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crs_R43012 | crs_R43012_0 | Introduction
Reforming or limiting itemized tax deductions for individuals has gained the interest of policymakers as one way to increase federal tax revenue, increase the share of taxes paid by higher-income tax filers, simplify the tax code, or reduce incentives that might lead to inefficient economic behavior. However, limits on deductions, in the views of some, would have adverse economic effects or changes in the distributional burden of the federal income tax code. AGI is the broad measure of income under the federal income tax and is the income measurement before itemized deductions and personal exemptions are taken into account. Floors usually come in the form of a limit based on a percentage of AGI. Specifically, the data analysis in this report intends to identify who claims itemized deductions, for how much, and for which provisions. Who Claims Itemized Tax Deductions? In 2014, 30% of all tax filers chose to itemize their deductions rather than claim the standard deduction. Although higher-income tax filers both tended to itemize at higher rates and claim a larger average total of itemized deductions, the majority of itemizers (56.2%) had incomes less than $100,000, and 86.8% of itemizers had an AGI less than $200,000. Tax filers in different income ranges tended to claim specific itemized deductions in different frequencies. Table 2 shows the average amount claimed in 2014 for selected deductions and the share of total tax filers who itemized in each income class that claimed a particular deduction. Tax filers in higher-income ranges claimed deductions for charitable gifts, state and local income taxes, and real estate property taxes at higher rates than tax filers in lower-income ranges. For example, the deduction for charitable gifts was claimed by 37% of tax filers with an AGI between $50,000 and $100,000; 68% of tax filers with an AGI between $100,000 and $200,000; and more than 86% of tax filers in each of the income ranges over $200,000. In contrast, the deduction for state and local income taxes was the largest average deduction amount claimed for any deduction by tax filers with an AGI greater than $500,000 (aside from the infrequent instance where a tax filer claimed the itemized deduction for extraordinary medical expenses). The average deduction for charitable gifts also increases sharply for tax filers with an AGI of $1 million or above. The deductions for state and local income taxes and charitable contributions composed a larger share of total deductions claimed as income rise. The four itemized deductions that are projected to contribute most to tax expenditures in FY2018 are estimated to account for 17.8% ($241.2 billion) of the approximately $1.36 trillion in net individual tax expenditures. First, efforts to target limits on itemized tax deductions toward higher-income tax filers are restricted in the amount of revenue that can be raised. Even though those at the top of the income range have high average itemized deduction claim totals, data from Table 1 indicate that 87% of itemizers have an AGI less than $200,000 (or 97% have less than $500,000 in AGI), and Figure 1 indicates that these tax filers account for 65% of itemized deductions claimed (or 82% for itemizers with less than $500,000 in AGI). Second, the form of a limit on itemized deductions might affect which deductions a tax filer might claim. If a tax filer potentially has deductions that exceed a flat-dollar value cap, then the tax filer must choose which deductions to claim. However, a tax filer might still engage in particular activities for other reasons (although possibly to a lesser extent) even without a tax benefit. Third, the extent to which a limit on itemized deductions increases revenue depends on its structure. Certain combinations of deduction limits may shift some tax filers to claim the standard deduction instead of itemizing. In this case, the revenue increase by limiting itemized deduction would be partially offset by more tax filers claiming the standard deduction. | Reforming or limiting itemized tax deductions for individuals has gained the interest of policymakers as one way to increase federal tax revenue, increase the share of taxes paid by higher-income tax filers, simplify the tax code, or reduce incentives that might lead to inefficient economic behavior. However, limits on deductions could cause adverse economic effects or changes in the distributional burden of the federal income tax code. This report is intended to identify who claims itemized deductions, for how much, and for which provisions.
This report analyzes data to inform the policy debate about reforming itemized tax deductions for individuals. In 2014, 30% of all tax filers chose to itemize their deductions rather than claim the standard deduction. In addition, the data indicate that both the share of tax filers who itemized their deductions and the amount claimed by each tax filer increased as adjusted gross income (AGI) increases. AGI is the basic measure of income under the federal income tax and is the income measurement before itemized deductions and personal exemptions are taken into account. Although higher-income tax filers were more likely to itemize their deductions and claim a larger amount of itemized deductions than lower-income tax filers, the majority of itemizers (56.2%) had an AGI less than $100,000, and 86.8% of itemizers had an AGI less than $200,000.
Tax filers in different income ranges tended to claim different itemized deductions in different frequencies. In 2014, tax filers in higher income ranges claimed deductions for charitable gifts, state and local income taxes, and real estate taxes at higher rates than tax filers in lower income ranges. For example, the deduction for charitable gifts was claimed by 37% of itemizing tax filers with an AGI between $50,000 and $100,000, whereas it was claimed by 68% to 87% of itemizing tax filers with an AGI above $100,000. Deductions for state and local income taxes and the deduction for charitable gifts comprised a larger share of itemized deductions as income rose.
The four largest itemized deductions are estimated to account for 17.8% ($241.2 billion) of the approximately $1.4 trillion in tax expenditures in FY2018. These deductions were for state and local income or sales taxes, home mortgage interest, charitable gifts, and real estate taxes.
These findings have several implications for reforming or limiting itemized tax deductions. First, efforts to target itemized tax deduction limits on the highest income class analyzed in this report (+$1 million in AGI) are limited in the amount of revenue that can be raised. Although tax filers with an AGI greater than $1 million claimed a larger average amount of deductions ($424,864), 87% of itemizers had an AGI less than $200,000 (or 97% have less than $500,000 in AGI) and they accounted for 65% of itemized deductions claimed (or 82% for itemizers with less than $500,000 in AGI).
Second, the structure of a limit on itemized deductions could affect which deductions a tax filer might claim. A limit based on a percentage reduction in the overall tax benefits of itemized deductions would not likely change the relative choice of deduction claims. However, limits using a flat-dollar amount likely would alter deduction claims and possibly tax filer behavior. A tax filer who has deductions that exceed a flat-dollar value cap must choose which deductions to claim. Even if a tax filer chooses not to claim a particular deduction because of the dollar cap, the tax filer might still engage in the activity for other reasons (although possibly to a lesser extent).
Third, the structure of a limit on itemized deductions also has an effect on its capacity to raise revenue. Limiting deductions might raise the taxable income of some individuals, and tax a higher share of their income at a higher marginal tax rate. However, certain combinations of deduction limits may shift some tax filers to claim the standard deduction instead of itemizing. In this case, the revenue increase by limiting itemized deduction would be partially offset by more tax filers claiming the standard deduction. |
crs_RL32499 | crs_RL32499_0 | In 2007, the U.S. Department of State reported that, "Saudi donors and unregulated charities have been a major source of financing to extremist and terrorist groups over the past 25 years." Official U.S. government concerns about this trend were apparent prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which amplified public criticism within the United States of alleged Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting against terrorist groups. The final report released by the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) indicates that the Commission "found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded [Al Qaeda]." In April 2008, Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey told the Senate Finance Committee that the Saudi government is "serious about fighting Al Qaeda in the kingdom, and they do," and argued that Saudi officials' "seriousness of purpose with respect to the money going out of the kingdom is not as high." He added, "Saudi Arabia today remains the location from which more money is going to... Sunni terror groups and the Taliban than from any other place in the world." The report also states, however, that Saudi Arabia "was a place where Al Qaeda raised money directly from individuals and through charities," and indicates that "charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship," such as the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, may have diverted funding to Al Qaeda. The Saudi government has not officially described Hamas as a terrorist organization. Saudi Counter-Terrorism Efforts
Post-September 11 Actions
Saudi officials maintain that they are working closely with the United States to combat terrorism, which they say is aimed as much at the Saudi regime as it is at the United States. U.S. officials traveled to Riyadh later that month to set up a joint task force to investigate terrorist financing in Saudi Arabia. However, several prominent Saudi individuals suspected by U.S. authorities of involvement in terrorist financing have not been charged or prosecuted in the United States, Saudi Arabia, or other jurisdictions. These individuals are believed to be in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. State Department has stated that "Saudi Arabia should demonstrate its willingness to hold elites accountable" for money laundering and terrorist financing related offenses. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ( P.L. 108-458 ) required the President to submit to Congress within 180 days a strategy for collaboration with the people and government of Saudi Arabia, including a framework for cooperation on efforts to combat terrorist financing. In the 110 th Congress, Section 2043 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act ( P.L. | According to the U.S. State Department 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, "Saudi donors and unregulated charities have been a major source of financing to extremist and terrorist groups over the past 25 years." The September 11, 2001 attacks fueled criticisms within the United States of alleged Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting against terrorist groups. The final report released by the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) indicates that the Commission "found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded [Al Qaeda]." The report also states, however, that Saudi Arabia "was a place where Al Qaeda raised money directly from individuals and through charities" and indicates that "charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship" may have diverted funding to Al Qaeda.
U.S. officials remain concerned that Saudis continue to fund Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In April 2008, Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey told the Senate Finance Committee that the Saudi government is "serious about fighting Al Qaeda in the kingdom, and they do," and argued that Saudi officials' "seriousness of purpose with respect to the money going out of the kingdom is not as high." He added, "Saudi Arabia today remains the location from which more money is going to terror groups and the Taliban—Sunni terror groups and the Taliban—than from any other place in the world."
Saudi officials insist that their counter-terrorist financing efforts are robust and are not limited to targeting domestic threats. In numerous official statements, Saudi leaders have said they are committed to cooperating with the United States in fighting terrorist financing, pointing out that Saudi Arabia has been a victim of terrorism and shares the U.S. interest in combating it. Saudi leaders acknowledge providing financial support for Islamic and Palestinian causes, but maintain that no official Saudi support goes to any terrorist organizations, such as Hamas.
Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia from 2003 to 2006 appear to have given added impetus to the Saudi leadership in expanding counter-terrorist financing efforts. Since mid-2003, the Saudi government has: set up a joint task force with the United States to investigate terrorist financing in Saudi Arabia; shuttered some charitable organizations suspected of terrorist ties; passed anti-money laundering legislation; banned cash collections at mosques; centralized control over some charities; closed unlicensed money exchanges; and scrutinized clerics involved in charitable collections. A planned National Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad has not been established. As required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (P.L. 110-53), President Bush has submitted strategies for U.S.-Saudi collaboration, with special reference to combating terrorist financing.
For more information about Saudi Arabia, see CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated to reflect major developments. |
crs_R45106 | crs_R45106_0 | Introduction
Sequestration is the automatic reduction (i.e., cancellation) of certain federal spending, generally by a uniform percentage. The sequester is a budget enforcement tool that Congress established in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act; P.L. 99-177 ) intended to encourage compromise and action, rather than actually being implemented (also known as triggered ). Generally, this budget enforcement tool has been incorporated into laws to either discourage Congress from violating specific budget objectives or encourage Congress to fulfill specific budget objectives. When Congress breaks these types of rules, either through the enactment of a law or lack thereof, a sequester is triggered and certain federal spending is reduced. Sequestration is of recent interest due to its current use as an enforcement mechanism for three budget enforcement rules created by the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Statutory PAYGO; P.L. 111-139 ) and the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ). However, the Statutory PAYGO sequester and the BCA discretionary sequester are current law and can be triggered if the budget enforcement rules are broken (and Congress does not take action to change or waive these rules). Medicare, which is a federal program that pays for covered health care services of qualified beneficiaries, is subject to a reduction in federal spending associated with the implementation of these three sequesters, although special rules limit the extent to which it is impacted. One automatic spending reduction involved the sequestration of certain mandatory spending from FY2013 to FY2021. Through subsequent legislation, including, most recently, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 18; P.L. 115-123 ), Congress extended this reduction through FY2027. Due to the varying payment structures of the four parts of the program, sequestration is applied differently across Medicare. Administrative Spending
The administration of Medicare is funded through a combination of discretionary and mandatory resources that are subject to reductions under a discretionary or mandatory sequestration order, respectively. Most notably, BBEDCA, as amended by the BCA, prohibits Medicare benefit payments from being reduced by more than 2% under a BCA mandatory sequestration order. Similarly, Statutory PAYGO prohibits Medicare benefit payments from being reduced by more than 4% under a Statutory PAYGO sequestration order. (See " Reductions in Benefit Spending ".) These orders can be issued either before or during the fiscal year in which they apply, depending on the trigger. Traditionally, Medicare benefit payments comprise the largest single source of sequestered funds in a given mandatory sequestration order. | Sequestration is the automatic reduction (i.e., cancellation) of certain federal spending, generally by a uniform percentage. The sequester is a budget enforcement tool that was established by Congress in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act; P.L. 99-177) and was intended to encourage compromise and action, rather than actually being implemented (also known as triggered). Generally, this budget enforcement tool has been incorporated into laws to either discourage Congress from violating specific budget objectives or encourage Congress to fulfill specific budget objectives. When Congress breaks these types of rules, either through the enactment of a law or the lack thereof, a sequester is triggered and certain federal spending is reduced.
Sequestration is of recent interest due to its current use as an enforcement mechanism for three budget enforcement rules created by the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Statutory PAYGO; P.L. 111-139) and the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25). At present, only the BCA mandatory sequester is triggered. Under the BCA, the sequestration of mandatory spending was originally scheduled to occur in FY2013 through FY2021; however, subsequent legislation, including the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 18; P.L. 115-123), extended sequestration for mandatory spending through FY2027. The Statutory PAYGO sequester and BCA discretionary sequester are current law and can be triggered if associated budget enforcement rules are broken (and Congress does not take action to change or waive these rules).
Medicare is a federal program that pays for certain health care services of qualified beneficiaries. The program is funded using both mandatory and discretionary spending and is impacted by any sequestration order issued in accordance with the aforementioned laws. Medicare is mainly impacted by the sequestration of mandatory funds since Medicare benefit payments are considered mandatory spending. Special sequestration rules limit the extent to which Medicare benefit spending can be reduced in a given fiscal year. This limit varies depending on the type of sequestration order.
Under a BCA mandatory sequestration order, Medicare benefit payments and Medicare Integrity Program spending cannot be reduced by more than 2%. Under a Statutory PAYGO sequestration order, Medicare benefit payments and Medicare Program Integrity spending cannot be reduced by more than 4%. These limits do not apply to mandatory administrative Medicare spending under either type of sequestration order. These limits also do not apply to discretionary administrative Medicare spending under a BCA discretionary sequestration order.
Generally, Medicare's benefit structure remains unchanged under a mandatory sequestration order and beneficiaries see few direct impacts. However, due to varying plan and provider payment mechanisms among the four parts of the program, sequestration is implemented somewhat differently across the program. |
crs_R41767 | crs_R41767_0 | Introduction
On April 5, 2011, Representative Paul Ryan, the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, released the Chairman's mark of the FY2012 House budget resolution. Additional detail on budgetary objectives and justifications was provided in Chairman Ryan's report entitled "The Path to Prosperity: Restoring America's Promise," issued the same day. The House Budget Committee considered and amended the Chairman's mark on April 6, 2011 and voted 22-16 to report the budget resolution to the full House. H.Con.Res. 34 was introduced in the House on April 11, 2011, and was accompanied by the House Budget Committee Report, H.Rept. On April 15, 2011, the House passed H.Con.Res. 34 by a vote of 235-193. CBO was asked to provide an analysis of the long-term budgetary impact of Chairman Ryan's budget proposal, and issued its report on April 5, 2011. In general, Chairman Ryan's budget proposal, as outlined in his "Path to Prosperity," in the Committee Report, and in CBO's analysis, suggests a change in the structure of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, the repeal many of the provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-152 ) including those that establish insurance exchanges, and changes to tort law governing medical malpractice. Part D covers prescription drug benefits. None of the four documents (budget resolution, Chairman's "Path to Prosperity" report, the Committee report, or CBO analysis) provided sufficient detail regarding specific provisions that would be repealed or retained to determine the disposition of provisions related to the quality and efficiency of health care (in Title III of PPACA), such as those creating value-based purchasing programs, quality reporting systems, and demonstrations and pilot programs that would test various patient care models including accountable care organizations. CBO indicated, however, that on the basis of specifications provided by House Budget Committee staff, its analysis of the long-term budgetary impacts of the proposal did not include a change in the sustainable growth rate mechanism for payments to physicians under Medicare. Long-Term Medicare Changes (2022 and Beyond)
Starting in 2022, the proposal would phase in an increase in the age of eligibility for Medicare and would convert the current Medicare entitlement program to a fixed federal contribution. Medicaid is jointly funded by the federal government and the states. 112-58 ) suggests restructuring Medicaid from an individual entitlement program to a block grant program, starting in FY2013. Repeal of Certain Private Health Insurance Provisions in PPACA
The budget resolution creates a health care reform reserve fund (Section 303 H.Con.Res. | On April 5, 2011, House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan released the Chairman's mark of the FY2012 House budget resolution together with his report entitled "The Path to Prosperity: Restoring America's Promise," which outlines his budgetary objectives. On the same day, CBO issued an analysis of the long-term budgetary impact of Chairman Ryan's budget proposal based on specifications provided by House Budget Committee staff. The House Budget Committee considered and amended the Chairman's mark on April 6, 2011, and voted to report the budget resolution to the full House. H.Con.Res. 34 was introduced in the House April 11, 2011, and was accompanied by the committee report (H.Rept. 112-158). On April 15, 2011, the House voted 235-193 to pass H.Con.Res. 34.
A budget resolution provides general budgetary parameters; however, it is not a law. Changes to programs that are assumed or suggested by the budget resolution would still need to be passed by separate legislation. Chairman Ryan's budget proposal, as outlined in his report, the committee report, and in the CBO analysis, suggests short-term and long-term changes to federal health care programs including Medicare, Medicaid, and the health insurance exchanges established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148).
Within the 10-year budget window (FY2012-FY2021), the budget proposal assumes that certain PPACA provisions would be repealed, including those that provide additional coverage under the Medicare prescription drug benefit, that expand Medicaid coverage to the non-elderly with incomes below 133% of the federal poverty level, and those provisions that establish health insurance exchanges. The proposal would also restructure Medicaid from an individual entitlement program to a block grant program beginning in FY2013.
Beyond the 10-year budget window, beginning in 2022, the budget proposal assumes an increase in the age of eligibility for Medicare, the conversion of Medicare to a fixed federal contribution program, and a restructuring of coverage for the elderly under Medicaid.
This report summarizes the proposed changes to Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurance as described in H.Con.Res. 34, Chairman Ryan's "Path to Prosperity" report, the House Budget Committee report, and the CBO analysis. Additionally, it briefly examines the potential impact of the proposed changes on health care spending and coverage. |
crs_RL32123 | crs_RL32123_0 | Debate has focused on the nature and immediacy of foreign missile threats to the United States and its interests, the pace and adequacy of technological development, the foreign affairs and budgetary costs of pursuing missile defenses, and implications for deterrence and global stability. For most missile defense advocates the Airborne Laser (ABL) program represents the most promising near-term effort. Currently, the ABL program is the primary focus of the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) Boost Defense program. Second, although the United States has primarily pursued kinetic energy kill mechanisms for missile defense some 25 years, many defense analysts believe that if the United States chooses to pursue increasingly effective missile defenses for the longer term future, then alternative concepts such as high-powered lasers may be the answer. This report tracks the current program and budget status of the Airborne Laser program. In addition, this report examines several related issues that have been of interest to Congress. This report does not provide a technical overview or detailed assessment of the ABL or Air-Based Boost Program. A number of subcontractors are also involved. The objective to acquire seven production aircraft likely remains. Until recently, Congress has largely supported the ABL program by appropriating the Defense Department's requests, which have totaled about $4.3 billion. For FY2007, the Bush Administration requested about $632 million for the ABL program, which Congress approved. For FY2008, the Bush Administration requested $548.8 billion for the ABL program. In the House version of the defense authorization bill ( H.R. First, the ABL continues to face technical challenges. Specific issues that may confront Congress include the severity and implications of the ABL programmatic and technological challenges, how the ABL might be employed if and when it is fielded, the potential for industrial base problems, the scheduled lethality test, and consideration of boost-phase alternatives to the ABL. There is some consensus on the ABL's current technical challenges. Lethality Test and Contingency Capability Issues
The lethality test now scheduled for August 2009 (some six years later than original plans) is seen as a critical next step in the ABL program's development. The objectives of this test include:
to demonstrate an actual shoot-down of a missile over the Pacific Ocean, possibly a Scud missile; to test the IRST (the Infrared Search & Track System), to see if the ABL can find, hold and track the intended target; and to demonstrate that the adaptive optics systems is able to compensate for atmospheric distortion. Some in the ABL program have suggested that the platform could be made available only as a airborne sensor and for battle management purposes. The ABL is DOD's most mature high power chemical laser program. | The United States has pursued a variety of ballistic missile defense concepts and programs over the past fifty years. Since the 1970s, some attention has focused on directed energy weapons, such as high-powered lasers for missile defense. Today, the Airborne Laser (ABL) program is the furthest advanced of these directed energy weapons in relative terms and remains the subject of some technical and program debate.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has remained a strong advocate for the ABL and its predecessor programs. The Defense Department and most missile defense advocates argue that the ABL, which is designed to shoot down attacking ballistic missiles within the first few minutes of their launch, is a necessary component of any broader U.S. ballistic missile defense system. Until recently, Congress has largely supported the Administration's ABL program.
Funding for the ABL began in FY1994, but the technologies supporting the ABL effort has evolved over 25 years of research and development concerning laser power concepts, pointing and tracking, and adaptive optics. Delayed now for many years, the ABL program plans to conduct a lethality test now scheduled for August 2009. Assuming a successful test, the Defense Department has said that this test platform could then be made available on an emergency basis for a future crisis. To date, about $4.3 billion has been spent on the ABL program, including $632 million for FY2007. For FY2008, the Administration requested $548.8 billion, which was cut substantially in the House and Senate defense authorization bills. Total ABL program costs are not available because the system architecture has not been defined.
Program skeptics continue to raise several issues. Their questions include the maturity of the technologies in use in the ABL program and whether current technical and integration challenges can be surmounted. If the ABL is proven successful, there have been questions about the number of platforms the United States should acquire. Seven aircraft have been mentioned previously, and apparently this number remains the program's objective, but is this number appropriate? What stresses might continued ABL program slippage or delays place on the supporting industrial base? How does the ABL compare to alternative concepts? To what degree should the United States invest in alternative missile defense technologies in the event that the ABL program may not prove successful?
This report examines the ABL program and budget status. It also examines some of the issues raised above. This report does not provide a detailed technical assessment of the ABL program (see CRS Report RL30185, The Airborne Laser Anti-Missile Program, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] (pdf)). This report is updated periodically as necessary. |
crs_RL31408 | crs_RL31408_0 | Introduction
Internet privacy issues encompass several concerns. One is the collection of personallyidentifiable information (PII) by website operators from visitors to government and commercialwebsites, or by software that is surreptitiously installed on a user's computer ("spyware") andtransmits the information to someone else. Another is the monitoring of electronic mail and Webusage by the government or law enforcement officials, employers, or e-mail service providers. Another issue, identity theft, is not an Internet privacy issue per se, but is often debated in the contextof whether the Internet makes identity theft more prevalent. For example, Internet-based practicescalled "phishing" and "pharming" may contribute to identity theft. This report provides an overview of Internet privacy-related issues and related laws passedin previous Congresses, and discusses legislative activity in the first session of the 109th Congress. Background information on Internet privacy issues is available in an archived CRS Report RL30784, Internet Privacy: An Analysis of Technology and Policy Issues , by Marcia Smith(available from author); and CRS Report RL31289 , The Internet and the USA PATRIOT Act:Potential Implications for Electronic Privacy, Security, Commerce, and Government , by MarciaSmith, et al. Although many in Congress and the Clinton Administration preferred industry self regulation, the105th Congress passed legislation (COPPA, see below) to protect the privacy of children under 13as they use commercial websites. Many bills have been introduced since that time regardingprotection of those not covered by COPPA, but the only legislation that has passed concerns federalgovernment, not commercial, websites. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), P.L. 105-277 . Some include enforcement as a fifth fair information practice. The E-Government Act ( P.L. In the wake of theSeptember 11 terrorist attacks, the debate over law enforcement monitoring has intensified. 107-56 , which expands lawenforcement's ability to monitor Internet activities. Sections 212 and 217 are not, andtherefore will expire on December 31, 2005. The Cyber Security Enhancement Act, section 225 of the 2002 Homeland Security Act ( P.L.107-296 ), amends section 212 of the USA PATRIOT Act. It lowers the threshold for when ISPsmay voluntarily divulge the content of communications. Debate may be influenced by revelations in December 2005 that President George W. Bush directedthe National Security Agency to monitor phone calls and e-mails in the United States withoutwarrants. Spyware
Spyware is discussed in more detail in CRS Report RL32706 , Spyware: Background andPolicy Issues for Congress , by Marcia Smith. FTC representatives and others caution that new legislation couldhave unintended consequences, barring current or future technologies that might, in fact, havebeneficial uses. The FACT Act ( P.L. Among its identity theft-related provisions, the law:
requires consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) to follow certain proceduresconcerning when to place, and what to do in response to, fraud alerts on consumers' creditfiles;
allows consumers one free copy of their consumer report each year fromnationwide CRAs as long as the consumer requests it through a centralized source under rules to beestablished by the FTC; (38)
allows consumers one free copy of their consumer report each year fromnationwide specialty CRAs (medical records or payments, residential or tenant history, check writinghistory, employment history, and insurance claims) upon request pursuant to regulations to beestablished by the FTC;
requires credit card issuers to follow certain procedures if additional cards arerequested within 30 days of a change of address notification for the sameaccount;
requires the truncation of credit card numbers on electronically printedreceipts;
requires business entities to provide records evidencing transactions allegedto be the result of identity theft to the victim and to law enforcement agencies authorized by thevictim to take receipt of the records in question;
requires CRAs to block the reporting of information in a consumer's file thatresulted from identity theft and to notify the furnisher of the information in question that it may bethe result of identity theft;
requires federal banking agencies, the FTC, and the National Credit UnionAdministration to jointly develop guidelines for use by financial institutions, creditors and otherusers of consumer reports regarding identity theft; and
extends the statute of limitations for when identity theft cases can bebrought. | Internet privacy issues encompass several types of concerns. One is the collection ofpersonally identifiable information (PII) by website operators from visitors to government andcommercial websites, or by software that is surreptitiously installed on a user's computer ("spyware")and transmits the information to someone else. Another is the monitoring of electronic mail andWeb usage by the government or law enforcement officials, employers, or email service providers.
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks intensified debate over the issue of monitoring bythe government and law enforcement officials, with some advocating increased tools to help themtrack down terrorists, and others cautioning that fundamental tenets of democracy, such as privacy,not be endangered in that pursuit. Congress passed the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act ( P.L. 107-56 ) that, inter alia , makes it easier for law enforcement officials to monitor Internet activities. That act wasamended by the Homeland Security Act ( P.L. 107-296 ), loosening restrictions as to when, and towhom, Internet Service Providers may voluntarily release the content of communications if theybelieve there is a danger of death or injury. Some provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, includingtwo that relate to Internet use, would have expired on December 31, 2005. Congress passed a briefextension (to February 3, 2006) in P.L. 109-160 . Debate over whether civil liberties protectionsneed to be added if the provisions are to be made permanent is expected to continue in the secondsession of the 109th Congress. Revelations that President Bush directed the National SecurityAgency to monitor some communications, including e-mails, in the United States without warrantsmay affect those deliberations.
The debate over website information policies concerns whether industry self regulation orlegislation is the best approach to protecting consumer privacy. Congress has considered legislationthat would require commercial website operators to follow certain fair information practices, but theonly law that has been enacted (COPPA, P.L. 105-277 ) concerns the privacy of children under 13,not the general public. Legislation has passed regarding information practices for federalgovernment websites, including the E-Government Act ( P.L. 107-347 ).
The growing controversy about how to protect computer users from "spyware" withoutcreating unintended consequences is discussed briefly in this report, but in more detail in CRS Report RL32706 . Another issue, identity theft, is not an Internet privacy issue per se, but is oftendebated in the context of whether the Internet makes identity theft more prevalent. For example,Internet-based practices called "phishing" and "pharming" may contribute to identity theft. Identitytheft is briefly discussed in this report; more information is available in CRS Report RS22082 , CRS Report RL31919 , and CRS Report RL32535 . Wireless privacy issues are discussed in CRS Report RL31636 .
This is the final edition of this report. It provides an overview of Internet privacy issues andrelated laws passed in previous Congresses, and discusses legislative activity in the first session ofthe 109th Congress. |
crs_R42486 | crs_R42486_0 | T he Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is the largest correctional agency in the country in terms of the number of prisoners under its jurisdiction. BOP must confine any offender convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a federal court. The total number of inmates under BOP's jurisdiction increased from approximately 25,000 in FY1980 to over 219,000 in FY2013. However, since the peak in FY2013, the number of inmates in the federal prison system decreased each subsequent fiscal year to approximately 192,000 inmates in FY2016. Appropriations for BOP
Trends in BOP's Total Appropriations
As shown in Figure 1 , BOP's appropriations increased by nearly $7.149 billion from FY1980 to FY2016. BOP's funding decreased by $340 million in FY2017. Between FY1980 and FY2016, the average annual increase in BOP's appropriations was approximately $199 million. BOP's annual budget is divided between two major accounts: Salaries and Expenses (S&E) and Buildings and Facilities (B&F). First, while there has been a nearly continuous increase in the overall appropriations for BOP, it is in large part driven by an almost continuous increase in appropriations for BOP's Salaries and Expenses (S&E) account since FY1980 (see Figure 2 ). In general, appropriations for BOP's S&E account increased as the prison population increased, which is not surprising given that the S&E account funds the operation of the federal prison system, including the salaries and benefits of both correctional officers and other institutional employees. However, funding for the S&E account has continued to increase, albeit at a reduced rate, even though the prison population has decreased each fiscal year from FY2013 to FY2016. Requested Versus Enacted Funding for BOP
A comparison of BOP's annual appropriations for its S&E and B&F accounts to the Administration's request for both accounts shows that Congress has been more likely to fund the Administration's request for prison construction and less likely to fully fund the Administration's request for operating the federal prison system (see Figure 3 ). The data presented in Figure 3 show that from FY1980 to FY2017, Congress appropriated less than the Administration's request for the B&F account 16 times. Per Capita Cost of Incarceration
As noted above, appropriations for BOP have continued to increase even though the federal prison population has decreased in recent years. As show in Figure 4 , the nominal per capita cost of incarceration has increased from approximately $22,000 per inmate in FY2000 to almost $35,000 in FY2016, a 61% rise. From FY2000 to FY2012, the per capita cost of incarceration roughly increased at the same rate as inflation. However, since FY2013 increases in the per capita cost have started to outstrip inflation. Appropriations for BOP Relative to Those for the Department of Justice
One concern among some policymakers is that BOP's expanding budget is starting to consume a larger share of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) overall annual appropriations. The trend lines (the dashed lines in the figure) show that since FY1980, both BOP's total budget and the S&E account have, in general, encompassed a growing share of DOJ's annual appropriations. | The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is the largest correctional agency in the country in terms of the number of prisoners under its jurisdiction. BOP must confine any offender convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a federal court.
Changes in federal criminal justice policy since the early 1980s spurred growth in the federal prison population. The total number of inmates under BOP's jurisdiction increased from approximately 25,000 in FY1980 to over 192,000 in FY2016. While the federal prison population in FY2016 is nearly 7 times larger than what it was in FY1980, the number of inmates under the BOP's jurisdiction peaked in FY2013 at approximately 219,000 inmates. The federal prison population has decreased each fiscal year from FY2013 to FY2016.
BOP's appropriations increased by nearly $7.149 billion from FY1980 to FY2016, which was the peak of BOP's nominal appropriations. Between FY1980 and FY2016, the average annual increase in BOP's appropriations was approximately $199 million. Its appropriations decreased by $340 million in FY2017.
BOP's annual budget is divided between two major accounts: Salaries and Expenses (S&E, i.e., the operating budget) and Buildings and Facilities (B&F, i.e., the capital budget).The nearly continuous increase in BOP's appropriations is in large part driven by a nearly unbroken year-by-year increases in the S&E account. Funding for the S&E account has continued to increase even though the prison population decreased from FY2013 to FY2016. An increasing per capita cost of incarceration might explain why funding for the S&E account has not decreased along with the prison population, but it might also be due to the fact that the prison population has not decreased to a point where BOP can reduce staff and shutter prisons.
The nominal per capita cost of incarcerating an inmate in the federal system has increased every fiscal year from FY2000 to FY2016, from approximately $22,000 per inmate to nearly $35,000 per inmate. After adjusting for inflation, the overall cost of incarceration was relatively flat from FY2000 to FY2012, but in recent fiscal years increases in per capita costs have started to outstrip inflation.
A comparison of requested and enacted funding for BOP's S&E and B&F accounts shows that Congress has been somewhat more likely to fund the Administration's request for prison construction and less likely to fully fund the Administration's request for operating the federal prison system. From FY1980 to FY2017, appropriations were lower than the Administration's request for the B&F account 16 times while appropriations were lower than the request for the S&E account 24 times.
One concern among some policymakers is that BOP's expanding budget is starting to consume a larger share of the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) overall annual appropriations. A review of funding for DOJ and BOP show that since FY1980 both BOP's total budget and the S&E account have, in general, encompassed a growing share of DOJ's annual appropriations. |
crs_98-211 | crs_98-211_0 | Senior executive branch officials had advisedthe President to veto these earlier measures because of inadequate funding. Asenacted on October 21 in H.R. 4328 , the Omnibus Consolidated andEmergency Supplemental Appropriations, 1999, Foreign Operations funds total$31.63 billion, including $12.827 billion for regular programs, $539 million forMDB arrears payments, $399 million in Child Survival, former Soviet aid, Africaembassy bombing-related, and counter-narcotics "emergency" supplementalspending, and $17.9 billion for the IMF. Much of the additional ForeignOperations resources added in H.R. 4328 is allocated for former Sovietaid, USAID operating expenses, disaster relief, the Peace Corps and U.S.contributions to the Global Environment Facility. The bill caps internationalfamily planning aid at $385 million but drops House-passed abortion restrictions. Introduction
The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislativevehicle through which Congress reviews and votes on the U.S. foreign assistancebudget and influences executive branch foreign policy making generally. But unlike a year ago,when the President concentrated most of the added funds requested on a few highpriority areas, most notably for payment of arrears at multilateral development banks,the FY1999 request asked for increases across a wide array of Foreign Operationsprograms. The Senate allocation set budget authority for Foreign Operations about$1 billion below the President's request and nearly $250 million less than enacted forFY1998. During executive-legislative budget discussions duringthe final days of the 105th Congress, negotiators added more than $880 million forForeign Operations spending in FY1999 to amounts approved by the House andSenate in September. Under the terms of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, appropriations for multilateral development bank(MDB) arrearage payments and the IMF do not score against budget allocations forForeign Operations programs in FY1999. In addition, H.R. These "emergency" supplementals also do score againstForeign Operations budget caps. 4569 , provided $635million for the Eximbank and other export promotion agencies, meeting about halfof the proposed increase from FY1998, while the Senate appropriated $674 millionin S. 2334 . Development assistance. Peace Corps. Demining aid would growfrom $20 million to $50 million. Multilateral Development Bank arrearage payments. H.R. 4328 . Leading Recipients of U.S. Foreign Aid:FY1997 -- FY1999 (appropriation allocations -- $s inmillions)
* Total or partial earmarks enacted in FY1997, FY1998, and FY1999 Foreign Operations bills. Both House and Senate bills proposed the initiation of a ten year process to phase outeconomic aid to Israel and to reduce Egypt's aid by half, cutting total assistance tothe two countries for FY1999 by $100 million to just over $5 billion. Policy Issues in the Foreign Operations Debate
In addition to funding decisions made by Congress in the Foreign Operations appropriation bill, the annual spending measure also includes a wide range of policyprovisions that frequently raise contentious foreign policy disagreements between thePresident and Congress. Policy priorities of U.S. development aid. U.S. international family planning programs had been one of the largest growth areas of the foreign aid budget in the 1990s. Middle East aid and Israel's plan to phase-out economic assistance. The Omnibus Appropriation, H.R. Aid Restrictions for Russia and Ukraine. | The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. foreign aid budget and influences executive branch foreign policymaking generally. It contains the largest share -- over two-thirds -- of total U.S. internationalaffairs spending. For Foreign Operations programs, President Clinton sought $13.6 billion indiscretionary budget authority for FY1999, nearly $800 million, or 6% higher than available forFY1998. But unlike a year ago, when the President concentrated most of the added funds requestedon a few high priority areas, the FY1999 request asked for increases across a wide array of ForeignOperations programs, including export promotion agencies, development assistance, debt reductioninitiatives, the Peace Corps, drug control aid, arrearage payments for multilateral development banks,and others. Israel, Egypt, Russia, Ukraine, and Bosnia would be the largest recipients of bilateralaid, as has been the case in the recent past. Beyond these regular Foreign Operations programs, thePresident also sought $17.9 billion for U.S. contributions to two IMF facilities and $502 million forU.S. arreage payments to multilateral development banks.
In addition to funding questions, the Foreign Operations debate also included important policy issues, such as priorities of development aid strategies, abortion restrictions on international familyplanning programs, adjusting Middle East aid allocations, policy restrictions on aid to Russia andUkraine, and the use of American assistance as a tool in the Armenian-Azerbaijan dispute overNagorno-Karabakh.
Foreign Operations is one of eight appropriation bills incorporated and enacted in H.R. 4238 , the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental AppropriationsAct, 1999. As passed on October 20/21, H.R. 4328 includes $12.827 billion fordiscretionary Foreign Operations. In addition, the omnibus bill includes $539 million to clear U.S.arrears at multilateral development banks, $399 million in "emergency" Foreign Operationssupplementals, and $17.9 billion for the IMF, funds that are not "scored" against the ForeignOperations budget cap, but which provide additional resources for U.S. foreign aid activities. Intotal, H.R. 4328 provides $31.63 billion for Foreign Operations in FY1999.
Although this still falls about $385 million below the President's request, it provides a substantial increase from what the House and Senate had approved in bills ( H.R. 4569 and S. 2334 ) passed in September. Senior executive branch officials had advised thePresident to veto these earlier measures because of inadequate funding. Compared with theSenate-passed bill, the higher of the two, budget negotiations between congressional leaders and theWhite House during the final days of the 105th Congress resulted in $880 million more for ForeignOperations in FY1999. Much of the additional money included in H.R. 4328 isallocated for former Soviet aid, USAID operating expenses, disaster relief, the Peace Corps and U.S.contributions to the Global Environment Facility. The bill caps international family planning aid at$385 million, but drops House-passed abortion restrictions. The enacted legislation also initiates aten year process to phase out economic aid to Israel and trim by half Egypt's aid, reducing totalcombined assistance for FY1999 by $100 million to just over $5 billion.
Key Policy Staff |
crs_RL31658 | crs_RL31658_0 | Since the September 11 attacks,roughly $121 million in terrorist assets has been frozen worldwide, but less than 20 percent of thistotal has been blocked in the past 11 months. How efforts to "follow the money" should be prioritized in and integrated witha comprehensive global struggle against terrorism thus becomes an issue of considerable significancefor U.S. policymakers and for Congress. They claim thatasset seizures to date have constricted the funds of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Both have employed a range of bank and non-bank transactions to store and transfer funds. (47)
Moving and Storing Value. The U.S.-led effort to sever terrorism's financial lifelines has received mixed reviews to date. Furthermore, the campaign against terrorist finance has provoked controversy on various religious, public policy, and humanitarian grounds. | The U.S.-led international campaign to deprive terrorists of funding has so far produced mixed results. Though more than $120 million in terrorists' accounts reportedly has been blocked sinceSeptember 11, 2001, less than 20 percent of this total has been frozen in the past 11 months. Theal Qaeda network increasingly is shifting to non-bank methods of moving and storing value and isrelying on a decentralized structure of largely self-financing cells; moreover, Middle Eastern donorsapparently continue to provide funds to al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In addition, thecampaign has aroused controversy on various political, religious and humanitarian grounds and isviewed in some quarters as broadly anti-Islamic. How the crackdown on terror finance should beprioritized and integrated with a comprehensive global struggle against terrorism thus becomes anissue of considerable significance for U.S. policymakers and for Congress. |
crs_R43464 | crs_R43464_0 | Because of the short distance between stops and the overall operating environment, streetcars are slow compared with non-streetcar light rail and other types of rail public transportation, such as commuter rail and heavy rail. How Many Streetcar Systems Exist in the United States? In early 2014, there were 12 operating streetcar systems, 7 new systems under construction, and approximately 21 new systems in the planning stages ( Figure 1 ). Because they are often controversial, streetcar systems that are being planned may not be built. Not all streetcar lines have succeeded in stimulating property development. What Are the Main Policy Options for Congress? Alternatively, Congress might decide to reduce or eliminate the use of federal funds for streetcar construction and operation. | Streetcars, a type of rail public transportation, are experiencing a revival in the United States. Also known as trolleys, streetcars were widespread in the early decades of the 20th century, but almost extinct by the 1960s. Several new streetcar systems have been built over the past 20 years, and many more are being planned. In early 2014, there were 12 operating streetcar systems, 7 new systems under construction, and approximately 21 new systems in the planning stages. Many streetcars systems, though not all, have been built or are being built with the support of federal funds.
This report answers some frequently asked questions about streetcars and federal involvement in their construction and operation. It concludes by laying out policy options for Congress in dealing with streetcars. |
crs_RL34154 | crs_RL34154_0 | Without an extension, most appropriated programs (also referred to as discretionary programs) in the 2002 farm bill and some mandatory programs, such as food stamps, would have faced the prospect of not having statutory authority for the appropriations committees to provide funding in FY2008 and subsequent years. All but one title of the 2008 farm bill, except the trade title (which was mistakenly missing from the enrolled version), were enacted on May 22 when the House and Senate overrode the presidential veto of H.R. For the commodity title, the dairy and sugar programs were included in the extension, as were price support loan programs for wool and mohair. Programs that specifically were not extended included the direct, counter-cyclical, and marketing loan programs for the 2008 crop year for all other supported commodities (e.g., feed grains, oilseeds, wheat, rice, cotton, and peanuts), peanut storage payments, agricultural management assistance for conservation, community food projects in the food stamp program, the rural broadband program, value-added market development grants, federal procurement of biobased products, the biodiesel fuel education program, and the renewable energy systems program. Possible Reversion to Permanent Law
If Congress had not enacted the 2008 farm bill before the beginning of the 2008 harvest, then the non-expiring provisions of primarily the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938 and the Agriculture Act of 1949 would have taken effect. The commodity support provisions of permanent law are so radically different from current policy—and inconsistent with today's farming, marketing, and trade agreements, as well as potentially costly to the federal government—that Congress was unlikely to let permanent law take effect. Many of these programs were extended by the 2002 farm bill and most of the programs expired September 30, 2007. Also, two programs, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Conservation Security Program (CSP), have been extended in earlier legislation to FY2010 and FY2011, respectively. However, some provisions of domestic food assistance law would have terminated. Without some action, authority to continue to pay out nutrition assistance grants to Puerto Rico and American Samoa (totaling some $1.6 billion for FY2008) would have terminated without a temporary extension. Trade and Foreign Food Aid Programs15
Several agricultural trade and international food aid programs were subject to expiration unless a new farm bill was enacted. 110-234 ) and enactment of the version with Title III ( P.L. These trade programs were authorized by the 2002 farm bill to receive mandatory funding. 480 expired without a temporary extension or a new farm bill. 107-171 ( H.R. 2008 Farm Bill
P.L. 110-231 continued to extend the 2002 farm bill as in the previous extension until the earlier of May 23, 2008, or enactment of the 2008 farm bill. 2419 became P.L. 110-246 (and superseded P.L. | The 2002 farm bill (P.L. 107-171) authorized an array of agricultural, rural, and nutrition programs. Many provisions of the 2002 farm bill were scheduled to expire in 2007. If a new farm bill or year-long extension were not enacted before the 2008 harvest, permanent law would have taken effect. Under permanent law, eligible commodities would be supported at levels much higher than they are now, and many of the currently supported commodities might not be eligible (including soybeans and peanuts). Permanent law for the commodity programs is so radically different from current policy and inconsistent with today's farming, marketing, and trade agreements—as well as costly to the federal government—that Congress was unlikely to let it take effect. Lack of new legislation would have reduced or eliminated some conservation, domestic nutrition assistance, trade and foreign food aid, and rural development programs.
Six temporary extensions continued the authority of most programs in the 2002 farm bill until May 23, 2008. A new farm bill was enacted on May 22, 2008 (P.L. 110-234), when the Senate joined the House in overriding the presidential veto of H.R. 2419. However, a clerical error omitted Title III, the trade and foreign aid title from the enrolled version sent to the President. To resolve the absence of Title III, another complete version of the farm bill (H.R. 6124) was passed, vetoed and overridden. The final enacted version of the 2008 farm bill is P.L. 110-246.
Prior to enactment of the farm bill, programs that were not extended in the temporary extensions included the direct, counter-cyclical, and marketing loan programs for the 2008 crop year for the major crops (such as corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and rice), peanut storage, community food projects authorized under the Food Stamp Act, the rural broadband program, value-added market development grants, and certain renewable energy programs. However, the dairy, sugar, and wool and mohair programs were extended.
Most of the long-standing USDA conservation programs were permanently authorized and had a current appropriation. Other conservation programs that pay farmers to remove fragile crop land from production were authorized and received mandatory funding from the 2002 farm bill but awaited renewal. Two conservation programs that pay farmers for adopting resource stewardship practices (the Environmental Quality Incentives Program and the Conservation Security Program) were extended beyond FY2007 by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171).
USDA's domestic food assistance programs (for example, food stamps) generally were permanently authorized, and, in most cases, they were not affected by the possible expiration of the farm bill, since they received a full-year FY2008 appropriation. However, two major provisions of the law could have been affected: nutrition assistance grants to Puerto Rico and American Samoa and authority to reduce food stamp administrative payments to states.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43844 | crs_R43844_0 | The many proposals and bills on this subject put forth over the years have distinguished two main alternatives to continued operation of the air traffic control system by a federal agency:
corporatization , which, in this context, generally refers to establishing air traffic services as a wholly owned government corporation or quasi-governmental entity; and privatization , which would entail creating some form of private ownership and control of an air traffic services corporation. While a proposed privatized model was offered as part of the FAA reauthorization bill considered by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in the 114 th Congress (see H.R. 4441 ), Congress included no such proposals in reauthorizing FAA through the end of FY2017 ( P.L. 114-190 ). The United States Air Traffic Service Corporation Act (1995)
In January 1994, the Clinton Administration released its "Initiative to Promote a Strong Competitive Aviation Industry," largely adopting the work of the airline industry commission and the National Performance Review, including the recommendation to create a government corporation to carry out FAA's air traffic functions. This sentiment, however, largely shifted to general support of the FAA-managed system after labor gained collective bargaining rights following personnel reforms made in the 1990s. None of the ANSPs in other countries are comparable to FAA in terms of their size or complexity. Statistical analysis provided by CANSO offers a means to compare ANSPs in terms of productivity and cost-effectiveness. The study attributed service quality and performance improvements to technological modernization. Considerations for Further Debate
The prospect of reforming FAA air traffic services into a government corporation or private entity raises many unique challenges to be considered in crafting and debating enabling legislation. Corporate Framework and Governance
The organizational structure and managerial and financial oversight of a new air traffic services entity could take one of many forms. A P3 approach could be regarded as a hybrid between a government-owned corporation and a completely private entity, with both the federal government and aviation industry stakeholders sharing in financial and organizational oversight. Any property conveyed to the corporation that is located at an FAA technical facility would have been required to be reverted to federal government ownership and placed under the control the Secretary of Transportation if either the corporation determined that it no longer needed the property to carry out air traffic services or the Secretary determined that the reversion was necessary to protect the interests of the United States. Corporate Financing and FAA Funding
Historically, proposals to corporatize or privatize air traffic services in the United States have been intertwined with debate over the implementation of user fees for air traffic services. The legislation did not provide any explicit tax-preferred treatment to debt issued by the proposed corporation. These various elements could be combined to create safety regulations and policies for an independent air traffic services entity, whether it be a government corporation, a private corporation, or a public-private partnership. | Over the past 40 years, Congress has intermittently considered proposals to establish a government corporation or private entity to carry out air traffic functions currently provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). While the issue had been relatively dormant since a proposal offered by the Clinton Administration in the 1990s failed to gain the support of Congress, interest reemerged following budget sequester-related funding cuts to FAA in FY2013. In the 114th Congress, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee ordered H.R. 4441, an FAA reauthorization bill that proposed to establish a government-chartered air traffic services corporation, to be reported. However, the bill was never reported in the House, and the FAA extension act passed by Congress in July 2016 (P.L. 114-190) did not make any organizational reforms regarding air traffic services. Authorizations under that extension expire at the end of FY2017, and debate over air traffic services reform has arisen once more.
Many other countries have established government corporations, quasi-governmental entities, or private firms to perform air traffic services. While none of these air traffic service organizations are comparable to FAA in terms of their size or complexity, they represent a broad array of organizational models including a large number of wholly government-owned corporations, a public-private partnership model in the United Kingdom, a government-controlled joint stock company in Switzerland, and a fully private nonprofit entity controlled by aviation industry stakeholders in Canada.
Direct comparisons among these models have been limited. There does not appear to be conclusive evidence that any of these models is either superior or inferior to others or to existing government-run air traffic services, including FAA, with respect to productivity, cost-effectiveness, service quality, and safety and security. Certain corporate and private air traffic service providers have improved cost-effectiveness and performance as a result of access to financial markets to fund large-scale acquisition projects, and of faster implementation of technologies. In this regard, the tax status of a potential air traffic entity's debt could become a significant issue in the United States, as a privatized or a government-owned corporation could end up paying more to borrow in the financial market than the federal government does.
The prospect of reforming FAA air traffic services raises many unique challenges for congressional consideration, including
the framework and governance of a future air traffic services corporation; its organizational structure and elements; corporate financing and FAA funding mechanisms; measures to ensure a smooth transition; labor provisions to address legal rights of labor organizations while minimizing potential system disruptions; safety regulation and oversight of the corporation; measures to address corporate liability; and safeguards to assure equitable treatment to the wide array of system users. |
crs_RL33294 | crs_RL33294_0 | (1) However, for fundingprovided by Energy and Water Development (E&W) Appropriations laws to the Department ofEnergy (DOE), this report defines an earmark as "funds set aside within an account for individualprojects, locations, or institutions." In the FY2006 E&W appropriation law, earmarks were labeledas "congressionally directed projects" (2) and most often appeared in the joint explanatory statement of theconference report. A "dear colleague letter" that seeks to change the process says,
We believe the process of earmarking undermines theconfidence of the American public in Congress because the practice is not open, fair, or competitiveand tends to reward the politically well-connected. (6)
In general, proponents agree that some modification of the process may be needed, but otherwisecontend that earmarking is legitimate under the Constitution and is justified because elected officialsare better able to make decisions about funding for local needs than program managers in theexecutive branch. (7)
DOE Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Earmark Funding
In a review of the FY2006 DOE budget, the American Academy for the Advancement ofScience (AAAS) examined earmarks for DOE energy research and development (R&D) programsand found that
... earmarks eat up whatever increases there are for mostenergy programs and cut deeply into core R&D programs. As a result, there will be enormous cuts to competitively awardedR&D grants in those areas. The tableshows that EERE funding earmarks have more than tripled, from $46.0 million in FY2003 to $159.0million in FY2006. The Administration's ACI document expresses concern about the potential for earmarks toimpede the proposed initiatives. (14)
Advanced Energy Initiative
A key component of ACI, the Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI), proposes new initiatives forseveral energy technologies. (15) In particular, it embraces key initiatives (16) for hydrogen,biomass/biorefinery, and solar energy (17) that are reflected in the FY2007 DOE budget request as majorfunding increases for corresponding host programs under the Office of Energy Efficiency andRenewable Energy (EERE). | Appropriations earmarks for the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Energy Efficiency andRenewable Energy (EERE) programs have tripled from FY2003 to FY2006. According to theExecutive Office of the President and the private American Association for the Advancement ofScience (AAAS), this affects the conduct of programs and may delay the achievement of goals. Further, the Administration has proposed new funding for hydrogen, biomass/biorefinery, and solarenergy initiatives proposed under the American Competitiveness Initiative/Advanced EnergyInitiative (AEI).
The report discusses the potential impact of congressional earmarks on EERE research anddevelopment (R&D) programs and, in particular, whether continued high levels of earmarks couldlead to new cuts in staff and dilute the desired impact of the AEI initiatives under EERE, shouldCongress decide to fund them.
The congressional debate over earmarks centers on the transparency of the process, with afocus on earmarks not initially approved in either chamber that appear in a bill's conference report. Opponents contend that the earmarking process is not open, fair, or competitive. Proponents say itis a legitimate practice and is justified by policymakers' knowledge of local needs, as it spreadsresearch money to deserving states and institutions.
The appropriation figures cited as "earmarks" in this report are those labeled by DOE budgetrequests as "congressionally directed activities" and, for FY2006, appear to be completely consistentwith figures in the FY2006 Energy and Water Development (E&W) conference report that arelabeled as "congressionally directed projects." In this regard, the earmark figures in this reportappear consistent with the definition of a congressional appropriations earmark as "funds set asidewithin an account for individual projects, locations, or institutions."
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34022 | crs_RL34022_0 | Most Recent Developments
FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act Approved
On December 19, 2007, Congress enacted the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (attached to H.R. The bill was signed into law by the President on December 26, 2007 ( P.L. On September 27, 2007, Congress approved a continuing resolution (CR) funding most programs at their FY2007 funding levels through November 16, 2007 ( P.L. Conference Agreement Reached
On November 8, 2007, House and Senate conferees agreed to an FY2008 Transportation-HUD funding bill ( H.Rept. It was approved by the House on November 14, 2007; it was never considered by the Senate. The President, in a Statement of Administration Policy, indicated that if the bill had been sent to him, he would have vetoed it because its funding level exceeded his request. Introduction to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Most of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts enacted by Congress. Surplus FHA funds are used to offset the cost of the HUD budget. On February 15, 2007, the 110 th Congress approved a revised continuing resolution covering the remainder of FY2007 ( P.L. 110-5 ). It funded most programs at their FY2006 level, although it specified higher or lower funding levels for some programs, including several HUD programs. Specifically, the CR funded six HUD accounts above their FY2006 level:
Tenant Based Rental Assistance: $15,920 million for FY2007; Project-Based Rental Assistance: $5,976 million for FY2007; Public Housing Operating Fund: $3,864 million for FY2007; Indian Housing Loan Guarantee: $6 million for FY2007; Homeless Assistance Grants: $1,442 million for FY2007; and Salaries and Expenses: the FY2006 levels, plus such sums as necessary to meet 50% of the need for cost-of-living increases for federal employees for FY2007. Accounts
The following section of the report provides a detailed discussion of the majority of accounts included in Table 2 . The committee report ( S.Rept. Both House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. The President's FY2008 budget requested that Congress rescind $1.3 billion from the HCF. Operating Fund
The President's FY2008 budget requested a $130 million increase in funding for the public housing Operating Fund. The House bill would have funded the account at the FY2007 level (over $400 million above the President's request), and the Senate bill would have provided almost $500 million above the President's request. HOPE VI
Each year since FY2004, the President has requested that Congress provide no new funds for the HOPE VI program, although each year the Congress has continued to fund the program. In addition, the President's budget request stated that the Administration would seek to reform the CDBG program during the 110 th Congress, but at the end of the first session, no formal legislative proposal had been introduced in the House or the Senate. In addition to reduced funding for CDBG formula grants, the Administration's FY2008 budget proposed eliminating funding for several other community development related programs, including Rural Housing and Economic Development Grants, Community Development Block Grant Section 108 loan guarantees, and Brownfields Economic Development Initiatives. 3074 . 3074 . 110-446 ), also proposed to fund these programs at $735 million; the House-passed version of H.R. The President's budget and the House bill estimated that FHA will require net positive appropriations for FY2008. 110-161 , like the House bill, Senate bill, and House-Senate conference agreement, includes the President's proposal to lift the multifamily loan limit, temporarily lifts the cap on HECMs, and rejects the President's proposals to increase GNMA's fees and move accounts between the GI/SRI fund and the MMI fund. | On February 5, 2007, President Bush released his FY2008 budget request, ten days before the Congress finished work on the FY2007 spending bills by approving a revised year-long continuing resolution (P.L. 110-5). The FY2007 CR funded most Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs at their FY2006 level, but with decreases for some programs, and increases for other programs. The CR provided HUD with over $36.6 billion for FY2007.
The President's FY2008 budget requested about a billion dollar decrease in funding for HUD. It proposed to provide no new funding for several programs that have been targeted for elimination in recent years, but that Congress has continued to fund (HOPE VI, Rural Housing and Economic Development, Brownfields Redevelopment, and Section 108 Loan Guarantees). The President's FY2008 budget also requested decreased funding for several programs, including housing programs for the elderly and disabled, fair housing and lead paint programs, public housing modernization, and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. Each of these programs had been targeted for decreases in past budget requests, but Congress had not approved the requested decreases. The President's budget requested funding increases for several programs, including public housing operating costs and programs for the homeless, persons with AIDS, and first-time homebuyers. The FY2008 funding debate was also shaped by the ongoing decline in receipts from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) available to offset the cost of the budget. For FY2007, it was estimated that FHA would generate a net surplus of over $650 million; for FY2008, that amount was estimated to be about $250 million.
On July 18, 2007, the House Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2008 HUD funding bill (H.R. 3074). On July 16, 2007, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version (S. 1789). Both bills would have increased funding above the President's request for Section 8 vouchers, HOPE VI, housing programs for the elderly and disabled, and CDBG. On July 24, 2007, the House approved H.R. 3074, and on September 12, 2007, the Senate approved its substitute version. On November 14, 2007, the House approved a conference agreement that would have funded HUD at about $3 billion above the President's request (H.Rept. 110-446). In a Statement of Administration Policy, the President indicated that he would veto the agreement, and the Senate never considered it. Instead, on December 19, 2007, Congress approved the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (attached to H.R. 2764), which funds HUD at a lower level than the House bill, Senate bill, and conference agreement, but at a level about $2 billion above the President's request. The President signed the bill into law on December 26, 2007 (P.L. 110-161), ending a series of continuing resolutions that had funded most agencies at their prior-year level since the end of the 2007 fiscal year.
This report tracks the FY2008 congressional appropriations process and provides a detailed discussion of the funding and issues related to the majority of accounts in HUD's budget. Following completion of the FY2008 appropriations process, this report will not be updated. |
crs_97-896 | crs_97-896_0 | Statutory Authority for Trade Agreements
The broad-gauged trade agreements entered into by the United States in the 1990s—the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement, and the multilateral trade agreements that a country must accept as a condition of WTO membership—were negotiated by the President and submitted to Congress under the terms of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA) and the Trade Act of 1974. The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (BTPAA), contained in Title XXI of the Trade Act of 2002, granted renewed trade negotiating authority to the President. Although the authority expired during the 110 th Congress, implementing bills for trade agreements entered into before July 1, 2007, remained eligible for expedited legislative consideration. Agreements that had been entered into before July 1, 2007, but that had not been approved by that date, included U.S. free trade agreements with Colombia, Korea, and Panama. Congress approved the three agreements in October 2011 under the expedited BTPAA procedures. Additionally, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), on behalf of the President, notified the House and Senate by letter in December 2009 that the President intended to enter into negotiations aimed at a regional, Asia-Pacific trade agreement, called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Notwithstanding the expiration of BTPAA authorities, the USTR stated in a December 2009 Federal Register notice that "USTR is observing the relevant procedures of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (19 U.S.C. 3804), which apply to agreements entered into before July 1, 2007, with respect to notifying and consulting with Congress regarding the TPP trade agreement negotiations." Notably, discussions to reinstate TPA through legislation have recently gained attention. In March 2013, the Acting U.S. Trade Representative, Demetrios Marantis, stated that the Obama Administration will work with Congress to enact new TPA legislation. Congress took this approach in the BTPAA with respect to ongoing FTA negotiations with Singapore and Chile and other trade negotiations under way at the time. | U.S. trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), World Trade Organization agreements, and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have been approved by majority vote of each house rather than by two-thirds vote of the Senate—that is, they have been treated as congressional-executive agreements rather than as treaties. The congressional-executive agreement has been the vehicle for implementing Congress's long-standing policy of seeking trade benefits for the United States through reciprocal trade negotiations. In a succession of statutes, Congress has authorized the President to negotiate and enter into tariff and nontariff barrier (NTB) agreements for limited periods, while permitting NTB and free trade agreements negotiated under this authority to enter into force for the United States only if they are approved by both houses in a bill enacted into public law and other statutory conditions are met; implementing bills are also accorded expedited consideration under the scheme. This negotiating authority and expedited procedures are commonly known as Trade Promotion Authority (TPA).
Congress most recently granted the President temporary trade negotiating authority utilizing this approach in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (BTPAA), contained in Title XXI of the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210. Although the authority expired during the 110th Congress, agreements entered into before July 1, 2007, remained eligible for congressional consideration under the expedited procedure. The President had entered into free trade agreements with Colombia, Korea, and Panama before this date, each of which awaited congressional approval at the time. In October 2011, Congress approved the three pending agreements, making a total of 11 free trade agreements approved under the BTPAA process.
In addition, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), on behalf of the President, notified the House and Senate in December 2009 by letter that the President intended to enter into negotiations aimed at a regional, Asia-Pacific trade agreement, called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Notwithstanding the expiration of BTPAA authorities, the USTR stated that the Obama Administration would be observing the relevant procedures of the act with respect to notifying and consulting with Congress regarding these negotiations. Notably, discussions to reinstate TPA through legislation have recently gained attention. In March 2013, the Acting U.S. Trade Representative, Demetrios Marantis, stated that the Obama Administration will work with Congress to enact new TPA legislation. |
crs_R43479 | crs_R43479_0 | Introduction
On April 1, 2014, Representative Paul Ryan, the chairman of the House Budget Committee, released the chairman's mark of the FY2015 House budget resolution. Additional detail on budgetary objectives and justifications was provided in Chairman Ryan's report entitled The Path to Prosperity: Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Resolution , issued the same day. The House Budget Committee considered the chairman's mark on April 2, 2014, and voted 22-16 to report the budget resolution to the full House. H.Con.Res. 96 was introduced in the House April 4, 2014, and was accompanied by the House Budget Committee Report ( H.Rept. 113-403 ). The House agreed to H.Con.Res. 96 on April 10, 2014, by a vote of 219-205. A budget resolution, if agreed to by both the House and Senate, sets enforceable budgetary parameters. 96 expresses the desired levels of spending for government health programs over 10 years (FY2015-FY2024), creates four health care-related reserve funds, and presents policy statements regarding assumptions about future Medicare reforms and replacing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as amended (ACA, P.L. 111-148 , P.L. 111-152 ). It is not a law and is not signed by the President. In general, the budget proposal, as outlined in Chairman Ryan's Path to Prosperity report and in the committee report, suggests a change in the structure of the Medicare and Medicaid programs; the repeal of many (or all) of the provisions in the ACA, including those that establish insurance exchanges; and changes to tort law governing medical malpractice. Long-Term Medicare Changes (FY2024 and Beyond)
The budget assumes that the current Medicare defined benefits program will be changed into a fixed federal contribution ("premium support") system beginning in 2024 for newly eligible beneficiaries. In addition to these programmatic changes, the budget proposal suggests significant reductions to federal Medicaid funding. Conversion of Medicaid to a Block Grant System
Another "illustrative policy option" included in the committee report is the restructuring of Medicaid from an individual entitlement program to a block grant program. Repeal of Private Health Insurance Provisions in ACA
As described earlier, H.Con.Res. | On April 1, 2014, House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan released the chairman's mark of the FY2015 House budget resolution together with his non-binding report entitled The Path to Prosperity: Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Resolution, which outlines his budgetary objectives. The House Budget Committee considered and amended the chairman's mark on April 2, 2014, and voted to report the budget resolution to the full House. H.Con.Res. 96 was introduced in the House April 4, 2014, and was accompanied by the committee report (H.Rept. 113-403). H.Con.Res. 96 was agreed to by the House on April 10, 2014.
Once it is agreed to by both chambers of Congress, a budget resolution provides enforceable budgetary parameters; however, it is not a law. Changes to programs that are assumed or suggested by the budget resolution would still need to be enacted in separate legislation. Chairman Ryan's budget proposal, as outlined in his report and in the committee report, suggests short-term and long-term changes to federal health care programs, including to Medicare, Medicaid, and the health insurance exchanges established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as amended (ACA, P.L. 111-148, P.L. 111-152).
Within the 10-year budget window (FY2015-FY2024), the budget allows for the full repeal of the ACA or just certain provisions, including those that reduce Medicare spending, those that expand Medicaid coverage to the non-elderly with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level, and those provisions that establish health insurance exchanges. Committee documents also suggest restructuring Medicaid from an individual entitlement program to a block grant program. In addition, beginning in 2024, the budget assumes the conversion of Medicare to a fixed federal contribution ("premium support") program.
This report summarizes the proposed changes to Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurance as described in H.Con.Res. 96 and accompanying documents, including the committee report and Chairman Ryan's Path to Prosperity report. |
crs_R40711 | crs_R40711_0 | These bills contain numerous provisions that affect military personnel, retirees and their family members. 111-166 ), and passed by the House on June 25, 2009. On July 23, the Senate struck the text of the House-passed H.R. The conference report was passed by the House on October 8, by the Senate on October 22, and was signed into law on October 28, 2009 and became P.L. 111-84 . Where appropriate, other CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided. Note: some issues were addressed in the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report RL34590, FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues concerning that legislation. Those issues that were previously considered are designated with a " * " in the relevant section titles of this report. *Military Pay Raise
Background: Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, highlighted by the significant increase in the number of servicemembers deployed to Afghanistan, continue to focus interest on the military pay raise. Reference : Previously discussed in CRS Report RL34590, FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], page 6. 2647 . The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 ( P.L. | Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the emerging operational role of the Reserve Components, further heighten interest in a wide range of military personnel policies and issues.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) selected a number of the military personnel issues considered in deliberations on the House-passed and Senate passed-versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84). This report provides a brief synopsis of sections that pertain to personnel policy. It includes background information and a discussion of the issue, along with a table that contains a comparison of the bill (H.R. 2647) passed by the House on June 25, 2009, the version of this bill passed by Senate on July 23, 2009, and the version signed into law on October 28, 2009. Where appropriate, other CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided. Note: some issues were addressed in the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act and discussed in CRS Report RL34590, FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], concerning that legislation. Those issues that were previously considered in CRS Report RL34590 are designated with a "*" in the relevant section titles of this report.
This report focuses exclusively on the annual defense authorization process. It does not include appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices or any discussion of separately introduced legislation. |
crs_RL34478 | crs_RL34478_0 | Introduction
Rising food prices are having impacts across the world, but especially among poor people in the low-income developing countries. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) reports that since 2000, a year of low food prices, the wheat price in international markets has more than tripled, corn prices have doubled, and the price of rice rose to unprecedented levels in March 2008. Such unprecedented increases in food prices have raised concerns about the ability of poor people to meet their food and nutrition needs and in a number of countries have lead to civil unrest. More than 33 countries, most of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa, are adversely affected by food prices increases. The World Bank has estimated that more than 100 million people are being pushed into poverty as a result of the escalation of food prices. A number of interrelated factors have been identified as causes of escalating prices for food. Droughts in Australia and Eastern Europe and poor weather in Canada, Western Europe, and Ukraine have reduced available supplies. Rising oil and energy prices have affected all levels of the food production and marketing chain, from fertilizer costs to harvesting, transporting, and processing food. Higher incomes in emerging markets like China and India have resulted in strong demand for food commodities, meat, and processed foods and higher prices in world markets. Increased demand for biofuels has reduced the availability of agricultural products for food or feed use. Food Aid Funding Shortfalls
One immediate consequence of the rise in global food prices is the emergence of a shortfall in funding for international food aid. In 2007, the WFP provided $2.7 billion of food aid to an estimated 70 million people in 80 countries. Response to Food Aid Funding Shortfalls
The United States responded initially to the WFP's appeal for food aid and its own food aid funding shortfall by announcing a release of $200 million from the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT), a reserve of commodities and cash that can be used to meet unanticipated emergency food aid needs. Congress also is considering an FY2008 emergency supplemental appropriation for food aid requested by the Administration. The President announced on May 1, 2009 a request for Congress to appropriate an additional $770 million in FY2009 to deal with the international food situation. Long-Term Considerations: Giving Priority to Agricultural Development
In addition to near-term measures to meet food needs in low-income countries, aid agencies are focusing on medium- and long-term efforts to enhance food security and agricultural productivity. There have been calls especially for increasing the priority and allocation of resources to agricultural development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank and USAID are two aid agencies that are promoting agricultural development and growth in low-income countries. Both indicate that African agricultural development should be a priority. | Rising food prices are having impacts across the world, but especially among poor people in low-income developing countries. Since 2000, a year of low food prices, wheat prices in international markets have more than tripled, corn prices have doubled, and rice prices rose to unprecedented levels in March 2008. Such increases in food prices have raised concerns about the ability of poor people to meet their food and nutrition needs and in a number of countries have lead to civil unrest. More than 33 countries, most of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa are particularly affected by food prices increases. The World Bank has estimated that more than 100 million people are being pushed into poverty as a result of food-price escalation.
A number of interrelated factors have been identified as causes of the rising food prices. Droughts in Australia and Eastern Europe and poor weather in Canada, Western Europe and Ukraine in 2007 have reduced available supplies. Reduced stocks have prompted many countries to restrict exports. Rising oil and energy prices have affected all levels of the food production and marketing chain from fertilizer costs to harvesting, transporting and processing food. Higher incomes in emerging markets like China and India have resulted in strong demand for food commodities, meat and processed foods and higher prices in world markets. Increased demand for biofuels has reduced the availability of agricultural products for food or feed use. Export restrictions in many countries have exacerbated the short supply situation.
One immediate consequence of the rise in global food prices is the emergence of a shortfall in funding for international food aid. The World Food Program has launched an urgent appeal for $755 million to address a funding gap brought on by high food and fuel prices. WFP indicates that without additional funding it would have to curtail feeding programs that meet the needs of more than 70 million people in 80 countries.
The United States has responded to the WFP appeal for food aid and its own food aid funding shortfall by announcing a release of $200 million from the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust (BEHT), a reserve of commodities and cash that can be used to meet unanticipated emergency food aid needs. Congress is considering an FY2008 emergency supplemental appropriation for emergency food aid requested by the Administration. The President announced on May 1, 2009 a request for Congress to appropriate an additional $770 million in FY2009 to deal with the international food situation.
In addition to near-term measures to meet food needs in low-income countries, aid agencies are focusing on medium- and long-term efforts to enhance food security and agricultural productivity. There have been calls for increasing the priority and allocation of resources to agricultural development in poor countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank and USAID are two aid agencies that are promoting agricultural development and growth in low-income countries. Both indicate that African agricultural development should be a priority. |
crs_R42051 | crs_R42051_0 | Among its many provisions, ACA restructures the private health insurance market, sets minimum standards for health coverage, and, beginning in 2014, will require most U.S. residents to obtain health insurance coverage or pay a penalty. Qualifying individuals and families will be able to receive federal subsidies to reduce the cost of purchasing coverage through the exchanges. The law includes direct spending to subsidize the purchase of health insurance coverage through the exchanges, as well as increased outlays for the expansion of state Medicaid programs. ACA also includes numerous mandatory appropriations to fund temporary programs to increase access and funding for targeted groups, provide funding to states to plan and establish exchanges, and support many other research and demonstration programs and activities. The report is periodically revised and updated to reflect important legislative and other developments. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
The primary goal of ACA is to increase access to affordable health insurance for the millions of Americans without coverage and make health insurance more affordable for those already covered. Automatic Annual Spending Reductions Under the Budget Control Act
As noted in the introduction to this report, the FY2013 sequestration is the first in a series of automatic annual spending reductions triggered under the BCA by the failure of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction to propose, and Congress and the President to enact, deficit-reduction legislation. In addition, the BCA established a process for reducing the federal deficit by at least $2.1 trillion over the 10-year period FY2012-FY2021. First, the law placed enforceable limits, or caps, on discretionary spending for each of those 10 fiscal years. The Joint Committee was instructed to develop legislation to reduce the federal deficit by at least $1.5 trillion through FY2021. If the budget deficit exceeded those target levels, then automatic across-the-board spending cuts would be triggered. For each of the remaining fiscal years (i.e., FY2014-FY2021), however, discretionary spending reductions will be achieved by lowering the BCA-imposed discretionary spending cap by the total dollar amount of the reduction. Impact on Health Reform Spending
The final section of this report discusses the potential impact of the BCA-triggered automatic spending reductions, both in FY2013 and in future years, on the following types of ACA-related spending: (1) mandatory spending on insurance coverage expansion, including exchange subsidies and Medicaid; (2) other mandatory spending; (3) discretionary spending; and (4) federal administrative expenses. For any given fiscal year in which sequestration is ordered, only new budget authority for that year (including advance appropriations that first become available for obligation in that year) is reduced. Unobligated balances (non-defense only) carried over from previous fiscal years are exempt from a sequestration order. The law reauthorized appropriations for numerous existing discretionary grant programs and activities authorized under the PHSA, and permanently reauthorized appropriations for programs and services provided by the Indian Health Service (IHS). ACA also created a number of new discretionary grant programs and provided for each an authorization of appropriations. CBO has projected that both the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) within HHS and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will incur substantial administrative costs to implement ACA. | The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) established new budget enforcement mechanisms for reducing the federal deficit over the 10-year period FY2012-FY2021. The BCA placed statutory limits, or caps, on discretionary spending for each of those 10 fiscal years, which will save an estimated $0.9 trillion during that period. In addition, it created a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction (Joint Committee) with instructions to develop legislation to reduce the federal deficit by at least another $1.5 trillion through FY2021. In the event that Congress and the President were unable to enact a Joint Committee bill—as turned out to be the case—then automatic annual spending reductions would be triggered beginning in FY2013 and extending through FY2021. Under the BCA, the reductions will be achieved by a combination of sequestration (i.e., an automatic across-the-board cancellation of budgetary resources) and, beginning in FY2014, by lowering the discretionary spending caps. The President ordered the FY2013 sequestration on March 1, 2013.
The potential impact of spending reductions triggered by the BCA on health reform spending under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) appears to be somewhat limited. ACA sought to increase access to affordable health insurance by expanding the Medicaid program and by restructuring the private health insurance market. It set minimum standards for private insurance coverage, created a mandate for most U.S. residents to obtain coverage, and provided for the establishment by 2014 of state-based insurance exchanges for the purchase of health insurance. Certain individuals and families will be able to receive federal subsidies to reduce the cost of purchasing coverage through the exchanges. The new law included direct spending to subsidize the purchase of health insurance coverage through the exchanges, as well as increased outlays for the Medicaid expansion. Under the rules governing sequestration, all Medicaid spending and most of the spending on subsidies is exempt from any reduction, and cuts to Medicare are capped at 2%.
ACA also included numerous mandatory appropriations that provide billions of dollars to support temporary programs to increase coverage and funding for targeted groups, provide funds to states to plan and establish exchanges, and support many other research and demonstration programs and activities. Generally, these appropriations are fully sequestrable. However, for any given fiscal year in which sequestration is ordered, only new budget authority for that year is reduced. Unobligated balances carried over from previous fiscal years are exempt from sequestration.
ACA also is having an effect on discretionary spending, which is subject to the annual appropriations process. The law reauthorized appropriations for numerous existing discretionary grant programs authorized under the Public Health Service Act, permanently reauthorized funding for the Indian Health Service (IHS), and created a number of new grant programs and provided for each an authorization of appropriations. In addition, the Congressional Budget Office projected that both the Department of Health and Human Services and the Internal Revenue Service will incur substantial administrative costs to implement ACA's policies and programs. ACA-related discretionary spending generally is fully sequestrable.
The report is periodically revised and updated to reflect important legislative and other developments. |
crs_R42681 | crs_R42681_0 | Introduction
The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) outlaws two forms of trade secret theft: theft for the benefit of a foreign entity (economic espionage) and theft for pecuniary gain (theft of trade secrets). A sentencing court must order the defendants to pay victim restitution, and the government may confiscate any property that is derived from or used to facilitate either offense. (1) Whoever
(2) with intent to convert
(3) a trade secret
(4) related to
(5) a product or service
(6)(a) used in or
(b) intended for use in
(7)(a) interstate commerce or
(b) foreign commerce
(8) to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof
(9) (a) intending or
(b) knowing
(10) that the offense will injure the owner of that trade secret
(11) knowingly
(12)(a) steals, without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information,
(b) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such information; [or]
(c) (i) receives, buys, or possesses such information,
(ii) knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization;
or
II. For purposes of the federal criminal code, an "organization" is any "person other than an individual." The thief may be, but need not be, the intended beneficiary. And the crime is likewise a RICO and, consequently, a money laundering predicate offense. Section 1831 condemns:
I. Section 1839's definition of foreign agent and foreign instrumentality, however, makes it clear that an entity can only qualify if it has a substantial connection to a foreign government. In the case of trade secret offenses, potentially corresponding offenses include violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the National Stolen Property Act, and the federal wire fraud statute. In addition, in the case of economic espionage violations, a defendant may be subject to prosecution under the general espionage statutes, the espionage component of the computer fraud statute, or for failure to register as the agent of a foreign power. The Defend Trade Secrets Act created a private cause of action. Pre-Trial Seizure
Perhaps EEA's most distinctive feature is its pre-trial seizure procedure. Section 1837 states that the chapter 90 applies to conduct occurring outside the United States if "the offender" is a U.S. national or an act in furtherance of the offense is committed within the United States. | Stealing a trade secret is a federal crime when the information relates to a product in interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1832 (theft of trade secrets), or when the intended beneficiary is a foreign power, 18 U.S.C. 1831 (economic espionage). Section 1832 requires that the thief be aware that the misappropriation will injure the secret's owner to the benefit of someone else. Section 1831 requires only that the thief intend to benefit a foreign government or one of its instrumentalities.
Offenders face lengthy prison terms as well as heavy fines, and they must pay restitution. Moreover, property derived from the offense or used to facilitate its commission is subject to confiscation. The sections reach violations occurring overseas, if the offender is a United States national or if an act in furtherance of the crime is committed within the United States.
Depending on the circumstances, misconduct captured in the two sections may be prosecuted under other federal statutes as well. A defendant charged with stealing trade secrets is often indictable under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the National Stolen Property Act, and/or the federal wire fraud statute. One indicted on economic espionage charges may often be charged with acting as an unregistered foreign agent and on occasion with disclosing classified information or under the general espionage statutes. Finally, by virtue of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (P.L. 114-153), Section 1831 and 1832 are predicate offenses for purposes of the federal racketeering and money laundering statutes.
P.L. 114-153 (S. 1890) dramatically increased EEA civil enforcement options when it authorized private causes of action for the victims of trade secret misappropriation. In addition, the EEA now permits pre-trial seizure orders in some circumstances, counterbalanced with sanctions for erroneous seizures.
This report is available in an abridged version, without footnotes or attribution, as CRS Report R42682, Stealing Trade Secrets and Economic Espionage: An Abridged Overview of the Economic Espionage Act. |
crs_R41854 | crs_R41854_0 | Introduction
Managing price and income risks can be a major challenge for dairy farmers. In 2011, the farm price of milk has rebounded from lows in 2009, but the price of corn, a major feed ingredient, has reached record highs. The volatile nature of commodity markets presents opportunities for profits and losses when milk prices or feed costs change. In dairy, and in agriculture generally, farm-level risk management is provided through both private and public sector tools. Many in the dairy industry, producers and processors alike, generally support the federal government's policies promoting the use of risk management tools by individual producers. In contrast, the industry is divided over changes to other, more traditional dairy policies and programs, including the possible addition of a supply management program. For information on a broader range of current programs and options for dairy policy, see CRS Report R41141, Previewing Dairy Policy Options for the Next Farm Bill . Current Risk Management Tools
Risk management tools for individual dairy producers can be categorized as either short-run or long-run tools. In the short run (up to about a year or so), producers can lock in what they may view as favorable (or at least acceptable) prices and/or margins using forward contracts with milk buyers and feed dealers. They might also use brokers to establish hedges using futures or options that lock in favorable prices or margins. Long-run risk management strategies might include diversifying the farm operation, perhaps by growing more feed (thus avoiding market purchases) or by adding other enterprises, such as a trucking operation. The goal of such moves would be to generate revenue streams that do not fluctuate in the same way as dairy revenues. Finally, the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program makes payments when milk prices drop below certain levels. 110-246 ). Sometimes producers can lock in favorable (high) margins, while at other times margins may be low or even negative. When milk and feed hedges are used together, a dairy producer can lock in a milk margin (milk price minus feed cost). LGM-Dairy is administered by USDA's Risk Management Agency (RMA) as part of the federal crop insurance program and is sold by private insurance agents. Dairy Risk Management and the Next Farm Bill
As Congress prepares to deliberate dairy policy in the next farm bill, policymakers might consider a number of options currently circulating in the industry to address the risk management needs of individual dairy producers. These include facilitating the use of private hedging, expanding the government's LGM-Dairy margin insurance, establishing "farm savings accounts," implementing a national margin insurance program, and modifying the existing MILC program that provides counter-cyclical payments to dairy producers. Finally, with respect to both private and public marketing tools (e.g., hedging and government programs), policymakers might address whether the margin provided by the market (and determined essentially each day that the futures market is open) is sufficient for producers, or whether a minimum margin needs to be set through a "margin insurance" program or a MILC-type program. Policymakers may also consider the implications of removing "too much" risk, and the possibility that high levels of margin protection could potentially lead to excess milk production and unfavorable returns for dairy producers. | Managing price and income risks can be a major challenge for dairy farmers. In 2011, the farm price of milk has rebounded from lows in 2009, but the price of corn, a major feed ingredient, has reached record highs. The volatile nature of commodity markets presents opportunities for profits and losses when milk prices or feed costs change.
In dairy and in agriculture generally, farm-level risk management tools are provided through both the private and the public sectors. By using these tools, dairy producers transfer risk to either the private sector or the government through programs that offer payments when milk prices decline. Risk management tools can also be categorized as either short-run or long-run tools.
In the short run (up to about a year or so), producers can lock in what they may view as favorable prices and/or margins (the milk price minus feed cost) using forward contracts with milk buyers and feed dealers. Producers might also use brokers to establish hedges using futures or options that would lock in those favorable prices or margins. Livestock Gross Margin—Dairy (LGM-Dairy) is an insurance product administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Risk Management Agency (RMA) but sold by private insurers. The short-run tools typically offer price or margin protection at whatever level the market determines. Sometimes producers can lock in favorable (high) margins, while at other times margins may be low or even negative.
Long-run risk management strategies might include diversifying the farm operation, perhaps by growing more feed (thus avoiding feed purchases at market prices) or by adding enterprises, such as a trucking operation. The intent behind such a strategy would be to generate income streams that do not fluctuate in the same way as dairy income. Another option is participation in the federal Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program, which makes payments to producers when milk prices drop below levels established in the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246).
As Congress prepares to deliberate dairy policy in the next farm bill, policymakers might consider a number of options to address the risk management needs of individual dairy producers. These include facilitating the use of private hedging, expanding the LGM-dairy margin insurance, establishing "farm savings accounts" to encourage cash reserves, implementing a national margin insurance program, modifying the existing MILC program, and helping secure additional lines of credit for margin accounts used in hedging. Regarding both private marketing tools (e.g., hedging) and public programs, policymakers will likely consider whether the margin provided by markets (and determined essentially each day that the futures market is open) is sufficient for producers, or whether a minimum margin needs to be set through a government program. Policymakers may also consider the implications of removing "too much" risk, and the possibility that high levels of margin protection could potentially lead to excess milk production and unfavorable returns for dairy producers.
Many in the dairy industry, producers and processors alike, generally support the federal government's policies promoting the use of risk management tools by individual producers. In contrast, the industry is divided over potential changes to other, more traditional dairy policies, including the addition of a supply management program, elimination of price support, and changes to the federal milk marketing order system. For information on a broader range of current programs and options for dairy policy, see CRS Report R41141, Previewing Dairy Policy Options for the Next Farm Bill. |
crs_R41067 | crs_R41067_0 | The Lugo victory was hailed as a step toward strengthening Paraguay's fragile democracy, ending six decades of one-party rule. Political Background1
The current political environment in Paraguay has been shaped by the country's turbulent political history. Due in large part to the country's authoritarian past, Paraguay's state institutions had remained weak while corruption continued to undercut democratic consolidation and economic development. Lugo's 2008 Election
There were three major candidates in the presidential election of April 20, 2008. They were the former minister of education Blanca Ovelar of the long-ruling Colorado Party; Fernando Lugo, then known in Paraguay as the "bishop of the poor," backed by the Patriotic Alliance for Change; and former military commander Lino Oviedo, the leader of a failed 1996 coup who was released from prison in early September 2007, running as a candidate of the party that he founded, the National Union of Ethical Citizens (UNACE). In July 2009, the entire PLRA split from the electoral alliance and joined the opposition in criticizing Lugo. In his first year in office, President Lugo had very limited success in working with an opposition congress. Lugo's reform agenda is stymied by a number of challenges: his electoral coalition has splintered; he is a political novice and has not acquired the political skills to build bridges with a constitutionally mandated strong Congress; and he faces a political and administrative culture reportedly riddled with corruption, clientelism, and a sympathy for and habituation to authoritarianism. As Lugo entered his second year in office, calls for impeachment became more frequent. His focus on increasing social and health expenditures to reduce inequality has resulted in modest reforms of education and healthcare. The United States has supported anti-corruption and democratization programs in Paraguay including providing more than $60 million in funding from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (see " U.S. Assistance "). Economic Situation
Paraguay, approximately the size of California, has a population of about 6.9 million people who are concentrated in and around the capital city of Asunción. It is one of the poorest countries in Latin America, however, and has suffered significantly from a recent drought and the global economic downturn. Poverty rates have dropped slightly from 61% of the population in 2001 to 58.2% in 2008. Relations with the United States
Paraguay and the United States have good relations, cooperating extensively on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. Counternarcotics Cooperation
Paraguay is a major transit country for illegal drugs destined primarily for neighboring South American states and Europe. It produces over half of the marijuana grown in South America. In April 2009, bills entitled the "U.S.-Paraguay Partnership Act of 2009" were introduced in the House ( H.R. 1837 ) and Senate ( S. 780 ). On September 14, 2009, the ATPDEA Expansion and Extension Act of 2009 ( S. 1665 ) was introduced in the Senate. Each of these bills would amend the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (Title XXXI of the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210 ) to extend trade preferences to Paraguay. Tri-Border Area and Terrorism
The United States is particularly concerned about illicit activities in the tri-border area (TBA) of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil, where money laundering, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and trade in counterfeit and contraband goods are prevalent. The United States has worked closely with the governments of the TBA countries on counterterrorism issues through the "3+1" regional cooperation mechanism, which serves as a forum for discussions, and the United States has provided anti-terrorism and anti-money-laundering support to Paraguay. Paraguay made some progress on counterterrorism legislation in 2009. | Paraguay, a landlocked nation in the center of South America, has friendly relations with the United States and has been a traditional ally. Paraguay's turbulent political history and tradition of political authoritarianism have resulted in international isolation that the country is seeking to overcome. The population of 6.9 million people is one the most homogenous mestizo populations in the hemisphere. Paraguay's largely agrarian economy has grown well in recent years on the strength of global commodity prices. However, in 2009, a severe drought and the impact of the global economic recession sharply reduced growth, but a recovery is anticipated in 2010.
The April 2008 election of Fernando Lugo, a former Roman Catholic bishop and leader of the Patriotic Alliance for Change, as President ended 61 years of one-party rule by the still-dominant Colorado Party. The United States has encouraged the strengthening of democracy in Paraguay, and hailed the peaceful transition of power. Known as the "bishop of the poor" after a decade of work in an impoverished rural diocese, Lugo pledged to introduce land and agrarian reform, improve education and health services to better serve Paraguay's poor majority, and combat widespread corruption. Yet, as he entered his second year in office, there were more frequent calls for his impeachment. His loose electoral alliance had splintered, and he faced broad opposition in the opposition-dominated Paraguayan Congress that had stymied his center-left agenda at nearly every turn. At the end of 2009, polls indicated that Lugo had one of the lowest popularity ratings of any leader in the region.
The United States and Paraguay cooperate in a number of areas but especially in the fight against corruption, and on anti-drug, counterterrorism and anti-smuggling initiatives. In 2006 and 2009, the United States and Paraguay signed two Millennium Challenge Corporation threshold agreements totaling more than $60 million dollars to combat corruption and strengthen the rule of law. Paraguay is a major transit country for cocaine and produces the largest crop of marijuana in South America. The United States remains concerned about illegal activities in the loosely controlled tri-border region with neighboring Brazil and Argentina, such as money-laundering, drugs and arms trafficking, and trade in counterfeit and contraband goods.
The 111th Congress has expressed growing interest in Paraguay. In April 2009, two bills were introduced entitled the "U.S.-Paraguay Partnership Act of 2009" (H.R. 1837 and S. 780). On September 14, 2009, the ATPDEA Expansion and Extension Act of 2009 (S. 1665) was introduced in the Senate. Each of these bills would amend the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (Title XXXI of the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-210) to extend unilateral trade preferences to Paraguay. Indicating additional interest in Paraguay, the House Democratic Partnership (formerly the House Democratic Assistance Commission) made a study trip to Paraguay in August 2009. Members of the eight-member delegation had discussions with the bicameral Congress and the executive about the need to work together to support democracy in Paraguay.
This report examines recent political and economic developments in Paraguay and issues in U.S.-Paraguayan relations. |
crs_RS20294 | crs_RS20294_0 | Introduction
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, authorized by Title XVI of the Social Security Act, is a means-tested income assistance program financed from general tax revenues. Under SSI, disabled, blind, or aged individuals who have low incomes and limited resources are eligible for benefits regardless of their work histories. In December 2013, more than 8.3 million people received SSI benefits. In that month, these beneficiaries received an average cash benefit of $529.15 and the program paid out over $4.6 billion in federally administered SSI benefits. All but four states and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands supplement the federal SSI benefit with additional payments, which may be made directly by the state or combined with the federal payment. Income and Resource Limits
Individuals and couples must have limited assets or resources to qualify for SSI benefits. Plans for Achieving Self-Support
A Plan for Achieving Self-Support (PASS) is an individual plan for employment designed by an SSI beneficiary. There is no limit to the amount of money in an IDA that can be excluded from the SSI resource calculation. Money in a dedicated account for children is not counted as a resource for the purposes of determining the child's SSI eligibility or the SSI eligibility of the representative payee. | The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, authorized by Title XVI of the Social Security Act, is a means-tested income assistance program financed from general tax revenues. Under SSI, disabled, blind, or aged individuals who have low incomes and limited resources are eligible for benefits regardless of their work histories. In December 2013, more than 8.3 million individuals received SSI benefits, receiving monthly payments of $529.15 on average. The SSI program paid out over $4.6 billion in federally administered benefits that month. All but four states and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands supplement the federal SSI benefit with additional payments, which may be made directly by the state or combined with the federal payment.
As a means tested program, SSI places a limit on the assets or resources of its beneficiaries. However, there are four types of accounts that represent an important part of the overall SSI program and can be used by SSI beneficiaries to build assets or plan for the future, including (1) money placed into burial accounts, (2) money used as part of a Plan for Achieving Self-Support (PASS), (3) money placed in Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), and (4) money placed in dedicated accounts for children. For the purposes of determining SSI eligibility these accounts are not counted as resources and can be used by beneficiaries without affecting their eligibility.
This report provides an overview of income and resource limits for SSI benefit determinations as well as the four types of accounts exempt from the SSI resource limitations. |
crs_RL32649 | crs_RL32649_0 | Together they account for over 30% of world domestic product (2012 estimate). This economic clout makes the United States and Japan powerful forces that influence each other's economies and those of other countries. Economic conditions in the United States and Japan also have a significant impact on the rest of the world. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relationship itself can influence economic conditions in other countries. The two countries remain very important economic partners, accounting for significant shares of each other's foreign trade and investment, even though their relative significance has declined. Nevertheless, the economic recoveries in both countries are expected to be fragile, especially in Japan. The second crisis was the March 11, 2011, earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accidents in northeast Japan. U.S.-Japanese Trade in Goods and Services
The growth in U.S.-Japanese bilateral trade in goods and services has been slow if not stagnant over the past two decades, reflecting, at least in part, the anemic state of the Japanese economy. The value of portfolio and direct investments between the United States and Japan exceeds the value of trade in goods and services. Japanese investors are major private foreign holders of U.S. Treasury securities that finance the U.S. national debt, and their importance has soared over the last few years. For Japan the importance of the relationship has been rooted in the emergence of the United States as the world's largest economic power; Japan's dependence on the United States for national security, especially during the Cold War; the dependence of Japanese manufacturing industries—autos, consumer electronics, and others—on exports to the United States; and the reliance of reform-minded Japanese political leaders on U.S. pressure, gaiatsu , to press for economic reforms in a political system that strongly protects the status quo. For the United States, the significance of the economic relationship with Japan has been grounded in its reliance on Japan as a critical ally; the emergence of Japan in the post-World War II period as an economic power in East Asia and, until recently, the second-largest economy (now the third-largest economy) in the world; the advancing competition from Japanese manufacturers in industries, for example autos and steel and high tech industries, including semiconductors and computers, which employ large numbers of U.S. workers; the rising trade deficits with Japan; Japan's emergence as a major source of investment in the United States; and Japanese government policies that have protected vulnerable sectors and assisted exporters, often at the expense of U.S. competitors. For Japan, China has emerged both as a major economic competitor and partner in the region requiring more attention. Japan and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and Its Other FTA Initiatives
The TPP is an evolving regional free trade agreement (FTA). Japan and the United States are major participants in those discussions. Prospects and Policy Options to Deepen Economic Ties
Although the relative significance of the U.S.-Japan economic relationship has been diminished somewhat with the rise of China and other emerging economic powers and Japan's stagnant economic performance, it remains important to the respective companies and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. As Japan and the United States continue to manage their economic relationship, they have several options on how to deepen the relationship. On the other hand, failure to do so could indicate that the underlying problems are too fundamental to overcome and could set back the relationship. This option could help to promote stability in the bilateral relationship by containing political friction like that which erupted in the 1980s and 1990s. While the United States and Japan have achieved some successes, a number of issues seem to have lingered over the years, such as government regulatory practices. Managing the U.S.-Japan Economic Relationship—A Brief History
For the United States and Japan, managing their economic relationship has meant cooperating in areas of mutual agreement and addressing problems in a manner that meets the national interest of each country while maintaining the integrity of the alliance. | Japan and the United States are two major economic powers. Together they account for over 30% of world domestic product, for a significant portion of international trade in goods and services, and for a major portion of international investment. This economic clout makes the United States and Japan potentially powerful actors in the world economy. Economic conditions in the United States and Japan have a significant impact on the rest of the world. Furthermore, the U.S.-Japan bilateral economic relationship can influence economic conditions in other countries.
The U.S.-Japan economic relationship is strong and mutually advantageous. The two economies are highly integrated via trade in goods and services—they are large markets for each other's exports and important sources of imports. More importantly, Japan and the United States are closely connected via capital flows. Japan is a major foreign source of financing of the U.S. national debt and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future, as the mounting U.S. public debt needs to be financed and the stock of U.S. domestic savings remains insufficient to meet the investment needs. Japan is also a significant source of foreign private portfolio and direct investment in the United States, and the United States is the origin of much of the foreign investment in Japan.
The relative significance of Japan and the United States as each other's economic partner has diminished. This trend is due in part to the rise of China and other emerging economic powers. For example, China has overtaken Japan as the largest source of foreign financing of the U.S. national debt. Nevertheless, analyses of trade and other economic data suggest that the bilateral relationship remains important, and policy leaders from both countries face the challenge of how to manage it. The trend is also due to the mediocre performance of the Japanese economy over the last two decades, which was exacerbated by the global economic slowdown beginning in 2008, and other setbacks, including the tsunami, earthquake, and nuclear accidents that occurred in March 2011. Japan is still struggling to achieve sustained economic recovery.
However, during the last decade, U.S. and Japanese policy leaders seem to have made a deliberate effort to drastically reduce the friction that prevailed in the economic relationship during the 1970s, 1980s, and the first half of the 1990s. On the one hand, this calmer environment has stabilized the bilateral relationship and permitted the two countries to focus their attention on other issues of mutual interest, such as national security. On the other hand, as some have argued, the friendlier environment masks serious problems that require more attention, such as Japan's continuing failure to resolve long-standing market access barriers to U.S. exports. Failure to resolve any of these outstanding issues could heighten friction between the two countries.
More generally, other issues regarding U.S.-Japan economic relations have emerged on the agenda of the 113th Congress. U.S. and Japanese leaders have several options on how to manage their relationship, including stronger reliance on the World Trade Organization; special bilateral discussion frameworks and agreements; or a free trade agreement such as the potential Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement in which Japan has decided to participate. Japan's participation in the TPP has renewed concerns of some Members of Congress over a number of Japanese trade practices. |
crs_R42611 | crs_R42611_0 | Introduction
The proposed Keystone XL pipeline has received considerable attention in recent months. If constructed, the pipeline would transport crude oil (e.g., synthetic crude oil or diluted bitumen) derived from oil sands resources in Alberta, Canada, to refineries and other destinations in the United States. Although some groups have raised concerns over previous oil pipelines—Alberta Clipper and the Keystone mainline pipelines, both of which are operating—the Keystone XL proposal has generated substantially more interest among environmental stakeholders. Some raise concerns about potential local impacts, such as oil spills. Arguments supporting the pipeline's construction also cover a range of issues. Proponents of the Keystone XL Pipeline, including high-level Canadian officials and U.S. and Canadian petroleum industry stakeholders, base their arguments supporting the pipeline primarily on increasing the security and diversity of the U.S. petroleum supply and economic benefits, especially jobs. This report focuses on selected environmental concerns raised in conjunction with the proposed pipeline and the oil sands crude it will transport. Moreover, many of the environmental concerns are not unique to oil sands. That segment did not require a permit from DOS because it does not cross a U.S. border. In this context, emissions intensity means GHG emissions per units of production (e.g., barrels). Other stakeholders, including the Alberta government and industry associations, argue that this conclusion is overstated, asserting that GHG emissions from oil sands crude oil are comparable to some other global crudes, some of which are produced and/or consumed in the United States. Climate Change Concerns
During a June 2013 speech, President Obama stated that an evaluation of the "net effects of the pipeline's impact on our climate" would factor into the State Department's national interest determination in order to determine if the project would "significantly exacerbate the problem of carbon pollution." The 2014 FEIS finds the following:
the GHG emissions released during the construction period for the project would be approximately 0.24 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (MMTCO 2 e) due to land use changes, electricity use, and fuels for construction vehicles (equivalent to 0.004% of U.S. annual GHG emissions); the GHG emissions released during normal operations would be approximately 1.44 MMTCO 2 e/year due to electricity use for pumping stations, fuels for maintenance and inspection vehicles, and fugitive emissions (equivalent to 0.02% of U.S. annual GHG emissions); the total, or gross, life-cycle GHG emissions (i.e., the aggregate GHG emissions released by all activities from the extraction of the resource to the refining, transportation, and end-use combustion of refined fuels) attributable to the oil sands crude transported through the proposed pipeline would be approximately 147 to 168 MMTCO 2 e per year (equivalent to 2.2%-2.6% of U.S. annual GHG emissions); the incremental, or net, life-cycle GHG emissions (i.e., GHG emissions over-and-above those from the crude oils expected to be displaced in U.S. refineries) is estimated to be 1.3 to 27.4 MMTCO 2 e per year (equivalent to 0.02%-0.4% of U.S. annual GHG emissions); but according to the State Department's market analysis, "approval or denial of any one crude oil transport project, including the proposed project, is unlikely to significantly impact the rate of extraction in the oil sands or the continued demand for heavy crude oil at refineries in the United States based on expected oil prices, oil-sands supply costs, transport costs, and supply-demand scenarios." Some stakeholders have questioned many of the conclusions in the 2014 FEIS and argue that the project may have greater climate change impacts than the DOS projects. They contend that there is nothing presumed or inevitable about the rate of expansion for the Canadian oil sands. They argue that as long as there is strong global demand for petroleum products, resources such as the Canadian oil sands will be produced and shipped to markets using whatever route necessary. Oil Sands Crudes and Pipeline Spills
Some environmental groups have argued that the pipeline would pose additional oil spill risks due to the material being transported. Other organizations, including Canadian agencies, questioned these conclusions. Although location is generally considered the most important factor, EPA stated (in comments during the EIS process) that spills of oil sands crude (e.g., DilBit) may result in different impacts than spills of other crude oils. Oil Sands Extraction Concerns
Although local/regional impacts from Canadian oil sands development may not directly affect public health or the environment in the United States, stakeholders often highlight the environmental impacts that pertain to the region in which the oil sands resources are extracted. | If constructed, the Keystone XL pipeline would transport crude oil derived from oil sands sites in Alberta, Canada, to U.S. refineries and other destinations. Because the pipeline would cross an international border, it requires a Presidential Permit.
Although some groups have opposed previous oil pipelines, opposition to the Keystone XL proposal has generated substantially more interest. Stakeholder concerns vary from local impacts, such as oil spills or extraction impacts in Canada, to potential climate change consequences.
Arguments supporting the pipeline's construction cover an analogous range. Proponents of the Keystone XL Pipeline, including high-level Canadian officials and U.S. and Canadian petroleum industry stakeholders, base their arguments supporting the pipeline primarily on increasing the security and diversity of the U.S. petroleum supply and economic benefits, especially jobs.
A number of studies have looked into the various environmental impacts of oil sands crude. This report focuses on selected environmental concerns raised in conjunction with the proposed pipeline and the oil sands crude it will transport.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Key studies indicate that the average greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions intensity—metric tons of GHG emissions per units of production (e.g., barrels)—of oil sands crude is higher than many other crude oils. However, industry stakeholders point to analyses indicating that GHG emissions from oil sands crude oil are comparable to other heavy crudes, some of which are produced and/or consumed currently in the United States.
Due to oil sands' increased emissions intensity, many stakeholders have voiced concern about potential climate change consequences associated with oil sands development. In June 2013, President Obama stated that an evaluation of the "net effects of the pipeline's impact on our climate" would factor into the Department of State's (DOS's) national interest determination in order to determine if the project would "significantly exacerbate the problem of carbon pollution." Thus, DOS's 2014 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) has received considerable attention. Among other conclusions, the FEIS estimated that the incremental (i.e., net) life-cycle GHG emissions associated with the pipeline would be 1.3 million to 27.4 million metric tons of carbon dioxide per year (0.02%-0.4% of U.S. annual GHG emissions). In addition, the FEIS stated that the "approval or denial of any one crude oil transport project, including the proposed project, is unlikely to significantly impact the rate of extraction in the oil sands or the continued demand for heavy crude oil at refineries in the United States based on expected oil prices, oil-sands supply costs, transport costs, and supply-demand scenarios."
Some stakeholders have questioned these conclusions, arguing (1) that the project may have greater climate change impacts than projected by DOS, and (2) that there is nothing presumed or inevitable about the rate of expansion for the Canadian oil sands. Other stakeholders support the FEIS analysis, arguing that as long as there is strong global demand for petroleum products, resources such as the Canadian oil sands will be produced and shipped to markets using whatever route necessary.
Oil Spills and Other Local Impacts
Some groups have argued that both the pipeline's operating parameters and the material being transported through it impose an increased spill risk. The National Academy of Sciences National Research Council examined this issue in a 2013 report, stating that it did not "find any causes of pipeline failure unique to the transportation of diluted bitumen [oil sands crude]." However, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), spills of oil sands crude may result in different impacts than spills of other crude oils.
Other environmental concerns pertain to the region in which the oil sands resources are extracted. Potential impacts include, among others, wildlife and ecosystem disturbance and water resource issues. In general, these local/regional impacts from Canadian oil sands development are unlikely to directly affect public health or the environment in the United States. Within the context of a Presidential Permit, the mechanism to consider local Canadian impacts is unclear. |
crs_RL32982 | crs_RL32982_0 | Introduction
The connections between trade and migration are as longstanding as the historic movements of goods and people. The desire for commerce may often be the principal motivation, but the need to send people to facilitate the transactions soon follows. In addition to the specific treaty trader/investor provisions of immigration law, there are often broader immigration issues raised in the context of the recent free trade agreements (FTAs). These issues include whether FTAs should contain provisions that expressly expand immigration between the countries as well as whether FTAs should require that the immigrant-sending countries restrain unwanted migration (typically expressed as illegal aliens). The question of whether the movement of people—especially temporary workers—is subsumed under the broader category of "provision of services" and thus an inherent part of any free trade agreement also arises. Even in FTAs that do not have explicit immigration provisions, such as the U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), there is a debate over the effects that FTAs may have on future migration. Although the United States has not created a common market for the movement of labor with our trading partners, there are immigration provisions in several existing FTAs that spell out reciprocal terms regulating the "temporary entry of business persons." The official summary of the four categories of "business persons" who may enter the three countries temporarily and on a reciprocal basis are as follows:
business visitors engaged in international business activities for the purpose of conducting activities related to research and design, growth, manufacture and production, marketing, sales, distribution, after-sales service and other general services (B-1 visitors for business); traders who carry on substantial trade in goods or services between their own country and the country they wish to enter, as well as investors seeking to commit a substantial amount of capital in that country, provided that such persons are employed in a supervisory or executive capacity or one that involves essential skills (E-1 treaty traders and E-2 treaty investors); intracompany transferees employed by a company in a managerial or executive capacity or one that involves specialized knowledge and who are transferred within that company to another NAFTA country (L intracompany transferees); and certain categories of professionals who meet minimum educational requirements or who possess alternative credentials and who seek to engage in business activities at a professional level in that country (TN professionals under Section 214(e) of the INA). There are a variety of approaches to study the impact of trade agreements on migration, and this report draws on three of several different possible perspectives. Trade Volume and Business-Based Temporary Admissions
The volume of trade that the United States has with its top trading partners correlates with the number of times foreign nationals from these countries enter the United States. Figure 2 illustrates the upward trends in the temporary migration of all business and professional workers that Globerman observed between the United States and Canada during the years that followed the entry into force of the Canada-United States FTA. As Figure 4 illustrates, the number of Mexican-born residents of the United States who report that they came after 1995 (NAFTA went into force in October 1994) is substantial and resembles the "migration hump" that Philip Martin predicted. | The connections between trade and migration are as longstanding as the historic movements of goods and people. The desire for commerce may often be the principal motivation, but the need to send people to facilitate the transactions soon follows. Recognition of this phenomenon is incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which includes provisions for aliens who are entering the United States solely as "treaty traders" and "treaty investors." Although the United States has not created a common market for the movement of labor with our trading partners, there are immigration provisions in existing free trade agreements (FTAs) that spell out reciprocal terms regulating the "temporary entry of business persons."
Immigration issues often raised in the context of the FTAs include whether FTAs should contain provisions that expressly expand immigration between the countries as well as whether FTAs should require that the immigrant-sending countries restrain unwanted migration (typically expressed as illegal aliens). The question of whether the movement of people—especially temporary workers—is subsumed under the broader category of "provision of services" and thus an inherent part of any free trade agreement also arises. Even in FTAs that do not have explicit immigration provisions, such as the United States-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), there may be a debate over the effects that FTAs might have on future migration.
There are a variety of approaches to study the impact of trade agreements on migration, and this report draws on several different perspectives. The volume of trade that the United States has with its top trading partners correlates with the number of times foreign nationals from these countries enter the United States, regardless of whether there is an FTA. Research on the aftermath of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) found upward trends in the temporary migration of business and professional workers between the United States and Canada during the years that followed the implementation of the Canada-United States FTA (later NAFTA). Another set of analyses revealed that the number of Mexican-born residents of the United States who report that they came in to the country during the years after NAFTA came into force is substantial and resembles the "migration hump" that economists predicted. Many factors other than NAFTA, however, have been instrumental in shaping this trend in Mexican migration.
This report provides background and analysis on the complex nexus of immigration and trade. It does not track legislation and will not be regularly updated. |
crs_RL34294 | crs_RL34294_0 | Introduction
The Energy Independence and Security Act ( P.L. 110-140 , H.R. 6 ) is an omnibus energy policy law that consists mainly of provisions designed to increase energy efficiency and the availability of renewable energy. This report describes the key provisions of the enacted law, summarizes the legislative action on H.R. 6 , and provides a summary of the provisions under each of the titles in the law. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards
The law sets a target of 35 miles per gallon for the combined fleet of cars and light trucks by model year 2020. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)
The law sets a modified standard that starts at 9.0 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2008 and rises to 36 billion gallons by 2022. Provisions Excluded
Two controversial provisions of H.R. 6 that were not included in the enacted law were the proposed Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS) and the proposed repeal of tax subsidies for oil and gas. Enough tax revenue offsets were included to cover the estimated cost of the CAFE provision. 3221 , and a proposed repeal of certain oil and natural gas subsidies to offset costs for new energy efficiency and renewable energy tax incentives. Certain energy efficiency measures for walk-in coolers and walk-in freezers are set by law. | The Energy Independence and Security Act (P.L. 110-140, H.R. 6) is an omnibus energy policy law that consists mainly of provisions designed to increase energy efficiency and the availability of renewable energy. This report describes the key provisions of the enacted law, summarizes the legislative action on H.R. 6, and provides a summary of the provisions under each of the titles in the law.
The highlights of key provisions enacted into law are as follows:
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE). The law sets a target of 35 miles per gallon for the combined fleet of cars and light trucks by model year 2020. Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS). The law sets a modified standard that starts at 9.0 billion gallons in 2008 and rises to 36 billion gallons by 2022. Energy Efficiency Equipment Standards. The adopted bill includes a variety of new standards for lighting and for residential and commercial appliance equipment. The equipment includes residential refrigerators, freezers, refrigerator-freezers, metal halide lamps, and commercial walk-in coolers and freezers. Repeal of Oil and Gas Tax Incentives. The enacted law includes repeal of two tax subsidies in order to offset the estimated cost to implement the CAFE provision.
The two most controversial provisions of H.R. 6 that were not included in the enacted law were the proposed Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS) and most of the proposed tax provisions, which included repeal of tax subsidies for oil and gas and new incentives for energy efficiency and renewable energy. |
crs_RS21176 | crs_RS21176_0 | FECA provides that a "person" is limited to contributing no more than
$2,000 per candidate, per election (adjusted for inflation to $2,300 for the 2007-2008 election cycle); $25,000 per year to a national committee of a political party (adjusted for inflation to $28,500 for the 2007-2008 election cycle); and $5,000 per year to PACs (limits on contributions by and to PACs are not adjusted for inflation). As a result of that ruling, it appears that an Indian tribe, by making, for example, an unlimited number of $2,300, $28,500, and $5,000 contributions, could significantly exceed the $108,200 aggregate election-cycle limit applicable to "individuals." PAC contributions are subject to limitations under FECA, as are contributions from individual citizens and political parties. Generally, as most Indian tribes are unincorporated, they are not subject to the FECA ban on the use of corporate treasury funds for contributions and expenditures in connection with federal elections. Several observations may be made about the ability of Indian tribes to spend money in federal elections compared with that of other interest groups, which typically operate through PACs. Like other interest groups, Indian tribes are subject to no aggregate limit on their total federal election contributions (only individual citizens are subject to this limit). Sometimes referred to as nonfederal funds, prior to the enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 ( P.L. Prior to BCRA, issue advocacy communications were generally unregulated by FECA. Therefore, Indian tribes (like corporations, labor unions, and individuals) could spend unlimited amounts of money on such communications. BCRA created a new term in federal election law, "electioneering communication," which describes a political ad that "refers" to a clearly identified federal candidate, is broadcast within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election, and if for House and Senate elections, is "targeted to the relevant electorate," (i.e., is received by 50,000 or more persons in the state or district where the respective House or Senate election is occurring). Therefore, while corporations and labor unions are prohibited from engaging in "electioneering communications," it appears that most Indian tribes, as unincorporated entities, may continue to finance such communications, subject to the disclosure requirements. | Under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), Indian tribes are subject to contribution limits applicable to "persons," as defined by the act. For the 2008 election cycle, these limits include $2,300 per election to a candidate, $28,500 per year to a political party's national committee, and $5,000 per year to a political action committee (PAC). The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has found, however, that FECA's $108,200 election cycle aggregate limit applicable to "individuals," as defined by the act, does not apply to Indian tribes (similar to FECA's treatment of other interest groups that operate through PACs and are also not subject to an aggregate limit). In addition, as most Indian tribes are unincorporated, they are not subject to the FECA ban on use of corporate treasury funds for contributions and expenditures in connection with federal elections. Hence, unlike corporations, most Indian tribes are not required to establish PACs in order to participate in federal elections. As the result of an FEC ruling, unlike PACs, Indian tribes are also not required to disclose the amounts and recipients of any contributions they make. With regard to unregulated soft money, Indian tribes may spend unlimited amounts of money on issue advocacy communications.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 made several significant changes to FECA, including increasing certain contribution limits from their previous levels. BCRA also prohibited any "person," which includes Indian tribes, from making soft money donations to political parties. While FECA prohibits corporations and unions from paying for broadcast issue advertisements that refer to federal candidates within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election, labeled by BCRA as "electioneering communications," unincorporated Indian tribes are not subject to such a prohibition. However, if an Indian tribe sponsors an electioneering communication, regardless of its incorporation status, it is subject to disclosure requirements, including the identification of disbursements and donors over certain dollar amounts. |
crs_RL32876 | crs_RL32876_0 | Recent Events
Wellington Declaration
With the November 2010 signing by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully of the Wellington Declaration, which affirms a new strategic partnership between the U.S. and New Zealand, the U.S.-New Zealand relationship has been restored to one that is once again largely defined by the many areas of bilateral cooperation between the two nations rather than past differences. Past differences over New Zealand's nuclear policy, which prevents nuclear armed or powered ships from entering New Zealand ports, had hindered the relationship despite deep common interests. New Zealand Prime Minister John Key noted at the signing of the Declaration that the relationship is "the best it's been for 25 years." MMP
New Zealand is a unicameral, mixed-member-proportional (MMP), parliamentary democracy. The center-right National Party led by Prime Minister John Key and the opposition center-left Labour Party led by Phil Goff are the two main political parties in New Zealand. New Zealand's Mixed Member Proportional system gives smaller parties a key role in forming coalition government. Prime Minister Key's performance in dealing with the aftermath of the 2011 earthquake will likely be a key issue in the election. New Zealand's principal exports are dairy products, meat, timber, fish, fruit, wool, and manufactured products. New Zealand views the TPP as a way to add momentum to trade liberalization among Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) member countries. Defense Posture
Throughout its history New Zealand has been an active participant in support of its allies and has fought alongside the United Kingdom and the United States in most of their major conflicts. New Zealand sent combat troops in support of the U.S. in Vietnam and has a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamiyan Province Afghanistan. New Zealand also sent support troops to Iraq. The paper also observes that security structures in the Asia-Pacific will continue to evolve. It makes the observation on security relations with the United States that "our security also benefits from New Zealand being an engaged, active, and stalwart partner of the U.S." The White Paper supports a continuing U.S. security presence in the Asia-Pacific and notes the United States' role as a contributor to regional stability. In summary, the key areas of cooperation are as follows:
Security cooperation in Afghanistan Regional cooperation and security in the South Pacific Bilateral trade and investment ties Cooperation in multilateral strategic and economic architectures such as TPP Science, technology, and education including cooperation on climate change mitigation and adaptation Non-proliferation and the Nuclear Security Summit Other transnational challenges Antarctic cooperation Socio-cultural and academic exchanges Intelligence cooperation
Many of these areas of cooperation are discussed in detail in the joint Center for Strategic and International Studies and New Zealand Institute of International Affairs report Pacific P artners: The Future of U.S.- New Zealand Relations , which found a clear consensus in both the United States and New Zealand that now is the time to take the bilateral relationship to a higher level of engagement. New Zealand also plays a leading role in maintaining stability in the Southwest Pacific in places such as Timor-Leste, the Solomon Islands, and Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, which are discussed in greater detail below. It has also been reported that the intelligence-sharing relationship has fully resumed. President Obama invited Prime Minister John Key to attend the Nuclear Summit in April 2010 and stated that New Zealand had "well and truly earned a place at the table." Institutional Support
There are several organizations and groups that help promote bilateral ties between the United States and New Zealand including the United States-New Zealand Council in Washington, DC, and its counterpart, the New Zealand-United States Council in Wellington; the Friends of New Zealand Congressional Caucus and its New Zealand parliamentary counterpart; and the more recent Partnership Forum. New Zealand's Pacific identity as well as its historical relationship with the South Pacific leads it to play a constructive role in the region. The Solomon Islands
New Zealand has demonstrated its resolve to help maintain peace and stability in its region through participation in operations such as the Australia and New Zealand led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). | New Zealand is increasingly viewed as a stalwart partner of the United States that welcomes U.S. presence in its region. New Zealand and the United States enjoy very close bilateral ties across the spectrum of relations between the two countries. These ties are based on shared cultural traditions and values as well as on common interests. New Zealand is a stable and active democracy with a focus on liberalizing trade in the Asia-Pacific region. New Zealand also has a history of fighting alongside the United States in most of its major conflicts including World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. New Zealand is a regular contributor to international peace and stability operations and has contributed troops to the struggle against militant Islamists in Afghanistan, where it has a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamiyan Province.
The bilateral relationship between the United States and New Zealand was strengthened significantly through the signing of the Wellington Declaration in November 2010. At that time, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and New Zealand Prime Minister John Key signaled that past differences over nuclear policy have been set aside as the two described the relationship as the strongest and most productive it has been in 25 years. In the mid-1980s New Zealand adopted a still-in-effect policy of not allowing nuclear armed or nuclear powered ships to visit New Zealand ports. In a mark of how the relationship has been changing in recent years, New Zealand's nuclear stance earned Prime Minister John Key an invitation to President Obama's nuclear summit in April 2010. The Congressional Friends of New Zealand Caucus and the ongoing Partnership Forum between the two countries, which includes Congressional participation, have played a key role in deepening relations between the two nations.
New Zealand favors an open and inclusive strategic and economic architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. New Zealand also continues to seek closer strategic and economic relations and continued U.S. engagement in the Asia Pacific through U.S. participation in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a Asia-Pacific regional free trade initiative, as well as through U.S. membership in the East Asia Summit (EAS). New Zealand is a member of both the TPP group and the EAS. New Zealand's main export products include dairy products, meat, and wood products.
New Zealand also plays an important role in promoting regional stability in the Southwest Pacific and in archipelagic Southeast Asia. New Zealand's commitment to such operations is demonstrated by its leading role in helping to resolve conflict on Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, and its participation in peace operations in East Timor, and through its contribution of troops to security operations related to the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). New Zealand has also contributed to peace operations in places such as Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo outside its region.
The National and Labour Parties have traditionally been the leading political parties in New Zealand. Prime Minister John Key of the National Party has faced a daunting challenge of dealing with the aftermath of a February 22, 2011 earthquake that devastated Christchurch, New Zealand's second largest city. Elections in New Zealand are to be held in November 2011. At that time, New Zealand voters will also be asked to vote on their preference for retaining the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system. |
crs_RL32088 | crs_RL32088_0 | Under Section 13(a)(1) of the act, employers of persons employed "in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity" (EAP employees) are freed from the act's otherwise applicable minimum wage and overtime pay requirements. On March 31, 2003, the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor (DOL), proposed revision of the regulations (29 CFR 541) that define the terms executive, administrative and professional and govern implementation of the FLSA exemption. This report sketches the evolution of the Section 13(a)(1) since 1938, noting the occasions on which the regulations governing the exemption (29 CFR 541) were modified. Among them was the following:
The provisions of sections 6 and 7 shall not apply with respect to (1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, professional ... capacity ... (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Administrator....)
The act went on to create within the Department of Labor a sub-unit—the Wage and Hour Division—to be presided over by an Administrator to be "appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate." No earnings threshold was set for a professional. Among the changes in the regulation was an increase in the earnings threshold: to be exempt, an executive was to be paid "on a salary basis at a rate of not less than $55 per week ($30 in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands)"; an administrator was to be paid "on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $75 per week ($200 per month in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands)"; and a professional was to be paid "on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $75 per week ($200 per month in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands)." Special sub-minima were set at $130 per week for executive and administrative employees and at $150 per week for professionals in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa. Reconsidering the Threshold Issue
The process remained open but did not reach fruition. In a Federal Register notice for November 14, 1994, DOL recalled that the thresholds had not been updated since 1975 when they were set "on an interim basis." It stated that it would re-open the comment period—continuing from the Reagan era initiatives of 1985. A New Rule Proposed
On March 31, 2003, Wage and Hour Administrator Tammy McCutchen posted in the Federal Register a "proposed rule with request for comments." Thus, both the Senate and the House were on record with respect to the Harkin amendment and the proposed revision of the Section 13(a)(1) regulation. H.R. 2660 remained in conference, having been by-passed. 2673 ( H.Rept. But, objection was heard. For example, how would a bona fide "professional" be defined for Section 13(a)(1) purposes? It was not added. First responders, it doesn't—it's only white-collar workers. So that is not true. The Secretary then responded more generally. "It was required by the regs." Among them was H.R. SECTION III
Promulgation of the Final Rule: April 23, 2004
The final rule governing Section 13(a)(1) was published on April 23, 2004. Most bona fide executive, administrative, or professional workers can be expected to earn in excess of $23,660. Above that level, exemption rests, largely, upon the duties test. Fortney praised the "primary duty" test. First . Amending the JOBS Act (S. 1637, H.R. 4520 , DOL's new overtime provisions had already been in place for nearly a month. As debate continued, two perspectives seem to have appeared. Second . | Section 13(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act permits exemption of employers of bona fide executive, administrative and professional employees from the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements of the act; that is, from the basic wage and hour provisions of the statute. What constitutes a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional employee has been left by Congress for the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit. That process, begun in 1938, lapsed after 1975 and was renewed by the Bush Administration in 2003 (see 29 CFR 541).
The first Section 13(a)(1) regulation appeared in 1938. Inter alia, it imposed two classification tests. First. To qualify as bona fide, a worker had to be paid at a rate befitting an executive or administrator. Second. The worker had to perform the actual work (duties) of an executive or administrator. A salary threshold was set at $30 a week. Initially, professionals were subject only to a duties test. In 1940, an earnings threshold ($50 a week) was set for professionals.
Definitions were modified periodically (both the earnings and duties tests) so that they could serve, credibly, as indicators of who might be deemed an executive, administrator or professional for Section 13(a)(1) purposes. Updates were always contentious. With lower thresholds, greater numbers of workers would find themselves unprotected by the terms of the FLSA. Thus, it was in the interests of employers to keep the thresholds low—and the duties tests as broad as possible. Workers, in turn, sought a higher threshold and a narrow definition of duties.
The last general revision occurred in 1975, but the effort encountered significant objections from employers. In 1978, a further update was proposed; but, in 1981, it was withdrawn by the new Reagan Administration. It never reappeared. The thresholds remain at 1975 levels: $155 per week for executives and administrators and $170 for professionals—with slightly lower levels for Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and American Samoa. The duties tests have evolved, slowly, since 1938 but remain heavily anchored in regulations from the act's early history.
On March 31, 2003, Wage/Hour Administrator Tammy McCutchen published in the Federal Register a proposed update of the Section 13(a)(1) regulation. The proposal sparked an intense public and legislative debate. (See, inter alia, H.R. 2660, H.R. 2673, H.R. 2665, H.R. 4520, S. 1485, S. 1611, and S. 1637 of the 108th Congress.) On April 23, 2004, DOL issued the rule in final form (Federal Register, April 23, 2004, pp. 22122-22274) to take effect the last week of August 2004. The new provisions have now been placed in effect. It seems unlikely that any further revisions can be expected to take place for the foreseeable future.
This report sketches the evolution of the Section 13(a)(1) regulation and explores the arguments, pro and con, that it has encountered. |
crs_R44251 | crs_R44251_0 | The Citizenship Clause has conventionally been taken to require U.S. citizenship generally to be accorded automatically to any child born within the United States, regardless of the citizenship or status of the child's parents. To uphold a statute limiting birthright citizenship, it would also appear that the Court would have to find either (1) that the discussion in Wong Kim Ark apparently supporting the conventional interpretation of birthright citizenship was mere dicta, not binding precedent, and the case's holding was limited to the facts of that case; or (2) that Wong Kim Ark incorrectly interpreted the Citizenship Clause, at least in some respects, and should be overruled. If a statute could not change the meaning of the Citizenship Clause, then a constitutional amendment, as some have proposed, would have the power to do so. That is what it means. By no means. It declared that a member of an Indian tribe was born owing allegiance to that tribe rather than to the United States, and tribes were not fully subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. More than a year after the case was argued, Justice Horace Gray found for Wong Kim Ark in an opinion that:
traced the development of the English common law with regard to jus soli , and countered the argument that it had been superseded by jus sanguinis ; read the original Constitution's references to citizenship in light of the common law while reviewing pre-Fourteenth Amendment judicial decisions on citizenship; delved into the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment; reviewed interpretations of the Citizenship Clause by lower federal and state courts and the executive branch; analyzed and distinguished the Slaughter-House Cases and Elk v. Wilkins ; and stated:
The foregoing considerations and authorities irresistibly lead us to these conclusions: The Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. While the threshold inquiry in Plyler centered on the "person within [a state's] jurisdiction" language of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court also analogized that phrase to the use of "jurisdiction" in the Citizenship Clause, in a footnote, stating:
Although we have not previously focused on the intended meaning of this phrase ["within its jurisdiction"], we have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[all] persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof , are citizens of the United States…." Cases on Birthright Citizenship in U.S. Two Competing Interpretations of the Citizenship Clause
There are, broadly speaking, two sides to the current legal debate over whether the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the automatic granting of U.S. citizenship to all persons born in the United States, including those born to unlawfully or temporarily present aliens. Legally, the "jurisdiction" referred to by the Citizenship Clause is territorial jurisdiction, which is the power of a sovereign to enforce its laws within its territorial limits. This conventional interpretation has been called the "ascriptive" view (at least by some opponents) because it determines citizenship by the objective geographical circumstances of a person's birth. The "jurisdiction" referred to by the Citizenship Clause, in this view, is a more "complete" jurisdiction that entails undivided allegiance. The bills would amend Section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide, applicable prospectively as of the date of enactment, that:
Acknowledging the right of birthright citizenship established by section 1 of the 14 th amendment to the Constitution, a person born in the United States shall be considered 'subject to the jurisdiction' of the United States for purposes of subsection (a)(1) if the person is born in the United States of parents, one of whom is—
(1) a citizen or national of the United States;
(2) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States whose residence is in the United States; or
(3) an alien performing active service in the armed forces…. Some commentators have testified before Congress that they believe a statute denying birthright citizenship to children of unlawfully present aliens would likely survive constitutional challenge. Nevertheless, a number of hurdles to such bills likely remain, including but not limited to the weight of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, the extensive discussion in Wong Kim Ark , the statements in various cases defining "jurisdiction" more often on the basis of territory rather than undivided allegiance, and the embrace of the prevailing birthright citizenship interpretation by more than a century of subsequent law and practice. | The first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, known as the Citizenship Clause, provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." This generally has been taken to mean that any person born in the United States automatically gains U.S. citizenship, regardless of the citizenship or immigration status of the person's parents, with limited exceptions such as children born to recognized foreign diplomats. The current rule is often called "birthright citizenship."
However, driven in part by concerns about unauthorized immigration, some have questioned this understanding of the Citizenship Clause, and in particular the meaning of "subject to the jurisdiction [of the United States]." Proponents of a narrower reinterpretation of that phrase argue that the term "jurisdiction" can have multiple meanings, and that in the Citizenship Clause, "jurisdiction" should be read to mean "complete jurisdiction" based on undivided allegiance and the mutual consent of the sovereign and the subject. This has been termed a "consensual" approach to citizenship. Conversely, proponents of the conventional view interpret the term "jurisdiction" to mean territorial jurisdiction, that is, the authority of a sovereign to enforce its laws within its boundaries. Under the conventional rule, citizenship is ascribed to a person at birth on the basis of the geographic location of that person's birth in the United States. This birthright citizenship rule has sometimes been termed an "ascriptive" approach to citizenship.
Proponents of either side of this legal debate argue that a variety of sources and arguments support their respective positions. The two approaches differ in their interpretations of pre-Revolutionary English common law, pre-Civil War understandings of citizenship, the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and subsequent case law. Two key Supreme Court cases in particular, Elk v. Wilkins (1884) and United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), interpreted the Citizenship Clause. Elk held that a member of a recognized Indian tribe was outside the scope of the Citizenship Clause because he was born owing allegiance to the tribe, rather than the United States, and the tribe was a political community not fully subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Wong Kim Ark held that a person born in the United States to resident aliens became a U.S. citizen at birth, even when the person's parents were barred from ever naturalizing. However, some argue that Wong Kim Ark's statements limiting the exceptions to birthright citizenship were not necessary to its holding, and that no Supreme Court case has ever squarely held that the Citizenship Clause requires a broad view of jurisdiction that extends birthright citizenship to children of unlawfully or temporarily present aliens. Twentieth and 21st century case law also can be seen to support the conventional interpretation of the Citizenship Clause, but again, not in direct case holdings.
Bills have been introduced since the early1990s to deny birthright citizenship to persons born in the United States to aliens other than lawful permanent residents. While a few proposals have suggested constitutional amendments, most seek to change the birthright citizenship rule by statute. It would likely fall to federal courts to determine whether such a statute could be upheld as constitutional. The weight of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, the analysis and discussion in Wong Kim Ark, the statements in various cases defining "jurisdiction" more often on the basis of territory rather than undivided allegiance, and the embrace of the prevailing birthright citizenship interpretation by more than a century of subsequent law, would probably factor against the constitutionality of a statute limiting birthright citizenship. Nevertheless, the scope of the guarantee of the Citizenship Clause remains a legal question of great interest and importance to many. |
crs_R40525 | crs_R40525_0 | With more open borders and the expansion of the Internet, organized criminals threaten the United States not only from within the borders, but beyond. Organized crime stretches far beyond the Italian mafia, encompassing Russian, Asian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, and African syndicates. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, national priorities and federal resources shifted away from more traditional crime fighting—including that of organized crime—toward counterterrorism and counterintelligence. Consequently, the policy question facing Congress is whether the resources that the federal government allocates to organized crime matters are sufficient to counter the threats that organized crime poses. It concludes with a discussion of issues that Congress may wish to consider, including the attention the federal government allocates to organized crime matters, the multilateral efforts to combat organized crime, and issues surrounding a potential nexus between organized crime and terrorism. Former Attorney General Mukasey reconvened the Organized Crime Council in April 2008, for the first time in 15 years. One possible side effect of a decrease in the number of federal agents investigating organized crime may be an increased workload for each agent working on these cases; if the organized crime threat is sustained—as has been suggested by DOJ officials—it is possible that the caseloads of organized crime agents could increase if the number of agents actually investigating organized crime is sustained or further decreased. Current Organized Crime Trends
As mentioned, organized crime in the United States has taken on an increasingly transnational nature. Impact of Organized Crime on the Economy
Organized crime could weaken the economy with illegal activities (such as cigarette trafficking and tax evasion scams) that result in a loss of tax revenue for state and federal governments. This is particularly of issue given the current state of the country's economic health. Their fraudulent activities in the domains of strategic commodities, credit, insurance, stocks, securities, and investments could weaken the already-troubled financial and housing markets. Despite the difference in motivation for organized crime and terrorism, the linking element for the two is money. Terrorist organizations may obtain funding from criminal acts, similar to organized crime groups. Even if organized crime groups and terrorist organizations do not form long-term alliances, the possibility of short-term business alliances may be of concern to citizens and policymakers alike. One issue is whether the tools that Congress has provided the federal government with to investigate and prosecute domestic organized crime—namely RICO, money laundering, and asset forfeiture statutes—are still effective tools to combat today's threats from organized crime. | Organized crime threatens multiple facets of the United States, including the economy and national security. In fact, the Organized Crime Council was reconvened for the first time in 15 years to address this continued threat. Organized crime has taken on an increasingly transnational nature, and with more open borders and the expansion of the Internet, criminals endanger the United States not only from within the borders, but beyond. Threats come from a variety of criminal organizations, including Russian, Asian, Italian, Balkan, Middle Eastern, and African syndicates. Policymakers may question whether the tools they have provided the federal government to combat organized crime are still effective for countering today's evolving risks.
Organized crime could weaken the economy with illegal activities (such as cigarette trafficking and tax evasion scams) that result in a loss of tax revenue for state and federal governments. This is particularly of issue given the current state of the country's economic health. Fraudulent activities in domains such as strategic commodities, credit, insurance, stocks, securities and investments could further weaken the already-troubled financial market.
On the national security front, experts and policymakers have expressed concern over a possible nexus between organized crime and terrorism. Despite the difference in motivation for organized crime (profit) and terrorism (ideology), the linking element for the two is money. Terrorists may potentially obtain funding for their operations from partnering directly with organized crime groups or modeling their profitable criminal acts. Even if organized crime groups and terrorist organizations do not form long-term alliances, the possibility of short-term business alliances may be of concern to policymakers.
In light of these developments, several possible issues for Congress arise. One issue centers on whether the evolving nature of organized crime requires new enforcement tools. Some policymakers have suggested that current laws may not be effective at countering present threats from organized crime. As organized criminals threaten American society from both within and outside U.S. borders, should Congress expand law enforcement's extraterritorial jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute these criminals, and to what extent should Congress encourage multilateral—both domestic and international—crime fighting efforts?
Another possible issue for Congress concerns whether the resources that the federal government allocates to organized crime matters are adequate and appropriately allocated to counter the threats organized crime poses. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, national priorities and federal resources shifted away from more traditional crime fighting—including that of organized crime—toward counterterrorism and counterintelligence. For instance, the number of federal agents actually working on organized crime matters and the number of organized crime cases opened in FY2004 decreased relative to levels before September 11, 2001. |
crs_RL31749 | crs_RL31749_0 | Background
China, as any other developing country, has needed foreign technology for its economicdevelopment. Sources of FDI Inflow into China
Most FDI into China comes from either "Greater China" or from the three major industrializedmarkets: the United States, Japan, and the European Union. Singapore provided 4.6%. (SeeTable 1). Table 1. Foreign Direct Investment in China by Type, 1979-2002 (in percentage)
Source: China. Table 2. Table 3. The differences between the two sets of figures have not been reconciled, but they likely can be traced to: differences in reporting criteria; U.S. investments originating in or going throughoffshore U.S. affiliated companies (particularly in Hong Kong); investments that fell under the U.S.threshold for counting; more complete data gathered by the U.S. Department of Commerce on repaidloans and other data internal to companies that are not generally accounted for by the Chineseministry that approves foreign investments; changes in exchange rates; and overstatements ofinvestment amounts by local Chinese officials and foreign investors. The United States has been the second largest source of FDI for China (next only to Hong Kong) and during 1999-2001 accounted for an average of about 10.5% of China's total inflows(using China's figures). The U.S. companies with affiliates in China include many of the large multinational corporations in the United States. (23)
U.S. FDI Position by Industrial Sector
According to U.S. data, as much as two-thirds of the stock of U.S. FDI in China is invested in manufacturing - more than 50% of which is in the electronic and electrical equipment sector. (24)
Effects of U.S. FDI in China on U.S. Trade
One of the criticisms of foreign investment in China and other countries is that it "exports U.S. jobs" and worsens the U.S. balance of trade. (25) U.S. companies in China do export some oftheir output back to the American market, but most is sold in China. (See Table 6)
In terms of the question of how much U.S. and foreign firms in China are contributing to the growing U.S. merchandise trade deficit with that country, this deficit has grown from $10 billionin 1990 to $61 billion in 1998 and to $83 billion in 2001 (a projected $100 billion in 2002 based onJanuary-November data). As noted earlier in this report, foreign affiliated firms account for the vast proportion of electronics-related and other high-technology exports from China. U.S. majority owned firms there,however, do not appear to have contributed directly to this rising bilateral trade deficit through theirproduction. Some of the rising U.S. trade deficit with China also is being transferred from other economies in Asia. (33)
Foreign affiliates are, by far, the largest source of China's exports of high-technology products. (36) FDIcontributed both to China's surplus in investmentinflows and to its surplus in trade. (39)
Security Concerns
Foreign direct investment in China affects security primarily through three avenues: itscontribution to economic growth which funds China's military, technology transfers, and economicinterests. With FDI contributing to rising economic power, China can devote more resources to its military, although in view of growing domestic needs, military spending has been taking secondplace to economic expansion and modernization. In the case of China, the questionis whether foreign direct investment is enhancing the competitiveness of Chinese exports to the pointwhere U.S. firms and American security are being threatened. U.S. exports of satellite technology, as is the case withother sensitive, dual-use technologies, are controlled by U.S. export laws. The foreign affiliated firms also can become a strong interest group that maypressure Beijing and their respective home governments to avoid political or military actions thatcould disrupt their businesses. FDI contributes to economic growth. These groups have directfinancial interest in maintaining stability, amicable Sino-foreign relations, and liberalized trade. FDIby Taiwan's businesses, in particular, may be changing the calculus for hostilities along the TaiwanStrait. | This report provides an overview of global Foreign Direct Investment in the People's Republic of China, examines its effects on the Chinese economy, surveys U.S. FDI in China, and includes adiscussion of policy implications for the United States. China, by far, is the largest recipient of FDIamong emerging economies with an inflow of $52.7 billion in 2002 and 424,196 foreign-affiliatedfirms operating in China representing paid-in foreign investment of $448.0 billion. These firmsaccount for about half of China's exports and imports. Nearly 1,500 U.S. companies from 41 stateshave direct investments of $10 to $34 billion in China.
For the U.S. Congress, foreign direct investment in China entails both oversight and regulatory issues. Some questions with respect to this investment are: (1) the extent to which FDI iscontributing to China's economic growth and technology development, (2) the extent to which U.S.FDI in China is contributing to the U.S. trade deficit, (3) whether FDI inflows into China come atthe expense of flows into other countries, (4) how FDI is affecting security concerns, and (5) whetherFDI affects the export of sensitive technology to China.
Foreign direct investment has contributed about 13 % to China's economic growth, and most of China's modern technology, particularly in electronics, has been imported. With respect to trade,there is little doubt that the large surplus in China's trade has been generated largely by the surge inits exports of foreign brand-name manufactures often made in foreign-affiliated factories. As muchas 80 to 90% of certain high technology exports originate from foreign affiliated firms there. Interms of the U.S. trade deficit with China, American companies there do export some of their outputback to the American market, but most is sold in China. China has been attracting some FDI flowsthat otherwise could have gone to other developing countries. In essence, China's gain may be theirloss.
In terms of security, the $20 to $34 billion in U.S. FDI in China combined with $68 billion from Taiwan, and some $300 billion from elsewhere is changing the calculus for hostilities and creatinggroups with a strong interest in stability both within China and between China and the United States,Taiwan, and other potential adversaries. Foreign direct investment in China affects securityprimarily through three avenues: its contribution to economic power, economic interests, and technology transfers. The more China grows, the more funds it is able to provide to its military andattain big-power status in the world. With respect to economic interests, foreign companies in Chinacan serve both as hostages for Beijing and important pressure groups that can pursue their interestsin maintaining stability with both Beijing and their home governments. With respect to sensitivetechnologies, in the U.S. case, it does not appear that prohibited U.S. technologies have beentransferred through foreign affiliated companies, although the technologies in the electronics andaviation industries that have been transferred do have dual civilian and military uses. Such transfersare controlled by export control regimes. The highly publicized cases of satellite technology beingallegedly illegally transferred to China involved direct transfers from U.S. corporations to Chinesecompanies. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_RS22247 | crs_RS22247_0 | Economic Situation
Bulgaria is one of the poorest countries in Europe. Foreign Policy
Bulgaria's foreign policy in recent years has focused on joining NATO and the European Union. U.S. Policy
The United States and Bulgaria have excellent bilateral relations. | This short report provides information on Bulgaria's current political and economic situation, and foreign policy. It also discusses U.S. policy toward Bulgaria. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41869 | crs_R41869_0 | For many years, "donor states" (mostly in the South, but also including some states in the Midwest and the West) have complained that they receive significantly less federal highway aid than their highway users pay into the highway account of the highway trust fund (HTF; unless otherwise indicated all references to the HTF are to the highway account). On the other side of the debate, "donee states," those that receive more federal highway aid than they pay in federal highway taxes, have opposed any reduction in their existing shares of total federal highway aid. The donor-donee issue has often been the most difficult issue to resolve during surface transportation reauthorization. The most recent multi-year authorization, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: a Legacy for Users (SAFETEA; P.L. A series of extension acts has extended SAFETEA, most recently through December 31, 2011. The Donor-Donee State Arguments
The donor state argument is that for the sake of equity each state should receive federal highway funding roughly equal to the fees and taxes that the state's highway users pay into the HTF. Donor state advocates generally contend that they have been subsidizing the repair and improvement of donee state infrastructure, especially of the older highway infrastructure in the Northeast. They also argue that some needs are inherently federal, such as a national highway network, and that these needs cannot be funded solely according to state or regional boundaries. The pattern of revenue flow from the taxpayers to the general fund is unrelated to highway user taxes and charges. Which States Are Donors? One method of determining a state's status as a donor or donee is based on dollars; if the state's highway users are estimated to have paid more into the highway account in a given year than the state's apportionment and allocation of federal highway funding, it would be considered a donor state. Each year,
the first $2.639 billion is apportioned to the Surface Transportation Program (STP); the next $2 million of the Equity Bonus are special no-year obligation funds (differing from the normal one-year obligation limitation) and are distributed to the states proportionally to their share of the overall Equity Bonus; the rest of the distribution is to each of the core formula programs based on the ratio of each program's apportionment to the total apportionment of all six programs for each state. This would reduce the amount of money needed to bring the donor states up to a guaranteed rate of return because the rate of return would already be embedded in each formula program. In a SAFETEA baseline scenario that assumes transfers from the general fund to the highway trust fund, having a scope limited to the part of the highway budget funded by the HTF might make sense. And if Congress were to opt for an increase in highway revenues, perhaps through an increase in fuel taxes large enough to make the Highway Account of the HTF self-sufficient again, the argument for resolving the donor-donee issue by devolving federal highway programs to the states might be revitalized. This would remove the amount of money flowing into and out of the highway trust fund as an issue in highway funding, perhaps eliminating the donor-donee issue as an obstacle to reauthorization. | Few issues in federal highway finance have raised such heated debate as how closely each state's federal highway grants should match its highway users' payments to the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). This "donor-donee" state issue has been contentious during every reauthorization of federal surface transportation programs since 1982. It has again emerged during the congressional debate over reauthorization of the current highway funding program, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: a Legacy for Users (SAFETEA; P.L. 109-59), which has been extended through December 31, 2011.
"Donor states" are states whose highway users are estimated to pay more to the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund than they receive. "Donee states" receive more than they pay.
Traditionally, the donor states, located mainly in the South and Midwest, have asserted that they have been subsidizing the repair and improvement of infrastructure in other parts of the country, especially in the Northeast. Donee state advocates have responded that some transportation needs are inherently federal rather than state, and that a national highway network cannot be based solely on state or regional boundaries. Although the argument continues, the facts on the ground have changed: Federal Highway Administration figures indicate that for FY2007-FY2009 all 50 states were donee states, because outlays from the Highway Trust Fund exceeded federal highway tax receipts in each year.
This report examines the donor-donee issue in the context of the effort to reauthorize federal surface transportation programs. The main questions facing Congress are the following:
How can the donor-donee controversy be resolved amid efforts to reduce the federal deficit, given that the solution in the past was to give all states more money? How might the donor-donee issue be resolved if highway program spending were limited to the annual revenues flowing into the highway account of the HTF? How can the donor-donee issue be resolved if highway spending over the next several years is restricted to the SAFETEA baseline level? Has the "user pays" principle, under which highway infrastructure is funded by taxes paid by the highway users who benefit from it, been violated and, if so, what are the implications for the "equity" of the distribution of federal highway spending?
In recent years, Congress has provided three transfers from the general fund totaling $29.7 billion to shore up the highway account. These general fund transfers to the HTF are unrelated to highway taxes and thereby weaken the arguments for a guaranteed rate of return on each state's highway tax payments to the HTF. If highway user taxes were to be increased or the highway program budget cut to bring the revenues flowing into the HTF into alignment with the funding flowing out, the case for a guaranteed rate of return would be strengthened. |
crs_RS22797 | crs_RS22797_0 | Seafood Safety Risks
Studies and dietary recommendations have suggested that increased consumption of seafood can contribute to a more healthful diet. Nonetheless, seafood consumption is not without risk. Recently concerns have been raised about potential contamination of seafood harvested from the Gulf of Mexico due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Increased imports, including from many other Asian countries in addition to China, have complicated efforts to protect consumers from unsafe fish and shellfish. Excepted are most meat and poultry products, which the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) inspects under other statutory authorities. On May 2, 2010, NOAA closed oil-affected federal waters of the Gulf of Mexico to commercial and recreational fishing. According to the FDA, "fish and shellfish harvested from areas re-opened or unaffected by the oil spill are considered to be safe to eat." 110-85 ) adopted in 2007 includes a provision (§1006) requiring the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to submit a report to Congress that
(1) describes the specifics of the aquaculture and seafood inspection program; (2) describes the feasibility of developing a traceability system for all catfish and seafood products, both domestic and imported, for the purpose of identifying the processing plant of origin of such products; and (3) provides for an assessment of the risks associated with particular contaminants and banned substances. Legislation in the 111th Congress
In the 111 th Congress, several food safety bills have been introduced, and comprehensive legislation ( H.R. 2749 is a revised version of H.R. In November the Senate resumed consideration of its bill and on November 30, 2010, S. 510 passed in the Senate. Although H.R. The Senate HELP Committee also adopted an amendment that would require FDA to update guidelines in Fish and Fisheries Products Hazards and Controls Guidance within 180 days. Three seafood-related provisions have been added to the Senate bill that focus on (1) establishing interagency agreements to improve seafood safety (§ 201); (2) assessing changes to regulations for post-harvest processing of raw oysters (§ 114); and (3) sending inspectors to assess production of seafood imported into the United States (§ 306). In the House, H.R. | Although seafood consumption can contribute to a healthy diet, some fish and shellfish can cause foodborne illnesses or contain environmental contaminants. Are current food safety programs sufficiently protecting consumers, and if not, what changes should be considered? A complicating factor is that most of the seafood consumed in the United States is from imports.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services plays the lead role in ensuring the safety of both domestic and imported fish and shellfish, but other agencies, including the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the Department of Commerce and the Food Safety and Inspection Service in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, also have notable responsibilities.
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill caused state and federal officials to close extensive areas of the Gulf of Mexico to commercial and recreational fishing. As areas have been reopened, concerns have been voiced by some fishermen and consumers regarding the safety of seafood from the Gulf. The FDA and NMFS have been testing areas before reopening them to fishing and no contaminated samples have been found in these areas.
In the 111th Congress, the food safety bills specific to seafood include S. 92 and S. 2934, aimed at violative seafood imports, and H.R. 1370, authorizing $15 million annually to strengthen coordination between agencies on seafood safety and quality, particularly regarding imports. On July 30, 2009, the House approved H.R. 2749, a revised version of H.R. 759. H.R. 2749 takes a comprehensive approach to food safety, including seafood. On November 30, 2010, the Senate passed S. 510, another comprehensive approach to food safety. The Senate bill includes four provisions specific to seafood that focus on (1) establishing interagency agreements to improve seafood safety; (2) assessing changes to regulations for post-harvest processing of raw oysters; (3) sending inspectors to assess production of seafood imported into the United States; and (4) requiring FDA to update guidelines in Fish and Fisheries Products Hazards and Controls Guidance within 180 days. |
crs_RL34725 | crs_RL34725_0 | As a general matter, organizations or corporate entities which receive federal funds by way of grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements do not lose their rights as organizations to use their own, private resources for what may generally be termed "political" activities because of or as a consequence of receiving such federal funds. When discussing "political activities" by such private grantees or contract recipients, this report is including the activities of lobbying or advocating for legislative programs or changes; campaigning for, endorsing, making electioneering communications concerning, or contributing to political candidates or parties; and voter registration or get-out-the-vote campaigns. Although (with some exceptions) organizations receiving federal grants or contracts are not, by virtue of such receipt, required to abdicate or refrain from exercising their First Amendment rights of political speech, participation, or expression with their own resources, such organizations are uniformly prohibited from using the federal grant or contract money for such "political" purposes, unless expressly authorized to do so by law. These recipient organizations must thus use private or other non-federal money, receipts, contributions, or dues for their political activities, and may not charge off to or be reimbursed from federal contracts or grants for the costs of such political activities. Certain entities, because of the nature of the organization or its tax status, may have particular limitations or restrictions on political or advocacy activities which would apply, in most instances, regardless of the entities' status as a federal grantee or contractor. § 501(c)(3)), are limited in the amount of lobbying in which the organization may engage, and are prohibited from participating or intervening in any political campaigns. Corporations and labor unions are expressly prohibited from making contributions for federal elections (2 U.S.C. § 441(b)), and federal government contractors are prohibited as well from making political contributions in such elections (2 U.S.C. § 441(c)). Corporations, labor unions, and federal contractors, however, are all allowed to establish and finance separate segregated funds which may act as political action committees (PACs) to gather voluntary contributions and make political campaign contributions or expenditures. Non-profit social action organizations (which are tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code [26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)]) are prohibited from engaging in certain lobbying activities, even with their own funds, if they receive federal grants, but may establish affiliated social action groups through which an organization and its members may exercise First Amendment rights of advocacy and speech using non-federal resources. "Electing" organizations (electing the "expenditure test" for lobbying limits for 501(c)(3)s under 26 U.S.C. Notwithstanding other provisions of this Circular, costs associated with the following activities are unallowable:
(1) Attempts to influence the outcomes of any Federal, State, or local election, referendum, initiative, or similar procedure, through in kind or cash contributions, endorsements, publicity, or similar activity;
(2) Establishing, administering, contributing to, or paying the expenses of a political party, campaign, political action committee, or other organization established for the purpose of influencing the outcomes of elections....
Federal Acquisition Regulation
The Federal Acquisition Regulation applies to for-profit businesses and entities contracting with the federal government, and in a similar manner and in identical wording to the OMB limitations for non-profit grantees, prohibit the use of federal contract funds for political campaign purposes, and prohibit the writing off to a federal contract the expenses for such activities. | This report discusses the permissible "political activities" in which organizations, associations, or businesses may engage if such entities receive federal funds through a grant or a federal contract. When discussing "political" activities by private grantees or contract recipients, this report includes lobbying or advocating for legislative programs or changes; campaigning for, endorsing, making campaign related expenditures, or contributing to political candidates or parties; and voter registration or get-out-the-vote campaigns.
Generally, organizations or entities which receive federal funds by way of grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements do not lose their rights as organizations to use their own, private, non-federal resources for "political" activities because of or as a consequence of receiving such federal funds. However, such organizations are uniformly prohibited from using the federal grant or contract money for such political purposes, unless expressly authorized to do so by law. These recipient organizations must thus use private or other non-federal money, receipts, contributions, or dues for their political activities, and may not charge off to or be reimbursed from federal contracts or grants for the costs of such activities.
Certain entities, because of the nature of the organization or its tax status, may have particular limitations or restrictions on political or advocacy activities which would apply, in most instances, regardless of the entities' status as a federal grantee or contractor. Thus, charitable 501(c)(3) organizations (entities exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), which are entitled to receive tax deductible contributions) are limited in the amount of lobbying in which the organization may engage, and are prohibited from participating or intervening in any political campaigns. Corporations and labor unions are expressly prohibited from making contributions to candidates, parties, or committees in federal elections (2 U.S.C. § 441(b)), and federal government contractors are prohibited from making political contributions in such elections (2 U.S.C. § 441(c)), although corporations, unions, and federal contractors are all allowed to establish and finance separate segregated funds which may act as political action committees (PACs) to gather voluntary contributions and make political campaign expenditures and contributions.
Non-profit social action organizations may lose their tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)) for engaging in certain lobbying activities, even with their own funds, if they receive federal grants; but these organizations may establish affiliated social action groups (other 501(c)(4)s) through which the organizations and their members may exercise First Amendment rights of advocacy and speech using non-federal resources. Additionally, under certain federal programs, other specific restrictions or limitations may apply to federal funds and activities within the scope of that particular program.
Legislative attempts to flatly require private organizations or entities to forgo or abdicate their First Amendment rights of speech, expression, or advocacy with their own, private resources as a condition to be eligible to receive federal grants or contracts would encounter serious First Amendment obstacles under the "unconstitutional conditions" cases, as well under any analysis of permissible limitations on so-called "government speech." The recent Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission has reaffirmed the right under the First Amendment of private entities, including corporate entities, to engage in independent political speech by way of making independent political "expenditures." |
crs_R42693 | crs_R42693_0 | Background and Purpose
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act requires qualified employers that intend to carry out plant closings or mass layoffs to provide 60 days' advance notice to affected employees, states, and localities. There are several purposes to the WARN Act. Notices provide workers with time to seek alternative employment, arrange for retraining, and otherwise adjust to the prospect of employment loss. The act also provides notice to state dislocated worker units so that services can be provided promptly to the affected employees and to local governments so they can adjust to upcoming changes in their local labor market. Provisions of the WARN Act
The WARN Act requires covered employers to provide 60 calendar days' notice prior to qualified employment losses affecting 50 or more employees. Federal, state, local, and federally recognized tribal governments are not subject to the WARN Act. Covered Events
Broadly speaking, there are three types of events that require notification under the WARN Act. Each of these events is limited to a single site of employment; employment losses by a single employer across multiple sites are not aggregated. Events that trigger the requirements of the WARN Act are
a plant closing resulting in employment losses that affect at least 50 employees; a mass layoff that affects at least 50 employees where the employment loss consists of at least 33% of employment at the site; or a mass layoff with an employment loss of 500 or more at a single site of employment, regardless of its proportion of total employment at the site or if the employment loss is part of a plant closing. For the purposes of the WARN Act, employment loss is defined as the involuntary separation of a worker exceeding six months or a reduction in hours worked of at least 50% during each month for a six-month period. There are also circumstances in which the WARN Act can be applied retroactively:
If an employer announces layoffs that are for less than six months but otherwise meet the WARN Act criteria and then subsequently extends the layoffs past six months, the employer may be subject to WARN Act notification responsibilities. The WARN Act is enforced through the federal court system. The Department encourages employers to give notice in all circumstances. | Enacted by the 100th Congress, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act requires qualified employers that intend to carry out plant closings or mass layoffs to provide 60 days' notice to affected employees, states, and localities. The purpose of the notice to workers is to allow them to seek alternative employment, arrange for retraining, and otherwise adjust to employment loss. The purpose of notifying states and localities is to allow them to promptly provide services to the dislocated workers and otherwise prepare for changes in the local labor market.
The WARN Act applies to employers with at least 100 or more employees (excluding part-time employees). Federal, state, and local government employers are not subject to the act.
Broadly speaking, there are three types of events that require notification under the WARN Act. Each of these events is limited to a single site of employment; employment losses by a single employer across multiple sites are not aggregated. Events that trigger the requirements of the WARN Act are
a plant closing resulting in employment losses of at least 50 employees; a mass layoff of at least 50 employees where the employment loss consists of at least 33% of employment at the site; or a mass layoff with an employment loss of 500 or more at a single site of employment, regardless of its proportion of total employment at the site or if the employment loss is part of a plant closing.
For the purposes of the WARN Act, an employment loss is defined as an involuntary termination, layoff exceeding six months, or a reduction in hours worked exceeding 50% for each of six consecutive months. In addition to the three events described above, an employer may also be subject to the WARN Act if it engages in several layoffs during a 90-day period that, in aggregate, meet the criteria of an applicable event. Short-term layoffs that are later extended to six months or more may also trigger WARN Act requirements.
The act and accompanying regulations also specify situations in which an otherwise covered employer may be exempt from WARN Act requirements. Generally, these exceptions relate to layoffs that are triggered by unanticipated situations such as unforeseeable business circumstances or natural disasters.
The WARN Act is enforced through the federal court system. While the Department of Labor is permitted to establish regulations related to the act and offer non-binding guidance to employers and workers, all penalties and settlements are administered through the courts. |
crs_R43829 | crs_R43829_0 | Several West African countries are currently grappling with an unprecedented outbreak of EVD. Here in the United States, where Ebola is not endemic, two undiagnosed EVD cases have been imported from the West African outbreak. The federal government has also taken measures to prevent further entry of persons who may have contracted Ebola virus. Actual and proposed measures to accomplish this include using quarantine or isolation orders under federal or state authority, imposing entry restrictions at the U.S. border, and limiting international air travel to the United States. Primary quarantine authority typically resides with state health departments and health officials; however, the federal government has jurisdiction over interstate and border quarantine. Although every state has the authority to pass and enforce quarantine laws as an exercise of its police powers, these laws vary widely by state. Legal Challenges to Quarantine
Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection may be implicated by the imposition of a quarantine or isolation order. Modern legal challenges to quarantine and isolation orders are not extensive, although a few cases can provide some basic insights about potential issues. Border Entry Issues 32
Federal law confers executive agencies with significant authority to restrict or regulate the entry into the United States of persons who are suspected of carrying Ebola virus or other communicable diseases. However, the stringency of the available restrictions depends upon whether the person is a foreign or U.S. national. Accordingly, aliens who have been determined to carry Ebola virus may be denied entry into the United States. The health-related grounds for exclusion do not apply to most lawful permanent resident aliens (sometimes described as immigrants) who briefly travel abroad. Indeed, U.S. citizens abroad may enjoy a constitutional right to reenter the country, in which case the government would be required, at a minimum, to overcome a heavier burden to justify a reentry restriction than would be required in situations where a person's constitutional rights were not implicated. During the current Ebola outbreak, the FAA has acknowledged its authority to restrict the use of U.S. airspace, but has cautioned that decisions made on a public health basis would involve other federal agencies. The DNB list enables domestic and international health officials to request that persons with communicable diseases who meet specific criteria and pose a serious threat to the public be restricted from boarding commercial aircraft departing from or arriving in the United States. Civil Rights
Governmental responses to infectious diseases, such as the current Ebola outbreak, may raise a classic civil rights issue: to what extent can an individual's liberty be curtailed to advance the common good? Federal Nondiscrimination Laws95
Discrimination against individuals with an infectious disease may be covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), or the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA). While quarantine and isolation could prove to be effective for minimizing Ebola exposure, they may also raise various employment concerns, particularly for those workers who fear losing their jobs or wages if they are forced to comply with a quarantine or isolation order. Infected workers may also be protected under the Family and Medical Leave Act if it can be established that they have a serious health condition. The Family and Medical Leave Act
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) guarantees an eligible employee 12 workweeks of unpaid leave during any 12-month period for one or more of the following reasons:
the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and to care for such son or daughter; the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care; to care for a spouse or a son, daughter, or parent of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition; a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee; and any qualifying exigency arising out of the fact that the spouse or a son, daughter, or parent of the employee is on covered active duty in the Armed Forces or has been notified of an impending call or order to covered active duty in the Armed Forces. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration144
Employers whose employees could face workplace exposure to Ebola virus may be obligated to comply with applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements. | Several West African countries are currently grappling with an unprecedented outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD). Here in the United States, where Ebola is not endemic, a handful of EVD cases have been diagnosed, and domestic transmission of the virus has occurred in only two cases to date. This report provides a brief overview of selected legal issues regarding measures to prevent transmission of Ebola virus and the civil rights of individuals affected by the disease.
Quarantine and isolation are restrictions on a person's movement, imposed to prevent the spread of contagious disease. The federal government has jurisdiction over interstate and border quarantine, carried out by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). However, primary quarantine authority typically resides with state health departments and health officials. Every state has the authority to pass and enforce quarantine laws as an exercise of its police powers, but these laws may vary widely by state. State and federal quarantine or isolation orders may be subject to suits alleging inadequate due process or violations of equal protection, but modern legal challenges to quarantine and isolation orders are not extensive.
In addition to the quarantine and isolation of persons within the United States, some have proposed limiting the entry of persons traveling to the United States from countries experiencing high rates of EVD transmission. Federal agencies' authority to restrict or regulate the entry into the United States of persons who are suspected of carrying Ebola virus or other communicable diseases depends largely upon whether the person is a foreign or U.S. national. Aliens who have been determined to carry Ebola virus may be denied entry, but the health-related grounds for exclusion do not apply to most lawful permanent residents who briefly travel abroad. U.S. citizens abroad may enjoy a constitutional right to reenter the country, in which case the government would be required, at a minimum, to overcome a heavier burden to justify a reentry restriction.
Proposals to restrict air travel to and from affected countries—regardless of citizenship—have also been discussed. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has acknowledged its authority to restrict the use of U.S. airspace, but has cautioned that decisions made on a public health basis would involve other federal agencies. Additionally, the Do Not Board (DNB) list provides a mechanism for U.S. and international health officials to request that specific persons be restricted from boarding commercial aircraft to the United States, on the basis that those persons present a public health risk. Independently, airlines may reserve the right to deny transportation to passengers who may pose a safety risk, but must act consistent with federal nondiscrimination laws.
The use of these measures to contain the spread of Ebola may raise a classic civil rights issue: to what extent can an individual's liberty be curtailed to advance the common good? In addition to the constitutional issues noted above, discrimination against individuals with an infectious disease may be covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), or the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA). While quarantine and isolation effectively minimize Ebola exposure, they may also raise various employment concerns, particularly for those workers who fear losing their jobs or wages if they are forced to comply with a quarantine or isolation order. Infected workers may also be protected under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) if it can be established that they have a serious health condition, and employers whose employees could face workplace exposure to Ebola virus may be obligated to comply with applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements. |
crs_RL31955 | crs_RL31955_0 | Introduction
Keeping an economy growing at a rate compatible with the full utilization of resources over the long run in an environment in which price inflation is stable has been an age-old goal for macroeconomic policy. Monetary policy and the institutional arrangements for carrying it out have long been regarded as important to achieving this goal. The Methodology of the Studies
The basic methodology of the academic studies involves the use of linear regression which is a statistical technique that attempts to estimate mathematically how important central bank independence and various parameters of that independence are to such important indicators of economic performance as the rate of inflation, the variability of inflation, the growth rate of output, the variability of the growth rate of output, and real interest rates. To make such computations, the above definitions of central bank independence must be turned into something that can be measured. 2. 3. The literature on central bank independence is extensive. The authors interpret these results to mean that since the degree of central bank independence is negatively related to the average rate of inflation in a statistically significant way, "monetary institutions matter." Contrary to the conclusion of the authors, the results for 1970-1979 and 1980-1989 suggest that the inflation performance of these countries is not so much related to the policy goal and methods of choosing CB governors and their terms of office (their measure of political independence) as it is to the requirement that the CB not be used to finance the government's budget deficit, their measure of economic independence. Or both? This is the opposite usage from the other indices in this report. The authors are quick to point out, however, that the results are consistent with the view that greater central bank independence may have resulted in a less activist monetary policy and, because of that, a better output-inflation tradeoff. Thus, the evidence for industrial countries supports a highly selective use of the term "central bank independence." Legitimate questions have been raised about the way these studies have been conducted that casts doubts on their findings. For example, Posen theorizes that what matters most in achieving low inflation is effective support by an important constituency, such as the financial sector. The weighting of the various characteristics will also be important in the regression results. Much of the evidence is tainted because it is obtained from an analysis that commingles data from fixed and flexible exchange rate periods. It should also be noted that central bank independence changes over time in ways that some of the studies may not capture. The Relevance of the Empirical Evidence to the Congressional Oversight of Monetary Policy
Much has been made of the empirical finding that central bank independence is negatively associated with the rate of inflation and that this comes as a "free lunch" in terms of no adverse effects on some very important and desirable performance characteristics of an economy. As used in the literature, the phrase applies to three aspects of independence:
1. the degree to which the CB's governing board is isolated from the political process;
2. the degree to which central banks can refuse to monetize public debt, i.e., finance the government;
3. the degree to which price stability has a primacy as the ultimate goal of central bank activity. It cannot directly purchase new Treasury issues. It may, they argue, wish to replace the current multi-goal directive with one directing the Federal Reserve to achieve and maintain price level stability, characteristic (3). | Keeping an economy growing over the long run at rates sufficient to provide full employment for labor and capital with low inflation or a stable price level has been an important goal for economic policy. Money and monetary policy have figured importantly in achieving this goal. Currently, it is argued, central bank independence is important to achieving this end.
Many small factors contribute to central bank independence, and so the literature does not yield a consistent definition of it. Rather, the emphasis is on three aspects of independence, the degree to which
(1) the governing board of the central bank is isolated from the political process;
(2) central banks can refuse to finance government budget deficits; and
(3) price stability has primacy as the ultimate goal of central bank activity.
Various indices of central bank independence have been compiled and used in empirical work to see how closely independence is related to such important performance characteristics of an economy as the rate of inflation, the growth of output, investment, and real interest rates.
For industrial countries, central bank independence indices embodying definitions (2) and (3) appear to be closely related to low inflation and low variability of inflation without having any effect on output and its variability, investment, and real interest rates. In particular, factor (2) seems to be driving the results, and the various measures of factor (1) have a negligible effect, a finding that the authors tend to neglect. Since the Federal Reserve cannot directly finance the U.S. government, factor (2) is not an issue for Congress. However, the results obtained with an index embodying (3) are of relevance to the conduct of monetary policy in the United States. These results may be used to support efforts to redefine the objective of monetary policy to focus it exclusively on price stability.
Critics of these studies point to three major methodological problems and one empirical problem. First, causation may be opposite to that posited. The desire for economic stability, for example, may lead to independent central banks. Thus, causation should run the other way around (or it may run in both directions). Second, central bank independence may arise because an important and influential constituency in a democratic society favors low inflation. Thus, the ultimate reason why inflation is low in some countries is the strength of important constituencies who favor low inflation. And these studies fail to measure this pressure. In a sense, they have captured only the proximate reason for low inflation, not the ultimate reason. Third, questions have been raised about the way that the authors transform non-numeric characteristics of independence into quantitative results. Finally, the data on which some of these empirical estimates are based are tainted in the sense that the samples commingle observations from the fixed and flexible exchange rate periods. The performance of central banks is quite different in each regime regardless of how its stated objective reads. This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_RL33299 | crs_RL33299_0 | Background
Child nutrition programs and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,Infants, and Children (the WIC program) are governed by three basic federal laws: (1)
The Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act . Only one significant law governing child nutrition programs (e.g., school mealprograms) and the WIC program has been (or is likely to be) enacted in the 108th and 109thCongresses -- the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-265 ) on June 30, 2004. The final productencompassed some $395 million in new gross spending through FY2009; however, this wasfinanced with an estimated $163 million in savings achieved primarily by revisions to thesystem for certifying and verifying eligibility for free and reduced-price school meals (seeimmediately below). As to school meal program operations, few changes were made (e.g., expansion ofeligibility for homeless, runaway, and migrant children and youth, loosened rules for higher"severe need" school breakfast subsidies). And, a major (and costly) proposal to phase inhigher income eligibility limits for free school meals was limited to authorization for a smallpilot project. While a number of federally led options were offered,in the end, the most significant change was a requirement that all schools participating inschool meal programs establish locally designed "wellness policies" to tackle obesity- andnutrition/health-related issues (like competitive foods and students' physical activity), withfederal technical assistance and other support. In related amendments, the program offeringfree fresh fruit and vegetables operating in selected schools in a few states was expanded andmade permanent, and important changes were made to food safety rules. Small changes also were made in the Summer Food Service and Child and Adult CareFood programs -- for example, making permanent and expanding the coverage ofpre-existing "simplified summer program" (so-called "Lugar") rules that make it easier forsummer program sponsors to participate, making permanent and nationally applicable apre-existing rule loosening eligibility requirements for for-profit child care centers wishingto participate in the Child and Adult Care Food program. Finally, a large number of revisions were made to the WIC program, but the mostsignificant were several aimed at strengthening rules containing food costs incurred by theprogram. Of these, the most controversial was a new provision placing substantial limits onvendors receiving the majority of their revenue from WIC vouchers (so-called "WIC-only"stores). The 2004 reauthorization law extended virtually all expiring child nutrition and WICappropriations authorizations and other authorities through FY2009. Additional Administrative Reviews. (9)
Pilot Expansion of Eligibility for Free School Meals. Nutrition, Health, and NutritionEducation. Nutrition Education/Promotion. Summer Food Service Program. Child and Adult Care Food Program(CACFP). Provides for the expansion of the CACFP. | Child nutrition programs (e.g., school meal programs, summer food service, child care foodprograms) and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (theWIC Program) are subject to periodic comprehensive reviews, when appropriations and otherauthorities expire and have to be reauthorized. They were up for reauthorization review in the 108thCongress, and the only substantial child nutrition-WIC legislation in the 108th Congress, and so farin the 109th Congress, has been the 2004 reauthorization law -- the Child Nutrition and WICReauthorization Act of 2004, P.L. 108-265 , enacted June 30, 2004.
The 2004 law extended virtually all expiring authorities through FY2009 and containedimportant, but incremental, changes in child nutrition programs and the WIC program; theCongressional Budget Office estimated that it will generate net new spending totaling about $230million through FY2009. Its major feature was a set of amendments aimed at improving the integrityand administration of the school meal programs. Significant changes were made in proceduresrelating to the way children's eligibility for free and reduced-price school meals is certified andverified, and new initiatives to upgrade schools' administration of their meal programs were put inplace. However, minimal revisions were made to the school meal programs themselves -- forexample, expansion of eligibility for homeless, runaway, and migrant children, loosened rules forcertain higher school breakfast subsidies -- and a major proposal to phase in higher income eligibilitylimits for free school meals was limited to an authorization for a pilot project. Relatively minoramendments also affected the Summer Food Service and Child and Adult Care Food programs --for example, making permanent and expanding coverage of "Lugar" rules facilitating participationby summer program sponsors and making permanent and nationally applicable a rule looseningChild and Adult Care Food program eligibility rules for for-profit child care centers.
Another area of concern addressed by the reauthorization law was nutrition, health, andnutrition education. Here, the biggest initiative was a requirement that all schools participating inschool meal programs establish locally designed "wellness policies" to set nutrition, physical activity,and other goals and strategies for meeting them. Coupled with it were (1) authorizations for newnutrition education efforts, (2) an expansion of the program offering free fresh fruit and vegetablesin selected schools, and (3) significant changes in food safety rules.
Finally, a large number of revisions were made to the law governing the WIC program. Themost important among them were amendments aimed at strengthening rules that help contain foodcosts incurred by the program; these included provisions placing substantial limits on vendorsreceiving the majority of their revenue from WIC vouchers (so-called "WIC-only" stores).
This report will be updated as events and legislation warrant. |
crs_R43617 | crs_R43617_0 | Title II contains appropriations for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Title III funds agencies in other departments, such as the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service in the Department of Health and Human Services; arts and cultural agencies, such as the Smithsonian Institution; and various other entities. Neither the House nor the Senate passed regular FY2015 appropriations for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies before the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2015. 5171 , the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015, containing FY2015 appropriations, and the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies had released a draft measure and accompanying explanatory statement. Neither measure had subsequent legislative action. Under the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 (CR), agencies generally received funding at the FY2014 level minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.0554%. On December 16, 2014, regular FY2015 appropriations were enacted for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies as part of P.L. 113-235 . The law included total appropriations of $30.48 billion for these agencies, primarily in Division F.
This report provides a brief overview of FY2015 appropriations levels. FY2015 Appropriations
Components of the FY2015 President's Request
For FY2015, the President requested $30.69 billion for the approximately 30 agencies and entities typically funded in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations law. FY2015 President's Request Compared with FY2014 Enacted Appropriations
The President's request of $30.69 billion for FY2015 would have been an increase of $570.9 million (1.9%) over the total FY2014 enacted appropriations of $30.12 billion. The total included $470.0 million in additional suppression funding for the Forest Service. The draft bill released on August 1, 2014, by the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies recommended $30.71 billion. The total included $1.19 billion in emergency appropriations for Wildland Fire Management activities of DOI and the Forest Service. For DOI agencies in Title I of the bill, appropriations were $11.09 billion, including $372.0 million for the Payments in Lieu of Taxes program. This figure was 36.4% of the total enacted. For EPA, appropriations were $8.14 billion, or 26.7% of the total. For agencies and other entities in Title III of the bill, appropriations were $11.25 billion, or 36.9% of the total. Five-Year History
Appropriations enacted for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies over the prior five fiscal years (FY2010-FY2014) peaked in FY2010 at $32.32 billion. Relative to FY2010, FY2015 enacted appropriations decreased by $1.84 billion (-5.7%). With the exception of FY2010, FY2015 appropriations were higher than the appropriations enacted for each of the fiscal years during the five-year period. Most recently, the FY2015 appropriations level was $358.0 million (1.2%) higher than the FY2014 appropriations level. | The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for most of the Department of the Interior (DOI) and for agencies within other departments—including the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also provides funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), arts and cultural agencies, and numerous other entities.
For FY2015, the President requested $30.69 billion for the approximately 30 agencies and entities typically funded in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations law. The President's request would have been an increase of $570.9 million (1.9%) over the total FY2014 enacted appropriations of $30.12 billion.
On July 23, 2014, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 5171, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015, containing $30.28 billion for FY2015. The measure included $470.0 million in additional fire suppression funding for the Forest Service. On August 1, 2014, the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft measure and accompanying explanatory statement recommending $30.71 billion in total appropriations. The draft included $1.19 billion in emergency appropriations for Wildland Fire Management of DOI and the Forest Service. Neither measure saw subsequent legislative action.
Regular appropriations for FY2015 were not enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2015. Accordingly, continuing appropriations were temporarily provided under continuing appropriations laws (originally P.L. 113-164). Agencies generally received funding at the FY2014 level minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.0554%, under the authority and conditions provided for FY2014.
On December 16, 2014, regular, full-year appropriations were enacted for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies as part of P.L. 113-235, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015. The law included total appropriations of $30.48 billion for these agencies, primarily in Division F. For DOI agencies in Title I of the bill, appropriations were $11.09 billion, including $372.0 million for the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program. This was 36.4% of the total enacted. For the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), appropriations were $8.14 billion, or 26.7% of the total. For agencies and other entities in Title III of the bill, the total was $11.25 billion, or 36.9% of the total.
Appropriations enacted for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies over the prior five fiscal years (FY2010-FY2014) peaked in FY2010 at $32.32 billion. Relative to FY2010, the FY2015 enacted appropriations decreased by $1.84 billion (-5.7%). However, the FY2015 appropriations were higher than the appropriations enacted for each of the other fiscal years during the five-year period. They were $358.0 million (1.2%) higher than the most recent (FY2014) appropriations. |
crs_R42628 | crs_R42628_0 | In a July 2011 study, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) reported that individuals who were not authorized to work in the United States received $4.2 billion by claiming the refundable portion of the child tax credit—the additional child tax credit (ACTC). The ACTC is available to working families with children under age 17. The TIGTA audit was based upon analysis of tax returns filed by persons with Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issues ITINs to individuals who are required to have a taxpayer identification number for tax purposes but are not eligible to obtain a Social Security number (SSN) because they are not authorized to work in the United States. The report proceeds to analyze the federal tax status of unauthorized aliens and their eligibility for refundable tax credits, including a legal analysis of whether refundable tax credits are "federal public benefits" under Section 401 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). The existing refundable tax credits include
the earned income tax credit (EITC); the additional child tax credit (ACTC), which is the refundable portion of the child tax credit; the American opportunity tax credit, which is a partially refundable credit for tuition and related expenses; the health coverage tax credit, which provides a credit for health insurance costs of qualifying individuals who receive trade adjustment assistance (TAA) or pension benefits under a plan taken over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC); the credit for tax withheld on wages; the credit for tax withheld at source for nonresident aliens and foreign corporations; the credit for fuel excise taxes paid on fuel used for nontaxable uses; and the credit for overpayment of tax. Estimates derived from the March Supplement of the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) indicate that the unauthorized resident alien population was 11.2 million in 2010. The Pew Hispanic Center reported that 35% of unauthorized adults have resided in the United States for 15 years or more and that 28% have resided for 10 to 14 years. The report also found that the proportion of unauthorized aliens who have been in the country at least 15 years has more than doubled since 2000. Pew researchers have also found that unauthorized aliens tend to be younger than the U.S. population overall and more likely to be in the child-bearing and child-rearing years. As a consequence, nearly half—an estimated 46%—of unauthorized adults are parents of minor children. Regarding unauthorized aliens in particular, Section 401 of PRWORA barred them from any federal public benefit except the emergency services and programs expressly listed in Section 401(b). So defined, this bar covers many programs whose enabling statutes do not individually make citizenship or immigration status a criterion for participation. PRWORA also amended the IRC to impose an SSN requirement for claiming the EITC. There is no indication that the IRS considers any refundable tax credits to be subject to PRWORA Section 401. It does not appear the agency has issued any regulations, rulings, or other guidance on this issue. To the extent that a court reaches the conclusion that any refundable tax credits are not federal public benefits under PRWORA Section 401, then it would appear that unauthorized aliens would be able to claim such credits absent a provision in the Internal Revenue Code explicitly requiring an SSN or disallowing the credit to those individuals (e.g., the IRC expressly disallows some credits to nonresident aliens). | In 2011, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) reported that individuals who were not authorized to work in the United States received $4.2 billion by claiming the refundable portion of the child tax credit—the additional child tax credit (ACTC). The ACTC is available to working families with children under age 17. The report sparked considerable concern that unauthorized aliens were obtaining refundable tax credits. The TIGTA audit was based upon an analysis of tax returns filed by persons with Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issues ITINs to individuals who are required to have a taxpayer identification number for tax purposes but are not eligible to obtain a Social Security number (SSN) because they are not authorized to work in the United States. All aliens, including those who are in the country illegally, are generally subject to federal taxes under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and even income illegally obtained is subject to taxation.
A refundable tax credit is one where the taxpayer may receive a payment from the IRS that exceeds his or her tax liability. Examples include the earned income tax credit (EITC), the additional child tax credit, the American opportunity tax credit, and the health coverage tax credit. While the EITC requires SSNs of all recipients, the other existing credits, including the ACTC, do not. Similarly, several now-expired credits included an SSN requirement, while others did not. Apart from any SSN requirement, the IRC also expressly prohibits nonresident aliens from claiming some refundable credits.
In addition to the specific provisions of the IRC, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 (P.L. 104-193) bars unauthorized aliens from any federal public benefit except certain emergency services and programs. So defined, this bar covers many programs whose enabling statutes do not individually make citizenship or immigration status a criterion for participation. The legal question arises as to whether any refundable tax credits are federal public benefits, which under PRWORA unauthorized aliens should be barred from receiving. There is no indication that the IRS considers any refundable tax credits to be subject to PRWORA Section 401. Looking to the statutory text, it is arguably unclear whether refundable credits should be treated as federal public benefits, although there is a strong argument that at least some should not (e.g., the credit for taxes withheld). It does not appear that any court has examined this issue or that the IRS has issued guidance on it.
The EITC and ACTC are the largest refundable tax credits—in 2009 taxpayers claimed $53.0 billion and $27.5 billion of each credit, respectively—and primarily benefit working families with children. Estimates derived from the March Supplement of the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) indicate that the unauthorized resident alien population was 11.2 million in 2010. The Pew Hispanic Center reported that two-thirds of the unauthorized resident alien population have resided in the United States for 10 or more years. The report also found that the proportion of unauthorized aliens who have been in the country at least 15 years has more than doubled since 2000. Pew researchers have also found that unauthorized aliens tend to be younger than the U.S. population overall and more likely to be in the child-bearing and child-rearing years. As a consequence, an estimated 46% of unauthorized adults are parents of minor children. |
crs_RL34753 | crs_RL34753_0 | Debarment and suspension (collectively known as "exclusion") are of perennial interest to Congress because exclusion is one of the primary techniques that federal agencies use to avoid dealings with vendors who have failed, or are deemed likely to fail, to meet their obligations under federal law or government contracts. Debarred contractors are generally ineligible for new federal contracts for a fixed period of time, while suspended contractors are generally ineligible for the duration of any investigation or litigation involving their conduct. Federal law specifies various grounds for exclusion, only some of which expressly relate to procurement. The grounds and procedures for nonprocurement exclusions are outside the scope of this report. However, all persons excluded on procurement or other grounds are listed in the System for Award Management (SAM) (previously the Excluded Parties List System (EPLS)). This report discusses grounds and procedures for procurement-related exclusions. Authorities Requiring or Allowing Exclusion
Contractors can currently be debarred or suspended under federal statutes or under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), an administrative rule governing contracting by executive branch agencies. Heads of procuring agencies generally cannot waive exclusions to allow debarred or suspended contractors to contract with their agency. However, because exclusions under the FAR are designed to protect the government's interests, they may not be imposed solely to punish prior contractor misconduct. First, debarment may be imposed when a contractor is convicted of or found civilly liable for any so-called "integrity offense." Suspension
The FAR also allows agency officials to suspend government contractors when they suspect, upon adequate evidence, any of the following offenses, or when contractors are indicted for these offenses:
fraud or criminal offenses in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public contract; violation of federal or state antitrust laws relating to the submission of offers; embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false statements, tax evasion, violations of federal criminal tax laws, or receipt of stolen property; violations of the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988; intentional misuse of the "Made in America" designation; unfair trade practices, as defined in Section 201 of the Defense Production Act; delinquent federal taxes in an amount exceeding $3,000; knowing failure by a principal to timely disclose to the government credible evidence of (1) violations of federal criminal laws involving fraud, conflict of interest, bribery, or gratuity offenses covered by Title 18 of the United States Code; (2) violations of the civil False Claims Act; or (3) significant overpayments on the contract that occurred in connection with the award, performance or closeout of a federal contract or subcontract and were discovered within three years of final payment; and other offenses indicating a lack of business integrity or honesty that seriously affect the present responsibility of a contractor. Because the public interest can be seen to encompass both safeguarding public funds by excluding contractors who may be nonresponsible and not excluding contractors who are fundamentally responsible and could otherwise compete for government contracts, agency officials could find that contractors who engaged in exclusion-worthy conduct should not be excluded, particularly if they appear unlikely to engage in similar conduct in the future. The debarment or suspension generally serves only to preclude an excluded contractor from (1) receiving new contracts or orders from executive branch agencies; (2) receiving new work or an option under an existing contract; (3) serving as a subcontractor on certain contracts with executive branch agencies; or (4) serving as an individual surety for the duration of the debarment or suspension. Any contracts that the excluded contractor presently has remain in effect unless they are terminated for default or for convenience under separate provisions of the FAR. While the possibility of de facto debarment often arises in connection with agency conduct that also deprives the contractor of a protected liberty interest without due process, the de facto debarment analysis focuses primarily upon conduct outside the debarment and suspension process that effectively excludes contractors. Additionally, in certain circumstances, agencies' determinations to debar or suspend a contractor could potentially be found to violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), particularly if the agency excludes the contractor based upon circumstances that the agency was aware of when it previously found that contractor sufficiently responsible to be awarded a federal contract. | Debarment and suspension (collectively known as "exclusion") are of perennial interest to Congress because exclusion is one of the primary techniques that federal agencies use to avoid dealings with vendors who have failed, or are deemed likely to fail, to meet their obligations under federal law or government contracts. Debarred contractors are generally ineligible for new federal contracts for a fixed period of time, while suspended contractors are generally ineligible for the duration of any investigation or litigation involving their conduct. Federal law specifies various grounds for exclusion, only some of which expressly relate to procurement. The grounds and procedures for nonprocurement exclusions are outside the scope of this report. However, all persons excluded on procurement or other grounds are listed in the System for Award Management (SAM), which contracting officers must check prior to awarding a contract.
Procurement-related exclusions can be broadly characterized as being either statutory or administrative. Statutory exclusions are required or authorized by congressional enactments that bar persons who have engaged in conduct prohibited under the statute from at least certain government contracts. Such exclusions are often mandatory, or at least beyond the discretion of the heads of procuring agencies, and are intended as punishments. The statute often prescribes the duration of the exclusion, and procuring agencies generally cannot waive the exclusion.
Administrative exclusions, in contrast, are authorized by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The FAR authorizes the debarment of contractors who are convicted of, found civilly liable for, or found by agency officials to have committed specified offenses, or when other causes affect contractor responsibility. It similarly authorizes suspension when contractors are suspected of or indicted for specified offenses, or when there are other causes that affect contractor responsibility. The FAR does not require the exclusion of a contractor, even when grounds for exclusion are present. Instead, agency officials retain discretion as to whether to exclude particular contractors, and they may enter into administrative agreements circumscribing the conduct of contractors in lieu of exclusion. Exclusion under the FAR is also intended to protect the government's interests, not for purposes of punishment. The length of the exclusion can vary depending upon the seriousness of the conduct in question and the duration of any investigation, among other things. However, agency heads could waive administrative exclusions.
Excluded parties are generally ineligible for new government contracts and, in the case of administrative exclusions, are also expressly said to be ineligible to (1) receive new work or an option under an existing contract; (2) serve as a subcontractor on certain contracts; or (3) serve as an individual surety. However, existing contracts of the excluded contractor generally remain in effect unless they are terminated for default or convenience by the government.
Because they are dealing with the federal government, contractors are entitled to due process before being excluded from government contracts, although the nature of the process due to them varies for debarments and suspensions. Agencies are generally prohibited from using means other than debarment or suspension proceedings to effectively exclude contractors. Such conduct is sometimes described as "de facto debarment." Conduct that results in de facto debarment could also result in contractors being deprived of constitutionally protected liberty interests in prospective government contracts. Additionally, agencies could be found to have violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by acting arbitrarily and capriciously if they exclude a contractor based upon circumstances that the agency was aware of when it previously found the contractor sufficiently "responsible" to be awarded a federal contract. |
crs_R45409 | crs_R45409_0 | Introduction
Combining elements of mathematics, computer science, engineering, and physical sciences, quantum information science (QIS) has the potential to provide capabilities far beyond what is possible with the most advanced technologies available today. QIS Applications
Although much of the press coverage of QIS has been devoted to quantum computing, there is more to QIS. Many experts divide QIS technologies into three application areas:
Sensing and metrology, Communications, and Computing and simulation. U.S. Government QIS Research History and Funding
The government's interest in QIS dates back at least to the mid-1990s, when the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Department of Defense (DOD) held their first workshops on the topic. QIS is first mentioned in the FY2008 budget of what is now the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program and has been a component of the program since then. U.S. Government QIS Initiatives and Activity
QIS is a component of the National Strategic Computing Initiative (Presidential Executive Order 13702), which was established in 2015. The National Strategic Overview for Quantum Information Science
In September 2018, the NSTC issued The National Strategic Overview for Quantum Information Science . The policy opportunities identified in this strategic overview are summarized in Table 1 . Comments on the ANPRM are due on December 19, 2018.
International QIS Initiatives
QIS R&D is being pursued at major research centers worldwide, with China and the European Union (EU) having the largest foreign QIS programs. Even without explicit QIS initiatives, many other countries, including Russia, Germany, and Austria, are making strides in QIS R&D. Additionally, the House has held three QIS hearings. Legislation
The Senate has introduced two bills and the House has introduced one bill related to QIS. National Quantum Initiative Act (S. 3143, H.R. These bills would establish a federal program to accelerate U.S. QIS R&D. Issues discussed included—
a comparison of U.S. and international QIS R&D and how to effectively train a QIS-knowledgeable workforce. Issues discussed included—
China's investment in leading-edge technologies, including QIS, and concerns that China may be closing the gap with the United States in advanced technology R&D. Issues discussed included —
an overview of the uses of quantum computers, the advantages of quantum computers over conventional computers, potential dangers from quantum technologies, barriers to the development of a commercially available quantum computer in the United States, and where the United States stands in relation to other nations in developing a commercially available quantum computer. | Quantum information science (QIS) combines elements of mathematics, computer science, engineering, and physical sciences, and has the potential to provide capabilities far beyond what is possible with the most advanced technologies available today. Although much of the press coverage of QIS has been devoted to quantum computing, there is more to QIS. Many experts divide QIS technologies into three application areas:
Sensing and metrology, Communications, and Computing and simulation.
The government's interest in QIS dates back at least to the mid-1990s, when the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Department of Defense (DOD) held their first workshops on the topic. QIS is first mentioned in the FY2008 budget of what is now the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program and has been a component of the program since then.
Today, QIS is a component of the National Strategic Computing Initiative (Presidential Executive Order 13702), which was established in 2015. Most recently, in September 2018, the National Science and Technology Council issued the National Strategic Overview for Quantum Information Science. The policy opportunities identified in this strategic overview include—
choosing a science-first approach to QIS, creating a "quantum-smart" workforce, deepening engagement with the quantum industry, providing critical infrastructure, maintaining national security and economic growth, and advancing international cooperation.
The United States is not alone in increasing investment in QIS R&D. This research is also being pursued at major research centers worldwide, with China and the European Union having the largest foreign QIS programs. Further, even without explicit QIS initiatives, many other countries, including Russia, Germany, and Austria, are making strides in QIS research and development (R&D).
The Senate has introduced three bills in the 115th Congress (S. 3143, S. 2998, and S. 3673) and the House has introduced one bill in the 115th Congress (H.R. 6227) related to QIS. These bills would establish a federal program to accelerate U.S. QIS R&D, create a National Quantum Coordination Office within OSTP, establish a Defense Quantum Information Consortium, and require the Secretary of Energy to carry out quantum information science research. The House has held three hearings related to QIS. Issues discussed in these hearings included a comparison of U.S. and international QIS R&D, and how to effectively train a QIS-knowledgeable workforce; China's investment in leading-edge technologies, including QIS, and concerns that China may be closing the gap with the United States in advanced technology R&D; and an overview of quantum computers.
This report provides an overview of QIS technologies: sensing and metrology, communications, and computing and simulation. It also includes examples of existing and potential future applications; brief summaries of funding and selected R&D initiatives in the United States and elsewhere around the world; a description of U.S. congressional activity; and a discussion of related policy considerations. |
crs_R44465 | crs_R44465_0 | Introduction and Overview
The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). FY2017 funding for energy and water development programs was provided by Division D of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ), an omnibus funding measure passed by Congress May 4, 2017, and signed into law the following day. (This followed a series of continuing resolutions.) Total funding for Division D was $38.89 billion, offset by $436 million in rescissions. That total was $1.27 billion above the Obama Administration request and $1.54 billion over the FY2016 level, excluding rescissions. The Obama Administration also had proposed $2.26 billion in new mandatory funding for DOE, which was not approved. Proposed reductions for the Corps, Reclamation, and CUP were also rejected. Figure 1 compares the major components of the Energy and Water Development bill. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2017 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill on April 14, 2016 ( S. 2804 , S.Rept. 114-236 ). The House Appropriations Committee completed action on April 19, 2016 ( H.R. 5055 , H.Rept. 114-532 ). As passed by committee, the House bill would have provided an increase of $4 million over the request. Definition of "Fill Material" Under the Clean Water Act
As approved by the Senate, H.R. 2028 (§103) prohibited the Corps during FY2017 from changing the definition of "fill material" or "discharge of fill material" in relation to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. However, the prohibition was included in the enacted measure. Large Proposed Increase for Energy Efficiency and Renewables
The Obama Administration requested an increase of $829.2 million (40.1%) in discretionary funding for DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) for FY2017, for a total of $2.898 billion. Both the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate voted to reject the Administration's proposed FY2017 budget increases for EERE, with the House panel approving a cut from FY2016 and the Senate approving level funding. Nuclear Waste Management
DOE proposed to triple its funding for the Integrated Waste Management System (IWMS) in FY2017—from $22.5 million to $76.3 million. In contrast, the Senate approved $61.0 million for IWMS and included an authorization (§306) and a $10.0 million appropriation for DOE to develop a consent-based waste storage pilot facility. The Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $22.5 million for IWMS and nothing for Yucca Mountain. The Obama Administration's proposed restructuring of the fossil fuels budget and the proposed funding reduction were mostly rejected by the House Appropriations Committee and the Senate, and in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which provided a total of $668 million for fossil energy R&D. Surplus Plutonium Disposition
The Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which would make fuel for nuclear reactors out of surplus weapons plutonium, has faced sharply escalating construction and operation cost estimates. The Senate approved the Obama Administration's funding request, while the House panel voted to continue construction at the FY2016 funding level. | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP), and the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's total funding.
FY2017 funding for energy and water development programs was provided by Division D of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), an omnibus funding measure passed by Congress May 4, 2017, and signed into law the following day. (This followed a series of continuing resolutions.) Total funding for Division D was $38.89 billion, offset by $436 million in rescissions. That total was $1.27 billion above the Obama Administration request and $1.54 billion over the FY2016 level, excluding rescissions. The Obama Administration also proposed $2.26 billion in new mandatory funding for DOE, which was not approved. Proposed reductions for the Corps, Reclamation, and CUP were also rejected.
The Senate approved its version of the FY2017 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill on May 12, 2016 (H.R. 2028, S.Rept. 114-236), which would have increased budget authority for energy and water programs by $261 million over the request (0.7%), including adjustments. The House Appropriations Committee completed action on April 19, 2016 (H.R. 5055, H.Rept. 114-532), but the bill was defeated on the House floor on May 26, 2016. As passed by the Appropriations Committee, the House version would have provided $4 million more than the request, after offsets and other adjustments.
Major Energy and Water Development funding highlights for FY2017 include
Definition of "Fill Material" Under the Clean Water Act. The Senate-passed bill included provisions to prohibit the Corps during FY2017 from changing the definition of "fill material" in relation to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The restriction was included in the enacted omnibus measure. 40% Requested Boost for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. The Obama Administration requested an increase of $829.2 million (40.1%) in discretionary funding for DOE's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) for FY2017, which the House committee and the Senate did not approve. The omnibus measure provided a 0.9% funding increase. Nuclear Waste "Consent-Based Siting." The Obama Administration proposed to triple funding in FY2017 for DOE to develop a consent-based nuclear waste siting program, to $76.3 million. The House Appropriations Committee rejected the proposal, instead providing $170 million to pursue a waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. The Senate approved $61.0 million for consent-based siting. The omnibus measure provided $22.5 million for consent-based siting, $62.5 million for used fuel R&D, and no funds for Yucca Mountain. Surplus Plutonium Disposition. Construction of the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which would make fuel for nuclear reactors out of surplus weapons plutonium, would have been terminated beginning in FY2017 by the Obama Administration's budget request. The Senate approved the Administration halt, while the House panel voted to continue construction. The omnibus measure continued construction with a 1.5% funding cut from FY2016. |
crs_RL30335 | crs_RL30335_0 | Land management is a principal mission for four federal agencies: the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the National Park Service (NPS), and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in the Department of the Interior (DOI); and the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture. Uses of the Funds
Most of the mandatory spending authorities for natural resource trust funds and special funds were established to fund certain agency activities or to compensate state or local governments for the tax-exempt status of federal lands. Many are small; 12 had average FY2005-FY2009 annual budget authority exceeding $5 million. Total average annual budget authority for FY2005-FY2009 for the 31 accounts was $824 million, accounting for 44% of BLM funding over the five years. Other BLM Accounts With Mandatory Spending Authority
The BLM has 19 other accounts with mandatory spending authority, including 12 for agency operations and 7 for local compensation. Owyhee Land Acquisition . Many are small; only seven had average annual FY2005-FY2009 budget authority exceeding $5 million, and the largest averaged $162 million. Average annual FY2005-FY2009 budget authority totaled $335 million, 12% of total NPS funding. Of these accounts, 15 support agency activities and the other 2 (both less than $0.5 million average annual budget authority) are compensation programs. The FY2005-FY2009 budget authority is shown in Table 18 . Other NPS Accounts With Mandatory Spending Authority
The NPS has 10 additional accounts with mandatory spending authority, primarily to fund specific agency activities. Five had average annual FY2005-FY2009 budget authority exceeding $5 million. Average annual FY2005-FY2009 funding from these 10 accounts totaled $798 million, 36% of total FWS funding. The two largest accounts (together $729 million in average annual budget authority) are funded mostly from fuel and excise taxes, and largely provide grants to states allocated by formula. FY2005-FY2009 budget authority is shown in Table 24 . Average annual FY2005-FY2009 budget authority for the 23 accounts totaled $764 million, 22% of FS non-fire obligations. Three accounts ($375 million) are compensation funds, while the other 20 accounts ($390 million, plus a portion of the largest compensation account) fund agency activities. They are listed in descending order of average FY2005-FY2009 budget authority. Comparison
Each of the four major federal land management agencies has numerous special funds and trust funds with mandatory spending authority—money available to be spent without further action by Congress. Most of these accounts are funded by receipts from the sale, lease, or use of federal lands and resources. Other funding sources include excise taxes, license fees, import duties, donations, and the U.S. Treasury. The mandatory spending authorities for these four agencies generally are used for one of three purposes: to fund agency activities; to compensate state and local governments for the tax-exempt status of federal lands; or to fund grants, with a formula allocation or through competition. Nine of the accounts ($198 million) are compensation programs and the other 22 ($626 million) fund BLM activities. Average annual budget authority for the 17 accounts for FY2005-FY2009 totaled $335 million, accounting for 12% of NPS funding. Many are funded from agency receipts, but the two largest accounts (together $729 million) are funded largely from excise taxes and import duties, and the majority of the spending grants funds to the states under fixed formulas. Of these, 13 had average annual budget authority exceeding $5 million for FY2005-FY2009. | The four major land management agencies have numerous special funds and trust funds that have mandatory spending authority, with the money available to be spent without further action by Congress. The four agencies have 81 accounts with mandatory spending authority, averaging $2.7 billion in annual budget authority for FY2005-FY2009, more than a quarter of annual agency funding. Most accounts are funded with receipts from the sale or lease of federal lands and resources; other sources include excise taxes, licensing fees, import duties, donations, and more. Many accounts fund agency activities; others compensate state and local governments for the tax-exempt status of federal lands; still more are grants, allocated by fixed formulas or competition.
Advocates of mandatory spending desire the predictability of funding that results from avoiding the annual congressional appropriations process. However, others are concerned about limited oversight, alleged rewards for environmentally damaging behaviors, and the adequacy of compensation for the tax-exempt status of federal lands. This report reviews agency-level mandatory spending accounts for the four agencies.
The Bureau of Land Management has mandatory spending authority for 31 accounts, averaging $824 million annually in FY2005-FY2009 budget authority (44% of BLM funds, excluding wildfire funding). Many are small; 12 exceeded $5 million in average annual budget authority, and the largest had average annual budget authority of nearly $400 million. Nine accounts ($198 million in total average annual FY2005-FY2009 budget authority) compensate local governments for lost tax revenues from the tax-exempt public lands. The other 22 ($626 million in total average annual FY2005-FY2009 budget authority) fund agency activities.
The National Park Service has mandatory spending authority for 17 accounts, averaging $335 million annually in FY2005-FY2009 budget authority (12% of NPS funds). Like the BLM, many are small; seven exceeded $5 million in average annual budget authority, and the largest account averaged $162 million in annual FY2005-FY2009 budget authority. Two accounts (less than $1 million in average annual FY2005-FY2009 budget authority) compensate local governments for tax-exempt federal park lands. The other 15 fund agency activities.
The Fish and Wildlife Service has 10 accounts with mandatory spending authority, averaging $798 million annually in FY2005-FY2009 budget authority (36% of FWS funds). Five of the accounts exceeded $5 million in average annual budget authority. The two largest (together $729 million in average annual FY2005-FY2009 budget authority) are funded mostly with fuel and excise taxes, and primarily provide grants to states allocated by formula. One, funded from receipts (44%) plus annual appropriations (56%), compensates local governments for the tax-exempt federal wildlife refuges. The others fund land acquisition and agency activities.
The Forest Service has mandatory spending authority for 23 accounts, averaging $764 million annually in FY2005-FY2009 budget authority (22% of agency funds, excluding wildfire appropriations). Many accounts are relatively large, with 13 exceeding $5 million in average annual budget authority, and most are funded from agency receipts. Three (totaling $375 million in average annual FY2005-FY2009 budget authority) compensate local governments for tax-exempt national forests and grasslands. The other 20 (totaling $390 million in average annual FY2005-FY2009 budget authority) fund agency activities. |
crs_RS22878 | crs_RS22878_0 | Introduction
In the 110 th Congress, legislation concerning the applicability of certain environmental regulatory requirements to recreational and other types of boats was introduced. As discussed in this report, Congress passed two of these bills, S. 2766 and S. 3298 , on July 22, 2008, and President Bush subsequently signed them into law. These bills were intended to address an issue that has arisen in implementation of the Clean Water Act (CWA). In 2006, a federal court ordered the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to revise a CWA regulation that currently exempts discharges from the normal operation of all vessels from the act's permit requirements. Further, on August 31, the federal district court approved EPA's request to delay the court's order until December 19, 2008, and EPA finalized a permit for vessels subject to a permit requirement on December 18. They reflected four approaches: (1) modifying a CWA definition to exempt discharges from recreational vessels; (2) modifying the CWA to exempt recreational vessel discharges from permitting and directing EPA to issue performance standards for discharges incidental to the normal operation of vessels; (3) directing the Coast Guard to issue national performance standards for such discharges, but exempting recreational and certain commercial vessels; and (4) temporarily exempting fishing and some commercial vessels from CWA permitting and requiring a study of impacts of vessel discharges. 110-288 ). 110-299 ). | The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to develop a regulatory response to a 2006 federal court ruling that vacated a long-standing EPA rule. That rule had exempted discharges associated with the normal operation of vessels from permit requirements of the Clean Water Act. Concern that this ruling could require millions of recreational boaters to obtain permits led to the introduction of legislation in the 110th Congress to exempt these and other types of vessels from water quality regulation. This report discusses background to the issue and bills introduced in the 110th Congress in response, two of which were passed by Congress in July 2008 (S. 2766 and S. 3298). The enacted measures exempted recreational vessels from permit requirements (P.L. 110-288) and delayed permit requirements for many other but not all vessels (P.L. 110-299). EPA finalized a permit for the remaining vessels on December 18, 2008. |
crs_R41253 | crs_R41253_0 | Yet the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program does not provide benefits to the self-employed. It pays a weekly SEA allowance, which is identical in amount and duration to what an individual would have received as a regular UC benefit. Unlike regular UC, however, SEA waives state requirements that individuals be actively searching for wage and salary jobs. SEA allowances are available to individuals who are eligible for unemployment benefits and who meet certain other requirements. SEA is one of three programs operating within UC that focuses on the reemployment of UC beneficiaries. Although SEA offers this alternative route out of unemployment, participation in the program by states and unemployed workers is low, partly as a result of a budget neutrality requirement. P.L. 103-182 , the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, created the SEA program in 1993. 105-306 , the Noncitizen Benefit Clarification and Other Technical Amendments Act of 1998, made the program permanent. The SEA program is financed—as is the case with UC, in general—by federal taxes on employers under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes on employers under the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA). P.L. 112-96 , the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, authorized the expansion of SEA to permit states to set up SEA programs available to certain claimants in the Extended Benefit (EB) and temporary, now-expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) programs. P.L. Rather, SEA beneficiaries must engage in full-time activities related to the establishment of a business and becoming self-employed. To be eligible for a SEA allowance, workers must meet the following requirements:
Eligible for UC Permanently laid off from previous job Identified as likely to exhaust UC benefits Participating in self-employment activities including entrepreneurial training, business counseling, and technical assistance
States identify UC claimants likely to exhaust benefits through the same worker profiling mechanism used in the WPRS program. State Availability of SEA for UC Claimants
In 2016, 10 states have active SEA programs for UC claimants (authorization for the SEA program in New York is scheduled to expire December 7, 2017). The authorizing legislation also requires that a SEA program be budget neutral. Designed to help individuals start or expand their own businesses, Project GATE provided self-employment training and other services. | Self-employment is one potential pathway to exit a spell of unemployment. The regular Unemployment Compensation (UC) program generally requires unemployed workers to be actively seeking work and to be available for wage and salary jobs as a condition of eligibility for UC benefits. These requirements constitute a barrier to self-employment and small business creation for unemployed workers who need income support. The Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) program, however, provides an avenue for combining income support during periods of unemployment with activities related to starting one's own business.
Thus, within the joint federal-state UC program, the SEA program focuses on the reemployment of UC beneficiaries. State SEA programs help unemployed workers generate their own jobs through small business creation. SEA waives state UC work search requirements for those individuals who are working full time to establish their own small businesses. SEA provides a weekly allowance in the same amount and for the same duration as regular UC benefits. It is available only to individuals who would otherwise be entitled to UC benefits and have been determined likely to exhaust their UC benefits. Despite the unique configuration of SEA, which pairs self-employment activities and income support, participation in the program by states as well as unemployed workers is limited. Currently, only 10 states have active SEA programs for UC claimants, and in one of these states—New York—authorization for the SEA program is scheduled to expire December 7, 2017. In part, the small-scale nature of the program is likely due to the authorizing legislation requirement that SEA be budget neutral; that is, no UC funds may be used to provide self-employment training.
P.L. 103-182, the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, created the SEA program on December 8, 1993. It was permanently authorized by P.L. 105-306, the Noncitizen Benefit Clarification and Other Technical Amendments Act, which was signed on October 28, 1998. Like the rest of UC, the SEA program is financed by federal taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) and by state payroll taxes under the State Unemployment Tax Acts (SUTA).
Most recently, provisions in P.L. 112-96, the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, gave states the authority to expand SEA participation to certain claimants in the Extended Benefit (EB) and temporary, now-expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) programs. |
crs_RS21668 | crs_RS21668_0 | The Role of UNRWA
UNRWA was established in 1949 to provide relief assistance and programs for Palestinian refugees. In keeping with its mission, it provides relief and social services, including food, housing, clothing, and basic health and education to over 4.1 million registered Palestine refugees living mostly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. UNRWA: Budget and Fund Distribution
Ninety-five percent of the UNRWA budget is funded through voluntary contributions from governments and the European Union. U.S. contributions to UNRWA come from the regular MRA account and also through the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account, which is made available for refugee emergencies. The U.S. contribution to UNRWA usually covers 22-25% of the UNRWA total budget. | Since 1950, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has provided relief and social services to registered Palestine refugees living mostly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Ninety-five percent of the UNRWA budget is funded through voluntary contributions from governments and the European Union. U.S. contributions to UNRWA come from the regular Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account and also through the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) account. The U.S. contribution to UNRWA usually covers 22-25% of the UNRWA total budget. The current cycle of violence in the Middle East presents particular challenges to UNRWA, including security, funding, and the impact of deteriorating socio-economic conditions. Recent congressional attention has focused on the issues concerning the progress of refugee resettlement, use of UNRWA funds, and the content of educational materials. This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R44534 | crs_R44534_0 | Introduction
The Capital Investment Grant (CIG) program, often referred to as New Starts, provides federal funds to public transportation agencies on a competitive basis for the construction of new fixed-guideway transit systems and the expansion of existing systems (49 U.S.C. Most CIG funding has gone for subway/elevated rail (heavy rail), light rail, or commuter rail projects. Many bus rapid transit projects are inexpensive enough to qualify as Small Starts projects. A third type of CIG project, eligible for funding since FY2013, involves expanding an existing fixed-guideway corridor to increase capacity by 10% or more. The CIG program is administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT). In December 2015, the program was reauthorized from FY2016 through FY2020 in the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act ( P.L. 114-94 ). Program Funding
The CIG program is one of six major funding programs administered by FTA, accounting for about 19% of FTA's budget ( Figure 1 ). Unlike FTA's other major programs, funding for CIG comes from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury, not the mass transit account of the Highway Trust Fund. For this reason, CIG funding is subject to appropriation each year. Moreover, the CIG program allocates discretionary grants to local transit agencies, whereas the other major programs apportion funding by formula. Program Characteristics
Types of Eligible Projects
Four types of projects are eligible for CIG funding:
New Starts p rojects , involving construction of an operable segment of a new fixed-guideway system or an extension of an existing system that costs $300 million or more and receives $100 million or more in CIG funding. Small Starts p rojects , defined as a new fixed guideway project or a corridor-based BRT project that costs less than $300 million and receives less than $100 million of CIG funding. Program of Interrelated p rojects , the simultaneous development of two or more New Starts, Small Starts, or Core Capacity projects, or a combination thereof. Key Policy Issues
Federal Role in Funding Major Capital Projects
The CIG program has not been without controversy. No comprehensive benefit-cost studies of completed CIG projects have been conducted to evaluate the relative success of the CIG program as federal policy. (See Appendix for more details of the legislative and regulatory changes in the CIG program.) Legislative changes in MAP-21 and the FAST Act have sought to speed the development of CIG projects. The final interim policy guidance addressed four topics not previously addressed in the regulations or policy guidance:
(1) the measures and breakpoints for the congestion relief criterion applicable to New Starts and Small Starts projects; (2) the evaluation and rating process for Core Capacity Improvement projects, including the measures and breakpoints for all the project justification and local financial commitment criteria applicable to those projects; (3) the prerequisites for entry into each phase of the CIG process for each type of project in the CIG program, and the requirements for completing each phase of that process; and (4) ways in which certain New Starts, Small Starts, and Core Capacity Improvement projects can qualify for ''warrants'' entitling them to automatic ratings on some of the evaluation criteria. | The Capital Investment Grant (CIG) program, often called New Starts, is a discretionary funding program for the construction of new fixed-guideway public transportation systems and the expansion of existing systems. Eligible projects include transit rail, including subway/elevated rail (heavy rail), light rail, and commuter rail, as well as bus rapid transit (BRT) and ferries.
The CIG program is one element of the federal public transportation program that is administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT). In December 2015, the CIG program was reauthorized from FY2016 through FY2020 as part of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act (P.L. 114-94). Funding is authorized at $2.3 billion per year, or about 19% of the overall federal public transportation program budget. Unlike FTA's other major programs, funding for the CIG program comes from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury, not the mass transit account of the Highway Trust Fund. CIG funding, therefore, is subject to appropriation each year. The CIG program allocates discretionary grants, whereas the other major programs apportion funds by formula.
There are four types of CIG projects:
New Starts, an operable segment of a new fixed-guideway system or an extension of an existing system that costs $300 million or more and receives $100 million or more in CIG funding. Small Starts, a new fixed-guideway project or a corridor-based BRT that costs less than $300 million and receives less than $100 million of CIG funding. Core Capacity, expansion of an existing fixed-guideway corridor to increase capacity by 10% or more. Program of Interrelated Projects, the simultaneous development of two or more New Starts, Small Starts, or Core Capacity projects, or a combination thereof.
The five key policy issues with the CIG program are the federal role in funding major transit projects, program funding, the types of projects supported, project delivery speed, and private involvement in project delivery. Although disagreements exist about federal involvement in major public transportation capital projects through the CIG program, and the appropriate level of CIG funding, no comprehensive benefit-cost studies are available on completed CIG projects to evaluate the relative success of the CIG program as federal policy.
Legislative and regulatory changes to the CIG program over the past decade have led to federal support of more BRT and streetcar projects. Critics have questioned whether some of these projects, particularly streetcars, provide enough transportation benefits to justify the costs. Legislative changes have also sought to reduce the time it takes for projects to be developed and constructed. Little is known about whether these changes have been effective. Private involvement in CIG projects through public-private partnerships (P3s) has been encouraged in federal law for many years, including changes introduced in the FAST Act. To date, however, only a few public transportation P3s involving private-sector funding have been formed. |
crs_RL30209 | crs_RL30209_0 | Most Recent Developments
On October 18, 1999, the Conference Committee approved a FY2000 CJS bill totaling $39 billion--$2.8 billion (or 7.7%)above the FY1999 appropriation and $1.3 billion below the President's request. Introduction and Overview
This report tracks legislative action by the first session of the 106th Congress on FY2000 appropriations fortheDepartments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and other related agencies (often referred to as CJSappropriations). Congress appropriated $36.2 billion for these agencies in FY1999 ( P.L. 4328 ). (6) The law approves total funding of $39.63 billion which is about $625 million above the level initially approved byCongress, $3.4 billion (or 9.5%) above FY1999 appropriation and $920 million below the President's request. Changing the focus and levels of appropriations for DOJ's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). Determining the level of INS detention capacity necessary to comply with the statutory mandate that certain criminal aliens be detained until deported;
The payment of arrears to the United Nations. Other issues that received attention include the following. Determining the severity of INS budget overruns in FY1999 due to overhiring in FY1998 and other mandatory costs, e.g., rents and telecommunications. Meeting the statutory mandate that the Border Patrol be increased by 1,000 agents in FY2000. Department of Commerce:
Progress made in the streamlining and downsizing of Department programs and operations. Increased funding for embassy security overseas. How much funding to appropriate for the Supreme Court's building improvement program. Adequacy of funding for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, given a rapidly growing workload of civil rights cases. A second CJS bill approved by Conference ( H.Rept.106-479 )included in H.R. 3194 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2000, was passed by the House onNovember 18, and the Senate on November 19, 1999. The number for the CJS bill is H.R. The President signed the bill into law on November 29, 1999 ( P.L.106-113 ; 113 Stat. 2 H.R, 3421 is included in Division B of H.R. 3194 , Section 1000(a), H.Rept. 1501). Majorissuesincluded: extending the 1994 Crime Act funding beyond FY2000 under the Violent Crime Reduction Fund,eliminatingmost funding for Title III crime prevention programs, funding for programs that would reduce violence in schoolsand thatwould address missing children under the Safe Schools Initiatives, the adequacy of Immigration and NaturalizationServicefunding and the possible need for reorganizing the federal immigration system; the downsizing of CommerceDepartmentprograms, funding and sampling needs for the decennial census, the use of federal funds to support industrialtechnology,and implementing the modernization of the National Weather Service; the funding controversy regarding U.S.contributionsto international organizations (particularly the payment of arrears to the United Nations) and U.S. peacekeepingoperations, the reorganization of foreign policy agencies and a $3 billion advance appropriations request from theAdministration forembassy security in FY2001-2005; the adequacy of funding to maintain essential services and security in the lowercourts;the merits of a pay increase for federal judges; how to contain the growing costs of the Judiciary's Defender Servicesaccount; and whether to increase funding to compensate court-appointed defense attorneys in federal criminal cases. For FY2000, H.R. ForFY2000,the bill passed by the House ( H.R. 106-283 ). Legal Services Corporation (LSC). Both the House and the Senate approvedtheConference Committee recommendation. 2670 was vetoed by the President on October 25, 1999. Current Funding Status
The President's FY2000 budget sent to Congress on February 1, 1999, requested about $40.5 billion for these agencies,about a $4.3 billion increase or about 12% above the FY1999 total. 2452 (Royce)
A bill to dismantle the Department of Commerce. 105-277 ). | This report tracks action by the 106th Congress on FY2000 appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, andState, the Judiciary, and other related agencies (often referred to as CJS appropriations). P.L. 105-277 ( H.R. 4328 ) appropriated $36.2 billion for these agencies for FY1999. The President's FY2000 budget requested about $40.5billion for these agencies, about a $4.3 billion increase or 12% above the FY1999 total. On October 18, theConferenceCommittee approved a CJS bill for FY2000 ( H.R. 2670 , H.Rept. 106-283 ) totaling $39 billion--$2.8 billion(or 7.7%) above the FY1999 appropriation and $1.5 billion below the President's request. The bill passed CongressonOctober 20. However, the bill was vetoed by the President on October 25. A second CJS bill approved byConference( H.Rept. 106-479 ) and included in H.R. 3194 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2000, was passedby the House on November 18, 1999. The number for the CJS bill is H.R. 3421 which is in Division B of H.R. 3194 , Section 1000(a). The Senate passed the bill on November 19, 1999. The measure was signedintolaw by the President on November 29, 1999 ( P.L. 106-113 ; 113 Stat. 1501). The law approves total funding of$39.63billion which is about $625 million above the level initially approved by Congress, $3.4 billion (or 9.5%) aboveFY1999appropriation and $920 million below the President's request.
The major CJS appropriations issues or concerns that received attention in both the Senate and the House included thefollowing. Department of Justice: extending the 1994 Crime Act funding authorization beyondFY2000; eliminating mostfunding under the 1994 Crime Act for Title III crime prevention programs; increasing funding for drug-relatedeffortsamong the Department of Justice (DOJ) agencies; changing the focus and levels of appropriations for DOJ's OfficeofJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP); funding for programs that would reduce violence in schools;determining the level of INS detention capacity necessary to comply with the statutory mandate that certain criminalaliensbe detained until deported; determining the severity of INS budget overruns in FY1999 due to over hiring in FY1998andother mandatory costs; meeting the statutory mandate that the Border Patrol be increased by 1,000 agents inFY2000;restructuring of INS either in the form of legislative proposals to dismantle the agency or as an internal restructuringof theagency by the Administration. Department of Commerce: the progress made in streamlining anddownsizing Departmentprograms; implementation of the forthcoming decennial census; federal financial support of industrial technologydevelopment programs; and implementing new White House environmental initiatives at the National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration. Department of State: increasing funding for embassy security;reorganization of foreignpolicy agencies of State, USIA, and other foreign policy agencies; and the payment of arrears to the United Nations. TheJudiciary : level of funding required for court staff, defender services, security for the lower courts, courtadministration,and the Supreme Court's building improvements program; and the merits of increasing judges' salaries. OtherRelatedAgencies: adequacy of funding levels for the Legal Services Corporation, and the Equal EmploymentOpportunityCommission, given a rapidly growing workload of civil rights cases.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: A = American Law; G&F = Government and Finance; RSI = Resources; Science, and IndustryDivision, DSP = Domestic Social Policy Division; FTD = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade. |
crs_R45219 | crs_R45219_0 | The federal government has numerous programs to support forest management on those private forests and also public—state and local—forests. These programs are primarily administered by the Forest Service (FS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and often with the assistance of state partner agencies. The Senate and House Agriculture Committees have jurisdiction over forestry in general, forestry assistance, and forestry research programs. Congress authorized specific forestry assistance programs in the Clarke-McNary Act of 1924. The House and Senate Agriculture Committees often examine these programs in the periodic omnibus legislation to reauthorize agriculture and food policy programs, commonly known as farm bills. The 2014 farm bill repealed several programs, mostly programs whose authorizations had expired or programs that had never received appropriations. However, the 2008 farm bill expanded the definition of authorized conservation practices for agricultural conservation programs generally to include forestry practices, and thus direct federal financial assistance to private forest landowners may be feasible through the conservation programs. To be eligible to receive funds for most of the programs, each state must prepare a State Forest Action Plan, consisting of
a statewide assessment of forest resource conditions, including the conditions and trends of forest resources in the state; threats to forest lands and resources, consistent with national priorities; any areas or regions of the state that are a priority; and any multistate areas that are a regional priority; and a long-term statewide forest resource strategy , including strategies for addressing the threats to forest resources identified in the assessment; and a description of the resources necessary for the state forester to address the statewide strategy. Financial assistance is typically delivered through formula or competitive grants (with or without contributions from recipients) or cost-sharing (with varying levels of matching contributions from recipients). As an example, the Forest Health Protection program provides both types of assistance: financial assistance in the form of funding for FS to perform surveys and to control insects or diseases on state or private lands (with the consent and cooperation of the landowner) and technical assistance in the form of data, expertise, and guidance for addressing specific insect and disease infestations. Most of the assistance programs are funded through the FS's State and Private Forestry (SPF) account, although some programs are funded or allocated from other accounts or programs. Some programs have been combined for funding purposes or for administrative reasons. Funding for forestry assistance programs has declined over the past 15 years, in both real and constant dollars (see Figure 2 ). The average annual appropriation over that time, from FY2004 through FY2018, was $362.7 million, with a peak of $420.5 million in FY2010 and a low of $328.9 million in FY2017. The Administration requested $197.4 million in FY2019 and proposed to eliminate funding for seven of the programs and decreased funding for the others (see Table 2 for FY2014-FY2018 appropriations and the FY2019 budget request; more information on each program is available in the " Forest Service Assistance Programs " section of this report). Forest Service Assistance Programs
This report focuses on forestry assistance programs administered by FS. Collaborative Forest Restoration Program (CFRP)
Community Forest and Open Space Conservation Program (CFP)
Cooperative Fire Protection: State Fire Assistance (SFA)
Cooperative Fire Protection: Volunteer Fire Assistance (VFA)
Forest Health Protection (FHP): Federal Lands and Cooperative Lands
Forest Legacy Program (FLP)
Forest Stewardship Program (FSP)
International Forestry Programs
Landscape Scale Restoration Program (LSR)
Urban and Community Forestry Assistance Program (UCF)
Wood Innovation Program | The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has numerous programs to support the management of state and private forests. These programs are under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees and are often examined in the periodic legislation to reauthorize agricultural programs, commonly known as farm bills. For example, the 2014 farm bill repealed, reauthorized, or modified many of these programs. The House version of the 2018 farm bill, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018 (H.R. 2), contains a forestry title (Title VIII) that would reauthorize, modify, and establish new forestry assistance programs.
Forestry-specific assistance programs (in contrast to agriculture conservation programs that include forestry activities) are primarily administered by the USDA Forest Service (FS), with permanent authorization of funding as needed. Some programs have been combined through the appropriations process or for administration purposes. These programs generally provide technical and educational assistance such as information, advice, and aid on specific projects. Other programs provide financial assistance, usually through grants (with or without matching contributions from recipients) or cost-sharing (typically through state agencies, with varying levels of contributions from recipients). Many programs provide both technical and financial assistance.
Some of the assistance programs provide support for planning and implementing forestry and related land management practices (e.g., Forest Stewardship, Urban and Community Forestry). Other programs provide assistance for forest restoration projects that involve more than one jurisdiction and address regional or national priorities (e.g., Landscape Scale Restoration). Other programs provide support for protecting forestlands from wildfires, insects and diseases, and from converting forestland to nonforest uses (e.g., Community Forest and Open Space Conservation, Forest Legacy). The Forest Health program provides support for protecting both federal and nonfederal forests from continuing threats, although most of the funding goes to federal forests. Programs also exist to enhance state and rural wildfire management capabilities (e.g., State Fire Assistance and Volunteer Fire Assistance) and to promote the use of forest products (e.g., Wood Innovation). International Forestry is often included as a forestry assistance program, because it provides technical forestry help and because it is funded through the FS appropriations account for forestry assistance programs (State and Private Forestry).
Most of the programs provide assistance to state partner agencies. The state agencies can use the aid on state forestlands or to assist local governments or private landowners. How the states use the resources is largely at the discretion of the states, within the authorization of each program and consistent with the national priorities for state assistance established by Congress in the 2008 farm bill.
Overall funding for the Forest Service's forestry assistance programs in FY2018 was $355.1 million, an 8% increase over FY2017 funding of $328.9 million. The Trump Administration requested $197.4 million in funding for FY2019. Overall funding has declined over the past 15 years, however, in both real and constant dollars. Over that time, funding for forestry assistance programs has ranged between 5% and 9% of the total annual Forest Service discretionary appropriation. |
crs_R40176 | crs_R40176_0 | Introduction
In 2010, various communities across America were hit hard by natural disasters ranging from the Tennessee and Arkansas floods to tornadoes in the Midwest and Tropical Storm Hermine in the Gulf region. When volunteers go to these disaster areas as they did when Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana and the surrounding states in 2005, questions arise as to the potential civil liability of those volunteer health professionals (VHPs)—individually licensed medical professionals who gratuitously provide medical services in response to these regions' clear need for medical skills and services. This report discusses the patchwork of federal and state laws that operate to protect volunteers generally, which can include VHPs, and those laws that trigger liability protection only for VHPs —with a focus on some of the midwestern states in addition to the Gulf region. | The devastation inflicted on the Gulf region by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008, in addition to recent disasters in the Midwest due to tornadoes and flooding, triggered mass relief efforts by local, state, and federal government agencies, as well as private organizations and individuals. As unpaid volunteers have carried out much of the relief effort, some have questioned whether such volunteers—particularly medical personnel, so-called "volunteer health professionals" (VHPs)—will be protected from potential civil liability in carrying out their duties. This report provides a general overview of the various federal and state liability protections available to VHPs responding to disasters. This report does not discuss liability of VHPs who go abroad to render assistance. |
crs_R43915 | crs_R43915_0 | In 2013, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified the changing climate (see Text Box below) as one of the 30 most significant risks facing the federal government. President Obama established adaptation as a prominent part of his Climate Action Plan, released in June 2013. The November 2013 Executive Order 13653, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change , continued the Administration's focus on federal climate change preparedness through agency and department adaptation planning. As of December 2014, more than 30 federal departments and agencies had, to varying degrees, produced climate change adaptation plans, vulnerability assessments, adaptation milestones, or adaptation performance metrics to address the potential vulnerabilities of their missions, property, operations, and/or personnel to climate change. Agency efforts identified wide-ranging vulnerabilities that could result from climate changes, as well as some opportunities. This report is not comprehensive. They are not dramatically different from updated modeling. Some instances of mainstreaming adaptation efforts in agencies are identified in a later section of this report. Synthesis of Agency Adaptation Plans and Example Actions
Almost 40 Federal Agencies Have Identified Adaptation Efforts
As of December 1, 2014, 38 federal departments and agencies had produced
initial (2012) Climate Change Adaptation Plans and, in most cases, second-round (2014) Plans; vulnerability assessments; adaptation plans with milestones; and/or metrics to evaluate adaptation performance. Agencies Are Adopting Common Approaches
CRS found that federal agencies are largely using a set of common approaches in their climate change adaptation efforts. Current budget constraints and federal budget scrutiny may not permit greater financial resources for federal adaptation actions. While the President's FY2016 budget request and other recent announcements (e.g., executive order on flooding and proposed FEMA rules) may mention adaptation (or "resilience") to climate change, most pertain to programs outside the narrow scope of this report: assessments and actions that agencies may be undertaking to address potential risks to their missions, property, operations, and personnel . For further detail or updates on climate change adaptation plans by individual agencies, the report provides contact information for CRS analysts at the end of each agency section in Part II. Some agencies are also tackling this access problem. The ability of organizations to take advantage of climate change-related information is also critical. Uncertainty
Planning and decision making in the face of uncertainty are a challenge in many fields. Congress may consider the following:
reviewing the significance and nature of the climate change risks to the federal government (including the distribution and timing of those risks); evaluating which, if any, preparations and adaptations are cost-beneficial and feasible; and assessing whether to alter specific agencies' existing authorities. Congress may act to provide federal agencies direction on whether and how adaptation efforts are to be organized and funded, and their performance measured and evaluated (e.g., effectiveness at reducing damage to property, lives, and habitat relative to the federal and private investment of an adaptation measure). Congress may consider the role, costs, and benefits of adapting federal agencies to projected climate change. 2. Analyzing the array of policy documents noted above, FEMA has committed to fulfilling a broad set of actions related to climate change adaptation, such as (but not limited to)
increasing its internal training and communications for FEMA emergency management staff on the connections between climate change and emergency management programs and functions; improving its existing cost-benefit analysis methods for post-disaster assistance programs provided through the Stafford Act, such as the Public Assistance and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, to incorporate future flood risks (e.g., sea-level rise) and other climate factors; updating risk assessment models that FEMA currently provides to accurately account for possible increases in risk due to climate change, including the Threat Hazard Identification Risk Assessment; and advance and participate in intergovernmental and "whole of community" partnerships to address specific extreme weather events that may increase in frequency and intensity with climate change, such as through the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy and the National Drought Resilience Partnerships. More detailed examples are discussed below in the individual summaries of agency climate adaptation plans. | Though Congress has debated the significance of global climate change and what federal policies, if any, should address them, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) since 2013 has identified the changing climate as one of the 30 most significant risks facing the federal government. President Obama established adaptation as a prominent part of his Climate Action Plan in June 2013. The November 2013 Executive Order 13653, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, directed agencies to undertake vulnerability assessments and planning for adaptation. The Administration aimed efforts at reducing agencies' own risks, taking advantage of "no-regrets" adaptation opportunities, and actions that promote resilience to climate changes.
Scope of Report
This report reviews current actions (as of January 2015) of selected federal departments and agencies to adapt their own missions, infrastructure, operations, and personnel to projected climate change. (It does not address federal programs meant primarily to assist others to adapt, although the boundary is often hard to delineate.) This synthesis is not comprehensive. It identifies common approaches among agencies, examples of specific actions, and notable barriers the federal government faces.
As of December 2014, almost 40 federal departments and agencies had, to varying degrees, produced climate change adaptation plans, climate change vulnerability assessments, adaptation milestones, and/or metrics to evaluate adaptation performance. These efforts have identified wide-ranging vulnerabilities to potential climate changes, as well as some opportunities.
Most agencies are in formative stages of their assessments and strategic planning. Some agencies are embarking on more detailed analyses and limited implementation actions. Overall, few examples are apparent of day-to-day agency decisions or actions that are different as a result of their adaptation efforts. Numerous challenges face federal officials in their efforts, including constrained resources, data gaps regarding location-specific climate changes or existing facilities, insufficient personnel training, and—sometimes—low priority among priorities. CRS identified few on-the-ground adaptations and few evaluations, as yet, of the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative adaptation approaches and actions.
It may not be possible to tally budgetary resources associated with federal adaptation efforts. While some are reported in the President's budget proposals, many are indivisible from the activities with which they are associated, reflecting more of a change in how efforts are undertaken than a change in level of effort.
Role of Congress
In light of agencies' risk assessments and adaptation planning, Congress may consider whether agencies have appropriate statutory authorities to take various climate change adaptation actions; how to make data pertinent to adaptation more accessible and usable by federal agencies and the public; the appropriate priority for federal adaptation efforts in the context of agency missions and budgetary constraints; and timeliness of activities. Congress may provide federal agencies direction on how they should organize and fund their adaptation efforts; whether and how to measure and evaluate program performance (e.g., effectiveness at reducing risks to property, lives, and habitats relative to the federal and private investment of an adaptation measure); and desirable reporting and accountability to Congress and the public. Congress also may assess the role, costs, benefits, and timing of adaptation in the context of discussions regarding climate change mitigation and other broad policy fields such as natural disaster, infrastructure, energy, environmental, agricultural, federal lands, defense, health, tax, and budget policies.
The President's FY2016 budget request and other related administrative announcements roughly concurrent with its release on February 2, 2015, are not addressed in this report. While the President's FY2016 budget request and other recent announcements (e.g., executive order on flooding and proposed FEMA rules) may mention adaptation (or "resilience") to climate change, most pertain to programs outside the narrow scope of this report: assessments and actions that agencies may be undertaking to address potential risks to their missions, property, operations, and personnel. For further detail or updates on climate change adaptation plans by individual agencies, the report provides contact information for CRS analysts at the end of each agency section in Part II. |
crs_R43116 | crs_R43116_0 | Overview
The growing number and modernization of ballistic missiles in the Asia-Pacific region poses a security challenge for the United States and its allies. Congress has expressed strong concern about the ballistic missile threat from both North Korea and Iran and strong interest in ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems to counter those threats. Section 229 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2013 ( P.L. Similarly, the FY2014 NDAA ( P.L. 113-291 ) encourage the United States to cooperate with regional allies on BMD issues to enhance the security of all partners. The configuration of sensors, command-and-control (C2) centers, and BMD interceptors in East Asia—in other words, the regional "architecture" of U.S. BMD—has slowly evolved in concert with contributions from treaty allies. Issues for Congress related to the evolution of U.S. BMD posture and policy in the Asia-Pacific region include
appropriations for BMD programs; the potential for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing of BMD technology to allies; the role of BMD cooperation in shaping alliance relationships and overall U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region; the effect of U.S. BMD cooperation on U.S. relations with China, North Korea, and Russia; and the possible role of U.S. BMD cooperation in influencing Chinese, North Korean, and Russian military developments. U.S. BMD Policy
The stated focus of U.S. BMD policy is to defend against limited missile strikes from so-called rogue states, namely Iran and North Korea, on the U.S. homeland or against allies and U.S. forces deployed abroad. As a matter of policy, U.S. missile defenses are not intended to alter the balance of nuclear deterrence with the major nuclear-armed states, i.e. Russia and China. North Korea's Ballistic Missile Threats
Observers believe that North Korea has a large arsenal of ballistic missiles that could reach targets in South Korea and Japan. U.S. and Allied BMD Capabilities in the Region
The responses of the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region to the threat of ballistic missiles have included political statements, policy coordination, changes to military doctrine, research and development programs, deployment of sensors, and procurement of ballistic missile interceptors and assets. The United States has an array of BMD assets already deployed in the Asia-Pacific region: SM-3 interceptors on Aegis-equipped destroyers; PAC-3 batteries at military bases in the theater; and early warning sensors in Japan, on land (AN/TPY-2), at sea (floating X-band radar), and in space. Japan . Australia . Russia has strongly criticized U.S. BMD deployments in Europe as targeted, at least partially, at Russia, and thus a danger to the strategic stability of nuclear deterrence. The potential for BMD programs in East Asia to strengthen the United States' alliance relationships in the region, which Beijing fears could be turned against China. Challenges, Risks, and Opportunities Arising from Increased BMD Cooperation
At present, U.S.-allied cooperation on BMD in the Asia-Pacific region follows the hub-and-spokes model of bilateral alliance relationships centered on the U.S. military. The United States and its allies share information and have commitments to mutual defense on a bilateral basis, but the multilateralism that underpins the European BMD architecture is largely absent. Section 1666 states,
It is the sense of Congress that—(1) the regional ballistic missile capabilities of countries such as Iran and North Korea pose a serious and growing threat to forward deployed forces of the United States, allies, and partner countries;
(2) given this growing threat, it is a high priority for the United States to develop, test, and deploy effective regional missile defense capabilities to provide the commanders of the geographic combatant commands with capabilities to meet the operational requirements of the commanders, and for allies and partners of the United States to improve their regional missile defense capabilities; ...
(5) the United States should continue to work closely with its allies in Asia, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Australia, to improve regional missile defense capabilities, particularly against the growing threat from North Korean ballistic missiles." | The growing number and modernization of ballistic missiles in the Asia-Pacific region poses a security challenge for the United States and its allies and is thus a concern for many in Congress. The United States has made ballistic missile defense (BMD) a central component of protection for forward-deployed U.S. forces and extended deterrence for allied security. The configuration of sensors, command-and-control centers, and BMD assets in the region has slowly evolved with contributions from treaty allies, primarily Japan, Australia, and South Korea.
Observers believe that North Korea has an arsenal of hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles and likely dozens of medium-range Nodong missiles; the extended-range Nodongs are considered capable of reaching Japan and U.S. bases there. Longer-range North Korean missiles appear to be under development but remain unreliable, with only one successful test out of five in the past 15 years. The U.S. intelligence community has not yet concluded that North Korea can build nuclear warheads small enough to put on ballistic missiles, but there is significant debate among experts on this question.
Congress has maintained a strong interest in the ballistic missile threat from both North Korea and Iran and in BMD systems to counter those threats. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2013 noted that East Asian allies have contributed to BMD in various ways, and it called on the Department of Defense (DOD) to continue efforts to develop and formalize regional BMD arrangements. Similarly, the FY2014 NDAA and FY2015 NDAA encourage the United States to cooperate with regional allies on BMD issues to enhance the security of all partners.
The United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region have responded to the North Korean missile threat by deploying BMD assets and increasing international BMD cooperation. The United States and Japan have deployed Aegis-equipped destroyers with Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) batteries, early warning sensors, and advanced radars to meet the threat. South Korea and Australia have relatively basic BMD capabilities with plans to improve those in the near future. Cooperation on BMD follows the hub-and-spokes model of U.S. bilateral alliance relationships in the region; the multilateralism that underpins the European BMD arrangement is largely absent. Working-level coordination is especially close among the United States, Japan, and Australia, but senior U.S. defense officials have called for greater integration of U.S. and allied BMD efforts in East Asia to improve effectiveness.
The stated focus of U.S. BMD policy is to defend against limited missile strikes from rogue states, not to alter the balance of strategic nuclear deterrence with the major nuclear-armed states. Nonetheless, Russia and China have strongly criticized U.S. BMD deployments as a threat to their nuclear deterrents, and thus a danger to strategic stability. Chinese officials and scholars make several other criticisms: that BMD is antagonizing North Korea and thus undermining regional stability; that the United States is using BMD to strengthen its alliance relationships, which could be turned against China; and that BMD is undermining China's conventional missile deterrent against Taiwan, and thus emboldening those on Taiwan who want to formalize the island's separation from China.
Specific issues for Congress raised by BMD cooperation in the Asia-Pacific include
appropriations for BMD programs; the potential for Foreign Military Sales financing of BMD technology to allies; the role of BMD cooperation in shaping alliance relationships and overall U.S. strategy in the region; the effect of U.S. BMD cooperation on U.S. relations with China, North Korea, and Russia; and the possible role of U.S. BMD cooperation in shaping military developments in those countries. |
crs_R42767 | crs_R42767_0 | 104-193 ) was its focus on requiring and promoting work and job preparation for parents (mostly single mothers) in needy families with children. That law created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, and completed a decades-long evolution in policy, from one where cash assistance was provided to families headed by single mothers to permit them to stay at home and care for their children to one of encouraging and ultimately requiring work. TANF's work rules generally date back to the 1996 welfare reform law, which was enacted following a period of growth in the welfare rolls. This report
provides a short history of work requirements in programs that provide cash assistance to needy families with children; reviews the major studies that contribute to the knowledge of what types of welfare-to-work programs are effective; discusses the TANF work provisions that apply directly to individuals and analyzes FY2011 data on engagement in work and work-related activities of adults in TANF households; discusses the TANF work participation standards that apply to states and analyzes FY2011 data on participation as they relate to those standards; and discusses some issues that Congress might consider in the future, such as how the work standards can address changing circumstances and the difficulties of measuring the performance of states in the context of a block grant. Experimental Studies
Follow-up studies to the welfare-to-work experiments of the 1980s and 1990s have yielded mixed results on new initiatives to improve program impacts. States were also subject to participation standards. The statutory purpose of TANF is to increase state flexibility to achieve the following goals:
1. provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; 2. end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; 3. prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and 4. encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. Cash welfare itself accounted for less than 30% of all TANF and MOE funds in FY2011. The next several sections of this report
provide a description of TANF work-eligible adults; briefly discuss TANF's work requirements as they apply directly to work-eligible individuals; and discuss the TANF work participation standards—the main performance measure for TANF that assesses state welfare-to-work efforts. Most are single mothers, many with young children. TANF work-eligible individuals also tend to have lower educational attainment than the population as a whole, with 41% lacking a high school diploma or equivalent. It shows that on average in a month in FY2011,
42% of all TANF work-eligible individuals (about 548,000 persons) were reported as either employed or having participated for at least one hour in a job preparation activity during the month; participation in activities among TANF work-eligible individuals was split about evenly, with 21% of work-eligible individuals employed in unsubsidized jobs and 21% otherwise engaged in work or job preparation; and the majority (58%) of work-eligible individuals were reported as having no participation in the month. However, that is not how state welfare-to-work programs are formally assessed. If a state achieves caseload reduction of 50%, its all-family standard is reduced by 50 percentage points—from 50% to 0%. The time-limited pre-employment activities of job search and readiness (10.7% of all individuals in families included in the participation rate) and vocational educational training (5.9% of such individuals) were the next most common activities . The required minimum hours per week in a month vary by the family's composition. For FY2011, the national average work participation rate was 29.5% for all families. However, some two-parent families receive assistance. Separate state programs are state programs with expenditures counted toward the TANF MOE but not considered TANF programs. TANF is a broad-based block grant to the states, with federal goals but a great deal of flexibility in meeting those goals. It was created in 1996, and it reflected the policy concerns of the 1980s and 1990s in terms of welfare receipt and dependency. Policy makers also face questions about whether the sole focus of assessing TANF ought to be its welfare-to-work performance, or whether attention should also be paid to how well TANF does in terms of meeting other goals related to improving the circumstances of families with children. | One of the central features of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant is promoting work and job preparation for parents (mostly single mothers) in families that receive cash assistance. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare law, which was the culmination of a decades-long evolution from providing single mothers "pensions" to permit them to stay home and raise children to a program focused on work. State TANF programs were influenced by research conducted during a period of much experimentation on welfare-to-work initiatives in the 1980s and early 1990s, which found that mandatory work requirements could reduce welfare receipt and increase employment among single mothers.
TANF aids some of the most disadvantaged families with children. These families are in a wide range of circumstances, and some of them are not subject to state welfare-to-work efforts. In FY2011, about 6 in 10 TANF assistance families had "work-eligible" individuals. TANF work-eligible individuals comprise in great part single mothers with young children. In FY2011, about a third of TANF work-eligible mothers were young (under the age of 24). Additionally, 40% of all work-eligible women lacked a high school diploma or the equivalent.
As a block grant to the states, TANF sets federal goals such as ending dependence of needy parents on government through work and job preparation, gives states flexibility in program design to achieve those goals, and measures the performance of states. The work requirements that actually apply to recipients are determined by the states, not by federal rules. In FY2011, 42% (monthly average) of all work-eligible adults were either working or engaged in a job preparation activity. The most common activity was working in a job while remaining on the rolls. Job search and vocational educational training followed as the second and third most common activities.
While state rules—not federal rules—determine work requirements for individual TANF recipients, federal TANF law establishes work participation standards that apply to the states and influence state program designs. The federal work standards are performance measures used to assess state TANF welfare-to-work efforts. The federal TANF work standards set target participation rates, specify activities that can be counted toward meeting the standards, and set minimum hours of engagement per week in a month for a recipient to be considered engaged in countable activities. The target participation rates vary by state: the statute sets a 50% standard for all families, but the standard is reduced by credits states may earn for caseload reduction. In FY2011, the official TANF work participation rate was 29.5%; however, all but seven states, the District of Columbia, and Guam met their all-family work standard.
The TANF work standards date back to the 1996 law, and reflect the policy concerns and the research on welfare-to-work programs of the time. Research on new welfare-to-work models since the 1996 law has yielded mixed and limited results. However, some innovations in workforce and education programs have yet to be tested within a welfare-to-work context. Policy makers also face questions about whether the sole focus of the assessment of TANF's success ought to be welfare-to-work. TANF has evolved into a program where cash assistance represents less than 30% of its funds. Policy makers thus face questions of whether consideration might be given to developing measures and assessment of how well TANF does in meeting other goals related to improving the circumstances of families with children. |
crs_R44104 | crs_R44104_0 | Introduction
Several protests around the country regarding the actions of local law enforcement officers have sparked a discussion about local law enforcement and judicial practices. In response, several Members of Congress have formulated a number of proposals designed to promote accountability and deter discrimination by state and local law enforcement and judicial officers. However, because the "[s]tates possess primary authority for defining and enforcing criminal law," the imposition of federal restrictions on such entities raises important constitutional issues: namely, the extent to which the Constitution permits the federal government to regulate the actions of state and local law enforcement and judicial officers. Many proposals condition the receipt of federal funds by local law enforcement agencies on the adoption of certain policies, for example by
establishing a federal grant program providing funds for local law enforcement agencies to acquire body-worn cameras; promoting the use of special prosecutors in cases of police-related shootings or fatalities by requiring recipient of federal funds to establish procedures to appoint them; directing law enforcement agencies that receive federal funds to conduct racial bias training for employees; providing that law enforcement officers in agencies that receive federal funds who engage in conduct constituting a crime of violence be punished for the offense under federal law; conditioning the receipt of federal funds by local law enforcement agencies on the adoption of polices that prohibit racial profiling; ending the receipt by local law enforcement of military-type weapons and equipment; and authorizing the formation of task forces to deter discrimination in local law enforcement agencies. Constitutional Limits on Congress's Power
Federalism and Enumerated Powers
The federal government possesses only limited powers. Pursuant to these foundational guidelines, current proposals to address local law enforcement issues at the federal level must be enacted consistent with a constitutionally enumerated power or powers supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause; otherwise such authority is reserved to the states. At least three constitutional provisions are likely to be relied upon for support by some of the current proposals, as they are often invoked to support similar provisions in current federal law. Pursuant to this authority, Congress may disperse funds to states contingent on compliance with specific conditions. These conditions can include the adoption of policies that Congress could not otherwise directly impose on states. Spending power legislation must be directed to the "general welfare," and conditions attached to the receipt of federal funds must be (1) "unambiguous[]" as to the "consequences of [a state's] participation," (2) related "to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs," and (3) not barred by a separate constitutional provision. Commerce Clause
While most proposals to regulate local law enforcement appear to do so under the Spending Clause or Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, legislation found to exceed Congress's authority in those areas might instead be supported by the Commerce Clause. The Constitution does, however, grant Congress the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce. First, Congress may regulate the "channels" of interstate commerce. Third, Congress may regulate activities that have a "substantial relation to interstate commerce" and intrastate economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate. Without a tether to federal funds, such legislation might be supported by Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, Congress may regulate only state and local governments under this authority, not private persons. As mentioned above, however, Congress would need to show a history of constitutional violations in order to support prophylactic legislation in this area. Consequently, a narrow remedy is more likely to be considered proportional to the constitutional violation at issue. | Several protests around the country regarding police use of force and a perceived lack of accountability for law enforcement officers have sparked a discussion about local law enforcement and judicial practices. In response, several Members of Congress have formulated a number of proposals designed to promote accountability and deter discrimination at the state and local levels. However, because the enforcement of criminal law is primarily the responsibility of state and local governments, the imposition of federal restrictions on such entities raises important constitutional issues: namely, the extent to which the Constitution permits the federal government to regulate the actions of state and local officers. Proposals include imposing restrictions on the receipt of federal funds as well as banning certain practices independently of a tether to federal money.
The federal government possesses limited powers. Current proposals to address local law enforcement issues at the federal level must be enacted consistent with a constitutionally enumerated power or powers supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause; otherwise such authority is reserved to the states. At least three constitutional provisions are often invoked to regulate state and local government under current federal laws and are likely to be relied upon by some of the current proposals.
Legislation that ties conditions to the receipt of federal funds, such as H.R. 1680, H.R. 429, and S. 1056, would likely be supported by Congress's power under the Spending Clause to provide for the general welfare. Pursuant to this authority, Congress may disperse funds to states contingent on compliance with specific conditions. These can include the adoption of policies that Congress could not otherwise directly impose on states. Conditions attached to the receipt of federal funds that regulate state and local governments must be unambiguous; relate to the federal interest in particular programs; not be barred by another constitutional provision; and not be so coercive as to compel states into participation.
In contrast, federal proposals that impose restrictions on state and local governments without a connection to federal money, such as H.R. 1933 and H.R. 2052, might be supported pursuant to the Commerce Clause or under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress possesses the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce. This includes the regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as well as activities that have a substantial relation to interstate commerce. Congressional proposals to regulate local governments passed pursuant to this power must likely be directed at economic activity that has a substantial relation to interstate commerce or be limited in application to regulating the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
Congress also possesses power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment and may enact "prophylactic legislation" intended to deter violations by proscribing a broader scope of conduct than barred by the Constitution. However, such legislation must be congruent and proportional to the injury to be remedied. In order to support legislation imposing restrictions on local law enforcement under this authority, Congress must likely show a widespread history of violations of the constitutional right to be protected. |
crs_RL34422 | crs_RL34422_0 | Legislative interest in the patent system has been evidenced by substantial discussion of omnibus reform bills. Some of the reforms considered in the 110 th Congress, but ultimately not enacted, would have impacted the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Alongside these congressional proposals, the USPTO itself has engaged in a substantial rulemaking effort in recent years. This process culminated in new rules that would make several significant changes to the patent acquisition process. First, the rules would limit the number of "claims" that can be filed in a particular patent application, unless the applicant supplies the USPTO with an "Examination Support Document" in furtherance of that application. Second, the rules would limit the number of "continued applications" that could be filed, absent a petition and showing by the patent applicant of the need for such applications. In addition, the USPTO has proposed reforms that would impose additional applicant disclosure obligations with respect to "Information Disclosure Statements" filed in support of a particular patent application. The USPTO rules concerning claims and continued applications are controversial. The USPTO has appealed this judgment. At the time of the publication of this report, this outcome of this appeal is not yet available. 1908 would have expressly provided the USPTO with regulatory authority to specify the circumstances under which a patent applicant may file a continuing application. Stated generally, a continued application is one that has been "re-filed" at the USPTO, commonly following the rejection of some or all of its claims. On the other hand, critics of the USPTO rules explain that continuation practice has a number of beneficial attributes. Legal challenges to the rules resulted in the April 1, 2008 decision in Tafas v. Dudas . There, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that the USPTO claims and continued application rules were substantive in nature. Because Congress has not granted general substantive rulemaking power to the USPTO, the District Court declared that the rules were void and therefore unenforceable. Congressional Issues and Alternatives
Should Congress conclude that the current situation with respect to the USPTO rulemaking is satisfactory, then no action need be taken. If Congress wishes to intervene, however, a number of options present themselves. One possibility would be to provide the USPTO with substantive rulemaking authority. | Congressional interest in the patent system has been evidenced by discussion of substantial reform bills in previous sessions. Alongside these congressional proposals, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has engaged in a significant rulemaking effort in recent years. This process culminated in new rules that would make several significant changes to the patent acquisition process.
First, the rules would limit the number of "continued applications" that could be filed, absent a petition and showing by the patent applicant of the need for such applications. Stated generally, a continued application is one that has been re-filed at the USPTO, commonly following an examiner's rejection. The USPTO has justified this limitation on the basis that the increasing number of continued examination filings is hampering its ability to review new applications.
Second, the rules would limit the number of "claims" that can be filed in a particular patent application, unless the applicant supplies the USPTO with an "Examination Support Document" in furtherance of that application. The USPTO asserts that these rules would lead to a more effective examination process.
Critics of the new rules contend that they will negatively impact the ability of innovators to obtain effective proprietary rights. Legal challenges to the rules resulted in the April 1, 2008 decision in Tafas v. Dudas. There, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that the USPTO claims and continued application rules were substantive in nature. Because Congress has not granted general substantive rulemaking power to the USPTO, the District Court declared that the rules were void and therefore unenforceable. The USPTO has appealed that judgment. At the time of the publication of this report, this outcome of this appeal is not yet available.
In addition, the USPTO has proposed reforms that would impose additional applicant disclosure obligations with respect to "Information Disclosure Statements" filed in support of a particular patent application. The USPTO has not yet taken action concerning this rule.
Should Congress conclude that the current situation with respect to claims and continued application practice at the USPTO is satisfactory, then no action need be taken. If Congress wishes to intervene, however, a number of options present themselves. Congress could expressly provide the USPTO with regulatory authority to specify the circumstances under which a patent applicant may file a continued application. Other possibilities include providing the USPTO with substantive rulemaking authority and more specific reforms directed to the relevant substantive provisions of the Patent Act. |
crs_R40623 | crs_R40623_0 | The revenue losses from this tax avoidance and evasion are difficult to estimate, but some have suggested that the annual cost of offshore tax abuses may be around $100 billion per year. This evasion has occurred in part because the United States does not withhold tax on many types of passive income (such as interest) paid to foreign entities; if U.S. individuals can channel their investments through a foreign entity and do not report the holdings of these assets on their tax returns, they evade a tax that they are legally required to pay. As discussed below, estimates of the revenue losses from corporate profit shifting vary substantially, ranging from about $10 billion to about $90 billion, or even higher. Several legislative proposals have been advanced that address international tax issues. 111-147 . Methods of Corporate Tax Avoidance
U.S. multinationals are not taxed on income earned by foreign subsidiaries until it is repatriated to the U.S. parent as dividends, although some passive and related company income that is easily shifted is taxed currently under anti-abuse rules referred to as Subpart F. (Foreign affiliates or subsidiaries that are majority owned U.S. owned are referred to as controlled foreign corporations, or CFCs, and many of these related firms are wholly owned.) Allocation of Debt and Earnings Stripping
One method of shifting profits from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax one is to borrow more in the high-tax jurisdiction and less in the low-tax one. These data suggest not only a significant amount of profit shifting but also a notable change. In 2010, Congress enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act (HIRE; P.L. 111-147 ). Limited Information Reporting Between Jurisdictions
In the past, the international taxation of passive portfolio income by individuals has been easily subject to evasion because there was no multilateral reporting of interest income. Estimates of the Revenue Cost of Individual Tax Evasion
A number of different approaches have been used to estimate corporate tax avoidance, however, all of these approaches rely on data reported on assets and income. Studies have estimated a significant increase in taxes from adopting formula apportionment. Foreign Tax Credits: Source Royalties as Domestic Income for Purposes of the Foreign Tax Credit Limit or Create Separate Basket; Eliminate Title Passage Rule; Restrict Credits for Taxes Producing an Economic Benefit
As noted above, one of the issues surrounding the cross-crediting of the foreign tax credit is the use of excess credits to shield royalties from U.S. tax on income that could be considered U.S. source income. Options to Address Individual Evasion
Most of the options for addressing individual evasion involve more information reporting and additional enforcement. As noted above, there is also a shift in the burden of proof for accounts with non-qualified intermediaries for filing an FBAR (Foreign Bank and Financial Account Report). Extension has been proposed by numerous commentators, is supported by the IRS officials and is included in the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, proposals discussed by the Senate Finance Committee, and proposals made by President Obama. The HIRE Act ( P.L. 111-226 . Provisions Affecting Multinational Corporations and Other Tax Law Changes
Hybrid Entities and Check-the-Box (FY2010 Budget Only)
The most significant provision in the FY2010 budget, based on revenue gain, is a revision directed at hybrid entities and check-the-box. A portion of overall deductions, such as interest, that reflect the share of foreign deferred income, would be disallowed until the income is repatriated. Provisions Relating to Individual Tax Evasion, Not Enacted in the HIRE Act
The President's proposals included a number of provisions relating to individual evasion, including reporting of information, withholding, and various penalties. Provisions in the Stop Tax Haven Abuse that are addressed in the HIRE Act ( P.L. Additional Proposals in the 113th Congress
A number of bills introduced in the 113 th Congress would have made a variety of changes in the tax law affecting the treatment of foreign source income. | Addressing tax evasion and avoidance through use of tax havens has been the subject of a number of proposals in Congress and by the President. Actions by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the G-20 industrialized nations also have addressed this issue. In the 111th Congress, the HIRE Act (P.L. 111-147) included several anti-evasion provisions, and P.L. 111-226 included foreign tax credit provisions directed at perceived abuses by U.S. multinationals. Numerous legislative proposals to address both individual tax evasion and corporate tax avoidance have been advanced.
Multinational firms can artificially shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions using a variety of techniques, such as shifting debt to high-tax jurisdictions. Because tax on the income of foreign subsidiaries (except for certain passive income) is deferred until income is repatriated (paid to the U.S. parent as a dividend), this income can avoid current U.S. taxes, perhaps indefinitely. The taxation of passive income (called Subpart F income) has been reduced, perhaps significantly, through the use of hybrid entities that are treated differently in different jurisdictions. The use of hybrid entities was greatly expanded by a new regulation (termed check-the-box) introduced in the late 1990s that had unintended consequences for foreign firms. In addition, earnings from income that is taxed often can be shielded by foreign tax credits on other income. On average, very little tax is paid on the foreign source income of U.S. firms. Ample evidence of a significant amount of profit shifting exists, but the revenue cost estimates vary substantially. Evidence also indicates a significant increase in corporate profit shifting over the past several years. Recent estimates suggest losses that may approach, or even exceed, $100 billion per year.
Individuals can evade taxes on passive income, such as interest, dividends, and capital gains, by not reporting income earned abroad. In addition, because interest paid to foreign recipients is not taxed, individuals can evade taxes on U.S. source income by setting up shell corporations and trusts in foreign haven countries to channel funds into foreign jurisdictions. There is no general third-party reporting of income as is the case for ordinary passive income earned domestically; the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relies on qualified intermediaries (QIs). In the past, these institutions certified nationality without revealing the beneficial owners. Estimates of the cost of individual evasion have ranged from $40 billion to $70 billion. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA; included in the HIRE Act, P.L. 111-147) introduced required information reporting by foreign financial intermediaries and withholding of tax if information is not provided. These provisions became effective only recently, and their consequences are not yet known.
Most provisions to address profit shifting by multinational firms would involve changing the tax law: repealing or limiting deferral, limiting the ability of the foreign tax credit to offset income, addressing check-the-box, or even formula apportionment. President Obama's proposals include a proposal to disallow overall deductions and foreign tax credits for deferred income, along with a number of other restrictions. Changes in the law or anti-abuse provisions have also been introduced in broader tax reform proposals. Provisions to address individual evasion include increased information reporting and provisions to increase enforcement, such as shifting the burden of proof to the taxpayer, increased penalties, and increased resources. Individual tax evasion is the main target of the HIRE Act, the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, and some other proposals. |
crs_RL31669 | crs_RL31669_0 | Further efforts regardingpublic outreach, enhancing treatment and prophylaxis through federal initiatives, or additionalregulation of materials used in developing chemical, biological, and toxin weapons are areaspolicymakers may revisit as preventative approaches to reduce the enhanced terror aspect of theseweapons
This report provides a general overview of chemical, biological, and toxin weapons and their treatment; a summary of why some of these weapons may be more attractive to terrorist groups thanconventional weapons; select aspects of the current response against chemical, biological and toxinterrorism; and potential options towards lessening these weapons' impact. Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons
The widespread public unease following the anthrax mailings and the continued concernregarding possible terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical, biological, orradiological - have highlighted the potential these weapons may have to a terrorist group. Some biological weapons are contagious pathogens, such as smallpox, and havethe potential to spread the effects of an attack by traveling from victim to victim. Symptoms from toxinexposure typically occur on a timescale intermediate between chemical and biological weapons,generally appearing over the course of several hours. Medical Treatment for Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons' Effects
Chemical, biological, and toxin weapons also differ in their medical treatment and theavailability of effective prophylaxis. Because of the large range of potential effects caused by chemicalweapons, there is no universal treatment for chemical weapon exposure. Additionally, biological weapons can be engineered, with some effort, in a laboratory to be resistantto specific countermeasures. The use of chemical, biological, or toxin weapons in terror attacks could complicate emergency response due to the need to establish special care facilities for the victims, such as decontaminationareas, and the need to protect first responders from the weapon's effects. Furthermore, chemical, biological, and toxin weapons may produce a wide array of effects. (33) A registration system for researchers andfacilities possessing select agents (34) has beendeveloped by the Department of Health and HumanServices, and additional restrictions regarding access to these agents have been made law. This act created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which has theprimary mission of preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, reducing national terrorismvulnerability, and minimizing damage and aiding in recovery from attacks. The National Academy of Sciences has completed projects related to chemical, biological, and toxin based terrorism. (45)
Directed Public Health Funding
One suggestion would be to continue increased funding to the public health system and law enforcement, in order to provide greater hospital capacity, trained medical and mental healthpersonnel, increased screening and surveillance, and sufficient equipment in the case of a chemical,biological, or toxin terrorist attack. | The catastrophic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax mailings have sensitized the nation to acts of domestic terror. The confirmation of terrorist interest inweapons of mass destruction and the vulnerability of the United States to such attack havehighlighted the potential that these weapons may be used as weapons of terror. The framework ofweapons of mass destruction (WMD) includes chemical, biological, and toxin weapons.
Chemical, biological, and toxin weapons can produce mass casualties if effectively disseminated, but have varying and different effects. Chemical weapons, predominantly man-madechemicals, require the largest amounts of material to be effective and cause their effects in minutesto hours. Biological weapons made of naturally occurring pathogens require the least material to beeffective, but generally have an incubation period of several days before symptoms show themselves. Toxin weapons, such as ricin, chemical agents formed by biological processes, are intermediatebetween the two in both amount and timescale. Treatment protocols for chemical, biological, andtoxin weapons vary by agent, ranging from weapons with effective treatment and prophylaxis toweapons which have no known cure nor protection.
Chemical, biological, and toxin weapons pose additional concerns beyond mass casualties. These weapons may contaminate the area in which they are used, emergency vehicles, and firstresponders. The wide array of potential symptoms from chemical, biological, and toxin weaponsmakes identification of the causal agent difficult and complicates treatment. Additionally, publicfears relating to disease and poisoning could increase the effect of a chemical, biological, or toxinattack, as worried, unexposed people request treatment from medical facilities. In extreme cases,public hysteria has been postulated as an outcome from mass dissemination.
Several initiatives are underway to reduce the potential value of chemical, biological, and toxin weapons. One approach has been through funding significant increases in the public health system'spreparedness and response capacity. Additionally, facilities and researchers possessing "selectagents" have been registered in a national database. Non-governmental agencies, such as theNational Academy of Sciences, and professional societies have also been active in developingpolicies and options to lower the threat of terrorist attack.
Potential options to further decrease the odds of chemical, biological, and toxin terrorism include regulating and registering domestic purchase of "dual-use" equipment; further developmentof the public health system; federal incentives for research and development into chemical,biological, and toxin medicines, vaccines, countermeasures and detectors; informational publicoutreach programs to properly inform the public about the risks involved; and voluntary mediacodes. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R42854 | crs_R42854_0 | The federal role for mitigating weather risk is primarily through federal crop insurance and a suite of agricultural disaster assistance programs to address a producer's crop or livestock production loss. These programs offer financial and technical assistance to producers to repair, restore, and mitigate damage on private land. Agricultural land assistance programs include the Emergency Conservation Program (ECP), the Emergency Forest Restoration Program (EFRP), and the Emergency Watershed Protection (EWP) program. In addition to these programs, USDA also has flexibility in administering other programs that allow for support and repair of damaged cropland in the event of an emergency. This report describes these emergency agricultural land assistance programs. Emergency Conservation Program
Purpose, Activities, and Authority
The Emergency Conservation Program (ECP) assists landowners in restoring land used in agricultural production when damaged by a natural disaster. Participants are limited to $200,000 per natural disaster. Funding and Allocation
Funding for ECP varies widely from year to year. Emergency Forest Restoration Program (EFRP)
Purpose, Activities, and Authority
The Emergency Forest Restoration Program (EFRP) provides cost-share assistance to private forestland owners to repair and rehabilitate damage caused by natural disasters on nonindustrial private forest land. The program is administered by FSA. Emergency Watershed Protection (EWP) Program
Purpose, Activities, and Authority
The Emergency Watershed Protection (EWP) program assists sponsors, landowners, and operators in implementing emergency recovery measures for runoff retardation and erosion prevention to relieve imminent hazards to life and property created by natural disasters. The EWP is administered by both USDA's Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and the U.S. Forest Service (USFS). The easements are meant to safeguard lives and property from future floods, drought, and the consequences of erosion through the restoration and preservation of the land's natural values. USDA holds all EWP floodplain easements in perpetuity. The Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 farm bill, P.L. Conservation Programs
In addition to the authorized land assistance programs, USDA uses a number of existing conservation programs to assist with rehabilitating land following natural disasters. Since most agricultural land assistance programs do not receive the level of attention that triggers a standalone supplemental appropriation bill, annual appropriation bills are increasingly seen as a vehicle for funding these programs. The timing of annual appropriations bills may not coincide with natural disasters and the subsequent requests for assistance. However, despite this flexibility, the inconsistent funding has left some agricultural land assistance programs without funding during times of high request volume. The variability of funding for agricultural land rehabilitation has led some to suggest that these programs have been left behind in favor of providing assistance for crop and livestock production loss rather than for land rehabilitation and natural resources degradation. Stafford Act Limitations
The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25 ) limits emergency supplemental funding for disaster relief. Under Section 251(b)(2)(D) of the BCA, funding used for disaster relief must be used for activities carried out pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288 ) for FY2012 through FY2021. This means funds appropriated through emergency supplemental acts for disaster relief through FY2021 may apply only to activities with a Stafford Act declaration. Since emergency agricultural land assistance programs do not normally require a federal disaster declaration from either the President or a state official, the Stafford Act requirement has become a limiting factor in the way agricultural land assistance programs work, potentially assisting fewer natural disaster events. | The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers several permanently authorized programs to help producers recover from natural disasters. Most of these programs offer financial assistance to producers for a loss in the production of crops or livestock. In addition to the production assistance programs, USDA also has several permanent disaster assistance programs that help producers repair damaged crop and forest land following natural disasters. These programs offer financial and technical assistance to producers to repair, restore, and mitigate damage on private land. These emergency agricultural land assistance programs include the Emergency Conservation Program (ECP), the Emergency Forest Restoration Program (EFRP), and the Emergency Watershed Protection (EWP) program. In addition to these programs, USDA also has flexibility in administering other programs that allow for support and repair of damaged cropland in the event of an emergency.
Both ECP and EFRP are administered by USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA). ECP assists landowners in restoring agricultural production damaged by natural disasters. Participants are paid a percentage of the cost to restore the land to a productive state. ECP is available only on private land, and eligibility is determined locally. EFRP was created to assist private forestland owners to address damage caused by a natural disaster on nonindustrial private forest land.
The EWP program and the EWP floodplain easement program are administered by USDA's Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and the U.S. Forest Service (USFS). The EWP program assists sponsors, landowners, and operators in implementing emergency recovery measures for runoff retardation and erosion prevention to relieve imminent hazards to life and property created by a natural disaster. In some cases this can include state and federal land. The EWP floodplain easement program is a mitigation program that pays for permanent easements on private land meant to safeguard lives and property from future floods, drought, and the consequences of erosion.
Funding for emergency agricultural land assistance varies greatly from year to year. Since most agricultural land assistance programs do not receive the level of attention that triggers a standalone supplemental bill, annual appropriation bills are increasingly seen as a vehicle for funding these programs. The timing of annual appropriation bills may not coincide with natural disasters, thus leaving some programs without funding during times of high request volume. This irregular funding method has led some to suggest the authorization of permanent mandatory funding similar to what was authorized in the Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 farm bill, P.L. 113-79) for agricultural disaster assistance programs that support crop and livestock production loss.
Restrictions placed on supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance have changed the way the agricultural land assistance programs allocate funding, potentially assisting fewer natural disasters. Language in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) limits to the use of emergency supplemental funding for disaster relief. Specifically, funding used for disaster relief must be used for activities carried out pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288) for FY2012 through FY2021. This means funds appropriated through emergency supplemental acts for disaster relief for these 10 years may apply only to activities with a Stafford Act designation (generally requiring a federal disaster declaration from either the President or a state official). Since emergency agricultural land assistance programs do not normally require a federal disaster declaration, the Stafford Act requirement has become a limiting factor in the way agricultural land assistance programs work, potentially assisting fewer natural disaster events. |
crs_R41478 | crs_R41478_0 | The U.S. refining industry faces a number of new policies that could force downward pressure on refinery numbers, capacity, or utilization:
Tighter Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) and vehicle greenhouse gas standards; the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS); natural gas as a transportation fuel; and EPA Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting. This report reviews the current production capacity of the refineries operating in the United States, and the sources and changes in their crude oil supply. Refining Capacity
After a volatile decade marked by record crude oil prices and profit margins, U.S. refiners now face the prospect of possibly long-term decreased demand for their products. A decade ago, 158 refineries operated in the United States and its territories. Despite permanent closures, operable refining capacity has increased over the past decade from 16.5 million barrels/day to approximately 18 million barrels/day. CRS count does not include refineries that primarily produce lubricating oils, or asphalt. The United States met roughly 39% of its crude oil demand in 2011 through domestic production ( Figure 8 ). This does not include natural gas needed in various refining processes, nor natural gas and petroleum condensates that are sold directly to retail markets (for example, propane and butane). In total, the United States meets 62% of its demand from crude oil produced in North America. Canada has become the United States' leading imported crude oil supplier through its increasing production from oil sands. Until quite recently, the diminishing supply of light sweet crude oil led U.S. refineries to make multi-million dollar investments in processing-upgrades to convert lower-priced heavier sour crude oils to high-value products such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Newly available light sweet crudes from the North Dakota's Bakken formation are changing refining dynamics in some regions of the United States. In the longer term, even with more rapid growth in income, the outlook for the gasoline demand in the United States will be constrained by changing attitudes toward petroleum usage, regulations to increase automobile fuel efficiency standards, and regulations mandating the expanded use of alternative fuels in motor transportation. Refinery Investment and Petroleum Product Imports
While imports of crude oil have been an important part of the U.S. energy supply picture for decades, the importance of petroleum product imports also rose before the recession and expansion of U.S. crude oil production. Recently motor-fuel demand has declined due both to economic factors and increased use of ethanol and other biofuels. These policies were intended, in part, to address the growing demand for refined petroleum products. Now, though, combined with the prospect of declining motor fuel demand overall, the use of more renewable fuels could influence operators to idle, consolidate, or permanently close refineries. In response to the Clean Air Act, refineries had to add processes that converted the H2S to elemental sulfur. Reformulated Gasoline . | A decade ago, 158 refineries operated in the United States and its territories and sporadic refinery outages led many policy makers to advocate new refinery construction. Fears that crude oil production was in decline also led to policies promoting alternative fuels and increased vehicle fuel efficiency. Since the summer 2008 peak in crude oil prices, however, the U.S. demand for refined petroleum products has declined, largely due to the economic recession, and the outlook for the petroleum refining industry in the United States has changed.
In response to weak demand for gasoline and other refined products, refinery operators have begun cutting back capacity, idling, and, in a few cases, permanently closing their refineries. By current count, 115 refineries now produce fuel in addition to 13 refineries that produce lubricating oils and asphalt. Even as the number of refineries has decreased, operable refining capacity has actually increased over the past decade, from 16.5 million barrels/day to over 18 million barrels/day. Cyclical economic factors aside, U.S. refiners now face the potential of long-term decreased demand for their products. Legislative and regulatory efforts that originally intended to address the growing demand for petroleum products may now displace some of that demand. These efforts include such policies as increasing the volume of ethanol in the gasoline supply, improving vehicle fuel efficiency, and encouraging the purchase of vehicles powered by natural gas or electricity.
The United States met roughly 39% of its crude oil demand in 2011 through domestic production, exclusive of the natural gas needed in various refining processes. Canada has become the United States' leading supplier of crude oil through its increasing production from oil sands providing roughly 15% of U.S. demand. In total, the United States meets 62% of its demand from crude oil produced in North America. Over the last few decades, imported crude oils have become heavier and higher in average sulfur content. Until quite recently, the diminishing supply of light sweet crude oil led U.S. refineries to make multi-million dollar investments in processing-upgrades to convert lower-priced heavier sour crude oils to high-value products such as gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.
Some key environmental and energy policies enacted over the past few decades directly or indirectly affect the operations of U.S. refineries and the market for petroleum products. These include requirements for the use of reformulated gasoline (RFG) in many areas of the country, mandates under the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), increasingly stringent vehicle efficiency standards, and greenhouse gas limits under the Clean Air Act and state laws.
Declining motor-fuel demand spurred by both market and regulatory forces has influenced some refinery operators to idle, consolidate, or permanently close refineries. However, newly available light sweet crudes from North Dakota, Texas, and Ohio are changing refining economics in some regions of the United States. |
crs_RS22017 | crs_RS22017_0 | What Are Special Operations and Paramilitary Operations? In this report, the term "paramilitary operations" will be used for operations conducted by the CIA whose officers and employees are not part of the armed forces of the United States. 99-661 , 10 U.S.C. 9/11 Report Recommendations6
Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission report states: "Lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. The 9/11 Commission's basis for this recommendation appears to be both performance and cost-based. In June of 2005 it was reported that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency responded to the President, stating that "neither the CIA nor DOD endorses the commission's recommendation on shifting the paramilitary mission or operations." | The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations should be shifted from the CIA to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The President directed the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence to review this recommendation and present their advice by mid-February 2005, but ultimately, they did not recommend a transfer of paramilitary responsibilities. This Report will briefly describe special operations conducted by DOD and paramilitary operations conducted by the CIA and discuss the background of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. For additional information see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS22655 | crs_RS22655_0 | This report provides a brief overview of the juvenile justice grant programs and the overall appropriation administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). Juvenile Justice Legislation and Grant Programs
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) was first passed by Congress in 1974 and was most recently reauthorized in 2002 by the 21 st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act. 107-273 ); however, it has continued to receive appropriations each subsequent fiscal year. Juvenile Justice Appropriations
Figure 1 shows overall appropriations for juvenile justice programs within DOJ. This juvenile justice appropriation includes funding allocated within the purview of the JJDPA, as well as other grant programs that are administered by OJJDP but that are not within the JJDPA. Funding for juvenile justice programs continued to decline in FY2012. Juvenile justice funding continued to decline in FY2014; through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. Most recently, through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ), Congress increased juvenile justice funding and appropriated nearly $270.2 million for these programs for FY2016. | Although juvenile justice has always been administered by the states, Congress has had significant influence in the area through funding for grant programs administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP). The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974, P.L. 93-415, was the first comprehensive juvenile justice legislation passed by Congress. Since 1974, the act has undergone several key amendments, including a significant reorganization enacted by P.L. 107-273 in 2002. The juvenile justice appropriation includes funding allocated within the purview of the JJDPA, as well as other grant programs that are administered by OJJDP but that are not within the JJDPA.
After the restructuring of juvenile justice grant programs in 2002, their funding, which had generally been above $500 million, began to decline. For FY2010, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) provided $424 million for juvenile justice programs within DOJ. This was the largest amount appropriated to juvenile justice programs since FY2003. From FY2010 through FY2015, juvenile justice funding declined each subsequent fiscal year. Most recently, through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), Congress increased juvenile justice funding to its highest level in five years and appropriated nearly $270.2 million for these programs for FY2016. |
crs_RL34597 | crs_RL34597_0 | Although some (and occasionally all) of the regular appropriations bills may be enacted before the fiscal year begins, in recent decades it has been common for most—if not all—of the regular appropriations bills to be enacted after the start of the fiscal year. In some recent instances—including FY2007, FY2009, FY2011, FY2013, FY2015, and FY2017—the consideration of regular appropriations bills has carried over to the following session of Congress. Eleven of the past 12 Congresses, covering the 103 rd Congress through the 114 th Congress, have concluded with a lame duck session. The enactment of appropriations measures has been an important element of most of these sessions. Although no regular or continuing appropriation measures were enacted during lame duck sessions held in 1994, 1998, 2008, and 2012, a total of 25 regular and 18 continuing appropriations measures were enacted during the 7 other lame duck sessions held in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2016. This report provides information on the enactment of regular and continuing appropriations measures in connection with lame duck sessions occurring between 1994 and 2016. Background
A lame duck session occurs during the period following Election Day, which is the Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each even-numbered year, and before the convening of a new Congress about two months later in early January. Under contemporary conditions, any meeting of Congress that occurs between a congressional election in November and the following January 3 is a lame duck session. The significant characteristic of a lame duck session is that its participants are the sitting Members of the existing Congress, not those who will be entitled to sit in the new Congress. Several factors may contribute to the occurrence of lame duck sessions, including the need to deal with unfinished business or urgent matters that have arisen suddenly. Overview of the Enactment of Appropriations Measures Before, During, and After Lame Duck Sessions
Between calendar years 1994 and 2016, lame duck sessions have in some instances afforded Congress an opportunity to complete action on regular appropriations for a fiscal year. In other instances, lame duck sessions played little or no role in this regard, as action on regular appropriations was completed well before or after a lame duck session. As was the case for the regular appropriations bills, the continuing appropriations measures were an important element in some of the lame duck sessions. In total, 46 of the 136 regular appropriations acts during this period were enacted before the beginning of the applicable lame duck session, 25 were enacted during a lame duck session, and 65 were enacted afterward. In total, 32 of the 61 CRs were enacted before the beginning of the applicable lame duck session, 18 were enacted during the lame duck session, and 11 were enacted afterward. | Eleven of the past 12 Congresses, covering the 103rd Congress through the 114th Congress, have concluded with a lame duck session. (No such session occurred in 1996, during the 104th Congress.) Under contemporary conditions, any meeting of Congress that occurs between a congressional election in November and the following January 3 is a lame duck session. The significant characteristic of a lame duck session is that its participants are the sitting Members of the existing Congress, not those who will be entitled to sit in the new Congress.
The enactment of appropriations measures has been an element of most of these lame duck sessions. Although no regular or continuing appropriations measures were enacted during lame duck sessions held in 1994, 1998, 2008, and 2012, a total of 25 regular and 18 continuing appropriations measures were enacted during the 7 other lame duck sessions held in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2016.
Although some (and occasionally all) of the regular appropriations bills for a fiscal year may be enacted before it begins, in recent decades it has been common for at least some of the regular appropriations bills to be enacted after the start of the fiscal year. In the past, this has triggered the necessity for continuing resolutions (CRs) to extend spending authority until the annual appropriations acts have been enacted and led to the consideration of regular appropriations legislation during the last quarter of the calendar year or even during the following session.
A lame duck session occurs during the period following Election Day—which is the Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each even-numbered year—and before the convening of a new Congress about two months later in early January. Several factors may contribute to the occurrence of lame duck sessions, including the need to deal with unfinished appropriations or other budgetary matters.
This report provides information on the enactment of annual appropriations acts in the years that lame duck sessions occurred between 1994 and 2016 (FY1995, FY1999, FY2001, FY2003, FY2005, FY2007, FY2009, FY2011, FY2013, FY2015, and FY2017). Lame duck sessions have in some instances afforded Congress an opportunity to complete action on regular appropriations for a fiscal year. In other instances, lame duck sessions played little or no role in this regard, as action on regular appropriations was completed well before or after a lame duck session. In total, 46 of the 136 regular appropriations acts during this period were enacted before the beginning of the applicable lame duck session, 25 were enacted during a lame duck session, and 65 were enacted afterward.
Continuing appropriations measures were also an important element in some, but not all, of the lame duck sessions that occurred between calendar years 1994 and 2016. In total, 32 of the 61 CRs were enacted before the beginning of the applicable lame duck session, 18 were enacted during the lame duck session, and 11 were enacted afterward.
The report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_RS21193 | crs_RS21193_0 | Nasdaq stock market was originally a wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary of the nonprofit NASD, which also served as its direct regulator or self-regulatory organization (SRO). In April 2000, however, the NASD membership approved spinning off the for-profit Nasdaq from the non-profit NASD and converting it into a shareholder-owned market. The process was initially envisioned to have three broad stages: (1) issuing privately placed stock; (2) converting to technical exchange status; and (3) issuing public stock. The private placement took place in two sub-stages. On March 15, 2001, Nasdaq submitted an initial application for exchange status to the SEC, an application that the agency published for comment on June 14, 2001. On January 13, 2006, the SEC approved Nasdaq's application to become a registered national securities exchange. Nasdaq is now officially a registered an exchange, but the SEC will not permit Nasdaq to begin operations as an exchange and to fully relinquish its independence from ongoing control by the NASD until various conditions, including the following key ones, are satisfied:
Nasdaq must join the various national market system plans and the Intermarket Surveillance Group; The NASD must determine that its control of Nasdaq through its Preferred Class D share is no longer necessary because NASD can fulfill through other means its obligations with respect to non-Nasdaq exchange-listed securities under the Exchange Act; The SEC must declare certain regulatory plans to be filed by Nasdaq to be effective; and Nasdaq must file, and the Commission must approve, an agreement pursuant to Section 17d-2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that allocates to NASD regulatory responsibility with respect to certain activities of common members. | Traditionally, the Nasdaq stock market was a for-profit, but wholly-owned subsidiary of the nonprofit National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), the largest self-regulatory organization (SRO) for the securities industry. In 2000, in a strategic response to an increasingly competitive securities trading market, the NASD membership approved spinning off the for-profit NASD-owned Nasdaq and converting it into a for-profit shareholder-owned market that later planned to issue publicly traded stock. For Nasdaq, this process has involved three basic stages: (1) issuing privately placed stock; (2) converting to technical exchange status; and (3) issuing publicly-held stock. Stage one, the private placement stage has been completed. In March 2001, Nasdaq submitted an application for exchange status to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an application that has been amended several times to address certain criticisms. Obtaining exchange status is necessary for Nasdaq to proceed to stage three, the issuance of publicly held stock. Realization of that stage became much closer on January 13, 2006, when after more than a half decade, the SEC approved Nasdaq's application to become a registered national securities exchange. |
crs_R41554 | crs_R41554_0 | Introduction
Since the beginning of the 112 th Congress, convened in January 2011, the House and Senate have observed a ban on earmarks, formally known as congressionally directed spending. It then discusses how federal transportation funding is distributed with a ban in place and how Members of Congress might influence the distribution. These programs collectively distribute a relatively small portion of federal transportation funding. The rules in both houses of Congress include identical definitions of "congressionally directed spending." The rules define an earmark as
a provision or report language included primarily at the request of a [Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner, or] Senator providing, authorizing, or recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality or Congressional district, other than through a statutory or administrative formula-driven or competitive award process. This definition covers earmarks in authorization and appropriations bills as well as in committee reports. 111-8 ):
"Soft" Earmarks and "Hard" Earmarks
The definition of "congressionally directed spending item" under House and Senate rules appears to permit some "soft" transportation earmarks. Earmark Ban
In the 112 th Congress, which convened in January 2011, the House and Senate began observing an earmark ban. Most of that funding is distributed under formula programs, with projects selected by states, local governments, or transportation authorities pursuant to a federally mandated planning process at the state and local levels. DOT's direct involvement in project selection is mostly limited to the funding in the department's discretionary programs. These funds are under the control of the states. To be eligible for federal highway funding, either discretionary or formula, the projects must be included in the State Transportation Improvement Plan (STIP), which is issued by each state's department of transportation. Transit and Rail
Like highway funding, most federal transit funding is distributed by statutory funding formulas. Amtrak receives both operating and capital support. AIP discretionary funds were often earmarked substantially before the earmark ban. Transportation Spending Under an Earmark Ban
Highways, transit, and intercity passenger rail are included in a single multi-year surface transportation authorization bill, which establishes programs and sets authorized spending levels. Earmarks serve as a way for Members of Congress to ensure that discretionary transportation funds are distributed according to their priorities, rather than those of the Administration, or in some cases the relevant state department of transportation. One alternative to earmarks is more detailed legislative language to govern the allocation of funds. Members of the appropriations committees can improve the chances that a specific project will be funded without earmarking by increasing the amount of funding provided to a particular program. | In the 112th Congress, which convened in January 2011, the House and Senate began observing an earmark ban. Earmarks—formally known as congressionally directed spending—directed a significant amount of federal transportation spending prior to the ban. This report discusses how federal highway, transit, rail, and aviation funding were distributed before and after the earmark ban, and how Members of Congress might influence the distribution with a ban in place.
The rules in both houses of Congress include identical definitions of "congressionally directed spending." The rules define an earmark as
a provision or report language included primarily at the request of a [Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner, or] Senator providing, authorizing, or recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for a contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality or Congressional district, other than through a statutory or administrative formula-driven or competitive award process.
This definition covers earmarks in authorization and appropriations bills as well as in committee reports.
Currently, about 92% of federal highway funds and more than 75% of transit funds are distributed by statutory formulas. The use of formula highway funds is under the control of the states. The bulk of formula transit funding is under the control of local governments and public transit agencies. Most federal funding for aviation is for operation of the air traffic control system and safety-related programs, and generally has not been earmarked. Most aviation infrastructure spending is distributed according to priorities set forth in national plans, but a small percentage was available for earmarking prior to 2011. Most rail funding goes to Amtrak to operate national intercity passenger service. Federal funding for maritime purposes is directed by statute and has not been earmarked.
Most of the remaining federal transportation funding is distributed under discretionary programs. U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) discretionary funds are typically distributed through a competitive grant-making process, within guidelines established by Congress and DOT. In practice, however, much of this funding was earmarked by Congress prior to 2011. The precise share of federal transportation dollars that was spent on earmarks cannot readily be calculated, but, according to a DOT Inspector General report, in FY2006 approximately 13% of DOT's total budgetary resources were earmarked.
Banning earmarks has not eliminated the opportunity for Members to influence the allocation of transportation resources. The funding formulas and eligibility rules in authorization bills can be shaped to favor particular states, congressional districts, and projects. The definition of "congressionally directed spending" under House and Senate rules appears to permit some "soft" earmarks, which do not specify a place or amount of funding. Without earmarking, Members can continue to call or write DOT in support of projects. Members may also seek to influence the priority a project receives under mandated state and local planning procedures, which can increase the likelihood of federal funding without an earmark. Members can also attribute their support for transportation authorizations to federally funded projects in their districts or states generally. |
crs_R41306 | crs_R41306_0 | As international trade law has developed, there has been interplay between domestic and global trade law. Initially, international trade agreements focused on tariffs, but, over time, they have broadened to encompass aspects of domestic policymaking and establish fairly stringent dispute settlement mechanisms. This report provides an overview of the legal framework that governs trade-related measures. This framework is composed of both international agreements and domestic laws. The particular agreements and statutes selected for this report are those that are most commonly implicated by U.S. trade interests and policy. This report is not intended to be a comprehensive review of trade law. Accordingly, this report first discusses international trade agreements and then turns to domestic law. The United States has international trade obligations under (1) the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, which include the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and other "covered agreements"; (2) its own free trade agreements; and (3) other international agreements with narrower policy goals, such as the conservation of natural resources. Each round of talks sought to liberalize new markets, lower tariffs, and identify solutions to different kinds of trade barriers. Other GATT articles may be implicated by the imposition of quantitative restrictions. Possible safeguards include quotas, tariffs, and tariff rate quotas. Used as a framework for U.S. trade agreements by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the model FTA is roughly based on NAFTA and the WTO Agreements but has evolved with congressional involvement and shifting U.S. priorities. Most recently, the model FTA has evolved to include electronic commerce obligations. Whereas Congress was initially only concerned with the conditions under which an import could enter the U.S., it has, over time, used its authority over international trade to regulate virtually all areas of trade policy, including how the Executive negotiates a trade agreement, how a negotiated trade agreement can be implemented, how domestic industries can obtain "remedies" for injury resulting from import competition, and how trade sanctions can be imposed. Separation of Powers in Practice: Fast Track and Trade Remedies
The following historical overview of two commonly discussed legal issues in international trade (fast track authority and import competition) illustrates how Congress and the executive branch have exercised their constitutional authorities over aspects of trade policy in response to changing concerns. The USTR also oversees the administration of other aspects of U.S. trade law, including the Generalized System of Tariff Preferences (commonly called the GSP), which permits duty-free entry for imports from developing countries, and telecommunications reviews under Section 1377. United States International Trade Commission
The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) is an independent federal agency with broad investigative responsibilities. United States Customs and Border Protection
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is a part of the Department of Homeland Security. Part IV: Selected Federal Statutes Regulating International Trade
Trade Remedy Laws
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Remedies for Violations of Trade Agreements and Other Inconsistent or Unjustifiable Foreign Trade Practices
Sections 301 through 310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (commonly referred to as "Section 301") require the USTR to impose trade sanctions on foreign countries that either (1) violate trade agreements, (2) have acts, policies, or practices that are inconsistent with a trade agreement, or (3) have acts, policies, or practices that are unjustifiable and burden U.S. commerce. Their investigations commence when an interested party files a countervailing duty petition with both ITA and the ITC alleging that an industry in the United States is materially injured or threatened by reason of the sale of subsidized imports in the United States at less than their fair value. However, sanctions, like other trade measures, must be crafted to comply with not only domestic laws but also principles of customary international law and WTO obligations. | The United States has trade obligations under multilateral trade agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the other World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, as well as bilateral and regional trade agreements. A variety of domestic laws implement these agreements, prescribe U.S. trade policy goals, or regulate international trade to achieve specific foreign policy objectives. This report provides an overview of both international and domestic trade law, focusing on a select group of international agreements and statutes that are most commonly implicated by U.S. trade interests and policy.
Historically, parties to international trade agreements were obligated to reduce two kinds of trade barriers: tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. Whereas the former may hinder an imported product's ability to compete in a foreign market by imposing an additional cost on the product's entry into the market, the latter has the potential to bar an import from entering that market altogether by, for example, restricting the number of such imports that can enter the market or imposing prohibitively strict packaging and labeling requirements. Consequently, at their most basic, international trade agreements obligate their parties to convert at least some of their non-tariff trade barriers into tariffs, set a ceiling on the tariff rates for particular products, and then progressively reduce those rates over time. However, over time, U.S. trade agreements have become increasingly complex. The U.S. model free trade agreement now targets not only tariffs and non-tariff barriers, but also domestic policies in areas such as labor, environmental law, and electronic commerce that U.S. policymakers consider unfair trade practices. Trade agreements have also evolved to include elaborate trade dispute settlement mechanisms. As illustrated in this report, the typical international trade agreement today disciplines its parties' use of tariffs and trade barriers, authorizes its parties to use discriminatory trade measures to remedy certain unfair trade practices, and establishes a dispute settlement body.
Domestic trade laws, meanwhile, can broadly be classified as laws (1) authorizing trade remedies, including remedies for violations of trade agreements, countervailing duties for subsidized imports, and antidumping duties for imports sold at less than their normal value, (2) setting domestic tariff rates and providing special duty-free or preferential tariff treatment for certain products, and (3) authorizing the imposition of trade sanctions to protect U.S. security or achieve foreign policy goals. In addition to describing these domestic laws, this report summarizes the constitutional authorities of Congress and the executive branch over international trade. Finally, the report identifies many of the federal agencies and entities charged with overseeing the development of new trade agreements and the administration and enforcement of federal trade laws. Among the federal agencies and entities discussed are the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the International Trade Administration (ITA), the International Trade Commission (ITC), the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the United States Court of International Trade (CIT).
This report is not intended as a comprehensive review of trade law. It is an introductory overview of the legal framework governing trade-related measures. The agreements and laws selected for discussion are those most commonly implicated by U.S. trade interests, but there are U.S. trade laws and obligations beyond those reviewed in this report. |
crs_98-486 | crs_98-486_0 | Requirements of � 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)
The text of � 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act under discussion here providesas follows:
Except as provided in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6), in the event that the President determines that any country, after the effective date of partB of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 --
(B) is a non-nuclear-weapon-state and either --
(i) receives a nuclear explosive device, or
(ii) detonates a nuclear explosive device,
then the President shall forthwith report in writing his determination to the Congress and shall forthwith impose the sanctions describedin paragraph (2) against that country. (12)
Details of � 102(b) Sanctions Imposed on India and Pakistan
After conducting an inter-agency review to develop a comprehensive sanctions policywith respect to India and Pakistan, the Administration announced its original implementation scheme for the two countries June 18, 1998. Provisions of P.L. (19)
Government credits, credit guarantees, and other financial assistance: The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) had issued notices terminating new business in India andPakistan prior to the Administration's June 18 announcement. (30) As notedearlier, the prohibition's exemption for agricultural commodities was legislatively expandedin July 1998 to include fertilizer. (35)
1998 Sanctions Relief Legislation
Concern over the lack of an exemption for food and agricultural products in the �102(b)(2)(D) prohibition on government credits, guarantees, and financing led to the July 14,1998, enactment of the Agriculture Export Relief Act (AERA), P.L. (39)
The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (IPRA), enacted October 21, 1998, authorized the President to waive "for a period not to exceed one year upon enactment" all or part of the� 102(b) sanctions imposed on India or Pakistan related to FAA and governmental financialassistance, international financial assistance, and private bank loans, as well as all or part ofthe following: � 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, prohibiting military assistance toPakistan based on its nuclear activities (Pressler Amendment); � 2(b)(4) of the Export-ImportBank Act, generally restricting financing based on the detonation of a nuclear device; and �101 of the AECA, which prohibits certain FAA and AECA assistance to countries engagedin nuclear enrichment transfers. 2561 , the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000. The new law, P.L. 106-79 , � 9001, authorizes the President to waive, without time limitation, all of the sanctions contained in �� 101 or 102 of the AECA, the nuclear-relatedrestriction in � 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act, and � 620E(e) of the ForeignAssistance Act (Pressler Amendment), as these apply to India or Pakistan. The Presidentmay waive military and export control sanctions in � 102(b)(2), however, only if he certifiesto Congress that a particular restriction would not be in U.S. national security interests. On October 27, the President waived the statutory restrictions covered by the new law as applicable to specific U.S. government programs and commercial transactions. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the President, on September 22, waived � 101(b)(2) sanctions and prohibitions onexports of defense items and sensitive technology and military financing with respect to bothIndia and Pakistan, having determined that continuation of the measures would not be in U.S.national security interests. (53) He also waived anyremaining sanctions in �� 101 or 102 of theAECA, the Export-Import Bank Act, and the Pressler Amendment. 2889 (Lantos), introduced September 14, 2001, would permanently remove nuclear sanctions as they apply to India. The bill, as reported by the SenateAppropriations Committee, does not contain this additional language. The President would have been required to notify Congress before using this authority; thestatute could not have been construed to authorize the President to provide for nuclearcooperation with either country. | Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) requires the President to impose sanctions on any country that he has determined is a "non-nuclear-weapon state" andhas received or detonated a "nuclear explosive device." Sanctions include prohibitions onforeign assistance; munitions sales and licenses; foreign military financing; governmentcredits, guarantees, and financial assistance; U.S. support for multilateral financialassistance; private bank lending to the affected government; and exports of certain specificcontrolled goods and technology. Specific exceptions exist for humanitarian aid; food andagricultural exports; food assistance; private bank loans and credits for purchases of food andagricultural commodities; and certain transactions involving intelligence activities. Thestatute does not provide for terminating or suspending sanctions once imposed. ThePresident placed � 102(b) sanctions on India and Pakistan in May 1998 following nucleartests by those countries earlier that month. The statute had never before been invoked andits full implementation give rise to various legal and policy issues. After an inter-agencyreview, the Administration announced its overall implementation plan for both countriesJune 18, 1998. Concerns over the lack of an exemption for agricultural goods in �102(b)(2)'s prohibition on government credits and guarantees led to enactment of theAgriculture Export Relief Act ( P.L. 105-194 ), which exempted Department of Agricultureprograms through FY99; it also permanently exempted government financing for medicineand medical goods and allowed private loans for fertilizer exports. In October 1998,Congress authorized the President to waive for one year certain � 102(b)(2) prohibitionsapplicable to the two countries, as well as other related statutory restrictions (India-PakistanRelief Act, P.L. 105-277 ). The President exercised this authority December 1, 1998.
Congress has since authorized the President to waive indefinitely, as they apply to India and Pakistan, all sanctions imposed under �� 101 or 102 of the AECA; a nuclear-relatedrestriction in the Export-Import Bank Act; and � 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act(FAA)(Pressler Amendment), which restricts military aid and exports to Pakistan (DODAppropriations Act, 2000, P.L. 106-79 , � 9001). The President may waive military andexport control sanctions only if he certifies to Congress that applying a restriction would notbe in U.S. national security interests; any licenses for defense exports must be notified toCongress and are subject to congressional review. In October 1999, President Clintonwaived sanctions with regard to certain programs and commercial transactions specific toeach country. In August and early September 2001, both the Bush Administration andMembers of Congress began to call for removal of the sanctions, mainly as applicable toIndia; legislation to lift the measures has also been introduced. Following the September 11attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the President waived for both India andPakistan prohibitions on exports of defense items and sensitive technology and militaryfinancing, citing U.S. national security interests; also waived were any remaining sanctionsin �� 101 or 102 of the AECA, the Export-Import Bank Act, and the Pressler Amendment. Foreign assistance to Pakistan continues to be restricted because of an anti-coup provisionin appropriations legislation and other debt-related restrictions; also, three Pakistani entitiesare subject to two-year AECA missile proliferation sanctions. Legislation allowing removalof restrictions on Pakistan ( S. 1465 ) was reported by the Senate ForeignRelations Committee October 4. This report will be updated. |
crs_RL31967 | crs_RL31967_0 | The growth in federal debt held by the public and in intergovernmental accounts, such as trust funds, has periodically obliged Congress to raise the debt limit. Debt limit issues since the passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011 are discussed in more detail in CRS Report R43389, The Debt Limit Since 2011 , by [author name scrubbed]. A Brief History of the Federal Debt Limit
Origins of the Federal Debt Limit
Congress has always placed restrictions on federal debt. For example, the 1919 Victory Liberty Bond Act (P.L. Since then, Congress has enacted 78 separate measures that have altered the limit on federal debt. For instance, the debt limit was increased by $1.9 trillion ( P.L. Between then and the end of May 2002, debt subject to limit increased by another $217 billion, divided between a $117 billion increase in debt held by government accounts and a $100 billion increase in debt held by the public, putting the debt close to the $5,950 billion limit. The President signed the bill into law on June 28 ( P.L. Subsequently, the House passed an amended version of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 ( H.R. The President signed the bill on July 30 ( P.L. 110-289 ), increasing the debt limit. On October 1, 2008, the Senate voted on, and passed, a different version of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( H.R. 1424 on October 3, 2008, and it was signed into law by the President ( P.L. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) as passed by the Senate on February 10, 2009 (Division B of the Senate Substitute amendment to H.R. The final conference agreement on ARRA was passed by the House and Senate on February 13, 2009, and signed by the President on February 17, 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ). This measure contained a provision increasing the debt limit to $12,104 billion. H.R. The President signed the measure ( P.L. 111-139 ) on February 12, 2010. Secretary Geithner Invokes Extraordinary Measures in May 2011
On May 16, 2011, U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announced that the federal debt had reached its statutory limit and declared a debt issuance suspension period, which would allow certain extraordinary measures to extend Treasury's borrowing capacity until about August 2, 2011. Subsequently, on August 2, 2011, President Obama signed into law a revised compromise measure (Budget Control Act; BCA; P.L. The BCA included numerous provisions aimed at deficit reduction in tandem with provisions allowing a series of increases in the debt limit of up to $2,400 billion ($2.4 trillion) subject to certain conditions. First, the debt limit was raised by $400 billion, to $14,694 billion on August 2, 2011, following a certification of the President that the debt was within $100 billion of its legal limit. A second increase of $500 billion occurred on September 22, 2011, which was also triggered by the President's certification of August 2. Debt Limit Suspended in Early 2012
The debt limit increases permitted through the BCA were sufficient to meet federal obligations until the last day of 2012. The Senate passed the measure on January 31 on a 64-34 vote; it was then signed into law (P.L. 113-3) on February 4. Debt Limit Suspended Again as Part of Package to End Government Shutdown in October 2013
The evening before October 17, 2013, when the U.S. Treasury's borrowing capacity was projected to be exhausted, Congress passed a continuing resolution (Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014; H.R. 2775; P.L. 113-46), which ended the shutdown of the federal government that had commenced at the start of the federal fiscal year on October 1 and included a provision to suspend the debt limit until February 8, 2014. Debt Limit Reinstated in March 2015
After the suspension ended on February 7, 2014, the U.S. Treasury reset the debt limit to $17,212 billion and the Treasury Secretary invoked authorities to use various extraordinary measures. On February 11, the House approved a measure to suspend the debt limit until March 15, 2015. 113-83 ) on February 15, 2014. Extraordinary Measures Projected to Last Until Early November 2015
Once the debt limit suspension expired on March 16, 2015, the limit was reestablished at $18,113 billion. On October 15, 2015, Secretary Lew stated that extraordinary measures would be exhausted "no later than" November 3, 2015, although a relatively small cash reserve—projected at less than $30 billion—would be on hand. On October 28, 2015, the House concurred with a modified version of Senate amendments to H.R. 1314 , which became known as the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015). 114-74 ) on November 2, 2015. | Congress has always restricted federal debt. The Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917 included an aggregate limit on federal debt as well as limits on specific debt issues. Through the 1920s and 1930s, Congress altered the form of those restrictions to give the U.S. Treasury more flexibility in debt management and to allow modernization of federal financing. In 1939, a general limit was placed on federal debt.
Federal debt accumulates when the government sells debt to the public to finance budget deficits and to meet federal obligations or when it issues debt to government accounts, such as the Social Security, Medicare, and Transportation trust funds. Total federal debt is the sum of debt held by the public and debt held by government accounts. Debt also increases when the portfolio of federal loans expands.
Congress has modified the debt limit 14 times since 2001. Congress raised the limit in June 2002, May 2003, November 2004, March 2006, and September 2007. The 2007-2008 fiscal crisis and subsequent economic slowdown led to sharply higher deficits in recent years, which led to a series of debt limit increases. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (H.R. 3221), signed into law (P.L. 110-289) on July 30, 2008, included a debt limit increase. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (H.R. 1424), signed into law on October 3 (P.L. 110-343), raised the debt limit again. The debt limit rose a third time in less than a year to $12,104 billion with the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 on February 13, 2009 (ARRA; H.R. 1), which was signed into law on February 17, 2009 (P.L. 111-5). Following that measure, the debt limit was subsequently increased by $290 billion to $12,394 billion (P.L. 111-123) in a stand-alone debt limit bill on December 28, 2009, and by $1.9 trillion to $14,294 billion on February 12, 2010 (P.L. 111-139).
The federal debt again reached its limit on May 16, 2011, prompting the Treasury Secretary to invoke authorities to use extraordinary measures to extend Treasury's borrowing capacity. On August 2, 2011, President Obama signed the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; S. 365; P.L. 112-25), which resolved that debt limit episode. The BCA included provisions aimed at deficit reduction and allowing the debt limit to rise between $2,100 billion and $2,400 billion in three stages, the latter two subject to congressional disapproval. Once the BCA was enacted, a presidential certification triggered a $400 billion increase, and a second $500 billion increase on September 22, 2011. A third $1.2 trillion increase took place on January 28, 2012.
Federal debt reached its limit on December 31, 2012. Extraordinary measures were again used until February 4, 2013, when H.R. 325, which suspended the debt limit until May 19, 2013, was signed into law (P.L. 113-3). When that suspension expired, the debt limit was set at $16,699 billion and extraordinary measures were reemployed. On October 16, 2013—the night before Treasury's borrowing capacity was estimated to be exhausted—Congress passed and the President signed a continuing resolution (H.R. 2775; P.L. 113-46) that included a suspension of the debt limit through February 7, 2014. On February 15, 2014, the debt limit was suspended again (S. 540; P.L. 113-83) through March 15, 2015. The debt limit was reset on March 16, 2015, at $18.1 trillion. On October 15, 2015, Secretary Lew stated that extraordinary measures would be exhausted no later than November 3, 2015. On October 28, 2015, the House concurred with a modified version of Senate amendments to H.R. 1314 (retitled as the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015), which would suspend the debt limit until March 15, 2017. The Senate approved the measure on October 30, 2015, and the President signed it (P.L. 114-74) on November 2, 2015. CRS Report R43389, The Debt Limit Since 2011, by [author name scrubbed] discusses recent debt limit events in more detail. |
crs_RS21267 | crs_RS21267_0 | Background
The Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) account of the National Science Foundation (NSF) was established in FY1995 and supports the acquisition, construction, and commissioning of major research facilities and equipment that are to extend the boundaries of science and engineering. Currently, the NSF provides approximately $1.0 billion annually in support of facilities and other infrastructure projects. With the significant exception of research facilities in the Antarctic, the NSF does not directly design or operate research facilities. There are concerns from Congress and from some in the academic and scientific community about the adequacy of the planning and management of NSF facilities. There has been considerable debate concerning the selection of major research facility projects for funding. MREFC Support in the FY2013 Budget Request
The Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) account receives $196.2 million in the FY2013 budget request, slightly below the FY2012 estimated level of $197.1 million. The FY2013 request proposes support for the National Ecological Observatory Network, $98.2 million (NEON); Advanced Laser Interferometer Gravitational Wave- Observatory, $14.9 million (AdvLIGO); Advanced Technology Star Telescope, $42.0 million (ATST); and the Ocean Observatories Initiative, $27.5 million (OOI). | The Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) account of the National Science Foundation (NSF) supports the acquisition and construction of major research facilities and equipment that are to extend the boundaries of science, engineering, and technology. The facilities include telescopes, earth simulators, astronomical observatories, and mobile research platforms. Currently, the NSF provides approximately $1.0 billion annually in support of facilities and other infrastructure projects. While the NSF does not directly design or operate research facilities, it does have final responsibility for oversight and management. Questions have been raised by many in the scientific community and in Congress concerning the adequacy of the planning and management of NSF facilities. In addition, there has been debate related to the criteria used to select projects for MREFC support.
The Administration's FY2013 budget request for the NSF is $7,373.1 million, a 4.8% increase ($340.0 million) over the FY2012 estimated level of $7,033.1 million. Included in the request total is $196.2 million for MREFC, slightly below the FY2012 estimate of $197.1 million. The FY2013 request proposes support for four projects—Advanced Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory ($14.9 million), Advanced Technology Solar Telescope ($42.0 million), Ocean Observatories Initiative ($27.5 million), and the National Ecological Observatory Network ($98.2 million). |
crs_RS22581 | crs_RS22581_0 | T he major federal securities laws that form the basis for the regulation of securities in the United States were enacted in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929. These acts include the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Other important securities acts were passed late in the 20 th century and early in the 21 st century. Registration under the 1933 Act covers only the securities actually being offered and only for the purposes of the offering in the registration statement. The act also requires additional disclosures for public companies and the officers and directors of those companies. | This report discusses in a very general way the major federal securities laws. The major federal securities laws may be grouped into two categories according to the time of their passage: the acts passed in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 and the acts passed later in the 20th century and early in the 21st century. The acts in the first group include the most important of the federal securities acts: the Securities Act of 1933, which concerns the initial registration of securities, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which requires ongoing disclosure reports. The acts in the second group include laws which specifically prohibit insider trading, restrict the bringing of shareholder derivative suits, and require additional reporting by officers and directors. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RS22294 | crs_RS22294_0 | T he Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, better known as Social Security, is administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA). The Survivors Insurance component of OASDI covers insured workers in case of death. When a worker insured by Social Security dies, his or her family may qualify for survivors benefits. Additional data on survivor benefits are provided in Table 1 at the conclusion of this report. Spouses, former spouses, children, and parents of fully insured workers are eligible for survivors benefits as long as they meet the other requirements for those benefits. | Social Security is formally known as the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. This report focuses on the Survivors Insurance component of Social Security. When workers die, their spouses, former spouses, and dependents may qualify for Social Security survivors benefits. This report describes how a worker becomes covered by Survivors Insurance and outlines the types and amounts of benefits available to survivors and eligibility for those benefits. This report also provides current data on survivor beneficiaries and benefits. |
crs_98-836 | crs_98-836_0 | T he Senate takes up business under procedures set in Senate rules and by long-standing custom, thereby giving it flexibility in setting its floor agenda. This report first discusses those processes or customs most often used by the Senate and then discusses some procedures less often used to call up business. | The Senate takes up measures and matters under procedures set in Senate rules and by long-standing customs, thereby giving it flexibility in setting its floor agenda. This report first treats those processes or customs most often used by the Senate and then discusses some procedures less often used to call up business.
This report will be revised as events warrant. |
crs_RL33178 | crs_RL33178_0 | Most Recent Events
March 20, 2008. September 5, 2007. Introduction
The rapid depreciation of the value of the dollar on foreign exchange markets is causing fundamental changes in the trading relationships between the United States and other nations whose currencies have appreciated lately. This is raised concerns that Japan may intervene in currency markets for the first time since March 2004 to shore up the value of the dollar and slow the appreciation of the yen. Japan has conducted such intervention in the past by purchasing dollars and selling yen on foreign exchange markets. Japan's past intervention to slow the upward revaluation of the yen raised concerns in the United States and brought charges that Tokyo was manipulating its exchange rate in order to gain unfair advantage in world trade. This coincided with similar charges being made with respect to the currency of China. In the 110 th Congress, H.R. 2886 (Knollenberg)/ S. 1021 (Stabenow) (Japan Currency Manipulation Act) would require negotiation, reports, and other action with respect to Japan's currency actions. Although, Japan claims that it has not intervened in foreign exchange markets since March 2004, some claim that Japan still "talks down the value of the yen." Since March 2004, the Japanese government has not intervened significantly in currency markets to support the value of the dollar. Figure 3 also shows that despite heavy buying (or selling) of dollars during certain periods of time, the intervention seems to have had little lasting effect. This multiplies the effect of the intervention. of $1,314 billion. Figure 4 shows Japan's currency intervention in terms of annual rates of change in its foreign exchange reserves and the yen/dollar exchange rate. In both reports, Treasury did not find currency manipulation by any country, including by Japan. GAO reported that Treasury viewed "Japan's exchange rate interventions as part of a macro-economic policy aimed at combating deflation...."
In September 2005 testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury David Loevinge stated that Treasury had discussed foreign exchange market issues with Japanese officials. In the IMF's August 2005 report on consultations with Japan, the Fund did not find currency manipulation, but noted that compared to the United States and the Euro Area, Japan stands out for its active use of foreign exchange market intervention as a policy instrument. The major policy options for Congress include the following:
let the market adjust (do nothing); clarify the definition of currency manipulation; require reports and negotiations; require the President to certify which countries are manipulating their currencies and take remedial action if the manipulation is not halted; and convene a special meeting of the International Monetary Fund to reach an agreement on the misalignment of the yen, oppose increased voting shares or representation in international financial organizations for any country that has a currency that is manipulated or in fundamental misalignment, initiate a dispute settlement case with the World Trade Organization (WTO), or block the Overseas Private Investment Corporation from providing services to Japan. 1498 (Ryan)/ S. 796 (Bunning) and H.R. Fair Currency Act of 2007. S. 1607 (Baucus). Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2007. S. 1677 (Dodd). Currency Reform and Financial Markets Access Act of 2007. | The rapid depreciation of the value of the dollar on foreign exchange markets is mirrored by an equally rapid appreciation of currencies, such as the yen (and Euro). This has raised concerns that Japan may intervene in currency markets for the first time since March 2004 to shore up the value of the dollar and slow the appreciation of the yen. Japan has conducted such intervention in the past by purchasing dollars and selling yen on foreign exchange markets. This intervention has raised concerns in the United States and brought charges that Tokyo is manipulating its exchange rate in order to gain unfair advantage in world trade. This coincides with similar charges being made with respect to the currencies of the People's Republic of China and South Korea. In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2886 (Knollenberg)/S. 1021(Stabenow) (Japan Currency Manipulation Act), H.R. 782 (Tim Ryan)/S. 796 (Bunning) (Fair Currency Act of 2007), S. 1677 (Dodd) (Currency Reform and Financial Markets Access Act of 2007), and S. 1607 (Baucus) (Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2007) address currency misalignment in general or by Japan in particular.
In the past, Japan has intervened (bought dollars and sold yen) extensively to counter the yen's appreciation, but since 2004, the Japanese government has not intervened significantly, although some claim that Tokyo continues to "talk down the value of the yen." This heavy buying of dollars resulted in an accumulation of official foreign exchange reserves that exceeded a record $979 billion (February 2008) by Japan. The intervention, however, seems to have had little lasting effect. Estimates on the cumulative effect of the interventions range from an undervaluation of the yen of about 3 or 4 yen to as much as 20 yen per dollar, although recent appreciation of the yen has erased most of such undervaluation.
In 2007, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury indicated that it had not found currency manipulation by any country, including by Japan. An April 2005 report by the Government Accountability Office reported that Treasury had not found currency manipulation because it viewed "Japan's exchange rate interventions as part of a macroeconomic policy aimed at combating deflation...." In its May 2006 report on consultations with Japan, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), likewise, did not find currency manipulation by Japan.
One problem with the focus on currency intervention to correct balance of trade deficits is that only about half of the increase in the value of a foreign currency is reflected in prices of imports into the United States. Periods of heaviest intervention also coincided with slower (not faster) economic growth rates for Japan.
Major policy options for Congress include (1) letting the market adjust; (2) clarifying the definition of currency manipulation; (3) requiring negotiations and reports; (4) requiring the President to certify which countries are manipulating their currencies and taking remedial action if the manipulation is not halted; (5) taking the case to the World Trade Organization or appealing to the IMF; or (6) opposing any change in governance in the IMF benefitting Japan. This report will be updated as circumstances require. |
crs_R43093 | crs_R43093_0 | Introduction
Electricity today is widely viewed as a commodity. As a commodity, electricity is bought and sold as both power and energy, with various attributes being traded in electricity markets. The importance of transparency in wholesale electricity markets was underscored by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05; P.L. 109-58 ) where under Subtitle G Section 1281, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or the Commission) was directed to facilitate price transparency in interstate markets for the sale and transmission of electric energy "having due regard for the public interest, the integrity of those markets, fair competition, and the protection of consumers." But with the California (or Western) energy crisis of 2000 to 2001, the susceptibility of electricity markets to manipulation became evident. Enron and its affiliates were principally found liable for "engaging in various gaming and market manipulation schemes," with an initial decision ordering the disgorgement of $1.6 billion in unjust profits. RTO Markets
RTOs use various types of markets both to serve end-use customer needs, and to make operational decisions. Over time, each RTO market has developed its own regulations or variations thereof, all under FERC's regulatory jurisdiction. However, these regulations and rules appear to be increasing in complexity, as the markets are revised to adjust for operational issues and regional differences. Recent RTO Market Issues
Electricity market issues can be usually separated into two categories—manipulation by market participants or RTO market structural issues. Capacity markets have come under fire in some areas where they are used, as brownouts or blackouts have still occurred in unusually high demand periods. In other RTOs without formal capacity markets (principally those in California and Texas), the question has been whether the additional cost would be justified by the perceived benefits. Forward Capacity Markets
Several RTOs use Forward Capacity markets to provide some degree of certainty that there will be adequate capacity to serve future load demand and meet system reserve needs. However, despite the existence of Forward Capacity markets, there has been considerable debate on whether these constructs work since high load pockets continue to persist in some RTO regions. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA or Dodd-Frank, P.L. 111-203 ) was passed largely as a response to the U.S. financial crisis which began in 2008. DFA initiated a number of reforms intended to strengthen the U.S. financial sector, leading to a number of rulemakings at the CFTC. Some Recent FERC Anti-Market Manipulation Actions
FERC states that it is focusing on anti-competitive "conduct that threatens market transparency" because such conduct undermines "confidence in the energy markets and [can] damage consumers and competitors." Discussion
RTO markets have enabled a variety of products and services, including derivatives and hedges for market participants, ostensibly to reduce risks from volatile prices. Financial instruments were added to RTO markets essentially to increase liquidity. It could be reasonably argued that a drive to increase liquidity and create mechanisms to deal with volatility has also led to the addition of financial instruments such as FTRs and virtual trades, which ostensibly act to encourage speculation in the electricity markets. However, Dodd-Frank addresses issues related to market manipulation from fraud, stating that "specific intent" or "recklessness" would trigger a rules violation. Yet some might argue that the "preference" for settlements at FERC leads to a lack of clarity about what constitutes market manipulation, and what does not. The electricity industry is entering a time of change, and electricity markets are evolving with the industry. The expected retirement of many coal-fired power plants can affect RTO markets as generator portfolios change to include more natural gas-fired plants, and the prices that this new generation is expected to command. With load growth stagnant or diminishing in many regions, the pull towards a greater use of hedging and more liquid markets may increase as the need to decrease costs and stabilize revenues increases. | Electricity today is widely viewed as a commodity. As a commodity, electricity is bought and sold as power (measured in kiloWatts or MegaWatts) and energy (measured in kiloWatt-hours), with various attributes being traded in electricity markets. The importance of transparency in wholesale electricity markets was underscored by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), which aimed to facilitate price transparency in interstate markets for the sale and transmission of electric energy, and to prohibit energy market manipulation.
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) are regional entities authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to administer the electricity transmission grid. RTOs use various types of markets to serve end-use customer needs, and to make operational decisions. Over time, each RTO market has developed its own regulations or variations thereof, all under FERC's regulatory jurisdiction. However, these regulations and rules appear to be increasing in complexity, as the markets are revised to adjust for operational issues and regional differences. Electricity market issues can be usually separated into two categories—manipulation by market participants or RTO market structural issues.
Capacity markets and Forward Capacity markets are two RTO topics often debated. Capacity markets have come under fire in some areas where they are used, as brownouts or blackouts have still occurred in unusually high demand periods. In other RTOs without formal capacity markets, the question has been whether the additional cost is justified by the perceived benefits. Several RTOs use Forward Capacity markets to provide some degree of certainty that there will be adequate capacity to serve future load demand and meet system reserve needs. However, there has been considerable debate on whether Forward Capacity markets work since high load pockets continue to persist in some RTO regions.
RTO markets have enabled a variety of products and services including derivatives and hedges for market participants, ostensibly to reduce risks from volatile prices. Financial instruments were added to RTO markets essentially to increase liquidity. It could be reasonably argued that a drive to increase liquidity has also led to the addition of financial instruments, which ostensibly act to encourage speculation in the electricity markets. With the California (or Western) energy crisis of 2000 to 2001, the susceptibility of electricity markets to manipulation became evident. Enron and its affiliates were principally found liable for "engaging in various gaming and market manipulation schemes." FERC continues to investigate allegations of energy market manipulation, with several recent cases ending in prominent settlements.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA or Dodd-Frank, P.L. 111-203) was passed largely as a response to the recent U.S. financial crisis. DFA initiated a number of reforms intended to strengthen oversight of the U.S. financial sector. Dodd-Frank addresses issues related to market manipulation from fraud, stating that "specific intent" or "recklessness" would trigger a rules violation. FERC for its part states that its focus is on anti-competitive "conduct that threatens market transparency." Some might argue that the recent spate of settlements at FERC leads to a lack of clarity about what constitutes market manipulation, and what does not.
The electricity industry is entering a time of change, and electricity markets are evolving with the industry. The expected retirement of many coal-fired power plants can affect RTO markets as generator portfolios change to include more natural gas-fired plants, and the prices that this new generation is expected to command. With load growth stagnant in many regions, the pull towards a greater use of hedging and more liquid markets may increase as the need to decrease costs and stabilize revenues increases. Congress may choose to consider whether to change how RTO electricity markets are regulated and operated (i.e., through some standardization of these markets or elements in these markets), with an eye towards improving efficiency, and increasing regulatory clarity and transparency, lowering costs, and thus potentially reducing opportunities for fraud or market manipulation. |
crs_R40476 | crs_R40476_0 | Since the enactment of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended (Base Closure Act), transfer or disposal of former military installations has been governed by relatively consistent legal requirements. This report provides an overview of the transfer and disposal authorities available under the law for military installations closed during the 2005 round, and indicate how amendments to the Base Closure Act have altered the property transfer and disposal process. Transfer, Disposal, and Leasing Authorities
The transfer or disposal of federal property is primarily performed by the General Services Administration (GSA) pursuant to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA). Thus, local communities can significantly affect the BRAC property transfer and disposal decisions made at the federal level. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the transferring DOD component to review the applications and make a determination as to whether the transfer is appropriate based on several factors:
the requirement for additional property must be valid and appropriate; the proposed use is consistent with the highest and best use of the property; the proposed transfer will not have an adverse impact on the transfer of any remaining portion of the installation; the proposed transfer will not establish a new program or substantially increase the level of a component's or agency's existing programs; the application offers fair market value for the property, unless waived; the proposed transfer addresses applicable environmental responsibilities to the satisfaction of the Secretary concerned; and the proposed transfer is in the best interest of the Government. If no DOD components or other federal agencies pursue acquisition, or if DOD denies an application for transfer, the property is determined to be surplus and the disposal process begins. Public Benefit Transfers
Public benefit transfers are authorized under FPASA and allow for conveyance of property at a discount or for no cost for specified public purposes. In general, a conservation conveyance is to be for reduced cost. However, in 2009, noting that many "negotiations between the Department of Defense and local redevelopment authorities ... over the value of property to be disposed under an economic development conveyance (EDC) have stalled over the past 2 years due to difficulties in the nation's financial markets, the deterioration of local economic conditions, and the potential of legislative changes," Congress further amended the Base Closure Act with respect to utilization of a no cost EDC. The process first requires screening to determine if other DOD components or federal agencies have a need for the property. Compliance with these authorities generally requires an analysis of suitability for homeless assistance or a public benefit transfer. Public auctions and negotiated sales are generally available, although it would appear that fair market value must generally be obtained under these authorities. | The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 100-526) and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (P.L. 81-152) provide the basic framework for the transfer and disposal of military installations closed during the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process. In general, property at BRAC installations is first subjected to screening for use by the Department of Defense and by other federal agencies. If no federal use for the property can be found or if an application for transfer is rejected, the property is deemed "surplus" to the needs of the federal government and made available for disposal through other mechanisms.
At this point, BRAC property is subjected to two simultaneous evaluation processes: the redevelopment planning process performed by a local redevelopment authority composed of various interested representatives of the community affected by the BRAC action; and a Department of Defense analysis prepared under the aegis of the National Environmental Policy Act and, eventually, informed by the local redevelopment plan.
As a part of this process, screening of the property must be performed to determine if a homeless assistance use would be appropriate. There are also a variety of "public benefit transfers," under which the property may be conveyed for various specified public purposes at reduced cost. It is also possible to dispose of BRAC property through the use of a public auction or negotiated sale, for which fair market value or a proxy for fair market value must generally be obtained. Finally the law governing the BRAC process authorizes economic development conveyances, through which a local redevelopment authority may obtain the property for specified purposes, sometimes for no consideration.
The BRAC property transfer process has been altered, both legislatively and administratively, throughout the numerous authorized closure rounds. Most recently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84) amended the law with respect to economic development conveyances at no cost to local redevelopment authorities. This report provides an overview of the various authorities available under the current law and describes the planning process for the redevelopment of BRAC properties. |
crs_R44955 | crs_R44955_0 | Domestic tensions persist between those who favor an orientation of Serbia toward the West, including membership in the EU, and nationalist forces led by the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), which oppose a Western orientation and express a desire to remain close to Russia. Many nationalists have not forgiven the West, particularly the United States, for supporting states that seceded from Yugoslavia in the 1990s, intervening in the Bosnia conflict, conducting airstrikes against Serbia in 1999, and supporting Kosovo's independence in 2008. Successive Serbian governments during this time have had to balance favorable domestic views of relations with Russia with aspirations for better relations with the EU, the United States, and NATO. Serbia's relations with its neighbors have been particularly tense due to allegations of war crimes committed by Serbs during the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Serbia's relationship with Bosnia also has been strained at times. Since then, Serbia has taken steps to strengthen screening and security measures along its borders and improve information-sharing practices with its neighbors. officials, as well as officials from the United States, Austria, and other key countries, have indicated they are willing to listen to a proposal based on border adjustment, Germany has remained firmly opposed. The 2015 European migration crisis, in which hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees entered the EU via the Balkan route, was a reminder of the region's strategic importance. The EU is also worried about potential political instability and the influence of third powers, such as Russia, China, and Turkey, in the Western Balkans. However, relations between the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union were often rocky after Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito broke with Stalin in 1948. Russia also channels its influence through its media and energy linkages with Serbia. Moscow reportedly provides financial and political support to several Serbian political parties. Some observers believe Russia uses its position in Serbia as a base to carry out operations in the Balkan region. These observers contend that most Serbians are also committed to Euro-Atlantic integration. Since Serbia's 2000 transition, the United States has viewed a stable, democratic Serbia as essential to stability in the Balkan region. Although the United States has offered to "agree to disagree" with Serbia over Kosovo, the issue may continue to affect relations, particularly as the United States generally remains Kosovo's most influential international supporter. Many Members of Congress support Kosovo's independence, the efforts at reconciliation between Serbia and Kosovo, and EU membership for both countries, but other Members have expressed skepticism about Serbia's relations with Russia or the future viability of the Serbia-Kosovo coexistence. Over the past several years, Congress has maintained a steady interest in the stability of the Western Balkans and has supported the efforts of those countries to join the EU and NATO. Some Members of Congress also visited countries in the Western Balkans in 2017 and 2018. Recognizing that Serbia is an important political and economic factor in the overall future of the Western Balkans and that the United States has provided a sizable amount of assistance to Serbia, Congress may focus more specifically on U.S. relations with Serbia; its role in the Western Balkans; Serbia's EU membership negotiations; and Serbia-Russia relations, particularly the operation of the Russian facility in Niš and Russian support for pro-Moscow political parties in Serbia. | Following the conflicts in the 1990s in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the prospect of membership in the Euro-Atlantic community and the active presence of the United States and European Union (EU) in the Western Balkans provided a level of stability that allowed most of the countries of the region to adopt economic and political reforms. During this time, Slovenia and Croatia joined the EU. These countries, along with Albania and Montenegro, also joined NATO. Other countries of the Balkans are pursuing EU and NATO membership.
However, many observers in Europe and the United States have expressed concern that political stability in the Western Balkans, sometimes referred to as Europe's "inner courtyard," remains tenuous. Several of these countries have experienced political crises, sometimes involving third-party interference, as well as stagnating economies, high unemployment, and high rates of emigration. These crises have raised concerns that any decrease in EU or U.S. presence could create a regional vacuum in which transnational crime, radicalization, or terrorism could flourish. Furthermore, some observers are concerned with the growing economic and political role of Russia, China, and other states whose agendas in the Western Balkans might conflict with U.S. and EU interests in the region.
Some observers see Serbia as relatively stable, despite its historically difficult relations with its neighbors, its ongoing dispute with Kosovo, recent concerns over its commitment to democratic rule, and its desire to balance its orientation toward the West with its historical ties to Russia. At the same time, others view Serbia as an important piece in the geopolitical competition in the Balkans between the West and Russia.
U.S. relations with Serbia have been rocky at times, due to past U.S. interventions in the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo and U.S. recognition of Kosovo's independence. Nevertheless, relations between Washington and Belgrade seem to have improved recently. Between 2001 and 2017, the United States provided close to $800 million in aid to Serbia to help stimulate economic growth, strengthen the justice system, and promote good governance. The United States continues to support Serbia's efforts to join the EU. At the same time, the United States has sought to strengthen its own relationship with Serbia through deepening cooperation based on mutual interests and respect. Many observers believe the EU, despite its stated commitment to expansion in the Western Balkans, has been preoccupied by internal issues such as the migration crisis, recovery from the eurozone crisis, and the exit of the United Kingdom from the union. These observers, in both Washington and the Balkans, believe the United States should reinvigorate its strategy of active engagement with the Western Balkans, and in particular its relations with Serbia.
This report provides an overview of Serbia and U.S. relations with Belgrade. |
crs_98-235 | crs_98-235_0 | U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Baselines
Pursuant to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United Stateshas published "national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinksof all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies... agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties." U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions (MMTCE),1990-2001
Source: Environmental Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2001 (April 2003), EPA 430R03004. (12) The United States also from timeto time reports on emissions andexplains its climate change programs in the Climate Action Report (CAR) to theUnited Nations; the third CAR was published in 2002. (13)
The U.S. baselines for the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are shown in Table 2 . Table 4. Status of Emissions Relative to Goals
Under the UNFCCC, the United States committed to the voluntary goal of holdinggreenhouse gas emissions at the end of the 1990s to their 1990 levels. However, U.S. emissions in 2000 were 1,921 MMTCE (not counting sinks). Based on the CAR projection that emissions willbe 2,213 MMTCE in 2010, the average annual reduction that would be necessary for theUnited States to meet the Kyoto target of 1,559 MMTCE per year for 2008-2012 would be654 MMTCE per year, or about 30% below the estimated level of "business as usual"emissions. The President's greenhouse gas initiative has the goal of reducing, through voluntary activities, the intensity of net greenhouse gas emissions per unit of economic activity by 18%over the next 10 years; this compares to a projected "business as usual" decline in intensityof 14% for the period -- compared to a decline during the 1990s of about 10% (see Table3 ). (25) At the anticipated increasedrate of intensity decline, total emissions would decline 100 MMTCE below "business asusual" emissions (although the absolute amount of emissions would continue to rise). The Kyoto Protocol also would provide that sinks can be taken into account in calculating a nation's emissions and its reduction obligation. (31)
Historical data show that the United States failed to meet its voluntary commitment under the UNFCCC for returning aggregate emissions at the end of the 1990s decade to the1990 level. Even with the potential for sequestration andemissions trading to reduce domestic reduction efforts, a goal to reverse greenhouse gasemissions trends would represent an extraordinary technical and political challenge for U.S.energy and environmental policy. | This report reviews U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases in the contexts both of domestic policy and of international obligations and proposals. On October 15, 1992, the United States ratified theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which entered into forceon March 21, 1994. This committed the United States to "national policies" to limit "itsanthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases," with a voluntary goal of returning "emissions ofcarbon dioxide [CO 2 ] and other greenhouse gases [methane (CH 4 ), nitrous oxide(N 2 O),hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6 )]" at the "endof the decade" to "their 1990 levels."
Subsequently, in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, the United States participated in negotiations that ended with agreement on further reductions that could become legally binding. TheUnited States signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, but President Clinton did not send it to the Senatefor advice and consent. President Bush has said that he rejects the Protocol, and former U.S.Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christine Todd Whitman told reporters that theAdministration would not be pursuing the UNFCCC commitment either. Instead, President Bushhas proposed to shift the nation's climate change program from a goal of reducing emissions per seto a goal of reducing energy intensity -- the amount of greenhouse gases emitted per unit ofeconomic productivity. Under the proposal, the intensity, which has been declining for a numberof years, would decline 18% between 2002 and 2012, as opposed to a 14% projected "business asusual" decline.
Meanwhile, the UNFCCC "end of the decade" deadline has passed and U.S. greenhouse gas emissions continue on an upward trend, though with dips in 1991 and in 2001, attributed mostly toeconomic slowdowns. Based on historical data, 2001 emissions were about 13% in excess of theUNFCCC goal. Overall, from 1990 to 2001, U.S. greenhouse gas emissions (weighted by globalwarming potential) have increased an average of about 1.1% per year. Projections suggest that U.S.emissions will continue to rise for at least the next decade. Reversing the upward trend ingreenhouse gas emissions would represent an extraordinary technical and political challenge to U.S.energy and environmental policy.
This report will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R43576 | crs_R43576_0 | This report explains the major provisions of the federal estate and gift transfer taxes for transfers by nonresident aliens in 2014. In determining estate tax liability, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) differentiates between the estates of U.S. citizens, resident aliens, and nonresident aliens. The estates of resident aliens follow the same rules and regulations to determine estate tax liability as do estates of U.S. citizens. However, the estates of nonresident aliens are taxed differently. Definition of a Nonresident Alien
Under the estate tax regulations, a "resident" decedent is a decedent who, at the time of his death, had his domicile in the United States. A person acquires a domicile in a place by living there, for even a brief period of time, with no definite present intention of later leaving that place. The determination of federal estate tax liability involves a series of adjustments and modifications of a tax base known as the "gross estate." Certain allowable deductions reduce the gross estate to the "taxable estate." Then, the total of all lifetime taxable gifts made by the decedent is added to the taxable estate before tax rates are applied. The result is the decedent's estate tax which, after the reduction for certain allowable credits, is the amount of tax paid by the estate. The Gross Estate: The Federal Estate Tax Base
The first step in determining estate tax liability for citizens, resident aliens, and nonresident aliens is to designate the "gross estate," which consists of property in which the decedent held an interest at the time of death. However, the gross estates of nonresident aliens, for federal estate tax purposes, include only property "situated" in the United States. Estates of citizens, resident aliens, and nonresident aliens share many deductions, including estate administration expenses, certain debts and losses, charitable bequests, and the amount of qualified transfers to a surviving spouse, although some differences in calculating these deductions may apply. The Federal Gift Tax for Nonresident Aliens
The federal gift tax is a tax imposed on an annual basis on all gratuitous transfers of property made during life. The tax seeks to account for transfers of property that would otherwise reduce the estate and accordingly estate tax liability at death. The donor's tax liability on the gift depends upon the value of the "taxable gift." The taxable gift is determined by reducing the gross value of the gift by the available deductions and exclusions. The Taxable Gift
Nonresident aliens are subject to the federal gift tax only on gifts of their interest in U.S. real estate and tangible personal property situated in the United States. The major deductions and exclusions available for nonresident alien donors are the annual exclusion, the gift tax marital deduction, and the gift tax charitable deduction. The tax liability of a taxable gift is measured initially by the value of the transferred property. | This report explains the major provisions of the federal estate and gift transfer taxes as they apply to transfers by nonresident aliens in 2014. Estate and gift taxes are two federal transfer taxes imposed on the passing of property title from one person or entity to another. The federal estate tax is levied on the transfer of property at death, while the federal gift tax is levied on the transfer of property during life by one individual to another while receiving nothing or less than full value in return. The following discussion provides basic principles regarding the computation of these two transfer taxes for this particular group of taxpayers.
In determining estate and gift tax liability, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) differentiates between the estates of citizens, resident aliens, and nonresident aliens. Under the estate tax regulations, a "resident" decedent is a decedent who, at the time of his death, had his domicile in the United States. A person acquires a domicile in a place by living there, for even a brief period of time, with no definite present intention of later leaving that place. The estates of resident aliens follow the same rules and regulations as do the estates of U.S. citizens to determine estate tax liability. However, the estates of nonresident aliens are taxed differently.
The federal estate tax is measured by the size of the decedent's estate. The tax is computed through a series of adjustments and modifications of a tax base known as the "gross estate." Unlike the estates of U.S. citizens, the gross estates of nonresident aliens include only property "situated" in the United States. Certain allowable deductions reduce the gross estate to the "taxable estate," to which is then added the total of all lifetime taxable gifts made by the decedent. Estates of citizens, resident aliens, and nonresident aliens share many deductions, including estate administration expenses, certain debts and losses, charitable bequests, and the amount of qualified transfers to a surviving spouse, although estates of nonresident aliens calculate some deductions differently. The tax rates are applied and, after reduction for certain allowable credits, the amount of tax owed by the estate is reached.
The federal gift tax for nonresident aliens is a tax imposed on gratuitous transfers of U.S. real estate and tangible personal property situated in the United States during life. The tax seeks to account for transfers of property that would otherwise reduce the estate and accordingly estate tax liability at death. The donor's tax liability of the gift depends upon the value of the "taxable gift." The taxable gift is determined by reducing the gross value of the gift by the available deductions and exclusions. The major deductions and exclusions available for nonresident donors are the annual exclusion, the gift tax marital deduction, and the gift tax charitable deduction. |
crs_RL34286 | crs_RL34286_0 | Background
Insurance is one of three primary sectors of the financial services industry. Unlike the other two, banks and securities, insurance is primarily regulated at the state, rather than federal, level. The primacy of state regulation dates back to 1868 when the Supreme Court found that insurance did not constitute interstate commerce, and thus did not fall under the powers granted the federal government in the Constitution. In 1944, however, the Court cast doubt on this finding. Preferring to leave the state regulatory system intact in the aftermath of this decision, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, which reaffirmed the states as principal regulators of insurance. Over the years since 1945, congressional interest in the possibility of repealing or amending McCarran-Ferguson and reclaiming authority over insurance regulation has waxed and waned. In 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which specifically reaffirmed the states as the functional regulators of insurance. Facing a new world of competition, however, the industry split, with larger insurers tending to favor some form of federal regulation, and smaller insurers tending to favor a continuation of the state regulatory system. Some members of Congress have responded to the changing environment in the financial services industry with a variety of legislation. The most consistent response has been the introduction of legislation calling for an Optional Federal Charter (OFC) for insurance. OFC legislation was first introduced in the 107 th Congress, with bills being introduced in the 109 th and 110 th Congresses as well. Specifics of OFC legislation can vary widely, but the common thread is the creation of a dual regulatory system, inspired by the current banking regulatory system. 1880 , addressed this by adding some mandatory aspects to a framework similar to the previous OFC bills. 4173 , which was ultimately enacted as the Dodd-Frank Act and included some insurance provisions, but did not include a federal charter for insurance. The Debate on Federal Chartering for Insurers
Many different arguments have been advanced for and against a dual regulatory system for insurance. Arguments For a Dual Regulatory System
In addition to the principal argument that the regulation of insurance companies needs to be overhauled at the federal level to enable insurers to become more competitive with other federally regulated financial institutions in the post-GLBA environment, other arguments advanced for dual chartering have included the following:
The recent financial crisis has shown that some insurers can present systemic risk and therefore should be regulated by a regulator with a broader outlook. A federal insurance regulator could be a knowledgeable voice and an insurance advocate in Washington, DC. The Comptroller of the Currency has successfully promoted the expansion of bank products through preemption of state laws, providing a model for the insurance sector. State insurance regulators have a better understanding of local markets and conditions that would a federal regulator. The fragmentation of the overall insurance regulatory system that could result from dual chartering and state/federal oversight. Should it be the federal government, the states, or some combination of the two? Previous Federal Chartering Legislation
111th Congress
The National Insurance Consumer Protection Act (H.R. Both would have created the option of a federal charter for the insurance industry, including insurers, insurance agencies, and independent insurance producers. Creation of a federal guaranty fund. | Insurance is one of three primary sectors of the financial services industry. Unlike the other two, banks and securities, insurance is primarily regulated at the state, rather than federal, level. The primacy of state regulation dates back to 1868 when the Supreme Court found in Paul v. Virginia (75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868)) that insurance did not constitute interstate commerce, and thus did not fall under the powers granted the federal government in the Constitution. In 1944, however, the Court cast doubt on this finding in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association (322 U.S. 533 (1944)). Preferring to leave the state regulatory system intact in the aftermath of this decision, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33), which reaffirmed the states as principal regulators of insurance. Over the years since 1945, congressional interest in the possibility of repealing McCarran-Ferguson and reclaiming authority over insurance regulation has waxed and waned.
Particularly since the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338), the financial services industry has seen increased competition among U.S. banks, insurers, and securities firms and on a global scale. Some have complained that the state regulatory system puts insurers at a competitive disadvantage. Whereas the insurance industry had previously been united in preferring the state system, it has now splintered, with larger insurers tending to argue for a federal system and smaller insurers tending to favor the state system.
Some members of Congress have responded with different proposals ranging from a complete federalization of the interstate insurance industry, to leaving the state system intact with limited federal standards and preemptions. A common proposal in the past has been for an Optional Federal Charter (OFC) for the insurance industry. This idea borrows the idea of a dual regulatory system from the banking system. Both the states and the federal government would offer a chartering system for insurers, with the insurers having the choice between the two. OFC legislation was offered in the 107th, 109th, and 110th Congresses.
Proponents of OFC legislation typically have cited the efficiencies that could be gained from a uniform system, along with the ability of a federal regulator to better address the complexities of the current insurance market and ongoing financial crisis as well as the need for a single federal voice for the insurance industry in international negotiations. Opponents of OFC legislation have been typically concerned with the inability of a federal regulator to take into account local conditions, the lack of consumer service that could result from a nonlocal administrator in Washington, DC, and the overall deregulation contained in some of the OFC proposals.
The recent financial crisis gave greater urgency to calls for federal oversight of insurance and has changed the tenor of the debate. The National Insurance Consumer Protection Act of 2009 (H.R. 1880) was introduced in the 111th Congress by two previous sponsors of OFC legislation. This bill differed significantly from previous OFC bills as it included the creation of a new systemic risk regulator with the power to mandate the adoption of a federal charter by some insurers. The broad Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) that was enacted to reform the financial system included some insurance aspects, but did not include a federal charter for insurance. Such legislation has not been introduced in the 112th Congress.
This report offers a brief analysis of the forces prompting federal chartering legislation, followed by a discussion of the arguments for and against a federal charter, and summaries of previous legislation. It will be updated as legislative events warrant. |
crs_R41420 | crs_R41420_0 | Introduction
Over the past three decades, obesity rates have more than doubled among adults, and tripled among children and adolescents. In 2011-2012, about 32% of U.S. children and adolescents between the ages of 2 and 19 years old were overweight, and more than half of those children were considered obese. Recent data suggest that obesity rates are stabilizing, but prevalence remains high, and obesity as a public health issue has gained the attention of health care professionals, policymakers, schools, employers, and the media. The Obama Administration has shown a strong interest in developing policies to address childhood overweight and obesity. Childhood obesity is a major initiative of First Lady Michelle Obama, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Agriculture (USDA). The President's Task Force on Childhood Obesity released an action plan with a series of recommendations to reduce childhood obesity to 5% by 2030. Many of these issues were addressed in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act ( P.L. 111-296 . The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. This report presents data on obesity among children and adolescents, and includes a discussion of obesity measurement, trends in obesity rates, and differences in rates that exist across gender, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and geographic location. Measurement of Childhood Overweight and Obesity
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), obesity and overweight are terms used to describe ranges of weight that are higher than what is generally considered healthy for a given height. BMI is presented as the indicator of overweight and obesity in most federally sponsored studies and reports of children's health, including the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) and Healthy People 202 0 . In children, obesity is defined as being at or above the 95 th percentile of the age- and sex-specific BMI relative to those reference populations ; overweight, also known as "at risk for obesity," is defined as being between the 85 th and 94 th percentiles. Prevalence of Childhood Overweight and Obesity
The increase in childhood overweight and obesity has affected certain subsets of the population more than others. Obesity prevalence varies by age group: 8% of children 2 to 5 years of age are obese, compared with almost 18% of children 6 to 11 years and 21% of children 12 to 19 years. In recent years, obesity prevalence rates among children and adolescents 2 to 19 years old have stabilized, and there has been a significant decrease in obesity prevalence among children two to five years old from 13.9% in 2003-2004 to 8.4% in 2011-212. Variation by Socioeconomic Status and Geographic Location
Overweight and obesity in children and adolescents have been associated with lower socioeconomic status and geographic location, particularly in the southeastern states. Some behavioral factors associated with childhood obesity are modifiable at the individual or family level, including energy intake, physical activity, and sedentary behaviors. Healthy People 2020 , released in 2010, set a goal of reducing child and adolescent obesity by 10%, from 16.1% to 14.6%. Research has suggested a comprehensive, multi-pronged policy approach to childhood overweight and obesity. | In children and adolescents, obesity is defined as being at or above the 95th percentile of the age- and sex-specific body mass index (BMI); overweight is defined as being between the 85th and 94th percentiles, based on growth charts developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Over the past three decades, obesity has become a major public health problem, capturing the interest of health care professionals, policymakers, schools, employers, and the media. Although obesity rates have stabilized over the past decade, almost 32% of U.S. children and adolescents between the ages of 2 and 19 are overweight, and more than half of those children are considered obese.
The prevalence of overweight and obesity in children varies by age, race, ethnicity, geographic location, and socioeconomic status. In 2011-2012, 18% of 6- to 11-year-olds and 21% of 12- to 19-year-olds were obese. The only age group reported to experience decreases in obesity rates were two- to five-year-olds, where obesity prevalence fell from 13.9% in 2003-2004 to 8.4% in 2011-2012. Overweight and obesity are more prevalent among certain minority groups and low-income children. Additionally, states with the highest child and adolescent obesity rates are concentrated in the southeastern region of the United States. Studies suggest that several factors may contribute to obesity, including behavioral factors such as energy intake (i.e., calories consumed) and physical activity, as well as familial, cultural, and socioeconomic factors.
In recent years, Congress has sought to address this issue through legislation that promotes nutrition, healthy weight, and fitness, particularly in communities, schools, and federal nutrition programs. For example, the 2010 Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act (P.L. 111-296) addresses several nutrition-related concerns through various child nutrition programs, including the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). A provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148) funds a demonstration program for a comprehensive approach to childhood obesity in Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) participants. Other proposed policies include support of research and implementation of best practices in both federal and community programs, as well as increased monitoring of BMI by health care providers and schools.
Congress and the Obama Administration have shown a strong interest in tracking childhood obesity data, and in developing policies to reverse the trend of increasing obesity rates. Federal policies to address childhood obesity span many departments, including the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Education, and Agriculture, among others. Reducing childhood obesity is also a major initiative of First Lady Michelle Obama and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. In May 2010, the President's Task Force on Childhood Obesity released an action plan with a series of recommendations to reduce childhood obesity prevalence from 17% in 2007-2008 to 5% by 2030. HHS has modified Healthy People 2020 goals (which track health objectives for the nation and progress toward those goals) to seek a 10% reduction in childhood obesity over the next 10 years.
This report provides an overview of the data being used to inform federal obesity policy. It presents an overview of obesity statistics among children and adolescents, and includes a discussion of obesity measurement, trends in obesity rates, and differences that exist across gender, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and geographic location. |
crs_RL33981 | crs_RL33981_0 | Overview: FDA and Medical Device Review
In order to understand the significance of MDUFMA, a basic introduction to FDA and the medical device review process is useful. The agreement specified that, in return for the additional resources provided by medical device user fees, FDA was expected to meet performance goals defined in a November 14, 2002 letter from the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Members of the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the U.S. House of Representative. FDA's authority for the first of these (the collection of user fees) will expire on October 1, 2007, unless Congress reauthorizes it. Pursuant to MDUFMA (§105), on April 30, 2007, FDA held a public meeting about the FDA Agreement. The terms of the FDA Agreement were, by and large, incorporated into the Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act ( S. 1082 ), which the Senate passed on May 9, 2007. They have also been generally incorporated into the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 ( H.R. 2900 ), which the House passed on July 11, 2007. The two bills' MDUFA 2007 provisions are similar, but not identical, as explained below. Differences are expected to be addressed in conference. Like MDUFMA, MDUFA 2007 proposals address both user fee authorities and third-party inspection. User Fees
Several important aspects of MDUFMA and MDUFA 2007 are related to user fees, including statutory "triggers" that link FDA's authority to collect and spend user fees to levels of Congressional appropriations, as well as reductions and exemptions to fees, performance goals, and allowable uses of fees. According to the President's FY2008 budget request, MDUFMA fees would translate into 200 FTEs for that year, or 13% of the FTEs in the device review process (See Table 5 ). Under authority created by the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act ( P.L. Small Businesses . MDUFA 2007 would change the third-party accredited person inspection program in three major areas. According to FDA, MDUFMA focused on premarket review activities, largely limiting FDA's use of MDUFMA funds to this area, and focusing all performance goals on it as well. S. 1082 contains no parallel provision in the medical device user fee title. This pilot would include only voluntary participants from industry, and the applications involved in the pilot would not be counted toward the MDUFA 2007 performance goals; Consider industry proposals on acceptable CLIA waiver study protocols, develop acceptable protocol designs, and make them available by adding appendices to the guidance or by posting redacted protocols on the Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device (OIVD) website; Track and report FDA performance on CLIA waiver applications and share this information with industry annually and then evaluate, at the end of year two, whether user fees and performance goals for CLIA waivers should be considered for MDUFA 2007I; Review an industry-provided list of Class I and II low risk IVD devices to determine if any could be exempted from premarket notification and allow interested parties to petition for exemptions consistent with 510(m)(2) [provisions exempting certain devices from 510(k) premarket notification requirements]; and Conduct a review of the pre-IDE program to address issues raised by industry. Acronyms Used in This Report | Unless Congress acts to reauthorize it, the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) authority to collect user fees under the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA; P.L. 107-250) and, by reference, FDA's obligation to meet related performance goals, will expire on October 1, 2007. According to the President's budget request, in FY2008, funds from a reauthorized MDUFMA would account for an estimated $47.5 million and 200 full-time equivalent employees (FTEs). This would comprise 16.6% of FDA's medical device review budget authority and 13.0% of its medical device review-related FTEs. While these numbers and percentages are not as high as those projected for collection under a similar FDA user fee authority related to prescription drugs (pursuant to the Prescription Drug User Fee Act), they are significant.
For MDUFMA as passed in 2002, the fee amounts and performance goals articulated and incorporated in statute were the result of an agreement between FDA and the medical device industry. In order to facilitate the reauthorization of MDUFMA, in April 2007, the FDA and industry published the results of their negotiations with a notice of an April 30, 2007, public meeting on the topic. According to FDA, during the five years covered by the proposals (through 2012), FDA would receive approximately $287 million from user fees. This represents an increase from the $110 million FDA received during the first four years of the program.
The industry agreement also calls for changes in the fee structure, performance goals, small business relief, and third-party inspection program. In addition, the agreement reflects FDA's initiatives related to the regulation of in vitro diagnostic devices (laboratory tests). (MDUFMA enabled third-party inspections and set standards for the use of reprocessed single-use devices.) The details of the proposed reauthorization of MDUFMA have been incorporated, with a few exceptions, into the Medical Device User Fee Amendments of 2007 (MDUFA 2007). On May 9, 2007, MDUFA 2007 passed the Senate as Title III of the Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act (S. 1082). On July 11, 2007, the House passed it as Title II of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (H.R. 2900). The bills' MDUFA 2007 provisions are similar, but not identical. Differences between them are expected to be addressed in conference. The provisions of MDUFMA and the proposals for MDUFA 2007 are discussed in this report, following an introduction to FDA's medical device review process.
This report will be updated as event warrant. |
crs_R45076 | crs_R45076_0 | Background
The BSA is "the primary U.S. anti-money laundering (AML) law" regulating financial institutions. BSA Enforcement Trends
Increases in Penalty Frequency and Size
Commentators have noted an increase in the frequency with which BSA enforcement actions have involved an assessment by federal regulators of monetary penalties, and an increase in the size of those penalties. Emphasis on Acceptance of Responsibility
A second recent trend in BSA/AML enforcement is an increased emphasis by regulators on the acceptance of responsibility by institutions charged with BSA violations. Increased Risk of Individual Liability
Finally, commentators have noted an increased risk of individual liability for BSA violations. | This report provides an overview of recent trends in the enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), the principal U.S. anti-money laundering law regulating financial institutions.
The report begins by providing general background information on BSA penalties and enforcement. The report concludes by discussing three recent trends that commentators have observed in BSA enforcement: (1) an increase in the frequency with which BSA enforcement actions involve an assessment of money penalties, and an increase in the size of those penalties, (2) an increased emphasis by regulators on the acceptance of responsibility by institutions entering into settlement agreements for BSA violations, and (3) an increased risk of individual liability for BSA violations. |
crs_R42470 | crs_R42470_0 | Introduction
Federal policy makers have a long-standing interest in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education. This interest is largely driven by concerns about the national science and engineering workforce, which is widely believed to play a central role in U.S. global economic competitiveness and national security. The foundation is also the only federal agency whose primary mission includes supporting education across all fields of science and engineering. As such, the NSF is a key component of the federal STEM education portfolio. The significance of these funding trends for NSF's education and research missions, as well as for the federal STEM education effort overall, depends in part on how these changes fit within historical funding trends at the NSF. This report analyzes those trends—and addresses selected STEM education policy issues—in order to place the conversation about federal funding for STEM education at NSF in broader fiscal and policy context. Policy Issues and Observations
As the previous section's analysis of historical funding trends at NSF shows, Congress reduced funding for NSF's main education account in both FY2011 and FY2012. Those year-over-year reductions followed several years of fluctuating funding for E&HR. In addition, changes in the distribution of the foundation budget reduced funding for the main education account as a percentage of the total NSF budget. These changes generally appear to result from a combination of holding the main education account more or less constant while applying most of the foundation's FY2003-FY2012 budget growth to R&RA. However, in constant (2005) dollars, at least some of the growth in NSF research funding appears to come from the foundation's education-related activities. It is not clear if these funding changes reflect evolving congressional and Administration policy priorities and an intentional prioritization of research over educational activities at the NSF. They may simply reflect the cumulative impact of funding decisions made in response to specific conditions in specific fiscal years. What are NSF's STEM education activities? What impact might changes in the NSF STEM education account have on research activities at NSF? Smaller portions of NSF's STEM education budget provided for a number of other objectives. What Is NSF's Role in the Federal STEM Education Portfolio? In terms of the character of its contribution to the federal STEM education portfolio, NSF highlights its STEM education research and development (R&D) functions. | Federal policy makers have a long-standing interest in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education that dates to at least the 1st Congress. This interest is largely driven by concerns about the national science and engineering workforce, which is widely believed to play a central role in U.S. global economic competitiveness and national security.
The National Science Foundation (NSF) is a key component of the federal STEM education effort. Several inventories of the federal STEM education portfolio have highlighted NSF's important role—both in terms of funding and in the number and breadth of NSF programs. The NSF is also the only federal agency whose primary mission includes supporting education across all fields of science and engineering. As such, funding for STEM education at the NSF impacts not only the agency, but also the entire federal STEM education effort.
Congress reduced enacted funding levels (from the prior year) for NSF's main education account in both FY2011 and FY2012. Those year-over-year reductions followed several years of varying funding, as well as changes in the overall distribution of the foundation budget that reduced funding for the main education account as a percentage of the total NSF budget. For the most part, these changes appear to result from a combination of holding the main education account more or less constant while applying most of the foundation's FY2003-FY2012 budget growth to the main research account. However, in constant dollar terms, it appears at least some of the increase in funding for research activities during the observed period may have come at the expense of education activities.
It is not clear if these funding changes reflect evolving congressional and Administration policy priorities and an intentional prioritization of research over educational activities at the NSF, or if they reflect the cumulative impact of funding decisions made in response to specific conditions in specific fiscal years that happen to have had this effect. Further, the significance of these changes for NSF's STEM education and research missions—and for the overall federal STEM effort—depends, in part, on how they fit within the broader policy context. In particular, it depends (among other things) on how policy makers perceive and assess the policy rationale behind STEM education funding at the NSF; the character of NSF's STEM education activities; the foundation's role in the federal STEM education portfolio; and the impact of changes in NSF's education account on the foundation's other primary mission, research.
This report analyzes NSF funding trends and selected closely related STEM education policy issues in order to place conversations about NSF's budget in a broader fiscal and policy context. It concludes with an analysis of potential policy options. |
crs_R44099 | crs_R44099_0 | In the coming weeks and months the 114 th Congress will debate a number of funding, governance, and constitutional issues affecting the District of Columbia, including budget and legislative autonomy, voting representation in the national legislature, federal appropriations, and congressionally supported education initiatives. In addition, Congress may consider measures intended to void or otherwise modify acts and initiatives approved by District citizens and their elected representatives. The mechanisms available to Congress in carrying out its oversight of District affairs include resolutions of disapproval, riders on appropriation acts, and stand-alone legislative proposals. This report discusses a number of District of Columbia issues and proposals that may be considered during the 114 th Congress, including legislative and budget autonomy, marijuana decriminalization, gun regulation, and issues of religious freedom and nondiscrimination. Each topic covered in this report includes a discussion of current legislative proposals and relevant policy questions. Background
Congress's Constitutional Authority
The United States Constitution gives Congress exclusive authority over the legislative affairs of the District of Columbia. In 1973, Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (Home Rule Act), granting the city's residents limited home rule. The act allowed for the popular election of a mayor and city council and authorized them to legislate and manage the city's affairs. It also established a budget and legislative review process allowing Congress to disapprove the implementation of any legislative measure passed by the city's elected leaders and to review the city's annual budget. Congressional Review and Oversight10
Congress may exercise its authority over the legislative affairs of the District through one of three means:
a resolution of disapproval nullifying an act of the District of Columbia Council as outlined in the District's Home Rule Act; the use of riders attached to the District's operating budget which must be approved as part of the appropriations process; and authorizing acts introduced as stand-alone measures or attached to other legislation. | In the coming weeks and months the 114th Congress will debate a number of funding, governance, and constitutional issues affecting the District of Columbia, including budget and legislative autonomy, voting representation in the national legislature, federal appropriations, and congressionally supported education initiatives. In addition, Congress may consider measures intended to void or otherwise modify acts and initiatives approved by District citizens and their elected representatives. The mechanisms available to Congress in carrying out its oversight of District affairs include resolutions of disapproval, riders on appropriation acts, and stand-alone legislative proposals.
The United States Constitution gives Congress exclusive authority over the legislative affairs of the District of Columbia. Congress has exercised its constitutional authority in a number of ways over the years, including granting District residents some level of self-rule. In 1973, Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (Home Rule Act), granting the city's residents limited home rule. The act allowed for the popular election of a mayor and city council and authorized them to legislate and manage the city's affairs. It also established a budget and legislative review process allowing Congress to disapprove the implementation of any legislative measure passed by the city's elected leaders, including the city's annual budget.
The 114th Congress, as part of its oversight and legislative responsibilities, will consider a number of issues and legislative measures related to the District of Columbia. This report provides an overview of several District of Columbia-related issues and legislative proposals that Congress may review and act upon, including the following:
granting the District legislative and budget autonomy; granting citizens of the District voting representation in Congress; marijuana decriminalization; gun regulation and Second Amendment issues; religious conscience clauses and reproductive health issues; and nondiscrimination exemptions for religious affiliated institutions and organizations.
In addition, for each of the items above the report identifies current legislative proposals, if any, and pertinent policy questions related to each issue. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R45155 | crs_R45155_0 | This report addresses various legal issues related to sexual harassment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the federal statute that generally prohibits discrimination in the workplace, including discrimination based on sex. As the statute contains neither an express prohibition against harassment nor a definition of harassment, this report examines (1) how the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts have mapped out the scope of protection that Title VII provides employees against sexual harassment, including the Supreme Court's "severe or pervasive" standard that harassment victims must meet to show a Title VII violation (which applies to most Title VII sexual harassment claims); (2) limits on employer liability for harassment; and (3) retaliation for reporting harassment, among other issues. When a plaintiff raises a Title VII harassment claim, federal courts often describe the action as alleging "harassment" or a "hostile work environment." A plaintiff can also show a violation of Title VII based on quid pro quo harassment, also discussed in this report. Constructive Discharge
Rather than firing an employee, employers may compel employees to resign, for example, by creating intolerable working conditions. Because federal courts interpret Title VII to prohibit sexual harassment, employees who report such harassment in the workplace may be protected from unlawful retaliation—such as termination or demotion—for making that report. Though the Supreme Court has not addressed whether an employee's disclosures in an internal harassment investigation constitute protected participation under Title VII, the Court has expressly held that an employee's report of sexual harassment made in the context of an employer's internal investigation may constitute protected opposition . By contrast, the Court observed, the anti-retaliation provision contains "[n]o such limiting words," and interpreted this difference in statutory language to be intentional. | Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) generally prohibits discrimination in the workplace, but does not contain an express prohibition against harassment. The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the statute to prohibit certain forms of harassment, including sexual harassment. Since first recognizing the viability of a Title VII harassment claim in a unanimous 1986 decision, the Court has also established legal standards for determining when offensive conduct amounts to a Title VII violation and when employers may be held liable for such actionable harassment, and created an affirmative defense available to employers under certain circumstances.
Given this judicially created paradigm for analyzing sexual harassment under Title VII, this report examines key Supreme Court precedent addressing Title VII sexual harassment claims, the statutory interpretation and rationales reflected in these decisions, and examples of lower federal court decisions applying this precedent. The report also discusses various types of harassment recognized by the Supreme Court—such as "hostile work environment," quid pro quo, constructive discharge, and same-sex harassment—and explores tensions, disagreements, or apparent inconsistencies among federal courts when analyzing these claims.
Finally, this report examines sexual harassment in the context of retaliation. Does Title VII's anti-retaliation provision protect an employee from being fired, for example, for reporting sexual harassment? How do federal courts approach the analysis of a Title VII claim alleging that an employer retaliated against an employee by subjecting him or her to harassment? The report discusses Supreme Court and federal appellate court precedent relevant to these questions. |
crs_R44923 | crs_R44923_0 | 2810 ) on July 14, 2017. The Senate Armed Services Committee reported its version of the NDAA ( S. 1519 ) on September 18, 2017. The FY2018 NDAA conference report was passed by the House on November 14, 2017, and the Senate on November 16, 2017. On December 12, President Donald J. Trump signed the bill into law ( P.L. 115-91 ). This report highlights selected personnel-related issues that may generate high levels of congressional and constituent interest. Some issues discussed in this report were previously addressed in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 ( P.L. Those issues that were considered previously are designated with an asterisk in the relevant section titles of this report. H.R. | Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. This report provides a brief synopsis of selected sections in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 (H.R. 2810), as passed by the House on July 14, 2017, and the Senate on September 18, 2017. The FY2018 NDAA conference report was passed by the House on November 14, 2017, and the Senate on November 16, 2017. On December 12, President Donald J. Trump signed the bill into law (P.L. 115-91). Issues include military end-strengths, pay and benefits, and other personnel policy issues.
This report focuses exclusively on the NDAA legislative process. It does not include language concerning appropriations, or tax implications of policy choices, topics that are addressed in other CRS products. Issues that have been discussed in the previous year's defense personnel reports are designated with an asterisk in the relevant section titles of this report. |
crs_RL32379 | crs_RL32379_0 | History of Weapons Inspections
From April 1991 until December 1998, a U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attempted to verify that Iraq had ended all its prohibited WMD programs and to establish a long-term monitoring program of WMD facilities ( Resolution 715 , October 11, 1991). The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1205 (November 5, 1998), deeming the Iraqi action a "flagrant violation" of the February 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement. "Axis of Evil" and U.S. Policy
After the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, there was a debate over whether to expand the post-September 11 "war on terrorism" to Iraq, based largely on concerns that Iraq might use WMD against the United States or provide WMD to terrorist groups. Resolution 1441
After several weeks of negotiations, on November 8, 2002 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, whcih (1) declared Iraq in material breach of pre-existing resolutions; (2) gave Iraq until December 8, 2002 to provide a full declaration of all WMD programs; (3) required new inspections to begin by December 23, 2002; (4) declared all sites, including presidential sites, subject to unfettered inspections; (5) gave UNMOVIC the right to interview Iraqis in private, including taking them outside Iraq, and to freeze activity at a suspect site; (6) forbade Iraq from taking hostile acts against any country upholding U.N. resolutions, a provision that appeared to cover Iraq's defiance of the "no fly zones;" and (7) provided for the Security Council to consider how to respond to Iraqi non-compliance. Saddam rebuffed the ultimatum, and on March 19, U.S. military action (Operation Iraqi Freedom) began. Post-War WMD Search and Status of U.N. According to the report, Saddam believe that Iran remained a vital threat to Iraq's national survival and that WMD could deter Iran and that the U.S. perception that Iraq retained WMD could deter a potential U.S. attack on Iraq. UNMOVIC's work was formally terminated by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1762 (June 29, 2007). U.N. The U.S. intelligence community's assessment of Iraq's pre-war WMD was outlined in an October 2002 white paper entitled Iraq ' s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (referred to below as "the CIA white paper"), which was based on a classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). U.S. and U.N. human rights reports after the 1991 Gulf war repeatedly described Saddam Hussein's regime as a gross violator of human rights. Post-War Findings
At least 270 mass graves have been reported by Iraqis and U.S. investigators since the fall of the regime, but about 50 were confirmed by Iraq's Human Rights Ministry. Those it had sought for trial include Saddam; his two sons Uday and Qusay (killed after discovery by and a firefight with U.S. forces in Mosul on July 22, 2003); Ali Hassan al-Majid, for alleged use of chemicals against the Kurds (captured August 21, 2003); Muhammad Hamza al-Zubaydi (surrendered in mid-April 2003); Taha Yasin Ramadan; first Vice President and number three in the regime (captured August 19, 2003); Izzat Ibrahim, Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and formally number two in the regime (still at large); Barzan al-Tikriti, Saddam's half brother (captured in mid-April 2003); Watban al-Tikriti (captured in April 2003) and Sabawi al-Tikriti, both other half brothers of Saddam and former leaders of regime intelligence bureaus; Tariq Aziz, deputy Prime Minister and foremost regime spokesman (surrendered in May 2003); and Aziz Salih Noman, governor of Kuwait during Iraq's occupation of that country (captured May 2003). On November 5, 2006, was convicted for the Dujail killings and was hanged by the Iraqi government on December 30, 2006. The United States, most recently during the July 2009 visit of Prime Minister Maliki, has reiterated the thrust of Article 25 of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, requiring the United States to try to help Iraq close out Chapter 7 resolutions. A U.N. Secretary General report on what is needed to close these Resolutions, required by Paragraph 5 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1859 (December 22, 2008), is due later in 2009. However, contention remains over border pillars. After that 1991 war, 605 Kuwaitis and other country nationals were missing. After January 1995, Iraq and Kuwait had met monthly on the Iraq-Kuwait border, along with U.S., British, French, and Saudi representatives, but Iraq boycotted the meetings after Operation Desert Fox. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 required Iraq to return all property seized from Kuwait, including the Kuwaiti national archives. The Kuwaiti national archives are still missing and no credible information on their whereabouts exists. After that war, the U.N. Security Council set up a mechanism for compensating the victims of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (individuals, governments, and corporations), using 25% (reduced from 30% in December 2000) of the proceeds from Iraqi oil sales. (See CRS Report 98-240, Iraq: Compensation and Assets Issues (pdf) . ) Resolution 1483 directed that the DFI be audited by an International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB). | After asserting that Iraq had failed to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions that required Iraq to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Bush Administration began military action against Iraq on March 19, 2003, and the regime of Saddam Hussein fell on April 9. U.N. Security Council resolution 1483, adopted May 22, 2003, lifted sanctions on Iraq and provided for the possibility that U.N. inspectors could return to Iraq, although the United States, not the United Nations, conducted the post-war WMD searches. U.S. teams attempted to find WMD and related production programs. Only minor finds of actual WMD were made. A major report (September 30, 2004) by U.S. experts performing post-war WMD searches (the "Duelfer report") has concluded that pre-war U.S. assessments of Iraq's WMD capabilities were mostly incorrect but that analysis of Saddam's WMD intentions was probably accurate. Iraq remains barred from developing WMD by the Saddam-era U.N Security Council resolutions, even though there is a new government in Baghdad that is relatively democratic, and even though the formal WMD search effort was ended by the U.N. Security Council.
Part of the pre-war debate over U.S. policy centered on whether Iraq's WMD programs could be ended through U.N. weapons inspections. During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) made considerable progress in dismantling and monitoring Iraq's WMD but was unable to verify Iraq's claim that it had destroyed all its WMD and related equipment. Iraq's refusal of full cooperation with UNSCOM eventually prompted U.S.-British military action—a series of air strikes designated as Operation Desert Fox—in December 1998. All inspectors withdrew and Iraq was largely uninspected during 1998-2002.
Many of the Saddam-era U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq-Kuwait issues remain in force, to the chagrin of Iraqi leaders who want all Chapter 7 U.N. resolutions ended. Article 25 of the U.S.-Iraq "Security Agreement," which took effect January 1, 2009, commits the United States to help Iraq obtain the terminate the application of these resolutions, and a U.N. report on outstanding Chapter 7 issues is due later in 2009. Even before the 2003 ousting of Saddam, the Iraq-Kuwait land and sea border was settled, and U.N. border monitoring was ended, under applicable U.N. resolutions. However a U.N. envoy remains empowered to continue to try to determine the fate of about 605 Kuwaitis and other nationals still missing from the first Gulf war as well as of Kuwait's national archives. The cases of 369 Kuwaiti and 3rd-party nationals remain unresolved, and the unknown whereabouts of the Kuwaiti National Archives continues to be a point of tension. Iraq is still required to devote 5% of all revenue to pay compensation to the victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, including over $25 billion still owed to Kuwaiti claimants. In addition, Iraq's oil monies continue to be audited by an international advisory board, and a U.N. mission in Iraq is empowered to work in Iraq on humanitarian issues.
Saddam Hussein's regime was widely deemed non-compliant in other areas, especially human rights issues. Since the fall of the regime, U.S. teams confirmed at least 50 mass graves containing primarily Shiites and Kurds that Saddam Hussein had characterized as a threat to the regime. The Iraqi Special Tribunal conducted two trials against Saddam and sentenced him to death by hanging on November 5, 2006. The sentence was carried out on December 30, 2006. Other close associates are now undergoing legal proceedings that will lead to their trial on crimes against humanity.
This report will be updated as warranted by developments. Please see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security. |
crs_RS22452 | crs_RS22452_0 | A "follow-on mission," Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), was started on January 1, 2015, to "continue training, advising, and assisting Afghan security forces." Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began on March 19, 2003, and was primarily conducted in Iraq. On October 15, 2014, U.S. Central Command designated new military operations in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). (For more information on war and conflict dates, see CRS Report RS21405, U.S. Periods of War and Dates of Recent Conflicts , by [author name scrubbed].) Daily updates of total U.S. military and civilian casualties in OIF, OEF, OND, OIR, and OFS can be found at the Department of Defense's (DOD's) website, at http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf . Traumatic Brain Injury
Many statistics on traumatic brain injury (TBI) are available to the public, at the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center, at http://dvbic.dcoe.mil/dod-worldwide-numbers-tbi . | This report presents statistics regarding U.S. military and civilian casualties in the active missions Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS, Afghanistan) and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR, Iraq and Syria) and, as well as operations that have ended, Operation New Dawn (OND, Iraq), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Iraq), and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan). It also includes statistics on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), and amputations. Some of these statistics are publicly available at the Department of Defense's (DOD's) website and others have been obtained through DOD experts.
For more information on pre-2000 casualties, see CRS Report RL32492, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R44325 | crs_R44325_0 | Introduction
The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. In Senate committees, the chair and ranking Member set the terms and conditions of employment for majority and minority staff, respectively. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in committee offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 13 staff position titles that are used in Senate committees, and for which sufficient data could be identified. Pay data for staff working in House committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014 . Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in the personal offices of Senators and Members of the House are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014 , and CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014 , respectively. Table 4 - Table 16 provide tabular pay data for each Senate committee staff position. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following:
a line graph showing change in pay, depending on data availability, in nominal (current) and constant 2016 dollars; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from FY2015, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change of that position to changes in pay, in constant 2016 dollars, of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of FY2015 pay, when available, in 2016 dollars, in $10,000 increments. Between FY2011 and FY2015, the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 16.93% increase for professional staff members to a -16.48% decrease for staff assistants. Of the seven staff positions for which data were available in FY2011 and FY2015, two positions saw pay increases while seven saw declines. This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%, over approximately the same period (calendar years 2011-2015). | The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in committee offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems.
This report provides pay data for 13 staff position titles used in Senate committees. The positions include the following: Chief Clerk, Chief Counsel, Communications Director, Counsel, Legislative Assistant, Minority Chief Counsel, Minority Staff Director, Press Secretary, Professional Staff Member, Senior Counsel, Staff Assistant, Staff Director, and Systems Administrator.
Tables provide tabular pay data for each Senate committee staff position. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following:
a line graph showing change in pay, depending on data availability; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from FY2015, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change of pay for that position, to the change in pay of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of FY2015 pay, when available, in $10,000 increments.
In the past five years (FY2011 and FY2015), the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, ranged from a 16.93% increase for professional staff members to a -16.48% decrease for staff assistants. Of the seven staff positions for which data were available in FY2011 and FY2015, two saw pay increases while five saw declines (data are not available in FY2011 or FY2015 for chief counsels, communications directors, legislative assistants, minority chief counsels, minority staff directors, and press secretaries). This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%, over approximately the same period (calendar years 2011-2015).
Pay data for staff working in House committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014. Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in the personal offices of Senators and Members of the House are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014, and CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014, respectively.
Information about the duration of staff employment is available in CRS Report R44683, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44685, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senate Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44682, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2006-2016, and CRS Report R44684, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, 2006-2016. |
crs_R40378 | crs_R40378_0 | Increased congressional interest in the patent system has reflected growing recognition of the role patents play in promoting innovation and economic growth. In recent years, a number of bills have proposed changes to the patent system designed to address perceived deficiencies. Several of these bills would have altered the current system of "patent revocation proceedings" administered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The term "patent revocation proceeding" commonly refers to a legal procedure through which members of the public may challenge the validity of an issued patent. Current law provides for two types of patent revocation proceedings: an ex parte reexamination and inter partes reexamination. Some observers believe that these proceedings are underutilized due to shortcomings in their design. Legislative proposals in the 111 th Congress would address existing patent revocation proceedings and also establish a new, more expansive "post-grant review proceeding." Proponents of reform assert that these changes would better fulfill the original purposes of reexamination, ultimately allowing more efficient resolution of patent disputes and improving patent quality. Under the ex parte reexamination regime, any individual, including the patentee, a licensee, and even the USPTO Director himself, may cite a patent or printed publication to the USPTO and request that a reexamination occur. If the USPTO determines that the cited reference does not raise "a substantial new question of patentability," then it will refund a large portion of the requestor's fee. Inter partes reexamination proceedings resulted in a certificate cancelling all the claims 60% of the time, a certificate confirming all the claims 5% of the time, and a certificate amending at least one claim 35% of the time. Other concerns have arisen with respect to reexamination. Transparent Decisions
Each of the bills calls for the record of the proceedings to be made available to the public. Minimizing Repetitive Charges Against the Patent Owner
The bills also incorporate features that may decrease the possibility that post-grant proceedings may be used against a patent owner in an arguably abusive manner. In the event that reform is considered desirable, these features may be adjusted in view of particular policy goals. Legislation proposing more expansive patent revocation proceedings may be viewed as attempting to achieve the goals of the earlier reexamination statutes: The creation of a predictable, cost-effective, and timely mechanism for resolving patent validity disputes while limiting harassment of the patent owner. | Congressional recognition of the role patents play in promoting innovation and economic growth has resulted in the introduction of legislation proposing changes to the patent system. Among other goals, these changes would potentially decrease the cost of resolving disputes concerning patents, increase commercial certainty regarding the validity of particular patents, address potential abuses committed by speculators, and account for the particular needs of individual inventors, universities, and small firms with respect to the patent system.
In pursuit of these goals, several bills introduced in the 111th Congress would alter the current system of "patent revocation proceedings" administered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The term "patent revocation proceeding" commonly refers to a legal procedure through which members of the public may challenge the validity of an issued patent.
Current law provides for two types of patent revocation proceedings: an ex parte reexamination and inter partes reexamination. Any individual may cite a patent or printed publication to the USPTO and request that an ex parte reexamination occur. If the USPTO determines that the request raises "a substantial new question of patentability," then it will commence the ex parte reexamination. The USPTO will then review the patent with special dispatch. The proceeding results in either a certificate upholding the claims in original or amended form, or a certificate of cancellation rejecting all of the claims of the patent. Inter partes reexamination operates similarly to an ex parte reexamination, but allows more significant participation by the individual requesting the proceeding.
Some observers believe that both types of reexamination have not been widely used and could be improved. As a result, previous legislative proposals have called for their elimination or modification. These bills would have also created a new, more expansive "post-grant review proceeding." This proposed procedure was intended to provide a predictable, cost-effective, and timely mechanism for resolving patent validity disputes and limit repetitive claims against the patent owner.
Patent revocation proceedings involve a number of design parameters that may be adjusted in order to meet certain policy goals. Among these parameters are the time at which the proceeding may begin, the patentability issues that may be addressed, the availability of discovery, and the extent to which participants may reassert unsuccessful arguments in subsequent administrative or judicial proceedings. These parameters may be modified in order to encourage certain policy goals, including timely use and resolution of the proceedings, limiting the possibility of harassment of the patent owner, and providing predictable, effective, and transparent decisions. |
crs_RS22168 | crs_RS22168_0 | Background
The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) was incorporated in 1967 as a private nonprofit corporation under the authority of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 (P.L. CPB is the largest single source of funding for public television and radio programming. CPB's principal function is to receive and distribute the federal appropriation in accordance with the Public Broadcasting Act, supporting qualified public radio and television stations and funding national content. Approximately 15% of public television and 10% of radio broadcasting funding comes from the federal appropriations that CPB distributes. On June 9, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved, 29-1, S.Rept. 114-274 , the FY2017 Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations bill. Among its provisions is $445 million for CPB in 2019. On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed P.L. 115-31 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, which maintained FY2017 funding for CPB through the rest of the fiscal year. On May 23, 2017, the Trump Administration released its FY2018 budget request. It calls for the elimination of federal funding for CPB for FY2018 and beyond; however, $30 million is requested for the orderly closeout of federal funding for CPB in FY2018. 5538 , would have eliminated federal appropriations for CPB when its two-year advanced funding ends. H.R. In this bill, the congressional request for CPB in FY2016—the forward two-year appropriation—was $45 million. On June 20, 2012, the CPB released a report, Alternative Sources of Funding for Public Broadcasting Stations. The report was undertaken in response to language in the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2012 directing the CPB to provide a report to congressional appropriations committees on alternative sources of federal funding for public broadcasting stations. 2055 , P.L. 112-74 ). Booz & Company found "there is simply no substitute for the federal investment" in public broadcasting and that "Ending federal funding for public broadcasting would severely diminish, if not destroy, public broadcasting service in the United States." Balanced against concerns about the role of the federal government in public broadcasting, as well as strong pressure to reduce federal spending, these issues will likely continue to be of interest to federal policymakers. | The Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) receives its funding through federal appropriations; overall, about 15% of public television and 10% of radio broadcasting funding comes from the federal appropriations that CPB distributes. CPB's appropriation is allocated through a distribution formula established in its authorizing legislation and has historically received two-year advanced appropriations. Congressional policymakers are increasingly interested in the federal role in supporting CPB due to concerns over the federal debt, the role of the federal government funding for public radio and television, and whether public broadcasting provides a balanced and nuanced approach to covering news of national interest.
It is also important to note that many congressional policymakers defend the federal role of funding public broadcasting. They contend that it provides news and information to large segments of the population that seek to understand complex policy issues in depth, and in particular for children's television broadcasting, has a significant and positive impact on early learning and education for children.
On June 20, 2012, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting released a report, Alternative Sources of Funding for Public Broadcasting Stations. The report was undertaken in response to the conference report accompanying the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Appropriations Act of 2012 (incorporated into the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2012, H.R. 2055, P.L. 112-74). The CPB engaged the consulting firm of Booz & Company to explore possible alternatives to the federal appropriation to CPB. Among its findings, the report stated that ending federal funding for public broadcasting would severely diminish, if not destroy, public broadcasting service in the United States.
The two-year advanced appropriations process for CPB means that in any given year congressional policymakers are considering what the CPB appropriations will be two years from that time. So as Congress continues to consider funding for the FY2017 fiscal year, that deliberation would include CPB funding for FY2019. On June 9, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee voted 29-1 to approve S.Rept. 114-274, the FY2017 Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations bill. Included in this report is $445 million for CPB in FY2019. On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed P.L. 115-31, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, which maintained FY2017 funding for CPB through the rest of the fiscal year. On May 23, 2017, the Trump Administration released its FY2018 budget request. It calls for the elimination of federal funding for CPB for FY2018 and beyond; however, $30 million is requested for the orderly closeout of federal funding for CPB in FY2018. |
crs_R40209 | crs_R40209_0 | Contributions from foreign sources have also been a concern, including during Senate consideration of Hillary Clinton's nomination as Secretary of State. That bill would have required library fundraising organizations to publicly disclose contributions of at least $200, along with the names and occupations of donors. This report provides an overview of recent legislation regarding presidential library fundraising. It also discusses policy issues and options. Requiring additional disclosure surrounding library fundraising could increase transparency and potentially discourage conflicts of interest. Amounts and sources of library fundraising would continue to be unlimited. Appropriated funds, therefore, have not been the subject of substantial legislative activity in recent Congresses. Although those organizations must report certain information to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), they are not required to publicly disclose identifying information about their donors. Contributions to libraries are also not subject to disclosure requirements or limitations contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which governs campaign financing. In recent Congresses, some Members have expressed concern about the lack of information surrounding private fundraising for library foundations. Under the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA), registered lobbyists who contribute $200 or more to library foundations (in the aggregate and over six-month reporting periods) must disclose the contributions in reports filed with the Clerk of the House or Secretary of the Senate. Library Fundraising: Legislation in the 112th Congress
On February 17, 2011, Representative Duncan introduced H.R. 775 , a bill to require additional fundraising disclosure surrounding presidential libraries and related organizations. Library Fundraising: Legislation in the 111th Congress
In one of its first acts of legislative business, and with minimal debate, the House passed the Presidential Library Donation Act of 2009 ( H.R. 36 would have required library fundraising organizations to file quarterly reports itemizing contributions totaling at least $200. Library Fundraising: Legislation in the 110th Congress
H.R. 36 in the 111 th Congress was virtually identical to the version of H.R. 1254 (Waxman) passed by the House during the 110 th Congress. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) favorably reported an amended version of H.R. 1254 , but the measure did not receive floor consideration. If Congress wishes to pursue broader regulation of library fundraising, aspects of federal campaign finance policy may be a useful model, although certainly not the only model. As noted previously, library contributions are not treated as campaign contributions, but some goals embodied in campaign finance regulation appear to be similar to those behind calls for additional library-fundraising disclosure. | In recent Congresses, some Members have expressed concern about the lack of information surrounding private fundraising for presidential libraries. Those calling for additional regulation argue that more transparency could reduce potential conflicts of interest surrounding library contributions. Contributions from foreign sources have also been the subject of debate.
Federal law and regulation are largely silent on contributions to presidential libraries. Contributions to library fundraising organizations may be unlimited and can come from any otherwise lawful source. In addition, although certain aspects of library contributions are similar to campaign contributions, library contributions are not considered to be campaign contributions and are not subject to limits on amounts and funding sources specified in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). In one of the few relatively recent regulatory changes affecting library contributions, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA), enacted in the 110th Congress, requires registered lobbyists to report their contributions to presidential libraries. However, non-lobbyists are not required to report their library contributions. Library fundraising organizations must report certain information to the Internal Revenue Service, but those organizations are not required to publicize information about individual donors.
Library-fundraising issues emerged during Senate consideration of Hillary Clinton's nomination as Secretary of State, amid concerns about fundraising for former President Clinton's library and other initiatives. Calls for additional disclosure, however, are not new. During the 110th Congress, the House passed H.R. 1254 (Waxman), which would have required library fundraising organizations to file quarterly reports itemizing contributions of at least $200 and identifying donors. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs reported an amended version of the bill, but the measure did not receive Senate floor consideration. In the 111th Congress, the House passed H.R. 36 (Towns) in January 2009; that measure was virtually identical to the House-passed version of H.R. 1254 from the 110th Congress. It did not advance in the Senate. An additional disclosure measure, H.R. 775 (Duncan), which would also require reporting of donations of at least $200, was introduced in the 112th Congress, in February 2011. If Congress wishes to pursue broader regulation of library fundraising, aspects of campaign finance policy may be a useful model. However, certain aspects of a campaign-finance disclosure model may invite controversy.
This report provides an overview of recent policy issues and legislation surrounding library fundraising. It will be updated in the event of significant legislative activity. |
crs_R43368 | crs_R43368_0 | This report provides answers to 20 frequently asked questions regarding contractors and HealthCare.gov, the federal online health insurance portal called for by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) ( P.L. 111-148 , as amended). Over 50 contractors, including CGI Federal and Quality Software Services, Inc. (QSSI), helped in building the site, which was reportedly largely unusable when it first became available to the public on October 1, 2013, and has been the subject of ongoing work since then. The questions and answers in the report are organized into three broad categories addressing (1) the processes whereby the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) selected vendors; (2) the terms of the vendors' contractual relationships with the government; and (3) potential amendments to federal procurement law that, some commentators suggest, could help prevent issues of the sort experienced with HealthCare.gov. The questions in this report are those that happen to have been frequently asked of the Congressional Research Service by congressional staffers. The inclusion of a particular question, or the exclusion of another question, should not be taken to indicate that particular factors didâor did notâcontribute to the problematic rollout of HealthCare.gov. In addition, answers to these questions must often be provided in general terms, in part, because specific language in the parties' contracts may be subject to multiple interpretations and has not been construed by any court. In addition, the parties' conduct in the course of performing the contractâthe details of which are still emergingâcan affect their rights. For example, the government could potentially be found to have waived certain rights that the contract's plain language would appear to grant to it by engaging in conduct that warrants an inference that it has relinquished the right. The authors of this report rely upon third-party investigations of the facts and circumstances surrounding HealthCare.gov, and additional information may emerge regarding topics discussed herein. There is also a video, CRS WVB00013, Contractors and HealthCare.gov: Background in Brief , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], that addresses certain of these questions. CMS's Selection of Vendors for HealthCare.gov
Were vendors competitively selected to do the initial work on HealthCare.gov? However, the award of a contract is not the only way in which agencies may assign work to specific vendors, and CICA's requirements as to "full and open competition" generally do not apply when agencies assign work to a vendor without awarding a contract. Are there any restrictions on "foreign" participation in federal contracts? Vendors' Contractual Relationships with CMS
How can I get copies of the contracts? Are vendors required to report performance problems to the government? Can the government get its money back? It remains to be seen whether and how much of the money that CMS spent on HealthCare.gov the government might be able to recover in light of the website's problematic rollout, or on other grounds. Potential Reforms in Response to HealthCare.gov
What about consideration of risk and modularity in IT contracting? Suggested techniques include modular contracting, among other things. Some have wondered about requiring IT vendors to post performance bonds, as some states did when contracting for IT in the 1990s. What about use of lead system integrators? | The widely reported problems with the rollout of the HealthCare.gov websiteâthe federal online health insurance portal called for by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) ( P.L. 111-148 , as amended)âhave prompted interest in the role that contractors played in developing this site. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relied upon the services of over 50 vendors to build the site, which was reportedly largely unusable when it first became available to the public on October 1, 2013, and has been the subject of ongoing work since then.
Given HealthCare.gov's problematic debut, questions have arisen about how CMS selected vendors to work on HealthCare.gov, and the terms of the vendors' contractual relationships with the government. For example, some have wondered how CMS could assign work to specific vendors without engaging in "full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures"; whether there are any restrictions on agencies' dealings with vendors that have foreign parent corporations, as some HealthCare.gov vendors do; and whether political input plays a role in the source-selection process. There have also been questions about how to obtain copies of particular contracts; vendor obligations to report performance problems to the government; modifications to existing contracts; how parties to a government contract resolve disputes; and whether the government can get its money back.
Most recently, questions have been raised about potential amendments to federal procurement law that could, some commentators suggest, prevent issues of the sort experienced with HealthCare.gov. HeathCare.gov's early difficulties are generally seen to have increased interest in the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) ( H.R. 1232 ), which would, among other things, increase the authority of the top agency chief information officers. FITARA passed the House, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2014, prior to HealthCare.gov's rollout, but was not included in the NDAA as enacted ( P.L. 113-66 ). Other measures have been introduced specifically in response to the rollout of HealthCare.gov (e.g., H.R. 3373 , S. 1843 ). Yet other potential reforms have been suggested, but are not reflected in proposed legislation. Topics of such proposed reforms include consideration of risk and use of modular contracting methods when acquiring information technology (IT); performance bonds and express warranties; and use of lead system integrators (i.e., contractors responsible for assembling a system from components developed and/or tested by other vendors).
The questions in this report are those that happen to have been frequently asked of the Congressional Research Service by congressional staffers. The inclusion of a particular question, or the exclusion of another question, should not be taken to indicate that particular factors didâor did notâcontribute to HealthCare.gov's problematic debut. In addition, answers to these questions must often be provided in general terms, in part, because specific language in the parties' contracts may be subject to multiple interpretations and has not been construed by any court. In addition, the parties' conduct in performing the contractâthe details of which are generally still emergingâcan affect their rights. For example, the government could potentially be found to have waived certain rights that the contract's plain language would appear to grant to it by engaging in conduct that warrants an inference that it has relinquished the right. The authors of this report rely upon third-party investigations of the facts and circumstances surrounding HealthCare.gov, and additional information may emerge regarding topics discussed herein.
There is also a video, CRS WVB00013, Contractors and HealthCare.gov: Background in Brief , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], that addresses certain of these questions. |
crs_R42867 | crs_R42867_0 | Introduction
At noon on January 20 of each year following a presidential election, the President-elect is sworn in as President of the United States. Due to safety and security concerns for the public and the American political leadership, the inauguration ceremony is designated a National Security Special Event (NSSE). NSSEs are high profile, and usually public, events that require significant security because of the attendance of U.S. and foreign dignitaries and the event's public or official nature. Instead, inauguration security funding is expected to be provided from the USSS general NSSE account. In limited circumstances, Congress has provided supplemental appropriations to "reimburse" local jurisdictions for inauguration related activities. Criticism of past inauguration security operations and practices has generated congressional concern. For example, during the 2009 inauguration of President Barack Obama, some ticket holders were unable to reach their designated seating areas, while others were stuck in a tunnel leading to the National Mall. This report provides information on inauguration security operations and inauguration security appropriations, and discusses potential policy issues associated with inauguration security operations. It also identifies some policy issues associated with inauguration security operations, including some past inauguration security operations criticisms and inauguration security operation appropriations. Options are provided for congressional consideration for future inauguration and inauguration security planning. Congress may wish to consider past criticisms of both inauguration security operations and appropriations. Background
Presidential inauguration ceremonies are unique public events in the District of Columbia (DC). Consequently, the inauguration is designated as an NSSE by DHS. In recent years, however, Congress has appropriated additional funds to reimburse some local governments and federal agencies for inauguration related expenses and has provided appropriations to the USSS for "unanticipated costs related to security operations for National Special Security Events," which could be used for inauguration related activities. Limited, and identified, appropriations for NSSE and the absence of specific inauguration security operations appropriations limits the ability to conduct substantive policy analysis on the costs associated with inaugurations generally, and inauguration security operations specifically. Issues for Congressional Consideration
Congressional interest in inauguration security may be based on various factors and determinates including its roles in appropriating funds for inaugurations, oversight of law enforcement and first responder entities with inauguration security responsibilities, and hosting the swearing-in ceremony, and the heightened interest in post-9/11 security operations. Inauguration Security Operations
In the past, there has been criticism of inauguration security operations. | Every four years, on January 20, the President-elect is sworn in as President of the United States. Presidential inauguration ceremonies are unique public events in the District of Columbia. The inauguration ceremonies are public and, like the President's State of the Union address, they are events in which a significant proportion of the American political leadership is in attendance. Consequently, the inauguration is designated as a National Special Security Event (NSSE) by the Department of Homeland Security. NSSEs are events that require significant security, in part because of the attendance of U.S. and foreign dignitaries and the event's public or official nature.
Funding for inauguration security operations is provided from the U.S. Secret Service's National Special Security Event general account, though information on the amount provided is not publicly available. In limited circumstances, however, Congress has also provided supplemental appropriations to reimburse local jurisdictions for inauguration-related activities. Other inauguration spending is less easily identifiable because it is indirect and a part of typical annual appropriations to the relevant agencies. Because of the absence of specificity, substantive policy analysis on costs associated with inauguration security may be limited.
In addition to Congress's responsibility for funding inauguration security operations, Congress also conducts oversight of the security operations. Criticisms of past inauguration security operations and practices generated congressional concern. An example of this criticism includes reports that some 2009 presidential inauguration ticket holders were unable to reach their designated seating areas due to security checkpoint contestation. Congressional, interest group, and media criticism appears to be specifically focused on 2009 inauguration security operations instead of general observations or criticism. There appears to have been no criticism of the 2013 inauguration's security.
This report provides information on inauguration security operations and inauguration security appropriations, and it discusses potential policy issues associated with inauguration security operations. It also identifies some policy issues associated with inauguration security operations, including some past inauguration security operations criticisms and inauguration security operation appropriations. Options are provided for congressional consideration for future inauguration and inauguration security planning.
Congressional interest in inauguration security may be based on various factors and determinates, including its roles in appropriating funds for inaugurations, oversight of law enforcement and first responder entities with inauguration security responsibilities, and hosting the swearing-in ceremony, as well as the heightened interest in post-9/11 security operations. Congress may wish to consider past criticisms of both inauguration security operations and appropriations. |
crs_98-67 | crs_98-67_0 | Introduction
The continued growth of the Internet for personal, government, and business purposes may be affected by a number of technology policy issues being debated by Congress. Among them are access to and regulation of broadband (high-speed) Internet services, computer and Internet security, Internet privacy, the impact of "spam," concerns about what children may encounter (such as pornography) when using the Internet, management of the Internet Domain Name System, and government information technology management. Number of Users
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issues biannual reports on broadband Internet access service. Broadband Internet Regulation and Access17
Broadband Internet access gives users the ability to send and receive data at speeds far greater than conventional "dial up" Internet access over existing telephone lines. These issues are anticipated to continue to be a focus of the broadband policy debate in the 110 th Congress. Trust in one's system may be reduced. The Strategy assigned a number of responsibilities for coordinating the protection of the nation's information infrastructure to the Department of Homeland Security. In fact, the e-mail or website is controlled by a third party who is attempting to extract information that will be used in identity theft or other crimes. It does not ban unsolicited commercial e-mail. 268 , which expresses the sense of the Congress that the current system for management of the domain name system works, and that "the authoritative root zone server should remain physically located in the United States and the Secretary of Commerce should maintain oversight of ICANN so that ICANN can continue to manage the day-to-day operation of the Internet's domain name and addressing system well, remain responsive to all Internet stakeholders worldwide, and otherwise fulfill its core technical mission." Government Information Technology Management40
The evolving role of the Internet in the political economy of the United States continues to attract increased congressional attention to government information technology management issues. Although wide-ranging, some of the most significant information technology management challenges facing the federal government include FCC regulation of converging technologies, funding for information technology research and development, ongoing development and oversight of electronic government (e-government) initiatives, and the growing use of open source software by federal agencies. Following is such a summary of all laws that have been tracked in this report over the years, by topic. (CRS Report RS21328, Internet: Status Report on Legislative Attempts to Protect Children from Unsuitable Material on the Web , by [author name scrubbed], provides further information on this and other legislative efforts to protect children from unsuitable material on the Internet.) | In the decade between 1994 and 2004, the number of U.S. adults using the Internet increased from 15% to 63%, and by 2005, stood at 78.6%. From electronic mail to accessing information to watching videos to online purchasing, the Internet touches almost every aspect of modern life. The extent to which use of the Internet continues to grow, however, may be affected by a number of technology policy issues being debated in Congress.
First is the availability of high-speed—or "broadband"—Internet access. Broadband Internet access gives users the ability to send and receive data at speeds far greater than "dial-up" Internet access over traditional telephone lines. With deployment of broadband technologies accelerating, Congress is seeking to ensure fair competition and timely broadband deployment to all sectors and geographical locations of American society.
Next are a range of issues that reflect challenges faced by those who do use the Internet, such as security, privacy (including spyware and identity theft), unsolicited commercial electronic mail ("spam"), protecting children from unsuitable material (such as pornography), and computer security, including the vulnerability of the nation's critical infrastructures to cyber attacks.
Other issues include the Internet's domain name system (DNS), which is administered by a nonprofit corporation called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). With the Department of Commerce currently exercising legal authority over ICANN, Congress continues to monitor the administration of the DNS, particularly with respect to issues such as privacy, governance, and protecting children on the Internet.
The evolving role of the Internet in the political economy of the United States also continues to attract congressional attention. Among the issues are what changes may be needed at the Federal Communications Commission in the Internet age, federal support for information technology research and development, provision of online services by the government ("e-government"), and availability and use of "open source" software by the government.
A number of laws already have been passed on many of these issues. Congress is monitoring the effectiveness of these laws, and assessing what other legislation may be needed. Other CRS reports referenced in this document track legislation, and the reader should consult those reports, which are updated more frequently than this one, for current information.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45116 | crs_R45116_0 | Blockchain is not a new technology; rather it is an innovative way of using existing technologies. It enables parties who may not have reason to trust each other to agree on the current distribution of assets and who has those assets, so that they may conduct new business. A blockchain is a digital ledger that allows parties to transact without the use of a central authority to validate those transactions. The use of a central, validating authority (i.e., a third party) can be avoided because in a blockchain, as transactions are added, the identities of the parties conducting those transactions are verified, and the transactions are verified as they are added to the ledger as a block of transactions. The strong relationships between identities, transactions, and the ledger enable parties to verify with a high degree of confidence the state of resources as logged in the ledger. With an agreement on that history, parties may then conduct a new transaction with a shared understanding of who has which resource and of their ability to trade that resource. Four particular technologies are used to enable blockchain: asymmetric key encryption; hashes; Merkle trees; and peer-to-peer networks. Transactions are grouped together and made into a block. Applications
Blockchain is not a panacea technology. A blockchain records events as transactions when they happen, in the order they happen, in an add-on only manner. Previous data on the blockchain cannot be altered, and users of the blockchain have access to the data on the blockchain in order to validate the distribution of resources. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies each have their own blockchain. But there are pitfalls and unsolved challenges which may inhibit its wide use. Some of these concerns are discussed below. The existence of that data is permanent on the blockchain. Ill-Defined Requirements
As with adopting any technology, adopters must examine the business, legal, and technical aspects of adopting blockchain. Will employees benefit from the use of the technology? In some blockchain implementations this is allowed and encouraged. Because of its novelty, blockchain is being piloted by industry, but at this time does not appear to be a replacement for existing systems. However, in addition to examining legislative options concerning the technology's use, Congress may, if it chooses to do so, provide oversight of federal agencies seeking to (1) use it for government business, and/or (2) regulate its use in the private sector. They are seeking ways to better manage identities, assets, data, and contracts. Additionally, federal agencies are creating test beds for blockchain technology. Conclusion
Interest in blockchain technology continues to grow in both the public and private sectors. Congress is aware of the growing interest in blockchain technology and has held several hearings on the technology and its potential implications for the economy and government use. | The rise of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and the use of Initial Coin Offerings to raise capital has drawn increased attention from both the public and private sector concerning the use of digital ledgers to conduct business (called blockchain technology) and its potential. Yet many remain unclear on what the technology actually is, what it does, and the tradeoffs for its use.
A blockchain is a digital ledger that allows parties to transact without the use of a central authority as a trusted intermediary. In this ledger, transactions are grouped together in blocks, which are cryptographically chained together in a way that is tamper-proof and creates a mathematically indisputable history.
Blockchain is not a new technology; rather it is an innovative way of using existing technologies. The technologies underpinning blockchain are asymmetric key encryption, hash values, Merkle trees, and peer-to-peer networks. Blockchain allows parties who may not trust each other to agree on the current distribution of assets and who has those assets, so that they may conduct new business. But, while there has been a great deal of hype concerning blockchain's benefits, it also has certain pitfalls that may inhibit its utility.
With blockchain, as transactions are added, the identities of the parties conducting those transactions are verified, and the transactions themselves are verifiable by other users. The strong relationship between identities, transactions, and the ledger enables parties that may not trust each other or an individual computing platform to agree on the state of resources as logged in the ledger. With that agreement, they may conduct a new transaction with a common understanding of who has which resource and their ability to trade that resource.
Blockchain is not a panacea technology. A blockchain records events as transactions when they happen, in the order they happen, and in an add-on only manner. Previous data on the blockchain cannot be altered, and users of the blockchain have access to the data on the blockchain in order to validate the distribution of resources. Though there are benefits to blockchain, there are also pitfalls and unsolved conditions which may inhibit blockchain use. Some of those concerns are data portability, ill-defined requirements, key security, user collusion, and user safety. As with adopting any technology, users must examine the business, legal, and technical aspects of that technology.
Blockchain is currently being tested by industry, but at this time does not appear to be a complete replacement for existing systems. Although the adoption of blockchain is in its early stages, Congress may have a role to play in several areas, including the oversight of federal agencies seeking to use blockchain for government business, and exploration of whether regulations are necessary to govern blockchain's use in the private sector.
Some federal agencies are seeking to better manage identities, assets, data, and contracts through the adoption of blockchain technology. In addition, some federal agencies are issuing guidance on industry use of blockchain, and whether or not the current legal framework governs blockchain use. |
crs_R44717 | crs_R44717_0 | Overview1
During the first session of the 115th Congress, Congress faced numerous international trade and finance policy issues. Continued focus on the U.S.-China economic relationship, and economic sanctions against Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Russia, and other countries also have been of interest to Congress. President Trump's withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement (FTA) among 12 Asia-Pacific nations, alongside a stated preference for negotiating bilateral rather than multi-party trade agreements were notable developments in the Trump Administration's policy approach to U.S. trade agreements. These decisions, in addition to the evolving global landscape on trade agreements, including a recently-concluded, revised TPP (now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)) among the 11 parties, without the United States, raise potentially significant legislative and policy issues for Congress, including: (1) potential congressional consideration of legislation to implement a revised NAFTA, (2) the economic and strategic rationale for U.S. participation in multi-party and other FTAs, (3) the extent to which past U.S. FTAs should be modernized or revised and, if so, in what manner, (4) how much priority should be placed in U.S. trade policy on new FTA and multilateral trade agreements, and (5) the effect of FTAs not including the United States on U.S. economic and broader interests, and the appropriate U.S. response to the proliferation of agreements. The U.S.-China trade and economic relationship is complex and wide-ranging. The Role of Congress in International Trade and Finance
The U.S. Constitution assigns authority over foreign trade to Congress. In 2015, Congress authorized new TPA, through 2021, provided the President requests an extension and Congress does not enact an extension disapproval resolution before July 1, 2018. These include such areas as U.S. trade agreement negotiations, tariffs and nontariff barriers, trade remedy laws, import and export policies, economic sanctions, and the trade policy functions of the federal government. The United States generally seeks IP commitments that exceed the minimum standards of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), known as "TRIPS-plus." Trade finance and promotion activities also may support U.S. foreign policy goals. International Trade Administration (ITA) of U.S. Department of Commerce
Part of the Department of Commerce, the International Trade Administration (ITA) is charged with "creat[ing] prosperity by strengthening the international competitiveness of U.S industry, promoting trade and investment, and ensuring fair trade and compliance with trade laws and agreements." International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Markets
Since World War II, governments have created and used formal international institutions and more informal forums to discuss and coordinate economic policies. In engaging on these issues, Congress may
conduct oversight of the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and potentially consider implementing legislation for a revised NAFTA, and oversight of modification of the KORUS FTA; consider new bilateral trade agreement negotiations, including with the UK or Japan; examine the status of trade negotiations launched under the previous Administration, including the potential Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) with the European Union (EU), a potential plurilateral Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), and ongoing discussions at the WTO, as well as the future implications of the TPP without U.S. participation; conduct oversight and take possible legislative action concerning a range of other trade issues, including U.S. trade relations with China and other major economies, as well as U.S. export and import policies and programs; and monitor developments in capital flows and global debt levels, the international financial institutions and U.S. funding levels, the evolution of the AIIB, and other countries' exchange rate policies, among other international finance issues. | The U.S. Constitution grants authority to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Congress exercises this authority in numerous ways, including through oversight of trade policy and consideration of legislation to implement trade agreements and authorize trade programs. Policy issues cover areas such as U.S. trade negotiations, U.S. trade and economic relations with specific regions and countries, international institutions focused on trade, tariff and nontariff barriers, worker dislocation due to trade liberalization, enforcement of trade laws and trade agreement commitments, import and export policies, international investment, economic sanctions, and other trade-related functions of the federal government. Congress also has authority over U.S. financial commitments to international financial institutions and oversight responsibilities for trade- and finance-related agencies of the U.S. government.
Issues in the 115th Congress
During the 2016 presidential campaign, U.S. trade policy and trade agreements received significant attention, particularly regarding the impact of trade agreements on the U.S. economy and workers. Among the more potentially prominent international trade and finance issues the 115th Congress is considering, or may consider, are:
the status of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which is authorized through 2021, provided the President requests an extension and Congress does not enact an extension disapproval resolution before July 2018; the Administration's renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and efforts to modify the U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) free trade agreement (FTA); U.S.-China trade relations, including investment issues, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, forced technology transfer, currency issues, and market access liberalization; proposals to launch new bilateral FTAs, such as with the United Kingdom, Japan, or possibly with countries in Africa; the future of U.S.-Asia trade and economic relations, given President Trump's withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and China's expanding Belt and Road Initiative; the future status of trade negotiations launched under the Obama Administration, including for the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) FTA with the European Union (EU) and the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA); oversight of World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements and negotiations, including the completed Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and expansion of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), as well as potential agreements on environmental goods and the WTO's future overall direction; the Administration's enforcement of U.S. trade laws; the effects of trade on the U.S. economy, jobs, and manufacturing, as well as policies that support U.S. workers and industries adversely affected by trade agreements; international finance and investment issues, including U.S. funding for and oversight of international financial institutions (IFIs), the creation of development and infrastructure banks by emerging economies, and U.S. negotiations on new bilateral investment treaties (BITs), notably with China and India; and oversight of international trade and finance policies to support development and/or foreign policy goals, including trade preferences for sub-Sahara Africa and sanctions on Iran, North Korea, Russia, and other countries. |
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