using distributed ledger technology, running on a network of independent, peer-to-peer computers. Governments around the world are taking different approaches to cryptocurrencies. The interest and debate surrounding cryptocurrencies has led some central banks to examine whether the technology underpinning cryptocurrencies could be leveraged to create digital versions of state-created currencies, which would have legal status in their jurisdiction of issue. In November 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced it is developing a report on cryptocurrency regulation, including a legislative framework for the 116 th Congress to consider in 2019. As Congress considers issues related to digital currencies, including whether to regulate further the cryptocurrency industry, the approaches taken by other governments and international bodies may be of interest. As cryptocurrencies have proliferated, they have taken on more forms. Others are far more skeptical. Government Approaches to Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrencies span borders and are international in nature, but governments around the world have responded differently to the proliferation of cryptocurrencies. Approach 1: Develop a Crytpocurrency Hub
Some governments are actively seeking to become cryptocurrency hubs by attracting and developing cryptocurrency industries in their countries. Approach 2: Restrict Cryptocurrencies
Some governments have banned the use of cryptocurrencies or specific activities associated with cryptocurrencies. As yet, one country, Venezuela, which is mired in a serious economic crisis, has issued a digital fiat currency, and there are serious questions about the new currency's success. A few small countries are in the process of launching digital fiat currencies. Some countries, including China and Sweden, are researching the costs and benefits of these currencies, and Iran and Russia are considering them as a way to evade U.S. sanctions. Many central banks in major economies, including in the United States and the Eurozone, have ruled out issuing a digital fiat currency at this time. Approach 3: Refrain from Creating a Digital Fiat Currency
Several central banks in advanced economies, including the U.S. Federal Reserve , the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England , the Reserve Bank of Australia , the Bank of Israel, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand , have argued against the benefits of digital fiat currencies and/or announced that they do not intend to adopt a digital fiat currency at this time. Many international organizations and forums are examining the potential implications of digital currencies and, in some cases, are starting to make policy recommendations. They have examined a range of issues, including
the utility of digital currencies for improving the international payments systems; the possible threats digital currencies may or may not pose to international financial stability; the divergence of national-level cryptocurrency regulations and whether international regulatory coordination is desirable; how cryptocurrencies should be treated in bank prudential regulation; and how to adapt international recommendations to combat money laundering and terrorist financing to cryptocurrencies. How do U.S. current regulations and the Treasury's proposed framework, when released, compare to other countries' regulations? Some governments are actively recruiting cryptocurrency companies and developing cryptocurrency industries. Should the United States follow suit, or risk losing market share in the industry? Alternatively, some governments are tightly restricting, or even banning, cryptocurrency activities to protect consumers. In the United States, do consumers have adequate protections in terms of cryptocurrencies? Has the Federal Reserve adequately assessed the potential benefits and costs of developing a digital U.S. dollar relying on distributed ledger technology? How does the U.S. position on this issue compare to other countries' calculations? Many international organizations and forums are working on various aspects of digital currencies. What digital currency policies are being advocated by the Trump Administration at various international organizations? How do international recommendations and standards fit with U.S. regulations? | Since Bitcoin was introduced a decade ago, about 2,100 cryptocurrencies have been developed. Cryptocurrencies are digital representations of value that have no status as legal tender and are administered using distributed ledger technology, running on a network of independent, peer-to-peer computers. Cryptocurrencies are controversial. Some think they will revolutionize the international payments system for the better; others are skeptical of the business model, calling it a scam. The interest and debate surrounding cryptocurrencies has led some central banks to examine whether the technology underpinning cryptocurrencies could be used to create digital versions of fiat currencies, which would have legal status in their jurisdiction of issue.
Governments around the world are taking different approaches to cryptocurrencies and digital fiat currencies, an area of increasing focus for international organizations and forums underpinning the global economy. As Congress considers issues related to digital currencies, including whether to regulate further the cryptocurrency industry, the approaches taken by other governments and international bodies may be of interest.
National Approaches to Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrencies span borders and are international in nature, but governments around the world have responded differently to the proliferation of cryptocurrencies. Three types of responses have generally taken shape. First, some governments, such as Malta, Singapore, and Switzerland, are active cryptocurrency hubs; they have been attracting and developing cryptocurrency industries in their countries. Second, some governments, such as China, India, and South Korea, have banned the use of cryptocurrencies or specific activities associated with cryptocurrencies. Third, some governments, including many European countries and the United States, are seeking balance between financial innovation and risk-management through regulation of cryptocurrencies.
National Approaches to Digital Fiat Currencies
To date, one country, Venezuela, which is mired in a serious economic crisis, has issued a digital fiat currency, and there are serious questions about the new currency's success and operational viability. A few small countries are in the process of launching digital fiat currencies. Some countries, including China and Sweden, are researching the costs and benefits of these currencies, and Iran and Russia are considering them as a way to evade U.S. sanctions. Many central banks in major economies, including in the United States and the Eurozone, have argued against issuing a digital fiat currency at this time.
International Bodies' Engagement on Digital Currencies
Many international organizations and forums are examining the implications of cryptocurrencies and, in some cases, are starting to make policy recommendations. They have examined a range of issues, including the utility of digital currencies for improving the international payments systems, the possible threats digital currencies may or may not pose to international financial stability, the divergence of national-level cryptocurrency regulations and whether international regulatory coordination is desirable, how cryptocurrencies should be treated in bank prudential regulation, and how to adapt international recommendations to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in light of cryptocurrencies.
Possible Questions for Congress
In November 2018, the Department of the Treasury announced it is developing a report on cryptocurrency regulation, including a legislative framework for Congress to consider in 2019. How do U.S. current regulations, and the proposed regulations when they are released, compare to other countries' regulations? Some governments are actively developing cryptocurrency industries. Should the United States follow suit, or risk losing market share in the industry? Alternatively, some governments are tightly restricting, or even banning, cryptocurrency activities to protect consumers. In the United States, do consumers have adequate protections in terms of cryptocurrencies? Has the Federal Reserve adequately assessed the potential benefits and costs of developing a digital U.S. dollar relying on distributed ledger technology? How does the U.S. position on digital fiat currencies compare to other countries' calculations? What are the potential future impacts on the role of the dollar as a reserve currency? What types of digital currency policies is the Trump Administration advocating at various international organizations? How do international recommendations and standards fit with U.S. regulations? |
crs_94-908 | crs_94-908_0 | The prevailing wage concept was expanded in 1964 to include a fringe benefit component. Through the years, Davis-Bacon prevailing wage provisions have been added to more than 50 program statutes. It then examines, briefly, some of the trends in the scholarship and reportage concerning the act and, finally, provides a bibliography of published non-documentary sources that are generally available to persons with a deeper interest in the statute, its history, and its administration. The Copeland "Anti-Kickback" Act (1934)
Congressional hearings on public contracting issues continued through the next several years. The Davis-Bacon amendments of 1935 reduced the threshold for coverage from $5,000 to $2,000. They provided coverage for all federal contract construction of whatever character to which the United States and the District of Columbia might be a party: "construction, alteration, and/or repair, including painting and decorating, of public buildings or public works." Other administrative provisions were also included. In addition to general operation of the statute, the Roosevelt Subcommittee focused specifically upon the following areas: (a) how Davis-Bacon wage rate determinations are made and the extent to which they are an accurate reflection of wage rates that actually prevail, locally, in the area of construction; (b) whether a system of review of Davis-Bacon wage rate determinations and related decisions of the Department of Labor might be needed; and (c) "any other constructive proposals" for the improvement of the act and of its administration. The Bush Suspension of Davis-Bacon (1992 1993)
Davis-Bacon critics had, through the years and for a variety of reasons, urged that the act be suspended by Presidential decree—as the President has the authority to do within the context of a "national emergency." Critics argued that the suspension was not justified. On March 6, 1993, President William Clinton did restore the statute to its full force. Implicit, here, is the assumption that if employers are forced by Davis-Bacon to pay not less than the locally prevailing wage in a craft, they will hire more broadly skilled, highly trained, or experienced workers. These public documents have provided a basis both for popular and scholarly consideration of the act. Another question frequently asked by those, both in industry and in the workforce, who may have to deal with the Davis-Bacon Act is: Is this particular project covered? Significant Gaps
There appear to be significant gaps in our knowledge of the act and of its administration despite oversight by Congress, extensive study by public and private agencies, and the work of individual scholars. A representative sample of these studies has been included in the listing. For the most part, items listed in the bibliography are available from the general collection of the Library of Congress and, frequently, are also available from university collections and public libraries. The Davis-Bacon Act: A Selected Bibliography. President." | The Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, as amended, requires that contractors engaging in certain federal contract construction pay workers on such projects not less than the locally prevailing wage for comparable work. In addition, such contractors are required to file payroll reports and to meet other administrative and labor standards requirements.
Enacted at the urging of the Hoover Administration, the statute was modified in 1934 with adoption of the Copeland ("anti-kickback") Act and in 1935 through general amendments dealing with administration and implementation: among them, establishment of a $2,000 coverage threshold (the threshold had been $5,000 in the original enactment), a requirement that the prevailing wage rate be determined prior to submission of bids, and extension of coverage both to public buildings and public works including painting and decorating. In 1964, the concept of "prevailing wage" was expanded to include a fringe benefit component. The statute has also been the subject of technical amendments through the years, and Davis-Bacon provisions have been added to more than 50 federal program statutes.
The act contains a provision allowing for its suspension by the President of the United States during a "national emergency." It has been suspended on three occasions: in 1934 by President Roosevelt, in 1971 by President Nixon, and in 1992 by President Bush. In each instance, the suspension was brief and the act was subsequently restored to its full strength.
While there is a relatively extensive literature (both popular and scholarly) concerning the act, there also appear to be significant gaps in our knowledge of the statute and its impact. Some have questioned the adequacy of the data upon which analysis of Davis-Bacon impact rests. During the Reagan Administration, changes were instituted in the manner in which the act was implemented and these, in turn, have produced a need for further, more current, data for analytical purposes.
Included, here, is a select bibliography of published materials dealing with the Davis-Bacon Act and immediately related issues. The list includes popular and scholarly sources but does not, for the most part, include an inventory of congressional documents, agency reports or publications of interest groups. Most of the documentation cited here will be available from the collections of the Library of Congress or from major public or university library collections. In some cases, privately published materials are available through the Internet. This bibliographic report will be updated periodically. |
crs_RL32302 | crs_RL32302_0 | H.R. The bill would providea total appropriation of $33.1 billion for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); an increaseof $500 million over the Administration's request, and a 9.2% increase over the enacted FY2004level of $30.3 billion. President's FY2005 Budget Submitted. Highlights
This report describes the President's proposal for FY2005 appropriations forDHS programs, as submitted to the Congress on February 2, 2004, and thecongressional response to that proposal. On October 18, 2004, P.L. 108-334 was signed into law providing $33.1 billion in appropriations for DHS for FY2005. 108-334 provides the following amounts for the four titles of the DHSappropriation: (I) Departmental Management and Operations, $607 million; (II)Security, Enforcement and Investigations, $20.6 billion; (III) Preparedness andRecovery, $9.5 billion; and (IV) Research and Development, Training, Assessments,and Services, $2.4 billion. 4567 ) recommends a total appropriation of $33.1 billion for DHS, representing an increase of $500 million compared to theAdministration's request, and a 9.3% increase compared to the FY2004 enactedlevel. The table compares the funding of Title II activities for FY2004 with the amounts requested for FY2005. The FY2005 total requestrepresents an increase of $1.4 billion or 7.3% over the FY2004 enacted level. 4567 fund this activityunder the Science and Technology Directorate. US-VISIT. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Transportation Security Administration(TSA). United States Coast Guard. P.L. Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR). Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) or Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness(OSLGCP). Title IV: Research and Development, Training, Assessments, and Services
Activities funded by Title IV include the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS); Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP); FederalLaw Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); and the Science and TechnologyDirectorate (S&T). 108-334 provides $2,392million for the activities of Title IV, including: $160 million in net appropriations forCIS; $894 million for IAIP; $222 million for FLETC; and $1,115 million for S&T. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). P.L. | This report describes the FY2005 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). On October 18, 2004, P.L. 108-334 was signed into law providing $33.1 billion inappropriations for DHS for FY2005. The report includes tables that compare the FY2004appropriations for the programs and activities of DHS, the President's FY2005 request, thecongressional response to the request, and the amounts enacted for FY2005.
P.L. 108-334 provides the following amounts for the four titles of the DHS appropriation: (I) Departmental Management and Operations, $607 million; (II) Security, Enforcement andInvestigations, $20.6 billion; (III) Preparedness and Recovery, $9.5 billion; and (IV) Research andDevelopment, Training, Assessments, and Services, $2.4 billion.
The President's FY2005 Budget requested total appropriations of $32.6 billion for DHS. H.R. 4567 and S. 2567 recommended a total appropriation of $33.1 billionrepresenting an increase of $500 million compared to the request, and a 9.2% increase compared tothe FY2004 enacted level.
P.L. 108-334 provides the following amounts for the major components of DHS. Included under Title II: Customs and Border Protection (CBP) $5.3 billion; Immigration and CustomsEnforcement (ICE) $3.2 billion; Transportation Security Administration (TSA) $3.3 billion; the U.S.Coast Guard $7.4 billion; the U.S. Secret Service $1.2 billion; and the U.S. Visitor and ImmigrantStatus Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) $340 million. Included under Title III is $4.0 billion forthe Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP), and $5.5billion for Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) activities. Title IV includes $160 millionfor Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS); $894 million for Information Analysis andInfrastructure Protection (IAIP); $222 million for the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center(FLETC); and $1.1 billion for the Science and Technology Directorate.
This report will not be updated.
Key Policy Staff: Homeland Security |
crs_R44309 | crs_R44309_0 | Federal responsibility for food safety rests primarily with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). FDA, an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for ensuring the safety of the majority of all domestic and imported food products (except for meat and poultry products). FSIS, an agency at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, regulates most meat, poultry, and processed egg products. The Subcommittees on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees appropriate funds for all of FDA and FSIS. The FY2016 Agriculture appropriation was enacted in December 2015, as part of an omnibus appropriation ( P.L. 114-113 ). Including enacted funding provided in the FY2016 Agriculture appropriation, combined appropriations and fees collected to cover food safety activities at FDA and USDA will total an estimated $2.5 billion in FY2016, more or less split between the two agencies ( Table 1 ). FSIS is responsible for roughly 10%-20% of the U.S. food supply, while FDA is responsible for the remaining 80%-90%. In recent years, congressional appropriators have increased funding for FDA food programs, more than doubling funding over the past decade. Largely, that has been in response to comprehensive food safety legislation enacted in the 111 th Congress, as part of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, P.L. 111-353 ). FSMA was the largest expansion of FDA's food safety authorities since the 1930s. FSMA did not directly address meat and poultry products under USDA's jurisdiction. FSMA also authorized additional appropriations and staff for FDA's food safety activities. It provided limited additional funding through industry-paid user fees. According to FDA, during the past five years (FY2011-FY2015), the agency has received increases to its funding base totaling $162 million for enacted changes to its food safety programs, after accounting for permanent base reductions due to sequestration and other differences from enacted amounts as reported by FDA. Previously, FDA reported that an additional $400 million to $450 million per year above the FY2012 base is needed to fully implement FSMA. FDA officials have continued to claim that without additional funding, as requested by the Administration, there will be a significant funding gap for FSMA implementation. FDA's Food Safety Activities
For FDA's food safety activities, including FSMA implementation, the enacted FY2016 Agriculture appropriation provides for a $104.5 million increase in budget authority, nearly that requested in the Administration's budget ($109.5 million). The enacted FY2016 appropriations provide $987.3 million for FDA's Foods program—one of the agency's primary program areas focused on food safety activities. FDA's Foods program covers the agency's food safety activities, as well as certain other food-related programs. Its budget in FY2015 accounted for about one-third of the agency's total appropriation. As reported by FDA, the agency's budget for food safety activities totaled $1.2 billion in FY2015. Including the enacted FY2016 appropriation that provides for a $104.5 million increase in budget authority, this could raise the budget authority for FDA's food safety activities to more than $1.3 billion annually. These congressional appropriations would be augmented by existing (currently authorized) user fees. Both the House and Senate reported bills explicitly did not include the Administration's proposed new fees. Selected Other Policy Provisions
The enacted FY2016 Agriculture appropriation contains a number of other policy riders for a range of programs related to FDA's Foods program. | The Subcommittees on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees oversee the budgets of two principal federal food safety agencies at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). FDA, an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for ensuring the safety of the majority of all domestic and imported food products (except for meat and poultry products). FSIS, an agency at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, regulates most meat, poultry, and processed egg products.
Combined appropriations and fees collected to cover food safety activities at FDA and USDA totaled an estimated $2.4 billion in FY2015, more or less evenly split between the two agencies. FSIS is responsible for roughly 10%-20% of the U.S. food supply, while FDA is responsible for the remaining 80%-90%. In the past few years, appropriators have increased funding for FDA's Foods program activities—one of the agency's primary program areas focused on food safety activities—more than doubling it from $435.5 million in FY2005 to $903.4 million in FY2015. In addition, FDA's food safety activities receive other program-level funding as part of FDA's overall budget. (FDA's Foods program accounts for about one-third of FDA's total appropriation.) FDA reports that food safety funding at FDA totaled $1.2 billion in FY2015.
The FY2016 Agriculture appropriation was enacted in December 2015, as part of an omnibus appropriations act (P.L. 114-113). For FDA's food safety activities, including Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, P.L. 111-353) implementation, the enacted FY2016 appropriation provides for a $104.5 million increase in budget authority, nearly matching that requested in the Administration's FY2016 budget ($109.5 million). This could raise the budget authority for FDA's food safety activities to more than $1.3 billion annually. The enacted FY2016 appropriations provide $987.3 million for FDA's Foods program, which is identical to the amount requested by the Administration. Separately, for FSIS, the enacted FY2016 Agriculture appropriation is $1.015 billion, above the Administration's requested appropriation ($1.012 billion).
These congressional appropriations would be augmented by existing (currently authorized) user fees. The Administration's FY2016 request for FDA and FSIS proposed a series of new user fees to augment both agencies' food safety activities. As in previous budget debates, however, appropriators did not include any new user fee proposals as part of either agency's FY2016 appropriations. The FY2016 appropriation further contains a number of policy riders for a range of FDA and USDA food safety and other food-related programs.
Increased funding for food safety activities at FDA is largely in response to additional responsibilities following the enactment of the FDA FSMA in the 111th Congress. FSMA was the largest expansion of FDA's food safety authorities since the 1930s. FSMA authorized additional appropriations and staff for the agency's food safety activities, and also provided limited additional funding through industry-paid user fees. However, according to FDA, during the past five years (FY2011-FY2015) it has received increases to its funding base totaling $168 million for enacted changes to its food safety programs. Previously, FDA had reported that an additional $400 million to $450 million per year above the FY2012 base is needed to fully implement FSMA. FDA officials continue to note that without additional funding there will be a significant funding gap for FSMA implementation. FSMA did not directly address meat and poultry products under USDA's jurisdiction. |
crs_RL34424 | crs_RL34424_0 | What Does Discretionary Spending Include? Discretionary spending covers the costs of the routine activities commonly associated with such federal government functions as running executive branch agencies, congressional offices and agencies, and international operations of the government. Essentially all spending on federal wages and salaries is discretionary. Congress provides and controls discretionary funding through annual appropriations acts, which grant federal agencies the legal authority to obligate the U.S. government to make payments. Budget authority (BA) is the amount that can be legally obligated. Outlays are the payments made by the U.S. Treasury to satisfy those obligations. This report mostly discusses trends in outlays. Categories of Federal Spending
Federal spending can be divided into three basic budget categories:
discretionary spending ($1.17 trillion in FY2014 outlays), mandatory spending ($2.11 trillion in FY2014 outlays), and net interest costs (about $230 billion in FY2014),
for a FY2014 total of $3,504 billion. Discretionary Spending Limits Reimposed in 2011
Recent trends in discretionary spending have been controlled by statutory limits reestablished in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 117 ; P.L. 8 ; P.L. 933 ; P.L. Full-Year Funding for FY2013
On March 6, 2013, the House passed a measure ( H.R. 113-6 ) on March 26, 2013. 59 ; P.L. Both modified defense and non-defense spending limits for FY2014 were $22.4 billion above the lowered caps levels that would have applied in the absence of the Bipartisan Budget Act, while FY2015 levels were about $9 billion higher. 113-76 ) on January 17, 2014. A short-term continuing resolution ( H.J.Res. 124 ) to provide FY2015 funding for the government until December 11, 2014. 113-164 ) into law on September 19, 2014. As Figure 1 shows, discretionary spending as a share of the federal budget has fallen, while mandatory spending's share has steadily increased. Discretionary spending will thus have gone from comprising two-thirds of federal spending in FY1962 to only 33% of total outlays in FY2014. Net interest accounted for 6% of federal outlays in FY1962 and 6.6% in FY2013. Discretionary Spending As a Share of GDP
Trends in discretionary spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) provide another perspective on how the composition of federal outlays has changed. CBO has projected that under current law discretionary spending would fall to 5.2% of GDP by FY2024. Because of the decline in discretionary spending as a percentage of total outlays and as a percentage of GDP and the resulting increase in the share of mandatory spending over time, reaching agreement on how to control the federal budget may become more difficult for Congress. Discretionary Spending and National Priorities
Discretionary spending can be categorized in several different ways. Spending trends can also be measured as shares of GDP, which reflects how federal spending compares with the size of the economy. Discretionary defense outlays, which had fallen to 3.0% of GDP by the late 1990s, rose sharply to 4.0% of GDP in 2005, and reached 4.7% of GDP in 2011, divided between 3.6% for the base defense budget and 1.1% for war funding (Overseas Contingency Operations; OCO). Increased defense outlays accounted for 53% of the real increase in total discretionary outlays over the decade of 2000-2010, rising 6.8% per year on average in real terms. How Much Defense Spending Is Appropriate? Non-defense discretionary spending rose to 4.6% of GDP in 2010, reflecting a decline in GDP (reducing the denominator of that share) due to the economic recession and policy responses such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; H.R. 1 , P.L. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) switched FY2013 caps to security/non-security from defense/non-defense. | Discretionary spending is provided and controlled through appropriations acts, which fund many of the activities commonly associated with such federal government functions as running executive branch agencies, congressional offices and agencies, and international operations of the government. Essentially all spending on federal wages and salaries is discretionary. Spending can be measured by budget authority (BA; what agencies can legally obligate the government to pay) or outlays (disbursements from the U.S. Treasury). This report mostly discusses trends in outlays.
Federal spending in fiscal year (FY) 2014 was just over a fifth (20.3%) of the U.S. economy, as measured as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), which is close to its average share since FY1962. Discretionary spending accounted for 33% of total outlays in FY2014 ($3,504 billion), well below mandatory spending's share (60% of outlays in FY2014). Weak economic conditions in recent years as well as demographic trends have increased spending on mandatory income support and retirement programs, while policy makers have acted to constrain the growth of discretionary spending. As interest rates return to more normal levels as the recovery proceeds, net interest costs—6.6% of federal outlays in FY2014—are projected to rise.
Discretionary spending's share of total federal spending has fallen over time largely due to rapid growth of mandatory outlays. In FY1962, discretionary spending accounted for 67% of total outlays and was the largest component of federal spending until the mid-1970s. Since then, discretionary spending as a share of federal outlays and as a share of GDP has fallen. Under current law projections, discretionary spending's share of GDP will fall to 5.2% in FY2024. Discretionary spending can be split into various categories to reflect broad national priorities or how federal spending decisions are made. In FY1962, discretionary spending was 12.7% of GDP, with defense spending making up 9.3% of GDP. In FY2014, discretionary spending was 6.8% of GDP, with defense spending (including war) totaling 3.5% of GDP. Defense spending can be divided between base budget and war expenditures, both of which grew sharply from FY2002 through FY2011. On average, defense outlays grew 6.8% per year in real terms from 2000 to 2010, while real non-defense discretionary outlays grew 5.6% per year. Discretionary spending has also been divided into security and non-security categories. Non-defense security spending rose sharply after 2001 and was 1.0% of GDP in FY2013, nearly twice its level before 2001.
The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) reintroduced statutory limits on spending by imposing a series of caps on discretionary BA from FY2012 through FY2021. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) modified limits for FY2013 and FY2014. The FY2013 full-year funding bill (H.R. 933; P.L. 113-6) enacted March 26, 2013, conformed to those limits. The Bipartisan Budget Act (H.J.Res. 59; P.L. 113-67) also modified BCA limits for FY2014 and FY2015. On January 17, 2014, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (H.R. 3547; P.L. 113-76) was enacted to provide funding within those limits for the rest of FY2014. On September 19, 2014, a continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 124; P.L. 113-164) was enacted to provide funding for the government until December 11, 2014.
The direction of fiscal policy has been the focus of contention among macroeconomists. Some contend that more spending would help reduce high unemployment levels, while others call for imposing greater budgetary stringency. Growth in entitlement program outlays, in the absence of new revenue measures, may put severe pressure on discretionary spending in the future unless policy changes are enacted. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34628 | crs_RL34628_0 | Background
First filed in 1996, Cobell v. Salazar involved the Department of the Interior's (DOI's) management of several money accounts. These money accounts, known as IIMs (an abbreviation for Individual Indian Monies) are monies which the federal government holds for the benefit of individual Indians rather than property held for the benefit of an Indian tribe. The conflict in the case emanated from the federal government's trust responsibility with respect to American Indians. In the capacity of trustee, the United States holds title to much of Indian tribal land and land allotted to individual Indians. Receipts from leases, timber sales, or mineral royalties are paid to the federal government for disbursement to the appropriate Indian property owners. The United States has fiduciary responsibilities to manage Indian monies and assets which have been derived from these lands and are held in trust. The Litigation
The Cobell litigation began in 1996, and its docket enumerated over 3,600 documents and over 20 federal district court and court of appeals opinions. December 7, 2009, Settlement
On December 7, 2009, the Secretaries of the Interior and Treasury reached a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs' class. After a number of failed attempts to approve the settlement, Congress finally authorized the settlement through the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 (CRA), which was signed by President Obama on December 8, 2010. However, the settlement also specifically excluded from the release (1) claims related to the payment of the account balances of existing IIM accounts; (2) claims related to the payment of existing amounts in special deposits accounts, tribal accounts, or judgment fund accounts; (3) claims related to the breaching of trust or alleged wrongs after September 30, 2009; (4) claims for damages to the environment other than those claims expressly identified as Land Administration Claims; (5) claims for trespass; (6) claims against tribes, contractors, and other third parties; (7) equitable, injunctive, or non-monetary claims for boundary correction and appraisal errors; (8) money damages arising from boundary or appraisal errors that occur after September 30, 2009; (9) claims arising out of leases, easements, rights-of-way, and similar encumbrances existing as of September 30, 2009; (10) claims related to failure to assert water rights and quantification; and (11) health and mortality claims. The second fund, called the "Trust Land Consolidation Fund," would receive $2 billion. This program is the principal vehicle by which the federal government consolidates fractionated trust and restricted lands. The district court approved the settlement on July 27, 2012. A few members of the class appealed the settlement to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. After the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari and the appeal period expired, the settlement became final on November 24, 2012. | The settlement reached in Cobell v. Salazar was authorized by the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 on December 8, 2010. Under the terms of the settlement, the United States government will pay $1.4 billion to members of the class who sought to have a historical accounting of their IIM accounts (an abbreviation for Individual Indian Monies). An additional $2 billion will be provided by the government for the purpose of consolidating fractionated trust and restricted lands.
First filed in 1996, Cobell v. Salazar involved the Department of the Interior's (DOI's) management of several money accounts. These money accounts, or IIMs, as distinguished from tribal trust funds, are monies which the federal government holds for the benefit of individual Indians. The conflict in the case traced to the federal government's trust responsibility with respect to American Indians. In the capacity of trustee, the United States holds title to much of Indian tribal land and land allotted to individual Indians. Receipts from leases, timber sales, or mineral royalties are paid to the federal government for disbursement to the appropriate Indian property owners. The United States has fiduciary responsibilities to manage Indian monies and assets which have been derived from these lands and are held in trust. However, several of the beneficiaries of these trust funds alleged that DOI mismanaged these funds and filed suit in order to obtain a proper accounting of these funds and to receive damages if warranted.
After more than a decade of litigation over obligations associated with the management of the IIM accounts—consisting of over 3,600 documents and over 20 federal district court and court of appeals opinions—the parties ultimately reached a settlement on December 7, 2009. However, the settlement, which by its terms would create a Trust Administration Fund and a Land Consolidation Fund, required congressional authorization before it could go into effect. A year later, Congress authorized the settlement through the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 (CRA), which was signed by President Obama on December 8, 2010.
The district court approved the settlement on July 27, 2011. After appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court were denied, the settlement became final on November 24, 2012. |
crs_RL33456 | crs_RL33456_0 | Among other provisions, the act authorized reforms to the IMF that had been pending since 2010 and will provide greater voting power to Brazil and other emerging economies. It also provided foreign assistance for Brazil, including $10.5 million to support conservation programs in the Brazilian Amazon (see " Amazon Conservation "). On June 29, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 ( P.L. Now over a year into her second term, Rousseff is struggling to keep her campaign promises to protect social welfare programs and maintain low unemployment while simultaneously implementing austerity measures that many economists maintain are necessary to turn around Brazil's economy. Background
Brazil occupies almost half of the continent of South America and is the fifth most populous country in the world with 204.5 million citizens. Rousseff Administration (2011-Present)
President Dilma Rousseff of the center-left PT was inaugurated to a second four-year term on January 1, 2015. She held off two strong challengers and was narrowly reelected with 51.6% of the vote in a second round runoff. Rousseff's political standing has declined precipitously as economic conditions have continued to deteriorate and a major corruption scandal has implicated numerous officials in the governing coalition. The economy contracted by an estimated 3.8% in 2015, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) now expects it to contract by 3.5% in 2016. Many economists and international investors maintain that Brazil must implement more far-reaching economic adjustments. Rousseff has fewer resources to distribute, however, as a result of her administration's austerity policies. In December 2015, Brazilian Chamber of Deputies President Eduardo Cunha, a member of the nominally allied, but non-ideological Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement ( Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro , PMDB), initiated impeachment proceedings against President Rousseff. U.S.-Brazil Relations
The United States and Brazil have traditionally enjoyed robust political and economic relations. The countries have at least 20 active bilateral dialogues, which serve as vehicles for policy coordination on issues of mutual concern, including trade, energy, security, racial equality, and the environment. According to the Obama Administration, Brazil is a "major global player" and an "indispensable partner" on issues ranging from international development to climate change. Nevertheless, bilateral ties have been strained from time to time as the countries' occasionally divergent national interests and independent foreign policies have led to disagreements. Similarly, Brazilian officials have been disappointed by the U.S. government's unwillingness to support Brazil's efforts to become a permanent member of a reformed U.N. Security Council and the reluctance of the U.S. Congress to approve reforms to the IMF that will provide greater voting power to Brazil and other emerging economies. 114-113 ). Brazil and the United States are currently working together to address an outbreak of Zika virus in Brazil and other Western Hemisphere nations (see " Zika Virus Response "). The actual level of assistance in FY2016 will be much higher as Congress included $10.5 million to support environmental programs in the Brazilian Amazon in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. Brazil benefits from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, which provides nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated developing countries. 114-27 ) in June 2015. Brazil is the world's second-largest producer of ethanol (after the United States). Defense
U.S.-Brazil military cooperation has increased significantly in recent years. | The United States traditionally has enjoyed robust economic and political relations with Brazil, which is the fifth most populous country and ninth-largest economy in the world. Brazil is recognized by the Obama Administration as a "major global player" and an "indispensable partner" on issues ranging from international development to climate change. Administration officials have often highlighted Brazil's status as a multicultural democracy, referring to the country as a natural partner that shares values and goals with the United States. Bilateral ties have been strained from time to time as the countries' occasionally divergent national interests and independent foreign policies have led to disagreements. U.S.-Brazilian relations were particularly strained following revelations in 2013 of alleged National Security Agency (NSA) activities inside Brazil. Cooperation has improved over the past year and a half, however, culminating in a June 2015 presidential meeting at the White House. Brazil and the United States are currently working together to address an outbreak of the Zika virus in Brazil and other Western Hemisphere nations. Other ongoing areas of engagement include trade, energy, security, racial equality, and the environment.
Domestic Situation
After narrowly winning a second-round runoff election in October 2014, President Dilma Rousseff of the center-left Workers Party was inaugurated to a second four-year term on January 1, 2015. Economic conditions in Brazil have deteriorated significantly in recent years, and Rousseff is now struggling to keep her campaign promises to protect social welfare programs and maintain low unemployment while simultaneously implementing austerity measures that many economists argue are necessary to attract investment and ultimately boost growth. Although international investors have advocated for a more rapid economic adjustment, much of Rousseff's political base is opposed to the policy shift. The economy contracted by an estimated 3.8% in 2015 and is expected to contract by 3.5% this year.
Brazil's deep economic recession has weakened Rousseff's political standing, which was already fragile as a result of a major corruption scandal that has implicated numerous officials in the governing coalition. In December 2015, 11% of Brazilians approved of Rousseff's job performance while 65% disapproved. Some nominally allied legislators have distanced themselves from Rousseff, opposing her administration's austerity measures and other key portions of her policy agenda. Moreover, the president of Brazil's Chamber of Deputies has initiated impeachment proceedings against the president.
Legislative Developments
The 114th Congress has approved two legislative measures that will influence U.S.-Brazil relations. As part of the Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-27), Congress renewed the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, which provides non-reciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from Brazil and other designated developing countries. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), Congress authorized reforms to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that had been pending since 2010 and will provide greater voting power to Brazil and other emerging economies. The act also provided foreign assistance for Brazil, including $10.5 million to support conservation programs in the Brazilian Amazon. Two other bills introduced in 2015 are designed to pressure Brazil to amend its constitution to allow the extradition of Brazilian nationals; H.R. 2784 would suspend foreign assistance to Brazil, and H.R. 2785 would suspend the issuance of visas to Brazilian nationals, until it changes its extradition policies. |
crs_R45286 | crs_R45286_0 | On January 18, 2001, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set current emission standards for criteria air pollutants and their precursors, including nitrogen oxide (NO x ) and particulate matter (PM). Further, on October 25, 2016, EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) jointly published the second (current) phase of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and fuel efficiency standards for medium- and heavy-duty engines and vehicles (Phase 2). The Phase 2 requirements set emission standards for commercial long-haul tractor-trailers, vocational vehicles, and heavy-duty pickup trucks and vans , and they phase in between model year (MY) 2018 and MY 2027. Glider Kits, Glider Engines, and Glider Vehicles
A glider kit is a tractor chassis with a frame, front axle, interior and exterior cab, and brakes (see Figure 1 ). It becomes a glider vehicle when an engine, transmission, and rear axle are added. Engines are often salvaged from earlier model year vehicles, remanufactured, and installed in glider kits. The final manufacturer of the glider vehicle (i.e., the entity that assembles the parts) is typically a different entity than the original manufacturer of the glider kit. Glider kits and glider vehicles are produced arguably for purposes such as allowing the reuse of relatively new powertrains from damaged vehicles. In short, EPA argued that "it is reasonable to require engines placed in newly-assembled vehicles to meet the same standards as all other engines in new motor vehicles." Current EPA emission standards for NO x and PM (which began in 2007 and took full effect in 2010) are at least 90% lower than previous standards (see Table 1 ). Additionally, based on prior standards, EPA estimated that NO x and PM emissions of any glider vehicles using pre-2002 engines (i.e., before exhaust aftertreatment requirements) could be 20-40 times higher than those of current engines. These emission impacts are compounded by the recent increase in sales of glider vehicles. Estimates provided to EPA during the Phase 2 rulemaking indicate that production of glider vehicles increased by an order of magnitude since 2006—from a few hundred each year to several thousands. Finally, the petitioners argued that the Phase 2 rule had failed to consider the significant environmental benefits that glider vehicles create. On November 16, 2017, EPA (under Administrator Scott Pruitt) proposed a repeal of the emission standards and other requirements on heavy-duty glider vehicles, glider engines, and glider kits based on a proposed interpretation of the CAA. Status of the Proposal
EPA's proposed "Repeal of Emission Requirements for Glider Vehicles, Glider Engines, and Glider Kits" has not been finalized. Some commentators have supported EPA's efforts to reverse the standards and provide relief to the affected glider vehicle assembler industry. They have reiterated the arguments, as presented in the petitions for reconsideration, that EPA lacks the authority to regulate glider vehicles under the CAA because they could not be considered "new motor vehicles." They assert that the benefit of a glider vehicle over a new truck is a more affordable, reliable, and fuel efficient vehicle for purchasing that requires less maintenance, yields less downtime, and yet offers a range of currently available safety features and amenities. On July 26, 2018, EPA withdrew the no-action assurance. However, the memo states that the agency would "continue to move as expeditiously as possible on a regulatory revision regarding the requirements that apply to the introduction of glider vehicles into commerce to the extent consistent with statutory requirements and due consideration of air quality impacts." | On October 25, 2016, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration jointly published the second phase of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and fuel efficiency standards for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles and engines. The rule affects commercial long-haul tractor-trailers, vocational vehicles, and heavy-duty pickup trucks and vans. It phases in between model years 2018 and 2027.
Under the rulemaking, EPA proposed a number of changes and clarifications for standards respecting "glider kits" and "glider vehicles." A glider kit is a chassis for a tractor-trailer with a frame, front axle, interior and exterior cab, and brakes. It becomes a glider vehicle when an engine, transmission, and rear axle are added. Engines are often salvaged from earlier model year vehicles, remanufactured, and installed in the glider kit. The final manufacturer of the glider vehicle (i.e., the entity that assembles the parts) is typically a different entity than the original manufacturer of the glider kit. Glider kits and glider vehicles are produced arguably for purposes such as allowing the reuse of relatively new powertrains from damaged vehicles.
The Phase 2 rule contains GHG and criteria air pollution emission standards for glider vehicles. The rule sets limits for glider vehicles similar to those for new trucks, with some exemptions. Under the rulemaking, EPA and various commentators argued that glider vehicles should be considered "new motor vehicles" under the Clean Air Act (CAA) because of recent changes in the glider market. That is, in the decade leading up to the rulemaking, sales of glider vehicles increased by an order of magnitude—from several hundred annually to several thousand or more. EPA and various commentators interpreted this change to be more than an attempt to replace damaged chassis, seeing it instead as an attempt by glider vehicle assemblers to circumvent various federal regulations. At the time, the older model year engines being used in glider vehicles were not required to meet current EPA emission standards for nitrogen oxide and particulate matter (which began in 2007 and took full effect in 2010). Under the Phase 2 rulemaking, EPA estimated that NOx and PM emissions from glider vehicles using pre-2002 engines (prior to exhaust aftertreatment requirements) could be 20-40 times higher than current engines.
Subsequent to the Phase 2 rulemaking, EPA received petitions for reconsideration for, among other provisions, the glider requirements. The petitioners argued that EPA lacks the authority to regulate glider vehicles under the CAA because they could not be considered "new motor vehicles." The petitioners asserted that the benefit of a glider vehicle over a new truck is a more affordable, reliable, and fuel efficient vehicle for purchasing that requires less maintenance, yields less downtime, and yet offers a range of currently available safety features and amenities. On November 16, 2017, EPA (under Administrator Scott Pruitt) proposed to repeal the emission standards and other requirements for heavy-duty glider vehicles, glider engines, and glider kits. On July 26, 2018, EPA (under acting Administrator Andrew Wheeler) stated that it would "move as expeditiously as possible on a regulatory revision regarding the requirements that apply to the introduction of glider vehicles into commerce to the extent consistent with statutory requirements and due consideration of air quality impacts." A rule has not been finalized.
Some in Congress have supported the Trump Administration's efforts to reverse the standards and provide relief to the affected glider vehicle assembler industry. However, EPA's efforts to delay and repeal the rule have prompted criticism from some trucking industry officials, state air agencies, environmentalists, and other lawmakers who fear that increasing production of glider vehicles could result in a fractured vehicle market and significantly higher in-use emissions of air pollutants associated with a host of adverse human health effects, including premature mortality. |
crs_RS20115 | crs_RS20115_0 | Compensation Provided to the President
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States provides that "The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them." The compensation is set and adjusted by Congress. The President's salary is currently set at $400,000 and is subject to income tax. A brief discussion of the congressional action that resulted in the three most recent increases to the President's salary follows. The salary became effective at noon on January 19, 1949. 91st Congress
Pursuant to P.L. | The Constitution of the United States provides that "The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected.... " (Constitution of the United States, Article II, Section 1.) The amount of compensation, which is not specified in the Constitution, is set and adjusted by Congress. The President currently receives a salary of $400,000 per annum, which became effective at noon on January 20, 2001, under P.L. 106-58. (P.L. 106-58, Title VI, §644(a); September 29, 1999; 113 Stat. 430, at 478.) An expense allowance, currently set at $50,000, also is provided. This report discusses the President's compensation and the three most recent increases to the salary enacted in 1949 (81st Congress), 1969 (91st Congress), and 1999 (106th Congress). It will be revised as events dictate. |
crs_RL33729 | crs_RL33729_0 | Most of those changes were included in Title VI of the DHS appropriations legislation for FY2007. In addition to the Post-Katrina Act, Congress enacted five other statutes that have long-term implications for the administration of federal emergency policies. These include:
Sections of P.L. 109-347 ( H.R. 4954 ), the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2005, known as the SAFE Port Act; P.L. 109-308 ( H.R. 3858 ), the Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006; P.L. 109-63 ( H.R. 3650 ), the Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act of 2005; P.L. 109-67 ( H.R. 3668 ), the Student Grant Hurricane and Disaster Relief Act; and Sections of P.L. 109-364 ( H.R. 5122 ), the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. This report does not reference such administrative actions. Report Organization
This report comprises ten sections, as follows:
the location and status of FEMA and the agency's authorities; the capabilities, responsibilities, and requirements associated with leadership positions; modifications to the statutory provisions relevant to the workforce charged with implementing emergency management policies; changes in national preparedness system components and requirements (those not specifically included in FEMA's mission); new emergency management education and training requirements; amendments to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) that provide additional or modified assistance authority to the President; changes in procedures governing federal contracting and procurement; oversight and review requirements that are expected to reduce fraud and waste practices in emergency response; requirements for the production of reports and guidelines; and miscellaneous provisions. The Office of Personnel Management must submit annual reports to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and those committees of the House of Representatives that the Speaker of the House determines appropriate on the operation of the bonus program for each of the five years that it will be in effect. 110th Congress Stafford Act Legislation
H.R. H.R. 1144 , the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Federal Match Relief Act of 2007, would ease financial burdens on the states affected by the two named hurricanes by waiving cost share requirements in the Stafford Act and striking a loan repayment provision. 1144 would amend language previously approved by the 109 th Congress ( P.L. However, in the aftermath of the hurricane, several procurement practices came to the attention of Members of Congress, as well as the public. 109-295 . Authorizations
The statutes enacted by the 109 th Congress contain several authorization provisions. CDL: Community Disaster Loan
CEM: Comprehensive Emergency Management System
CHCO: Chief Human Capital Officer
CMO: Chief Medical Officer
COG: Continuity of Government
COOP: Continuity of Operations
CORE: Cadre-On-Response Employees
DAE: Disaster Assistance Employees
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
DOD: Department of Defense
EMAC: Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMI: Emergency Management Institute
FCC: Federal Communications Commission
FCO: Federal Coordinating Officer
FEMA Trailers: Temporary Housing Units
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLETC: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
G&T: Office for Grants and Training
GAO: Government Accountability Office
HHS: Health and Human Services
HSPD-5: Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5
HSPD-8: Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8
HSA: Homeland Security Act
IHP: Individual and Household Program
NDPC: National Domestic Preparedness Consortium
NFA: National Fire Academy
NIC: National Integration Center
NIMS: National Incident Management System
NISAC: National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center
NOC: National Operations Center
NPG: National Preparedness Goal
NPS: National Preparedness System
NRP: National Response Plan
PA: Public Assistance
PETS Act: Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006
Post-Katrina Act: Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
RAMP: Remedial Action Management Program
SAFE Port Act: Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2005
SHSGP: State Homeland Security Grant Program
Stafford Act: Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
TRADE: Training and Data Exchange Group | Reports issued by committees of the 109th Congress, the White House, federal offices of Inspector General, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), among others, concluded that the losses caused by Hurricane Katrina were due, in part, to deficiencies such as questionable leadership decisions and capabilities, organizational failures, overwhelmed preparation and communication systems, and inadequate statutory authorities. As a result, the 109th Congress revised federal emergency management policies vested in the President; reorganized the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and enhanced and clarified the mission, functions, and authorities of the agency, as well as those of its parent, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Six statutes enacted by the 109th Congress are notable in that they contain changes that apply to future federal emergency management actions. These public laws include the following:
Title VI of P.L. 109-295 (H.R. 5441), the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, referred to in this report as the Post-Katrina Act; Sections of P.L. 109-347 (H.R. 4954), the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2005, known as the SAFE Port Act; P.L. 109-308 (H.R. 3858), the Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006; P.L. 109-63 (H.R. 3650), the Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act of 2005; P.L. 109-67 (H.R. 3668), the Student Grant Hurricane and Disaster Relief Act; and Sections of P.L. 109-364 (H.R. 5122), the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.
Most of these statutes contain relatively few changes to federal authorities related to emergencies and disasters. The Post-Katrina Act, however, contains many changes that will have long-term consequences for FEMA and other federal entities. That statute reorganizes FEMA, expands its statutory authority, and imposes new conditions and requirements on the operations of the agency.
The Administration will implement these new authorities through the FY2008 appropriations legislation. The oversight plans of committees with jurisdiction indicate that Members of the 110th Congress will evaluate the steps taken by the leadership of FEMA to carry out the expanded legislative mandate. In addition, Members will continue to debate legislation pertaining to the recovery of Gulf Coast states. For example, H.R. 1144 would waive disaster assistance cost share requirements for the states affected by the hurricanes. This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_RL33069 | crs_RL33069_0 | Trends in Poverty1
In 2013, the official U.S. poverty rate was 14.5%, compared to 15.0% in 2012, and marked the first statistically significant drop in the rate since 2006. In 2013, 45.3 million persons were estimated as having income below the official poverty line, a number statistically unchanged from the estimated 46.5 million poor in 2012. A strong economy during most of the 1990s is generally credited with the declines in poverty that occurred over the latter half of that decade, resulting in a record-tying, historic low poverty rate of 11.3% in 2000 (a rate statistically tied with the previous lowest recorded rate of 11.1% in 1973). The 2013 child poverty rate is still well above its pre-recession low of 16.9% (2006). Thus, the poverty line reflects a measure of economic need based on living standards that prevailed in the mid-1950s. The Census Bureau, in partnership with the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), has recently released a Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), designed to address many of the perceived flaws of the "official" measure. Their estimated poverty rate fell from 21.3% in 2012, to 19.5% in 2013. Measured by a slightly raised poverty standard (125% of the poverty threshold), 15.1% of the aged could be considered poor or " near poor " in 2013; 12.6% who are ages 65 to 74, and 18.4% who are 75 years of age and over, could be considered poor or "near poor." Since 2007, state poverty rates have generally increased consequent to the 18-month recession (December 2007 to June 2009). As its name implies, the SPM is intended to "supplement," rather than replace, the "official" poverty measure. The "official" Census Bureau statistical measure of poverty will continue to be used by programs that allocate funds to states or other jurisdictions on the basis of poverty, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will continue to derive Poverty Income Guidelines from the "official" Census Bureau measure. The NAS panel issued a wide range of specific recommendations to develop an improved statistical measure of poverty in its 1995 report M easuring Poverty: A New Approach . Criticisms of the "official" poverty measure raised by the NAS expert panel include the following:
The "official" poverty measure, by counting only families' total cash, pre-tax income as a resource in determining poverty status, ignores a host of government programs and policies that affect the disposable income families may actually have available. Except for minor technical changes and adjustments for price inflation, poverty income thresholds have essentially been frozen in time, reflecting living standards of a half-century ago. Resources and Expenses Included in the SPM
As discussed earlier, the "official" poverty measure is based on counting families' and unrelated individuals' pre-tax cash income against poverty thresholds that vary by family size and composition. The SPM resource measure includes the value of a number of federal in-kind benefits, such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamp) benefits; free and reduced-price school lunches; nutrition assistance for women, infants, and children (WIC); federal housing assistance; and energy assistance under the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). It also includes federal tax benefits administered by the Internal Revenue Service, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the partially refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit (CTC), known as the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC). The figures show the magnitude of the difference among the 13 states and the District of Columbia that had statistically significant higher poverty rates under the SPM than under the "official" measure, as well as for the 26 states in which the state's SPM rate was lower than its "official" poverty rate and the 11 states in which the incidence of poverty under the two measures did not differ statistically. Appendix A. U.S. | In 2013, 45.3 million people were counted as poor in the United States under the official poverty measure—a number statistically unchanged from the 46.5 million people estimated as poor in 2012. The poverty rate, or percent of the population considered poor under the official definition, was reported at 14.5% in 2013, a statistically significant drop from the estimated 15.0% in 2012. Poverty in the United States increased markedly over the 2007-2010 period, in tandem with the economic recession (officially marked as running from December 2007 to June 2009), and remained unchanged at a post-recession high for three years (15.1% in 2010, and 15.0% in both 2011 and 2012). The 2013 poverty rate of 14.5% remains above a 2006 pre-recession low of 12.3%, and well above an historic low rate of 11.3% attained in 2000 (a rate statistically tied with a previous low of 11.1% in 1973).
The incidence of poverty varies widely across the population according to age, education, labor force attachment, family living arrangements, and area of residence, among other factors. Under the official poverty definition, an average family of four was considered poor in 2013 if its pre-tax cash income for the year was below $23,834.
The measure of poverty currently in use was developed some 50 years ago, and was adopted as the "official" U.S. statistical measure of poverty in 1969. Except for minor technical changes, and adjustments for price changes in the economy, the "poverty line" (i.e., the income thresholds by which families or individuals with incomes that fall below are deemed to be poor) is the same as that developed nearly a half century ago, reflecting a notion of economic need based on living standards that prevailed in the mid-1950s.
Moreover, poverty as it is currently measured only counts families' and individuals' pre-tax money income against the poverty line in determining whether or not they are poor. In-kind benefits, such as benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly named the Food Stamp program) and housing assistance, are not accounted for under the "official" poverty definition, nor are the effects of taxes or tax credits, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) or Child Tax Credit (CTC). In this sense, the "official" measure fails to capture the effects of a variety of programs and policies specifically designed to address income poverty.
A congressionally commissioned study conducted by a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel of experts recommended, some 20 years ago, that a new U.S. poverty measure be developed, offering a number of specific recommendations. The Census Bureau, in partnership with the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), has developed a Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) designed to implement many of the NAS panel recommendations. The SPM is to be considered a "research" measure, to supplement the "official" poverty measure. Guided by new research, the Census Bureau and BLS intend to improve the SPM over time. The "official" statistical poverty measure will continue to be used by programs that use it as the basis for allocating funds under formula and matching grant programs. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) will continue to issue poverty income guidelines derived from "official" Census Bureau poverty thresholds. HHS poverty guidelines are used in determining individual and family income eligibility under a number of federal and state programs. Estimates from the SPM differ from the "official" poverty measure and are presented in a final section of this report. |
crs_RL34251 | crs_RL34251_0 | Introduction
Four groups of federal programs target unemployed workers: unemployment insurance programs, health care assistance, job search assistance, and training. This report does not attempt to discuss these means-tested benefits and programs. When eligible workers lose their jobs, the Unemployment Compensation (UC) program may provide income support through the payment of UC benefits. Those who exhaust UC benefits may be eligible for additional weeks of unemployment compensation through the temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program or through the permanent Extended Benefit (EB) program. If an unemployed worker is not eligible to receive UC benefits and the worker's unemployment may be directly attributed to a declared major disaster, a worker may be eligible to receive Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits. In most states, regular UC benefits are available for up to 26 weeks. 3304 note), may extend UC benefits at the state level if certain economic conditions exist within the state. Health Care Assistance for Unemployed Workers
Two federal laws may aid unemployed workers in the purchase of health insurance. The first, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), allows unemployed workers in certain circumstances to purchase continued health insurance coverage from their previous employers. The second, the Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC), allows certain TAA and RTAA participants to receive an advanceable and refundable tax credit for purchasing health insurance. Job Search Assistance for Unemployed Workers
Federal support for Americans seeking assistance to obtain, retain, or change employment is undertaken by a national system of local One-Stop Career Centers (One-Stops). One-Stops were established by law under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA, P.L. This labor exchange system is undertaken by the U.S. Employment Service (ES), first established by the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933. These offices offer an array of services to job seekers and employers, including career counseling, job search workshops, labor market information, job listings, applicant screening, and referrals to job openings. WIA State Formula Grant Programs for Job Training and Related Services
The three formula grant programs for youth, adult, and dislocated workers provide funding for employment and training activities provided by the national system of One-Stop Career Centers. | Four groups of federal programs target unemployed workers: unemployment insurance, health care assistance, job search assistance, and training. This report presents information on federal programs targeted to unemployed workers specifically, but does not attempt to discuss means-tested programs (such as Medicaid or SSI) that are available regardless of employment status.
When eligible workers lose their jobs, the Unemployment Compensation (UC) program may provide up to 26 weeks of income support through the payment of regular UC benefits. Unemployment benefits may be extended by the temporarily authorized Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program. Unemployment benefits may also be extended for up to 13 or 20 weeks by the permanent Extended Benefit (EB) program if certain economic conditions exist within the state. Workers whose job loss is caused by foreign competition may be eligible for extended income support through the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (TAA) program. If an unemployed worker is not eligible to receive UC benefits and the worker's unemployment may be directly attributed to a declared major disaster, a worker may be eligible to receive Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits.
Two federal laws may aid unemployed workers in the purchase of health insurance. The first, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), allows unemployed workers in certain circumstances to continue health insurance coverage from their employers. The second, the Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC), allows certain TAA participants to receive an advanceable and refundable tax credit for purchasing qualified health insurance.
Federal support for Americans seeking assistance to obtain, retain, or change employment is undertaken by a national system of local One-Stop Career Centers (One-Stops) that were established by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998. A variety of services and partner programs—notably including UC and TAA—are located within or linked to One-Stops, which primarily provide job search assistance, career counseling, labor market information, and other employment services. Core labor exchange services (matching job seekers and employers) are provided by the U.S. Employment Service (ES), which was first established by the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 and most recently amended under Title III of WIA. In addition to ES, Title I of WIA authorizes resources for similar core and intensive employment services for youth, adults, dislocated workers, and targeted populations.
Title I of WIA is also the nation's central job training legislation, providing funds for traditional, on-the-job, customized, and other forms of training to individuals unable to obtain or retain employment through other services.
This report will be updated with major new legislation. |
crs_RS22906 | crs_RS22906_0 | On May 15, 2008, the deadline imposed by court order, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) listed the polar bear as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). At the same time, it published an ESA "special rule" limiting the application of ESA prohibitions to activities affecting the bear. The listing and special rule sparked debate not only because of the polar bear's charismatic qualities. Thus, the consequences of the listing, many thought, could be vast. This argument has some flaws. A second point is that while the causal nexus between "specific sources" and adverse effects on polar bear habitat may be elusive, some federal actions—such as CAA regulations—may increase GHG emissions from enough sources that the linkage may be more clear. First, the 90-day finding . | On May 15, 2008, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) listed the polar bear as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). At the same time, it published a "special rule" limiting the application of ESA prohibitions to activities affecting the bear. The listing and special rule attracted attention due to the likelihood that the listing will be used as a legal basis to attempt to force reductions of greenhouse gas emissions from sources nationwide. At least two arguments might be made. First, the ESA prohibition of "takes" could be argued to be violated by major greenhouse gas sources. The special rule seeks to bar this argument, but has been challenged in court. Second, the ESA might require consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service before a federal agency can authorize a major source of greenhouse gases, though the Service argues that current science does not support an adequate causal nexus between specific sources of greenhouse gases and specific effects on polar bears. |
crs_R40412 | crs_R40412_0 | Background1
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. To assist those most impacted by the recession. To invest in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure that will provide long-term economic benefits. To stabilize state and local government budgets, in order to minimize and avoid reductions in essential services and counterproductive state and local tax increases. Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE)
DOE Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Research5
ARRA provides $2.5 billion for applied research, development, demonstration and deployment activities at DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). DOE Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants6
ARRA provides $3.2 billion for an Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grants (EECBGs) program. The Weatherization Assistance Program enables low-income families to permanently reduce their energy bills by making their homes more energy efficient. DOE State Energy Program and Decoupling Provision11
ARRA provides $3.1 billion for DOE's State Energy Program (SEP). The states design and carry out their own renewable energy and energy efficiency programs. The decoupling problem involves efforts to encourage utilities to promote customer use of energy efficiency measures. The funds available for allocation to the states that meet these criteria (decoupling and building codes) are about $3.05 billion of the total of $3.1 billion, compared to the allocation of $1 million per state which, as cited by §410 of ARRA, is specified in section 365(f) of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ( P.L. Alternative-Fueled Vehicles20
ARRA appropriates $300 million to provide grants to states, localities, and metropolitan transit agencies for the purchase of alternative fuel and advanced technology vehicles. Grants may also be used to install infrastructure to support those vehicles. Transportation Electrification21
ARRA provides $400 million in transportation electrification grants. Loan Guarantee Program (Office of Chief Financial Officer)
ARRA (§406) provides $6.0 billion for a "temporary program for rapid deployment of renewable energy and electric power transmission." Office of Fossil Energy Research and Development36
ARRA provides $3.4 billion for DOE's Fossil Energy R&D program. 1 (Title V) recommended $2.4 billion, and the Senate version (Title IV) recommended $4.6 billion. Title V – General Services Administration (GSA)
High-Performance Green Buildings45
ARRA provides $5.5 billion for the Federal Buildings Fund, of which at least $4.5 billion is to be used to convert GSA facilities to high-performance green buildings as defined in EISA. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)49
State and Tribal Assistance Grants
Energy efficiency measures are one allowed type of use for $1.2 billion in ARRA funding for EPA state revolving loan funds. Title X – Department of Veterans Affairs
For medical facilities of the Department of Veterans Affairs, ARRA includes $1 billion for "non-recurring maintenance, including energy projects," which is to remain available for obligation through the end of FY2010. Title XII – Departments of Transportation (DOT) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD)51
DOT Federal Transit Administration
Under the Federal Transit Administration, ARRA provides $100 million as discretionary grants to public transit agencies for capital improvements that will assist in "reducing energy consumption or greenhouse gas emissions" of their public transit systems. Title XIV – Department of Education (DOED)
For DOED, ARRA provides $53.6 billion for a State Fiscal Stabilization Fund. The law follows the Senate proposal. State and local governments can issue the bonds for a broad range of purposes that include capital expenditures to reduce energy use in publicly owned buildings by at least 20%; implementing green community programs; rural development involving electricity production from renewables; research facilities and grants for the development of cellulosic ethanol or other nonfossil fuels; technologies to capture and sequester carbon dioxide produced by fossil fuel use; increasing the efficiency of technologies for producing nonfossil fuels; automobile battery technologies and other technologies to reduce fossil fuel use in transportation, or technologies to reduce energy use in buildings; mass commuting facilities that reduce energy use (including pollution reduction for vehicles used for mass commuting); demonstration projects that promote commercialization of green building technology; conversion of agricultural waste for fuel production; advanced battery manufacturing technologies; technologies to reduce peak electricity demand; technologies that capture and sequester carbon dioxide emitted from fossil-fuel-fired power facilities; and public education campaigns to promote energy efficiency. Subtitle D – Manufacturing Recovery Provisions
Advanced Energy Manufacturing Facility Investment Tax Credit
The Senate bill (Sec. ARRA allows up to $2.3 billion in credits to be allocated. DOE would administer the grant program, which would be in place only for tax years 2009 and 2010. Labor Standards for Energy Bond Programs64
The House (Sec. | The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) emphasizes jobs, economic recovery, and assistance to those most impacted by the recession. It also stresses investments in technology, transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure and proposes strategies to stabilize state and local government budgets.
Energy provisions are a featured part of ARRA. More than $45 billion is provided in appro-priations for energy programs, mainly for energy efficiency and renewable energy. Most funding must be obligated by the end of FY2010. ARRA also provides more than $21 billion in energy tax incentives, primarily for energy efficiency and renewable energy.
More than $11 billion is provided in grants for state and local governments through three Department of Energy programs. They are the Weatherization Assistance Program, which provides energy efficiency services to low-income households; the State Energy Program, which provides states with discretionary funding that can be used for various energy efficiency and renewable energy purposes; and the new Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant Program, which aims to help reduce energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. The law conditions eligibility for most of the State Energy Program funding on enactment of new building codes and adoption of electric utility rate "decoupling" to encourage energy efficiency. For the Department of Education, about $8.8 billion is provided for "Other Government Services," which may include renovations of schools and college facilities that meet green building criteria. The Department of Housing and Urban Development ($2 billion),and the Environmental Protection Agency ($1 billion) receive multi-purpose funds that can be used for energy efficiency measures in public housing and state and tribal facilities.
New transportation-related grant programs support state and local government and transit agency purchases of alternative fuel and advanced technology vehicles, multi-modal use of transportation electrification, and manufacturers' development of facilities for advanced battery production.
Nearly $5 billion is provided for "leadership by example" efforts to improve energy efficiency in federal buildings and facilities. The law puts the General Services Administration (GSA) at the forefront of this effort, with $4.5 billion for "high performance" federal facilities. For Department of Defense facilities, ARRA provides $3.7 billion for improvements that have a focus on energy efficiency. ARRA provides $100 million to the Department of Transportation for "reducing energy consumption or greenhouse gases." The Department of the Interior ($1 billion) and Department of Veterans Affairs ($1 billion) receive multi-purpose funds that can be applied to "energy efficiency" or "energy projects." Also, GSA receives $300 million for federal purchases of alternative fuel vehicles.
Nearly $8 billion is provided for energy and other R&D programs, $2.4 billion for energy technology and facility development grants, and $14 billion for electric power transmission grid infrastructure development and energy storage development (including $6 billion for loan guarantees). Also, the $21 billion in tax incentives include $14.1 billion for renewable energy, $2.3 billion for energy efficiency, $2.2 billion for transportation, $1.6 billion for manufacturing, and $1.4 billion for state and local government energy bonds. In response to the weakening value of renewable energy tax credits, caused by the economic recession, ARRA provides a cash grant alternative to both production and investment credits during 2009 and 2010. |
crs_RL34101 | crs_RL34101_0 | Price transparency may also mean that consumers understand how prices are set and are aware of any price discrimination (different prices charged to different customers). In health care markets consumers often have difficulty finding useful price information. In particular, few consumers have a clear idea of what hospital stays or hospital-based procedures will cost, or understand how hospital charges are determined. It addresses certain special characteristics of the health care market which may reduce the importance of prices as signals, for example, the complicated nature of health care, the intermediation of physicians in making health care choices including choosing hospitals, and the presence of third party payment (e.g., insurance companies). One such example relates to NASDAQ. Considering all of the evidence of price transparency, the majority of the empirical studies tend to find that greater price transparency, including advertising and reduction in costs of finding information through the Internet, leads to lower and more uniform prices. Certain market characteristics of industries that provide many of these products are important in analyzing the effects of price transparency: they are subject to quality differences (and are thus not entirely homogeneous products); the product may be one whose nature and benefits are not easily understood by the customer; sellers charge different prices to different customers and customers pay different (and often small) shares of the costs because of insurance; and within specific geographic areas there may be few providers, at least in the case of hospitals. The discussion below reviews basic aspects of pricing that lead to different prices in a market and are relevant to discussing barriers to the effect of transparency on prices in the health market. Implications of Hospital Price Dispersion
Does evidence on the effects of price transparency in other markets, which by and large supports the view that better information on pricing reduces prices, imply that greater price transparency would affect health markets in the same way, despite the specific structures and characteristics of the health care market? Several private insurers also allow policyholders access to online tools that allow some price comparisons for medical procedures. Finally, changes in prices might correlate to offsetting changes in quality or amenity levels. However, the available evidence, while preliminary, suggests that the California price transparency initiative so far has had little observable effect where it might have been expected to have the greatest effect. How Would Greater Price Transparency Affect the Health Care Sector? Were price transparency to improve, and if consumer choice in health care were to become more sensitive to price differentials, then economic analysis would suggest that these effects would increase pressure on hospitals to become more productively efficient, that is, to use fewer inputs to produce the same or greater output. Price discrimination typically raises prices for some groups and lowers them for others. He found the lowest prices in states with no restrictions, but also some benefit from advertising without price advertising. Two studies related to food prices. Search Costs and the Internet
In some markets consumers obtain price information with difficulty or at high cost. On average, consumers who search more pay lower prices. | Consumer advocates, proponents of wider use of market incentives in the health care sector, and some policy makers have called for greater price transparency. These measures might include posting prices in an accessible form or regulations constraining price discrimination (different prices charged to different customers). Price transparency implies that consumers can obtain price information easily, so they can usefully compare costs of different choices. Price transparency may also mean consumers understand how prices are set and are aware of price discrimination. In health care markets consumers often have difficulty finding useful price data. In particular, few consumers have a clear idea of what hospital stays or hospital-based procedures will cost, or understand how hospital charges are determined.
Many empirical studies have investigated how changes in price transparency have affected various markets. Most of this evidence, largely relating to advertising restrictions and lower search costs on the Internet, suggests that price transparency leads to lower and more uniform prices, a view consistent with predictions of standard economic theory. If this evidence could be applied to the health market, it would suggest that reforms that increase transparency would reduce prices. In cases involving NASDAQ and Amazon.com, public reaction created pressure to change pricing strategies. A few studies, involving intermediate goods in one case and less clearly identified advertising effects in others, found that transparency raised prices.
However, the special characteristics of the health market make it difficult to directly apply empirical evidence gathered from other markets. These characteristics include limits on competition among hospitals, complicated products that vary in quality, intermediate agents (physicians) who make choices, and third-party payment of costs through insurance. The dispersion of prices for similar health care procedures is high, which suggests that these markets are not working well with respect to price outcomes, as would be expected in ordinary competitive markets. In addition, prices paid by different types of payers vary dramatically. On average, patients without insurance or who pay their own bills pay much more relative to what private insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid pay.
Despite these complications, greater price transparency, such as accessibly posted prices, might lead to more efficient outcomes and lower prices. Some markets where lifting advertising restrictions led to lower prices also involved complicated products such as eye care, suggesting that the complex nature of health care may not be a barrier to benefits from price transparency. Internet comparison shopping sites also appear to have lowered prices for many products. Better price information might allow patients, either directly or through their physicians, to obtain better value for health care services. Several states and health insurers now provide online data on hospital costs. These price transparency initiatives, at least so far, have had little visible effect on pricing. Public pressure, which in some cases has caused hospitals to curtail aggressive bill collection tactics, might change hospitals' and health care providers' pricing behavior. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41337 | crs_R41337_0 | Introduction
An evaluation may provide information at any stage of the policy process about how a federal government policy, program, activity, or agency is working. One aspect of choosing how to carry out an evaluation involves deciding when some kind of "independence" would be a desirable attribute. In the context of evaluation, independence may apply to an evaluation or to an evaluator. On one hand, for example, the term may relate to independence of an evaluation from the policy preferences of an individual or group ("independent evaluation"), perhaps by prohibiting political appointees from revising an evaluation. Independence also may refer to an entity that conducts evaluations that also is located outside the immediate organization responsible for policy implementation ("independent evaluator"). There is some diversity of opinion regarding how to define independence and what makes an evaluator (or evaluation) independent. For example, an evaluator's "external" status, outside the organization that is implementing a program, does not necessarily equate with independence. Nor would an evaluator's "internal" status, inside the implementing organization, necessarily equate with a lack of independence for an evaluation (e.g., if an expert panel reviewed the internally produced evaluation for bias). There is also varying opinion concerning when independence is necessary, or possibly counterproductive, and what value it may bring. Nonetheless, instances of independent evaluators appear to be growing in number and variety. This report focuses on the characteristics of independent evaluators (IEs)—examples of which are described in the Appendix—when an evaluation is to be conducted by an entity outside the immediate organization that is responsible for policy implementation, and the IE is also intended to have one or more dimensions of independence. IEs and similar constructs that conduct independent evaluations, however, vary across a number of attributes: structure, jurisdiction, authority, resources, length of tenure, and specific duties and responsibilities. These differences, in turn, could affect their capabilities, effectiveness, and assistance to others, including their contributions to the oversight of a program or project by the executive or legislature. After an overview of such entities—which include newly and specially created units as well as existing ones, such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and offices of inspector general (OIGs)—this report suggests possible broad characteristics and criteria of independent evaluators or similar units. The final section describes a number of such offices, along with citations to relevant materials for each example (public laws, legislative proposals, executive branch documents, and secondary analyses). These include the expertise of the staff, competency and impartiality of the evaluator, and trust and confidence between an evaluator and the program office. Refinements of these and other possibilities might be considered as well. | Congress and the executive, as well as outside organizations, have long been attentive to the evaluation of federal programs, with frequent interest paid to the independent status of the evaluator. This interest continues into the current era, with numerous illustrations of the multi-faceted approaches adopted and proposed.
An evaluation may provide information at any stage of the policy process about how a federal government policy, program, activity, or agency is working. Congress has required evaluations through legislation (or requested these via its committee and Member offices); and the executive branch has pursued evaluations through presidential or agency directives.
Part of choosing how to carry out an evaluation involves deciding if some kind of "independence" would be a desirable attribute. Observers often see independence as a means of avoiding or deterring bias and ensuring an objective, impartial assessment. In the context of evaluation, independence may apply to an evaluation or to an evaluator. On one hand, for example, the term may relate to independence of an evaluation from the policy preferences of an individual or group ("independent evaluation"), perhaps by prohibiting political appointees from revising or evaluating a program. Independence may refer to an entity that conducts evaluations that also is located outside the immediate organization responsible for policy implementation ("independent evaluator").
There is some diversity of opinion regarding the definition of independence and how it might be ensured. For example, an evaluator's "external" status, outside the organization that is implementing a program, does not necessarily equate with independence. Nor would an evaluator's "internal" status, inside the implementing organization, necessarily equate with a lack of independence for an evaluation (e.g., if an expert panel reviewed the internally produced evaluation for bias). There is varying opinion concerning when independence is necessary, or possibly counterproductive, and what value it may bring.
The differences of opinion among definitions and perceived need notwithstanding, instances of independent program evaluators appear to be growing in number and variety at the federal level.
This report focuses on examples of independent evaluators (IEs): when an evaluation is to be conducted by an entity outside the immediate organization that is responsible for policy implementation, and the entity also is intended to have one or more dimensions of independence. IEs and similar constructs, however, vary across a number of characteristics and attributes: structure, jurisdiction, authority, resources, length of tenure, and specific duties and responsibilities. These differences, in turn, could affect their capabilities, effectiveness, and assistance to others, including their contributions to the oversight of a program or project by Congress and the executive branch.
After an overview of such entities—which encompass new units created specifically for conducting an evaluation as well as existing ones, such as the Government Accountability Office and offices of the inspectors general—this report suggests possible broad characteristics and criteria of independent evaluators or similar units, which could be valuable in oversight or legislative endeavors. The Appendix describes a number of such offices—past, present, and proposed—along with citations to relevant official documents and other materials for each example (public laws, legislative proposals, executive branch directives, and secondary analyses). This report will be updated as conditions warrant. |
crs_RS21892 | crs_RS21892_0 | Organizations that meet these qualifications must generally apply to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for recognition of their § 501(c)(3) status. | Charities and other entities seeking tax-exempt status as § 501(c)(3) organizations generally must apply to the Internal Revenue Service. This report provides an overview of the application process. |
crs_R40537 | crs_R40537_0 | President Barack Obama signed H.R. 1 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, into law on February 17, 2009, as P.L. 111-5 (123 Stat. 115-521). This report provides a summary and legislative history of ARRA and identifies other resources that provide additional information regarding its content and implementation. Overview of the Act
ARRA is a relatively lengthy and complex act, amounting to just over 400 pages (in slip law form) and melding together hundreds of billions of dollars in discretionary spending, mandatory spending, and revenue provisions encompassing the jurisdiction of several House and Senate committees. ARRA provides almost $800 billion through extensive discretionary spending, mandatory spending, and revenue provisions that the Administration estimates will save or create some 3.5 million jobs. Funding is provided for existing and some new programs in the 15 Cabinet-level departments and 11 independent agencies. Some of the funds are distributed to states, localities, other entities, and individuals through a combination of formula and competitive grants and direct assistance. In addition to new spending and tax provisions, new policies are created regarding unemployment compensation, health insurance, health information technology, broadband communications, and energy, among others. With regard to its specific impact on the budget, the act is expected to increase the deficit by $787.2 billion over the 11-year period covering FY2009-FY2019; the cost estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is presented in Table 1 . The estimated deficit impact reflects spending increases of $575.3 billion (in outlays) and revenue reductions of $211.8 billion. The total spending increases consist of $311.2 billion in discretionary new budget authority (yielding $308.3 billion in outlays) and $269.5 billion in mandatory new budget authority (yielding $267.0 billion in outlays). As Table 2 shows, 20.9% of total outlays ($120.1 billion) are estimated to occur by the end of FY2009. By the end of FY2010, 59.0% of total outlays ($339.4 billion) are expected to occur, and by the end of FY2011, 80.9% of total outlays ($465.6 billion) are expected to occur. Revenue reductions (as shown in Table 1 ) occur more quickly, with reductions of $64.8 billion in FY2009 and $180.1 billion in FY2010. Division A (Appropriations Provisions) includes supplemental appropriations for FY2009 (and later fiscal years) covering all 12 of the parallel regular appropriations acts. Four additional titles, dealing with health information technology, a state fiscal stabilization fund, accountability and transparency, and general provisions complete the division. Division B (Tax, Unemployment, Health, State Fiscal Relief, and Other Provisions) consists of seven separate titles. Division A includes the discretionary spending provisions, but some significant substantive provisions as well. Division B includes the mandatory spending and revenue provisions, with some exceptions. Summary of General Oversight Provisions
Divisions A and B of ARRA contain numerous oversight, accountability, and transparency provisions. | President Barack Obama signed H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, into law on February 17, 2009, as P.L. 111-5 (123 Stat. 115-521). The act is seen as one of the most significant legislative responses made thus far to the current economic turmoil. This report provides a summary and legislative history of ARRA and identifies other resources that provide additional information regarding its content and implementation.
ARRA is a relatively lengthy and complex act, amounting to just over 400 pages (in slip law form) and melding together hundreds of billions of dollars in discretionary spending, mandatory spending, and revenue provisions encompassing the jurisdiction of several House and Senate committees. The act consists of two major divisions. Division A (Appropriations Provisions) includes supplemental appropriations for FY2009 (and later fiscal years) covering by separate titles all 12 of the regular appropriations acts, as well as four additional titles dealing with health information technology, a state fiscal stabilization fund, accountability and transparency, and general provisions. Division B (Tax, Unemployment, Health, State Fiscal Relief, and Other Provisions) consists of seven separate titles. Division A includes the discretionary spending provisions, but some significant substantive provisions as well; Division B includes the mandatory spending and revenue provisions, with some exceptions.
ARRA provides almost $800 billion through extensive discretionary spending, mandatory spending, and revenue provisions that the Administration estimates will save or create some 3.5 million jobs. Funding is provided for existing and some new programs in the 15 Cabinet-level departments and 11 independent agencies. Some of the funds are distributed to states, localities, other entities, and individuals through a combination of formula and competitive grants and direct assistance. In addition to new spending and tax provisions, new policies are created regarding unemployment compensation, health insurance, health information technology, broadband communications, and energy, among others.
Numerous oversight, accountability, and transparency provisions are contained in the act. They include various reporting requirements and funding for offices of inspector general, the Government Accountability Office, and a newly established Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board.
With regard to its specific impact on the budget, the act is estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to increase the deficit by $787.2 billion over the 11-year period covering FY2009-FY2019. The estimated deficit impact reflects spending increases of $575.3 billion (in outlays) and revenue reductions of $211.8 billion. The total spending increases consist of $311.2 billion in discretionary new budget authority (yielding $308.3 billion in outlays) and $269.5 billion in mandatory new budget authority (yielding $267.0 billion in outlays).
About 21% of total outlays ($120.1 billion) under ARRA are estimated to occur by the end of FY2009. By the end of FY2010, 59% of total outlays ($339.4 billion) are expected to occur, and by the end of FY2011, 81% of total outlays ($465.6 billion) are expected to occur. Revenue reductions occur more quickly, with reductions of $64.8 billion in FY2009 and $180.1 billion in FY2010, offset somewhat in later years by modest revenue increases.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32890 | crs_RL32890_0 | Introduction
Persons suspected of terrorist or criminal activity may be transferred from one State (i.e., country) to another to answer charges against them. A distinct form of rendition is extradition , by which one State surrenders a person within its territorial jurisdiction to a requesting State via a formal legal process, typically established by treaty between the countries. The terms "irregular rendition" and "extraordinary rendition" have been used to refer to the extrajudicial transfer of a person from one State to another, generally for the purpose of arrest, detention, and/or interrogation by the receiving State (for purposes of this report, the term "rendition" will be used to describe irregular renditions, and not extraditions, unless otherwise specified). Where appropriate, the United States seeks assurances that transferred persons will not be tortured." In January 2009, President Obama issued an Executive Order creating a special task force to review U.S. transfer policies, including the practice of rendition, to ensure compliance with applicable legal requirements. In August, the task force issued recommendations to ensure that U.S. transfer practices comply with applicable standards and do not result in the transfer of persons to face torture. These recommendations include strengthening procedures used to obtain assurances from a country that a person will not face torture if transferred there, including through the establishment of mechanisms to monitor the treatment of transferred persons. This report describes the most relevant legal guidelines limiting the transfer of persons to foreign States where they may face torture, as well as recent legislation seeking to limit the rendition of persons to countries believed to practice torture. Limitations Imposed on Renditions by the Convention Against Torture and Implementing Legislation
The U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and U.S. domestic implementing legislation impose the primary legal restrictions on the transfer of persons to countries where they would face torture. Domestic Implementation of CAT Article 3
The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA) implemented U.S. obligations under CAT Article 3. Application of CAT and Implementing Legislation to the Practice of Extraordinary Renditions
Although the express intent of CAT was to help ensure that no one would be subjected to torture, it is arguably unclear as to whether CAT would in all circumstances bar renditions to countries that practice torture, including possibly in certain cases where the rendering State was aware that a rendered person would likely be tortured. Again, neither CAT nor U.S. implementing regulations prohibit the United States from transferring persons to States where they would face harsh treatment—including treatment that would be prohibited if carried out by U.S. authorities—that does not rise to the level of torture. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA, P.L. However, the War Crimes Act may be interpreted as prohibiting some renditions. CAT-implementing regulations prohibit the transfer of persons to countries where they would more likely than not face torture , but not cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment that does not rise to the level of torture. The Executive Order entitled "Ensuring Lawful Interrogations" establishes a Special Interagency Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies, which is charged with reviewing
the practices of transferring individuals to other nations in order to ensure that such practices comply with the domestic laws, international obligations, and policies of the United States and do not result in the transfer of individuals to other nations to face torture or otherwise for the purpose, or with the effect, of undermining or circumventing the commitments or obligations of the United States to ensure the humane treatment of individuals in its custody or control. | Persons suspected of criminal or terrorist activity may be transferred from one State (i.e., country) to another for arrest, detention, and/or interrogation. Commonly, this is done through extradition, by which one State surrenders a person within its jurisdiction to a requesting State via a formal legal process, typically established by treaty. Far less often, such transfers are effectuated through a process known as "extraordinary rendition" or "irregular rendition." These terms have often been used to refer to the extrajudicial transfer of a person from one State to another. In this report, "rendition" refers to extraordinary or irregular renditions unless otherwise specified.
Although the particularities regarding the usage of extraordinary renditions and the legal authority behind such renditions are not publicly available, various U.S. officials have acknowledged the practice's existence. During the Bush Administration, there was controversy over the use of renditions by the United States, particularly with regard to the alleged transfer of suspected terrorists to countries known to employ harsh interrogation techniques that may rise to the level of torture, purportedly with the knowledge or acquiescence of the United States. In January 2009, President Obama issued an Executive Order creating a special task force to review U.S. transfer policies, including the practice of rendition, to ensure compliance with applicable legal requirements. In August, the task force issued recommendations to ensure that U.S. transfer practices comply with applicable standards and do not result in the transfer of persons to face torture. These recommendations include strengthening procedures used to obtain assurances from a country that a person will not face torture if transferred there, and the establishment of mechanisms to monitor the treatment of transferred persons.
This report discusses relevant international and domestic law restricting the transfer of persons to foreign states for the purpose of torture. The U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and its domestic implementing legislation (the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998) impose the primary legal restrictions on the transfer of persons to countries where they would face torture. Both CAT and U.S. implementing legislation generally prohibit the rendition of persons to countries in most cases where they would more likely than not be tortured, though there are arguably limited exceptions to this prohibition. Historically, the State Department has taken the position that CAT's provisions concerning the transfer of persons do not apply extraterritorially, though as a matter of policy the United States does not transfer persons in its custody to countries where they would face torture (U.S. regulations and statutes implementing CAT, however, arguably limit the extraterritorial transfer of individuals nonetheless). Under U.S. regulations implementing CAT, a person may be transferred to a country that provides credible assurances that the rendered person will not be tortured. Neither CAT nor its implementing legislation prohibits the rendition of persons to countries where they would be subject to harsh treatment not rising to the level of torture. Besides CAT, additional obligations may be imposed upon U.S. rendition practice via the Geneva Conventions, the War Crimes Act (as amended by the Military Commissions Act (P.L. 109-366), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
Legislation was introduced in the 110th Congress to limit or bar U.S. participation in renditions. It is possible that similar legislation will be proposed in the 111th Congress. |
crs_RL30725 | crs_RL30725_0 | Introduction
The House of Representatives follows a well-established routine on the opening day of a new Congress. The proceedings include electing and swearing in the Speaker, swearing in Members, electing and swearing in House administrative officers, and adopting rules of procedure and various administrative resolutions. Resolutions assigning some or many Members to committees may also be adopted. Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution sets a term of office for Members of the House at two years. Thus, one House ends at the conclusion of each two-year Congress, and the newly elected Representatives must constitute a new House at the beginning of a new Congress. The House Convenes
The Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution directs that a new Congress convene at noon on January 3 in each odd-numbered year, unless the preceding Congress has by law designated a different day for the new Congress's convening. 129 , setting the convening date for the 114 th Congress as January 6, 2015. 113-201 ). Congressional leaders planned that the 115 th Congress would convene January 3, 2017, and that the 116 th Congress would convene January 3, 2019, obviating the need for a law to set the date. Although no officers of the House will have been elected when the House first convenes, officers from the previous Congress perform certain functions. After the Clerk calls the Representatives-elect to order, the Chaplain offers a prayer. A quorum being present, the first order of official business is the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. ELECTION OF SPEAKER
The CLERK. The CLERK. The CLERK. The oath of office may be administered by another Member or by a judge. The Speaker administers the oath to the newly elected officers. Adoption of House Rules of Procedure36
The next order of business is the adoption of the rules of the House. Speaker's Announcements
On the day of convening or shortly thereafter, the Speaker customarily announces the Speaker's policies with respect to certain floor practices for the duration of the Congress. 1 , 115 th Congress) by unanimous consent to allow the Speaker and the majority leader of the Senate (or their designated representatives) to notify the Members of the House and Senate to assemble outside of Washington, DC, if circumstances require it. Committee Organization
The committee assignment process occurs largely within the party groups—the Republican Conference and the Democratic Caucus. Other First-Day Floor Actions
Other routine organizational business may be taken up on the House floor on the first day. Counting Electoral Votes
Some resolutions are dependent on specific circumstances that might not occur in every new Congress. For example, following a presidential election, the new House adopts resolutions providing for the counting by the new Congress of electoral votes cast for the President and Vice President of the United States; continuing the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies; and authorizing the use of the Capitol and its grounds for inaugural activities. | Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution sets a term of office of two years for all Members of the House. One House ends at the conclusion of each two-year Congress, and the newly elected Representatives must constitute a new House at the beginning of the next Congress. Consequently, the House must choose its Speaker and officers and adopt the chamber's rules of procedure every two years.
The Constitution mandates that Congress convene at noon on January 3, unless the preceding Congress by law designated a different day. P.L. 113-201 set January 6, 2015, as the convening date of the 114th Congress. Congressional leaders planned that the 115th Congress would convene January 3, 2017, and that the 116th Congress would convene January 3, 2019, obviating the need for a law to set the date. Although no officers will have been elected when the House first convenes, officers from the previous Congress perform certain functions, such as conducting the election of the Speaker.
The House follows a well-established first-day routine. The proceedings include—
a call to order by the Clerk of the House; a prayer led by the Chaplain and the Pledge of Allegiance led by the Clerk; a quorum call ordered by the Clerk; the election of the Speaker, ordered by the Clerk and conducted with the assistance of tellers; remarks by the Speaker-elect, followed by his or her swearing-in by the dean of the House; the oath of office for the newly elected and re-elected Members, administered by the Speaker; adoption of the rules of the House for the new Congress; adoption of various administrative resolutions and unanimous consent agreements; and announcement of the Speaker's policies on certain floor practices.
On opening day, the House often adopts resolutions assigning some or many of its Members to committees. This process regularly continues over several more weeks. The committee assignment process occurs primarily within the party groups—the Republican Conference and the Democratic Caucus. Other routine organizational business may also be taken up on the House floor on the first day, such as adoption of a resolution to allow a judge or a Member of Congress to administer the oath of office to one or more Members-elect who are absent.
Some resolutions on opening day are dependent on specific circumstances and do not occur at the beginning of each new Congress. At the outset of a new Congress following a presidential election, the House and Senate must adopt a resolution agreeing to meet to count the electoral votes cast for President and Vice President.
For an explanation of proceedings occurring on the first day in the Senate, see the companion report: CRS Report RS20722, The First Day of a New Congress: A Guide to Proceedings on the Senate Floor. |
crs_RL32414 | crs_RL32414_0 | Background
Historically, the federal government has assumed primary responsibility for the management and testing for foreign animal diseases like bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, commonly known as "mad cow disease." Following the first confirmed case of BSE in the United States, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced an enhanced BSE sampling and surveillance program designed to test more cattle in the targeted high-risk population with the assistance of designated state and university diagnostic laboratories across the country. USDA implemented the new program in June 2004, and uses USDA-approved "rapid" immunologic test kits. Responding to and anticipating concerns of foreign governments and domestic consumers about potential contamination of the U.S. beef supply, Creekstone Farms Premium Beef—a private specialty producer and processor of Black Angus Beef—sought approval from the USDA to conduct voluntary BSE rapid testing for all the cattle it processes under a "marketing" program. On April 8, 2004, the USDA rejected Creekstone's request stating that the test had been licensed only for animal health "surveillance" purposes and "the test as proposed by Creekstone would have implied a consumer safety aspect that is not scientifically warranted." On March 23, 2006, Creekstone filed a lawsuit against the USDA seeking, among other things, an injunction enjoining USDA from implementing or enforcing any prohibition on Creekstone acquiring or using USDA-approved BSE rapid test kits for purposes of routinely screening for BSE-infected cattle. The USDA's rejection of Creekstone's request to privately test all of its cattle for BSE with rapid test kits ignited a significant amount of debate among lawmakers and segments of the beef industry and ultimately resulted in the lawsuit discussed herein. At issue is whether the USDA's decision to reject Creekstone's request to test all of its animals for BSE was a valid agency action. This report analyzes the legal authority of the USDA to regulate the voluntary testing of 100% of a private company's animals with rapid test kits and the USDA's rejection of Creekstone's application to test for BSE all of the cattle it processes. This analysis examines some of the legal arguments that have or might be presented in the Creekstone lawsuit. | The positive identification of bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, commonly known as "mad cow disease," in a Washington State cow in December of 2003 sparked a number of reactions from the federal government, the meat industry, and close to forty countries world-wide. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), for example, launched an extensive BSE sampling and surveillance program designed to test more high-risk cattle with the assistance of designated state and university diagnostic laboratories across the country. USDA implemented the new program in June of 2004, and uses USDA-approved "rapid" immunologic test kits.
Most countries, however, quickly banned the importation of United States beef following the announcement. In an effort to meet new consumer demand, some private slaughterers propose to test 100% of their cattle using USDA approved "rapid test" kits. For example, Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, a private specialty producer and processor of Black Angus Beef, sought approval from the USDA to conduct voluntary BSE rapid testing for all the cattle it processes in order to promote sales, especially exports. The USDA, however, rejected Creekstone's request primarily because the test had only been licensed for animal health "surveillance" purposes and "the test as proposed by Creekstone would have implied a consumer safety aspect that is not scientifically warranted."
The USDA's rejection of Creekstone's request to privately test all of its cattle for BSE ignited a significant amount of debate and resulted in the filing of a lawsuit by Creekstone on March 23, 2006, against the USDA. At issue is whether the USDA's decision to reject Creekstone's request to test all of its animals for BSE was a valid agency action. This report examines the legal authority of the USDA's Animal and Plant Health Protection Service to regulate all testing for BSE, particularly the voluntary testing of 100% of a private company's animals with rapid test kits and the USDA's recent rejection of Creekstone's application to test all of the cattle it processes for BSE. This analysis encompasses some of the legal arguments that have or might be presented in the Creekstone lawsuit.
This report does not discuss the possible role that the Food and Drug Administration may play in the regulation of BSE testing and surveillance. For information on the USDA and legislative activities relating to BSE, see CRS Report RL32199, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, or "Mad Cow Disease"): Current and Proposed Safeguards, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL34718 | crs_RL34718_0 | On September 26, 2006, President Bush signed into law S. 2590 , the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA; P.L. 109-282 ). To that end, the legislation required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish a publicly available website that would allow users to search for detailed information about entities that are awarded federal grants, loans, contracts, and other forms of assistance. According to the most recently published Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR), federal agencies award over $880 billion in those three categories of financial assistance alone: $470 billion in grants, $381 billion in contracts, and $29 billion in direct loans. OMB launched the database, USAspending.gov, on December 13, 2007. While the new database has been praised as a step toward a worthy objective—enhancing the transparency of government expenditures—government officials and members of the public have expressed concern about the quality of the data it provides, the ability of the database to identify earmarked awards, and the potential cost of enhancing and expanding data collection efforts. This report initially discusses the background of the FFATA. It then discusses the act's provisions, noting what types of assistance are part of the new website, the primary sources of the data, and deadlines for implementation. The report then identifies and discusses issues that have been raised regarding the act that might affect its implementation. Finally, it examines a legislative proposal from the 110 th Congress that would have significantly expanded the information accessible through USAspending.gov. Three major financial assistance databases were identified in the act as likely sources of information for the new website—the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), the Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS), and Grants.gov. | On September 26, 2006, President Bush signed the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) into law (P.L. 109-282). In an attempt to expand oversight of federal spending, including earmarks, the new law required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish a publicly available online website that provides access to information about entities that are awarded federal grants, loans, contracts, and other forms of assistance. Federal agencies award over $880 billion dollars annually in three of the primary categories of financial assistance that are included in the database—$470 billion in grants, $381 billion in contracts, and $29 billion in direct loans. The FFATA was endorsed by leaders of both parties and an array of business, union, and watchdog organizations.
OMB launched the FFATA-mandated website, USAspending.gov, on December 13, 2007. While the website has been praised as a step toward a worthy objective—enhancing the transparency of government expenditures—government officials and members of the public have expressed concern that issues surrounding its implementation have not been adequately addressed. In particular, many observers question the reliability of information taken from the Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS) and the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which are important sources of information for USAspending.gov. They note that information in FAADS and FPDS is often incomplete and inaccurate, and therefore might limit transparency. Some observers also believe that the cost of establishing and maintaining the new website might grow as agencies seek to improve data quality and collect new information on subawards.
This report initially discusses the background of the FFATA. It then discusses the act's provisions, noting what types of assistance are part of the new website, the primary sources of the data, and deadlines for implementation. The report then identifies and discusses issues that have been raised regarding the act that might affect its implementation. Finally, it examines a legislative proposal from the 110th Congress that would have expanded the information accessible through USAspending.gov. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42756 | crs_R42756_0 | But the importance given to import dependence varies. A particularly controversial aspect of the debate is the issue of global climate change, because burning fossil fuels produces large amounts of carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas. Like the goals of energy policy, the means of achieving them have three dimensions: reducing consumption by increased energy efficiency; increasing domestic production of conventional energy sources, particularly oil and natural gas; and developing new sources of energy, particularly renewable energy and renewable fuels, that can replace oil and other fossil fuels. A fundamental dichotomy that lies beneath many individual policy debates, not only in energy issues, is between those who see government intervention as a positive force, and those who view it at best as a necessary evil to be restricted as much as possible. Legislation in the 114th Congress
Comprehensive Energy Legislation
In the second session of the 114 th Congress, both the House and Senate are considering broad energy legislation, as well as specific topics of key interest. On April 20, 2016, the Senate passed S. 2012 , the Energy Policy and Modernization Act. On December 3, 2015, the House passed H.R. 8 , the North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2015. On May 25, 2016, the House passed an amended version of S. 2012 which contains the text of H.R. 8 , as well as the text of several other energy and natural resources-related bills. The conference committee met for the first time on September 8. Both bills would address a variety of energy topics, including energy efficiency in federal buildings, data centers, manufacturing, and schools; water conservation/efficiency; electric grid cybersecurity; and review of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The House bill also includes topics such as electric grid physical security and study of electricity markets; the Senate bill also includes provisions on helium and critical minerals, electric grid energy storage, and loan programs. U.S. Crude Oil Exports
Some major energy topics were addressed at the end of first session of the 114 th Congress as part of the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 114-113 ). Among other provisions, the act repealed the 40-year limitation on exports of U.S.-produced crude oil under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. Energy Tax Incentives
The FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act also extended several energy tax incentives, including the production tax credits (PTC) for wind and solar electricity, electric vehicle tax credits, and incentives for advanced biofuel production. Keystone XL Pipeline
Early in the first session of the 114 th Congress, the House and Senate passed the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act ( S. 1 ), which was vetoed by President Obama on February 24, 2015. The bill would have immediately approved this controversial pipeline project. On November 6, 2016, the Department of State determined that the pipeline would "not serve the national interest of the United States," and rejected TransCanada's permit application. | Energy policy in the United States has focused on three major goals: assuring a secure supply of energy, keeping energy costs low, and protecting the environment. In pursuit of those goals, government programs have been developed to improve the efficiency with which energy is utilized, to promote the domestic production of conventional energy sources, and to develop new energy sources, particularly renewable sources.
Implementing these programs has been controversial because of varying importance given to different aspects of energy policy. For some, dependence on imports of foreign energy, particularly from the Persian Gulf, is the primary concern; for others, the continued use of fossil fuels, whatever their origin, is most important. The contribution of burning fossil fuels to global climate change is particularly controversial. Another dichotomy is between those who see government intervention as a positive force and those who view it as a necessary evil at best, to be restricted as much as possible.
In the 114th Congress, both the House and Senate are considering broad energy legislation, as well as specific topics of key interest. On April 20, 2016, the Senate passed S. 2012, the Energy Policy and Modernization Act. On December 3, 2015, the House passed H.R. 8, the North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2015. On May 25, 2016, the House passed an amended version of S. 2012 which contains the text of H.R. 8, as well as the text of several other energy and natural resources-related bills. The conference committee met for the first time on September 8. Both bills would address a variety of energy topics, including energy efficiency in federal buildings, data centers, manufacturing, and schools; water conservation/efficiency; electric grid cybersecurity; and review of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The House bill also includes topics such as electric grid physical security and study of electricity markets; the Senate bill also includes provisions on helium and critical minerals, and electric grid energy storage, and loan programs.
Many energy topics were also addressed at the end of 1st Session of the 114th Congress as part of the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113). Among other provisions, the act included two major energy provisions:
Repeal of the limitation on exports of U.S.-produced crude oil under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act; and Extension of several energy tax incentives, including the production tax credits (PTC) for wind and solar electricity, electric vehicle tax credits, and incentives for advanced biofuel production.
Early in the first session of the 114th Congress, the House and Senate passed the Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act (S. 1), which was vetoed by President Obama on February 24, 2015. The bill would have immediately approved this controversial pipeline project. On November 6, 2015, the Department of State determined that the pipeline would "not serve the national interest of the United States," and rejected TransCanada's permit application. |
crs_R42003 | crs_R42003_0 | 2965 ), modified, and after congressional passage, signed into law by President Obama as P.L. 111-321 on December 20, 2010, setting in motion the process for repealing Section 654, Title 10 United States Code and the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy that was promulgated as a result of this law. According to P.L. The certification occurred on July 22, 2011. How will language in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, particularly the article prohibiting sodomy, be affected? This report will examine these issues. The Role of Congress
Under the Constitution, Congress has the authority "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Congressional Oversight
Congress may also respond to the repeal by exercising its oversight duties. For example, it could hold hearings, as well as propose legislative changes to laws/policies affected by the repeal of Section 654. 111-321 ) to require the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to submit to the congressional defense committees their written certification that repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell law specified in section 654 of title 10, United States Code, will not degrade the readiness, effectiveness, cohesion, and morale of combat arms units and personnel of their respective armed force that are engaged in combat, deployed to a combat theater, or preparing for deployment to a combat theater. Benefits and Privileges
A panoply of pay, benefits, and privileges are available to military personnel. On September 21, 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) became law. Under this law, marriage is defined as the union between one man and one woman. The federal government, therefore, does not recognize same-sex marriages for the purpose of extending benefits and privileges, although several states do. Other questions arise. Defense of Marriage Act
In an effort to contend with the issue of variations in military benefits that may occur as the result of certain states recognizing same-sex marriages, it has been suggested that the most direct way to address the issue is to repeal DOMA. Senate versions of these bills did not contain similar language. Sodomy
Congressional treatment of sodomy in the military context has varied over time. Legislative provisions have been included in the Senate version of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act that would repeal the crime of sodomy under the UCMJ (Article 125) and expand Article 120 ("Rape and Carnal Knowledge") to include three sections applying to (1) rape and assault against any person, (2) sexual offenses against children, and (3) other non-consensual sexual misconduct. This language was not included in the final version of the law. 125 been repealed, consensual sodomy could not be prosecuted. Application to Transgender Individuals
The repeal of Section 654 has encouraged some to advocate for other changes to the law and/or military policy. Activists have complained that despite the repeal, the military discriminates against transgender individuals. Based on military fitness policies, individuals who have a history of mental disorders that, in the opinion of the medical examiner, would interfere with or prevent satisfactory performance of military duties are not allowed to serve. Among the disorders cited are "sexual and gender identity disorders." (These disorders are listed in the International Classification of Diseases, 9 th Revision, Clinical Modification or ICD-9-CM, 302.) At one time, homosexuality was listed as a psychiatric disorder, but this was removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) in 1973. (DSM and ICD have merged their codes.) | On December 22, 2010, President Obama signed P.L. 111-321 into law. It called for the repeal of the existing law (Title 10, United States Code, §654) barring open homosexuality in the military by prescribing a series of steps that must take place before repeal occurs. One step was fulfilled on July 22, 2011, when the President signed the certification of the process ending the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, which was repealed on September 20, 2011. However, in repealing the law and the so-called "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, a number of issues have been raised, but were not addressed by P.L. 111-321. This report considers issues that Congress may wish to consider regarding matters arising as a result of the repeal of §654.
Under the Constitution, Congress has the authority for making "rules for the government and regulation" of the military services. It has been suggested that Congress could hold hearings concerning such matters as the anticipated changes in other laws regarding military benefits, for example.
Issues for consideration include, but are not limited to, congressional oversight of the repeal process, differences in benefits and privileges some individuals may experience (especially differences created under the Defense of Marriage Act), changes involving sodomy prohibitions, and efforts by some to expand the repeal to include transgender individuals.
Certain military benefits and privileges are extended to spouses as defined by law. Under the Defense of Marriage Act, the federal government recognizes marriage as the union of one man and one woman. However, certain states recognize same-sex marriages. Thus, it is possible for a same-sex couple to be legally married but not eligible for certain military benefits and privileges.
Laws prohibiting sodomy (defined as "unnatural carnal copulation") in the military context have varied over time. There existed proposed language in the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act in the 112th Congress that would remove sodomy from the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, effectively decriminalizing sodomy. Similar language did not exist in the House version. This language was not included in the final law. Instead, use of the term "forced" sodomy has been cited suggesting violations involving "consensual" sodomy will not be enforced.
The repeal of the ban on homosexual behavior has encouraged some to expand efforts to end discrimination against transgender individuals. Based on military fitness policies, individuals who have a history of mental disorders that, in the opinion of the medical examiner, would interfere with or prevent satisfactory performance of military duties are not allowed to serve. Among the disorders cited are "sexual and gender identity disorders." (These disorders are listed in the International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification or ICD-9-CM, 302.) At one time, homosexuality was listed as a psychiatric disorder, but this was removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) in 1973. Some have argued that other "gender disorders" should also be removed. Along these lines, advocates believe it is unfair for the military to continue to discriminate against these individuals. Others, however, believe that until the DSM and ICD-9-CM are changed, such individuals should continue to be barred from serving. |
crs_RS21562 | crs_RS21562_0 | Background
The U.S. Post Office Department, the predecessor to the U.S. Congress first honored an individual by naming a post office through freestanding legislation in 1967. During this period, post office naming acts were a very common form of legislation, comprising almost 20% of all statutes enacted. The USPS has compiled a comprehensive list of all the statutes enacted since 1967 to name post offices, including the addresses, name of the honoree, and reason(s) for the post office dedication. In the 111 th Congress, the committee adopted the rule stating that it—
will not consider any legislation that would name a postal facility for a living person with the exception of bills naming facilities after former Presidents and Vice Presidents of the United States, former Members of Congress over 70 years of age, former state or local elected officials over 70 years of age, former judges over 70 years of age, or wounded veterans. It is not uncommon for post office naming bills that have passed the House to wait several months for action by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and the full Senate. The House passed the bill; the Senate did not. The tangible effect of naming a post office is the installation of a dedicatory plaque in "a prominent place in the facility's lobby, preferably above the post office boxes." H.R. 3137 also would amend 39 U.S.C. | Legislation naming post offices for persons has become a very common practice. During the 108th through 112th Congresses, almost 20% of all statutes enacted were post office naming acts.
This report describes how the practice of naming post offices through public law originated and how it is commonly done today. It also details the House and Senate committee policies for considering such legislation and the U.S. Postal Service's procedures for implementing post office naming acts.
Unanimity of a state's congressional delegation is required for the movement of naming bills to the floor of the House or Senate. Additionally, the Senate committee of jurisdiction has adopted the rule that it "will not consider any legislation that would name a postal facility for a living person with the exception of bills naming facilities after former Presidents and Vice Presidents of the United States, former Members of Congress over 70 years of age, former state or local elected officials over 70 years of age, former judges over 70 years of age, or wounded veterans."
The cost of dedicating a post office in the name of an individual is modest. Renaming a post office through legislation does not change either the U.S. Postal Service's or the public's identification of the facility by its geographic location. Rather, a small plaque is installed within the post office.
In the 111th Congress, H.R. 3137 was introduced to amend current postal law to clarify that the U.S. Postal Service may accept financial donations toward the cost of providing a commemorative plaque. This bill did not become law.
This report will be updated early in the 114th Congress or in the event of significant legislative action in the 113th Congress. |
crs_R41261 | crs_R41261_0 | Many knowledgeable observers have expressed concern that the USPTO does not possess the capability to process the large number of patent applications that it receives. The growing backlog of filed, but unexamined applications could potentially lead to long delays in the time the USPTO requires to grant patents. Some experts believe that the concept of "deferred examination" may assist in alleviating the growing USPTO inventory of applications that have yet to be reviewed. Under current law, a USPTO examiner reviews each patent application that is filed. Failure to file such a request within a specified time period—usually from three to five years—results in the abandonment of the application. Deferred examination may hold potential benefits. Some inventors who file patent applications may subsequently decide not to expend the additional resources needed to obtain patents. The USPTO then does not need to review those applications, allowing others to move through the agency more quickly. On the other hand, some experts believe that deferred examination holds negative consequences, such as marketplace uncertainty. Firms may not know for many years whether their new products will infringe a patent that resulted from deferred examination. In particular, if an applicant certifies that the invention disclosed in the U.S. application will not be the subject of a patent application in another country that requires publication of applications 18 months after filing, then the USPTO will not publish the application. Explaining that it "frequently receives suggestions that the USPTO adopt a deferral of examination procedure," the USPTO held a roundtable on February 12, 2009, in order to obtain input on the possibility of adopting this system. Applicants may choose not to pursue their filed applications further for a number of reasons. Proponents of a deferred examination system also contend that with increasing application pendency rates at the USPTO, the United States effectively operates under a de facto deferral regime today. Other advocates of deferred examination observe that this system has been used by leading patent offices for many years. But they are concerned that adoption of deferred examination may exaggerate these unwelcome trends. It also indicates a number of system parameters that the designers of a deferred examination system for the United States could potentially manipulate in an attempt to maximize its perceived advantages while minimizing its perceived disadvantages. However, some deferral systems allow third parties to request examination as well. Another issue for consideration is the impact of deferred examination upon the term of a patent. As an example, if a period of three years elapses between the date of filing and the date that examination is requested, then the maximum term of the patent would be 23 years from the date of filing. No current system of deferred examination is believed to provide for patent term extension in this manner. Some commentators have suggested that intervening rights should also apply to patents that issued from deferred applications, provided that an enterprise commercialized a product during the deferral period that subsequently became subject to a patent. The USPTO apparently relied upon this procedural rulemaking authority in order to enact its current regulation regarding deferred examination. | Recent congressional interest in the patent system has in part focused upon the capabilities of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Many experts have expressed concern that the USPTO lacks the capacity to process the large number of patent applications that it receives. The USPTO's growing inventory of filed, but unexamined applications could potentially lead to longer delays in the USPTO patent-granting process.
Under current law, a USPTO examiner automatically reviews each patent application that is filed. Some observers have suggested that the USPTO instead adopt a system of "deferred examination" in order to alleviate its growing backlog. Under this system, the USPTO would not automatically review each application. Applicants would instead be required to submit a specific request for examination. Failure to file such a request within a specified time period—typically ranging from three to five years—would result in the abandonment of the application.
Deferred examination may hold potential benefits. For example, some inventors who file a patent application may subsequently decide ultimately not to expend further resources in obtaining a patent on that technology due to marketplace developments or other reasons. The USPTO then does not need to review those applications, allowing others to move through the agency more quickly. Deferred examination may be particularly suitable for enterprises that sell products, including pharmaceuticals and medical devices, that may have a long development cycle and be subject to regulatory approval. Proponents of deferred examination observe that numerous foreign patent offices have used this system for many years. They further explain that given increasingly lengthy delays, the USPTO effectively operates under a de facto deferral regime today.
On the other hand, some experts believe that deferred examination holds negative consequences. Deferred examination may cause many years to pass between the time an application was filed and the date a patent issues. Other firms may not know for some time whether their new products will infringe a patent that resulted from deferred examination. It is also possible that applicants could use the system strategically. They may choose to defer examination, monitor the industry, and then amend their applications in order to obtain patents that cover the successful products of their competitors. Opponents of deferred examination are also skeptical that a significant number of applications will "drop out" of the USPTO if this system were adopted. They also explain that the USPTO currently allows applicants to delay prosecution for up to three years, but that this procedure is rarely used.
Designers of a deferred examination system may potentially manipulate a number of parameters in an attempt to maximize potential benefits while minimizing perceived disadvantages. Among these parameters are the maximum length of the deferral period, the ability of third parties to request examination of a deferred application, the framing of the system as an "opt-in" or "opt-out" procedure for applicants, pre-grant publication of deferred applications, the fee structure, the impact of deferred examination upon patent term, and the availability of third party "intervening rights" for patents that issue from deferred applications. Options for implementing deferred examination include both legislation and USPTO rulemaking. |
crs_RS22801 | crs_RS22801_0 | § 2319(d); circumvention of copyright protection systems in violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. | This report provides a general overview of copyright law and briefly summarizes the major provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act. |
crs_R40893 | crs_R40893_0 | Its reauthorization may be considered by the 111 th Congress. A wide variety of libraries—public, public school, college or university, research (if they provide public access to their collections), and (at state discretion) private libraries—may receive aid under the Library Services and Technology Act, not just the public and research libraries eligible for aid under the predecessor legislation, the Library Services and Construction Act (LSCA). 108-81 ). P.L. 108-81 authorized $232 million for LST in FY2004, and such sums as may be necessary for FY2005-FY2009. The bulk of LST funding is distributed to states via formula grants. Funding is also provided for Native Americans and for national leadership projects. 108-81 provided for an increase in initial state grants for library services and technology to $680,000 (from $340,000) in years in which the amount appropriated for the year, and available for state grants, exceeds the amount of grants to all states in FY2003. FY2009 was the first year in which appropriations for the IMLS were sufficient to trigger the higher state grant amounts authorized by P.L. Participating states are required to develop five-year plans that set goals and priorities consistent with the purposes of LST (i.e., to enhance information-sharing networks and target library services to disadvantaged populations). The plans must provide for independent evaluations of federally assisted library services. LST is administered by the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS). P.L. The Museum Services program is administered by OMS within IMLS. Currently, OMS administers five competitive grant programs (Museums for America, Museum Professionals for the 21 st Century, Conservation Project Support, Native American and Native Hawaiian Museum Services, and National Leadership Grants for Museums) and two cooperative agreements (Museum Assessment Program and Conservation Assessment Program). The OMS also administers a related program, the African American Museum Services program, authorized separately through the African American History and Culture Act ( P.L. 108-184 ). Summary of the 2003 Reauthorization
On September 25, 2003, the Museum and Library Services Act of 2003 was signed into law ( P.L. 108-81 ). increasing initial state grants for outlying areas to $60,000 if appropriations in a given year are sufficient to meet the higher initial state grants of $680,000; if remaining funds are insufficient to reach $60,000, they are to be distributed equally among outlying areas receiving such funds; authorizing $232 million for Library Services and $38.6 million for Museum Services for FY2004, and such sums as may be necessary for FY2005-FY2009; authorizing the director to enter into contracts and cooperative agreements to help pay the federal share (50% share, with an exception that, by arrangement, 20% of the funds may be used to pay above a 50% share for museum services) for a broader range of museum activities, including learning partnerships and collaborations among museum, libraries, schools, and other community organizations; new technologies to enhance access to museums; and specialized programs for underserved areas; locating advisory functions (which for libraries were previously delegated to the National Commission on Libraries and Information Sciences) within a new National Museum and Library Services Board (previously, solely a Museum Services Board) in the IMLS; requiring the director to carry out and publish analyses of the impact of museum and library services, and increasing from 3% to 3.5% the amount available for federal administrative costs, to provide funding for this new function; prohibiting the use of IMLS funds for construction; and permitting the director of the IMLS to make national awards for library service, in addition to the already authorized national awards for museum service. | The authorization of the Museum and Library Services Act expired with FY2009. Its reauthorization may be considered by the 111th Congress. It was last reauthorized by P.L. 108-81, the Museum and Library Services Act of 2003 (MLSA), signed into law on September 25, 2003. MLSA authorizes funding for Library Services and Technology (LST) and for Museum Services. MLSA is administered by the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS). P.L. 108-81 authorized $232 million for LST in FY2004, and such sums as may be necessary for FY2005-FY2009. It authorized $38.6 million for Museum Services in FY2004, and such sums as may be necessary for FY2005-FY2009.
The bulk of LST funding is distributed to states via formula grants. Funding is also provided for library services for Native Americans and for national activities. Participating states are required to develop five-year plans that set goals and priorities consistent with LST purposes (i.e., to enhance information-sharing networks and target library services to disadvantaged populations). The plans must provide for independent evaluations of federally assisted library services. A wide variety of types of libraries—public, public school, college or university, research (if they provide public access to their collections), and (at state discretion) private libraries—may receive LST aid.
P.L. 108-81 provided for an increase in initial state grants for LST from $340,000 to $680,000 if the amount appropriated for a year, and available for state grants, exceeds the amount of grants to all states in FY2003. In addition, initial grants for outlying areas were increased to $60,000 if appropriations in a given year are sufficient to meet the higher initial state grant of $680,000. FY2009 was the first year appropriations were sufficient to trigger the higher initial state grant amounts authorized by P.L. 108-81.
Funding for Museum Services is administered by IMLS, Office of Museum Services (OMS), through competitive grant programs and cooperative agreements. Funding is used by museums to pay the federal share of the cost of museum services (i.e., not more than 50%). Under Museum Services, the OMS currently administers five grant programs (Museums for America, Museum Professionals for the 21st Century, Conservation Project Support, Native American and Native Hawaiian Museum Services, and National Leadership Grants for Museums) and two cooperative agreements (Museum Assessment Program and Conservation Assessment Program). The OMS also administers a related program, the African American Museum Services program, authorized separately through the African American History and Culture Act (P.L. 108-184).
This report will be updated in response to legislative developments. |
crs_RL31010 | crs_RL31010_0 | 2904 . The military construction appropriations bill provides a large part of the funding to enhance andmaintain this infrastructure. The bill funds construction projects and real property maintenance ofthe active Army, Navy and Marine Corps, Air Force, and their reserve components; additionaldefense-wide construction; U.S. contributions to the NATO Security Investment Program (formerlyknown as the NATO Infrastructure Program); and military family housing operations andconstruction. Other major appropriation legislation includes the defenseappropriations bill, which provides funds for all non-construction military activities of theDepartment of Defense and constitutes more than 90% of national security-related spending, and theenergy and water development appropriations bill, which provides funding for atomic energy defenseactivities of the Department of Energy and for civil projects carried out by the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers. The House passed the FY2002 Military Construction Appropriations Act( H.R. It also required an upward adjustment of 302(b) budget allocationfrom $10.2 billion to $10.5 billion. Aspassed by the Senate, the $10.500 billion bill exceeded the president's request by$528.7 million, allocating $5.5 billion to military construction, $163 million to theNATO Security Investment Program, $4.1 billion to family housing, and $682million to Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). Conference Action. Key Policy Issues
Elective Quality of LifeConstruction. In recent years, quality of life,including the use of military construction funds, has been a focus of the defensedebate. An historical comparison shows that thedivergence between DOD budget requests and congressional appropriationenactments originated relatively recently and has mainly affected the less than 20 %of military construction funding dedicated to the National Guard and Reserves (see Table 5 at the end of this report). The Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI). The Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI) was announced by theDepartment of Defense on August 2, and the Department's General Counselsubmitted proposed legislation to Congress on August 3. In support of the first action, the Secretary of Defense has instructed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to undertake a thorough assessment of alloverseas military installations based on the results of the upcoming QuadrennialDefense Review (QDR). Congress has authorized the Secretary to "convert any military orcivil service appropriated or non-appropriated fund activity at Brooks Air Force Base,Texas, into a contracted activity or an exchange of services compensated for by thelease, sale, conveyance, or transfer of real or private property." Conflicting Priorities and Construction Funding. Major Funding Trends
Requested military construction funds declined steadily from a high of $7.2billion for FY1985 to a low of $1.6 billion for FY2000. Table 5 compares Administration militaryconstruction requests and enactments for Guard and Reserve projects fromFY1985-2002. Legislation
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
P.L. 107-38 , H.R. 2888 . Making appropriations for military construction, family housing, and base realignment and closure for the Departmentof Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, and for other purposes.The House Committee on Appropriations reported an original measure , H.Rept.107-207 , on September 21, 2001. S. 1460 (Fenstein). Military Construction Appropriations by Account: FY2001-2002 (new budget authority in thousandsof dollars)
Source: Data for FY2001-FY2002 from Amended FY2002 Budget Request. Table 4. | The military construction (MilCon) appropriations bill provides funding for (1) military construction projects in the United States and overseas; (2) military family housing operations andconstruction; (3) U.S. contributions to the NATO Security Investment Program; and (4) the bulk ofbase realignment and closure (BRAC) costs.
Funding for rebuilding parts of the Pentagon destroyed in the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, is likely to be included in military construction appropriations. Preliminary estimates of thetotal cost vary from $100 million to $1 billion. Part of the emergency funding legislation, H.R. 2888 ( P.L. 107-38 ), passed by Congress Friday, September 14, will be allocatedfor this rebuilding. To date, $173.4 million in contracts have been awarded for emergency structuralassessment, repair, and restoration to the Pentagon, with provision for additional awards at 60-dayintervals.
On June 27, the Administration submitted a $343.5 billion amended FY2002 defense budget request. $10.0 billion of this is intended for military construction. Of that amount, $4.6 billion isintended for the active services and DOD; $0.6 billion for the National Guard and Reserves; $4.1billion for construction and operation of military family housing; $0.2 billion for the NATO SecurityInvestment Program, and $0.5 billion for BRAC. Separate versions of appropriations bills (bothgranting $10.5 billion in new budget authority) have been passed by Congress ( H.R. 2904 and S. 1460 ).
A key issue in Congress is funding for quality of life construction. Military work facilities, particularly those overseas and those by the National Guard and Reserves, are perceived by manyas being deteriorated and underfunded. Recently, Congress has often appropriated more inconstruction funds than the Administration has requested. Congress has similarly augmented budgetrequests for military family housing appropriations. The FY2002 military construction bill exceedsthe requested amount by 5.3%.
An additional key issue is the future of the Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI). DOD recommended legislation on August 3 to initiate a worldwide assessment of military installationrequirements, based on the results of the current Quadrennial Defense Review, and a subsequentround of base closures and realignments. The legislation as submitted would permanently authorizethe service secretaries to convey base property to local or state government or private enterprise andlease back what is necessary for military use. This is modeled on a demonstration project begunduring FY2000 at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. If enacted, the EFI is likely to affect the future needfor military construction and operations and maintenance funding.
Other issues include the provision of construction contingency funds in budget requests (to enable uninterrupted construction), an understanding of the total costs of DOD real property (spreadacross several budget accounts), and recent conflicts between Administration and congressionalconstruction priorities and funding. Conference action on the bill is pending.
Key Policy Staff
* FDT = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service |
crs_R43216 | crs_R43216_0 | This report highlights some of the fundamental aspects of the process by providing answers to frequently asked questions. A security clearance is a determination that an individual—whether a federal employee or a private contractor—is eligible for access to classified national security information. A security clearance alone does not grant an individual access to specific classified materials. Rather, a security clearance means that an individual is eligible for access. In order to gain access to specific classified materials, an individual should also have a demonstrated "need to know" the classified information for his or her position and policy area responsibilities. The levels of security clearances correspond to the levels of sensitivity of the information that cleared individuals will be eligible to access. In addition, there are two major categories of classified information that are commonly associated with the Top Secret level: Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), which refers to information involving intelligence sources and methods, and Special Access Programs (SAPs), which refers to highly sensitive policies, projects, and programs. These categories exist for classified information that has been deemed particularly vulnerable. Eligibility standards and investigative requirements for access to SCI and SAPs are higher than for other information classified at the same level, which further restricts the number of individuals that are eligible for access. An individual who is performing work for the federal government—whether that individual is a direct government employee or a private contractor—may be eligible to obtain a security clearance if his or her work requires access to classified materials. With certain limited exceptions, an individual must hold a security clearance in order to gain access to classified materials. An individual may not obtain or initiate a security clearance on his or her own. Although the security clearance process involves a number of stages, the key steps to obtaining and maintaining a security clearance are pre-investigation, investigation, adjudication, and reinvestigation. Adjudication . Generally, this decision is made by the sponsoring agency and is based on the information obtained during the background investigation. The process to obtain a security clearance must be initiated by a sponsoring federal agency. Previously, the Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Services (OPM-FIS) oversaw approximately 95% of all background investigations. On October 1, 2016, President Obama transferred responsibility for investigative work and related services from OPM-FIS to the newly established National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB). Like OPM-FIS, the NBIB conducts some of the investigative work itself and contracts the rest out to private firms. Typically, the requesting agency pays for background investigations of federal employees and contractor employees. The cost of background investigations vary depending on the level of clearance requested and the scope of the investigation conducted. With certain exceptions, a security clearance granted by one agency must be accepted by other agencies, though it is difficult to determine the degree to which reciprocity of security clearance background investigations and determinations actually occurs between agencies. | This report provides a primer on some of the fundamental aspects of the security clearance process, using a "Frequently Asked Questions" format.
A security clearance is a determination that an individual—whether a direct federal employee or a private contractor performing work for the government—is eligible for access to classified national security information. A security clearance alone does not grant an individual access to classified materials. Rather, a security clearance means that an individual is eligible for access. In order to gain access to specific classified materials, an individual should also have a demonstrated "need to know" the information contained in the specific classified materials.
There are three levels of security clearances: Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret, which correspond to the levels of sensitivity of the information that a cleared individual will be eligible to access. In addition, there are two major categories of classified information that require additional handling and access restrictions—Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), which includes intelligence sources, methods, and processes, and Special Access Programs (SAPs), which are highly sensitive projects and programs. These categories exist for classified information that has been deemed particularly vulnerable. Eligibility standards and investigative requirements for access to SCI and SAPs are higher than for access to information otherwise classified at the same level, which further restricts the number of individuals eligible for access.
Federal employees and private contractors must be cleared in order to gain access to classified materials. An individual may not obtain or initiate a security clearance on his or her own. A sponsoring federal agency initiates the process and will make the final security clearance determination based on a background investigation.
Although the process involves a number of stages, the key steps to obtaining and maintaining a security clearance are (1) agency sponsorship and submission of clearance application materials; (2) a background investigation, the extent of which may vary by level of clearance; and (3) adjudication to determine whether an individual is deemed eligible for access. Adjudication and final clearance determinations are generally handled by the sponsoring agency. To maintain a security clearance, an individual is also subject to periodic reinvestigations and, more recently, continuous monitoring and evaluation of his or her background.
Previously, the Office of Personnel Management, Federal Investigative Services (OPM-FIS) oversaw approximately 95% of all background investigations. On October 1, 2016, President Obama transferred responsibility for investigative work and related services from OPM-FIS to the newly established National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB). Like OPM-FIS, the NBIB conducts some of the investigative work itself and contracts the rest out to private firms.
Typically, the costs of a background investigation, including background investigations of private contractors, are paid for by the requesting agency. While the final determination to grant or deny a security clearance is typically made by the requesting agency, with certain exceptions a security clearance granted by one agency must be accepted by other agencies. It is difficult, however, to determine the degree to which reciprocity occurs between agencies. |
crs_RL33690 | crs_RL33690_0 | 107-171 ), the first since 1996, reauthorized appropriations for and substantially revised the Food Stamp program and a number of other domestic food aid programs. As a historical source and in the expectation that some of the same nutrition program issues and provisions of law addressed in 2002 will again come up—and that the effects of the changes made in 2002 will be explored in designing any 2007 farm bill—this report lays out in some detail what happened in 2002. Nutrition Programs and Activities Covered by the Farm Bill
Farm bills typically cover the following nutrition/domestic food assistance programs and activities, all within the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Agriculture and the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry:
the Food Stamp program, operated under the Food Stamp Act; inflation-indexed nutrition assistance block grant programs, included in the Food Stamp Act, for Puerto Rico and American Samoa—that are operated in lieu of the regular Food Stamp program; the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR)—offered, under the Food Stamp Act, in lieu of the regular Food Stamp program to those tribal organizations that choose it; The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), governed by provisions of the Food Stamp Act and the Emergency Food Assistance Act; the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), authorized under Sections 4 and 5 of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 and Section 1114(a)(2) of the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 (i.e., the 1973 and 1981 farm bills); Community Food Projects, established under the Food Stamp Act; and rules governing the provision of federally acquired food commodities to domestic feeding programs (e.g., school meal programs). It established a Fruit and Vegetable pilot program for schools and authorized a program to increase domestic consumption of fresh fruit and vegetables. It set aside funding to be used to purchase fresh fruit and vegetables for schools. It authorized Congressional Hunger Fellowships. It included provisions to encourage schools to purchase locally produced foods. It changed eligibility rules affecting military families applying for free or reduced-price school meals and benefits under the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (the WIC program). Overview of Nutrition Programs in the 2002 Farm Bill
The 2002 farm bill—the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) of 2002 ( P.L. However, it went well beyond the House measure, primarily by:
Expanding eligibility for noncitizens (more extensively than proposed by the Administration); Setting up state options to: establish when eligibility will be redetermined, reduce recipient reporting requirements, simplify benefit calculations, and conform asset eligibility rules with TANF and Medicaid standards; Increasing benefits for recipients with very high shelter costs; Liberalizing and simplifying work requirements for able-bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs); Ending limits on spending of work/training funds and changing the federal share of this spending; and, Permitting use of food stamp benefits to buy dietary supplements. It also included some new initiatives. Significant New State Options in Administering the Food Stamp Program
Five provisions of Title IV provided states with new options to vary from regular food stamp rules. Title IV did not have a provision (suggested in the Senate bill) to raise benefits for those with very high shelter costs. Title IV did not include a change (put forth in the Senate bill) to allow states to conform their method of reviewing households' food stamp eligibility to the method used for other public assistance programs. | Among the titles dealing with farm-support and other agriculture-related issues, Title IV of the 2002 farm bill (the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act; P.L. 107-171) reauthorized appropriations for and substantially revised the Food Stamp program. It also included provisions affecting several other domestic food aid programs/activities operated under the aegis of the Department of Agriculture that have typically been included in farm bills: nutrition assistance block grants to Puerto Rico and American Samoa, the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations (FDPIR), The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), Community Food Projects, and rules governing foods used in domestic feeding programs such as the School Lunch program. Beyond this traditional array of food assistance programs, the 2002 bill encompassed provisions for a new Seniors Farmers' Market program, a new Fruit and Vegetables pilot program, a set-aside to purchase fresh fruit and vegetables for schools, a Congressional Hunger Fellows program, the purchase of locally produced food, and changed eligibility rules for free and reduced-price school meals and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (the WIC program).
As a historical source and in the expectation that the issues raised in and the results of actions taken during consideration of the 2002 farm bill may come up again in the next scheduled farm bill (2007), this report presents in some detail what happened with regard to nutrition programs in 2002.
The nutrition title of the 2002 farm bill (Title IV): substantially expanded food stamp eligibility for legally resident noncitizens (the single largest change), liberalized food stamp benefits and eligibility rules, provided new options for states to vary from regular Food Stamp program rules, greatly changed the system for penalizing states with high rates of erroneous benefit and eligibility determinations, increased funding for TEFAP and CSFP, and, as noted above, introduced several new programs. It was estimated to cost $2.7 billion to $2.8 billion over FY2002-FY2007. However, a number of issues were raised but not addressed: Administration requests to loosen the food stamp asset test as it relates to vehicles and to limit state options to make public assistance recipients automatically eligible for food stamps, a provision to increase benefits for those with very high shelter costs, recommendations to open up work requirements for able-bodied adults without dependents, a change to allow states to conform their method of reviewing households' food stamp eligibility to the method used for other public assistance programs, and a proposal to allow food stamps to be used for dietary supplements.
Overall, the basic themes of the nutrition title of the 2002 farm bill were expanded eligibility for legal noncitizens, more leeway for states to establish their own version of food stamp rules, and support for expanded availability of fresh fruit and vegetables.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41167 | crs_R41167_0 | Introduction
Since early 2010, the Eurozone has been facing a major debt crisis. The governments of several countries in the Eurozone have accumulated what many consider to be unsustainable levels of government debt, and three—Greece, Ireland, and Portugal—have turned to other European countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for loans in order to avoid defaulting on their debt. Additionally, the United States has the largest financial commitment to the IMF of all the IMF members. It concludes with an analysis of issues of particular interest to Congress, including the impact of the Greek debt crisis on the U.S. economy, the exposure of U.S. banks to Greece and other distressed Eurozone economies, and IMF involvement in the crisis. An influx of capital at low interest rates during the 2000s and the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 further exacerbated these problems, straining public finances to an unsustainable degree. EU policies that had been put in place to provide a check on the accumulation of public debt failed to do so. Higher interest rates compensated investors for the higher risk involved in holding Greek government bonds, but they also drove up Greece's borrowing costs, exacerbated its debt levels, and caused Greece to veer towards default. Fear of contagion and financial turmoil drove a major policy response by the Europeans, the IMF, the Greek government, and central banks in May 2010 to avoid a Greek default. When Greece again veered towards default more than a year later, a second crisis response was announced in the summer of 2011. IMF and EU programs were subsequently provided to Ireland and Portugal (see Table 1 ). More Financial Assistance
In July 2011, European leaders announced a second financial assistance package for Greece totaling €109 billion ($157 billion). The policy measures aimed to prevent a disorderly Greek default, to restore debt sustainability in Greece, and to prevent the spread of the crisis to other Eurozone countries and the global economy. The inclusion of bondholders in the crisis response in July 2011 signaled a major shift in the approach to responding to the crisis, which previously had focused primarily on the provision of financial assistance to Greece and economic reforms in Greece. However, fostering short-term growth in the Greek economy has not been a central feature in the policy response to date, and growth in the economy is proving elusive, with the economy contracting at a faster rate than expected. As a member of the Eurozone, it cannot depreciate its currency against its major trading partners to help spur exports. In the late summer of 2011, interest rate spreads on Spanish and Italian bonds started to rise. Greece's crisis has also raised a number of more specific economic and political implications, detailed below:
First, the policy responses to Greece's debt crisis have set precedents for how the debt crises in other Eurozone countries have been handled. Third, Greece's debt crisis has created new financial liabilities for other European countries. Issues for Congress
The Greek debt crisis has been an ongoing source of concern for some Members of Congress. Impact on U.S. Economy
The bilateral economic relationship between the EU and the United States is one of the largest and strongest in the world, and economic turmoil in Greece and the broader Eurozone could have negative implications for the U.S. economy. At the start of the crisis, it was expected that austerity measures would slow growth in Europe and lead to a loss of confidence in the euro, causing a depreciation of the euro relative to the U.S. dollar. As the crisis has continued, however, increased perceptions of risk have affected U.S. financial markets. If the crisis does spread, the impact on the U.S. economy could be greater. Exposure of U.S. Banks
Given the interconnectedness of the U.S. and European financial sectors, another source of concern is how much U.S. banks could lose if Greece or other Eurozone countries were to default on their debts, or, in other words, how "exposed" U.S. banks are to Greece and other vulnerable Eurozone countries. However, U.S. banks may be more heavily exposed to Greece through what the BIS calls "other potential exposures." The BIS defines "other potential exposures" as derivative contracts, guarantees, and credit commitments. 111-203 ). For example, H.R. 2313 ) and Senate ( S.Amdt. The Senate voted against the amendment on June 29, 2011. | The Eurozone is facing a serious sovereign debt crisis. Several Eurozone member countries have high, potentially unsustainable levels of public debt. Three—Greece, Ireland, and Portugal—have borrowed money from other European countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to avoid default. With the largest public debt and one of the largest budget deficits in the Eurozone, Greece is at the center of the crisis. The crisis is a continuing interest to Congress due to the strong economic and political ties between the United States and Europe.
Build-Up of Greece's Debt Crisis
In the 2000s, Greece had abundant access to cheap capital, fueled by flush capital markets and increased investor confidence after adopting the euro in 2001. Capital inflows were not used to increase the competitiveness of the economy, however, and European Union (EU) rules designed to limit the accumulation of public debt failed to do so. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 strained public finances, and subsequent revelations about falsified statistical data drove up Greece's borrowing costs. By early 2010, Greece risked defaulting on its public debt.
Policy Responses with Limited Success
EU, European Central Bank, and IMF officials agreed that an uncontrolled Greek default could trigger a major crisis. In May 2010, they announced a major financial assistance package for Greece, and the Greek government committed to far-reaching economic reforms. These measures prevented a default, but a year later, the economy was contracting sharply and again veered towards default. European leaders announced a second set of crisis response measures in July 2011. The new package calls for holders of Greek bonds to accept losses, as well as for more austerity and financial assistance.
These responses have prevented a disorderly Greek default, but the prospects for Greek recovery remain unclear. The economy is contracting more severely than expected, and, as a member of the Eurozone, Greece cannot depreciate its currency to spur export-led growth. Unemployment is close to 16%.
Additionally, the policy responses have not contained the crisis. Ireland and Portugal turned to the EU and IMF for financial assistance. In the summer of 2011, interest rates on Spanish and Italian bonds rose sharply.
Broader Implications
Greece's economy is small, but its crisis exposes the problems of a common currency combined with national fiscal policies. Additionally, its crisis set precedents for responding to crises in other Eurozone countries; highlighted concerns about the health of the European financial sector; created new financial liabilities for other Eurozone countries struggling debt; and sparked reforms to EU economic governance. It has also revealed tensions among EU member states about the desirability of closer integration.
Issues for Congress
Impact on the U.S. economy: U.S. exports to the EU could be impacted if the crisis slows growth in the EU and causes the euro to depreciate against the dollar. Through the first quarter of 2011, growth in the Eurozone was strong, but it may be starting to weaken. There has not been a clear depreciation of the euro against the dollar since the start of the crisis. As the crisis continues, increased perceptions of risk are impacting U.S. financial markets. If the crisis spreads in the Eurozone, the impact on the U.S. economy could be much greater. Exposure of U.S. banks: U.S. banks have little direct exposure to Greece ($7.3 billion), but other potential exposures (derivative contracts, guarantees, and credit commitments) to Greece are much higher ($34.1 billion). U.S. banks are more heavily exposed to Spain and Italy, with direct and other potential exposures totaling nearly $450 billion. IMF involvement: Some Members of Congress are concerned about IMF involvement in the Greek crisis. In 2010, Congress passed legislation aimed at limiting IMF support for advanced economies (P.L. 111-203). In 2011, legislation was introduced in the House and the Senate to rescind some U.S. contributions to the IMF (H.R. 2313; S.Amdt. 501). The Senate voted down this legislation in June 2011. |
crs_R40435 | crs_R40435_0 | The nation's budget situation is challenging. In fiscal year (FY) 2008, the budget deficit reached $455 billion or 3.2% of gross domestic product (GDP), up from $161 billion or 1.2% of GDP in FY2007. New deficit projections provide a picture of what the United States faces over the next decade. In February 2009, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that the deficit in FY2009 will reach more than $1.4 trillion, which includes the deficit impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; H.R. Between FY2010 and FY2019, cumulative deficits could reach as high as $10 trillion. CBO projects deficits in each fiscal year of this period. These deficits are largely a result of federal financial intervention and fiscal stimulus legislation designed to alleviate the credit crunch and to bolster the economy. Current economic conditions have also led to increases in outlays for certain government social programs and declines in revenue collections, leading to further deterioration in the budget balance. Deficits can serve as a powerful instrument of fiscal policy. Occasional deficits, in and of themselves, are not necessarily problematic. Deficit spending allows governments to smooth outlays and taxes to shield taxpayers and program beneficiaries from abrupt economic shocks. Persistent deficits, on the other hand, lead to growing accumulations of federal debt that may lead to higher interest payments, tax increases, or spending cuts. Recent Policies and Their Effects on the Deficit
Several significant federal financial interventions were enacted in 2008 and early 2009 in an effort to relieve the credit crisis and mitigate the economic affects of the recession on Americans. These include the enactment of economic stimulus in early 2008, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) in July 2008, the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) and its components in October 2008, the extension of unemployment benefits in November 2008, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009. Technical changes in FY2009 largely stem from the decision to include the net present value of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's existing assets and liabilities, as discussed earlier. In his budget proposal, President Obama also outlined specific policies he hopes to implement, which include significant new agendas with regard to energy, health care, and education. If all of these provisions are enacted, the President's budget proposal would result in an FY2009 deficit of $1.8 trillion or 12.3% of GDP. To eventually reduce the deficit would require less spending, increased taxes, faster than average economic growth, or a combination of these things. Over the long-term, entitlement spending, especially as it relates to rising health care costs, is projected to increase rapidly. CBO has concluded that "under any plausible scenario, the federal budget is on an unsustainable path," over the long run. Large economic and technical changes point to the significant uncertainty behind budget projections, even over short periods of time. | In fiscal year (FY) 2008, the nation's budget deficit reached $455 billion or 3.2% of gross domestic product (GDP), up from $161 billion or 1.2% of GDP in FY2007. New deficit projections provide a picture of what the United States faces over the next decade. In February 2009, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that the deficit in FY2009 will reach more than $1.4 trillion. Between FY2010 and FY2019, cumulative deficits could reach as high as $10 trillion. CBO projects deficits in each fiscal year of this period. These deficits are largely a result of enacted federal financial intervention and fiscal stimulus legislation designed to alleviate the credit crunch and to bolster the economy. Current economic conditions have also led to increases in outlays for certain government social programs and declines in revenue collection, leading to further deterioration in the budget balance.
Several significant federal financial interventions were enacted in 2008 in an effort to relieve the credit crisis and mitigate the economic effects of the recession on Americans. These include the enactment of economic stimulus in early 2008, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act in July 2008, the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) and its components in October 2008, the extension of unemployment benefits in November 2008, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009. Other actions have involved the purchase of assets largely utilizing existing or expanded authority.
Deficits can serve as a powerful instrument of fiscal policy and are not necessarily problematic. Governments use deficit spending to smooth outlays and taxes so that taxpayers and program beneficiaries are shielded from abrupt economic shocks and to mitigate the size of those shocks. However, persistent deficits lead to growing accumulations of federal debt that may lead to higher interest payments, tax increases, or spending cuts.
Over time, deviations from baseline deficit projections can be attributed to three broad causes: legislative, economic, and technical changes. Projected fiscal balances can differ significantly from actual outcomes. Changes in legislative policy between January 2008 and January 2009 are likely to more than double the FY2009 deficit according to revisions to the CBO baseline over that period. Further, technical changes, largely attributed to the government placing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, will add hundreds of billions of dollars to the FY2009 deficit. Other factors will also contribute to a larger deficit in FY2009.
In his budget proposal, President Obama also outlined specific policies he hopes to implement, which include significant new agendas with regard to energy, health care, and education. If all of these provisions are enacted, the President's budget proposal would result in a FY2009 deficit of $1.752 trillion or 12.3% of GDP.
When the economy recovers from the current downturn, Congress may choose to focus more effort on balancing the budget and reining in debt by spending less, increasing taxes, or a combination of these things. Over the long-term, balancing the budget is further complicated by significant issues regarding entitlement spending, especially as it relates to rising health care costs. CBO has concluded that "under any plausible scenario, the federal budget is on an unsustainable path." |
crs_R43946 | crs_R43946_0 | T he manner in which staff are deployed within an organization may reflect the missions and priorities of that organization. This report provides staffing levels in Senators', committee, leadership, and other offices since 1977. Staff levels from committees, leadership, and officers and officials, however can be evaluated across the entire 1977-2016 time period. In the Senate, the number of staff has grown steadily, from 4,916 in 1987 to 5,749 in 2016, or 16.94%. From 1977 to 1986, excluding congressional staff from state offices, the number of staff in the Senate has grown steadily from 3,397 in 1977 to 4,180 in 1986, or 23.05%. Discussion
Since 1987, the number of staff working for the Senate has grown. There have been increases in the number of staff working in Senate leadership offices, and larger increases in the staffing of officers and officials through 2015, though 2016 saw a dip in those numbers. Staff working for Senators have shifted from committee settings to leadership settings or the personal offices. Some of these changes may be indicative of the growth of the Senate as an institution, or the value the chamber places on its various activities. Staff in Member offices has grown while staff in Senate committees has decreased, both in real numbers and in percentage of total staff. | The manner in which staff are deployed within an organization may reflect the missions and priorities of that organization. This report provides staffing levels in Senators' Senate committee, leadership, and other offices since 1977. From 1977 to 1986, Senate staff, excluding state-based staff, increased from 3,397 to 4,180, or 23.05%. From 1987 to 2016, all Senate staff grew from 4,916 to 5,749, or 16.94%. The changes in both time periods were characterized in part by increases in the number of staff working in chamber leadership offices, and, prior to 2016, increases in the staffing of chamber officers and officials. Additionally, staff working for Members have shifted from committees to the personal offices of Members. Since 2010, however, staff working for the Senate has decreased 6.79%. Some of these changes may be indicative of the growth of the Senate as an institution, or the value the chamber places on its various activities.
This report is one of several CRS products focusing on congressional staff. Others include CRS Report RL34545, Congressional Staff: Duties and Functions of Selected Positions, by R. Eric Petersen; CRS Report R43947, House of Representatives Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2016, by R. Eric Petersen and Amber Hope Wilhelm; CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2015, coordinated by R. Eric Petersen; CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2015, coordinated by R. Eric Petersen; CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2015, coordinated by R. Eric Petersen; and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2015, coordinated by R. Eric Petersen. |
crs_R45402 | crs_R45402_0 | Introduction
A "lame duck" session of Congress takes place whenever one Congress meets after its successor is elected but before the term of the current Congress ends. From 1940 to 2016, there were 21 lame duck sessions. The most recent la me duck session, which commenced on November 13, 2018, is not included in the data presented in this report. Of the 21 lame duck sessions examined, seven followed an election that switched the majority party in one or both chambers. That is, the party that controlled the House or Senate during the lame duck session did not retain its majority into the next Congress. Tab l e 1 displays these sessions, occurring in 1948, 1954, 1980, 1994, 2006, 2010, and 2014. This report provides additional information on the 1954, 1994, and 2010 lame duck sessions. Their primary purpose is to complete action on legislation. They have also been used to prevent recess appointments and pocket vetoes, to consider motions of censure or impeachment, to keep Congress assembled on a standby basis, or to approve nominations (Senate only). In recent years, most lame duck sessions have focused on program authorizations, trade-related measures, appropriations, and the budget. Midterm Election, First Term of President (1954, 1994, 2010)
In each of the lame duck sessions that followed a midterm election in a President's first term in office, the same party controlled the White House, the House, and the Senate. | "Lame duck" sessions of Congress take place whenever one Congress meets after its successor is elected but before the term of the current Congress ends. Their primary purpose is to complete action on legislation. They have also been used to prevent recess appointments and pocket vetoes, to consider motions of censure or impeachment, to keep Congress assembled on a standby basis, or to approve nominations (Senate only). In recent years, most lame duck sessions have focused on program authorizations, trade-related measures, appropriations, and the budget.
From 1940 to 2016, there were 21 lame duck sessions. Seven followed an election that switched the majority party in one or both chambers. That is, the party that controlled the House or Senate during the lame duck session did not retain its majority into the next Congress. These sessions occurred in 1948, 1954, 1980, 1994, 2006, 2010, and 2014.
Three lame duck sessions between 1940 and 2016 followed a majority-changing midterm election during a President's first term of office. In each of these sessions (1954, 1994, 2010), the same party had controlled the White House, House, and Senate prior to the election. This report provides additional information on the 1954, 1994, and 2010 lame duck sessions. The most recent lame duck session, which commenced on November 13, 2018, is not included in the data presented. |
crs_RL33605 | crs_RL33605_0 | The price of this "authorized copy" is ordinarily lower than that of the brand-name drug. They have nonetheless proven controversial. Some observers argue that such products may possibly discourage independent generic firms both from challenging drug patents and from selling their own generic products. 741 and S. 373 , proposed to prevent pharmaceutical firms from selling authorized generics. Marketing Approval and Patent Issues for Generic Drugs
The practice of authorized generics has arisen within a complex statutory framework established by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, legislation more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act. The reward consists of a 180-day generic drug exclusivity period awarded to the first ANDA applicant to file a paragraph IV certification. As originally enacted, the Hatch-Waxman Act allowed the brand-name firm and the first independent generic applicant to share the market for the first 180 days of generic competition. At the close of this period, other independent generic competitors could receive FDA marketing approval. The Concept of Authorized Generics
Authorized Generics Practice
As noted previously, an "authorized generic" is a pharmaceutical that is marketed by or on behalf of a brand-name drug company, but is sold under a generic name. Without an independent generic patent challenger in the first instance, brand-name firms may themselves make diminished, or delayed, use of the authorized generic strategy. As the FDA opined in a statement issued in July 2004:
Marketing of authorized generics increases competition, promoting lower prices for pharmaceuticals, particularly during the 180-day exclusivity period in which the prices for generic drugs are often substantially higher than after other generic products are able to enter the market. Authorized generics may also facilitate settlement of patent infringement suits between brand-name and independent generic firms. By settling patent litigation, and allowing an ANDA applicant to produce an authorized generic, brand-name firms may potentially better manage risk. During the 180-day exclusivity period, the presence of an authorized generic competitor on average reduces the first-filing generic's revenues by 40% to 52%. However, the reduced revenues resulting from authorized generic competition during the 180-day exclusivity period have not substantially reduced the number of challenges to branded drug patents by generic firms. Two notable judicial opinions have upheld the FDA's position favoring authorized generics. As a result, the term "exclusivity" may be considered to have a particular meaning in the Hatch-Waxman Act—one that does not necessarily mean that independent generic firms will not face competition during the 180-day period even in the absence of authorized generics. Unenacted bills introduced in the 112 th Congress, H.R. In turn, the 180-day generic exclusivity period would then apply against the authorized generic. Some observers stress that authorized generics benefit consumers by providing enhanced access to lower-cost alternatives to branded drugs, while others express concerns that authorized generics will defeat the incentives that independent generic firms possess to challenge pharmaceutical patents. | The practice of "authorized generics" has recently been the subject of considerable attention by the pharmaceutical industry, regulators, and members of Congress alike. An "authorized generic" (sometimes termed a "branded," "flanking," or "pseudo" generic) is a pharmaceutical that is marketed by or on behalf of a brand-name drug company, but is sold under a generic name. Although the availability of an additional competitor in the generic drug market would appear to be favorable to consumers, authorized generics have nonetheless proven controversial. Some observers believe that authorized generics potentially discourage independent generic firms both from challenging drug patents and from selling their own products.
These perceived disincentives result from the provisions of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. Better known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, this legislation provides independent generic firms with a reward for challenging patents held by brand-name firms. That "bounty" consists of a 180-day generic drug exclusivity period awarded to the first patent challenger. During the 180-day period, the brand-name company and the first generic applicant are the only firms that receive authorization to sell that pharmaceutical. At the close of this period, other independent generic competitors may obtain marketing approval and enter the market, ordinarily resulting in lower prices for generic medicines.
Some commentators view the 180-day exclusivity period as a crucial incentive for generic firms to challenge patents held by brand-name firms. Under this view, the launch of an authorized generic during the 180-day exclusivity period makes the recovery of litigation expenses more difficult. In turn, the possibility that a brand-name firm will sell an authorized generic during the 180-day exclusivity period may decrease the incentives of generic firms to challenge patents in the first instance.
Other observers believe that authorized generics benefit consumers by increasing competition in the generic market. Because the authorized generic is manufactured by the brand-name firm and identical to its own product, consumers may be encouraged to switch to the lower-cost authorized generic alternative. Authorized generics may also facilitate the settlement of patent litigation between brand-name and independent generic firms. As an historical matter, certain of these settlement agreements have allowed authorized generics to enter the market, and therefore promoted competition, prior to the expiration of the relevant patent term.
Recent judicial opinions have upheld FDA practices allowing authorized generics. If authorized generic practice is deemed appropriate, then no action need be taken. The approach taken by legislation introduced in the 112th Congress, H.R. 741 and S. 373, presented another option. Under these bills, authorized generics may not be sold during the term of the 180-day generic exclusivity. This legislation was not enacted. |
crs_R43765 | crs_R43765_0 | In the context of the Intelligence Community (IC), whistleblowers are generally employees or contractors of federal intelligence agencies who bring to light information on agency wrongdoings. Whistleblowers disclose this information through government channels (e.g., the congressional intelligence committees or agency inspectors general) or to the media. Such disclosures can aid oversight of, and thereby curb misconduct within, intelligence agencies. When an IC whistleblower discloses information on alleged agency wrongdoing, he could face retaliation from his employer by, for example, being fired, demoted, or having his security clearance revoked. The threat of retaliation may deter potential whistleblowers from disclosing information on agency wrongdoing. Apparently seeking to strike balance within this tension, Congress and President Obama have taken action to limit retaliation against IC whistleblowers for certain types of protected disclosures, which do not include disclosures to media sources. There are three sources of protections against retaliation for IC whistleblowers: the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (ICWPA), Presidential Policy Directive 19 (PPD-19), and Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Title VI). Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998
The ICWPA is the oldest of the three intelligence whistleblower protections. Rather, the ICWPA merely allows an IC whistleblower who has faced such retaliation to then use the act's disclosure procedures to inform the intelligence committees that the retaliation has occurred. Under the ICWPA, IC employees and contractors can disclose to Congress only complaints and information that are "with respect to an urgent concern." Conversely, the ICWPA provides no explicit mechanism for remedying for retaliation stemming from disclosure of an urgent concern to Congress; it merely prescribes the process through which such disclosures can be made and allows employees and contractors to then use those disclosure procedures to inform Congress of any resulting improper retaliation. PPD-19 requires that agency procedures permit agency Inspectors General to review employee allegations of adverse personnel action or improper restriction of access to classified information and recommend agency heads take corrective action if a violation of PPD-19 has occurred. PPD-19 offers intelligence whistleblowers falling within its scope more protection against retaliation than the ICWPA. Further, PPD-19, unlike the ICWPA, expressly prohibits retaliation against IC whistleblowers who make protected disclosures, whereas the ICWPA merely outlines the process through which such disclosures can be made. Rather, this external review panel can only recommend that agency heads take corrective action. Title VI seemingly codifies some of PPD-19's protections and, under specified circumstances, expands upon them. Title VI's protections are bifurcated: it protects whistleblowers from retaliation in the form of both adverse personnel actions and adverse security clearance or information access determinations resulting from their making protected disclosures. Protection from Adverse Personnel Actions
Under Title VI, disclosures for which an employee is protected against retaliation in the form of adverse personnel action include those made to (1) the Director of National Intelligence (or his or her designee); (2) the IGIC (or his or her designee); (3) the head of the employing agency (or his or her designee); (4) the employing agency's Inspector General; (5) congressional intelligence committees; or (6) a member of a congressional intelligence committee. As of this writing, the Director of National Intelligence does not appear to have developed these appeal procedures. | Intelligence whistleblowers are generally Intelligence Community (IC) employees or contractors who bring to light allegations of agency wrongdoings by, for example, disclosing information on such wrongdoings to congressional intelligence committees. Such disclosures can aid oversight of, or help curb misconduct within, intelligence agencies. However, intelligence whistleblowers could face retaliation from their employers for their disclosures, and the fear of such retaliation may deter whistleblowing. Congress and President Obama have taken measures to protect certain intelligence whistleblowers from retaliation, and thereby seemingly encourage these whistleblowers to disclose information on agency wrongdoing. These measures are the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (ICWPA), Presidential Policy Directive 19 (PPD-19), and Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2014 (Title VI). Each of these measures details what disclosures fall within the scope of its protections, which generally include certain disclosures through government channels (e.g., disclosures to agency inspectors general or congressional intelligence committees). None of these measures protect against retaliation or potential criminal liability arising from disclosures to media sources. The ICWPA applies to both IC employees and contractors, whereas PPD-19 and Title VI appear to apply only to IC employees.
The ICWPA is the oldest of the three intelligence whistleblower protections and, of the three, provides the least amount of protection to those falling within its scope. The ICWPA does not explicitly prohibit retaliation against IC whistleblowers. Rather, it outlines procedures through which whistleblowers can disclose to the congressional intelligence committees information on "urgent concerns," such as violations of law or false statements to Congress. The ICWPA further contains no explicit mechanism for obtaining a remedy for retaliation stemming from disclosure of an urgent concern to Congress. It merely allows an IC whistleblower who has faced an adverse personnel action because he disclosed an urgent concern to the congressional intelligence committees to then use the ICWPA's disclosure procedures to inform the committees of the retaliation.
PPD-19, unlike the ICWPA, expressly prohibits an IC employee from taking an adverse personnel action or security clearance determination against another employee because of a protected disclosure. It additionally requires intelligence agencies to develop procedures for internally investigating, through agency Inspectors General, allegations of impermissible retaliation. After finding that impermissible retaliation has occurred, Inspectors General can recommend that agency heads take corrective action. When an employee has exhausted the internal review procedures that must be established under PPD-19, he can appeal to the Director of National Intelligence, who then has the discretion to convene a review panel. If it finds that improper retaliation occurred, the review panel can recommend that the agency head take remedial action.
Title VI seemingly codifies, and expands upon, some of the protections of PPD-19. Its protections, and modes of enforcement, differ depending on the type of retaliation alleged. More specifically, Title VI's protected disclosures and enforcement methods in the context of allegations of adverse personnel action are distinct from its protected disclosures and enforcement methods for allegations of adverse security clearance or information access determinations. |
crs_RL34103 | crs_RL34103_0 | Overview of Sugar Program
The sugar program is designed to guarantee the minimum price received by growers of sugarcane and sugar beets, and by the firms (raw sugar mills and beet refiners) that process these crops into sugar. To accomplish this, the USDA limits the amount of sugar that processors can sell domestically under "marketing allotments" and restricts imports. This report focuses on the issues raised by the sugar program provisions in the House and Senate farm bills. USDA is required to use its other tools to protect this price guarantee. These minimum prices have guaranteed producers of sugar crops and the processors that convert these crops into sugar, a U.S. price that since the early 1980s has ranged from two to four times the price of sugar traded in the world marketplace. Controlling Sugar Supply to Protect Sugar Prices
The sugar program uses two tools—import quotas and marketing allotments—to ensure that producers and processors receive price support benefits. By regulating the amount of foreign sugar allowed to enter and the quantity of sugar that processors can sell, USDA can for the most part keep market prices above effective support levels, meet the no-cost objective, and ensure that domestic sugar demand is met. Since January 1, 2008, however, U.S. sugar imports from Mexico are no longer restricted. However, other provisions prescribe how USDA must now administer import quotas. USDA justified removing these restrictions because of "changes occurring over time in the domestic marketing of cane sugar." Both announcements reflect the enacted 2008 farm bill's requirement that USDA set both the raw sugar and refined sugar TRQs at the minimum levels required by U.S. WTO trade commitments by October 1, 2008. However, USDA is given some discretionary authority to exercise on this matter. Legislation
Implementation of the 2002 farm bill's marketing allotment authority resulted in the U.S. sugar production sector's share of domestic food consumption ranging from a low of 73% in FY2006 to a high of 89% in FY2004. In the interim, any call made by sugar users for USDA to increase the end-of-year U.S. sugar supply (to meet their desire for lower sugar prices) is limited by what USDA can do under the enacted 2008 farm bill to increase imports (see " Implementation " under " Import Quotas ", above). During the debate, producers and processors sought a deal with the Bush Administration on a sugar-for-ethanol package. Legislation
The enacted 2008 farm bill incorporates a proposal presented to the Agriculture Committees by the U.S. sugar production sector. The "Feedstock Flexibility Program for Bioenergy Producers" requires USDA to administer a sugar-for-ethanol program using sugar intended for food use but deemed to be in surplus. USDA will sell both surplus sugar that it purchases if determined necessary to maintain prices above support levels, and the sugar acquired as a result of loan forfeitures, to bioenergy producers for processing into fuel grade ethanol and other biofuel. Outlook
The current U.S. sugar market outlook (i.e., demand considerably above current supply, implying that market prices will be above loan forfeiture levels) suggests that, at present, USDA will likely be able to meet the program's no-cost directive without having to activate the new sugar-for-ethanol program in FY2009. Projected outlays reflected estimates of the budgetary impact of additional sugar imports from Mexico and from other countries with additional access to the U.S. market for their sugar under bilateral FTAs. | Congress reauthorized the sugar price support program with some changes in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246, the enacted 2008 farm bill). The sugar program is designed to guarantee the price received by sugar crop growers and processors and is intended to operate at "no cost" to the U.S. Treasury. To accomplish this, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) controls supply by limiting the amount of sugar that processors can sell domestically under "marketing allotments" and restricts imports. At the same time, USDA seeks to ensure that supplies of sugar are adequate to meet domestic demand. "No cost" is achieved if USDA applies these tools in a way that maintains market prices above minimum price support levels.
Since January 1, 2008, sugar imports from Mexico no longer face quotas or duties under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Other imports are allowed entry under quotas found in other free trade agreements (FTAs). To address the potential for a U.S. sugar surplus caused by additional imports under these trade agreements, the enacted farm bill mandates a sugar-for-ethanol program. USDA is now required to purchase as much U.S.-produced sugar as necessary to maintain market prices above support levels, to be sold to bioenergy producers for processing into ethanol. Funding is open-ended for this program. Other provisions increase the minimum guaranteed prices for raw sugar and refined beet sugar by 4% to 5%, mandate an 85% market share for the U.S. sugar production sector, and remove certain discretionary authority that USDA exercises to administer import quotas.
The enacted sugar provisions reflect the proposal presented to the House and Senate Agriculture Committees by producers of sugar beets and sugarcane and the processors of these crops. They favored continuing the structure of the current sugar price support program but sought changes to enhance their position in the U.S. marketplace. Their sugar-for-ethanol provisions ensure that the prospect of imports adding to U.S. sugar supplies under any future trade agreements will not undermine the program's price guarantee and the sugar industry's market share. Food and beverage manufacturers that use sugar opposed the proposed program's provisions, arguing that costs to consumers will increase and that new requirements will restrict the flow of sugar for food use in the domestic market. The Bush Administration opposed these provisions, with the President identifying them as one reason why he vetoed the farm bill.
USDA has continued to estimate a tight domestic sugar supply in FY2009 largely due to reduced beet production. Its import quota decisions made to date and its estimate of sugar expected to enter from Mexico and other FTA partners do not point to a sugar surplus. As a result, USDA announced in September 2008 that the sugar-for-ethanol program will not be implemented this year. Attention now turns to how USDA will implement newly enacted rules dealing with the timing of additional raw cane sugar versus refined sugar imports, because of the implications for market prices.
For background information on the sugar program and a review of more recent developments, please see CRS Report R40995, Sugar Policy Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42829 | crs_R42829_0 | The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-240 , enacted on January 2, 2013) included an extension of the 2008 farm bill through September 30, 2013. This report focuses on the Nutrition title (Title IV) of the 2012 farm bill proposals included in the 112 th Congress's Senate-passed bill (Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2012; S. 3240 ) and House Committee-reported bill (Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of 2012; H.R. These were five-year reauthorization proposals, and, while the 113 th Congress must "start from scratch," it is expected that these actions during 2012 will influence the farm bill formulation during the current Congress. The report also discusses the two bills' changes to The Emergency Food Assistance Program, Commodity Supplemental Food Program, commodity foods in schools, and additional farm bill nutrition assistance programs and policies. Summary of CBO Cost Estimates of Title IV
From a budget standpoint, the largest difference between the Senate-passed and House Committee bills' Nutrition titles was their forecasted SNAP spending; this is due largely to the House Committee-reported bill's restrictions to SNAP " Categorical Eligibility ." For S. 3240 , CBO estimated that if enacted, the bill's Nutrition title—which contains SNAP and non-SNAP proposals—would have resulted in a net reduction in spending of $4.0 billion over 10 years. As summarized below, the Senate-passed and House Committee-reported bills, for the most part, would have maintained current federal law on SNAP benefit calculation; however, both bills would have changed the role of LIHEAP in SNAP benefit calculation (specifically, the significance of LIHEAP in the excess shelter deduction). It has been reported that certain states were including a household's medical marijuana expenses to determine a household's excess shelter deduction. Both bills would have amended SNAP's definition of retail food store in two ways. The bills would have given USDA the authority "to consider whether the applicant is located in an area with significantly limited access to food" in its authorization of stores, and the bills would have made an exception to the 45% requirement if USDA determines that the participation of the retailer is "required for the effective and efficient operation of the supplemental nutrition assistance program." Trafficking
Trafficking is the sale of SNAP benefits for cash or for ineligible items. 6083 is similar to the Senate-passed bill except that the House-reported bill would have provided USDA $5 million annually in additional mandatory funding to track and prevent SNAP trafficking. The House Committee's bill would have continued the FY2012 appropriations' ( P.L. In the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, American Samoa and Puerto Rico are given mandatory funds for nutrition assistance block grants. For the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, H.R. The Senate bill would have increased the mandatory funding amounts that are indexed to inflation by $174 million over 10 years. In addition, both bills would have limited eligibility for CSFP to income-eligible elderly. While typically changes to the programs' authorizing statutes, Russell National School Lunch Act and Child Nutrition Act, fall under the jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, the policies pertaining to USDA commodity food procurement are in the jurisdiction of both the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and the House Committee on Agriculture. The policies and related S. 3240 and H.R. 6083 (Section 4205) proposed different approaches for supporting "farm to school" efforts. The bill would also have added a new authority for purchasing pulse crop products for the school meals programs, but it would not have funded the project, instead it would have provided a discretionary funding authorization ("authorized to be appropriated") of $10 million for the program. Other 2012 Farm Bill Nutrition Programs
Fresh Fruit and Vegetable ("Snack") Program
The 2008 farm bill permanently authorized and funded the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program, sometimes referred to as the "snack" program. 6083 would have made several additional changes. 112-240 's farm bill extension extended the discretionary authority for the Hunger-Free Community Grants, which had expired after September 30, 2012. For the incentive grants, the bill would provide $100 million in mandatory funding over five years. The House-reported bill would have increased funding for Community Food Projects to a total of $15 million annually and carved out $5 million of these funds for projects to encourage low-income households to purchase fruits and vegetables. Senate-Passed and House-Reported Bills
S. 3240 (Section 4206) included authorization for a Healthy Food Financing Initiative; the House-reported bill did not include this program. | Many provisions of the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246) expired on September 30, 2012. On January 2, 2013, President Obama signed the American Taxpayer Relief Act (P.L. 112-240), which included an extension of the 2008 farm bill through September 30, 2013.
This report focuses on the Nutrition title (Title IV) of the 2012 farm bill proposals included in the 112th Congress's Senate-passed bill (Agriculture Reform, Food, and Jobs Act of 2012; S. 3240) and House Committee-reported bill (Federal Agriculture Reform and Risk Management Act of 2012; H.R. 6083). These were five-year reauthorization proposals, and, while the 113th Congress must "start from scratch," it is expected that these actions during 2012 will influence the farm bill formulation during the current Congress.
Title IV of both S. 3240 and H.R. 6083 would have largely maintained the nutrition program policies and discretionary and mandatory funding that are contained in the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 and other nutrition program authorizing statutes. Many provisions in the two bills were the same, but the bills also differed in a number of ways, most notably provisions related to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated total 10-year budget savings of $4.0 billion in the Senate-passed bill and $16.1 billion in the House-reported bill.
SNAP policies constituted the bulk of Title IV of the 112th Congress's farm bill proposals, with notable differences between the Senate-passed and House-reported bills. SNAP provisions in both bills would have changed authorization requirements for retailers and some of the rules that govern participants' and retailers' redemption of SNAP benefits. Both bills would have provided additional mandatory funding for reducing SNAP trafficking (the sale of SNAP benefits for cash or ineligible goods), although the Senate bill proposed a larger amount. In terms of a household's eligibility for SNAP and the calculation of monthly benefit amounts, both bills would have identically reduced the impact of a household's receipt of Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) benefits affecting the household's SNAP benefit calculation. The House Committee bill also would have restricted categorical eligibility, a policy most responsible for the difference between the nutrition title cost estimates. The House committee-reported bill also would have repealed state performance bonuses, clarified the consideration of medical marijuana expenses, and made several other administrative changes. The House committee-reported bill would also have made changes to the nutrition assistance provided to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and Puerto Rico.
Both bills would have increased mandatory funding for The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP, a major source of federal support for emergency feeding organizations), the Senate by $174 million over 10 years, and the House Agriculture Committee by $245 million over 10 years. Both bills would have limited eligibility for the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP) to low-income elderly participants, phasing out eligibility for low-income pregnant and post-partum women, infants, and children.
Within the child nutrition programs, the Senate bill would have provided authorization and funding to continue a whole grain pilot program and authorization to begin a pulse crops pilot program. In contrast, the House committee-reported bill would not have included these pilots and would have eliminated the "fresh" requirement in the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program, which provides such snacks in elementary schools. Both bills would have provided additional authorizations for "farm to school" efforts to bring local agricultural products into school cafeterias.
Both bills proposed increases for Community Food Projects grants (the Senate by $5 million each year and the House Agriculture Committee by $10 million); H.R. 6083 also would have carved out $5 million of these grants each year for projects that encourage low-income households to purchase fruits and vegetables. The Senate bill would have added discretionary authority for a Healthy Food Financing Initiative, a financing mechanism to sustain and create food retail opportunities in communities that lack access to healthy food; and would have provided $100 million (over five years) in mandatory funding for Hunger-Free Communities Incentive Grants, which would fund programs that provide incentives for SNAP participants' purchase of fruits and vegetables; neither of these programs had been included in the House committee's bill. |
crs_RL34204 | crs_RL34204_0 | Introduction
Comprehensive immigration reform was the subject of much discussion at the start of the 110 th Congress. Aimed at addressing a host of perceived problems with the U.S. immigration system, this legislation combined border security and interior enforcement provisions with provisions on temporary workers, permanent admissions, and unauthorized aliens. On June 28, 2007, the Senate voted on a motion to invoke cloture on S. 1639, which, if approved, would have ultimately brought the bill to a vote. The cloture motion failed, however, on a vote of 46 to 53, and the Senate Majority Leader pulled the bill from the Senate floor. In October 2007, however, the Senate considered, as a stand-alone bill, a proposal on unauthorized alien students, which has been included in various comprehensive reform bills. The proposal, known as the DREAM Act, would enable certain unauthorized students to obtain legal status. 110-53 ); on border security in P.L. 110-161 ); and on military service-based immigration benefits in the Kendell Frederick Citizenship Assistance Act ( P.L. 110-382 ). 110-293 ); on alien eligibility for benefits in the SSI Extension for Elderly and Disabled Refugees Act ( P.L. 110-328 ); and on employment eligibility verification in P.L. 110-161 and the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L..110-329). 110-181 ), as amended by P.L. This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have seen legislative action or are of significant congressional interest. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations are addressed in a separate report and, for the most part, are not covered here. A version of the DREAM Act also was included in S. 1639 , the immigration bill that the Senate considered but failed to invoke cloture on in June 2007. P.L. The 110 th Congress also has enacted P.L. 110-161. P.L. 110-28 and P.L. 110-242 amends P.L. P.L. P.L. All of these measures are discussed earlier in the report. Enacted
P.L. Contains refugee-related provisions. 110-36 ( S. 1104 ). 110-257 ( H.R. P.L. P.L. Contains provisions on alien smuggling. 110-251 .) Contains refugee-related provisions. | Comprehensive immigration reform was the subject of much discussion at the start of the 110th Congress. In the spring of 2007, the Senate considered several broad immigration reform measures aimed at addressing a host of perceived problems with the U.S. immigration system. These measures combined border security and interior enforcement provisions with provisions on temporary workers, permanent admissions, and unauthorized aliens. In June 2007, the Senate voted on a motion to invoke cloture on one of these measures (S. 1639), which, if approved, would have ultimately brought the bill to a vote. The motion failed, however, and the bill was subsequently pulled from the Senate floor.
In October 2007, the Senate considered a proposal that has been included in various comprehensive measures. Known as the DREAM Act, this bill (S. 2205) would enable certain unauthorized alien students to obtain legal status. The Senate failed to invoke cloture on S. 2205.
At the same time, the 110th Congress has enacted some immigration-related provisions. Among them are refugee-related provisions included in P.L. 110-5, P.L. 110-28, P.L. 110-36, P.L. 110-161, P.L. 110-181, and P.L. 110-242. The 110th Congress also has enacted provisions on border security in P.L. 110-53 and P.L. 110-161; on the Visa Waiver Program in P.L. 110-53; on alien inadmissibility in P.L. 110-257 and P.L. 110-293; on military service-based immigration benefits in P.L. 110-251 and P.L. 110-382; on alien eligibility for benefits in P.L. 110-328; and on employment eligibility verification in P.L. 110-161 and P.L. 110-329.
This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have seen legislative action or are of significant congressional interest. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations are addressed in CRS Report RL34004, Homeland Security Department: FY2008 Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed] et al., and CRS Report RL34482, Homeland Security Department: FY2009 Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed] et al., and for the most part, are not covered here. This is the final update of this report. |
crs_RL32928 | crs_RL32928_0 | Additionally, some states have laws or rules that more directly bear on the obligation of breastfeeding mothers to serve on juries. (The laws of Colorado and Massachusetts probably are not applicable to the excuse or deferral of breastfeeding mothers from jury duty.) Even if a state has neither a specific statute dealing with jury service and breastfeeding, a "family friendly" statute, nor a statewide court rule, it does not necessarily mean that a nursing mother will be required to perform jury duty. Individual court rules or custom, community practice, or other circumstances may permit an excuse or a deferral from jury service for a nursing mother. State Laws Permitting Breastfeeding Mothers to have Jury Duty Excused or Postponed
At the present time, eleven states have enacted laws which specifically allow a breastfeeding mother to either postpone or be excused from jury duty. Federal District Court Rules
Many of the federal district courts have made a provision in their jury plan to excuse or a defer jury duty for persons caring for a child or children under the age of ten. Some states have enacted legislation which provides a specific excuse or deferral from jury duty for a breastfeeding mother. Legislation is currently pending in Wyoming to legislatively respond to the issue of breastfeeding and jury duty. California has a specific state-wide court rule which deals with the issue of breastfeeding mothers and jury duty. It is likely that local and state courts—where there is no uniform rule—may have varied, and not necessarily implemented consistent policies in dealing with breastfeeding mothers and jury duty responsibilities. | The increasing popularity of breastfeeding has focused attention on how the law facilitates or discourages the practice. One issue that has arisen involves breastfeeding mothers and jury duty, and whether a breastfeeding mother may receive an excuse or deferral from compulsory jury duty.
At the present time there is no federal legislation on the subject, although Congress has considered and adopted other legislation concerning certain breastfeeding issues.
By contrast, several states have enacted legislation to excuse or defer jury duty for breastfeeding mothers, either specifically or more generally under "family friendly" jury duty legislation. "Family friendly" jury legislation varies in scope, but it generally, though not always, is sufficiently expansive to cover breastfeeding mothers.
Court rules concerning breastfeeding mothers and jury duty vary widely. California has adopted a uniform statewide rule. However, federal district courts have not adopted standard rules or practices. Likewise, state and local courts may have no specific rules, or very different rules on breastfeeding mothers and jury duty.
The fact that a state, a court system, or a single court does not have a law, rule, or formally written procedure does not necessarily mean that a breastfeeding mother will be compelled to serve on a jury. It appears that a general "medical exception" from jury duty may be applicable to breastfeeding mothers in some instances, and local practice and custom may influence an excuse or deferral from jury duty. It appears that many of the decisions concerning a nursing mother's excuse or deferral from jury duty are handled on a case-by-case basis by the individual courts. |
crs_R40955 | crs_R40955_0 | Introduction
There have been three different versions of the homebuyer tax credits enacted since the summer of 2008. In July 2008, Congress enacted a first-time homebuyer tax credit as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA; P.L. 110-289 ). The tax credit was originally set to expire on July 1, 2009. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ) increased the tax credit's value and extended its expiration date to December 1, 2009. Most recently, the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (WHBAA; P.L. 111-92 ) extended the tax credit through the first half of 2010 and expanded it to repeat homebuyers. The most recently available data suggest that home prices in general may be stabilizing, at least temporarily. Given the close proximity of these improvements to when the homebuyer tax credit was enacted by HERA and first modified ARRA, one could argue that the tax credit was the cause of these improvements. This report provides an economic analysis of the homebuyer tax credit. WHBAA required that a homebuyer be entered into a binding written contract before May 1, 2010, and complete the home purchase by July 1, 2010, to qualify for the credit. The maximum credit amount is reduced to $6,500 for repeat homebuyers. In addition, the tax credit deadlines are extended by one year for individuals who serve on qualified official extended duty outside the United States for 90 days before May 1, 2010. Mostly recently, the deadline by which homebuyers need to complete their home purchases in order to qualify for the credit was extended to September 30, 2010. Buyers are still required to have been entered into a binding contract before May 1, 2010. The extension was provided by H.R. 5623 , the Homebuyer Assistance and Improvement Act of 2010. Due to several unrelated provisions contained in the bill, the estimated $140 million 10-year cost of the extension was mostly off-set. Home Inventory
There are also indications that the inventory (supply) of homes on the market may be returning to a more normal level. A correlation, however, does not imply causation. Around the same time that the homebuyer tax credit was enacted, home prices were falling and mortgage rates were approaching recent historic lows, which may have led more homebuyers to enter the market. Next, estimates of the number of additional first-time purchases that can be attributed to the ARRA and WHBAA versions of tax credit are then presented and compared to private industry estimates. The estimates presented here raise questions about those reported by industry analysts and the role of the tax credit in stabilizing the housing market. Home Prices, Mortgage Rates, and the HERA and ARRA Homebuyer Tax Credits
To quantify the potential effect of the HERA and ARRA versions of the first-time homebuyer tax credit and compare it to the effect of falling prices and mortgage rates, an estimate was made of how much each reduced the typical buyer's mortgage payment. Lastly, the tax credit was assumed to effectively lower the purchase price of a home. As a result, lower home prices and mortgage rates may have played a larger role in stabilizing the housing market than the tax credit since the incentive that they provided was larger and more widespread than the incentive provided by the homebuyer tax credit. | There have been three different versions of the homebuyer tax credit enacted since the summer of 2008. In July 2008, Congress enacted a first-time homebuyer tax credit as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA; P.L. 110-289). The tax credit was originally set to expire on July 1, 2009. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) increased the tax credit's value and extended its expiration date to December 1, 2009. The Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (WHBAA; P.L. 111-92) extended the tax credit through the first half of 2010 and expanded it to repeat homebuyers.
The changes enacted by P.L. 111-92 extended the tax credit to homebuyers who enter a written binding contract before May 1, 2010, and completed their purchase before July 1, 2010. These deadlines were extended by one year for members of the military and other individuals who serve on qualified official extended duty outside the United States for 90 days before May 1, 2010. The tax credit for repeat buyers was capped at $6,500 and was limited to those who have owned and lived in their current home for five of the last eight years. Other changes included an expansion of the maximum credit income eligibility limits to $125,000 for individuals and $225,000 for married couples, up from $75,000 and $150,000, respectively. Lastly, an $800,000 limit on the purchase price of a home was included.
Mostly recently, the deadline by which homebuyers need to complete their home purchases in order to qualify for the credit was extended to September 30, 2010. Buyers are still be required to have been entered into a binding contract before May 1, 2010. The extension was provided by H.R. 5623, the Homebuyer Assistance and Improvement Act of 2010. Due to several unrelated provisions contained in the bill the estimated $140 million 10-year cost of the extension was mostly off-set.
This report provides an economic analysis of the homebuyer tax credit. Recent data suggest that home prices in general may be stabilizing and that the home inventory is beginning to return to a more normal level. Given the close proximity of these improvements to when the homebuyer tax credit was enacted by HERA and first modified by ARRA, one could argue that the tax credit was the cause of these improvements. A correlation, however, does not imply causation. Around the same time, home prices were falling and mortgage rates were approaching recent historic lows, which may have led more homebuyers to enter the market.
Results presented in this report suggest that lower home prices and low mortgage rates were quantitatively more important in stabilizing the housing market than the tax credit. For example, the effect of home prices and mortgage rates on the typical buyer's mortgage payment is estimated to have been about eight times that of the first two versions of the tax credit. In addition, lower home prices and mortgage rates tended to benefit first-time and repeat buyers, as opposed to the tax credit which until recently just benefited the former.
Estimates of the number of additional home purchases that can be attributed to the ARRA and WHBAA versions of tax credit are presented and compared to those reported by private industry analysts. The estimates raise questions about those reported by industry analysts, as well as questions about how effective the tax credit may have been at reducing the home inventory. The analysis also investigates the tax credit's ability to support the housing market moving forward. |
crs_RL33635 | crs_RL33635_0 | Brief History of Impoundment
Impoundment includes any executive action to withhold or delay the spending of appropriated funds. As a result of a compromise in conference, the ICA differentiated deferrals, or temporary delays in funding availability, from rescissions, or permanent cancellations of designated budget authority, with different procedures for congressional review and control of the two types of impoundment. In the case of a rescission, the ICA provided that the funds must be made available for obligation unless both houses of Congress take action to approve the rescission request within 45 days of "continuous session" (recesses of more than three days not counted). 100-119 ), Congress enacted several budget process reforms. Section 206 of P.L. Over the years many bills and resolutions (mainly proposed constitutional amendments) have been introduced, but action in Congress on item veto proposals, beyond an occasional hearing, has been limited. In the 101 st Congress, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution held a hearing on proposed constitutional amendments permitting an item veto on April 11, 1989, and reported two such amendments, without recommendation, on June 8. In the 102 nd Congress, the House voted on language providing item veto authority for the President. 104-130 ) represented such hybrids. The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 (LIVA) amended the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 ( P.L. The act authorized the President to cancel in whole any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority (appropriations), any item of new direct spending (entitlement), or limited tax benefits with specified characteristics, contained in a bill otherwise signed into law. To facilitate judicial review, the act provided for (1) expedited review by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia of an action brought by a Member of Congress or an adversely affected individual on the ground that any provision of this act violates the Constitution; (2) review of an order of such Court by appeal directly to the Supreme Court; and (3) expedited disposition of such matter by the Supreme Court. The act became effective on January 1, 1997. In Congress, disapproval bills to overturn the cancellations by the President were introduced, along with alternative measures for providing the President with expanded rescission authority, bills to repeal the Line Item Veto Act, and even a bill to correct an apparent "loophole" in the original Act. 9 , H.J.Res. 30 , and S.J.Res. 31 ), and to provide alternative statutory means for conveying expanded impoundment authority to the President ( S. 100 and S. 139 ). H.J.Res. On March 6, 2006, President Bush sent a draft bill titled the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006 to Congress, and the measure was introduced the next day ( see H.R. 4890 . Measures Reported in the 109th Congress
H.R. H.R. S.J.Res. The House passed H.R. On May 24, 2010, President Obama transmitted an Administration draft bill to Congress, the Reduce Unnecessary Spending Act of 2010, which would provide expedited rescission procedures for consideration of certain requests from the President. On June 17, 2010, the House Budget Committee held a hearing titled the "Administration's Proposal for Expedited Rescission." Chairman Spratt, who has supported expedited rescission measures in the past and introduced H.R. Measures Introduced in the 111th Congress
H.R. S. 907 (Carper et al.) . S. 1808 (Feingold) . This title of the omnibus budget reform measure is virtually the same as H.R. 1294 and S. 524 . S. 3423 (Kerry) . Constitutional amendment. | Conflicting budget priorities of the President and Congress accentuate the institutional tensions between the executive and legislative branches inherent in the federal budget process. Impoundment, whereby a President withholds or delays the spending of funds appropriated by Congress, provides an important mechanism for budgetary control during budget implementation in the executive branch; but Congress retains oversight responsibilities at this stage as well. Many Presidents have called for an item veto, or possibly expanded impoundment authority, to provide them with greater control over federal spending.
The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Title X of P.L. 93-344), established two categories of impoundments: deferrals, or temporary delays in funding availability; and rescissions, or permanent cancellation of budget authority. With a rescission, the funds must be made available for obligation unless both houses of Congress take action to approve the President's rescission request within 45 days of "continuous session."
Consideration of impoundment reform increasingly became joined with that of an item veto for the President. While Constitutional amendment proposals have not disappeared (see H.J.Res. 15 and S.J.Res. 22 ), many who originally favored an item veto constitutional amendment turned to expanded rescission authority for the President as a functionally similar mechanism achievable more easily by statutory change.
The Line Item Veto Act was signed into law on April 9, 1996 (P.L. 104-130), and it became effective January 1, 1997. Key provisions allowed the President to cancel any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new direct spending, or certain limited tax benefits contained in any law, unless disapproved by Congress. On June 25, 1998, the Supreme Court, in the case of Clinton v. City of New York, held the law unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the presentment clause; in order to grant the President true item veto authority, a constitutional amendment would be needed (according to the majority opinion).
Measures seeking to provide a constitutional alternative to the 1996 law have been introduced in each subsequent Congress. In the 109th Congress, the House passed H.R. 4890, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006, by a vote of 247-172, but no further action on the measure occurred before the 109th Congress adjourned.
Several measures have been introduced in the 111th Congress that would establish expedited rescission procedures, including H.R. 1294, H.R. 1390, H.R. 4921, S. 524, S. 640, S. 907, and S. 3423. Other proposals would provide for expedited rescission along with various other budget process reforms, such as increased earmark accountability or spending controls. In the 111th Congress, H.R. 3268, H.R. 3964, S. 1808, and S. 3026 provide examples of such omnibus budget process bills. Two Constitutional amendment proposals have been introduced, H.J.Res. 15 and S.J.Res. 22. The Obama Administration has endorsed an expedited process for congressional consideration of rescission requests and announced on May 24, 2010, the transmittal of a proposal to Congress, titled Reduce Unnecessary Spending Act of 2010. The Administration bill has been introduced as H.R. 5454 and S. 3474. In the 111th Congress, three committees have held hearings on expedited rescission measures, the most recent being on June 17, 2010, by the House Budget Committee. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22559 | crs_RS22559_0 | Navy Preference for Design Based on DDG-1000 Hull
Although the CG(X) AOA is examining a wide range of design options for the CG(X), the Navy has publicly stated on several occasions that would like to use the design of its new DDG-1000 destroyer as the basis for the CG(X). Nuclear propulsion is an option being studied in the CG(X) AOA. | The Navy has stated that it would like to use the design of its new DDG-1000 destroyer as the basis for its planned CG(X) cruiser. Ships based on other hull designs are possible. Nuclear propulsion is an option being studied for the CG(X). For a more general discussion of both the CG(X) and DDG-1000, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. This report on basic CG(X) design options will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS21029 | crs_RS21029_0 | If a married couple dies, both of whom were federal employees covered by CSRS, each child is eligible for two survivor annuities. Children of deceased federal employees who were covered by FERS may be eligible for Social Security benefits, according to the laws governing that program. A survivor who is entitled to both an annuity under CSRS or FERS and to survivor compensation must elect one of the two benefits. Consequently, survivor benefits under both CSRS and FERS are partially subsidized by the federal government. Health Insurance for Surviving Spouses and Children
A widow or widower of a deceased retiree who is eligible for a survivor annuity under either CSRS or FERS and who was covered under the FEHBP at the time of the retiree's death can continue to participate in the program at the same cost as applies to workers and retirees. Instead, the surviving spouse receives a refund of the employee's contributions to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund. | Federal employees with permanent appointments may be eligible for retirement and disability benefits under either the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) or the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). Most federal employees initially hired into permanent federal employment on or after January 1, 1984, are covered by FERS. Employees hired before January 1, 1984, are covered by CSRS unless they chose to switch to FERS during open seasons held in 1987 and 1998. Both FERS and CSRS provide survivor benefits for spouses and dependent children of employees and retirees. Survivors who had been participating in the Federal Employees' Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) can continue to do so. The federal government pays compensation to dependent survivors of federal civilian employees who are killed while performing their duties; however, a survivor eligible for both an annuity under CSRS or FERS and for survivor compensation cannot receive both. |
crs_R43031 | crs_R43031_0 | Introduction
In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller , in which the Court held that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects an individual right to possess a firearm, unconnected with service in a militia, and the use of that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. Shortly afterward in McDonald v. City of Chicago , the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment also applies to the states, but it did not further explore the scope of the Second Amendment. Since Heller and McDonald , both federal and state firearms laws have been regularly challenged under the Second Amendment. This report first discusses the standard of judicial review that the lower courts generally have fashioned to determine if a firearm law is in violation of the Second Amendment. Next, the report examines select categories of firearms laws that have been challenged under the Second Amendment. Under this approach, courts have upheld bans on possession by felons, by substance abusers, by illegal aliens, and by people convicted of domestic violence. Implications for Future Second Amendment Challenges
Although many firearms laws have been upheld as constitutional, the differences in how courts interpret the text of Heller , insofar as providing some guidance on the scope of the Second Amendment, as well as how they apply the two-step inquiry may impact the burden upon the government to prove its case. | The U.S. Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller held that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects an individual right to possess a firearm, unconnected with service in a militia, and the use of that firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. It also held that the Second Amendment applies to the states in McDonald v. City of Chicago. Since then, federal and state firearms laws have been challenged under the Second Amendment. Lower courts have been disputed in determining how to evaluate these provisions, given that the Heller decision was not an exhaustive analysis of the scope of the Second Amendment.
This report first discusses the two-step inquiry fashioned by the lower courts to analyze provisions under the Second Amendment. It proceeds to highlight how this test has been employed on a select number of firearms laws—namely, the federal age requirement and prohibition on possession by those convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; and state requirements to obtain a concealed carry permit and a state assault weapons ban. How courts have applied the test to these categories may provide some indication as to how future firearms regulations may be considered by the Supreme Court. The report concludes with a discussion on how varied interpretations by the lower courts of the Heller decision may affect the burden upon the federal government to defend firearms provisions, as well as new analytical frameworks that have been suggested. |
crs_RL34545 | crs_RL34545_0 | Introduction
The United States Congress conducts several types of activities for which it employs staff. Congressional employees are retained to perform public duties that include assisting Members in official responsibilities in personal, committee, leadership, or administrative office settings. Congressional career tracks generally mirror common stages of other professional careers, but with adaptations to the congressional workplace. These adaptations include relatively short career ladders on which staff may acquire substantial responsibilities in a relatively short period of time, and close support of a Member's legislative and representational responsibilities. This report focuses on positions in House and Senate personal offices, and provides sample position descriptions for 14 positions with similar job titles in each chamber. As with all congressional entities with employing authority, individual Members of Congress have wide discretion in setting many workplace policies, including procedures for establishing the duties and functions of staff positions. Staffing decisions may be determined by the priorities and goals of a congressional office, and the preferences and needs of a Member's constituents. | The United States Congress conducts several types of activities for which it employs staff. These activities include assisting Members in official responsibilities in personal, committee, leadership, or administrative office settings. Congressional career tracks generally mirror common stages of other professional careers, but with adaptations to the congressional workplace. These adaptations include relatively short career ladders on which staff may acquire substantial responsibilities in a relatively short period of time, and close support of a Member's legislative and representational responsibilities.
This report focuses on positions in House and Senate personal offices (Member staff), and provides sample position descriptions for 14 positions with similar job titles in each chamber. As with all congressional entities with employing authority, individual Members of Congress have wide discretion in setting many workplace policies, including procedures for establishing the duties and functions of staff positions. Staffing decisions may be determined by the priorities and goals of a congressional office, and the preferences and needs of a Member's constituents.
This report is one of several CRS products focusing on various aspects of congressional operations and administration. Others include CRS Report RL33686, Roles and Duties of a Member of Congress, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R41366, House of Representatives and Senate Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2010, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42818 | crs_R42818_0 | Overview
This report analyzes the impacts of wind generation on competitive power markets, including financial and economic impacts on electric power generators. Additionally, this report addresses three specific questions about the market interaction of wind power and electric power generators: (1) How might wind power affect wholesale market clearing prices? (2) Does wind power contribute to negative wholesale power price events within competitive electric power markets? Background
Wind electricity generation in the United States has experienced rapid growth over the last two decades. In 1992, cumulative installed U.S. wind capacity was approximately 1,500 megawatts (MW). In August of 2012, the U.S. wind industry reached a new milestone of 50,000 MW of installed wind power capacity. States essentially create demand for wind power projects by implementing renewable portfolio standard (RPS) policies that require a certain amount of renewable power to be generated by a certain date. The federal production tax credit is currently 2.2 cents ($0.022) for each kilowatt-hour of electricity produced from a qualified wind project. Reports by consulting companies have been published indicating that low and negative wholesale prices resulting from wind power are distorting markets, adversely impacting the financial economics of conventional power generators, and skewing the economic signals necessary to stimulate new capacity builds to ensure electric system reliability. These concepts and definitions provide some insight into the complexities associated with U.S. power markets, and the relationships between wind power generation, wholesale power markets, and the financial economics of power generators. Each RTO/ISO organization has a different structure and set of market rules that members must follow in order to participate in each respective market. Some generators are willing to accept negative prices (essentially, the generator pays the RTO to provide power) for a variety of reasons, some of which might include: (1) maintenance and fuel costs associated with power plant shutdown and start-up may exceed the cost of the temporary negative price event, (2) technical difficulties with cycling nuclear plants on and off provide an inherent incentive to operate continuously, and (3) incentives are provided for electricity production, such as the production tax credit (PTC) that is currently available for wind power projects. Since 2008, wholesale power prices in all RTO markets have declined. Considering the key concepts and definitions described above, the following sections examine three fundamental questions related to the impact of wind power in competitive electricity markets: (1) How might wind power affect market clearing prices?, (2) Does wind power contribute to negative wholesale electricity price events?, and (3) Does wind power impact electric system reliability? The ability of wind to bid negatively priced electricity is a result of value received from federal production tax credit incentives and the potential opportunity to sell renewable energy credits (RECs) to third parties. Two primary reasons for this decline, according to the IMM, were: (1) lower natural gas prices, and (2) lower average load demand. Two specific aspects of electric system reliability are typically discussed in the context of how wind power might impact electricity markets. Large amounts of wind electricity generation can potentially result in operational reliability issues due to the variable and sometimes unpredictable nature of wind power. There are two specific reserve types that may be needed to manage the variable nature of wind power production: (1) operating reserves, and (2) spinning reserves. Resource Adequacy and Capacity Margins
RTO system operators are typically concerned with the long-term operational reliability of the electric power system, and they generally monitor and plan for the power generation resources needed to satisfy expected load demand during a certain period of time (sometimes referred to as resource adequacy). As discussed in additional detail above, it is important to understand that wholesale electricity prices, typically the largest source of revenue available to power generators, are influenced by a number of factors (i.e., demand, weather, and fuel prices). Concluding Remarks
Increasing amounts of wind power can potentially impact wholesale power prices in RTO-managed markets by possibly reducing market clearing prices and contributing to negative price events in certain locations during certain seasons and times of day. However, the absolute financial impacts of wind power generation are unclear due to the complex nature of wholesale power markets and the many variables that can impact wholesale electricity prices and generator revenues (i.e., location, natural gas prices, generation mix, and electricity demand). Nevertheless, should wind power continue to experience growth, it is uncertain whether current RTO market designs would function to ensure availability of the types of generation that would be necessary to both maintain resource adequacy and manage the variable and intermittent nature of wind power. | U.S. wind power generation has experienced rapid growth in the last 20 years as total installed capacity has increased from 1,500 megawatts (MW) in 1992 to more than 50,000 MW in August of 2012. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), wind power provided approximately 3% of total U.S. electricity generation in 2011. Two primary policies provide market and financial incentives that support the wind industry and have contributed to U.S. wind power growth: (1) production tax credit (PTC)—a federal tax incentive of 2.2 cents for each kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity produced by a qualified wind project (set to expire for new projects at the end of 2012), and (2) renewable portfolio standards (RPS)—state-level policies that encourage renewable power by requiring that either a certain percentage of electricity be generated by renewable energy sources or a certain amount of qualified renewable electricity capacity be installed.
The concentration of wind power projects within competitive power markets managed by regional transmission operators (RTOs), the focus of this report, has resulted in several concerns expressed by power generators and other market participants. Three specific concerns explored in this report include: (1) How might wind power affect wholesale market clearing prices? (2) Does wind power contribute to negative wholesale power price events? and (3) Does wind power impact electric system reliability? These concerns might be considered during congressional debate about the future of wind PTC incentives.
When considering the potential impacts of wind power on electric power markets, it is important to recognize that wholesale power markets are both complex and multi-dimensional. Wholesale power markets are influenced by a number of factors, including weather, electricity demand, natural gas prices, transmission constraints, and location. Therefore, determining the direct impact of a single variable, in this case wind power, on the financial economics of power generators can be difficult. In 2012, wholesale electric power prices were down from recent highs in 2008, and lower price trends can result in financial pressure for power generators in RTO markets. Arguably, however, the two primary contributors to this decline are low natural gas prices and low electricity demand.
Wind power generation can potentially reduce wholesale electricity prices, in certain locations and during certain seasons and times of day, since wind typically bids a zero ($0.00) price into wholesale power markets. Additionally, independent market monitor reports for three different RTOs each indicate that wind generators will sometimes bid a negative wholesale price in order to ensure electricity dispatch. The ability of wind generators to bid negatively priced power is generally attributed to value associated with PTC incentives and the ability to sell renewable energy credits (REC). However, wholesale power price reductions and negative electricity prices associated with wind generation need to be considered in context with other dimensions of organized power markets. For example, other revenue sources (i.e., capacity markets) may be available to generators in certain RTO market areas. Also, generators oftentimes enter into bilateral power purchase agreements that can provide a hedge against power price volatility. Therefore, the absolute impact of wind electricity on the economics of power generators is difficult to determine due to the many variables and dimensions that influence wholesale power markets.
With regard to how wind power might impact electricity system reliability, two aspects of reliability are typically discussed: (1) impacts to system operations—the ability of the power system to manage the variable and sometimes unpredictable nature of wind power production, and (2) resource adequacy and capacity margins—the potential for wind power generation to either influence power plant retirements or contribute to market conditions that do not support investment in new capacity resources. RTOs are currently implementing various initiatives (i.e., dispatchable resource programs, renewable energy transmission projects) to address the variable generation characteristics of wind power. Furthermore, each RTO market is designed to provide the economic signals necessary to stimulate capacity additions in order to ensure resource adequacy and maintain capacity margins. However, should wind power generation continue to grow, it is uncertain if current RTO market designs will provide the signals needed to encourage specific types of generation capacity (e.g., operating and spinning reserves) necessary to manage the variable nature of wind power. |
crs_R45096 | crs_R45096_0 | Overview
Iraq's government declared military victory against the Islamic State organization (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) in December 2017, but insurgent attacks by remaining IS fighters threaten Iraqis as they shift their attention toward recovery and the country's political future. Security conditions have improved since the Islamic State's control of territory was disrupted ( Figure 1 and Figure 2 ), but IS fighters are active in some areas of the country and security conditions are fluid. Meanwhile, daunting resettlement, reconstruction, and reform needs occupy citizens and leaders. National legislative elections were held in May 2018, but results were not certified until August, delaying the formal start of required steps to form the next government. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi sought reelection, but his electoral list's third-place showing and lack of internal cohesion undermined his chances for a second term. Nevertheless, on October 2, Iraq's Council of Representatives chose former Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister and former Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih as Iraq's President. Salih, in turn, named former Oil Minister Adel Abd al Mahdi as Prime Minister-designate and directed him to assemble a slate of cabinet officials for approval by the Council of Representatives (COR). Paramilitary forces have grown stronger and more numerous since 2014, and have yet to be fully integrated into national security institutions. Some figures associated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militias that were organized to fight the Islamic State participated in the 2018 election campaign and won seats in the COR, including individuals with ties to Iran. Large, volatile protests in southern Iraq during August and September 2018 highlighted some citizens' outrage with poor service delivery and corruption. Iraqi politicians have increasingly employed cross-sectarian political and economic narratives in an attempt to appeal to disaffected citizens, but identity-driven politics continue to influence developments across the country. Iraq's neighbors and other outsiders, including the United States, are pursuing their respective interests in the country, at times in competition. The Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq (KRI) enjoys considerable administrative autonomy under the terms of Iraq's 2005 constitution, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held legislative elections on September 30, 2018. The KRG had held a controversial advisory referendum on independence in September 2017, amplifying political tensions with the national government and prompting criticism from the Trump Administration and the United Nations Security Council. In October 2017, the national government imposed a ban on international flights to and from the KRI, and Iraqi security forces moved to reassert security control of disputed areas that had been secured by Kurdish forces after the Islamic State's mid-2014 advance. Iraqi and Kurdish security forces remain deployed across from each other along contested lines of control while their respective leaders are engaged in negotiations over a host of sensitive issues. Internally displaced Iraqis are returning home in greater numbers, but stabilization and reconstruction needs in areas liberated from the Islamic State are extensive. An estimated 1.9 million Iraqis remain as internally displaced persons (IDPs), and Iraqi authorities have identified $88 billion in reconstruction needs over the next decade. In general, U.S. engagement with Iraqis since 2011 has sought to reinforce Iraq's unifying tendencies and avoid divisive outcomes. At the same time, successive U.S. Administrations have sought to keep U.S. involvement and investment minimal relative to the 2003-2011 era, pursuing U.S. interests through partnership with various entities in Iraq and the development of those partners' capabilities—rather than through extensive deployment of U.S. military forces. To date, the 115 th Congress has appropriated funds to continue U.S. military operations against the Islamic State and to provide security assistance, humanitarian relief, and foreign aid for Iraq. For background on Iraq and its relations with the United States, see CRS Report R45025, Iraq: Background and U.S. Policy . | Iraq's government declared military victory against the Islamic State organization (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) in December 2017, but insurgent attacks by remaining IS fighters threaten Iraqis as they shift their attention toward recovery and the country's political future. Security conditions have improved since the Islamic State's control of territory was disrupted, but IS fighters are active in some areas and security conditions are fluid.
Meanwhile, daunting resettlement, reconstruction, and reform needs occupy citizens and leaders. Internally displaced Iraqis are returning home in greater numbers, but stabilization and reconstruction needs in liberated areas are extensive. An estimated 1.9 million Iraqis remain as internally displaced persons (IDPs), and Iraqi authorities have identified $88 billion in reconstruction needs over the next decade. Large protests in southern Iraq during August and September 2018 highlighted some citizens' outrage with poor service delivery and corruption.
National legislative elections were held in May 2018, but results were not certified until August, delaying the formal start of required steps to form the next government. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi sought reelection, but his electoral list's third-place showing and lack of internal cohesion undermined his chances for a second term. On October 2, Iraq's Council of Representatives (COR) chose former Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister and former Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih as Iraq's President. Salih, in turn, named former Oil Minister Adel Abd al Mahdi as Prime Minister-designate and directed him to assemble a slate of cabinet officials for COR approval within 30 days.
Paramilitary forces have grown stronger and more numerous since 2014, and have yet to be fully integrated into national security institutions. Some figures associated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that were organized to fight the Islamic State participated in the 2018 election campaign and won seats in the Council of Representatives, including individuals with ties to Iran. Iraqi politicians have increasingly employed cross-sectarian political and economic narratives in an attempt to appeal to disaffected citizens, but identity-driven politics continue to influence developments. Iraq's neighbors and other outsiders, including the United States, are pursuing their respective interests in Iraq, at times in competition.
The Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq (KRI) enjoys considerable administrative autonomy under the terms of Iraq's 2005 constitution, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held legislative elections on September 30, 2018. The KRG had held a controversial advisory referendum on independence in September 2017, amplifying political tensions with the national government, which moved to reassert security control of disputed areas that had been secured by Kurdish forces after the Islamic State's mid-2014 advance. Iraqi and Kurdish security forces remain deployed across from each other along contested lines of control, while their respective leaders are engaged in negotiations over a host of sensitive issues.
In general, U.S. engagement with Iraqis since 2011 has sought to reinforce Iraq's unifying tendencies and avoid divisive outcomes. At the same time, successive U.S. Administrations have sought to keep U.S. involvement and investment minimal relative to the 2003-2011 era, pursuing U.S. interests through partnership with various entities in Iraq and the development of those partners' capabilities—rather than through extensive deployment of U.S. military forces. The Trump Administration has sustained a cooperative relationship with the Iraqi government and plans to continue security training for Iraqi security forces. To date, the 115th Congress has appropriated funds for U.S. military operations against the Islamic State and for security assistance, humanitarian relief, and foreign aid for Iraq. For background on Iraq and its relations with the United States, see CRS Report R45025, Iraq: Background and U.S. Policy. |
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