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crs_R45339 | crs_R45339_0 | Introduction
Some observers asserted that leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 banks did not have sufficient credit loss reserves or capital to absorb the losses and as a consequence supported additional government intervention to stabilize the financ ial system. In its legislative capacity, Congress has devoted attention to strengthening the financial system in an effort to prevent another financial crisis by passing legislation. In its oversight capacity, while maintaining oversight of reforms implemented through the regulatory agencies, Congress has delegated authority to the bank regulators and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to determine minimum credit loss reserves and the current expected credit loss (CECL) implementation. Credit loss reserves help mitigate the overstatement of income on loans and other assets by adjusting for potential future losses on related loans and other assets. Credit losses are often very low shortly after origination; subsequently, they rise in the early years of a loan, and then taper to a lower rate of credit loss until maturity. Consequently, a firm's financial statements might not accurately reflect the potential credit losses at loan inception. U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), currently, require an incurred loss methodology to recognize credit losses on financial statements. CECL requires "consideration of a broader range of reasonable and supportable information" to determine the expected credit loss, including expected loss over the life of a loan or financial instrument by considering current and future expected economic conditions. The expected losses over the life of the financial instrument are to be recognized at the time the financial instrument is created. This report primarily focuses on the effects of CECL on the banking industry, although CECL will also affect other financial institutions and sectors. Current Expected Credit Loss
Credit loss estimates based on CECL are projected to result in greater transparency of expected losses earlier in the life of the loan and improve a user's ability to understand changes to expected credit losses at each reporting period. The proposed changes are significant enough to affect the regulatory capital rules that the federal banking regulators—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), collectively, the regulators—have initiated a "notice of proposed rulemaking," to address bank capital requirements. Currently, credit losses in the banking industry are referred to, generally, as Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL), or sometimes referred to as allowance for loans. CECL Implementation Dates
Early adopters of CECL may start issuing CECL-based financial statements for financial reporting periods after December 15, 2018. All public companies are required to issue financial statements that incorporate CECL for reporting periods after December 15, 2019. A FASB board member also raised similar concerns stating that the loans in the U.S. commercial banking system increased by 85% in the seven years leading up to the financial crisis whereas the reserves to cover the losses increased by 21%. Since FASB's announcement of CECL, banking industry professionals have raised concerns about implementing CECL, including during congressional testimonies. Others have described the change in how credit losses are determined by adopting CECL "as the biggest bank accounting change in 40 years." As a consequence of CECL's changes, the banking regulators are proposing to replace ALLL with a newly defined term in the capital rules—allowance for credit losses (ACL). Credit loss allowances under CECL cover a broader range of financial assets than ALLL. Banks that use spreadsheets or other internal models to determine credit losses might need to migrate to third-party vendor systems for CECL. Training
In addition to any technology upgrades, there might be additional training costs for stakeholders to implement CECL. According to one estimate, the transition to CECL will likely result in an upfront increase in ACL of between $50 billion and $100 billion. As these projected adjustments are in aggregate across the banking industry, some banks might need to increase their reserves significantly more than the projected 25-50 basis points whereas others might need to adjust less. In 2021, not only will all banking organizations be required to adopt CECL, but also stress tests are to use ACL. Differences in the way that U.S. GAAP and international accounting standards treat credit loss estimates and credit loss reserves could potentially disadvantage U.S. banks. Similar to certain banks being allowed to phase in the increased credit reserves over three years, Congress and FHFA can choose to allow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to accumulate the additional reserves over three years, potentially avoiding additional draws from the Treasury. | Some observers asserted that leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 banks did not have sufficient credit loss reserves or capital to absorb the resulting losses and as a consequence supported additional government intervention to stabilize the financial system. In its legislative oversight capacity, Congress has devoted attention to strengthening the financial system in an effort to prevent another financial crisis and avoid putting taxpayers at risk. However, some Members of Congress have expressed concern that financial reforms have been unduly burdensome, reducing the availability and affordability of credit. Congress has delegated authority to the bank regulators and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) to address credit loss reserves. FASB promulgates the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP), which provides the framework for financial reporting by banks and other entities.
Credit loss reserves help mitigate the overstatement of income on loans and other assets by accounting for future losses. Credit losses are often very low shortly after loan origination, subsequently rising in the early years of the loan, and then tapering to a lower rate of credit loss until maturity. Consequently, a firm's financial statements might not accurately reflect potential credit losses at loan inception. During the seven years leading up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the loan values held by the U.S. commercial banking system increased by 85%, whereas the credit loss reserves increased by only 21%. The ratio of loss reserves prior to the financial crisis was as low as 1.16% in 2006 and was more than 3.70% near the end of the crisis in early 2010.
In response to banks' challenges during and after the crisis, in June 2016, FASB promulgated a new credit loss standard—Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL). The new standard is expected to result in greater transparency of expected losses at an earlier date during the life of a loan. Early recognition of expected losses might not only help investors, but might also create a more stable banking system. CECL requires consideration of a broader range of reasonable and supportable information in determining the expected credit loss, including current and future economic conditions. In addition to loans, CECL also applies to a broad range of other financial products. The expected lifetime losses of loans and certain other financial instruments are to be recognized at the time a loan or financial instrument is recorded. All public companies are required to issue financial statements that incorporate CECL for reporting periods beginning after December 15, 2019. Although adherence to CECL is required for all public companies, it is expected to have a more significant effect on the banking industry. The change to credit loss estimates under CECL is considered by some to be the most significant accounting change in the banking industry in 40 years.
The banking regulators (Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) have issued preliminary guidance on CECL implementation. Banking regulators have also proposed changing the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL) to Allowance for Credit Loss (ACL) as a newly defined term. The change to ACL is to reflect the broader range of financial products that will be subject to credit loss estimates under CECL.
During congressional hearings, banking industry professionals have raised several concerns about CECL. According to one estimate, the transition to CECL will likely result in an increase in loan loss reserves of between $50 billion and $100 billion for banks. As these projections are in aggregate across the banking industry, some banks might need to significantly increase their credit reserves whereas others might need to adjust less.
To mitigate the effect of CECL, regulators have given banks the option of phasing in the increased credit reserves over three years. In addition, the Federal Reserve has delayed stress tests that incorporate CECL for the largest banking organizations until 2021. Banks are expected to incur additional costs of developing new credit loss models and costs of implementation. Banks may need to retain historical information on more financial products to estimate credit losses under CECL. Adopting CECL may require upgrading existing hardware and software or paying higher fees to third-party vendors for such services. Participants in recent congressional hearings have raised concerns about CECL implementation issues. The difference in how credit loss estimates are calculated based on CECL and international accounting standards could potentially disadvantage U.S. banks, but CECL is considered less complex to implement.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises, are also to be subject to CECL credit loss estimates as they are subject to private-sector GAAP requirements even though they are currently in conservatorship under the Federal Housing Financing Agency. |
crs_R41669 | crs_R41669_0 | Background
The Obama Administration, in the FY2012 budget proposal, has proposed eliminating a variety of federal tax deductions and credits available to the oil and natural gas industries. Many of these proposed tax changes have the effect of equalizing the tax treatment of independent oil producers to that of the major oil companies. The repeal of the expensing of intangible drilling expenses, the repeal of percentage depletion, and the repeal of the manufacturing tax deduction for the oil industry would increase the industry's estimated tax payments by $41.9 billion through 2021. Repeal Passive Loss Exception for Working Interests in Oil Properties
Repeal of the passive loss exception for working interests in oil and natural gas properties is a relatively small item in terms of tax revenues, $117 million from 2012 to 2016. As shown in Table 1 , the Administration estimates that the repeal of this deduction for the oil and natural gas industries would contribute $7.7 billion in revenue for the period 2012 to 2016. Increase Geological and Geophysical Amortization Period
Geological and geophysical expenses are incurred during the process of oil and natural gas resource development. Department of the Interior Budget
The Department of the Interior (DOI) budget proposal contains several changes in fees and other revenue generating items that would affect the oil and natural gas industries. Although these fees and charges would increase the cost of exploring, developing, and operating oil and natural gas facilities under DOI's management and are likely to reduce those activities as suggested by opponents of the proposals, the effects are likely to be small, as these fees represent only a fraction of a percent of the revenues, profits, or other taxes and fees paid to the government. | The Obama Administration, in the FY2012 budget proposal, seeks to eliminate certain tax expenditures that benefit the oil and natural gas industries. Supporters of these tax provisions see them as comparable to those affecting other industries and supporting the production of domestic oil and natural gas resources. Opponents of the provisions see these tax provisions as subsidies for a profitable industry the government can ill afford, and impediments to the development of clean energy alternatives.
The FY2012 budget proposal outlines a set of proposals, framed in terms of deficit reduction, or termination of tax preferences, that would potentially increase the taxes on the oil and natural gas industries, especially those of the independent producers. These proposals include repeal of the enhanced oil recovery and marginal well tax credits, repeal of the current expensing of intangible drilling costs, repeal of the deduction for tertiary injectants, repeal of the passive loss exception for working interests in oil and natural gas properties, elimination of the manufacturing tax deduction for oil and natural gas companies, increasing the amortization period for certain exploration expenses, and repeal of the percentage depletion allowance for independent oil and natural gas producers. In addition, a variety of increased inspection fees and other charges that generate more revenue for the Department of the Interior are included in the budget proposal.
The Administration estimates that the tax changes outlined in the budget proposal would provide $22.8 billion in revenues over the period 2012 to 2016, and over $43.6 billion from 2012 to 2021. These changes, if enacted by Congress, also would reduce the tax advantage enjoyed by independent oil and natural gas companies over the major oil companies. On what would likely be a small scale, the proposals also would make oil and natural gas more expensive for U.S. consumers and likely increase foreign dependence.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41934 | crs_R41934_0 | Introduction
Title I of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 ( P.L. 106-170 ) established the Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency program (hereinafter referred to as the Ticket to Work or Ticket program), which is administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA). The purpose of this program is to enhance work incentives for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneficiaries . The goal of the Ticket program is to reduce dependence on disability benefits and help Social Security disability beneficiaries enter or reenter the workforce. This report provides an overview of how the Ticket to Work program operates and addresses several issues related to the Ticket program. 1180 into law on December 17, 1999, which became P.L. Specifically, the legislation authorized (1) "tickets" or vouchers to beneficiaries to give them increased choice of rehabilitation providers and access to services needed to obtain and retain employment, (2) payments to employment service providers based on ticket holder achieving certain employment "milestones" or outcomes, (3) SSA demonstrations to test different approaches to removing barriers to employment for Title II (SSDI) beneficiaries, and (4) options for states to adopt a Medicaid "buy-in" program to allow beneficiaries to maintain health coverage after returning to work and a continuation of Medicare coverage to certain beneficiaries who are working. ENs are responsible for assisting ticket recipients with entering or re-entering the workforce. The program is currently administered by two contracted program managers (PMs) who report to SSA administrators. The program was initially available for eligible beneficiaries in 13 states and was extended to all states by September 2004. ENs have been selected to conduct vocational rehabilitation and other services for ticket holders in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The regulations indicate measures to assess beneficiaries' progress through SSA's performance of TPRs at
12 months in which the ticket holder is required to have worked 3 months above the TWP level or completed 60% of full-time college credits, 24 months in which the ticket holder is required to have worked 6 months above the TWP level or completed 75% of full-time college credits, 36 months in which the ticket holder is required to have worked 9 months at the SGA level or completed a 2-year program or an additional 1 year of full-time college credit, 48 months in which the ticket holder is required to have worked 9 months at the SGA level or completed an additional 1 year of full-time college credit, 60 months in which the ticket holder is required to have earnings for 6 months that are sufficient for a zero cash benefit or completed an additional 1 year of full-time college credit, 72 months in which the ticket holder is required to have earnings for 6 months that are sufficient for a zero cash benefit or completed a 4-year degree program, and successive 12-month periods in which the ticket holder is required to have earnings for 6 months that are sufficient for a zero cash benefit status. Other Provisions of Ticket to Work Legislation
P.L. The legislation also established two grant programs for the purpose of disseminating accurate information to beneficiaries with disabilities on work incentive programs. 106-170 also authorized SSA to award one or more cooperative agreements with qualified organizations to provide benefit planning, assistance, and outreach. These Work Incentives Planning and Assistance (WIPA) programs are community-based organizations that receive grants from SSA to provide services to Social Security disability beneficiaries with free access to long-term employment planning support. Awarded under the Protection and Advocacy for Beneficiaries of Social Security (PABSS) program, these grants are in addition to the current Developmental Disability program grants. The purpose of the grants is to provide information and advice about how to obtain vocational rehabilitation, employment, advocacy, or other services that SSDI or SSI beneficiaries may need to secure or regain gainful employment. Of the 13.6 million tickets issued, 319,972 (approximately 2.4%) have been activated (i.e., the ticket has been assigned to an EN or state VR agency). Low Participation Among Social Security Beneficiaries
The Ticket to Work program has come under increased scrutiny and criticism by policy makers for low participation rates among eligible SSDI and SSI recipients. Lack of Employment Network Oversight
GAO found that between FY2007 and July 2010, the number of ENs providing employment support services to ticket holders and SSA payments to ENs increased dramatically, likely a result of the July 2008 regulatory changes that offered additional financial incentives to ENs to participate in the Ticket program. This has possibly led to service approaches by ENs in which the Ticket to Work revenue sharing provisions have become out of line with the general goals of the Ticket program. | Title I of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-170) was signed into law on December 17, 1999, and created a Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency program, administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA). Through the Ticket to Work legislation, Congress sought to address several major work disincentives for individuals with disabilities. Ticket to Work provides a "ticket" or voucher to working-aged Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneficiaries to obtain employment and other support services. Services are furnished through the current system of state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies or a ticket holder's choice of an approved public or private sector, program-specific employment network (EN) to assist them in entering or re-entering the workforce. Additional provisions are briefly described below.
The Ticket to Work program was phased in nationally in three stages, which began in February 2002 and concluded in September 2004. By statute, SSA contracts with program managers (PMs) to administer program aspects related to ENs and ticket holders. As of December 31, 2013, SSA has 666 ENs certified to provide employment support services for ticket holders in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Of the approximately 13.6 million "active" tickets that have been issued by SSA, 319,972 (approximately 2.4%) are "in-use," that is, a disability beneficiary has assigned his or her ticket to an EN or state VR agency.
P.L. 106-170 also directed SSA to establish supplementary work incentive programs designed to reduce dependence on disability benefits and encourage workforce participation. The Work Incentives Planning and Assistance (WIPA) program was created to disseminate accurate information to Social Security disability beneficiaries on work incentive projects. SSA established cooperative agreements with community-based organizations to provide benefits planning, assistance, and outreach services to beneficiaries. In addition, SSA established the Protection and Advocacy for Beneficiaries of Social Security (PABSS) program with the aim of providing information and advice about how to obtain vocational rehabilitation, employment, advocacy, or other services that SSDI or SSI beneficiaries may need to secure or regain gainful employment.
The Ticket to Work program underwent major regulatory changes in July 2008, which, among other adjustments, increased financial incentives for ENs and expanded the eligibility criteria for Social Security disability beneficiaries to participate. The program has come under increased scrutiny by policy makers due to low SSDI and SSI beneficiary participation and lower than expected return-to-work rates among ticket holders. In addition, a May 2011 Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessment reported a lack of oversight of the program that has led to service approaches among some ENs that are out of line with the general goal of the Ticket program, which is to reduce beneficiaries' dependence on benefits through earnings from work.
Ticket to Work legislation also created state options to eliminate the dilemma faced by many beneficiaries—choosing between work and health insurance coverage—through provisions that allow for additional Medicaid eligibility options and an extension of Medicare eligibility. This report only discusses the Ticket to Work program components administered by SSA and does not address issues related to the Medicaid or Medicare programs. |
crs_R41487 | crs_R41487_0 | Reclamation's Water Reuse (Title XVI) Program
To address growing challenges in western water management, in 1992, Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to establish a federal water reclamation, recycling, and reuse program to share project costs in the West (Title XVI of P.L. Commonly referred to as Title XVI, the program is administered by the Department of the Interior's (DOI's) Bureau of Reclamation and provides funding for projects in several western states and Hawaii. Program implementation has at times been contentious, with various stakeholders having widely different views of the program and its performance. DOI has taken action in recent years to improve program implementation. At issue for Congress is the degree to which DOI actions are consistent with congressional priorities, whether legislative attention is needed to improve the program, and if so, how it should be changed. One question is whether to authorize additional Title XVI projects; several bills pending before the 111 th Congress (e.g., H.R. 2442 , H.R. Recent Congresses have also held several oversight hearings on the program, its projects, and their funding. The rate of Title XVI project authorizations has outpaced annual appropriations. The program has a $630 million "backlog" of authorized projects awaiting appropriations. The DOI has issued three documents to guide the program's implementation: (1) agency guidelines for preparing, reviewing, and processing Title XVI project proposals, (2) internal "Directives and Standards" to increase the consistency and effectiveness of the program by establishing feasibility study requirements for prospective Title XVI projects, and (3) funding criteria to prioritize project funding. 102-575 , the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Studies and Facilities Act. As shown in Figure 1 , more than two-thirds of the 53 authorized projects are located in California. This concentration reflects the early focus of the program on the Southern California and Colorado River hydrologic region in the original authorization as well as interest in the program in the California. The backlog of authorized projects in 2006 was $354 million; today it is approximately $630 million. Even with stimulus spending discussed below, the Title XVI backlog has grown with the authorization of several new projects in the 111 th Congress. ARRA funds significantly reduced the number of unfunded projects and contributed to the completion of the federal share of multiple projects; however, outstanding authorizations grew to $630 million. Some Members of Congress continue to voice concern over the program's goals and implementation, including costs. With the Administration's FY2011 budget request for a lump sum of $20 million to be allocated using proposed funding criteria, the Administration seems to be trying to accomplish administratively what some programs (e.g., EPA water quality programs) have in statute. Congress appropriates money annually for these programs; however, except for some congressionally designated projects, project funding is not regularly appropriated for each project, as it is for Reclamation and Corps projects. Should projects that have successfully completed projects without Title XVI assistance still be eligible for the authorized federal cost-share (as indicated in the proposal)? Federal Role in Reuse
A broad policy issue related to Title XVI, but not frequently discussed in recent years, is the question of the appropriate federal role in water supply development, particularly for municipal and industrial (M&I) purposes, and particularly the role of Reclamation in this regard. Because Title XVI projects are largely municipal water development projects and the most recent articulated congressional policy on these types of projects is half a century old (under the Water Supply Act of 1958), debate remains in some circles over whether, and if so how, the federal government should fund these activities. Instead, legislative activity has been limited to individual project authorizations and oversight. Or is that already happening as a function of which local governments and sponsors are seeking legislation? Reclamation's new funding criteria and other programmatic actions attempt to answer some of these questions; whether Congress agrees with Reclamation's approach and appropriates the lump sum funding for the Administration to allocate has yet to be decided. Resolution of Title XVI issues will depend on many factors, including to what degree congressional and Administration priorities for the program can be articulated and balanced. It is not clear how many projects may ultimately seek multiple sources of federal funding or already have done so. | Congress authorized the Department of the Interior (DOI) to undertake a program to provide federal financing for water reuse (i.e., planned beneficial use of treated wastewater and impaired surface and groundwater) with passage of the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Studies Feasibility Act of 1992 (Title XVI of P.L. 102-575). The Department of the Interior's implementation of the program by the Bureau of Reclamation at times has been contentious. Many Members of Congress, particularly from water-scarce western states, have supported the program and specific projects. However, with a funding backlog of more than $630 million to complete already authorized projects, several pending authorizations, and ongoing concerns about the appropriate federal role in funding Title XVI facilities, it is not clear what action the 111th Congress will take in its remaining days. Similarly, it is not clear what approach the 112th Congress will take toward the Title XVI program.
Approximately $531 million has been appropriated for Title XVI projects in the West, mostly in California. Of the 53 authorized projects, 42 have received some appropriation. From FY2009 to FY2010, the number of projects that are either complete or have exhausted their authorized federal cost-share rose from 10 to 16. However, the rate of Title XVI project authorizations has outpaced annual appropriations. For example, recent stimulus funding combined with regular appropriations resulted in fewer "unfunded" projects on the books, but the overall funding backlog has grown to approximately $630 million.
At issue for Congress in the short term is whether to authorize new projects and at what level to fund already authorized projects (e.g., H.R. 2442 and H.R. 2522). At issue for the longer term is whether legislative action and oversight is needed to address Title XVI implementation issues, and if so, how to change the program. The Department of the Interior has taken action in recent years to improve the program's implementation. To what degree these actions are consistent with congressional priorities for the program will significantly shape perspectives on whether the program warrants legislative attention in the 112th Congress. Other issues include the future of new project authorizations, given the backlog of authorized projects awaiting appropriations and competing budget priorities, and whether Congress should appropriate lump sum funding to be allocated to projects by the Administration under new funding criteria.
A challenge for Congress is that stakeholders' perspectives on how to manage and improve the program can be fundamentally different. Title XVI authorizations and appropriations have been pursued by many water utilities seeking access to federal funds, which can be leveraged to obtain additional financing. Project sponsors generally are seeking a more streamlined project development process and expanded program appropriations. The Administration appears to support a smaller, more focused program with long-term objectives tied to federal interests, as indicated by funding criteria released by the Administration in October 2010. Others fear the program will overwhelm Reclamation's budget and compete with the upkeep and new authorizations for traditional Reclamation projects.
Views on the Title XVI program and its future also vary based on perspectives on the proper federal role in water supply development, the appropriate priority for the program in the current federal and state fiscal environments, the history and mission of the program, and the urgency and need for investment and promotion of water reuse technologies. The justification for federal involvement in these projects, which expand municipal water supply, and the long-term goals and planning for the program have come under scrutiny and may be at issue in the 112th Congress. |
crs_R44308 | crs_R44308_0 | Overview
The Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP), a program of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is a national network of centers that provide custom services to small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) to improve production processes, upgrade technological capabilities, and facilitate product innovation. Reflecting these ideas, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act ( P.L. The first three centers were established in 1989. In 2010, the "overarching strategy" for the MEP program was to reduce manufacturing costs through "lean, quality, and other programs targeting plant efficiencies" and to increase profitability "through business growth services resulting in new sales, new markets, and new products." Current MEP efforts focus on innovation strategies, commercialization, lean production, process improvements, workforce training, supply chain optimization, and exporting. Statutory Mission and Activities
The statutory objective of the MEP centers is to enhance productivity and technological performanc e in U.S. manufacturing through the following:
the transfer of manufacturing technology and techniques developed at NIST to centers and, through them, to manufacturing companies throughout the United States; the participation of individual s from industry, universities, state governments, other f ederal ag encies, and, when appropriate, NIST in cooperative technology transfer activities; efforts to make new manufacturing technology and processes usable by U.S.-based small- and medium-sized companies; the active dissemination of scientific, engineering, technical, and management information about manufacturing to industrial firms, including small- and medium-sized manufacturing companies; the utilization, when appropriate, of the expertise and capability that exists in f ederal agencies and federally sponsored laboratories; the provision to community colleges and area career and technical education schools of information about the job skills needed in manufacturing companies, including small and medium-sized manufacturing businesses in the regions they serve;promoting and expanding certification systems offered through industry, associations, and local colleges when appropriate, including efforts such as facilitating training, supporting new or existing apprenticeships, and providing access to information and experts, to address workforce needs and skills gaps in order to assist small- and medium-sized manufacturing businesses; andthe growth in employment and wages at United States-based small and medium-sized companies. System-Wide Center Recompetition
In 2017, NIST completed a recompetition of all its centers. According to NIST, the system-wide competition was intended to result in center funding levels more closely reflecting the national distribution of manufacturing activity and result in a single center in each state and Puerto Rico. Other objectives included aligning center activities to the NIST MEP strategic plan; aligning center activities with state and local strategies; providing opportunities for new partnering arrangements; and restructuring and reinvigorating local center boards. The federal government may provide up to 50% of the funds required to establish and support a center regardless of the year of operation of the center. In 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations expressed concerns about the federal cost-share structure (as it existed prior to the recent system-wide competition) and directed NIST to provide a report to the committee and to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation "detailing quantifiable metrics on total MEP center funding, including a breakdown of the type of contribution source across centers that have transitioned from the 50 percent Federal, 50 percent non-Federal cost-share to a lower cost-share held by the Federal Government." On March 23, 2018, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, providing $140.0 million for MEP. President Trump has again proposed to eliminate federal funding for the MEP centers in his FY2019 budget. Both the House committee-reported bill, H.R. For FY2009, President Bush's final budget proposed to end federal funding for MEP, requesting $4 million to allow for "the orderly change of MEP centers to a self-supporting basis." President Trump proposed the elimination of federal support for the MEP centers in FY2018, requesting $6.0 million "for the orderly wind down" of the program. Congress appropriated $140.0 million for MEP for FY2018. In his FY2019 budget, President Trump proposed again to eliminate federal support for the MEP centers, requesting no funding for the program. The MEP program has, at times as it is now, been included in discussions surrounding termination of federal programs that provide direct support for industry. Proponents assert that SMMs play a central role in the U.S. economy and that the MEP system provides information and assistance not otherwise available to SMMs. Some opponents have asserted that such services are available from other sources and that MEP inappropriately shifts a portion of the costs of these services to taxpayers. In 1998, Congress lifted the prohibition on funding after the fifth year and allowed NIST MEP to provide up to one-third of center costs after their sixth year of operation indefinitely. | The Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) program is a national network of centers established by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (P.L. 100-418). MEP centers provide custom services to small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) to improve production processes, upgrade technological capabilities, and facilitate product innovation. Operating under the auspices of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the MEP system includes centers in all 50 states and Puerto Rico.
NIST provides funding to support MEP center operations, with matching funds provided by nonfederal sources (e.g., state governments, fees for services). Initially established with a goal of transferring technology developed in federal laboratories to SMMs, MEP shifted its focus in the early 1990s to responding to needs identified by SMMs, including off-the-shelf technologies and business advice. As MEP evolved, its focus shifted to reducing manufacturing costs through lean production, quality, and other programs targeting plant efficiencies and to increasing profitability through growth. Current MEP efforts focus on innovation and growth strategies, cybersecurity, commercialization, lean production, process improvements, workforce training, supply chain optimization, and exporting.
In 2017, NIST completed a system-wide revamp of MEP to better align center funding levels with the national distribution of manufacturing activity and to result in a single center in each state and Puerto Rico. Other objectives included aligning center activities to the NIST MEP strategic plan; aligning center activities with state and local strategies; providing opportunities for new partnering arrangements; and restructuring and reinvigorating the boards of local centers.
As originally conceived, the centers were intended to become self-supporting after six years. The original legislation provided for a 50% federal cost-share for the first three years of operation, followed by declining levels of federal support for the final three years; federal funding after a center's sixth year of operation was prohibited. In 1998, Congress eliminated the prohibition on federal funding after year six. In 2017, Congress authorized NIST to provide up to 50% of the capital and annual operating and maintenance funds required to establish and support a center. Previously, the federal cost-share was limited to 50% for a center's first three years of operation, 40% in year four, and one-third in fifth and subsequent years.
The MEP program has, at times, been included in discussions surrounding termination of federal programs that provide direct support for industry. Invoking the intent of the original legislation, President George W. Bush proposed in his FY2009 budget to eliminate federal funding for MEP and to provide for "the orderly change of MEP centers to a self-supporting basis." Nevertheless, Congress appropriated $110 million for the program. Proponents assert that SMMs play a central role in the U.S. economy and that the MEP system provides assistance not otherwise available to SMMs. Some opponents have asserted that such services are available from other sources and that MEP inappropriately shifts a portion of the costs of these services to taxpayers.
Continued federal support for MEP centers remains a point of contention. In his FY2018 budget, President Trump sought to eliminate federal support for MEP centers, requesting $6.0 million for the program's "orderly wind down." The House committee-reported appropriations bill included $100 million for MEP, while the Senate committee-reported bill included $130.0 million. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), provides $140.0 million for MEP for FY2018. President Trump has again proposed the elimination of MEP in his FY2019 budget.
As Congress makes appropriation decisions, it may continue to discuss support for MEP in the context of the federal government's role in bolstering innovation and competitiveness, and in the context of the appropriate federal role in such activities. |
crs_RL33199 | crs_RL33199_0 | Introduction
Personal data security breaches are being reported with increasing regularity. During the past few years, there have been numerous examples of hackers breaking into corporate, government, academic, and personal computers and compromising computer systems or stealing personal data such as Social Security, bank account, credit card, and driver's license numbers, as well as medical and student records. A California law that requires notice of security breaches to the affected individuals is the major reason for the increased awareness of these breaches. This law, which was implemented in July 2003, was the first of its kind in the nation. State security breach notification requires companies and other entities that have lost personal data to notify affected consumers. Thirty-five states have enacted legislation requiring companies or state agencies to disclose security breaches involving personal information. Congress considered legislation in the 109 th Congress to address data security following a series of high-profile data security breaches at major financial services firms and data brokers, including ChoicePoint and LexisNexis. | Personal data security breaches are being reported with increasing regularity. Within the past few years, numerous examples of data such as Social Security, bank account, credit card, and driver's license numbers, as well as medical and student records have been compromised. A major reason for the increased awareness of these security breaches is a California law that requires notice of security breaches to the affected individuals. This law, implemented in July 2003, was the first of its kind in the nation.
State data security breach notification laws require companies and other entities that have lost data to notify affected consumers. As of January 2007, 35 states have enacted legislation requiring companies or state agencies to disclose security breaches involving personal information.
Congress is considering legislation to address personal data security breaches, following a series of high-profile data security breaches at major financial services firms, data brokers (including ChoicePoint and LexisNexis), and universities. In the past three years, multiple measures have been introduced, but to date, none have been enacted.
This report will be updated regularly. |
crs_RL33637 | crs_RL33637_0 | Introduction
After the New York Times reported that the National Security Agency (NSA) was conducting a secret Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a national debate emerged about whether the program was subject to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), whether the Administration needed additional authority to continue the program, and how and whether Congress should oversee the program. The TSP involved surveillance without a warrant or court order under the FISA of international communications of persons within the United States, where one party to the communication is believed to be a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda. The Bush Administration asserted constitutional and statutory support for its program. While describing electronic surveillance under FISA as a valuable tool in combating terrorism, the Bush Administration argued that it lacked the speed and agility to deal with such terrorists or terrorist groups. In a January 17, 2007, letter to Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Gonzales advised them that, on January 10, 2007, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) judge "issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization." The Attorney General stated that, in light of these orders, which "will allow the necessary speed and agility," all surveillance previously occurring under the TSP will now be conducted subject to the approval of the FISC. He indicated further that, under these circumstances, the President has determined not to reauthorize the TSP when the current authorization expires. The NSA program has been challenged on legal and constitutional grounds. 06-CV-10204 (E.D. The decision has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On October 4, 2006, the Sixth Circuit stayed Judge Taylor's August 17, 2006, judgment and permanent injunction pending appeal, American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency , Docket Nos. One of these bills, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, H.R. 5825 , 109 th Congress, was introduced on July 18, 2006, and passed the House on September 28, 2006. The measure was designed to provide increased flexibility in authorizing electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information, while requiring increased reporting and affording Congress additional oversight over such activities. The 110 th Congress may choose to explore similar or different approaches to the issues related to the TSP, or may choose to forego legislative action in light of the new FISC orders and the anticipated termination of the TSP at the conclusion of its current authorization, while continuing congressional oversight of these issues. This report summarizes the provisions of H.R. 5825 , as passed by the House of Representatives in the 109 th Congress, and discusses the impact of its provisions, were similar legislation to be enacted, on current law. "Electronic surveillance"
Sec. | After the New York Times reported that the National Security Agency (NSA) was conducting a secret Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), a national debate emerged about whether the program was subject to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), whether the Administration needed additional authority to continue the program, and how and whether Congress should oversee the program. The TSP involved surveillance without a warrant or court order under FISA of international communications of persons within the United States, where one party to the communication is believed to be a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda. The Bush Administration asserted constitutional and statutory support for its program. While describing electronic surveillance under FISA as a valuable tool in combating terrorism, the Administration argued that it lacked the speed and agility to deal with such terrorists or terrorist groups. In a January 17, 2007, letter to Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Gonzales advised them that, on January 10, 2007, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) judge "issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization." In light of these orders, which "will allow the necessary speed and agility," he stated that all surveillance previously occurring under the TSP will now be conducted subject to the approval of the FISC. He indicated further that the President has determined not to reauthorize the TSP when the current authorization expires.
The NSA program has been challenged on legal and constitutional grounds. On August 17, 2006, in American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, Case No. 06-CV-10204 (E.D. Mich. August 17, 2006), Judge Taylor held the program unconstitutional and granted a permanent injunction of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. The decision has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On October 4, 2006, the Sixth Circuit granted a motion staying Judge Taylor's judgment and permanent injunction pending appeal.
The Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, H.R. 5825, 109th Congress, was one of a number of bills introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives addressing various aspects of the TSP and a variety of approaches to electronic surveillance of terrorists and those affiliated with them. This bill was designed to enhance flexibility in electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information, while requiring increased reporting and congressional oversight of these activities. The measure was introduced on July 18, 2006, and passed the House on September 28, 2006. This report summarizes the bill as passed by the House and analyzes the potential impact of its provisions were they to become law. The 110th Congress may wish to contemplate similar or different approaches to these issues, or may choose to forego legislation in light of the new FISC orders and the anticipated termination of the TSP, while continuing congressional oversight. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40801 | crs_R40801_0 | Most Recent Developments
The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations were provided through a consolidated budget bill ( H.R. 3288 ) that was signed into law ( P.L. 111-117 ) by President Obama on December 16, 2009. Prior to the enactment of the consolidated bill, two continuing resolutions had provided funding for FSGG programs and activities between October 1, 2009, and December 18, 2009, generally at FY2009 rates. 3170 , the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, FY2010, on July 16, 2009. The House approved $46.389 billion for FSGG programs and agencies, a 4.1% increase from FY2009 enacted appropriations. The Senate bill would have provided $46.479 billion for FSGG programs and agencies, a 4.3% increase from FY2009 enacted appropriations. Overview of FY2010 Appropriations
On May 7, 2009, the Obama Administration delivered its FY2010 budget request to Congress. The Administration requested $46.439 billion for FSGG agencies and programs, an increase of $1.857 billion (+4.2%) over FY2009 enacted appropriations. The House approved $46.389 billion for FSGG agencies, an increase of $1.807 billion (+4.1%) over FY2009 enacted appropriations, and $50 million less than the Administration requested. Key Issues
The wide scope of FSGG appropriations—which provide funding for two of the three branches of the federal government, a city government, and 26 independent agencies with a range of functions—encompasses a number of potentially controversial issues, some of which are identified below. Department of the Treasury. Is the proposed funding for enforcement, taxpayer services, and business systems modernization at the Internal Revenue Service adequate for lowering the federal tax gap? Should Congress consider proposals from the Obama Administration to combine the White House Office and the Office of Policy Development accounts, and to increase National Security Council funding and staff levels under the EOP appropriation? The Judiciary. What level of funding should Congress provide for judicial security enhancements and other administrative issues, such as hiring of additional staff to meet the demands of rising workloads due to increases in bankruptcy filings and criminal cases, and increasing the hourly rates paid to public defenders? United States Postal Service. In light of the U.S. Postal Service's financial challenges, should Congress consider removing the six-day delivery requirement that has appeared in annual appropriations laws? Executive Office of the President and Funds Appropriated to the President45
The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill provides funding for all but three offices under the Executive Office of the President (EOP) Table 4 shows appropriations enacted for FY2009, amounts requested by the President for FY2010, appropriations provided by the House in H.R. P.L. This is approximately $40 million less than recommended by the House, and $11.4 million less than requested by the Administration. 3170 , which included FY2010 appropriations for the District of Columbia. United States Postal Service (USPS)153
The U.S. On July 9, 2009, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 1432 ( S.Rept. | The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and 26 independent agencies. Among the independent agencies funded by the bill are the General Services Administration (GSA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the United States Postal Service (USPS).
On May 7, 2009, the Obama Administration delivered its FY2010 budget request to Congress. The Administration requested $46.439 billion for FSGG agencies and programs, a 4.2% increase from FY2009 enacted appropriations, excluding emergency and supplemental appropriations. On July 16, 2009, the House passed H.R. 3170, the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, FY2010. The House bill would provide $46.389 billion for FSGG programs and agencies, a 4.1% increase from FY2009 enacted appropriations and $50 million less than the Administration requested. On July 9, 2009, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 1432, which would provide $46.479 billion for FSGG programs and agencies. This represents a 4.3% increase from FY2009 enacted appropriations and $40 million more than the Administration requested. No further action has been taken on S. 1432. A continuing resolution (CR) went into effect October 1, 2009, which generally provided funding for FSGG programs and activities at FY2009 levels through October 31, 2009. P.L. 111-88, enacted October 30, 2009, extended funding under the CR through December 18, 2009. FSGG appropriations were ultimately provided through a consolidated budget bill (H.R. 3288) that was signed into law (P.L. 111-117) by President Obama on December 16, 2009. FSGG agencies were provided $46.435 billion in enacted appropriations for FY2010, which is $4 million less than the Administration requested.
The wide scope of FSGG appropriations—which provide funding for two of the three branches of the federal government, a city government, and 26 independent agencies with a range of functions—encompasses a number of potentially controversial issues, some of which are identified below.
Department of the Treasury. Is the proposed funding for enforcement, taxpayer services, and business systems modernization at the Internal Revenue Service adequate for lowering the federal tax gap? Executive Office of the President (EOP). Should Congress consider proposals from the Obama Administration to combine the White House Office and the Office of Policy Development accounts, and to increase National Security Council funding and staff levels under the EOP appropriation? The Judiciary. What level of funding should Congress provide for judicial security enhancements and other administrative issues, such as hiring of additional staff to meet the demands of rising workloads due to increases in bankruptcy filings and criminal cases, and increasing the hourly rates paid to public defenders? United States Postal Service. In light of the U.S. Postal Service's financial challenges, should Congress consider removing the six-day delivery requirement that has appeared in annual appropriations laws? |
crs_RS21618 | crs_RS21618_0 | In addition, Nice did little to stem charges that EU institutions and decision-making lack transparency and democratic accountability and are unintelligible to the average European citizen. The Constitutional Treaty
The Lisbon Treaty grew out of the so-called constitutional treaty, an earlier failed attempt to merge the EU's existing treaties into a single document while enacting institutional reforms. Already in December 2001—before ratification of the Treaty of Nice and the EU's eastward enlargement—EU leaders announced they would convene a Convention on the Future of Europe to examine the EU's institutional arrangements and make proposals that would increase democratic legitimacy and encourage the development of the EU as a stronger global actor. In May 2005, French voters rejected the document in a national referendum, and in June 2005 Dutch voters followed suit. The Czech Republic completed the final national ratification on November 3, allowing the treaty to come into effect on December 1, 2009. The Lisbon Treaty creates the new position of President of the European Council to chair the meetings of the 27 EU heads of state or government. In choosing former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy, however, EU leaders have initially defined this position as more of a manager who will coordinate the activities of the Council, help ensure policy continuity, and work to facilitate consensus. The Lisbon Treaty also creates another important new position to boost the EU's international visibility: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The High Representative is to have extensive staff support with the creation of a European External Action Service, in effect a new EU diplomatic corps. After some EU officials unsuccessfully attempted to promote former UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband for the position, EU leaders ultimately agreed on Baroness Catherine Ashton (also of the United Kingdom), formerly European Commissioner for Trade. The treaty also gives national parliaments a greater role in EU policy-making and more authority to challenge draft EU legislation. Implications for the United States
Many experts assert that the Lisbon Treaty could have positive implications for U.S.-EU relations. These two new positions, and related changes to take effect on December 1 as a result of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, will strengthen the EU and enable it to be an even stronger partner to the United States." If the EU is able to increasingly "speak with one voice" on global issues—a stronger, more consistent, and more coherent voice—proponents of close U.S.-EU ties argue that the EU could take a more active and assertive international role and be a more credible and effective partner for the United States in tackling common challenges. Analysts assert that the treaty could remove some obstacles to further EU enlargement to the Balkans and perhaps eventually Turkey, which the United States supports. This change reflects the fact that the overall institutional power and responsibilities of the European Parliament have been substantially increased by the Lisbon Treaty. | The Lisbon Treaty, the latest institutional reform treaty of the European Union (EU), went into effect on December 1, 2009. The document was signed by the heads of state or government of the 27 EU member countries in December 2007. The process of completing ratification by each individual member country lasted nearly two years, concluding with ratification by the Czech Republic on November 3, 2009. The Lisbon Treaty reforms the EU's governing institutions and decision-making process to enable the EU to operate more effectively. The treaty grew out of the proposed "constitutional treaty" that foundered after French and Dutch voters rejected it in referendums in 2005.
The Lisbon Treaty seeks to give the EU a stronger and more coherent voice with the creation of a new position, President of the European Council. The first holder of this office is former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy. He chairs the activities of the 27 EU heads of state or government, working to facilitate consensus and ensure policy continuity, and acting as the group's spokesman. Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty seeks to increase the weight and visibility of the EU on the world stage by creating the new position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Catherine Ashton (from the United Kingdom), formerly European Commissioner for Trade, serves in this position. She will be supported by a newly created EU diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service.
The treaty also makes changes to the EU's internal decision-making mechanisms. These changes have been designed to streamline the process and make it less susceptible to gridlock or blockage. Additional reforms attempt to address concerns about democratic accountability and transparency in EU policy-making by granting a greater role to the directly elected European Parliament, national parliaments, and citizens' initiatives.
Experts assert that the Lisbon Treaty could have positive implications for U.S.-EU relations. Some observers believe that it could eventually allow the EU to take on a more active and effective role as a U.S. partner in tackling global challenges. The adoption of the treaty could also help make the EU more amenable to future enlargement, including to the Balkans and perhaps Turkey, which the United States supports. On the other hand, some observers doubt how much of an impact the Lisbon Treaty will have, and some skeptics maintain that a stronger EU poses a potentially detrimental rival to NATO and the United States.
This report provides information on the Lisbon Treaty and possible U.S.-EU implications that may be of interest to the 112th Congress. Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32514 | crs_RL32514_0 | The constitutional standard by which laws that burden free exercise are measured has evolved over the last half-century through U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court stated, "there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability." In Employment Division v. Smith , the Court abandoned the requirement that laws burdening religious exercise have a compelling governmental interest with respect to neutral statutes. Congress responded to the Smith decision by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA; P.L. 103-141 ) of 1993. RFRA statutorily reinstated the strict scrutiny standard in all circumstances where government actions burdened religious exercise. RFRA provided that the government could substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if the burden (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. As originally enacted, RFRA applied the strict scrutiny standard for governmental action at the federal, state, and local levels. Congress justified applying strict scrutiny to the states as an exercise of power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants "Congress the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article [guaranteeing individuals equal protection and due process of law]." In City of Boerne, Texas v. Flores , the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as it applied to states and localities because the statute exceeded Congress's remedial powers to enforce rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the wake of Boerne , Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA; P.L. 106-274 ). The protections of RLUIPA apply only where states or localities place a substantial burden on religious exercise as a result of a land use regulation, or on the religious exercise of institutionalized persons. Thus, to avoid the broad exercise of power invalidated by Boerne , Congress specifically delineated the narrow application of the RLUIPA protections in order to ground the statute in Congress's powers under the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment. In part, Congress enacted RLUIPA to address challenges to zoning ordinances based on religious exercises. Several appellate courts, however, have upheld the land use provisions of RLUIPA in the face of these challenges, holding that the statute is a legitimate use of power under the Commerce Clause or section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and does not violate either the Establishment Clause or the Tenth Amendment. According to the Second Circuit, RLUIPA does not advance religion simply by removing barriers to an individual's constitutionally protected right to freely exercise his religious beliefs. The Court noted that nothing in RLUIPA compels the states to prohibit or require particular acts. | The constitutional standard by which laws that burden an individual's First Amendment right to exercise his religion are measured has evolved over the last half-century through U.S. Supreme Court decisions and legislative action by Congress in response to those decisions. After decades of requiring that laws burdening the free exercise of religion be subject to heightened judicial review, the Court reinterpreted that constitutional standard in the 1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith, deciding that the First Amendment provided narrower protection than the Court had previously recognized. In Smith, the Court held that the strict scrutiny standard of review, which required a compelling governmental interest achieved by the least restrictive means, did not apply to neutral laws that applied to society generally. Under Smith, heightened review (sometimes referred to as strict scrutiny) applies only to cases that involve religious claims for exemption in programs that allow for individualized assessments, cases that involve deliberate governmental targeting of religion, or cases in which a Free Exercise claim is joined with another constitutional claim.
A constitutional standard is a baseline of protection, but Congress may raise that standard to provide heightened protection by statute. After Smith narrowed the protections provided under the Constitution, Congress sought to reinstate the heightened standard of review statutorily. Congress enacted legislation that created a statutory standard of review that would apply, first through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA; P.L. 103-141), which applied heightened judicial review to all federal, state, and local government actions. In the 1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court struck down as unconstitutional portions of RFRA that applied to state and local government actions. Congress responded later through the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA; P.L. 106-274), which applies heightened review to state and local government actions in limited types of cases.
The heightened standard of review provided by RLUIPA applies to state and local government actions that (1) restrict religious exercise through zoning laws, or (2) restrict the religious exercise of institutionalized persons. In order to avoid federal interference with state governments, which had proved fatal to portions of RFRA, Congress further limited the application of heightened review provided by RLUIPA to certain instances within these two categories of state and local action. The heightened standard of review under RLUIPA therefore applies only in (1) instances in which Congress exercises power under the Spending Clause, Commerce Clause, or section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) instances in land use cases in which decisions are made based on a case-by-case assessment of particular properties.
Since its enactment in 2000, RLUIPA has been challenged several times in federal court. Most courts have upheld RLUIPA as constitutional under the Spending Clause, Commerce Clause, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Establishment Clause. This report provides background on RFRA and discusses the provisions of RLUIPA and its related case law. |
crs_R41824 | crs_R41824_0 | Over the past year, several state legislatures have proposed measures that would restrict the consideration of religious law in domestic courts. In November 2010, voters in Oklahoma definitively approved a state constitutional amendment that would prohibit the use or application of Islamic law (sharia) in state courts, which led to a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the amendment under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This report will discuss various legal issues related to the role of religious law in U.S. courts. Finally, the report explains the role that foreign law generally may have within the U.S. legal system and potential unintended consequences that may arise from restrictions on the consideration of religious and foreign laws. Potential limitations on particular religious beliefs may run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause if they impose restrictions on the ability of individuals to practice their religious faith. Establishment of Religion
The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from taking actions that would benefit one religion or religion generally. The Court noted its long-standing principle in Establishment Clause cases "that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion...." However, the Court explained that Establishment Clause jurisprudence typically involved cases that allegedly benefited some religion and that challenges to laws that allegedly disfavor religion are more appropriately addressed by the Free Exercise Clause, as a government action that infringes upon the exercise of the targeted religion. Others propose broader bans on religious law or foreign law generally. Consideration of foreign and international law by domestic courts has been a controversial matter for various reasons in recent years. Constitutional Amendment Banning Sharia and Reference to Other State Laws That Apply Sharia (Wyoming)
In January 2011, Wyoming proposed an amendment to its state constitution that would bar courts from considering international law, sharia law, or the laws of other states if those states' laws include sharia law:
When exercising their judicial authority the courts of this state shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the constitution of the United States, the Wyoming constitution, the United States Code and federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, laws of this state, established common law as specified by legislative enactment, and if necessary the law of another state of the United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia law. | Controversy has surrounded attempts by several state legislatures to limit the consideration of Islamic religious law (commonly referred to as sharia) or religious law generally, in domestic courts. In one of the most publicized examples, Oklahoma voters definitively approved a state constitutional amendment that prohibited state courts from considering "sharia law," but the amendment has not taken effect pending the outcome of a lawsuit challenging its constitutionality. Other states have introduced variations of this limitation, with some generally prohibiting the use of religious principles in domestic courts.
Critics have questioned the constitutionality of several recently proposed or enacted measures under the religion clauses of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from establishing an official religion or showing preference among religions or between religion and non-religion. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from burdening an individual's ability to exercise his or her religious beliefs if the burden does not arise from neutral law of general applicability but instead infringes upon a particular set of beliefs. Any bill that would specifically ban sharia may be challenged as a disapproval of Islam in violation of the Establishment Clause or as an infringement on the ability of Muslims to freely exercise their beliefs under the Free Exercise Clause. Broader proposals that address religion generally would not necessarily comport with the First Amendment either, however.
This report discusses proposals to limit the consideration by domestic courts of religious principles in general, and Islamic law in particular. It explains the role that religious law and beliefs may play in U.S. courts and analyzes the constitutional protections for religion in the First Amendment. Finally, the report also addresses the role of foreign and international law generally in U.S. courts and potential unintended consequences of restrictions on the consideration of religious or foreign law. |
crs_R42011 | crs_R42011_0 | Department of Education Rules on Gainful Employment
Since the enactment of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329), participation in the federal student aid programs authorized under Title IV of the HEA has been available for certain educational programs on the condition that the programs prepare students for gainful employment in recognized occupations. For many years, however, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) had not promulgated regulations that explicitly defined what it means for a program to be preparing students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation. In 2010, ED initiated an effort to develop new regulations on gainful employment to address concerns about the quality of programs that prepare students for gainful employment and concerns about the level of student loan debt assumed by students who attend these programs. Essentially, the proposed rules called for the establishment of a series of reporting and disclosure requirements and a set of performance metrics designed to measure how effectively program attendees repay the student loans they borrow to attend these programs, and the relationship between the debt of program completers and their earnings. The proposal of new rules on gainful employment was very contentious. Overall, ED received more than 90,000 comments on the proposed rules, with approximately three-quarters opposed to the rules and one-quarter in support. Many were concerned that the new rules would increase the regulatory burden and potential adverse effects from programs losing eligibility to participate in HEA, Title IV federal student aid programs. Others supported the regulation of gainful employment programs, particularly with regard to the student loan debt of students who attend them. The final rules establish three performance measures for gainful employment programs. A loan repayment rate (LRR) is designed to measure how effectively students who are borrowers of federal student loans made under the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program or the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program and who attended a gainful employment program repay the loans they borrowed to attend the program. Two debt-to-earnings measures—an earnings rate (ER) and a discretionary income rate (DIR)—are designed to measure the proportion of students who complete a gainful employment program whose combined federal and non-federal student loan debt exceeds certain percentage thresholds of their earnings. Litigation
In early 2012, the Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities (APSCU) brought suit against ED challenging the gainful employment regulations; and on June 30, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a decision that vacated many aspects of the regulations and remanded them to ED for further action. Table 1 shows how the gainful employment regulations apply to the various categories of programs offered by public and private not-for-profit institutions of higher education, proprietary institutions of higher education, and public and private not-for-profit postsecondary vocational institutions. Ineligible Programs
A program would have been identified by ED as ineligible to participate in the HEA, Title IV federal student aid programs if it failed to meet all three of the performance measures for any three out of the most recently completed four fiscal years. | Some types of postsecondary education programs at institutions of higher education that are eligible for participation in the federal student aid programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA), face additional conditions for Title IV aid eligibility. These programs, which are offered by public and private not-for-profit institutions of higher education and postsecondary vocational institutions, and by for-profit proprietary institutions of higher education, must prepare students for gainful employment in recognized occupations.
For many years, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) had not promulgated regulations that explicitly defined what it means for a program to be preparing students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation. To address concerns about the quality of programs that prepare students for gainful employment and concerns about the level of student loan debt assumed by students who attend these programs, ED issued new rules on gainful employment in late 2010 and early 2011.
The final rules established a series of reporting and disclosure requirements for institutions of higher education that offer gainful employment programs and additional requirements for institutions that add new gainful employment programs. The rules also established a series of three performance metrics designed to measure how effectively completers of gainful employment programs repay the student loans they borrow to attend these programs, and the relationship between their student loan debt and their earnings. One metric, a loan repayment rate, was designed to measure how effectively students who are borrowers of federal student loans and who attended a gainful employment program repay the loans they borrowed to attend the program. Two additional metrics—an earnings rate and a discretionary income rate—are debt-to-earnings measures and were designed to measure the proportion of students who complete a gainful employment program whose combined federal and non-federal student loan debt exceeds certain percentage thresholds of their earnings. A program failing to pass at least one of the three performance metrics for any three out of the most recently completed four fiscal years would lose eligibility to participate in HEA, Title IV programs.
The Department of Education's efforts to establish new rules on gainful employment were very contentious. When ED published proposed rules in the summer of 2010, it received an unprecedented volume of comments. Overall, ED received more than 90,000 comments, with approximately three-quarters opposed to the rules and one-quarter in support. Many were concerned that the new rules would increase regulatory burden and potential adverse effects from programs losing eligibility to participate in HEA, Title IV federal student aid programs. Others supported the regulation of gainful employment programs, particularly with regard to the student loan debt of students who attend them.
Prior to the effective date of the gainful employment regulations, they were challenged in court by the Association of Private Sector Colleges and Universities. On June 30, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a decision that vacated most aspects of the regulations and remanded them to ED for further action. At present, only the disclosure requirements remain in effect. |
crs_R41045 | crs_R41045_0 | Supreme Court Ruling
Summary
In a 5-to-4 ruling, the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC invalidated two provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b. It struck down the long-standing prohibition on corporations using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures, and Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which amended FECA, prohibiting corporations from using their general treasury funds for "electioneering communications." The Court determined that these prohibitions constitute a "ban on speech" in violation of the First Amendment. In so doing, the Court overruled its earlier holding in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, finding that it provided no basis for allowing the government to limit corporate independent expenditures; and the portion of its decision in McConnell v. FEC upholding the facial validity of Section 203 of BCRA, finding that the McConnell Court relied on Austin. The Court, however, upheld the disclaimer and disclosure requirements in Sections 201 and 311 of BCRA as applied to the movie that Citizens United produced and the broadcast advertisements it planned to run promoting the movie. According to the Court, while they may burden the ability to speak, disclaimer and disclosure requirements "impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities." As a result of the Court's ruling, it appears that federal campaign finance law does not restrict corporate and, most likely, labor union use of their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for any communication expressly advocating election or defeat of a candidate, including broadcast and cablecast communications made immediately prior to an election. Corporations and unions may still establish PACs, but are only required to use PAC funds in order to make contributions to candidates, parties, and other political committees. | In a 5-to-4 ruling, the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC invalidated two provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b. It struck down the long-standing prohibition on corporations using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures, and Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which amended FECA, prohibiting corporations and labor unions from using general treasury funds for "electioneering communications." The Court determined that these restrictions constitute a "ban on speech" in violation of the First Amendment. In so doing, the Court overruled its earlier holdings in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, finding that it provided no basis for allowing the government to limit corporate independent expenditures. The Court also overruled the portion of its decision in McConnell v. FEC upholding the facial validity of Section 203, finding that the McConnell Court relied on Austin. The Court, however, upheld the disclaimer and disclosure requirements in Sections 201 and 311 of BCRA as applied to the movie that Citizens United produced and the advertisements it planned to run promoting the movie. According to the Court, while they may burden the ability to speak, disclaimer and disclosure requirements "impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities."
As a result of the Court's ruling, it appears that federal campaign finance law does not limit corporate and, most likely, labor union use of their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for any communication expressly advocating election or defeat of a candidate, including broadcast and cablecast communications made immediately prior to an election. Corporations and unions may still establish PACs, but are only required to use PAC funds in order to make contributions to candidates, parties, and other political committees. |
crs_R42999 | crs_R42999_0 | At the same time, U.S. policy makers—particularly some Members of Congress—have expressed concern with UNESCO's apparent politicization, lack of budget discipline, and perceived leanings toward anti-democratic countries. Since the United States rejoined the organization in 2003, Congress has demonstrated support for UNESCO—appropriating about $618.6 million in regular budget contributions and $9.5 million in voluntary contributions from FY2004 through FY2011. As a result of this decision, the United States withheld its contributions to UNESCO in accordance with two laws enacted in the 1990s that prohibit funding to U.N. entities that admit the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a member ( P.L. 103-236 ). From FY2012 through FY2014, the United States withheld nearly $80 million per year, or 22% of the UNESCO annual regular budget. The Obama Administration actively opposes Palestinian membership in UNESCO. Organization and Structure
UNESCO programs and activities encompass five sectors—education, natural sciences, social and human sciences, culture, and communication and information. More than 2,000 personnel from 170 countries work for UNESCO; approximately 850 staff work in the organization's 65 field offices and institutes worldwide. UNESCO's relationships with other organizations are strengthened by National Commissions established by member governments in their respective countries. Funding and Budget
UNESCO activities are funded through a combination of assessed contributions by member states to the regular budget; voluntary contributions by member states, organizations, and others to special programs; and funds provided by partners such as other U.N. entities, NGOs, and the private sector. Effectiveness and Reform
Many U.S. policy makers generally support UNESCO's aim of promoting international collaboration in the fields of education, science, and communication. Organizational Culture and Priorities
Some experts contend that UNESCO's organizational structure and culture hinder its ability to fulfill its objectives. Recent Reform Activities
Over the years, UNESCO member states have sought to improve the organization's effectiveness through a range of reform efforts. Many observers, including some in the United States, agree that UNESCO has successfully implemented various reforms, particularly during the time between the United States' decision to withdraw from the organization in 1984 and its return in 2003. The full impact of these recent reform efforts is still unclear. Their overall success—and the success of any future reform efforts—will largely depend on how effectively both UNESCO and its member countries follow through on implementation. At the same time, U.S. policy makers, including some Members of Congress, have been critical of the organization, leading to the United States' nearly 20-year withdrawal in 1984, followed by its subsequent decision to rejoin in 2003. As previously mentioned, two provisions in U.S. law prohibit funding to U.N. entities that admit the PLO as a member or grant full membership as a state to any organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood:
Section 410 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 ( P.L. Obama Administration officials stated that the GC's decision was "regrettable and premature," and emphasized that the United States "remains steadfast in its support for the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state.... [S]uch a state can only be realized through direct negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians." In November 2013, the United States lost its vote in the UNESCO General Conference (GC) under Article IV of the organization's constitution. They recognized the organization as a "critical partner," and noted that the United States intends to "continue its engagement with UNESCO in every possible way." Priorities
An area of ongoing concern among some U.S. policy makers is the impact that the U.S. withholding and loss of voting rights in the GC may have on U.S. influence within UNESCO. Some also worry that the financial withholding has negatively impacted activities that the United States views as priorities—including Holocaust education programs, tsunami early warning systems, educational programs for women and girls, World Heritage sites (see text box on next page), and various training and literacy programs in the Middle East. Impact of Withholding on UNESCO Programs and Activities
U.S. and international policy makers generally agree that the U.S. withholding has negatively affected the scope and effectiveness of UNESCO's programs and activities. There are disagreements, however, regarding the extent of this impact. Ultimately, the long-term impact of the U.S. withholding on UNESCO activities remains to be seen, and may depend on
the fiscal or organizational actions, if any, UNESCO continues to take in response to the sudden funding decrease (for example, further adjustments to the organization's budget and programming in both the short and long-term by the Executive Board, GC, and/or DG); the extent to which UNESCO can continue to solicit extrabudgetary contributions from other countries, other international organizations, or the private sector, to cover any budget shortfalls; or when, if at all, the United States resumes financial contributions to UNESCO (for example, if the United States withholds UNESCO funding for 4 years, the impact would be far less than if it were to withhold contributions for 10 years). Effectiveness of Funding Restrictions
The U.S. financial withholding from UNESCO has raised broader issues about the effectiveness of the legislative restrictions that prohibit U.S. contributions to U.N. entities that admit Palestine as a member. They argue that if the United States were to modify the legislative restrictions to allow for UNESCO funding, it would undermine U.S. credibility and provide a "green light" for Palestine to apply for membership in entities across the U.N. system. Role of UNESCO in U.S. Foreign Policy
The role of UNESCO, and multilateralism as a whole, in U.S. foreign policy is one of the underlying issues facing policy makers as they consider U.S. funding of and participation in the organization. In addition to concerns regarding Palestinian membership, some critics of UNESCO maintain that its activities do not reflect U.S. foreign policy interests. Supporters of UNESCO maintain that the organization plays a key role in global issues that the United States views as strategic priorities, particularly education, science, cultural heritage, and media freedom. A key obstacle is governments' differing perspectives on UNESCO's role in the global multilateral framework. Each country has its own foreign policy priorities, political agenda, and perceptions of how the organization should work. Such differences sometimes lead to fundamental disagreements on budgeting, programming, and, as most recently demonstrated, membership. | Recent international events have renewed congressional interest in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO is a specialized agency of the U.N. system that promotes collaboration among its member countries in the fields of education, natural sciences, social and human sciences, culture, and communications and information. With an annual budget of approximately $326 million, it supports nearly 2,000 staff members working at its headquarters in Paris and 65 field offices and institutes worldwide. UNESCO activities are funded through a combination of assessed contributions by member states to its regular budget, and voluntary contributions by member states and organizations.
U.S. Policy
The United States is a member of UNESCO and generally supports the organization's objectives. Over the years, however, some U.S. policy makers—particularly some Members of Congress—have expressed strong concern with UNESCO's politicization and, as some have alleged, lack of budget discipline and anti-democratic leanings. These concerns led to the United States' decision to withdraw from UNESCO in 1984. Since the United States rejoined the organization in 2003, Congress has demonstrated support for UNESCO—appropriating between $73 million and $84 million in assessed contributions per fiscal year, or about 22% of UNESCO's annual regular budget. It has maintained an ongoing interest in ensuring that UNESCO runs as efficiently and effectively as possible, and that its policies and programs are in line with U.S. priorities.
Palestinian Membership: U.S. Financial Withholding, FY2012–FY2014
Since late 2011, UNESCO has received significant U.S. and international attention resulting from member states' decision to admit "Palestine" as a member. The Obama Administration and many Members of Congress vehemently opposed this action, maintaining that Palestinian statehood can only be realized through direct negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians rather than through membership in U.N. entities. Subsequently, the United States withheld approximately $80 million in FY2012 through FY2014 funding to UNESCO. Two laws enacted in the 1990s prohibit funding to U.N. entities that admit the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) as a member (P.L. 101-246), or grant full membership as a state to any organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood (P.L. 103-236). The Obama Administration asked Congress to enact legislation to waive the aforementioned restrictions.
In November 2013, as a result of the financial withholding, the United States lost its vote in the UNESCO General Conference (GC), the organization's main decision-making body. The Obama Administration has emphasized that the United States remains a member of the organization and that it intends to "continue its engagement with UNESCO in every possible way."
Reform
Since UNESCO's establishment, member states have sought to improve the organization's effectiveness through reform. Many observers, including the United States, agree that UNESCO has successfully implemented various reforms, particularly during the time between the United States' decision to withdraw from the organization in 1984 and its return in 2003. At the same time, many experts argue that the organization needs additional reform. Weaknesses in UNESCO's structure and culture, they contend, hinder its ability to fulfill its mission.
A 2010 Independent External Evaluation report commissioned by member states recommends changing some of UNESCO's management processes, enhancing UNESCO's field presence, and strengthening the organization's governance mechanisms. Ultimately, the full impact of these and other reform efforts is unclear. Their success—and the success of any future reforms—will likely depend on how effectively both UNESCO and its members follow through on implementation.
Issues for the 113th Congress
The recent controversy over Palestinian membership and loss of the United States' vote in the General Conference—coupled with broad concerns about spending levels in light of the recent economic downturn—have prompted some policy makers and observers to review the U.S. relationship with UNESCO. Examples of issues being considered are described below.
Effect on U.S. priorities. Some experts and policy makers worry that the U.S. financial withholding and loss of voting rights in the GC have negatively impacted programs and activities that the United States views as priorities—including U.S. World Heritage sites, Holocaust education programs, tsunami early warning systems, and educational programs for women and girls. The impact of the U.S. financial withholding on UNESCO's activities. Many experts agree that the U.S. withholding has adversely affected the scope and effectiveness of UNESCO's programs. There are disagreements, however, regarding the extent of this impact. The long-term implications of the withholding remain to be seen and are largely dependent on how long the United States withholds funds and what fiscal actions, if any, UNESCO continues to take in response to the funding decrease. The effectiveness of the U.S. withholding. Some policy makers argue that the legislative restrictions prompting the U.S. withholding are no longer relevant or effective and should be waived. Others, however, contend that waiving the legislation would undermine U.S. credibility and provide a "green light" for Palestine to apply for membership in entities across the U.N. system. UNESCO's role in U.S. foreign policy. Some critics of UNESCO maintain that its activities do not reflect U.S. foreign policy interests. Supporters contend that the organization plays a key role in global issues that the United States views as strategic priorities, particularly education and science. Challenges to UNESCO reform. A significant obstacle to UNESCO reform is governments' differing views on the organization's role in the global multilateral framework. Moreover, each UNESCO member state has its own foreign policy priorities, political agenda, and perceptions of how the organization should work. These differences can lead to disagreements on budgeting, programming and, as most recently demonstrated, membership.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22578 | crs_RS22578_0 | In health insurance, beneficiaries may face two types of out-of-pocket payments: (1) participation-related cost-sharing, typically in the form of monthly premiums, regardless of whether services are utilized, and (2) service-related cost-sharing, which consists of payments made directly to providers at the time of service delivery. Finally, some groups covered by Medicaid through certain waivers can be charged premiums that exceed nominal amounts. For persons with income above 150% FPL, DRA places no limits on the amount of premiums that may be charged. Under the DRA option, certain groups and services are also exempt from the service-related cost-sharing provisions. Consequences for Failure to Pay Cost-Sharing
The rules governing consequences for failure to pay premiums differ somewhat under traditional Medicaid and DRA. States can apply this DRA provision to some or all applicable groups. P.L. Comparison of Service-Related Cost-Sharing Rules—Traditional Medicaid, DRA Options, and SCHIP | Under traditional Medicaid, states may require certain beneficiaries to share in the cost of Medicaid services, although there are limits on the amounts that states can impose, the beneficiary groups that can be required to pay, and the services for which cost-sharing can be charged. Prior to DRA, changes to these rules required a waiver. DRA provides states with new options for benefit packages and cost-sharing that may be implemented through Medicaid state plan amendments (SPAs) rather than waiver authority. These rules vary by beneficiary income level and for some types of service. The recently enacted P.L. 109-432 (Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006) modified the DRA cost-sharing rules. This report describes the new cost-sharing options and recent state actions to implement these provisions, and will be updated as additional activity warrants. |
crs_RL33479 | crs_RL33479_0 | Cyclone Relief Controversy
Estimates of the death toll of Cyclone Nargis on May 2-3, 2008, were 135,000 as of early June 2008. The SPDC imposed special restrictions against the United States, France, and other Western countries that had long imposed sanctions on the SPDC over human rights issues. It announced on May 15 that the voters had approved the constitution by 92.5%. Khin Nyunt had been the arm of the SPDC in dealing with foreign governments, including the United States and Burma's partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The second factor is the ability of Burma to expand exports of a variety of commodities to countries of Asia and beyond. Burma earned an estimated $1 billion in exports of natural gas in 2004 and 2005, and earnings could grow substantially in the future from new natural gas explorations and production. China and India have signed deals with the SPDC, which would make them primary customers for this gas and future discoveries of gas. Burma reportedly earns between $1 billion and $2 billion annually from exports of the illegal drugs, heroin and methamphetamines. Most of these earnings, predominately foreign exchange, go to drug traffickers who produce and ship the drugs across Burma's borders. However, Burmese military officials at various levels have a number of means to gain a substantial share of these earnings. The fourth and probably biggest factor is Chinese economic and military aid to Burma. China fulfilled that apparent pledge when it vetoed the U.S. resolution in the U.N. Security Council in January 2007 and blocked the U.S.-EU initiative in the Security Council in September 2007. China's growing role also is cited by Indian officials as a prime justification for India's "constructive engagement" policy toward Burma. In April 2006, they reestablished diplomatic relations. U.S. Policy
Since 1988, the United States has imposed a wide range of sanctions against Burma. The main sanctions currently are: a suspension of aid, including anti-narcotics aid; opposition to new loans to Burma by the international financial institutions; an executive order by President Clinton on May 20, 1997, prohibiting U.S. private companies from making new investments in Burma; and congressional passage of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act ( P.L. 108 - 61 ) banning imports from Burma into the United States, affecting mainly imports of Burmese textiles, and banning travel to the United States by Burmese connected to the SPDC and U.S. financial transactions with individuals and entities connected to the Burmese government. In the aftermath of the September 2007 uprising, the Bush Administration does not appear interested further meetings. In the past, the Administration has indicated that it would use sanctions to initiate a kind of "road map" process with the SPDC in which the Administration would respond to a positive measure by the SPDC by selectively lifting an individual sanction with the prospect of additional lifting of sanctions in response to additional positive measures by the SPDC. | On May 2-3, 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit the Irrawaddy delta and the Rangoon area of Burma. Estimates of the number of people who died was 135,000 as of early June 2008. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their homes and sources of livelihood. Foreign governments and relief organizations sought to bring in massive aid, but the Burmese government (SPDC) restricted the volume of goods that came in and access of disaster experts and relief workers to the affected areas. In the meantime, the SPDC proceeded to hold a referendum on a new constitution in areas not affected by the cyclone. It announced on May 15 that voters approved the constitution by 92.4%.
Many observers assessed the referendum process as not being free and open. This appeared in line with the SPDC's reported poor human rights record since 1990, including the suppression of anti-regime protests in September 2007.
The SPDC appears unaffected by sanctions imposed by the United States and other Western nations. Western sanctions are uneven with U.S. sanctions being the heaviest. Burma has been able to expand exports of a variety of commodities, including growing earnings from natural gas production. China and India have signed deals with the SPDC for substantial purchases of natural gas. Burma also reportedly earns between $1 billion and $2 billion annually from exports of illegal drugs, heroin and methamphetamines. Most of these earnings go to drug traffickers connected to the Wa and Shan ethnic groups, but Burmese military officials have means to gain a substantial share of these earnings. Burma's fellow members in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have grown more critical of the SPDC, but they continue to oppose sanctions. Chinese diplomatic support of the SPDC and military and economic aid is very important: $2 billion in military aid since the early 1990s, $200 million annually in economic aid, substantial foreign investment including new investment in natural gas, and a huge influx of Chinese migrants into Burma, mainly traders. China's role is a prime justification for India's "constructive engagement" policy toward Burma, although India suspended arms sales after the September 2007 uprising. Burma has reestablished diplomatic relations with North Korea amidst reports of growing military cooperation between them.
Since 1988, the United States has imposed sanctions against Burma, including congressional passage in 2003 of the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act (P.L. 108-61) banning imports from Burma (renewed by Congress in 2006). The Bush Administration proposed that the U.N. Security Council consider the Burma situation and introduced a resolution in the Council in December 2006. China and Russia vetoed the resolution in January 2007 and blocked a U.S. attempt to secure Security Council consideration of sanctions in September 2007. Since then, the Administration issued several executive orders prohibiting U.S. financial dealings and imposing a travel ban on named Burmese individuals and companies connected to the SPDC. |
crs_98-670 | crs_98-670_0 | Child Pornography: Recent Developments
In 1994, Congress amended the child pornography statute to provide that "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person" "is not limited to nude exhibitions or exhibitions in which the outlines of those areas were discernible through clothing." This rationale, the Court found, "turns the First Amendment upside down. Indecent material is protected by the First Amendment unless it constitutes obscenity or child pornography. Except on broadcast radio and television, indecent material that is protected by the First Amendment may be restricted by the government only "to promote a compelling interest" and only by "the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest." 106-554 (2000)
CIPA restricts access to obscenity, child pornography, and material that is "harmful to minors," and so is discussed here separately. | The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." The First Amendment applies to pornography, in general. Pornography, here, is used to refer to any words or pictures of a sexual nature. There are two types of pornography to which the First Amendment does not apply, however. They are obscenity and child pornography. Because these are not protected by the First Amendment, they may be, and have been, made illegal. Pornography and "indecent" material that are protected by the First Amendment may nevertheless be restricted in order to limit minors' access to them. |
crs_RS22314 | crs_RS22314_0 | Sources of Information about Contracts and Other Types of Awards
Information about contracts and other award types related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is available from several sources, including:
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), at https://www.fpds.gov . Department of Homeland Security (DHS), at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0729.xml . U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), at http://www.usace.army.mil . U.S. Navy, Military Sealift Command (MSC), at http://www.procurement.msc.navy.mil/Contract/Welcome.jsp . Contracting information available from the other three sources—FEMA (via the DHS website), USACE, and MSC—is not included in the FPDS spreadsheets. A delivery order or a task order (TO) is used to purchase supplies or services, respectively, from an established government contract or with government sources. Factors include type and complexity of the agency's requirement, urgency of the requirement, performance period, and the extent and nature of proposed subcontracting. | Information about contracts and other types of government procurements made in support of hurricane recovery efforts may be obtained online from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command websites. The government-wide database, FPDS, provides the most comprehensive and detailed information, but the other three websites include contracts not currently listed in FPDS. Available information about government procurements includes, among other things, the type of award (for example, a contract or a delivery order), the type of contract, and the extent of competition. |
crs_R40946 | crs_R40946_0 | Introduction
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides grants to states, Indian tribes, and territories for a wide range of benefits, services, and activities that address economic disadvantage. TANF is best known for funding state cash assistance programs for low-income families with children. However, in FY2013, cash assistance represented only 28% of TANF funds. Basic Block Grants
The bulk of federal TANF funding is in a basic block grant totaling $16.5 billion for the 50 states and the District of Columbia. This amount has been frozen since TANF's creation in the 1996 welfare law. It has not been adjusted for inflation or changes in a state's circumstances such as its cash welfare caseload, population, or number of poor children. In total, a minimum of $10.4 billion must be spent collectively by the states from their own funds under the MOE requirement. TANF Cash Assistance
To many, TANF is synonymous with cash assistance (sometimes called "welfare") for needy families. However, TANF cash assistance benefits in all states represent only a fraction of poverty-level income. New York had the highest benefits in the lower 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia, paying $770 per month (48% of poverty-level income). Mississippi, the state with the lowest benefit levels, paid a family of three a maximum of $170 per month, 11% of poverty-level income. Additionally, there are no federal rules for determining the income eligibility level, how much money a family may have in the bank, the value of a family's car(s), whether or not a state pays benefits to families with earnings, or other factors that go into determining a family's eligibility for TANF and its cash assistance benefit amount. The Cash Assistance Caseload
In December 2013, the cash assistance caseload stood at 1.7 million families. The caseload is down dramatically from its pre-welfare-reform level, reduced by 67% from the historic peak of 5.1 million families in March 1994. During the 2007-2009 recession and its aftermath, the caseload began to rise from its post-welfare reform low in August 2008 (1.7 million families), peaking in December 2010 at close to 2 million families. For more information on the trends in the number and composition of the TANF cash assistance caseload, see CRS Report R43187, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): Size and Characteristics of the Cash Assistance Caseload , by [author name scrubbed]. In FY2013, more than half of federal TANF and state MOE funds were used for activities that are generally not associated with a traditional cash assistance program. Among other things, TANF funds are used to
support work for low-income families through funding subsidized child care and refundable tax credits such as state Earned Income Tax Credits (EITCs); operate subsidized employment programs for low-income parents (both on and off the cash assistance rolls) and for youth; fund post-secondary educational programs for low-income parents; provide economic aid to families with children on an emergency and short-term basis; fund programs that address child abuse and neglect; and fund early child development programs, such as pre-kindergarten programs and Head Start programs. Conclusion
TANF is not a program, but rather a flexible funding stream that states can use to provide a wide range of benefits, services, and activities. Thus, the issues related to TANF broadly span those that reflect the effects and address the root causes of disadvantage among families with children. | The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides grants to states, Indian tribes, and territories for a wide range of benefits, services, and activities that address economic and social disadvantage for families with children. TANF is best known for funding state cash assistance programs for needy families with children, and it was created in the 1996 welfare reform law. However, TANF is not synonymous with cash assistance. In FY2013, only 28% of federal and state TANF dollars were for cash assistance.
The bulk of federal TANF funding is in a fixed block grant, which has been set at $16.5 billion since FY1997. The basic block grant is not adjusted for inflation, or for changes in the circumstances of a state such as its cash assistance caseload, population, or number of children in poverty. States are also required to spend a specified minimum of $10.4 billion in state funds on TANF-related activities and populations. This amount also has not changed since FY1997.
TANF cash assistance programs today reflect a long history (going back to the early 1900s) and much controversy. States set their own cash assistance benefit levels. In 2012, cash benefits in all states represented a fraction of poverty-level income. In New York, the state with the highest benefit among the 48 contiguous states, the maximum monthly TANF cash benefit for a family of three was $770, which translates to 48% of poverty-level income. In contrast, Mississippi paid a monthly cash benefit for a family of three of $170 (11% of poverty-level income). Families with adult recipients (and certain nonrecipient parents) come under work participation rules. Federally funded aid is also time-limited for such families.
The cash assistance caseload has declined dramatically from its pre-welfare-reform high of 5.1 million families in 1994 to 1.7 million families in July 2008. The cash assistance caseload increased with the economic slump associated with the 2007-2009 recession, to a peak of 2.0 million families in December 2010. In December 2013, the cash assistance caseload stood at 1.7 million families. The cash assistance caseload has traditionally consisted of families headed by a nonworking parent, usually a single mother. However, in FY2011, less than half of the TANF cash caseload fit this description. The TANF cash caseload is very diverse, with more than half the caseload having different characteristics than the historical traditional cash assistance family.
TANF is not a program per se, but a flexible funding stream used to provide a wide range of benefits and services that address the effects of, and the root causes of, disadvantage among families with children. In addition to cash assistance for needy families, TANF also funds child care; programs that address child abuse and neglect; various early childhood initiatives, including pre-kindergarten programs; earnings supplements for workers in low-income families; emergency and short-term aid; pregnancy prevention programs; responsible fatherhood programs; and initiatives to encourage healthy marriages. |
crs_R44205 | crs_R44205_0 | Supporters of the bill maintained that these requirements would guarantee a higher level of care for women seeking abortions. Opponents, however, characterized the requirements as unnecessary and costly, and argued that they would make it more difficult for abortion facilities to operate. 2 required a physician who performs or induces an abortion to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles from the location where the abortion was performed or induced. In general, admitting privileges allow a physician to transfer a patient to a hospital if complications arise in the course of providing treatment. 2 required an abortion facility to satisfy the same standards as an ambulatory surgical center (ASC). These standards address architectural and other structural matters, as well as operational concerns, such as staffing and medical records systems. Hellerstedt has been recognized both for its impact in Texas and for its perceived refinement of the undue burden standard that is used to evaluate the constitutionality of abortion regulations. Because at least 25 states are believed to have either an admitting privileges or ASC requirement, Hellerstedt is also expected to have an impact in other jurisdictions. Following Casey , the Court applied the undue burden standard in just three cases prior to Hellerstedt . Justice Breyer noted that the undue burden standard requires courts to consider "the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer." Moreover, Justice Breyer maintained that courts should place considerable weight on the evidence and arguments presented in judicial proceedings when they consider the constitutionality of abortion regulations. Citing other evidence concerning the closure of abortion facilities as a result of the admitting privileges requirement and the increased driving distances experienced by women of reproductive age because of the closures, the Court maintained: "[T]he record evidence indicates that the admitting-privileges requirement places a 'substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice.'" The Court again referred to the record evidence to conclude that the ASC requirement imposed an undue burden on the availability of abortion. | In Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, the U.S. Supreme Court (Court) invalidated two Texas requirements that applied to abortion providers and physicians who perform abortions. Under a Texas law enacted in 2013, a physician who performs or induces an abortion was required to have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles from the location where the abortion was performed or induced. In general, admitting privileges allow a physician to transfer a patient to a hospital if complications arise in the course of providing treatment. The Texas law also required an abortion facility to satisfy the same standards as an ambulatory surgical center (ASC). These standards address architectural and other structural matters, as well as operational concerns, such as staffing and medical records systems. Supporters of the Texas law maintained that the requirements would guarantee a higher level of care for women seeking abortions. Opponents, however, characterized the requirements as unnecessary and costly, and argued that they would make it more difficult for abortion facilities to operate.
In Hellerstedt, the Court concluded that the admitting privileges and ASC requirements placed a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion, and imposed an undue burden on the ability to have an abortion. In applying the undue burden standard that is now used to evaluate abortion regulations, the Court explained that a reviewing court must consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits that are conferred by the law. The Court also indicated that courts should place considerable weight on the evidence and arguments presented in judicial proceedings when they consider the constitutionality of abortion regulations.
Hellerstedt has been recognized both for its impact in Texas and for its perceived refinement of the undue burden standard. Because at least 25 states are believed to have either an admitting privileges or ASC requirement, Hellerstedt is expected to have an impact in other jurisdictions. This report examines Hellerstedt and discusses how the decision might affect the application of the undue burden standard in future abortion cases. |
crs_R43213 | crs_R43213_0 | These incidents have raised questions regarding how allegations of sexual assault are addressed by the chain of command, the authority and process to convene a court-martial, and the ability of the convening authority to provide clemency to a servicemember convicted of an offense. Under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to raise and support armies; provide and maintain a navy; and provide for organizing and disciplining them. Under this authority, Congress has enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which is the code of military criminal laws applicable to all U.S. military members worldwide. The President implemented the UCMJ through the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), which was initially prescribed by Executive Order 12473 (April 13, 1984). The MCM contains the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM), the Military Rules of Evidence (MRE), and the UCMJ. Some "military offenses" have a civilian analog, but some are exclusive to the military. The Armed Forces have used Art. The seriousness of the offenses alleged generally determines the type of court-martial. Congress, in creating the military justice system, established three types of courts-martial: (1) summary court-martial, (2) special court-martial, and (3) general court-martial. There are no "hung juries" in courts-martial. Selected Legislative Proposals
Congress, exercising its constitutional authority to raise, support, and regulate the armed forces, has attempted to address the issue of sexual assaults and other sex-related offenses under the UCMJ through the introduction of various legislative proposals. The proposed language, if enacted, would prohibit the enlistment of individuals previously convicted of sexual offenses, eliminate the statute of limitations on prosecution of sexual offenses, and prohibit commanders from overturning a court-martial conviction as part of the post-trial review process. The House and Senate have included numerous provisions addressing sexual assault, including those mentioned above, in the respective versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (FY2014 NDAA). Additionally, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently announced that the Department of Defense would implement a series of new initiatives designed to address sexual assaults in the military, many of which are addressed by proposals contained in the House and Senate versions of the FY2014 NDAA. Due to the sheer number and scope of the provisions contained in the House and Senate versions of the FY2014 NDAA, this report addresses selected proposals including requiring creation of special victims' counsel programs, changes to disposition and clemency authorities, mandatory minimum punishments, commander's authority to transfer an accused, and protections for recruits and trainees. The House addresses the authority of the CA to act on the findings and sentence of a court-martial in the FY2014 NDAA. | Recent high-profile military-related cases involving sexual assaults by U.S. servicemembers have resulted in increased public and congressional interest in military discipline and the military justice system. Questions have been raised regarding how allegations of sexual assault are addressed by the chain of command, the authority and process to convene a court-martial, and the ability of the convening authority to provide clemency to a servicemember convicted of an offense.
Under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to raise and support armies; provide and maintain a navy; and provide for organizing and disciplining them. Under this authority, Congress has enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which is the code of military criminal laws applicable to all U.S. military members worldwide. The President implemented the UCMJ through the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM). The Manual for Courts-Martial contains the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM), the Military Rules of Evidence (MRE), and the UCMJ. Members of the Armed Forces are subjected to rules, orders, proceedings, and consequences different from the rights and obligations of their civilian counterparts, and the UCMJ establishes this unique legal framework.
The UCMJ authorizes three types of courts-martial: (1) summary court-martial, (2) special court-martial, and (3) general court-martial. Depending on the severity of the alleged offense, the accused's commanding officer enjoys great discretion with respect to the type of court-martial to convene. Generally, each of the courts-martial provides fundamental constitutional and procedural rights to the accused, including, but not limited to, the right to a personal representative or counsel, the opportunity to confront evidence and witnesses, and the right to have a decision reviewed by a lawyer or a court of appeals.
In the 113th Congress, there have been no fewer than 10 separate bills introduced addressing the issue of sexual assault in the military. The bills have proposed various provisions that include, but are not limited to prohibiting enlistment in the armed forces of individuals previously convicted of sexual offenses, eliminating the statute of limitations on prosecution of sexual offenses under the UCMJ, and barring commanders from overturning convictions obtained at court-martial.
In recent months, Congress has included many provisions addressing sexual assault, including those mentioned above, in the House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (FY2014 NDAA). Additionally, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently announced that the Department of Defense would implement a series of new initiatives designed to address sexual assaults in the military.
Due to the sheer breadth of the various provisions contained in the House and Senate versions of the FY2014 NDAA, this report will address selected legislative proposals including requiring special victims' counsel, changes to disposition and clemency authorities, creation of a mandatory minimum punishment, authority to transfer the accused, and protections for recruits and trainees. |
crs_RL32515 | crs_RL32515_0 | While the NRO is a DOD agency, itis staffed by both DOD and CIA personnel. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
The NGA, established in 1996 and originally known as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), provides geospatial intelligence -- imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatialdata and information to DOD users and other officials responsible for national security. He is to "exercise authority, direction, and control"over DIA, NGA, the NRO, NSA, and other agencies. Impetus for Reform
In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, a number of observers as well as the JointInquiry of the two congressional intelligence committees and the 9/11 Commission, concluded thatthe organization and management of the Intelligence Community was inadequate and that, as aresult, the DCI was unable to ensure that crucial information about the 9/11 plot was shared withanalysts who might have been able to identify the threat in advance. So sustaining the existing relationship, we think, is essential." P.L. The legislation was approved by thePresident on December 17, 2004. The conference report for S. 2845 authorized the DNI to
provide guidance for National Intelligence Program budget to heads of departments containing intelligence organizations;
"develop and determine" an annual consolidated National Intelligence Programbudget;
present National Intelligence Program budget to the President for approval(together with dissenting comments from heads of departments containing intelligenceorganizations);
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the annualbudgets for DOD-wide and tactical military intelligence programs;
ensure the "effective execution" of annual intelligencebudgets;
direct the allotment or allocation of appropriations through the heads ofdepartments containing intelligence agencies or organization
provide "exclusive direction" to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)regarding apportionment and subsequent allocations of appropriated funds;
transfer or reprogram funds from one program in the National IntelligenceProgram to another (with OMB approval and subject to other restrictions);
transfer personnel from one intelligence agency to another for up to two years(under certain conditions). (38)
Taken together, these authorities will provide the DNI with significantly greater budgetary authorities than possessed by the DCI. In particular, provisions authorizing the DNI to directallocations and allotments of appropriated funds gives the DNI significant leverage in the acquisitionand program management efforts of intelligence agencies in DOD. Moreover, the final version of the legislation includes a provision (Section 1018) that requires the President to issue guidelines to ensure the effective implementation of authorities granted to theDNI, the Director of the OMB, and cabinet heads "in a manner that maintains, consistent with theprovisions of this act, the statutory responsibilities of the head of the departments of the UnitedStates Government with respect to such departments." The guidelines are to be issued within 120days of the appointment of the first DNI. 108-458 difficult. Nevertheless, the requirementfor close coordination between the DNI and DOD agencies will remain. | Although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the best known member of the Intelligence Community, the bulk of the nation's intelligence effort is undertaken by the intelligence agencies ofthe Department of Defense (DOD). In particular, the National Security Agency (NSA), the NationalReconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (formerlyknown as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)) are major collectors of informationfor DOD and non-DOD consumers and absorb a large percentage of the annual intelligence budget. (The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), albeit a large and important component of the IntelligenceCommunity, is more directly focused on DOD requirements.)
Some Members of Congress and independent commissions, most recently the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the 9/11 Commission, have argued thata lack of coordination among intelligence agencies contributed to the failure to provide warning ofthe terrorist attacks of September 2001. In response, in December 2004 Congress passed intelligencereform legislation ( P.L. 108-458 ) that modifies the existing organization of the IntelligenceCommunity and establishes more centralized leadership under a newly created Director of NationalIntelligence (DNI).
As the legislation was being debated in the fall of 2004, attention focused on the extent of the budgetary and administrative authorities to be assigned to the DNI. Significant concerns wereexpressed by DOD officials, some Members of Congress, and various outside observers thatproviding the DNI with greater authority and control of intelligence agencies in DOD couldjeopardize the increasingly close relationship between these agencies and the operating militaryforces.
The conference committee on intelligence reform legislation ( S. 2845 ) addressed these concerns with language that gave the DNI substantial authorities over intelligence budgets, butnot operational control over their activities. The final version of the legislation also provided thatthe details of budgetary authorities to be exercised by the DNI and other cabinet officers be workedout in accordance with guidelines to be issued by the President after the DNI is appointed.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R40875 | crs_R40875_0 | Introduction
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a broad civil rights act prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. As stated in the act, its purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." In 2008, Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), P.L. 110-325 , to address Supreme Court decisions which interpreted the definition of disability narrowly. On September 23, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued proposed regulations under the ADA Amendments Act. Comments on the proposed regulations must be submitted on or before November 23, 2009. EEOC Proposed Regulations
Overview
The ADA Amendments Act, which states that the definition of disability shall be construed broadly, and which specifically rejects portions of the EEOC's ADA regulations, necessitated regulatory changes. The major changes made to the regulations include specific examples of impairments that will consistently meet the definition of disability, changes in the definition of the term "substantially limits," and expansion of the definition of "major life activity" including changes to the concept of the major life activity of working. The EEOC also amended its interpretative guidance for Title I of the ADA. | The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a broad civil rights act prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities. As stated in the act, its purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." In 2008, Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), P.L. 110-325, to address Supreme Court decisions which interpreted the definition of disability narrowly. On September 23, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued proposed regulations under the ADA Amendments Act. Comments on the proposed regulations must be submitted on or before November 23, 2009.
The ADA Amendments Act, which states that the definition of disability shall be construed broadly and which specifically rejects portions of the EEOC's ADA regulations, necessitated regulatory changes. The major changes made to the regulations include specific examples of impairments that will consistently meet the definition of disability, changes in the definition of the term "substantially limits," and expansion of the definition of "major life activity" including changes to the concept of the major life activity of working. The EEOC also amended its interpretative guidance for Title I of the ADA. |
crs_RS21226 | crs_RS21226_0 | RS21226 -- The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Paperwork in Special Education
Updated December 18, 2003
Introduction
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (1) both authorizes federal funding for special education and related services(for example, physical therapy) and, for states that accept these funds, (2) sets out principles under which special education and relatedservices are to be provided. (20)
Time Spent on Paperwork
The most recent data on paperwork is a study by Westat for the U.S. Department of Education (ED). (24)
Provisions in H.R.1350 and S. 1248 Related to Paperwork Reduction
Both the House and Senate committee reports (25) accompanying their respective bills note that reducing paperwork is an important aimof the legislation. (30)
Both bills would eliminate the requirement that IEPs contain benchmarks or short-term goals (Sec.614(d)(1)(A)(ii) of current law). | Congress is currently considering reauthorizing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). H.R. 1350, 108th Congress, was passed by the House on April 30, 2003. S. 1248was reported out of committee by a unanimous vote on June 25, 2003. On November 21, 2003, a unanimousconsent agreementproviding for floor consideration of S. 1248 was adopted. Among the issues both bills address is the amountofpaperwork special education teachers have to complete. This report will discuss some of the requirements of thelaw that give rise topaperwork, the available statistics on the time special educators spend on paperwork, and selected issues in theHouse and Senate billsthat are related to paperwork reduction. This report will be updated to reflect major legislative action. |
crs_R43953 | crs_R43953_0 | Additionally, EPA established separate standards for two categories of PM based on size: "fine" particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter (referred to as PM 2.5 ) and slightly larger, but still inhalable, particles less than or equal to 10 micrometers (referred to as PM 10 ). EPA last reviewed and revised the PM NAAQS in 2006. Promulgation of NAAQS sets in motion a process under which the states and EPA first identify geographic nonattainment areas (i.e., those areas failing to meet the NAAQS) based on monitoring and analysis of relevant air quality data. The April 2015 modifications did not impact EPA's designation determinations for areas in Indian country as published in January 2015. However, in a January 4, 2013, decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit determined that EPA had erred in implementing the PM 2.5 NAAQS under Subpart 1 and required the agency to implement the PM 2.5 NAAQS under Subpart 4 of Part D in Title I of the CAA ("Subpart 4"). 7407) of the CAA requires the governor of each state to submit a list to EPA of all areas in the state "designating as ... nonattainment, any area that does not meet ( or that contributes to ambient air quality in a nearby area that does not meet ) an air quality standard" (emphasis added). EPA April 2015 Amended Final Designations
The final area designations as amended and published in the April 2015 Federal Register encompass 20 counties or portions of counties (nine areas) in four states—California, Idaho, Ohio, and Pennsylvania—as nonattainment only for the 2013 revised annual PM 2.5 standard. The area in Indiana (2 counties) and one of the two areas in Kentucky (2 of the 5 counties) were re-designated unclassifiable. EPA also designated five areas in Georgia (including two counties in Alabama and South Carolina) as unclassifiable. Several of the 14 nonattainment areas included counties from multiple states. Comparing EPA's Final Nonattainment Designations for the 2013 PM NAAQS with the 2006 and 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS Final Designations
EPA's final designations for nonattainment of the 2006 and 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS (those areas with or contributing to air quality levels exceeding the annual and 24-hour PM 2.5 standards or both) included all or part of 242 counties in 28 states and the District of Columbia. Conclusion
States will have 18 months from April 15, 2015, the effective date of EPA's final designations for the 2013 PM 2.5 NAAQS, to submit SIPs, which identify specific regulations and emission control requirements that are to bring an area into compliance. Under CAA, Section 188 of Subpart 4, states must achieve attainment as expeditiously as practicable but no later than the end of the sixth calendar year after designation as nonattainment: December 2021 for the 2013 PM 2.5 standard. Some Members expressed concerns in hearings, letters to the EPA administrator, and proposed legislation in anticipation of potential changes to the PM NAAQS leading up to the January 2013 final published revisions. Counties in Nonattainment for the 2013 PM 2.5 NAAQS Annual (12 μg/m 3 ): U.S. EPA January 15, 2015, Final Designations and Comparison with the 2006 and 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS Final Designations
The following maps present EPA's final nonattainment area designations as published in the Federal Register on January 15, 2015, which EPA subsequently amended April 7, 2015, based on more current air quality data (2012-2014). | On April 7, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published amendments to the January 15, 2015, final rule designating areas for compliance with the 2013 primary annual National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for fine particulate matter (PM2.5). Revising a NAAQS established under the Clean Air Act (CAA) sets in motion a process under which the states and EPA identify areas that exceed the standard ("nonattainment areas") using multi-year air quality monitoring data and other criteria, requiring states to take steps to reduce pollutant concentrations in order to meet the standard.
The 2013 revisions to the PM NAAQS were the subject of considerable congressional oversight. EPA's designation of nonattainment areas may be an issue of interest and debate among Members of Congress, states, and other stakeholders. The PM NAAQS revisions, published January 2013 changed the annual health-based ("primary") standard for "fine" particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter (or PM2.5) to a limit of 12 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) from the 15 µg/m3 limit. Revisions to the PM NAAQS retained the existing 24-hour primary standard for PM2.5 of 35 µg/m3 (as promulgated in 2006) and the existing standard for larger, but still inhalable, "coarse" particles 10 micrometers or less in diameter, or PM10.
During EPA's consideration of alternative approaches for revising the PM NAAQS, many stakeholders and some in Congress expressed concern about the potential impacts associated with an increased number of areas that may be deemed nonattainment under a more stringent standard. The number of areas ultimately determined nonattainment for the revised PM NAAQS were considerably fewer than some had anticipated.
Based on its review of recently submitted 2014 air quality data, EPA's April 2015 modifications to the final area designations for the 2013 PM NAAQS resulted in nine areas consisting of 20 counties in four states designated as nonattainment. All but two of the 20 counties have been previously designated as nonattainment for the 2006 and/or the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS. In accordance with a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on January 4, 2013, EPA classified all areas determined to be in nonattainment as "moderate" nonattainment areas under the authority of Section 188 of the CAA.
In comparison to the nonattainment area designations as amended by EPA in April 2015, EPA's final designations published in January 2015 were composed of 14 areas comprising 38 counties in 6 states. The EPA April 2015 amended designations changed the nonattainment designation of two areas in Pennsylvania (four counties) and one each in Ohio (three counties) and Ohio (four counties)/Kentucky (three counties) to "unclassifiable/attainment" and one area in Kentucky (two counties)/Indiana (two counties) to "unclassifiable." EPA also designated five areas in Georgia (including two counties in Alabama and South Carolina) as unclassifiable.
States have 18 months from the April 15, 2015, effective date of EPA's final designations to submit State Implementation Plans, which identify specific regulations and emission control requirements intended to bring an area into compliance or maintain compliance. Section 188 of the CAA requires that moderate nonattainment areas achieve attainment as expeditiously as practicable but no later than the end of the sixth calendar year after designation as nonattainment. |
crs_R43163 | crs_R43163_0 | Introduction
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (P.L. 20), as amended and later codified in the U.S. Code , requires the President to submit a consolidated federal budget annually to Congress toward the beginning of each regular session. Under Title 31 of the U.S. Code , the President must submit the budget—which contains budgetary estimates, proposals, and other required reports—to Congress on or after the first Monday in January, but no later than the first Monday in February. The President's consolidated, annual budget submission to Congress, or the Budget of the United States Government as it is referred to in statute, is referred to in this report as "the President's budget." Content of the President's Budget
The President's budget typically provides detailed estimates of the financial operations of federal agencies and programs, the President's budgetary and legislative recommendations, and other information supporting the President's recommendations. These estimates and proposals are developed by the legislative and judicial branches, and are then transmitted to the President and submitted, without change, as part of the President's budget submission. There are a number of reports that are required to be submitted along with, or at the same time as, the President's budget. For example, the President is required to submit an annual federal government performance plan for the overall budget. The budget submissions of the past three Presidents have each included the following volumes: Budget of the U.S. Government , Historical Tables , Analytical Perspectives , and Appendix . The Budget volume also includes summary tables of budgetary aggregates and estimates of the effects of the President's proposals on the deficit, among others. 30 The Historical Tables volume provides a historical overview of federal government finances, including time series statistics on budget authority, government receipts, outlays, government employment, economic statistics, and the federal debt going back several decades and in some cases as far back as 1789. 34 Since FY1995, the President's budget submission has included an Analytical Perspectives volume, which contains in-depth analysis of government programs, including credit and insurance programs, discussion of crosscut budgets (i.e., budgets that span two or more agencies), and technical explanation of the budget baseline used in the analyses and estimates contained in the President's budget, among other items. 42 The Appendix volume includes detailed budget estimates and financial information for each appropriations account and for selected programs, listed by appropriations account. Timely Submission of the President's Budget
In the 95 years since the President was required to submit a consolidated budget to Congress, the budget was submitted on or before the original statutory deadline on 76 occasions. On 54 of these occasions, the budget was submitted on the deadline. On the remaining 22 occasions, the President's budget was submitted early, between 1 and 13 days before the deadline. Delayed Submission of the President's Budget
The President's budget has been submitted after the statutory deadline on 19 occasions. In 6 of these 19 occasions, Congress extended the deadline by statute. In all but one of these occasions, the President's budget was submitted by the extended deadline. In the 14 instances when the budget was submitted after the original or extended deadline, it was delayed, on average, 31.71 days. | The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as amended and later codified in the U.S. Code, requires the President to submit a consolidated federal budget to Congress toward the beginning of each regular session of Congress. Under 31 U.S.C. §1105(a), the President must submit the budget—which contains budgetary proposals, projections, and other required reports—to Congress on or after the first Monday in January, but no later than the first Monday in February.
The President's budget, or the Budget of the United States Government as it is referred to in statute, is required to include in part (1) estimates of spending, revenues, borrowing, and debt; (2) detailed estimates of the financial operations of federal agencies and programs; (3) the President's budgetary, policy, and legislative recommendations; and (4) information supporting the President's recommendations. The President's budget also contains budgetary proposals for the legislative and judicial branches, which are transmitted to the President and submitted, without change, as part of the President's budget submission to Congress. There are a number of reports that are required to be submitted along with, or at the same time as, the President's budget, such as an annual federal government performance plan.
The content and structure of the President's budget have varied by President. The budget submissions of the past three Presidents have each included the following volumes:
Budget of the U.S. Government—includes a short budget message summarizing the President's policy priorities, summary tables of budgetary aggregates, and narrative descriptions of proposed government activities; Historical Tables—provides a historical overview of federal government finances, including historical data on budget authority, government receipts, outlays, and the federal debt; Analytical Perspectives—contains in-depth discussion of government programs and technical explanation of the budget baselines that were used to produce the estimates contained in the President's budget; and Appendix—includes detailed budget estimates and financial information on individual programs listed by appropriations account, which includes the President's recommended appropriations language, among other information.
Timely Submission of the President's Budget. In the 95 years since the President was required to submit a budget to Congress, it was submitted on or before the original statutory deadline on 76 occasions. On 54 of these occasions, the budget was submitted on the deadline. On the remaining 22 occasions, the President's budget was submitted early.
Delayed Submission of the President's Budget. The President's budget has been submitted after the statutory deadline on 19 occasions. In 6 of these 19 occasions, Congress extended the deadline by statute. In all but one of these occasions, the President's budget was submitted by the extended deadline. In the 14 instances when it was submitted after the original or the extended deadline, the President's budget was delayed, on average, 31.71 days.
This report, which provides information on the origins, content, and submission dates of the President's budget, will be updated annually or as developments warrant. |
crs_RS22545 | crs_RS22545_0 | Introduction
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), signed into law on January 8, 2002 ( P.L. The NCLB states that paraprofessionals (also known as instructional aides) must have completed two years of college, obtained an associate's degree, or demonstrated content knowledge and an ability to assist in classroom instruction. ED's interim report on NCLB teacher quality implementation revealed that paraprofessionals accounted for about one-third of instructional staff in Title I-A funded schools and districts. Prior to the NCLB, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) required only that paraprofessionals possess a high school diploma. The requirements apply to all paraprofessionals employed in a Schoolwide Title I program without regard to whether the position is funded with federal, state, or local funds. In Targeted Assistance Title I programs, only those paraprofessionals paid with Title I funds must meet the requirements (not those paid with state or local funds); however, special education paraprofessionals in targeted assistance programs must meet the requirements even if only part of their pay comes from Title I funds. Reauthorization
NCLB authorized most ESEA programs through FY2007. The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) provided an automatic one-year extension of these programs through FY2008. While most ESEA programs no longer have an explicit authorization, the programs continue to receive annual appropriations and paraprofessional quality requirements continue to be in place. LEAs in states that have received an ESEA flexibility waiver are not restricted in the use of Title I-A funds for failing to meet NCLB teacher quality and student achievement accountability requirements; however, all LEAs still must comply with the law's paraprofessional quality requirements. | The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) established minimum qualifications for paraprofessionals (also known as instructional aides) employed in Title I, Part A-funded schools. NCLB required that paraprofessionals must complete two years of college, obtain an associate's degree, or demonstrate content knowledge and an ability to assist in classroom instruction. Prior to the NCLB, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) required only that paraprofessionals possess a high school diploma.
These requirements, as enacted through NCLB, apply to all paraprofessionals employed in a Title I-A Schoolwide (§1114) program without regard to whether the position is funded with federal, state, or local funds. In Title I-A programs known as Targeted Assistance (§1115), only those paraprofessionals paid with Title I-A funds must meet the requirements (not those paid with state or local funds). A report by the Education Department (ED) reveals that paraprofessionals accounted for about one-third of instructional staff in Title I-A funded schools and districts.
NCLB authorized most ESEA programs through FY2007. The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) provided an automatic one-year extension of these programs through FY2008. While most ESEA programs no longer have an explicit authorization, the programs continue to receive annual appropriations and paraprofessional quality requirements continue to be in place. LEAs in states that have received an ESEA flexibility waiver are not restricted in the use of Title I-A funds for failing to meet NCLB teacher quality and student achievement accountability requirements; however, all LEAs still must comply with the law's paraprofessional quality requirements.
This report describes the paraprofessional quality provisions and guidance provided by ED regarding implementation. The report concludes with discussion of issues that may arise as Congress considers reauthorization of the ESEA. |
crs_RL34526 | crs_RL34526_0 | Application of the act to these (and to new) legislative programs has continued to spark congressional interest. Some urge that the prevailing wage statute is as important now as in the 1930s. This report is essentially a tracking document. In 1935, Congress adopted major changes to the statute: (a) reducing the coverage threshold from contracts of at least $5,000 to those in excess of $2,000; (b) extending coverage from public buildings to include "construction, alteration, and/or repair, including painting and decorating, of public buildings or public works"; and (c) requiring that the locally prevailing wage rates be predetermined—prior to solicitation of bids—and that they be written into bid solicitations. Serious academic studies may be fewer. The Davis-Bacon Act and the CWA/SRFs
Through more than a decade, authorization for funding of the Clean Water Act State Revolving Fund (CWA/SRF) has been a matter of contention with the authorizing committees of both the House and the Senate. Mica (as would others) referred to "an unprecedented expansion of Davis-Bacon requirements" and suggested that the "President will veto the legislation if it contains the Davis-Bacon provisions." Davis-Bacon and Energy Independence (H.R. For example, in Sec. 2419)
The Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007 ( H.R. 2419 ), as passed by the House, contains loan guarantees for biorefineries and biofuel production facilities. It was the construction of these plants that suggested a Davis-Bacon provision and encouraged the Committee on Agriculture to propose one. 2419 , as reported from committee, provided that, as a condition for receiving a loan or loan guarantee, the applicant "shall ensure that all laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or subcontractors in the performance of construction work financed in whole or in part" with such loan or loan guarantee, "shall be paid wages at rates not less than those prevailing on similar construction in the locality, as determined by the Secretary of Labor...."
At the full committee level, Representative Marilyn Musgrave, a long-time critic of Davis-Bacon, proposed striking the prevailing wage provision. But, the bill's fate ( H.R. Davis-Bacon and Homeland Security (H.R. It chose as its vehicle H.R. HOPE VI Reauthorization Act of 2007 (H.R. The HOPE Housing Act
The bill ( H.R. 1328)
In the House, on March 6, 2007, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act Amendments of 2007 was introduced ( H.R. Correct, it does not change current law. Citing the General Education Provisions Act or GEPA [20 U.S.C. 1232b], he observed that the "Davis-Bacon mandate would apply to any bill that received federal dollars for construction or renovation" and affirmed that "...Davis-Bacon is the federal government intruding in the affairs of the States...." He charged that the act is "anti-competitive." 3021 . Appropriations: Departments of Transportation and HUD (H.R. Ultimately, the measure was added to H.R. Appropriations: Agriculture and Rural Development (H.R. 3161 , the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (2008). And related concerns. None of the funds made available in this Act shall be used to pay the salaries or expenses of any employee of the Department of Agriculture who would require contracts to construct renewable energy systems to be carried out in compliance with the provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act. It is a mean amendment, and it should be defeated." There may have been some measure of irony, here. Litigation followed. | In 1931, following several years of intermittent hearings and, ultimately, encouragement from the Hoover Administration, Congress adopted the Davis-Bacon Act (now, 40 U.S.C. 3141-3148). The act, as amended, requires that workers employed on public buildings and public works of the federal government and of the District of Columbia must be paid at least the locally prevailing wage as determined by the Secretary of Labor. Initially, the act applied to construction in excess of $5,000; but, in 1935, the act was amended to render its terms applicable to projects of $2,000 and above.
With the passage of time, the act was added to a series of individual public works statutes—perhaps more than fifty, depending upon one's count. As each of these statutes came up for renewed funding, the Davis-Bacon provision became a subject of dispute; and, by the 1960s, such disputes became both numerous and contentious. Some have suggested that the act, having long outlived its Depression-era origins, should be repealed. Others have argued that the act is as important today as it was in the 1930s and that it should be applied more generally and routinely.
Through the past decades, application of Davis-Bacon to the Clean Water Act (State Revolving Funds) has posed a serious problem and, with other concerns, has impeded authorization of funding for covered projects. (See H.R. 720.) The battle for (or against) Davis-Bacon has been fought out in other sectors as well: for example, see Homeland Security (H.R. 2638) and the energy independence bill (H.R. 6). Even the Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007 (H.R. 2419) contains a Davis-Bacon provision. (As part of that program, a series of biorefineries and biofuel production facilities would be constructed; and, if so, construction workers on such plants can expect to be paid at least locally prevailing wages.) See also the HOPE VI housing renovation and restoration act (H.R. 3524), the Indian health care amendments of 2007 (H.R. 1328, S. 1200), and construction of educational facilities (H.R. 2470, H.R. 3021, H.R. 5401, S. 912, and others).
Other construction-related proposals currently before Congress contain Davis-Bacon requirements. See, for example, H.R. 3074 (the Department of Transportation and related agencies appropriations bill) and H.R. 3161 (the Agriculture and Rural Development appropriations bill).
This report, essentially a tracking document, will be updated as developments warrant. It reviews the origins and evolution of Davis-Bacon, suggests what is (and may not be) known about the act's impact, and reviews current legislative initiatives that involve the act. Though it may not review all Davis-Bacon proposals of the 110th Congress, it does provide some measure of the give-and-take on the legislative front. |
crs_R43331 | crs_R43331_0 | However, since reaching a vote on a contested proposal to amend the Senate Standing Rules likely would require, under Rule XXII, invoking cloture with the support of two-thirds of Senators voting, some supporters of change have advocated making changes to Senate procedure instead by establishing a new precedent (basically, a reinterpretation of the rules). Some Senators and outside observers have used the term "nuclear" to describe such proceedings, in part because they might rely on steps that are novel (potentially in contravention of existing rules and precedents), or because they could undermine the prerogatives exercised heretofore by Senate minorities or individual Senators. As on legislation, a cloture motion filed on a nomination under Rule XXII receives a vote after two days of Senate session. As a result, reaching a vote on the motion does not require a cloture process, so a simple majority of those voting can agree to bring up the nomination without requiring a supermajority to invoke cloture in order to limit debate on the question of bringing up the nomination. Specifically, for the remainder of the 113 th Congress, all but the very highest of executive nominations are subject to a maximum of eight hours of post-cloture consideration, and district judge nominations are subject to only two hours, post-cloture. (See Table 1 below.) The November 21 Precedent: Some Effects and Implications
Reinterpretation of Rule XXII
The precedent set on November 21, 2013, did not change the text of Rule XXII of the Standing Rules. In summary, in floor proceedings on November 21, the Senate established a new precedent by which it has reinterpreted the provisions of Rule XXII to require only a simple majority to invoke cloture on most nominations. Effect on Senate Floor Consideration of Nominations
The effect of the Senate's new precedent is to lower the vote threshold by which cloture can be invoked on a nomination other than to the U.S. Supreme Court from three-fifths of the Senate to a simple majority of those voting, thereby enabling a supportive simple majority to reach an "up-or-down" vote on confirming the nomination. Other Potential Effects on Presidential Nominations
Broader effects of the November 21 precedent cannot yet be fully assessed, but the precedent could have implications for elements of the nomination and confirmation process that occur prior to floor consideration. 116 , or not), except for those to the Supreme Court. In addition, while the lower threshold for cloture on nominations will remain in effect until the Senate takes further action to alter it, the reduction in the limits on post-cloture consideration for certain nominations (pursuant to S.Res. Effect on Future Proposals to Change Senate Rules or Practices
The procedures by which the precedent was set also may have implications for future proposals to alter Senate rules or their application. A key procedural detail on which the November 21 proceedings turned was the inability of opponents of these proceedings to extend debate on the appeal of the chair's ruling. Since the practicability of proposed "nuclear" proceedings has often turned on the Senate being able to reach a vote to establish new procedures in a contested situation, the parliamentary circumstances under which the new precedent was set will likely be examined for their implications for future attempts to change Senate rules or the Senate's interpretation and application of them. Appendix. The majority leader appealed the ruling of the chair. Based on the precedent just set by the Senate providing that a numerical majority was sufficient for invoking cloture on certain nominations (of which the Millett nomination was one), the presiding officer announced that the motion was agreed to. | On November 21, 2013, by overturning a ruling of the chair on appeal, the Senate set a precedent that lowered the vote threshold required by Senate Standing Rule XXII for invoking cloture on most presidential nominations. The precedent did not change the text of Rule XXII of the Standing Rules; rather, the Senate established a precedent reinterpreting the provisions of Rule XXII to require only a simple majority of those voting, rather than three-fifths of the full Senate, to invoke cloture on all presidential nominations except those to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The precedent does not eliminate the potential need for a cloture process for the Senate to reach a vote on a contested nomination. The time required to invoke cloture on a pending nomination remains as it was before the precedent. Specifically, nominations are still subject to Rule XXII's requirement that (1) a cloture motion filed on a pending nomination lie over for two days of Senate session prior to the cloture vote, and (2) the nomination be subject to an additional 30 hours of post-cloture consideration prior to a vote on confirmation. For the 113th Congress only (pursuant to S.Res. 15), this post-cloture time limit is eight hours for most nominations and two hours for U.S. District Court judges; the limit is still 30 hours for high level executive nominations and the top judicial positions (see Table 1).
The only direct effect of the new precedent is to change the vote threshold by which the Senate can invoke cloture (and thereby eventually reach a vote) on these nominations from three-fifths of the Senate to a numerical majority of Senators voting (with a quorum present). However, to the extent that the change may effectively limit the floor leverage of Senators opposing a nomination, there may be implications for the pre-floor stages during which nominations are vetted.
In addition, the parliamentary circumstances under which the November 21 precedent was set will likely be examined for their implications for future attempts to change Senate procedures. A key element of the feasibility of such action is whether a Senate majority in favor of change can reach a vote to establish new procedures in the face of opposition. Reaching a vote to reinterpret existing rules, in a contested situation, might rely on steps that are novel or potentially are in contravention of existing rules and precedents; in addition, the effects of such actions could also undermine the existing procedural prerogatives available to Senators. Such proceedings have sometimes been called the "nuclear option." In this context, an important feature of the proceedings of November 21 was the inability of opponents to extend debate on the appeal of the chair's ruling.
This report explains the procedural context within which the precedent was set and addresses the precedent's effects on floor consideration of nominations (as well as noting other potential effects on the nominations process). In addition, since the parliamentary circumstances under which the precedent was set fall within proceedings often called the "nuclear option," the report concludes by briefly noting the precedent's relevance for future proposals to alter or reinterpret Senate rules through the establishment of new precedent. An Appendix details the key procedural steps by which the precedent was set. This report will be updated if events warrant, or to add citations to additional CRS reports that address related issues. |
crs_R43162 | crs_R43162_0 | Postal Service (USPS) has been a self-supporting, wholly governmental entity. Non-Reliant on Appropriations
The PRA designed the USPS to be a marketized government agency, which is an agency that would cover its operating costs with revenues generated through the sales of postage and related products and services. Of the $8.4 billion expense increase, nearly all of it resulted from the PAEA's RHBF funding requirements. If RHBF payments are excluded, the USPS would have run modest surpluses of $800 million in FY2013 and $300 million in FY2014. The USPS has greater freedom to price competitive products. Mail volume was 23.2% lower in FY2014 than in FY2003, and 27.1% below its FY2006 peak. Additionally, during the past decade the "mail mix" has shifted. An increasing portion of the mail handled by the USPS is advertising mail, which yields low profits. Concurrently, the annual volume of first-class mail, which is highly profitable, has been dropping steadily, at least in part because mailers are shifting to electronic communications (e.g., online bill remittances and payment). Debt and Liquidity
The USPS reached its $15 billion debt cap in late FY2012 and continues to have no remaining borrowing authority through the end of FY2014. Figure 3 above shows the USPS's revenues were $7.1 billion higher in FY2007 and FY2008 than in FY2014. Since that time, the U.S. Treasury's "Monthly Statement of the Public Debt" has not included an entry for the CPF. Despite these organizational actions and the increase in revenue for the USPS in FY2013, the Postal Service projects that legislative change will be necessary to improve liquidity moving forward. The above financial data, however, suggest that for any reforms to be successful they would need to
contend with the USPS's short-term liquidity problem; be of sufficient magnitude to make appreciable changes to the USPS's annual operating revenue (currently $67 billion) or operating costs (currently $70+ billion); enable the USPS to sufficiently fund its retiree health benefits; help the USPS reduce its debt (currently $15 billion); and place the USPS on a long-term trajectory where the agency's revenues could be expected to meet or exceed expenses. | Since 1971, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has been a self-supporting government agency that covers its operating costs with revenues generated through the sales of postage and related products and services.
The USPS is experiencing significant financial challenges. After running modest profits from FY2003 through FY2006, the USPS lost $45.6 billion between FY2007 and FY2013. Since FY2011, the USPS has defaulted on $22.4 billion in payments to its Retiree Health Benefits Fund (RHBF). The agency reached its $15 billion borrowing limit in FY2012 and has not reduced total debt since that time. In October 2012, the USPS bolstered its liquidity by withdrawing all of the cash from its competitive products fund. This fund has not been replenished.
While the revenues for the USPS increased in FY2014, expenses have also risen. Compared with FY2013, expenses for FY2014 were $1.1 billion higher while revenues have increased by $500 million.
The USPS's recent financial difficulties are partially the product of reduced demand. The agency has experienced a 36.3% drop in mail volume during the past 10 years. Additionally, during the past decade the "mail mix" has shifted. A growing portion of the mail is advertising mail, which yields low profits. Concurrently, the annual volume of first-class letters, which are highly profitable, has been dropping steadily, at least in part due to mailers shifting to electronic communications. As a result, the Postal Service's revenues in FY2014 were lower than they were in FY2005. Additionally, the Postal Service's liquidity has decreased and its debt has increased since FY2006, partially as a result of the statutorily mandated payments to the RHBF that were made between FY2007 and FY2010. The USPS has not had sufficient liquidity to make the payments since FY2011.
This report discusses these issues in more detail, and includes financial results through the end of FY2014. This report will be updated in the event of any significant developments. |
crs_RL32566 | crs_RL32566_0 | On October 18, 2004, the President signed into law P.L. 108-334 making appropriations for DHSfor FY2005. 108-334 provides $33.1 billion in new obligational budget authority for DHS, ofwhich $19.6 billion or 59% is for the border and transportation security-related activities identifiedin this report. Border security entails regulating the flow of goods and peopleacross the nation's borders so that dangerous and unwanted goods or people are detected and deniedentry. Transportation security entails inspecting people and goods as they move among differentlocations within the country to reduce the possibility of terrorist attacks or the incursion of unwantedpeople or goods. The activities for which BTS has assumed responsibility are organized into three bureaus: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP); the Bureau of Immigration and CustomsEnforcement (ICE); and the Transportation Security Agency (TSA). On the other hand, this functionalgrouping does include the activities of the Coast Guard, a separate agency in DHS which is not partof the Directorate for Border and Transportation Security, but which has an essential role inproviding "border and transportation security" as those words are commonly understood. The Administration's FY2005 request followsthis structure and has grouped the requests for the Undersecretary for Border and Transportation;US-VISIT; CBP; ICE; the TSA; the U.S. Coast Guard; and the U.S. Secret Service in Title II Security, Enforcement, and Investigations . For the purposes of this report, we excludeappropriations for the U.S. Secret Service; but include appropriations for FLETC, which is locatedin Title IV. The Administration requested $32.6 billion for DHS in FY2005, of this amount $19 billion or 58% is for Border and Transportation Security functions as identified in the report. Summary of Border and Transportation Security Appropriations, Functional Presentation ($ in millions)
Source: P.L. 108-334 , H.Rept. Cargo and Container Security. Inspections and Inspection Technology (NII). DHS and BTS are currently undertaking a review of air and marine assets andoperations in the department. Citizenship and Immigration Services. P.L. U.S. Coast Guard
The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for the maritime component of homeland security. | A well-managed border is central to maintaining and improving the security of the homeland against terrorist threats. Border security entails regulating the flow of goods and people across thenation's borders so that dangerous and unwanted goods or people are denied entry. Transportationsecurity entails inspecting and securing people and goods as they move among different locationswithin the country to reduce the possibility of terrorist attacks or the incursion of unwanted peopleor goods. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been given primary responsibility forsecuring the nation's borders and for increasing the security of transportation, among otherresponsibilities.
The locus of border and transportation security activity within DHS is in the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (BTS) which houses the Bureau of Customs and BorderProtection (CBP), the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and theTransportation Security Administration (TSA). The U.S. Coast Guard is a standalone agency withinDHS but plays an important role in border and transportation security, as does the Federal LawEnforcement Training Center (FLETC). This report includes appropriations for the functions andagencies of BTS, the U.S. Coast Guard and FLETC.
On October 18, 2004, P.L. 108-334 was signed into law, making appropriations for DHS for FY2005. P.L. 108-334 provides $33.1 billion in new obligational budget authority for the activitiesof DHS. Of this amount, $19.6 billion or 59% is for border and transportation activities as identifiedin this report. P.L. 108-334 includes $340 million for the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant StatusIndicator Technology (US-VISIT) program; $5.3 billion for CBP; $3.2 billion for ICE; $3.3 billionfor TSA; $7.4 billion for the U.S. Coast Guard; and $200 million for FLETC.
Significant issues in border and transportation security include cargo and container security; implementation of the US-VISIT program; organization of air and marine assets; aviation security;and security of other transportation modes.
This report will not be updated.
Key Policy Staff: Border and Transportation Security |
crs_R43752 | crs_R43752_0 | National Youth in Transition Database
Background
Research on former foster youth is limited and most of the studies on outcomes for these youth face methodological challenges. However, two studies—the Northwest Foster Care Alumni Study and the Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former Foster Youth—have tracked outcomes for a sample of youth across several domains, either prospectively (following youth in care and as they age out and beyond) or retrospectively (examining current outcomes for young adults who were in care at least a few years ago), and compared these outcomes to other groups of youth, either those who aged out and/or youth in the general population. Nonetheless, these studies focus only on youth who were in foster care in four states. The 1999 law ( P.L. 106-169 ) authorizing the Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP) required that HHS develop a data system to capture the characteristics and experiences of certain current and former foster youth across the country. The law directed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to consult with state and local public officials responsible for administering independent living and other child welfare programs, child welfare advocates, Members of Congress, youth service providers, and researchers to (1) "develop outcome measures (including measures of educational attainment, high school diploma, avoidance of dependency, homelessness, non-marital childbirth, incarceration, and high risk behaviors) that can be used to assess the performances of States in operating independent living programs"; and (2) identify the data needed to track the number and characteristics of children receiving independent living services, the type of services provided, and state performance on the measures. In response to these requirements, HHS created the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD). The final rule establishing the NYTD became effective April 28, 2008, and it required states to report data to HHS on youth beginning in FY2011. This report provides summary and detailed data for FY2011 through FY2013. First, states report information twice each fiscal year on eligible youth who currently receive independent living services regardless of whether they continue to remain in foster care, were in foster care in another state, or received child welfare services through an Indian tribe or privately operated foster care program. These youth are known as served youth . Second, states report information on foster youth on or about their 17 th birthday, two years later on or about their 19 th birthday, and again on or about their 21 st birthday. In this second group, foster youth at age 17 are known as the baseline youth, and at ages 19 and 21 they are known as the follow-up youth (and are also referred to as tracked youth in this report). These current and former foster youth are tracked regardless of whether they receive independent living services at ages 17, 19, and 21. Served Youth
Table 1 includes an overview of data on the served youth who received an independent living service and the type of services they received for each of FY2011 through FY2013. The number of youth receiving an independent living service in each of those years ranged from about 97,500 to nearly 102,000. Follow-Up Youth
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics and outcomes of the 19-year-old follow-up youth in FY2013. Figure 2 includes data on selected outcomes for youth in foster care and those who are no longer in foster care. Financial Self-Sufficiency
About one-third of youth were working full-time and/or part-time at age 19; however, youth in foster care were more likely to be working part-time and youth not in foster care or not receiving any independent living service were slightly more likely to be working full-time. Positive Connections with Adults
Almost all youth at age 19—regardless of foster care status or receipt of independent living services—said that they had a positive connection to an adult who could serve in a mentoring or substitute parent role, including a relative, former foster parent, birth parent, or older member of the community. (Nearly all youth had reported the same when they were surveyed at age 17.) Homelessness and High-Risk Behaviors
Most of the 19-year-old youth had not experienced homelessness in their lifetime, and youth in foster care were much less likely to report being homeless than the other groups (11% versus 18%-24%). Youth in care at age 19 were also less likely to report having been incarcerated (14% versus 20%-29%). | Congress has long been concerned with the well-being of older youth in foster care and those who have recently emancipated from care without going to a permanent home. Research on this population is fairly limited, and the few studies that are available have focused on youth who live in a small number of states. This research has generally found that youth who spend time in foster care during their teenage years tend to have difficulty as they enter adulthood and beyond.
The Chafee Foster Care Independence Act (P.L. 106-169), enacted in 1999, specified that state child welfare agencies provide additional supports to youth transitioning from foster care under the newly created Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP). The law also directed the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which administers child welfare programs, to consult with stakeholders to develop a national data system on the number, characteristics, and outcomes of current and former foster youth. In response to these requirements, HHS created the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD) under a final rule promulgated in 2008. The rule requires that each state child welfare agency commence collecting and reporting the data beginning in FY2011 (October 1, 2010).
This report provides summary and detailed data about current and former foster youth, as reported by states to HHS via the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD). Data are available on two sets of youth. First, states report information each fiscal year on eligible youth who currently receive independent living services regardless of whether they continue to remain in foster care, were in foster care in another state, or received child welfare services through an Indian tribe or privately operated foster care program. These youth are known as served youth. Data on served youth are intended to show how many youth received independent living services. Second, states report information on foster youth on or about their 17th birthday, on or about their 19th birthday, and on or about their 21st birthday. This reported information is based primarily on data collected through surveys of the youth. In this second group, foster youth at age 17 are known as the baseline youth, and at ages 19 and 21 they are known as the follow-up youth. Data from the tracked population of youth are intended to show education, work, health, and other outcomes of youth who were in foster care at age 17. These current and former foster youth are tracked regardless of whether they receive independent living services at ages 17, 19, and 21.
As noted, states began reporting NYTD data to HHS for served and baseline youth in FY2011. The data in this report include those for served youth in FY2011 through FY2013 and for follow-up youth for FY2013. Between 97,000 and 102,000 youth received an independent living service in each of FY2011 through FY2013. The median age of these youth was 18. In each of the three years, the most common independent living services they received were academic support, career preparation, and education about housing and home management. Approximately 7,500 follow-up youth were surveyed about their outcomes at age 19. About one-third of youth were working full-time and/or part-time. Just over half (54%) were enrolled in school. Almost all of the youth had a positive connection with an adult who could serve in a mentoring or substitute parent role. Most youth had not experienced homelessness or incarceration in their lifetimes. The majority of youth had Medicaid or some other health insurance. However, youth who were no longer in foster care tended to have more negative outcomes on certain indicators. For example, youth in foster care were much less likely to report ever having been homeless compared to youth who left care (11% versus 24%). Likewise, they were less likely to report having ever been incarcerated compared to these same peers (14% versus 29%). |
crs_RS21352 | crs_RS21352_0 | In tax years 2005 through 2007, the phase-out level was $2,000 higher, and beginning in tax year 2008, the phase-out level was $3,000 higher. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ) increased this differential to $5,000 for tax year 2009, and adjusted for inflation in 2010. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-312 ) extended the ARRA provisions for marriage penalty relief through tax year 2012. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. The phase-out level for married couples filing a joint tax return was $5,210 higher than for other tax filers in tax year 2012, and will be $5,340 higher than for other tax filers in tax year 2013. EITC Changes
As shown in Table 1 , between tax years 2011 and 2013, there are increases in the maximum earned income, maximum credit, and phase-out income levels associated with indexing for inflation. A limited number of taxpayers not eligible for the EITC in tax year 2011 will, because of indexing, be eligible for a small EITC in tax years 2012 and 2013. Legislative Changes Affecting the EITC in 2011, 2012, and 2013
P.L. 111-5 (ARRA) created a new credit category, for families with three or more children, for tax years 2009 and 2010 only. For families with three or more children, the credit rate in tax years 2009 and 2010 was 45%. The ARRA also increased the phase-in amount for married couples filing joint tax returns so that it was $5,000 higher than for unmarried taxpayers in tax year 2009. In tax year 2010, the differential was adjusted for inflation. 111-312 extended the ARRA provisions for marriage penalty relief and the category for three or more children through tax year 2012. The EGTRRA changes that were extended through tax year 2012 include (1) changing the definition of earned income for the EITC so that it does not include nontaxable employee compensation; (2) eliminating the reduction in the EITC for the alternative minimum tax; (3) simplifying the calculation of the credit through use of AGI rather than modified adjusted gross income; and (4) providing marriage penalty relief through a higher phase-out income level for taxpayers filing married joint tax returns. 112-240 (ATRA) made the EGTRRA changes permanent and extended the ARRA provisions for families with three or more children and marriage penalty relief for five years (through tax year 2017). | The earned income tax credit (EITC), established in the tax code in 1975, provides cash assistance to lower income working parents and individuals through the tax system. The EITC will be higher in 2012 and 2013 than it was in 2011. An increase in the size of the EITC will occur because the maximum amount of earned income used to calculate the credit and the phase-out income level are indexed for inflation. The increases reflect the inflation adjustment.
For tax year 2012, the maximum EITC for tax filers without children was $475, and it will increase to $487 in 2013. For families with one child, the maximum credit was $3,169 in tax year 2012, and it will increase to $3,250 in 2013. For families with two children, in tax year 2012 the maximum was $5,236, and it will increase to $5,372 in 2013.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) created a new credit category, for families with three or more children for tax years 2009 and 2010.
The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) extended the new category for three or more children to tax years 2011 and 2012. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) extended the ARRA provisions for families with three or more children and marriage penalty relief for five years (through tax year 2017). For families with three or more children, the maximum credit was $5,751 in tax year 2011, $5,891 in tax year 2012, and will be $6,044 in tax year 2013.
Beginning in tax year 2008, the phase-out level for married couples filing a joint tax return was $3,000 higher than the level for other filers. ARRA increased the $3,000 differential for married couples to $5,000 for tax year 2009, and inflation adjusted the amount for tax year 2010.
P.L. 111-312 extended the higher phase-out level to tax years 2011 and 2012. In tax year 2011, the phase-out level for married couples was $5,080 higher than for unmarried taxpayers, $5,210 higher in tax year 2012, and in tax year 2013, it will be $5,340 higher than for unmarried taxpayers.
This report will be updated when new information becomes available. |
crs_RL30751 | crs_RL30751_0 | Policies to Halt Trade in Conflict Diamonds
Regulatory Challenges
Effective policing of the illicit diamond trade faces difficult challenges. The world diamond trade is large, diamonds are a highly fungible and concentrated form of wealth, and the legitimateinternational diamond industry is historically insular, self-regulating, and lacks transparency. Magnitude of the Global Diamond Market
Trade in conflict diamonds, and regulatory proposals to end trade in such gems, are associated primarily with the rough diamond market. (37)
Conflict Diamonds in Global Diamond Markets. Three primaryapproaches for determining the origin of diamonds have been proposed. Physical or "Geo-Chemical" Identification of Diamonds. Tagging of Diamonds. 3. Certificate of Origin Laws. It called for measures toend the conflict diamond trade. For over 2 years, throughconsensus-based negotiation, Process participants worked to create an import/export certificationsystem designed to govern the international trade in rough diamonds. Its efforts centered on the creation of a multi-lateral diamond trade regime backedby international sanctions aimed at curtailing such commerce. International and Multilateral Policy. The Bush Administration has pursued policies to stem the flow ofconflict diamonds that are broadly similar to those of the Clinton Administration, and hasparticipated in the Kimberley Process. Allegations that diamonds may play a rolein financing of international terrorist groups have also drawn congressional attention. (67)
In addition to addressing human rights and conflict-related concerns, conflict diamond hearings n the 106th and 107th Congresses highlighted congressional interest in ensuring thatproposals toregulate international trade in diamonds and any U.S. legislation to implement such proposals beconsistent with relevant World Trade Organization trade rules. 2722 (Houghton); H.R. 107-115 ] was the only onein which diamond-related provisions were included in the final version of legislation signed into law.It prohibited certain OPIC and Ex-Im Bank diamond-related projects in countries not implementinga system of rough diamond export and import controls, as defined in the Act. The 108th Congress, like the pasttwo Congresses, has demonstrated continuing interest in ending the conflict diamond trade. 108-10 ) also contains two provisions related to conflict diamonds.First, conferees stated their expectation that of funds provided to the Council of American OverseasResearch Centers, "necessary funds" would be granted for research to develop a diamondfingerprinting technology to facilitate monitoring of the international trade in conflict diamonds.Second, the Statement, reflecting the language of the Joint Resolution, as passed, recommended the$2,000,000 technical assistance, and noted that the Senate amendment to H.J.Res. 1415 and H.R. 1584. Both would have allowed a waiverof such a prohibition for up to a year if the President determines and reports to Congress that a roughdiamond exporting or importing country is taking effective steps to implement the KimberleyProcess Certification Scheme or the President determines that such a waiver is in the nationalinterests of the United States, and reports such a determination and the reasons for it to Congress.Both bills also included a range of enforcement provisions and policy recommendations, some in"sense of Congress" language, as well as reporting requirements. On April 8, 2003, an amended version of H.R. 1584 was passed by the House. The enrolled bill wassigned into law by President Bush on April 25, 2003, and became P.L. S. 760 appears to be a companion bill to H.R. 239. 108-19 , Representative Watson introduced H.Con.Res. (76)
Some in the diamond trade have generally argued against a more extensive certificate regime. | In several diamond-rich countries affected by armed conflict, notably in Africa, belligerents have funded their military activities by mining and selling diamonds, and competition over the useand control of diamond wealth has contributed significantly to the depth and extended duration ofthese conflicts. Diamonds used in this fashion, labeled "conflict diamonds," were estimated to havecomprised an estimated 3.7 % to 15% of the value of the global diamond trade in 2000. The presentvolume of such trade appears is difficult to estimate. Several diamond-related conflicts have ended,but others have burgeoned. Policy makers' attention has also increasingly focused on the possiblerole that diamonds may play in the financing of terrorist operations.
In response to public pressure to halt trade in conflict diamonds, and due to the persistence of several diamond-related conflicts, governments and multilateral organizations have pursued effortsto end such trade. Several international policy forums, national legislatures, and diverse privateparties have proposed various reforms and legislation to achieve such goals. Effective regulation ofthe diamond trade is difficult. Diamonds are a highly fungible, concentrated form of wealth, and theglobal diamond industry is historically insular and self-regulating. The illicit diamond trade exploitsthese factors. Proposals to end illicit trading generally center on legally identifying the origin ofdiamonds and requiring the registration, identification, and monitoring of cross-border trade indiamond, as is common for trade in other goods. Methods for achieving such ends include thecataloging of unique physical diamond features; the "tagging" of diamonds with minute markings;and the creation of certification-of-origin laws to document the origin of diamonds.
The Clinton Administration worked to create a certificates of origin-based international diamond trade regime, but sought to ensure that such efforts would not negatively affect thelegitimate industry. It also backed marketing reforms and regulatory capacity building in diamond-rich Africancountries, consulted with the diamond industry, pushed for U.N. sanctions to end theconflict diamond trade, and created an inter-agency group on conflict diamonds. The BushAdministration has pursued policies that broadly mirror those of its predecessor.
The United States participates in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, a global diamond trade regulation framework. The Administration began implementing the Scheme in the UnitedStates with voluntary interim compliance measures, prior to the passage of H.R. 1584 (see below). Several congressional hearings have addressed trade in conflict diamonds. Potentiallinks between terrorism financing and trade in diamonds have garnered increasing congressionalattention. The 106th and 107th Congresses considered several diamond-related bills. The108thCongress passed H.J.Res. 2 in February 2003; it contained several conflictdiamond-related provisions. Other conflict diamond bills introduced in the 108th Congress include H.Con.Res. 239 (Watson); S. 760 (Grassley), H.R. 1415 (Houghton), and H.R. 1584 (Houghton). The latter three bills shared many goals incommon with H.R. 1584 , an amended version of which was passed by both chambersand signed into law by President Bush, becoming P.L. 108-19 . |
crs_RL34237 | crs_RL34237_0 | Introduction
Historically, Central California's San Joaquin River supported large Chinook salmon populations. Since the Bureau of Reclamation's Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River became fully operational in the 1940s, much of the river's water has been diverted for agricultural uses. As a result, approximately 60 miles of the river is dry in most years, making it impossible to support Chinook salmon populations in the upper reaches of the river. A U.S. District Court judge has since ruled that operation of Friant Dam violates state law because of its destruction of downstream fisheries. Faced with mounting legal fees, considerable uncertainty, and the possibility of dramatic cuts to water diversions, parties agreed to negotiate a settlement instead of proceeding to trial on a remedy regarding the court's ruling. The Settlement calls for new releases of water from Friant Dam to restore fisheries in the San Joaquin River and for efforts to mitigate water supply losses due to the new releases. Implementation legislation based on the Settlement ( H.R. 4074 , H.R. Other San Joaquin water management bills have also been introduced (e.g., H.R. The quantity of water used for restoration flows and the quantity by which water deliveries would be reduced are related, but the relationship would not necessarily be one-for-one. Congressional authorization and appropriations are required for full implementation of the Settlement. A key legislative issue is how to finance Settlement implementation, specifically how to resolve congressional Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) issues. Other challenges are how to achieve the Settlement's dual goals of fisheries restoration and water management, and how to address concerns of stakeholders not party to the Settlement, without disrupting the negotiated agreement. 24 and S. 27 ), it has not been enacted. Settlement Goals and Implementing Legislation: Key Issues
As noted above, the settling parties agreed that it would have two goals: (1) a Restoration Goal: "... to restore and maintain fish populations in 'good condition' in the mainstem of the San Joaquin River below Friant Dam to the confluence of the Merced River, including naturally-reproducing and self-sustaining populations of salmon and other fish..."; and (2) a Water Management Goal: "... to reduce or avoid adverse water supply impacts to all of the Friant Division long-term contractors that may result from the Interim Flows and Restoration flows provided for in this Settlement...". Using two available data sources (which do not account for improvements in water management that may dampen the Settlement's impact on agricultural and municipal users), it appears that annual water supplies for the Friant Division Service Area would be, on average , 15% to 16% less under the Settlement, than average supplies under current operating protocols. On the other hand, the region may benefit from increased recreational expenditures and investment in San Joaquin River restoration activities, as well as increased downstream water supply and water quality benefits. The Settlement will also affect communities and interests not party to the Settlement. "Third Party" Impacts
Communities dependent on groundwater supplies are also concerned about potential effects on groundwater quantity and quality. Therefore, for at least three-quarters of the contractors, the reductions in Friant Division deliveries represents a reduction in one of multiple supplies. | Historically, Central California's San Joaquin River supported large Chinook salmon populations. Since the Bureau of Reclamation's Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River became fully operational in the 1940s, much of the river's water has been diverted for off-stream agricultural uses. As a result, approximately 60 miles of the river bed is dry in most years. Thus, the river no longer supports Chinook salmon populations in its upper reaches. In 1988, a coalition of conservation and fishing groups sued Reclamation (Natural Resources Defense Council v. Rodgers). A U.S. District Court judge has ruled that operation of Friant Dam violates state law because of its destruction of downstream fisheries. Faced with mounting legal fees, uncertainty, and the possibility of dramatic cuts to water diversions, parties negotiated a settlement instead of proceeding to trial. In September 2006, an agreement, commonly called the Settlement, was reached. It calls for new releases of water from Friant Dam to restore fisheries, as well as for efforts to mitigate reductions in off-stream deliveries lost to restoration flows.
Congressional authorization and appropriations are required for full Settlement implementation. Legislation based on the Settlement (H.R. 4074, H.R. 24 and S. 27) is pending. Related bills have also been introduced. A key legislative issue is how to finance the Settlement, specifically how to resolve congressional pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) issues. Other challenges are how to achieve the Settlement's dual goals of fisheries restoration and water management, and how to address concerns of stakeholders not party to the Settlement, without disrupting the negotiated agreement.
The amount of water projected for restoration flows and the volume of reduced Friant water deliveries are related, but the relationship would not necessarily be one-for-one. Available estimates for total annual Friant water supplies (including both contract and temporary water) are, on average, 15% to 16% less under the Settlement than under current operations; but such estimates do not account for improvements in water management that might reduce the impact on water users. For three-quarters of water contractors, the reduction would represent a reduction in one of their available sources of water. The impacts of such reductions will vary by contractor depending on the firmness of existing surface water supplies and the reliability of groundwater supplies. How to offset the decrease and who would pay for investments in other water sources and improved efficiency has not been determined.
Although the region may benefit from increased recreational expenditures and investment in river restoration activities under the Settlement, studies suggest its largest and mostly negative economic impact would be on the agriculture industry, at least in the short term. In addition, downsteam interests not party to the Settlement have been concerned about increased flooding, groundwater infiltration, and competition with existing federal financial commitments. Nearby communities fear harm to groundwater quantity and quality. Some of these concerns have been addressed in the legislation, but some remain. On the other hand, some communities and interests believe restoration will bring other benefits to the river, such as improved surface water quality in lower San Joaquin River reaches. Ultimate Settlement costs and benefits are very difficult to predict. |
crs_RS21338 | crs_RS21338_0 | More Flexible Forward-Deployment Schedules
The Navy's traditional means of maintaining forward-deployed presence had been the standard six-month deployment. Navy officials also concluded that orienting Navy readiness toward maintaining standard six-month deployments resulted in a fleet that offered insufficient flexibility for surging large numbers of naval forces in a short time to respond to major regional contingencies. Long-Duration Deployments with Crew Rotation (Sea Swap)
The Navy in recent years has experimented with the concept of long-duration deployments with crew rotation. Global Fleet Stations (GFSs)
The Navy is experimenting with a concept, first announced in 2006, called global fleet stations, or GFSs. For what kinds of ships should Navy use Sea Swap or multiple crewing? How will FRP and the forward-homeporting of additional ships affect the distribution of Navy ship overhaul and repair work? | The Navy has implemented new kinds of naval formations, more flexible forward-deployment schedules, and a ship readiness plan (called the Fleet Response Plan, or FRP) for surge-deploying several aircraft carriers in a short period of time to respond to contingencies. The Navy has also forward-homeported additional ships, experimented with long-duration deployments with crew rotation (which the Navy calls Sea Swap), investigated multiple-crewing of ships, and is experimenting with a new forward-deployment concept called global fleet stations, or GFSs. These actions raise several potential issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44639 | crs_R44639_0 | Introduction
Military construction for active and reserve components of the Armed Forces, military family housing construction and operations, the U.S. contribution to the NATO Security Investment Program, military base closures and realignment actions, and the military housing privatization initiative will be funded through Title I and Title IV of the FY2017 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The act is associated with three separate bill numbers: H.R. 4974 , S. 2806 , and H.R. 2577 . The request included an additional $172.4 million for construction activities associated with Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The House-Senate conference reported a new budget authority appropriation of $7.90 billion that, after incorporating budget authority rescinded from previous years, would make available a total appropriation of $8.21 billion, as shown in Table 1 . The House has agreed to the conference report. 4974 , the first version of the military construction appropriations bill of the legislative session, was introduced in the House on April 15, 2016. A companion bill, S. 2806 , was introduced in the Senate on April 18. H.R. 2577 , originally the Department of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development (T-HUD) appropriations bill for FY2016, was adopted to serve as the vehicle for a compromise appropriation bill. Division A of the amended bill would have provided FY2017 T-HUD appropriations, and Division B would have provided FY2017 MILCON/VA appropriations. The amended bill was passed by the Senate on May 19, 2016, and sent to the House. H.R. 2577 , as engrossed by the House, would have established Division A as the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017; Division B as the Zika Response Appropriations Act, 2016; and Division C as the Zika Vector Control Act. The House passed the amended bill on May 26, 2016, and requested a conference. The conference was held on June 15, 2016, and the conferees filed their report, H.Rept. The House agreed to the report on June 23, 2016, by the Yeas and Nays, 239 – 171 ( Roll no. In the Senate, portions of the bill were incorporated into H.R. The amended bill contained four parts: (1) Division A: Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017; (2) Division B: Zika Response and Preparedness; (3) Division C: Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017; and (4) Division D: Rescissions of Funds. 573 ) the same day. The President signed the bill into law ( P.L. 114-223 ) on September 29, 2016. Military Construction Appropriations Since FY2000
The President has requested new budget authority in the amounts of $7.44 billion (base budget) and $172.4 million (Overseas Contingency Operations, OCO) for a total of $7.62 billion for military construction and military family housing for FY2017. | Military construction for active and reserve components of the Armed Forces, military family housing construction and operations, the U.S. contribution to the NATO Security Investment Program, military base closures and realignment actions, and the military housing privatization initiative will be funded through Title I and Title IV of the FY2017 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The act is associated with three separate bill numbers: H.R. 4974, S. 2806, and H.R. 2577.
For FY2017, the President requested $7.44 billion in new budget authority for regular (base budget) military construction and family housing activities and an additional $172.5 million for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) construction for a total of $7.62 billion in new budget authority. The bill's conference committee recommended $7.73 billion in the base budget and $172.0 million in OCO funding for a total of $7.90 billion in new budget authority. With additional funds available through the rescission of prior-year appropriations, Congress could make available up to $8.03 billion in base funding and $172.0 million in OCO appropriations for a total military construction appropriation of $8.21 billion for FY2017.
The FY2017 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act originated in the House as H.R. 4974, introduced on April 15, 2016. A similar bill, S. 2806, was introduced in the Senate on April 18, 2016. On May 19, 2016, the Senate combined the versions of the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development (T-HUD), Military Construction and Veterans Affairs (MILCON/VA), and Zika Response and Preparedness appropriations bills into H.R. 2577 (a T-HUD appropriations bill for FY2016 that the House had passed in June, 2015), passed the amended bill, and sent it to the House. The House substituted its own amendment in three divisions (Division A: MILCON/VA, Division B: Zika Response Appropriations, and Division C: Zika Vector Control), removing the T-HUD portion for H.R. 2577, passed the bill, and requested a conference.
The conference met on June 15, 2016, and filed its report (H.Rept. 114-640) the next day. The conference bill contained four divisions: (1) Division A: MILCON/VA; (2) Division B: Zika Response and Preparedness Appropriations; (3) Division C: Zika Vector Control; and (4) Division D: Rescission of Funds. The House agreed to the report on June 23, 2016.The Senate incorporated portions of the amended H.R. 2577 into another bill, H.R. 5325, organized as (1) Division A: Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017; (2) Division B: Zika Response and Preparedness; (3) Division C: Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017; and (4) Division D: Rescissions of Funds, and passed the bill. The House agreed to the amended H.R. 5325 the same day. The President signed H.R. 5325 into law (P.L. 114-223 ) on September 29, 2016. |
crs_RS22905 | crs_RS22905_0 | Historically, Congress has mandated programs to help U.S. exporters compete with subsidies provided by other countries, to assist with financing for exports where credit is a constraint, or to promote U.S. agricultural exports. The enacted farm law repeals legislative authority for the major export subsidy program, but extends authority for a smaller program that subsidizes dairy product exports. Funded by using the borrowing authority of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), the farm bill agricultural export programs are administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). In the 2002 farm bill ( P.L. Four CCC export credit guarantee programs were authorized in the 2002 farm bill. Export Market Development
The 2002 farm bill authorized four programs to promote U.S. agricultural products in overseas markets, including the Market Access Program (MAP), the Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP), the Emerging Markets Program (EMP), and the Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops Program (TASC). The 2008 farm bill extends FMDP through FY2012 without change in the funding authorization. Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops
TASC aims to assist U.S. specialty crop exports by providing funds for projects that address sanitary, phytosanitary, and technical barriers that prohibit or threaten U.S. speciality crop exporters. | Agricultural exports, which are forecast by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to reach $108.5 billion in 2009, are an important source of employment, income, and purchasing power in the U.S. economy. Programs that deal with U.S. agricultural exports are a major focus of Title III, the trade title, in the new omnibus farm bill, the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246, H.R. 6124). The enacted farm bill repeals the major U.S. export subsidy program, and reauthorizes and changes a number of programs that assist with financing U.S. agricultural exports or that help develop markets overseas. Changes include modifying export credit guarantee programs to conform with U.S. commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO), making organic products eligible for export market development programs, and increasing the funds available to address sanitary and phytosanitary barriers to U.S. specialty crop exports.
International food aid programs are the other major focus of the farm bill trade title. For a discussion of farm bill changes in food aid programs, see CRS Report RS22900, International Food Aid Provisions of the 2008 Farm Bill. |
crs_R41985 | crs_R41985_0 | This report focuses both on those policies contained in the 2008 farm bill—and as extended by §701 of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 110-246 ) in favor of non-corn feedstock, especially cellulosic-based feedstock. Key biofuels-related provisions in the enacted 2008 farm bill include
expansion of the existing bio-based marketing program to encourage federal procurement of bio-based products (§9002); expansion of the federal bio-products certification program (§9002); additional support for biorefinery development (§9003); grants and loan guarantees for advanced biofuels (especially cellulosic) production (§9005); an education program to promote the use and understanding of biodiesel (§9006); support for rural energy efficiency and self-sufficiency and biofuels marketing infrastructure (§9007); reauthorization of biofuels research programs (§9008) within USDA and the Department of Energy (DOE); a new program to incentivize the production, harvesting, storage, and transportation of cellulosic ethanol feedstock (§9011); reauthorization of Sun Grant Initiative programs that coordinate research on advanced biofuels at land-grant universities and federally funded laboratories (§7526); establishment of a new cellulosic ethanol production tax credit (§15321); reduction of the blender tax credit for corn-based ethanol (§15331); studies of the market and environmental impacts of increased biofuels use (§15322); and continuation of the duty on imported ethanol (§15333). Funding Under the 2008 Farm Bill for FY2008-FY2012
The 2008 farm bill authorized slightly over $1 billion in mandatory funding for Title IX energy programs for FY2008 through FY2012 ( Table 1 ), compared with $800 million in the 2002 farm bill (FY2002-FY2007). However, actual discretionary appropriations to Title IX energy programs have been substantially below authorized levels at $106 million through FY2012. As regards mandatory funding, all of the bioenergy provisions of Title IX—with the exception of Section 9010, the Feedstock Flexibility Program for Bioenergy Producers, which is authorized indefinitely—had mandatory funding only for the life of the 2008 farm bill, FY2008 through FY2012. If policymakers want to continue these programs under either the 2008 farm bill extension or in the next farm bill, they will need to pay for the programs with offsets. 112-240 ) are included. 112-175 or P.L. Section 9003: Biorefinery Assistance Program (BAP)
Function: The Biorefinery Assistance Program (BAP) assists in the development of new and emerging technologies for advanced biofuels. (7 U.S.C. Bioenergy Programs Proposed by the 113th Congress
In the 113 th Congress, both the Senate-passed ( S. 954 ) and House-passed ( H.R. 2642 ) bills would extend most of the renewable energy provisions of Title IX, with the exception of the Rural Energy Self-Sufficiency Initiative, the Forest Biomass for Energy Program, the Biofuels Infrastructure Study, and the Renewable Fertilizer Study, which are either omitted or explicitly repealed by both bills. In addition, S. 954 omits the Repowering Assistance Program, while H.R. 2642 adds a new reporting requirement on energy use and efficiency at USDA facilities. The primary difference between the House and Senate bills is in the source of funding ( Table 3 ). Over their five-year reauthorization period (FY2014-FY2018), the Senate bill contains a total of $900 million in new mandatory funding and authorizes $1.140 billion in appropriations for the various Title IX programs. In contrast, H.R. 2642 contains no mandatory funding for Title IX programs, while authorizing $1.405 billion over the five years, subject to annual appropriations. In addition, the House bill eliminates all support for the collection, harvest, storage, and transportation (CHST) component of BCAP, severely limiting its potential effectiveness as an incentive to produce cellulosic feedstocks. Although most of the Title IX bioenergy programs have been reauthorized for FY2013 by the ATRA farm bill extension, they have received no new mandatory funding. However, the principal program designed to help "kick start" the U.S. cellulosic biofuels sector was the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP, §9001). | Title IX, the energy title of the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-240), contains the bioenergy programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). USDA renewable energy programs have incentivized research, development, and adoption of renewable energy projects, including solar, wind, and anaerobic digesters. However, the primary focus of USDA renewable energy programs has been to promote U.S. biofuels production and use—including corn starch-based ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, and soybean-based biodiesel.
Cornstarch-based ethanol dominates the U.S. biofuels industry. The 2008 farm bill attempted to refocus U.S. biofuels policy initiatives in favor of non-corn feedstocks, especially the development of the cellulosic biofuels industry. The most critical programs to this end are the Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels, which pays producers for production of eligible advanced biofuels; the Biorefinery Assistance Program, which assists in the development of new and emerging technologies for advanced biofuels; the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP), which assists farmers in developing nontraditional crops for use as feedstocks for the eventual production of cellulosic ethanol or other second-generation biofuels; and the Renewable Energy for America Program (REAP), which has funded a variety of biofuels-related projects including the installation of blender pumps to help circumvent the emerging blend wall that could potentially circumscribe domestic ethanol consumption near current levels of about 13 billion gallons.
The 2008 farm bill authorized slightly over $1 billion in mandatory funding for energy programs for FY2008 through FY2012, while discretionary funding in the 2008 farm bill totaled $1.7 billion. However, actual discretionary appropriations to Title IX energy programs have been substantially below authorized levels through FY2012.
All of the major Title IX bioenergy programs expired at the end of FY2012 and lacked baseline funding going forward. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) extends the 2008 farm bill through FY2013. However, all major bioenergy provisions of Title IX—with the exception of the Feedstock Flexibility Program for Bioenergy Producers—have no new mandatory funding in FY2013 under the ATRA farm bill extension. If policymakers want to continue these programs under either the 2008 farm bill extension or in the next farm bill, they will need to pay for the program with offsets.
In the 113th Congress, both the Senate-passed (S. 954) and House-passed (H.R. 2642) bills would extend most of the renewable energy provisions of Title IX, with the exception of the Rural Energy Self-Sufficiency Initiative, the Forest Biomass for Energy Program, the Biofuels Infrastructure Study, and the Renewable Fertilizer Study, which are either omitted or explicitly repealed by both bills. In addition, S. 954 omits the Repowering Assistance Program, while H.R. 2642 adds a new reporting requirement on energy use and efficiency at USDA facilities. Otherwise, the primary difference between the House and Senate bills is in the source of funding. Over their five-year reauthorization period (FY2014-FY2018), the Senate bill contains a total of $900 million in new mandatory funding and authorizes $1.140 billion in appropriations for the various Title IX programs. In contrast, H.R. 2642 contains no mandatory funding for Title IX programs, while authorizing $1.405 billion over the five years, subject to annual appropriations. In addition, the House bill eliminates all support for the collection, harvest, storage, and transportation (CHST) component of BCAP, severely limiting its potential effectiveness as an incentive to produce cellulosic feedstocks. |
crs_R40154 | crs_R40154_0 | Congress has been interested in detecting nuclear weapons and the special materials needed to make them for many years, especially since 9/11. However, they are generated in different ways. Atomic number and density
Atomic number, abbreviated "Z," is the number of protons in an atom's nucleus. Thus a way to detect an object, such as a bomb, in a container is to beam in x-rays or gamma rays to create a radiograph (an opacity map) like a medical x-ray. Each point on the spectrum shows the number of photons emitted (vertical axis) at each energy level (horizontal axis). Detectors, algorithms, and CONOPS are the eyes and ears, brains, and hands of nuclear detection: effective detection requires all three. For example, shielding a bomb with lead to attenuate gamma rays would create a large, opaque image on a radiograph. This section discusses nine U.S. technologies selected to include different (1) agencies sponsoring projects (the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), an agency of the Department of Defense (DOD); the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an agency of the Department of Energy (DOE)), (2) organizations performing the work (national laboratories, industry, universities, and collaborations between them), (3) types of technology (materials, algorithms, simulation, systems), (4) physical principles (muon tomography, radiography, stimulated emission of radiation, nuclear resonance fluorescence), (5) distances between the detector and the object being scanned (near and far), and (6) levels of maturity (in use for many years but constantly updated, near deployment, and anticipated to be available for deployment in several years). There are two main types of scintillators. Many variables affect detector performance. Operational analysis. In an effort to overcome these limitations, DNDO is conducting R&D on advanced radiography systems under the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) program. A different physical principle enables a radiography system to search for materials with high atomic number (Z). (The third CAARS system utilizes a different principle.) It produced its first image in May 2009. Based on tests conducted in early 2010 with its prototype scanner, DSIC estimated in April 2010 that its system would take less than 1 minute to clear most containers with 95% confidence; that it could automatically detect a cube of unshielded SNM 5 cm on a side in a container in that time; and that it could automatically detect that cube inside shielding (e.g., a larger cube) in less time. (5) Because muons are highly penetrating, they can be used to detect high-Z material even when shielded. Such materials are not high Z. NRF may be able to provide different types of data. At issue: Is NRF a useful approach to determining the materials in a weapon? If a beam of such photons is sent through a cargo container or other object, and the detector on the other side can record the energy of each transmitted photon, a hole or "notch" in the spectrum at a certain energy level means that some particular material has absorbed photons at that energy level through NRF and then subsequently re-emitted the absorbed photons at about the same energy level. This section considers the Photonuclear Inspection and Threat Assessment System (PITAS), a project funded by DTRA and conducted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Chapter 3. Other technologies, such as improved detector material and improved algorithms, also have the potential to improve detection capability. It is difficult to predict the schedule of new detection technologies . It is easier, less costly, and potentially more effective to accelerate a program in R&D than in production. Technology development is dynamic. Concept of operations " (CONOPS) is crucial to the effectiveness of detection systems. Current equipment to detect and identify SNM makes use of two main signatures of this material, opacity for radiography to detect SNM, and gamma-ray emissions for spectroscopy to detect and identify SNM. Congress may wish to address gaps and synergisms in this portfolio. Observations on Technical Progress and Terrorism
Ongoing improvement in U.S. detection capabilities produces uncertainties for terrorists that seem likely to increase over time, adding another layer of deterrence beyond that of the capabilities themselves. However, that beam will also cause other materials to fission, including natural uranium, so emission of a burst of neutrons and gamma rays resulting from interrogation by a high-energy gamma ray beam is a possible, but not a definitive, indicator by itself of the presence of SNM. Detecting Signatures of a Nuclear Weapon or SNM
Overview: How are signatures gathered, processed, and used? Denser, higher-Z material within a solid object absorbs photons of lower energy and scatters photons of higher energy. Evasion of Detection Technologies
In order to understand the capabilities of detection systems, it is important to know their weaknesses as well as their strengths. | Detection of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material (SNM, plutonium, and certain types of uranium) is crucial to thwarting nuclear proliferation and terrorism and to securing weapons and materials worldwide. Congress has funded a portfolio of detection R&D and acquisition programs, and has mandated inspection at foreign ports of all U.S.-bound cargo containers using two types of detection equipment.
Nuclear weapons contain SNM, which produces suspect signatures that can be detected. It emits radiation, notably gamma rays (high-energy photons) and neutrons. SNM is dense, so it produces a bright image on a radiograph (a picture like a medical x-ray) when x-rays or gamma rays are beamed through a container in which it is hidden. Using lead or other shielding to attenuate gamma rays would make that image larger. Nuclear weapons produce detectable signatures, such as radiation or a noticeable image on a radiograph. Other detection techniques are also available.
Nine technologies illustrate the detection portfolio: (1) A new scintillator material to improve detector performance and lower cost. This project was terminated in January 2010. (2) GADRAS, an application using multiple algorithms to determine the materials in a container by analyzing gamma-ray spectra. If materials are the "eyes and ears" of detectors, algorithms are the "brains." (3) A project to simulate large numbers of experiments to improve detection system performance. (4, 5) Two Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems (CAARS) to detect high-density material based on the principle that it becomes less transparent to photons of higher energy, unlike other material. (6) A third CAARS to detect material with high atomic number (Z, number of protons in an atom's nucleus) based on the principle that Z affects how material scatters photons. This project was terminated in March 2009. (7) A system to generate a 3-D image of the contents of a container based on the principle that Z and density strongly affect the degree to which muons (a subatomic particle) scatter. (8) Nuclear resonance fluorescence imaging to identify materials based on the spectrum of gamma rays a nucleus emits when struck by photons of a specific energy. (9) The Photonuclear Inspection and Threat Assessment System to detect SNM up to 1 km away, unlike other systems that operate at very close range. It would beam high-energy photons at distant targets to stimulate fission in SNM, producing characteristic signatures that may be detected. These technologies are selected not because they are necessarily the "best" in their categories, but rather to show a variety of approaches, in differing stages of maturity, performed by different types of organizations, relying on different physical principles, and covering building blocks (materials, algorithms, models) as well as systems, so as to convey many points on the spectrum of detection technology development.
This analysis leads to several observations for Congress. It is difficult to predict the schedule or capabilities of new detection technologies. It is easier and less costly to accelerate a program in R&D than in production. "Concept of operations" is crucial to detection system effectiveness. Congress may wish to address gaps and synergisms in the technology portfolio. Congress need not depend solely on procedures developed by executive agencies to test detection technologies, but may specify tests an agency is to conduct. Ongoing improvement in detection capabilities produces uncertainties for terrorists that will increase over time, adding deterrence beyond that of the capabilities themselves.
This report will be updated occasionally. |
crs_R40165 | crs_R40165_0 | Introduction
One consequence of unemployment is that individuals and their family members can lose their health insurance. Loss of insurance may have little impact on individuals who do not use many health care services. However, for those who have health problems or who are injured, loss of coverage can be serious. Without insurance, individuals often have difficulty obtaining needed care and have problems paying for the care they receive. Unemployed individuals and their family members who cannot postpone care may incur large bills that create or add to financial distress. Some of the unemployed and/or their family members will be eligible for Medicaid coverage. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended) is intended to improve access to health insurance coverage, but it does not necessarily provide immediate access to coverage for unemployed individuals and their family members. Some provisions of the ACA that improve access to care have been implemented, but they apply to specific populations (e.g., individuals with preexisting conditions). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) expects the unemployment rate to remain above 8.0% through 2014, indicating that the impact of unemployment on health insurance is likely to continue for some time to come. This report contains information and analysis intended to inform congressional debate over whether to address these issues, and if so, how, and to what extent. It is divided into five parts:
1. analysis showing the diversity of the unemployed population; 2. analysis showing the relationship between unemployment and loss of employer-sponsored health insurance; 3. analysis of certain unemployed individuals at risk for being uninsured; 4. summaries of current federal programs and tax treatments that can help some unemployed individuals obtain or retain health insurance; and 5. additional options that might be considered. COBRA Health Coverage Tax Credit Medicaid Itemized Deduction for Medical Expenses Health Savings Accounts
COBRA
Title X of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA, P.L. 99-272 ) generally requires employers with 20 or more workers to provide employees and their families the right to continue participation in the company's group health plan in case of certain events, one of which is involuntary dismissal. One limitation of COBRA for the unemployed has been that covered individuals usually have to pay 102% of the health plan's full premium (i.e., both the employee's and the employer's share, plus a 2% administrative fee). Several provisions of the ACA are intended to increase consumer access to health insurance. An ACA provision that is helping certain unemployed individuals under age 26 obtain or retain health insurance is the expansion of dependent coverage. Beyond the immediate reforms to the health insurance market, beginning in 2014 the ACA will also provide premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies for certain eligible individuals who obtain coverage through a health insurance exchange, which could include some unemployed individuals. In addition, in 2014, or sooner at state option, the ACA will expand Medicaid access to certain individuals who are under age 65 with modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) up to 133% of the federal poverty level ($30,657 for a family of four in 2012). The COBRA premium subsidy was not available for those who lost their jobs after May 31, 2010. Individuals are generally not eligible for Medicare until age 65. | When workers lose their jobs, they can also lose their health insurance. If that health insurance is family coverage, then a worker's family members can also become uninsured. For individuals who do not typically use many health care services, loss of insurance might have little impact. However, for individuals who have health problems or who are injured, loss of coverage can be serious. Without insurance, individuals often have difficulty obtaining needed care and problems paying for the care they receive. Unemployed individuals and their family members who cannot postpone care may incur large bills that create or add to financial distress. With the Congressional Budget Office expecting the unemployment rate to remain above 8.0% through 2014, retaining or obtaining health insurance may continue to be difficult for the unemployed and their family members.
The 111th Congress passed legislation that temporarily addressed part of this problem through a temporary premium subsidy for health insurance coverage through Title X of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA, P.L. 99-272). COBRA generally requires certain employers to provide employees and their families the right to continue participation in the employer's health plan in the case of certain events, including involuntary dismissal. To continue coverage, workers must pay both the employee's and the employer's share of the premium, plus a 2% administrative fee. The premium subsidy that reduced the cost of COBRA coverage for certain individuals who lost their jobs expired on May 31, 2010.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended) is intended to expand access to health insurance coverage. Some ACA provisions made immediate market reforms to increase consumer access to health insurance, particularly for young adults, individuals with preexisting conditions, and other, higher-risk groups. For example, one provision of the ACA generally allowed dependents up to age 26 to remain eligible for insurance coverage through their parents' plans, which could help the younger unemployed. Some other provisions of the ACA that increase access to coverage do not become effective until 2014, however. Those provisions include expansion of Medicaid to those with modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) up to 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) and insurance premium credits and subsidies for individuals and families with MAGI below 400% FPL.
Currently, certain individuals cannot benefit from the expanded access to coverage under the ACA because either the provisions do not apply to them or because applicable provisions have not yet taken effect. These individuals could include unemployed individuals and their family members. This report examines access to health insurance coverage among the unemployed population and provides information and analysis to inform the congressional debate on this issue. The report is divided into five parts: (1) analysis showing the diversity of the unemployed population, (2) analysis showing the relationship between unemployment and loss of employer-sponsored health insurance, (3) analysis of certain unemployed individuals at-risk for being uninsured, (4) summaries of current federal programs and tax treatments that can help some unemployed individuals (and their families) obtain or retain health insurance, and (5) additional options that might be considered, including extending the COBRA eligibility period and allowing unemployed individuals under age 65 to "buy-in" to Medicare—that is, to pay premiums to join Medicare before they reach age 65. |
crs_RL32775 | crs_RL32775_0 | Three need-based Federal Student Aid (FSA) programs authorized under the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA) —the Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant (FSEOG) program, the Federal Work-Study (FWS) program, and the Federal Perkins Loan program—are collectively referred to as the campus-based financial aid programs. The programs have also been criticized because the current distribution of funds allows institutions that receive proportionately more funding on a per-student basis to give larger campus-based awards to more students and to students with higher incomes than can be awarded at other institutions. Some have proposed modifying the campus-based programs' funding procedures to gradually phase out the current practice of allocating the majority of funds to institutions on the basis of the amounts they received in prior years and to require that all funding eventually be provided in proportion to the aggregate financial need of students at participating institutions. 609 , as introduced in the House, would have amended the allocation procedures for the campus-based programs to gradually phase out provisions that provide for the allocation of funds on the basis of the amounts institutions' received in prior years so that eventually all funds would be allocated to institutions on the basis of their aggregate student financial need. In the second stage, any funds remaining after the allocation of base guarantees are allocated to IHEs according to need-based formula allocation procedures. Earlier in this report, it was shown that an institution's fair share is the amount of funds it would receive if the total appropriation were allocated entirely on the basis of institutional need. In the current postsecondary education environment in which college costs have been rising rapidly in recent years, it is not uncommon under the fair share formulas for institutional need at higher-cost IHEs to be comprised largely of the financial need of middle- and upper-income students, whereas at lower-cost IHEs, institutional need is comprised primarily of the financial need of lower- and middle-income students. Significantly, on a per-student basis, greater amounts of institutional need are calculated for high-cost institutions than for low-cost institutions. This part of the report estimates and analyzes the prospect of eliminating base guarantees in favor of allocating all campus-based funding according to the existing fair share formulas. This tends to favor students attending higher-cost institutions. Both the percentage of students receiving aid and average award amounts increase consistently with institutional COA. When these procedures were developed, it was envisioned that funds would be allocated according to a series of formulas designed to provide each institution with funding in proportion to its fair share of aggregate student need. Overall, however, more IHEs would receive allocation increases than decreases if base guarantees were eliminated. Analysis of the distribution of aid to students revealed that despite there being a strong correlation between a student's family income and the cost of attendance at the institution a student attends, larger proportions of students at high-cost institutions receive campus-based aid than students at low-cost institutions. | The Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant, Federal Work-Study, and Federal Perkins Loan programs are collectively referred to as the campus-based financial aid programs largely because participating institutions play a central role in their operation, and because the aid they make available to students comprises federal funds matched in part with institutional funds. In recent years, the programs have been criticized because a large share of funding is allocated to institutions on the basis of amounts received in prior years for "base guarantees" as opposed to being allocated exclusively on the basis of aggregate student financial need. They also have been criticized because the current funding procedures allow institutions that receive proportionately greater funding on a per-student basis to provide larger awards to students with higher incomes than can be provided to lower-income students at institutions that receive less funding. In recent Congress bills have been introduced to modify the funding procedures by gradually phasing out base guarantee funding and requiring all campus-based funding to be allocated to institutions according to existing need-based "fair share" formulas.
This report describes and analyzes (a) the process through which federal funds are allocated to institutions under the campus-based programs, (b) the potential for allocating all campus-based funding according to the existing need-based formulas, and (c) the current distribution of aid to students. It will be updated to track legislative proposals addressing the campus-based allocation procedures. Major findings presented in the report include the following:
Under each program, the majority of funds are allocated to institutions on the basis of amounts received in prior years, while only a modest amount are allocated according to aggregate student financial need as calculated according to "fair share" formulas. Under the need-based formulas, the cost of attendance at an institution is the dominant factor in determining institutional need. Much greater amounts of institutional need are calculated on a per-student basis at high-cost institutions than at low-cost institutions. At low-cost institutions, institutional need comprises limited amounts of aggregate student need attributable to large numbers of predominately low-income students, while at high-cost institutions, it tends to comprise greater amounts of need attributable to a smaller number of mostly middle- and upper-income students. It is estimated that if the allocation procedures were to be modified so that funding was allocated entirely on the basis of institutions' proportionate share of institutional need, more institutions would receive allocation increases than would receive allocation decreases. Larger proportions of students at higher-cost institutions receive campus-based aid, and receive larger awards, than do comparable students at lower-cost institutions; however, average awards at higher-cost institutions cover a smaller percentage of costs. |
crs_RL34666 | crs_RL34666_0 | Introduction
Between FY1998 and FY2007, the annual budget of the Department of Defense (DOD) Science and Technology (S&T) Program grew from $7.7 billion to $12.8 billion. In constant FY2009 dollars, the cumulative increase was $22.5 billion. The purpose of this report is to aid Congressional oversight of DOD's S&T program by analyzing this budget increase by department and agency, by budget activity, and by program element. Activities 6.1 through 6.3 (basic research, applied research, and advanced technology development) constitute what is called the Science and Technology (S&T) program. Analysis
This report focuses on the growth in the base S&T budgets between FY1998 and FY2007. Program Elements are the building blocks of DOD's budget. propulsion technologies). It expresses the value of the direct program. Baseline funding, in constant FY2009 dollars, was $9.6 billion dollars per year. Defense agencies, as a whole, increased the least—$5.2 billion. While the defense agencies' 6.2 funding accounted for the single largest increase in funding in absolute dollars, the percentage increase was not as large as those of the departments. The Army and the Air Force basic research increased 39% and 31%, while the Navy's increased 14% and the basic research across all defense agencies increased only 3%. FY1998 appears to have been a transitional year for the PE. Except for the Army's Combat Vehicle and Advanced Automotive Technology program, these PEs contributed little to the overall increase in S&T funding and their relatively high increases in percentage terms are mainly due to their relatively low funding levels. Review of Major Findings
The increase in S&T funding over the 10 years from FY1998 to FY2007 was distributed broadly across the S&T program. Each department (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and the defense agencies as a whole shared roughly equally in dollar terms. A possible exception may be a growing emphasis on countering weapons of mass destruction. In an expanding program, Congress may be able to accommodate an increase in basic research (or elsewhere within the S&T program) without having to make other major allocation adjustments. | Every year Congress appropriates billions of dollars for the Science and Technology Program of the Department of Defense. Besides deciding on how much money to appropriate, Congress must also decide on how best to allocate those resources. Over the last ten years, the Science and Technology program has grown to historic levels in inflation-adjusted dollars. However, the funding increases appear to have peaked. In light of growing federal budget deficits, Congress may re-examine its investments in DOD's S&T program. Before doing that, it might be helpful to understand how the budget increases of the last ten years have been allocated. That is the purpose of this report.
Between FY1998 and FY2007, the annual budget of the Department of Defense (DOD) Science and Technology (S&T) program grew from $7.7 billion to $12.8 billion. The cumulative increase, in constant FY2009 dollars, was $22.5 billion.
The increase was distributed broadly across the S&T program. In constant dollars, the S&T budget of all departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and all defense agencies increased (except that of the Missile Defense Agency). While there was some variation in the distribution, no single department, agency, budget activity or program predominated.
Of the three budget activities that make up the S&T program—basic research, applied research, and advanced technology development—basic research increased the least. The increase in basic research varied widely between departments and agencies. Army, Navy, and Air Force advanced technology development, and Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) applied research received the highest increases.
Considering individual program elements, the Army's Combat Vehicle and Advanced Automotive Technology advanced technology development program received the single largest increase in constant dollars ($1.7 billion FY2009 dollars). The mission area that attracted the greatest increases was countering weapons of mass destruction. Four of the eleven S&T program elements that received the highest increases were related to this mission.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32822 | crs_RL32822_0 | C alculations indicating that the current Social Security program will not be financially sustainable in the long run under the present statutory scheme have fueled the current debate regarding Social Security reform. This report addresses selected legal issues that may be raised regarding entitlement to Social Security benefits as Congress considers possible changes to the Social Security program in view of projected long-range shortfalls in the Social Security Trust Funds. Beneficiaries under Title II have a legal entitlement to receive Social Security benefits as set forth by the Social Security Act and as administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA), an independent agency in the executive branch. Thus, the fact that Social Security benefits are financed by taxes on an employee's wages does not provide a limit on Congress's power to fix the levels of benefits under the Social Security Act, or the conditions upon which they may be paid. The U.S. Supreme Court also has made clear that the payment of Social Security taxes conveys no contractual rights to Social Security benefits. A legislative guarantee of a certain level of Social Security benefit payments with a corresponding obligation upon future Congresses for payment of such benefits would require either a finding of a contractual relationship between the federal government and individual certificate holders, the modification or repeal of which would be constitutionally impermissible, or a right stemming from Congress's implied promise not to enact legislation in the future that would bind a future Congress in the sense that the legislative enactment guaranteeing Social Security benefit payments could not be repealed or altered. Payment of Social Security Benefits From the Trust Fund in Case of Exhaustion
The projected exhaustion of the Social Security Trust Funds, formally known as the Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund and the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund, raises a question regarding whether that possibility would affect the legal right of beneficiaries to receive full Social Security benefits. Social Security is a statutory entitlement program. An entitlement by definition legally obligates the United States to make payments to any person who meets the eligibility requirements established in the statute that creates the entitlement. Congress, however, has reserved the "right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this (Social Security) Act" and the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed Congress's power to modify provisions of the Social Security Act in Flemming v. Nestor and subsequent court decisions. Congress has the power legislatively to guarantee to pay eligible individuals a certain level of Social Security benefits and not to reduce that level of benefits to such individuals in the future. While Congress may decide to take whatever measures necessary to fulfill such an obligation, courts would be unlikely to find that Congress's unilateral promise constitutes a contract that could not be modified or abrogated in the future. Although the legal right of beneficiaries to receive full benefits would not be extinguished by the insufficient amount of funds in the Social Security Trust Funds, a court suit to obtain the difference between the amount in them available to pay partial benefits and the full benefit amount would not be likely to succeed in getting the difference. Consequently, unless Congress amends applicable laws, it appears that beneficiaries would have to wait until the trust funds receive an amount sufficient to pay full benefits to receive the difference between the amount that can be paid from them and the full benefit amount. | Calculations indicating that the Social Security program will not be financially sustainable in the long run under the present statutory scheme have fueled the current debate regarding Social Security reform. This report addresses selected legal issues that may be raised regarding entitlement to Social Security benefits as Congress considers possible changes to the Social Security program in view of projected long-range shortfalls in the Social Security Trust Funds.
Social Security is a statutory entitlement program. Beneficiaries have a legal entitlement to receive Social Security benefits as set forth under the Social Security Act. The fact that Social Security benefits are financed by taxes on an employee's wages, however, does not limit Congress's power to fix the levels of benefits under the Social Security Act or the conditions upon which they may be paid. Congress's authority to modify provisions of the Social Security program was affirmed in the 1960 Supreme Court decision in Flemming v. Nestor, wherein the Court held that an individual does not have an accrued "property right" in his or her Social Security benefits. The Court has made clear in subsequent court decisions that the payment of Social Security taxes conveys no contractual rights to Social Security benefits.
Congress has the power legislatively to promise to pay individuals a certain level of Social Security benefits, and to provide legal evidence of Congress's "guarantee" of the obligation of the federal government to provide for the payment of such benefits in the future. While Congress may decide to take whatever measures necessary to fulfill such an obligation, courts would be unlikely to find that Congress's unilateral promise constitutes a contract which could not be modified in the future. In addition, a congressional promise not to reduce a specific level of Social Security benefits payable to certain eligible individuals would likely not overcome the constitutional principle, subject to due process considerations, that one Congress may not bind a subsequent Congress to legislative action or inaction.
The calculations concerning the possible future insolvency of the Social Security Trust Funds raise a question relating to whether that result would affect the legal right of beneficiaries to receive full Social Security benefits. While an entitlement by definition legally obligates the United States to make payments to any person who meets the eligibility requirements established in the statute that creates the entitlement, a provision of the Antideficiency Act prevents an agency from paying more in benefits than the amount in the source of funds available to pay the benefits. The Social Security Act states that Social Security benefits shall be paid only from the Social Security Trust Funds, and the act appropriates all payroll taxes to pay benefits. Although the legal right of beneficiaries to receive full benefits would not be extinguished by an insufficient amount of funds in the Social Security Trust Funds, it appears that beneficiaries would have to wait until the Trust Funds receive an amount sufficient to pay full benefits in the case of a shortfall unless Congress amends applicable laws. |
crs_R44836 | crs_R44836_0 | In support of these goals, several UI programs provide benefits for eligible unemployed workers. For information on the expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 (EUC08) program, which provided additional unemployment benefits depending on state economic conditions from July 2008 to December 2013, see CRS Report R42444, Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Status of Benefits Prior to Expiration . President's Budget Proposal for FY2019
The President's budget for FY2019 proposes changes to several aspects of the UI system. For information on a previous attempt to create a paid benefit for the birth or adoption of a child through the UC program, see CRS In Focus IF10643, Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Family Leave . Enacted Laws in the 115th Congress
Congressional Review Act: Disapproval of Unemployment Compensation Drug Testing Regulations (H.J.Res. 42/P.L. 115-17)
On March 31, 2017, President Donald Trump signed H.J.Res. 42 / P.L. This Congressional Review Act (CRA) resolution negated 20 C.F.R. Part 620. This rule had set out the circumstances under which states were allowed to prospectively drug test UC claimants based upon the prevalence of drug testing in the occupations in which they were seeking employment. 115-123)
On February 9, 2018, President Donald Trump signed the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. Among other provisions, P.L. 115-123 includes two UI-related changes. 115-123 authorizes a deferral of interest payments on an outstanding federal UI loan for the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI). 115-123 codifies Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEAs) for UI beneficiaries into Title III of the Social Security Act (SSA) and provides an allocation formula for the funds and other requirements. 115-254 , the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, was signed into law on October 5, 2018. Among its many provisions, it retroactively extended Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) for an additional 26 weeks for persons who were unemployed in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands as a direct result of the 2017 Hurricane Irma or Hurricane Maria disasters. (This created a total potential entitlement to DUA of up to 52 weeks for some individuals.) Legislative Proposals in the 115th Congress
Rehiring UI Beneficiaries and Exhaustees
Representative David McKinley introduced the Manufacturing Economic Recovery Act of 2017, H.R. 3702 . 4470 . Vouchers and Demonstration Projects
Representative James Renacci sponsored H.R. H.R. Unemployment Benefits for Energy Workers
Senator Jeff Merkley and Representative Jared Polis introduced S. 987 and H.R. 3330 , the Ensuring Quality in the Unemployment Insurance Program (EQUIP) Act. Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX)51
Representative Steve Russell sponsored H.R. | The 115th Congress continues to consider many issues related to the two major components of the unemployment insurance (UI) system: Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Extended Benefits (EB). This report begins with a brief overview of the UI programs that may provide benefits to eligible unemployed workers. It provides information on legislation enacted in the 115th Congress related to UI programs. In addition, this report includes short summaries of legislative proposals introduced in the 115th Congress as a well as UI proposals included in the President's budget for FY2019.
President Trump signed H.J.Res. 42 on March 30, 2017 (P.L. 115-17). This Congressional Review Act (CRA) resolution negated 20 C.F.R. Part 620. This now-negated rule had set out the circumstances under which states were allowed to prospectively drug test UC claimants based upon the prevalence of drug testing in the occupations in which they were seeking employment. Additionally, President Trump signed P.L. 115-123, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, on February 9, 2018. Among other provisions, P.L. 115-123 includes two types of UI provisions: (1) codification of Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEAs) for UI beneficiaries, including funding and other requirements; and (2) a deferral of outstanding interest on federal UI loans for the U.S. Virgin Islands.
President Trump signed P.L. 115-254, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, on October 5, 2018. Among its many provisions, this law temporarily extends the duration of Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) for an additional 26 weeks (up to 52 weeks total) for persons who were unemployed in Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin as a direct result of the 2017 Hurricane Irma and Hurricane Maria disasters.
This report also describes UI legislation proposed in the 115th Congress that addresses the following:
Rehiring UI beneficiaries and exhaustees—H.R. 3702 and H.R. 4470 Vouchers and demonstration projects—H.R. 1091 Additional UI benefits for certain energy workers—S. 987 and H.R. 3314 Drug Testing—H.R. 3330 Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX)—H.R. 2861
For information on the expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 (EUC08) program, which provided additional unemployment benefits from July 2008 to December 2013, see CRS Report R42444, Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Status of Benefits Prior to Expiration.
For a brief overview of UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation. |
crs_R42864 | crs_R42864_0 | From the perspective of U.S. trade policy, efforts to reduce the trade and investment barriers of the REPs that are impeding U.S. producers and workers from maximizing the benefits of participation in the global economy are likely to be a high priority. Bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements have proliferated and WTO-sponsored multilateral trade liberalization negotiations have stalled. The Rising Economic Powers
U.S. Trade Interests and the REPs
U.S. Exports and Imports: The REPs are becoming much more important U.S. trading partners (see Figure 3 ). REP Trade Barriers: If the United States is to maximize its export potential and boost its living standards, exporters and investors will need to have better access to REP markets. REP Interventionist Policies: The ability of the United States to persuade the REPs to embrace the principles of free and fair trade is constrained by growing differences over the role that the state should play in economic activity. As the 2008 global financial crisis may have weakened the case for free market approaches, some of these countries may now feel more willing to entertain market-distorting practices and take advantage of gaps in the rules .REPs as "Responsible Stakeholders" : As the REPs have benefitted greatly from participation in the global economy, many observers hoped that over time they would assume greater responsibility for the maintenance of the trading system. How to persuade these countries that a strengthened multilateral trading system is squarely in their national economic interests and a way to move domestic economic reforms forward remains a challenge. Strengthening WTO Dispute Settlement: In an era in which both global economic power and trade leadership are in transition, the WTO's dispute settlement understanding (DSU) has become a linchpin for maintaining global economic order. If the United States wishes to move in this direction, deviations from its standard FTA template may need to be considered. At the same time, ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and a potential comprehensive U.S. FTA with the European Union (EU) could serve as incentives for the REPs to view higher standard multilateral or bilateral negotiations more favorably. The 113 th Congress may consider a number of questions relating to the future direction of U.S. trade relations with the REPs , particularly if President Obama should ask for a renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in 2013. Some observers maintain that U.S. trade leadership is bolstered when the President has TPA and a mandate from Congress to negotiate new agreements. While this report focuses primarily on seven large, populous rising economic powers—China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey—some of these countries' economic prospects could easily decline if fundamental challenges are not addressed. With large economies and trade flows, these countries have greater involvement in WTO negotiations and dispute settlement processes, as well as greater autonomy in applying the rules and obligations of the WTO system domestically. While their protests and criticisms have not been followed by changes in U.S. trade or economic policies, the REPs arguably have become more able to deflect U.S. trade and market access demands. To improve their business climates and reinvigorate their economies, the REPs could undertake a range of trade, regulatory, and structural reforms. The more interventionist practices of the REP governments coincide with a desire to maintain "policy space" to promote economic development via policies that often appear to violate the letter or spirit of WTO rules and obligations. With ongoing pressures to reduce government spending and consumer debt, exports could become an increasingly important source of growth for the U.S. economy. It has long been suggested that principles that have guided multilateral trade negotiations in the past, such as unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) and special and differential (S&D) treatment, may need to be reexamined. For the United States and other advanced countries, the DSU is a way to engage the REPs directly about their responsibilities for upholding a system of multilateral trade rules. For a number of reasons, the United States has not negotiated FTAs with large and more significant trading partners, such as China, India, and Brazil. In trying to induce the REPs with their very different state-led economic models into maintaining and strengthening the market-oriented WTO system, U.S. trade negotiators may need considerable resources, flexibility, and leverage to be successful. These potential "turnaround" or "long-shot" countries include Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, and Vietnam. | A handful of developing countries are becoming major players in the global economy due, in part, to their large populations, rising trade flows, and rapidly growing economies. These evolving economies are likely to be of increasing interest to the 113th Congress. Led by China, these rising economic powers (REPs) include Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey. Based on purchasing power parity estimates, China, India, Brazil, and Russia are now among the 10 largest economies in the world and Mexico (#11), Indonesia (#15), and Turkey (#16) are not far behind. With large economies and rising shares of world trade flows, the REPs have greater involvement in World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations and dispute settlement cases, have protested with greater frequency U.S. economic and trade policies, and are more able and willing to deflect or reject U.S. trade and market access demands.
Although they have made great economic strides, any of these REPs could stumble if they do not take steps to improve their business climates by undertaking a range of trade, regulatory, and structural reforms. At the same time, other large developing countries that have enormous economic potential, such as Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, and Vietnam, could rise if they successfully address underlying political and economic challenges.
U.S. exports to the REPs and other developing countries have become an increasingly important source of growth for the U.S. economy. If the United States is to maximize its export potential and boost its living standards, U.S. exporters and investors may need to have better access to the REP markets. Trade and investment barriers remain considerably higher in most of the REPs than in the United States and other advanced countries. Efforts have stalled in these countries to reduce their barriers further, and several REPs have reactivated industrial policies or found ways to take advantage of gaps in the world trade rules to promote home companies at the expense of foreign companies.
The United States' ability to persuade these emerging economic powers to embrace the principles of free and fair trade is constrained by growing differences over the role of the state in economic activity. The more interventionist practices and philosophies of REP governments coincide with a desire to maintain "policy space" to promote development of their economies via policies that often appear to violate the letter or spirit of WTO rules and obligations. Persuading the REPs that a strengthened multilateral trading system is squarely in their national economic interests and a way to move their domestic economic reforms forward remains a challenge.
As global power and prosperity is reconfigured, U.S. trade policymakers face a number of overlapping and complex issues relating to the role of future trade liberalizing negotiations, U.S. leverage in influencing REP economic reforms, and the management of the global trading system. Given the checkered history of the Doha Round, future progress on trade liberalization within the WTO may require new approaches. Principles that have guided multilateral trade negotiations in the past, such as unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) and special and differential treatment (S&D), may need to be reexamined. Similarly, if the United States wishes to negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs) with large and more significant trading partners, it may need to consider deviations from its standard FTA template. At the same time, ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and a potential comprehensive U.S. FTA with the European Union (EU) could serve as incentives for the REPs to view multilateral or bilateral negotiations more favorably.
In an era in which global trade leadership is shifting and uncertain, the WTO's dispute settlement understanding (DSU) has become a key forum for managing trade relations. The DSU, despite weaknesses, is a way to engage the REPs directly about their responsibilities for upholding a system of multilateral trade rules.
The 113th Congress may review U.S. trade relations with the REPs, particularly if President Obama should ask for a renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in 2013. Some observers maintain that U.S. trade leadership is bolstered when the President has TPA and a mandate from Congress to negotiate new trade agreements. In trying to tie the REPs with their very different state-led economic models into the more market-oriented WTO system, U.S. trade negotiators may need considerable resources, incentives, flexibility, and leverage. |
crs_R44378 | crs_R44378_0 | Overview of the FY2017 HHS Budget Request
On February 9, 2016, the Obama Administration released its FY2017 budget request. However, HHS would receive the next largest share (nearly 7%) of all discretionary budget authority requested by the President, followed by the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Education. Budgetary Resources vs. Appropriations
Readers should be aware that the HHS budget includes a broader set of budgetary resources than the amounts provided to HHS through the annual appropriations process. As a result, certain amounts shown in FY2017 HHS budget materials (including amounts for prior years) will not match amounts provided to HHS by annual appropriations acts and displayed in accompanying congressional documents. In addition, the HHS budget request takes into account the department as a whole, while the appropriations process breaks up HHS funding across three different appropriations bills. A table of K ey P olicy S taff is included at the end of the report. | This report provides information about the FY2017 budget request for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). It begins by reviewing the department's mission and structure. This is followed by an overview of the total FY2017 request for the department. Next, the report discusses the concept of the HHS budget as a whole, compared to funding provided to HHS through the annual appropriations process. This distinction is important because certain amounts shown in FY2017 HHS budget materials (including amounts for prior years) will not match amounts provided to HHS by annual appropriations acts (and displayed in accompanying congressional documents) because they take into account a broader set of budgetary resources. The report concludes with a breakdown of the HHS request by agency, along with additional HHS resources that provide further information on the request. A table of key policy staff is included at the end of the report. |
crs_R41003 | crs_R41003_0 | Conference committees can be created by the House and Senate after each chamber has disagreed to the position of the other. Conference committees develop and present compromise legislation, in the form of a conference report, for approval in each chamber. The difference between amendments between the houses and a conference committee is not necessarily in the way a policy compromise is reached but in the formal parliamentary steps taken after the principal negotiators have agreed to a compromise. Throughout the report, the phrase "amendment exchange" is sometimes used as an alternative to the longer but formal name of "amendments between the houses." The second step, agreeing to the same legislative language, is generally more challenging. The chambers can resolve their differences over the text either (1) through an amendment exchange, when the chambers shuttle the bill and amendments back and forth between them proposing alternatives in hopes that both houses will eventually agree on the same language; or (2) through a conference committee, a panel of Members from each chamber that meets to resolve the differences between the bill and the amendment(s) proposed by the second-acting chamber. Most of the time, the majority leader requests that the Presiding Officer lay the amendment(s) before the Senate in the following way:
Senator: Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House on the bill S.____, with the amendment(s) of the House thereto. The limitation on the number of rounds of amendment still applies in a situation in which the Senate must dispose of multiple House amendments. The prohibition against amending text both chambers have agreed to can complicate changing long titles of bills in the Senate; if the House and Senate both passed a bill and agreed to the same long title, it would take unanimous consent in the Senate to agree to a House amendment to the title. In addition, any motion to concur with an amendment is itself subject to amendment. In recent Congresses, the majority leader has typically offered three motions to fill this tree: (1) the motion to concur in the House amendment; (2) the motion to concur in the House amendment with an amendment (a motion that would be in order with the straight motion to concur pending); and (3) a perfecting amendment to the amendment proposed in the motion to concur. House amendments are called up without debate, and if the majority leader then "fills the tree," amendments are precluded (at least temporarily). Bicameral meetings and conversations among Senators, Representatives, and staff from the relevant committees of jurisdiction can be substantively similar regardless of whether the resulting compromise is embodied in an amendment between the houses or a conference report. Some requirements under the rules can apply to amendment exchange procedures but not to conference reports. Typically, the House disposes of Senate amendments through one of the expedited processes described below: a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules, a motion to suspend the rules, or by unanimous consent. Motion to Recommit Usually Not Allowed
In contrast to the initial consideration of a bill or joint resolution under the terms of a special rule, consideration of Senate amendments is unlikely to include an opportunity for a Member of the minority party to offer a motion to recommit (or to commit, if the matter had not already been before the committee). As discussed at length above, if the House acts on a Senate amendment, instead of acting on a bill or joint resolution that has not yet passed the House, then (1) the motion to recommit is less likely to be in order, and (2) there will not necessarily be a single vote in relation to the Senate amendment, because the House proposal might be considered as separate amendments to the Senate amendment. | The House and Senate must agree to the same measure with the same legislative language before a bill can be presented to the President. To resolve differences between House and Senate versions of legislation, Congress might appoint a conference committee to negotiate a compromise that is then reported to each chamber for consideration. Alternatively, Congress might use the process of amendment exchange. In this process, each chamber acts on the legislation in turn, shuttling the measure back and forth, sometimes proposing alternatives in the form of amendments, until both chambers have agreed to the same text.
The difference between a conference committee and an amendment exchange is not necessarily in the way a policy compromise is reached but in the formal parliamentary steps taken after the principal negotiators have agreed to a compromise. After each chamber has passed its version of the legislation—or in some cases even before that stage—Senators, Representatives, and staff from the relevant committees of jurisdiction engage in policy discussions in an effort to craft compromise legislation that can pass both chambers. These informal meetings and conversations are sometimes referred to colloquially as "pre-conference," although they need not be followed by the convening of a formal conference committee. The phrase is applied generally to final-stage efforts to prepare legislation for passage in both the House and the Senate.
The decision to use the amendment exchange route has procedural implications. Amendments between the houses are not subject to the same procedures as conference reports. For example, some of the limitations on the content of conference committee reports do not apply to amendment exchange. Furthermore, amendment exchange provides alternative opportunities to structure decisions, because the policy compromise can be voted on as separate amendments between the houses instead of as a single legislative package. In addition, in the Senate, House amendments are privileged, and therefore their consideration typically begins immediately after the majority leader asks the Presiding Officer to lay them before the Senate. In contrast, to begin consideration of a bill or resolution, the majority leader must either obtain unanimous consent or make a motion to proceed to the measure, which is debatable in most circumstances. Furthermore, in the House, consideration of Senate amendments is unlikely to include an opportunity for a Member of the minority party to offer a motion to recommit, an opportunity that is generally assured on initial consideration of a bill or joint resolution.
In an amendment exchange, the formal actions the chambers generally take on amendments from the other chamber are (1) to concur, (2) to concur with an amendment, or (3) to disagree. There is a limit to the number of times each house can propose amendment(s) and send the measure back to the other house, but in both chambers the limitation can be waived. In the contemporary House, Senate amendments are typically disposed of through a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules, a motion to suspend the rules, or by unanimous consent. In the Senate, consideration of House amendments has the potential to become procedurally complex, particularly when the Senate must dispose of multiple House amendments. Because House amendments, unlike conference reports, are subject to amendment, the Senate majority leader might offer a motion to dispose of the House amendment and then "fill the tree" to temporarily prevent any Senator from proposing an alternative method of acting on the House amendment. |
crs_RL33771 | crs_RL33771_0 | Introduction
It is estimated that HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria together kill more than 6 million people each year. According to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), at the end of 2007, an estimated 33.2 million people were living with HIV/AIDS, of whom 2.5 million were newly infected, and 2.1 million died in the course of that year. More than 2 million of those living with HIV/AIDS at the end of 2007 were children, and some 290,000 of those who died of AIDS that year were under 15 years old. On each day of 2007, some 1,000 children worldwide became newly infected with HIV, due in large part to little access to drugs that prevent the transmission of HIV from mother to child. An estimated 9% of pregnant women in low- and middle-income countries were offered services to prevent HIV transmission to their newborns. While HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria are preventable diseases, their impacts have been catastrophic, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. From FY2004 through FY2008, Congress provided almost $20 billion to fight the global spread of HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, of which $18.3 billion was appropriated for global HIV/AIDS programs and the Global Fund ( Table 2 ). Congress exceeded the President's request by some $570 million, providing $6.3 billion for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria efforts, including $5.8 billion for global HIV/AIDS programs and a U.S. contribution to the Global Fund. Meanwhile, U.S. agencies and departments implement additional international HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs not funded through PEPFAR. In 2003, about 1,000 volunteers worked on HIV/AIDS programs, and in 2004, about 3,100 volunteers engaged in HIV/AIDS activities. Still other HIV/AIDS analysts suggest that health infrastructure challenges and health worker shortages in many countries will have to be resolved if the United States is to combat effectively the global spread of HIV/AIDS. The section below analyzes some of the key issues that Congress might consider as it debates PEPFAR reauthorization. Some question whether U.S. contributions to the Fund are provided at the expense of U.S. bilateral HIV/AIDS programs. OGAC estimates that in FY2006, it allocated 9% of all spending on ARVs to children. The bill authorizes funds to improve health care capacity on the continent. Supporters of this idea argue that vaccine identification should be an intractable part of U.S. international HIV/AIDS assistance. | It is estimated that HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria together kill more than 6 million people each year. According to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), at the end of 2007, an estimated 33.2 million people were living with HIV/AIDS, of whom 2.5 million were newly infected, and 2.1 million died in the course of that year. More than 2 million of those living with HIV/AIDS at the end of 2007 were children, and some 290,000 of those who died of AIDS that year were under 15 years old. On each day of 2007, some 1,000 children worldwide became newly infected with HIV, due in large part to little access to drugs that prevent the transmission of HIV from mother to child. An estimated 9% of pregnant women in low- and middle-income countries were offered services to prevent HIV transmission to their newborns.
UNAIDS asserts that an effective fight against the global spread of HIV/AIDS would cost $15 billion in 2006, $18 billion in 2007, and $22 billion in 2008. In FY2006, Congress provided about $3.1 billion for international HIV/AIDS programs and U.S. contributions to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria, $4.3 billion in FY2007, and $5.7 billion in FY2008. Most recent statistics indicate that in 2005, some $8.3 billion was spent on HIV/AIDS globally, though UNAIDS estimated that $11.6 billion was needed. About $4.3 billion of those funds were provided by donor governments. The Kaiser Family Foundation asserts that in 2005, the United States provided the largest percentage of HIV/AIDS assistance in the world, comprising some 49% of all donor spending.
Although the United States is the leading provider of international HIV/AIDS assistance, some argue that it needs to give more, particularly to the Global Fund. Critics of increased AIDS spending, however, question whether the most affected region—sub-Saharan Africa—can absorb increased revenue flows. Some also contend that additional HIV/AIDS allocations will yield limited results, as poor health care systems and health worker shortages complicate efforts to scale up HIV/AIDS spending. While this report describes how HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria are interlinked and exacerbate efforts to control each disease, it primarily addresses funding issues related to U.S. global HIV/AIDS initiatives. It provides background information on the key U.S. agencies that implement global HIV/AIDS programs, analyzes U.S. spending on HIV/AIDS by U.S. agency and department, and presents some issues Congress might consider, particularly as debate on PEPFAR reauthorization ensues. This report will not be updated; PEPFAR authorization expires in FY2008. Subsequent reports will analyze additional funding should the initiative be reauthorized. |
crs_97-522 | crs_97-522_0 | Political Background
Azerbaijan enjoyed a brief period of independence in 1918-1920, after the collapse of the Tsarist Russian Empire. However, it was re-conquered by Red Army forces and thereafter incorporated into the Soviet Union. It re-gained independence when the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991. Upon independence, Azerbaijan continued to be ruled for a while by its Soviet-era leader, but in May 1992 he was overthrown and Popular Front head Abulfaz Elchibey was soon elected president. Military setbacks in suppressing separatism in the breakaway Nagorno Karabakh (NK) region contributed to Elchibey's rise to power, and in turn contributed to his downfall. In June 1993, forces in Ganja challenged Elchibey's power, spurring Elchibey to invite Heydar Aliyev—the leader of Azerbaijan's Nakhichevan region and a former communist party head of Azerbaijan—to Baku to mediate the crisis. In July 1994, a ceasefire agreement was signed in the NK conflict (see below). Heydar Aliyev served until October 2003, when under worsening health he stepped down. His son Ilkham Aliyev was elected president a few days later. Then-U.S. U.S. cumulative budgeted assistance to Azerbaijan from FY1992 through FY2010 was $975.75 million (all agencies and programs). Budgeted aid to Azerbaijan was $26.4 million in FY2011 and an estimated $20.9 million in FY2012 ("Function 150" foreign assistance programs, excluding Defense Department funding). Under the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2013, signed into law on September 28, 2012 ( P.L. 112-175 ), regular foreign aid accounts are funded until late March 2013 at the same level as in FY2012 plus .612%, and most country allocations may be adjusted at agency discretion. Contributions to Counter-Terrorism
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Azerbaijan "granted blanket overflight clearance, engaged in information sharing and law-enforcement cooperation, and approved numerous landings and refueling operations at Baku's civilian airport in support of U.S. and Coalition military operations" in Afghanistan. Azerbaijan has contributed troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since 2003. It increased its contingent from 45 to 90 personnel in 2009, and there are currently 94 personnel deployed, including medical and civil affairs specialists. From 2003-2008, about 150 Azerbaijani troops participated in the coalition stabilization force for Iraq. | Azerbaijan is an important power in the South Caucasus by reason of its geographic location and ample energy resources, but it faces challenges to its stability, including the unresolved separatist conflict involving Nagorno Karabakh (NK). Azerbaijan enjoyed a brief period of independence in 1918-1920, after the collapse of the Tsarist Russian Empire. However, it was re-conquered by Red Army forces and thereafter incorporated into the Soviet Union. It re-gained independence when the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991. Upon independence, Azerbaijan continued to be ruled for a while by its Soviet-era leader, but in May 1992 he was overthrown and Popular Front head Abulfaz Elchibey was soon elected president. Military setbacks in suppressing separatism in the breakaway NK region contributed to Elchibey's rise to power, and in turn to his downfall just over a year later, when he was replaced by Heydar Aliyev, the leader of Azerbaijan's Nakhichevan region and a former communist party head of Azerbaijan. In July 1994, a ceasefire agreement was signed in the NK conflict. Heydar Aliyev served until October 2003, when under worsening health he stepped down. His son Ilkham Aliyev was elected president a few days later.
According to the Obama Administration, U.S. assistance for Azerbaijan aims to develop democratic institutions and civil society, support the growth of the non-oil sectors of the economy, strengthen the interoperability of the armed forces with NATO, increase maritime border security, and bolster the country's ability to combat terrorism, corruption, narcotics trafficking, and other transnational crime. Cumulative U.S. assistance budgeted for Azerbaijan from FY1992 through FY2010 was $976 million (all agencies and programs). Almost one-half of the aid was humanitarian, and another one-fifth supported democratic reforms. Budgeted aid to Azerbaijan was $26.4 million in FY2011 and an estimated $20.9 million in FY2012 (including "Function 150" foreign aid and excluding Defense and Energy Department funds). Under the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for FY2013, signed into law on September 28, 2012 (P.L. 112-175), regular foreign aid accounts are funded until late March 2013 at the same level as in FY2012 plus .612%, and most country allocations may be adjusted at agency discretion.
After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Azerbaijan granted over-flight rights and approved numerous landings and refueling operations at Baku's civilian airport in support of U.S. and coalition military operations in Afghanistan. More recently, the country is a major land, air, and sea conduit of the Northern Distribution Network for supplies entering and leaving Afghanistan to support U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) stabilization operations. Azerbaijan has contributed troops for the ISAF since 2003. The country increased its contingent from 45 to 90 personnel in 2009, including medical and civil affairs specialists. From 2003 to 2008, about 150 Azerbaijani troops participated in the coalition stabilization force for Iraq. |
crs_RL32662 | crs_RL32662_0 | Introduction
U.S. attention has focused on Russia's fitful democratization since it emerged in 1991 from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many observers have argued that a democratic Russia with free markets would be a cooperative bilateral and multilateral partner rather than an insular and hostile national security threat. Concerns about democratization progress appeared heightened after Vladimir Putin became president in 2000. Setbacks to democratization have included more government interference in elections and campaigns, restrictions on freedom of the media, civil as well as human rights abuses in the breakaway Chechnya region, and the forced liquidation of Russia's largest private oil firm, Yukos, as an apparent warning to other entrepreneurs not to support opposition parties or otherwise challenge government policy. Democratization faced further challenges following terrorist attacks in Russia that culminated in the deaths of hundreds of school-children in the town of Beslan in September 2004. President Putin almost immediately proposed restructuring all three branches of government and strengthening federal powers to better counter the terrorist threat to Russia. The proposed restructuring included integrating security agencies, switching to purely proportional voting for the Duma (lower legislative chamber), eliminating direct elections of the heads of federal subunits, asserting greater presidential control over the judiciary, and achieving more control over civil society by creating a "Public Chamber" consultative group of largely government-approved non-governmental organizations (NGOs). On the one hand, some Russian and international observers have supported the restructuring as compatible with Russia's democratization. They have accepted Putin's argument that his moves counter Chechen and international terrorists intent on destroying Russia's territorial integrity and political and economic development. On the other hand, critics of the restructuring moves have branded them as the latest of Putin's democratic rollbacks since he came to power in 2000. According to several observers, this declaration has spurred the maneuvering of Putin's supporters to fine tune a system of "managed democracy" (see below for definitions), if not authoritarianism, in order to gain substantial influence over electoral processes ahead of State Duma elections scheduled for December 2007 and the Russian presidential election set for March 2008. The U.S. Administration and Congress have welcomed some cooperation with Russia on vital U.S. national security concerns, including the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), strategic arms reduction, NATO enlargement, and since September 11, 2001, the Global War on Terror. At the same time, the United States has raised concerns with Russia over anti-democratic trends, warning that a divergence in democratic values could eventually harm U.S.-Russian cooperation. Some U.S. observers have urged circumspection in criticizing lagging democratization in Russia, lest such criticism harm U.S.-Russian cooperation on vital U.S. national security concerns. Others have urged stronger U.S. motions of disapproval, regardless of possible effects on bilateral relations. Interests? | U.S. attention has focused on Russia's fitful democratization since Russia emerged in 1991 from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many observers have argued that a democratic Russia with free markets would be a cooperative bilateral and multilateral partner rather than an insular and hostile national security threat. Concerns about democratization progress appeared heightened after Vladimir Putin became president in 2000. Since then, Russians have faced increased government interference in elections and campaigns, restrictions on freedom of the media, large-scale human rights abuses in the breakaway Chechnya region, and the forced breakup of Russia's largest private oil firm, Yukos, as an apparent warning to entrepreneurs not to support opposition parties or otherwise challenge government policy.
Democratization faced further challenges following terrorist attacks in Russia that culminated in the deaths of hundreds of school-children in the town of Beslan in September 2004. President Putin almost immediately proposed restructuring the government and strengthening federal powers to better counter such terrorist threats. The restructuring included integrating security agencies, switching to party list voting for the Duma (lower legislative chamber), eliminating direct elections of the heads of federal subunits, and asserting greater presidential control over civil society by creating a "Public Chamber" consultative group of largely government-approved non-governmental organizations. All the proposals had been enacted into law or otherwise implemented by early 2006.
Some Russian and international observers have supported the restructuring as compatible with Russia's democratization. They have accepted Putin's argument that the restructuring would counter Chechen and international terrorists intent on destroying Russia's territorial integrity and political and economic development. On the other hand, critics of the restructuring have branded them the latest in a series of anti-democratic moves since Putin came to power. They have characterized these moves as fine tuning a system of "managed democracy," if not authoritarianism, in order to gain more influence over electoral processes ahead of Duma and presidential races in 2007-2008. The stakes for various power groups seeking to avert unwanted popular electoral "interference" are high, since Putin has declared that he will not seek another term.
The U.S. Administration and Congress have welcomed some cooperation with Russia on vital U.S. national security concerns, including the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), strategic arms reduction, NATO enlargement, and since September 11, 2001, the Global War on Terror. At the same time, the United States has raised increased concerns with Russia over anti-democratic trends, warning that a divergence in democratic values could increasingly stymie U.S.-Russian cooperation. Some U.S. observers have urged restraint in advocating democratization in Russia, lest such efforts harm U.S.-Russian cooperation on vital concerns, while others have urged stronger U.S. advocacy, regardless of possible effects on bilateral relations. This report may be updated as events warrant. See also CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31789 | crs_RL31789_0 | (13)
Since the implementing bill and FTA agreement cannot be amended, theHouse Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees and House and SenateJudiciary committees held mock (non-markup) markups with Administrationrepresentatives as witnesses to make changes to the draft implementing legislation. For suchexports, tariffs are to be phased out over five years. This was the first time such commitments were included in aninternational trade agreement and may set a precedent for services liberalizationefforts in the WTO and in other FTAs. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). (Chapter 16) According to the U.S. Trade Representative, the protection ofcopyrights, patents, trademarks and trade secrets under the FTA goes farther thanprevious free-trade agreements. practice. (30)
Competition Policy. Government Procurement. Customs Procedures. Labor and Environmental Provisions
Environment. The TPA ( P.L. Among themare to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United States does not fail toeffectively enforce its environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurringcourse of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the United States;to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core laborstandards; and to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to protect theenvironment through the promotion of sustainable development. The labor and other provisions in the FTA have been criticized by theAFL-CIO. Issues
A fundamental issue with respect to the U.S.-Singapore FTA was whether theUnited States should pursue free trade and investment relations on a bilateral basiswith the island nation of Singapore rather than maintaining existing trade practiceson both sides or pursuing more liberalized trade relations through other means. The underlying issue of whether the United States should pursue moreliberalized trade and investment relations with Singapore dovetails into the largerissue of globalization and its effects on the United States, particularly on labor andwages. (52)
As discussed earlier in this report, the Integrated Sourcing Initiative alsohas generated some debate. Also at issue is the extent to which particular provisions of theU.S.-Singapore FTA would be used as a template for FTA negotiations with othernations . (58)
In summary, since Singapore is a relatively small economy, the overalleconomic effects of the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement are not expected tobe great. The debate over implementation of the FTA fell between business andfree-trade interests who favor more liberalized trade, particularly in services, andlabor or anti-globalization interests who oppose more FTAs because of the overallimpact of imports on jobs and the general effects of globalization on incomedistribution, certain jobs, and the environment. S. 1417 , the United States-Singapore Free Trade AgreementImplementation Act, was introduced July 15, 2003, by Senator Grassley. July 14, 2003. 2739 , U.S.-Singapore Free Trade AgreementImplementation Act by a vote of 32-5. July 17, 2003. Senate Judiciary Committee also approved the act. The House passed H.R. 2739 (United States-Singapore Free TradeAgreement Implementation Act) by a vote of 272-155 (Roll No. for the UnitedStates and Singapore Under the U.S.-Singapore Free TradeAgreement
Source: Text of the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. | On September 4, 2003, President Bush signed the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement( P.L. 108-78 ) into law in a White House ceremony. The agreement went into effect on January 1,2004. In late July 2003, the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act hadpassed the House by a vote of 272-155 and the Senate by a vote of 66-32. The Free Trade Agreement(FTA) will, with a phase-in period, eliminate tariffs on all goods traded between them, cover tradein services, and protect intellectual property rights. In July 2003, the House Ways and MeansCommittee, Senate Finance Committee, and House and Senate Judiciary Committees held mockmarkups on the draft implementing legislation. On July 15, the United States-Singapore FTAImplementation Act ( H.R. 2739 (Delay) and S. 1417 (Grassley)) wasintroduced and by July 17 had received committee approval.
The agreement has received support from the business community and consumerorganizations but has been criticized by labor and some environmental interests. Some of thespecific concerns raised deal with the restrictions on penalties for unresolvable disputes over laborand environmental issues, the Integrated Sourcing Initiative, potential capital controls, temporaryvisas, and access for U.S. exports of chewing gum. A basic policy issue with respect to the FTA iswhether the United States should pursue free trade and investment relations on a bilateral basis ratherthan maintaining existing trade and investment practices on both sides or pursuing more liberalizedtrade relations through other means. Also at issue is the extent to which the FTA language shouldbe used as a model for other agreements.
Negotiations for the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement were launched under the ClintonAdministration in December 2000. The FTA would be the fifth such agreement the United Stateshas signed and the first with an Asian country. According to the U.S. Trade Representative, the FTAhas broken new ground in electronic commerce, competition policy, and government procurement. It also includes what the U.S. Trade Representative reportedly considers to be major advances inintellectual property protection, environment, labor, transparency, customs cooperation, andtransshipments.
The U.S.-Singapore FTA required congressional implementation under expedited TradePromotion Authority legislative procedures. It continues the trend toward greater trade liberalizationand globalization, contains a new approach to imposing penalties for unresolvable environmentaland labor disputes; and may affect certain trade flows that would, in turn, affect U.S. businesses.
Since Singapore is a relatively small economy, the economic effects of the U.S.-SingaporeFree Trade Agreement, by themselves, are not likely to be great. The debate over implementationof the FTA is falling between business and free trade interests who would benefit from moreliberalized trade, particularly in services, and labor or anti-globalization interests who oppose moreFTAs because of the overall impact of imports on jobs and the general effects of globalization onincome distribution, certain jobs, and the environment. Specific provisions of the agreement alsohave generated debate. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_98-567 | crs_98-567_0 | It is often referred to as the U.S. government's development finance institution (DFI). Over the past several years, Congress has extended OPIC's authority through appropriations law. Most recently, an FY2017 continuing resolution extended OPIC's authority through April 28, 2017 ( P.L. The Foreign Assistance Act directs OPIC to "mobilize and facilitate the participation of United States private capital and skills in the economic and social development of less developed countries and areas, and countries in transition from nonmarket to market economies ... under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State." OPIC works to fulfill its mandate by providing political risk insurance, project and investment funds financing, and other services to promote U.S. direct investment overseas. Its services are intended to mitigate the risks affecting U.S. international investment, such as political risks (including currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence), for U.S. firms making qualified investments overseas. The 115 th Congress may take up a number of issues related to OPIC, chief of which could be whether to renew OPIC's authority and, if so, under what terms. Congress also may examine OPIC's financial product offerings, policies, activity composition, and organizational structure, among other issues. 108-158 ) extended OPIC's authority for nearly four years until September 30, 2007. Programs
OPIC categorizes its operations into three main programs—insurance, finance, and investment funds—that are intended to promote U.S. private investment in less developed countries by mitigating risks, such as political risks, for U.S. firms making qualified investment overseas. OPIC is active in a range of economic sectors. OPIC also has focused on expanding financing available to SMEs in developing countries and emerging markets. While OPIC has the authority to spend from its own revenue to cover its operations, Congress and the President set OPIC's maximum spending levels for its administrative and program expenses through the annual appropriations process. The FY2016 appropriations act provided $62.8 million for OPIC's administrative expenses to carry out its credit and insurance programs and a transfer of $20 million from its noncredit account for credit program costs. In FY2016, OPIC had a staff of 289 full-time equivalents (estimate) (see Table 3 ). In developing countries, ODA historically was the main source of external financing. Over time, FDI flows have grown relative to ODA flows (see Figure 4 ). For example, OPIC's cumulative portfolio totaled nearly $20 billion in FY2015. Supporters argue that OPIC fills gaps in private sector political risk insurance and financing for investment and helps "level the playing field" for U.S. businesses competing against foreign companies supported by their own DFIs, while critics argue that OPIC distorts the flow of capital and resources away from efficient uses and crowds out viable, private sector alternatives for investment financing and insurance. From a foreign policy perspective, supporters contend that OPIC's activities, on a demand-driven basis, advance U.S. development and national security interests by contributing to economic development in poor countries, while critics counter that the actual composition of OPIC's activities may not reflect U.S. foreign policy priorities and that the development benefits of OPIC's activities are questionable. Those in favor of OPIC may argue that the federal government plays a unique role in addressing market failures; that OPIC's backing by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government may make certain transactions more commercially attractive or give OPIC leverage to guarantee repayment in a way that is not available to the private sector; and that federal investment support is critical when there is a shortfall in private sector financing and insurance. Appendix A. OPIC Authorization History
OPIC operates on a renewable basis under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. §2191 et seq .). 114-254 ). | The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a wholly owned U.S. government corporation, is referred to as the U.S. development finance institution (DFI). It provides political risk insurance, project and investment funds financing, and other services to promote U.S. direct investment in developing countries and emerging economies that will have a development impact. It operates under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State. OPIC's governing legislation is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. §2191 et seq.).
Congress periodically has extended OPIC's authority to conduct its programs. Over the past several years, Congress has extended OPIC's authority through appropriations law, most recently through April 28, 2017 (FY2017 further continuing resolution, P.L. 114-254). The last multi-year, stand-alone reauthorization took place in 2003 with legislation extending OPIC's authority until September 30, 2007 (P.L. 108-158). Congress also has appropriations, oversight, and other legislative responsibilities related to OPIC.
OPIC's programs are intended to promote U.S. private investment in developing countries by mitigating risks, such as political risks (including currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence). Its financing and insurance are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. Congress places statutory requirements on OPIC's activities, such as those related to the economic and environmental impacts of projects. OPIC support is available in over 160 countries around the world and across a range of economic sectors. According to OPIC, it extended $4.4 billion in financing and insurance commitments in FY2015. OPIC also reported a record high total exposure of nearly $20 billion at the end of that year. OPIC estimates that since its inception in 1974, it has contributed to about $80 billion in U.S. exports and supported over 280,000 U.S. jobs.
The international context in which OPIC operates has evolved. Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have overtaken official development assistance (ODA) flows as a primary source of external financing to developing countries. DFIs are playing a more active role in supporting private sector capital flows to developing countries. The composition of DFI players, historically dominated by developed countries, also has evolved, with emerging markets such as China becoming more prominent.
OPIC states that it operates on a "self-sustaining basis," using its own revenues, which include user fees and interest from U.S. Treasury securities. Congress annually sets in legislation OPIC's maximum spending levels for its administrative and program expenses. The FY2016 appropriations act provided $62.8 million for OPIC's administrative expenses to carry out its credit and insurance programs and a transfer of $20 million from its noncredit account for credit program costs. In FY2016, OPIC had a staff of 289 full-time equivalents (estimate).
OPIC presents a number of possible issues for Congress, a key one being whether to renew OPIC's authority and, if so, under what terms. Supporters highlight OPIC's role in filling gaps in private sector investment financing and political risk insurance and helping to level the playing field for U.S. businesses vis-à-vis foreign competitors, while critics argue that OPIC is a form of "corporate welfare," with the private sector better suited to conduct such services, and question OPIC's development benefits. Other issues include OPIC's financial product offerings, policies, activity composition, and organizational structure. |
crs_R44180 | crs_R44180_0 | Introduction
Several western states, including California, Oregon, Nevada, Washington, and portions of Montana and Idaho, are experiencing extreme—and in some cases exceptional—drought conditions. To date, federal legislative proposals to address drought have focused on the persistence and intensity of the drought in the western states and the federal role in managing water supplies, supporting drought-related projects and programs, and conserving fish species and their habitat. A number of bills have been introduced in the 114 th Congress that would address drought. These bills include S. 176 , S. 1837 , S. 1894 , H.R. 3045 , among others. Two of these bills in particular, H.R. On July 17, 2015, H.R. 2898 , the Western Water and American Food Security Act, was passed by the House. The House bill has 11 titles, which address a wide range of issues. On July 29, 2015, S. 1894 , the California Emergency Drought Relief Act of 2015, was introduced in the Senate. This report summarizes the provisions of S. 1894 , as introduced, and H.R. 2898 , as passed by the House. It identifies comparable provisions between the two bills and discusses some of the ways in which those provisions overlap or differ. It also summarizes selected other major provisions in each bill. Some of these provisions would be triggered by drought conditions or declarations, and others would result in permanent changes in water management. Issues Addressed in Both Bills
Several drought-related issues are addressed in both H.R. For example, both bills contain multiple sections that focus on infrastructure and water conveyance in California, often specifically pertaining to management of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP). Other sections discuss common goals to address drought on a broader scale, the most notable of which are construction of new surface water storage projects and amendments to Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) authority under the SECURE Water Act (Title IV of P.L. Operational changes associated with compliance with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543) aim to protect and recover threatened and endangered species. 2898 and S. 1894 include provisions that would address water conveyance and flows in relation to fish populations listed under ESA. For example, H.R. S. 1894 does not have this broad directive to potentially change parts of the Delta smelt BiOp; however, under Section 101(a)(8), S. 1894 would direct the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior (the Secretaries) to use all scientific tools to identify changes to the real-time operations of Reclamation and of state and local water projects that could increase water supplies. 2898 would amend the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA; P.L. 2898 would require the Secretary of the Interior to notify the state of California if implementation of the salmon and smelt BiOps under the act reduces environmental protections, S. 1894 would require notification of changes in implementation of the BiOps and confirmation that they are authorized under the respective documents. 2898: Other Issues Addressed
H.R. 2898 includes a number of sections that are not included in S. 1894 . S. 1894: Other Issues Addressed
S. 1894 contains several titles and individual provisions that are not in H.R. Issues for Congress
Among the key issues for Congress is how to address water supply shortages in general and management of federal water supply projects in particular during times of drought and increasing demand. Both bills call for maximizing water supplies to users, with certain limitations. | Several western states are experiencing extreme, and in some cases exceptional, drought conditions. The persistence and intensity of the current drought has received considerable attention from Congress. To date, federal legislative proposals to address drought have focused on the federal role in managing water supplies, supporting drought-related projects and programs, and conserving fish species and their habitat.
A number of bills in the 114th Congress include proposals to address drought, including S. 176, S. 1837, S. 1894, H.R. 2898, and H.R. 3045, among others. Two of these bills have received significant attention as potential legislative vehicles for drought proposals and are compared in this report: H.R. 2898 and S. 1894. H.R. 2898, the Western Water and American Food Security Act, was passed by the House on July 17, 2015. The House bill has 11 titles. S. 1894, the California Emergency Drought Relief Act of 2015, was introduced in the Senate on July 29, 2015. The Senate bill includes 4 titles. Both bills address a wide range of drought issues, including those that are specific to the state of California and those that are regional or national in scope.
This report provides a high-level comparison of S. 1894 (as introduced) and H.R. 2898 (as passed by the House). It identifies comparable issue areas addressed in both bills and discusses selected commonalities and differences between those provisions. It also summarizes selected provisions in each bill that are not addressed in the other bill.
Certain issues are addressed in both pieces of legislation. For example, both bills contain multiple sections that focus on water infrastructure and water conveyance in California. These sections include provisions that would address operations of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the California State Water Project (SWP) as they relate to managing water flows and conserving endangered and threatened fish populations (i.e., the Delta smelt and certain salmon species) listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543). Some of these provisions would be triggered by drought conditions, whereas others would be permanent changes. Other sections address common goals throughout the West, such as the facilitation of new surface water storage projects.
Although the bills address some common issue areas and include some similar provisions, their approaches often differ in important ways. For instance, S. 1894 provides broad guidance for the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce to maximize water deliveries in accordance with applicable laws; H.R. 2898 has a similar directive but also includes a number of specific requirements that could alter the current implementation of biological opinions (BiOps) under the ESA.
Outside of common issue areas addressed in both bills, each would also authorize a number of changes that have no obvious corollary in the other bill. For example, H.R. 2898 includes provisions that would alter implementation of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA; P.L. 102-575), which is not addressed in S. 1894. Similarly, S. 1894 contains new authorities related to water reuse and recycling, which are not addressed in H.R. 2898.
Key issues raised by these bills include how to address the management of federal water supply projects in times of drought and how to handle the overall increasing demands for water supplies despite scarce water resources. Congress may also consider whether federal law and its implementation adequately address the balance between competing demands (e.g., fishery conservation and agricultural use) for limited supplies and whether changes are warranted during drought and/or under other circumstances. |
crs_RL31260 | crs_RL31260_0 | Digital television (DTV) is a new television service representing the most significant development in television technology since the advent of color television. DTV can provide movie theater quality pictures and sound, a wider screen, better color rendition, multiple video programming or a single program of high definition television (HDTV), and other new services currently being developed. Meanwhile, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104 - 104 ) provided that initial eligibility for any DTV licenses issued by the FCC should be limited to existing broadcasters. Because DTV signals cannot be received through the existing analog television broadcasting system (known as NTSC) the FCC decided to phase in DTV over a period of years, so that consumers would not have to immediately purchase new digital television sets or converters. Thus, broadcasters were given 6 MHZ of new spectrum for digital signals, while retaining their existing 6 MHZ for analog transmission so that they can simultaneously transmit NTSC and DTV signals to their broadcasting market areas. The FCC set a target date of 2006 for broadcasters to cease broadcasting the analog signal and return their existing analog television spectrum licenses to be auctioned for other commercial purposes. During the 105 th Congress, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 ( P.L. However, the act required the FCC to grant extensions for reclaiming the analog television licenses in the year 2006 from stations in television markets where any one of the following three conditions exist:
if one or more of the television stations affiliated with the four national networks are not broadcasting a digital television signal; if digital-to-analog converter technology is not generally available in the market of the licensee; or if at least 15% of the television households in the market served by the station do not subscribe to a digital "multi-channel video programming distributor" (including cable or satellite services) and do not have digital TV sets or converters. Status of the DTV Buildout
The nationwide buildout of digital television is a complex and multifaceted enterprise. A successful buildout requires: the development by content providers of compelling digital programming; the delivery of digital signals to consumers by broadcast television stations, as well as cable and satellite television systems; and the widespread purchase and adoption by consumers of digital television equipment. A key issue in the debate was addressing the millions of American over-the-air households whose existing analog televisions will require converter boxes in order to receive digital signals when the analog signal is turned off. This Fund will be used by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce to establish a digital-to-analog converter box program. P.L. 109 - 171 ). Specifically, Congress is actively overseeing the activities of federal agencies responsible for the digital transition—principally the FCC and the NTIA—while assessing whether additional federal efforts (including enhanced coordination and leadership) are necessary, particularly with respect to public education and outreach. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109 - 171 ; H.Rept. Title III is the Digital Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005, which sets a digital transition deadline of February 17, 2009, and allocates up to $1.5 billion for a program to assist consumers in the purchase of converter boxes. | Digital television (DTV) is a new television service representing the most significant development in television technology since the advent of color television. DTV can provide movie theater quality pictures and sound, a wider screen, better color rendition, multiple video programming or a single program of high definition television (HDTV), and other new services currently being developed. The nationwide deployment of digital television is a complex and multifaceted enterprise. A successful deployment requires the development by content providers of compelling digital programming; the delivery of digital signals to consumers by broadcast television stations, as well as cable and satellite television systems; and the widespread purchase and adoption by consumers of digital television equipment.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-104) provided that initial eligibility for any DTV licenses issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) should be limited to existing broadcasters. Because DTV signals cannot be received through the existing analog television broadcasting system, the FCC decided to phase in DTV over a period of years, so that consumers would not have to immediately purchase new digital television sets or converters. Thus, broadcasters were given new spectrum for digital signals, while retaining their existing spectrum for analog transmission so that they can simultaneously transmit analog and digital signals to their broadcasting market areas.
Congress and the FCC set a target date of December 31, 2006, for broadcasters to cease broadcasting their analog signals and return their existing analog television spectrum to be auctioned for commercial services (such as broadband) or used for public safety communications. However, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) allowed a station to delay the return of its analog spectrum if 15% or more of the television households in its market did not subscribe to a multi-channel digital service and did not have digital television sets or converters. Given the slower-than-expected pace at which digital televisions have been introduced into American homes, and given the impetus to reclaim analog spectrum for commercial uses and public safety, the 109th Congress enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171), which established a "date certain" digital transition deadline of February 17, 2009.
A key issue in the Congressional debate over the digital transition continues to be addressing the millions of American over-the-air households whose existing analog televisions will require converter boxes in order to receive digital signals when the analog signal is turned off. P.L. 109-171 established a digital-to-analog converter box program—administered by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce—that will partially subsidize consumer purchases of converter boxes. Specifically, Congress is actively overseeing the activities of federal agencies responsible for the digital transition—the FCC and the NTIA—while assessing whether additional federal efforts are necessary, particularly with respect to public education and outreach.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42951 | crs_R42951_0 | Introduction
The Oregon & California Railroad (O&C) lands consist of 2.6 million acres of timberland in western Oregon (see Figure 1 ). The majority of these lands (2.5 million acres) were originally granted to the Oregon & California Railroad Company in 1866 for constructing approximately 300 miles of the Oregon portion of a railroad from Portland, OR, to Sacramento, CA. In 1908, the United States sued the railroad company, and in 1915 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the railroad violated the terms of the grant. The disposition of these lands was eventually resolved when the Chamberlain-Ferris Act of 1916 revested all unsold tracts of land back to the federal government. Management concerns—such as how to compensate the counties for the loss of property tax revenue—persisted, and were addressed with the Oregon & California Railroad Lands Act of 1937 (O&C Act). This act directed that the Department of the Interior (DOI) would administer the lands "for permanent forest production" with the purpose of providing timber, protecting watersheds, providing recreational opportunities, and contributing to the economic stability of the local communities. The O&C Act also established a revenue sharing system for the counties. The Northwest Forest Plan
The O&C lands are included in the Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP). The NWFP covers 24 million acres of public land, including 19 national forests managed by the Forest Service and 7 BLM districts in California, Oregon, and Washington. The O&C lands make up 11% of the NWFP management area by acreage, and 37% of Oregon's NWFP management area. Federal Payments to the O&C Counties
The counties containing the O&C lands had a financial stake in the O&C lands because they received tax payments from the railroad until 1911, when the railroad stopped paying in anticipation of the land being returned to federal ownership. Payments for FY2014 (to be made in 2015) will return to 50% of receipts for the O&C counties, unless Congress acts to extend, modify, or replace SRS. These payments would likely be significantly lower than previous years' SRS payments. With the last of the SRS payments made in early 2014, the FY2014 payments (to be made in early 2015) are likely to be significantly lower than the FY2013 payments unless Congress changes current law to prevent a reversion to 50% of O&C receipts. The 114 th Congress may continue to debate these issues; for example, one bill was introduced on January 8, 2015. Legislative Activity in the 113th Congress
The 113 th Congress considered legislation to address the management of the O&C lands and federal payments programs to the O&C counties. 1526 —the Restoring Healthy Forests for Healthy Communities Act—would have transferred management authority of much of the O&C lands to a panel appointed by the governor of Oregon and established a trust with fiduciary responsibility to the counties, among other provisions related to the management and applicability of federal environmental laws. Senate Action: S. 1784
The Oregon and California Land Grant Act of 2013 ( S. 1784 ), reported out of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on December 11, 2014, would have amended the O&C Act of 1937 and would have allocated portions of the O&C lands as "forestry emphasis areas" and other portions as "conservation emphasis areas," each with different management prescriptions. H.R. | The Oregon and California Railroad (O&C) lands consist of 2.6 million acres of timberland in western Oregon. The majority of these lands (2.5 million acres) were originally granted to the Oregon & California Railroad Company in 1866 for constructing approximately 300 miles of the Oregon portion of a railroad from Portland, OR, to Sacramento, CA. However, in 1915 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the railroad company violated the terms of the grant. The disposition of these lands was eventually resolved with the O&C Act of 1937, which revested the lands back into federal ownership to be managed by the Department of the Interior "for permanent forest production" with the purpose of providing a supply of timber, protecting watersheds, providing recreational opportunities, and contributing to the economic stability of the local communities. The O&C Act of 1937 established a revenue-sharing system with the 18 counties in Oregon that contain O&C lands. Currently at issue for Congress are payments to the counties that contain O&C land, and the applicability of various land management and environmental laws.
The O&C lands are managed under the Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP). The NWFP is a series of administrative policies and forest management directives adopted in the 1990s. The NWFP covers 24 million acres of public land, including 19 national forests managed by the Forest Service and 7 Bureau of Land Management (BLM) districts in California, Oregon, and Washington. The O&C lands make up 11% of the NWFP management area by acreage, and 37% of Oregon's NWFP management area by acreage.
The 1937 O&C Act established a revenue sharing system to compensate for the loss of property tax revenue when the O&C lands were revested back to the federal government. When timber sales and revenues began to decline in the Pacific Northwest in the 1990s, Congress established alternative compensation systems for the county payments: first, the safety net payments specifically for the Pacific Northwest, and then, the broader Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (SRS; P.L. 106-393, as amended). After several reauthorizations and extensions—including the most recent one-year reauthorization for FY2013 (P.L. 113-40)—SRS expired after the FY2013 payment was issued in early 2014. Therefore, the O&C counties will not receive an SRS payment for FY2014 (to be made in 2015), but the payments will return to 50% of receipts, unless Congress acts to extend, modify, or replace SRS. These payments would likely be significantly lower than previous years' SRS payments.
The 113th Congress considered legislation to address the management of the O&C lands and federal payment programs to the O&C counties. A House-passed bill (H.R. 1526, the Restoring Healthy Forests for Healthy Communities Act) would have transferred management authority of much of the O&C lands to a governor-appointed panel and established a trust with fiduciary responsibility to the counties, among other provisions related to the management and applicability of federal environmental laws. A Senate bill reported out of committee, S. 1784, would have retained management authority within the BLM, but would have designated portions of the O&C lands as forestry emphasis areas, and other portions as conservation emphasis areas, each with different management prescriptions. Neither proposal was enacted.
Management of the O&C lands and federal payments to the O&C counties may continue to be issues for the 114th Congress. For example, The Oregon and California Land Grant Act of 2015, S. 132, was introduced on January 8, 2015, and is very similar to S. 1784 from the 113th Congress. |
crs_RL33540 | crs_RL33540_0 | Introduction
On March 9, 2009, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13505, "Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research Involving Human Stem Cells." Draft NIH guidelines were released on April 23, 2009. Final guidelines were issued on July 6, 2009. Although federal funding of embryonic stem cell research was briefly enjoined by a preliminary injunction between August 23 and September 9, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ultimately rejected that argument and allowed federal funding of human embryonic stem cell research to continue under the 2009 guidelines. Circuit's opinion stand. However, the Bush decision limited funding to research on 21 stem cell lines that had been created prior to the date of the August 2001 policy announcement. In contrast, as of January 8, 2013, a total of 200 stem cell lines are listed in the new NIH stem cell registry. Legislation introduced but not passed in the 111 th and 112 th Congresses would have codified the Obama stem cell policy, preventing reversal by future Administrations. However, even if such legislation had been enacted, the use of federal funds for the derivation of new human embryonic stem cell lines would still not be permitted as long as the Dickey Amendment remains in effect. One group, at the University of Wisconsin, derived stem cells from five-day-old embryos produced via in vitro fertilization (IVF). They believe the destruction of embryos for the purpose of harvesting embryonic stem cells is morally and ethically unacceptable and argue that researchers should use other alternatives, such as induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells or adult stem cells, both described below, instead of embryonic stem cells. The rider, often referred to as the Dickey Amendment, prohibited HHS from using appropriated funds for the creation of human embryos for research purposes or for research in which human embryos are destroyed. George W. Bush Administration Stem Cell Policy
On August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush announced that for the first time federal funds would be used to support research on human embryonic stem cells, but funding would be limited to "existing stem cell lines where the life and death decision has already been made." On June 20, 2007, President Bush signed Executive Order 13435 directing the support of "research on the isolation, derivation, production and testing of stem cells that are capable of producing all or almost all of the cell types of the developing body and may result in improved understanding of or treatments for diseases and other adverse health conditions, but are derived without creating a human embryo for research purposes or destroying, discarding, or subjecting to harm a human embryo or fetus." However, many scientists continued to stress that research should focus on all types of stem cells, including those derived from human embryos. Shortly after the 2009 guidelines were issued, opponents of human embryonic stem cell research brought suit in federal court arguing that federal funding of such research was barred by the Dickey amendment's prohibition against federal funding of "research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in utero [under federal law]." Specifically, the litigation turned on whether HHS could lawfully interpret the term "research" to include only activities performed once human embryonic stem cells had been isolated, or whether "research" must also include the antecedent embryonic stem cell derivation activities that generally resulted in the destruction of human embryos. During the consent process, the donor(s) were informed of the following: (1) the embryos would be used to derive human embryonic stem cells for research; (2) what would happen to the embryos in the derivation of human embryonic stem cells for research; (3) the human embryonic stem cells derived from the embryos might be kept for many years; (4) the donation was made without any restriction or direction regarding the individual(s) who may receive medical benefits from the use of the human embryonic stem cells, such as who may be recipients of cell transplants; (5) the research is not intended to provide direct medical benefit to the donors; (6) the results of research using the human embryonic stem cells may have commercial potential, and the donor(s) would not receive financial or any other benefits from any such commercial development; (7) whether information that could identify the donor(s) would be available to researchers. In December 2009, the agency created a new NIH registry of human embryonic stem cell lines that are eligible for use in research supported by federal funds. | Since FY1996, the Dickey amendment in Labor-Health and Human Services (HHS) appropriations acts has prohibited the use of federal funds for the creation of human embryos for research purposes or for research in which human embryos are destroyed. At the time, the Dickey amendment halted the development of guidelines by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) on the broad field of human embryo research and has each year since 1996 prohibited federal funding for human embryo research and related topics, including in vitro fertilization (IVF) and human embryonic stem cells. These cells have the ability to develop into virtually any cell in the body, and may have the potential to treat injuries as well as illnesses, such as diabetes and Parkinson's disease. Currently, most human embryonic stem cell lines used in research are derived from embryos produced via IVF. Because the process of removing these cells destroys the embryo, some individuals believe the derivation of stem cells from human embryos is ethically unacceptable.
In August 2001, President George W. Bush announced that for the first time, federal funds would be used to support research on human embryonic stem cells. However, the Bush decision limited funding to research on 21 stem cell lines that had been created prior to the date of the August 2001 policy announcement. Scientists expressed concern about the quality and longevity of these 21 stem cell lines, believing that research advancement requires access to new human embryonic stem cell lines. However, those concerned about the ethical implications of deriving stem cells from human embryos argue that researchers should use alternatives, such as induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells or adult stem cells (from bone marrow or umbilical cord blood). In June 2007, President Bush signed an executive order directing the support of "research on the isolation, derivation, production and testing of stem cells that are capable of producing all or almost all of the cell types of the developing body and may result in improved understanding of or treatments for diseases and other adverse health conditions, but are derived without creating a human embryo for research purposes or destroying, discarding, or subjecting to harm a human embryo or fetus." Many scientists continued to stress that research should focus on all types of stem cells, including those derived from human embryos.
On March 9, 2009, President Barack Obama signed an executive order that reversed the nearly eight-year-old Bush Administration restriction on federal funding for human embryonic stem cell research and the June 2007 executive order. The Obama decision directed NIH to issue new guidelines for the conduct of embryonic stem cell research. Draft guidelines were released on April 23, 2009, and final guidelines were issued on July 6, 2009. In December 2009, NIH created a new registry of human embryonic stem cell lines that are eligible for use in research supported by federal funds under the 2009 guidelines. Shortly after the 2009 guidelines were issued, opponents of human embryonic stem cell research brought suit in federal court arguing that federal funding of such research was barred by the Dickey amendment. Specifically, the litigation turned on whether HHS could lawfully interpret the term "research" to include only activities performed once human embryonic stem cells had been isolated, or whether "research" must also include the antecedent embryonic stem cell derivation activities that generally resulted in the destruction of human embryos. Although federal funding of embryonic stem cell research was briefly enjoined, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected that argument and allowed federal funding of human embryonic stem cell research to continue under the 2009 guidelines. The Supreme Court has declined to review that decision, letting the D.C. Circuit's opinion stand. As of January 8, 2013, a total of 200 stem cell lines are listed in the NIH registry.
Legislation introduced but not passed in the 111th and 112th Congresses would have codified the Obama stem cell policy, preventing reversal by future Administrations. However, even if such legislation had been enacted, the use of federal funds for the derivation of new human embryonic stem cell lines would still not be permitted as long as the Dickey Amendment remains in effect. |
crs_R42365 | crs_R42365_0 | Questions about the characteristics of Members of Congress, including their age, education, previous occupations, and other descriptors, are of ongoing interest to Members, congressional staff, and constituents. Some of these questions may be asked in the context of representation, in efforts to evaluate the extent to which Members of Congress reflect their constituencies and the nation at large. In other instances, questions arise as to how the characteristics of Members have changed over time, which may speak in part to the history of Congress. No government entity has collected data on Members in a consistent manner for all Congresses. This report provides profiles of Senators and Representatives based on selected characteristics since 1945. Data provided in this report are based on the number of Representatives and Senators who took seats on the first day of a new Congress. The report provides data on the following characteristics: age, including the oldest and youngest Members of the House and Senate; sex; previous occupation; race and ethnicity; education; religion; and military service. In some categories, the report provides data on the U.S. population that may be comparable to data available on Members of Congress, as discussed in more detail below. Following the characteristic summaries, the report provides a number of tables that provide the detailed data by the category on which the summaries are based. All data tables appear in the " Member Characteristics Data Tables " section. A detailed discussion of the methods used to develop the data presented in the report, and efforts to provide comparison between Member characteristics and the American public, is provided in an Appendix . Due to differences in data collection or characterization, data in other studies on Member characteristics may differ from those presented in this report. Members in 2013 are older, more likely to identify a religious affiliation, and include more women and members of racial and ethnic groups than Members in 1945. The data suggest that since the 79 th Congress, Members have had high levels of education, and worked in professional positions prior to coming to Congress. The number of Members who previously served in the military has risen and fallen, possibly in tandem with the levels of service in the broader population. Senator or Representative, the disclosure of details of a Member's race, education, previous occupation, or other characteristics over the years has been voluntary, and has not been collected by congressional or other governmental authorities. Data on religious affiliations of the U.S. population are taken from a private source, as discussed in the " Religion " section below. | Questions about the characteristics of Members of Congress, including their age, education, previous occupations, and other descriptors, are of ongoing interest to Members, congressional staff, and constituents. Some of these questions may be asked in the context of representation, in efforts to evaluate the extent to which Members of Congress reflect their constituencies and the nation at large. In other instances, questions arise about how the characteristics of Members have changed over time, which may speak in part to the history of Congress.
This report provides profiles of Senators and Representatives in selected Congresses since 1945. It includes data based on Representatives and Senators serving on the first day of the 79th – 113th Congresses for several demographic characteristics. The characteristics discussed include age, including the oldest and youngest Members of the House and Senate; sex; previous occupation; race and ethnicity; education; religion; and military service.
Following summaries of each characteristic, the report provides a number of tables that present the detailed data by the category on which the summaries are based. All data tables appear in the "Member Characteristics Data Tables" section.
In several categories, the report provides data on the U.S. population that may be comparable to data available on Members of Congress. A detailed discussion of the methods used to develop the data presented in the report, and efforts to provide comparison between Member characteristics and the American public, is provided in an Appendix.
The disclosure of details of a Member's race, education, previous occupation, or other characteristics has been voluntary, and no official, authoritative source has collected Member characteristic data in a consistent manner over time. Member data provided in this report are based on commercially collected information. Comparative data on the U.S. population are taken from the Census Bureau, and are supplemented by private sources.
Compared to Representatives and Senators in 1945, Members in 2013 are
older; more likely to identify a religious affiliation; include more women; and include members of minority racial and ethnic groups in greater numbers.
The data presented in this report suggest that since the 79th Congress, Members have had high levels of education, and generally worked in professional positions prior to coming to Congress. The number of Members who previously served in the military has risen and fallen, which may mirror the levels of service in the broader population.
Other Congressional Research Service reports also provide data and information on the characteristics of Members. These include CRS Report R42964, Membership of the 113th Congress: A Profile; CRS Report R41647, Membership of the 112th Congress: A Profile; and CRS Report R41545, Congressional Careers: Service Tenure and Patterns of Member Service, 1789-2013. Due to differences in data collection or characterization, data in other studies on Member characteristics may differ from those presented in this report. |
crs_R44053 | crs_R44053_0 | Introduction
This report describes and analyzes annual appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2016. It compares the enacted FY2015 appropriations for DHS, the Administration's FY2016 budget request, the appropriations proposed by Congress in response, and those enacted thus far. The suite of CRS reports on homeland security appropriations tracks legislative action and congressional issues related to DHS appropriations, with particular attention paid to discretionary funding amounts. 112-25 ). Data used in this report for FY2015 amounts are derived from the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015 P.L. 114-68 . Information on the House-reported recommended funding levels is from H.R. 3128 and H.Rept. 114-215 . 114-113 , the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2016—Division F of which is the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016—and the accompanying explanatory statement published in Books II and III of the Congressional Record for December 17, 2015. The Administration requested $1,396 million in FY2016 net discretionary budget authority for components included in this title. Division F of P.L. 114-113 included $33,062 million in net discretionary budget authority for the components in this title, a $581 million (1.8%) increase from the request and $1,388 million (4.4%) above FY2015. The appropriations request was $267 million (4.5%) more than was provided for FY2015. 114-113 included $6,353 in net discretionary budget authority for the components in this title, a $131 million (2.1%) increase from the request and $398 million (6.7%) above FY2015. The Administration requested $1,554 million in FY2016 net discretionary budget authority for components included in this title, as part of a total budget for these components of $5,427 million for FY2016. The appropriations request was $251 million (13.9%) less than was provided for FY2015. Division F of P.L. Senate-reported S. 1619 included $1,359 million in rescissions, while House-reported H.R. 3128 included $1,692 million. As a result, I doubt DHS's budget will rise as steeply as the request proposes. Executive Order 13715 issued by President Barack Obama on December 18, 2015, authorized a 1.3% pay adjustment for almost all federal civilian employees effective in January 2016. Structural Pay Reform Restriction
The FY2016 Homeland Security Appropriations Act included a general provision that had been carried in both House- and Senate-reported bills that prohibited the obligation of appropriated funds for any structural pay reform that affects more than 100 full-time positions or costs more than $5 million in a single year until the end of the 30-day period that begins when the Secretary notifies Congress about (1) the number of FTE positions affected by the change, (2) funding required for the change for the current year and through the Future Years Homeland Security Program, (3) the justification for the change, and (4) an analysis of the compensation alternatives to the change that the department considered. Aside from the specific direction provided in the Senate- and House-reported legislation, both committee reports provided additional direction. Within DHS, Coast Guard retirement pay is an example of appropriated mandatory spending. DHS net discretionary budget authority , or the total funds that are appropriated by Congress each year, is composed of discretionary spending minus any fee or fund collections that offset discretionary spending. Some entitlements are funded by permanent appropriations, and others are funded by annual appropriations. They include discretionary totals available to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations for enactment in annual appropriations bills through the subcommittees responsible for the development of the bills. 114-4 , the President's request for FY2016, House and Senate subcommittee allocations for the Homeland Security appropriations bills for FY2016, and the allocation that would have been needed to accommodate the FY2016 enacted Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016. Two of these—emergency spending and overseas contingency operations/Global War on Terror—are not limited. Under the Budget Control Act, the allowable adjustment for disaster relief is determined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), using the following formula:
Limit on disaster relief cap adjustment for the fiscal year = Rolling average of the disaster relief spending over the last ten fiscal years (throwing out the high and low years) + the unused amount of the potential adjustment for disaster relief from the previous fiscal year. The disaster relief allowable adjustment for FY2016 was $14,125 million. | This report discusses the FY2016 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and provides an overview of the Administration's FY2016 request. The report makes note of many budgetary resources provided to DHS, but its primary focus is on funding approved by Congress through the appropriations process. It also includes an Appendix with definitions of key budget terms used throughout the suite of Congressional Research Service reports on homeland security appropriations. It also directs the reader to other reports providing context for and additional details regarding specific component appropriations and issues engaged through the FY2016 appropriations process.
The Administration requested $41.4 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2016, as part of an overall budget that the Office of Management and Budget estimates to be $64.8 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not annually appropriated or does not score against discretionary budget limits). The request amounted to a $1.7 billion, or 4.4%, increase from the $39.7 billion enacted for FY2015 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 114-4).
The Administration also requested an additional $6.7 billion not reflected above for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the Budget Control Act (BCA, P.L. 112-25), and a $160 million transfer from the Navy to the Coast Guard for overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding. Neither the disaster relief funding nor the OCO funding is considered when calculating the total amount of adjusted net discretionary budget authority, as neither count against the discretionary spending limit.
On June 18, 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 1619, accompanied by S.Rept. 114-68. S. 1619 included $40.2 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2016. This was $1.2 billion (2.9%) below the level requested by the Administration, but over $0.5 billion (1.4%) above the enacted level for FY2015. The Senate committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding and OCO funding covered by BCA adjustments—the latter as an appropriation in the DHS appropriations bill rather than the requested transfer.
On July 14, 2015, the House Committee on Appropriations reported out H.R. 3128, accompanied by H.Rept. 114-215. H.R. 3128 included $39.3 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2016. This was almost $2.1 billion (5.0%) below the level requested by the Administration, and $337 million (0.8%) below the FY2015 enacted level. While the House-reported bill included the Administration-requested level for disaster relief funding, overseas contingency operations funding for the Coast Guard covered by BCA adjustments was provided in the House-passed Department of Defense appropriations act as a transfer from the Navy—therefore it is not included in the total funding in this bill for DHS.
On December 18, 2015, the President signed into law P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Division F of which was the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016. The act included almost $41.0 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2016, almost $1.3 billion more than was provided for FY2015, and $443 million less than was requested. The enacted bill included the requested overseas contingency operations and disaster relief funding as well.
This report will be updated in the event a supplemental appropriation is provided for DHS for FY2016. |
crs_R44898 | crs_R44898_0 | Introduction
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) is the primary source of federal aid to K-12 education. The ESEA was last reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ) in 2015. The Title I-A program has always been the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and was funded at $15.5 billion for FY2017. Title I-A grants provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of poverty. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). This report begins with an overview of key issues that have factored prominently in the evolution of the Title I-A formulas. The report then traces, in detail, the evolution of the Title I-A formulas in statute and identifies the reasons offered for changes to them, as expressed in committee reports, floor debates, and, to a limited extent, congressional hearings. The report concludes with three appendices. Appendix A provides historical appropriations data for the Title I-A formulas dating back to FY1980. Appendix B provides a summary of major changes that have been made to the factors that comprise each of the four Title I-A formulas that are currently authorized from their initial enactment through the ESSA. Appendix C provides a list of selected acronyms used in this report. By shifting the distribution of funds under the formulas, especially under the Concentration Grant, Targeted Grant, and EFIG formulas, the inclusion of state minimum grant and LEA hold harmless provisions may reduce the targeting of funds on LEAs with higher concentrations of poverty by reducing grant amounts to LEAs that would have otherwise received more funding. The Concentration Grant formula was added in the 1970s in an attempt to provide additional funding for LEAs with concentrations of poverty. As both of these formulas were enacted into law, and the Basic Grant and Concentration Grant formulas were retained, funds are allocated through four formulas under current law. The Title I-A program was also amended to include two new formulas—Targeted Grants (developed by the House) and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG; developed by the Senate)—in an attempt to target Title I-A funds more effectively on concentrations of poverty. A compromise on a single new formula was not reached; nor was there agreement on eliminating the existing formulas. Appendix C. Selected Acronyms Used in This Report
AFDC : Aid to Families with Dependent Children
APPE : Average per pupil expenditures
ARRA : American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
BIA : Bureau of Indian Affairs
BIE : Bureau of Indian Education
CV : Coefficient of variation
ECIA : Education Consolidation and Improvement Act
ED : U.S. Department of Education
EFIG : Education Finance Incentive Grants
ELLs : English language learners
ESEA : Elementary and Secondary Education Act
ESSA : Every Student Succeeds Act
GEPA : General Education Provisions Act
HEW : Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
IASA : Improving America's Schools Act
IDEA : Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
LEA : Local educational agency
MOE : Maintenance of effort
NAEP : National Assessment of Educational Progress
NCLB : No Child Left Behind Act
NDEA : National Defense Education Act
NIE : National Institute of Education
PCI : Per capita income
SAIPE : Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates
SEA : State educational agency
SIE : Survey of Income and Education
SNS : Supplement, not supplant
TANF : Temporary Assistance to Needy Families | The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) is the primary source of federal aid to K-12 education. The ESEA was last reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95) in 2015. The Title I-A program has always been the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA. Title I-A grants provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families.
The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The current four formula strategy has evolved over time, beginning with the Basic Grant formula when the ESEA was originally enacted in 1965. The Concentration Grant formula was added in the 1970s in an attempt to provide additional funding for LEAs with high concentrations of poverty. During consideration of ESEA reauthorization in the early 1990s, there was an attempt by the Senate to replace the two existing formulas with a new formula (Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) formula) that would better target Title I-A funds to concentrations of poverty. A compromise on a single new formula was not reached; nor was there agreement on eliminating the existing formulas or only adding one of the new formulas created by the House (Targeted Grant formula) and the Senate (EFIG formula). As a result, funds are allocated through four formulas under current law.
This report begins with an overview of key policy issues and underlying tensions that have factored into the evolution of the Title I-A formulas. These include issues related to the selection of poverty measures and identification of formula children, determination of the role state expenditures on public K-12 education would play in allocations, the use of state minimum grant and LEA hold harmless provisions, determination of the relative emphasis to place on percentages versus counts of formula children when targeting Title I-A funds on areas with high concentrations of poverty, and the tradeoff between transparency and complexity with respect to the formulas.
The report then traces the evolution of the Title I-A formulas and identifies the reasons offered for changes to them, as expressed in committee reports, floor debates, and to a limited extent, congressional hearings. The report concludes with three appendices. Appendix A provides historical appropriations data for the Title I-A formulas dating back to FY1980. Appendix B provides a summary of major changes that have been made to the factors that comprise each of the four Title I-A formulas that are currently authorized from their initial enactment through the ESSA. Appendix C provides a list of selected acronyms used in this report. |
crs_R40246 | crs_R40246_0 | Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress further increased its attention on homeland security assistance programs by, among other things, establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Some officials such as Members of Congress, former President Bush's administration personnel, and President Barack Obama have questioned (1) the purpose and number of assistance programs; (2) the use of preparedness funding; (3) the determination of eligibility; (4) the funding amounts for the assistance programs; (5) the programs' funding distribution methodology, and (6) the use of grant funding for sustainment and maintenance costs associated with previous fiscal year homeland security projects. Since the establishment of DHS, the department has not only been responsible for preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks, it is also the lead agency for preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any accidental man-made or natural disasters. This legislation was a result of numerous years of debate on how DHS should allocate homeland security assistance funding to states, the District of Columbia (DC), and U.S. insular areas. In the FY2011 budget request, the Administration requests funding for only eight programs. This report uses DHS documents, and congressional reports to summarize the programs. These potential issues include (1) the purpose and number of assistance programs; (2) the use of preparedness funding; (3) the determination of eligible recipients of assistance; (4) the funding for the assistance programs; and (5) the programs' distribution methodology. The majority of disasters and emergencies that have occurred since September 11, 2001, have been natural disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav. In FY2010, Congress appropriated approximately $4.16 billion for state and local programs, and of this amount $2.55 billion (60%) is targeted for terrorism focused programs. Should Congress determine there is a need to address the types and number of grants DHS provides to states and localities, it could consider allowing terrorism preparedness programs such as the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative, to be used for all-hazards preparedness, response, and recovery. However, the question remains whether or not the grant funding has been used in an effective way to enhance the nation's homeland security. Eligible Grant Recipients
Another policy issue associated with homeland grant programs is the question of who or what entities and jurisdictions are eligible to receive federal homeland security assistance. In the past eight years, Congress has appropriated a total of $34 billion for state and local homeland security assistance with an average annual appropriation of $3.8 billion. Congress, in the FY2010 DHS appropriations, provided $757 million less for these programs than was appropriated in FY2009; however, some programs received increased funding in FY2010. Conclusion
As the 111 th Congress begins its second session, Members may wish to consider the policy issues identified in this report or other related issues. | In light of lessons learned from the September 2001 terrorist attacks and other catastrophes such as Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav, the second session of the 111th Congress is expected to consider questions and issues associated with federal homeland security assistance. Federal homeland security assistance, for the purpose of this report, is defined as U.S. Department of Homeland Security programs that provide funding, training, or technical assistance to states, localities, tribes, and other entities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from man-made and natural disasters. Since the nation is still threatened by terrorist attacks and natural disasters, the 111th Congress may wish to consider questions and challenges about whether, or how, federal homeland security assistance policy should be revisited. Policy solutions could affect, and be constrained by, existing law and regulations, and constitutional considerations.
Since FY2002, Congress has appropriated over $34 billion for homeland security assistance to states, specified urban areas and critical infrastructures (such as ports and rail systems), the District of Columbia, and U.S. insular areas. Originally, in FY2002, there were eight programs; in FY2010 there are 15 programs. This expansion and scope of homeland security assistance programs are the result of congressional and executive branch actions.
The Grant Programs Directorate, within the Federal Emergency Management Agency, administers these programs for the Department of Homeland Security. Each assistance program has either an all-hazards purpose or a terrorism preparedness purpose. However, in FY2010, 60% of funding has been appropriated for terrorism preparedness programs, a decision that has been criticized by some grant recipients, Members of Congress, and others.
Congress appropriated $757 million less for state and local programs than was appropriated in FY2009; however, some programs received increased funding in FY2010, such as the Urban Area Security Initiative. This reduction is primarily the result of Congress not funding the Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance Program, and the Trucking Security Grant program. According to news reports, a Department of Homeland Security official announced that the overall FY2011 budget request for the department will decline from previous years' levels, and in the FY2011 budget request, the Administration requested approximately $4 billion. The impact of a reduction on grants assistance may be an issue.
This report summarizes these programs, and identifies and analyzes potential issues for the 111th Congress. These issues include (1) the purpose and number of assistance programs; (2) the evaluation of the use of grant funding; (3) the determination of eligible grant recipients; (4) the programs' funding amounts; and (5) the programs' funding distribution methodologies. Some of these issues have been debated and legislation passed since FY2002.
This report will be updated when congressional or executive branch actions warrant. |
crs_R40613 | crs_R40613_0 | Credit rating agencies (CRAs) provide investors with what is presumed to be an informed perspective on securities' debt risk (also referred to as credit risk), the risk that issuers will fail to make promised interest or principal payments when they are due. The agencies provide judgments ("opinions") on the creditworthiness of bonds issued by a wide spectrum of entities, including corporations, nations, nonprofit firms, special purpose entities, and state and municipal governments. The judgments take the form of ratings that are usually displayed in a letter hierarchical format: AAA being the highest and safest, with lower grades representing an increasing scale of risk to the investor. In terms of market share, the three dominant CRAs are Moody's, Standard & Poor's (S&P, a subsidiary of McGraw-Hill), and Fitch (a subsidiary of FIMILAC, a French business services conglomerate); a number of smaller U.S.-based agencies also exist. Insufficient CRA Regulation. Various Responses to the Perceived Rating Agency Failings
There have been a variety of responses to the perceived failings of the rating agencies with respect to structured mortgage-backed securities. It however, also conceded that the distinction between providing feedback during the rating process and making recommendations could be a potential gray area; require an NRSRO or NRSRO applicant to provide rating change statistics for each asset class of credit ratings for which it is registered or is seeking registration, broken out over 1, 3, and 10 year periods; require an NRSRO to provide all rating change statistics (upgrades as well as downgrades) and disclose default statistics relative to the initial rating, including defaults that occur after a credit rating is withdrawn; require an NRSRO to provide enhanced disclosure in three areas: (1) whether (and, if so, how much) verification performed on assets underlying or referenced by the structured finance transaction is relied on in determining credit ratings; (2) whether (and, if so, how) assessments of the quality of originators of structured finance transactions play a part in the determination of the credit ratings; and (3) more detailed information on the surveillance process, including whether different models or criteria are used for ratings surveillance than for determining initial ratings; prohibit a person within an NRSRO who has responsibility in determining credit ratings or for developing or approving procedures or methodologies used for determining credit ratings from participating in any fee discussions, negotiations, or arrangements; prohibit an NRSRO from allowing a credit analyst who has participated in determining or monitoring the credit rating to receive gifts, including entertainment, from the obligor being rated or from the issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of the securities being rated, other than items provided in the context of normal business activities, such as meetings, that have an aggregate value of no more than $25; require an NRSRO to make publicly available on its corporate website a random sample of 10% of its issuer-paid credit ratings and their histories for each class of issuer-paid credit rating for which it is registered and has issued 500 or more ratings; require an NRSRO to keep records of all rating actions related to a current rating from the initial rating to the current rating. On September 17, 2009, the SEC continued its efforts toward NRSRO reforms by:
adopting rules to provide greater information concerning ratings histories; adopting rules to enable competing CRAs to offer unsolicited ratings for structured finance products, by granting them access to the necessary underlying data for structured products; adopting amendments to the SEC's rules and forms to remove certain references to credit ratings by nationally recognized statistical rating organizations; reopening public comment to allow additional comment on SEC proposals to eliminate references to NRSRO credit ratings from certain other rules and forms; and proposing amendments aimed at strengthening NRSRO compliance by requiring annual compliance reports and enhance disclosure of potential sources of revenue-related conflicts. 4173 , which was passed in the House as amended on December 11, 2009. In the Senate, Chairman Christopher Dodd of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee issued a single comprehensive committee print on November 16, 2009, the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009. This original bill was amended in committee on March 22, 2010, and ordered reported to the Senate floor. H.R. It would strike references to "not investment grade" or to "ratings" or similar language in a number of federal statutes such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (which embodies the basic authority for the operation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC); the Investment Company Act of 1940 (which regulates the organization of companies, including mutual funds, that engage primarily in investing, reinvesting, and trading in securities, and whose own securities are offered to the investing public); the National Bank Act (which established a system of national banks headed by the Comptroller of the Currency); and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and substitute language requiring the regulator instead to establish standards of creditworthiness. • It would require NRSROs to disclose the primary assumptions used in constructing the procedures and methodologies for arriving at credit ratings. • It would require NRSROs to have established internal controls over the processes used to determine credit ratings. Neither H.R. Both H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. | Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are expected to provide investors with an informed and unbiased view on securities' debt risk (also referred to as credit risk), the risk that issuers will fail to make promised interest or principal payments when they are due. The agencies provide judgments ("opinions") on the creditworthiness of bonds issued by a wide spectrum of entities, including corporations, nonprofit firms, special purpose entities, sovereign nations, and state and municipal governments. They take the form of ratings that are usually displayed in a letter hierarchical format: AAA being the highest and safest, with lower grades representing an increasing scale of risk to the investor. The three dominant CRAs are Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch.
CRAs have been a fixture of securities markets since the 19th century; they predate federal regulation of the markets. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issues a designation of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO), which is important because a variety of laws and regulations reference their use. (For example, the amount of risk-based capital that banks must hold against a portfolio of securities is linked to ratings; and thrift institutions are not allowed to own bonds rated below investment grade.)
In recent years, many assert that the performance of the dominant rating agencies has been marked by a number of spectacular failures. Companies like Enron and WorldCom retained their high credit ratings until a few days before they filed for bankruptcy. More recently, many mortgage-backed securities initially rated AAA have defaulted or have been sharply downgraded. In both situations, investors who relied on the ratings suffered heavy losses. The SEC and other observers have criticized the three dominant CRA's ratings of mortgage-backed securities.
Between December 2008 and September 2009, the SEC adopted several reforms aimed at enhancing NRSRO disclosures, and mitigating NRSRO conflicts of interest, including a prohibition on NRSRO personnel involved in rating determination participating in fee discussions, negotiations, or arrangements; a requirement that each NRSRO and NRSRO applicant provide rating change statistics for each asset class of credit ratings for which it is registered or is seeking registration; an authorization for competing NRSROs to offer unsolicited ratings for structured finance products by granting them access to the necessary underlying data for structured products; and an elimination from federal securities regulations and laws certain references to credit ratings by NRSROs. On December 11, 2009, the House passed H.R. 4173. On March 22, 2010, the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee ordered reported out an amended version of the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, which had been released on March 15, 2010. The bill also contains rating agency reform provisions. Both H.R. 4173 and the Senate committee bill would require NRSROs to have established internal controls over the processes used to determine credit ratings, enhance the rights of entities to bring private actions against rating agencies for certain knowing or reckless failures in research with respect to rating determinations, and disclose the primary assumptions used in constructing the procedures and methodologies for arriving at credit ratings. Separately, H.R. 4173 would strike references to "not investment grade" or to "ratings" or similar language in a number of federal statutes, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Act; replace the term ''nationally recognized statistical rating'' with ''nationally registered statistical rating'' in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and require the removal of references by federal financial regulators and in certain federal laws. Other bills that would also provide for rating agency reforms include S. 927 (Pryor), S. 1073 (Reed), H.R. 1181 (Ackerman), H.R. 1445 (McHenry), and H.R. 2253 (Delahunt). This report will be updated as events dictate. |
crs_RL32705 | crs_RL32705_0 | Overview of Key Concepts
Improving border and transportation security (BTS) are essential strategies for improving andmaintaining homeland security. Border security entails regulating the flow of traffic across thenation's borders so that dangerous and unwanted goods and people are detected and denied entry. This requires a sophisticated border management system that balances the need for securing thenation's borders with facilitating the essential free flow of legitimate commerce, citizens, andauthorized visitors. Transportation security involves securing the flow of people and goods alongthe nation's highways, railways, airways, and waterways. (1) While in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 efforts primarilyconcentrated on an expanded federal role in aviation security (in particular on the heightenedscreening of passengers and baggage), increasingly attention is being turned towards other modesof transportation. It provides a brief description ofselected agencies and their border and transportation security responsibilities. Finally, this report presents some specific border and transportation securityissues that may be of interest to the 109th Congress. (3)
DHS Border and Transportation Security Responsibilities
DHS is the primary agency responsible for the security of the borders. (4) The border and transportation security responsibilities of DHS areprimarily located within the BTS Directorate. The Coast Guard is a stand alone agency within DHS,but has significant border security responsibilities. Within the BTS Directorate, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has responsibility forsecurity at and between ports-of-entry along the border. As such, it is responsible for border and transportation security as it applies to U.S. ports, coastal andinland waterways, and territorial waters. (6) DOS's Bureau of Consular Affairs is responsible for issuing visas. DHS's Citizenship andImmigration Services Bureau (USCIS) is charged with approving immigrant petitions. In addition,DOJ's Executive Office for immigration Review (EOIR) plays a significant policy role through itsadjudicatory decisions on specific immigration cases. Although the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau (USCIS) and theDepartment of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) are clearly the leadagencies in asylum policy, the first contacts many asylum seekers have with the U.S. governmentare with Border and Transportation Security (BTS) officials. Non-Aviation Transportation Security. These recommendations include (but are not limited to the following):
the United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations, andlaw enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators and constrainterrorist mobility;
the U.S. border security system should be integrated into a larger network ofscreening points that include our transportation system and access to vital facilities, such as nuclearreactors;
the President should direct the Department of Homeland Security to lead theeffort to design a comprehensive screening system, addressing common problems and settingcommon standards with systematic goals in mind (see the summary of HSPD-11below);
the Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by Congress, shouldcomplete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit system, including a single system forspeeding qualified travelers, [i]t should be integrated with the system that provides benefits toforeigners seeking to stay in the United States;
the U.S. government ... should do more to exchange terrorist information withtrusted allies, and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel and border crossing overthe medium and long term through extensive international cooperation;
the federal government should set standards for the issuance of birthcertificates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses;
the U.S. government should identify and evaluate the transportation assets thatneed to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them, select the most practical andcost-effective ways of doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and funding to implement theeffort, [t]he plan should assign roles and missions to relevant authorities (federal, state, regional, andlocal) and to private stakeholders;
improved use of "no-fly" and "automatic selectee" lists should not be delayedwhile the argument about a successor to CAPPS continues, [t]his screening function should beperformed by TSA, and it should utilize the larger set of watchlists maintained by the federalgovernment, [a]ir carriers should be required to supply the information needed to test and implementthis new system;
the TSA and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the abilityof screening checkpoints to detect explosives on passengers, ... each individual selected for specialscreening should be screened for explosives; and
the TSA should conduct a human factor study ... to understand problems inscreener performance and set attainable objectives for individual screeners and for the checkpointswhere screening takes place. | Enhancing border and transportation security (BTS) are essential strategies for improving andmaintaining homeland security. Border security entails regulating the flow of traffic across thenation's borders so that dangerous and unwanted goods and people are detected and denied entry.This requires a sophisticated border management system that balances the need for securing thenation's borders with facilitating the essential free flow of legitimate commerce, citizens, andauthorized visitors. Transportation security involves securing the flow of people and goods alongthe nation's highways, railways, airways, and waterways. (For more information on the complexityof the BTS challenge, see CRS Report RL32839 , Border and Transportation Security: TheComplexity of the Challenge , by [author name scrubbed].) While in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 effortsprimarily concentrated on an expanded federal role in aviation security (in particular on theheightened screening of passengers and baggage), increasingly attention is being turned towardsother modes of transportation.
The effective implementation of border and transportation security measures requires theparticipation of numerous agencies. Federal responsibility for border and transportation securityefforts is primarily contained within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS's Borderand Transportation Security Directorate houses: the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection(CBP), which has responsibility for security at and between ports-of-entry along the border; theBureau of Customs and Immigration Enforcement (ICE), which has responsibility for investigatingand enforcing the nation's customs and immigration laws; and the Transportation SecurityAdministration (TSA), which is responsible for the security of the nation's transportation systems. The U.S. Coast Guard is a stand-alone agency within DHS, and has primary responsibility for themaritime components of homeland security (U.S. ports, coastal and inland waterways, and territorialwaters). DHS's Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau (USCIS) is charged with approvingimmigrant petitions. In addition, the Department of State's (DOS) Bureau of Consular Affairs isresponsible for issuing visas; and the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Executive Office forImmigration Review (EOIR) has a significant policy role through its adjudicatory decisions onspecific immigration cases. For more information on border agencies, see CRS Report RS21899 , Border Security: Key Agencies and Their Missions , by [author name scrubbed]. For more information oncurrent BTS programs and policies, see CRS Report RL32840 , Border and Transportation Security:Selected Programs and Policies , by [author name scrubbed] et al.
This report provides a summary of the roles and responsibilities of various federal agenciesengaged in border and transportation security activities; describes selected concepts and termsprominent in border and transportation security debates; and discusses selected issues that might beof interest to the 109th Congress. For more information on BTS policy options, see CRS Report RL32841 , Border and Transportation Security: Possible New Directions and Policy Options , byWilliam Robinson et al. This report will be updated as significant developments occur.
Key Policy Staff: Border and Transportation Security |
crs_R45427 | crs_R45427_0 | A cryptocurrency is digital money in an electronic payment system in which payments are validated by a decentralized network of system users and cryptographic protocols instead of by a centralized intermediary (such as a bank). Media coverage of cryptocurrencies has been widespread, and various observers have characterized cryptocurrencies as either the future of monetary and payment systems that will displace government-backed currencies or a fad with little real value. The purpose of this report is to assess how and how well cryptocurrencies perform this function, and in so doing to identify possible benefits, challenges, risks, and policy issues surrounding cryptocurrencies. Even when forms of money had intrinsic value, governments played a role in assigning value to money. The trusted intermediaries maintain private ledgers of accounts recording how much money each participant holds. In addition, intermediaries generally are required to provide certain protections to consumers involved in electronic transactions. Notably, certain individuals may lack access to electronic payment systems. In general, these electronic payment systems use public ledgers that allow individuals to establish an account with a pseudonymous name known to the entire network—or an address corresponding to a public key—and a passcode or private key that is paired to the public key and known only to the account holder. In addition, certain companies offer applications or interfaces that users can download onto a device to make transacting in cryptocurrencies more user-friendly. Blockchain technology uses cryptographic protocols to prevent invalid alteration or manipulation of the public ledger. In this system, parties that otherwise do not know each other can exchange something of value (i.e., a digital currency) not because they trust each other but because they trust the platform and its cryptographic protocols to prevent double spending and invalid changes to the ledger. Recent volatility in the price of cryptocurrencies suggests they function poorly as a unit of account and a store of value (two of the three functions of money discussed in " The Functions of Money ," above), an issue covered in the " Potential Challenges to Widespread Adoption " section of this report. This number indicates how many times a day Bitcoins are transferred between accounts. Skeptics, however, emphasize the obstacles facing the widespread adoption of cryptocurrencies and doubt that cryptocurrencies can overcome these challenges. These risks could act as a disincentive to parties considering using cryptocurrencies in certain transactions and thus could hinder cryptocurrencies' ability to act as a medium of exchange. Potential Risks Posed by Cryptocurrencies
Policymakers developed most financial laws and regulations before the invention and subsequent growth of cryptocurrencies, which raises questions about whether existing laws and regulations appropriately and efficiently address the risks posed by cryptocurrency. These bills include the following:
H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. However, this secondary use of cryptocurrency as investment vehicles is different from the use of cryptocurrencies as money, and it is beyond the scope of this report. Cryptocurrency is a relatively new type of asset, and consumers may not be familiar with how cryptocurrencies work and how they derive their value. Some central bankers and other experts and observers have speculated that the widespread adoption of cryptocurrencies could affect the ability of the Federal Reserve and other central banks to implement and transmit monetary policy, and some have suggested that these institutions should issue their own digital, fiat currencies. For example, some proponents extend the arguments related to cryptocurrencies providing efficiency gains over traditional legacy systems to CBCDs; they contend that central banks could use the technologies underlying cryptocurrencies to deploy a faster, less costly government-supported payment system. Proponents of the technology assert cryptocurrencies will become a widely used payment method and provide increased economic efficiency, privacy, and independence from centralized institutions and authorities. Skeptics—citing technological challenges and obstacles to widespread adoption—assert cryptocurrencies do not effectively perform the functions of money and will not be a valuable, widely used form of money in the future. As technological advancements and economic conditions play out, policymakers likely will be faced with various issues related to cryptocurrency, including concerns about its alleged facilitation of crime, the adequacy of consumer protections for those engaged in cryptocurrency transactions, the level of appropriate regulation of the industry, and cryptocurrency's potential effect on monetary policy. | Cryptocurrencies are digital money in electronic payment systems that generally do not require government backing or the involvement of an intermediary, such as a bank. Instead, users of the system validate payments using certain protocols. Since the 2008 invention of the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies have proliferated. In recent years, they experienced a rapid increase and subsequent decrease in value. One estimate found that, as of August 2018, there were nearly 1,900 different cryptocurrencies worth about $220 billion. Given this rapid growth and volatility, cryptocurrencies have drawn the attention of the public and policymakers.
A particularly notable feature of cryptocurrencies is their potential to act as an alternative form of money. Historically, money has either had intrinsic value or derived value from government decree. Using money electronically generally has involved using the private ledgers and systems of at least one trusted intermediary. Cryptocurrencies, by contrast, generally employ user agreement, a network of users, and cryptographic protocols to achieve valid transfers of value. Cryptocurrency users typically use a pseudonymous address to identify each other and a passcode or private key to make changes to a public ledger in order to transfer value between accounts. Other computers in the network validate these transfers. Through this use of blockchain technology, cryptocurrency systems protect their public ledgers of accounts against manipulation, so that users can only send cryptocurrency to which they have access, thus allowing users to make valid transfers without a centralized, trusted intermediary.
Money serves three interrelated economic functions: it is a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value. How well cryptocurrencies can serve those functions relative to existing money and payment systems likely will play a large part in determining cryptocurrencies' future value and importance. Proponents of the technology argue cryptocurrency can effectively serve those functions and will be widely adopted. They contend that a decentralized system using cryptocurrencies ultimately will be more efficient and secure than existing monetary and payment systems. Skeptics doubt that cryptocurrencies can effectively act as money and achieve widespread use. They note various obstacles to extensive adoption of cryptocurrencies, including economic (e.g., existing trust in traditional systems and volatile cryptocurrency value), technological (e.g., scalability), and usability obstacles (e.g., access to equipment necessary to participate). In addition, skeptics assert that cryptocurrencies are currently overvalued and under-regulated.
The invention and proliferation of cryptocurrencies present numerous risks and related policy issues. Cryptocurrencies, because they are pseudonymous and decentralized, could facilitate money laundering and other crimes, raising the issue of whether existing regulations appropriately guard against this possibility. Many consumers may lack familiarity with cryptocurrencies and how they work and derive value. In addition, although cryptocurrency ledgers appear safe from manipulation, individuals and exchanges have been hacked or targeted in scams involving cryptocurrencies. Accordingly, critics of cryptocurrencies have raised concerns that existing laws and regulations do not adequately protect consumers dealing in cryptocurrencies. At the same time, proponents of cryptocurrencies warn against over-regulating what they argue is a technology that will yield large benefits. Finally, if cryptocurrency becomes a widely used form of money, it could affect the ability of the Federal Reserve and other central banks to implement and transmit monetary policy, leading some observers to argue that central banks should develop their own digital currencies (as opposed to a cryptocurrency); others oppose this idea.
The 115th Congress has shown significant interest in these and other issues relating to cryptocurrencies. For example, the House passed several bills (H.R. 2433, H.R. 5036, and H.R. 6069, and H.R. 6411) aimed at better understanding or regulating cryptocurrencies. The 116th Congress—and beyond—may continue to consider the numerous policy issues raised by the increasing use of cryptocurrencies. |
crs_RL33463 | crs_RL33463_0 | April 10, 2008: The House passed a rule ( H.Res. April 8, 2008: Legislation implementing the U.S.- Colombia FTA was introduced in the House ( H.R. In the 109 th Congress agreements were concluded and Congress approved the Central American-Dominican Republic FTA and bilateral agreements with Bahrain and Oman. The Bush Administration is making bilateral and regional free-trade agreements more important elements of its trade policy. U.S. Negotiating Strategy
U.S. negotiating strategy is based on a concept known as "competitive liberalization." As explained by the Administration, this strategy is designed to push forward trade liberalization on multiple fronts: bilateral, regional, and multilateral. It is meant to further trade negotiations by liberalizing trade with countries willing to join free trade agreements, and to put pressure on other countries to negotiate in the WTO. Critics assert that the emphasis on regional and bilateral negotiations undermines the World Trade Organization (WTO) and increases the risk of trade diversion. After several weeks of negotiations, congressional leaders and the Bush Administration announced a conceptual agreement on May 10 on several issues that may clear the way for consideration of the Peru and Panama agreements. The United States has concluded agreements with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. Legislation to implement these agreement likely will be considered by the 110 th Congress under the timetable set forth by trade promotion authority (see Table 1 ). Under trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation passed in 2002 (Title XXI, P.L. 107-210 ), the President must notify Congress before starting negotiation of a trade agreement and before signing a completed agreement. TPA legislation applies to trade agreements entered into before July 1, 2007. If the Administration meets the notification requirements, consults as required, and satisfies other conditions in the TPA legislation, the 2002 legislation calls on Congress to consider implementing legislation for a trade agreement under expedited ("trade promotion" or "fast-track") procedures. 5724 , S. 2830 ) to Congress under trade promotion authority. 1092 ) to suspend TPA rules governing consideration of H.R. Agreements Under Negotiation
The WTO Doha Round
At the fourth Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Doha, Qatar, on November 9-14, 2001, trade ministers from over 140 member countries of the World Trade Organization agreed to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. For an agreement to be considered under TPA, Congress must have been notified by April 2, 2007. The Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership/New Zealand/Brunei
On September 22, 2008, the United States announced the launch of negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P-4), an FTA currently comprised of Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. However, negotiations have continued in 2008, the most recent being held on July 14. Other Potential Trade Agreements
Middle East-North African Free Trade Agreement
On May 9, 2003, President Bush announced an initiative to create a U.S.-Middle East Free Trade Agreement by 2013. | The Bush Administration has made bilateral and regional free-trade agreements (FTAs) an important element of U.S. trade policy, a strategy known as "competitive liberalization." This strategy, it argues, will push forward trade liberalization simultaneously on bilateral, regional, and multilateral fronts. It is meant to spur trade negotiations by liberalizing trade with countries willing to join FTAs, and to pressure other countries to negotiate multilaterally. Critics contend, however, that the accent on regional and bilateral negotiations undermines the multilateral forum and increases the risk of trade diversion away from competitive countries not in the trade bloc. On May 10, 2007, Congressional leaders and the Bush Administration announced a conceptual agreement on changes to currently notified free trade agreements (FTA).
Negotiations have been concluded with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea in time to be considered by Congress under U.S. trade promotion authority. Legislation to implement the Peru FTA was approved by Congress and signed into law by the President on December 14, 2007 (P.L. 110-138). Legislation to implement the Colombia FTA was introduced in each chamber under TPA rules on April 8, 2008 (H.R. 5724, S. 2830). On April 10, the House voted to suspend TPA rules with regard to this agreement (H.Res. 1092). Several other trade initiatives are under discussion, including a U.S.-Middle East FTA and negotiations with countries in the 'P-4' group (Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei). Legislation to implement the Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and FTAs with Bahrain and Oman were approved by the 109th Congress.
The broadest trade initiative being negotiated is the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In November 2001, trade ministers from WTO member countries agreed to launch a new round of trade talks covering market access, trade remedies, and developing-country issues. Nearly seven years of negotiations have occurred since then without a breakthrough on 'modalities,' the methods and formulas by which negotiations are conducted, with the recent Geneva negotiating Ministerial conducted between July 21 and 29 likewise failing to reach agreement. In September 2008, the United States entered into negotiations with the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (P-4) countries of Brunei, Chile, Singapore, and New Zealand for a common FTA.
U.S. trade promotion authority (TPA) expired on July 1, 2007. Potential agreements resulting from current trade negotiations (Colombia, Panama, and South Korea) may be considered by Congress under TPA legislation enacted in 2002. Under the legislation, if the President meets notification requirements and other conditions, Congress will consider a bill to implement a trade agreement under an expedited procedure (no amendment, deadlines for votes). The notification requirements include minimum 90-day notices before starting negotiations and before signing a trade agreement. However, TPA governs internal rules of each chamber and may be altered by each chamber at any time. |
crs_R42397 | crs_R42397_0 | Located beneath the East Front Plaza, the CVC was designed to enhance the security, educational experience, and comfort of visitors to the U.S. Capitol. The decision to build a subterranean facility largely invisible from an exterior perspective was made so the structure would not compete with, or detract from, the appearance and historical architectural integrity of the Capitol. The project's designers sought to integrate the new structure with the landscape of the Capitol Grounds and ultimately recreate the park-like setting intended by landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted Sr. in his 1874 design for the site. The cost of the center was an estimated $621 million. For information on the use of the Capitol Visitor Center space for official events, see CRS Report RL34619, Use of the Capitol Rotunda, Capitol Grounds, and Emancipation Hall: Concurrent Resolutions, 101st to 112th Congress , by Matthew Eric Glassman and [author name scrubbed]. In November 1999, the United States Capitol Preservation Commission approved a revised conceptual design, and a design and engineering obligation plan was approved by the House and Senate legislative appropriations subcommittees in November 1999 and January 2000, respectively. On January 31, 2000, design development work was begun, and in mid-October 2000, the United States Capitol Preservation Commission approved the final design plan. Sequence 1: Foundation/Structural Work
On June 12, 2002, the Architect of the Capitol awarded a $99.9 million contract for Sequence 1 construction. On April 21, 2003, the AOC awarded a $144.2 million contract for Sequence 2. 108-279 ) included several mechanisms designed to facilitate monitoring the project's expenditures, including (1) directing GAO to perform quarterly performance reviews; (2) limiting to $10 million the total of federal funds that could be obligated or expended for the tunnel connecting the center with the Library of Congress; (3) prohibiting the Architect of the Capitol from obligating funds for the tunnel until an obligation plan was approved by the chairs and ranking members of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations; and (4) urging those responsible for exhibits in the center to consult with the Library of Congress "to ensure that the exhibit presents history of the Congress as well as the role of the Congress in the preservation of the cultural and artistic heritage of the American people." The act provided $22.4 million for FY2011 and also included a $14.6 million rescission of prior year unobligated amounts provided for the CVC. The CVC opened to the public on December 2, 2008. | The Capitol Visitor Center (CVC), which opened to the public on December 2, 2008, was designed to enhance the security, educational experience, and comfort of those visiting the U.S. Capitol. The decision to build a subterranean facility beneath the East Front Plaza, largely invisible from an exterior perspective, was made so the structure would not compete with, or detract from, the appearance and historical architectural integrity of the Capitol. The project's designers sought to integrate the new structure with the landscape of the East Capitol Grounds and ultimately recreate the park-like setting intended by landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted Sr. in his historic 1874 design for the site.
Estimates for the cost of the center were as high as $621 million, although the FY2011 appropriations act subsequently included a $14.6 million rescission. The project was financed with appropriated funds and $65 million from private donations and revenue generated by the sale of commemorative coins.
In March 1999, the Architect of the Capitol was authorized $2.8 million to coordinate a team of architects, engineers, and consultants to review and revalidate a 1995 study of the site selection and project design. In order to simplify the approval process for the design and construction phases, Congress transferred authority for these functions to the United States Capitol Preservation Commission in September 1999. Three months later, a revised conceptual design for the center was approved by the commission. A design and engineering obligation plan was approved by the House and Senate legislative appropriations subcommittees in November 1999 and January 2000, respectively.
On January 31, 2000, design development work began, and in mid-October 2000, the United States Capitol Preservation Commission approved the final design plan for the center. Subsequently, a construction management firm was hired to oversee the project; an $8 million contract was awarded to relocate utility lines; a $99.9 million contract was awarded for Sequence 1 (foundation/structural work); and a $144.2 million contract was awarded for Sequence 2 (electrical, mechanical, plumbing, and finishing work).
Additionally, a firm also was retained to oversee the development of the CVC exhibition gallery; a tree maintenance contractor was hired to help assure the protection of trees on the East Capitol Grounds; historic preservation workers temporarily removed historic Olmsted landscape features from the grounds for their protection; and temporary visitor screening facilities and media sites were constructed.
Throughout the entire construction of the nearly 580,000 square foot underground facility, the project was monitored by congressional committees, which held numerous oversight and appropriations request hearings.
For information on the use of the Capitol Visitor Center space for official events, see CRS Report RL34619, Use of the Capitol Rotunda, Capitol Grounds, and Emancipation Hall: Concurrent Resolutions, 101st to 112th Congress, by Matthew Eric Glassman and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41501 | crs_R41501_0 | Members and leaders of both parties have questioned whether practices, while consistent with House rules, have gotten out of balance, with too much deliberation sacrificed to efficiency or electioneering. They have made speeches, introduced resolutions, and, when in the minority, issued critiques of the House's legislative management. Practices targeted have included waivers of layover rules, use of structured and closed special rules, and waivers of committee assignment limitations. The purpose of this report is to provide Members with an analysis of House legislative rules and practices, and committee organization and procedures, that could be changed in the 112 th Congress. Some analyses respond to bipartisan Member concerns over the House's legislative management, others to the needs of leaders in managing such a large body. Mechanisms to Effect Changes to Rules andTheir Implementation
Change to legislative procedures and to committee organization in the House of Representatives can be achieved in a number of ways. Perspectives on Standing Rules
A House rule or set of rules might be analyzed in a number of ways. What is the balance being sought between deliberation and decision making? What leader or group of Members will be empowered by a change, or will the House be the decision maker? Will an action be allowed, forbidden, or made conditional? How might party rules supplement or supplant an existing or new rule? In addition to providing a process, a rule may—
Disallow an action, such as the proscription in Rule XIII on the Rules Committee from reporting a special rule prohibiting the motion to recommit; Allow an action, such as the demand for the division of a question in Rule XVI; Require an action to be taken, such as the referral of legislation by the Speaker in Rule XII; Establish conditions precedent for an action, such as placing a motion to discharge on the Discharge Calendar only after a majority of the membership has signed the motion, as provided in Rule XV; Establish consequences for an action, such as the call to order ("words taken down") in Rule XVII; Determine who may take an action, such as the authorization of the majority leader in Rule XXI to make a motion for the Committee of the Whole to rise and report a general appropriations bill that has been read for amendment; Determine whether, how, and when an individual or entity may make a decision on an action, such as the authority of the Speaker in Rule 1 to approve the Journal, subject to a demand by a Member for a vote by the House for its approval; Create a rigid process, such as that under Rule XI that allows a committee to report a measure only when a majority of the committee's membership is physically present; Create a flexible process, with discretion vested in an individual or an entity, such as the discretion vested in the Speaker in Rule XX to postpone votes and, after the first vote in a series is taken, to reduce the time for voting to five minutes; Make an exception to a process, such as the requirement for a so-called one-day layover of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee unless, as provided in Rule XIII, the House by a two-thirds vote waives the requirement; Allow a motion and attach conditions to it, such as the motion in Rule XI to dispense with the first reading of a bill or resolution in a committee if printed copies are available, which motion is privileged and nondebatable; Disallow a motion, such as the motion to reconsider on an affirmative vote to approve the Journal in Rule I; Create an entity and give responsibility or authority, or both, to it, such as the officers and officials of the House in Rule II; Establish requirements, such as those in Rule XIII on the contents of committees' reports on legislation; Bestow privilege, such as to measures listed in Rule XIII; or Bring deliberation to an end, such as the motion for the previous question allowed under rule XIX. Committee System Overview
Numerous House rules address the committee system, including committee and subcommittee membership, and committee jurisdiction and referral. Many Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference rules also govern the organization, structure, and procedures of House committees, and many party rules, in addition, supplement or even circumvent House rules to reflect, for example, the size of the majority and the political and other needs of both the majority party and its members. As the number of committees, subcommittees, and informal groups and task forces have increased, and the number of waivers and temporary assignments has expanded, the average number of assignments for Members has also risen. Committee Party Ratios .") Regular Order and Committee Processing of Legislation
The means by which legislation is developed has become an issue in and of itself in recent Congresses. Members of both parties, whether their party has been in the majority or the minority, have criticized departures from "regular order" and the development of leadership alternatives outside of and subsequent to the committee process. The evolution of rules and practices in the House in the past 25 years, however, has favored decision making and efficiency. Members might ask whether the House in recent years has favored decision making too much over deliberation? Whether the minority has been excluded too much from influencing legislative outcomes? Change, if desired, could be accomplished through a rules change, party rules or guidelines, or leadership commitments. | Members and leaders of both parties have questioned whether legislative practices, while consistent with House rules, have gotten out of balance, with too much deliberation sacrificed to efficiency or electioneering. They have made speeches, introduced resolutions, and, when in the minority, issued critiques of the House's legislative management. Practices targeted have included waivers of layover rules, use of structured and closed special rules, and waivers of committee assignment limitations. The purpose of this report is to provide Members with an analysis of House legislative rules and practices, and committee organization and procedures, that could be changed in the 112th Congress. Some analyses respond to bipartisan Member concerns over the House's legislative management, others to the needs of leaders in managing such a large body.
Change to legislative procedures and to committee organization in the House of Representatives can be achieved in a number of ways, including the opening-day rules resolution, freestanding resolutions, the Speaker's announced policies, party rules, and majority-party leadership commitments.
A House rule or set of rules might be drafted a number of ways. Questions for a proponent of a rules change include: What is the balance being sought between deliberation and decision making? What leader or group of Members will be empowered by a change, or will the House be the decision maker? Will an action be allowed, forbidden, or made conditional? How will the rule be enforced? How could party rules supplement or supplant an existing or new rule?
Numerous House rules address the committee system, including structure, membership, jurisdiction and referral, and procedures. Numerous Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference rules and decisions on committees supplement or even circumvent House rules to ensure the majority party's dominance of committees' policymaking and to organize committees to reflect the majority party's values. The number, jurisdiction, size, and party ratios of committees are important for these reasons. In addition, as the number of waivers and temporary assignments has expanded, the average number of assignments for Members has risen. These attributes of the committee system, and others, could be changed if Members wish to do so.
The means by which legislation is developed has become an issue in and of itself in recent Congresses. Members of both parties, whether their party has been in the majority or the minority, have criticized departures from "regular order" and the development of leadership alternatives outside of and subsequent to the committee process. The evolution of rules and practices in the House in the past 25 years, however, has favored decision making and efficiency. Members seem now to be asking whether the House favors decision making too much over deliberation? Whether the minority has been excluded too much from influencing legislative outcomes?
Because important legislation, including conference reports and amendments between the houses, is almost always considered in the House chamber under a special rule reported by the Rules Committee—the "arm of the leadership"—the use of structured and closed rules has become the principal means by which the House makes decisions efficiently. If the House wishes to rebalance decision making and deliberation, numerous options exist for working within the special rules process to increase deliberation and Member participation in policymaking.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32160 | crs_RL32160_0 | Conditions in the Region
The Caribbean, encompassing 16 independent nations, is a diverse region of some 34 million people that includes some of the hemisphere's richest and poorest nations (see Table 1 ). The region consists of 13 island nations, from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Tobago in the south; Belize, which is geographically located in Central America; and the two nations of Guyana and Suriname, located on the north central coast of South America. With the exception of Cuba and Haiti, regular elections have been the norm, and for the most part have been free and fair. Although many Caribbean nations have maintained long democratic traditions, they are not immune from terrorist and other threats to their political stability. Many Caribbean nations experienced an economic slump in 2001-2002 due to downturns in the tourism and agriculture sectors, although most Caribbean economies have rebounded since 2003. Overview of U.S.-Caribbean Relations
U.S. interests in the Caribbean are diverse, and include economic, political, and security concerns. The Administration describes the Caribbean as America's "third border," with events in the region having a direct impact on the homeland security of the United States. It describes Caribbean nations as "vital partners on security, trade, health, the environment, education, regional democracy, and other hemispheric issues." The U.S.-Caribbean relationship is characterized by extensive economic linkages, cooperation on counter-narcotics efforts and security, and a sizeable U.S. foreign assistance program supporting a variety of projects to strengthen democracy, promote economic growth and development, alleviate poverty, and combat the AIDS epidemic in the region. Despite close U.S. relations with most Caribbean nations, there has been tension at times in the relationship. For example, relations between Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations and the United States became strained in the aftermath of the departure of President Jean Bertrand Aristide from power in February 2004. Caribbean nations that depend on tourism such as Jamaica and the Bahamas are concerned about the potential negative effects on tourism in the region because of a new U.S. passport requirement, as of January 8, 2007, for U.S. citizens traveling by air to the Caribbean, as well as to Canada and Mexico. (For further on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS Report RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns , and CRS Report RL33156, Haiti: International Assistance Strategy for the Interim Government and Congressional Concerns , both by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants , by [author name scrubbed].) Most significantly, the initiative included increased funding to combat HIV/AIDS in the region. In addition, the 108 th Congress appropriated $100 million in emergency assistance ( P.L. CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109 th Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. | With some 34 million people and 16 independent nations sharing an African ethnic heritage, the Caribbean is a diverse region that includes some of the hemisphere's richest and poorest nations. The region consists of 13 island nations, from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Tobago in the south; Belize, which is geographically located in Central America; and the two nations of Guyana and Suriname, located on the north central coast of South America. With the exception of Cuba and Haiti, regular elections in the region are the norm, and for the most part have been free and fair. Nevertheless, while many Caribbean nations have long democratic traditions, they are not immune to threats to their political stability, including terrorism. Many nations in the region experienced economic decline in 2001-2002 due to downturns in the tourism and agriculture sectors. Most Caribbean economies have rebounded since 2003, although the extensive damage resulting from several storms in 2004 caused economic difficulties for several countries.
U.S. interests in the Caribbean are diverse, and include economic, political, and security concerns. The Bush Administration describes the Caribbean as America's "third border," with events in the region having a direct impact on the homeland security of the United States. It maintains that Caribbean nations are "vital partners on security, trade, health, the environment, education, regional democracy, and other hemispheric issues."
The U.S.-Caribbean relationship is characterized by extensive economic linkages, cooperation on counter-narcotics efforts and security, and a sizeable U.S. foreign assistance program. U.S. aid supports a variety of projects to strengthen democracy, promote economic growth and development, alleviate poverty, and combat the AIDS epidemic in the region. In the aftermath of several devastating storms in 2004, Congress approved $100 million in emergency supplemental funding (P.L. 108-324) to support humanitarian efforts and reconstruction in Haiti, Grenada, and Jamaica. Despite close U.S. relations with most Caribbean nations, there has been tension at times in the relationship. For example, relations with Caribbean nations became strained in the aftermath of the departure of Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide from power in February 2004. More recently, Caribbean nations that depend on tourism are concerned about the potential negative economic effects of a new U.S. requirement, as of January 8, 2007, for U.S. citizens traveling by air to the Caribbean (as well as to Canada and Mexico) to hold a passport.
This report deals with broader issues in U.S. relations with the Caribbean, including foreign assistance, anti-drug trafficking and anti-money laundering cooperation, support to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the region, and security concerns such as port security and border security efforts. It does not include an extensive discussion of Haiti and Cuba. U.S. policy toward these Caribbean nations is covered in the following products: CRS Report RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS22286 | crs_RS22286_0 | 98-8 ) in which Congress allocated $50 million to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide emergency food and shelter to needy individuals. The program funds soup kitchens, food banks, and shelters, and also provides homeless prevention services. Local communities largely determine how funds will be used. The National Board
Although funds for the EFS program are appropriated to FEMA, a National Board was established to carry out the program, including the distribution of funds to local jurisdictions. Very little EFS program funding is used for administrative expenses. Location of the EFS Program
Beginning in FY2003 and continuing through FY2005, the President's budget request proposed moving the EFS program from FEMA to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in order to consolidate homeless programs. | The Emergency Food and Shelter (EFS) Program allocates funds to local communities to fund homeless programs including soup kitchens, food banks, shelters, and homeless prevention services. The EFS program is part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and after Hurricane Katrina struck, some questions arose about the use of EFS program funds for Presidentially-declared disasters. This report describes how the EFS program operates through its National Board, local boards, and local recipient organizations. It further discusses the use of EFS program funds during disasters, and recent attempts to move the program from FEMA to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). |
crs_R40906 | crs_R40906_0 | Introduction
Several comprehensive bills have been introduced on the topic of health reform in the 111 th Congress, such as H.R. 3962 (the Affordable Health Care for America Act), S. 1679 (Affordable Health Choices Act), and S. 1796 (America's Healthy Future Act of 2009). On November 3, 2009, an additional health reform proposal was made public: Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 3962 Offered by Mr. Boehner of Ohio ("the Amendment"). If adopted, the Amendment would replace the substantive text of H.R. 3962 with the text of the Common Sense Health Care Reform and Affordability Act. This report summarizes the contents of the proposed Amendment. Each state has implemented a unique set of reform strategies to address concerns about health insurance and the health care delivery system. The Plan Finder would be available on the internet and accessible to all individuals in the state. A portion of this appropriation is earmarked for the OIG. | Health care reform is at the top of the domestic policy agenda for the 111th Congress, driven by concerns about the growing ranks of the uninsured and the unsustainable growth in spending on health care and health insurance. Improving access to care and controlling rising costs are seen to require changes to both the financing and delivery of health care. Experts point to a growing body of evidence of the health care system's failure to consistently provide high-quality care to all Americans.
Several comprehensive bills have been introduced on the topic of health reform in the 111th Congress, such as H.R. 3962 (the Affordable Health Care for America Act), S. 1679 (Affordable Health Choices Act), and S. 1796 (America's Healthy Future Act of 2009).
On November 3, 2009, an additional health reform proposal was made public: Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 3962 Offered by Mr. Boehner of Ohio ("the Amendment"). If adopted, the Amendment would replace the substantive text of H.R. 3962 with the text of the Common Sense Health Care Reform and Affordability Act. This report summarizes the contents of the proposed Amendment.
This report will be updated as appropriate. |
crs_R41170 | crs_R41170_0 | Introduction
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are international institutions that provide financial assistance, typically in the form of loans and grants, to developing countries in order to promote economic and social development. The United States is a member and significant donor to five major MDBs. These include the World Bank and four smaller regional development banks: the African Development Bank (AfDB); the Asian Development Bank (AsDB); the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Congress plays a critical role in shaping U.S. policy at the MDBs through funding and oversight of U.S. participation in the institutions. The second section discusses the role of Congress in the MDBs, including congressional legislation authorizing and appropriating U.S. contributions to the MDBs and congressional oversight of U.S. participation in the MDBs. Non-concessional assistance is, depending on the MDB, extended to middle-income governments, some creditworthy low-income governments, and private-sector firms in developing countries. The other type of lending window is used to provide financial assistance at below market-based terms (concessional assistance), typically in the form of loans at below-market interest rates and grants, to governments of low-income countries. The World Bank initially focused on providing financing for large infrastructure projects. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
The EBRD is the youngest MDB, founded in 1991. The United States is the largest donor to the non-concessional lending windows to the IBRD, the IFC, the EBRD, and the IDB. Replenishments of the MDB concessional windows happen regularly, while capital increases for the MDB non-concessional windows occur much more infrequently. Some legislative mandates require the U.S. Executive Directors to support, rather than oppose, financial assistance. Second, legislative mandates direct the U.S. representatives at the MDBs to advocate for policies within the MDBs. Under a number of Administrations, the MDBs have been viewed as critical to promoting U.S. foreign policy , economic interests, and national security interests abroad, although various Administrations have had different views on the appropriate level of U.S. funding for the MDBs and policy reforms to improve the effectiveness of the MDBs. U.S. Funding for the MDBs
U.S. funding for the MDBs may shift under President Trump, who campaigned on an "America First" platform and has signaled a reorientation of U.S. foreign policy. In March 2017, the Trump Administration proposed cutting $650 million over three years compared to the commitments made under the Obama Administration. Congress sets U.S. fundi ng for the MDBs as part of the State and Foreign O perations authorization and appropriations process. Critics of the MDBs argue that they are international bureaucracies focused on getting money "out the door" to developing countries, rather than on delivering results in developing countries; that the MDBs emphasize short-term outputs like reports and frameworks but do not engage in long-term activities like the evaluation of projects after they are completed; and that they put enormous administrative demands on developing-country governments. Some analysts have also raised questions about whether there is a clear division of labor among the MDBs. Bilateral aid gives donors more control over where the money goes and how the money is spent. The Changing Landscape of the MDBs
In recent years, several countries have taken steps to launch two new multilateral development banks. Second, China has led the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). These two institutions are the first major MDBs to be created in decades, and there is debate about how they will fit in with existing international financial institutions. | Multilateral development banks (MDBs) provide financial assistance to developing countries in order to promote economic and social development. The United States is a member, and donor, to five major MDBs: the World Bank and four regional development banks, including the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank.
The MDBs primarily fund large infrastructure and other development projects and provide loans tied to policy reforms by the government. The MDBs provide non-concessional financial assistance to middle-income countries and some creditworthy low-income countries on market-based terms. They also provide concessional assistance, including grants and loans at below-market rate interest rates, to low-income countries.
The Role of Congress in U.S. Policy at the MDBs
Congress plays a critical role in U.S. participation in the MDBs through funding and oversight. Congressional legislation is required for the United States to make financial contributions to the banks. Appropriations for the concessional windows occur regularly, while appropriations for the non-concessional windows are less frequent.
Congress exercises oversight over U.S. participation in the MDBs, managed by the Treasury Department, through confirmations of U.S. representatives at the MDBs, hearings, and legislative mandates. For example, legislative mandates direct the U.S. Executive Directors to the MDBs to advocate certain policies and how to vote on various issues at the MDBs. Congress also has issued reporting requirements for the Treasury Department on issues related to MDB activities, and tied MDB funding to specific institutional reforms.
Selected Issues for Congress
U.S. Funding for the MDBs. U.S. funding for the MDBs may shift under President Trump. In March 2017, the Trump Administration proposed cutting $650 million over three years compared to the commitments made under the Obama Administration. However, in the spring of 2018, the Trump Administration pledged to support an expansion of the World Bank's non-concessional lending facility, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Congress sets U.S. funding for the MDBs as part of the annual state and foreign operations authorization and appropriations process.
Effectiveness of MDBs. Critics argue that the MDBs focus more on "getting money out the door" than delivering results, are not transparent, and lack a clear division of labor. They also argue that providing aid multilaterally relinquishes U.S. control over where and how the money is spent. Proponents argue that providing assistance to developing countries is the "right" thing to do and has been successful in helping developing countries make strides in health and education over the past four decades. They also argue that the MDBs leverage funds from other donors, promote policy reforms in developing countries, and enhance U.S. leadership.
Changing Landscape of the MDBs. Emerging markets have launched two new multilateral development banks: the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank. The first major MDBs created in decades, questions have been raised how they will fit in with existing MDBs. |
crs_R42594 | crs_R42594_0 | The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reportedly regulates $62 billion worth of cosmetics. Cosmetics, Drugs, and Combination Products
This section discusses the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) definitions of cosmetics and drugs, and how the FFDCA differentiates between cosmetics and a cosmetic that also meets the statutory definition of a drug. In addition to the FFDCA, cosmetics are regulated under the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA) and related regulations. For example, FDA has regulations on voluntary facility registration and voluntarily reporting for ingredients used in cosmetic products and adverse reactions to cosmetics. Instead, under a voluntary FDA program, cosmetic manufacturers and packagers may report the ingredients used in their product formulations. Finally, FDA does not have mandatory recall authority to require a cosmetic manufacturer to recall a product from the marketplace. However, the agency may request a voluntary recall, and FDA has issued general regulations on the conduct of voluntary recalls that outline the agency's expectations of manufacturers during a recall. While FDA does not have the authority to require compliance with these regulations, FDA may take action against adulterated or misbranded cosmetics. FDA's authority over cosmetics is less comprehensive than its authority over other FDA-regulated products with regard to GMP; premarket notification, clearance, or approval; testing; and mandatory risk labeling. As an example, cosmetic producers are not required to use GMP unless their cosmetics are also drugs. With the exception of color additives, FDA does not require premarket notification, safety testing, or premarket review or approval of the chemicals used in cosmetic products. FDA has issued rules restricting the use of some ingredients in cosmetic products, such as those that it has determined are poisonous or deleterious, which would cause the cosmetic to be adulterated. Additionally, under FFDCA, cosmetics will be deemed to be misbranded, if
the "labeling is false or misleading in any particular"; the label lacks required information; required labeling information is not prominently placed with conspicuousness and "in such terms as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase and use"; the "container is so made, formed, or filled as to be misleading"; use of a color additive does not conform to packaging and labeling requirements; or the packaging or labeling violates the regulations issued under the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970. In contrast, the agency has the authority to order recalls of food, infant formula, medical devices, human tissue products, and tobacco products. Conclusion
Although FDA's authorities over cosmetic products include some of those applicable to other FDA-regulated products, they are generally less comprehensive and exclude certain requirements imposed on other FDA-regulated products. The manner in which a cosmetic product could or should be regulated, however, is not always clear. Nevertheless, some questions remain as to whether the FDA's current oversight of cosmetic products and their ingredients is appropriate. Nor does the agency have the authority to mandate adverse event reports for interactions that consumers experience from the use of a company's products. | The 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) granted the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate cosmetic products and their ingredients. The statutory provisions of the FFDCA that address cosmetics include adulteration and misbranding provisions. In addition to the FFDCA, cosmetics are regulated under the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA) and related regulations. The cosmetics provisions were amended by the Color Additive Amendments Act of 1960 and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, but remain basically the same as the provisions in the 1938 FFDCA.
FDA's authorities over cosmetic products include some of those applicable to other FDA-regulated products, such as food, drugs, medical devices, and tobacco. For example, FDA has the authority to take certain enforcement actions—such as seizures, injunctions, and criminal penalties—against adulterated or misbranded cosmetics. Additionally, as with drug and food companies, FDA may conduct inspections of cosmetic manufacturers and prohibit imports of cosmetics that violate the FFDCA. The agency also has issued rules restricting the use of ingredients that the agency has determined are poisonous or deleterious.
However, FDA's authority over cosmetics is less comprehensive than its authority over other FDA-regulated products with regard to registration; testing; premarket notification, clearance, or approval; good manufacturing practices; mandatory risk labeling; adverse event reports; and recalls. For example, FDA does not impose registration requirements on cosmetic manufacturers. Rather, cosmetic manufacturers may decide to comply with voluntary FDA regulations on registration. With the exception of color additives, FDA does not require premarket notification, safety testing, review, or approval of the chemicals used in cosmetic products. Cosmetic manufacturers also are not required to use good manufacturing practices (GMP)—although FDA has released GMP guidelines for cosmetic manufacturers—nor required to file ingredient information with, or report adverse reactions to, the agency. Instead, under a voluntary FDA program, cosmetic manufacturers and packagers may report the ingredients used in their product formulations. FDA does not have the authority to require a manufacturer to recall a cosmetic product from the marketplace, although the agency has issued general regulations on voluntary recalls. The agency's ability to issue regulations on cosmetic products is limited by the agency's statutory authorities or lack thereof.
As a result, cosmetics are arguably more self-regulated than other FDA-regulated products. The manner in which a cosmetic product could or should be regulated, however, is not always clear. FDA's guidelines have provided the cosmetic industry with considerable flexibility for product development and claims. The question remains as to whether that flexibility and the extent of government oversight of cosmetic products are still appropriate. |
crs_RL33227 | crs_RL33227_0 | Afghanistan
Overall, conditions for women in Afghanistan have vastly improved since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, particularly in terms of education and job opportunities. Other problems women face are similar to those of the population as a whole: economic insecurity and the threat of political and sectarian violence. Several programs have been launched specifically focused on women and are detailed below. Two similar bills were introduced authorizing unspecified funds for assistance to Iraqi women in the areas of health care, education, economic empowerment, political participation, civil society, and personal security ( H.R. While Congressional funding for democracy building, civil society development, and participation in the workforce will have an important affect on women's lives in each country, the rehabilitation of the basic education and health care infrastructure for Afghan and Iraqi women is equally, if not more, vital. | This report reviews U.S. funding for programs directed toward women in Afghanistan and Iraq. Women in these two countries have faced particularly difficult conditions under the Taliban and Baathist regimes. Although there have been notable improvements since the ouster of these regimes in 2001 and 2003, respectively, women still face real challenges in the areas of education, health care, political participation, and, in many cases, basic human rights. The national and international response to the plight of Afghan and Iraqi women may have an important impact not only on the women being directly assisted, but also on their countries as a whole, in terms of more widespread access to education, health care, and political and economic participation. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42390 | crs_R42390_0 | Introduction
Congress has generally broad authority to impose requirements upon the federal procurement process, or the process whereby agencies obtain goods and services from the private sector. One of the many ways in which Congress has exercised this authority is by enacting measures intended to promote contracting and subcontracting with "small businesses" by federal agencies. Among other things, these measures (1) declare a congressional policy of ensuring that a "fair proportion" of federal contract and subcontract dollars are awarded to small businesses; (2) establish government-wide and agency-specific goals for the percentage of contract and/or subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses; (3) require or authorize agencies to conduct competitions in which only small businesses may compete (i.e., set-asides), or make noncompetitive awards to them in circumstances when such awards could not be made to other businesses; and (4) task the Small Business Administration (SBA) and officers of the procuring agencies with reviewing and helping to restructure proposed procurements so as to maximize opportunities for small business participation. A companion report, CRS Report R42391, Legal Authorities Governing Federal Contracting and Subcontracting with Small Businesses , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], provides an overview of these statutes, the regulations implementing them, and the various judicial and other tribunals that construe them. This report describes measures that Members of the 112 th Congress enacted or proposed in response to particular issues pertaining to small business contracting and subcontracting (e.g., increasing SBA's size standards, increasing government-wide or agency-specific goals for contracting and/or subcontracting with small businesses). Proposals to create new set-aside programs for "early stage" small businesses or mid-sized firms are discussed above, under the heading " Size Standards ." The Obama Administration has also issued guidance addressing the payment of small business contractors and subcontractors. Bundling and Consolidation
The way in which agencies structure their requirements can have significant implications for small businesses. Procurement Center Representatives; Offices of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization
A number of SBA and agency personnel currently are tasked, under various statutes and regulations, with protecting the interests of small businesses in the federal procurement process. The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 currently provides that agencies may use "other than full and open competition" when making awards to small businesses. Rather, it only authorizes agencies to set aside contracts for them. | Congress has generally broad authority to impose requirements upon the federal procurement process, or the process whereby agencies obtain goods and services from the private sector. One of the many ways in which Congress has exercised this authority is by enacting measures intended to promote contracting and subcontracting with "small businesses" by federal agencies. Among other things, these measures (1) declare a congressional policy of ensuring that a "fair proportion" of federal contract and subcontract dollars are awarded to small businesses; (2) establish government-wide and agency-specific goals for the percentage of contract and/or subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses; (3) require or authorize agencies to conduct competitions in which only small businesses may compete (i.e., set-asides), or make noncompetitive awards to them in circumstances when such awards could not be made to other businesses; and (4) task the Small Business Administration (SBA) and officers of the procuring agencies with reviewing and helping to restructure proposed procurements so as to maximize opportunities for small business participation. A companion report, CRS Report R42391, Legal Authorities Governing Federal Contracting and Subcontracting with Small Businesses, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], provides an overview of these statutes, the regulations implementing them, and the various judicial and other tribunals that construe them.
This report describes and analyzes measures that Members of the 112th Congress enacted or proposed in response to particular issues pertaining to small business contracting and subcontracting. The majority of such measures addressed (1) the standards under which firms' size is measured, including the establishment of size standards for "early stage" small businesses and "mid-sized" firms; (2) government-wide or agency-specific goals for contracting and subcontracting with small businesses; and (3) eligibility for the set-aside programs for particular types of small businesses (e.g., HUBZone small businesses). Other measures addressed federal contractors' obligations vis-à-vis small business subcontractors; limitations on the amount of work that may be subcontracted by small businesses to other firms; expedited payment of small business contractors; increases to the maximum surety bond amount that SBA may guarantee; bundling and consolidation of requirements into contracts unsuitable for award to small businesses; and agency "insourcing" of functions performed by small businesses. Yet other measures addressed the responsibilities of SBA Procurement Center Representatives and agency Offices of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization; the circumstances in which agencies may set aside contracts for small businesses or make non-competitive awards to them; the use of small businesses when making "small purchases;" mentor-protégé programs wherein large businesses provide financial and other assistance to small businesses; the deterrence and punishment of fraud in small business contracting programs; and contracting or subcontracting with small businesses by particular agencies. |
crs_R44360 | crs_R44360_0 | Introduction
The Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGA) provides federally developed food-based recommendations for Americans two years of age and older, designed to promote health and prevent disease. As mandated by the 1990 National Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Act ( P.L. 101-445 ), the guidelines are to be reviewed and updated at least every five years by the Secretaries of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Agriculture (USDA). It is an evidence-based and authoritative policy document that serves as the basis for nutrition policies and programs in the United States, including the National School Lunch Program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). In 1987, a House Committee on Appropriations conference report directed HHS and USDA to "reestablish a Dietary Guidelines Advisory Group on a periodic basis. This Advisory Group will review the scientific data relevant to nutritional guidance and make recommendations on appropriate changes to the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services." The 1995 DGA was the first statutorily mandated ( P.L. The experts' work is solely advisory and time-limited. The DGAC provides an advisory scientific report to the Secretaries of HHS and USDA, who consider the report when writing the final DGA policy document. The Secretaries used that report, along with input from other federal agencies and public comments, to develop the final policy document, which was released on January 7, 2016. Which Key Issues Were Raised by Stakeholders with the 2015 DGAC's Report? HHS and USDA received over 29,000 written comments during the 75-day comment period, as well as 73 oral comments at a March 2015 public meeting. Stakeholders flagged several issues with the 2015 DGAC's report, particularly with the scope of the DGAC's recommendations, the process by which the DGAC made its conclusions and recommendations, and concerns over several specific recommendations. The 2015-2020 DGA
What Were the Recommendations in the 2015-2020 DGA? The 2015-2020 DGA consists of five overarching guidelines, which are accompanied by "Key Recommendations" that provide further guidance on how individuals can follow the guidelines. In response to stakeholder concern surrounding the scope of the 2015 DGAC's report and the process used to develop the 2015-2020 DGA, Congress included several DGA-related policy riders in the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act ( P.L. 114-113 ). Section 735(a) required the Secretary of USDA, within 30 days of the enactment of the law, to engage the National Academy of Medicine (NAM, formerly the Institute of Medicine [IOM]) to conduct a comprehensive study of the process used to establish the 2015 DGAC and the subsequent development of the 2015 DGA. Section 735(b) further required that the NAM panel selected to conduct this study include a "balanced representation of individuals with broad experiences and viewpoints regarding nutrition and dietary information," and that this comprehensive study include an analysis of how
the DGA can better prevent chronic disease, ensure nutritional adequacy for all Americans, and accommodate a range of individual factors, including age, gender, and metabolic health; the DGAC selection process "can be improved to provide more transparency, eliminate bias, and include committee members with a range of viewpoints"; the NEL is compiled and used, including whether NEL and other systematic reviews, as well as data analyses, are conducted following "rigorous and objective scientific standards"; and systematic reviews are conducted on "longstanding" DGA recommendations, including "whether scientific studies are included from scientists with a range of viewpoints." What's Next for the DGA? | The Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGA) is a policy document that provides federally developed, nutrition-based recommendations for Americans two years of age and older. The guidelines are statutorily mandated under the 1990 National Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Act (P.L. 101-445), which requires the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Agriculture (USDA) to jointly publish the DGA policy document at least once every five years.
The DGA forms the basis for all federal nutrition policies, including the National School Lunch Program and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). The guidelines also
influence food and nutrition labeling; guide local, state, and national health promotion and disease prevention initiatives; and inform various organizations and industries (e.g., products developed and marketed by the food and beverage industry).
To facilitate publication of the DGA policy document, a conference report from the House Committee on Appropriations directed HHS and USDA to establish a Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee (DGAC) on a periodic basis. The DGAC is an independent group of experts from outside the federal sector, generally in the fields of nutrition and medicine, whose work is solely advisory and time-limited. The DGAC is tasked with reviewing the scientific data relevant to nutritional guidance and making recommendations to the Secretaries of HHS and USDA regarding changes to the DGA policy document.
The 571-page Scientific Report of the 2015 DGAC (2015 DGAC's report) was made public on February 19, 2015, and was used by the departments, along with public comments and input from other federal agencies, to inform the drafting of the 2015-2020 DGA policy document.
Because the DGA influences nutrition policy, the guidelines are of interest to public health, nutrition, agriculture, and food industry stakeholders. Following the release of the 2015 DGAC's report, HHS and USDA received 29,000 written comments during the 75-day comment period, as well as 73 oral comments at a March 2015 public meeting. Stakeholders flagged several concerns with the report, particularly with the scope of the DGAC's recommendations and the process by which the DGAC made its conclusions and recommendations, along with concerns regarding several specific recommendations.
In response to concerns surrounding the scope of the 2015 DGAC's report and the process used to develop the 2015-2020 DGA, several DGA-related policy riders were included in the FY2016 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 114-113), prior to the release of the 2015-2020 DGA. As mandated by Congress, the National Academies of Medicine (NAM) are, for the first time, required to review the DGA and its development process due to concerns with the "quality of scientific evidence and extraneous factors" that were included in the 2015 DGAC's report.
HHS and USDA issued the 2015-2020 DGA on January 7, 2016. This most recent DGA provides five overarching guidelines for the general population, accompanied by several "Key Recommendations" that provide further guidance on how individuals can follow the five guidelines. |
crs_R42339 | crs_R42339_0 | Overview1
As Congress exercises oversight and prepares to consider programs for Lebanon in the coming year, uncertainty about Syria's future is now raising questions about how unrest there may affect the security and stability of Lebanon. Lebanese concerns center on the potential for conflict or regime change in Syria to disrupt Lebanon's security directly and to reshape the context in which Lebanon's fragile sectarian political balance has endured since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990. At present, Syria continues to exert a great deal of influence in Lebanon through its patronage relationships with Hezbollah and the Hezbollah-affiliated, pro-Syrian March 8 governing coalition. The unrest in Syria and the possibility for spillover into Lebanon affect the current policy priorities of the United States, which include preserving regional peace, strengthening Lebanon's weak democratic institutions, limiting Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon's political process, and countering transnational threats from Hezbollah and other militant groups. These programs began in the wake of the withdrawal of Syrian military forces in 2005 and the Israel-Hezbollah war of July and August 2006. March 14 has expressed anger with Syria, accusing the Asad regime of violating Lebanese sovereignty by repeatedly launching incursions into Lebanese territory, and kidnapping Syrian and Lebanese nationals within Lebanon who are connected to the Syrian opposition. Current Effects of the Syrian Unrest on Lebanon
The Economy
Pro-Syrian business interests are deeply influential within the Lebanese economy. Others have been kidnapped by Syrian troops. Population Movements
Many Syrian dissidents are escaping to Lebanon to find safe haven. How Might Future Events in Syria Affect Lebanon? Key factors to monitor may include increased flow of refugees, the degree of mobilization and/or radicalization among Syrian and Lebanese Sunnis and Christians, cross-border flows of arms, and the incidence of sectarian clashes. Given the current security and political situation in Syria, Members may consider the following questions as they discuss future U.S. security assistance to Lebanon:
What are the rationales for key U.S. foreign assistance programs related to the security forces, border control, and combating terrorism? To what extent should U.S. policymakers seek to impose further conditions on U.S. aid to Lebanon in light of events to curtail Hezbollah's political influence? As the Obama Administration and Congress review U.S. policy priorities in this shifting landscape, issues that Members may encounter include:
Whether and how U.S. assistance programs in Lebanon are being affected by developments in Syria and what, if any, changes in assistance program goals or implementation may be necessary in light of changing conditions; Whether events in Syria and Lebanon create new concerns regarding the protection of religious minorities, particularly in light of proposed H.R. 440 , which provides for the establishment of a special envoy to promote the religious freedom of religious minorities in the Near East and South Central Asia; How U.S. support for the LAF, the ISF, and Lebanon's security apparatus can best minimize risks posed by Hezbollah as its strategic alliance with Syria remains in question; How might the United States engage with Lebanon to better protect Israel in light of continuing regional unrest; and, How might U.S. assistance and trade and investment policy most effectively shield the Lebanese economy from the effects of political unrest? | As Congress exercises oversight and prepares to consider programs for Lebanon in the coming year, some observers have expressed fear that Syrian instability may negatively affect Lebanon. Syria exerts a strong political influence on Lebanon and Syrian business interests remain prominent in the Lebanese economy. Both Lebanon and Syria have diverse societies where ethnic and sectarian groups compete and cooperate as they seek power within the confines of a rigid political system. Primary concerns about the implications of Syrian unrest include:
Negative effects on the Lebanese economy; Incursions by Syrian forces into Lebanese territory; The cross-border transfer of arms to Hezbollah and the Syrian opposition; opportunities for suspected Al Qaeda supporters; and, The migration of Syrian dissidents and refugees to Lebanon seeking safe haven.
Continued unrest could exacerbate all of these problems, while complicating sectarian relations in Lebanon, reshaping Hezbollah's strategic position, and contributing to regional instability. Although Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005, Syria continues to exercise influence through its patronage relationships with members of the pro-Syrian and Hezbollah-affiliated March 8 governing coalition This coalition includes Hezbollah, the Shiite party Amal, the Maronite Christian Free Patriotic Movement, and the Druze-led Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Its members have mostly supported the Asad regime since unrest in Syria began in early 2011, complicating Lebanese politics and Lebanese-Syrian relations. Despite these complications, many analysts agree that the major political players in Lebanon share a desire to insulate Lebanon from the unrest in Syria and avoid risking domestic conflict by dramatically upsetting the current Lebanese balance of power. However, the fractious nature of Lebanese politics makes discord likely; a small provocation could easily disrupt the tenuous peace. Increased unrest in Syria or dramatic regime change there may incite instability in Lebanon.
These factors also may affect the goals and implementation of U.S. programs in Lebanon, which include strengthening Lebanon's weak democratic institutions, limiting Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon's political process, and countering transnational threats from Hezbollah and other militant groups through security assistance. Congress may review U.S. priorities and programs and consider the following questions in relation to future U.S. policy in Lebanon:
What are the rationales for key U.S. foreign assistance programs related to Lebanon's security forces, border control, and efforts to combat terrorism? How might unrest in Syria and potential spillover effects challenge the assumptions and viability of U.S. programs? How might prolonged unrest or civil war in Syria affect relations among Lebanese groups? How might U.S. assistance limit potential negative effects? How are Lebanese political leaders and groups responding to events in Syria? How has the unrest and the potential for regime change affected Hezbollah's strategic position and outlook? To what extent should U.S. policymakers seek to impose or remove conditions on U.S. assistance to Lebanon in light of events?
For more information on Lebanon, please see CRS Report R40054, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed] and contact Christopher Blanchard, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, at extension [phone number scrubbed]. |
crs_R42874 | crs_R42874_0 | Overview
U.S.-Ghanaian relations are warm, as signaled by President Barack Obama's travel in 2009 to Ghana, where he laid out his views on democratization and governance in Africa in his single major Africa-focused policy address. Ghana is the only sub-Saharan African country to which Mr. Obama has thus far traveled while serving as president. It has built a relatively robust democracy and a growing economy, although it faces persistent, widespread poverty and a range of profound development challenges. Ghana, which last held national elections in early December 2012 (see below), is considered a model for many of the outcomes that congressional and executive branch policy-makers have long sought to achieve in the region under diverse programs that have drawn substantial congressional engagement. Ghana has received a large U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact and may soon receive a second one. It also participates in three presidential development initiatives, the Global Climate Change (GCC) initiative, Feed the Future (FtF), and the Global Health Initiative (GHI), and hosts U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) regional offices and the USAID-administered West Africa Trade Hub. The Hub activities seek to expand intra-regional and bilateral trade with West African countries, a focus of renewed congressional interest and a key pillar of the Obama Administration's June 2012 U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Afric a . Ghana has also drawn U.S. attention because of its recent discovery of sizable oil reserves and its potential contributions to global and U.S. energy security. Energy production may boost national income and development prospects, but may also pose good governance and resource management challenges, as is common in oil-rich developing countries. Commitment to constitutional governance has become increasingly ingrained, as illustrated by successful inter-party transfers of state power following close recent national elections. Similarly, when President John Atta Mills died in July 2012, state power was transferred to then-Vice President John Dramani Mahama, as constitutionally mandated, within hours. Ghana is a steady contributor of troops to international peacekeeping operations, both in Africa and elsewhere, and is a recipient of U.S. training and assistance aimed at supporting such deployments. Ghana was selected as one of four initial U.S. Partnership for Growth countries globally for several reasons. The winner of the 2012 election was also seen as well placed to win the 2016 election. Services have expanded rapidly, and contributed 47% of GDP in 2011. In recent years, the World Bank's annual Doing Business report has consistently rated Ghana positively—better than all but four countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The start of oil production has spurred an increase in public spending and borrowing based on projected future oil earnings. This means that the government "does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so," according to the State Department's most recent annual Trafficking in Persons Report , released in June 2012. It also pledged to help Ghana to achieve the poverty reduction and development-focused United Nations Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Ghana hosts the USAID regional office and USAID's West Africa Trade Hub, which seeks to increase exports from countries in the region. Ghana's role as a new oil producer is also likely to increase its strategic importance to the United States. Development cooperation is likely to remain a key area of congressional engagement; despite its economic successes, Ghana faces deep-seated socio-economic development challenges. | Ghana: Bilateral Cooperation and Leadership Engagement
Ghana is considered a model for many of the outcomes that many Members of Congress have long sought to achieve in sub-Saharan Africa in the areas of authorizations; appropriations and program guidance; and oversight. Ghana has received a large U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact and may soon receive a second. It is also a recipient of substantial U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and State Department bilateral aid, much of which is channeled through three presidential development initiatives:
the Global Climate Change (GCC) initiative; Feed the Future (FtF), a global food security and poverty reduction initiative; and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) and the Global Health Initiative (GHI).
Ghana also hosts USAID and U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) regional offices and the USAID-administered West Africa Trade Hub. The Hub focuses on expanding intra-regional and bilateral trade with countries in the region, a key area of current congressional interest and a pillar of the Obama Administration's U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, released in June 2012.
Ghana is also one of four initial Partnerships for Growth (PfG) countries. PfG, implementation of which began in 2011 in El Salvador, is intended to advance public and private bilateral cooperation with selected countries whose top leaders demonstrate commitment to good governance and sustainable development. Ghana hosts regular visits by Members of Congress, and in 2009 President Barack Obama signaled that ties remain close by traveling to Ghana, the only sub-Saharan African country that he has visited as president.
Good Governance and Stability
President Obama's visit was premised on Ghana's record of having built a relatively robust democracy and a growing economy, albeit in the face of widespread poverty and diverse development challenges, making it a stable country in an often unstable region. During his visit he lauded its democratic and economic development record and made a major policy address relating these issues to good governance in Africa and the wider developing world. Ghana's stability is maintained, in part, by its citizens' commitment to constitutional governance. Since undergoing a transition from single party rule in the early 1990s, it has held a series of peaceful but close elections, two involving inter-party transfers of state power. The most recent elections, held in early December 2012, were closely contested. In all cases, opposition challengers have either accepted poll results outright or contested them through the courts, rather than through the use of violence or street protests. Constitutional governance was also upheld in July 2012, when state power was rapidly and transparently transferred to the current president, John Dramani Mahama, after the death of President John Atta Mills.
Ghana has also contributed to efforts to maintain stability and end conflict in the surrounding West Africa region, and regularly contributes to international peacekeeping operations elsewhere. It receives U.S. capacity-building assistance in this area, as well as aid to help counter threats posed by international narcotics trafficking.
Development and Economy: Progress and Challenges
Ghana's economy has grown substantially in recent years, based both on increases in farm and mining exports and, more recently, oil production, which is likely to increase its strategic importance to the United States. Growing oil earnings may help fund development, but may also pose resource governance and fiscal management challenges. Economic growth has led to socio-economic and infrastructure construction gains, but Ghana continues to face profound development challenges and threats to the rule of law linked to corruption and trafficking in illegal drugs and persons. |
crs_R45400 | crs_R45400_0 | Introduction
The Impact Aid program, administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), was originally established in 1950 by P.L. 81-815 and P.L. 81-874, 15 years prior to the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Impact Aid compensates local educational agencies (LEAs) for a "substantial and continuing financial burden" resulting from federal activities. These activities include federal ownership of certain lands, as well as the enrollments in LEAs of children whose parents work or live on federal property and children living on Indian lands. The federal government provides compensation because LEAs are unable to collect property or other taxes from these individuals (e.g., members of the uniformed services living on military bases) or their employers, even though the LEAs are obligated to provide free public education to their children. Thus, Impact Aid is intended to compensate LEAs, in part, for the resulting loss of tax revenue. In addition to the Impact Aid programs administered by ED, a smaller set of programs administered by the Department of Defense (DOD) are often referred to as the "DOD Impact Aid" programs. These two programs include one that provides supplemental aid to LEAs serving children with a parent on active duty in the uniformed services, and one that provides assistance to LEAs serving children with severe disabilities with a parent on active duty in the uniformed services. Overview of FY2018 Impact Aid Payments5
ESEA Title VII authorizes several types of Impact Aid payments. These are children who reside with a parent who is on active duty in the uniformed services living on or off federal property, with a parent who is an accredited foreign military officer living on or off federal property, on Indian lands, in low-rent public housing, or with a parent who is a civilian working or living on federal property. Section 7003(b) authorizes basic support payments (BSPs) for federally connected children. 4. Actual payments are reduced if appropriations are insufficient to make maximum grant payments. Types of Federally Connected Children and Their Formula Weights
Table 2 details the categories of federally connected children and the weights that the act assigns to them. 5. The authorizations of appropriations for these programs have been lower than those provided for the Impact Aid programs administered by ED. | The Impact Aid program, administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) and authorized by Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), was originally established in 1950 by P.L. 81-815 and P.L. 81-874, 15 years prior to the enactment of the ESEA. Impact Aid compensates local educational agencies (LEAs) for a "substantial and continuing financial burden" resulting from federal activities. These activities include federal ownership of certain lands, as well as the enrollments in LEAs of children whose parents work or live on federal property and children living on Indian lands. The federal government provides compensation because LEAs are unable to collect property or other taxes from these individuals (e.g., members of the uniformed services living on military bases) or their employers, even though the LEAs are obligated to provide free public education to their children. Thus, Impact Aid is intended to compensate LEAs, in part, for the resulting loss of tax revenue.
The Impact Aid program authorizes several types of payments, as detailed in the table below.
Overall, the Impact Aid program received about $1.4 billion in FY2019. The largest Impact Aid payment is basic support payments (BSPs) for federally connected children (Section 7003(b)), accounting for nearly 90% of the total appropriation. Federally connected children are those who reside with a parent who is a member of the uniformed services living on or off federal property, with a parent who is an accredited foreign military officer living on or off federal property, on Indian lands, in low-rent public housing, or with a parent who is a civilian working or living on federal property. BSPs are allocated directly to LEAs based on a formula that uses weights assigned to different categories of federally connected children, cost factors to determine maximum payment amounts, and provisions to determine payment amounts when appropriations are insufficient to provide maximum payments.
In addition to the Impact Aid programs administered by ED, a smaller set of programs administered by the Department of Defense (DOD) are often referred to as the "DOD Impact Aid" programs. These two programs include one that provides supplemental aid to LEAs serving military children, and one that provides assistance to LEAs serving military children with severe disabilities. For FY2018, total appropriations for these programs were $35 million ($30 million for the first program and $5 million for the second). |
crs_94-261 | crs_94-261_0 | Introduction
Since the creation of the modern U.S. intelligence community after World War II, neither Congress nor the executive branch has made public the total extent of intelligence spending except for two fiscal years in the 1990s. Rather, intelligence programs and personnel have largely been contained, but not identified, within the capacious expanse of the budget of the Department of Defense (DOD). This practice has long been criticized by proponents of open government. Despite the release of data for fiscal years 1997 and 1998, however, no subsequent appropriations levels have been made public. More recently, the FY2007 Intelligence Authorization legislation ( S. 372 ) reported in the Senate in January 2007 would require publication of budget totals for national, but not tactical, intelligence programs. the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States government:
(1) the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);
(2) the National Security Agency (NSA);
(3) the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);
(4) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (formerly the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA));
(5) the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO);
(6) the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps
(7) the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR);
(8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
(9) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS);
(10) the Coast Guard;
(11) the Department of the Treasury;
(12) the Department of Energy;
(13) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Past Budgetary Practice
Budgeting for secret intelligence efforts has long presented difficult challenges to the Congress. This legislation, reported by the two armed services committees, provided authority for the CIA "to transfer to and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget [predecessor of today's Office of Management and Budget]...." The 1949 Act also provided that "sums transferred to the [CIA]... may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of this Act without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred...."
Representative Carl Vinson, speaking on the floor of the House shortly after passage of the 1949 Act, stated that the legislation contained:
the authority to transfer and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget for the performance of any of the agency functions. These include not only some intelligence programs but also procurement of new weapons systems such as stealth aircraft. There are several parts of the intelligence budget that are made public. Advocates of disclosure argue that greater public discussion of intelligence spending made possible by the disclosure of spending levels would ultimately lead to a stronger intelligence effort. From our review of the constitutional language, its history, and the sparse judicial interpretation of its import, it seems that the courts regard the Congress as having the power to define the meaning of the clause. In addition, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that the "overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret." This would be different from the Clinton Administration's practice in FY1997 and FY1998 when the total appropriated amount for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities was released. 108-458 , did not include the Senate's provision to make intelligence spending figures public. Even some of those who believed that Cold War conditions necessitated that intelligence budgets be kept secret now argue that conditions have changed and that current enemies would not be able to make use of information on overall levels of intelligence budgets. Funding for intelligence-related activities presents special difficulties; budgetary totals can fluctuate from year to year solely because certain DOD programs are transferred into or out of intelligence accounts. | Although the United States Intelligence Community encompasses large Federal agencies—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the National Security Agency (NSA)—among others—neither Congress nor the executive branch has regularly made public the total extent of intelligence spending. Rather, intelligence programs and personnel are largely contained, but not identified, within the capacious budget of the Department of Defense (DOD). This practice has long been criticized by proponents of open government and many argue that the end of the Cold War has long since removed any justification for secret budgets. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission recommended that "the overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret."
The Constitution mandates regular statements and accounts of expenditures, but the courts have regarded the Congress as having the power to define the meaning of the clause. From the creation of the modern U.S. Intelligence Community in the late 1940s, Congress and the executive branch shared a determination to keep intelligence spending secret. Proponents of this practice have argued that disclosures of major changes in intelligence spending from one year to the next would provide hostile parties with information on new program or cutbacks that could be exploited to U.S. disadvantage. Secondly, they believe that it would be practically impossible to limit disclosure to total figures and that explanations of what is included or excluded would lead to damaging revelations.
On the other hand, some Members dispute these arguments, stressing the positive effects of open government and the distortions of budget information that occur when the budgets of large agencies are classified. Legislation has been twice enacted expressing the "sense of the Congress" that total intelligence spending figures should be made public, but on several separate occasions both the House and the Senate have voted against making such information public. The Clinton Administration released total appropriations figures for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal years 1997 and 1998, but subsequently such numbers have not been made public. Legal efforts to force release of intelligence spending figures have been unsuccessful.
Central to consideration of the issue is the composition of the "intelligence budget." Intelligence authorization bills have included not just the "National Intelligence Program"—the budgets for CIA, DIA, NSA et al., but also a wide variety of other intelligence and intelligence-related efforts conducted by the Defense Department. Shifts of tactical programs into or out of the total intelligence budgets have hitherto been important only to budget analysts; disclosing total intelligence budgets could make such transfers matters of concern to a far larger audience. Legislation reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2007 (S. 372) would require that funding for the National Intelligence Program be made public but it does not address other intelligence activities. Earlier versions of this Report were entitled Intelligence Spending: Should Total Amounts Be Made Public? This report will be updated as circumstances change. |
crs_R41570 | crs_R41570_0 | A set of refugee resettlement assistance programs, administered by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in the Department of Health and Human Services' Administration for Children and Families (HHS/ACF), provides transitional assistance to refugees and other designated groups. These programs are intended to help the beneficiaries (who are referred to collectively as "refugees" in this report) achieve economic self-sufficiency as soon as possible after their arrival in the United States. Separate from the ORR program, the Department of State (DOS) administers a program of initial resettlement for newly arriving refugees known as the Reception and Placement Program. Under this program, public and private, nonprofit entities provide arriving refugees with initial resettlement services and referrals to other services, as needed. These recent steps by HHS and DOS to provide additional resources for refugee resettlement reflect a larger view on the part of many observers that the refugee resettlement assistance system is in need of reform. The Obama Administration has initiated an interagency review of refugee resettlement, which is being lead by the National Security Council (NSC). They have been widely anticipated, however, and may further energize reform efforts. To help inform possible future efforts to reform the refugee resettlement assistance system, this report discusses existing resettlement assistance programs, key issues and challenges in providing effective assistance, and policy options to reform the current system. ORR Assistance
ORR benefits and services are available to refugees and other designated groups, as enumerated above. In the case of asylees, the eight-month eligibility period begins the month that the individual is granted asylum. According to ORR, this formula change was required to meet the needs of newly arriving refugees. Current Issues in Refugee Resettlement Assistance
In recent years, as noted above, the United States has admitted an increasingly diverse group of refugees. Several other recent reports have focused on the resettlement of Iraqi refugees in the United States. Broad Challenges
The U.S. refugee resettlement assistance program faces a number of broad challenges, several of which are described here. As a result of this "lottery" system, refugees resettled in different parts of the United States may receive very different levels of assistance. ORR Programs
These options concern ORR's refugee resettlement assistance programs, which include cash assistance, medical assistance, and social services. | In recent years, the United States has admitted an increasingly diverse group of refugees and other humanitarian cases with a diverse set of needs. There seems to be broad consensus that the U.S. refugee resettlement assistance system is not adequately meeting the needs of these new arrivals and is ripe for reform. The National Security Council is leading an interagency review of refugee resettlement, the forthcoming results of which may further energize reform efforts. To help inform possible future efforts to reform the refugee resettlement assistance system, this report discusses existing resettlement assistance programs, key challenges and issues in providing effective assistance, and policy options to reform the current system.
To assist newly arriving refugees, the Department of State (DOS) administers a program of initial resettlement known as the Reception and Placement Program. Under this program, public and private, nonprofit entities provide new refugees with initial resettlement services and referrals to other services, as needed.
A separate set of refugee resettlement assistance programs, administered by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in the Department of Health and Human Services' Administration for Children and Families (HHS/ACF), provides transitional assistance to refugees and other designated groups. These groups include individuals granted asylum, Cuban and Haitian entrants, trafficking victims, Amerasians, and Iraqi and Afghan special immigrants. The ORR programs—which provide mainly cash assistance, medical assistance, and employment-related services—are intended to help the beneficiaries (who are referred to collectively as "refugees" in this report) achieve economic self-sufficiency as soon as possible after their arrival in the United States.
Many observers argue that the DOS and ORR programs and the refugee resettlement assistance system more broadly are in need of reform. A number of reports have identified perceived shortcomings in the existing system and have offered recommendations for change. Several of these reports have focused, in particular, on the recent experience of Iraqi refugees resettled in the United States.
Among the broad challenges facing the refugee resettlement assistance system are interagency coordination and information sharing, and funding. Critics also question the system's self-sufficiency model, which requires refugees to secure employment as quickly as possible. Key issues include financial assistance to refugees, which is widely viewed as insufficient, and the "lottery effect," whereby refugees resettled in different parts of the United States receive different levels of financial assistance and services. Growing out of these challenges and issues are a variety of options for reforming the existing system with respect to administration and planning and the ORR programs. |
crs_RL33380 | crs_RL33380_0 | Introduction(1)
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are mutual funds made up of real estate and mortgageassets. In recent years, their performance has been stronger than broader market indicators, leadingto calls for inclusion of a REIT alternative in the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) for federal workers. H.R. 1578 , the Real Estate Investment Thrift Savings Act, was introduced April12, 2005, to provide for an REIT option in the TSP. Hearings were held on the legislation April 19,2005, by the House Government Reform Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and AgencyOrganization. Further hearings are scheduled for April 26, 2006. A companion bill, S. 2490 , was introduced in the Senate on April 13, 2006. This report summarizes the legal and economic history of REITs and the factors that havecontributed to recent strong performances of REITs as investment vehicles. It then addresses thearguments behind their possible inclusion as an investment alternative in the TSP. At present, the TSP hasfive investment vehicles, three of which are broad stock indexes. | Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are mutual funds made up of real estate and mortgageassets. In recent years, their performance has been stronger than broader market indicators, leadingto calls for inclusion of an REIT alternative in the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) for federal workers. At present, the TSP is limited to five savings vehicles, three of which are broad-based stock indexes.Proponents of inclusion cite greater diversification and participant choice in the TSP as well aspotentially higher returns as benefits of the proposal. The TSP board, while studying the matter, hasargued that changes should only occur as part of a comprehensive program, should not encourage"return chasing" by participants, and should maintain the current very low cost structure of the TSP.
H.R. 1578 , the Real Estate Investment Thrift Savings Act, was introduced April12, 2005, to provide for an REIT option in the TSP. Hearings were held on the legislation April 19,2005, by the House Government Reform Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and AgencyOrganization. Further hearings are scheduled for April 26, 2006. A companion bill, S. 2490 , was introduced in the Senate on April 13, 2006.
This report summarizes the legal and economic history of REITs and the factors that havecontributed to recent strong performances of REITs as investment vehicles. It then addresses thearguments behind their possible inclusion as an investment alternative in the TSP.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40100 | crs_R40100_0 | Introduction
As the debate on reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs) has progressed, increasing concern has been raised about how a U.S. reduction program would interact with programs in other countries. In a global context where currently some countries have legally binding policies to reduce greenhouse gas emission and other countries do not—i.e., differentiated global carbon policies—the potential exists that countries imposing carbon control policies will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis countries without comparable policies. The risks accompanying establishment of carbon control policies, in the absence of similar policies among competing nations, have been central to debates on whether the United States should enact greenhouse gas legislation. Specifically, concerns have been raised that if the United States adopts a carbon control policy, industries that must control their emissions or that find their feedstock or energy bills rising because of costs passed-through by suppliers may be less competitive and may lose global market share (and jobs) to competitors in countries lacking comparable carbon policies. In addition, this potential shift in production could result in some of the U.S. carbon reductions being diluted by increased production in more carbon intensive countries (commonly known as "carbon leakage"). Options to Provide Assistance
There are three basic approaches to assisting greenhouse-gas-intensive, trade-exposed industries: (1) assist domestic industry; (2) penalize foreign competitors; and (3) develop alternative sectoral approaches. Support for domestic industries, the approach most commonly included in legislative proposals, is not focused on this objective; it is focused on preserving the industry's current competitive position and jobs and may, depending on the details, help transition that industry to the future. Trade measures for foreign competitors, another approach commonly included in legislative proposals, may provide a stick for international negotiation, but the primary focus is on protecting greenhouse gas-intensive, trade-exposed industries from "unfair" competition while the country awaits an international agreement. Finally, the sectoral approach represents a range of options focused on integrating developing countries' industrial bases into a mutually acceptable international framework that provides a level playing field for all participants. Whether any of these approaches would have appreciable effects on carbon leakage is unclear. The design of an assistance program—the goals, eligible participants, implementation, and enforcement—would be difficult to define in a manner that satisfies all parties. There is every incentive for any industry facing a cost increase from carbon policies to claim that its competitive position could be diminished, thereby justifying special consideration by the government. The government would be in the difficult position of picking winners and losers, sometimes without access to important but proprietary data. | As the debate on reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs) has progressed, increasing concern has been raised about how a U.S. reduction program would interact with those of other countries. In a global context where currently some countries have legally binding policies to reduce greenhouse gas emission and other countries do not—i.e., differentiated global carbon policies—the potential exists that countries imposing carbon control policies will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis countries without comparable policies.
The risks accompanying establishment of carbon control policies, in the absence of similar policies among competing nations, have been central to debates on whether the United States should enact greenhouse gas legislation. Specifically, concerns have been raised that if the United States adopts a carbon control policy, industries that must control their emissions or that find their feedstock or energy bills rising because of costs passed-through by suppliers may be less competitive and may lose global market share (and jobs) to competitors in countries lacking comparable carbon policies. In addition, this potential shift in production could result in some of the U.S. carbon reductions being counteracted by increased production in less regulated countries (commonly known as "carbon leakage").
There are three basic approaches, which are not mutually exclusive, to assist greenhouse gas-intensive, trade-exposed industries: (1) directly supporting domestic industries; (2) penalizing foreign competitors; and (3) developing alternative sectoral approaches. Importantly, these are presumably transitional actions, pending some international agreement that "levels the playing field."
Each approach has its own focus. Support for domestic industries, embodied in most legislative proposals, is focused on preserving the industry's current competitive position and jobs and may, depending on the details, help transition that industry to the future. It does not directly promote an international agreement. Trade measures levied against foreign competitors, another approach being proposed, may provide a stick for international negotiation, but the primary focus is on protecting greenhouse gas-intensive, trade-exposed industries from "unfair" competition—producers in countries not imposing comparable carbon control policies. Finally, the sectoral approach represents a range of options focused on integrating developing countries' industrial base into a mutually acceptable international framework that provides a level playing field for all participants. Whether any of these approaches would have any appreciable effect on carbon leakage is unclear.
The design of an assistance program—the goals, eligible participants, implementation and enforcement—would be difficult to define in a manner that satisfies all parties. There is every incentive for any industry facing a cost increase from carbon policies to claim that its competitive position could be diminished, thereby justifying special consideration by the government. The government would be in the difficult position of picking winners and losers, sometimes without access to important, but proprietary, data. |
crs_R44185 | crs_R44185_0 | Particularly notable were the actions taken by the Federal Reserve (Fed) under its broad emergency lending authority, Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 344). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter, the Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 ) limited the Fed's discretion under Section 13(3), but some Members of Congress believe that these changes were insufficient. It then discusses policy issues and legislation to amend Section 13(3), including H.R. Section 13(3) can also be used to authorize lending to banks. Credit outstanding (in the form of cash or securities) under Section 13(3) peaked at $710 billion in November 2008. Currently, all credit extended under Section 13(3) has been repaid with interest and all 13(3) facilities have expired. Contrary to popular belief, the Fed did not suffer any losses on transactions taken under Section 13(3) and earned profits of more than $30 billion (more than half of which is AIG related). Nevertheless, some of these transactions exposed the taxpayer to greater ex ante risks than the discount window because the terms of the programs had fewer safeguards—in some cases involving non-recourse loans and troubled asset purchases, for example. Broadly Based Facilities
The Fed created six broadly based facilities under Section 13(3) in 2008 to extend credit to all eligible borrowers within a particular class of nonbank financial firms or to a particular segment of financial markets:
The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) were created to assist primary dealers (a group of investment firms that are the Fed's counterparties for open market operations). Special Assistance to Firms Deemed "Too Big to Fail"
Section 13(3) was also invoked to provide exclusive, tailored assistance to prevent the disorderly failure of four large financial firms on an ad hoc basis:
In March 2008, the Fed assisted JP Morgan Chase's takeover of Bear Stearns to prevent the latter's failure. It required that
at least five of the seven Fed governors find that there are "unusual and exigent circumstances" —while this phrase has no specific legal definition, it implies that financial conditions are not normal; the Fed may "discount (for) any individual, partnership, or corporation"—that is, assistance should take the form of a loan, and the loan may be made to private individuals or businesses; the borrower must present "notes, drafts, and bills of exchange endorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank"—that is, the loan must be backed by collateral approved by the Fed; the Fed shall charge an interest rate consistent with the same limitations applied to the discount window; and "the Federal Reserve Bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions"—that is, there must be evidence that the borrower does not have private alternatives. Changes in the Dodd-Frank Act
Concerns in Congress about some of the Fed's actions under Section 13(3) during the financial crisis led to the section's amendment in Section 1101 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The Fed's Rule Implementing the Dodd-Frank Act's Changes
As Section 13(3) can be used only in "unusual and exigent circumstances" and had not been used for decades, the Fed had not promulgated a rule governing its use as of 2008, even though it had the discretion to do so. On December 18, 2015, the Fed promulgated a final rule implementing Section 1101. Section 1102 allowed GAO to audit any action under Section 13(3) for operational integrity, accounting, financial reporting, internal controls, effectiveness of collateral policies, favoritism, and use of third-party contractors—but did not allow GAO to conduct an economic evaluation—and Section 1109 required GAO to conduct an audit of all Fed emergency facilities created between December 2007 and enactment. Who Should Have Access to the Lender of Last Resort? Lending to Nonbank Financial Firms? The Dodd-Frank Act now requires that assistance provided under Section 13(3) be "for the purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system, and not to aid a failing financial company." In 2008, the Fed chose to use Section 13(3) to provide credit mainly to financial firms, although nonfinancial firms were eligible to sell their commercial paper to the CPFF. One broader economic concern with Section 13(3) lending raised by House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling is that "its use risks exacerbating moral hazard costs." How Much Discretion Should the Fed Be Granted? Because we cannot anticipate what may be needed in the future, the Congress should preserve the ability of the Fed to respond flexibly and nimbly to future emergencies. By reducing the Fed's discretion, Chair Janet Yellen has stated that H.R. 3189 would "essentially repeal the Federal Reserve's remaining ability to act in a crisis." By contrast, Chairman Hensarling believes that "Dodd-Frank tried but failed to rein in the Fed's emergency lending authority." What Rate Should the Fed Charge? Some Members of Congress have expressed an interest in revisiting this issue. Selected Legislation in the 114th Congress
H.R. On November 19, 2015, it was passed by the House. H.R. | The deepening of the financial crisis in 2008 led the Federal Reserve (Fed) to revive an obscure provision found in Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 344) to extend credit to nonbank financial firms for the first time since the 1930s. Section 13(3) provides the Fed with greater flexibility than its normal lending authority. Using this authority, the Fed created six broadly based facilities (of which only five were used) to provide liquidity to "primary dealers" (certain large investment firms) and to revive demand for commercial paper and asset-backed securities. More controversially, the Fed provided special, tailored assistance exclusively to four firms that the Fed considered "too big to fail"—AIG, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, and Bank of America.
Credit outstanding (extended in the form of cash or securities) authorized by Section 13(3) peaked at $710 billion in November 2008. At present, all credit extended under Section 13(3) has been repaid with interest and all Section 13(3) facilities have expired. Contrary to popular belief, the Fed earned profits of more than $30 billion and did not suffer any losses on transactions authorized by Section 13(3). These transactions exposed the taxpayer to greater risks than traditional lending to banks through the discount window, however, because in some cases the terms of the programs had fewer safeguards.
The Fed's use of Section 13(3) in the crisis raised fundamental policy issues: Should the Fed be lender of last resort to banks only, or to all parts of the financial system? Should the Fed lend to firms that it does not supervise? How much discretion does the Fed need to be able respond to unpredictable financial crises? How can Congress ensure that taxpayers are not exposed to losses? Do the benefits of emergency lending outweigh the costs, including moral hazard? How can Congress ensure that Section 13(3) is not used to "bail out" failing firms? Should the Fed tell Congress and the public to whom it has lent?
The restrictions in Section 13(3) placed few limits on the Fed's actions in 2008. However, in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) added more restrictions to Section 13(3), attempting to ban future assistance to failing firms while maintaining the Fed's ability to create broadly based facilities. On December 18, 2015, the Fed promulgated a final rule implementing these changes. The Dodd-Frank Act also required records for actions taken under Section 13(3) to be publicly released with a lag and required the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to audit those programs for operational integrity, accounting, financial reporting, internal controls, effectiveness of collateral policies, favoritism, and use of third-party contractors. Although Section 13(3) must be used "for the purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system," some Members of Congress have expressed interest in—while others have expressed opposition to—the Fed using Section 13(3) to assist financially struggling entities, including states, municipalities, and territories of the United States.
House Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling contends that "Dodd-Frank tried but failed to rein in the Fed's emergency lending authority." In the 114th Congress, legislation—including H.R. 2625, H.R. 3189, and S. 1320—has been introduced that would limit the Fed's discretion under Section 13(3). On November 19, 2015, H.R. 3189 was passed by the House. Section 11 of H.R. 3189 would require the approval of three-quarters of the Fed regional presidents to activate Section 13(3), tighten the definition of solvency, limit borrowers to financial firms, and provide a formula for setting the interest rate above market rates. Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen contends that this bill would "essentially repeal the Federal Reserve's remaining ability to act in a crisis." A Fed governor has opposed further reducing the Fed's discretion under Section 13(3) on the grounds that the Fed needs "to be able to respond flexibly and nimbly" to threats to financial stability. |
crs_RL32981 | crs_RL32981_0 | As highlighted by the Social Security Administration (SSA), the aging of the (United States) population, hastened by the impending retirement of the huge baby-boom generation, has caused policy-makers to question whether the U.S. Social Security system can meet the demands for retirement benefits in the future. Because the current system largely pays benefits through taxes paid by current workers, the financial health of the system is sensitive to the ratio of dependents to workers—sometimes called the age dependency ratio or support ratio. Trends and projections of dependency ratios, including the relationship between both older (years 65 and older) and younger (under age 20) dependents to the working-age population in the United States are considered in the first section of this demographic report. Next, the United States is compared to nine other nations, including the seven other members of the G8. In the final section, policy implications of the changing dependent-to-worker ratios are considered in the context of pay-as-you-go (paygo) social security systems. Some Take-Away Messages
If the Social Security population estimates and projections for the 130-year period of 1950-2080 are correct, then the greatest demographic "burden"—when the number of dependents (children plus the elderly) relative to the working-age population—is already in the past, having reached its height in 1965 when there were 94.7 dependents per 100 persons of working age. The total number of dependents per 100 persons of working age has generally been decreasing since 1965 but is expected to reverse course beginning around year 2013. The composition of the dependency ratio is changing. The number of children per worker has been falling since 1965; most of the anticipated increase in the dependency ratio in the coming decades reflects a growing proportion of older persons (ages 65 and older). These age-specific trends in the age dependency ratios are not, however, off-setting in terms of their federal budget implications. Programs carried out by the federal government focus much more heavily on assisting the elderly population. State and local governments have historically provided substantial support for families with children through spending on elementary and secondary education and other programs. Eight of the countries are members of the G8, a consultative grouping of leading industrial democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, China and India, the two most populous countries globally, are included to highlight that population aging is occurring even in nations that are less industrialized and have "younger" current age structures. In summary, population aging, which results primarily from declining fertility rates and increasing survival, is a global phenomenon. Today, the United States is the "youngest" of the industrialized G8 nations. While the proportion of the U.S. population that is aged 65 and older will continue to increase, aging in the United States is still projected to be considerably slower than in any of the other industrialized countries. | The aging of the population of the United States, hastened by the impending retirement of the huge baby-boom generation, has caused some policy-makers to question whether the U.S. Social Security system can meet the demands for retirement benefits in the future. The financial health of the system, which is largely financed through payroll taxes paid by current workers in a pay-as-you-go manner, is sensitive to the ratio of dependents to workers—sometimes called the age dependency ratio or support ratio.
Trends and projections of dependency ratios, including the relationship between both older (years 65 and older) and younger (under age 20) dependents to the working-age population in the United States are considered in the first section of this demographic report. If one considers the 130-year period from 1950-2080, the greatest demographic "burden"—when the number of dependents (children plus the elderly) most exceeds persons in the working-age population—is already in the past, having reached its height in 1965 when there were 94.7 dependents per 100 persons of working age. While the dependency ratio has generally been decreasing since that time, two trends are evident. First, the ratio of dependents to workers will again reverse course beginning around year 2013 with the retirement of a large number of baby boomers. Second, the composition of the dependency ratio is changing. The number of children per worker has been falling since 1965; most of the anticipated increase in the dependency ratio in the coming decades reflects a growing proportion of older persons (ages 65 and older). Age-specific trends in the age dependency ratios are not off-setting in terms of their federal budget implications. Programs administered by the federal government (especially Social Security and Medicare) focus much more heavily on assisting the elderly population whereas state and local governments have historically provided substantial support for families with children through spending on elementary and secondary education and other programs.
Next, the United States is compared to nine other nations. Seven of the countries are members of the G8, a consultative grouping of leading industrial democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom. (The United States is the 8th member). In addition, China and India, the two most populous countries globally, are included to highlight that population aging is occurring even in nations that are less industrialized and have "younger" current age structures. Population aging, which largely results from declining fertility rates and increasing survival, is a global phenomenon. Today, the United States is the "youngest" of the industrialized G8 nations. While the proportion of the U.S. population that is aged 65 and older will continue to increase, aging in the United States is still projected to be considerably slower than in any of the other industrialized countries.
In the final section, policy implications of the changing dependent-to-worker ratios are considered in the context of pay-as-you-go (paygo) social security systems.
This report will be updated every two years. |
crs_RL33902 | crs_RL33902_0 | United States Organ Procurement System
In order to help ensure that organs are equitably distributed, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA). 710 ; P.L. Over time, Congress has considered a range of legislation aimed at encouraging the practice of living organ donation. Others, such as H.R. Directed Living Donation and Valuable Consideration: Paired Donation and Other Types of Exchanges
As described above, in traditional living donation, a specific donor, who is biologically compatible with his or her intended recipient, donates an organ to that person. One is paired donation (also known as paired organ donation or human paired organ donation ). In paired donation, two or more donors whose kidneys are incompatible with their own intended recipients, but compatible with each other's, trade donations. Each recipient receives a compatible kidney from a living donor. 110 - 144 clarified that NOTA's prohibition on the exchange of valuable consideration for organs does not extend to paired donation. If so, these arrangements would have been illegal. 110 - 114 on the permissibility of list donation is unclear. The effect, if any, of the passage of P.L. It presents statistics related to the current system, and estimates the impact that paired and list donation programs would have on the supply of organs for transplantation, waiting lists, and deaths. Next, the report presents a legal analysis of NOTA's prohibition on valuable consideration as it relates to directed living donation exchange programs. The ethical dimensions of this issue are discussed further in the Ethical Issues section of this report. The legislative history of the 1984 NOTA did not discuss the meaning of the term valuable consideration. 110 - 144 , the Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation Act, which clarifies that "human organ paired donation" is not a human organ transfer for valuable consideration and thus does not violate NOTA. Now that Congress has clarified that paired transplants of compatible living donors and recipients do not violate NOTA's prohibition of valuable consideration in return for organ donation, issues may still be raised regarding other kinds of living donation arrangements such as list donation, because Congress clarified only the legality of paired donation arrangements. Ethical and Policy Issues Related Living Organ Donation, and Paired and List Donation
The central ethical question involved in organ transplantation is how to balance the needs of people seeking organs with one another, and with the needs of potential organ donors. This question has given rise to many issues, discussed below, including those related to evolving transplantation systems, the directive that physicians do no harm, risk-benefit ratios, informed consent, type O recipients, resource allocation, parity, and the possibility of paying for organs. Current law permits and defines paired organ donation ( P.L. | The central issue before Congress with respect to living organ donation is how to balance the needs of people seeking organs with one another, and with the needs of potential organ donors. While the majority of organs are harvested from deceased donors, an increasing number of donations are made by living donors each year. As new types of programs are developed to help encourage the practice of living donation, both legal and ethical issues may arise.
The primary federal law governing organ donation in the United States is the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA, P.L. 98-507). It permits living and deceased organ donation, and prohibits the sale of organs. Specifically, section 301 of NOTA prohibits the exchange of valuable consideration (money or the equivalent) for organs.
Congress specified in the Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation Act (H.R. 710; S. 487; P.L. 110-144) that NOTA's prohibition on the exchange of valuable consideration for organs does not extend to paired organ donation (also known as paired donation, or human organ paired donation). Paired organ donation arises when two or more willing living donors are incompatible with their intended recipients, but compatible with one another's recipients. The donors give their organs to one another's intended recipients so that each recipient receives a compatible organ.
Living organ donation generally, and paired and other similar types of organ donation arrangements specifically, raise or at least touch upon a range of issues. These include some related to evolving transplantation systems, the directive that physicians do no harm, risk-benefit ratios, informed consent, type O recipients, resource allocation, parity, and the possibility of paying for organs.
Over time, Congress has considered several other types of measures intended to increase organ donation by amending NOTA's prohibition on the exchange of organs for valuable consideration. These would have specified that some combination of familial, emotional, psychological, and physical benefit, and another type of organ exchange known as list donation, were exempt from the prohibition. The impact, if any, of P.L. 110-144 on the legality of these exchanges is unclear.
This report contains background regarding how living donation is included within the larger organ donation construct, the likely impact that paired organ donation will have, and that list donation programs would have, on organ supply, the legislative history and legal interpretation of the term valuable consideration as it is defined by NOTA, and the various ethical and policy issues related to living donation, paired donation and list donation.
This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RS22380 | crs_RS22380_0 | The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program, Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, was enacted on January 4, 1975 ( P.L. Child support payments collected by CSE agencies increased from $1 billion in FY1978 to $28.6 billion in FY2015. However, the program still collects only 20% of child support obligations for which it has responsibility if payments on past-due child support (i.e., "arrearages") are taken into account (otherwise, 65%) and collects payments for only 61% of its caseload. In FY2015, total CSE expenditures amounted to $5.7 billion. On average, in FY2015 the CSE program collected $5.26 in child support payments for each $1 spent on the program. The balance of this report describes each of the major program elements of the CSE program. It also includes a discussion of the related programs: Access and Visitation Grants and the Responsible Fatherhood Program. Program Elements
The CSE program provides seven major services on behalf of children: (1) parent location, (2) paternity establishment, (3) establishment of child support orders, (4) review and modification of child support orders, (5) collection of child support payments, (6) distribution of child support payments, and (7) establishment and enforcement of medical support. Enforcement
The CSE program has a vast array of enforcement methods at its disposal to help ensure that child support payments are made on time and in the full amount that is owed. Most payments are collected from noncustodial parents through income withholding. Other methods of enforcement include
intercepting federal and state income tax refunds; intercepting unemployment compensation; filing liens against property; subjecting insurance settlements to withholding; intercepting lottery winnings, judgments, or settlements; seizing debtor parent assets held by public or private retirement funds and financial institutions; withholding, suspending, or restricting driver's licenses, professional or occupational licenses, and recreational or sporting licenses; and denying, revoking, or restricting passports. Financing28
The CSE program is funded with both state and federal dollars. The federal government's funding is "open-ended" in that it pays its percentage of expenditures by matching the amounts spent by state and local governments with no upper limit or ceiling. Third, states collect child support on behalf of families receiving TANF assistance to reimburse themselves (and the federal government) for the cost of TANF cash payments to the family. Federal law requires states to reinvest CSE incentive payments back into the CSE program or related activities. Fifth, annual user fees and costs recovered may help finance the CSE program. To reimburse the states and federal government for the cost of TANF cash benefits, TANF families are required by federal law to assign their child support rights to the state. Responsible Fatherhood Programs
The federal government has also sought to engage noncustodial parents in the lives of their children through what are known as "responsible fatherhood programs." For FY2011, funding for those fatherhood grants was increased to $75 million. | The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state program (Title IV-D of the Social Security Act). The primary purpose of this program was to reduce public expenditures for welfare recipients by obtaining ongoing support from noncustodial parents that could reimburse the state and federal governments for part of their expenses (i.e., welfare cost-recovery). Relatedly, the program also sought to strengthen families by securing financial support for children from their noncustodial parent on a consistent and continuing basis to enable some families to remain self-sufficient and off public assistance. Over the years, CSE has evolved into a multifaceted program. While welfare cost-recovery still remains an important function of the program, its other aspects include service delivery and promotion of self-sufficiency and parental responsibility. The CSE program has different rules for welfare (i.e., the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program; TANF) and non-welfare families.
The CSE program provides seven major services on behalf of children: (1) parent location, (2) paternity establishment, (3) establishment of child support orders, (4) review and modification of child support orders, (5) collection of child support payments, (6) distribution of child support payments, and (7) establishment and enforcement of medical support.
The CSE program has a vast array of enforcement methods at its disposal. Most child support payments are collected from noncustodial parents through income withholding. Other methods of enforcement include intercepting federal and state income tax refunds; intercepting unemployment compensation; filing liens against property; sending insurance settlement information to CSE agencies; intercepting lottery winnings, judgments, or settlements; seizing debtor parent assets held by public or private retirement funds and financial institutions; withholding, suspending, or restricting driver's licenses, professional or occupational licenses, recreational or sporting licenses; and denying, revoking, or restricting passports.
The CSE program is funded via a number of sources. The program is a federal-state matching grant program under which states must spend money in order to receive federal funding. For every dollar a state spends on CSE expenditures, it generally is reimbursed 66 cents from the federal government. This reimbursement requirement is "open ended," in that there is no upper limit or ceiling on the federal government's match of those expenditures. In addition to matching funds, states receive CSE incentive payments from the federal government. States also collect child support on behalf of families receiving TANF assistance to reimburse themselves (and the federal government) for the cost of that assistance to the family. Finally, annual user fees paid by certain families that have never received TANF assistance, and costs recovered, also help finance the CSE program.
In FY2015, the CSE program distributed $28.6 billion in child support collections and served nearly 14.7 million child support cases. However, the program still collects only 65% of current child support obligations for which it has responsibility (20% if payments on past-due child support are taken into account), and collects payments for only 61% of its caseload. In FY2015, total CSE expenditures amounted to $5.7 billion. On average, in FY2015 the CSE program collected $5.26 in child support payments for each $1 spent on the program.
Two other related programs, the $10 million per year Access and Visitation Grants Program and the $75 million per year Responsible Fatherhood Program, also are described in this report. |
crs_R41832 | crs_R41832_0 | Overview
A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. Pakistan is at the locus of several top-tier policy areas of urgent concern, including regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons proliferation; the Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development. Today Pakistan is identified as a haven for numerous Islamist extremist and terrorist groups, and is the world's most rapid proliferator of nuclear weapons, a combination that places it at the top of the international security agenda. Pakistan has been praised by U.S. leaders for its post-2001 cooperation with U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, although long-held doubts about Islamabad's commitment to some core U.S. interests deepened dramatically in 2011 and may be altering the nature of the relationship in 2012. A mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan insurgents and anti-India militants operating from its territory. Pakistan's troubled economic conditions and precarious political setting combine with perilous security circumstances and a history of difficult relations with neighbors to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers. May 2011 revelations that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden (OBL) had found apparently years-long refuge inside Pakistan marked a new era of intensive U.S. government scrutiny of a now tense and even adversarial relationship. The two governments—and, at a lower level, the diplomatic and security agencies within them—seem at loggerheads after a grueling series of crises. Anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories remain rife among ordinary Pakistanis; opinion surveys find that the United States has of late replaced India as the nation least favored by Pakistanis (a significant development, given the visceral, decades-old Pakistan-India rivalry). Congress appropriated about $2 billion in direct aid for Pakistan in FY2012, placing it among the world's leading recipients of U.S. foreign assistance (see Table 1 ). The lines will be drawn. The developments fueled bilateral distrust and acrimony unseen in the post-2001 period. Congress pointedly questioned the wisdom of continued engagement with a national government that may at some levels have had knowledge of OBL's whereabouts; figures from both major parties expressed disbelief at Pakistan's allegations of ignorance and called for greater oversight and accountability for future U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Partial Suspension of U.S. Security Assistance
In July 2011, the Obama Administration made some significant changes in its security-related aid policy toward Pakistan. To date, there has been no similar certification for FY2012. Pressure was increased to allow American investigators access to bin Laden's three widows in Pakistani custody. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan play central roles as U.S. allies in global efforts to combat Islamic militancy. However, in the summer of 2011, increased incidence of "reverse infiltration" caused friction between Islamabad and Kabul, especially after more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers were killed in a June cross-border raid by up to 400 militants from Afghanistan's Kunar province. This reporting requirement would be renewed by pending FY2103 legislation. U.S. Foreign Assistance and Coalition Support Reimbursements206
In 2001, Congress renewed large U.S. assistance packages to Pakistan. Second, as approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 24, 2012, S. 3241 , a bill to fund the State Department and foreign operations for FY2013, contains provisions that would
provide $50 million for the PCCF (about 6% of both the amount requested by the Administration and the amount appropriated for FY2012), but only if the Secretary of State certifies that Pakistan has reopened the GLOCs to Afghanistan and that the funds can be used efficiently and effectively; withhold all funds appropriated for Pakistan under ESF, INCLE, FMF, and PCCF unless the Secretary of State certifies that Pakistan is (1) cooperating with the United States in counterterrorism efforts against the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Al Qaeda, and other domestic and foreign terrorist organizations; (2) not supporting terrorist activities against United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, and Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies are not intervening extra-judicially into political and judicial processes in Pakistan; (3) dismantling IED networks; (4) preventing nuclear-related proliferation; (5) implementing policies to protect judicial independence and rule of law; (6) issuing visas in a timely manner for official U.S. visitors; and (7) providing humanitarian organizations access to detainees, internally displaced persons, and other Pakistani civilians affected by the conflict (Sec. | In a security alliance since 2004 and "strategic partners" since 2006, the United States and Pakistan for decades experienced major shifts in the nature and tone of their relations. In the post-9/11 period, assisting in the creation of a more stable, democratic, and prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy has been among the most important U.S. foreign policy efforts. Vital U.S. interests are seen to be at stake in its engagement with Pakistan related to regional and global terrorism; efforts to stabilize neighboring Afghanistan; nuclear weapons proliferation; links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism; Pakistan-India tensions and conflict; democratization and human rights protection; and economic development. As a haven for numerous Islamist extremist and terrorist groups, and as the world's most rapid proliferator of nuclear weapons, Pakistan presents a combination that places it at the top of many governments' international security agendas.
The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently years-long and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of providing significant U.S. foreign assistance to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Although Obama Administration officials and most senior congressional leaders spent most of 2011 consistently recognizing Pakistan as a crucial ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, long-held doubts about Islamabad's commitment to core U.S. interests deepened over the course of the year. The Pakistani military and intelligence services are seen to be too willing to distinguish among Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to Afghan insurgent and anti-India militant organizations operating from Pakistani territory as a means of forwarding Pakistani's perceived security interests.
U.S.-Pakistan relations are fluid at present, but running a clearly negative course: still based on several national interests shared by both countries, yet marked by levels of mutual distrust and resentment that are likely to catalyze a new set of assumptions for future ties. The tenor of interactions has been increasingly negative in a slide predating a series of crises in 2011. These included a CIA operative shooting dead two Pakistanis in Lahore, bin Laden's killing, suspension of most bilateral security cooperation, a spike in Haqqani Network attacks in Afghanistan, and an incident in which two dozen Pakistani soldiers were inadvertently killed by NATO aircraft. The latter calamity led Pakistan to shut down NATO's road access to Afghanistan and demand an apology that has not been forthcoming in intervening months. Access remains closed to date.
Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. aid in the post-9/11 period, having been appropriated about $24 billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001. FY2013 legislation in the 112th Congress would cut U.S. assistance funding significantly from both the levels requested by the Administration and from those Congress approved for FY2012. Provisions also would introduce more rigorous restrictions and certification requirements on such aid. With anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories rife among ordinary Pakistanis, persistent economic travails and a precarious political setting combine to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers. This report will be updated periodically. See also CRS Report R41856, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, and CRS Report R42116, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements, both by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL34248, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and Mary Beth Nikitin. |
crs_R42702 | crs_R42702_0 | In comparison to when disaster declarations were first introduced in 1953, the average number of declarations issued per year has increased. Calendar year 2011 was the busiest year on record with 97 major disaster declarations. This report discusses a wide range of factors that might be contributing to the increase in declarations and provides policy options that might reduce the number of declarations and some of their associated costs. Today the principal authority governing federal assistance for emergencies and major disasters in the United States is the Robert T. Stafford Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P.L. Emergency declarations may be declared before an incident occurs to save lives and prevent loss. The average number of major disasters declared per year from 1953 to 2016 was 35.8. During the 1990s the average number of major disaster declarations per year was 45.8, the average number from 2000 to 2009 was 57.1, and the average number from 2010 to 2016 was 58.7 (see inset of Figure 5 ). Major Disaster Declarations by State and Type
The majority of incidents declared as major disasters are issued as a result of a flood, tornado, winter storm, or hurricane (see inset of Figure 6 ). These include changes in (1) federal legislation and (2) various FEMA declaration policies. On the other hand, it could be argued that while a President may be motivated to issue a declaration or be reluctant to deny a declaration for political reasons, it is at best a small factor. Election year impacts are also found. Changes in State Policies and Circumstances
In addition to the federal elements that may have played a role in the increases in major disaster declarations, there are a number of state-level factors that have made the states more likely to request a declaration than in years past. However, they may argue that the increase in the number of declarations being issued is justified because the declarations are tied to increased inclement weather, population growth, and development. Changes to the Stafford Act
The following section discusses some potential changes to the Stafford Act that might limit the number of declarations being issued each year or the amount of assistance provided to the state by the federal government. Concluding Observations
Given the variables described in this report that can lead to an increase in the number of declarations, including trends in severe weather patterns, population growth, and development, the upward trend of declarations will likely continue if declarations policies remain unchanged. Some may contend that the policy mechanisms used to address the number of declarations should be shaped in response to the causes of the increase. Another method would be shifting a greater share of the responsibility for providing assistance from the federal government to states and localities. The approach to reduce declarations might shift somewhat if the increase in declarations and their costs is due primarily to federal policies. Finally, as mentioned throughout this report, a combination of all of the above could be implemented. At the heart of the declaration phenomenon is the role of the government when a disaster strikes. While it is generally agreed that the government should help disaster victims in time of need, it is debatable whether the fiscal responsibility resides primarily with the federal or the state government. Many of the policy options described in this report would shift a greater share of disaster-related costs to states and localities. It remains to be seen if reducing declarations and/or limiting the amount of disaster assistance provided to requesting states would severely disrupt the state's ability to recover from an incident or if states would be able to adjust to the changes by reallocating available state resources. | The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act authorizes the President to issue declarations that provide states, tribes, and localities with a range of federal assistance in response to natural and man-made incidents. Since 1953 the frequency of declarations has increased. For example, the average number of major disaster declarations issued from 1960 to 1969 was roughly 18.6 per year. In contrast, the average number of major disaster declarations issued from 2000 to 2009 was 57.1 per year. The highest number was declared in 2011, with 97 major disaster declarations.
Declarations are of concern to Members of Congress and state delegations when incidents occur in their states and/or congressional districts. Declarations are also of broader congressional interest for at least two reasons: (1) the costs involved with the federal assistance provided by the declarations, and (2) concerns that declarations may be used as political tools—especially during election years.
Analysis of Stafford Act declarations from 1953 to 2016 demonstrates that:
most emergency declarations are for winter storms and hurricanes; most major disaster declarations are for floods, tornados, winter storms, and hurricanes; the average number of declarations issued per year in presidential election years from 1974 to 2016 is slightly higher than the average number of declarations in other years from 1974 to 2016, but the number is not significant enough to draw a decisive conclusion regarding their use as a political tool.
After providing an overview of each type of declaration, this report discusses factors that may be responsible for the increase in frequency of declarations, including federal policy changes, increases in severe weather incidents, population growth, and development.
Some may contend that declaration policies should not be changed because they trigger important federal assistance to states and localities. Others argue that policies should be implemented to reduce either the number of declarations being issued each year, or the amount of federal assistance that they provide, or both. These policies include
amending certain Stafford Act policies; changing the per capita threshold formula used to recommend the issuance of a declaration; implementing a state capacity indicator to assess whether the state is capable of addressing an incident on its own; substituting federal loans to states for recovery grants; and adjusting the federal to state cost-share.
Such changes could reduce declarations and shift a portion of the funding back to the states. On the other hand, reducing declarations could hamper the ability of states and localities to recover from an incident and could create long-term consequences.
The selected approach will likely be influenced by how policymakers view the role of the government when a disaster strikes. It is generally agreed that the government should help disaster victims in times of need, but it is debatable whether the fiscal responsibility resides primarily with the federal or the state government. Many of the policy options described in this report shift a greater share of disaster-related costs to states and localities. It remains to be seen if reducing declarations and/or limiting the amount of disaster assistance provided to requesting states would severely disrupt the state's ability to respond and recover from an incident.
This report concludes that the upward trend in declarations will likely continue if declaration policies remain unchanged and severe weather patterns, population growth, and development continue to increase. All of these variables appear to play a role in declaration activity. It could be argued that the policy mechanisms used to address the increase in declarations should be shaped in response to the given variable or variables. This may prove to be difficult because it is unclear which of the variables (or combination of variables) has had the greatest impact on the increase in disaster declarations over the years.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43078 | crs_R43078_0 | Introduction
The deregulation of the airline industry in the United States in 1978 eliminated governmental control over most business practices of airlines. However, the federal government continues to regulate certain practices for the protection of the airlines' customers, in addition to its long-standing role in overseeing air safety. Congress determines the extent to which airline consumer rights are codified in law, authorizes federal agencies to enforce those rights, and directs or authorizes federal agencies to define and enforce passenger rights that are not specifically enumerated in legislation. The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation are the primary congressional committees of jurisdiction, and exercise routine oversight over DOT, the principal department responsible for executing and enforcing airline passenger rights laws. The Role of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
DOT Regulatory Authority
DOT is responsible for executing and enforcing airline consumer rights laws established by Congress. More specifically, DOT has authority "under 49 U.S.C. Section 41712, in concert with 49 U.S.C. Most of DOT's consumer rules are based on the "unfair or deceptive practices" provision, with a few based on the "ensure safe and adequate service" provision. The definition and interpretation of the phrase "unfair or deceptive practices" can significantly affect the scope of DOT's rulemaking and enforcement authorities. The CAB could take action against an air carrier that violated its approved tariffs. Advisory Committee for Aviation Consumer Protection
Section 1102(j) extends the Advisory Committee for Aviation Consumer Protection through FY2017. DOT Regulatory Actions
Airline flight delays and cancellations were addressed in a final rule issued in December 2009 by DOT, "Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections." The rule expanded on previous regulations to address tarmac delays and chronically delayed flights and to require greater information disclosure to consumers. While language in the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 ( P.L. On April 25, 2011, DOT issued a further rulemaking to strengthen the rights of air travelers in the event of oversales, flight cancellations, and delays; to ensure consumers have accurate and adequate information when selecting flights; and to improve responsiveness to customer complaints. Spirit Airlines, Allegiant Air, and Southwest Airlines challenged in federal court that portion of DOT's April 2011 rule that requires airlines and ticket agents to most prominently display the total cost of a ticket, including taxes, when advertising airfares. The bill would have allowed airlines' advertisements and websites to give greatest prominence to "base airfare," as long as they "clearly and separately" disclose government taxes and fees and the total cost of air transportation. 114-190 ), signed into law on July 15, 2016, did not address disclosure of ancillary fees. | The 1978 deregulation of the airline industry in the United States eliminated federal control over many airline business practices, including pricing and domestic route selection. However, the federal government continues to legislate and enforce certain consumer protections for airline passengers. Congress largely determines the degree to which the rights of airline passengers are codified in law or developed through regulatory rulemaking.
The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation are the primary congressional committees of jurisdiction over airline passenger rights. Congress can authorize or require the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to enact rules on certain issues, and it can enact requirements for airlines through direct legislation. In specific cases, DOT may take enforcement actions against air carriers that violate consumer protection rules.
Most of DOT's consumer rules are based on 49 U.S.C. §41712, which directs it to "protect consumers from unfair or deceptive practices." Some are based on DOT's authority to require air carriers in interstate transportation to provide "safe and adequate service" (49 U.S.C. §41702). The interpretation of the phrase "unfair or deceptive" can significantly affect the scope of DOT's enforcement authority.
In December 2009, DOT issued a comprehensive final rule, "Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections," that expanded regulatory protections for aviation consumers. The rule established procedures related to extended ground delays involving aircraft with passengers aboard, required air carriers to address chronically delayed flights, and mandated more information disclosure to consumers. In April 2011, DOT completed a further rulemaking that strengthened the rights of air travelers in the event of oversales, flight cancellations, and delays. The rule also required consumer access to accurate and adequate information when selecting flights, and improvements in agency responsiveness to customer complaints. A key provision of the 2011 rules, requiring airlines to prominently disclose to the consumer the total cost of a flight, including all government and airline taxes and fees, was upheld in the federal courts.
The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190), signed into law by the President on July 15, 2016, included a few provisions regarding the rights of airline passengers and created a firmer statutory basis for certain rules already adopted by DOT. However, the legislation did not address a number of consumer-related subjects, including disclosure of code-share arrangements on domestic flights, compensation of passengers "bumped" from oversold flights, and disclosure of ancillary fees. Proposals to overturn a DOT policy requiring that airline and travel websites give most prominent display to the total cost of a flight, including taxes and fees, were not included in the act. Such action would have allowed airlines to advertise base airfares, even though consumers would not be able to purchase transportation at those prices. |
crs_RL34099 | crs_RL34099_0 | For this reason, the mobile source portion of the CAA (Title II) generally "preempts" states from adopting their own emission standards for new motor vehicles or engines. There is an exception to this rule of federal preemption, however, in CAA Section 209(b) —
The [EPA] Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive application of this section [the preemption of State emission standards] to any State which has adopted standards (other than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards. EPA's Response to the Waiver Request and Resulting Litigation
EPA took two years, from late 2005 to late 2007, to respond to California's waiver request for its motor vehicle GHG emission standards. Following this decision, EPA announced that it would consider the California waiver request. As will be discussed further below, 14 other states and the District of Columbia have adopted regulations identical to California's, and 2 others have announced their intention to do so, but their ability to implement the regulations depends on California first being granted a waiver. On December 19, 2007, EPA announced its decision. EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson wrote California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to say, "I have decided that EPA will be denying the waiver and have instructed my staff to draft appropriate documents setting forth the rationale for this denial in further detail.... " According to press reports, the decision was taken against the unanimous advice of the agency's technical and legal staffs. It was published in the March 6, 2008 Federal Register , and will be referred to herein as the March 6 decision. The section adds:
No such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator finds that-
(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and capricious,
(B) such State does not need such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or
(C) such State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with section 202(a) of this part. California's Justification of Its Waiver Request
In requesting a waiver, California argued that its standards met each of the CAA criteria: that they were at least as protective as applicable federal standards, because there are no federal GHG standards; that air pollution generally, and climate change in particular, present numerous conditions to the state that are compelling and extraordinary; and that the standards and enforcement procedures are consistent with Section 202(a), based on previous EPA interpretation of the consistency requirement. Positions of the Parties in the Waiver Denial Litigation
As noted, the active suit against the waiver denial is California v. EPA , filed May 5, 2008, by California, other states, and environmental groups. Alternatively, the Obama Administration EPA could wait until the D.C. Related Litigation
Aside from litigation over EPA's denial of California's request for a CAA preemption waiver, there is active litigation over state regulation of mobile source GHG emissions raising non-CAA preemption and other legal theories. The chief non-CAA preemption theory in this litigation is based on the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), the authority under which the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) establishes corporate average fuel economy standards ("CAFE standards"). More pertinent here, EPCA preempts states from adopting laws "related to" the federal fuel economy standards. | California has adopted regulations requiring new motor vehicles to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), beginning in model year 2009. The Clean Air Act (CAA) generally preempts states from adopting their own emission standards for mobile sources. However, the act allows such standards in California, if the state obtains a waiver of CAA preemption from EPA.
California requested this waiver in 2005, but EPA took until December 19, 2007, to decide that it would deny the request. On that day, EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson wrote California Governor Schwarzenegger to say, "I have decided that EPA will be denying the waiver and have instructed my staff to draft appropriate documents setting forth the rationale for this denial in further detail.... " According to press reports, the decision was taken against the unanimous advice of the agency's technical and legal staffs. The Administrator published a decision document denying the waiver in the March 6, 2008 Federal Register.
Following EPA's denial of the waiver request, California and environmental groups petitioned for review in the D.C. Circuit, with 18 other states intervening on California's side. The interest of the intervening states derives from the fact that under the CAA, other states may adopt motor vehicle emission standards identical to California's and avoid CAA preemption if California is granted a waiver. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia have already adopted such regulations.
This report reviews the nature of EPA's, California's, and other states' authority to regulate emissions from mobile sources, the applicability of that authority to GHGs, and issues related to the California waiver request. To obtain a waiver, California must meet conditions laid out in CAA Section 209(b): the state must first determine that its standards will in the aggregate be at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable federal standards. The EPA Administrator must then find whether the state's determination is arbitrary and capricious; whether the state needs the standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions; and whether the standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are consistent with CAA Section 202(a).
This report does not analyze whether California is preempted from regulating mobile-source GHGs by the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) requirements of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, or the amended CAFE standards of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140). Under these laws, authority to set fuel economy standards is reserved to the federal government—specifically, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). In several court cases and in other venues, the auto industry is maintaining that the regulation of mobile-source GHG emissions is simply another method of regulating fuel economy, so California's GHG standards (and identical standards adopted by other states) are preempted. Two federal district courts have rejected this argument, but both decisions have been appealed.
On January 21, 2009, California submitted a formal request to President Obama and EPA Administrator-designate Lisa Jackson for reconsideration of the waiver denial. In response to this request, EPA will hold a hearing March 5, 2009, and will accept written comments until April 6. |
crs_R45104 | crs_R45104_0 | As a record of a committee's legislative and oversight actions, the reports may provide valuable information for Members of Congress and their staff interested in learning more about a Member's new committee assignments or committee activities in certain subject areas. In many cases, they also provide information that is otherwise either not aggregated in one place or not available elsewhere. This CRS report will address
the purpose and history of these reports, including their predecessors; required contents of the reports; House and Senate Rules regarding the filing of reports; a discussion of the types of information that may be included; variations in the organization of the reports among committees; provisions related to the inclusion of supplemental, minority, additional, or dissenting views; additional historical changes to House and Senate Rules regarding the reports, including recent changes to frequency of the reports in the House and the 1974 revisions to the list of committees required to prepare activity reports; and the differences between the committee activity reports and other congressional publications, including committee calendars, House and Senate calendars, the Résumé of Congressional Activity , and the House Document Repository at docs.house.gov. Table 1 provides examples of the types of information found in each publication as well as their timeframe for coverage and publication. This internal congressional examination culminated in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. The requirement for these reports, which appears at 2 U.S.C. Pursuant to House Rule XI, clause 1(d)(1), reports are to be filed by January 2. Pursuant to Senate Rule XXVI, paragraph 8(b), reports are to be filed by March 31. The committee activity reports, compared to the other publications, may be more likely to provide discussion, analysis, or statistics. They also differ from some of the other publications since they provide a retrospective accounting of the actions taken by a particular committee, rather than information on prospective, planned, or ongoing actions. Appendix. | All House committees and most Senate committees are required to prepare reports each Congress detailing their activities.
These committee activity reports provide a historical record of a committee's legislative and oversight actions. They may serve as an introduction to the work of the individual committees, and, in many cases, they also provide information that is otherwise either not aggregated in one place or not available elsewhere.
The committee activity reports are required by the rules of the House (House Rule XI, clause 1(d)) and Senate (Senate Rule XXVI, clause 8(b)). The reporting requirement dates to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (2 U.S.C. §190d).
Each report covers the activities for one Congress. In odd-numbered years, House reports are to be filed by January 2, while Senate reports are to be filed by March 31.
This report includes a discussion of the types of information that may be included in the activity reports, variations across reports and time, and the filing process.
A table provides a comparison of the committee activity reports and other congressional publications, including the types of information found in each as well as their timeframe for coverage and publication. For example, the activity reports may be more likely to provide discussion, analysis, or statistics than committee calendars (if published). They also provide a retrospective accounting of the actions taken by a particular committee, while House authorization and oversight plans, for example, provide information on prospective or planned actions.
The appendix lists activity reports issued by the House and Senate committees covering the 110th, 111th, 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses. |
crs_RS22566 | crs_RS22566_0 | The House of Representatives amended its internal Rules on January 4, 2007, with the adoption of H.Res. 6 , to apply greater restrictions, more transparency, and further regulation concerning the acceptance by Members and staff of "gifts" from outside, private sources, including specifically "gifts" of travel-expense reimbursements or payments provided by lobbyists, foreign agents, or their clients. Additional changes to internal House Rules on "ethics" were made by the "Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007," P.L. 110-81 , September 14, 2007 ( S. 1 , 110 th Congress). The exception for reasonable and necessary expenses for some "officially connected" travel is also still provided, and Members and staff may continue to accept such travel expenses from many private sources, other than lobbyists, foreign agents, and certain of their clients, but with several additional restrictions, including more detailed disclosure of such travel. New Rule
Under the new House Rules, Rule XXIII, cl. | On January 4, 2007, the House adopted new internal rules to prohibit the receipt of most gifts by Members and staff from lobbyists, foreign agents, and most of their private clients. Additionally, the new House Rules placed more restrictions and requirements on the acceptance from outside private sources of travel expenses for "officially connected" travel by Members and staff. Such restrictions are designed specifically to further limit the participation and involvement of lobbyists, foreign agents, or their clients in such travel events, and to provide for more transparency and disclosures of any such travel. With the passage of the "Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007" ( P.L. 110-81 , September 14, 2007), further ethics provisions applicable to House Members and staff were adopted. |
crs_R44535 | crs_R44535_0 | T he Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury (Title I), the Executive Office of the President (EOP, Title II), the judiciary (Title III), the District of Columbia (Title IV), and more than two dozen independent agencies (Title V). The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. This structure has existed in its current form since the 2007 reorganization of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. Although financial services are a major focus of the bills, FSGG appropriations bills do not include many financial regulatory agencies, which are instead funded outside of the appropriations process. Administration and Congressional Action
On February 9, 2016, then-President Obama submitted his FY2017 budget request. The request included a total of $46.5 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $330 million for the CFTC. On June 15, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2017 ( H.R. 5485 , H.Rept. 114-624 ). Total FY2017 funding in the reported bill would have been $43.5 billion, with another $250 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 5054 , H.Rept. 114-531 ), which was reported on April 26, 2016. The combined total of $43.8 billion would have been about $2.8 billion below the President's FY2017 request with most of this difference in the funding for the Department of the Treasury and the General Services Administration (GSA). After a number of amendments on the floor, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5485 on July 7, 2016. Although funding was shifted among some FSGG agencies, the overall level remained unchanged. On June 16, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Act, 2017 ( S. 3067 , S.Rept. 114-280 ). S. 3067 would have appropriated $44.4 billion for FY2017, about $2.2 billion below the President's request. Continuing Resolution8
With the end of FY2016 approaching and no permanent FSGG appropriations bill enacted, Congress passed, and the President signed, H.R. 5325 / P.L. 114-223 . Division C of this act provided for continuing appropriations through December 9, 2016, generally termed a continuing resolution (CR). The CR provides funding for most FSGG agencies at the FY2016 funding rate subject to an across-the-board decrease of 0.496% (pursuant to Section 101(b) of Division C). 114-254 provided funding through April 28, 2017, and a third, P.L. 115-30 provided funding through May 5, 2017. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 244 on May 3, 2017, followed by Senate passage on May 4 and enactment on May 5. FSGG appropriations, including the CFTC, were provided in Division E. FY2017 FSGG appropriations totaled $43.3 billion, approximately $3.2 billion below the President's request. P.L. | The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. This structure has existed since the 2007 reorganization of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.
On February 9, 2016, then-President Obama submitted his FY2017 budget request. The request included a total of $46.5 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $330 million for the CFTC.
On June 15, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 5485, H.Rept. 114-624). Total FY2017 funding in the reported bill would have been $43.5 billion, with another $250 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 5054, H.Rept. 114-531), which was reported on April 26, 2016. The combined total of $43.8 billion would have been about $2.8 billion below the President's FY2017 request. After a number of amendments on the floor, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5485 on July 7, 2016. Although funding was shifted among some FSGG agencies, the overall level remained unchanged.
On June 16, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Financial Services and General Government Act, 2017 (S. 3067, S.Rept. 114-280). S. 3067 would have appropriated $44.4 billion for FY2017, about $2.2 billion below the President's request. S. 3067 was not considered on the Senate floor during the 114th Congress.
No FY2017 FSGG appropriations were enacted prior to the end of FY2016. On September 29, 2016, the President signed P.L. 114-223. Division C of this act provided for continuing appropriations through December 9, 2016, generally termed a continuing resolution (CR). P.L. 114-223 provided funding for most FSGG agencies at the FY2016 funding rate subject to an across-the-board decrease of 0.496% (pursuant to Section 101(b) of Division C). This was followed by a second CR, P.L. 114-254, which provided funding through April 28, 2017, and a third, P.L. 115-30, which provided funding through May 5, 2017.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31/H.R. 244) was enacted on May 5, 2017, following House passage on May 3 and Senate passage on May 4. FSGG appropriations, including the CFTC, were provided in Division E. FY2017 FSGG appropriations totaled $43.3 billion, approximately $3.2 billion below the President's request.
Although financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are funded outside of the appropriations process. The FSGG bills do, however, often contain additional legislative provisions relating to such agencies. |
crs_RL34421 | crs_RL34421_0 | With a staff of some 10 officials, the CAC has provided the principal means of communication between civil users of intelligence capabilities and the providers in the Intelligence Community under the chairmanship of the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey, a component of the Interior Department, and there is a secretariat hosted by the Geological Survey. It nevertheless remains uncertain exactly how much "value added" satellites would offer for homeland security and law enforcement purposes. The Bush Administration maintained that the results of the ISG were briefed to all relevant agency and department heads, but it did not indicate that congressional committees were similarly briefed. Language to this effect was included in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 110-329 , Section 518), approved on September 30, 2008. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 , Division E, Section 525), signed by the President on December 26, 2007, provides that "none of the funds provided in this Act shall be available to commence operations of the National Applications Office ... until the Secretary certifies that these programs comply with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy and civil liberties standards, and that certification is reviewed by the Government Accountability Office." Observers see a number of legal issues involved in the use of satellite-derived information for law enforcement purposes, although discussion and analysis are complicated by the classified nature of satellite capabilities and operations and the absence of public information about ways that satellite-derived information could be used by law enforcement agencies. Other commentators have also questioned whether the proposed surveillance would violate the Posse Comitatus Act, post-Civil War legislation that restricts the use of military forces for domestic law enforcement. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether satellite imagery constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the following statutory authorities, as well as any statutes Congress may choose to enact with respect to domestic satellite surveillance, may have a bearing on how courts treat the fruits of such surveillance. In addition, the NGA has the statutorily prescribed mission of "support[ing] the geospatial intelligence requirements of the Department of State and other departments and agencies of the United States outside the Department of Defense." Conclusion
Although mechanisms for using imagery and other data acquired by satellites for some domestic needs have been in existence since the 1970s without controversy, the possibility of using satellites to support law enforcement and homeland security missions has raised serious concerns among Members of Congress and individuals and groups concerned about the possibility of using intelligence resources as a weapon against U.S. persons. Having conducted a review of the issue, the Obama Administration terminated the NAO, but has not provided detailed information about current procedures for the domestic use of satellites for domestic purposes. | Reconnaissance satellites, first deployed in the early 1960s to peer into denied regions of the Soviet Union and other secretive enemy states, have from time to time been used by civilian agencies of the federal government to assist with mapping, disaster relief, and environmental concerns. These uses have been coordinated by the Civil Applications Office at the U.S. Geological Survey, a component of the Interior Department. Post 9/11, the Bush Administration sought to encourage use of satellite-derived data for homeland security and law enforcement purposes, in addition to the civil applications that have been supported for years. In 2007, it moved to transfer responsibility for coordinating civilian use of satellites to the Department of Homeland Security. The initiative was launched, however, apparently without notification of key congressional oversight committees.
Members of Congress and outside groups raised concerns that using satellites for law enforcement purposes may infringe on the privacy and Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. persons. Other commentators questioned whether the proposed surveillance will violate the Posse Comitatus Act or other restrictions on military involvement in civilian law enforcement, or would otherwise exceed the statutory mandates of the agencies involved. Such concerns led Congress to preclude any funds in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 2764, P.L. 110-161), from being used to "commence operations of the National Applications Office ... until the Secretary [of the Department of Homeland Security] certifies that these programs comply with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy and civil liberties standards, and that certification is reviewed by the Government Accountability Office." (Section 525.) Similar language has been included in a subsequent Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-329) approved in September 2008.
The Obama Administration conducted its assessment of the issue and terminated the NAO in June 2009, maintaining that there were better information sharing programs to meet the needs of state and local homeland security partners. Little public information is available concerning current policies for the use of satellite information for domestic purposes.
This report provides background on the development of intelligence satellites and identifies the roles various agencies play in their management and use. Issues surrounding the current policy and proposed changes are discussed, including the findings of an Independent Study Group (ISG) with respect to the increased sharing of satellite intelligence data. There follows a discussion of legal considerations, including whether satellite reconnaissance might constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; an overview of statutory authorities, as well as restrictions that might apply; and a brief description of executive branch authorities and Department of Defense directives that might apply. The report concludes by discussing policy issues Congress may consider as it deliberates the potential advantages and pitfalls that may be encountered in expanding the role of satellite intelligence for homeland security purposes. |
crs_R40803 | crs_R40803_0 | Even if an invention satisfies the novelty, nonobviousness, and utility requirements described above, it may not qualify for patent protection if it does not fall within one of the four statutory categories of patent-eligible subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. The statutory scope of patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act is quite expansive—the U.S. Supreme Court once observed that the legislative history describing the intent of § 101 was to make patent protection available to "anything under the sun that is made by man." Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Since Diehr, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has decided several cases concerning patent-eligible subject matter. Bilski v. Kappos
The patent application at issue in Bilski v. Kappos contained claims that relate to a method of hedging risk in the commodities trading field. The Federal Circuit's Opinion
On October 30, 2008, the Federal Circuit issued an opinion in the case, in which it affirmed the Board's decision. In so doing, the Federal Circuit expressly overruled In re Alappat, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, and its other prior decisions that relied on the "useful, concrete and tangible result" test for process patent eligibility. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit asserted that the Diehr Court had reaffirmed this test, and rejected Bilski's argument that the Supreme Court did not intend the "machine-or-transformation" test to be the sole and exclusive governing test for determining patent eligibility for a process under § 101:
We believe that the Supreme Court spoke of the machine-or-transformation test as the "clue" to patent-eligibility because the test is the tool used to determine whether a claim is drawn to a statutory "process"—the statute does not itself explicitly mention machine implementation or transformation. On June 1, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bilski to consider two questions:
Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a "process" must be tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a different state or thing ("machine-or-transformation" test), to be eligible for patenting under 35 U.S.C. He noted that the Court's precedents provide three specific exceptions to subject matter that may be patented under the Patent Act: "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." Relying on the Court's earlier decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr , all members of the Court agreed that Bilski's patent application is not a patentable "process" under § 101 because it attempts to patent abstract ideas:
The concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook. However, the Court recognized that its precedents have found that the "machine-or-transformation" test is "a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101." Thus, the Court did not invalidate the "machine-or-transformation" test, but rather reversed the Federal Circuit's requirement that the test be the only standard by which courts may examine a process for patent eligibility under § 101. In addition to this conclusion based upon the ordinary meaning rule, Justice Kennedy observed that "federal law explicitly contemplates the existence of at least some business method patents," citing the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 that had added § 273 to the Patent Act and created the "prior user rights" defense to patent infringement, described earlier in this report:
[B]y allowing this defense the statute itself acknowledges that there may be business method patents. He expressed concern that business methods may stifle technological progress (and legitimate business competition and innovation) rather than promote it. 2. Nevertheless, by finding that the Patent Act's definition of "method" does not categorically exclude business methods, the Court did not outright invalidate the patents that have already been issued in the financial services, biotechnology, and Internet fields; furthermore, by rejecting the use of the "machine-or-transformation" test as the exclusive test, Bilski requires courts and PTO examiners to follow a more flexible approach in determining patent eligibility of processes. | The source of federal patent law originates with the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress: "To promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries." Section 101 of the Patent Act describes the subject matter that is eligible for patent protection, which may be divided into four categories: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued two decisions in the 1990s, In re Alappat and State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, that had expanded the scope of patent-eligible subject matter to include any process that produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result." In October 2008, the Federal Circuit issued an en banc opinion, In re Bilski, that expressly overruled those earlier decisions. The Federal Circuit's Bilski opinion articulated a new legal standard governing the eligibility of process claims for patent protection under § 101 of the Patent Act: if the process is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or if it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing. Some observers and patent practitioners criticized this "machine-or-transformation" standard as being too rigid and not in compliance with Supreme Court precedent concerning patentable subject matter eligibility. They raised concerns that the test potentially restricts patent protection for new innovations in business methods and software, and that it called into question the validity of already-issued patents that claim information-based and computer-managed processes.
On June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bilski v. Kappos, representing the first time that the Court has ruled on the scope of patentable subject matter since its last decision on this topic, the 1981 decision Diamond v. Diehr. At the outset of the opinion, the Court emphasized that its precedents already provide limits to patent eligibility under § 101—laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas may not be patented. Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected Bilski's patent application (regarding a commodities trading risk-hedging method) without using any "test" that may have been developed by the Federal Circuit; rather, the Court relied on its precedents in declaring that the processes that were claimed in Bilski's patent application are unpatentable abstract ideas.
The Court ruled that the Federal Circuit was incorrect in holding that the "machine-or-transformation" standard is the sole test for showing patent eligibility of process claims; however, the Court acknowledged that the test is a "useful and important clue, an investigative tool," for determining whether a particular process is patentable. Thus, the Court did not invalidate the test, but rather rejected the Federal Circuit's conclusion that the test is the exclusive one that governs the analysis for process patent eligibility under § 101 of the Patent Act. However, the Court did not articulate a different test or adopt new categorical rules for process patent eligibility, nor did it provide much guidance to the lower courts on this matter. Instead, the Court invited the Federal Circuit to develop additional tests and other limiting criteria regarding what constitutes a patentable process.
The Bilski Court also ruled that some business methods may be patentable, because (1) the Patent Act's definition of "process" does not categorically exclude business methods; and (2) § 273 of the Patent Act contemplates the possibility that some business methods, at least in some circumstances, may be eligible for patenting. |
crs_R44415 | crs_R44415_0 | Introduction
Signed into law on August 2, 2011, the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25, hereinafter the BCA) established a set of limits on federal spending, as well as a set of mechanisms to adjust those limits to accommodate spending that has special priority. One of these mechanisms—a limited allowable adjustment to pay for the congressionally designated costs of major disasters under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (hereinafter "the disaster relief allowable adjustment" or "allowable adjustment")—represented a new approach to paying for disaster relief. By providing this flexibility in the budget caps, Congress changed the way it approached funding disaster relief and recovery efforts. This report looks at how the adjustment has functioned over the first five years, and what the future of disaster relief (as defined under the BCA) may look like under current law for the next five years and beyond. That limitation is based on a modified 10-year rolling average of disaster relief appropriations calculated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The first calculations of the allowable adjustment, which applied to FY2012, relied entirely on BCA-mandated OMB calculations of past appropriations pursuant to major disaster declarations. The application of this designation has been limited to the allowable size of the disaster relief adjustment in a given year, with costs beyond that limit being designated by Congress as emergency funding. As noted above, the annual total of disaster relief appropriations for years after FY2011 used to calculate the allowable adjustment is based on the congressional designation of appropriations as disaster relief. Using the Allowable Adjustment
The allowable adjustment has been most often used to accommodate budget authority for the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF)—the primary FEMA account used to fund disaster response activities and pay for ongoing disaster recovery programs. The Disaster Relief Allowable Adjustment: The Next Five Years (FY2017-FY2021)
Forecasts for the Next Five Years with the Status Quo
As Congress considers the future of federal disaster relief and budgetary controls, it may choose to consider changes to the disaster relief allowable adjustment. The allowable adjustment declines to roughly $6.8 billion as high expenditure years "age out" of the average, before increasing to nearly $7.5 billion in 2021. According to OMB, to be accounted for under the allowable adjustment, and to be included in the calculation of the 10-year rolling average on which the adjustment is based, appropriations must be designated by Congress as disaster relief. Not all costs of major disasters receive the disaster relief designation. Furthermore, the definition of disaster relief in the BCA is a limiting factor—it already excludes some forms of federal disaster assistance by focusing on the major disaster declaration. Disaster Relief After the BCA
As it currently stands, the discretionary spending limits pursuant to the Budget Control Act expire after FY2021. A more fundamental change to how the federal government pays for the costs of disaster relief is also possible. | Signed into law on August 2, 2011, the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25, or BCA) established a set of limits on federal spending, as well as a set of mechanisms to adjust those limits to accommodate special categories of spending that has special priority. One of these mechanisms—a limited allowable adjustment to pay for the congressionally designated costs of major disasters under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (hereinafter "the disaster relief allowable adjustment" or "allowable adjustment")—represented a new approach to paying for disaster relief. By providing this flexibility in the budget caps, Congress changed the way it approached funding disaster relief and recovery efforts.
The disaster relief allowable adjustment is based on a modified rolling average of annual federal government appropriations for the costs of major disasters, pursuant to a methodology laid out in the BCA. Annually, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) looks back at the past 10 years of disaster relief appropriations. For fiscal years prior to FY2012, OMB has identified appropriations associated with major disaster declarations for use in the calculation. For FY2012 and later years, OMB relies on explicit Congressional designations of appropriations as disaster relief pursuant to the BCA. OMB takes these 10 annual totals of disaster relief appropriations, drops the highest and lowest years, and averages the remaining 8. This modified average is then supplemented by any unused amounts from the average calculated for the previous fiscal year. This calculation generates a limit up to which the discretionary budget caps can be adjusted to accommodate appropriations on major disasters. In practice, this limitation on the size of the disaster relief adjustment has also limited the application of the disaster relief designation. Funds that would meet the definition of disaster relief may not be classified as such.
Implementation of the disaster relief allowable adjustment has allowed Congress to fund the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) to a greater degree through annual appropriations, rather than through supplemental appropriations as it had before enactment of the BCA. Allowing the discretionary budget limitations to be adjusted to pay for disaster costs has removed, to an extent, the costs of disaster relief from competing with other annual priorities for funding. However, the allowable adjustment is expected to drop significantly in the near future as two of the highest disaster cost years roll out of the calculated average used in setting the adjustment.
This report examines how the adjustment has functioned over the first five years, and what the future of disaster relief (as defined by the BCA) may look like for the next five years and beyond. Under current law, the allowable adjustment is expected to decline from a high of almost $18.5 billion in FY2015 to between $7.5 billion and $9.5 billion by the time the BCA discretionary spending limits expire after FY2021.
As Congress considers budget planning and potential changes to how it budgets for disaster assistance for a variety of different types of incidents, it may consider whether the allowable adjustment has worked as planned. Congress may also consider changes to how it addresses disaster costs, through changes to the existing structure of the allowable adjustment, or by revisiting other laws. |
crs_R41550 | crs_R41550_0 | The United States also has expressed an interest in closer economic relations, including the possible elimination of restrictions on arms sales to Vietnam, but has previously told the Vietnamese government that it needs to make certain changes in the legal, regulatory, and operating environment of its economy to conclude either the BIT agreement or to qualify for the GSP program. The growth in bilateral trade also has created sources of trade friction. Another complicating factor during the negotiations was Vietnam's negotiations with 15 other nations to form another regional trade agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), that does not include the United States. It is uncertain how RCEP would affect Vietnam's interest and commitment to TPP, if both regional trade agreements are finalized. Key TPP Issues for U.S.-Vietnam Trade Relations
The final text of the TPP agreement contains a number of provisions of particular importance to trade relations between the United States and Vietnam. These include amending existing laws, decrees or resolutions such that:
"workers, without distinction, employed by an enterprise" may form a grassroots labor union of their own choosing without prior authorization; the grassroots labor unions may be formed across enterprises "and at levels above the enterprise"; the grassroots labor unions can register with its choice of either the VGCL or a "competent government body"; "A grassroots labour union registered with the competent government body shall have the right autonomously to elect its representatives, adopt its constitution and rules, organize its administration, including managing its finances and assets, bargain collectively, and organize and lead strikes and other collective actions related to the occupational and socio-economic interests of the workers at its enterprise"; "A grassroots labour union registered with the competent government body shall have no lesser rights in law and practice with regard to the labour rights as stated in the lLO Declaration than a grassroots labour union under the VGCL"; Vietnam's laws do not mandate that "A labour union registered with the competent government body to operate according to the Statutes of Viet Nam General Confederation of Labour"; all labor union officials are elected by that labor union's membership, and union can employ persons to assist with its activities; and Vietnam's laws allow for rights-based strikes, consistent with ILO guidance. The Plan also establishes a Senior Officials Committee (SOC):
composed of senior officials from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of Labor for the United States and from the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs for Viet Nam to monitor, assess and facilitate rapid response to any concerns about compliance with and implementation of the legal and institutional reforms under this Plan. Vietnam's National Assembly reportedly will consider the TPP agreement in July 2016. Vietnam is a major exporter of frozen fish fillets using certain varieties of fish—known as basa , swai , and tra in Vietnamese—that are commonly referred to as catfish in the global fish market. The 2008 Farm Bill transferred catfish inspection (including basa , swai , and tra ) from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The transfer was confirmed in the Agriculture Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-79 ). As discussed in more detail below, the new inspection regime took effect on March 1, 2016. By these provisions, the 2008 Farm Bill effectively transferred the regulation of imported catfish from the FDA to the USDA, which is generally viewed as maintaining stricter inspection standards than the FDA. Arms Sales
Restrictions on the sales of military equipment and arms are one of the few U.S. trade restrictions with Vietnam that remains in place since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. For over 20 years, Vietnam has been transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Alternatively, Congress could pass legislation stipulating additional eligibility criteria for the President to consider when deciding to confer BDC status to Vietnam. U.S. The value of U.S. clothing imports from Vietnam continued to rise every year until 2009, with the largest year-on-year increases occurring in 2003 and 2007—the first full years after the U.S. granted Vietnam conditional and permanent NTR status, respectively. The perceived continuing problems with Vietnam's IPR protection may have played a role in the TPP negotiations, as well as in any consideration of Vietnam's GSP application. Key Trends in Bilateral Trade
The preceding sections of the report have focused on current and past issues in U.S.-Vietnam trade relations. According to U.S. trade statistics, the top U.S. imports from Vietnam in 2015, besides clothing, were (in order): electrical machinery; footwear; and furniture and bedding (see Table 1 ). The implication is that efforts to curtail the growth of certain top exports of Vietnam to the United States could result in a decline in U.S. exports to Vietnam and possible job losses in the United States. Vietnam was the second-largest source of footwear imports for the United States in 2015 (after China), more than three times the size of imports from Indonesia (the next largest source). Pursuant to this agreement, the two associations are supporting the TPP. | The year 2015 was a memorable year in U.S.-Vietnam relations, marking the 40th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War, the 20th anniversary of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, the first U.S. visit by a Chairman of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) (in July), and the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations (in October). This year also will be marked with historical events, including the 15th anniversary of the United States granting Vietnam permanent normal trade relations (PNTR), the February signing of the TPP, and President Obama's first official visit to Vietnam in May.
According to U.S. trade statistics, bilateral trade has grown from about $220 million in 1994 to $45.1 billion in 2015, transforming Vietnam into the 13th-largest source for U.S. imports and 37th-largest destination for U.S. exports. Vietnam is the second-largest source of U.S. clothing imports (after China), and a major source for electrical machinery, footwear, and furniture. Much of this rapid growth in bilateral trade can be attributed to U.S. extension of normal trade relations (NTR) status to Vietnam in 2001. Another major contributing factor is over 20 years of rapid economic growth in Vietnam, ushered in by a 1986 shift to a more market-oriented economic system.
Vietnam's incentive to join the TPP largely is contingent on greater market access in the United States, particularly for agricultural goods, aquacultural goods, clothing, and footwear. For the United States, Vietnam offers a significant market for U.S. exports, but some parties are concerned about Vietnam's protection of workers' rights, protection of intellectual property rights, and potential unfair competition from state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. Vietnam is also a party to negotiations to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a pan-Asian regional trade association that currently does not include the United States. It is uncertain how RCEP would affect Vietnam's interest and commitment to TPP, if both regional trade agreements are finalized. Congress would have to consider implementing legislation for the United States to comply with the TPP.
The growth in bilateral trade has not been without accompanying issues and problems. Vietnam would like the United States officially to recognize it as a market economy and to further relax U.S. restrictions on arms sales to Vietnam. In addition, the two nations have disagreed over U.S. treatment of the import of catfish-like fish known as basa, swai, or tra, from Vietnam. In 2008, the 110th Congress passed legislation that transferred the regulation of catfish from the Food and Drug Administration to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which many analysts contend maintain stricter inspection standards than the FDA. The Vietnamese government strongly protested the law as a protectionist measure. The Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79) confirmed the transfer of inspection to the USDA, and explicitly included basa, swai, and tra as catfish. In November 2015, the USDA released final regulations for the import of catfish that went into effect in March 2016. While Vietnam continues to object to the regulatory change, it is making efforts to comply with the new U.S. inspection regime.
The 114th Congress may play an important role in one or more of these issues, as have past Congresses. The Human Rights Act of 2016 (S. 2632) opposes the "further easing of the prohibition on the sale of lethal military equipment to the Government of Vietnam" unless certain human rights conditions improve. The House report accompanying the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (H.R. 1890), cites a perceived lack of a "mechanism to ensure compliance by TPP parties" to international standards for labor laws and practices, and in particular Vietnam. Vietnam's compliance with a bilateral trade and labor relations side agreement to the TPP may factor in congressional consideration of the larger TPP agreement. This report will be updated as circumstances require. |
crs_93-931 | crs_93-931_0 | Violent and Authoritarian Traditions
Politics in Haiti have been generally violent and authoritarian, ever since Haiti became anindependent republic in 1804, when African-descended slaves revolted against their French colonialmasters. This legacy would appeardifficult to overcome. U.S. The United States intervened in Haiti in 1915 to stop civil strife andprevent Germany from establishing a foothold there. (1) The Marines stayed until 1934, overseeing public works, taxcollection, treasury management, and the development of a native Haitian Constabulary which wasHaiti's first professional military force. Some of these contributions were welcome and muchneeded. But the U.S. presence was also deeply resented as an affront to Haitian sovereignty. (2)
Francois Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude ruled Haiti for nearly 30 years, leaving behind alegacy of repression and corruption. Difficult Path Towards Democracy
A New Constitution Thwarted by Military-Dominated Governments
Aristide's 1991 ouster ushered in the seventh government in the five and one-half years sincethe young Duvalier's departure. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President with 67.5 percent of the vote, and wasinaugurated on the fifth anniversary of the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship. A 37-year-oldpopulist Roman Catholic priest, he was the most controversial of 11 candidates ruled eligible to runby the independent Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). Aristide previously opposed democratic elections in Haiti, arguing that free and fair elections wereimpossible as long as Duvalierists still had a hold on economic and political power. After 8 months in office, Aristide had receivedmixed reviews. It is provided for by the Constitution, which bansmacoutes from the political scene." Role of the Military in the Democratic Process. | The overthrow of Haiti's first democratically elected president in September 1991 propelledHaiti into its worst crisis since popular protests brought down the 29-year dictatorship of theDuvalier family in 1986. Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President of Haiti in a landslidevictory on December 16, 1990, in what was widely heralded as the first free and fair election in thecountry's 186-year history. A Catholic priest of the radical left, he was inaugurated on February 7,1991, and overthrown by the military on September 30.
Politics in Haiti have been generally violent and authoritarian, ever since Haiti became anindependent republic in 1804. The legacy of despotic rulers has been difficult to overcome.
The United States intervened in Haiti in 1915 to stop civil strife and prevent Germany fromestablishing a foothold. The U.S. Marines occupied Haiti until 1934, overseeing public works, taxcollection, treasury management, and the development of a native Haitian Constabulary which wasHaiti's first professional military force. While many of these contributions were welcomed and muchneeded, many Haitians deeply resented the U.S. presence as an affront to Haitian sovereignty.
From 1957 through 1986, Francois Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude rule Haiti for nearly30 years, leaving behind a legacy of repression and corruption. After Duvalier's ouster in 1986, aseries of short-lived governments, most military-dominated, ruled through 1990.
This report provides background information on the violent and authoritarian traditions thathave characterized Haiti's political dynamics since Haiti attained independence in 1804. It examinesHaiti's difficult path toward democracy after the fall of the Duvalier regime, from numerousshort-lived governments until the election of Aristide in December 1990. Finally, the report alsobriefly surveys Aristide's rule from February 1991 until his subsequent overthrow by the Haitianmilitary 8 months later, in September 1991. |
crs_R41197 | crs_R41197_0 | Those include inadequate information, lack of common standards, concerns about costs, and both market and technical uncertainties. The environmental footprint of a product or service can be described as its overall impact on the environment, including use of resources such as energy and water, and effects on health and other aspects of the human environment. A salient feature of the concept of green procurement described above is that it is multidimensional, usually involving an integrated evaluation of criteria such as cost, performance, and impact of a product or service with respect to a set of green factors over the entire life cycle , from design through disposal. For example, among federal agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides public access to databases of products assessed as environmental preferable through various criteria. The General Services Administration (GSA) also provides information on green products through its website. Because of such characteristics and complexities, and other factors such as the ways in which programs, policies, and regulations tend to be developed by both governments and private industry, green procurement initiatives often emphasize particular attributes, such as recycled content, energy efficiency, water use or footprints, waste reduction at end of life, and reduction in hazardous chemicals. Generally, these appear to focus on planning rather than performance assessment. Federal Green Purchasing Initiatives
As stated in the introduction to this report, federal initiatives relating to green purchasing of products and services can usefully be organized into two categories based on their primary focus:
agency-focused initiatives intended to facilitate the procurement of green products and services by federal agencies, and market-focused programs aimed at the availability of green products and services in the broader economy. Since then, various statutes, regulations, executive orders, policy documents, and agency programs have required or encouraged federal agencies to purchase specific products or types of products because of their environmental attributes, as discussed below. Currently, agencies are required to purchase alternative fuels and alternative-fuel vehicles, and biobased, Energy Star and energy efficient, EPEAT-registered, and recycled-content products, although acquisitions may be exempt in specified circumstances. Agencies must consider purchasing alternatives to toxic and priority chemicals and ozone-depleting substances, and EPP products and services. Only EPP and EPEAT attempt to provide an integrative approach to green procurement. The others each address only one or a few attributes. Some of those responsibilities are shared with the Office of the Federal Environmental Executive, housed at EPA. OMB requires agencies to report annually on their activities in green procurement. However, those reporting requirements appear to be largely qualitative. However, quantitative reporting is required for the recycled content and alternative fuels preferences. Questions raised include the following:
What, if any, are the most useful and appropriate policy goals for green procurement? Are the means by which different green-procurement preferences, programs, and other initiatives have been established the most appropriate for meeting policy goals? How effectively are agency implementation and performance of green procurement being assessed? How successful are current programs and initiatives at meeting policy goals? Are policies on the acquisition of green services sufficient? Are the preferences and the methods of implementing them sufficiently harmonized and integrated? Are there significant gaps in the various federal preferences for types of green products and services? Are there implementation methods not currently used by the federal government that should be considered? Is training of procurement officials sufficient? A discussion of the complex and often long-standing controversies about the desirability of green policy goals in general is beyond the scope of this report, but an assessment of green procurement policy might include an evaluation of the appropriateness of the goals Congress has already established in various statutes, as well as those specifically addressed in executive orders issued by Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama, in addition to new policy proposals. Acquisition of Services
Roughly half of all federal procurement spending is for services. | Economic and environmental concerns have contributed to rising interest in green procurement—a term used in various ways but that may best be described as acquisition of products and services with smaller-than-average environmental footprints. Fully assessing a product or service requires integrated evaluation of cost, performance, and impacts for a set of green factors over all stages of the life cycle. Green building is an example of this approach. More generally, complexities and information gaps may constrict assessment options. However, where choices are comparative, partial assessments may often suffice. Because of such considerations, green procurement often emphasizes particular attributes, such as recycled content, energy efficiency, and waste reduction. Labeling and certification programs such as Energy Star, as well as other approaches, may be used to identify green products and services. While the use of green procurement appears to be increasing nationally, the success of programs is often not clear. Barriers to broader adoption include inadequate information among decisionmakers, lack of common implementation standards, real and perceived cost obstacles, and market and technical uncertainties.
As a major consumer of goods and services with significant potential impacts on the environment, including human health, the federal government could arguably influence the adoption of green procurement generally and the market for green products and services. Federal green-procurement efforts focus largely on acquisition of products, even though services account for about half of federal procurement spending. Various statutes, regulations, executive orders, and policy documents require or encourage the purchase of several types of products because of their environmental attributes. Agencies are required to purchase alternative fuels and alternative-fuel vehicles, and products that are biobased, Energy Star and energy-efficient, EPEAT (a green technology labeling program), and that contain recycled content, but acquisitions may be exempt in specified circumstances. Agencies must consider purchasing alternatives to toxic and priority chemicals and ozone-depleting substances, and environmentally preferable (EPP) products and services. Only EPP and EPEAT attempt to provide an integrative approach, rather than addressing only one or a few attributes, but they lack a specific basis in enacted statutes.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides broad guidance through various policy documents, as does the Office of the Federal Environmental Executive (OFEE), housed at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). For some kinds of attributes, procurement criteria are set by specific agencies. EPA, the General Services Administration (GSA), OFEE, and other agencies have databases that help identify green products. OMB requires agencies to have green procurement plans and to report annually on their activities. Those reporting requirements appear to be largely qualitative, but quantitative reports are available for recycled-content and alternative-fuels products.
Green procurement raises several policy questions, especially for federal acquisitions: (1) What are the most useful and appropriate policy goals for green procurement? (2) Are the legal authorities and other means by which different green product and service initiatives have been established the most appropriate for meeting policy goals? (3) How effectively is agency implementation and performance of green procurement being assessed? (4) How successful are current programs and initiatives at meeting policy goals? (5) Are policies on the acquisition of green services sufficient? (6) Are the policies and the methods of implementing them sufficiently harmonized and integrated? (7) Are there significant gaps in the preferences for green products and services? (8) Are there implementation methods not currently used by the federal government that should be considered? (9) Is training of the acquisition workforce sufficient? |
crs_R42439 | crs_R42439_0 | The federal government owns significant amounts of land and resources. These assets are exempt from state and local taxation. Some payment programs are based on the number of Indian children or children of federal employees, some on federal receipts, and some on federal acreage. In addition, some of the payments are permanently authorized and have mandatory spending authority, while others require periodic reauthorization and/or annual appropriations. The mandatory spending authority for the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS Act) program expired at the end of FY2011, and that for the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program will expire at the end of FY2012. As Congress debates reauthorization of the SRS Act, the mandatory spending authority of the PILT program, and other payment programs, it might consider the broader questions of what is fair and consistent compensation to state and local governments for the tax-exempt status of federal lands. If these lands were privately owned, the states and local governments would receive tax payments of various sorts from the lands and the economic activity that is generated from the lands—property taxes, sales taxes, income taxes, and more. Provision of Goods and Services by State and Local Governments9
State and local governments provide a wide variety of services—education, social services, public safety, transportation facilities, utilities, and much more. Under a complete tax equivalency system, federal payments would replace the state and local taxes that a private landowner would have made. Federal Lands Included for Payments to State and Local Governments
Another issue for federal payments to state and local governments is what lands to include for the payment program. Existing Payment Programs
Beginning more than a century ago, Congress has created numerous programs to provide funds to state and local governments because of the tax-exempt status of federal lands and resources. In recent years, total annual funding for the program has been about $1.3 billion. State and Local Taxation vs. Current Payment Programs: Comparison and Discussion
When established, most of the federal payment programs were justified as compensation for the tax-exempt status of federal lands. The plethora of federal payment programs were enacted by various congressional committees over the past century. One is differences in committees of jurisdiction over the various programs. As Congress debates the reauthorization of the SRS Act and the mandatory spending authority of the PILT Program, and possibly of other payment programs, it might consider the broader questions of what is fair and consistent compensation to state and local governments for the tax-exempt status of federal lands. Excise taxes are essentially sales taxes on particular products. Severance taxes are relatively insignificant in most states. Some payments are based on numbers of children associated with tax-exempt lands, many on receipts from selling or using federal lands and resources, others on federal acreage, while a few are tax-like payments, and some combine these approaches. | The federal government owns significant amounts of land and resources that are exempt from state and local taxation. State and local governments provide a wide variety of services—education, social services, public safety, transportation facilities, utilities, and much more. These services are funded through intergovernmental transfers (federal grants to state governments and federal and state grants to local governments), user fees, and state and local levied taxation—property taxes, income taxes, sales and use taxes, excise taxes, severance taxes, and more.
Congress has established programs to compensate state and local governments for the tax-exempt status of federal lands. Some propose that "fair" compensation would provide payments that are equivalent to the taxes that would be paid if the lands were privately owned. Assessing such tax equivalency, however, is difficult because of the substantial variability in state and local reliance on and rates for the various types of taxes. Others suggest that "fair" compensation would provide payments that offset the costs imposed on state and local governments from the federal lands, although this would exclude payments for governmental services that are not paid by the beneficiaries (e.g., social services). Providing consistent payments is a challenge; permanent appropriations are the most stable, but are difficult to establish and create permanent obligations. Finally, which lands to include for federal payments may seem straightforward, but lack of precise data on the federal lands might compromise accuracy of payments, and federal responsibility for tax-exempt Indian lands is unclear.
A plethora of federal payment programs exist, enacted at various times and for various reasons over the past century. Some payment programs are based on numbers of Indian children or children of federal employees (about $1.3 billion annually), some on federal receipts (about $0.5 billion annually), and some on federal acreage (about $0.4 billion annually). Some of the receipt- and acreage-based payments are broad, covering many federal lands, while others are quite narrow (e.g., based on sales of a particular resource within a limited area). Some are permanently authorized, and have mandatory spending authority (payments without annual action by Congress). Others require periodic reauthorization, annual appropriations, or both.
Although most of the federal payment programs were justified as compensation for the tax-exempt status of federal lands, the programs poorly reflect state and local tax equivalency or state and local costs of providing governmental services. In some places, the payments probably exceed what a private landowner would pay; in others, the payments fall short of what many might consider "fair" compensation. These possibly inequitable results likely occur from differences in the congressional committees of jurisdiction over various lands and programs and over time, and because only some programs were established with mandatory spending authority.
The mandatory spending authority for two relatively large payment programs—the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS Act) program and the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program—expired at the end of FY2011 and will expire at the end of FY2012, respectively. As Congress debates the reauthorization of the SRS Act, the mandatory spending authority of the PILT program, and other payment programs, it might consider the broader questions of what is fair and consistent compensation to state and local governments for the tax-exempt status of federal lands. |
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