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crs_RL34306 | crs_RL34306_0 | Research has shown that mentoring programs have been associated with some positive youth outcomes, but that the long-term ability of mentoring to produce particular outcomes and the ability for mentored youth to sustain gains over time are less certain. The Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Juvenile Mentoring Program (JUMP), the first such program, was implemented in 1994 to provide mentoring services for at-risk youth ages 5 to 20. Although there is no single overarching policy today on mentoring, the federal government has supported multiple mentoring efforts for vulnerable youth since JUMP was discontinued in FY2003. Previously, two mentoring programs—the Mentoring Children of Prisoners (MCP) program and Safe and Drug Free Schools (SDFS) Mentoring program—provided a significant source of federal funding for mentoring services. However, the programs were short-lived: the MCP was administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) from FY2003 through FY2011 and the SDFS program was administered by the Department of Education (ED) from FY2002 through FY2010. The federal government currently funds mentoring efforts through short-term grants and initiatives, primarily carried out by DOJ. Youth ChalleNGe, an educational and leadership program for at-risk youth administered by the Department of Defense (DOD), helps to engage youth in work and school, and leadership opportunities. The Federal Mentoring Council was created in 2006 to address the ways agencies can combine resources and training and technical assistance to federally administered mentoring programs, and to serve as a clearinghouse on mentoring issues for the federal government. In the context of this report, mentoring refers to the relationship between a youth and an adult who supports, guides, and assists the youth. Approximately 4.5 million youth are in structured mentoring relationships. Some programs have broad youth development goals, while others focus more narrowly on a particular outcome such as reducing gang activity or substance abuse, or improving grades. Origins of Contemporary Mentoring Programs
The origin of today's structured mentoring programs is credited to the efforts of charity groups that formed during the Progressive Movement of the early 1900s. These early organizations provided practical assistance to youth, including help with finding employment, and created recreational outlets. These include whether (1) participating youth have preexisting difficulties, such as delinquent behavior, or are exposed to significant environmental risk (not defined, but presumably referring to the home and community in which the youth resides); (2) programs serve greater proportions of males; (3) mentors' educational or occupational backgrounds are well matched to the goals of the program; (4) mentors and youth are paired based on mutual interests, such as career interests; and (5) mentors serve as advocates and teachers to provide guidance to youth and to help ensure their overall welfare. Similarly, an evaluation of the discontinued federal school-based mentoring program (funded from FY2002 through FY2009) demonstrated that the program did not have an impact on students overall in terms of interpersonal relationships, academic outcomes, and delinquent behaviors. This law incorporated the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2001 ( H.R. Corporation for National and Community Service
The Corporation for National and Community Service (CNS) is an independent federal agency that administers programs to support volunteer services. Congress has since provided an annual appropriation for the program as part of the Department of Defense authorization acts. Federal Issues in Mentoring
Issues that may be relevant to any discussions around the federal role in mentoring include the limitations of research on outcomes for mentored youth and the potential need for additional mentors, particularly for vulnerable populations. The evaluation of the Big Brothers Big Sisters school-based mentoring program found similar results for mentored youth. Focusing on Quality of Programs
The number of mentoring programs appears to have grown in recent years, likely due to a variety of reasons, including federal attention to mentoring as an intervention for at-risk youth and promising associations between mentoring and multiple outcomes. | Youth mentoring refers to a relationship between youth—particularly those most at risk of experiencing negative outcomes in adolescence and adulthood—and the adults who support and guide them. The origin of the modern youth mentoring concept is credited to the efforts of charity groups that formed during the Progressive era of the early 1900s to provide practical assistance to poor and juvenile justice-involved youth, including help with finding employment.
Approximately 4.5 million youth today are involved in formal mentoring relationships through organizations such as Big Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS) of America. Contemporary mentoring programs seek to improve outcomes and reduce risks among vulnerable youth by providing positive role models who regularly meet with the youth in community or school settings. Some programs have broad youth development goals, while others focus more narrowly on a particular outcome. Evaluations of the BBBS program and studies of other mentoring programs demonstrate an association between mentoring and some positive outcomes, but the impact of mentoring and the ability for mentored youth to sustain gains over time are less certain.
There is no single overarching federal policy on mentoring or an entity that coordinates mentoring supports across the federal government. The Federal Mentoring Council had served as a resource on mentoring issues for the federal government from 2006 to 2008 and is no longer active. Currently, the federal government provides funding for mentoring primarily through a grant program with annual appropriations for the program of about $78 million to $90 million in recent years. This grant is administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) within the Office of Justice Programs. Program funding has been used for research and direct mentoring services to select populations of youth, such as those involved or at risk of being involved in the juvenile justice system. Other federal agencies provide or are authorized to support mentoring as one aspect of a larger program. For example, select programs carried out by the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) can provide mentoring, among other services. Youth ChalleNGe, an educational and leadership program for at-risk youth administered by the Department of Defense's (DOD's) National Guard, includes mentoring as an aspect of its program. Federal agencies also coordinate on federal mentoring issues.
Two other federal programs—the Mentoring Children of Prisoners (MCP) program and Safe and Drug-Free Schools (SDFS) Mentoring program—provided a significant source of federal funding for mentoring services. However, the programs were short-lived: funding for the MCP program was discontinued beginning with FY2011, and funding for the SDFS program was discontinued beginning with FY2010. The MCP program was created in response to the growing number of children under age 18 with at least one parent incarcerated in a federal or state correctional facility. The program was intended, in part, to reduce the chance that mentored youth would use drugs and skip school. Similarly, the SDFS Mentoring program provided school-based mentoring to reduce school dropout and improve relationships for youth at risk of educational failure and with other risk factors. As part of its FY2010 budget justifications, the Obama Administration had proposed eliminating the program because of an evaluation showing that it did not have an impact on students overall in terms of interpersonal relationships, academic outcomes, and delinquent behaviors.
Issues relevant to the federal role in mentoring include the limitations of research on outcomes for mentored youth, the quality of mentoring programs, and the potential need for additional mentors. |
crs_R44032 | crs_R44032_0 | Introduction
Both patents and regulatory exclusivities have been the subject of congressional interest in recent years. The patent system has traditionally served as the primary innovation incentive for new medicines. Patents, which are administered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), allow for a uniform 20-year term of protection for a variety of inventions. Regulatory exclusivities apply to drugs and biologic medicines regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Federal legislation establishes a complex range of regulatory exclusivities applicable to, among other subjects, new chemical entities, orphan drugs, and generic drugs. In general, these intellectual property rights require the FDA to protect an approved drug from competing applications for a set period of time. Contemporary legislative trends may elevate the regulatory exclusivity from a supplemental protection scheme to the primary driver of innovation within the pharmaceutical industry. The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 created a 12-year regulatory exclusivity, and under the Generating Antibiotics Incentives Now (GAIN) Act a "qualified infectious disease product" that consists of a new chemical entity enjoys an exclusivity period of 10 years. That unenacted legislation would have effectively allowed brand-name pharmaceutical firms, in certain circumstances, to exchange their patents for a 15-year period of regulatory exclusivity. These proposals have been placed before the 114 th Congress in the form of a discussion draft of the 21 st Century Cures Act. Congress has established fifteen regulatory exclusivities. Comparing Patents and Regulatory Exclusivities
The growing prominence of this intellectual property right invites comparison between regulatory exclusivities and patents. They must be asserted by their proprietors through litigation in the federal courts. In contrast, the FDA enforces regulatory exclusivities automatically, without the intervention of the proprietary rights holder, and sometimes without even his knowledge. More recent legislation has extended the terms of regulatory exclusivities. Recent Legislative Proposals
Statutory distinctions between the pharmaceutical industry and other industrial sectors with respect to intellectual property may be increasing, however. The MODDERN Cures Act
Legislation introduced in the last several sessions of Congress, but not enacted, would have continued to emphasize regulatory exclusivities as a driver of pharmaceutical innovation. For example, the regulatory exclusivities could be divided into categories based upon the extent of protection, including (1) denial of approval of any competing product for the same indication, as provided under the Orphan Drug Act, (2) denial of access to the sponsor's data package, as is the case for the new chemical entity exclusivity, and (3) protection limited to a specific use, formulation, or route of administration of an approved drug, the scope of rights provided by the new clinical study exclusivity. Congress may wish to ensure that regulatory exclusivities incorporate exceptions that provide for the continued sale of safe and effective medicines that are currently available to the public. | Patents and regulatory exclusivities have each been the subject of congressional interest in recent years. Patents, which are administered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), allow for a uniform 20-year term of protection for a variety of inventions. In contrast, regulatory exclusivities apply to drugs and biologic medicines regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Federal legislation establishes a complex range of regulatory exclusivities applicable to, among other subjects, new chemical entities, orphan drugs, and generic drugs. In general, these intellectual property rights require the FDA to protect an approved drug from competing applications for a set period of time.
Patents and regulatory exclusivities each create intellectual property rights for their proprietors, but operate through distinct mechanisms. Patents must be enforced through litigation in federal court and may be invalidated during judicial proceedings. In contrast, the FDA ordinarily maintains regulatory exclusivities through agency procedures, without the intervention of the rights holder. Unlike patents, regulatory exclusivities may restrict the sale of public domain medicines. And although patents traditionally provided a longer term of protection, more recently enacted regulatory exclusivities tend to have more comparable durations.
The patent system has traditionally served as the primary innovation incentive for new medicines. But recent legislative trends may elevate the regulatory exclusivity from a supplemental protection scheme to the primary driver of innovation within the pharmaceutical industry. For example, the Generating Antibiotics Incentives Now (GAIN) Act and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act created regulatory exclusivities of 10 to 12 years, respectively, for certain products.
Legislation introduced most recently before the 113th Congress, the MODDERN Cures Act, H.R. 3116, would have continued to expand the role of regulatory exclusivities. That unenacted legislation would have effectively allowed brand-name pharmaceutical firms, in certain circumstances, to exchange their patents for a 15-year period of regulatory exclusivity. While proponents of the legislation believe it would provide a more certain and effective innovation incentive for the pharmaceutical industry, others assert that it significantly expands intellectual property rights and represents a windfall for the brand-name drug industry. These proposals have been placed before the 114th Congress in the form of a discussion draft of the 21st Century Cures Act.
Congress has several options as it considers the relationship between patents and regulatory exclusivities. If the current situation is deemed satisfactory, then no action need be taken. Other options include rationalizing the various terms of protection and scope of rights that regulatory exclusivities provide. Congress may also consider providing distinct names for the regulatory exclusivities and ensuring that these rights do not remove safe and effective medicines from the public domain. |
crs_RS21213 | crs_RS21213_0 | Under this region-wide initiative, the United Statessubstantially increased State Department supportfor Colombian CN efforts, and provided Colombian security forces, primarily the police, with equipment throughforeign military financing grants and DODequipment drawdowns. Funding for Colombia dropped in the first two years of the Clinton Administration budgets. During Pastrana's October 1998state visit, President Clinton announced that the United State would provide nearly three times more assistance toColombia during FY1999 than it had the previousyear. In July 2000, Congress approved the Clinton Administration's request for $1.3 billion in FY2000 State Department and DOD emergency supplemental appropriations ( P.L. With its FY2002 budget request, the Bush Administration expanded the scope of Clinton's "Plan Colombia" policy through its Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), with continuing highlevels of support for existing "Plan Colombia" programs in Colombia, and increased assistance to states borderingor close to Colombia. FY2004 Request
For FY2004, the Bush Administration has requested $573 million for Colombia, including $463 million in Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) funds, and $110 million in ForeignMilitary Financing. Table 2 shows aid from FY1989-FY1999. (INC Air Wing funding supports the sprayeradication efforts. That is the first yearin which DOD provided a publicly-available breakdown by country and authority for funding from its centralcounternarcotics account. | Over the past 15 years, from FY1989-FY2003, the United States has providedColombia with over $3.6 billion inassistance, most of it directed to counternarcotics or related efforts. During the first 11 fiscal years(FY1989-FY1999), when assistance totaled just over $1 billion,the annual levels were considerably lower than during the past three fiscal years and the current fiscal year. FromFY2000-FY2003, assistance totals about $2,556billion. The Clinton Administration increased assistance in FY2000 to fund its "Plan Colombia" programs tocounter the spread of coca cultivation in southernColombia.
The Bush Administration has continued "Plan Colombia" programs through its Andean Regional Initiative(ARI), which also provides increased funding forColombia's neighbors. In FY2002, President Bush also sought authority to expand the circumstances under whichfunding for the Colombian security forces can beused. As approved by Congress in 2002 and 2003, funding for FY2003 and previous years can be used forcounternarcotics and anti-terrorist purposes.
For FY2004, the Bush Administration has requested $573 million in State Department Andean CounterdrugInitiative and Foreign Military Financing funds, andestimates it will spend some $45 million in Colombia from the central State Department Air Wing account. TheDepartment of Defense (DOD) estimates that itwill spend almost $119 million for Colombia from its central counternarcotics account. |
crs_R43756 | crs_R43756_0 | Some of these groups have pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda (AQ) leader Ayman al Zawahiri, and others have not. While many of the groups discussed in this report focus the majority of their attacks on local targets, U.S. officials have identified them as posing a credible threat to the United States or its allies, or to U.S. interests in the Middle East and Africa. Some have speculated that Al Qaeda may be one beneficiary of the Islamic State's decline in terms of recruits, prestige, and/or resources. For additional information on the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. With the exception of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Nusra Front, AQ affiliate groups had developed around local conflicts before forging ties with Al Qaeda. Prior to the 2013 creation of the Islamic State, Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa included the following groups. In January 2017, it merged with several other militant groups to form Hay'at Tahrir al Sham (HTS, Levant Liberation Organization). Beyond Syria, this pattern of AQ-IS competition has repeated itself throughout the Middle East and Africa. Threat Assessments
Even at the height of IS territorial control in Syria and Iraq, U.S. officials warned that the emphasis on the Islamic State does not indicate a reduced focus on the threat posed to the United States by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula34
Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Lora Shiao described AQAP in December 2017 as "the only known al-Qa'ida affiliate to have attempted a direct attack against the U.S." adding that it "continues to threaten and call for attacks against the U.S." The group has operated in Yemen since 2009, and has been the most active in the southern provinces that were formerly part of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, which reunited with northern Yemen in 1990. Al Qaeda Messaging on the Islamic State
Al Qaeda Responds to the Emergence of the Islamic State
After the rise of the Islamic State, Al Qaeda's public messaging refocused on clarifying the rules for jihad and on discrediting the Islamic State's leadership and tactics. In 2017, CENTCOM Commander Gen. Joseph Votel stated that building partner capacity
is a lower-cost alternative to U.S. boots on the ground, has longer-term sustainability, and is necessary for interoperable, combined coalition operations...By building capacity and enabling partners to assume a larger role in providing for the stability and security of their sovereign spaces, we will enhance regional stability while still maintaining our critical access and influence in [the Middle East and North Africa]
The 2018 National Defense Strategy names building "the capability required to counter violent extremism," among other threats, as a priority of U.S. policy in Africa. In addition, the network of Al Qaeda affiliates operates in multiple countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North, West, Central, and East Africa. Trump Administration officials have supported reliance on the 2001 AUMF as the primary authority for continued use of military force against Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and associated forces. Outlook
Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups continue to evolve, reflecting internal debates as well as reactions to competitors such as the Islamic State. Other U.S. officials have warned that Al Qaeda affiliates, seeking to compete with the attention garnered by the Islamic State, are countering with high-publicity attacks on soft targets such as hotels. | After a more than a decade and a half of combating Al Qaeda (AQ) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States faces a diverse array of threats from Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa. While senior Al Qaeda figures reportedly remain based in Pakistan, the network includes a number of affiliates across the Middle East and Africa including Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Al Shabaab. Al Qaeda also retains a small but possibly growing presence in Afghanistan. U.S. officials have stated that Al Qaeda still maintains a foothold in Syria through its ties to Hay'at Tahrir al Sham (formerly known as the Nusra Front), though the exact nature of that relationship may be evolving. This report examines the threat posed by Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa as described by U.S. officials and outside observers, as well as the U.S. approach to date in responding to these threats.
The rise of the Islamic State and its rapid territorial expansion across Syria and Iraq has at times eclipsed the attention directed towards Al Qaeda, at least in the public debate. However, U.S. officials have warned that Al Qaeda remains focused on attacking the United States, and that some of its affiliates in the Middle East have the capability to do so. It is also possible that Al Qaeda could leverage the Islamic State's setbacks in Iraq and Syria to bolster its recruits, resources, and prestige.
AQ affiliates that have primarily targeted local governments have also turned their efforts to Western interests in the region, aiming at soft targets—such as hotels—frequented by Americans or Europeans. U.S. officials have cautioned that some Al Qaeda affiliates may increasingly turn to this type of attack as a way of remaining "competitive" for funds and recruits, in light of the wide publicity garnered by such attacks carried out by the Islamic State.
Congressional concerns regarding these issues might shape ongoing reevaluations of the laws that underpin U.S. counterterrorism policy, including the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40) as well as successive National Defense Authorization Acts that have progressively broadened the scope of the U.S. military's involvement in training and equipping foreign forces for counterterrorism purposes. Overall, Congress has addressed the enduring presence of Al Qaeda affiliates through a number of channels, including oversight of executive branch counterterrorism policies and practices; authorization and appropriations of U.S. funds for counterterrorism activities; and oversight of assistance for partner nations engaged in such activities.
Note: This report does not cover Al Qaeda affiliates outside of the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Africa. See also CRS Report R44563, Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44501, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by [author name scrubbed] et al. |
crs_R40767 | crs_R40767_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) is responsible for issuing federal government debt. The primary objective of Treasury's debt management strategy is to finance the government's borrowing needs at the lowest cost over time. To accomplish this Treasury adheres to three principles: (1) to issue debt in a regular and predictable pattern, (2) to provide transparency in the decisionmaking process, and (3) to seek continuous improvements in the auction process. Within the Treasury, the Office of Debt Management (ODM) makes all decisions related to debt issuance and the management of the United States debt portfolio. When federal spending exceeds revenues, the ODM directs the Bureau of the Fiscal Service to borrow the funds needed to finance government operations by selling securities to the public and government agencies through an auction process. The Bureau of the Fiscal Service manages the operational aspects of the issuance of Treasury securities, including the systems related to and the monitoring of security auctions. This report examines Treasury's debt management practices, focusing on the auction process, how prices and interest rates of securities are determined, and the role of market participants in the process. How Treasury Sells Debt
During the mid-1970s, the economy experienced a period of rising nominal federal budget deficits, which increased debt issuance and disrupted financial markets. At that time, Treasury decided that it needed a new strategy to provide greater transparency and regularity in debt management. The resulting debt management process modernized the market for Treasury securities, realizing the benefits of predictability in an environment of large deficits. Marketable Securities
Most of the debt sold by the federal government is marketable, meaning that securities are sold via the auction process and can be resold on the secondary market. Currently, Treasury offers five types of marketable securities: Treasury bills, notes, bonds, inflation protected securities (TIPS), and floating rate notes (FRNs). Gross federal debt is composed of debt held by the public and intragovernmental debt. Factors Affecting Supply and Demand for Treasury Securities
Investors examine several key factors when deciding whether they should purchase Treasury securities. Treasury securities provide a known stream of income and offer greater liquidity than other types of fixed-income securities. Because they are also backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, they are often seen as one of the safest investments available, though investors are not totally immune from losses. Budgetary Impacts
Legislative activity can affect Treasury's ability to issue debt and can impact the budget process. The statutory limit on the debt can constrain debt operations, and, in the past, has hampered traditional practices when the limit was approached. The accounting of asset purchases in the federal budget has created differences between how much debt Treasury has to borrow to purchase assets and how much the same purchases will impact the budget deficit. If budget deficits continue to rise, thereby requiring devotion of more resources to paying interest on the debt, fewer funds are available to spend on other federal programs, all else equal. Constraints of the Debt Limit
Congress sets a statutory limit on federal debt levels in an effort to assert its constitutional prerogatives to control spending and impose a form of fiscal accountability. | The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), among other roles, manages the country's debt. The primary objective of Treasury's debt management strategy is to finance the government's borrowing needs at the lowest cost over time. To accomplish this Treasury adheres to three principles: (1) to issue debt in a regular and predictable pattern, (2) to provide transparency in the decisionmaking process, and (3) to seek continuous improvements in the auction process.
Within the Treasury, the Office of Debt Management (ODM) makes all decisions related to debt issuance and the management of the United States debt portfolio. When federal spending exceeds revenues, the ODM directs the Bureau of the Fiscal Service to borrow the funds needed to finance government operations by selling securities to the public and government agencies through an auction process. The Bureau of the Fiscal Service manages the operational aspects of the issuance of Treasury securities, including the systems related to and the monitoring of security auctions.
During the mid-1970s, Treasury faced a period of rising nominal federal budget deficits and debt requiring unanticipated increases in issuances of securities. Up to that point, debt management was characterized by an ad-hoc, offering-by-offering survey of market participants. At that time, Treasury implemented a new debt management strategy that provided greater transparency and reduced the potential for market volatility. The resulting debt management process modernized the market for Treasury securities, realizing the benefits of predictability in an environment of large deficits. A reliance on auctions became a central part of the strategy's increased focus on regular and predictable debt management.
Most of the debt sold by the federal government is marketable, meaning that it can be resold on the secondary market. Currently, Treasury offers five types of marketable securities: Treasury bills, notes, bonds, inflation protected securities (TIPS), and floating rate notes (FRNs), sold in about 270 auctions per year. A small portion of debt held by the public and nearly all intragovernmental debt (debt held by government trust funds) is nonmarketable.
Investors examine several key factors when deciding whether they should purchase Treasury securities, including price, expected return, and risk. Treasury securities provide a known stream of income and offer greater liquidity than other types of fixed-income securities. Because they are also backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, they are often seen as one of the safest investments available, though investors are not totally immune from losses. Security prices are determined by investors according to the value of such characteristics in the context of the financial marketplace.
Legislative activity can affect Treasury's ability to issue debt and can impact the budget process. Congress sets a statutory limit on the permissible amount of federal debt to assert its constitutional prerogatives to control spending and impose a form of fiscal accountability. The statutory limit on the debt can constrain debt operations, and, in the past, has hampered traditional practices when the limit was approached. The accounting of asset purchases in the federal budget has created differences between how much debt Treasury has to borrow to make those purchases and how much the same purchases will impact the budget deficit. If budget deficits continue to rise, thereby causing more resources to be devoted to paying interest on the debt, there will be fewer funds available to spend on other federal programs, all else equal. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL31673 | crs_RL31673_0 | Procurement of F-22s began in FY1999, and a total of 195 (177 production aircraft, 16 test aircraft, and 2 development aircraft) were procured through FY2009. Recent Developments
F-22 Oxygen Issues
Following a November 2010 fatal crash of an F-22 in Alaska, the Air Force began an effort to understand why pilots were "reporting hypoxia-like symptoms in the air. At least 25 "physiological incidents" were recorded among F-22 pilots; 14 prior to the Raptor being grounded from May to September 2011, for investigation of the issue, and at least 11 subsequently. FY2013 F-22 Funding
The Administration's proposed FY2013 defense budget requests $283.9 million in FY2013 procurement funding for modification of in-service aircraft and $36.7 million to equip Air Logistics Centers to perform F-22 maintenance. The Senate Appropriations Committee mark of H.R. In August 2012, the Air Force announced that the oxygen deprivation issue was due to "a 'mosaic' of interrelated cockpit equipment issues that led to a chain reaction of glitches resulting in symptoms similar to hypoxia." The Administration's proposed FY2013 defense budget also requests a new start program, funded at $140.1 million in research and development, for the Increment 3.2B software; and $371.7 million in FY2013 research and development funding for F-22A Squadrons. FY2013 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to approve or license the sale of the F-22A advanced tactical fighter to any foreign government: Provided, That the Department of Defense may conduct or participate in studies, research, design and other activities to develop a future export version of the F-22A that protects classified and sensitive information, technologies and U.S. warfighting capabilities. | Procurement of Air Force F-22 Raptor fighters began in FY1999, and a total of 195 (177 production aircraft, 16 test aircraft, and 2 development aircraft) were procured through FY2009. In the FY2010 budget, the Administration proposed to end F-22 procurement at 187, and Congress approved that termination. The F-22 assembly line in Marietta, GA, has been shut down, with its tools and equipment placed in storage.
Since 2010, operational issues have arisen. Following a November 2010 fatal crash of an F-22 in Alaska, the Air Force recorded at least 25 "physiological incidents" of F-22 pilots reporting hypoxia-like symptoms while flying, possibly indicating oxygen deprivation. Following a lengthy investigation and grounding of the F-22 fleet, the Air Force attributed the oxygen deprivation to "a 'mosaic' of interrelated cockpit equipment issues." Following corrective actions, the F-22 fleet has returned to the air.
The Administration's proposed FY2013 defense budget requests $283.9 million in FY2013 procurement funding for modification of in-service aircraft and $36.7 million to equip Air Logistics Centers to perform F-22 maintenance. The Administration's proposed FY2013 defense budget also requests a new start program, funded at $140.1 million in research and development, for the Increment 3.2B software, and $371.7 million in FY2013 research and development funding for F-22A Squadrons.
The Senate Appropriations Committee markup of the FY2013 defense appropriation bill includes language prohibiting funds from being used to approve or license the sale of the F-22 to other countries. The bill does permit the Department of Defense to conduct studies and design activities to develop a future export version of the aircraft that protects classified and sensitive information. This language is similar to provisions passed by Congress each year since 1998. |
crs_R44797 | crs_R44797_0 | A January 2017 executive order that could render certain state and local governments ineligible to receive federal grants has generated interest in the federal government's power to condition funding on recipients taking or refraining from certain actions. The Spending Clause
While Congress would generally not be permitted to compel state legislators or executive officials to enforce or administer a federal regulatory program, it could provide federal grants to encourage states to participate in a federal program. Providing federal funds to nonfederal entities has been seen to constitute an exercise of one of Congress's enumerated powers, namely, its power under the Spending Clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 1). Limitations on the Spending Power
Although Congress's power under the Spending Clause is expansive, the Supreme Court articulated certain limitations on the use of federal grant conditions in its 1987 decision in South Dakota v. Dole —which arguably remains the leading decision regarding the use of the federal government's conditional spending power—and in subsequent cases. In particular, these limitations require that any conditions attached to the receipt of federal funds must:
1. be unambiguously established so that recipients can knowingly accept or reject them; 2. be germane to the federal interest in the particular national projects or programs to which the money is directed; 3. not violate a separate constitutional provision, such as the First Amendment or the Due Process or Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment; and 4. not cross the line from enticement to coercion, such that states have no real choice but to accept the funding and enact or administer a federal program. Coercive Conditions That Intrude on a State's Sovereignty
The fourth and final limitation that the Supreme Court has articulated as to the spending power is that any conditions imposed on the use of federal funds must comport with the basic principles of federalism as embodied in the Tenth Amendment. Executive Order 13768
The issuance of President Trump's January 25, 2017, executive order that could render "sanctuary jurisdictions" ineligible for federal grants has prompted renewed interest in the federal government's legal authority to impose conditions on federal funds. Some of these questions may be considered by the federal courts, as several jurisdictions have already filed lawsuits against the President and his senior officials, challenging the EO's constitutionality and seeking an injunction barring its implementation. Collectively, these lawsuits argue, among other things, that the EO violates: (1) the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution by imposing funding conditions that are unduly coercive or that are not related to the federal interest furthered by the funds; and (2) the Tenth Amendment prohibition against the federal government "commandeering" state and local governments by compelling them to enforce federal immigration law. | Commonly known as the Spending Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution has been widely recognized as providing the federal government with the legal authority to offer federal grant funds to states and localities that are contingent on the recipients engaging in, or refraining from, certain activities. However, the Supreme Court has articulated certain limitations on the exercise of this power. In its 1987 decision in South Dakota v. Dole, which arguably remains the leading case regarding the use of the federal government's conditional spending power, the Court held that legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause must be in pursuit of the "general welfare." In addition, the Dole Court held that any conditions attached to the receipt of federal funds must: (1) be unambiguously established so that recipients can knowingly accept or reject them; (2) be germane to the federal interest in the particular national projects or programs to which the money is directed; (3) not violate other provisions of the Constitution, such as the First Amendment or the Due Process or Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment; and (4) not cross the line from enticement to impermissible coercion, such that states have no real choice but to accept the funding and enact or administer a federal regulatory program. The fourth of these criteria, in particular, is intended to ensure that any conditions on federal grant funds do not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment's prohibition on the federal government's "commandeering" of state or local governments or officials by requiring them to carry out federal programs.
The power of the federal government to attach conditions to federal grants has received renewed attention due to a January 2017 executive order issued by President Trump that is intended to encourage state and local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement by withholding federal grants to nonfederal entities that have adopted "sanctuary" policies. Several jurisdictions that could be affected by the executive order have filed suit against the President and his senior officials challenging the order's constitutionality and seeking an injunction that would bar its implementation. The plaintiffs argue, among other things, that the executive order: (1) does not comport with the restrictions on the spending power that were articulated by the High Court in Dole, and (2) violates the Tenth Amendment by compelling states and localities to enforce federal immigration law. This litigation regarding the executive order, and other legal challenges that may be filed in the future, could provide an opportunity for the federal courts to elaborate further on the federal government's power to impose conditions on the use of federal funds. |
crs_R42548 | crs_R42548_0 | Despite these victories, PRI/Green Ecological Party (PVEM) candidate Enrique Peña Nieto won by a relatively narrow margin over Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the leftist coalition led by the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), and the PRI/PVEM failed to capture a simple majority in either chamber of the congress. The conservative National Action Party (PAN) lost the presidency, two gubernatorial contests, and seats in the Chamber of Deputies, but picked up senate seats and retained the governorship of Guanajuato. This report provides background information on the parties and presidential candidates that competed in Mexico's 2012 elections, analyzes the election results, and discusses some potential implications of those results for U.S.-Mexican relations in the areas of security cooperation, economic integration, and energy policy. Since even before the campaign officially began on March 30, 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto of the PRI/PVEM had maintained a double-digit lead in most polls over Josefina Vázquez Mota of the PAN, López Obrador of the coalition led by the PRD, and Gabriel Quadri of the National Alliance Party (PANAL). The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI ) unified the country after the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) by organizing the major groups in Mexican society (organized labor, peasants, professionals) into a corporatist party that governed Mexico from 1929 until 2000. Before the 2012 elections, the PAN governed six states alone and three in coalition with the PRD, and held 39% of the seats in the Senate and 28% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Election Results
On July 1, 2012, Mexico held federal (presidential and congressional) and state elections in 14 states. Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) conducted the elections with the oversight of the Federal Electoral Tribunal, which had to officially certify the election results by September 6, 2012. While some independent domestic observation groups—including a group affiliated with YoSoy132 — found that vote-buying, intimidation, and other irregularities marred the electoral process, observers accredited by IFE concluded that the isolated incidents they observed did not merit an annulment of the election. It did not challenge the legitimacy of the legislative elections. According to preliminary results published by IFE on election day, Peña Nieto captured 38.2% of the vote, followed by López Obrador with 31.6%, Vázquez Mota with 25.4%, and Quadri with 2.3%. He is scheduled to take office for a six-year term on December 1, 2012. The Tribunal then certified Enrique Peña Nieto's presidential victory on August 31, 2012. Polls had been predicting that PRI might capture a simple majority in one or both chambers. The PRI/PVEM's failure to capture a congressional majority means that President-elect Peña Nieto and the PRI will have to form cross-party coalitions in order to pass key reforms, particularly those requiring constitutional amendments. The PRI will most likely find support from the PANAL. The PAN, which lost seats in the Chamber but retained a powerful bargaining position, is another possible ally. The PRD-led coalition, which will now have more seats in the Chamber than the PAN and remains the third-largest force in the Senate, could complicate labor reform efforts and initiatives aimed at increasing private participation in the energy sector, a key priority for Peña Nieto. Implications for U.S.-Mexican Relations
Some Members of Congress may be concerned that the leadership changes resulting from the July 1, 2012, Mexican elections will significantly impact U.S.-Mexican relations, particularly now that the party controlling the presidency has changed. However, few analysts are predicting that the transition from PAN to PRI rule will result in any seismic shifts in bilateral relations. Throughout the campaign, Enrique Peña Nieto sought to reassure U.S. policy makers that a PRI administration would continue to combat organized crime, combat corruption, and govern democratically. Peña Nieto also expressed support for increased bilateral and trilateral (with Canada) economic cooperation. | U.S. policy makers have closely followed the 2012 elections in Mexico, a key ally with whom the United States shares a nearly 2,000-mile border and some $460 billion in annual bilateral trade. On July 1, 2012, Mexico held federal (presidential and legislative) elections. Turnout reached record levels as 63% of eligible voters cast their ballots. Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) conducted the elections with the oversight of the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPFJ). Some election observers asserted that vote-buying and other irregularities marred the electoral process, while observers from the Organization of American States generally praised IFE's handling of the elections. After considering legal challenges to the results, the TEPFJ found insufficient evidence of vote-buying to warrant an annulment of the vote. The Tribunal declared Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) candidate Enrique Peña Nieto, a former governor of the state of Mexico, president-elect on August 31, 2012. Peña Nieto will take office on December 1, 2012.
The centrist PRI that governed Mexico from 1929 to 2000 not only retook the presidency after 12 years of rule by the conservative National Action Party (PAN), but also won a plurality in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. In the presidential contest, Enrique Peña Nieto captured 38.2% of the vote, followed by Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) with 31.6%, Josefina Vázquez Mota of the PAN with 25.4%, and Gabriel Quadri of the National Alliance Party (PANAL) with 2.3%. The narrow margin of Peña Nieto's victory, coupled with the fact that López Obrador has refused to recognize the election results, could complicate the transition period. And, while PAN President Felipe Calderón has pledged to work with the incoming administration, his party has joined the PRD in calling on authorities to investigate whether the PRI used any illicit finances to fund Peña Nieto's campaign.
Polls predicted that the PRI might also capture a simple majority in one or both chambers of the Mexican Congress, a feat not accomplished since 1994. The PRI and the allied Green Ecological Party (PVEM) party failed to capture a majority in either house, but could achieve a simple majority in the Chamber by aligning with the PANAL. For legislation to pass the Senate, and for any measures to amend the constitution (which require a two-thirds majority), the PRI will have to form cross-party coalitions. The PRI will most likely find support from the PAN, which lost seats in the Chamber but retained a powerful bargaining position. The PRD-led coalition, which will now have more seats in the Chamber than the PAN and remains the third-largest force in the Senate, could complicate some reform efforts, including those aimed at increasing private participation in the energy sector, a key priority for Peña Nieto.
Some Members of Congress may be concerned that the leadership changes resulting from the July 1, 2012, Mexican elections will significantly impact U.S.-Mexican relations, particularly now that the party controlling the presidency has changed. However, few analysts are predicting that the transition from PAN to PRI rule will result in seismic shifts in bilateral relations. Enrique Peña Nieto has sought to reassure U.S. policy makers that his Administration will continue to combat organized crime, while also striving to reduce violence in Mexico. He also aims to increase bilateral and trilateral (with Canada) economic and energy cooperation.
This report provides an overview of the parties and candidates who competed in the Mexican federal elections with a focus on the presidential contest, recaps the election results, and discusses some potential implications of the elections for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, North American economic integration, and U.S. energy security. |
crs_R40011 | crs_R40011_0 | Military Operations in Iraq: A Historical Perspective
U.S. military operations in Iraq are congressionally authorized pursuant to H.J.Res. 114 ( P.L. On November 26, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki signed a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America. Pursuant to this Declaration, the parties pledged to "begin as soon as possible, with the aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, agreements between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural, economic, and security spheres." Among other things, the Declaration proclaims the parties' intention to negotiate a security agreement
To support the Iraqi government in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces so they can provide security and stability to all Iraqis; support the Iraqi government in contributing to the international fight against terrorism by confronting terrorists such as Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, other terrorist groups, as well as all other outlaw groups, such as criminal remnants of the former regime; and to provide security assurances to the Iraqi Government to deter any external aggression and to ensure the integrity of Iraq's territory. On November 17, 2008, after months of negotiations, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and Iraq Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari signed two documents: (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Iraq, and (2) the Agreement Between the United States of America and Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq. The second agreement is commonly referred to as the SOFA between the United States and Iraq and is incorporated by reference into the larger strategic agreement. The agreements, while negotiated and concluded as executive agreements by the U.S. government and without the consent of the Congress, required approval on multiple levels by the Iraqi government. The agreements entered into force on January 1, 2009, following an exchange of diplomatic notes between the United States and Iraq, and are set to expire on December 31, 2011. What is a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)? Although the United States has transitioned from combat operations, allowing the Iraqi military to take the lead in maintaining security within Iraq, it remains to be seen if the security situation will allow for the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces by the end of 2011. | The United States has been involved in military operations in Iraq since March 2003. The legal framework under which the United States has operated includes H.J.Res. 114 (P.L. 107-243), multiple U.N. Security Council Resolutions, orders under the Coalition Provisional Authority, and, currently, agreement with the government of Iraq.
On November 26, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki signed a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America. Pursuant to this Declaration, the parties pledged to "begin as soon as possible, with the aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, agreements between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural, economic, and security spheres." Among other things, the Declaration proclaims the parties' intention to enter an agreement that would commit the United States to provide security assurances to Iraq, arm and train Iraqi security forces, and confront Al Qaeda and other terrorist entities within Iraqi territory.
On November 17, 2008, after months of negotiations, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and Iraq Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari signed two documents: (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Iraq, and (2) the Agreement Between the United States of America and Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq. The second agreement is commonly referred to as the SOFA between the United States and Iraq and is incorporated by reference into the larger strategic agreement.
Congress has several tools by which to exercise oversight regarding negotiation, form, conclusion, and implementation of agreements by the United States. The agreements with Iraq were negotiated and concluded as executive agreements and entered into force on January 1, 2009, and yet there remain many unanswered questions about the specific terms within the SOFA. As the withdrawal deadline of December 31, 2011, approaches, it remains to be seen if Iraq will be able to maintain security on its own and whether the United States will be able to complete the pullout in accordance with the terms of the Security Agreement. This report begins by discussing the historical legal framework governing U.S. military operations in Iraq. The report then provides a general background as to the content of agreements traditionally considered Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). Finally, the report discusses specific aspects of the SOFA, highlighting issues that may require continued congressional oversight. |
crs_R42572 | crs_R42572_0 | Introduction
In the wake of the worst U.S. financial crisis since the Great Depression, Congress passed and the President signed into law sweeping reforms of the financial services regulatory system through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), P.L. 111-203 . Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFP Act). The CFP Act establishes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or Bureau) within the Federal Reserve System (FRS) with rulemaking, enforcement, and supervisory powers over many consumer financial products and services, as well as the entities that sell them. The 113 th Congress has been actively involved in conducting oversight of the implementation of the CFP Act. The 113 th Congress also has considered bills that would either eliminate the CFPB altogether or significantly alter the structure of the Bureau by, for example, making the CFPB's primary funding subject to the traditional appropriations process, converting the CFPB's leadership structure from a sole directorship to a commission, or allowing the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to overturn CFPB-issued regulations with a simple majority vote, as opposed to the current supermajority vote. This report provides an overview of the regulatory structure of consumer finance under existing federal law before the Dodd-Frank Act went into effect and examines arguments for modifying the regime in order to more effectively regulate consumer financial markets. It then analyzes how the CFP Act changes that legal structure, with a focus on the Bureau's organization; the entities and activities that fall (and do not fall) under the Bureau's supervisory, enforcement, and rulemaking authorities; the Bureau's general and specific rulemaking powers and procedures; and the Bureau's funding. Conclusion
The CFP Act substantially, though not completely, consolidates in the CFPB federal consumer protection powers that previously were held by seven other regulators. It has the authority to write rules to implement a broad array of federal consumer financial protection laws, as well as most consumer compliance supervisory and enforcement powers over larger depositories. However, the CFPB did not acquire from the banking regulators the primary supervisory and enforcement powers over smaller depositories. The Bureau also wields new federal consumer financial protection powers to regulate nondepository financial institutions, which previously were largely unregulated at the federal level. However, the CFP Act wholly exempts certain nondepository financial institutions from the Bureau's regulatory reach and curtails the CPFB's authority to regulate others. Although the powers that the CFPB has at its disposal are largely the same or analogous to those that other federal regulators have held for decades, there is a great deal of uncertainty in how the new agency will exercise these broad and flexible authorities, especially in light of its almost exclusive focus on consumer protection and the novel expansion of federal oversight to nondepository financial institutions. This uncertainty has some anxious that the Bureau, in the name of protecting consumers, may excessively restrict consumer credit and unduly increase regulatory costs. As the Bureau continues to exercise its authorities, policy makers will have a performance record on which to evaluate how the CFP Act is working and whether amendments might improve consumer protections, increase access to credit markets, reduce the costs of consumer financial products and services, or reduce compliance costs. | In the wake of the worst U.S. financial crisis since the Great Depression, Congress passed and the President signed into law sweeping reforms of the financial services regulatory system through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), P.L. 111-203. Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFP Act). The CFP Act establishes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or Bureau) within the Federal Reserve System (FRS) with rulemaking, enforcement, and supervisory powers over many consumer financial products and services, as well as the entities that sell them.
The CFP Act substantially, though not completely, consolidates in the CFPB federal consumer protection powers that previously were held by seven other regulators. It has the authority to write rules to implement a broad array of federal consumer financial protection laws, as well as most consumer compliance supervisory and enforcement powers over larger depositories. However, the CFPB did not acquire from the banking regulators the primary supervisory and enforcement powers over smaller depositories. The Bureau also wields new federal consumer financial protection powers to regulate nondepository financial institutions, which previously were largely unregulated at the federal level. However, the CFP Act wholly exempts certain nondepository financial institutions from the Bureau's regulatory reach and curtails the CPFB's authority to regulate others.
Although the powers that the CFPB has at its disposal are largely the same or analogous to those that other federal regulators have held for decades, there is a great deal of uncertainty in how the new agency will exercise these broad and flexible authorities, especially in light of its almost exclusive focus on consumer protection and the novel expansion of federal oversight to nondepository financial institutions. This uncertainty has some anxious that the Bureau, in the name of protecting consumers, may excessively restrict consumer credit and unduly increase regulatory costs. As the Bureau continues to exercise its authorities, policy makers will have a performance record on which to evaluate how the CFP Act is working and whether amendments might improve consumer protections, increase access to credit markets, reduce the costs of consumer financial products and services, or reduce compliance costs.
The 113th Congress has been actively involved in conducting oversight of the implementation of the CFP Act. The 113th Congress also has considered bills that would either eliminate the CFPB altogether or significantly alter the structure of the Bureau by, for example, making the CFPB's primary funding subject to the traditional appropriations process, converting the CFPB's leadership structure from a sole directorship to a commission, or allowing the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to overturn CFPB-issued regulations with a simple majority vote, as opposed to the current supermajority vote.
This report provides an overview of the regulatory structure of consumer finance under existing federal law before the Dodd-Frank Act went into effect and examines arguments for modifying the regime in order to more effectively regulate consumer financial markets. It then analyzes how the CFP Act changes that legal structure, with a focus on the Bureau's organization; the entities and activities that fall (and do not fall) under the Bureau's supervisory, enforcement, and rulemaking authorities; the Bureau's general and specific rulemaking powers and procedures; and the Bureau's funding. |
crs_R44480 | crs_R44480_0 | O n October 23, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published its final Clean Power Plan rule (CPP or Rule) to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), specifically carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), from existing fossil fuel-fired power plants. The goal of the Rule, according to EPA, is to help protect human health and the environment from the impacts of climate change. The CPP has been one of the more singularly controversial environmental regulations ever promulgated, and the controversy is reflected in the enormous multi-party litigation over the Rule in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Numerous petitions challenging the Rule have been consolidated under the caption West Virginia v. EPA . While the litigation is still ongoing at the circuit court level, an interlocutory—that is, mid-litigation—application to the Supreme Court resulted in a stay, or pause, of the Rule. This report provides legal background on the Rule, its Clean Air Act (CAA) framework under Section 111, and some of the main climate-related lawsuits that have preceded the present litigation over the CPP. It then gives an overview of the participants in the litigation, including Members of Congress, who have offered briefs in support of both sides. This report explains the major events in the litigation as of the date of publication, including the Supreme Court stay and the D.C. Circuit oral argument, and the expected schedule of events in the near term. It then presents condensed summaries of some of the main arguments on the merits. This report concludes with a brief look at parallel litigation in the D.C. Circuit that is challenging a related EPA regulation, which limits GHG emissions from new, modified, and reconstructed power plants. (B) Within one year after the inclusion of a category of stationary sources in a list under subparagraph (A), the Administrator shall publish proposed regulations, establishing Federal standards of performance [i.e., NSPSs] for new sources within such category....
…
(d) (1) The Administrator shall prescribe regulations which shall establish a procedure similar to that provided by section [1]10 of this title [which provides for State Implementation Plans for NAAQS] under which each State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which
(A) establishes standards of performance for any existing source for any air pollutant
(i) for which air quality criteria have not been issued or which is not included on a list published under section [1]08(a) …
[From this point, there is dispute in the litigation regarding how subparagraph (i) continues; the House-originated amendment, which appears in both the U.S. Code and the Statutes at Large , ends subparagraph (i) with " or emitted from a source category which is regulated under section [1]12 " while the Senate-originated amendment, which appears only in the Statutes at Large and not the U.S. Code , ends subparagraph (i) with " or section [1]12(b) " ]
but
(ii) to which a standard of performance under this section would apply if such existing source were a new source, and
(B) provides for the implementation and enforcement of such standards of performance. EPA finalized Section 111(b) NSPSs for GHG emissions from new, modified, and reconstructed power plants at the same time as the Clean Power Plan. Thus, the stay briefing previewed some of the legal and factual arguments on both sides, including arguments relating to the scope of EPA's authority and the reasonableness of EPA's decisions. Circuit, who referred the actions to the full Court. Next Steps in West Virginia v. EPA
As noted above, oral argument was held on September 27, 2016. | On October 23, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published its final Clean Power Plan rule (Rule) to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), specifically carbon dioxide (CO2), from existing fossil fuel-fired power plants. The aim of the Rule, according to EPA, is to help protect human health and the environment from the impacts of climate change. The Clean Power Plan would require states to submit plans to achieve state-specific CO2 goals reflecting emission performance rates or emission levels for predominantly coal- and gas-fired power plants, with a series of interim goals culminating in final goals by 2030.
The Clean Power Plan has been one of the more singularly controversial environmental regulations ever promulgated by EPA, and the controversy is reflected in the enormous multi-party litigation over the Rule ongoing in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit). Numerous petitions challenging the Clean Power Plan have been consolidated into one case, West Virginia v. EPA. While the litigation is still ongoing at the circuit court level, an unusual mid-litigation application to the Supreme Court resulted in a stay of the Rule, meaning that the Rule does not have legal effect at least for the duration of the litigation. On September 27, 2016, the en banc (full court) D.C. Circuit heard oral argument for the case.
This report provides legal background on the Rule, its Clean Air Act (CAA) framework under Section 111, and climate-related lawsuits that have preceded the present litigation over the Clean Power Plan. It then gives an overview of the participants in the current litigation, including two groups of Members of Congress, who have offered briefs in support of both sides. This report highlights the major events in the litigation as of the date of publication, including the Supreme Court stay and oral argument, and the likely timetable of events in the near term.
Some of the main arguments on the merits are then briefly summarized and excerpted from court filings, including
the standard of review to apply to EPA's action; the scope of EPA's overall authority under CAA Section 111; whether Section 111 allows the Clean Power Plan's inclusion of generation-shifting, such as from coal-fired power plants to lower-emitting sources of electricity; the interpretation of a statutory exclusion in CAA Section 111 that cross-references CAA Section 112's regulation of hazardous air pollutants, particularly in light of the apparent enactment in 1990 of differing House and Senate amendments to the same cross-reference; constitutional arguments relating to federalism and separation of powers; record-based challenges to the achievability and reasonableness of the Rule; and arguments regarding rulemaking procedures.
This report concludes with a brief look at parallel litigation in the D.C. Circuit, consolidated as North Dakota v. EPA, which is challenging a related EPA regulation that imposes new source performance standards (NSPSs) limiting CO2 emissions from new, modified, and reconstructed fossil fuel-fired power plants. |
crs_RL34461 | crs_RL34461_0 | In earlier action, on February 17, 2009, the President signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. The bill also provides funds for agencies in two other departments—the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the Indian Health Service (IHS) in the Department of Health and Human Services—as well as funds for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 111 - 5 , H.R. Current Overview
On March 11, 2009, the President signed the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-8 , H.R. The omnibus law contained regular appropriations for FY2009 of $27.59 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. This funding was $1.78 billion (7%) over the FY2009 Bush Administration request of $25.81 billion, but $825.9 million (3%) below the FY2008 level of $28.42 billion. This broad economic stimulus legislation contained $10.95 billion in emergency funds for FY2009 for some of the accounts within agencies typically funded by the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations laws. In general, the funds were made available for obligation until September 30, 2010 (the end of FY2010). Taken together, the omnibus law and the stimulus law provided a total of $38.54 billion for FY2009 for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2009. Regular appropriations for FY2009 were not enacted for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies before the October 1, 2008 start of the fiscal year. Division A, Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009, generally extended funding for accounts in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill at the amounts provided in the FY2008 regular appropriations law. Funds were available under the terms and conditions provided in the FY2008 law, except where otherwise specified. It removed the prohibitions on spending funds for oil and gas leasing activities in certain regions of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), which had been controversial (see the "Minerals Management Service" section). However, no bills providing regular appropriations for FY2009 for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies were reported by the House or Senate Appropriations Committees or considered on the House or Senate floor during the 110 th Congress. Divisiveness over whether to retain long-standing prohibitions on funding for oil and gas leasing in regions of the Outer Continental Shelf was perhaps the biggest impediment to developing and considering an Interior appropriations bill. In general, the accounts funded in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations title of P.L. (For more information, see the "Bureau of Indian Affairs" and the "Indian Health Service" sections in this report.) Wildland Fire Management135
Wildfire protection programs and funding continue to be controversial. | The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and for two agencies within other departments—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also includes funding for arts and cultural agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency, and numerous other entities.
On February 17, 2009, the President signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, H.R. 1). This broad economic stimulus legislation contained $10.95 billion in emergency funds for FY2009 for some of the accounts within agencies typically funded by the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations laws. In general, the funds were made available for obligation until September 30, 2010 (the end of FY2010).
On March 11, 2009, the President signed the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8, H.R. 1105). The omnibus law contained regular appropriations for FY2009 of $27.59 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. This funding was $825.9 million (3%) below the FY2008 level of $28.42 billion (including $1.82 billion in emergency appropriations), but $1.78 billion (7%) above the FY2009 Bush Administration request of $25.81 billion. Together with funding in the stimulus law, Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies received a total of $38.54 billion for FY2009.
Regular appropriations for FY2009 were not enacted for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies before the October 1, 2008, start of the fiscal year. Instead, agencies were receiving funds under the terms of a continuing funding resolution—Division A, Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2009 (P.L. 110-329, FY2009 CR). The measure generally extended funding for accounts in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill at the amounts provided in the FY2008 regular appropriations law and under the terms and conditions provided in that FY2008 law. A notable exception was that the FY2009 CR removed the prohibitions on spending funds for oil and gas leasing activities in certain regions of the Outer Continental Shelf.
No bills providing regular appropriations for FY2009 for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies were reported by the House or Senate Appropriations Committees or considered on the House or Senate floor during the 110th Congress. Perhaps the biggest impediment to developing and considering an Interior bill was divisiveness over whether to retain long-standing prohibitions on funding for oil and gas leasing in the OCS. Other issues that have been controversial in Interior deliberations have included funding for Bureau of Indian Affairs construction, education, and housing; Indian Health Service construction and urban Indian health; wastewater/drinking water needs; land acquisition; the Payments in Lieu of Taxes program; the Superfund program; and wildland fire fighting, in addition to Indian trust fund management and royalty relief.
This report is not expected to be updated. |
crs_R41194 | crs_R41194_0 | Bangladesh-U.S. Relations
U.S. policy toward Bangladesh emphasizes support for political stability and democracy, economic development, liberalized trade and investment, human rights, and some military-to-military exchange. The United States has long-standing supportive relations with Bangladesh and views Bangladesh as a moderate voice in the Islamic world. The State Department views U.S. assistance as vital to strengthening the country following its return to a democratically elected government in 2008. Due to the moderate form of Islamic belief that is prevalent in Bangladesh, the country is valued for its "strong secular and democratic heritage." Bangladesh is situated at the northern extreme of the Bay of Bengal and could potentially be a state of increasing interest in the evolving strategic dynamics between India and China. Workers' Rights and U.S. Policy
Workers' rights have long been a concern in Bangladesh, and U.S. attention on the issue was greatly heightened with the collapse of a Bangladesh factory that produced garments for consumers in the United States and Europe on April 24, 2013, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,100 workers. Domestic Politics, Political Parties, and Elections
Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy that has traditionally been led by one of two political parties, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL). The AL has led the government since January 2009. The AL is led by current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina while the BNP is led by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. When in opposition, both parties have sought to regain control of the government through transport blockades, demonstrations, and general protests and strikes also known as Hartals . Since that time Bangladesh has done much to curb militant Islamist activity. Two political leaders from the BNP and five from the Jamaat-i-Islami have been arrested under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act and accused of war crimes dating back to Bangladesh's war of secession and independence from Pakistan in 1971. The two-day mutiny was quickly suppressed by the army. The Government of Bangladesh has also attempted to curb terrorism in recent years through social measures that especially focus on the youth. Bangladesh in a Regional Context
Bangladesh is a nation of strategic importance not only to the South Asian sub-region but to the larger geopolitical dynamics of Asia as a whole. Bangladesh-U.S. trade has been expanding in recent years, and the United States is Bangladesh's largest trading partner. There are an estimated six million Bangladeshis working abroad. Demographic pressure and environmental problems, including those linked to climate change, are increasingly problems for Bangladesh as well. The low-lying nation would be significantly affected by projected sea level rise. Such climate-related challenges as well as an increasing population, when combined with poor economic resources and limits on the extent to which agricultural output can be expanded, could prove to be politically destabilizing in the future. | Bangladesh (the former East Pakistan) is an Islamic-majority nation in South Asia, bordering the Bay of Bengal, dominated by low-lying riparian zones. It is the world's eighth-largest country in terms of population, with 164 million people housed in a land mass the size of Iowa. Roughly 80% of Bangladesh's population lives on less than $2 per day. It suffers from high levels of corruption and, at times, a faltering democratic system that has been subject to pressure from the military, though the nation has an established reputation as a largely moderate and democratic majority Muslim country.
U.S. policy toward Bangladesh emphasizes support for political stability and democracy, development, and human rights. The United States has long-standing supportive relations with Bangladesh and views Bangladesh as a moderate voice in the Islamic world. The United States offers economic assistance to Bangladesh, and has military-to-military ties that include cooperation in multilateral peacekeeping. Bangladesh is also of interest to the United States for the role it plays in the larger geopolitical dynamics of South Asia.
Bangladesh has been under threat from a combination of political violence, weak governance, poverty, corruption, and Islamist militancy. There has been concern in the past that influence by Islamist extremists could increase and destabilize the country. Such concerns have abated somewhat in more recent years as Islamist militants have been vigorously pursued by authorities and as Bangladesh has returned to democratic government. That said, experts continue to warn that militants may regroup and present new challenges in Bangladesh despite the significant efforts by the government of Bangladesh against them.
The Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL) traditionally have dominated Bangladeshi politics, with the AL in power since January 2009. The AL is led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina while the BNP is led by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. When in opposition, both parties have sought to regain control of the government through demonstrations, labor strikes, and transport blockades. The current Hasina government came to power with an overwhelming majority in parliament. It has moved forward with a war crimes tribunal to prosecute atrocities from the 1971 war of independence from Pakistan. The Hasina government has also moved to strengthen ties with both India and China. With the help of the army, it successfully suppressed a mutiny by the Bangladesh Rifles, a border guard unit, in February 2009.
Demographic pressure and environmental problems, some likely exacerbated by climate change, are increasingly problems for Bangladesh. A rising population, when combined with limited economic resilience and limits on the extent to which agricultural output can be expanded, could prove to be politically destabilizing in the future. Bangladesh's population increases by approximately 2.2 million each year. This raises urgent questions concerning Bangladesh's future food security. Minority groups in Bangladesh, as well as women's rights and security are threatened due to socio-religious prejudices. Another key concern is worker rights and worker safety. Bangladesh is an important part of global supply chains, particularly in the textile industry, and successive factory disasters there have increased global and U.S. concerns about its labor rights regime. |
crs_R42776 | crs_R42776_0 | Introduction
In January 2003, former President George W. Bush proposed that the United States spend $15 billion over the next five fiscal years to fight three diseases worldwide—malaria, tuberculosis (TB), and HIV/AIDS—through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The plan included $10 billion for programs to combat HIV/AIDS in 15 focus countries; $4 billion for bilateral HIV/AIDS activities in some 100 non-focus countries, global HIV/AIDS research, and international TB projects; and $1 billion for the multilateral Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund). In May 2003, Congress authorized $15 billion in support of the initiative through P.L. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (the Leadership Act). 110-293 , the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (the Lantos-Hyde Act). The act authorized $48 billion to be spent from FY2009 through FY2013 on fighting the three diseases; including $5 billion for international malaria programs, $4 billion for global TB efforts, and $2 billion for a contribution to the Global Fund in FY2009. The Leadership Act and subsequent appropriations were considered groundbreaking. In the first phase of PEPFAR (FY2004-FY2008), the United States spent more than $18 billion on global HIV/AIDS initiatives, including the Global Fund. From FY2009 through FY2012, U.S. spending on international HIV/AIDS assistance reached nearly $26 billion. Supporters, on the other hand, assert the Global Fund complements U.S. efforts by leveraging contributions from other donors and is an important partner in the U.S. fight against global HIV/AIDS. Congressional appropriations for the Global Fund exceeded requested levels during the Bush and Obama Administrations. The gap between requested and actual spending was the most pronounced, however, throughout the Bush Administration. President Bush never requested that more than 10% of global HIV/AIDS funds be spent on the Global Fund, whereas President Obama requested that up to 27% of global HIV/AIDS funds be reserved for the Global Fund ( Figure 4 ). Per the legislation, the frameworks are to outline plans for increasing country ownership of the operation and funding of national HIV/AIDS plans. Financial contributions from traditional donors are fluctuating, and some global health advocates fear international support for the Global Fund is waning. While there is some uncertainty about future funding levels from traditional donors, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) are playing a greater role in international HIV/AIDS assistance and are transforming from recipient countries into donor nations. At the same time, BRICS have increasingly assumed control over their own national HIV/AIDS programs. In December 2002, one month before PEPFAR was announced, only 50,000 people of the estimated 4 million requiring anti-retroviral (ARV) medicines in sub-Saharan Africa were receiving treatment. By 2011, more than 8 million people living with HIV/AIDS in low- and middle-income countries were receiving antiretroviral treatment, some 20% more than 2010 levels (6.6 million people). Progress has been made as well in preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS. Nonetheless, observers question whether global funding for addressing HIV/AIDS will be sustained. Several issues may affect future support for PEPFAR and the global fight against HIV/AIDS, including:
PEPFAR Reauthorization. 108-25 , and the Lantos-Hyde Act, P.L. The acts authorized the provision of $15 billion and $48 billion, respectively, for fighting HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. Authorization for PEPFAR is set to expire at the end of FY2013. At the same time, key elements within the act remain controversial, including those related to family planning. If Congress does not extend authorization of PEPFAR, the program could continue to be funded through annual appropriations, but Congress could lose some of its opportunity to direct how its priorities are implemented. Increased Spending by Emerging Economies. The Lantos-Hyde Act emphasized country ownership. It is unclear whether U.S. funding levels for global HIV/AIDS programs will continue to rise as the United States and other donors continue to call on recipient countries to increase their contributions to national HIV/AIDS plans. Nonetheless, several AIDS advocates are concerned that growing emphasis on transitioning ownership of programs implies declining support for PEPFAR programs. Elevated Political Will Among Recipient Countries. While the world has made tremendous advancements in expanding access to HIV/AIDS, two phenomena may raise the cost of treating HIV-positive people: (1) drug resistance and (2) changes in intellectual property rights. Spending on HIV/AIDS Treatment in PEPFAR Programs
One of the greatest accomplishments of PEPFAR has been to increase the number of people receiving anti-retroviral (ARV) treatments worldwide, due in large part to increased use of generic formulations. | The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is the largest bilateral health initiative in the world. The 2003 pledge of President George W. Bush to spend $15 billion over five years on fighting HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria was considered groundbreaking. The initiative challenged the international community to reject claims that large-scale HIV/AIDS treatment plans could not be carried out in low-resource settings. In December 2002, one month before PEPFAR was announced, only 50,000 people of the estimated 4 million requiring anti-retroviral (ARV) medicines in sub-Saharan Africa were receiving treatment. By the end of FY2004, 155,000 people were receiving treatment through PEPFAR.
As of March 2012, PEPFAR has supported
the provision of anti-retroviral therapy (ART) for more than 4.5 million people (up from 155,000 in 2005); testing and counseling for more than 40 million people, including 9.8 million pregnant women; prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission (PMTCT) services for more than 660,000 HIV-positive pregnant women, curbing some 200,000 HIV infections among infants; and care and support for more than 13 million people, including more than 4 million orphans and vulnerable children (OVC).
Congress first authorized funds in support of PEPFAR in 2003 through P.L. 108-25, the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (Leadership Act). The $15 billion authorization was to be spent on global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs from FY2004 through FY2008. Strong bipartisan support for PEPFAR in particular and global health in general led to annual appropriations amounts that exceeded authorized levels. During the first phase of PEPFAR (FY2004-FY2008), the Bush Administration spent $18.1 billion on global HIV/AIDS programs.
As the expiration date of the Leadership Act approached, congressional support for PEPFAR remained enthusiastic. Members debated a range of issues (see CRS Report RL34569, PEPFAR Reauthorization: Key Policy Debates and Changes to U.S. International HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Programs and Funding), but ultimately authorized an extension of PEPFAR. The Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-293, Lantos-Hyde Act) authorized $48 billion to be appropriated from FY2009 through FY2013 for combating the three diseases. From FY2009 through FY2012, the Obama Administration obligated nearly $26 billion on global HIV/AIDS programs.
As the September 30, 2013, expiration date for the authorization of the Lantos-Hyde Act approaches, it is unclear whether Congress will again authorize multiyear funding for PEPFAR. Bipartisan support for PEPFAR remains strong; nonetheless, congressional debate about key elements of the program has raised some concerns. For example, some Members question the extent to which family planning programs are integrated into global HIV/AIDS activities. At the same time, growing unease about the federal budget deficit minimizes the likelihood that past trends of ever-increasing appropriations for global HIV/AIDS programs will be sustained.
Fiscal pressures may have influenced funding amounts that fluctuated (but mostly remained level) throughout the Obama Administration—a departure from the steady growth in spending seen during the Bush Administration. Financial constraints in the global economy have resulted in similar outcomes during the Obama Administration. Whereas many international donors consistently increased their pledges for fighting global HIV/AIDS throughout the Bush Administration, resources made available by key contributors (such as European nations and the Global Fund) began to stagnate and in some cases declined during the past few years. While contributions by traditional donors have mostly stabilized, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) are playing a greater role in international HIV/AIDS assistance and are transforming from recipient countries into donor nations. At the same time, some aid recipient countries are increasing investments in their own national HIV/AIDS plans.
This report outlines U.S. spending on global HIV/AIDS programs since the inception of PEPFAR, analyzes global HIV/AIDS funding by other donors, and highlights key issues pertaining to funding that will face the 113th Congress as it considers the future of PEPFAR, including
whether to reauthorize funding for PEPFAR following the expiration of the Lantos-Hyde Act in FY2013; engagement with emerging economies and other non-traditional donors who are increasing their participation in the global fight against HIV/AIDS; the impact of U.S. efforts to transition ownership of national HIV/AIDS plans to recipient countries; the appropriate funding level for the Global Fund; whether to support innovative fund-raising approaches for global HIV/AIDS programs, such as taxes on financial transactions and income; and developments that might increase HIV/AIDS treatment costs, including intellectual property rights and drug resistance.
Program implementation and authorization issues will be addressed more extensively in future related reports. |
crs_RL34430 | crs_RL34430_0 | In 2005, Congress again addressed the issue of national standards for drivers' licenses and personal identification cards by passing The REAL ID Act of 2005 (REAL ID). REAL ID contains a number of provisions relating to improved security for drivers' licenses and personal identification cards, as well as instructions for states that do not comply with its provisions. Statutory Provisions and Requirements of REAL ID
In general, although REAL ID does not directly impose federal standards with respect to states' issuance of drivers' licenses and personal identification cards, states nevertheless appear to need to adopt such standards and modify any conflicting laws or regulations to continue to have such documents recognized by federal agencies for official purposes. Constitutional Questions
Both at the time that REAL ID was debated in Congress, and during the regulatory comment period, questions about the constitutionality of the statute were raised. There have been four main constitutional arguments made against REAL ID. First, because REAL ID cannot be premised on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, it is a violation of states' rights as protected by the Tenth Amendment. Second, the requirement that REAL IDs be used to board federally regulated aircraft impermissibly encroaches on citizen's right to travel. Third, specific requirements such as the digital photograph potentially violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Finally, REAL ID infringes upon a citizen's right under the First Amendment to freely assemble, associate, and petition the government. "Unfunded Mandate" Issues
According to some advocacy groups, state and federal elected officials—including numerous commentators to the proposed regulations —and others, REAL ID imposes an unconstitutional "unfunded mandate" on the states. State Legislative Responses and Potential Issues for Citizens of Non-Compliant States
Since its adoption in 2005, REAL ID has been a highly contested issue among state legislatures and governors. Prior to the publication of the NPRM in 2007, however, there was little activity at the state lawmaking level, primarily because officials were uncertain as to precisely what the implementation requirements were going to necessitate, either in terms of cost or potential changes to state law. Since the publication of the NPRM in 2007, there has been a dramatic increase in state responses to REAL ID and its requirements. Selected Regulatory Requirements of REAL ID
The final regulations promulgated by DHS on January 29, 2008, contained over 280 pages and responded to over 21,000 comments. This section contains a summary description and analysis of several of the major elements of the REAL ID regulations. | In 2005, Congress addressed the issue of national standards for drivers' licenses and personal identification cards by passing The REAL ID Act of 2005 (REAL ID). The act contains a number of provisions relating to improved security for drivers' licenses and personal identification cards, as well as instructions for states that do not comply with its provisions. In general, while REAL ID does not directly impose federal standards with respect to states' issuance of drivers' licenses and personal identification cards, states nevertheless appear compelled to adopt such standards and modify any conflicting laws or regulations to continue to have such documents recognized by federal agencies for official purposes.
Both at the time that REAL ID was debated in Congress, and during the regulatory comment period, questions about the constitutionality of the statute have been raised. There have been four main constitutional arguments made against REAL ID. First, because REAL ID cannot be premised on Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, it is a violation of states' rights as protected by the Tenth Amendment. Second, the requirement that REAL IDs be used to board federally regulated aircraft impermissibly encroaches on citizens' right to travel. Third, specific requirements such as the digital photograph potentially violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Finally, REAL ID infringes upon a citizen's right under the First Amendment to freely assemble, associate, and petition the government.
Since its adoption in 2005, REAL ID has been a highly contested issue among state legislatures and governors. According to some advocacy groups, state and federal elected officials—including numerous commentators to the proposed regulations—and other interested parties, REAL ID imposes an unconstitutional "unfunded mandate" on the states. Prior to the publication of the proposed rule in 2007, however, there was little activity at the state-lawmaking level, primarily because officials were uncertain as to precisely what the implementation requirements were going to necessitate, either in terms of cost or potential changes to state law. Since the publication of the proposed rule in 2007, there has been a dramatic increase in state responses to REAL ID and its requirements.
The final regulations were promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on January 29, 2008, and contain 280 pages of explanation as well as responses to over 21,000 comments. This report contains a summary description and analysis of several of the major elements of the REAL ID regulations.
Finally, this report will address REAL ID in relationship to other federal laws and identification programs. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40581 | crs_R40581_0 | Introduction
The health reform debate in the 111 th Congress continued and expanded upon the work begun in the 110 th Congress. On November 12, 2008, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Baucus, released a white paper detailing his principles for health reform. This provided a framework for work within the committee for the 111 th Congress. Several bills were introduced when the 111 th Congress first convened, and these bills focused on a broad spectrum of approaches to health reform. On November 7, 2009, the House passed H.R. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200 , America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, which was originally introduced on July 14, 2009, and was reported separately on October 14, 2009, by three House Committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means. The U.S. Senate passed its version of health insurance reform on December 24, 2009, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, in H.R. 3590 consolidated and amended bills passed by the two committees with principal jurisdiction, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, which ordered reported S. 1679 , the Affordable Health Choices Act on July 15, and the Senate Finance Committee, which ordered reported S. 1796 , America's Healthy Future Act of 2009, on October 19, 2009. The House and Senate must agree to the same measure with the same legislative language before a bill can be presented to the President. In an effort to move the process forward, the President released a health reform proposal on February 22, 2010, which combines and modifies provisions in the Senate and House passed bills. On February 25, 2010, the President held a bipartisan meeting on health reform, attended by both Democrats and Republican Members of Congress. This report presents basic background information on health insurance that may be useful to legislators considering health insurance reforms. It describes health insurance reform approaches and provides brief descriptions of health insurance reform bills introduced in the 111 th Congress. The potential impact of various reform approaches and bills is not analyzed in this report. As a result, it does not provide evaluations of how well different bills, once enacted, would meet their objectives. These bills, as well as other proposals currently under consideration, can be classified as expanding coverage using one of the following approaches:
Largely replace existing coverage with a national government-provided health insurance program (or a national health service). Expand existing public programs for certain individuals. Encourage state-based reforms. Simultaneously expand private and public coverage options. Expand Privately Sponsored Coverage
H.R. Simultaneously Expand Private and Public Coverage Options
H.R. 3962
The Affordable Health Care for America Act was passed in the House on November 7, 2009. 3590 , as amended by the Senate (hereafter referred to simply as H.R. | The health reform debate in the 111th Congress continued and expanded upon the work begun in the 110th Congress. On November 12, 2008, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Baucus, released a white paper detailing his principles for health reform. This provided a framework for work within the committee for the 111th Congress. Several bills were introduced when the 111th Congress first convened, and these bills focused on a broad spectrum of approaches to health reform.
On November 7, 2009, the House passed H.R. 3962, the Affordable Health Care for America Act. H.R. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200, America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, which was originally introduced on July 14, 2009, and was reported separately on October 14, 2009, by three House Committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means. The U.S. Senate passed its version of health insurance reform on December 24, 2009, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, in H.R. 3590, as amended by the Senate (hereafter referred to simply as H.R. 3590). H.R. 3590 consolidated and amended bills passed by the two committees with principal jurisdiction, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, which ordered reported S. 1679, the Affordable Health Choices Act on July 15, and the Senate Finance Committee, which ordered reported S. 1796, America's Healthy Future Act of 2009, on October 19, 2009. The House and Senate must agree to the same measure with the same legislative language before a bill can be presented to the President. In an effort to move the process forward, the President released a health reform proposal on February 22, 2010, which combines and modifies provisions in the Senate and House passed bills. On February 25, 2010, the President held a bipartisan meeting on health reform, attended by both Democrats and Republican Members of Congress.
The health reform bills passed by the House and Senate focus on simultaneously expanding private and public coverage options. Some of the other bills introduced in the 111th Congress take a similar approach to health reform. Additionally, other bills have focused on other solutions, attempting to expand coverage using one of the following approaches:
Largely replace existing coverage with a national government-provided health insurance program (or a national health service). Expand existing public programs for certain individuals. Expand privately sponsored coverage. Encourage state-based reforms. Simultaneously expand private and public coverage options.
This report presents basic background on health insurance that may be useful to legislators considering health insurance reforms. It describes reform approaches and provides brief descriptions of health insurance reform bills introduced in the 111th Congress, as well as some of the general principles currently being considered by the Congress. The potential impact of the various approaches and bills is not analyzed in this report, however. As a result, it does not provide evaluations of how well different bills, once enacted, would meet their objectives. This report will be updated periodically to reflect recent congressional activity in health reform. |
crs_R43932 | crs_R43932_0 | The President's FY2016 budget seeks new authority under the federal foster care, adoption assistance, and kinship guardianship assistance program (authorized in Title IV-E of the Social Security Act) to support services intended to prevent children's entry to foster care and ensure appropriate care and treatment for those in foster care. It also proposes additional federal support for tribes to implement Title IV-E programs, makes some policy proposals related to permanency planning for children in care and serving youth who have "aged out" of care, and again proposes a requirement that child support payments be used only in a child's best interests. The Children's Bureau is the agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF) that administers nearly all federal child welfare programs. Title IV-E Funding Request
Under the Title IV-E program, states are entitled to open-ended reimbursement for a part of the cost of providing to eligible children foster care, adoption assistance, and (in states that choose to provide it) kinship guardianship assistance. The FY2016 current law request for Title IV-E funding is $7.601 billion. This is $258 million more than funding expected to be used under the Title IV-E program for FY2015 ($7.343 billion). Proposed Law Funding Request
Apart from the request for additional funds to meet current law commitments, the Administration seeks $430 million in additional FY2016 Title IV-E budget authority to support various legislative proposals. Not all of this requested funding is expected to be spent in FY2016, however. Proposed Title IV-E Policy Changes and Estimated Costs
As mentioned earlier, the Administration seeks legislative authority to implement several new policies under the Title IV-E program. The combined cost (budget authority) of the proposals included in the President's FY2016 budget is estimated by HHS/ACF to be $430 million for FY2016 and $1.358 billion over 10 years. The proposals, along with some policy proposals that do not have any associated costs, are briefly described in the remainder of this report. Permit Title IV-E Support for Services to Prevent Entry, or Re-entry, to Foster Care
The Administration seeks authority to provide federal Title IV-E reimbursement for a part of the cost states incur in providing "evidence-based" or "evidence-informed" services to prevent the otherwise expected entry (or re-entry) of children into foster care. It estimated this proposal would have an initial one-year cost of $78 million in FY2016, but that across 10 years it would reduce Title IV-E spending by $69 million. The Administration estimates this proposal would cost $27 million in FY2016 and $114 million across 10 years. 112-34 ), Congress required state child welfare agencies to adopt specific protocols for the use of psychotropic medications for children in foster care. Among other things, this proposal would end the current law requirement that states return a portion of child support collected on behalf of children in foster care (who are Title IV-E eligible) to the federal government as reimbursement for a part of the cost of providing foster care maintenance payments to the child. With regard to the Title IV-E program, it is estimated to cost $45 million in FY2016 and $476 million across 10 years. Eliminate the Permanency Plan "Another Planned Permanent Living Arrangement" (APPLA)
The Administration proposes to eliminate APPLA as a permanency plan for any child in care. Under current law, as a condition of Title IV-E funding, states must ensure every child in foster care has a "permanency" plan designed to allow the child to be reunited with his/her family, or to find the child a new permanent family via adoption, legal guardianship, or placement with a fit and willing relative. Allow Certain States to Spend Chafee Service Funds for Youth Up to Age 23
The Administration would permit some states to use funding under the Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP) to serve young people who were formerly in foster care up to the age of 23. The Administration proposes this increased flexibility only for those states that have taken the current law option to extend Title IV-E assistance to youth up to 21 years of age (as of February 2015, 22 states, including the District of Columbia, offer extended Title IV-E assistance), or for any state that provides comparable extended Title IV-E foster care assistance using state or other funding. | Under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, states are entitled to open-ended reimbursement for the cost of providing foster care, adoption assistance, and (in states that choose to provide it) kinship guardianship assistance. Additional mandatory funding is available, on a capped basis, for services to youth who "age out" of foster care, or are expected to, and for Tribal Title IV-E plan development and technical assistance. Each year the President's budget estimates the amount of funding necessary to meet federal commitments under Title IV-E based on current law and, if included in the budget, provides estimates related to proposed changes to the law. While the current law estimate reflects funding needed to support policies that have already been placed in statute, Congress would need to make changes to the law to enable the proposed policies (and any related spending) to be implemented.
For FY2016, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF) estimates that, under current law, $7.601 billion will be needed to meet the costs of all Title IV-E program components (including those with open-ended funding and those with capped funding). The overall funding level is $258 million above what HHS/ACF expects to need under the program for FY2015 ($7.343 billion). The primary reasons HHS/ACF assumes a need for this additional FY2016 funding are expected growth in the number of children receiving Title IV-E foster care maintenance, adoption assistance, and guardianship assistance payments; and increased program administrative costs tied to implementation of new program requirements.
The Administration also seeks legislative authority to implement several new policies under the Title IV-E program. Combined, it estimates these policies would require an additional $430 million in Title IV-E budget authority in FY2016 and a total of $1.358 billion in additional funding across 10 years (FY2016-FY2025). Specifically, it seeks budget authority of
$30 million in FY2016 ($587 million across 10 years) to enable federal support for a part of the cost of providing services needed to prevent the entry or re-entry to foster care of children who are at imminent risk of this outcome; $78 million in FY2016 (but an estimated savings of $69 million across 10 years) to require states to meet new Title IV-E requirements before placing a child in a congregate care setting, while also providing enhanced Title IV-E support to expand the capacity of states to provide family-based care for children in foster care, including those with identified behavioral problems or clinical mental health concerns; $27 million in FY2016 ($114 million over 10 years) to offer enhanced Title IV-E support to enable tribes with approved Title IV-E plans to implement them; $250 million in FY2016 (total 10-year cost of $250 million) to address concerns about prescription of psychotropic medication for children in foster care (additional funding is sought under the Medicaid program as part of this same proposal); and $45 million in FY2016 ($476 million over 10 years) to ensure child support payments for children in foster care are used only in the child's best interest (and not as reimbursement to federal or state government).
Finally, the Administration also proposes two policy changes that do not have an associated cost (or savings): (1) requiring states to have a permanency plan for each child in foster care that involves reunification, adoption, legal guardianship, or placement with a fit and willing relative (by eliminating entirely the permanency plan option known as "another planned permanent living arrangement," or APPLA); and (2) permitting states that offer foster care assistance to youth up to age 21 to spend Chafee Foster Care Independence (CFCIP) funds for otherwise eligible youth up to age 23 (current law limits the use of these funds to otherwise eligible youth up to age 21). |
crs_RS20900 | crs_RS20900_0 | Unfortunately, these medals are no longer being awarded by the French government. All medals to commemorate the 50 th anniversary ceremony on June 6, 1994, have been distributed by the French government. These medals were obtained either from the Association Debarquement et Bataille de Normandie 1944 or from a commercial source. "Thank-You-America 1944-1945" Certificates
The French government is no longer distributing the Jubilee of Liberty medals. | This report details the Jubilee of Liberty Medal awarded to U.S. veterans by the French government to commemorate the 50 th anniversary of the invasion of Normandy by the Allied forces on June 6, 1994 (D-Day). These medals are no longer distributed by the French government. Included is information on how to obtain this medal from a commercial source and how U.S. veterans may obtain an official "Thank-You-America 1944-1945" certificate of participation from the French government. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL33073 | crs_RL33073_0 | Introduction
At the June 2005 Group of Eight (G8) (1) finance ministers meeting, member nations agreed on a financingplan for 100% debt relief for countries that complete the International Monetary Fund (IMF) andWorld Banks' Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief program. There are also two pieces of legislation( H.R. 1130 and S. 1320 ) that if enacted would allow for higher levels ofdebt relief than is provided for in the G8 proposal. This report addresses the HIPC debt burden and the various debt relief initiatives, bothbilateral and multilateral, that have been implemented and proposed. Background
In recent decades, the rapid growth in poor country debt has emerged as a key foreign policyconcern. Nonetheless, many agree that high levelsof debt are a major burden for the poorest countries and that any effort to promote economic growthand reduce poverty needs to address the HIPC debt burden. The poor country debt burden is indeed staggering. In 1988, a group of majorcreditor nations, known as the Paris Club, (10) agreed for the first time to cancel debts owed to them instead ofrefinancing them on easier terms as they had done until then. In 1996, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the regional developmentbanks agreed to allow a portion of debts owed to them to be cancelled as well, and created the DebtRelief Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). IMF Gold. (48)
Reaction from poor countries not included in the debt deal was critical. Key Details of the Agreement
If fully implemented, the agreement would result in immediate 100% cancellation of theremaining debts of 18 countries that have reached HIPC completion point ($40 billion) from theInternational Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank, and totalcancellation of $55.6 million if all HIPC-eligible countries complete the program. The proposed agreementspecifies that HIPC countries that receive debt reduction will have their gross assistance flowsreduced by the amount of debt forgiven. In this view, any potential economic growth due to the increased resourcesprovided by debt relief may be negated by a decrease in total net assistance. (55)
Limited Debt Cancellation. As proposed, theagreement only covers one regional development bank, the African Development Bank. Multilateral Development Bank Compensation is NotGuaranteed. Future assistance to the developmentbanks, compensating them for their debt relief, is not assured. Future Cost May Rise. Depending on whichcountries are added, the cost of HIPC may increase. Introducedby Senator Mike DeWine on June 28, 2005, the Multilateral Debt Relief Act of 2005 ( S. 1320 ) would authorize the necessary funding to implement the June 2005 G8 debt relief andauthorize the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the U.S. Executive Director of each internationalfinancial institution to use the voice and vote of the United States to reach an agreement among theother shareholder nations to permanently cancel 100% of the debts owed to each institution by allHIPC countries. | In recent decades, the rapid growth in poor country debt has emerged as a key foreign policyconcern. Many analysts believe that this debt burden is an impediment to economic growth andpoverty reduction. Others contend that for the poorest countries, other factors such as weak politicaland economic institutions, are a greater impediment to growth than the debt burden.
There have been many efforts to help reduce poor country debt. In 1988 a group of majorcreditor nations, known as the Paris Club, agreed for the first time to cancel debts owed to theminstead of refinancing them on easier terms as they had done previously. In 1996, the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the regional development banks agreed to allow aportion of debts owed to them by a select group of countries to be cancelled. This effort is knownas the Debt Relief Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). In June 2005, the Groupof Eight (G8) nations agreed to further deepen debt relief and proposed 100% cancellation of allmultilateral debt for countries that have finished the HIPC program. Several pieces of legislation( H.R. 1130 and S. 1320 ) also have been introduced that could extend debtrelief to an even larger group of countries. As introduced, the G8 proposal raises four possibleconcerns:
Scope of Debt Cancellation -- The proposed agreement is limited to the IMF,the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. Several other development banks are majorcreditors and are not included in the proposal.
No Net New Assistance -- The proposed agreement specifies that HIPCcountries that receive debt reduction will have their total assistance flows reduced by the amount ofdebt forgiven. This money will then be reallocated among all low-income countries.
Funding is Not Assured -- The agreement promises that G8 countries willcompensate the development banks for any debt relief they provide. However, future contributionsto the development banks are not guaranteed.
Future Commitments are Unspecified -- The agreement commits G8members to cover the cost of debt relief for countries that may later enter the HIPC process. Depending on which, if any, countries are added, the potential cost of debt relief may risesignificantly.
No congressional appropriations are required at this time to implement the G8 proposal. However, additional U.S. funds may need to be appropriated in the future to fund higher levels ofHIPC debt relief.
This report will no longer be updated. For information on the current status of the G8 debtrelief proposal, see CRS Report RS22534 , The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative , by Martin A.Weiss. |
crs_RL31772 | crs_RL31772_0 | Interest in increasing bilateral commerce began after the end of the apartheid era in South Africa in the early 1990s. At the same time, Congress developed legislation that sought to improve U.S.-Africa trade relations. In 2000, Congress approved the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; Title I, P.L. 106-200 ). In AGOA, Congress also declared that free-trade agreements should also be negotiated, where feasible, with interested SSA countries. This provision was recently extended through September 2015. This report examines African economic trends and U.S. trade and investment flows with SSA. Between 1960 and 1973, which is the period immediately following independence in most African countries, economic growth was reasonably strong in many SSA countries. Current Perspectives
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that the SSA region will grow in terms of real GDP by 5.3% in 2012 and 2013 (see Table 1 ). Natural resources continue to dominate U.S. imports from SSA. AGOA beneficiaries are exempt from certain caps on allowable duty-free imports under the GSP program ("competitive need limitations"). Qualifying articles include
Apparel assembled in one or more AGOA beneficiary countries from U.S. yarn and fabric; Apparel made of SSA (regional) yarns and fabrics, subject to a cap until 2015; Apparel made in a designated lesser-developed country (LDC) of third-country yarns and fabrics, subject to a cap until 2015 (" Third-Country Fabric Provision Extended "); Apparel made of yarns and fabrics not produced in commercial quantities in the United States (determination must be made that the yarn or fabric cannot be supplied by the U.S. industry in a timely manner, and to extend preferential treatment to the eligible fabric); Certain cashmere and merino wool sweaters; Eligible handloomed, handmade, or folklore articles and ethnic printed fabrics (certain countries only); Textiles and textile articles produced entirely in an LDC SSA beneficiary country; and Certain handloomed, handmade, ethnic printed fabrics, or folklore articles (certain countries only). 112-163 ). This amendment also added South Sudan to the list of SSA countries eligible for AGOA benefits, though full beneficiary status also requires approval by the Administration. Pending Legislation
H.R. 656 (introduced February 11, 2011), in part, directs the President to establish a Special Representative for United States-Africa Trade, Development, and Diaspora Affairs within the U.S. Department of State. H.R. 4221 (introduced March 20, 2012) and its companion bill in the Senate, S. 2215 (introduced March 21, 2012), seek to increase U.S. exports to Africa, in part, through strategies aimed at further developing relationships between the United States and African countries on a government-to-government level, as well as fostering private sector U.S.-African ties and targeting more U.S. export financing toward U.S.-SSA trade. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted to report out an amended version of S. 2215 on September 19, 2012. The 11 th AGOA Forum was held in Washington, DC, June 14-15, 2012. Hosted by the State Department and several other U.S. government agencies and private business promotion groups, the conference sought
to expand on the AGOA Forum by providing an opportunity to both showcase U.S. business expertise to potential African clients, and to highlight trade and investment opportunities in Africa to U.S. exporters and investors … [focused] broadly on infrastructure development, including energy, transportation, and water and sanitation. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
AGOA's mandate to encourage trade-related technical assistance is primarily implemented by USAID through the African Global Competitiveness Initiative (AGCI), a Presidential Initiative which supplanted the Trade for African Development and Enterprise (TRADE) initiative in 2006. Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa (AUSTRA)
Section 117 of AGOA supported the creation of this position to serve as the "primary point of contact in the executive branch for those persons engaged in trade between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa," and the chief adviser to the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) on trade and investment issues pertaining to Africa. Discussion of potential partners for free trade agreements has revolved around South Africa and the South African Customs Union (SACU), but several other regional groupings are potential partners for future trade agreements with the United States. These negotiations began in June 2003, but were postponed indefinitely in April 2006. | Following the end of the apartheid era in South Africa in the early 1990s, the United States sought to increase economic relations with sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). President Clinton instituted several measures that dealt with investment, debt relief, and trade. Congress passed legislation that required the President to develop a trade and development policy for Africa.
Between 1960 and 1973, Africa's economic growth was relatively strong, followed by a period of stagnation and decline for the subsequent two decades in many SSA countries. Current perspectives, however, indicate that many of the fastest-growing countries in the world are on the African continent, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that the SSA region will grow in terms of real GDP by 5.3% in 2012 and 2013.
In 2000, Congress approved new U.S. trade and investment legislation for SSA in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA; Title I, P.L. 106-200). According to U.S. trade statistics, U.S. trade with SSA has comprised 1% to 2% of U.S. total trade with the world. AGOA extends preferential treatment to U.S. imports from eligible countries that are pursuing market reform measures. Data show that U.S. imports under AGOA are mostly energy products, but imports of other products have grown significantly. AGOA mandated that U.S. officials meet regularly with their counterparts in SSA, and 11 of these meetings have been held to date. The 11th AGOA Forum was held from June 14 to June 15, 2012, in Washington, DC.
AGOA also directed the President to provide U.S. government technical assistance and trade capacity support to AGOA beneficiary countries. Government agencies that have roles in this effort include the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa (established by statute under AGOA), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service, and the Trade and Development Agency. In AGOA, Congress declared that free-trade agreements should be negotiated, where feasible, with interested SSA countries. Related to this provision, negotiations on a free-trade agreement with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which includes South Africa and four other countries, began in June 2003, but were suspended in April 2006.
The 112th Congress enacted legislation to extend through September 2015 an expiring provision in AGOA, which allows apparel made in lesser-developed countries to be made of yarns and fabrics from any country and still receive duty-free treatment, subject to a cap (P.L. 112-163). This amendment to AGOA also added South Sudan to the list of SSA countries eligible for AGOA benefits. Eligible countries may become AGOA beneficiaries subject to approval by the Administration.
Legislation is pending to further enhance U.S.-SSA trade relations. H.R. 4221 and S. 2215 seek to increase U.S. exports to Africa, in part, through strategies aimed at further developing relationships between the United States and African countries on a government-to-government level, fostering private sector U.S.-African ties, and targeting more U.S. export financing toward trade with Africa. An amended version of S. 2215 was ordered reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2012. H.R. 656, a separate initiative, would create at the State Department a Special Representative for United States-Africa Trade, Development, and Diaspora Affairs that would also promote U.S. trade and investment ties with SSA. |
crs_R44975 | crs_R44975_0 | Specifically, when a President nominates an individual to a U.S. circuit or district court judgeship, the chairman of the committee sends a blue-colored form to the Senators representing the home state of the nominee. A home state Senator, if he or she has no objection to a nominee, returns the blue slip with a positive response. There have also been recent years, however, during which the committee's blue slip policy prevented, at times, a single Senator from having an absolute veto over the fate of judicial nominees from his or her state. The blue slip process is not codified in the Judiciary Committee's rules, and is instead a policy set by the chairman of the committee. During this period, which encompassed both unified and divided party control of the presidency and the Senate, if a home state Senator had some objection to the nominee and wanted to stop committee action, he or she could decide not to return the blue slip or return it with a negative response. Since 1979, the blue slip policy used the Judiciary Committee has varied. There have been recent years when the blue slip policy used by the Senate Judiciary Committee stopped consideration of any nomination for which a home state Senator did not return a positive blue slip. The Obama Presidency
During the Obama presidency, the policy of both Senator Patrick Leahy (chairman of the Judiciary Committee from 2009-2014) and Senator Chuck Grassley (chairman from 2015-2016) was to preclude consideration of a U.S. circuit or district court nomination by the committee if the nomination did not receive two positive blue slips from the nominee's home state Senators. The George W. Bush Presidency
Most recently, from 2003-2004 during the George W. Bush presidency, the policy of Senator Hatch was to "give great weight to negative blue slips" but, in some instances, to allow a nomination opposed by home state Senators to receive a committee hearing and committee vote (which could result in the nomination being reported to the full Senate without the support of one or both home state Senators). For one circuit court nomination, the committee held hearings and a vote. How have Senators viewed the role of "consultation" with a President in the blue slip process used for U.S. circuit and district court nominations? These circumstances were identified in a letter to Charles Ruff, counsel to the President, and included the following:
(1) failure to give serious consideration to individuals proposed by home state Senators as possible nominees;
(2) failure to identify to home state Senators and the Judiciary Committee an individual the President is considering nominating with enough time to allow the Senator to provide meaningful feedback before any formal clearance (i.e., by the [American Bar Association] or [Federal Bureau of Investigation]) on the prospective nominee is initiated;
(3) after having identified the name of an individual the President is considering nominating, failure to (a) seek a home state Senator's feedback, including any objections the Senator may have to the prospective nominee, at least two weeks before any formal clearances are initiated, and (b) give that feedback serious consideration;
(4) failure to notify a home state Senator, and the Judiciary Committee, that formal clearance on a prospective nominee is being initiated despite the Senator's objections; and
(5) failure to notify home state Senators, and the Judiciary Committee, before a nomination is actually made, that the President will nominate an individual. Circuit Court candidates? Senators have generally exerted less influence over the selection of circuit court nominees than over the selection of district court nominees. The lesser role for Senators, and the more independent role of the President, in the selection of circuit court nominees is well established by custom. That role of a home state Senator once the nomination is submitted is determined by the chairman's blue slip policy. Other Senators have suggested, however, that the committee's blue slip policy should not distinguish between circuit and district court nominations. The blue slip policy, however, has changed over time and may change at some point during the current presidency, or during a future one, in ways that reduce the role of home state Senators in the blue slip process for U.S. circuit and district court nominations. A blue slip policy that lessens or eliminates the ability of home state Senators to block, at least occasionally, judicial nominees they oppose might have consequences for the Senate as an institution, as well as consequences for the judicial confirmation process itself. | The blue slip process used by the Senate Judiciary Committee (the committee) for U.S. circuit and district court nominations has received renewed interest from Senators. The committee's use of the blue slip has been, since at least 1917, a feature of its consideration of U.S. circuit and district court nominations. After a President selects a nominee for a U.S. circuit or district court judgeship, the chairman sends a blue-colored form to the Senators representing the home state of the nominee. The form seeks the home state Senators' assessment of the nominee. If a home state Senator has no objection to a nominee, the blue slip is returned to the chairman with a positive response. If, however, a home state Senator objects to a nominee, the blue slip is either withheld or returned with a negative response.
Since the use of blue slips is not codified or included in the committee's rules, the chairman of the committee has the discretion to determine the extent to which a home state Senator's negative, or withheld, blue slip stops a President's judicial nomination from receiving a committee hearing and a committee vote and, consequently, whether it reaches the Senate floor. Over the century of the use of the blue slip, different chairmen have used the blue slip in different ways. During some years, a chairman has required a nominee to receive two positive blue slips from his or her home state Senators. This particular blue slip policy, for example, was in place during the eight years of the Obama presidency and much of the George W. Bush presidency—during periods of both unified and divided party control.
During other years, a chairman's blue slip policy has allowed for a nomination to proceed in committee—and, at times, to the Senate floor—even if the nominee did not have the support of one or both home state Senators. Since at least 1956, however, regardless of the particular blue slip policy used by the committee to process judicial nominations, it has been relatively rare for the Senate to confirm a nominee not supported by his or her home state Senators.
Historically, a committee's blue slip policy has applied to both U.S. circuit and district court nominations. Senators, however, have traditionally exerted less influence over the selection of circuit court nominees than over district court nominees. The lesser role for Senators, and the more independent role of the President, in the selection of circuit court nominees is well established by custom. While home state Senators have historically exerted less influence over the selection of circuit court nominees, they have nonetheless often retained certain prerogatives under the committee's blue slip policy once a circuit court nominee is selected by a President. For example, during the Obama presidency and much of the George W. Bush presidency, a circuit court nomination did not proceed in committee unless it had received two positive blue slips from a nominee's home state Senators.
Future changes to the committee's blue slip policy, whether during the current presidency or a future one, might have several consequences—some of which might be viewed as adverse, others which might be viewed as beneficial—to the institutional role of the Senate, as well as to the judicial confirmation process itself. |
crs_97-305 | crs_97-305_0 | During the late 1980s, several bills were introduced in Congress to relax the statutory restrictions.The first proposal that actually broke the deadlock was the elaborate scheme prescribed by theDefense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988 ( P.L. Among other things, the 1990 version of the law provided for three successive, eight-membercommissions that would operate in 1991, 1993, and 1995, with all eight members of eachcommission appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The statutes and the Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) (6) commissions succeeded ineffecting the selective closure of many military bases and the reduction of military infrastructure. Furthermore, the BRAC statute provided for expedited congressional procedures todisapprove commission recommendations regarding base realignments and closures, with a straightup or down vote and no possibility for amending the list. The Secretary of Defense madethe initial recommendations for closure or realignment. The commission could, and did, add to anddelete from these recommendations. (7) Heads of federal departments and agencies were allowed to detailpersonnel to the commission, upon the commission director's request, and the Comptroller Generalwas required to provide assistance to the commission (including the detailing of GAO employees)in accordance with an agreement with the commission. 101-510 , dated November 5, 1990. 100-526 ). First, it was declared to be the "sense of Congress" that militaryoperations at overseas bases be terminated at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense "at theearliest opportunity." The 1990 statute required the Defense Department to publish its proposed criteriafor selecting bases to be closed. Cost and manpower implications. A number of Senators and Congressmen objectedto proposed closures in their various jurisdictions, but in general Congress appeared to find the listmore acceptable than the one announced by Secretary Cheney in January 1990. Many Membersof Congress, as well as other witnesses, testified regarding the process, merits, and impacts of thepossible closings. However, this emphasis shifted to assistingthe economic recovery of communities affected by a closure. He also commented, in connection with the base closureprogram, that "we have closed all of the bases that were relatively easy to close," but that DOD still"need(s) to close more bases from the point of view of saving infrastructure..."
Creation of 1995 Base Closure Commission
Former Senator Alan Dixon of Illinois was nominated and confirmed as chairman of the 1995commission in October 1994, before the 103rd Congress adjourned. DOD estimated aggregated savings of about $57 billion over 20 years, from this and the previousthree rounds. Creation of a new BRAC commission wouldrequire new authorizing legislation by Congress. Additional changes werecontained in the FY1997 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. Thus, RAND noted, "(C)losuresof major facilities such as Mare Island or Long Beach may have serious effects on the displacedworkers, but the effects on the local community are muted by the fact that the community isembedded in a much larger economy..." (p.12)
It was clear to many observers that individual workers and firms would be adversely affectedas the base closures and realignments laid out by the four commissions were completed. | The United States has experienced difficulty in closing military bases to match therequirements of downsized forces with changed composition. During the decade of the 1980s, majormilitary base closures were seriously hampered by procedural requirements established by Congress,to the point that none occurred. The mismatch between real estate assets and defense requirementsgrew with the military downsizing that began late in the Reagan Administration and continued underPresidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton.
After several legislative efforts to break the deadlock had failed, Congress established a newbase closure procedure in P.L. 100-526 , enacted October 24, 1988. The statute provided for abipartisan commission, appointed by the Secretary of Defense, to make recommendations toCongress on closures and realignments to be voted down or accepted as a whole. The process wassuccessfully implemented, but produced complaints of partisanship in selecting bases for closure. P.L. 101-510 , enacted November 5, 1990, provided new authority for additional base closurerecommendations by a series of presidentially appointed commissions (with the advice and consentof the Senate), commonly called Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commissions. Thesecommissions were to operate in 1991, 1993, and 1995, after which the authority of the final baseclosure commission would end.
The four commissions recommended closure of 98 major bases and hundreds of smallerinstallations, and the realignment of many other bases and facilities. These recommendations wereestimated to be implemented and completed by the year 2001. The Department of Defense at onetime estimated savings of about $57 billion over 20 years.
At the community level, in turn, implementation of the base closure process commenced. Congress has amended the base closure legislation several times to protect and assist communitiesas they adjust to the social and economic stress caused by the loss of military installations. Many,but by no means all, communities appeared to be succeeding in local efforts to replace defense jobsand find new uses for former military lands and buildings.
After expiration of the authorizing legislation, a number of influential leaders recommendedestablishment of a new commission and the closure of additional bases and facilities. Theseadvocates included the chairman of the 1995 commission, Alan Dixon, former Defense SecretaryWilliam Perry, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman John Shalikashvili. In Congress, many felt thatinfrastructure costs diverted money from modernization and sapped the readiness of America's armedforces. Against these pressures to cut military real estate further was caution concerning furthermilitary cuts, as well as the traditional reluctance of Senators and Representatives to lose federal jobsand disrupt communities in their state or district.
Subsequently, new authorizing legislation by the Congress was required to reconstitute baseclosure and realignment through the commission approach. |
crs_R44503 | crs_R44503_0 | The EFC formulas in the HEA are also known as the "federal methodology." Collection and Processing of Student Information
The FAFSA is the data collection instrument for information used to calculate the EFC. Applicants with certain characteristics and incomes below a specified level are eligible for a simplified needs test (SNT) or an automatic zero EFC. An independent student with dependents is eligible for the automatic zero EFC if the student is eligible for the SNT and the AGI of the student and the student's spouse (if applicable) was below $25,000. Calculating the Contribution for a Dependent Student's Parents
Definition of a Parent
If the student's parents are married, the EFC formula considers the income and assets of both parents. Formula B: Calculation of EFC for Independent Students without Dependents32
The calculation of the EFC for an independent student without dependents considers the financial resources of the student and, if applicable, the student's spouse. Thus, the "contribution from assets" is 20% of assets in excess of the APA. The EFC can also be considered the sum of 50% of the applicant family's available income and 20% of the applicant family's available assets. Available income is one component of adjusted available income, which is described in a subsequent step. In cases where a family has more than one student enrolled in or accepted for enrollment in college, the EFC is divided by the number of students. AAI is assessed at a progressive rate. Professional Judgment and Students with Unusual Circumstances
In some cases where a family is subject to unusual financial circumstances, the EFC formulas may not accurately reflect a family's current ability to contribute to educational expenses. For example, a student may request PJ if the family recently experienced a job loss of a primary earner or other substantial changes to the family's income or assets. Untaxed Income
The EFC formulas consider some forms of income that are excluded from federal taxation. Untaxed income that is considered by the EFC formulas includes the following:
child support received for any of a parent's children, but not including foster care or adoption payments; payments to tax-deferred pension and retirement savings plans; IRA deductions and payments to self-employed SEP, SIMPLE, Keogh, and other qualified plans; tax-exempt interest income; untaxed portions of IRA distributions, excluding rollovers; untaxed portions of pensions, excluding rollovers; housing, food, and other living allowances paid to members of the military, clergy, and others (including cash payments and cash value of benefits), not including the value of on-base military housing or the value of a basic military allowance for housing; veterans noneducation benefits, such as Disability, Death Pension, or Dependency and Indemnity Compensation and/or VA Educational Work-Study allowances; money received, or paid on the student's behalf, not reported elsewhere on the FAFSA, including money received from a parent whose financial information is not reported on the FAFSA and that is not part of a legal child support agreement, but excluding money paid on a dependent student's behalf by parents whose information is included on the FAFSA; and other untaxed income not otherwise reported, such as workers' compensation, disability, etc., but not including extended foster care benefits, student aid, earned income credit, additional child tax credit, welfare payments, untaxed Social Security benefits, Supplemental Security Income, Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act educational benefits, on-base military housing or a military housing allowance, combat pay, benefits from flexible spending arrangements (e.g., cafeteria plans), foreign income exclusion, or credit for federal tax on special fuels. There are five allowances against income. Applicants who do qualify for the SNT do not have to provide asset information for federal student aid purposes. Retirement accounts . Family-owned businesses . Asset Protection Allowance
As is the case with income, an allowance against assets means that only non-exempt assets in excess of the allowance contribute to the EFC. Asset Conversion Rate
The asset conversion rate is the portion of available assets that either
contribute to the final EFC, or contribute to the calculation of adjusted available income that is subsequently assessed to calculate the EFC. The asset conversion rate varies by dependency status. Assessment Rate and Calculation of the EFC
The assessment rate is the portion of available income, available assets, or AAI that is determined to be available for educational expenses and contributes to the EFC. For example, the assessment rate for available income for independent students without dependents is 50%. Modified versions of these programs remain in Title IV of the HEA, as amended. While terminology and definitions varied between the formulas, both the Pell Formula and the Part F Formula followed the same general process of determining the financial resources of the student (and if applicable, the student's parents and/or spouse) by calculating the applicant's total income (and assets), subtracting specified allowances, and then assessing financial resources in excess of those allowances. | This report describes the need analysis formulas used to calculate the Expected Family Contribution (EFC) for federal student aid applicants. The formulas are codified in Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA), as amended. The Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) is the data collection instrument through which students submit the information that is used to calculate the EFC.
The HEA has three EFC formulas: one for dependent students and one each for independent students with and without dependents. A student's dependency status is determined by the student's age and other characteristics. The dependent student formula considers the financial resources of the student and the student's parents. The independent student formulas consider the financial resources of the student and, if applicable, the student's spouse.
The financial resources considered by the EFC formulas are divided into income and assets. The EFC formulas' definition of a family's income is fairly inclusive and includes many forms of taxable and nontaxable income. The EFC formulas' definition of assets includes balances of qualified bank accounts, investments, business equity, and real estate. There are substantial exemptions in the calculation of assets, including a family's primary residence, retirement accounts, and a family-owned small business.
The EFC formulas provide a number of allowances against income and assets (also known as "protections"). Only income and assets in excess of these allowances ("available" income and assets) are considered when calculating the EFC. If the family's income is below the allowance level, the family will have no available income and therefore no contribution from income. Similarly, if the family is required to report assets and the amount of assets is below the asset protection allowance, the family will have no available assets and therefore no contribution from assets.
Assessment of available income and/or assets is the calculation of the actual EFC or components thereof. The assessment rate is the portion of available income or available assets that contribute to the EFC. For example, the assessment rate for available income of an independent student without dependents is 50%, meaning that each dollar of income in excess of the income allowances increases the family's expected contribution by 50 cents. Assessment rates vary by dependency status and type of financial resource (i.e., income or assets). Generally speaking, additional available income is assessed at a higher rate than additional available assets.
In cases where an applicant's income is below statutorily-specified levels, the family may be eligible for a simplified needs test (SNT) in which the family is not required to report information on assets. Thus, the EFC of applicants who are eligible for the SNT is based entirely on the family's income. In cases where an applicant qualifies for the SNT and meets certain additional income criteria, the applicant may be eligible for an "automatic zero" EFC.
The HEA contains provisions that allow for adjustments for families in specified circumstances. For example, a family with multiple students enrolled in postsecondary education has its EFC divided among the enrolled students. The HEA also contains provisions that allow an individual school's financial aid administrator to exercise professional judgment and adjust certain data used to calculate the EFC to reflect unusual circumstances like job loss, atypically high medical expenses, or other exceptional situations. |
crs_RL34577 | crs_RL34577_0 | Division F of the law provided the FY2009 L-HHS-ED appropriations, including $155.0 billion in discretionary funding. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) Enacted (P.L. Interim FY2009 appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) were provided by Division A of P.L. 110-410 ), its proposal for FY2009 L-HHS-ED appropriations. The bill recommended $155.7 billion in discretionary funds for L-HHS-ED. Table 1 summarizes the legislative status of FY2009 L-HHS-ED appropriations. Overall, the Administration requested $12.1 billion in discretionary appropriations for L-HHS-ED Related Agencies for FY2009, a 0.9% increase over FY2008 funding of $12.0 billion. The comparable FY2008 amount was $148.6 billion. 111-8, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009
The 110 th Congress did not complete action on any regular FY2009 appropriations until passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2009, P.L. 111-8 provided discretionary appropriations at the program level of $160.1 billion for L-HHS-ED programs, compared to $155.7 billion in the Senate-reported bill, $157.7 billion in the draft House bill, and $147.4 billion in the President's request. For DOL, P.L. 111-8 increased funding for WIA programs by $127 million, from $5.2 billion for FY2008 to $5.3 billion for FY2009. For HHS, funding was increased by the following amounts compared to FY2008: Community Health Centers, $125 million; NIH, $938 million; CMS Program Management, $154 million; CMS Fraud and Abuse Control Initiative, $198 million; LIHEAP, $2.5 billion; Head Start, $235 million; and Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund, $669 million. 111-8 increased funding for SSA administrative expenses by $709 million, from $9.7 billion for FY2008 to $10.5 billion for FY2009. Overall, for FY2009, the Omnibus provided $12.7 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED Related Agencies, an increase of $791 million over FY2008 appropriations of $12.0 billion. 111-5 on February 17, 2009. Title VIII provided a total of $70.6 billion in discretionary funding, including $4.8 billion for the Department of Labor, $21.9 billion for the Department of Health and Human Services, $42.6 billion for the Department of Education, and $1.2 billion for Related Agencies. 110-329 through March 11, 2009. ARRA provided an additional $4.8 billion in discretionary funding for FY2009, some portion of which will not be obligated until FY2010. The request reduced funding for Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs by $553 million, from $5.2 billion for FY2008 to $4.6 billion for FY2009. The total was an increase of $5.7 billion (8.7%) over FY2008. CRS Report RL31865, The Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP): Program and Funding , by [author name scrubbed]. The draft bill marked up but not reported by the House Appropriations Committee included $63.6 billion in discretionary funding, an increase of $4.4 billion (7.5%) over FY2008. Total discretionary appropriations for ED (including ARRA funding) for FY2009 were $159.8 billion, an increase of $100.6 billion (170%) over FY2008. The President's FY2009 budget request proposed changes of at least $100 million for the following ED programs:
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) programs, funded in aggregate at $24.4 billion in FY2008, were increased by $125 million in the President's FY2009 budget request; Title I, Part A, Grants to Local Educational Agencies (LEAs) for Education for the Disadvantaged, funded at $13.9 billion in FY2008, were increased by $406 million; Reading First State Grants, funded at $393 million in FY2008, were increased by $607 million; One K-12 education initiative of at least $100 million was proposed by the President: $300 million for Pell Grants for Kids; Teacher Quality State Grants, funded at $2.9 billion in FY2008, were decreased by $100 million; Educational Technology State Grants, funded at $267 million in FY2008, were eliminated; 21 st Century Community Learning Centers, funded at $1.1 billion in FY2008, were decreased by $281 million and renamed the 21 st Century Learning Opportunities program; The Fund for the Improvement of Education (FIE), funded at $254 million in FY2008, was reduced by $201 million; The Teacher Incentive Fund, funded at $97 million in FY2008, was increased by $103 million; Safe and Drug-Free Schools State Grants, funded at $295 million in FY2008, were decreased by $195 million; The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Part B Grants to States program, funded at $10.9 billion in FY2008, were increased by $337 million; The Perkins Career and Technical Education program, funded at $1.3 billion in FY2008, was eliminated; The Pell Grants program, funded at $14.2 billion in FY2008, was increased by $2.7 billion. FY2009 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations: P.L. | This report tracks FY2009 appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED). This legislation provides discretionary funds for three major federal departments and 13 related agencies. The report, which will not be further updated, summarizes L-HHS-ED discretionary funding issues but not authorization or entitlement issues.
President George W. Bush's FY2009 budget request to Congress, including amendments, proposed $147.4 billion in discretionary L-HHS-ED funds; the comparable FY2008 amount was $148.6 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2009 L-HHS-ED bill (S. 3230, S.Rept. 110-410), including $155.7 billion in discretionary funds. The House Appropriations Committee considered but did not report an FY2009 L-HHS-ED bill; a draft bill recommended $157.7 billion. Two continuing resolutions (CRs) provided temporary FY2009 funding until enactment of P.L. 111-8, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, on March 11, 2009. Division F of the omnibus act provided $155.0 billion for discretionary L-HHS-ED programs, adding to $5.1 billion provided in the first CR, for an FY2009 total in regular appropriations of $160.1 billion. FY2009 emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $124.2 billion for discretionary L-HHS-ED programs were provided in the economic stimulus legislation enacted February 17, 2009, P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).
Department of Labor (DOL). DOL discretionary appropriations were $12.4 billion for FY2009, an increase of $0.6 billion (5.2%) over funding for FY2008. The request for FY2009 was $10.5 billion, including a reduction in funding for Workforce Investment Act (WIA) programs of $553 million. P.L. 111-8 increased funding for WIA by $127 million. ARRA added $4.8 billion in funding for DOL, including $4.2 billion for WIA programs.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS discretionary appropriations were $71.4 billion for FY2009, an increase of $5.7 billion (8.7%) over funding for FY2008. The request for FY2009 was $64.7 billion. P.L. 111-8 increased funding over FY2008 for Health Centers ($125 million); National Institutes of Health (NIH, $938 million); Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Program Management ($154 million); CMS Fraud and Abuse Control Initiative ($198 million); Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP, $2.5 billion); Head Start ($235 million); and Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund ($669 million). ARRA added $21.9 billion in funding for HHS, including $10.4 billion for NIH.
Department of Education (ED). ED discretionary appropriations were $63.5 billion in FY2009, an increase of $4.4 billion (7.4%) over funding for FY2008. Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) programs were funded at $24.8 billion in FY2009, an increase of $412 million (1.7%) over funding for FY2008. Pell Grants were increased by $3.1 billion to $17.3 billion. ARRA added $96.2 billion in discretionary funding for ED, including $14.0 billion for ESEA programs.
Related Agencies. Discretionary appropriations for L-HHS-ED were $12.7 billion for FY2009, an increase of $0.8 billion (6.6%) over funding for FY2008. The Administration requested $12.1 billion. P.L. 111-8 added $709 million for SSA administrative expenses. ARRA added $1.2 billion for Related Agencies, including $1.0 billion for SSA. |
crs_R42029 | crs_R42029_0 | Introduction
An adequate physician supply is important for the effective and efficient delivery of health care services and, therefore, for population health and the cost and quality of health care. Assessments of the adequacy of physician supply often focus on three dimensions of the physician population: its size; its composition (e.g., the distribution of primary care and specialty physicians); and its geographic distribution. Policies that aim to alter physician supply generally focus on both current and future supply along these three dimensions because physician training is a lengthy process; therefore, changes implemented to alter supply do not have immediate effects. Each of the three dimensions of physician supply is important for health care spending because physician clinical decisions affect approximately 90% of each health care dollar spent. The size of the physician population partially determines the volume of health services provided and therefore costs, as physicians provide health care services that generally cannot be provided by non-physicians. The composition of the physician population also affects population health. The federal government supports physician services and training, which may make the adequacy of the current and future physician supply of interest to Congress. Specifically, the federal government pays for physician services, primarily through the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The federal government also supports physician training through a number of programs in various departments and agencies. On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. This report examines each dimension of physician supply, separately discussing current (and, where appropriate, future) concerns and changes included in the ACA that may affect each dimension. The report then discusses workforce planning activities included in the ACA that may affect all of these dimensions of supply. ACA and the Size of the Physician Population
The ACA may affect both the demand for physician services as well as the volume of physician services available, and therefore may influence determinations of the appropriate size of the physician population. ACA and the Geographic Distribution of the Physician Population
The ACA includes provisions that may expand the number of NHSC providers available to serve in shortage areas, increase the diversity of the physician workforce, and increase physician training in shortage areas. The ACA may intensify some of these concerns; specifically, although the ACA includes a number of provisions that aim to alter physician supply, it is not yet known whether and how these provisions will affect physician supply. Many of the programs established by the ACA have not yet been implemented, and others may not have immediate effects. In addition, some the ACA programs are temporary, and many rely on discretionary funding. | An adequate physician supply is important for the effective and efficient delivery of health care services and, therefore, for population health and the cost and quality of health care. Assessments of the adequacy of physician supply often focus on three dimensions of the physician population: its size; its composition (e.g., the mix between primary care and specialty physicians); and its geographic distribution. Policies that aim to alter physician supply generally focus on both current and future supply along these three dimensions because physician training is a lengthy process; therefore, changes implemented to alter supply do not have immediate effects.
Each of the three dimensions of physician supply is important for health care spending and for population health because physician clinical decisions affect approximately 90% of each health care dollar spent. In addition, as physicians provide health care services that, with some exceptions, cannot be provided by non-physicians, the size, composition, and geographic distribution of the physician population affects the amount and type of health care services available. A number of studies have found physician shortages overall, in certain specialties, and in certain geographic areas. The federal government pays for physician services, primarily through the Medicare and Medicaid programs, and supports physician training through a number of programs in various departments and agencies. Given current investments in physician services and the physician workforce, the adequacy of the current and future physician supply may be of interest to Congress.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) may affect the demand for physician services, a major determinant of physician supply, because it expands insurance coverage to some of those previously uninsured. The ACA also includes provisions that may affect the size, composition, and geographic distribution of the physician population by supporting changes to physician training, compensation, and practice. Specifically, provisions targeting the number of physicians trained and their productivity may affect the size of the physician population. The composition of the physician population may be altered by provisions targeting the supply of primary care providers or specialties in shortage. Provisions addressing the diversity of the physician workforce and those incentivizing practice in rural or other underserved areas may affect the geographic distribution of the physician population. Finally, the ACA includes provisions that provide for data collection and evaluation of the adequacy of the workforce in general, and federal workforce programs specifically. Whether and how these provisions will affect physician supply is not yet known because some of these provisions have not been implemented yet, are temporary, will not have immediate effects, or rely on discretionary funding.
This report examines each dimension of physician supply, separately discussing current (and, where appropriate, future) concerns and relevant changes included in the ACA that may affect each dimension. The report then discusses workforce planning activities included in the ACA that may affect all three dimensions of supply. |
crs_R41350 | crs_R41350_0 | Introduction
In response to problems raised by the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) was enacted on July 21, 2010. This report provides a brief summary of the major provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and how they relate to the financial crisis. Legislative History
The 111 th Congress considered several proposals to reorganize financial regulators and to reform the regulation of financial markets and financial institutions. 4173 . The Senate then passed its version of H.R. The legislation was signed into law on July 21, 2010, as P.L. 111-203 . In March 2008, then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson issued a "Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure." Doubts about counterparty exposure were magnified by opacity in derivatives markets. Provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act (Titles I and VIII)
Rather than creating a dedicated systemic risk regulator with broad powers to neutralize sources of systemic risk as they arise, Dodd-Frank instead created a Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), composed of the Treasury Secretary as chair along with eight heads of federal regulatory agencies (including the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) and a presidential appointee with insurance experience as voting members. The act created an Office of Financial Research to support the council. The council is authorized to identify systemically important financial firms regardless of their legal charter, and the Fed will subject them and all bank holding companies with over $50 billion in assets to stricter prudential oversight and regulation, including counterparty exposure limits set at 25% of total capital, annual stress tests and capital planning requirements, resolution planning ("living wills"), early remediation requirements, and risk management standards. The act prohibited firms regulated by the Fed from participating in the selection of directors of the regional Federal Reserve Banks. Instead, these insured depositories are subject to a special resolution regime, called a conservatorship or receivership (C/R), that typically is administered by the FDIC. The financial turmoil at the end of the last decade that resulted from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the federal government's provision of ad hoc emergency financial assistance to prevent the bankruptcies of AIG, Bear Stearns, and others focused congressional attention on options for resolving large, complex financial companies while maintaining the stability of the U.S. financial system. Provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act (Title II)
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a new resolution regime for certain financial companies, called the "Orderly Liquidation Authority" (OLA). Securitization risks were not properly managed leading up to the crisis, contributing in part to the housing bubble and financial turmoil. Securitizers were prohibited from hedging the retained credit risk. Regulatory Consolidation. Commercial banks and similar institutions are subject to regulatory examination for safety and soundness. They could be viewed as posing additional risks that might make banks more likely to fail, but alternatively those risks might better diversify a bank's risks, making it less likely to fail. Regulatory Consolidation. Title III also made changes to federal deposit insurance. Risky Activities. Additionally, both depository institutions and nondepository financial companies were subject to federal consumer financial protection laws. The role that nonperforming mortgages played in the financial crisis led some to suggest actions to protect consumers from risky mortgage products and to protect the U.S. financial system from experiencing major losses due to troubled mortgages in the future. It requires regulators to impose margin requirements on certain swaps that remain uncleared by any clearinghouse. It established the SEC Office of Credit Ratings; imposed new reporting, disclosure, and examination requirements on NRSROs; established new standards of legal liability; and required the removal of references to NRSRO ratings from federal statutes and regulations. The firm was a registered broker-dealer subject to oversight by Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA, the self-regulatory organization for broker-dealers overseen by the SEC) and was also a registered investment adviser subject to SEC oversight. Nonetheless, the collapse of LTCM and the systemic issues that it revealed led the 111 th Congress to consider the laws that applied or, more accurately, did not apply to hedge funds and their managers. Statutory Changes to the Dodd-Frank Act | Beginning in 2007, U.S. financial conditions deteriorated, leading to the near-collapse of the U.S. financial system in September 2008. Major commercial banks, insurers, government-sponsored enterprises, and investment banks either failed or required hundreds of billions in federal support to continue functioning. Households were hit hard by drops in the prices of real estate and financial assets, and by a sharp rise in unemployment. Congress responded to the crisis by enacting the most comprehensive financial reform legislation since the 1930s.
Then-Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner issued a reform plan in the summer of 2009 that served as a template for legislation in both the House and Senate. After significant congressional revisions, President Obama signed H.R. 4173, now titled the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), into law on July 21, 2010.
Perhaps the major issue in the financial reform legislation was how to address the systemic fragility revealed by the crisis. The Dodd-Frank Act created a new regulatory umbrella group chaired by the Treasury Secretary—the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)—with authority to designate certain financial firms as systemically important and subjecting them and all banks with more than $50 billion in assets to heightened prudential regulation. Financial firms were also subjected to a special resolution process (called "Orderly Liquidation Authority") similar to that used in the past to address failing depository institutions following a finding that their failure would pose systemic risk.
The Dodd-Frank Act made other changes to the regulatory structure. It created the Office of Financial Research to support FSOC. The act consolidated consumer protection responsibilities in a new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB). It consolidated bank regulation by reassigning the Office of Thrift Supervision's (OTS's) responsibilities to the other banking regulators. A federal office was created to monitor insurance. The Federal Reserve's emergency authority was amended, and its activities were subjected to greater public disclosure and oversight by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
Other aspects of Dodd-Frank addressed particular sectors of the financial system or selected classes of market participants. Dodd-Frank required more derivatives to be cleared and traded through regulated exchanges, reporting for derivatives that remain in the over-the-counter market, and registration with appropriate regulators for certain derivatives dealers and large traders. Hedge funds were subject to new reporting and registration requirements. Credit rating agencies were subject to greater disclosure and legal liability provisions, and references to credit ratings were required to be removed from statute and regulation. Executive compensation and securitization reforms attempted to reduce incentives to take excessive risks. Securitizers were subject to risk retention requirements, popularly called "skin in the game." It made changes to bank regulation to make bank failures less likely in the future, including prohibitions on certain forms of risky trading (known as the "Volcker Rule"). It created new mortgage standards in response to practices that caused problems in the foreclosure crisis.
This report reviews issues related to financial regulation and provides brief descriptions of major provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, along with links to CRS products going in to greater depth on specific issues. It does not attempt to track the legislative debate in the 115th Congress. |
crs_96-530 | crs_96-530_0 | This report discusses the current law with respect to the loss of the federal pension of a Member of Congress for the conviction of certain crimes and the recent law to limit a former Member's receiving service credit toward a federal pension for any time served as a Member of Congress if that person is convicted of any one of a number of criminal offenses involving abuse of the public trust. 110-81 , 121 Stat. 112-105 , 126 Stat. Hiss Act Provisions Regarding Federal Retirement Annuity Payments
Members of Congress (and most other officers and employees of the federal government) now forfeit the federal retirement annuities for which they had qualified if they are convicted of a federal crime that relates to espionage, treason or other national security offense against the United States, as expressly designated in the so-called "Hiss Act." The provisions of this law concerning forfeiture of pensions apply, at 5 U.S.C. Amendments in STOCK Act
The pension forfeiture provisions originally placed in the law by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA) were amended in 2012 by the provisions of the so-called "Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act," (STOCK Act). The provisions adopted by Congress in HLOGA and amended in the STOCK Act provide that any former Member of Congress who, while a Member of Congress, or while the President, Vice President, or while an elected official of a state or local government, had engaged in conduct that results in the conviction for one of several criminal offenses will lose all of the "creditable service" toward his or her federal pension annuity earned for being a Member of Congress. This forfeiture will apply to such misconduct if "[e]very act or omission of the individual that is needed to satisfy the elements of the offense directly relates to the performance of the individual's official duties as a Member, the President, the Vice President, or an elected official of a State or local government." Member Contributions and Thrift Savings Plan
Under the provisions of HLOGA, as amended, those convicted of offenses covered by the loss of annuity provisions may receive back their own contributions to the retirement system, as well as their own contributions and earnings in their Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) account (in a similar manner as in the operation of the Hiss Act provisions). | Members of Congress may forfeit or lose their congressional pensions upon conviction of certain federal crimes under two different provisions of federal law:
1. Under the so-called "Hiss Act," Members of Congress (and most other officers and employees of the federal government) will forfeit their entire federal employee retirement annuities if convicted of a federal crime that relates to espionage, treason, or several other national security offenses against the United States.
2. In addition to the Hiss Act provisions, Congress enacted, as part of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA; P.L. 110-81, Section 401), and as amended by the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (STOCK Act; P.L. 112-105, Section 15) in 2012, further provisions that will deprive Members of all of their "creditable service" as a Member of Congress for federal pension purposes if that Member is convicted of any one of a number of federal laws concerning corruption, election crimes, or misconduct in office. The forfeiture provisions of this law will apply if the criminal misconduct was engaged in while the individual was a Member of Congress (or while the individual was the President, Vice President, or an elected official of a state or local government), and if every element of the offense "directly relates to the performance of the individual's official duties as a Member, the President, the Vice President, or an elected official of a State or local government." 5 U.S.C. § 8411(l)(2)(B).
Any new or additional penalty for the commission of a crime, such as the penalty of forfeiture or loss of part or all of one's federal pension, must, under the Constitution's ex post facto prohibition, apply prospectively only, and cannot work retroactively to take away the pensions or annuities of Members of Congress or former Members who had already engaged in the covered criminal misconduct prior to the passage of the new law. The new statutory penalties, in a similar manner to the current Hiss Act, would allow convicted former Members to retain their own contributions to the retirement fund, as well as their own savings and earnings in the Thrift Savings Plan under the Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS). Unlike the operation of forfeitures under the Hiss Act, however, the more recent forfeiture provisions apparently would allow Members to keep the government's contribution to their Thrift Savings Plan, while under the Hiss Act such contribution appears to be forfeited. |
crs_R43126 | crs_R43126_0 | The December 14, 2012, shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, CT, that claimed the lives of 20 children and 6 adults, has heightened congressional interest in school security. §3796dd-8), a "school resource officer" is defined as
a career law enforcement officer, with sworn authority, deployed in community-oriented policing, and assigned by the employing police department or agency to work in collaboration with schools and community-based organizations—(A) to address crime and disorder problems, gangs, and drug activities affecting or occurring in or around an elementary or secondary school; (B) to develop or expand crime prevention efforts for students; (C) to educate likely school-age victims in crime prevention and safety; (D) to develop or expand community justice initiatives for students; (E) to train students in conflict resolution, restorative justice, and crime awareness; (F) to assist in the identification of physical changes in the environment that may reduce crime in or around the school; and (G) to assist in developing school policy that addresses crime and to recommend procedural changes. LEMAS survey data show that the number of full-time law enforcement officers employed by local police departments or sheriff's offices who were assigned to work as SROs increased between 1997 (the first year data were collected) and 2003 before decreasing slightly in 2007. Data from the SSCS for the 2007-2008 school year show that a greater proportion of high schools, schools in cities, and schools with enrollments of 1,000 or more report the presence of SROs. Two federal grant programs provided funding for the hiring and placement of law enforcement officers in schools across the country: the COPS in Schools (CIS) program and the State Formula Grants program through the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Act. The COPS in Schools (CIS) Program
The CIS program provided grants for hiring new, additional school resource officers to conduct community policing services in and around primary and secondary schools. The body of research on the effectiveness of SRO programs is noticeably limited, both in terms of the number of studies published and the methodological rigor of the studies conducted. In addition, the research does not address whether SRO programs deter school shootings, one of the key reasons for renewed congressional interest in these programs. The Comprehensive School Safety Initiative
The Administration requested $150 million in funding for a Comprehensive Schools Safety Program as a part of its FY2014 budget request for the COPS program. Congress required the NIJ to collaborate with key partners from law enforcement, mental health, and education disciplines to develop and publish a comprehensive strategy and model for school safety. Within the amount provided, $50 million is for pilot programs to improve school safety consistent with the school safety model published by the NIJ. The remaining $25 million is for research and evaluation into potential root causes of school violence. To put the number of reported at-school youth homicides in context, the number of youth homicides that occurred at school remained less than 2% of the total number of homicides of school aged children for each school year going back to the 1992-1993 school year. However, data also show that some schools—namely middle schools, city schools, and schools with a higher proportion of low-income students (defined as the proportion of students who are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch)—have higher rates of reported violent and serious violent incidents. If Congress acted to expand the number of SROs, it is likely that many of those officers would go to law enforcement agencies serving jurisdictions of fewer than 25,000 people. Data from the BJS show that nearly 88% of police departments and almost half of sheriff's offices serve jurisdictions of fewer than 25,000 people. Traditionally, COPS grants have provided "seed" money for local law enforcement agencies to hire new officers, but it is the responsibility of the recipient agency to retain the officer(s) after the grant expires. Since smaller law enforcement agencies tend to have smaller operating budgets and smaller sworn forces, retaining even one or two additional officers after a grant expires might pose a significant financial burden. The researchers found that schools that added SROs were more likely to report non-serious violent crimes (i.e., physical attack or fights without a weapon and threat of physical attack without a weapon) to the police than schools that did not add SROs. Yet schools are not free of violence and crime, and some schools—such as city schools, middle schools, and schools with a higher proportion of low income students—have higher rates of violent incidents. However, the body of research on the effectiveness of SRO programs is noticeably limited, and the research that is available draws conflicting conclusions about whether SRO programs are effective at reducing school violence. If there are concerns about the presence of SROs resulting in more children being arrested for minor offenses, should there be a limitation on what SROs can do while working at a school? | Some policymakers have expressed renewed interest in school resource officers (SROs) as a result of the December 2012 mass shooting that occurred at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, CT. SROs are sworn law enforcement officers who are assigned to work in schools.
For FY2014, the Administration requested $150 million in funding for a Comprehensive Schools Safety Program under the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program. Congress appropriated $75 million for a Comprehensive School Safety Initiative. Congress required the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to collaborate with key partners from law enforcement, mental health, and education disciplines to develop and publish a comprehensive strategy and model for school safety. Within the amount provided, $50 million is for pilot programs to improve school safety consistent with the school safety model published by the NIJ. The remaining $25 million is for research and evaluation into potential root causes of school violence.
Data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics show that the number of full-time law enforcement officers employed by local police departments or sheriff's offices who were assigned to work as SROs increased between 1997 and 2003 before decreasing slightly in 2007 (the most recent year for which data are available). Data show that a greater proportion of high schools, schools in cities, and schools with enrollments of 1,000 or more report having SROs.
Two federal grant programs promoted SRO programs: the COPS in Schools (CIS) program, which was funded until FY2005, and State Formula Grants under the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Act (SDFSCA), which was funded until FY2009. The CIS program provided grants for hiring new, additional school resource officers to conduct community policing services in and around primary and secondary schools. Local educational agencies could use funds they received under the SDFSCA State Formula Grant program for, among other things, hiring and training school security personnel.
The body of research on the effectiveness of SRO programs is limited, both in terms of the number of studies published and the methodological rigor of the studies conducted. The research that is available draws conflicting conclusions about whether SRO programs are effective at reducing school violence. Also, the research does not address whether SRO programs deter school shootings, one of the key reasons for renewed congressional interest in these programs.
There are several questions Congress might consider in the context of grant funding specifically for SRO programs.
Does the current level of school violence warrant congressional efforts to expand the number of SROs in schools across the country? Data suggest that schools are, generally speaking, safe places for children. During the 2010-2011 school year there were 11 reported homicides of children at school. The number of youth homicides that occurred at school remained less than 2% of the total number of homicides of school aged children for each school year going back to the 1992-1993 school year. In 2010, fewer children reported being the victim of a serious violent crime or a simple assault while at school compared to 1994. However, data also show that some schools—namely middle schools, city schools, and schools with a higher proportion of low-income students—have higher rates of reported violent incidents, and schools with a higher proportion of low-income students had higher rates of reported serious violent incidents. Is funding for a wide-scale expansion of SRO programs financially sustainable? If Congress expanded the number of SROs through additional federal funding, it is likely that many of those officers would go to law enforcement agencies serving jurisdictions of fewer than 25,000 people (data show that nearly 88% of police departments and almost half of sheriff's offices serve jurisdictions of fewer than 25,000 people). Traditionally, COPS grants have provided "seed" money for local law enforcement agencies to hire new officers, but it is the responsibility of the recipient agency to retain the officer(s) after the grant expires. Since smaller law enforcement agencies tend to have smaller operating budgets and smaller sworn forces, retaining even one or two additional officers after a grant expired might pose a significant financial burden. Would additional SROs result in more children being placed in the criminal justice system? Research in this area is limited to a small number of studies, but these suggest that children in schools with SROs might be more likely to be arrested for low-level offenses. On the other hand, some studies indicate that SROs can deter students from committing assaults on campus as well as bringing weapons to school. Schools with SROs may also be more likely to report non-serious violent crimes (i.e., physical attack or fights without a weapon and threat of physical attack without a weapon) to the police than schools lacking SROs. |
crs_95-710 | crs_95-710_0 | Introduction
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) was enacted "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." The original 1968 act prohibited discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, or national origin" in the sale or rental of housing, the financing of housing, or the provision of brokerage services. In 1974, the act was amended to add sex discrimination to the list of prohibited activities. The last major change to the act occurred in 1988 when it was amended to prohibit discrimination on the additional grounds of physical and mental handicap, as well as familial status. Housing Practices in Which Discrimination Is Prohibited
The FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin in the sale or rental of housing, the financing of housing, the provision of brokerage services, or in residential real estate-related transactions. In general, the FHA applies to a broad assortment of housing, both public and private, including single family homes, apartments, condominiums, mobile homes, and others. Thus, the provisions of the FHA extend to the secondary mortgage market. Exemptions from Coverage
Although the FHA is broadly applicable, it includes some exemptions. The FHA does not "limit[] the applicability of any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling." Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Regulations
In July 2015, HUD issued final regulations designed to implement an FHA mandate that executive agencies administering HUD programs, as well as HUD-grantees and other recipients of HUD funding, further the FHA's goals of reducing segregation and housing barriers. The Supreme Court's holding in Inclusive Communities that "disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the [FHA]" mirrors previous interpretations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and all 11 federal courts of appeals that had ruled on the issue. While plaintiffs historically have faced fairly steep odds of getting their disparate impact claims past the preliminary stages of litigation, much less succeeding on the merits of those claims, it is possible that the "cautionary standards" stressed by the Inclusive Communities majority might result in even fewer successful disparate impact claims and swifter disposal of claims that are raised. Discrimination Based on Sex, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity
While the FHA prohibits discrimination based on sex, the act does not explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Nevertheless, certain forms of discrimination against members of the LGBT community can violate the FHA. | The Fair Housing Act (FHA) was enacted "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." The original 1968 act prohibited discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, or national origin" in the sale or rental of housing, the financing of housing, or the provision of brokerage services. In 1974, the act was amended to add sex discrimination to the list of prohibited activities. The last major change to the act occurred in 1988 when it was amended to prohibit discrimination on the additional grounds of physical and mental handicap, as well as familial status. However, legislation that would amend the FHA is routinely introduced in Congress, including S. 1858/H.R. 3185, H.R. 501, and H.R. 3145 in the 114th Congress.
Key Takeaways
The FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin...." In general, the FHA applies broadly to all sorts of housing, public and private, including single family homes, apartments, condominiums, mobile homes, and others. The act's coverage also extends to the secondary mortgage market. However, the act includes some exemptions. For example, the FHA does not "limit[] the applicability of any reasonable local, State, or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling." While the FHA prohibits discrimination based on sex, the FHA does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. However, certain forms of discrimination against members of the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) community can violate the FHA. In June 2015, the Supreme Court held in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project that, in addition to intentional discrimination, disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA—a view previously espoused by HUD and the 11 U.S. Courts of Appeals to render opinions on the issue. Although plaintiffs historically have faced fairly steep odds of getting their disparate impact claims past the preliminary stages of litigation, much less succeeding on the merits, the "cautionary standards" stressed by the Inclusive Communities Court might result in even fewer successful disparate impact claims being raised in the courts and swifter disposal of claims that are raised. In July 2015, HUD issued final regulations designed to implement an FHA mandate that executive agencies administering HUD programs, as well as HUD-grantees and other recipients of HUD funding, affirmatively further the FHA's goals of reducing segregation and housing barriers. The FHA may be enforced in varying ways by the Attorney General, by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and by victims of discrimination. Potential remedies available under the act include actual damages, punitive damages, equitable relief, and reasonable legal costs. Violators also may be assessed civil penalties. |
crs_RL34474 | crs_RL34474_0 | In addition to global food security concerns, higher commodity prices have stoked the flames of food price inflation and its potentially deleterious effect on lower-income households while raising costs for livestock feeders and food processors. Because the rising prices have been associated with unexpectedly large price volatility, they also have increased the risk and costs of grain merchandising all along the marketing chain. Finally, the high, volatile commodity prices have dramatically increased the cost of routine hedging activities (i.e., pricing commodities for purchase, delivery, or use at some future date) at commodity futures exchanges and thereby diminished "forward contracting" opportunities for grain and oilseed producers who are eager to take advantage of record high market prices. Not All Commodities Are Equal
The specific circumstances leading to high market prices—e.g., weather-related supply shortfalls, unexpected surges in demand, market-distorting government policies—vary in important ways for each of the major U.S. program crops. U.S. Farm Prices Projected Record High for Several Crops
As a result of the commodity price increases of the past several months, USDA is projecting record high season-average farm prices for nearly all of the major program crops—wheat, rice, corn, sorghum, barley, soybeans, and soybean products (soybean oil and soybean meal)—for the current 2007/2008 crop year, while farm prices for rice are expected to be the highest since 1973 ( Table 3 ). Further contributing to high commodity prices have been a series of international government policies to limit domestic export supplies that have heightened fears of shortage and a weak U.S. dollar that has made U.S. exports more competitive in international markets. Higher corn prices, in turn, have forced soybean, wheat, and other grain prices higher in a bidding war for available crop land. Most analysts agree that the current high commodity prices are likely to entice some marginal land back into production in 2008. Farm Commodity Market Outlook
Positive Short-Run Outlook, Especially for Food Crops
For some crops, the price increases are likely to be relatively short-term in nature. Long-Term Outlook Hinges on Productivity Gains
Projections for a steady rise in global population, accompanied by sustained income growth in the world's developing economies, are expected to sustain growth in demand for livestock products and the feedstuffs—e.g., coarse grains and protein meals—needed to produce those products. In addition, the outlook for increased demand for agricultural feedstocks to meet large increases in government biofuel-usage policies, particularly in the United States and the European Union (EU), suggest that demand will increase strongly over the coming decade for corn (the primary feedstock for U.S. ethanol production), and vegetable oils (the primary feedstock for biodiesel production in the United States and the EU). As a result, even with a return to normal crop growing conditions and successful harvests, prices for feed grains and oilseeds—as well as those crops that compete for area with feed grains and oilseeds—are expected to remain at significantly higher levels than experienced during the 1998-2006 period. The two principal agencies within the United Nations (U.N.) responsible for international agricultural development and food aid are the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Food Program (WFP). | Prices for nearly all major U.S. agricultural program crops—corn, barley, sorghum, oats, wheat, rice, and soybeans—have exhibited extreme price volatility since mid-2007, while rising to record or near-record levels in early 2008. Several international organizations have announced that the sharply rising commodity prices are likely to have dire consequences for the world's vulnerable populations, particularly in import-dependent, less developed nations. In the United States, high commodity prices have pushed farm income to successive annual records and have sharply lowered government farm program costs, but they have also stoked the flames of food price inflation and have raised costs for livestock producers and food processors. In addition, high, unexpectedly volatile prices have increased the risk and costs associated with grain merchandising. In particular, they have dramatically increased the cost of routine hedging activities (i.e., pricing commodities for purchase, delivery, or use at some future date) at commodity futures exchanges and, as a result, have diminished "forward contracting" opportunities for grain and oilseed producers who are eager to take advantage of record high market prices.
For some crops (particularly for wheat and rice), the price increases are likely to be relatively short-term in nature and are due to weather-related crop shortfalls in major producer and consumer countries, a weak U.S. dollar that has helped spark large increases in U.S. exports, a bidding war among major U.S. crops for land in the months leading up to spring planting in 2008, and the often perverse price effects resulting from international policy responses by several major exporting and importing nations to protect their domestic markets. Assuming a return to normal weather, these factors will likely self-correct within two growing seasons as global supplies are replenished and prices moderate. For coarse grains (corn, sorghum, barley, oats, and rye), oilseeds, and oilseed products (e.g., vegetable oil and meal), the price increases have also been due to strong, sustained demand deriving from two sources: robust income growth in developing countries (e.g., China and India), which has contributed to increased demand for meat products and the feed grains needed to produce that meat; and growing agricultural feedstock demand to meet large increases in government biofuel-usage mandates or goals in the United States, the European Union, and other countries.
Market analysts, including the United Nations' Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), are predicting record global grain and oilseed production in 2008 in response to the high market prices. However, given the overall strength in demand growth, most market analysts predict that when commodity supplies eventually recover and prices moderate from current high levels, the new equilibrium prices will be significantly higher than has traditionally been observed during periods of market balance.
This report examines the causes, consequences, and outlook for prices of the major U.S. program crops, and provides references for more detailed information. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33616 | crs_RL33616_0 | Introduction1
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress has not only focused considerable attention on how intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated in order to protect the homeland against terrorism, but also what should such intelligence encompass. Prior to 9/11, it was possible to make a distinction between "domestic intelligence"—primarily law enforcement information collected within the United States—and "foreign intelligence"—primarily military, political, and economic intelligence collected outside the country. Today, this distinction is blurred. Threats to the homeland posed by terrorist groups are national security threats, and intelligence collected outside the United States is often very relevant to the threat environment inside the United States and vice versa. Traditional intelligence collection done clandestinely and overtly, largely at the federal level, to inform national-level policymakers is often differentiated from criminal intelligence gathered by a broader set of federal, state, and local actors generally for law enforcement purposes. Some of the similarities between these perceptions include (1) a fundamental belief that intelligence is the first line of defense for the nation, (2) threats to U.S. national security are largely, although not solely, of foreign origin, and (3) there is a national intelligence role for non-traditional players (largely state, local, tribal law enforcement, as well as the private sector), a role in which they make contributions to preventing terrorist attacks or other inimical acts directed against U.S. citizens within the United States. At a policy and, importantly, local level, are non-traditional players viewed by federal personnel as equal partners, and/or "force multipliers?" Moreover, the strategy states that
U.S. intelligence elements must focus their capabilities to ensure that (1) Intelligence elements in the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security are properly resourced and closely integrated within the larger Intelligence Community, (2) all Intelligence Community components assist in facilitating the integration of collection and analysis against terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the homeland, and (3) state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector are connected to our homeland security and intelligence efforts. How the term "connected" is defined becomes of critical importance, as it implies communication and the sharing of information among federal, state, and local intelligence officials. Statutory Definitions of Intelligence and Homeland Security Information
Homeland security intelligence is not a term that is as yet defined or codified in law. The methods of traditional foreign intelligence collection fall into the following five areas: imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), and open source intelligence (OSINT). Because HSINT is not necessarily source-specific, some would question whether it should be referred to as a collection "discipline." Approaches to Framing Homeland Security Intelligence
There are at least three different constructs that could be used to frame HSINT: (1) geographic (2) structural, and (3) holistic. Under the holistic approach, the HSINT community might include the 16 statutory members of the IC (as each collects national intelligence, or intelligence related to national security which could have a profound impact on homeland security); the National Counterterrorism Center, National Counterintelligence Center, National Counter Proliferation Center, and the Open Source Intelligence Center; the 14 existing private sector Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACS), scores of state and local law enforcement entities charged with gathering criminal intelligence, numerous state and regional "intelligence fusion" centers, and federal entities with law enforcement responsibilities which may collect intelligence related to national security. | Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress has focused considerable attention on how intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated in order to protect the homeland against terrorist threats. Prior to 9/11, it was possible to make a distinction between "domestic intelligence"—primarily law enforcement information collected within the United States—and "foreign intelligence"—primarily military, political, and economic intelligence collected outside the country. Today, threats to the homeland posed by terrorist groups are now national security threats. Intelligence collected outside the United States is often very relevant to the threat environment inside the United States and vice versa.
Although the activities involved in homeland security intelligence (HSINT) itself are not new, the relative importance of state, local, and private sector stakeholders; the awareness of how law enforcement information might protect national security; and the importance attached to homeland security intelligence have all increased substantially since the events of 9/11.
There are numerous intelligence collection disciplines through which the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) collects intelligence to support informed national security decision-making at the national level and the allocation of tactical military and law enforcement resources at the local level. The collection disciplines are generally referred to as those which fall within national technical means or non-technical means. Technical means include signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT). Non-technical means include human intelligence (HUMINT) and open source intelligence (OSINT). Each of these collection disciplines is source-specific—that is, a technical platform or human source, generally managed by an agency or mission manager, collects intelligence that is used for national intelligence purposes.
HSINT, however, is generally not source specific, as it includes both national technical and non-technical means of collection. For example, HSINT includes human intelligence collected by federal border security personnel or state and local law enforcement officials, as well as SIGINT collected by the National Security Agency. Reasonable individuals can differ, therefore, with respect to the question of whether HSINT is another collection discipline, or whether homeland security is simply another purpose for which the current set of collection disciplines is being harnessed. Homeland security information, as statutorily defined, pertains directly to (1) terrorist intentions and capabilities to attack people and infrastructure within the United States, and (2) U.S. abilities to deter, prevent, and respond to potential terrorist attacks.
This report provides a potential conceptual model of how to frame HSINT, including geographic, structural/statutory, and holistic approaches. Given that state, local, tribal, and private sector officials play such an important role in HSINT, the holistic model, one not constrained by geography or levels of government, strikes many as the most compelling. The report argues that there is, in effect, a Homeland Security Intelligence Community (HSIC). Although the HSIC's members are diffused across the nation, they share a common counterterrorism interest. The proliferation of intelligence and information fusion centers across the country indicate that state and local leaders believe there is value to centralizing intelligence gathering and analysis in a manner that assists them in preventing and responding to local manifestations of terrorist threats to their people, infrastructure, and other assets. At the policy and operational levels, the communication and integration of federal HSINT efforts with these state and local fusion centers will likely remain an important priority and future challenge. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33966 | crs_RL33966_0 | As attention continues to focus on juvenile offenders, some question the way in which they are treated in the U.S. criminal justice system. Since the late 1960s, the juvenile justice system has undergone significant modifications as a result of United States Supreme Court decisions, changes in federal and state law and the growing perception that juveniles were increasingly involved in more serious and violent crimes. Despite this shift in focus to one more closely resembling the adult criminal justice system, juvenile offenders are not generally afforded the full panoply of rights provided to adult criminal defendants. Some argue that this hybrid system blurs the historical distinction between the juvenile justice and adult criminal systems. To ensure that juveniles receive the essentials of fair treatment during an adjudicatory hearing, the Court found that juveniles were entitled to certain due process rights afforded to adult criminal defendants under the U.S. Constitution. These rights include the right to reasonable notice of the charges, the right to counsel, the right to confrontation, and the right against self-incrimination. However, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania , the Court held that juveniles do not have a fundamental right to a jury trial when being adjudicated in the juvenile justice system. The Court narrowed the issue presented to whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensured the right to trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a juvenile court delinquency proceeding. First, some are likely to argue that the increasingly punitive nature of cases adjudicated in the juvenile justice system calls into question the validity of the Court's reasoning underlying its holding in McKeiver that juveniles are not entitled to the right to a jury trial. Currently, some juvenile adjudication hearings are open to the public, the system is more formal and adversarial, and juvenile adjudications are frequently used in criminal prosecutions for sentence enhancement. From their perspective, the civil and rehabilitative nature of the juvenile justice system has shifted to a more punitive one which more closely resembles the adult criminal justice system. In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized and emphasized the important role that juries play in criminal proceedings. In Duncan v. Louisiana , the U.S. Supreme Court held that the right to jury trial is fundamental and guaranteed by due process. In Williams v. Florida , the Court reaffirmed that the "purpose of the jury trial ... is to prevent oppression by the Government." | As more attention is being focused on juvenile offenders, some question whether the justice system is dealing with this population appropriately. Since the late 1960s, the juvenile justice system has undergone significant modifications resulting from U.S. Supreme Court decisions, changes in federal and state law, and the growing belief that juveniles were increasingly involved in more serious and violent crimes. Consequently, at both the federal and states levels, the juvenile justice system has shifted from a mostly rehabilitative system to a more punitive one, with serious ramifications for juvenile offenders. Despite this shift, juveniles are generally not afforded the panoply of rights afforded to adult criminal defendants. The U.S. Constitution requires that juveniles receive many of the features of an adult criminal trial, including notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-examination, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and double jeopardy. However, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that juveniles do not have a fundamental right to a jury trial during adjudicatory proceedings.
The Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees the right to an impartial jury trial in criminal prosecutions. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this right is fundamental and guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court has since limited its holding in Duncan to adult defendants by stating that the right to a jury trial is not constitutionally required for juveniles in juvenile court proceedings. Some argue that because the Court has determined that jury trials are not constitutionally required for juvenile adjudications, courts should not treat or consider juvenile adjudications in subsequent criminal proceedings. In addition, some argue that the use of non-jury juvenile adjudications in subsequent criminal proceedings violates due process guarantees, because juvenile justice and adult criminal proceedings are fundamentally different.
Has the juvenile justice system changed in such a manner that the Supreme Court should revisit the question of jury trials in juvenile adjudications? Are the procedural safeguards in the juvenile justice system sufficient to ensure their reliable use for sentence enhancement purposes in adult criminal proceedings? To help address these questions, this report provides a brief background on the purpose of the juvenile system and discusses procedural due process protections provided by the Court for juveniles during adjudicatory hearings. It also discusses the Court's emphasis on the jury's role in criminal proceedings and will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34419 | crs_RL34419_0 | The Administration foresees a steady improvement of the federal government's fiscal position, including a surplus of $29 billion in FY2013, the last year projected, although the FY2013 on-budget deficit, which excludes Social Security surpluses, is projected at $201 billion. Administration projections omit all costs of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq beyond FY2008 aside from a $70 billion supplemental request. Federal deficits are projected to rise rapidly after FY2020. Major Administration proposals include extensions of the expiring tax cuts, limited increases in domestic discretionary spending, and halting the expanding reach of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) for calendar 2008, but not for later years. Medicare and Medicaid are expected to grow more slowly than in recent years. 70 and H.Con.Res. The House passed its budget resolution on March 13 by a 212 to 207 vote, and the Senate passed its version in the early hours of March 14 by a 51 to 44 vote. The budget conference report, H.Rept. 70 conference report on a 48-45 vote, and the House passed it the next day on a 214-210 vote. This analysis included the effects of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-185 ), which was projected to raise the FY2008 budget deficit by $152 billion and the FY2009 deficit by $16 billion. Administration Projections and Proposals
President Bush's FY2009 budget proposed a permanent extension of most of the 2001 EGTRRA and 2003 JGTRRA tax cuts, as well as extending other expiring tax provisions. Assuming that AMT fixes lapse boosts estimated tax revenues. Congressional Budget Action
On March 7, 2008, the House and Senate Budget Committees reported budget resolutions ( S.Con.Res. 312 ). 110-659 ) was filed on May 20, and on the next day, the House approved H.Res. On June 4, 2008, the Senate passed the S.Con.Res. According to September 2008 CBO projections, federal outlays (aside from the costs of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) would grow by an additional $295 billion over the FY2009-FY2013 period were discretionary spending to grow at the same rate as the economy. The Administration estimated spending on the national defense function will total $603.7 billion in FY2008 and proposes spending $670.7 billion in FY2009. CBO Revenue Projections
The March 2008 CBO preliminary analysis of the President's FY2009 policy proposals projected slightly lower revenues in FY2008 than the President's budget, in part because the CBO estimate reflected recent fiscal stimulus legislation. Long-term CBO and OMB projections both show substantial increases in budget deficits in the years after FY2020. Administration Deficit Projections
The President's February budget estimated the FY2008 deficit at $410 billion (1.6% of GDP) and a small surplus of $29 billion in FY2013. March 2008 Baseline Projections
In March 2008, CBO released revised current-law baseline projections, which incorporated costs of the Economic Stimulus Act and superceded projections issued in January. The CBO also projected that the President's budget would generate a FY2009 deficit of $342 billion, well above the revised baseline projection of a $207 billion FY2009 deficit. The projected deficit for FY2008 rose to $407 billion and $438 billion for FY2009. The Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid programs present different challenges to the long-term fiscal position of the federal government. | On February 4, 2008, President Bush sent his fiscal year (FY) 2009 budget to Congress. The President's budget predicted a deficit of $407 billion for FY2008 and $410 billion for FY2009, up from $162 billion in FY2007. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the FY2008 deficit would total $396 billion if the President's proposals were enacted, about $39 billion more than the current-law baseline. CBO projected that the President's proposals would generate a FY2009 deficit of $342 billion. Tax rebates and business investment incentives enacted in the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-185), which passed in January, will push up the FY2008 deficit by an estimated $152 billion. CBO estimated the on-budget deficit, which excludes Social Security surpluses, for the President's budget proposals would reach $592 billion in FY2008 and $525 billion in FY2009. Budget and economic estimates issued later in 2008 have been less optimistic.
In February, the Administration foresaw a steady improvement in federal finances, including a surplus of $29 billion in FY2013, the last year projected. The FY2013 on-budget deficit was projected at $201 billion. These projections omitted costs of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq beyond FY2008 aside from a $70 billion supplemental request. Federal deficits are projected to rise rapidly after FY2020. Major Administration proposals include extending expiring tax cuts, limiting domestic discretionary spending, and halting the expanding reach of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) for calendar 2008, but not for later years. Medicare and Medicaid were expected to grow more slowly than in recent years.
The FY2009 budget also discusses long-term fiscal problems. According to longer-term projections from the Administration, CBO, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the impending retirement of the baby boom generation and rising health care costs will substantially expand spending on Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid over the coming decades. The long-term growth of outlays, if left unchanged or if not offset by new revenues, could overwhelm the government's ability to finance its obligations.
September 2008 CBO baseline projections, which incorporate costs of the Economic Stimulus Act and legislation affecting housing policy, veterans' benefits, and unemployment benefits, show a $407 billion deficit in FY2008, a $147 billion deficit in FY2013, and a $135 billion deficit in FY2018. CBO baseline projections assume that key tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 (as well as some others) expire as scheduled, real discretionary spending is fixed, and the AMT is unchanged.
On March 7, 2008, the House and Senate Budget Committees introduced budget resolutions (S.Con.Res. 70 and H.Con.Res. 312). The House passed its budget resolution on March 13 by a 212 to 207 vote. The Senate passed its version the next day. The budget conference report, H.Rept. 110-659, was filed on May 20. The Senate passed the S.Con.Res. 70 conference report on June 4, 2008, and the House passed it the next day. This report will be updated as legislative conditions warrant. |
crs_RS22941 | crs_RS22941_0 | The Midwestern Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2008 ( S. 3322 / H.R. 6587 ), introduced by Senator Grassley and Representative Loebsack, provides temporary tax relief intended to assist with the recovery from the severe storms, tornadoes, and flooding that occurred during the summer of 2008 in the Midwest. The Jobs, Energy, Families, and Disaster Relief Act of 2008 ( S. 3335 ), introduced by Senator Baucus, contains some temporary tax provisions intended to assist in disaster recovery generally. S. 3335 has fewer relief provisions than S. 3322 / H.R. 6587 , accounting for the differences that are due to the fact that S. 3335 is not limited to the Midwest disaster. The Baucus bill has no similar provision. | The Midwestern Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2008 (S. 3322 and H.R. 6587) is intended to assist with the recovery from the severe weather that affected the Midwest during the summer of 2008. The Jobs, Energy, Families, and Disaster Relief Act of 2008 (S. 3335) includes some similar provisions, but these are not limited to the Midwest disaster. The disaster relief in the three bills is similar to that provided to assist with the recovery from the 2005 hurricanes and the 2007 Kansas tornadoes. This report broadly discusses the disaster relief provisions in S. 3322/H.R. 6587 and S. 3335. |
crs_R43653 | crs_R43653_0 | Introduction
New sources of crude oil from the Bakken region of North Dakota, the Eagle Ford and Permian basins in Texas, and western Canada have induced new routes for shipping crude oil to U.S. and Canadian refineries. While pipelines have traditionally been the preferred method of moving crude overland, especially to or from landlocked locations, they either are not available or have insufficient capacity to move all the crude from these new sources of production. The other has to do with the impact of the Jones Act, a 1920 law that restricts domestic waterborne transport to vessels built in the United States and crewed by U.S. citizens, which may now be affecting U.S. producers' decisions about how to ship crude oil and whether to send it to refineries in the United States or in Canada. New Shipping Routes
The vast majority of U.S. refineries are located along the coast (including the Great Lakes) or an inland waterway. New Barge Safety Regime
Barges are the workhorses in moving Bakken and Texas oil by water. However, the Coast Guard has just begun establishing a safety inspection regime for barges. 108-293 , §415), Congress directed the Coast Guard to establish a barge safety inspection and certification regime similar to that which exists for ships. In the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. That policy remains in the law today:
It is necessary for the national defense and the development of the domestic and foreign commerce of the United States that the United States have a merchant marine (1) sufficient to carry the waterborne domestic commerce and a substantial part of the waterborne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to provide shipping service essential for maintaining the flow of waterborne domestic and foreign commerce at all times; (2) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency; (3) owned and operated as vessels of the United States by citizens of the United States; (4) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel; and (5) supplemented by efficient facilities for building and repairing vessels. Jones Act Shipping Rates
According to oil shippers, the price for moving crude oil from the Gulf Coast to the U.S. Northeast on Jones Act tankers is $5 to $6 per barrel, while moving it to eastern Canada on foreign-flag tankers is $2. For these reasons, tanker should be significantly cheaper than rail for transport of crude oil, even when the water route is much longer. This shipping pattern is not unique to oil. Congress is greatly concerned about the safety of shipping crude oil by rail. Limited capacity exists in U.S. shipyards to build tankers. 4745 ) would rescind $29 million of this amount while the Senate reported bill ( S. 2438 ) provides $7 million for the program. Current Legislation
Several bills now pending in Congress address matters related to waterborne transportation of oil, including many of the safety and commercial issues raised in this report:
The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2014 ( H.R. 4005 , passed by the House April 1, 2014) directs the U.S. Department of Transportation to submit a national maritime strategy that identifies federal regulations that reduce the competitiveness of U.S.-flag vessels in international trade, submit recommendations to make U.S.-flag vessels more competitive and enhance U.S. shipbuilding capability, and identify strategies to increase the use of U.S.-flag vessels to carry imports and exports and domestic commerce. | New sources of crude oil from North Dakota, Texas, and western Canada have induced new routes for shipping crude oil to U.S. and Canadian refineries. While pipelines have traditionally been the preferred method of moving crude overland, they either are not available or have insufficient capacity to move all the crude from these locations. While rail has picked up some of this cargo, barges, and to a lesser extent tankers, also are moving increasing amounts of crude in domestic trade.
The rather sudden shift in transportation patterns raises concerns about the safety and efficiency of oil tankers and barges. The United States now imports less oil than five years ago by oceangoing tankers, while more oil is moving domestically by river and coastal barges. However, the Coast Guard still lacks a safety inspection regime for barges similar to that which has long existed for ships. The possibility of imposing an hours-of-service limit for barge crews as part of this regime is controversial. Congress called for a barge safety inspection regime a decade ago, but the related rulemaking is not complete. The Coast Guard's progress in revamping its Marine Safety Office is a related issue that Congress has examined in the past.
The majority of U.S. refineries are located near navigable waters to take advantage of economical waterborne transport for both import and export. However, for refineries switching from imported to domestic crude oil, the advantage diminishes considerably. This is because the Jones Act, a 1920 law that seeks to protect U.S. shipyards and U.S. merchant sailors in the interest of national defense, restricts domestic waterborne transport to U.S.-built and -crewed vessels. The purchase price of U.S.-built tankers is about four times the price of foreign-built tankers, and U.S. crewing costs are several times those of foreign-flag ships. The small number of U.S.-built tankers makes it difficult for shippers to charter tankers for a short period or even a single voyage, highly desirable in an oil market with shifting supply patterns. The unavailability of U.S.-built tankers may result in more oil moving by costlier, and possibly less safe, rail transport than otherwise would be the case. Some Texas oil is moving to refineries in eastern Canada, bypassing refineries in the northeastern United States, because shipping to Canada on foreign-flag vessels is much cheaper than shipping domestically on Jones Act-eligible ships.
Some of these issues may be addressed in the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2014 (H.R. 4005), which has passed the House, and the Coast Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2015 and 2016 (S. 2444), introduced in the Senate. The House bill requests federal agency studies and recommendations towards improving the competitiveness of the U.S.-flag industry while the Senate bill contains provisions related to oil spill response. |
crs_R40515 | crs_R40515_0 | The recent trend in state laws requiring voters to present identification when casting their ballots has raised questions about the burdens imposed on individuals who do not have photo identification, including those who object to photographs based on religious beliefs. Photo identification has been a recurring issue in a number of contexts, and Congress recently has considered questions regarding whether photo ID can or should be required under the REAL ID Act of 2005. A number of religious beliefs may interfere with requirements for photo identification, leading to questions about whether a religious exemption to photograph requirements may be required to comport with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). This report will analyze the legal issues associated with religious exemptions to photo identification laws. Although no lawsuits appear to have challenged federal laws with photo requirements, state photo identification laws have been challenged for several decades. After discussing the legal requirements of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA, the report will explain the elements of analysis necessary for legal challenges involving religious objections to photo requirements. The report will also analyze lawsuits that have challenged state photo requirements, including significant factors of consideration in such cases. Finally, the report will analyze what factors may be relevant in future decisions that may arise related to federal photo identification requirements as well as U.S. Supreme Court opinions related to religious objections to voter identification requirements. Under the Free Exercise Clause, individuals are guaranteed the right to practice their religious beliefs without government interference. Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court applied a heightened standard of review to government actions that allegedly interfered with a person's free exercise of religion. In other words, RFRA may be preempted by another federal law. The standard that this balance must meet is determined by the applicable law protecting religious exercise. For cases brought under the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the governmental interest generally may be deemed to outweigh the burden on religious exercise if the governmental action is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose—the minimum constitutional standard of review sometimes referred to as rational basis review. Considerations for Potential Exemptions to Federal Photo Requirements
Under the analysis used in photo identification cases, if a legal requirement for a photograph infringes on an individual's sincerely held religious beliefs, the government must prove that the individual's religious exercise is not substantially burdened by the requirement or that the state's interest outweighs the burden under the standard imposed by the relevant law under which the photo requirement is challenged. If Congress does provide an exemption based on religion to federal identification requirements, it is unlikely that such an exemption would be considered a violation of the Establishment Clause. | Recent controversies over state laws requiring voters to present identification when casting their ballots have raised questions about the burdens imposed on individuals who do not have photo identification, including those who object to photographs based on religious beliefs. The 112th Congress has introduced a number of bills directed at so-called voter ID requirements. Congress also has previously considered federal photo identification requirements, most recently in the REAL ID Act of 2005. A number of religious beliefs may conflict with requirements for photo identification, leading to questions about whether a religious exemption may be required to protect religious exercise.
The Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution generally prohibits Congress from enacting laws that restrict the free exercise of religion, guaranteeing individuals the right to practice their religious beliefs without government interference. To comport with the Free Exercise Clause, any neutral law of general applicability (i.e., those that do not target religion or require individual assessments) must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. If a state law with a photo requirement meets this standard of review, an exemption based on religion is not necessary under the federal constitution. Federal laws burdening religious exercise must also comport with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which provides a heightened level of review for such laws. Under RFRA, any federal law burdening religion generally must have a compelling governmental interest achieved by the least restrictive means possible. If the government can meet this standard of review, an exemption based on religion is not necessary under RFRA. State laws requiring photo identification would be required to comport with the Free Exercise Clause, as well as with any applicable state provisions that may provide heightened standards of review.
Generally, courts considering challenges to legal requirements that may infringe upon religious exercise consider whether the religious belief is sincerely held; whether it is substantially burdened; and whether the government's interest in burdening the belief is sufficient under the applicable standard of review. These questions tend to distinguish sincere objections with actual burdens from so-called claims of convenience. In other words, courts look for evidence that the objector's religious exercise is in direct conflict with a particular requirement, rather than being used as an excuse to avoid compliance with a law with which the individual merely disagrees.
This report will analyze the legal issues associated with religious exemptions to photo identification laws. Although no lawsuits appear to have challenged federal laws with photo requirements, state photo identification laws have been challenged for several decades. After discussing the legal requirements of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA, the report will explain the elements of analysis necessary for legal challenges involving religious objections to photo requirements. The report will also analyze lawsuits that have challenged state photo requirements, including significant factors of consideration in such cases. Finally, the report will analyze what factors may be relevant in future decisions that may arise related to federal photo identification requirements and state voter identification requirements. |
crs_RL32044 | crs_RL32044_0 | In December 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) published final rules to significantly amend their respective regulations on the H-2A temporary agricultural worker program and the H-2B temporary nonagricultural worker program. These new rules went into effect in January 2009. Current Programs
The United States currently has two main programs for importing temporary low-skilled workers. Agricultural workers enter through the H-2A program and other temporary workers enter through the H-2B program. In September 2009, under the Obama Administration, DOL proposed a new H-2A rule to replace the December 2008 rule. This rule was published as a final rule in February 2010 and became effective on March 15, 2010. DHS's 2008 H-2A rule modifies previous limitations on an H-2A worker's period of stay in the United States. The DHS rule establishes various new requirements under the H-2A program. DOL's 2010 H-2A rule reestablishes the type of H-2A labor certification process in effect prior to the 2008 rule. It reverses changes in the 2008 rule that established an attestation-based labor certification process for H-2A employers. Among its other provisions, the 2010 rule includes a system of post-certification audits of H-2A employer applications, a revised version of the system in the 2008 rule, and expands DOL's debarment authority. Like prospective H-2A employers, prospective H-2B employers must first apply to DOL for a certification that U.S. workers capable of performing the work are not available and that the employment of alien workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. DHS and DOL H-2B Regulations
The DHS and DOL December 2008 final rules on the H-2B visa make various changes to the H-2B program. The 2008 DHS H-2B rule institutes a prohibition on payments by prospective H-2B workers to employers, recruiters, or other employment service providers where the payments are a condition of obtaining H-2B employment, and provides for the denial or revocation of H-2B petitions in the event of petitioner violations. DHS's H-2B rule, like its H-2A rule, limits participation in the H-2B program to nationals of countries to be designated annually by DHS, with the concurrence of DOS. Prospective H-2B employers attest in their applications, under threat of penalties, that they have complied with program requirements. DOL's H-2B rule also establishes a system of post-certification audits. They include bills known as the AgJOBS Act of 2009 to reform the H-2A program and establish a legalization program for certain agricultural workers, as well as bills to make various changes to the H-2B program. 2414 , S. 1038 ) propose to overhaul the H-2A agricultural worker program. Other H-2B bills seek to reenact an H-2B returning worker provision (discussed above). Legislation in the 109 th Congress
As in the 108 th Congress, bills were introduced in the 109 th Congress to reform the H-2A and H-2B programs, to reform the "H" visa category, and to establish new temporary worker visas. 884 and H.R. 884 and H.R. 884 and H.R. 5495 and H.R. After receiving certification from DOL, the employer would have had to file a petition with DHS to import Y workers. Among these proposed changes, H-2A employers would no longer have been subject to the adverse effect wage rate (discussed above). | The United States has two main programs for temporarily importing low-skilled workers, or guest workers. Agricultural guest workers enter through the H-2A visa program, and other guest workers enter through the H-2B visa program. Before an employer can file a petition with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to import workers under either program, the employer must apply to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) for a certification that U.S. workers capable of performing the work are not available and that the employment of alien workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. Other requirements of the programs differ.
In December 2008, DHS and DOL published final rules to significantly amend their H-2A and H-2B regulations. The new rules became effective on January 17, 2009. Under the Obama Administration, DOL proposed a new H-2A rule to replace the 2008 rule. This rule was published in final form in February 2010 and went into effect on March 15, 2010. The Administration left intact the 2008 H-2A rule issued by DHS and the 2008 H-2B rules issued by DHS and DOL.
The DHS 2008 H-2A and H-2B rules modify previous limitations on H-2A and H-2B workers' periods of stay in the United States. The rules also establish new requirements under both visas. They prohibit payments by prospective H-2A or H-2B workers to employers, recruiters, or other employment service providers where the payments are a condition of obtaining H-2A or H-2B employment, and provide for the denial or revocation of petitions in the event of petitioner violations. Among the other new requirements applicable to both programs, the DHS rules limit participation in the H-2A and H-2B programs to nationals of designated countries.
DOL's 2008 H-2B rule replaces the labor certification process with an attestation-based process, in which employers attest in their applications, under threat of penalties, that they have complied with program requirements. Among other changes to DOL's H-2B regulations, the new rule establishes a system of post-certification audits of H-2B employer applications.
DOL's 2010 H-2A rule reverses some major changes to the H-2A program that were included in its 2008 rule. Under the new rule, prospective H-2A employers must go through the traditional labor certification process and are subject to the adverse effect wages rate, as calculated prior to the 2008 rule. In addition, the 2010 rule calls for the creation of a new electronic registry for H-2A job opportunities, and retains a system of post-certification audits of H-2A employer applications that was included in the 2008 rule.
Various bills have been introduced in recent years to make changes to the H-2A and H-2B programs and to establish new temporary worker visas. In the 111th Congress, AgJOBS bills (H.R. 2414, S. 1038) propose to reform the H-2A program and establish a legalization program for agricultural workers, and H-2B bills variously seek to reform the H-2B program (H.R. 4381, S. 2910) and to reenact, in different forms, an expired provision to exempt certain returning workers from the H-2B cap of 66,000 (H.R. 1136, H.R. 1934, S. 388).
The current discussion of guest worker programs takes place against a backdrop of high levels of unauthorized migration to the United States, leading to various questions, such as whether new guest worker proposals would enable participants to obtain legal permanent resident (LPR) status. This report will be updated as legislative developments occur. |
crs_R41391 | crs_R41391_0 | 2466 , the Private Right of Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013, would introduce a private cause of action for misappropriation of trade secrets under federal law. S. 1770 , the Future of American Innovation and Research Act of 2013, would establish a private cause of action against a person who misappropriates a trade secret while located outside the United States, provided that the misappropriation causes or is reasonably anticipated to cause an injury within the United States or to a U.S. person. As of the date of publication of this report, neither bill had been enacted. Trade Secrets and Innovation Policy
Many businesses have developed proprietary information that provides a competitive advantage because it is not known to others. As the United States continues its shift to a knowledge- and service-based economy, the economic strength and competitiveness of firms increasingly depend upon their know-how and intangible assets. Framing the trade secret law requires a balancing of competing interests. Trade secret law may also encourage firms to invest in human capital. Trade secret law also confirms and regulates standards of commercial ethics and morality. On the other hand, trade secret laws potentially have negative aspects. As well, firms must expend resources to maintain information as a trade secret. Among the factors in assessing whether certain subject matter is a trade secret are:
the extent to which the information is known outside of the company; the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the company; the extent of measures taken by the company to guard the secrecy of the information; the value of the information to the company and to its competitors; the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. The law protects trade secrets from misappropriation by others. The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) criminalizes both "economic espionage" and the "theft of trade secrets." The EEA provides for substantial fines and imprisonment penalties. The EEA also provides for criminal forfeiture of property and court orders preserving the confidentiality of trade secrets. Most inventors must choose one of three options: (1) maintain a technology as a trade secret, (2) seek patent protection, (3) or decline to seek intellectual property protection at all and allow the technology to enter the public domain. A number of factors inform this decision. Also, trade secrets may potentially extend indefinitely, so long as the requirements for trade secret protection are maintained. However, some commentators believe that patents and trade secrets generally act in a complementary manner. H.R. This legislation had not been enacted as of the publication of this report. As a result, legislative reforms that are perceived to make patents more effective may reduce industrial reliance upon trade secrets. Because trade secrets are currently a matter of state law, congressional influence over the system has thus far been indirect: Through the enactment of a criminal statute, the Economic Espionage Act, and through amendment to the patent law. | Many businesses have developed proprietary information that provides a competitive advantage because it is not known to others. As the United States continues its shift to a knowledge- and service-based economy, the strength and competitiveness of domestic firms increasingly depends upon their know-how and intangible assets. Trade secrets are the form of intellectual property that protects this sort of confidential information.
Trade secret law protects secret, valuable business information from misappropriation by others. Subject matter ranging from marketing data to manufacturing know-how may be protected under the trade secret laws. Trade secret status is not limited to a fixed number of years, but endures so long as the information is valuable and maintained as a secret. A trade secret is misappropriated when it has been obtained through the abuse of a confidential relationship or improper means of acquisition.
A number of competing innovation policy concerns help shape the particular doctrines that comprise trade secret law. The availability of legal protection for trade secrets potentially promotes innovation, encourages firms to invest in employee development, and confirms standards of commercial ethics and morality. On the other hand, trade secret protection involves the suppression of information, which may hinder competition and the proper functioning of the marketplace. An overly robust trade secret law also could restrain employee mobility and promote investment in costly, but socially inefficient security measures.
Trade secrets are primarily a matter of state law. In 1996, Congress enacted the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), a statute that criminalizes both "economic espionage" and the "theft of trade secrets." The EEA provides for substantial fines and imprisonment penalties, as well as criminal forfeiture of property and court orders preserving the confidentiality of trade secrets. Some commentators believe that few prosecutions have occurred under the EEA since its enactment and have deemed the legislation ineffective.
Patents and trade secrets provide different intellectual property options for many new inventions. Inventors typically must choose (1) to maintain an invention as a trade secret, (2) to obtain a patent on the invention, or (3) to allow the invention to enter the public domain. As a result, federal legislation or other developments that are perceived to alter the effectiveness of the patent system may make the trade secret more or less attractive to industry.
As of the date of publication of this report, two bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress that focus upon trade secrets. H.R. 2466, the Private Right of Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013, would introduce a private cause of action within the EEA. S. 1770, the Future of American Innovation and Research Act of 2013, would establish a private cause of action against a person who misappropriates a trade secret while located outside the United States, provided that the misappropriation causes or is reasonably anticipated to cause an injury within the United States or to a U.S. person. As of the date of publication of this report, neither bill had been enacted. |
crs_R44774 | crs_R44774_0 | Introduction
The federal government is the largest source of funding for academic research and development (R&D) at U.S. universities and colleges, obligating more than $28 billion in FY2016. As part of oversight of federal funding for academic research, Congress and federal agencies have established requirements through statutes, regulations, and guidance documents that U.S. universities, colleges, and other research institutions must comply with when applying for, receiving, and reporting on the results of federal research grants. Such requirements are implemented to ensure transparency and help prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Academic stakeholders generally recognize the need for oversight to ensure accountability, safety, and the integrity of the research enterprise. However, for more than a decade many have raised concerns that federal regulations and administrative requirements are having unintended consequences, such as reducing research productivity and the potential return on federal investments and discouraging students from pursuing careers in academic research. Businesses, state and local governments, and nonprofit organizations, among others, provide the remaining sources of funding for academic R&D. Federal funds are provided through grants and other mechanisms by more than two dozen federal agencies. The Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999 ( P.L. Legislative Activities in the 114th Congress
Reflecting congressional concerns over the amount of time and resources spent complying with federal regulations and administrative requirements, legislation in the 114 th Congress sought to streamline and reduce federal academic research requirements. 114-255 ). Additionally, the act requires the Director of OMB to establish an advisory committee—known as the "Research Policy Board" (RPB) and composed of both federal and nonfederal members—to make recommendations on the modification and harmonization of regulations and policies across research funding agencies to minimize administrative burdens while maintaining effective oversight of federally funded research. American Innovation and Competitiveness Act
On January 6, 2017, the American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (AICA) was signed into law ( P.L. 114-329 ). Specifically, the act
requires the Director of OMB to establish an interagency working group that is responsible for reviewing administrative requirements imposed on federally funded researchers and recommending ways to minimize regulatory burden, including through the development of a uniform grant format and a centralized database for investigator biosketches; requires the NSF Inspector General to conduct an audit of NSF's policies and procedures related to subrecipient monitoring; and increases the micro-purchase threshold for procurement activities—below which supplies or services can be acquired without soliciting competitive bids—from $3,500 to $10,000 for research grants awarded by NSF, NASA, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Other Selected Legislation
On December 23, 2016, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 was signed into law ( P.L. 114-328 ). Federal Coordination and Stakeholder Engagement
Two overarching, related areas of concern for many stakeholders have been federal coordination of regulations across agencies, and effective stakeholder engagement. Further, Congress may broadly consider the appropriate balance between supporting the nation's academic research enterprise through efforts to streamline regulations and maintaining mechanisms for oversight, transparency, and accountability. | For decades, the federal government and academic research institutions have been partners in supporting American innovation, competitiveness, and economic growth. The federal government is the largest source of academic research and development (R&D) funding in the United States, providing funds through more than two dozen federal agencies, with the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) providing the largest portions of federal R&D funding to U.S. colleges and universities.
As part of oversight of federal funding for academic research, Congress and federal agencies have established requirements through statutes, regulations, and guidance documents that U.S. universities and other research institutions must comply with when applying for, receiving, and reporting on the results of federal research grants. Such requirements seek to ensure transparency and effectiveness of federal funds, while helping to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
Academic research institutions broadly recognize the need for, and benefits from, federal regulations but have raised concerns that federal regulations and administrative requirements have produced unintended consequences, such as reducing research productivity and the return on federal investments. Surveys and assessment reports conducted over the past two decades have evaluated the benefits and challenges related to federal requirements for academic research. Among specific areas of concern frequently brought forth by researchers and academic administrators are the amount of time spent on completing administrative tasks compared to conducting research; the increasing number, and lack of harmonization, of requirements across federal funding agencies; the adequacy of stakeholder engagement in the review and modification of federal regulations; and the need for updated requirements for human subjects and animal research.
Legislation was enacted in the 114th Congress that addressed a number of the concerns, including the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255), the American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (AICA, P.L. 114-329), and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA, P.L. 114-328). Enacted provisions addressed a subset of issues focused on specific agencies, including conflicts of interest disclosure, financial reporting, and subrecipient monitoring. Enacted provisions also addressed cross-agency efforts by directing the establishment of an advisory committee (Research Policy Board) with federal and non-federal stakeholders, as well as an interagency working group (WG) on federal research regulations.
The 115th Congress may conduct oversight as agencies work to implement the provisions enacted in the 114th Congress. Congress may further consider legislation to extend certain provisions more widely across the federal government. For current and potential future efforts to streamline and harmonize federal regulations, a central consideration will likely be ensuring that mechanisms to evaluate transparency and accountability of federal funds are not diminished. |
crs_RL32104 | crs_RL32104_0 | AFDC was abolished in 1996 and replaced by a state block grant called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). 104-193 ) as a replacement for the former welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), TANF provides fixed grants to states for time-limited and work-conditioned aid for low-income families. Many low-income families pay much more than 30% of their incomes towards housing costs. Many argue that "affordable" housing is simply unavailable for low-income families. These programs are administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and authorized under the Housing Act of 1937 ( P.L. The three major forms of direct housing assistance currently administered by HUD are: the low-rent Public Housing program, the Housing Choice Voucher program and project-based assistance programs. The conflict in these rules has been discussed both by housing and welfare advocates. The Interaction of Program Rules
For families who receive benefits from both TANF and HUD housing assistance programs, the different features of the two programs can create unintended consequences. In order to be eligible for a WtW voucher, a family must be both eligible for housing assistance and for TANF cash assistance. Research Findings
Several studies have been conducted to test whether and how the receipt of housing assistance impacts low-income families, including families who have or are receiving cash assistance. As a result, some have proposed to make changes to the administration of housing programs in order to enhance compatibility with welfare programs. The second is difficult because of the competing needs of the elderly and disabled. While several changes have been made in recent years to improve this coordination, the differences inherent in the two sets of programs, such as the high proportion of elderly and disabled households served by housing programs, the different levels of government that administer housing and welfare programs, and the costs associated with providing additional services, may make further changes difficult to enact. | The 1995-1996 debate over creation of a block grant to states for cash aid to needy families with children (Temporary Assistance for Needy FamiliesâTANF) focused on reducing welfare rolls by promoting work. Except for child care costs, it gave scant attention to other living expenses of low-income parents. The issues of housing cost and affordability were essentially absent from the debate, although rent is the largest expense for many low-income families.
The important role housing plays in families' lives has been recognized through a system of programs, administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), that subsidize the housing costs of low-income families. The three major direct housing assistance programs are the low-rent public housing program, the Housing Choice Voucher program (also known as Section 8 vouchers) and project-based rental assistance.
Both housing programs and TANF are designed to serve the needs of low-income households. As a result, many low-income families who receive TANF cash assistance or services, or have in the past, also qualify for housing assistance. It is estimated by CRS that possibly half a million households were receiving both cash welfare assistance and housing assistance in 2001. Although the two programs, in many cases, serve the same populations, the structures and rules of the two programs are often in conflict. This inconsistency in program rules can lead to inefficiencies for dual program participants. Some changes have been made to enhance the compatibility of housing and welfare programs. Further changes to one or both of the programs to enhance coordination have been considered as a part of the debate surrounding both welfare reauthorization and proposed housing reform measures.
This paper will introduce the reader to federal housing assistance and welfare programs, the people they serve, how the programs interact and current issues. It will be updated to track relevant legislation. |
crs_RL34191 | crs_RL34191_0 | Introduction
Recent high oil and gas prices and concerns about global climate change have heightened interest in ethanol and other biofuels as alternatives to petroleum products. On March 9, 2007, the two countries signed an agreement to (1) advance research and development bilaterally, (2) help build domestic biofuels industries in third countries, and (3) work multilaterally to advance the global development of biofuels. Many Bush Administration officials and Members of Congress note that the new biofuels partnership with Brazil may help improve the U.S. image in Latin America and diminish the influence of President Chávez in the region. Increasing biofuels cooperation with Brazil and other countries in Latin America may prompt challenges to existing U.S. trade, energy, and agriculture policies. In the 109 th Congress, legislation was introduced that would have eliminated current tariffs on foreign ethanol. This report examines the opportunities and barriers related to increasing U.S. cooperation with other countries in the hemisphere on biofuels development, focusing on the U.S.-Brazil agreement. Brazil and the United States: Hemispheric Leaders in Ethanol Production
Brazil and the United States are by far the world's largest ethanol producers. Brazilian ethanol is produced almost exclusively from sugar cane. Figure 5 shows U.S. ethanol imports over the past eight years. U.S.-Brazilian Memorandum of Understanding on Biofuels
On March 9, 2007, the United States and Brazil signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote greater cooperation on ethanol and biofuels in the Western hemisphere. 109-432 ). Members have cited Brazil as an example of a country that has successfully reduced its reliance on foreign oil by using alternative energies. However, in December 2006, Congress voted to extend the duties on foreign ethanol through December 31, 2008 ( P.L. In the 110 th Congress, S. 1106 (Thune) would extend those tariffs through 2011, and H.R. 196 (Pomeroy) would make the tariffs permanent. Several legislative initiatives in the 110 th Congress would increase hemispheric cooperation on energy issues, including biofuels development and distribution. S. 193 (Lugar), the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act of 2007, calls for the establishment of a regional-based ministerial forum known as the Hemisphere Energy Cooperation Forum that would, among its many activities, be involved in developing an Energy Sustainability Initiative to promote the development, distribution, and commercialization of renewable fuels in the region. Another initiative, S. 1007 (Lugar), the United States-Brazil Energy Cooperation Pact of 2007, calls for the same cooperation groups as S. 193 , and directs the Secretary of State to work with Brazil and other Western Hemisphere countries to develop partnerships to accelerate the development of biofuels production, research, and infrastructure. The bill was introduced on March 28, 2007, and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. H.Res. While some Members of Congress have been supportive of energy cooperation efforts like the U.S.-Brazil MOU, others might not support any initiatives that they feel will adversely affect U.S. corn-based ethanol producers. | In the past several years, high oil and gas prices, instability in many oil-producing countries, and concerns about global climate change have heightened interest in ethanol and other biofuels as alternatives to petroleum products. Reducing oil dependency is a goal shared by the United States and many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, a region composed primarily of energy-importing countries. In the region, Brazil stands out as an example of a country that has become a net exporter of energy, partially by increasing its production and use of sugar-based ethanol.
On March 9, 2007, the United States and Brazil, which together produce almost 70% of the world's ethanol, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote greater cooperation on ethanol and other biofuels in the Western Hemisphere. The countries agreed to (1) advance research and development bilaterally, (2) help build domestic biofuels industries in third countries, and (3) work multilaterally to advance the global development of biofuels.
Many analysts maintain that the United States would benefit from having more energy producers in the region, while Brazil stands to further its goal of developing ethanol into a globally traded commodity. In addition to these economic benefits, some analysts think that an ethanol partnership with Brazil could help improve the U.S. image in Latin America and lessen the influence of oil-rich Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. However, obstacles to increased U.S.-Brazil cooperation on biofuels exist, including current U.S. tariffs on most Brazilian ethanol imports.
While some Members of Congress support greater hemispheric cooperation on biofuels development, others are wary of any cooperative efforts that might negatively affect U.S. ethanol producers. The Energy Diplomacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 193 (Lugar), approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 28, 2007, would increase hemispheric cooperation on energy. S. 1007 (Lugar), the United States-Brazil Energy Cooperation Pact of 2007, calls for the same hemispheric cooperation groups as S. 193, and directs the Secretary of State to work with Brazil and other Western Hemisphere countries to develop biofuels partnerships. H.Res. 651 (Engel) recognizes and supports the importance of the U.S.-Brazil MOU on biofuels. In the 109th Congress, legislation was introduced that would have eliminated current tariffs on foreign ethanol, but in December 2006, Congress voted to extend the ethanol tariffs through December 31, 2008 (P.L. 109-432). In the 110th Congress, S. 1106 (Thune) would extend those tariffs through 2011, and H.R. 196 (Pomeroy) would make the tariffs permanent.
This report discusses the opportunities and barriers related to increasing U.S. cooperation with other countries in the hemisphere on biofuels development, focusing on the U.S.-Brazil agreement. This report may be updated. For more information, see CRS Report RL33290, Fuel Ethanol: Background and Public Policy Issues, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33693, Latin America: Energy Supply, Political Developments, and U.S. Policy Approaches, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44260 | crs_R44260_0 | Introduction
The Constitution gives Congress the authority to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and other federal "civil officers" upon a determination that such officers have engaged in treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. First, a simple majority of the House impeaches —or formally approves allegations of wrongdoing amounting to an impeachable offense, known as articles of impeachment. If the Senate, by vote of a two-thirds majority, convicts the official of the alleged offenses, the result is removal from office of those still in office, and, at the Senate's discretion, disqualification from holding future office. The House has impeached 19 individuals: 15 federal judges, one Senator, one Cabinet member, and two Presidents. The Senate has conducted 16 full impeachment trials. Of these, eight individuals—all federal judges—were convicted by the Senate. —Article I, Section 3
The Constitution provides that impeachment applies only to the "President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States," and that the grounds for impeachment are limited to "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." The Senate, in turn, has the sole power to try impeachments. Conviction of an individual requires a two-thirds majority of the present Senators on one of the articles brought by the House. The immediate effect of conviction upon an article of impeachment is removal from office, although the Senate may subsequently vote on whether the official shall be disqualified from again holding an office of public trust under the United States. The Constitution does not define "civil Officers of the United States." Therefore lesser functionaries—such as federal employees who belong to the civil service, do not exercise "significant authority," and are not appointed by the President or an agency head—would not be subject to impeachment. At the opposite end of the spectrum, it would seem that any official who qualifies as a principal officer, including a head of an agency such as a Secretary, Administrator, or Commissioner, would be impeachable. Nonetheless, congressional precedents reflect three broad types of conduct thought to constitute grounds for impeachment, although they should not be understood as exhaustive or binding: (1) improperly exceeding or abusing the powers of the office; (2) behavior incompatible with the function and purpose of the office; and (3) misusing the office for an improper purpose or for personal gain. On December 8, 2010, he was convicted on all four articles, removed from office, and disqualified from holding future federal offices. Overview of Impeachment Procedures
The Constitution sets forth the general principles which control the procedural aspects of impeachment, vesting the power to impeach in the House of Representatives, while imbuing the Senate with the power to try impeachments. A conviction on an article of impeachment requires a two-thirds vote of those Senators present. No formal vote is required for removal, as it is a necessary effect of the conviction. | The impeachment process provides a mechanism for removal of the President, Vice President, and other "civil Officers of the United States" found to have engaged in "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." The Constitution places the responsibility and authority to determine whether to impeach an individual in the hands of the House of Representatives. Should a simple majority of the House approve articles of impeachment specifying the grounds upon which the impeachment is based, the matter is then presented to the Senate, to which the Constitution provides the sole power to try an impeachment. A conviction on any one of the articles of impeachment requires the support of a two-thirds majority of the Senators present.
Should a conviction occur, the Senate retains limited authority to determine the appropriate punishment. Under the Constitution, the penalty for conviction on an impeachable offense is limited to either removal from office, or removal and prohibition against holding any future offices of "honor, Trust or Profit under the United States." Although removal from office would appear to flow automatically from conviction on an article of impeachment, a separate vote is necessary should the Senate deem it appropriate to disqualify the individual convicted from holding future federal offices of public trust. Approval of such a measure requires only the support of a simple majority.
Key Takeaways of This Report
The Constitution gives Congress the authority to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and other federal "civil officers" upon a determination that such officers have engaged in treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. A simple majority of the House is necessary to approve articles of impeachment. If the Senate, by vote of a two-thirds majority, convicts the official on any article of impeachment, the result is removal from office and, at the Senate's discretion, disqualification from holding future office. The Constitution does not articulate who qualifies as a "civil officer." Most impeachments have applied to federal judges. With regard to the executive branch, lesser functionaries—such as federal employees who belong to the civil service, do not exercise "significant authority," and are not appointed by the President or an agency head—do not appear to be subject to impeachment. At the opposite end of the spectrum, it would appear that any official who qualifies as a principal officer, including a head of an agency such as a Secretary, Administrator, or Commissioner, is likely subject to impeachment. Impeachable conduct does not appear to be limited to criminal behavior. Congress has identified three general types of conduct that constitute grounds for impeachment, although these categories should not be understood as exhaustive: (1) improperly exceeding or abusing the powers of the office; (2) behavior incompatible with the function and purpose of the office; and (3) misusing the office for an improper purpose or for personal gain. The House has impeached 19 individuals: 15 federal judges, one Senator, one Cabinet member, and two Presidents. The Senate has conducted 16 full impeachment trials. Of these, eight individuals—all federal judges—were convicted by the Senate. |
crs_R42588 | crs_R42588_0 | Introduction
This report provides a status update on FY2013 appropriations actions for accounts traditionally funded in the appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED). The L-HHS-ED bill provides appropriations for the following federal departments and agencies:
the Department of Labor; the majority of the Department of Health and Human Services, except for the Food and Drug Administration (provided in the Agriculture appropriations bill), the Indian Health Service (provided in the Interior-Environment appropriations bill), and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (also funded through the Interior-Environment appropriations bill); the Department of Education; and more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration, the Corporation for National and Community Service, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Institute of Museum and Library Services, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Railroad Retirement Board. FY2013 Continuing Resolutions
Congress did not enact a regular L-HHS-ED appropriations bill prior to the beginning of FY2013. 113-6 , Division F). Full-Year CR for L-HHS-ED
On March 26, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. 933 , as amended). This law funds 7 of the 12 regular appropriations bills (including L-HHS-ED) via a full-year CR in Division F. With limited exceptions, the full-year CR generally funds discretionary L-HHS-ED programs at their FY2012 levels, minus an across-the-board rescission of 0.2% per Section 3004, as interpreted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This is a lower level of funding than had been provided by the six-month CR for FY2013, which generally funded discretionary L-HHS-ED programs at FY2012 rates, plus. Because the sequester was ordered before the enactment of the FY2013 full-year CR, OMB calculated the amounts to be sequestered based on annualized funding levels in place under the six-month FY2013 CR ( P.L. In light of the enactment of the full-year appropriations law, the effect of these reductions at the account, program, project, and activity level remains unclear, pending further guidance from OMB as to how these reductions are to be applied (see " FY2013 Joint Committee Sequestration " for more information). 112-175)
On September 28, 2012, the President signed into law a six-month government-wide CR ( P.L. 112-175 ). FY2013 Disaster Relief Appropriations
On January 29, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. 113-2 ). FY2013 Action in the House
On July 18, 2012, the House Appropriations L-HHS-ED Subcommittee approved a draft bill to provide full-year FY2013 L-HHS-ED appropriations. The bill was not marked up by the full committee prior to the end of the 112 th Congress and a detailed table on programs that would have been funded by the bill was not made publicly available. As such, this report provides only limited information about this draft bill from the 112 th Congress. According to the committee's press release, the bill would have provided roughly $150 billion for discretionary L-HHS-ED programs and activities in FY2013. FY2013 Action in the Senate
On June 14, 2012, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a bill that would provide full-year FY2013 L-HHS-ED appropriations ( S. 3295 , S.Rept. 112-176 ). As reported by the full committee during the 112 th Congress, S. 3295 would have provided $166 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED. This amount is about 1% more than the comparable FY2012 funding level ($164 billion) and about 0.03% less than the FY2013 President's request, based on estimates drawn from the committee report. In addition, the Senate committee bill would have provided an estimated $612 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of nearly $778 billion for L-HHS-ED as a whole (see Figure 1 ). FY2013 President's Budget Request
On February 13, 2012, the Obama Administration released its FY2013 Budget. The President's Budget requested $166 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the L-HHS-ED bill (+1% from comparable FY2012), based on estimates shown in the Senate committee report. In addition, the laws provided an estimated $577 billion in mandatory funding for L-HHS-ED accounts, for a total of roughly $741 billion. Accordingly, OMB estimated that the joint committee sequester would require a 5.0% reduction in non-exempt nondefense discretionary funding, a 2.0% reduction in certain Medicare funding (subject to a special rule), and a 5.1% reduction for most other non-exempt nondefense mandatory funding. This amount is $28 million (-0.2%) less than the comparable FY2012 funding level of $14.71 billion and $358 million (+2.5%) more than the FY2013 President's Budget request of $14.32 billion, based on estimates reported in S.Rept. 112-176 . This amount is $32.3 billion (+5.5%) more than the comparable FY2012 funding level of $589.3 billion and $1.0 billion (+0.2%) more than the FY2013 President's Budget request of $620.6 billion, based on estimates reported in S.Rept. 112-176 . This amount is $1.4 billion (+2.0%) more than the estimated discretionary funding level for FY2012 ($69.6 billion) and $1.0 billion (+1.4%) more than the discretionary total requested in the FY2013 President's Budget ($70.0 billion). Selected PHS highlights of the Senate committee bill include
an emphasis on disease prevention and health promotion, especially through CDC programs such as those for childhood immunizations, prevention of diabetes, obesity, and smoking, work on cognitive health and cognitive impairment, and food safety; support of medical research and innovation, including $30.7 billion for NIH, an overall increase of $100 million (+0.3%) from FY2012, which included a $30 million boost for the Cures Acceleration Network that fosters translational medicine; maintenance of funding levels for some HRSA programs that the Administration had proposed decreasing or eliminating, such as the Children's Hospitals Graduate Medical Education program (maintained at $265 million), Community Health Centers (maintained at $1.567 billion), and Area Health Education Centers (maintained at $27 million); increases to certain HRSA programs, including $2.397 billion in BA for Ryan White AIDS programs (+1.3% from FY2012, -2.0% from the FY2013 President's request) and $144 million for Rural Health programs (+4.3% from FY2012, +17.9% from the FY2013 request); and increases of $20 million each for the two SAMHSA block grants, recommending $459 million in BA for the Community Mental Health Services Block Grant (+4.6% from FY2012, +4.6% from the FY2013 President's request) and $1.741 billion in BA for the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant (+1.2% from FY2012, +26.5% from the FY2013 request). According to the committee report ( S.Rept. 112-176 . This amount is $5 million (-15%) less than the comparable FY2012 funding of $36 million. The FY2013 Senate committee bill did not provide funding for this program. 112-176 ) would have provided $69.56 billion in combined mandatory and discretionary funding for related agencies funded through this bill. 112-176 . | This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress to provide FY2013 appropriations for the accounts funded by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (L-HHS-ED) appropriations bill. The L-HHS-ED bill provides funding for all accounts subject to the annual appropriations process at the Departments of Labor (DOL) and Education (ED). It provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration is funded via the Agriculture bill). The L-HHS-ED bill also provides funding for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration.
Continuing Resolutions: On March 26, 2013, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6). Division F of this law includes a full-year continuing resolution (CR) for L-HHS-ED. With limited exceptions, the full-year CR generally funds discretionary L-HHS-ED programs at their FY2012 levels, minus an across-the-board rescission of 0.2% per Section 3004, as interpreted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The full-year CR superseded a six-month CR for FY2013 (P.L. 112-175) that had been enacted on September 28, 2012. The six-month CR generally funded discretionary L-HHS-ED programs at their FY2012 rates, plus 0.612%.
Sequestration: On March 1, 2013, President Obama issued a sequestration order, as required under the terms of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended. The order called for an across-the-board cut of 5.0% for non-exempt nondefense discretionary funding, 2.0% for certain Medicare funding (per a special rule), and 5.1% for other non-exempt nondefense mandatory funding. Because the sequester was ordered before the enactment of the FY2013 full-year CR, OMB calculated the amounts to be sequestered based on annualized funding levels in place under the six-month FY2013 CR (P.L. 112-175). In light of the enactment of the full-year appropriations law, the effect of these reductions at the account, program, project, and activity level remains unclear, pending further guidance from OMB as to how these reductions are to be applied.
Disaster Relief Funding: On January 29, 2013, the President signed into law a supplemental appropriations bill in response to Hurricane Sandy (P.L. 113-2). This disaster supplemental included roughly $827 million for L-HHS-ED programs and activities, the majority of which ($800 million) went to HHS to support health, mental health, and social services needs in affected states, including costs related to the construction and renovation of damaged health, mental health, biomedical research, child care, and Head Start facilities.
House Actions on L-HHS-ED Bill (112th Congress): On July 18, 2012, the House Appropriations L-HHS-ED Subcommittee approved a draft FY2013 L-HHS-ED bill. This bill was not introduced or marked up by the full committee prior to the end of the 112th Congress. A detailed table on programs funded by the bill was not made publicly available and, as such, this report includes only limited information on the draft House subcommittee bill.
Senate Actions on L-HHS-ED Bill (112th Congress): On June 14, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2013 L-HHS-ED bill (S. 3295, S.Rept. 112-176). The committee report estimated that this bill included $166.0 billion in discretionary funds, which is about 1.2% more than the committee's estimate of comparable FY2012 funds ($164.1 billion). In addition, the committee report estimated the bill included $611.6 billion in mandatory funds, for a combined total of $777.6 billion (+4.9% from the comparable FY2012 funding level).
President's Request: On February 13, 2012, prior to the initiation of congressional action on FY2013 appropriations, the Obama Administration released the FY2013 President's Budget. The President's Budget, as estimated in the committee report accompanying the FY2013 Senate bill (S.Rept. 112-176), called for $166.1 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED accounts (+1.2% from FY2012). In addition, the President requested $611.6 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $777.6 billion (+4.9% from FY2012) in L-HHS-ED appropriations.
DOL Snapshot: The FY2013 Senate committee bill from the 112th Congress would have provided roughly $12.3 billion in discretionary funding for DOL. This amount is 1.7% less than the comparable FY2012 funding level of $12.6 billion and 3.0% more than the FY2013 request of $12.0 billion, as estimated in S.Rept. 112-176.
HHS Snapshot: The FY2013 Senate committee bill from the 112th Congress would have provided roughly $71.0 billion in discretionary funding for HHS. This amount is 2% more than the comparable FY2012 funding level of $69.6 billion and 1.4% more than the FY2013 request of $70.0 billion, as estimated in S.Rept. 112-176.
ED Snapshot: The FY2013 Senate committee bill from the 112th Congress would have provided roughly $68.5 billion in discretionary funding for ED. This amount is 0.6% more than the comparable FY2012 funding level of $68.1 billion and 2.0% less than the FY2013 request of $69.9 billion, as estimated in S.Rept. 112-176.
Related Agencies Snapshot: The FY2013 Senate committee bill from the 112th Congress would have provided roughly $14.1 billion in discretionary funding for L-HHS-ED related agencies. This amount is 2.3% more than the comparable FY2012 funding level of $13.8 billion and 0.2% less than the FY2013 request of $14.2 billion, as estimated in S.Rept. 112-176. |
crs_R42143 | crs_R42143_0 | I n the years since President Obama took office, Congress has included provisions in annual defense authorization bills addressing issues related to detainees at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and, more broadly, the disposition of persons captured in the course of hostilities against Al Qaeda and associated forces. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (2012 NDAA; P.L. 112-81 ) arguably constituted the most significant legislation informing wartime detention policy since the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF; P.L. 107-40 ), which serves as the primary legal authority for U.S. operations against Al Qaeda and associated forces. Both the National Defense Authorization Acts for FY2013 (2013 NDAA; P.L. 112-239 ) and FY2014 (2014 NDAA; P.L. 113-66 ) contain subtitles addressing U.S. detention policy, particularly with respect to persons held at Guantanamo, though neither act addresses detention matters as comprehensively as the 2012 NDAA. The FY2015 NDAA ( P.L. 113-291 ) essentially maintained the status quo established by the 2014 NDAA, while the FY2016 NDAA ( P.L. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (2015 Cromnibus, P.L. The Obama Administration subsequently stepped up transfers of cleared detainees to foreign countries. The 2016 NDAA reenacted a modified version of earlier restrictions and imposed some new ones. This report offers a brief background of the salient issues and provides a section-by-section analysis of the detainee provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012. It also discusses executive interpretation and implementation of the act's mandatory military detention provision. Background
At the heart of the consideration of the detainee provisions in the 2012 NDAA appears to have been an effort to confirm or, as some observers view it, expand the detention authority Congress implicitly granted the President in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. President Obama also announced that he would "not authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of American citizens," regardless of whether such detention would be permissible under the AUMF or the 2012 NDAA. However, more recent funding limitations, including those contained in the 2012 Minibus and the 2012 CAA, prohibited the transfer of Guantanamo detainees into the United States for any purpose, including criminal prosecution. This version of the restriction was extended until the end of FY2013 by the 2013 NDAA, through the end of FY2014 by the 2014 NDAA and the 2014 Omnibus, through 2015 by the 2015 NDAA and the 2015 Cromnibus, and through the end of 2016 by the 2016 NDAA and the 2016 Omnibus. Restrictions on Guantanamo detainee transfers contained in the 2012 NDAA and prior and subsequent legislative enactments are widely believed to have constrained executive efforts to transfer detainees to foreign custody. The directive declares that, acting pursuant to the statutory waiver authority provided under Section 1022, the President has waived application of the provision's military transfer requirements when
a person in U.S. custody is a lawful permanent resident alien (i.e., green-card holder) who is arrested in the United States on the basis of conduct occurring inside the country; a person has been arrested by a federal agency in the United States on charges other than terrorism, unless he is subsequently charged with a terrorism offense and held in federal custody on such charges; a person is arrested by state or local law enforcement, pursuant to state or local authority, and is thereafter transferred to federal custody; placing a foreign country's nationals or residents in U.S. military detention would impede counterterrorism cooperation, including on matters related to intelligence-sharing or assistance in the investigation or prosecution of suspected terrorists; a foreign government indicates that it will not extradite or otherwise transfer a person to the United States if he would be placed in military custody; transferring a person to military custody could interfere with efforts to secure the person's cooperation or confession; or transferring a person to military custody could interfere with efforts to jointly prosecute the individual with others who are either not subject to military custody or whose prosecution in a federal or state court had already been determined to proceed. 3304 represented a compromise between these approaches—extending the existing blanket prohibition on transferring Guantanamo detainees to the United States through the end of 2014, but allowing the Executive greater flexibility in determining whether to transfer detainees to foreign custody. 114-92 ). Section 1035 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a comprehensive plan for the detention of current and future individuals captured and held under AUMF authority pending the end of hostilities, including the following:
the specific facility or facilities to be used to hold individuals for the purpose of trial and incarceration after conviction or law of war detention and interrogation; estimated costs associated with Guantanamo detainees' detention inside the United States; a plan for the disposition of transferred detainees if the law of war authority for detention were to expire and an assessment of precautions that might mitigate implications to the national security interests of the United States; a plan for the disposition of individuals held under AUMF authority at Guantanamo; a plan for the disposition of future detainees held under AUMF authority; and an explanation of any additional authorities that may be necessary to hold a detainee as an unprivileged enemy belligerent pursuant to the AUMF pending the end of hostilities or a future determination that the individual no longer requires detention. | In recent years, Congress has included provisions in annual defense authorization bills addressing issues related to detainees at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and, more broadly, the disposition of persons captured in the course of hostilities against Al Qaeda and associated forces. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (2012 NDAA; P.L. 112-81) arguably constituted the most significant legislation informing wartime detention policy since the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF; P.L. 107-40), which serves as the primary legal authority for U.S. operations against Al Qaeda and associated forces. Much of the debate surrounding passage of the 2012 NDAA centered on what appeared to be an effort to confirm or, as some observers view it, expand the detention authority that Congress implicitly granted the President via the AUMF in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. But the 2012 NDAA addressed other issues as well, including the continued detention of persons at Guantanamo. Both the 2013 NDAA (P.L. 112-239) and the 2014 NDAA (P.L. 113-66) also contain subtitles addressing U.S. detention policy, though neither act addresses detention matters as comprehensively as did the 2012 NDAA. The 2015 NDAA (P.L. 113-291) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (2015 Cromnibus; P.L. 113-235), essentially maintain the status quo. The 2016 NDAA (P.L. 114-92) likewise addressed detention.
The 2012 NDAA authorizes the detention of certain categories of persons and requires the military detention of a subset of them (subject to waiver); regulates status determinations for persons held pursuant to the AUMF; regulates periodic review proceedings concerning Guantanamo detainees; and continued funding restrictions on Guantanamo detainee transfers. During floor debate, significant attention centered on the extent to which the bill and existing law permit the military detention of U.S. citizens believed to be enemy belligerents, especially if arrested within the United States. The act clarified that its affirmation of detention authority under the AUMF is not intended to affect existing authorities relating to the detention of U.S. citizens or lawful resident aliens, or any other persons arrested in the United States. When signing the 2012 NDAA into law, President Obama stated that he would "not authorize the indefinite military detention without trial of American citizens."
The 2012 NDAA and subsequent defense authorization enactments also included provisions concerning the transfer or release of detainees currently held at Guantanamo. Subsequent NDAAs have extended the prohibition on the release of detainees into the United States for any purpose, as well as restrictions upon the transfer of such Guantanamo detainees to foreign countries. The 2014 NDAA extended the blanket prohibition on transferring Guantanamo detainees to the United States, but allowed the Executive greater flexibility in determining whether to transfer detainees to foreign custody. Both policies continued in the 2015 NDAA and the 2015 Cromnibus, and the Obama Administration stepped up the transfer of detainees to foreign countries. The 2016 NDAA, however, reenacted and modified earlier restrictions and imposed some new transfer restrictions.
This report offers a brief background of the salient issues raised by the detainee provisions of the FY2012 NDAA, provides a section-by-section analysis, and discusses executive interpretation and implementation of the act's mandatory military detention provision. It also addresses detainee provisions in subsequent defense authorization legislation. An earlier version of this report was entitled The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 and Beyond: Detainee Matters. |
crs_R42936 | crs_R42936_0 | The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 ( P.L. 110-252 ), which created a new temporary unemployment insurance program, the EUC08 program. 112-240 . Thus, on December 28, 2013 (December 29, 2013, for New York), the EUC08 program ended. The authorization for the temporary EB trigger modifications expired the week ending on or before December 31, 2013. Unemployment Insurance Benefits and the Sequester
The sequester order required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. Reduction of an individual's Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefit in any month in which that person also receives an unemployment benefit
In addition, the President's Budget Proposal would provide $4 billion in mandatory funding to support partnerships between businesses and education and training providers to train approximately 1 million long-term unemployed workers for new jobs. Enacted Legislation in the 113th Congress
Unemployment Insurance Integrity Provision in P.L. Legislative Proposals in the 113th Congress
Extension of Federal UI Provisions
Numerous proposals have been introduced in the 113 th Congress to further extend some or all of the now-expired temporary federal provisions of UI law: the authorization of EUC08, the 100% federal financing of EB, the authorization for states to use a three-year lookback for state EB triggers, temporary railroad UI benefits, and funds for Reemployment Services and Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment Activities (RES/REAs). H.R. Among other provisions, H.R. 3979 would also
extend the expired EB provisions for five months; extend the expired railroad UI provisions for five months; reauthorize the funding for RES/REAs and change the timing of RES/REAs requirements; provide an exception to the nonreduction rule associated with EUC08 prior to its expiration; prohibit any individual reporting more than $1 million in adjusted gross income (AGI) in the preceding year from receiving EUC08 benefits; and make the same decreases in expenditures and increases in revenues to offset the cost of the proposed UI extensions as are found in S. 2148 and S. 2149 . Both H.R. 4550 contain identical language to H.R. 3979 , H.R. 3546 , H.R. 3773 , H.R. 3885 , S. 1747 , and S. 1797 ). H.R. 3936 and S. 2077 propose a retroactive, six-month extension through June 2014; S. 2097 , S. 2148 , and S. 2149 propose a retroactive, five-month extension through May 2014; and H.R. 3813 , H.R. 3824 , S.Amdt. H.R. 3773 , H.R. 2821 , H.R. 3546 , H.R. 3885 , S.Amdt. 2631 , S. 1931 , and S. 2097 ). H.R. 3979 , H.R. 4415 , H.R. 4550 , H.R. 4970 , S.Amdt. 2714 , S. 2097 , S. 2148 , S. 2149 , and S. 2532 would extend the changes that the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. H.R. 4970 , S. 2097 , S. 2148 , S. 2149 , and S. 2532 include an extension of certain customs user fees. S. 2149 , S. 2532 , H.R. 3979 , H.R. 4415 , H.R. 4550 , and H.R. 2821 includes several provisions relating to unemployment insurance. Short-Time Compensation Programs ("Worksharing")
H.R. H.R. Exempting UI Benefits from the Sequester
H.R. 113-67 . H.R. H.R. Concurrent Receipt of SSDI and UI Benefits42
H.R. H.R. 2448 , S.Amdt. 4550 (Section106), and H.R. Vouchers/Demonstration Projects
H.R. H.R. Job Training and Education
H.R. S. 2148 , S. 2149 , and H.R. Drug Testing47
H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. 188 , H.R. 1617 , and H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. Domestic Violence
H.R. | The 113th Congress continues to face numerous issues related to unemployment insurance programs: Unemployment Compensation (UC), the temporary, now-expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08), and Extended Benefits (EB). With the national unemployment rate decreasing but still high, the interest in extended unemployment benefits continues at elevated levels.
P.L. 112-240 extended the authorization for the EUC08 program until the week ending on or before January 1, 2014 (December 28, 2013, for most states). In addition, P.L. 112-240 extended the 100% federal financing of the EB program through December 31, 2013. Congress continues to consider whether to extend the authorization for these expired key temporary unemployment insurance provisions.
This report provides a brief overview of the three unemployment insurance programs—UC, EUC08 (expired), and EB—that may provide benefits to eligible unemployed workers. It contains a brief explanation of how the EUC08 program, as well as some other UC-related payments, began to experience reductions in benefits as a result of the sequester order contained within the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25).
This report also includes descriptions of enacted and proposed unemployment insurance (UI) legislation in the 113th Congress, organized by the following categories:
Extension of federal UI provisions (H.R. 2821, H.R. 3546, H.R. 3773, H.R. 3813, H.R. 3824, H.R. 3885, H.R. 3936, H.R. 3979, H.R. 4415, H.R. 4431, H.R. 4550, H.R. 4970, H.R. 5352, S. 1747, S. 1797, S. 1845, S.Amdt. 2631, S.Amdt. 2714, S. 1931, S. 2077, S. 2097, S. 2148, S. 2149, and S. 2532) Exemption of UI benefits from the sequester (H.R. 2177) UI program integrity (P.L. 113-67, H.R. 3205, H.R. 2826, H.R. 3447, S. 1870, and S. 1876) Short-Time Compensation (STC) (H.R. 5583 and S. 2906) Concurrent receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and UI benefits (H.R. 1502, H.R. 3885, S.Amdt. 2631, S. 1099, S. 1931, and S. 2097) UI income restrictions (S. 18, H.R. 2448, H.R. 3979, H.R. 4415, H.R. 4550, H.R. 4970, S.Amdt. 2714, S. 2097, S. 2148, S. 2149, and S. 2532) UI vouchers and demonstration projects (H.R. 51, H.R. 3864, H.R. 4550, H.R. 5352, and S. 2870) Job training and education (H.R. 1530, H.R. 3979, S. 2097, S. 2148, and S. 2149) Drug testing (H.R. 1172, H.R. 1277, H.R. 3454, and H.R. 4310) Aid for Hurricane Sandy states (S. 803) Proposals to aid in the rehiring of UI beneficiaries and exhaustees (H.R. 188, H.R. 1617, H.R. 2821, H.R. 2889, H.R. 3453, H.R. 3726, H.R. 3781, H.R. 4033, H.R. 4550, and H.R. 5352) Domestic violence (H.R. 1229) President's Budget Proposal for FY2015 |
crs_RL34194 | crs_RL34194_0 | The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Southeast Asia
Overview
While there has been significant anti-Western terrorist activity in Southeast Asia, counter-terror measures in recent years appear to have significantly degraded anti-Western terrorist groups' ability to launch attacks against Western targets in the region. U.S. attention in the region has been focused on radical Islamist groups, particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network, that are known or alleged to have ties to the Al Qaeda network. Despite mutual interests in combating terrorism, Southeast Asian governments have to balance these security concerns with domestic political considerations. Although proponents of violent, radical Islam remain a very small minority in Southeast Asia, many governments view increased American pressure and military presence in their region with concern because of the political sensitivity of the issue with both mainstream Islamic and secular nationalist groups. Jemaah Islamiyah is believed to have carried out the October 12, 2002 bombing in Bali, Indonesia, that killed approximately 200 people, mostly Western tourists. Al Qaeda reportedly provided funds and trainers for camps operated by local groups in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Since the Bali bombing in 2002, which JI is suspected of carrying out, crackdowns by various governments in the region are believed to have severely weakened the organization. They have shared training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mindanao. The sophistication of the simultaneous July 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta (discussed in " The July 2009 Jakarta Hotel Bombings ") triggered speculation that Al Qaeda had renewed ties with some Indonesian radicals, particularly the cell led by Noordin Mohammed Top. Many analysts believe that years of arrests have weakened JI to such an extent that it essentially is no longer a regional organization, but rather is one confined to Indonesia, with some individuals still operating in the southern Philippines. Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta killed nine and injured more than 50, including 6 Americans. The bombings were the first successful anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia in four years. Like Indonesia, the United States has faced terrorist threats and terrorist attacks. Indonesia has been effective in the apprehension and conviction of terrorists and extremists organizations. Indonesia also has strong bilateral counter-terror cooperation with Australia. Indonesia's attractiveness to Islamist terrorist groups appears to derive primarily from relatively weak central government control and considerable social and political instability and its overwhelmingly Muslim population. The bombings, the most deadly terrorist attack since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, appeared to mark a shift in JI's strategy; the FBI reported that in early 2002, senior JI leaders—meeting in Thailand—decided to attack "softer targets" in Asia such as tourist sites frequented by Westerners. Other bombings believed to have been carried out by JI since 2002 include the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003 that killed more than ten people and injured dozens; the bombing of the Australian Embassy in September 2004, killing 10 and wounding around 200; and the Bali II bombing of October 2005, in which three suicide bombers exploded bombs within minutes of one another in Bali, killing more than 20 people and wounding more than 100. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and President Bush agreed on the deployment of U.S. military personnel to the southern Philippines to train and assist the Philippine military against the terrorist Abu Sayyaf group, making the Philippines one of the most extensive examples of U.S. counterterrorism cooperation in Southeast Asia. U.S. Support for Philippine Military Operations
The Bush Administration has supported the Philippine government's policy of applying military pressure on Abu Sayyaf and seeking a negotiated settlement with the MILF. The KMM is a small, militant group calling for the overthrow of the Malaysian government and the creation of a pan-Islamic state encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines. Since 9/11, Singapore has increased intelligence cooperation with regional countries and the United States. | Since September 2001, the United States has increased focus on radical Islamist and terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly those in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Southeast Asia has been a base for terrorist operations. Al Qaeda penetrated the region by establishing local cells, training Southeast Asians in its camps in Afghanistan, and by financing and cooperating with indigenous radical Islamist groups. Indonesia and the southern Philippines have been particularly vulnerable to penetration by Islamic terrorist groups.
Members of one indigenous network, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which has had extensive ties to Al Qaeda, helped two of the September 11, 2001 hijackers and have confessed to plotting and carrying out attacks against Western targets. These include the deadliest terrorist attack since September 2001: the October 2002 bombing in Bali, Indonesia, that killed approximately 200 people, mostly Westerners. Since the Bali bombing in 2002, crackdowns by various governments in the region—encouraged and in some cases supported by the U.S. government and military—are believed to have weakened JI to such an extent that it essentially is no longer a regional organization, but rather is one confined to Indonesia, with some individuals still operating in the southern Philippines. The degrading of JI's leadership structure is believed to have altered the group's strategy. More violent, anti-Western JI members have formed breakaway cells. In September 2009, Indonesian authorities claimed they had killed the leader of one such cell, Noordin Mohammed Top. Noordin is believed to have been responsible for organizing the near-simultaneous July 17, 2009 bombings of the J.W. Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta. The bombings were the first successful anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia in four years. Their sophistication triggered speculation that Al Qaeda had renewed ties with Top.
To combat the threat, the U.S. has pressed countries in the region to arrest suspected terrorist individuals and organizations, funded and trained Indonesia's elite counter-terrorist unit, and deployed troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military in their fight against the violent Abu Sayyaf Group. It has also launched a Regional Maritime Security Initiative to enhance security in the Straits of Malacca, increased intelligence sharing operations, restarted military-military relations with Indonesia, and provided or requested from Congress substantial aid for Indonesia and the Philippines. Also, since 2001, Thailand and the United States have substantially increased their anti-terrorism cooperation.
The responses of countries in the region to both the threat and to the U.S. reaction generally have varied with the intensity of their concerns about the threat to their own stability and domestic politics. In general, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines were quick to crack down on militant groups and share intelligence with the United States and Australia, whereas Indonesia began to do so only after attacks or arrests revealed the severity of the threat to its citizens. Since that time, Indonesian authorities have been aggressive in their pursuit of terrorists and extremist groups. Many governments view increased American pressure and military presence in their region with ambivalence because of the political sensitivity of the issue with both mainstream Islamic and secular nationalist groups. The Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand has escalated in recent years as has terrorist activity in southern areas of the Philippines.
The report looks at the rise of Islamist militancy and the JI network, and discusses terrorism in the region, concluding with options for U.S. policy. Strategies include placing greater emphasis on attacking institutions that support terrorism, building up regional governments' capacities for combating terrorist groups, and reducing the sense of alienation among Muslim citizens. |
crs_R41482 | crs_R41482_0 | Background
The Dominican Republic is situated on the eastern two-thirds of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, which it shares with Haiti (see Figure 1 ). In May 2010, Férnandez's PLD party captured 31 of 32 seats in the Dominican Senate and 105 of 183 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. It will control both chambers through May 2016. Upon taking office, President Medina endorsed austerity and fiscal reform. Buoyed by a large congressional majority and high approval ratings (83% in a January 2015 poll), President Medina has implemented a variety of new social programs that have already yielded positive results. If the Dominican Republic rendered thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent stateless and deported some of them to Haiti, the potential impact on Haiti could be significant. If Medina does not run in 2016, the PLD may again select Leonel Fernández as its standard bearer for a fourth time. Regardless, most observers are expecting the party to retain the presidency in 2016. The main opposition party—the populist Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD)—has remained divided for several years between supporters of its leader, Miguel Vargas Maldonado (who is widely expected to seek its nomination in 2016), and those of former President Hipólito Mejía (2000-2004). Mejía seeks to run in 2016 as the candidate of a new Convergence party. Upon President Medina's election, President Obama said that he looked forward to working with him on bilateral and regional issues of shared concern. Foreign Aid
The United States is one of the largest bilateral donors to the Dominican Republic, with U.S. assistance totaling an estimated $25.3 million in FY2014 (see Table 1 below). The Administration requested $24.4 million for the Dominican Republic in its FY2016 request. In FY2010, rather than continuing to receive this assistance through the Mérida Initiative, the Dominican Republic began to receive assistance through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), a regional security initiative first announced at the April 2009 Summit of the Americas. From FY2010 to FY2014, Congress appropriated an estimated $327.0 million for CBSI programs. The Obama Administration asked Congress for $56.5 million in additional CBSI funding in its FY2015 budget request and $53.5 million for the program in FY2016. The Dominican Republic has also been designated a jurisdiction of primary concern for money laundering. Trade Issues
Since the 1980s, U.S.-Dominican trade and investment linkages have increased, first as a result of U.S. trade preference programs and then as a result of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The Dominican Congress ratified the agreement in September 2005 and implemented it on March 1, 2007. The United States remains the Dominican Republic's main trading partner, with two-way trade totaling nearly $12.5 billion in 2014. Agriculture and Labor Issues
In addition to influencing Dominican trade and economic policies, the labor chapter (Chapter 16) of CAFTA-DR seeks to ensure that there is increasing respect for internationally recognized labor standards in the Dominican Republic. In recent statements and in the State Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices covering 2013, the Obama Administration has expressed concern about the potential impact of the Dominican Constitutional Tribunal's ruling on the status of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent living in the Dominican Republic (see " Ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal of the Dominican Republic "). Medina is barred from seeking consecutive reelection but could decide to run again in 2020. Dominican-U.S. relations could become strained, however, due to U.S. concerns about human rights and labor issues. | The Dominican Republic, a country of roughly 10.3 million people that shares the Caribbean island of Hispaniola with Haiti, is a close U.S. trade partner and political ally in Latin America. The United States is the Dominican Republic's main trading partner, with two-way trade totaling more than $12.5 billion in 2014. In addition to trade, U.S. interest in the Dominican Republic has recently focused on anti-drug cooperation and governance/human rights issues, particularly as they relate to Haiti. U.S.-Dominican cooperation on bilateral and regional issues intensified during Leonel Fernández's most recent terms in office (2004-2008 and 2008-2012) and has continued during the Danilo Medina Administration.
Led by former President Fernández and current President Medina, the center-left Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) has solidified its dominance over Dominican politics. In May 2010, the PLD captured two-thirds of the seats in the Dominican Congress; the party will remain in control of the legislature through May 2016. With President Medina constitutionally barred from seeking consecutive reelection, the PLD may again select Leonel Fernández as its standard bearer. Regardless, most observers are expecting the party to remain dominant in the 2016 election cycle. The main opposition party—the populist Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD)—has remained divided for several years between supporters of its leader, Miguel Vargas Maldonado (who is widely expected to seek its nomination in 2016), and those of former President Hipólito Mejía (2000-2004). Mejía seeks to run in 2016 as the candidate of a new political movement.
Inaugurated on August 16, 2012, President Medina, a former member of the Dominican Congress and minister of the presidency, has built upon his predecessors' legacy while seeking to resolve lingering challenges related to the country's fiscal situation, energy sector, and education system. Medina has implemented ambitious economic and social policies that have helped him maintain extremely high approval ratings (83% in January 2015). The Medina government has struggled, however, to implement a September 2013 Dominican Constitutional Tribunal ruling that many argue may place hundreds of thousands of Dominican-born persons, most of who are of Haitian descent, at risk of statelessness. The ruling has been widely condemned by the international community and strained Dominican-Haitian relations.
In recent years, congressional interest in the Dominican Republic has focused on security, trade, and human rights issues. The United States is one of the largest bilateral donors to the Dominican Republic; in FY2014, assistance totaled some $25.3 million. FY2015 estimated assistance provided in P.L. 113-235 is not yet available. The Dominican Republic has also received at least $32.5 million through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), a regional initiative for which Congress appropriated $327.0 million from FY2010-FY2014. For FY2016, the Obama Administration requested at least $24.4 million for the Dominican Republic and $53.5 million for the CBSI program. Bilateral trade and investment flows have expanded since the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) entered into force for the Dominican Republic on March 1, 2007. Human rights issues, particularly the treatment of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, have also been of significant interest to Congress.
This report provides background information on political and economic conditions in the Dominican Republic, as well as an overview of some of the key issues in U.S.-Dominican relations. |
crs_RS22291 | crs_RS22291_0 | Highlights of the 2005 BRAC Commission Report
Closures and Realignments
In the 2005 BRAC round, the Department of Defense (DOD) recommended 190 closures and realignments. Subsequent Commission-recommended Legislation
Overview
The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended various changes to the existing statute governing its creation, organization, process, and outcome. It would expand the Commission's lifespan and mission. The Commission proposed legislation to extend the period to seven (7) months. | The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (commonly referred to as the BRAC Commission) submitted to the President its report on domestic military base closures and realignments on September 8, 2005. The President approved the list and forwarded it to Congress on September 15. This report summarizes some of the report's highlights and examines in detail the Commission's proposed legislation for the conduct of a potential future BRAC round. It will not be updated. |
crs_R41284 | crs_R41284_0 | Agencies responsible for national systems are usually separate from those that design and acquire tactical systems. Observers argue—and a number of key Members of Congress have concurred—that the drawbacks inherent in past and current ISR acquisition efforts are serious enough to indicate that consideration should be given to the preparation of an agreed-upon multi-year plan or "architecture" that provides production schedules for currently planned ISR systems and the introduction of new platforms. If such a plan were agreed upon, advocates argue, it would be possible to restrain cost growth, ensure that all requirements had been considered, and establish the best possible mix of satellites and unmanned and manned systems. Stability operations, large-scale counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism operations are not niche challenges or the responsibility of a single Military Department, but rather require a portfolio of capabilities as well as sufficient capacity from across America's Armed Forces and other departments and agencies. Funds are also authorized and appropriated in different legislative measures. Other important ISR systems are designed for and operated by military commanders and are grouped in the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Most UAS have been MIP systems as have manned aircraft in recent decades. Satellite acquisition is complicated. This model would provide for a balanced architecture where a foundational capability would be provided from medium or large systems. Alternately, some might argue that long-existing organizational relationships tend to become sclerotic, potentially inhibiting the development of innovative technologies that can serve operating forces at reasonable costs. Both have an endurance of 24 hours. Without a strategy (and a plan to implement it) "the defense and intelligence communities may continue to make independent decisions and use resources that are not necessarily based on national priorities, which could lead to gaps in some areas of space operations and redundancies in others." Some observers believe that these committees may tend to focus on ISR systems as components of larger defense programs whereas the intelligence committees might have focused more on support to national policymakers. The FY2009 Defense Authorization Act, Section 144, also required
the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff establish a policy and an acquisition strategy for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance payloads and ground stations for manned and unmanned aerial vehicle systems. The 113th Congress
ISR issues will continue to be an area of concern, especially in light of the lack of a long-term investment strategy called for by the 112 th Congress and the pending impact of sequestration. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in March 2013, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper indicated that sequestration would delay major systems acquisition and require older reconnaissance systems to be decommissioned. The DNI and the FY2014 budget request indicated an effort to protect the intelligence community workforce, suggesting that hard choices in response to budget cuts will focus on ISR systems and other expensive collection platforms. Similarly, there are no indications that technological capabilities of ISR systems have reached a stable plateau, and basing future plans on current technologies may prove to be shortsighted. Acquiring and using ISR systems is likely to remain a substantial challenge for the U.S. government in coming decades and one that will depend on effective cooperation among the intelligence community, the Defense Department, and Congress. | Increasing calls for intelligence support and continuing innovations in intelligence technologies combine to create significant challenges for both the executive and legislative branches. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems are integral components of both national policymaking and military operations, including counterterrorism operations, but they are costly and complicated and they must be linked in order to provide users with a comprehensive understanding of issues based on information from all sources. Relationships among organizations responsible for designing, acquiring, and operating these systems are also complicated, as are oversight arrangements in Congress. These complications have meant that even though many effective systems have been fielded, there have also been lengthy delays and massive cost overruns. Uncertainties about the long-term acquisition plans for ISR systems persist even as pressures continue for increasing the availability of ISR systems in current and future military operations and for national policymaking.
These challenges have been widely recognized. A number of independent assessments have urged development of "architectures" or roadmaps setting forth agreed-upon plans for requirements and acquisition and deployment schedules. Most observers would agree that such a document would be highly desirable, but there are significant reasons why developing such an architecture and gaining an enduring consensus remain problematic. First, ISR technologies are not static; whereas it is possible to plan for aircraft, ships, or tanks that can be used for decades, it is doubtful that today's inventory of satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, and manned aircraft will still be the right mix a few years hence. Some believe that a "cast-in-concrete" plan would inhibit the ability to take advantage of new technologies or techniques as they emerge. Secondly, achieving consensus on such a plan would be greatly affected by the separate priorities of different parts of the intelligence community, the Defense Department, and Washington policymakers. The needs of policymakers and military commanders are different and are usually reconciled only on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, different congressional oversight committees may also have different perspectives on priorities and some may seek to emphasize funding for specific systems.
The Director of National Intelligence could be given authority to reach across current organizational boundaries to define requirements and priorities. Some propose establishing a position for a separate "ISR Czar" to do this. Few observers believe that ISR programs could be carved out of the intelligence budget and/or the defense budget, and placed under the control of a single officer or lead agency. There is a strong likelihood that separate needs and concerns that affect the current systems will not disappear, even if one official has a new and expansive charter. Similar concerns would exist in regard to the jurisdictions of congressional oversight committees.
ISR issues will continue to be an area of concern for the 113th Congress, especially in light of the lack of a long-term investment strategy and the pending impact of sequestration. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in March 2013, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper indicated that sequestration would delay major systems acquisition and require older reconnaissance systems to be decommissioned. The DNI and the President's FY2014 budget request indicated an effort to protect the intelligence community workforce, suggesting that hard choices in response to budget cuts will focus on ISR systems and other expensive collection platforms. |
crs_R44256 | crs_R44256_0 | However, a number of recent high-profile police shootings and other law enforcement-related deaths have reignited the debate about how much force police should wield in a democratic society that values both law and order and the personal liberty of each of its citizens under law. Certain segments of the law enforcement community and its supporters have argued that regulating local police is best left to the province of state and local governments, and that a one-size-fits-all approach would hamper local experimentation. On the civil side is 42 U.S.C. To provide legal context for this debate, this report will address three overarching questions: (1) what are the constitutional rules governing an officer's use of force; (2) what role has Congress played in providing a remedy for a violation of these rules; and (3) what are the potential reforms to these rules and remedies? While this provision is best known for providing restraints on government searches and surveillance and the procedures under which they may be conducted, in a series of cases beginning in the 1980s the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment as the primary federal legal restraint on excessive force. Resolving a dispute in the lower federal courts about whether the Fourth Amendment applied outside the context of deadly force, the Supreme Court held that " all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard." That said, a few general trends can be noted. In rejecting Singleton's Section 1983 claim premised on excessive force, the court held that the use of the pepper spray was not unreasonable because (1) the state had a significant interest in keeping public roads clear; (2) the officer faced an "explosive situation" in which he was greatly outnumbered by the protesters; (3) he provided a warning before using the spray; and (4) pepper spray was likely the least intrusive force available to the officer. Remedies for Use of Force
To provide legal remedies for the unconstitutional use of force by law enforcement officers, Congress has primarily relied on three federal statutes: (1) a criminal offense for violations of constitutional rights, including excessive force; (2) a civil cause of action for deprivation of such rights; and (3) a statute authorizing the Attorney General to bring civil suits for injunctive relief against police departments engaged in a "pattern or practice" of such unconstitutional use of force. Federal Criminal Civil Rights Statute (18 U.S.C. §242)
Following the Civil War, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which made it a criminal offense to deprive another of a civil right while acting under color of law. Circuit Courts' Interpretation of Section 242
In the wake of Screws , the lower courts have been left to determine the meaning of "willfully" and how to apply Section 242's specific intent requirement. Federal Civil Rights Claims (42 U.S.C. This doctrine has frequently come under attack for shielding officers from liability even when they have engaged in unconstitutional conduct. The right to indemnification is not governed by federal law, but is a matter of state or local law. Municipal Liability
In addition to suing the police officers directly involved in an incident of excessive force, many Section 1983 plaintiffs can go after the "deep pocket of municipalities" that employ these officers. Section 14141, the "pattern or practice" statute. Reforming Police Use of Force
In response to the recent law enforcement-related deaths in Ferguson and elsewhere, Members have introduced various bills in the 114 th Congress to rein in police use of excessive force and provide accountability. 2052)
The Excessive Use of Force Prevention Act of 2015 ( H.R. 1102)
The Police Accountability Act of 2015 ( H.R. 1101 ) would create a new federal crime for certain homicides committed by law enforcement officers. | Several high-profile police shootings and other law enforcement-related deaths in the United States have sparked intense protests throughout the country and a fierce debate in Congress concerning the appropriate level of force police officers should wield in a society that equally values public safety and the lives of each of its citizens under law. These incidents have been the subject of several congressional hearings, have prompted the introduction of various legislative measures, and have catalyzed a new civil rights movement in the United States aimed at reforming the criminal justice system. Reformers claim that police work too closely with local prosecutors resulting in insufficient oversight and have called for greater involvement by the federal government. The law enforcement community and its supporters have countered that these recent deaths are anomalous in otherwise exemplary police conduct, and that placing the federal government in direct regulation of state and local police would present an unwarranted intrusion into state and local affairs.
To provide legal context for this debate, this report will address three overarching questions: (1) what are the constitutional rules governing an officer's use of force; (2) what role has Congress played in providing a remedy for a violation of these rules; and (3) what are the potential reforms to these rules and remedies?
Rules. In a line of cases beginning in the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court ruled that all claims of excessive force occurring during an arrest or investigatory stop—deadly or otherwise—are governed by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures. Under prevailing judicial precedent, all uses of force must be "objectively reasonable" based on the totality of the circumstances viewed through the lens of the officer in the field. This requires a fact-intensive inquiry that is not easily reduced to categorical rules, but some general trends can be discerned from the case law. For instance, the courts have been deferential to officers in the field who are required to make split-second decisions in dangerous situations. Also, officers need not use the least intrusive means to effectuate a seizure so long as their actions are reasonable.
Remedies. In an effort to provide teeth to federal constitutional restraints, Congress has enacted three federal statutes that accord various remedies for police use of excessive force. First is the federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 242, which prohibits officers from willfully depriving another of a constitutional right while acting under color of law. Enacted shortly after the Civil War, many have argued that Section 242's specific intent mens rea requirement is too high a threshold to provide an adequate deterrence to excessive force. Moreover, the federal circuit courts are split on how to apply this test, with some requiring a strict form of intent and others permitting a reckless disregard jury instruction. Second is the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which provides a civil cause of action for deprivations of one's constitutional rights. While generally viewed as successful in providing monetary damages to those injured by officers in the field, the doctrine of qualified immunity has frequently shielded officers from liability when the law was not "clearly established" at the time. Third is the more recently enacted "pattern or practice" statute, 42 U.S.C. Section 14141, which authorizes the Attorney General to sue local municipalities whose police forces have engaged in a pattern of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.
Reforms. Various reform bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress to provide additional restraints on police use of force, including the Excessive Use of Force Prevention Act of 2015 (H.R. 2052), which would criminalize the use of chokeholds, and the Police Accountability Act of 2015 (H.R. 1102), which would create a new federal crime for certain homicides committed by law enforcement officers. Additionally, several bills would place requirements on states to report use of force statistics to the federal government. |
crs_RL33340 | crs_RL33340_0 | Introduction
More than 80 benefit programs provide cash and noncash aid that is directed primarily to persons with limited income. These benefit programs cost approximately $583 billion in FY2004, a record high. This sum was up $34 billion (6.2%) from the previous peak of FY2003, and it equaled 5% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Higher medical spending accounted for $26 billion of the net increase in FY2004, and 55 cents out of every dollar spent on persons with limited income went for medical benefits. Federal low-income spending represented 18.6% of the federal budget, with 9% attributed to medical assistance. That is, they transfer income in the form of cash, goods, or services to persons who make no payment and render no service in return. However, in the case of the job and training programs and some educational benefits, recipients must work or study for wages, training allowances, stipends, grants, or loans. Further, the TANF block grant program requires adults to commence work (defined by the state) after a period of enrollment, the Food Stamp program imposes work and training requirements, and public housing programs require recipients to engage in "self-sufficiency" activities or to perform community service. Finally, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is available only to workers. Spending Trends by Level of Government
Tables 3, 4, and 5 present 1968-2004 spending on low-income programs in constant 2004 dollars, by form of benefit; Table 3 displays federal spending; Table 4 , corresponding state-local data; and Table 5 , total low-income spending amounts. State-local spending (constant dollars) rose from $26 billion to $156 billion during the same period, an increase of 502%. Federal spending set successive new record highs during FY1998-FY2004. Aid Received by Poor Families With Children
The Census Bureau reports that 7.6 million families (including 5.8 million with children) in 2003 had total pre-tax money income—after counting any cash from the programs of TANF, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and General Assistance (GA)—that was below their poverty threshold. Figure 3 depicts income-tested aid provided to families with children who were poor before receiving any cash aid from TANF, GA, or the EITC. In 2003, these families totaled 6.1 million (compared with 5.1 million in 2000): 3.7 million with a female householder and 2.4 million with a male householder (chiefly two-parent families). Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries (SLMB) . Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
Note: This entry describes use of TANF block grant funds for cash aid. 1). Food Aid
19. 56. Appropriations for social services were $152.2 million in FY2004. WIA defines a low-income person as one who (a) receives cash welfare or is a member of a family that receives cash welfare, (b) receives food stamps or is a member of family that was eligible to receive food stamps in the previous six months; (c) had family income for the preceding six months no higher than the federal poverty guideline (a limit in 2003 throughout the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia of $ 18,400 for a family of four persons and $8,980 for a single person) or no higher than 70% of the lower living standard income level (LLSIL) (a ceiling that ranged, effective on May 30, 2003, for a four-person family from $18,270 in non-metropolitan areas of the South to $22,230 in metropolitan areas of the Northeast—and higher in Alaska, Hawaii and Guam); (d) is homeless, as defined in the Stewart McKinney Homeless Assistance Act; (e) is a foster child on behalf of whom state or local government payments are made; or (f) is a disabled person whose own income meets the program limit, but whose family income exceeds it. | More than 80 benefit programs provide aid—in cash and noncash form—that is directed primarily to persons with limited or low income. Such programs constitute the public "welfare" system, if welfare is defined as income-tested or need-based benefits. This definition omits social insurance programs like Social Security and Medicare.
Income-tested benefit programs in FY2004 cost approximately $583 billion: $427 billion in federal funds and $156 billion in state-local funds (Table 1). Spending on these programs represented 18.6% of all federal spending, with medical aid accounting for 9% of the budget. Total low-income spending in FY2004 equaled 5% of the gross domestic product and set a record high, up $34 billion (6.2%) from the previous peak of FY2003. In current dollars, spending on income-tested programs increased during the year for all forms of aid except jobs, training, services, and energy aid. Higher medical spending accounted for $26 billion of the net increase in FY2004, and 55 cents of every low-income dollar went for medical assistance. Expressed in constant FY2004 dollars (Table 2), income-tested spending increased by 3.8% from the 2003 level.
The composition of low-income spending differed by level of government (Tables 3 and 4). Medical aid consumed nearly 82% of state-local funds, but 46% of federal low-income dollars.
Most income-tested programs provide benefits in the form of cash, goods, or services to persons who make no payment and render no service in return. However, in the case of the job and training programs and some educational benefits, recipients must work or study for wages, grants, or loans. Further, the block grant program of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) requires adults to start work after a period of enrollment, the food stamp program imposes work and training requirements, and public housing requires residents to engage in "self-sufficiency" activities or perform community service. Finally, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is available only to workers.
An unduplicated count of beneficiaries of income-tested programs is not available. Enrollment in TANF and food stamps remained below 1994-1995 peak levels during 2002-2004 (although food stamp enrollment rose from the 2000-2002 period), while Medicaid enrollment set a record high. Average 2004 monthly numbers: food stamps, 24.9 million; TANF, 4.7 million; and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 7.1 million. During the year, 56.1 million persons received Medicaid services, and in calendar year 2004, EITC payments went to an estimated 19.2 million tax filers. Census Bureau data indicate that 5.8 million families with children were poor in 2003 before receiving cash aid from TANF, General Assistance (GA), or the EITC, compared with 6.7 million in 1996 (the last full year of the pre-TANF welfare program). Among these families, the EITC was received by 43.8% of those with a female head, and by 67.8% of those with a male present (Figure 3). |
crs_R43344 | crs_R43344_0 | High-level state corruption also slowed post-war recovery and development. The political dispute that triggered the crisis was not based on ethnic identity, but it overlapped with preexisting ethnic and political grievances, sparking armed clashes and targeted ethnic killings in the capital, Juba, and then beyond. Major clashes between the two sides decreased, but armed conflict continued and both sides repeatedly violated the ceasefire before coming together to form a new Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) in late April 2016, six months behind schedule. Recent Developments
The unity government's formation did not end the war—clashes have continued, notably in areas that were comparatively calm in the first two years of the conflict. In early July, a series of incidents between the parties' forces in Juba sparked days of intense fighting in the city. Machar, whose residence was destroyed, also fled and was reportedly pursued by government forces for weeks; he ultimately sought refuge outside the country. Government forces have been accused of serious abuses against civilians during the fighting in Juba and afterward, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, looting and property destruction, and sexual violence. U.N. officials estimate that at least 50,000 people have been killed since the conflict began, but no reliable death count exists, and some experts suggest the toll may be much higher. More than 2.7 million people have been displaced since December 2013. Many of the displaced lost their livelihoods when they fled their homes. U.N. officials estimate that over half the country needs humanitarian aid and that more than 4.8 million people—roughly 40% of the population—face life-threatening hunger. The operational environment for aid agencies is deteriorating. Human Rights Concerns
U.N. human rights officials assert that targeted attacks by both government and opposition forces against civilians and U.N. personnel during the conflict in South Sudan may constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity. The U.N. Security Council has sought to bolster the region's efforts to facilitate a political solution to the crisis, including through the threat of sanctions, and has authorized the deployment of additional peacekeepers in an effort to protect civilians and to support both humanitarian relief operations and the peace process. South Sudan overtook Afghanistan in 2015 as the country with the highest reported number of major attacks on humanitarians. More than 60 relief workers have been killed since the conflict began. By some accounts, violence against aid workers may be designed to deter assistance to certain communities. The U.N. Panel of Experts reports that threats against the U.N. and international humanitarian personnel are increasing "in scope, number, and degree of brutality, in a context in which senior figures of the government, including Kiir, are intensifying their rhetoric against and hostility toward the U.N., regional bodies, and the broader international community." The reported threats to civil society coincide with a reported tightening of government restrictions on the operations of relief agencies. Efforts to Stabilize the Country
The U.N. Security Council, seeking to stabilize the South Sudan crisis, has emphasized that it views the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan as "the framework for durable peace, reconciliation and national cohesion." The status of that deal, however, is now in question, as is the warring parties' commitment to it. The United States, at the request of East African countries after the fighting in July, has led an international diplomatic push to deploy additional U.N. peacekeepers to Juba. The RPF's mandate would be to provide a secure environment in the capital, with the hope that the force's presence might create conditions more conducive for broader stabilization efforts. The South Sudan government was initially vocal in its opposition to the proposed expansion of the existing peacekeeping mission, viewing the RPF's deployment as a threat to its sovereignty and suggesting that it was part of an alleged "regime change agenda." The government grudgingly granted consent after a visit by U.N. Security Council representatives in early September, but has sought to condition its acceptance on approval of "modalities" for the proposed RPF, including its composition and armament. Mixed messages from the international community on the status of the peace agreement and the legitimacy of the TGNU, in light of Kiir's replacement of opposition members of the government, may complicate the path forward. That statement has been interpreted by some in the region as a determination by the United States that Deng's appointment as First Vice President was in line with the peace agreement. Whether President Kiir's replacement of Machar and other SPLM-IO officials complies with the terms of the peace agreement is a key question in the context of international engagement with the South Sudan government. With conflict ongoing in parts of the country and rumors of forthcoming dry-season offensives, donors may question whether this is an appropriate time to invest in the government's proposed recovery and development efforts. Without donor engagement, though, South Sudan's crisis appears set to worsen further—the International Monetary Fund has warned that without economic reforms and political reconciliation, the economic situation will further deteriorate and the government will be unable to meet key obligations. In view of ongoing negotiations on the RPF's deployment, the prospects for a possible arms embargo, threatened by the Security Council in Resolution 2304 in August, are unclear. U.S. Policy and Foreign Assistance
The United States played a major role in facilitating the CPA and South Sudan's independence, and is the country's largest bilateral foreign aid donor. It also plays a key role in U.N. Security Council deliberations on South Sudan. The U.S.-based Enough Project has called for the United States and others in the international community to curb the laundering of proceeds of corruption in South Sudan and to impose new sanctions on leaders responsible for misappropriating state assets, obstructing civil society, committing mass atrocities, and fueling the war. With U.S. spending on humanitarian, development, reconstruction, security sector, and peacekeeping support approaching, and sometimes exceeding, $1 billion per year in South Sudan since the CPA was signed in 2005, the United States has invested over $11 billion in the country since 2005. In addition to its support for the humanitarian response and ongoing development programs, the United States is the largest financial contributor to UNMISS and a key donor for ceasefire monitoring and other efforts to mitigate conflict. On July 12, the U.S. military deployed 47 personnel to Juba to protect U.S. citizens and property. While many viewed the August 2015 peace agreement as an important milestone toward ending the conflict, the violence has continued, spurring new displacement. Despite its rhetorical commitment to the August 2015 peace agreement, there is little evidence that the government of President Salva Kiir is currently willing to share power with the opposition, and the prospects for the opposition's return to Juba are unclear. Given the gravity of the abuses committed during the conflict and the shortcomings of South Sudan's criminal justice system, the 2015 peace deal included the creation of a hybrid court, to be established by the African Union and independent from the national judiciary, with a majority of its judges from African countries other than South Sudan. | South Sudan, which separated from Sudan in 2011 after almost 40 years of civil war, was drawn into a devastating new conflict in late 2013, when a political dispute that overlapped with preexisting ethnic and political fault lines turned violent. Civilians have been routinely targeted in the conflict, often along ethnic lines, and the warring parties have been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The war and resulting humanitarian crisis have displaced more than 2.7 million people, including roughly 200,000 who are sheltering at U.N. peacekeeping bases in the country. Over 1 million South Sudanese have fled as refugees to neighboring countries. No reliable death count exists.
U.N. agencies report that the humanitarian situation, already dire with over 40% of the population facing life-threatening hunger, is worsening, as continued conflict spurs a sharp increase in food prices. Famine may be on the horizon. Aid workers, among them hundreds of U.S. citizens, are increasingly under threat—South Sudan overtook Afghanistan as the country with the highest reported number of major attacks on humanitarians in 2015. At least 62 aid workers have been killed during the conflict, and U.N. experts warn that threats are increasing in scope and brutality.
In August 2015, the international community welcomed a peace agreement signed by the warring parties, but it did not end the conflict. The formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) in late April 2016, six months behind schedule, followed months of ceasefire violations. Opposition leader Riek Machar returned to the capital, Juba, for the first time since the conflict began, and his swearing-in as First Vice President of the new power-sharing government led by his rival, President Salva Kiir, was heralded as a major milestone toward peace. By late June, however, with little sign of subsequent progress in implementing the agreement, the head of the international monitoring commission warned that the peace deal was under threat of collapse. Fighting in parts of the country previously seen as stable spurred new displacement and amplified concerns about a return to full-scale war.
By early July, mistrust among the parties in Juba had mounted and, with the two sides having negotiated security arrangements that allowed armed elements in the capital, the situation quickly deteriorated—which side started the fighting remains subject to debate, but hundreds were killed before ceasefires were declared on July 11. Reported attacks by government forces, including sexual assaults and ethnically targeted killings, on civilians and aid workers during the violence have prompted an international outcry and raised questions about the response of peacekeepers. More than 12,000 people sought shelter at the U.N. peacekeeping bases in Juba; Machar and other opposition officials fled the city and ultimately sought refuge outside the country. The status of the unity government, and the peace agreement itself, is now in question.
The United States, at the request of East African countries, has since led an international effort to deploy additional U.N. peacekeepers to Juba, with the immediate aim of providing a secure environment in the capital, and with the hope that the force's presence may create conditions more conducive for broader stabilization efforts. The South Sudan government has been reluctant to accept the force, viewing the deployment as a possible threat to its sovereignty, and has sought to condition its consent on approval of "modalities" for the force, including its composition. While negotiations on the force's deployment continue, the prospects for a possible arms embargo, threatened by the U.N. Security Council in August, are unclear.
Mixed messages from the international community on the status of the peace agreement and the legitimacy of the TGNU, following President Kiir's replacement of Machar and many of the opposition representatives in the government in late July, may complicate the path forward. By some accounts, the TGNU and the peace agreement on which it was based have collapsed, and reports suggest that both sides may be preparing for a return to full-scale war.
In the context of ongoing conflict, donor governments, including the United States, may deliberate on whether, or how, to invest in proposed recovery and development efforts in the country. Without robust donor engagement, South Sudan's crisis appears set to worsen—the International Monetary Fund warns that without economic reforms and political reconciliation, the economy will further deteriorate and the government may be unable to meet key obligations, including salaries for its army. Donor concern about state corruption, however, is high, amid reports that senior officials have diverted state assets to fuel the war, and for their own benefit.
The United States, which played a key role in supporting South Sudan's independence, has long been its leading donor and is a key diplomatic actor. With congressional support, the United States made major investments in South Sudan's recovery and development after the Sudanese civil war ended in 2005, but many of those gains have now been reversed. The Obama Administration has contributed over $1.7 billion in humanitarian aid since the conflict began in December 2013. Along with its support for the humanitarian response and ongoing development programs, the United States is the largest financial contributor to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the country and a key donor for ceasefire monitoring and other efforts to mitigate conflict. As Congress considers available options for U.S. engagement, several key questions arise:
How can the United States most effectively facilitate an end to violence and a path toward peace and reconciliation, both among political factions and rival communities? Is the August 2015 peace agreement still viable? Should peace negotiations be restarted? Is the government in Juba still, in practice, a unity government? If fighting continues, what possible steps—further sanctions, an arms embargo, new types of aid, aid restrictions—would be most appropriate and most effective? How can the United States support efforts to pursue accountability for alleged war crimes without a negative impact on the peace process? Given the serious abuses committed by the warring parties, what role, if any, should the United States play in the reform of a security apparatus that is expected to combine their forces? How should the United States engage with senior officials who have been accused of directing military operations in which war crimes have reportedly been committed? How can the international community help to create a more secure environment for aid workers, including U.S. citizens? How significant is the impact of reported government restrictions on aid deliveries? In light of reported threats against Americans and recent assaults on U.S. citizens and incidents involving U.S. diplomats in Juba, how does the U.S. government currently assess the threat to the U.S. embassy, and to U.S. citizens in South Sudan more broadly? What are the international community's expectations of peacekeepers with regard to protecting civilians, and do they have the appropriate personnel, equipment, and political will to implement their mandate? What lessons have been learned from past support for state-building efforts in South Sudan, and how can foreign donors best support more transparent, inclusive, and accountable governance going forward? |
crs_RS22583 | crs_RS22583_0 | Introduction
Concern about shareholder value, corporate governance, and the economic and social impact of escalating pay for corporate executives has led to a controversy regarding the practices of paying these executives. In the 110 th Congress, two laws containing executive compensation provisions applicable to executives of specific types of businesses were enacted: P.L. 110-289 , the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, and P.L. 110-343 , the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Bills concerning executive compensation limits have been introduced in the 111 th Congress. In the 111 th Congress, Title VII of P.L. 111-5 , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), amended Section 111 of P.L. 110-343 to set forth somewhat different and more detailed restrictions on the compensation of executives of companies during the period in which any obligation arising from financial assistance provided under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) remains outstanding. H.R. The House Committee on Financial Services circulated a discussion draft of H.R. 3269 , the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009. On July 31, 2009, the House passed an amended version of the bill. The bill is included as Title II of H.R. 4173 , passed by the House on December 11, 2009. As part of their financial regulatory reform legislation, both the House and the Senate passed bills with provisions applying to executive compensation. The House- and Senate-passed executive compensation provisions differed, in some cases significantly. The House and Senate conferees on Wall Street reform passed an executive compensation subtitle. On June 30, 2010, the House agreed to the conference report for H.R. 4173 , now referred to as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). The Senate agreed to the conference report on July 15, 2010. The President signed the bill into law as P.L. 111-203 on July 21, 2010. In the 112 th Congress, H.R. 3606 , eventually a combination of several House bills, passed both the House and the Senate and is titled the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). The bill's Section 102(a) exempts for up to five years certain companies with annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion, called emerging growth companies, from complying with the requirement of Dodd-Frank concerning the nonbinding shareholder vote on the approval of executive compensation. The President signed the bill on April 5, 2012. Jones v. Harris Associates
On March 3, 2009, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones v. Harris Associates . Interest in this case from the executive compensation angle centers on the possibility that the decision may provide a hint as to what the Court could consider excessive executive compensation if it has before it a case concerning, for example, government actions limiting executive compensation. On November 2, 2009, the Court heard oral argument in this case. On March 30, 2010, the Court held that, in order to be successful in holding that an adviser misled the fund's directors and thereby violated his fiduciary duty, investors must show that an investment adviser has charged a "fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm's length bargaining." | Concern about shareholder value, corporate governance, and the economic and social impact of escalating pay for corporate executives has led to a controversy regarding the practices of paying these executives. Proposals have been made in the current and recent Congresses to limit executive compensation and the amount of deferred compensation for tax purposes. In the 110th Congress, two laws containing executive compensation provisions were enacted: P.L. 110-289, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, and P.L. 110-343, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Bills have also been introduced in the 111th Congress concerning limiting executive compensation. In the 111th Congress, Title VII of P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), sets forth restrictions on the compensation of executives of companies during the period in which any obligation arising from financial assistance provided under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) remains outstanding. In July 2009 the House Committee on Financial Services circulated a discussion draft of H.R. 3269, the Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation Fairness Act of 2009. On July 31, 2009, the House passed an amended version of H.R. 3269, which is included as Title II of H.R. 4173, passed by the House on December 11, 2009. The Senate considered a proposal of a financial regulatory reform bill, of which Subtitle E of Title IX concerned executive compensation.
Both the House and the Senate passed bills with provisions applying to executive compensation. The House- and Senate-passed executive compensation provisions differed, in some cases significantly. The House and Senate conferees on Wall Street reform passed an executive compensation subtitle. On June 30, 2010, the House agreed to the conference report for H.R. 4173, now referred to as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). The Senate agreed to the conference report on July 15, 2010. The President signed the bill into law as P.L. 111-203 on July 21, 2010.
In the 112th Congress, H.R. 3606, eventually a combination of several House bills, passed both the House and the Senate and is titled the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act). The bill has a provision which would exempt certain companies with annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion from complying with many of the executive compensation provisions of Dodd-Frank for up to five years. The President signed the bill on April 5, 2012.
On March 3, 2009, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones v. Harris Associates, a case which challenged the fees charged by a mutual fund's investment advisers as excessive and a breach of fiduciary duty. Interest in this case from the executive compensation angle centered on the possibility that the decision might provide a hint as to what the Court could consider excessive executive compensation. On November 2, 2009, the Court heard oral argument in this case. On March 30, 2010, the Court held that, in order to be successful in holding that an adviser misled the fund's directors and thereby violated his fiduciary duty, investors must show that an investment adviser has charged a "fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm's length bargaining." |
crs_R44162 | crs_R44162_0 | Introduction
In every war fought by the United States, civilian ships have supported military operations by transporting supplies and personnel. Currently, only limited groups of World War II-era merchant mariners are eligible for benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). H.R. A complete list of groups granted active duty status for the purpose of eligibility for veterans' benefits pursuant to P.L. Considered Active Duty and Eligible for All Veterans' Benefits
United States merchant seamen who served on blockships in support of Operation Mulberry. American merchant marine in oceangoing service during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, and who meet the following qualifications: was employed by the War Shipping Administration or Office of Defense Transportation (or their agents) as a merchant seaman documented by the U.S. Coast Guard or the Department of Commerce (Merchant Mariner's Document/Certificate of Service) or as a civil servant employed by the U.S. Army Transport Service (later redesignated U.S. Army Transportation Corps, Water Division) or the Naval Transportation Service; and served satisfactorily as a crew member during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, aboard merchant vessels in oceangoing—that is, foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise—service (per 46 U.S.C. §§10301 and 10501) and further to include near foreign voyages between the United States and Canada, Mexico, or the West Indies via ocean routes, or public vessels in oceangoing service or foreign waters. Eligible for Burial Benefits and National Cemetery Interment Only18
Served between August 16, 1945, and December 31, 1946, as a member of the United States merchant marine (including the Army Transport Service and the Naval Transport Service) serving as a crewmember of a vessel that was operated by the War Shipping Administration or the Office of Defense Transportation (or an agent of either); operated in waters other than inland waters, the Great Lakes, and other lakes, bays, and harbors of the United States; under contract or charter to, or property of, the government of the United States; and serving the Armed Forces; and while so serving, was licensed or otherwise documented for service as a crewmember of such a vessel by an officer or employee of the United States authorized to license or document the person for such service. 154 , the Honoring Our WWII Merchant Mariners Act of 2017, would provide compensation to former World War II-era merchant mariners to account for the benefits they were not able to access before being granted veterans' benefit eligibility in the 1980s. 105-368 . | Although merchant mariners have supported the Armed Forces in every war fought by the United States, they generally are not considered veterans for the purpose of eligibility for federal benefits. Pursuant to legislation enacted in 1977 (P.L. 95-202) and 1988 (P.L. 105-368) and to decisions made by the Secretary of the Air Force in 1985 and 1988, the following groups of World War II-era merchant mariners are the only merchant mariners eligible for veterans' benefits.
Eligible for all veterans' benefits:
United States merchant seamen who served on blockships in support of Operation Mulberry. American merchant marine in oceangoing service during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, and who meet the following qualifications: employed by the War Shipping Administration or Office of Defense Transportation (or their agents) as a merchant seaman documented by the U.S. Coast Guard or the Department of Commerce (Merchant Mariner's Document/Certificate of Service) or as a civil servant employed by the U.S. Army Transport Service (later redesignated U.S. Army Transportation Corps, Water Division) or the Naval Transportation Service; and served satisfactorily as a crew member during the period of armed conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945, aboard merchant vessels in oceangoing—that is, foreign, intercoastal, or coastwise—service (per 46 U.S.C. §§10301 and 10501) and further to include near foreign voyages between the United States and Canada, Mexico, or the West Indies via ocean routes, or public vessels in oceangoing service or foreign waters.
Eligible for burial benefit and national cemetery interment only:
Served between August 16, 1945, and December 31, 1946, as a member of the United States merchant marine (including the Army Transport Service and the Naval Transport Service), serving as a crewmember of a vessel that was operated by the War Shipping Administration or the Office of Defense Transportation (or an agent of either); operated in waters other than inland waters, the Great Lakes, and other lakes, bays, and harbors of the United States; under contract or charter to, or property of, the government of the United States; and serving the Armed Forces; and while so serving, was licensed or otherwise documented for service as a crewmember of such a vessel by an officer or employee of the United States authorized to license or document the person for such service.
H.R. 154, the Honoring Our WWII Merchant Mariners Act of 2017, would provide one-time compensation of $25,000 to World War-II merchant mariners to account for benefits they were not able to access before being granted veterans' benefit eligibility. |
crs_RL34497 | crs_RL34497_0 | In August 2007, Congress authorized the establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy (ARPA-E) to support transformational energy technology research projects with the goal of enhancing the nation's economic and energy security. Modeled on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the Department of Defense (DOD), ARPA-E would be a new organization within the Department of Energy (DOE) (see Box 1 below ). Overview of ARPA-E Design
As outlined in the America COMPETES Act ( P.L. Funding
Congress authorized $300 million for ARPA-E in FY2008 and "such sums as are necessary" for FY2009 and FY2010. Congress subsequently appropriated no funds for FY2008. The Bush Administration requested no funds for ARPA-E in FY2009, and took no actions to begin its operations. In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ), Congress provided ARPA-E funding of $400 million which supplemented FY2009 funds of $15 million ( P.L. 111-8 ). As a result, ARPA-E's received its initial funding of $415 million in FY2009. The ARRA funds are available for obligation until September 30, 2010. The Obama Administration has proposed ARPA-E receive funding of $10 million in FY2010. The House Committee on Appropriations declined to provide this funding. No Senate action has taken place. No information is provided in the FOA regarding ARPA-E's organization or staffing, or the amount of its $415 million FY2009 budget for those activities. Given DOE expects to award $150 million in response to this first solicitation, $265 million remains of this budget for ARPA-E administration and possible future awards. Concerned members of Congress may be involved in oversight of these activities to ensure that ARPA-E meets the goals outlined in the America COMPETES Act. Several management design elements to monitor include the timely appointment of a director for ARPA-E, recruitment of highly qualified technical Program Managers familiar with the DARPA process, maintenance of autonomy from DOE's current activities, and sufficient funding and organizational flexibility. Issues for Congress
Besides overseeing the establishment of ARPA-E and its funding, an issue for Congress is how ARPA-E will differ from existing DOE Office of Science activities, including the new Energy Frontier Research Centers, the DOE energy technology offices, and the Energy Innovation Hubs proposed in the FY2010 budget. In addition, several bills introduced in Congress would either provide ARPA-E with additional authority or a source of funds, or require the Secretary of Energy to monitor its interaction with other proposed DOE research and development organizations. | In August 2007, Congress authorized the establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy (ARPA-E) within the Department of Energy (DOE) as part of the America COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69). Modeled on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), ARPA-E would support transformational energy technology research projects with the goal of enhancing the nation's economic and energy security.
Congress authorized $300 million for ARPA-E in FY2008 and "such sums as are necessary" for FY2009 and FY2010. Congress subsequently appropriated no funds for FY2008. The Bush Administration requested no funds for ARPA-E in FY2009, and took no actions to begin its operations. In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5), Congress provided ARPA-E initial funding of $400 million which supplemented FY2009 funds of $15 million (P.L. 111-8). As a result, ARPA-E's received its initial funding of $415 million in FY2009. The ARRA funds are available for obligation until September 30, 2010. The Obama Administration requested $10 million for ARPA-E in FY2010. The House Committee on Appropriations declined to provide this funding. No Senate action has taken place.
Now that ARPA-E has received its initial funding, concerned members of Congress might wish to oversee its implementation to ensure that it achieves its goals. Several management design elements to monitor include the timely appointment of a director for ARPA-E, recruitment of highly qualified technical Program Managers familiar with the DARPA process, maintenance of autonomy from DOE's current activities, and sufficient funding and organizational flexibility. One concern is that the minimum number of scientific, engineering, and professional personnel required by the America COMPETES Act, 70, may be too high, at least in the initial stages, given ARPA-E's budget of $415 million.
On April 27, 2009, the Obama Administration announced the "launch" of ARPA-E and its initial solicitation for concept papers due June 2009. DOE expects to award $150 million of its $415 million FY2009 budget in response to this solicitation. No information was provided regarding ARPA-E's organization or staffing, or the amount of its $415 million FY2009 budget that will be used to fund those activities.
Besides overseeing the establishment of ARPA-E and its funding, an issue for Congress is how ARPA-E will differ from existing DOE Office of Science activities, including the new Energy Frontier Research Centers, the DOE energy technology offices, and the Energy Innovation Hubs proposed in the FY2010 budget. In addition, several bills introduced in Congress would either provide ARPA-E with additional authority or a source of funds, or require the Secretary of Energy to monitor its interaction with other proposed DOE research and development organizations. |
crs_RS20898 | crs_RS20898_0 | The Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
The deadlocked November 2000 presidential election focused national attention on previously obscure details of election administration. 107-252 ), was enacted in October. It established requirements in the states to
provide a provisional ballot to a voter who is not on the registration list or whose registration is in question; post a sample ballot and voter information at polling places on election day; restate the requirement for first time voters who registered by mail, to vote in person (first required by the National Voter Registration Act, NVRA) and impose a new voter identification standard; provide for voter error correction on voting systems used in federal elections; provide accessibility for persons with disabilities via at least one properly equipped voting machine per polling place; provide for manual auditing of the voting system and alternative-language accessibility; and create and maintain a computerized, verified statewide voter registration list. In addition, HAVA
required the EAC to develop voting system guidelines for computer hardware and software for voluntary use by the states, and voluntary guidance to assist states in meeting HAVA requirements; left methods of implementation to the states and prohibited rulemaking by the EAC, leaving enforcement to the U.S. Attorney General while requiring states to establish grievance procedures; and amended the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) to make improvements to voting procedures for members of the military and overseas citizens. Although many bills have been introduced to amend HAVA since it became law, only a minor change has been enacted. The outcome of the debate was that HAVA authorized appropriations for the EAC only for FY2003 through FY2005, but it did not contain a sunset provision for the agency. 1994 in the 113 th Congress, which was reported by the Committee on House Administration. None of those bills received further action. 195 would eliminate the EAC and transfer its functions to the FEC. BMDs were relatively uncommon when HAVA was enacted, but today, optical scan systems with BMDs can meet the HAVA accessibility requirements. Ballots are counted either at the polling place or the central election office. Direct recording electronic (DRE) systems . Voters mark choices via a computer interface and the voting machine records them directly to an electronic memory (either with or without a paper copy that the voter can check)—used in at least some jurisdictions in about 60% of states to meet HAVA accessibility requirements, with at least some jurisdictions in almost half of all states using it as the primary polling-place voting system. Hand-counted paper ballots . Most states require that their systems be tested for conformance with EAC guidelines. Election Administration Improvements. Administered by Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). As with all information systems, those computers are potentially vulnerable to unauthorized access aimed at stealing, deleting, modifying, or otherwise affecting the confidentially, integrity, or availability of the information they store or process. Such vulnerabilities apply not only to systems with Internet connectivity but also those that can be accessed through other means such as memory cards or other peripheral devices. In response to such concerns, many states enacted requirements for paper ballot records that can be verified by the voter and used in recounts. More than 90% of HAVA payments to states were appropriated in FY2003 and FY2004. In 2016, documented intrusions into systems of state and local election offices and political organizations have amplified concerns about foreign influence. For those and other reasons, many observers expect that the risk of impacts of attempted intrusions is minimal at present. That could create problems in elections in several ways. Both DRE and optical scan voting systems are potentially vulnerable to such attacks. In light of the documented breaches and concerns about security, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has offered assistance to states in addressing the security of their election systems, in addition to the efforts of the EAC. 5819 , S. 3214 ); amend HAVA to require that voting systems use voter-verifiable paper ballots and meet other requirements, provide additional requirements payments to states, require manual audits of election results, provide the EAC with rulemaking authority, and establish other election administration requirements ( H.R. The EAC has been criticized by some for exceeding its authority, or for being slow, ineffectual, or even unnecessary. Others believe that the agency is a necessary federal resource for improving election administration and has been hampered by budgetary constraints and difficulties in the nomination process for commissioners. The final appropriation ( P.L. FY2010
For FY2010, the President's budget request included $16.5 million for the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and $106 million for election reform payments to states, with $5.26 million for protection and advocacy programs and $12.15 million for accessibility payments administered by HHS, as in FY2009. | The deadlocked November 2000 presidential election focused national attention on previously obscure details of election administration. Congress responded with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; P.L. 107-252). HAVA created the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), established a set of election administration requirements, and provided federal funding, but it did not supplant state and local control over election administration. Several issues have arisen or persisted in the years since HAVA was enacted.
Some observers have criticized the EAC for being obtrusive, slow, ineffectual, or even unnecessary. Others believe that the agency is an important resource for improving the election administration. The EAC lacked a quorum of commissioners between 2011 and 2015.
HAVA requires computerized state voter registration systems, and its voting-system requirements promote the use of electronic voting systems. However, those systems, especially the kinds that record votes directly into a computer's memory (DREs), raise concerns about security and reliability. In response, many states have enacted requirements for paper ballot records that can be verified by the voter and used in recounts.
All states now use paper-based optical scan systems for at least some voters, and most use them in at least some polling places. DRE systems are also used in most states, in many cases to meet HAVA accessibility requirements, but in several states to serve as the primary voting system in at least some jurisdictions. Several states also have jurisdictions that still use hand-counted paper ballots.
Both DRE and optical scan voting systems are computerized, with votes counted electronically. All computerized systems, whether used in the polling place or the election office, are potentially vulnerable to unauthorized access aimed at stealing, deleting, or modifying the information that the systems store or process. Such vulnerabilities apply not only to systems with Internet connectivity but also those that can be accessed electronically through other means, such as memory cards.
Documented intrusions into systems of state and local election offices and political organizations in 2016 have amplified concerns about attempts by nation-states such as Russia, or by nonstate actors, to use tampering or disinformation campaigns to influence the election. The Department of Homeland Security and the EAC are providing assistance to states to help them secure their systems. Whether such actions will be sufficient is a subject of ongoing debate, although many observers expect that the risk of tampering is minimal.
HAVA's limited voter-identification provisions did not resolve the longstanding controversy over whether broad identification requirements are needed to prevent voter fraud, or whether such requirements would create an unacceptable risk of disenfranchising legitimate voters. Many states have enacted requirements that voters present identification documents at polling places. Also, while HAVA's voter-registration requirements may have improved that process, some observers have argued that more automated registration systems are needed to make further improvements.
HAVA authorized $3.65 billion in payments to states to replace voting systems and meet the requirements of the act. Congress appropriated $3.28 billion of that amount between FY2003 and FY2010. Altogether, more than $3.5 billion of HAVA funds were appropriated through FY2016: the $3.28 billion in election reform payments to states, $196 million for the EAC and its programs, and more than $129 million in accessibility payments to states, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services. Numerous bills to amend HAVA have been considered in Congress, but none have been enacted except the 2009 MOVE Act, which made some amendments relating to uniformed services and overseas voters.
In the 114th Congress, H.R. 195, reported by the Committee on House Administration, would eliminate the EAC and transfer its functions to the Federal Election Commission. House-passed appropriations bills for FY2014 and FY2015 would have defunded the EAC, but the agency has received about $10 million in final appropriations for each fiscal year since FY2012. Other bills in the 114th Congress would address a variety of issues, and some committees have held hearings on election issues, including security. |
crs_RL34330 | crs_RL34330_0 | Introduction
The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) entered into force on March 15, 2012. However, the increase in the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea since the agreement's entry into force has caused some observers to question the benefits of the agreement, although other factors—including a decrease in South Korea's rate of economic growth—may have been the main drivers of evolving trade patterns. As discussed in the " Implementation Issues " section below, some U.S. companies have argued that certain aspects of the KORUS agreement are not being implemented appropriately. Perceptions about the KORUS FTA and its provisions may influence other U.S. trade negotiations, as well as congressional debate over their potential implementation. Views on the relative benefits of KORUS may also affect the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) negotiations between the United States and the European Union. Many observers have argued that in addition to its economic implications, the KORUS FTA has diplomatic and security implications. In December 2010, the United States and South Korea reached a joint understanding on automotive trade. Other Key Provisions
The KORUS FTA covers a broad range of other areas. Under TPA the President had the discretion on when to submit the implementing legislation to Congress. Despite signing the KORUS FTA in 2007, President Bush did not submit the implementing legislation to Congress because of differences, primarily with the Democratic leadership, over treatment of autos and beef, among other issues. On December 3, 2010, U.S. and South Korean leaders announced that they had reached agreement on addressing the outstanding issues related to the KORUS FTA. As a result, U.S. and South Korean negotiators agreed to modifications to some of the commitments made in the 2007 agreement. On October 3, 2011, President Obama submitted draft implementing legislation ( H.R. The President signed the legislation on October 21, 2011 ( P.L. 112-41 ). In 2013, the United States was South Korea's second-largest goods trading partner. As required by U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which expired in 2007, the USITC conducted a study in 2007 of the KORUS FTA at the request of the President. Economic Impact: Two Years of the KORUS FTA
On entry into force of the KORUS FTA on March 15, 2012, 82% of U.S. tariff lines and 80% of South Korean tariff lines became duty free, whereas prior to the KORUS FTA, only 38% of U.S. tariff lines and 13% of South Korean tariff lines were duty free. Implementation Issues
During the more than two years that the KORUS FTA has been in force, the United States has raised several issues regarding its implementation. Express delivery packages . Data transfers . Implications for U.S. Trade Policy and U.S. Asia Policy
The KORUS FTA continues to have implications for U.S. trade policy and U.S. Asia policy. It is economically significant as South Korea is the sixth largest U.S. trade partner making the agreement the largest U.S. FTA after NAFTA. Japan and South Korea trade similar products with the United States, and despite generally low U.S. import tariffs, the KORUS FTA now provides South Korea with a competitive advantage in the U.S. market. The Obama Administration claimed this was a necessary step in approval of the agreement because "the [original] U.S.-Korea trade agreement did not go far enough to provide new market access to U.S. auto companies and to level the playing field for U.S. auto manufacturers and workers." on the investments from the other. | President Obama signed the legislation implementing the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) on October 21, 2011 (P.L. 112-41), and the Korean National Assembly passed the agreement on November 22, 2011. The KORUS FTA entered into force on March 15, 2012.
With the KORUS FTA now in force for over two years, focus has shifted from the debate over its passage to its implementation, economic impact, and effect on future U.S. FTAs. Some U.S. companies have argued that certain aspects of the KORUS agreement are not being implemented appropriately, citing issues related to rules of origin verification, express delivery shipments, data transfers, and pending auto regulations. In addition, a widening trade deficit with South Korea since the implementation of the agreement has led some observers to argue the agreement has not benefitted the U.S. economy, but it is difficult to distinguish the KORUS FTA's impact on U.S.-South Korea trade patterns from the impact of other economic variables. As the largest of the recently passed U.S. FTA's, perceptions of the KORUS FTA's economic impact and concerns over its implementation may influence congressional debate in the new FTAs now under negotiation, specifically the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which South Korea has signaled an interest in joining, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) between the United States and the European Union.
The KORUS FTA is the second-largest U.S. FTA (next to NAFTA). In goods trade in 2013, South Korea was the sixth-largest trading partner of the United States, and the United States was South Korea's second-largest trading partner. The KORUS FTA covers a wide range of trade and investment issues and, therefore, could have significant economic implications for both the United States and South Korea.
Congress approved the KORUS FTA implementing legislation using expedited procedures authorized by Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Under TPA, which expired in 2007, the President had the discretion on when to submit the implementing legislation to Congress. The KORUS FTA was negotiated and signed on June 30, 2007, by President George W. Bush. However, President Bush did not submit the legislation because of differences with the Democratic leadership over treatment of autos and beef, among other issues. On December 3, 2010, after a series of negotiations, President Obama and South Korean President Lee announced that they had reached an agreement on addressing the outstanding issues related to the KORUS FTA. As a result, the final implementing legislation modified certain provisions of the 2007 agreement, primarily focused on trade in agriculture and autos.
A broad swath of the U.S. business community supported the KORUS FTA. With the modifications in the commitments reached in December 2010, the three Detroit-based auto manufacturers and the United Auto Workers (UAW) union changed their positions and backed the agreement. Other labor unions and some nongovernmental organizations opposed the agreement. Many U.S. supporters viewed the KORUS FTA as important to secure new opportunities in the South Korean market, while opponents claimed that the KORUS FTA did not go far enough to break down South Korean trade barriers or that it would benefit U.S. corporations without producing gains for U.S. workers. Other observers suggested the KORUS FTA could have implications for the U.S.-South Korean alliance as a whole, as well as on U.S. Asia policy and U.S. trade policy. |
crs_RS22458 | crs_RS22458_0 | In the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. The FY2008 Tiahrt language, however, continues to prohibit the release of firearm trace data for the purposes of suing gun manufacturers and dealers. For FY2009, similar language was included in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. Related Legislative Proposals
For FY2003-FY2009, a rider on the ATF appropriations language has prohibited that agency from disclosing data on illegal gun trafficking based on firearm traces and FFL transfer records, as well as multiple handgun sale reports, for any purpose other than supporting a "bona fide" criminal investigation. This rider is known as the "Tiahrt" amendment, for its sponsor in full committee markup of the FY2004 Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill, Representative Todd Tiahrt. A coalition of 210 city mayors led by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg favors the repeal of this amendment, but the Fraternal Order of Police reportedly favors retaining it, as does ATF. 110-161 ). 111-8 ). | For FY2003-FY2009, a rider on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) appropriations has prohibited that agency from disclosing firearm trace data (based on firearm transfer records maintained in part by licensed gun dealers) and multiple handgun sales reports data for any purpose other than supporting a criminal investigation or agency licensing proceeding. This rider is known as the "Tiahrt" amendment, for its sponsor in full committee markup of the FY2004 Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill, Representative Todd Tiahrt. A coalition of 210 city mayors led by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg favors the repeal of this rider, but the Fraternal Order of Police favors retaining it, as does ATF. For FY2008, Congress included modified Tiahrt amendment language in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161). This modified language states explicitly that it does not prohibit the release of aggregate statistical data on illegal gun trafficking or statistical information on the U.S. firearms industry. For FY2009, similar language was included in the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8). |
crs_R43886 | crs_R43886_0 | Same-sex marriage has engendered heated debate throughout the country. Many states have passed statutes or constitutional amendments that prohibit same-sex couples from marrying, and that deny recognition of same-sex marriages that were legally formed in other states. These same-sex marriage bans may impact gay individuals' rights and claims to state and federal benefits. For example, they may affect tax liabilities and entitlements to Social Security benefits. Until recently, state same-sex marriage bans were seemingly insulated from Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process challenges to their validity because of a 1972 Supreme Court case, Baker v. Nelson . There, the Supreme Court dismissed equal protection and due process challenges to a state statute that defined marriage in terms of a man and a woman, finding that the issues involved in the case did not present a substantial federal question. Then, it discusses key cases that led to the existing circuit split on the constitutionality of state same-sex marriage bans. However, the Fifth Amendment applies to action by the federal government, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state action. The circuit courts have split regarding whether state same-sex marriage bans violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees, and in doing so, they have interpreted Supreme Court precedent in differing ways. Conversely, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all held that doctrinal developments since Baker —more specifically, the Supreme Court's decisions in Romer v. Evans , Lawrence v. Texas , and United States v. Windsor —indicate that the Court now views the issues summarily decided in Baker as raising substantial federal questions. These courts have also considered the appropriate level of scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation required under the Constitution's equal protection principles, and whether the fundamental right to marry under the Constitution's due process principles incorporates same-sex marriage. In doing so, they have each determined that doctrinal developments subsequent to Baker render that decision non-binding. On the one hand, the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all subjected state same-sex marriage bans to heightened levels of scrutiny after finding that such bans infringe upon fundamental rights or create suspect classifications. The Seventh Circuit held that state same-sex marriage bans cannot survive rational basis review as "[t]he discrimination against same-sex couples is irrational, and therefore unconstitutional even if the discrimination is not subjected to heightened scrutiny...." The Seventh Circuit observed that because such bans cannot pass constitutional muster under equal protection principles, it had no reason to reach the question of whether or not the fundamental right to marriage includes the right to same-sex marriage for purposes of the due process clause. As an initial matter, the Sixth Circuit considered whether Baker prevented it from determining whether state same-sex marriage bans violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Supreme Court Appears Poised to Resolve the Circuit Split
On January 16, 2015, the Supreme Court announced that it was consolidating and granting review of the four state same-sex marriage ban cases that the Sixth Circuit decided in DeBoer v. Snyder . Oral arguments are scheduled for April 28, 2015. If the Court were to reach this conclusion, it could arguably do so by finding that state same-sex marriage bans neither create suspect or quasi-suspect classifications, nor infringe upon fundamental rights, and thus are not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and due process guarantees, just as the Sixth Circuit did in DeBoer . On the other hand, if the Court were to find that state same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional, it would seemingly broaden the rights of gay individuals by permitting same-sex marriages in all states. | Same-sex marriage has engendered heated debate throughout the country. There is no federal same-sex marriage prohibition after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor, which struck down the portion of the Defense of Marriage Act that defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman. However, many states have passed statutes or constitutional amendments that prohibit same-sex couples from marrying, and that deny recognition of same-sex marriages that were legally formed in other states. These state same-sex marriage bans may impact gay individuals' rights and claims to state and federal benefits. For example, such restrictions may affect tax liabilities and entitlements to Social Security.
Until recently, state same-sex marriage bans were seemingly insulated from Fourteenth Amendment challenges in federal courts because of a 1972 Supreme Court decision, Baker v. Nelson, wherein the Court summarily dismissed such a challenge for lack of a substantial federal question. However, in recent years, some courts have held that Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Baker—namely, Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas, and Windsor—have rendered Baker non-binding. These courts have thus considered whether state same-sex marriage bans violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, state action that classifies groups of individuals may be subject to heightened levels of judicial scrutiny, depending on the type of classification involved. State same-sex marriage bans have faced equal protection challenges because they classify individuals based on sexual orientation. Additionally, under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process guarantees, state action that infringes upon a fundamental right—such as the right to marry—is subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny. State same-sex marriage bans have been challenged on the basis that they infringe upon the fundamental right to marry, which, it has been argued, incorporates the right to same-sex marriage.
Circuit courts are currently split regarding whether Baker precludes them from considering the constitutionality of state same-sex marriage bans, and whether such bans violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have struck down state same-sex marriage bans after finding that Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Baker render that decision non-binding. In doing so, they have generally, though not uniformly, subjected state same-sex marriage bans to heightened levels of judicial scrutiny after finding that governmental classifications based on sexual orientation warrant increased scrutiny or finding that the fundamental right to marry includes the right to same-sex marriage.
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, held that Baker remains binding precedent that precluded its review of Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state same-sex marriage bans. The Sixth Circuit then went on to find that even if it could consider the constitutionality of such bans, it would subject them to the lowest level of judicial scrutiny and uphold them as constitutional. On January 16, 2015, the Supreme Court granted review of cases from the Sixth Circuit involving Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state same-sex marriage bans, with oral arguments scheduled for April 28, 2015. The Court seems poised not only to resolve the existing circuit split, but also to settle key questions about rights for gay people. |
crs_RS20798 | crs_RS20798_0 | Elected in March 2000 with 39% of the popular vote, (1) Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian hassince faced an uncooperative legislature and has endeavored to establish a firm grip on his government. The congressional staff delegation observed severalimportant features of Taiwan's "transition politics." (2)
There are no firm indications about how Taiwan's political parties will fare in the December 2001 legislative elections, although no party is expected to attain amajority in the Legislative Yuan. Some American and Taiwanese economic analysts viewed China as the key to Taiwan's continueddevelopment. (10)
Research Trip Findings. Despite the uncertain and often tense political atmosphere, cross-strait economic ties have grownconsiderably since the late 1980s. Inthe first half of 2000, cross-strait trade increased29%. Implications for U.S. Policy
Two trends have helped to stabilize PRC-Taiwan relations in the short term. Other factors may add to tensions in the future. | This report summarizes findings from a congressional staff trip to Taiwan (Republicof China), December 10-17,2000, with supplemental material from other sources. The staff delegation met with Taiwan government andmilitary officials, political party representatives,leading private citizens, and United States officials and business persons in Taipei, the capital. The findings includemajor factors that have shaped relationsbetween Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) since Chen Shui-bian's election as President of Taiwanin March 2000. Taiwan's democratization andthe growth of cross-strait economic ties have, in some respects, helped to stabilize relations in the short run. Taiwan's legislative elections in December 2001 willlikely focus largely on domestic issues; its impact on cross-strait relations is uncertain. Chinese nationalism andmilitary modernization in the PRC will likelycontinue to contribute to tensions. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45050 | crs_R45050_0 | Ballast water discharged from ships is one significant pathway for the introduction of ANS. Today, multiple entities—including the Coast Guard, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and some states—regulate discharges incidental to the normal operation of vessels, including ballast water. Coast Guard Regulations
The Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990 (NANPCA, P.L. 110-299 , provided a two-year moratorium on CWA permitting for certain incidental discharges (excluding ballast water) from commercial fishi ng vessels of all sizes and non recreational vessels less than 79 feet in length . State Regulations
In addition to federal requirements, vessel discharges are also subject to regulation by approximately half of the states. Overlapping Federal Requirements
The maritime industry has argued for harmonization of what it views as duplicative federal rules for vessel discharges, especially for ballast water discharges, through a single set of requirements. Shipping and other industry groups have raised concerns that EPA and Coast Guard requirements overlap, making implementation needlessly costly and complex. Many in these groups have called for centralizing responsibilities with the Coast Guard, which has long had administrative and regulatory authority over the industry. State Role and Federal Preemption
Shipping and other industry groups have also objected to the conditions that states attach to EPA's permit. They argue these conditions create a patchwork of inconsistent requirements that are economically inefficient and cumbersome to implement. Approval of Ballast Water Management Systems
Under NANPCA (as amended by NISA) and the Coast Guard's implementing regulations, as previously discussed, vessels equipped with ballast tanks and operating in waters of the United States, unless specifically exempt, must comply with the numeric ballast water discharge standards through one of the following options: eliminating ballast water discharge, discharging to an onshore facility or to another vessel for the purpose of treatment, using ballast water that is only drawn from a U.S. public water system, or by installing a BWMS that has been approved (i.e., "type approved") by the Coast Guard . Availability of Type Approved BWMS
Although all new and existing vessels subject to the 2012 Coast Guard Rule and the 2013 VGP were to be in compliance with the numeric ballast water discharge standards by January 2016, the Coast Guard did not type-approve any BWMS until December 2016. Testing Standard for BWMS
Some—particularly BWMS manufacturers—have argued that the testing protocol the Coast Guard uses in determining whether a particular BWMS is effective in meeting the ballast water discharge standards (and should therefore be type approved) is too restrictive. Some in the shipping industry argue that such vessels, which are confined to a geographically limited area, do not introduce ANS and should not need to treat their ballast water. Others—including the National Park Service and environmental groups—argue that Lakers spread ANS from one area in the Great Lakes to other areas more widely and quickly than would occur through normal migration. Others assert that potential environmental impacts can result from such incidental discharges and believe it is important to regulate them as well. Vessel Incidental Discharge Legislation in the 115th Congress
In the 115 th Congress, some Members have introduced bills intended to address issues with the existing regulatory system for ballast water and other discharges incidental to the normal operation of vessels. H.R. 1154 and S. 168 , both titled the "Vessel Incidental Discharge Act," are the same with one potentially significant exception discussed below. The companion bill in the Senate, S. 168 , was reported out of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in March. In addition, in June 2017, the committee reported S. 1129 , the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2017. As reported, S. 1129 includes the text of S. 168 as Title VIII. Several bills address only the moratorium on CWA permitting for certain incidental discharges (excluding ballast water) from commercial fishing vessels of all sizes and nonrecreational vessels less than 79 feet in length. S. 2273 ( P.L. 115-100 ), signed by President Trump on January 3, 2018, extended the moratorium that expired on December 18, 2017, through January 19, 2018. S. 2194 and H.R. 4656 would extend the moratorium through December 18, 2020. S. 2331 , introduced on January 23, 2018, would extend the moratorium through March 23, 2018. | Stakeholders broadly agree on the need to control vessel discharges—particularly ballast water discharges, which can introduce numerous contaminants into U.S. and international waters. Ballast water discharge from ships is one significant pathway for introduction of aquatic nuisance species (ANS)—that is, invasive species—that can harm aquatic ecosystems. Federal requirements for ballast water and other incidental discharges from vessels in the United States flow from two laws—the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990, as amended by the National Invasive Species Act of 1996, and the Clean Water Act (CWA)—and related Coast Guard and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations. Further, individual state requirements apply in approximately half of the states. Vessels are also subject to a number of international agreements, treaties, and conventions.
The current regulatory scheme presents several complex policy issues.
Overlapping Federal Requirements. The maritime industry has argued for harmonization of what it views as duplicative rules for vessel discharges, especially ballast water discharges, through a single set of requirements. Shipping and other industry groups have raised concerns that EPA and Coast Guard requirements overlap, needlessly increasing cost and complexity. Some have called for centralizing responsibilities with the Coast Guard; others assert that EPA should be responsible if regulation is centralized. State Role and Federal Preemption. Shipping and other industry groups have objected to conditions that states attach to EPA's permit for vessels. They argue this creates a patchwork of inconsistent requirements that are hard to implement. However, many states oppose federal preemption of state action in this area. Ballast Water Discharge Standards. Current Coast Guard and EPA requirements for ballast water contain identical discharge standards. Some states, environmental groups, and others favor more stringent standards to eliminate ANS invasions. EPA and the Coast Guard believe that technology to meet more stringent standards is not currently technically or economically achievable. Approval of Ballast Water Management Systems. Some groups have expressed frustration over the Coast Guard's approval process for systems that can achieve ballast water discharge standards. Although vessels were to comply with the standards by January 2016, the Coast Guard did not approve any systems until December 2016. The testing protocol the Coast Guard uses in approving systems differs from the International Maritime Organization's protocol. Some have argued the Coast Guard's protocol is too restrictive; others argue it is more reliable for ensuring ANS prevention. "Lakers." "Lakers" are vessels that operate exclusively in the Laurentian Great Lakes. Some argue that such vessels do not introduce ANS and should not need to treat their ballast water. Others argue that Lakers spread ANS in the Great Lakes more quickly and widely than would otherwise occur and should be subject to the same regulations as other vessels. Extending the Moratorium for Small Vessels. The moratorium on CWA permitting for certain incidental discharges (not including ballast water) from commercial fishing vessels of all sizes and nonrecreational vessels less than 79 feet in length expired January 19, 2018. Many believe these vessels should be permanently excluded from CWA permitting while others believe it is important to regulate them.
In the 115th Congress, several bills have been introduced to address issues with the regulatory system for ballast water and other discharges incidental to normal vessel operations. Except for one potentially significant exception, H.R. 1154 and S. 168, both titled the "Vessel Incidental Discharge Act," are the same. In March 2017, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported S. 168. In June 2017, the committee reported S. 1129, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2017. As reported, S. 1129 includes the text of S. 168. On January 3, 2018, President Trump signed S. 2273 (P.L. 115-100), extending through January 19, 2018, the moratorium on CWA permitting for certain incidental discharges (excluding ballast water) from commercial fishing vessels and nonrecreational vessels less than 79 feet in length. S. 2194 and H.R. 4656 would extend the moratorium through December 18, 2020. S. 2331 would extend it through March 23, 2018. |
crs_RL31663 | crs_RL31663_0 | The Supreme Court ruled (6-3) on June 26, 1981, in the case of McCarty v. McCarty , that the former spouse of a military member or retiree could not be awarded any share of that member's/retiree's retirement pay as a part of a divorce property settlement in a community property state , because then-current federal law did not authorize the treatment of military retired pay as divisible property in such a settlement. Congress responded by enacting the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act in September 1982. The USFSPA has five main provisions. 5. The USFSPA does not direct state courts to divide retired pay or to award a former spouse a certain percentage of disposable retired pay. Concurrent Receipt of Retired Pay and Disability Compensation
In recent years, Congress has addressed an issue concerning the payment of military retired pay to retirees who qualify for disability compensation from the Department of Veteran's Affairs (VA). As modified in 1941, the law prevented the concurrent receipt of both military nondisability retired pay and veteran's disability compensation. This can result in reductions in the amount of money that a former spouse can claim in a divorce. In cases where the servicemember has waived retirement pay for non-divisible disability pay, some courts have ruled that the member must make up the difference in additional payments to the former spouse. Federal Civil Service Retirement and Waiver of Military Retired Pay
If a military retiree is divorced, later retires from the federal civil service, and elects to waive his or her military retired pay and credit his or her military service toward a single civil service pension, problems arise in the implementing a court-ordered division of military retired pay under the USFSPA. These options may have affected former spouses and military members, since (1) a court may consider or may have considered future retired pay as divisible property, although the member may not have actually retired to receive those benefits because of the drawdown, (2) the potential amount available under these programs may be substantially less than would have been available under longevity retirement (retirement after a military career of 20 years or more), (3) Congress has neither authorized nor prohibited the courts from considering these separation benefits as divisible property, and (4) national interests (i.e., the size and composition of the military) removed from the domain of domestic relations concerns of state courts, are at issue. Previous Congresses have proposed changes to USFSPA that would terminate payments upon remarriage of a former spouse. In addition, new laws that affect military benefits but are not directly related to the USFSPA may have unintended effects on equitable division of already settled or future divorce cases. | In 1981, the Supreme Court ruled that the former spouse of a military member or retiree could not be awarded any share of that member's/retiree's retired pay as a part of a divorce property settlement in a community property state. In response, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA) in 1982. Under the USFSPA, as amended, state courts can treat disposable military retired pay as divisible property in divorce cases. However, state laws may vary on these concepts. The USFSPA makes no assumption of such a division nor does it presume how much of a division should be made. In addition to possible receipt of retired pay, certain former spouses remain eligible to receive certain military benefits or privileges. Recent changes in other laws that affect the concurrent receipt of military retired pay and veteran disability pay may affect the amount of retired pay a former spouse receives.
In other situations, later career and financial decisions made by military retirees may affect the availability of their retired pay. For example, military retirees who take federal civilian jobs and then retire from those jobs can waive their military retired pay and credit their military time to their civilian careers. In so doing, they eliminate their military retired pay, and thereby any share that might have been awarded to the former spouse.
Since its inception, the USFSPA has remained contentious. Opponents of the law feel that it is unfair to servicemembers and should be modified or repealed. Proponents argue that the law protects the former spouse within nationally accepted standards. Some of the most frequently cited issues include (1) definition of disposable retired pay, (2) effects from new laws concerning concurrent receipt of military retired pay and veteran disability compensation, (3) interactions with other federal retirement systems, (4) effects in cases of early separation of servicemembers, and (5) treatment of benefits upon remarriage of a former spouse. As with the original provisions of the USFSPA, these and other proposed changes have been the source of great debate.
Although legislation making various changes to the USFSPA has been introduced in the past, none of this legislation has allowed for retroactive change to settled cases. |
crs_R40490 | crs_R40490_0 | Although all poor (i.e., below 100% of the federal poverty level, FPL) American children and pregnant woman are eligible for Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), other populations' upper-income eligibility threshold for Medicaid is often well below poverty. In some cases, individuals are ineligible for Medicaid regardless of their income. Some health reform proposals include provisions to expand traditional Medicaid—to 100% of poverty, for example—regardless of whether one is a member of a covered group, such as children, pregnant women, the aged, and the disabled. This report briefly describes two key aspects of current Medicaid eligibility—(1) categorical eligibility (i.e., membership in a covered group) and (2) income eligibility. The report then discusses some policy and legislative considerations in expanding mandatory Medicaid eligibility to 100% of poverty (regardless of category) through federal legislation. The upper-income threshold for AFDC eligibility in 1996 ranged across states from 11% to 68% of poverty. LPRs who have been in the country for less than five years are generally ineligible for Medicaid, although there is a new option for states to cover such children and pregnant women under CHIP. | All poor American children and pregnant woman are eligible for Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), although millions are not enrolled. However, some other populations' upper income eligibility threshold for Medicaid is often well below the federal poverty level. For working parents of dependent children, for example, the median Medicaid upper income eligibility threshold among the states is 68% of poverty—less than $10,000 a year for a single parent with a child. (For parents who are not working, the median Medicaid upper income eligibility threshold among the states is even lower, at 41% of poverty—less than $6,000 a year for a single parent with a child.) Adults under age 65 who are not disabled, not pregnant and not custodial parents of dependent children—often referred to as "childless adults"—are generally ineligible for Medicaid, regardless of their income.
Some health reform proposals include provisions to expand traditional Medicaid—to 100% of poverty, for example—regardless of whether one is in a covered "category," such as children, pregnant women, the aged or disabled, as generally required for Medicaid coverage today. This report briefly describes current Medicaid eligibility and presents some policy and legislative considerations if Congress decided to expand mandatory Medicaid eligibility to 100% of poverty through federal legislation. |
crs_RL32189 | crs_RL32189_0 | Introduction
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have drawn attention to the security of many institutions, facilities, and systems in the United States, including the nation's water supply and water quality infrastructure. Damage or destruction by terrorist attack could disrupt the delivery of vital human services in this country, threatening public health and the environment, or possibly causing loss of life. This report presents an overview of this large and diverse sector, describes security-related actions by the government and private sector since 9/11, and discusses additional policy issues and responses, including congressional interest. Although officials believe that risks to water and wastewater utilities are small, operators have been under heightened security conditions since 9/11. There are no federal standards or agreed-upon practices within the water infrastructure sector to govern readiness, response to security incidents, and recovery. Efforts to develop voluntary protocols and tools are ongoing since the 2001 terrorist attacks. Out of funds appropriated in 2002 ( P.L. A key focus of EPA's activities since 2005 has been the Water Sector Initiative. Department of Homeland Security
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS, established in P.L. 107-297 ) has a mandate to coordinate securing the nation's critical infrastructure, including water infrastructure, through partnerships with the public and private sectors. Policy Issues
Congress and other policymakers have considered a number of initiatives in this area, including enhanced physical security, communication and coordination, and research. Some operators of non-federal facilities and utilities are likewise concerned. Appropriations
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress has provided appropriations to the Corps, the Bureau, and EPA for security-related programs and activities to protect water infrastructure. 107-188 ). It would have encouraged wastewater utilities to conduct vulnerability assessments and authorized $220 million to assist utilities with assessments and preparation of site security plans. Implementing regulations were promulgated by DHS in 2007, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). During this period there have been several competing proposals: to create permanent DHS rules for wastewater and drinking water facilities; or to create permanent DHS security rules for chemical plants and wastewater facilities but exempt drinking water plants; or to require EPA to establish risk-based security rules for drinking water plants and for EPA and DHS to consult on security at co-managed drinking water and wastewater facilities; or to leave the existing exemption in place and designate in statute that EPA is the lead agency for drinking water and wastewater security. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, wastewater and drinking water utilities have been engaged in numerous activities to assess potential vulnerabilities and strengthen facility and system protections. Congressional oversight of this sector's homeland security activities has been limited but could be of interest in the 113 th Congress. | Damage to or destruction of the nation's water supply and water quality infrastructure by terrorist attack or natural disaster could disrupt the delivery of vital human services in this country, threatening public health and the environment, or possibly causing loss of life. Interest in such problems increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.
Across the country, water infrastructure systems extend over vast areas, and ownership and operation responsibility are both public and private, but are overwhelmingly non-federal. Since the attacks, federal dam operators and local water and wastewater utilities have been under heightened security conditions and are evaluating security plans and measures. There are no federal standards or agreed-upon industry practices within the water infrastructure sector to govern readiness, response to security incidents, and recovery. Efforts to develop protocols and tools are ongoing since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This report presents an overview of this large and diverse sector, describes security-related actions by the government and private sector since 9/11, and discusses additional policy issues and responses, including congressional interest.
Policymakers have been considering a number of initiatives, including enhanced physical security, better communication and coordination, and research. A key issue is how additional protections and resources directed at public and private sector priorities will be funded. In response, Congress has provided some appropriations for security at water infrastructure facilities (to assess and protect federal facilities and support security assessment and risk reduction activities by non-federal facilities) and passed a bill requiring drinking water utilities to conduct security vulnerability assessments (P.L. 107-188). When Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002 (P.L. 107-297), it gave DHS responsibilities to coordinate information to secure the nation's critical infrastructure, including the water sector. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the lead federal agency for protecting drinking water and wastewater utility systems.
Recent congressional interest has focused on two legislative issues: (1) security of wastewater utilities, and (2) whether to include water utilities in chemical plant security regulations implemented by DHS. Congress has considered legislation to encourage wastewater treatment works to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop site security plans, but none has been enacted. Congress also has considered legislation to extend DHS's Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards and, as part of that debate, whether to preserve an existing exemption for water utilities from chemical facility standards or to include them in the scope of DHS security rules. For now, the exemption from DHS standards remains in place.
Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, wastewater and drinking water utilities have been engaged in numerous activities to assess potential vulnerabilities and strengthen facility and system protections. Congressional oversight of this sector's homeland security activities has been limited but could be of interest in the 113th Congress. |
crs_R40457 | crs_R40457_0 | Recent Developments
November 15 - 18, 2009 — President Obama made his first official visit to China. Background and Overview
The Administration of President Barack Obama has inherited from the George W. Bush Administration a relationship with China that is smoother than in the past, but also has grown significantly more complex, multifaceted, and intertwined. During the Bush Administration, Washington and Beijing cultivated regular high-level visits and exchanges of working level officials, resumed military-to-military relations, cooperated on anti-terror initiatives, and worked closely on the Six Party Talks to restrain and eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons activities. These and other initiatives of engagement are likely to continue in some fashion under the Obama Administration. They include difficulties over the status and well-being of Taiwan, ongoing disputes over China's failure to protect U.S. intellectual property rights, China's economic and trade policies, and growing concerns about the quality and safety of exported PRC products. The PRC's more assertive foreign policy and continued military development also have significant long-term implications for U.S. global power and influence and have been of concern to U.S. policymakers. Some U.S. lawmakers have suggested that U.S. policies toward the PRC perhaps should be reassessed in light of these trends. China's Importance and Implications for U.S. Policy
Many U.S. observers have become increasingly concerned about China's growing economic and political reach in the world, often referred to as "China's rise," and what it means for global U.S. economic and political interests. Complicating this debate are the effects of globalization, which have bound together U.S. and PRC interests much more closely than in the 1990s. These extensive inter-linkages make it increasingly difficult for either government to take unilateral actions without inviting far-reaching, unintended consequences that could adversely affect other policy interests. Global Financial Crisis7
With the continued troubles in the U.S. financial system, the PRC is positioned to play a crucial role in any policy that Congress and the Obama Administration design to address the U.S. economic problems. Some are worried that China may be re-thinking its policy on purchasing U.S. Treasuries. The PRC remains the second-largest U.S. trading partner, with total U.S.-China trade in 2008 at $409 billion. Tibet remains an issue of concern for Congress and a sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations. U.S.-PRC Official Dialogues
The Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED)
On April 1, 2009, on the sidelines of the G-20 Financial Summit in London, President Obama and China's President Hu Jintao announced the initiation of a new annual high-level dialogue, to be called the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), designed to focus on economic, security, and other issues. Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not at this point a state in the international community. Human Rights79
During her first trip to China in February 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton generated some controversy when she downplayed the issue of human rights in her discussion of the three key challenges for U.S.-China relations: the global financial crisis, climate change, and a range of security issues. China-Related Legislation in the 111th Congress
H.R. February 20 - 22 , 2009 —Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made her first official visit to China as Secretary. | The bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China (PRC) is vitally important, touching on a wide range of areas including, among others, economic policy, security, foreign relations, and human rights. U.S. interests with China are bound together much more closely now than even a few years ago. These extensive inter-linkages have made it increasingly difficult for either government to take unilateral actions without inviting far-reaching, unintended consequences. The Administration of President Barack Obama has inherited from the George W. Bush Administration not only a greater array of policy mechanisms for pursuing U.S.-China policy, but a more complex and multifaceted U.S.-China relationship where the stakes are higher and where U.S. action may increasingly be constrained.
Economically, the United States and China have become symbiotically intertwined. China is the second-largest U.S. trading partner, with total U.S.-China trade in 2008 reaching an estimated $409 billion. It also is the second largest holder of U.S. securities and the largest holder of U.S. Treasuries used to finance the federal budget deficit, positioning China to play a crucial role, for good or ill, in the Obama Administration's plans to address the recession and the deteriorating U.S. financial system. At the same time, China's own substantial levels of economic growth have depended heavily on continued U.S. investment and trade, making China's economy highly vulnerable to a significant economic slowdown in the United States.
Meanwhile, other bilateral problems provide a continuing set of diverse challenges. They include difficulties over the status and well-being of Taiwan, ongoing disputes over China's failure to protect U.S. intellectual property rights, the economic advantage China gains from not floating its currency, and growing concerns about the quality and safety of products exported by China. China's more assertive foreign policy and continued military development also have significant long-term implications for U.S. global power and influence. Some U.S. lawmakers have suggested that U.S. policies toward China should be reassessed in light of these trends.
During the Bush Administration, the U.S. and China cultivated regular high-level visits and exchanges of working level officials, resumed military-to-military relations, cooperated on anti-terror initiatives, and worked closely on the Six Party Talks to restrain and eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons activities. These and other initiatives of engagement are likely to continue in some fashion during the Obama presidency. Obama Administration officials already have made known their views about China's importance for U.S. interests. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton included China in her first official trip abroad as Secretary in February 2009, which included stops in Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and China (February 20-22). In addition, the Administration established a new Strategic and Economic Dialogue with the PRC in 2009, and President Obama in November 2009 made his first official visit to China.
This report addresses relevant policy questions in current U.S.-China relations, discusses trends and key legislation in the current Congress, and provides a chronology of developments and high-level exchanges. It will be updated as events warrant. Additional details on the issues discussed here are available in other CRS products, noted throughout this report. For background information and legislative action during the 110th Congress, see CRS Report RL33877, China-U.S. Relations in the 110th Congress: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS products can be found on the CRS website at http://www.crs.gov/. |
crs_R44907 | crs_R44907_0 | Introduction
Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which took effect in January 1994, motor vehicle and vehicle parts manufacturers have integrated their production operations in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. On July 17, 2017, the Administration announced its objectives in forthcoming negotiations. While U.S. domestic production of finished vehicles has fluctuated somewhat, Mexico has become a major center of parts and motor vehicle manufacturing, fully integrated into the U.S. and Canadian supply chains. Parts trade has grown more rapidly than trade in assembled vehicles. These include Mexico's lower labor costs, the Mexican government's investment in its educational system to graduate engineers and technicians to operate and manage vehicle and parts plants, and Mexico's growing network of free trade agreements with many countries outside the NAFTA region. Motor Vehicle and Parts Trade
Motor vehicle and parts trade accounted for more than 20% of U.S. merchandise trade with other NAFTA signatories in 2016, slightly more than the shares in 2006 and 2007 before the recession ( Figure 7 ). The United States has trade deficits in assembled vehicles with both Canada and Mexico ( Figure 9 ). Only in U.S. motor vehicle parts trade with Canada did the United States record a surplus ($7 billion) in 2016. In NAFTA, the rules of origin affecting motor vehicles and parts are established by a method intended to ensure that a certain percentage of the value of a manufactured product (as determined by the cost of inputs, labor, and other direct costs of processing operations) originates in the NAFTA region. NAFTA has the highest RVC requirement for automotive products, at 62.5% (meaning that the majority of the parts in the vehicle have to originate in the NAFTA region to receive the tariff benefit). NAFTA Renegotiation Process
A renegotiation of NAFTA is likely to be considered by Congress under Trade Promotion Authority. On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Mexico and Canada to renegotiate or modernize the free trade agreement as required by TPA. ACTPN did not make specific recommendations with regard to motor vehicle trade, but its report does address some of the specific issues raised by motor vehicle industry and union organizations. However, its broad objectives are consistent with a number of recommendations cited by speakers at USTR's late June 2017 hearings, including
maintaining existing duty-free market access for industrial goods and removing nontariff barriers; promoting greater regulatory compatibility and cooperation and removing technical barriers to trade; updating customs procedures; strengthening the rules of origin to "ensure that the benefits of NAFTA go to products genuinely made in the United States and North America" and ensuring that such rules "incentivize the sourcing of goods and materials from the United States and North America"; preventing the establishment of restrictions on cross-border data flows; improving intellectual property protection; bringing labor and environmental provisions into the main NAFTA agreement, instead of in side agreements, while expanding their scope; and developing a mechanism "to ensure that the NAFTA countries avoid manipulating exchange rates in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage." | Motor vehicles and vehicle parts accounted for more than 20% of the total value of U.S. merchandise trade with Canada and Mexico in 2016, making them the largest category of manufactured products traded among the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect in January 1994, the vehicle supply chain has become fully integrated, with parts manufacturing and assembly in all three countries.
On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration notified Congress of its intent to renegotiate NAFTA. In consequence, the 115th Congress will likely address numerous issues related to NAFTA and the North American motor vehicle industry.
NAFTA has contributed to a large increase in trade in vehicles and auto parts within North America. Since 1994, Mexico has grown to become a major location for vehicle and parts manufacturing, while production in the United States and Canada has remained fairly steady, except during recessions. In addition to NAFTA trade liberalization commitments, growth of the Mexican vehicle industry was assisted by unilateral Mexican measures that removed restrictive trade and investment barriers, as well as Mexico's lower labor costs, the government's investment in training engineers and technicians to operate and manage motor vehicle plants, and numerous free trade agreements that give Mexican vehicles and parts tariff-free access to countries where U.S. exports face a tariff. In 2016, the United States had a motor vehicle trade deficit with both NAFTA partners, a deficit in vehicle parts trade with Mexico, and a surplus in vehicle parts trade with Canada.
A topic in the renegotiation of NAFTA may be rules of origin, which determine which products qualify for the benefits of the agreement. NAFTA requires that 62.5% of a vehicle's net cost and 60% of the cost of parts originate in the NAFTA region in order for those products to have duty-free access to the United States. This is the highest such requirement for motor vehicles of any U.S. trade agreement. In general, vehicle and parts manufacturers support retaining the current rules of origin, whereas the United Auto Workers union seeks to require a higher percentage of regional content, which it believes would reduce the share of parts produced in non-NAFTA countries.
The Trump Administration announced its negotiating objectives for NAFTA renegotiation on July 17, 2017, but it has not enumerated negotiating objectives specific to the automotive industry. However, some of its stated goals are consistent with recommendations of auto industry and union representatives, including updating customs procedures, promoting greater regulatory compatibility within the NAFTA region, improving intellectual property protection, improving labor and environmental provisions, and deterring currency manipulation. |
crs_R41525 | crs_R41525_0 | Introduction
The stated mission of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is "to protect society by confining offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure, and that provide work and other self-improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens " (emphasis added). CRS used data from the 1997 and 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities to analyze (1) whether there has been an increase in the proportion of federal inmates in need of rehabilitative programming, (2) if inmates with a need for rehabilitative programming were more likely than other inmates to participate in a program to address their need, and (3) whether there was an increase between 1997 and 2004 in the probability that inmates with a reported need participated in rehabilitative programming. Potential issues relevant to this analysis include the amount of resources available to BOP to carry out its mission to provide rehabilitative programming to federal inmates and the structure of incentives for inmates to participate in rehabilitative programs. BOP's Rehabilitative Programs
BOP provides a variety of rehabilitative programs for federal prison inmates, three of which are the focus of this report: work assignments through the Federal Prison Industries (FPI), educational programs, and substance abuse treatment. Data from the 1997 and 2004 surveys show that it was likely that there was increased need for drug abuse treatment programs, but the need for literacy/GED and occupational education programs along with FPI work assignments remained flat. Yet, the analysis also suggests that there was not a significant difference in the likelihood that inmates in 1997 and 2004 with rehabilitative needs participated in programming. The results of the analysis suggest that the probability that a typical inmate with a rehabilitative need participated in a program to address that need was, in most cases, less than 1 in 2. The results of the analysis also suggest that the probability that the highest-participating inmates participated in rehabilitative programs was 3 in 5 or lower. | The stated mission of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is "to protect society by confining offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure, and that provide work and other self-improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens." In support of this mission, BOP offers a variety of rehabilitative programs, including work opportunities through the Federal Prison Industries (FPI), occupational education programs, literacy/GED courses, and a variety of drug abuse treatment programs.
CRS used data from the 1997 and 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities to analyze (1) whether there has been an increase in the proportion of federal inmates in need of rehabilitative programming, (2) if inmates with a need for rehabilitative programming were more likely than other inmates to participate in a program to address their need, and (3) whether there was an increase between 1997 and 2004 in the probability that inmates with a reported need participated in rehabilitative programming.
Some of the key observations based on the CRS analysis include the following: (1) data from the 1997 and 2004 surveys show that it was likely that there was increased need for drug abuse treatment programs, but the need for literacy/GED and occupational education programs along with FPI work assignments remained flat; (2) with the exception of inmates who were unemployed before being arrested, inmates who had a rehabilitative need were significantly more likely than other inmates to participate in a rehabilitative program to address their need; (3) there was not a significant difference in the likelihood that inmates in 1997 and 2004 with rehabilitative needs participated in programming; and (4) the probability that a typical inmate with a rehabilitative need participated in a program to address that need was, in most cases, less than 1 in 2, and the probability that the highest-participating inmates were involved in rehabilitative programs was 3 in 5 or lower.
Potential issues relevant to this analysis include the amount of resources available to BOP to carry out its mission to provide rehabilitative programming to federal inmates and the structure of incentives for inmates to participate in rehabilitative programs. |
crs_RL32753 | crs_RL32753_0 | Some of the most controversial changes were made regarding the discipline of children with disabilities. Generally under IDEA a child with a disability is not immune from disciplinary procedures; however, these procedures are not identical to those for children without disabilities. If a child with a disability commits an action that would be subject to discipline, school personnel have immediate several options. A child with a disability who violates a code of student conduct may be removed from her current placement to another setting or suspension for up to 10 school days; the child may be placed in an interim alternative education setting for up to 45 school days for situations involving weapons, drugs, or if the student has inflicted serious bodily injury upon another person while at school; and a hearing officer may be asked to order a child be placed in an interim alternative educational setting for up to 45 school days if the hearing officer determines that maintaining the current placement of the child is substantially likely to result in injury to the child or others. If the local educational agency (LEA) seeks to change the placement of a child with a disability because of a violation of a code of student conduct either on an interim basis or on a long-term basis (except for a 10-day suspension), a manifestation determination review must be conducted to determine whether the conduct in question was caused by, or had a direct and substantial relationship to, the child's disability or was the direct result of the LEA's failure to implement the individualized education program (IEP). Several provisions were added by P.L. 108-446 that give schools increased flexibility for dealing with children with disabilities who misbehave. 108-446 . If the child's behavior is not a manifestation of a disability, long-term disciplinary action such as expulsion may occur, except that educational services may not cease. P.L. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 changed the "stay put" provision in the appeals section. | Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a child with a disability is not immune from disciplinary procedures; however, these procedures are not identical to those for children without disabilities. If a child with a disability commits an action that would be subject to discipline, school personnel have several immediate options. A child with a disability who violates a code of student conduct may be removed from her current placement to another setting or suspension for up to 10 school days; the child may be placed in an interim alternative education setting for up to 45 school days for situations involving weapons, drugs, or if the student has inflicted serious bodily injury upon another person while at school; and a hearing officer may be asked to order a child be placed in an interim alternative educational setting for up to 45 school days if the hearing officer determines that maintaining the current placement of the child is substantially likely to result in injury to the child or others. If the local educational agency (LEA) seeks to change the placement of a child with a disability because of a violation of a code of student conduct, either on an interim basis or on a long-term basis (except for a 10-day suspension), a manifestation determination review must be conducted to determine whether the conduct in question was caused by, or had a direct and substantial relationship to, the child's disability, or was the direct result of the LEA's failure to implement the individualized education program (IEP). If the child's behavior is not a manifestation of a disability, long-term disciplinary action such as expulsion may occur, except that educational services may not cease.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, P.L. 108-446, is a comprehensive reauthorization of the previous law on special education. Several important changes are made by this law to provisions on the discipline of children with disabilities. Generally, the new provisions give schools increased flexibility for dealing with children with disabilities who misbehave.
This report examines the statutory provisions relating to discipline with an emphasis on changes that were made by P.L. 108-446 and the final regulations. It will be updated as necessary. |
crs_RL33360 | crs_RL33360_0 | The report discusses four general strategies for reducing the Navy's dependence on oil for its ships:
reducing energy use on Navy ships; alternative hydrocarbon fuels; nuclear propulsion; and sail and solar power. Reducing Energy Use on Navy Ships
One strategy for reducing the Navy's dependence on oil would be to reduce energy use on Navy ships. Integrated Electric-Drive Propulsion
Compared to a traditional mechanical-drive propulsion system with two separate sets of turbines (one for propulsion, the other for generating electricity for shipboard use), an integrated electric-drive propulsion system can reduce a ship's fuel use by permitting the ship's single combined set of turbines to be run more often at their most fuel-efficient speeds. Fuel Cells
Fuel cell technology, if successfully developed for Navy shipboard application, could reduce Navy ship fuel use substantially by generating electricity much more efficiently than is possible through combustion. Alternative Hydrocarbon Fuels
A second strategy for reducing the Navy's dependence on oil would be to shift to alternative hydrocarbon fuels. 2006 Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Study
A January 2006 "quick look" study by the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board examined several potential alternative fuels for Air Force use. 2005 Naval Reactors Quick Look Analysis
A 2005 "quick look analysis" conducted by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, also known as Naval Reactors, concluded that total life-cycle costs (i.e., procurement plus life-cycle operating and support costs) for nuclear- and fossil-fueled versions of large-deck aircraft carriers would equalize when the price of diesel fuel marine (DFM) delivered to the Navy reached $55. The break-even figures for LHA/LHD-type large-deck amphibious assault ships and large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers) were $80 and $205 per barrel, respectively. Sail and Solar Power
A fourth strategy for reducing the Navy's dependence on oil would be to make use of sail and solar power, perhaps particularly on Navy auxiliaries and DOD sealift ships. Solar Power
Solar power might offer some potential for augmenting other forms of shipboard power, perhaps particularly in Navy auxiliaries and DOD sealift ships. Legislative Activity
FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 109-364)
House
Section 128 of H.R. ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN WEAPONS PLATFORMS. 5122 / P.L. 109-364 (conference report H.Rept. 109-702 of September 29, 2006) states:
SEC. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—In light of the findings in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that the Navy should make greater use of alternative technologies, including expanded application of integrated power systems, fuel cells, and nuclear power, for propulsion of future major surface combatant ships. (c) REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of the Navy shall include integrated power systems, fuel cells, and nuclear power as propulsion alternatives to be evaluated within the analysis of alternatives for future major surface combatant ships. Section 360 states:
SEC. The Committee encourages the Department of Defense to continue to explore the use of Fischer-Tropsch fuels as alternative sources for DOD's fuel requirements. 889/P.L. | General strategies for reducing the Navy's dependence on oil for its ships include reducing energy use on Navy ships; shifting to alternative hydrocarbon fuels; shifting to more reliance on nuclear propulsion; and using sail and solar power.
Reducing energy use on Navy ships. A 2001 study concluded that fitting a Navy cruiser with more energy-efficient electrical equipment could reduce the ship's fuel use by 10% to 25%. The Navy has installed fuel-saving bulbous bows and stern flaps on many of its ships. Ship fuel use could be reduced by shifting to advanced turbine designs such as an intercooled recuperated (ICR) turbine. Shifting to integrated electric-drive propulsion can reduce a ship's fuel use by 10% to 25%; some Navy ships are to use integrated electric drive. Fuel cell technology, if successfully developed, could reduce Navy ship fuel use substantially.
Alternative hydrocarbon fuels. Potential alternative hydrocarbon fuels for Navy ships include biodiesel and liquid hydrocarbon fuels made from coal using the Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process. A 2005 Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) study and a 2006 Air Force Scientific Advisory Board both discussed FT fuels.
Nuclear propulsion. Oil-fueled ship types that might be shifted to nuclear propulsion include large-deck amphibious assault ships and large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers). A 2005 "quick look" analysis by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program concluded that total life-cycle costs for nuclear-powered versions of these ships would equal those of oil-fueled versions when oil reaches about $70 and $178 per barrel, respectively.
Sail and solar propulsion. Kite-assisted propulsion might be an option for reducing fuel use on Navy auxiliaries and DOD sealift ships. Two firms are now offering kite-assist systems to commercial ship operators. Solar power might offer some potential for augmenting other forms of shipboard power, perhaps particularly on Navy auxiliaries and DOD sealift ships.
FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364). Section 128 of P.L. 109-364 (conference report H.Rept. 109-702 of September 29, 2006) expresses the sense of the Congress that the Navy should make greater use of alternative technologies, including expanded application of integrated power systems, fuel cells, and nuclear power, for propulsion of future major surface combatant ships. The report directs the Navy to include integrated power systems, fuel cells, and nuclear power as propulsion alternatives to be evaluated within the analysis of alternatives for future major surface combatant ships. Section 360 makes it Department of Defense (DOD) policy to improve the fuel efficiency of weapons platforms, consistent with mission requirements, and requires a report on DOD progress in implementing the policy.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33135 | crs_RL33135_0 | (12) The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator reports that at the end of March 2005, the PEPFARGlobal HIV/AIDS Initiative was supporting antiretroviral therapy for more than 235,000 AIDSpatients in the focus countries. (16) Some patients receivingtreatment for AIDS are participating in programs supported by both PEPFAR and the Global Fund. (17)
Global Fund Resource Gap
The Global Fund estimates that it needs $3.3 billion in 2006 and 2007 to cover all existinggrants through the end of 2007. In addition, it is seeking $3.7 billion, for a total of $7 billion, inorder to respond to anticipated applications in Rounds 6 through 8 during the two-year period. (18) At a pledging conferenceheld in London in September 2005, donors pledged a total of $3.7 billion. Unless additional pledgesare made, the Global Fund will have the resources to do little more than fund its existing grants. Itwill not be able to bring new resources to bear in fighting the AIDS pandemic. For FY2003 through FY2005, theAdministration requested $200 million annually, but Congress provided more than requested in eachyear. Funding for U.S. Global Fund and PEPFAR in U.S. Policy
Representatives of the Global Fund and PEPFAR consistently maintain that the two arepartners rather than competitors in the struggle against AIDS. (23) AnAugust 2005 Global Fund press release affirmed that the two programs are partners, noting that"Together, the Global Fund and PEPFAR are the major financial engines to achieve greatly increasedtreatment numbers over the coming years." (24) Jack Valenti, President of Friends of the Global Fight AgainstAIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, which advocates for the Global Fund in the United States,describes the Fund as the "multi-lateral arm of PEPFAR, complementing the work of U.S. bilateralprograms around the world." Bycontributing to the Global Fund, the United States is able to "leverage" its investment for fightingthe pandemic because the Fund provides a means for other donors, most of which lack the capacityfor carrying out large bilateral AIDS program, to participate in fighting the pandemic. (28) The tendency of the Administration to request less for the GlobalFund than Congress was willing to provide may be traced to these anti-multilateral points of view,some believe. (29) However,even many of those who have been skeptical of the degree of partnership between the Global Fundand PEPFAR now acknowledge that there seems to be a new spirit of cooperation, as symbolizedin the Administration's $300 million request for the Fund in FY2006. Thus, the United States would have to contribute $2.3 billion in FY2006 andFY2007 combined, rather than the $600 million pledged by Ambassador Tobias, if it is to persuadeother donors to make contributions sufficient to meet the Global Fund's stated need of $7 billion. Administration officials and others argue that the United States has already been generous towardthe Global Fund, and should not be expected to do more. Table 2 suggests that the one-third rule may not be governing pledges by other donorsfor 2006 and 2007, although it is also possible that their pledges reflect an expectation that Congresswill add to the U.S. contribution. The United States has already contributed substantial amountsto the Global Fund, and some believe that a failure by the Fund to mobilize the resources it needsto fight the AIDS pandemic will to some degree be a failure of U.S. policy. Another option would be a concerted U.S. effort to persuade other donor countries to increasetheir contributions to the Global Fund even in the absence of a large U.S. increase. To date, however, non-government sources -- apart from theBill and Melinda Gates Foundation -- have contributed only modest amounts to the Global Fund. | The United States is responding to the international AIDS pandemic through the President'sEmergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which includes bilateral programs and contributionsto the multilateral Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. PEPFAR overall appears ontarget to meet the Administration's five-year, $15 billion spending plan, although competing budgetpriorities could affect its prospects. By contrast, the Global Fund, which relies on multiple donors, is reporting a funding gap that may prevent it from awarding new grants to fight the pandemic. The Fund estimates that it needs $3.3 billion in 2006 and 2007 to cover the renewal of its existing grants,in addition to $3.7 billion in order to fund two new Rounds of grant-making. At a September 2005Global Fund pledging conference in London, donors offered a total of $3.7 billion for the two years,and unless additional pledges are made, the Fund will be able to do little more than fund existinggrants.
The United States, at the London meeting, pledged a total $600 million for 2006 and 2007,although Andrew Tobias, the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, suggested that Congress might providea larger amount. Congress has consistently appropriated more than requested for the Fund. Somebelieve that the Administration increased its FY2006 request for the Fund to $300 million, from$200 million sought in FY2003-FY2005, in recognition of the support the Fund enjoys in Congress.
Representatives of the Global Fund and PEPFAR maintain that their programs arecomplementary, and that they are partners rather than competitors. The United States is the largestcontributor to the Global Fund through PEPFAR. Some worry, however, that there are strainsbetween U.S. officials and the Global Fund, pointing to the tendency of the Administration torequest less for the Fund than Congress has been willing to provide. Global Fund representativesattended a major PEPFAR planning session in May 2005, and this is seen by many as one indicatoramong others that any past strains between the two programs are easing.
Advocates for the Global Fund seek a major increase in the U.S. contribution, arguing thatit would affirm U.S. leadership in the struggle against AIDS and persuade other donors to increasetheir support. They believe that the Global Fund has several unique advantages, including itsmultilateral character, its contribution to capacity building, and its operations in countries other thanthe 15 PEPFAR focus countries. Supporters of U.S. bilateral programs note that they too buildcapacity and operate beyond the focus countries, while bringing the capacities of highly experiencedU.S. agencies to bear in fighting the pandemic. Through PEPFAR, some argue, the United Statesis already doing more than its fair share in fighting AIDS, and any large increase for the Global Fundshould come from other donor countries. U.S. officials and others are also encouragingcontributions from private sector sources. Such contributions have been limited to date, apart from$150 million contributed by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. This report will not be updated. For further information, see CRS Report RS21181, HIV/AIDS International Programs:Appropriations FY2003-FY2006 and CRS Report RL31712 , The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Background and Current Issues . |
crs_RL32543 | crs_RL32543_0 | Introduction
From the mid-1980s to the end of FY2003, federal agencies had been authorized to enter intoEnergy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) with contractors that privately financed andinstalled energy conservation measures in federal buildings and facilities. In return, the contractorsreceived specified shares of any resulting energy cost savings. The term "energy conservationmeasure" (ECM) applies to energy-efficiency improvements such as energy- and water-savingequipment, and renewable energy systems such as solar energy panels. (1)
The contractor, referred to as an Energy Service Company (ESCO), provided the design,acquisition, installation, testing, operation, maintenance, and repair services for the ECM. TheESCO also had to guarantee a fixed amount of energy and cost savings throughout the term of thecontract, and bore the risk of the ECM's failure to produce a projected energy savings. The sum ofthe ECM cost and its reduced level of energy cost could not exceed the pre-ESPC energy cost. To date more than 340 ESPCs have been awarded, according to the Department of Energy(DOE), and no ESCO has failed to produce an energy and cost savings. (19) In comparison to ESPCs, $3.17 billion in appropriated funds wasinvested in energy-reducing capital improvements between FY1985 and FY2001.Appropriations-funded projects peaked at $288 million in FY1995 and declined to $131 million byFY2001. After an extensive review of whether ESPCs imposed a futurefinancial obligation on the federal government, CBO began scoring ESPCs as mandatory spending,coinciding with the expiration of the BEA. Policy Considerations
Since the 1970s, both the executive branch and Congress have promoted energy efficiencywithin federal agencies. When the federal government's energy-efficiency and conservationprograms received severe budget cuts in the 1980s, Shared Energy Savings and later Energy SavingsPerformance Contracts were devised as part of the strategy to meet federal energy reduction goals. Appropriations-funded energy conservation projects have been declining since FY1995, and federalmanagers have increasingly turned to ESPCs as a remedy to fund energy conservation measures. Congress may decide once again to extend the sunset provision,as had been authorized in the 1998 legislation. | Since the 1970s, both the executive branch and Congress have promoted energy efficiencywithin federal agencies. When the federal government's energy-efficiency and conservationprograms received severe budget cuts in the 1980's, Shared Energy Savings and later Energy SavingsPerformance Contracts were devised as part of the strategy to meet federal energy reduction goals.
Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) offered federal agencies a novel means ofmaking energy-efficiency improvements to aging buildings and facilities. In return for privatelyfinancing and installing energy conservation measures, a contractor received a specified share of anyresulting energy cost savings. The contractor, referred to as an Energy Service Company (ESCO),guaranteed a fixed amount of energy and cost savings throughout the term of the contract, and borethe risk of the improvement's failure to produce a projected energy savings. The sum of theimprovement's cost and its reduced level of energy cost could not exceed the pre-ESPC energy cost. The term "energy conservation measure" (ECM) was applied to energy-efficiency improvementssuch as energy- and water-saving equipment, and renewable energy systems such as solar energypanels.
ESPCs were authorized in 1992 by amendments to the National Energy Conservation PolicyAct. Federal agencies' authorization to enter into ESPCs expired October 1, 2003. Legislativeattempts to reauthorize ESPCs in the 108th Congress stalled when the Congressional Budget Office(CBO) scored ESPCs as mandatory spending that imposed a future financial obligation on the federalgovernment.
To date more than 340 ESPCs have been awarded with a total value of approximately $1.6billion in private sector investments. None have failed to produce energy and cost savings. Incomparison to ESPCs, $3.17 billion in appropriated funds was invested in energy-reducing capitalimprovements between FY1985 and FY2001, peaking at $288 million in FY1995 and declining to$131 million by FY2001. As appropriations-funded energy conservation projects have beendeclining since FY1995, federal managers have increasingly turned to ESPCs to fund energyconservation measures.
Options for Congress include taking no further action on the sunset provision that endedagencies' authorization to enter into ESPCs, extending the sunset provision, or extending the ESPCauthorization with amendments. Such amendments could include reducing the maximum contractlength and expanding the contract scope to non-building applications. This report will be updatedas the situation warrants. |
crs_R41190 | crs_R41190_0 | This report discusses the extent of deportation-related advice a noncitizen defendant is constitutionally owed in deciding whether to plead guilty to a particular crime. Noncitizens and Guilty Pleas
When an accused is a noncitizen, one especially momentous result of prosecution is possible deportation. He asserted that his attorney had failed to adequately investigate and advise him on the possible immigration consequences of his guilty plea, but instead, according to Padilla, said that Padilla "did not have to worry about [his] immigration status since he had been in the country so long." The Sixth Amendment includes an express right to counsel among other procedural protections it confers to criminal defendants:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense . Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties.... From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in the American Bar Association standards and the like ... are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. The test for relief under Strickland is two-pronged. Supreme Court's Decision in Padilla v. Kentucky
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Padilla v. Kentucky on March 31, 2010. Seven of the nine Justices agreed that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance requires that a defense lawyer, at a minimum, raise the possibility of deportation in advising a noncitizen in a criminal case. Nevertheless, he eschewed applying that test in Padilla's case "because of the unique nature of deportation." First, the impact of deportation is profound. On this issue of what immigration expertise is required of defense counsel, the five-Justice majority opinion and the two-Justice concurrence part ways. According to the majority, when immigration law is "succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence" of a conviction for a specified crime, an attorney must correctly advise on the very high likelihood of deportation before the accused pleads guilty to the offense. In less straightforward cases, "a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences." This is a due process obligation of the court, not counsel, and even though there may not be a constitutional remedy in a case like Padilla's—the dissent observes that the matter had not been presented to the lower courts and, remember, that the distinction between direct and collateral consequences was drawn in due process plea decisions—legislatures and the courts could establish (and to a degree have established) nonconstitutional rules and remedies for falling to advise, or for misadvising, on deportation. For that, a defendant must have been "prejudiced" by the error. Even if the courts were to consider "effective assistance" claims in additional contexts, some do not see the implications of considering "collateral" consequences to be overwhelming. Further considerations might pertain to drug or sex crimes. Other variations require that the court direct a defendant to defense counsel for advice, or even that the court ascertain whether a defendant's attorney has discussed possible deportation consequences with the accused. | The Sixth Amendment entitles an accused in a criminal prosecution to "Assistance of Counsel for his defense." This right to counsel implies a right to "effective assistance." Effective assistance has dimensions of both breadth and depth: breadth in the sense of what considerations beyond those immediately at issue in the prosecution should be taken into account, so-called collateral consequences; depth in the sense of what professional standards pertain. In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that "ineffective assistance" standards require informing a noncitizen defendant on possible deportation when advising on whether to accept a guilty plea. Forced removal through deportation is a civil proceeding separate and apart from criminal prosecution.
The test for deficient representation for Sixth Amendment purposes is two-pronged. First, was the attorney's performance reasonable under prevailing professional norms? Second, was the defendant prejudiced by the attorney's shortcomings? As to the first prong, the Padilla Court emphasized the unique nature of deportation. Criminal courts do not decide whether to deport a noncitizen defendant; rather, federal immigration authorities do. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that deportation can have enormous repercussions for a noncitizen and the noncitizen's family. The Court further observed that Congress curtailed the historic, though indirect, ability of criminal judges to forestall a convict's deportation, at the same time it dramatically expanded the range of crimes that can lead to deportation.
The Court cited the hardship of deportation and its increasingly automatic application in prelude to discussing whether Padilla's attorney fell short of prevailing practice. The lawyer had volunteered that Padilla did not have to worry about deportation in considering whether to plead guilty to marijuana trafficking because he had legally resided in the United States for over 40 years. Yet it was not the volunteering of mistaken advice that was critical to the Court. According to the Court, silence was not an adequate option. Instead, professional norms, as reflected in standards of the American Bar Association, criminal defense organizations, and the like, pointed to an affirmative duty to inform on the risk of deportation.
How far must an attorney go in advising a defendant? The five-Justice majority found immigration law to be "succinct, clear, and explicit" in Padilla's case, and held that in this circumstance defense counsel must correctly advise on the high likelihood of deportation. In less straightforward cases, the majority opined, it might suffice to advise that the pending charges carried a risk of deportation. The two concurring Justices found immigration law to be so complex that defense counsel need only warn of a general risk of deportation in all cases and suggest that the defendant see a specialist for further advice.
Deportation is commonly a risk for noncitizen criminal defendants, but there are other possible immigration consequences of a criminal conviction. Also, all defendants can face other collateral consequences, from loss of a business license to loss of the right to vote to loss of certain public benefits. A number of factors might bear on a defendant's decision to plead guilty, but the Padilla Court carefully limited its holding to advice on deportation. Also left open by Padilla is guidance on when failing to advise on deportation is sufficiently prejudicial to a defendant to warrant nullifying a guilty plea. The Court remanded this issue to lower courts for further consideration. |
crs_R40866 | crs_R40866_0 | Introduction
On June 11, 2009, in response to the global spread of a new strain of influenza, the World Health Organization (WHO) raised the level of influenza pandemic alert to phase 6, which indicates the start of an actual pandemic. This change reflects the spread of the new influenza A(H1N1) virus, not its severity. Although currently the pandemic is of moderate severity with the majority of patients experiencing mild symptoms and making a rapid and full recovery, this experience could change. The application of the ADA to an influenza pandemic is uncharted territory since the most recent previous influenza pandemic was in 1969, before the 1990 enactment of the ADA, and before the 1973 enactment of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which was the model for the ADA. Specifically, are individuals infected with a pandemic influenza virus considered to be individuals with disabilities? However, if the disease were to become more severe, an infected individual might be considered to be an individual with a disability under the ADA. Despite the fact that currently an individual infected with the H1N1 virus would not be considered an individual with a disability, the EEOC states that "employers should allow employees who experience flu-like symptoms to stay at home." During a pandemic, reasonable accommodations must continue to be provided unless these constitute an undue hardship. | On June 11, 2009, in response to the global spread of a new strain of influenza, the World Health Organization (WHO) raised the level of influenza pandemic alert to phase 6, which indicates the start of an actual pandemic. This change reflects the spread of the new influenza A(H1N1) virus, not its severity. Although currently the pandemic is of moderate severity with the majority of patients experiencing mild symptoms and making a rapid and full recovery, this experience could change.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities and protects applicants and employees from discrimination based on disability. The application of the ADA's nondiscrimination mandates during an influenza pandemic is uncharted territory since the most recent previous influenza pandemic was in 1969, before the 1990 enactment of the ADA. Currently, an individual infected with the H1N1 virus would most likely not be considered an individual with a disability; however, if the H1N1 virus were to mutate to cause more severe illness, such an infection may be considered a disability. The ADA prohibits employers from making certain disability-related inquiries and, currently, this prohibition might be interpreted to apply to inquiries about whether an employee would be in a high-risk group for pandemic influenza. The ADA also requires that employers provide reasonable accommodation for individuals with disabilities, and during a pandemic these accommodations would continue to be applicable unless they constitute an undue hardship. |
crs_R42978 | crs_R42978_0 | Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 , as amended) expands health insurance coverage primarily through two mechanisms: by expanding the existing Medicaid program and by establishing new health insurance exchanges where certain individuals and businesses can purchase private health insurance. Under ACA, Medicaid and exchanges are envisioned to work in tandem, with the potential to provide a continuous source of subsidized coverage for lower-income individuals and families, beginning in 2014. On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius . The Court held that the federal government cannot terminate current Medicaid program federal matching funds if a state does not expand its Medicaid program, effectively making the ACA expansion "optional." As a result, some states may choose not to expand their Medicaid program. Thus, some individuals in these states would not be eligible for Medicaid and could become eligible for subsidized exchange coverage, while others may remain uninsured. A third group of potentially affected individuals are those who may "churn", that is, they may go back and forth between Medicaid and exchange coverage, depending on their financial or other situation at the time. While some "churning" may be unavoidable, minimizing its effects may be critical to the health coverage of affected individuals and families. This analysis is by no means exhaustive; rather it is illustrative of the complexities that are inherent in the interactions between Medicaid and the exchanges. Benefits Under Medicaid and Exchange Plans
This section provides a description of benefits under Medicaid and the exchanges. Thus, it is difficult to make benefit comparisons across the state Medicaid programs (which also varies by individuals and/or groups). HHS identified four benchmark plan types that a state could use for the purpose of defining EHBs in the state (see Table 1 for a comparison between Medicaid and exchange benchmark plans):
One of the three largest plans in the state's small group health insurance market; One of the three largest health plans offered to state employees; One of the three largest national plans offered through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP); or The largest commercial non-Medicaid health maintenance organization in the state. Comparing Medicaid and Exchange Plans: Potential Implications for Benefits
Medicaid's alternative set of benefits (benchmark and benchmark-equivalent coverage) will include the essential health benefits, and has the potential to align with the benefits available under the exchange for certain individuals. Non-disabled Adults
States that offer alternative Medicaid benefit coverage (to specified groups including ACA expansion eligibles) will be required to cover the same EHBs provided in exchange plans. Potentially, not all Medicaid beneficiaries will receive these preventive services. For example, while the Medicaid program has historically provided "wrap-around coverage" to supplement coverage available through the private health insurance market, such coverage does not appear to be an available option for individuals who are eligible for exchange subsidies, because individuals may only be eligible for one low-income subsidy program (i.e., Medicaid, CHIP, subsidies to purchase coverage through the exchanges) at any given time. States may continue to provide coverage to medically needy individuals after 2014, and are required to offer such coverage with respect to children until the MOE requirements expire in 2019. Costs for Individuals Under Medicaid and Exchange Plans
Beneficiary Costs Under Medicaid
Under Medicaid, states may require certain beneficiaries to share in the cost of Medicaid services, although limitations generally exist on (1) the dollar or percentage amount, (2) the beneficiary groups to whom these requirements apply, and (3) the services on which cost-sharing can be charged. Certain individuals are required to apply some of their income toward the cost of their care. The amounts they may retain vary by setting and by state rules. Certain individuals enrolled in exchange plans will receive federal tax credits to cover all or part of exchange premiums. Finally, certain individuals who are eligible for premium credits in the exchanges will also be eligible for subsidies towards cost-sharing for services. Table 3 summarizes key differences and similarities in costs for individuals depending on whether they are covered by Medicaid or enrolled in an exchange plan. Because of the diversity of the populations that Medicaid serves and their unique health care needs, Medicaid offers benefits that are not typically covered in major insurance plans offered in the private market. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) expands health insurance coverage primarily through two mechanisms: by expanding the existing Medicaid program and by establishing new health insurance exchanges where certain individuals and businesses can purchase private health insurance. Under ACA, Medicaid and exchanges are envisioned to work in tandem, with the potential to provide a continuous source of subsidized coverage for lower-income individuals and families, beginning in 2014.
On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. The Court held that the federal government cannot terminate current Medicaid program federal matching funds if a state does not expand its Medicaid program, effectively making the ACA expansion "optional." As a result, some states may choose not to expand their Medicaid program. Individuals who are eligible for Medicaid are not eligible for subsidies in exchange plans. Thus, some individuals in these states would not be eligible for Medicaid and could become eligible for subsidized exchange coverage, while others may remain uninsured.
Individuals who receive coverage through exchange plans will likely not receive the same benefits offered by the Medicaid program, and vice versa. For example, traditional Medicaid provides a wide range of benefits to certain beneficiaries that are not typically covered in major medical plans in the private market, such as non-emergency transportation services or Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT). Exchange plans will reflect a "typical" private health insurance plan offered by employers, which generally includes a wide range of benefits, but not necessarily all, that are offered to various Medicaid groups of individuals. Exchange plans will be required to offer essential health benefits, which include preventive services with no cost-sharing, a benefit available to many, but not all, Medicaid beneficiaries. Thus there will likely be differences in available benefits for some individuals, depending on whether they are covered by Medicaid or exchange plans.
In lieu of traditional Medicaid benefits, states can choose to offer an alternative set of benefits (benchmark and benchmark-equivalent coverage) that will include the essential health benefits, but only to certain groups of Medicaid beneficiaries. This alternative set of benefits has the potential to more closely align the benefits under Medicaid and the exchange for certain individuals.
In addition to differences in benefits, there may also be differences with regard to the costs required of individuals. Currently, states may require certain Medicaid beneficiaries to share in the cost of services, but because of their lower income, such obligations are generally limited. Nonetheless, variation exists across the different categories of Medicaid eligibility groups with respect to costs. Similarly, ACA provides for premium and cost-sharing assistance for the purchase of exchange plans for certain lower-income individuals. However the only permissible variation across qualified individuals (or families) for these exchange subsidies is based on income.
Another group for whom the alignment between Medicaid and exchanges is important is composed of individuals who are covered by Medicaid today, but who may lose Medicaid coverage when states are allowed to scale back their Medicaid program. This state "maintenance of effort" requirement for covering certain adults will be lifted beginning in 2014 (and in 2019 for the coverage of children). Some of these individuals will qualify for subsidies through exchange plans, while others may become uninsured. Additionally, some individuals may "churn"; that is, they may go back and forth between Medicaid and exchange coverage, depending on their financial or other situation at the time. While some "churning" may be unavoidable, minimizing its effects may be critical to the health coverage of affected individuals and families.
The 113th and future Congresses will likely continue to play a significant role in shaping U.S. health care policy. This report provides an analysis of some of the key similarities and differences between Medicaid and insurance plan structure in plans offered through exchanges. Because Medicaid services vary by population covered and by state, and exchanges' plans can also vary by state, this report provides insight into the complexities and issues when comparing beneficiary benefits and costs to individuals for Medicaid and the exchanges. The inherent variations in Medicaid and the uncertainty about exactly how the exchanges will operate are just two of the factors that complicate a comparison. |
crs_R41118 | crs_R41118_0 | Organized retail crime exposes the United States to economic, public health, and domestic security dangers. Estimates of retail losses to ORC range from as low as $15 billion to as high as $37 billion annually. In addition to the economic impact of ORC, the theft and resale of stolen consumable or health and beauty products, such as infant formula, may pose safety risks to individuals purchasing such goods from ORC fences. Combating retail theft has traditionally been handled by state law enforcement under state criminal laws. Some, however, have begun to question whether state laws—which vary in the quantity of monetary losses that constitute major theft—are adequate to combat ORC. While many agree that ORC is a national problem, there is debate over the federal government's role in deterring ORC and sanctioning various actors that may be involved in committing or aiding these crimes. One policy issue facing Congress is whether criminalizing organized retail crime in the U.S. Code would allow for more effective investigation and prosecution of these criminals. Another related issue that Congress may wish to consider is whether regulating resale marketplaces (online markets, in particular), to require such entities to increase information sharing with retailers and law enforcement, would strengthen investigations and prosecutions of ORC as well as decrease the prevalence of retail thieves relying on legitimate online marketplaces to fence stolen goods. Generally, boosters act as professional shoplifters who steal or illegally obtain merchandise. Impact of Globalization and Technology
In an increasingly globalized society, more and more transactions take place online rather than face-to-face. As such, in addition to relying on physical resale markets, organized retail thieves have turned to the Internet and online marketplaces as means to fence their ill-gotten goods. The economic impact, however, extends beyond the manufacturing and retail industry and affects costs incurred by consumers and taxes lost by the states. In addition, some industry experts and policy makers have expressed concern about the possibility that proceeds from ORC may be used to fund terrorist activities. Economic Impact: A Lack of Consensus
The exact loss from organized retail crime to the retail industry is unknown. These costs are then borne by consumers. In 2010, however, retailers reported spending an average of 0.46% of annual sales on loss prevention. These marketplaces take various measures to combat the sale of stolen and fraudulently obtained goods—not solely by organized retail criminals—on their websites, including educating sellers and consumers, monitoring suspicious activity, and partnering with retailers and law enforcement. | Organized retail crime (ORC) involves the large-scale theft of everyday consumer items and potentially has much broader implications. Organized groups of professional shoplifters, or "boosters," steal or fraudulently obtain merchandise that is then sold, or "fenced," to individuals and retailers through a variety of venues. In an increasingly globalized society, more and more transactions take place online rather than face-to-face. As such, in addition to relying on physical resale markets, organized retail thieves have turned to online marketplaces as means to fence their ill-gotten goods.
ORC exposes the United States to costs and harms in the economic, public health, and domestic security arenas. The exact loss from ORC to the retail industry is unknown, but estimates have ranged from $15 billion to $37 billion annually. The economic impact, however, extends beyond the manufacturing and retail industry and includes costs incurred by consumers and taxes lost by the states. The theft and resale of stolen consumable or health and beauty products such as infant formula (that may have been repackaged, relabeled, and subjected to altered expiration dates) poses potential safety concerns for individuals purchasing such goods from ORC fences. In addition, some industry experts and policy makers have expressed concern about the possibility that proceeds from ORC may be used to fund terrorist activities.
Current efforts to combat ORC largely come from retailers, online marketplaces, and law enforcement alike. Retailers responding to the 2010 National Retail Security Survey spent an average of 0.46% of their annual sales on loss prevention measures. These loss prevention costs are ultimately borne by consumers in the form of higher prices on goods. Also, online marketplaces report taking various measures to combat the sale of stolen and fraudulently obtained goods on their websites, including educating sellers and consumers, monitoring suspicious activity, and partnering with retailers and law enforcement. Combating retail theft has traditionally been handled by state law enforcement under state criminal laws. Some, however, have begun to question whether state laws—which vary in the quantity of monetary losses that constitute major theft—are adequate to combat ORC.
While many agree that ORC is a national problem, there is debate over the federal government's role in deterring ORC and sanctioning various actors that may be involved in committing or aiding these crimes. One policy issue facing Congress is whether criminalizing organized retail crime in the U.S. Code would allow for more effective investigation and prosecution of these criminals. Congress may also wish to consider whether regulating resale marketplaces (online markets, in particular), to require such entities to increase information sharing with retailers and law enforcement, would strengthen investigations and prosecutions of ORC as well as decrease the prevalence of retail thieves relying on legitimate online marketplaces to fence stolen goods. |
crs_RL32030 | crs_RL32030_0 | 108-447 , the Consolidated Appropriations Actfor FY2005, included a provision that renders ineligible for L visa status those aliens who serve ina capacity involving specialized knowledge at the worksite of an employer other than the petitioningemployer or its affiliate if (1) the alien will be controlled principally by the unaffiliated employer;or (2) the placement with the unaffiliated employer is part of an arrangement merely to provide laborrather than to use the alien's specialized knowledge. It also added a provision that requires theSecretary of Homeland Security to impose a fraud prevention and detection fee of $500 on H-1B(foreign temporary professional workers) and L (intracompany business personnel) petitioners. (6)
Trends
The number of L visas issued has increased by 363.5% over the past 25 years. The U.S.Department of State (DOS) issued only 26,535 L visas in FY1980. L visa issuances began increasingin the mid-1990s and peaked at 122,981 in FY2005, as Figure 1 depicts. Supporters of current law argue that it is essential for multinational firms to be able to assigntop personnel to facilities in the United States on an "as needed basis" and that it iscounterproductive to have government bureaucrats delay these transfers to perform labor markettests. They warn these multinational firms will find it too burdensome and unprofitable to dobusiness in the United States. Some point out that U.S. corporations who do business abroad mightwell lose the reciprocal benefit of transferring top U.S. personnel overseas if restrictions are addedto the L visa. 2738 and H.R. The visa permits petitioners to transfer themselves to the UnitedStates. Representative Rosa DeLauro introduced the L-1 Nonimmigrant Reform Act( H.R. 2849 wouldhave reduced by two years the total time an L visa holder could remain in the United States. 4166 were incorporated into Title IV of P.L. (32)
Activity in the 109th Congress
L Visa Reform. The Comprehensive ImmigrationReform Act ( S. 2611 / S. 2612 ) includes a substantial revision of the lawon L visas. 2612 would add certainrequirements for L visa applicants seeking to come to the United States to work in new or unopenedfacilities and would expand the staffing resources of DHS, DOS, and DOL to investigate abuses andenforce violations of the L visa. L Visa Fees. 3648 , which wouldimpose additional fees with respect to immigration services for L visa intracompany transferees. 3648 would require the Secretaries of State and Homeland Securityto each charge additional fees of $1,500 to employers filing for visa applications and nonimmigrantpetitions for L visas. The House Committee on the Judiciary ordered H.R. These provisions were included in Title V of H.R. On November 18, 2005, the Senate passed S. 1932 , the Deficit Reduction OmnibusReconciliation Act of 2005, with these provisions as Title VIII. The conference report ( H.Rept. | Concerns are growing that the visa category that allows executives and managers ofmultinational corporations to work temporarily in the United States is being misused. This visacategory, commonly referred to as the L visa, permits multinational firms to transfer top-levelpersonnel to their locations in the United States for five to seven years. The number of L visasissued has increased by 363.5% over the past 25 years. The U.S. Department of State (DOS) issuedonly 26,535 L visas in FY1980. L visa issuances began increasing in the mid-1990s and peaked at122,981 in FY2005.
Some are now charging that firms are using the L visa to transfer "rank and file" professionalemployees rather than limiting these transfers to top-level personnel, thus circumventing immigrationlaws aimed at protecting U.S. employees from the potential adverse employment effects associatedwith an increase in the number of foreign workers. Proponents of current law maintain that anyrestrictions on L visas would prompt many multinational firms to leave the United States, as wellas undermine reciprocal agreements that currently permit U.S. corporations to transfer theiremployees abroad.
Title IV of P.L. 108-447 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005, renders ineligiblefor L visa status those aliens who serve in a capacity involving specialized knowledge at the worksiteof an employer other than the petitioning employer or its affiliate if (1) the alien will be controlledprincipally by the unaffiliated employer; or (2) the placement with the unaffiliated employer is partof an arrangement merely to provide labor rather than to use the alien's specialized knowledge. Italso requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to impose a fraud prevention and detection fee of$500 on H-1B (foreign temporary professional workers) and L (intracompany business personnel)petitioners.
In the 109th Congress, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act ( S. 2611 / S. 2612 ) would add certain requirements for L visa applicants seeking to cometo the United States to work in new or unopened facilities and would expand the staffing resourcesof DHS, DOS, and DOL to investigate abuses and enforce violations of the L visa. Other bills thatwould reform the L visa include H.R. 3322 and H.R. 3381 .
Earlier, the House Committee on the Judiciary reported H.R. 3648 , which wouldimpose additional fees with respect to immigration services for L visa intracompany transferees. Thebill would require the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to each charge fees of $1,500 toemployers filing certain visa applications and nonimmigrant petitions for L visas. These provisionswere included in Title V of H.R. 4241 , the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which theHouse passed on November 18, 2005. The Senate version ( S. 1932 ) would raise theminimum fee for L-1 visas by $750. The conference report on S. 1932 did not includethese L visa provisions. This report tracks legislative activity and will be updated as action warrants. |
crs_RL32252 | crs_RL32252_0 | Introduction
Since HIV/AIDS was discovered in 1981, more than 20 million people have lost their livesto the virus. Nearly 40 million people are currently living with HIV/AIDS, including nearly 2.2million children under the age of 15. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the most affected continent with 1.9 million ofthe 2.2. million infected children. (1) A joint study conducted by the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the Joint United NationsProgram on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) found that at the end of 2003, 15 million children under the ageof 18 had lost one or both parents to AIDS, with 12.3. million of them found in sub-SaharanAfrica. Due to the 10-year time lag between HIV infection and death,experts predict that without the availability of anti-retroviral medications orphan populations willcontinue to grow for at least two decades after a country has reached its peak HIV infection rate. Experts report that the number of orphans is only nowexpected to decline in the country, from 14.6% of Ugandan children in 2001 to a projected 9.6% in2010. (8) rate of less than 1% at the end of 2003, 5.1 million people wereliving with HIV/AIDS at that time. (10)
Children living in high seroprevalence areas may see a decline in access to education or inthe quality of education. (15)
The majority of children orphaned or made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS are living with asurviving parent, or within their extended family (often a grandparent). 108-25 , The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 , which authorized 10% of global HIV/AIDS funds to be usedfor children orphaned or made vulnerable by the virus (OVC). In the 109th session, H.R. 1409 , Assistance for Orphans and Other VulnerableChildren in Developing Countries Act of 2005, passed the House and Senate on October 18, 2005and October 25, 2005, respectively. Ultimately, the bill was enacted on November 8, 2005. The act, P.L. 109-95 , authorized spending for orphan-related programs in FY2006 and FY2007; establisheda monitoring and evaluation system to measure the effectiveness of related assistance activities;directed the appointment of a Special Advisor for Assistance to Orphans and Vulnerable Childrenwithin USAID; and required an annual report on project implementation. (60)
Economic and Material Responses
This section discusses some of the initiatives that the United States and the internationalcommunity implement to serve the needs of the children affected by AIDS, and some of thechallenges that these programs face. Children who live in orphanages haveaccess to education, food, shelter, and nurturing, which they may not be able to secure on their own,advocates of orphanages say. These children may also be stigmatized and isolated, asignorance about the virus remains high. Those who offersupport to communities affected by HIV/AIDS have found that the early programs, which focusedspecifically on children whose parents died of AIDS, often missed other vulnerable children, suchas those who are at high risk of becoming orphaned by AIDS (because their parents have HIV), thosewho live in households with children orphaned by AIDS, and those who may have been orphanedfrom other causes (like war or disease) are equally vulnerable. P.L. Access to ARVs for Children. 1567 , "Debt Cancellation for HIV/AIDS Response Act" in the 107th Congress, andin the 108th Congress H.R. Similar legislation is expected to be introduced in the 109th session. | Since HIV/AIDS was discovered in 1981, more than 20 million people have lost their livesto the virus. According to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), nearly 40million are currently living with HIV/AIDS, including nearly 2.2 million children under the age of15. In 2004, 4.9 million people acquired the virus, and 3.1 million died from AIDS. Sub-SaharanAfrica remains the most affected region with 25.4 million people living with HIV/AIDS at the endof 2004, 1.9 million of whom were children under the age of 15. The United States Agency forInternational Development (USAID), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and UNAIDSestimate that at the end of 2003, 15 million children under the age of 18 had lost one or both parentsto AIDS, with the majority (82%) in sub-Saharan Africa. In just two years, from 2001 to 2003, theglobal number of children orphaned by AIDS increased from 11.5 million to 15 million. By 2010,it is expected that more than 25 million children will be orphaned by this deadly virus. Due to the10-year time lag between HIV infection and death, officials predict that orphan populations willcontinue to rise for a similar period, even after the HIV rate begins to decline. Experts say onlymassive spending to prolong the lives of parents could be expected to change this trend.
The impact of HIV/AIDS on children is just beginning to be explored. Not only are childrenorphaned by AIDS affected by the virus, but those who live in homes that have taken in orphans,children with little education and resources, and those living in areas with high HIV rates are alsoimpacted. Children who have been orphaned by AIDS may be forced to leave school, engage inlabor or prostitution, suffer from depression and anger, or engage in high-risk behavior that makesthem vulnerable to contracting HIV. Children who live in homes that take in orphans may see adecline in the quantity and quality of food, education, love, nurturing, and may be stigmatized. Impoverished children living in households with one or more ill parent are also affected, as healthcare increasingly absorbs household funds, which frequently leads to the depletion of savings andother resources reserved for education, food, and other purposes.
Congress passed P.L. 108-25 ("The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003") in the 108th Congress, which authorizes 10% of HIV/AIDSfunds to be used for children orphaned or made vulnerable by the virus. In the 109th Congress, H.R. 1408 , "Assistance for Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children in DevelopingCountries Act of 2005," passed the House and Senate on October 18, 2005, and October 25, 2005,respectively. Ultimately, the bill was enacted on November 8, 2005. The act, P.L. 109-95 ,established a monitoring and evaluation system to measure the effectiveness of related assistanceactivities; directed the appointment of a Special Advisor for Assistance to Orphans and VulnerableChildren within USAID; and required an annual report on project implementation. This reportexplores some of the challenges facing children affected by HIV/AIDS, outlines U.S. andinternational efforts to assist those children, and outlines some key issues that may be considered byCongress in the 109th session. This report will be updated. |
crs_RL34271 | crs_RL34271_0 | Introduction and Background
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) has released for public comment 10 economic research studies on media ownership that it had commissioned to provide data and analysis to support the policy debate on what ownership limitations are in the public interest. These studies also provide data and analysis useful to the on-going policy debates on how best to foster minority ownership of broadcast stations and on tiered vs. à la carte pricing of multichannel video program distribution (MVPD) services, such as cable and satellite television. On October 22, 2007, Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, and Free Press (Consumer Commenters) submitted to the FCC very detailed comments on the 10 FCC-commissioned media ownership studies. The Consumer Commenters identify a number of alleged specification errors—some raised by the peer reviewers, some by the Consumer Commenters themselves—in the major statistical studies commissioned by the FCC, and then present statistical results from re-running the models in those studies, applying the same empirical data to models revised to correct for the alleged specification errors. Despite the lack of consensus on many issues, it appears that the following general statements can be made about the status of the data collection and analysis available to policy makers. Large, systematic, detailed, and accurate data sets on media ownership characteristics, viewer/listener preferences, and programming are now available for analysts and policy makers. But several gaps remain in data collection. Most significantly the databases on minority and female ownership of broadcast and telecommunications properties are incomplete and/or inaccurate, and statistical analysis based on those data would not be reliable. Although the 10 FCC-commissioned studies present a large number of statistical findings, many of these relationships are not statistically significant across alternative model specifications. This has led the researchers and peer reviewers to offer disclaimers that the findings are not robust and where they find statistical relationships they demonstrate correlation, not causality. The peer reviewers and the Consumer Commenters identified a number of possible technical problems in the econometric analyses performed in the 10 studies. The potentially most noteworthy criticism appears to be that all but one of the studies addressed the impact of media ownership characteristics on the programming provided by individual cross-owned stations, not on the total programming available to consumers in the local market, which arguably is the key public policy concern. No process is in place to determine whether the criticisms are valid and/or whether the study results are reliable. The Consumer Commenters claim that, when they modified the FCC-commissioned studies to take into account these criticisms, they obtained robust results demonstrating that loosening the media ownership limits harmed the public interest, though their results were not always consistent across model specifications. | The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) has released for public comment 10 economic research studies on media ownership that it had commissioned to provide data and analysis to support the policy debate on what ownership limitations are in the public interest. These studies also provide data and analysis useful to the on-going policy debates on how best to foster minority ownership of broadcast stations and on tiered vs. à la carte pricing of multichannel video program distribution (MVPD) services, such as cable and satellite television. The FCC also has released peer reviews of these studies that are required by the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, and Free Press (Consumer Commenters) jointly submitted to the FCC very detailed comments on the 10 FCC-commissioned studies that included statistical results from re-running the models in those studies, applying the same empirical data to models revised to correct for alleged specification errors. Despite the lack of consensus on many issues, it appears that the following general statements can be made about the status of the data collection and analysis available to policy makers:
Large, systematic, detailed, and accurate data sets on media ownership characteristics, viewer/listener preferences, and programming are now available for analysts and policy makers. Several gaps remain in data collection, however. Most significantly the databases on minority and female ownership of broadcast and telecommunications properties are incomplete and inaccurate, and statistical analysis based on those data would not be reliable. Although the 10 FCC-commissioned studies present a large number of statistical findings, many of these relationships are not statistically significant across alternative model specifications. This has led the researchers and peer reviewers to offer disclaimers that the findings are not robust and where they find statistical relationships they demonstrate correlation, not causality. The peer reviewers and the Consumer Commenters identified a number of possible technical problems in the econometric analyses performed in the 10 studies. The potentially most noteworthy criticism appears to be that all but one of the studies addressed the impact of media ownership characteristics on the programming provided by individual cross-owned stations, not on the total programming available to consumers in the local market, which arguably is the key public policy concern. It has not yet been determined whether the criticisms are valid and/or whether the study results are reliable. The Consumer Commenters claim that when they modified the FCC-commissioned studies to take into account these criticisms, they obtained robust results demonstrating that loosening the media ownership limits harmed the public interest, though their results were not always consistent across model specifications. Their modified studies have not yet been subject to full review by others. |
crs_RL30240 | crs_RL30240_0 | Purposes, Authority, and Participants
Throughout its history, Congress has engaged in oversight—broadly defined as the review, monitoring, and supervision of the implementation of public policy—of the executive branch. 837 (1946) (emphasis added); and d. Established the Legislative Reference Service, renamed the Congressional Research Service by the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act (see below), as a separate department in the Library of Congress and called upon the Service "to advise and assist any committee of either House or joint committee in the analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of any legislative proposal ... and otherwise to assist in furnishing a basis for the proper determination of measures before the committee." Expanded House and Senate committee authority for oversight . The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has additional oversight duties to a. review and study on a continuing basis, the operation of government activities at all levels to determine their economy and efficiency (Rule X, clause 3); b. receive and examine reports of the Comptroller General and submit recommendations thereon to the House (Rule X, clause 4); c. evaluate the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of the government (Rule X, clause 4); d. study intergovernmental relationships between the United States and states, municipalities, and international organizations of which the United States is a member (Rule X, clause 4); and e. report an oversight agenda , not later than March 31 of the first session of a Congress, based upon oversight plans submitted by each standing committee and after consultation with the Speaker of the House, the majority leader, and the minority leader. i. The casework performed by a Member's staff for constituents can be an effective oversight tool. Oversight Coordination and Processes
A persistent problem for Congress in conducting oversight is coordination among committees, both within each chamber as well as between the two houses. The appropriations process is one of Congress's most important forms of oversight. It is frequently, as here, employed to make sure that the action under the delegation squares with the Congressional purpose." In anticipation of congressional interest or at the request of a member or committee, CRS organizes and conducts seminars and workshops on issues of current interest to members and staff of Congress. CRS Divisional Responsibilities
CRS has adopted an interdisciplinary and integrative approach as it responds to requests from Congress. Through those papers, CBO aims to enhance the transparency of its work and to encourage external review of that work. Produced: Throughout the year. Vols. No. Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and Congressional Procedure. Senate. S.Rept. Congressional Investigations. Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. : MM70003, 1999 Congressional Oversight Seminars. : MM70003, 1999 Congressional Oversight Seminars. | The Congressional Research Service (CRS) developed the Congressional Oversight Manual over 30 years ago, following a three-day December 1978 Workshop on Congressional Oversight and Investigations. The workshop was organized by a group of House and Senate committee aides from both parties and CRS at the request of the bipartisan House leadership. The Manual was produced by CRS with the assistance of a number of House committee staffers. In subsequent years, CRS has sponsored and conducted various oversight seminars for House and Senate staff and updated the Manual as circumstances warranted. Worth noting is the bipartisan recommendation of the House members of the 1993 Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress (Rept. No. 103-413, Vol. I):
[A]s a way to further enhance the oversight work of Congress, the Joint Committee would encourage the Congressional Research Service to conduct on a regular basis, as it has done in the past, oversight seminars for Members and congressional staff and to update on a regular basis its Congressional Oversight Manual.
Over the years, CRS has assisted many Members, committees, party leaders, and staff aides in the performance of the oversight function: the review, monitoring, and supervision of the implementation of public policy. Understandably, given the size, reach, cost, and continuing growth of the modern executive establishment, Congress's oversight role is even more significant—and more demanding—than when Woodrow Wilson wrote in his classic Congressional Government (1885): "Quite as important as lawmaking is vigilant oversight of administration." Today's lawmakers and congressional aides, as well as commentators and scholars, recognize that Congress's work, ideally, should not end when it passes legislation. Oversight is an integral way to make sure that the laws work and are being administered in an effective, efficient, and economical manner. In light of this destination, oversight can be viewed as one of Congress's principal responsibilities as it grapples with the complexities of the 21st century. |
crs_R45089 | crs_R45089_0 | Trump Administration's FY2018 Foreign Assistance Request6
The Trump Administration requested $1.1 billion to be provided to Latin America and the Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and USAID in FY2018, which would have been $617 million, or 36%, less than the $1.7 billion of assistance provided to the region in FY2017 (see Table 1 ). The Administration also proposed the elimination of the Inter-American Foundation, a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Colombia has received significant amounts of U.S. assistance to support counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts since FY2000. Legislative Developments
On March 23, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, provides $39.9 billion for foreign operations globally, which is a 4.2% cut compared to FY2017. It is currently unclear how much assistance will be provided to Latin America and the Caribbean, since the legislation and the accompanying explanatory statement do not specify aid levels for every country. Nevertheless, the amounts designated in the act for several significant initiatives indicate that total funding for the region will exceed the Administration's request and may approach FY2017 levels (see Table 4 ). The act appropriates "up to" $615 million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is $155 million more than the Administration requested but $84.7 million less than was allocated to the initiative in FY2017. The act appropriates "not less than" $391.3 to support security and development efforts and the implementation of the peace accord in Colombia. This is $139.9 million more than the Administration requested and $5 million more than Colombia received in FY2017. According to the explanatory statement, the act appropriates $152.7 million for Mexico, which is $65 million more than the Administration requested and $14.1 million more than Mexico received in FY2017. The act appropriates $15 million for programs to promote democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela. Implications for U.S. Policy
The Trump Administration's desire to scale back U.S. foreign assistance could have significant implications for U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean in the coming years. In particular, it could accelerate U.S. efforts to transition countries in the region away from traditional development assistance and toward other forms of bilateral engagement. It also could result in the Department of Defense (DOD) taking on a larger role in U.S. security cooperation with the region. Moreover, the Administration's proposed foreign assistance cuts, combined with other policy shifts, could contribute to a relative decline in U.S. influence. Influence
Although the relative importance of foreign aid in U.S. relations with the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean has declined since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government continues to use assistance to advance key policy initiatives in the region. | The United States provides foreign assistance to the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean to support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets since the 1990s. Over the past year, the Trump Administration has sought to reduce foreign aid significantly and refocus U.S. assistance efforts in the region to address U.S. domestic concerns, such as irregular migration and transnational crime.
FY2018 Request
For FY2018, the Trump Administration requested $1.1 billion to be provided to Latin America and the Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). That would have been $617 million, or 36%, less than the $1.7 billion of U.S. assistance the region received in FY2017. The proposal would have cut funding for nearly every type of assistance and would have reduced aid for every Latin American and Caribbean nation. The Trump Administration also proposed the elimination of the Inter-American Foundation, a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in the region.
The Administration's efforts to scale back U.S. assistance could have significant implications for U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Faced with potential cuts, U.S. agencies could accelerate efforts to transition countries in the region away from traditional development assistance and toward other forms of bilateral engagement. Reductions in State Department-managed security assistance could lead to the Department of Defense taking on a larger role in U.S. security cooperation. Moreover, reductions in foreign aid, combined with other policy shifts, could contribute to a relative decline in U.S. influence in the region.
Legislative Developments
On March 23, 2018, nearly six months after the start of FY2018, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141). The act provided $39.9 billion for foreign operations globally, a 4.2% cut compared to FY2017. The total amount of foreign assistance Congress appropriated for Latin America and the Caribbean is unclear since the legislation and the accompanying explanatory statement do not specify aid levels for every Latin American and Caribbean nation. Nevertheless, the amounts designated in the act for several significant initiatives indicate that total funding for the region will exceed the Administration's request and may approach FY2017 levels:
The act provides $615 million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is $155 million more than the Administration requested but $85 million less than was allocated to the initiative in FY2017. The act provides more than $391 million to support the peace process and security and development efforts in Colombia, which is $140 million more than requested and $5 million more than Colombia received in FY2017. The act provides nearly $153 million to support security and rule-of-law efforts in Mexico, which is $65 million more than requested and $14 million more than Mexico received in FY2017. |
crs_R40186 | crs_R40186_0 | Introduction
Biochar—a charcoal produced under high temperatures using crop residues, animal manure, or other organic material—has the potential to offer multiple environmental benefits. Biochar
Biochar is a soil supplement that sequesters carbon in the soil and thus may help to mitigate global climate change. It has the potential to curtail greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental hazards in the near term and to benefit agricultural producers as a soil amendment and source of renewable energy. Biochar is similar in appearance to potting soil or to a charred substance, depending on the feedstock ( Figure 1 ). Potential Advantages
Whether used as a soil amendment or burned as an energy source (e.g., for cooking and heating), biochar provides numerous potential environmental benefits, some of which are not quantifiable. Large amounts of carbon may be sequestered in the soil for long time periods (hundreds to thousands of years at an estimate), but precise estimates of carbon amounts sequestered as a result of biochar application are scarce. Potential Disadvantages
Recognizing that biochar technology is in its early stages of development, there are many concerns about the applicability of the technology in the United States. Three issues are feedstock availability, biochar handling, and biochar system deployment. Energy costs for a producer's operation may be reduced by using the energy generated from the biochar production system. Additionally, some assert that the use of biochar results in higher crop yields. Some asserted that the legislation addressed research and development needs for biochar production. Noted research areas include biochar production and use, co-production with bioenergy, soil enhancements, and soil carbon sequestration. | Biochar is a charcoal produced under high temperatures using crop residues, animal manure, or any type of organic waste material. Depending on the feedstock, biochar may look similar to potting soil or to a charred substance. The combined production and use of biochar is considered a carbon-negative process, meaning that it removes carbon from the atmosphere.
Biochar has multiple potential environmental benefits, foremost the potential to sequester carbon in the soil for hundreds to thousands of years at an estimate. Studies suggest that crop yields can increase as a result of applying biochar as a soil amendment. Some contend that biochar has value as an immediate climate change mitigation strategy. Scientific experiments suggest that greenhouse gas emissions are reduced significantly with biochar application to crop fields.
Obstacles that may stall rapid adoption of biochar production systems include technology costs, system operation and maintenance, feedstock availability, and biochar handling. Biochar research and development is in its infancy. Nevertheless, interest in biochar as a multifaceted solution to agricultural and natural resource issues is growing at a rapid pace both nationally and internationally.
Past Congresses have proposed numerous climate change bills, many of which do not directly address mitigation and adaptation technologies at developmental stages, such as biochar. However, biochar may equip agricultural and forestry producers with numerous revenue-generating products: carbon offsets, soil amendments, and energy.
This report briefly describes biochar, some of its potential advantages and disadvantages, legislative support, and research and development activities underway in the United States. |
crs_R42716 | crs_R42716_0 | In November 2002, Congress responded to the fears of economic damage due to the absence of commercially available coverage for terrorism with passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). The TRIA program was amended and extended in 2005 and 2007. Following the 2007 amendments, the TRIA program is set to expire at the end of 2014. TRIA in the 113th Congress
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 Reauthorization Act of 2013 (H.R. H.R. The full Senate took up the bill on July 17, 2014, amending it and passing it on a vote of 93-4. TRIA Reform Act of 2014 (H.R. 4871)16
H.R. Among the provisions are
gradual reduction of federal share of losses from 85% to 80%; gradual increase in program trigger from $100 million to $500 million; increase in the maximum of the mandatory recoupment amount to the total of insurer deductibles under the program (currently approximately $36 billion) and removal of a provision that decreases mandatory recoupment in the case of very large attacks; increase to mandatory recoupment from 133% to 150% of the federal share of losses; separate treatment of Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (NCBR) terrorist attacks with lower trigger ($100 million) and higher federal loss sharing (85%). The House Committee on Financial Services marked up H.R. Goals and Specifics of the Current TRIA Program
The original TRIA legislation's stated goals were to (1) create a temporary federal program of shared public and private compensation for insured terrorism losses to allow the private market to stabilize; (2) protect consumers by ensuring the availability and affordability of insurance for terrorism risks; and (3) preserve state regulation of insurance. The changes to the program have largely reduced the government coverage for terrorism losses, except that the 2007 amendments expanded coverage to losses due to domestic terrorism, rather than limiting the program to foreign terrorism. For a relatively small loss, there is no federal sharing. For a medium-sized loss, the federal role is to spread the loss over time and over the entire insurance industry, providing assistance up front but then recouping the payments through a broad levy on insurance policies afterwards. For a large loss, the federal government is to pay most of the losses, although recoupment is possible in these circumstances as well. The federal government shares in an insurer's losses due to a certified act of terrorism only if "the aggregate industry insured losses resulting from such certified act of terrorism" exceed $100 million. 5. In the years following the federal sharing of insurer losses, but prior to September 30, 2017, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to establish surcharges on property/casualty insurance policies to recoup 133% of some or all of the outlays to insurers under the program. If losses are very high, the Secretary has the authority to assess surcharges, but is not required to do so. The exact amount of the 20% deductible at which TRIA coverage would begin depends on how the losses are distributed among insurance companies. For events with insured losses over $27.5 billion, the Secretary has discretionary authority to recoup all the government outlays and may be required to partially recoup the government outlays depending on the size of the attacks and the amount of uncompensated losses paid by the insurance industry. Policyholders are not, however, required to purchase coverage. Language that would have specifically extended TRIA coverage to NCBR events was offered in the past, but was not included in legislation as enacted. H.R. The Terrorism Insurance Market
Post-9/11 and Pre-TRIA
The September 2001 terrorist attacks, and the resulting billions of dollars in insured losses, caused significant upheaval in the insurance market. There was significant uncertainty, however, as to how businesses would react, because there was no general requirement to purchase terrorism coverage and the pricing of terrorism coverage was initially high. For insured losses over $27.5 billion, the mandatory recoupment amount decreases, thus the Secretary would be required to recoup less than 133% of the outlays. | Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, coverage for losses from such attacks was normally included in general insurance policies without specific cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, such coverage became very expensive if offered at all. Because insurance is required for a variety of transactions, it was feared that the absence of insurance against terrorism loss would have a wider economic impact. Terrorism insurance was largely unavailable for most of 2002, and some have argued that this adversely affected parts of the economy.
Congress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA; P.L. 107-297). TRIA created a temporary three-year Terrorism Insurance Program in which the government would share some of the losses with private insurers should a foreign terrorist attack occur. This program was extended in 2005 (P.L. 109-144) and 2007 (P.L. 110-160). The amount of government loss sharing depends on the size of the insured loss. In general terms, for a relatively small loss, private industry covers the entire loss. For a medium-sized loss, the federal role is to spread the loss over time and over the entire insurance industry; the government assists insurers initially but then recoups the payments through a broad levy on insurance policies afterwards. For a large loss, the federal government would cover most of the losses, although recoupment is possible in these circumstances as well. Insurers are required to make terrorism coverage available to commercial policyholders, but TRIA does not require policyholders to purchase the coverage. The prospective government share of losses has been reduced over time, but the 2007 reauthorization expanded the program to cover losses from acts of domestic terrorism. The TRIA program is currently slated to expire at the end of 2014.
The specifics of the current program are as follows: (1) terrorist act must cause $5 million in insured losses to be certified for TRIA coverage; (2) the aggregate insured losses from a certified act of terrorism must be $100 million in a year for the government coverage to begin; and (3) an individual insurer must meet a deductible of 20% of its annual premiums for the government coverage to begin. Once these thresholds are passed, the government covers 85% of insured losses due to terrorism. If the insured losses are under $27.5 billion, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to recoup 133% of government outlays. As insured losses rise above $27.5 billion, the Secretary is required to recoup a progressively reduced amount of the outlays. At some high insured loss level, which will depend on the exact distribution of losses, the Secretary would no longer be required to recoup outlays, but retains the discretionary authority to do so.
Since TRIA's passage, the private industry's willingness and ability to cover terrorism risk have increased. According to industry surveys, prices for terrorism coverage have generally trended downward, with approximately 60% of commercial policyholders purchasing coverage over the past few years. This relative market calm has been under the umbrella of TRIA coverage, and it is unclear how the insurance market would react to the expiration of the federal program.
In the 113th Congress, five bills (H.R. 508, H.R. 1945, H.R. 2146, S. 2244, and H.R. 4871) have been introduced to amend the TRIA statute. S. 2244 passed the Senate on a vote of 93-4 on July 17, 2014. H.R. 4871 was reported by the House Financial Services Committee on July 16, 2014. Both bills would extend the TRIA program, but have a number of differences, particularly the length (seven years for S. 2244 vs. five years for H.R. 4871) and the program trigger (remaining at $100 million in S. 2244 vs. increasing to $500 million for non-Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, or Radiological [NCBR] terrorist events in H.R. 4871). |
crs_R41465 | crs_R41465_0 | Introduction
With the large federal deficit, some Members of Congress have become interested in institutional mechanisms that Congress has used in the past in attempts to address one component of this issue—federal spending. One of the mechanisms that has drawn interest is the Joint Committee on Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures, which existed from 1941 to 1974. Its existence was terminated in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The report concludes with some considerations involved with the creation of a committee—the purpose of which is to assist Congress in reducing federal spending—and with a brief examination of committee oversight authority extant in House and Senate committees and of alternative mechanisms for cutting spending. Later in 1941, in an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1941 recommended by the Senate Finance Committee, the duties and purposes of the joint committee were solely to "make a full and complete study and investigation of all expenditures of the Federal Government with a view to recommending the elimination or reduction of all such expenditures deemed by the joint committee to be nonessential." The Joint Committee on Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures was a study committee, without legislative authority. Its recommendations on cutting or reducing nonessential spending were reported to the House and Senate and submitted to the Committees on Appropriations. Individual Members might also have been interested in the joint committee's work and have based arguments or amendments on the committee's recommendations. It is not possible to track the joint committee's influence over the course of its existence, although the provenance in 1974 of the Budget Committees' scorekeeping was the joint committee's scorekeeping reports. The Joint Committee's Work
Created to recommend potential savings in federal spending, the work of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures was characterized by a dual narrative—one of genuine interest in reducing federal expenditures, and another concerned with projecting legislative control over spending in government programs. For many policymakers, the debt was so high and the prospect of war so certain that immediate action was required to strengthen federal finances. Thus, the call for a reduction of nonessential federal expenditures served many purposes. Spending that was eliminated would save money that could be applied to the war effort. Additionally, it was argued, American taxpayers would be more willing to shoulder the high taxes needed to fund the war if they saw that the federal government was acting frugally. Finally, reduced federal deficit spending could help control potentially damaging rates of inflation. The second purpose of this report is to briefly explain the creation of a new committee, should the House or Senate, alone or together, wish to establish a new committee with a role in cutting federal spending. A joint committee may be created by adoption of a concurrent resolution or as a provision of another piece of legislation that becomes law. A committee may be given authority to report legislation—legislative authority—or it may be authorized only as a study or investigatory committee. As indicated, with political support, it is a straightforward process to create a House, Senate, or joint committee. | With today's large federal deficit, some Members of Congress have become interested in institutional mechanisms that Congress has used in the past in attempts to address one component of this issue—federal spending. One mechanism that has drawn interest is the Joint Committee on Reduction of Non-Essential Federal Expenditures, which existed from 1941 to 1974. It was also known eponymously as the Byrd committee, after its advocate and long-time chair, Senator Harry F. Byrd. The joint committee was established by Section 601 of the Revenue Act of 1941, and terminated by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
In reporting the Revenue Act, the Senate Finance Committee recommended an amendment to create the joint committee with the duty to "make a full and complete study and investigation of all expenditures of the Federal Government with a view to recommending the elimination or reduction of all such expenditures deemed by the joint committee to be nonessential."
On the eve of U.S. entry into World War II, the federal debt was so high and the prospect of war so certain that immediate action was required to strengthen federal finances. The call in Congress and among policymakers, then, for a reduction of nonessential federal expenditures served many purposes. Spending that was eliminated would save money that could be applied to the war effort. American taxpayers, it was argued, would be more willing to shoulder the high taxes needed to fund the war if they saw that the federal government was acting frugally. Finally, reduced federal deficit spending could help lessen potentially damaging rates of inflation.
The joint committee was a study committee, without legislative authority. Its recommendations on cutting or reducing nonessential spending were reported to the House and Senate and submitted to the Appropriations Committees. Individual Members might also have been interested in the joint committee's work and have based arguments or amendments on the committee's recommendations. It is not possible to track the joint committee's influence over the course of its existence, although the provenance in 1974 of the Budget Committees' scorekeeping was the joint committee's scorekeeping reports.
The work of the joint committee was characterized by a dual narrative—one of genuine interest in reducing federal expenditures, and another concerned with projecting legislative control over federal spending. This report briefly discusses representative investigations conducted by the joint committee and several issues that interested the joint committee over much of its existence.
With political support, creation of a new committee with a role in cutting federal spending would be a straightforward process. The House or Senate may create a committee through adoption of a simple resolution or by law. Together they may create a joint committee through adoption of a concurrent resolution or by law. A committee may be created as a study committee, or it may be given legislative authority. This report concludes with some considerations involved with the creation of a committee—the purpose of which is to assist Congress in reducing federal spending—and with a brief examination of committee oversight authority extant in House and Senate committees and of alternative mechanisms for cutting spending. |
crs_95-416 | crs_95-416_0 | Introduction
This report explains the major provisions of the federal estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes as they apply to transfers in 2014. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 temporarily (through the end of 2012) reinstated the estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes with lower top rates and larger exemptions and reunified the estate and gift taxes. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 permanently extended the estate tax rules enacted by the 2010 Act except for the top tax rate, which increased from 35% to 40%. The determination of federal estate tax liability involves a series of adjustments and modifications of a tax base known as the "gross estate." Certain allowable deductions reduce the gross estate to the "taxable estate." The result is the decedent's estate tax which, after reduction for certain allowable credits, is the amount of tax paid by the estate. Computation of the Estate Tax
Under the unified estate and gift tax system, computation of a decedent's estate tax liability requires a "grossed-up," or a combination, of the decedent's lifetime taxable gifts and the decedent's taxable estate to which the tax rate schedule is then applied. To the extent this credit is used to offset gift taxes, it is unavailable to offset estate taxes. The IRC refers to the credit as an "applicable exclusion amount," that is, the amount of taxable gifts or estate that the credit would cover. The applicable exclusion amount in 2014 is $5,340,000. The Federal Gift Tax
The federal gift tax is a tax imposed on an annual basis on all gratuitous transfers of property made during life. The tax seeks to account for transfers of property that would otherwise reduce the estate and accordingly estate tax liability at death. The donor's tax liability on the gift depends upon the value of the "taxable gift." The taxable gift is determined by reducing the gross value of the gift by the available deductions and exclusions. The purpose of the resulting GST tax is the same as its predecessor, to close a loophole in the estate and gift tax system where property could be transferred to successive generations without paying multiple estate or gift taxes. This discussion will divide the generation-skipping transfer tax into two components: generation-skipping transfers and the computation of the tax. Generation-Skipping Transfers
The GST tax is a flat-rate tax. An indirect skip occurs when the generation one level below the decedent (e.g., children) receives some beneficial interest in the property before the property passes to the generation two or more levels below (e.g., grandchildren). Additionally, the $14,000 per donee annual exclusion from the gift tax is recognized against taxation of direct skips only (i.e., where the property passes directly to the generation two or more levels below the decedent). | This report contains an explanation of the major provisions of the federal estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer taxes as they apply to transfers in 2014. The following discussion provides basic principles regarding the computation of these three transfer taxes.
The federal estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes were resurrected by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) after a hiatus of one year (2010). The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) permanently extended the estate tax rules enacted by the 2010 Act except for the top tax rate, which increased from 35% to 40% for both the estate and gift taxes.
The federal estate tax is a tax levied on the transfer of property at death and measured by the size of the decedent's estate. The tax is computed through a series of adjustments and modifications of a tax base known as the "gross estate." Certain allowable deductions reduce the gross estate to the "taxable estate," to which is then added the total of all lifetime taxable gifts made by the decedent. The tax rates are applied and, after reduction for certain allowable credits, the amount of tax owed by the estate is reached.
The federal gift tax is a tax imposed on all gratuitous transfers of property made during life. The tax seeks to account for transfers of property that would otherwise reduce the estate and accordingly estate tax liability at death. The donor's tax liability of the gift depends upon the value of the "taxable gift." The taxable gift is determined by reducing the gross value of the gift by the available deductions and exclusions.
The unified transfer tax credit is available against both gift and estate tax liability. To the extent this credit is used to offset gift taxes, it is unavailable to offset estate taxes. The Internal Revenue Code refers to the credit as an "applicable exclusion amount," that is, the amount of taxable gifts or estate that the credit would cover. The applicable exclusion amount in 2014 is $5,340,000.
The generation-skipping transfer tax attempts to close a perceived loophole in the estate and gift tax system where property could be transferred to successive generations without intervening estate or gift tax consequences. There are two basic forms of generation-skipping transfers: the indirect skip, where the generation one level below the decedent receives some beneficial interest in the property before the property passes to the generation two or more levels below; and the direct skip, where the property passes directly to the generation two or more levels below the decedent. The generation-skipping transfer tax is imposed at a flat rate of 40% with an available exclusion of $5,340,000. While it is of the same value, this exclusion is separate from the unified transfer tax credit available for the estate and gift taxes. |
crs_R43457 | crs_R43457_0 | Introduction
While the power to prescribe rules as to which aliens may enter the United States and which aliens may be removed resides solely with the federal government, the impact of alien migration—whether lawful or unlawful—is arguably felt most directly in the communities where aliens settle. State and local responses to unlawfully present aliens within their jurisdictions have varied considerably, particularly as to the role that state and local police should play in enforcing federal immigration law. 1070, were facially preempted by federal immigration law. At the other end of the spectrum, some states and localities have been unwilling to assist the federal government's enforcement of measures that distinguish between those residents with legal immigration status and those who lack authorization under federal law to be present in the United States. In some instances, these jurisdictions have adopted measures that seek to thwart federal efforts to identify and apprehend unlawfully present aliens within the state or locality's jurisdiction. While state and local restrictions on cooperation in federal immigration enforcement efforts have existed for decades, there has been an upswing in the adoption of these measures in recent years. Moreover, the nature of these restrictions has evolved over time, particularly in response to recent federal immigration enforcement initiatives like Secure Communities (subsequently replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), as discussed below), which enable federal authorities to more easily identify potentially removable aliens in state or local custody. This report discusses legal issues related to state and local measures limiting law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration authorities. It begins by providing a brief overview of constitutional principles informing the relationship between federal immigration authorities and state and local jurisdictions. The report then discusses various types of measures adopted or considered by states and localities to limit their participation with federal immigration enforcement efforts, including (1) limiting police investigations into the immigration status of persons with whom they come in contact; (2) declining to honor federal immigration authorities' requests that certain aliens be held until those authorities may assume custody; (3) shielding certain unlawfully present aliens from detection by federal immigration authorities; and (4) amending or applying state criminal laws so as to reduce or eliminate the immigration consequences that might result from an alien's criminal conviction. Some states and localities have sought to restrict police cooperation with federal immigration authorities' efforts to apprehend removable aliens. Entities that have adopted such policies are sometimes referred to as "sanctuary" jurisdictions, though there is not necessarily a consensus as to the meaning of this term. Although criticized by some for impeding federal immigration enforcement efforts, state or local policies of declining to honor at least some immigration detainers would appear to be permissible under federal law. Nothing in the INA purports to require that states and localities honor immigration detainers. | While the power to prescribe rules as to which aliens may enter the United States and which aliens may be removed resides solely with the federal government, the impact of alien migration—whether lawful or unlawful—is arguably felt most directly in the communities where aliens settle. State and local responses to unlawfully present aliens within their jurisdictions have varied considerably, particularly as to the role that state and local police should play in enforcing federal immigration law. Some states, cities, and other municipalities have sought to play an active role in immigration enforcement efforts. However, others have been unwilling to assist the federal government in enforcing measures that distinguish between residents with legal immigration status and those who lack authorization under federal law to be present in the United States. In some circumstances, these jurisdictions have actively opposed federal immigration authorities' efforts to identity and remove certain unlawfully present aliens within their jurisdictions.
Although state and local restrictions on cooperation with federal immigration enforcement efforts have existed for decades, there has reportedly been an upswing in the adoption of these measures in recent years. Moreover, the nature of these restrictions has evolved over time, particularly in response to recent federal immigration enforcement initiatives like Secure Communities (subsequently replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program), which enable federal authorities to more easily identify removable aliens in state or local custody. Entities that have adopted such policies are sometimes referred to as "sanctuary" jurisdictions, though there is not necessarily a consensus as to the meaning of this term or its application to a particular state or locality. Recent reports that an alien who shot and killed a woman, after being released by San Francisco authorities who had declined to honor an immigration detainer issued by federal authorities, have brought increased attention to state and local practices of declining to honor such detainers, as well as "sanctuary" policies more generally.
This report discusses legal issues related to state and local measures that limit law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration authorities. The report begins by providing a brief overview of the constitutional principles informing the relationship between federal immigration authorities and state and local jurisdictions, including the federal government's power to preempt state and local activities under the Supremacy Clause, and the Tenth Amendment's proscription against Congress directly "commandeering" the states to administer a federally enacted regulatory scheme.
The report then discusses various types of measures adopted or considered by states and localities to limit their participation in federal immigration enforcement efforts, including (1) limiting police investigations into the immigration status of persons with whom they come in contact; (2) declining to honor federal immigration authorities' requests that certain aliens be held until those authorities may assume custody; (3) shielding certain unlawfully present aliens from detection by federal immigration authorities; and (4) amending or applying state criminal laws so as to reduce or eliminate the immigration consequences that might result from an alien's criminal conviction. For discussion of legal issues raised by states and localities seeking to play an active role in enforcing federal immigration law, see CRS Report R41423, Authority of State and Local Police to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42986 | crs_R42986_0 | Background
Congressional interest in U.S. energy policy has often focused on ways through which the United States could secure more economical, reliable, and cleaner fossil fuel resources both domestically and internationally. Recent expansion in natural gas production, primarily as a result of new or improved technologies (e.g., hydraulic fracturing) used on unconventional resources (e.g., shale, tight sands, and coalbed methane), has made natural gas an increasingly significant component in the U.S. energy supply. Associated emissions have the potential to contribute significantly to air pollution. The focus of this report is on fugitive and combusted natural gas emissions. Pollutants
Air pollutants associated with natural gas systems include, most prominently, methane and VOCs—of which the crude oil and natural gas sector is one of the highest-emitting industrial sectors in the United States—as well as NO x , SO 2 , and various forms of HAPs. This combustion occurs during several activities, including (1) the flaring of natural gas during drilling and well completions, (2) the combustion of natural gas to drive the compressors that move the product through the system, and (3) the combustion of fuels in engines, drills, heaters, boilers, and other production, construction, and transportation equipment. Hazardous Air Pollutants ( HAP s ). This report summarizes some of the more significant actions taken by EPA, the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the U.S. Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). EPA and the Clean Air Act
The CAA seeks to protect human health and the environment from emissions that pollute ambient, or outdoor, air. Under the Obama Administration, on August 16, 2012, EPA promulgated new standards for several sources in the "Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production" source category never before regulated at the federal level. On June 3, 2016, EPA promulgated updates to the 2012 standards "for methane and VOC emissions from new and modified oil and gas production sources, and natural gas processing and transmission sources." In a direct response to the Obama-era standards, and in line with his campaign promises, President Trump signed Executive Order 13783 on March 28, 2017. The order—entitled "Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth"—requires agencies to review existing regulations and "appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind those that unduly burden" domestic energy production and use. Section 7 of the executive order specifically directs the EPA Administrator to review several regulations related to U.S. oil and gas development, including the agency's methane standards. On July 3, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated EPA's administrative 90-day stay, agreeing with arguments that the agency improperly used its authority under CAA Section 307(d)(7)(B) to pause provisions of the rule. EPA promulgated NESHAPs for both the "Crude Oil and Natural Gas Production" and the "Natural Gas Transmission and Storage" sectors in 1999. Under the Obama Administration, on November 18, 2016, BLM promulgated a "Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation" rule, which targets natural gas emissions as a potential waste of public resources and loss of royalty revenue. On October 4, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted both motions and ruled against BLM's initial postponement. These activities can affect air quality issues in the downstream sectors of the natural gas supply chain. The Regulatory Role of Federal, State, and Local Governments
Federal regulation of air emissions in the oil and gas industry remains controversial. Covered Sources and Pollutants
The 2012 federal air standards focus primarily on the upstream sectors of the oil and gas industry and cover only some of the pollutants and potential sources of emissions. However, the recent expansion in natural gas production in the United States has given rise to a new set of concerns regarding human health and environmental impacts, including impacts on air quality. BLM rescinded many of the novel requirements of its rule on September 28, 2018. | Natural Gas Systems and Air Pollution
Congressional interest in U.S. energy policy has often focused on ways through which the United States could secure more economical, reliable, and cleaner fossil fuel resources both domestically and internationally. Recent expansion in natural gas production, primarily as a result of new or improved technologies (e.g., hydraulic fracturing, directional drilling) used on unconventional resources (e.g., shale, tight sands, and coalbed methane) has made natural gas an increasingly significant component in the U.S. energy supply. This expansion, however, has prompted questions about the potential impacts of natural gas systems on human health and the environment, including impacts on air quality.
The natural gas supply chain contributes to air pollution in several ways, including (1) the leaking, venting, and combustion of natural gas in the course of production operations; and (2) the combustion of other fossil fuel resources or other emissions during associated operations. Emission sources include pad, road, and pipeline construction; well drilling, completion, and flowback activities; and gas processing and transmission equipment such as controllers, compressors, dehydrators, pipes, and storage vessels. Pollutants include, most prominently, methane (i.e., the principal component of natural gas) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs)—of which the natural gas industry is one of the highest-emitting industrial sectors in the United States—as well as nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide (SO2), and various forms of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs).
Federal Air Standards for the Sector
Under the Obama Administration, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated air standards for several source categories in the crude oil and natural gas sector on August 16, 2012. These standards revise previously existing rules and promulgate new ones to regulate emissions of VOCs, SO2, and HAPs from many production and processing activities that had never before been covered by federal standards (including, most notably, VOC controls on new hydraulically fractured natural gas wells). In an extension of these regulations, and in conjunction with the Obama Administration's Climate Action Plan, EPA promulgated additional rules on June 3, 2016, "to set standards for methane and VOC emissions from new and modified oil and gas production sources, and natural gas processing and transmission sources" not covered by the 2012 rule. Further, the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management (BLM), promulgated a "Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation" rule on November 18, 2016, to target natural gas emissions on federal and Indian lands as a potential waste of public resources and loss of royalty revenue.
In a direct response to the Obama-era standards, and in line with his campaign promises, President Trump signed Executive Order 13783 on March 28, 2017. The order—entitled "Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth"—requires agencies to review existing regulations and "appropriately suspend, revise, or rescind those that unduly burden" domestic energy production and use. Section 7 of the order specifically directs the EPA Administrator and the Secretary of the Interior to review several regulations related to domestic oil and gas development, including EPA's 2016 methane standards and BLM's 2016 waste prevention rule. In June 2017, both EPA and BLM announced plans to postpone the compliance dates for certain sections of the standards, pursuant to the Clean Air Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), while the agencies work through the reconsideration process. On July 3, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated EPA's administrative stay of the 2016 methane standards. On October 4, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California ruled against BLM's delay. Both agencies have since proposed rulemakings to revise or rescind requirements of the rules. BLM finalized its revisions on September 28, 2018.
Scope and Purpose of This Report
This report provides information on the natural gas industry and the types and sources of air pollutants in the sector. It examines the role of the federal government in regulating these emissions, including the provisions in the Clean Air Act and other statutes, and EPA's and other agencies' regulatory activities. It concludes with a brief discussion of a number of issues under debate, including
defining the roles of industry and local, state, and federal governments; establishing comprehensive emissions data; determining the proper control of pollutants and sources; understanding the human health and environmental impacts of emissions; and estimating the costs of pollution abatement. |
crs_R43041 | crs_R43041_0 | Introduction
The recent fiscal crisis and recession have accentuated debt collection issues, prompted federal regulatory and enforcement activities regarding the debt collection industry, and motivated assessments of the effectiveness of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Bureau or CFPB) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the two main agencies charged with regulating and/or enforcing the FDCPA, have identified debt buying, the use of litigation as a collection strategy, and the impact of current technology on the debt collection industry as three major developments that did not exist when the FDCPA was enacted in 1977. They have conducted analyses of consumer complaints about FDCPA violations, studies on and workshops to evaluate the debt buying industry, and the impact of technological developments such as social media, email, and mobile phones on how debt collectors communicate with consumers and find information about consumer debts. At present, about 30 million Americans, nearly 10% of the population, are subject to debt collection for amounts averaging $1,500 per person, according to the CFPB. The FDCPA was signed into law on September 29, 1977, as an amendment to the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The purpose of the FDCPA is to "eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors." Debt collectors are prohibited from threatening or harassing debtors, and their contacts with debtors are restricted. The FDCPA commonly only applies to third-party debt collectors. A "debt collector" is generally defined as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another." The FDCPA does not apply to creditors who are collecting their own debts, unless in the process of collecting debts, the creditor uses a name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is attempting to collect the debt on his behalf. As of the date of this report, one bill to revise the FDCPA has been introduced in the 113 th Congress. S. 508 would define child support as a debt and is similar to S. 1383 in the 112 th Congress. 5794 would have limited debt collector liability for conduct that the debt collector in good faith believed complied or conformed to regulations or official interpretations of the CFPB that were later amended, rescinded, or determined to be invalid by a judicial or other authority. | The recent fiscal crisis and recession have accentuated debt collection issues, prompted federal regulatory and enforcement activities regarding the debt collection industry, and motivated assessments of the effectiveness of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Bureau or CFPB) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the two main agencies charged with regulating and/or enforcing the FDCPA, have identified debt buying, the use of litigation as a collection strategy, and the impact of current technology on the debt collection industry as three major developments that did not exist when the FDCPA was enacted in 1977. They have conducted analyses of consumer complaints about FDCPA violations and studies and workshops to evaluate the debt-buying industry and the impact of technological developments such as social media, email, mobile phones, etc., on how debt collectors communicate with consumers and find information about consumer debts. At present, about 30 million Americans, nearly 10% of the population, are subject to debt collection for amounts averaging $1,500 per person, according to the CFPB.
The FDCPA was enacted as an amendment to the Consumer Credit Protection Act. Its purpose is to "eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors." Debt collectors are prohibited from threatening or harassing debtors, and their contacts with debtors are restricted. The FDCPA commonly only applies to third-party debt collectors. A "debt collector" is generally defined as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another." The FDCPA does not apply to creditors who are collecting their own debts, unless in the process of collecting debts, the creditor uses a name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is attempting to collect the debt on his behalf. There are certain other exceptions, such as federal or state government employees collecting debts as part of their official duties.
As of the date of this report, only one bill to revise the FDCPA has been introduced in the 113th Congress. This bill would define child support as a debt. Several bills were introduced in the 112th Congress to address various consumer problems with the debt collection industry, including attempted collection of time-barred debts, arrests of debtors, inadequate information about a debt and/or inadequate verification of a debt, and threatening to withhold treatment to induce payment of delinquent medical debt. On the other hand, legislation in the 112th would also have restricted the liability of good-faith debt collectors for conduct that complies or conforms with regulations or interpretations of the CFPB. |
crs_R45195 | crs_R45195_0 | Overview and Key Developments
Liberia is a small West African country of about 4.7 million people. Its government continues to pursue a transition toward a national policy agenda focused on alleviation of poverty, which is widespread, long-term growth and development, and the reconstruction of infrastructure and public service institutions devastated by two civil wars (1989-1997 and 1999-2003). The country is also continuing to overcome the economic effects of a devastating outbreak of the contagious and often fatal Ebola Virus Disease (2014-2016), which spurred a sharp decrease in economic growth rates and a 1.6% contraction of the economy in 2016. Weah, a former internationally famed professional soccer player, was inaugurated on January 22, 2018, becoming Liberia's 25 th president and its second post-war head of state. He succeeded two-term president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who was term-limited. Also at issue was the preservation of gains resulting from more than $5 billion dollars in U.S. post-war investments in development, security, and humanitarian welfare, and considerable aid from other donors. U.S. Ties: Background
The United States has had a nearly 200-year bilateral relationship with Liberia and played a formative role in its creation. UNMIL completed its mandate on March 30, 2018. Since 2006, Congress has fostered relations through a House Democracy Partnership (HDP) program with the Liberian legislature. The focus of U.S. development programs, administered primarily by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department, has ranged from the infrastructure sector, with a priority on boosting access to electricity and road maintenance, to health, education, agriculture, and economic growth activities. Political Background
Sirleaf Administration (2006-2018)
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, a U.S.-educated former government administrator, banker, and U.N. Development Program official, became president after winning a runoff election against Weah in 2005, in Liberia's first post-war general elections. The extent to which the Weah administration may be able to effectively pursue this agenda remains to be seen. Such prosecutions have been aided in the United States by the Justice Department's Human Rights Special Prosecutions Section. Congress, which Sirleaf addressed in a 2006 joint session, has shown continuing interest in Liberia's post-war development and has held hearings on its development, stability, and democratization trajectories, most recently in September 2017, in advance of the elections. Other Federal Agencies
The Department of the Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) has maintained a presence in Liberia for most of the post-war period with the aim, for instance, of helping the Liberia Revenue Authority to prevent and address employee corruption and misconduct and improve physical and information technology security. | Liberia, a small coastal West African country on the Gulf of Guinea, has made substantial development gains since the end of the second of two civil wars (1989-1997 and 1999-2003). In late 2017, Liberia held its third post-war general election. George Weah, a former soccer star, won the presidential election in a runoff and was inaugurated on January 22, 2018. Weah succeeded two-term president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who was constitutionally prohibited from seeking a third term, in Liberia's first electoral transfer of state executive power since 1944.
Weah's policy agenda focuses on four broad goals: improved service delivery and support for marginalized groups; economic growth and diversification; the further consolidation of peace and security; and improved governance, transparency, and accountability. Weah inherits significant challenges from the Sirleaf administration, including the continuing aftereffects of a devastating 2014-2016 outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease, which undermined the country's weak health system and economy. He will govern without support from a U.N. peacekeeping operation, known as UNMIL, which provided significant post-war security and governance support for 15 years until its mandate ended in late March 2018.The Weah government is likely to remain a recipient of substantial bilateral and multilateral aid, although the extent and focus of this aid is likely to be conditioned, in part, on his leadership and governance records.
The United States has maintained close bilateral ties with Liberia for nearly 200 years, with periodic exceptions. Ties were particularly close during the Sirleaf years. The U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have administered a wide range of post-war bilateral assistance programs, especially in the areas of health and economic development. Liberia also benefits from programs administered by other U.S. agencies, including the Department of the Treasury, Peace Corps, Defense Department, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
Congress has maintained an interest in Liberia, and has held hearings on its post-war development, stability, and democratization trajectories. Congress has appropriated more than $5 billion in post-war aid and assistance to halt the Ebola outbreak, and helped to foster relations through a House Democracy Partnership with the Liberian legislature. Some Members of Congress, often those with politically active Liberian-American constituencies, have also supported the immigration rights of noncitizen Liberians resident in the United States. |
crs_R40551 | crs_R40551_0 | The Census Bureau's task in conducting the once-a-decade enumeration has been summarized very simply: count each person whose usual residence is in the United States; count that person only once; and count him or her at the right location, where the person lives all or most of the time. This report discusses the major innovations that were planned for the 2010 census, problems encountered with the attempt to automate certain census field operations, the persistent differential census undercount of less advantaged groups in the population, and efforts to ensure an equitable census. The 23 rd census began north of the Arctic Circle on January 25, 2010, in Noorvik, AK, where the then-Bureau Director, among others, traveled by snowmobile and dogsled to enumerate the residents. Most U.S. households—about 120 million—received their census forms by mail in March, ahead of the official April 1 Census Day, and 74% of the households that received forms mailed them back. On December 21, 2010, 10 days before the legal deadline, the Bureau released the official state population figures for House apportionment and the total U.S. resident population count of 308,745,538 as of Census Day. Departing from recent enumerations, the 2010 census questionnaire was a short form only. It asked for the age, sex, race, and ethnicity (Hispanic or non-Hispanic) of each person in a household, as well as the individual's relationship to the person filling out the form. The form also included a question about tenure, that is, whether the housing unit was rented or owned by a member of the household. The long form was replaced by the American Community Survey (ACS), a "continuous measurement" survey of, from 2005 to 2011, about 250,000 households per month, totaling about 3 million annually (now about 295,000 households per month, totaling about 3.54 million a year), which, with few exceptions, gathers the same data as its predecessor. Automated Field Operations
Another innovation for 2010 was to have been the automation of two major census field operations: address canvassing and nonresponse follow-up (NRFU). The goal of pre-census address canvassing was for temporary Bureau field staff to verify and correct census addresses and maps, technically called the "Master Address File" (MAF) and "Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing" (TIGER) system. NRFU required that enumerators try repeatedly to visit or telephone people who had not completed their census questionnaires and convince them to respond. In April 3, 2008, congressional testimony, then-Bureau Director Steve Murdock acknowledged that the Bureau had abandoned the plan to use the handhelds for NRFU, would resort to the traditional paper-based approach, and would rely on the handhelds only for address canvassing. The change required the Bureau to hire and train more NRFU staff, at increased expense. The failure of the handhelds for nonresponse follow-up fueled concerns, like those of the Commerce Department OIG and GAO cited previously, that the late-date alterations to NRFU could threaten the success of the 2010 census. The greater tendency for minorities and less affluent members of society than for whites and wealthier people to be undercounted can lead to differential undercounts of the former. The estimated net percentage undercount for non-Hispanic blacks was 1.84%; for native Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders, 2.12%; for American Indians off reservations, 0.62%; and for Hispanics, 0.71%. The CCM estimates were released on May 22, 2012. They indicated a net percentage overcount of
0.01% for the total population (compared with the net overcount estimate of 0.49% in the 2000 census); 0.84% for non-Hispanic whites (compared with their 1.13% estimated net overcount in 2000); and 1.95% for American Indians off reservations (versus their 0.62% estimated net undercount in 2000). | The 23rd decennial census of the U.S. population began on January 25, 2010, in Noorvik, AK, where the U.S. Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau) Director, among others, traveled by snowmobile and dogsled to enumerate the residents. Most households in the United States—about 120 million—received their census forms by mail in March, ahead of the official April 1 Census Day, and 74% of the households that received forms mailed them back. From May through July, the Census Bureau contacted about 47 million nonresponding households and on December 21, 2010, released the official state population figures and total U.S. resident population count of 308,745,538 as of Census Day.
The Bureau's constitutional mandate to enumerate the U.S. population every 10 years has been summarized with deceptive simplicity: count each person whose usual residence is in the United States; count the person only once; and count him or her at the right location. In reality, the attempt to find all U.S. residents and correctly enumerate them is increasingly complicated and expensive, and attracts congressional scrutiny. This report discusses the major innovations that were planned for 2010; problems encountered; and issues of census accuracy, coverage, fairness, and objectivity.
For 2010, the Bureau devised a short-form questionnaire that asked for the age, sex, race, and ethnicity (Hispanic or non-Hispanic) of each household resident, his or her relationship to the person filling out the form, and whether the housing unit was rented or owned by a member of the household. The census long form, which for decades collected detailed socioeconomic and housing data from a sample of the population, was replaced by the American Community Survey, a "continuous measurement" survey of about 250,000 households per month from 2005 through 2011 (now about 295,000 per month), which gathers largely the same data as its predecessor.
Another innovation for 2010 was to have been the development of highly specialized handheld computers to automate two essential census field operations: address canvassing and nonresponse follow-up (NRFU). The goal of pre-census address canvassing was to verify and correct census maps and addresses for mailing census forms and sending enumerators. During NRFU, census workers tried repeatedly to visit or telephone people who had not completed their questionnaires and obtain information from them. Testing had revealed such serious problems with the handheld devices that although the Bureau used them for address canvassing, it resorted to the traditional paper-based approach for NRFU. The change required the Bureau to hire and train more NRFU staff, at increased expense. In 2012, the total life-cycle cost of the 2010 census was estimated at about $13 billion, instead of the previously estimated $11.5 billion. The problems with the handhelds fueled concerns that the success of the census could be at risk. Some feared, in particular, that the late-date changes to NRFU could impair census accuracy, reduce coverage, and exacerbate the recurrent likelihood of differential undercounts—the greater tendency for minorities and less affluent members of society than for whites and wealthier people to be undercounted.
Estimates of 2010 census coverage, released on May 22, 2012, indicated a net percentage overcount of 0.01% for the total population, 0.84% for non-Hispanic whites, and 1.95% for American Indians off reservations; but a net percentage undercount of 2.07% for non-Hispanic blacks, 0.08% for non-Hispanic Asians, 1.34% for native Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders, 4.88% for American Indians on reservations, and 1.54% for Hispanics. |
crs_R45399 | crs_R45399_0 | Background
Military medical care is a congressionally authorized entitlement that has expanded in size and scope since the late 19 th century. Chapter 55 of Title 10 U.S. Code, entitles certain health benefits to military personnel, retirees, and their families. These health benefits are administered by a Military Health System (MHS). The primary objectives of the MHS, which includes the Defense Department's hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel, are (1) to maintain the health of military personnel so they can carry out their military missions and (2) to be prepared to deliver health care during wartime. The MHS is one of the largest health systems in the United States and serves over 9.4 million beneficiaries. The primary mission of the MHS is to maintain the health and wellness of military personnel so they can carry out their military missions, and to be prepared to deliver health care during wartime. Conduct "humanitarian and civic assistance activities in conjunction with authorized military operations…"
Health care within the MHS is delivered through either Department of Defense (DOD) medical facilities, known as military treatment facilities (MTFs) as space is available, or through civilian health care providers. The MHS operates 681 MTFs and employs nearly 63,000 civilians and 84,000 military personnel across the United States and in overseas locations. The MHS also covers dependents of active duty personnel, military retirees, and their dependents, including some members of the reserve components. Since 1966, civilian health care to millions of retirees, as well as dependents of active duty military personnel and retirees, has been provided through a program still known in law as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), but more commonly known as TRICARE. A Medicare wrap-around option (TRICARE for Life) for Medicare-eligible retirees was added in 2002. Other TRICARE plans include TRICARE Young Adult, TRICARE Reserve Select, and TRICARE Retired Reserve. TRICARE also includes a pharmacy program, optional dental plans, and a vision plan that are to be made available for certain beneficiaries in 2019. Options available to beneficiaries vary by the sponsor's duty status and geographic location. Questions and Answers
1. How is the Military Health System Structured? Established in September 2013, the role of DHA is to:
manage the TRICARE program; manage and execute the Defense Health Program appropriation and the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (MERHCF); support coordinated management of the eMSMs to create and sustain a cost-effective, coordinated, and high-quality health care system; exercise management responsibility for shared services, functions, and activities of the MHS; exercise authority, direction, and control over MTFs within the National Capital Region; and support the effective execution of the DOD medical mission. How is the Military Health System Funded? Funding for military medical personnel (doctors, nurses, medics, technicians, and other health care providers) and TRICARE for Life accrual payments are generally provided in the defense appropriations bill under the Military Personnel (MILPERS) title. A standing authorization for transfers from the MERHCF to reimburse TRICARE for the cost of services provided to Medicare eligible retirees is provided by 10 U.S.C. Costs of war-related military health care are generally funded through supplemental appropriations bills. What is the Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (MERHCF)? The Floyd D. Spence NDAA for FY2001 directed the establishment of the Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund to pay for Medicare-eligible retiree health care beginning on October 1, 2002, via a new program called TRICARE for Life. What is TRICARE? TRICARE has three main benefit plans: a health maintenance organization option (TRICARE Prime), a preferred provider option (TRICARE Select), and a Medicare wrap-around option (TRICARE for Life) for Medicare-eligible retirees. Other TRICARE plans include TRICARE Young Adult, TRICARE Reserve Select, and TRICARE Retired Reserve. TRICARE also includes a pharmacy program and optional dental or vision plans. Options available to beneficiaries vary by the beneficiary's relationship to a sponsor, sponsor's duty status, and geographic location. Since 1966, civilian care to millions of retirees and dependents of active duty military personnel and retirees has been provided through a program still known in law as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), but since 1994 more commonly known as TRICARE. TRICARE outside of the United States (including certain U.S. commonwealths and territories) is overseen by the TRICARE Overseas Program Office and administered by the health services support contractor, International SOS. 5. Who Is Eligible for TRICARE? What are the Different TRICARE Plans? TRICARE Prime
TRICARE Prime is a managed health care option similar to a health maintenance organization (HMO) program. This plan features a military or civilian primary care provider who manages a beneficiary's overall health care and facilitates referrals to specialists. TRICARE Select
TRICARE Select is a self-managed, preferred provider option (PPO) available worldwide for eligible beneficiaries. , The program established under this authority is known as TRICARE Retired Reserve (TRR). The option established under this authority is known as TRICARE Young Adult (TYA). How Does the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Affect TRICARE? When can beneficiaries enroll in or change their TRICARE plan? What is the DOD Pharmacy Benefits Program? This is known as the Uniform Formulary . What is the Extended Care Health Option (ECHO) Program? How Are Priorities for Care in Military Treatment Facilities Assigned? Have Military Personnel Been Promised Free Medical Care for Life? What are DOD's Access to Care Standards? How Does the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Affect TRICARE? In general, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) does not directly affect TRICARE administration, health care benefits, eligibility, or cost to beneficiaries. What Health Benefits are Available to Reservists? Some military personnel and retirees maintain that they and their dependents were promised "free medical care for life" at the time of their enlistment. What is the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Program? | Military medical care is a congressionally authorized entitlement that has expanded in size and scope since the late 19th century. Chapter 55 of Title 10 U.S. Code, entitles certain health benefits to military personnel, retirees, and their families. These health benefits are administered by a Military Health System (MHS). The primary objectives of the MHS, which includes the Defense Department's hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel, are (1) to maintain the health of military personnel so they can carry out their military missions and (2) to be prepared to deliver health care during wartime. Health care services are delivered through either Department of Defense (DOD) medical facilities, known as military treatment facilities (MTFs) as space is available, or through civilian health care providers. As of 2017, the MHS operates 681 MTFs, employs nearly 63,000 civilians and 84,000 military personnel, and serves 9.4 million beneficiaries across the United States and in overseas locations.
Since 1966, civilian care for millions of retirees, as well as dependents of active duty military personnel and retirees, has been provided through a program still known in law as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), more commonly known as TRICARE. TRICARE has three main benefit plans: a health maintenance organization option (TRICARE Prime), a preferred provider option (TRICARE Select), and a Medicare supplement option (TRICARE for Life) for Medicare-eligible retirees. Other TRICARE plans include TRICARE Young Adult, TRICARE Reserve Select, and TRICARE Retired Reserve. TRICARE also includes a pharmacy program and optional dental and vision plans. Options available to beneficiaries vary by the sponsor's duty status and geographic location.
This report answers selected frequently asked questions about military health care, including
How is the Military Health System structured? What is TRICARE? What are the different TRICARE plans and who is eligible? What are the costs of military health care to beneficiaries? What is the relationship of TRICARE to Medicare? How does the Affordable Care Act affect TRICARE? When can beneficiaries change their TRICARE plan? What is the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care fund, which funds TRICARE for Life?
This report does not address issues specific to battlefield medicine, veterans, or the Veterans Health Administration. Veterans' health issues are addressed in CRS Report R42747, Health Care for Veterans: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed].
Military medical care is a congressionally authorized entitlement that has expanded in size and scope since the late 19th century. Chapter 55 of Title 10 U.S. Code, entitles certain health benefits to military personnel, retirees, and their families. These health benefits are administered by a Military Health System (MHS). The primary objectives of the MHS, which includes the Defense Department's hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel, are (1) to maintain the health of military personnel so they can carry out their military missions and (2) to be prepared to deliver health care during wartime. Health care services are delivered through either Department of Defense (DOD) medical facilities, known as military treatment facilities (MTFs) as space is available, or through civilian health care providers. As of 2017, the MHS operates 681 MTFs, employs nearly 63,000 civilians and 84,000 military personnel, and serves 9.4 million beneficiaries across the United States and in overseas locations.
Since 1966, civilian care for millions of retirees, as well as dependents of active duty military personnel and retirees, has been provided through a program still known in law as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), more commonly known as TRICARE. TRICARE has three main benefit plans: a health maintenance organization option (TRICARE Prime), a preferred provider option (TRICARE Select), and a Medicare supplement option (TRICARE for Life) for Medicare-eligible retirees. Other TRICARE plans include TRICARE Young Adult, TRICARE Reserve Select, and TRICARE Retired Reserve. TRICARE also includes a pharmacy program and optional dental and vision plans. Options available to beneficiaries vary by the sponsor's duty status and geographic location.
This report answers selected frequently asked questions about military health care, including
How is the Military Health System structured? What is TRICARE? What are the different TRICARE plans and who is eligible? What are the costs of military health care to beneficiaries? What is the relationship of TRICARE to Medicare? How does the Affordable Care Act affect TRICARE? When can beneficiaries change their TRICARE plan? What is the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care fund, which funds TRICARE for Life?
This report does not address issues specific to battlefield medicine, veterans, or the Veterans Health Administration. Veterans' health issues are addressed in CRS Report R42747, Health Care for Veterans: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed].
Military medical care is a congressionally authorized entitlement that has expanded in size and scope since the late 19th century. Chapter 55 of Title 10 U.S. Code, entitles certain health benefits to military personnel, retirees, and their families. These health benefits are administered by a Military Health System (MHS). The primary objectives of the MHS, which includes the Defense Department's hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel, are (1) to maintain the health of military personnel so they can carry out their military missions and (2) to be prepared to deliver health care during wartime. Health care services are delivered through either Department of Defense (DOD) medical facilities, known as military treatment facilities (MTFs) as space is available, or through civilian health care providers. As of 2017, the MHS operates 681 MTFs, employs nearly 63,000 civilians and 84,000 military personnel, and serves 9.4 million beneficiaries across the United States and in overseas locations.
Since 1966, civilian care for millions of retirees, as well as dependents of active duty military personnel and retirees, has been provided through a program still known in law as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), more commonly known as TRICARE. TRICARE has three main benefit plans: a health maintenance organization option (TRICARE Prime), a preferred provider option (TRICARE Select), and a Medicare supplement option (TRICARE for Life) for Medicare-eligible retirees. Other TRICARE plans include TRICARE Young Adult, TRICARE Reserve Select, and TRICARE Retired Reserve. TRICARE also includes a pharmacy program and optional dental and vision plans. Options available to beneficiaries vary by the sponsor's duty status and geographic location.
This report answers selected frequently asked questions about military health care, including
How is the Military Health System structured? What is TRICARE? What are the different TRICARE plans and who is eligible? What are the costs of military health care to beneficiaries? What is the relationship of TRICARE to Medicare? How does the Affordable Care Act affect TRICARE? When can beneficiaries change their TRICARE plan? What is the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care fund, which funds TRICARE for Life?
This report does not address issues specific to battlefield medicine, veterans, or the Veterans Health Administration. Veterans' health issues are addressed in CRS Report R42747, Health Care for Veterans: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42327 | crs_R42327_0 | On December 8, 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a draft report on its investigation of groundwater contamination near the town of Pavillion, Wyoming. This CRS report provides a synopsis of the statutory authority for EPA's investigation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), a summary of the primary findings in the EPA Draft Report, and a brief discussion of issues raised subsequent to the release of the draft report by proponents and opponents of the use of hydraulic fracturing for natural gas development. EPA indicated that it would defer to the state of Wyoming to assume the lead role in investigating drinking water quality in the area, and that the continuing role of EPA would focus on providing technical support and input to the state. EPA also stated that its approach indicates that gas production activities have likely enhanced the migration of natural gas in the aquifer and the migration of gas to domestic wells in the area. Stakeholder Responses to the EPA Draft Report
Because the EPA Draft Report linked groundwater contamination in Wyoming to activities related to hydraulic fracturing, it had raised concerns about hydraulic fracturing practices in general. Some stakeholders took issue with some of the findings in the draft report. Various organizations representing private business interests within the oil and gas industry questioned the scientific validity of EPA's contention that "the explanation best fitting the data for the deep monitoring wells is that constituents associated with hydraulic fracturing have been released into the Wind River drinking water aquifer at depths above the current production zone." In contrast, some environmental organizations cited EPA's findings in calling for more stringent regulation of hydraulic fracturing. Some stakeholders also commissioned independent assessments of EPA's Draft Report and released their respective assessments in May 2012. An assessment commissioned by an industry organization disagreed with EPA's findings, whereas an assessment commissioned by four environmental organizations supported the agency's findings. The IPAA-commissioned report agreed with the EPA Draft Report's conclusion that surface pits were the source of shallow groundwater contamination in the area of investigation, but disagreed that constituents associated with hydraulic fracturing were released into the Wind River drinking water supply (Conclusion 2 of the EPA Draft Report), and that hydraulic fracturing has led to enhanced migration of natural gas to groundwater used for domestic water supply (Conclusion 3 of the EPA Draft Report). On January 20, 2012, 11 members of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee sent a letter to EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson asking that the EPA investigation be considered a "highly influential scientific assessment and that any related, generated report is subject to the most rigorous, independent, and thorough external peer review process." In the House, the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology held a hearing on February 1, 2012, to examine EPA's findings and stakeholder concerns. On March 8, 2012, EPA had announced its decision to collect additional samples from the deep monitoring wells in response to concerns about the scientific validity of the agency's findings. The USGS report contains raw data results only from EPA well MW01. In an initial news report, an EPA spokesperson stated that the USGS data are "generally consistent" with the earlier EPA draft report findings. A spokesman from Encana stated that there was nothing surprising in the USGS results, based on a preliminary examination of the data. EPA did not appear to conclude that there was a definitive link to a release from the production wells, nor to the constituents found in the domestic wells in the shallower portion of the aquifer. Now that EPA has decided not to finalize its report, nor to subject it to independent scientific peer review, whatever additional actions may be taken at the Pavillion site would appear to depend on the outcome of the investigation of the state of Wyoming and what role EPA may play in a supporting capacity. | On December 8, 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a draft report on its investigation of groundwater contamination near the town of Pavillion, Wyoming. EPA had initiated the investigation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in response to citizen complaints in 2008 about domestic well water quality. On June 20, 2013, EPA announced that it would not finalize the report but would defer to the state of Wyoming to assume the lead in investigating drinking water quality in Pavillion. The EPA draft report indicated that certain constituents in groundwater are consistent with some of the constituents used in natural gas well operations, including the process of hydraulic fracturing. EPA claimed that its approach to the investigation best supports the explanation that different compounds associated with hydraulic fracturing have contaminated the aquifer used for domestic water supply in the Pavillion area. EPA also stated that its approach indicates that gas production activities have likely enhanced the migration of natural gas in the aquifer. EPA did not appear to conclude that there was a definitive link to a release from the production wells, nor to the constituents found in domestic wells in shallower parts of the aquifer.
Because the draft report linked groundwater contamination in Wyoming to activities related to hydraulic fracturing, it had raised concerns about hydraulic fracturing practices in general. Some stakeholders took issue with some of the findings in the draft report. They questioned the scientific validity of EPA's contention that "the explanation best fitting the data for the deep monitoring wells is that constituents associated with hydraulic fracturing have been released into the Wind River drinking water aquifer at depths above the current production zone." In contrast, some environmental organizations cited EPA's findings in calling for more stringent regulation of hydraulic fracturing. Stakeholder groups commissioned independent assessments of EPA's draft report and released their respective assessments in May 2012. An assessment commissioned by an industry organization disagreed with EPA's findings, whereas an assessment commissioned by four environmental organizations supported the agency's findings.
EPA's draft report also has received attention within Congress. On January 20, 2012, 11 members of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee sent a letter to EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson asking that the EPA investigation be considered a "highly influential scientific assessment and that any related, generated report is subject to the most rigorous, independent, and thorough external peer review process." In the House, the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology held a hearing on February 1, 2012, to examine EPA's findings. Concerns about the status of EPA's report and the scientific validity of its findings have continued into the 113th Congress.
In response to concerns about the adequacy of the original data, EPA worked with the U.S. Geological Survey and the state of Wyoming to collect additional samples from two deep monitoring wells installed by EPA. On September 26, 2012, the USGS released two reports regarding their sampling program for the two wells. The USGS provided raw data from only one well because the second well did not yield enough water to collect representative samples. A news report cited an EPA spokesperson stating that the USGS sampling results were generally consistent with findings from the earlier EPA draft report. An industry spokesperson stated that there was nothing surprising in the USGS results, based on a preliminary examination of the data. Now that EPA has decided not to finalize its report, whatever additional actions may be taken at the Pavillion site would appear to depend on the outcome of the investigation of the state of Wyoming and what continuing role EPA may play in a supporting capacity. |
crs_R44473 | crs_R44473_0 | Introduction
Watching television used to mean tuning into one of a few broadcast television stations with the help of an antenna. More recently, viewers have taken to watching TV programming on their computers, tablets, mobile phones, and other Internet-connected devices, dispensing with television stations, and cable and satellite operators altogether. With each innovation in the distribution of television, Congress, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the courts have applied a combination of communications and copyright laws to regulate the conditions under which cable and satellite operators may retransmit the signals of television stations. Three key public policies are intertwined:
1. protecting the property rights of the copyright owners to encourage the production of television programs; 2. promoting competition among distributors of video programming; and 3. enabling broadcast television stations to serve the local communities to which they are licensed by the FCC. This regulatory and legal structure has come under increasing stress as firms offer alternative ways to watch television programming, upsetting established relationships and raising questions about whether the key public policy goals defined by Congress can still be achieved. In particular, firms offering television programming to consumers over the Internet, known as online video distributors (OVDs), are not covered by some of the laws and regulations governing video distribution by providers that rely on their own facilities, such as cable and satellite operators. Federal courts have reached conflicting conclusions about the extent to which some OVD services are covered by existing copyright laws. The FCC is proposing to modify its regulations governing the retransmission of broadcast television signals by cable and satellite operators to cover certain OVDs in order to promote competition among distributors of video programming. Both the House Judiciary Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee have announced plans to review copyright and communications laws, respectively. Because of the intertwined relationship between copyright and communications laws, major reform of the regulatory structure is likely to require Congress or the courts to consider how copyright and communications laws intersect. Copyright laws, by giving content owners control over the distribution of their content, enable content owners to enforce window and market exclusivity. In general, these laws and regulations are intended to protect broadcast stations' exclusive rights to distribute television programming within local television markets. Both broadcast television stations and MVPDs distribute video programming at prescheduled times. When the FCC first adopted exclusivity rules in the 1940s with respect to broadcast stations, the zones coincided with the station's communities of licenses. | In the 1940s and 1950s, watching television meant tuning into one of a few broadcast television stations, with the help of an antenna, to watch a program at a prescheduled time. Over subsequent decades, cable and satellite operators emerged to enable households unable to receive over-the-air signals to watch the retransmitted signals of broadcast television stations. More recently, some viewers have taken to watching TV programming on their computers, tablets, mobile phones, and other Internet-connected devices at times of their own choosing, dispensing with television stations and cable and satellite operators altogether.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Congress, and the courts have overseen this evolution by applying a combination of communications and copyright laws to regulate the distribution of television programming. These laws are intended to achieve three policy goals:
1. protecting the property rights of content owners to encourage the production of television programs; 2. promoting competition among distributors of video programming; and 3. enabling broadcast television stations to serve the local communities to which they are licensed by the FCC.
The regulatory structure intended to accomplish these goals was established in copyright and communications laws and regulations adopted by Congress and the FCC in the 1970s. These laws and regulations grant broadcast stations exclusive rights to carry programming under certain conditions; allow content owners to control the use of copyrighted content except in certain circumstances; and assign cable and satellite operators both obligations and rights with respect to the stations whose signals they retransmit.
This structure has come under increasing stress as firms offer alternative ways to watch television programming, upsetting established relationships and raising questions about whether the key public policy goals defined by Congress can still be achieved. In particular, firms offering television programming to consumers over the Internet, known as online video distributors (OVDs), are not covered by some of the laws and regulations governing video distribution by providers that rely on their own facilities, such as cable and satellite operators. Station owners, meanwhile, are concerned that relationships between OVDs and broadcast networks could adversely affect stations' revenues.
Both the House Judiciary Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee have announced plans to review and update copyright and communications laws, respectively, while the FCC is considering how and whether to apply its regulations governing the distribution of television signals to a new era. At the same time, federal courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to how copyright laws apply to video programming in the new world of online video distribution. Because of the intertwined relationship between copyright and communications laws, major reform of the regulatory structure governing the distribution of television signals is likely to require Congress or the courts to consider how these two bodies of law intersect. |
crs_R43934 | crs_R43934_0 | Introduction
Federal law requires the President to submit an annual budget request to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. The budget informs Congress of the President's overall federal fiscal policy based on proposed spending levels, revenues, and deficit (or surplus) levels. The budget request lays out the President's relative priorities for federal programs, such as how much should be spent on defense, education, health, and other federal programs. The President's budget also may include legislative proposals for spending and tax policy changes. Although the President is not required to propose legislative changes for those parts of the budget that are governed by permanent law (i.e., mandatory spending), such changes generally are included in the budget. President Obama submitted his FY2016 budget request to Congress on February 2, 2015. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the division of the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) responsible for administering Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). CMS also is responsible for administering the private health insurance programs established in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended). CMS is the largest purchaser of health care in the United States, with Medicare and federal Medicaid expenditures accounting for almost 30% of the total national health expenditures in 2013. This report summarizes the President's budget request for each of the following sections of the CMS budget: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, CHIP, state grants and demonstrations, private health insurance protections and programs, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation, and program management. Then, for each legislative proposal included in the President's budget, this report provides a description of current law and the President's proposal. At the end of each of these sections, a table summarizes the Administration's estimates of costs or savings associated with each legislative proposal. Budget Summary
The CMS budget includes both mandatory and discretionary spending. However, a vast majority of CMS spending is mandatory, such as Medicare benefit spending and grants to states for Medicaid. Total Net Outlays: With the Medicare physician payment adjustment, the estimated impact of the legislative proposals, and the estimated savings from program integrity activities ($0.9 billion), the President's budget estimates CMS's net outlays would be $970.8 billion in FY2016, which is an increase of $73.6 billion, or 8.2%, over the estimated net outlays for FY2015. The CMS budget is divided into the following sections: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, CHIP, state grants and demonstrations, private health insurance protections and programs, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation, and program management. The President's budget includes legislative proposals that would impact CHIP. Legislative Proposals
The President's FY2016 budget contains a number of proposals that would impact the CMS budget. Some of these proposals are program expansions, and others are designed to reduce federal spending. | Federal law requires the President to submit an annual budget request to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. The budget informs Congress of the President's overall federal fiscal policy based on proposed spending levels, revenues, and deficit (or surplus) levels. The budget request lays out the President's relative priorities for federal programs, such as how much should be spent on defense, education, health, and other federal programs. The President's budget also may include legislative proposals for spending and tax policy changes. While the President is not required to propose legislative changes for those parts of the budget that are governed by permanent law (i.e., mandatory spending), such changes generally are included in the budget. President Obama submitted his FY2016 budget request to Congress on February 2, 2015.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the division of the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) responsible for administering Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). CMS also is responsible for administering the private health insurance programs established in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended). CMS is the largest purchaser of health care in the United States, with expenditures from CMS programs accounting for almost 30% of the nation's health expenditures. In FY2016, CMS estimates that almost 126 million individuals will receive coverage through Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP.
The CMS budget includes a mixture of both mandatory and discretionary spending. However, the vast majority of the CMS budget is mandatory spending, such as Medicare benefit spending and grants to states for Medicaid. In the President's FY2016 budget, proposed Medicare outlays make up 60% of the CMS budget and proposed Medicaid outlays comprise 36% of the CMS budget.
The CMS budget is divided into the following sections: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, CHIP, state grants and demonstrations, private health insurance protections and programs, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation, and program management. The President's FY2016 budget contains a number of legislative proposals that would affect the CMS budget. Some of these proposals are program expansions, and others are designed to reduce federal spending.
The President's proposed budget for CMS would be $970.8 billion in net mandatory and discretionary outlays for FY2016, which would be an increase of $73.6 billion, or 8.2%, over the estimated net outlays for FY2015. This estimate includes the cost of the Medicare physician payment adjustment ($8.8 billion), the net cost of legislative proposals ($5.4 billion), and the estimated savings from program integrity investments ($0.9 billion).
This report begins with summaries of each section of the CMS budget. Then, for each legislative proposal included in the President's budget, this report provides a description of current law and the President's legislative proposal. The President's budget includes legislative proposals for the following sections of CMS: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, CHIP, state grants and demonstrations, and program management. A table summarizing the Administration's estimates of the budgetary impact for each legislative proposal is at the end of each of these sections. |
crs_R42492 | crs_R42492_0 | Introduction
The space industry refers to economic activities related to the manufacture and delivery of components that go into Earth's orbit or beyond. The space industry is a subset of the U.S. aerospace industry and U.S. strength in aerospace has helped to provide U.S. strength in space. The focus of this report is the global commercial space manufacturing sector (launch vehicles, spacecraft, satellites, and parts and equipment). Together, the space and ground infrastructure enables a much larger space services sector that includes satellite telecommunications and broadcasting services and satellite remote sensing, among many other services. The space industry, broadly defined, is an important part of the U.S. industrial and technology base. The U.S. commercial space manufacturing sector is small, but the companies that manufacture commercial satellites also manufacture satellites for the U.S. government. The U.S. government is by far the largest consumer of space products and services, accounting for 23% of global spending. The major policy issues discussed in this report are limited to those that appear to have large effects on the competitiveness of the U.S. space manufacturing sector: classification of commercial satellites as munitions subject to stringent U.S. export controls laws and regulations; domestic and international spectrum regulations that may not have kept pace with the emergence of new technologies that appear to require much greater flexibility in terms of spectrum use; and the dramatically increased use of commercial satellites for Department of Defense communications needs. Spacecraft and space systems are manned or unmanned vehicles that transport passengers or cargo. Orbital is an established commercial space company that manufactures launch vehicles, spacecraft, and satellites. 111-84 , Section 1248) provides that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall carry out an assessment of the national security risks of removing satellites and related components from the United States Munitions List (USML). 331 , H.R. Legislation ( H.R. However, both spectrum and satellite orbital position are scarce resources and governments regulate and allocate the use of radio spectrum on earth and in space. One of the issues of concern to the military and to commercial satellite operators has been the shift from a need for surge capacity to increased reliance on commercial satellites for core communications capabilities that meet military requirements. The Department of Defense is a large user of geosynchronous satellites, and it could potentially play a significant role in encouraging more competition in the commercial satellite sector—especially if it is successful in deploying hosted payloads on commercial satellites. U.S. manufacturers of launch vehicles, spacecraft, and satellites have a number of distinct advantages over many foreign competitors, including a very large aerospace industrial base capable of supporting commercial and government demand for space technologies and equipment. As the U.S. government's role in promoting human spaceflight has transitioned from the Space Shuttle to a strategy that relies on the private sector to develop products that are competitive and serve the broad U.S. goals and activities that were identified in the National Space Policy of June 2010, the U.S. launch industry has become dependent on government payloads and has continued to face stiff competition from Russia and Europe. | The space industry refers to economic activities related to the manufacture and delivery of components that go into Earth's orbit or beyond. The space industry is a subset of the U.S. aerospace industry and U.S. strength in aerospace has helped to provide U.S. strength in space. The space industry was originally developed by government entities, and government policies and spending continue to exercise a strong influence on commercial space activities in the United States and elsewhere. Space-oriented manufacturing, which includes launch vehicles, spacecraft, satellites, and parts and equipment, has created a large space-industrial infrastructure that enables a much larger space services sector that includes satellite telecommunications and broadcasting services, and satellite remote sensing, among others. Together, these are an important part of the U.S. industrial and technology base. The focus of this report is the global commercial space manufacturing sector (launch vehicles, spacecraft, and satellites). Although relatively small, accounting for less than $6 billion of expenditures in 2010, it enables an estimated $276 billion in spending for ground equipment and satellite services.
The United States manufactures more launch vehicles, spacecraft, and satellites than any other country, but the relative U.S. competitive position has eroded as other countries have made large investments in commercial and government space activities. The U.S. government remains the world's largest customer for space equipment and services. With the end of the Space Shuttle era, the government will increasingly depend on the U.S. commercial space industry for transport of humans and cargo, and on commercial satellites for communications and data. The extent and nature of government demand are likely to be significant factors shaping the U.S. commercial space industry. U.S. policy has gradually shifted toward encouraging more competition among firms that manufacture launch equipment, spacecraft, and satellites, encouraging the participation of smaller, entrepreneurial firms in an industry segment traditionally dominated by large aerospace firms.
Several policy issues appear to have significant effects on the growth and competitiveness of the U.S. space manufacturing industry:
In 1998, Congress passed legislation that reclassified all satellites and satellite parts and equipment as weapons under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, limiting the ability of U.S. manufacturers of commercial space equipment to sell abroad and encouraging foreign rivals to increase their global market share at the expense of U.S. manufacturers. On April 18, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State issued a congressionally mandated report that assessed risks associated with removing satellites and related components from the United States Munitions List (USML). Bills have been introduced in the 112th Congress to reauthorize and amend U.S. export control laws (H.R. 2122, H.R. 2004, H.R. 1727, H.R. 3288). The rapid growth in technologies that consume large amounts of bandwidth threatens to destabilize the current system that allocates spectrum and orbital position to specific users. Spectrum is a scarce resource, but increasingly, commercial satellite operators are developing technological solutions to increase capacity. DOD is now a major user of commercial satellites. From a surge related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it now places greater reliance on commercial satellites. Hosted payloads are also likely to become a more common feature of the commercial satellite industry in the future. |
crs_R45244 | crs_R45244_0 | T he Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 ) was signed into law on March 23, 2010. On March 30, 2010, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA; P.L. 111-152 ) was signed into law, which included new provisions and amended several ACA provisions. Since enactment of the ACA and HCERA, lawmakers have repeatedly debated the laws' implementation and considered bills to repeal, defund, or otherwise amend them. This report summarizes legislative actions taken during the 111 th -115 th Congresses to modify the health care-related provisions of the ACA and HCERA. The first part of the report provides a brief overview of the ACA's core provisions and its impact on federal spending and health insurance coverage as context for the other material presented in the report. The second part of the report includes Table 2 , which summarizes laws enacted during the 111 th -115 th Congresses that modified ACA provisions. The third part of the report lists bills passed in the House or the Senate during the 111 th -115 th Congresses that would have modified ACA provisions, had they been enacted. Identifying legislation that modifies the ACA has become increasingly difficult over the years. This is because of the vast number of ACA provisions, their complexity, and the fact that these provisions are codified in many different parts of the U.S. Code . As a result, the legislation presented in this report's tables may not include all enacted legislation that modifies the ACA or all House- or Senate-passed legislation that would have modified the ACA, had it been enacted. Due to the increasing complexity of tracking such legislation and concerns about the ability to do so authoritatively, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) does not intend to update this report. The provisions in Titles I-VIII largely relate to how health care in the United States is financed, organized, and delivered. Title IX contains revenue provisions. Title X reauthorizes the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, establishes some new programs and requirements, and amends provisions included in the other nine titles of the ACA. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148) was signed into law on March 23, 2010. The law comprises numerous provisions in 10 titles. The provisions in Titles I-VIII largely relate to how health care in the United States is financed, organized, and delivered. Title IX contains revenue provisions. Title X reauthorizes the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, establishes some new programs and requirements, and amends provisions included in the other nine titles of the ACA. On March 30, 2010, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA; P.L. 111-152) was signed into law, which included new provisions and amended several ACA provisions.
Since enactment of the ACA and HCERA, lawmakers have repeatedly debated the laws' implementation and considered bills to repeal, defund, or otherwise amend them. This report summarizes legislative actions taken during the 111th-115th Congresses to modify the health care-related provisions of the ACA and HCERA.
The first part of the report provides a brief overview of the laws' core provisions and their impact on federal spending and health insurance coverage as context for the other material presented in the report. The second part of the report includes Table 2, which summarizes laws enacted during the 111th-115th Congresses that modified ACA or HCERA provisions. The third part of the report lists bills passed in the House or the Senate during the 111th-115th Congresses that would have modified ACA or HCERA provisions, had they been enacted.
Identifying legislation that modifies the ACA and HCERA has become increasingly difficult over the years. This is because of the vast number of ACA and HCERA provisions, their complexity, and the fact that these provisions are codified in many different parts of the U.S. Code. As a result, the legislation presented in this report's tables may not include all enacted legislation that modifies the ACA or HCERA, or all House- or Senate-passed legislation that would have modified the ACA or HCERA, had it been enacted. Due to the increasing complexity of tracking such legislation and concerns about the ability to do so authoritatively, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) does not intend to update this report. |
crs_R41561 | crs_R41561_0 | Conflicting Views
Since Barack Obama was sworn in as President of the United States in 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed and promulgated numerous regulations under many of the 11 pollution control statutes Congress has directed it to implement. The statutes also mandate that EPA conduct periodic reviews of many of the standards and rules that it issues. Committees have conducted vigorous oversight of the agency's actions; oversight and efforts to limit EPA's activities accelerated in the 114 th Congress. Environmental groups generally believe that the agency moved in the right direction, but in several cases they would have liked the regulatory actions to be stronger or to have occurred sooner. That EPA is running scared." The report identifies and briefly characterizes major regulatory actions promulgated, proposed, or under development by EPA from January 2009 to late 2016. Each entry in this report (1) gives the name or, where appropriate, the common name of the regulatory action (e.g., the Clean Power Plan or Mountaintop Mining in Appalachia); (2) explains what the action does; (3) states the current status of the rule or action (e.g., proposed September 20, 2013); (4) explains the significance of the action, providing information on estimated costs and benefits, where available; (5) discusses the timeline for implementation, and whether there is a nondiscretionary congressional deadline or a court order or remand driving its development; and (6) identifies a CRS analyst who would be the contact for further information. They may also be substantially altered before they become final and take effect, as a result of the proposal and public comment process, and/or judicial review. EPA has also, in several cases, reconsidered rules after promulgation, changing what were announced as "final" standards, and, in some cases, granting additional time for compliance. Existing sources generally have several years following promulgation and effective dates of standards, therefore, to comply with any standards. In the 114 th Congress, opponents of EPA's initiatives, who maintained that the agency was exceeding its authority, again considered various approaches to altering the agency's course, including riders on appropriations bills, stand-alone legislation, resolutions of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act, and amendments to the underlying environmental statutes. With Republican majorities in both the House and the Senate, the 114 th Congress accelerated oversight activities of the Administration's initiatives and legislative efforts to limit EPA's regulatory activities. Critics both in Congress and outside of it regularly accuse the agency of overreach. The pace of new proposed and final regulations has waxed and waned. It thus provides an overview of major environmental regulations and regulatory issues that were prominent and controversial during the eight years of the Obama Administration. Of these, most would have faced only an administrative requirement to provide an estimate of their GHG emissions. Other Clean Air Act Rules
22. EPA states that this regulatory action would not directly invoke any costs or benefits. | Since Barack Obama was sworn in as President in 2009, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed and promulgated numerous regulations to implement the pollution control statutes enacted by Congress. Critics have reacted strongly. Some, both within Congress and outside of it, have accused the agency of reaching beyond the authority given it by Congress and ignoring or underestimating the costs and economic impacts and overestimating the benefits of proposed and promulgated rules. The House conducted vigorous oversight of the agency in the 112th and 113th Congresses, and approved several bills that would overturn specific regulations or limit the agency's authority. Particular attention was paid to the Clean Air Act, but there also was congressional scrutiny of other environmental statutes and regulations implemented by EPA. With Republican majorities in both the House and Senate, the 114th Congress accelerated oversight of the Administration's initiatives and renewed efforts to limit EPA's regulatory activities.
Environmental groups and other supporters of the agency disagree that EPA has overreached. Many of them believe that the agency has, in fact, moved in the right direction, including taking action on significant issues that had been long delayed or ignored in the past. In several cases, environment and public health advocates would have liked the regulatory actions to be stronger.
EPA has stated that critics' focus on the cost of controls obscured the benefits of new regulations, which, it estimates, far exceed the costs. It maintains that pollution control is an important source of economic activity, exports, and American jobs. Further, the agency and its supporters have said that EPA is carrying out the mandates detailed by Congress in the federal environmental statutes.
This report provides background information on EPA regulatory activity during the Obama Administration to help address these issues. It examines major or controversial regulatory actions taken by or under development at EPA from January 2009 to late 2016, providing details on the regulatory action itself, presenting an estimated timeline for completion of rules not yet promulgated (including identification of related court or statutory deadlines), and, in general, providing EPA's estimates of costs and benefits, where available.
The report also discusses factors that affect the time frame in which regulations take effect, including statutory and judicial deadlines, public comment periods, judicial review, and permitting procedures, the net results of which are that existing facilities are likely to have several years before being required to comply with most of the regulatory actions under discussion. Unable to account for such factors, which will vary from case to case, timelines that show dates for proposal and promulgation of EPA regulations effectively underestimate the complexities of the regulatory process and overstate the near-term impact of many of the regulatory actions. |
crs_R40446 | crs_R40446_0 | Background
Many years of debate about unauthorized immigration to the United States culminated in the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. To reduce the job magnet, IRCA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to add a new Section 274A, which makes it unlawful to knowingly hire, recruit, or refer for a fee, or continue to employ, an unauthorized alien, and requires all employers to examine documents presented by new hires to verify identity and work authorization and to complete and retain employment eligibility verification (I-9) forms. Ten years after the enactment of IRCA, Congress attempted to strengthen the employment verification process as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). E-Verify
The Basic Pilot progra m, the first of the three IIRIRA employment verification pilots to be implemented and the only one still in operation, began in November 1997 in the five states with the largest unauthorized alien populations at the time. In December 2004, in accordance with P.L. It is administered by DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Most recently, it extended E-Verify until September 30, 2018, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018. Employers participating in E-Verify then must submit information from the I-9 form about their new hires (name, date of birth, Social Security number, immigration/citizenship status, and alien number, if applicable) via the internet for confirmation. The information in the employer's query is automatically compared with information in SSA's primary database, the Numerical Identification File (Numident), which contains records of individuals issued Social Security numbers. On April 2, 2018, employer enrollment in E-Verify stood at 779,722, and there were more than 2.5 million participating sites. As mentioned, E-Verify is a largely voluntary program. Legislation in Recent Congresses
Electronic employment eligibility verification measures have been introduced in recent Congresses. The 115 th Congress has likewise acted on electronic employment verification measures. Policy Considerations
In weighing proposals that may emerge on electronic employment eligibility verification, policymakers may want to consider potential impacts on the key issues of unauthorized employment; verification system accuracy, efficiency, and capacity; discrimination; employer compliance; privacy; and verification system usability and employer burden. Among them is a concern that individuals could improperly use E-Verify to obtain information about others. It may be that a mandatory system would require new strategies to address these issues. | Unauthorized immigration and unauthorized employment continue to be key issues in the ongoing debate over immigration policy. Today's discussions about these issues build on the work of prior Congresses. In 1986, following many years of debate about unauthorized immigration to the United States, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This law sought to address unauthorized immigration, in part, by requiring all employers to examine documents presented by new hires to verify identity and work authorization and to complete and retain employment eligibility verification (I-9) forms. Ten years later, in the face of a growing unauthorized population, Congress attempted to strengthen the employment verification process by establishing pilot programs for electronic verification, as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).
The Basic Pilot program (known today as E-Verify), the first of the three IIRIRA employment verification pilots to be implemented and the only one still in operation, began in November 1997. Originally scheduled to terminate in November 2001, it has been extended several times. It is currently authorized until September 30, 2018, in accordance with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141).
E-Verify is administered by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). As of April 2, 2018, there were 779,722 employers enrolled in E-Verify, representing more than 2.5 million hiring sites. E-Verify is a largely voluntary program, but there are some mandatory participation requirements. Among them is a rule, which became effective in 2009, requiring certain federal contracts to contain a new clause committing contractors to use E-Verify.
Under E-Verify, participating employers enter information about their new hires (name, date of birth, Social Security number, immigration/citizenship status, and alien number, if applicable) into an online system. This information is automatically compared with information in Social Security Administration and, if necessary, DHS databases to verify identity and employment eligibility.
Legislation on electronic employment eligibility verification has been considered in recent Congresses. In weighing proposals on electronic employment verification, Congress may find it useful to evaluate them in terms of their potential impact on a set of related issues: unauthorized employment; verification system accuracy, efficiency, and capacity; discrimination; employer compliance; privacy; and verification system usability and employer burden. |
crs_R41887 | crs_R41887_0 | Introduction
The U.S. monetary system is based on paper money backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. The currency is neither valued in, backed by, nor officially convertible into gold or silver. Through much of its history, however, the United States was on a metallic standard of one sort of another. On occasion, there are calls for Congress to return to such a system. Such calls are usually accompanied by claims that gold or silver backing has provided considerable economic benefits in the past. This report briefly reviews the history of the gold standard in the United States. It is intended to clarify the dates during which the standard was used, the type of gold standard in operation at the various times, and the statutory changes used to alter the standard and eventually end it. It is not a discussion of the merits of such a system. Full-bodied gold or silver coins may be issued without making them legal tender. Basically Silver: 1792-1834
Officially, the United States began not with a gold standard, but with a bimetallic standard in which both gold and silver were used to define the monetary unit. The ratio of silver to gold in a given denomination was 15 to 1. The ratio was changed to 16 to 1 by reducing the gold in gold coins. Paper Money in the Antebellum Period
Throughout the period before the Civil War, there was no legal-tender paper money in the United States. Circulating Treasury Notes
Starting for the first time during the War of 1812, the Treasury issued Treasury notes that promised to pay gold or silver at a future date. The government had returned to a gold standard; but two important changes had taken place with respect to paper money: (1) the government now was an issuer of paper money redeemable on demand and (2) the paper money was legal tender. Because of the fall in the value of silver, the silver dollars and certificates under this legislation—like the silver subsidiary coins—had a metallic value on the world market much less than their mint value. The new national bank notes were of uniform design. In 1900, the government reaffirmed its commitment to the gold standard. In 1913, this problem was addressed by the creation of the Federal Reserve System (Fed). The dollar was still defined in terms of gold. Federal Reserve notes were redeemable in lawful money. The End of the Gold Standard: 1933
In 1933, the gold standard was ended for the United States. Convertibility into gold was suspended. Private holdings of gold were nationalized. Quasi-Gold Standard: 1934-1973
Under the system adopted by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the United States continued to define the dollar in terms of gold. This "closing of the gold window" was not an official action, so that it did not constitute an official abandonment of gold. The new price was the official price of the dollar, and policies were pursued to maintain the dollar's value relative to other currencies. However, there continued to be no convertibility into gold—even for international transactions. After 1933, it was a quasi-gold standard that gradually became a pure fiat standard over the period 1967-1973. A central bank and a metallic standard are not mutually exclusive. A genuine metallic standard is one in which the public is able to freely shift gold from exchange to other uses, and paper issued by the government freely convertible into gold. It occurred by default as links to gold became impossible to maintain. | The U.S. monetary system is based on paper money backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. The currency is neither valued in, backed by, nor officially convertible into gold or silver. Through much of its history, however, the United States was on a metallic standard of one sort or another.
On occasion, there are calls for Congress to return to such a system. Such calls are usually accompanied by claims that gold or silver backing has provided considerable economic benefits in the past. This report briefly reviews the history of the gold standard in the United States. It is intended to clarify the dates during which the standard was used, the type of gold standard in operation at the various times, and the statutory changes used to alter the standard and eventually end it. It is not a discussion of the merits of such a system.
The United States began with a bimetallic standard in which the dollar was defined in terms of both gold or silver at weights and fineness such that gold and silver were set in value to each other at a ratio of 15 to 1. Because world markets valued them at a 15½ to 1 ratio, much of the gold left the country and silver was the de facto standard.
In 1834, the gold content of the dollar was reduced to make the ratio 16 to 1. As a result, silver left the country and gold became the de facto standard. In addition, gold discoveries drove down the value of gold even more, so that even small silver coins disappeared from circulation. In 1853, the silver content of small coins was reduced below their official face value so that the public could have the coins needed to make change.
During the Civil War, the government issued legal tender paper money that was not redeemable in gold or silver, effectively placing the country on a fiat paper system. In 1879, the country was returned to a metallic standard; this time a single one: gold. Throughout the late 19th century, there were efforts to remonetize silver. A quantity of silver money was issued; however, its intrinsic value did not equal the face value of the money, nor was silver freely convertible into money. In 1900, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the gold standard and relegated silver to small denomination money.
Throughout the period under which the United States had a metallic standard, paper money was extensively used. A variety of bank notes circulated, even without being legal tender. Various notes issued by the Treasury also circulated without being legal tender. This use of paper money is entirely consistent with a gold standard. Much of the money used under a gold standard is not gold, but promises to pay gold. To help ensure that the paper notes theretofore issued by banks were honored, the government created the national bank system in 1863. In 1913, it created the Federal Reserve System to help ensure that checks were similarly honored. The creation of the Federal Reserve did not end the gold standard.
The gold standard ended in 1933 when the federal government halted convertibility of notes into gold and nationalized the private gold stock. The dollar was devalued in terms of its gold content, and made convertible into gold for official international transactions only. Even this quasi-gold standard became difficult to maintain in the 1960s. Over the period 1967-1973, the United States abandoned its commitment to covert dollars into gold in official transactions and stopped trying to maintain its value relative to foreign exchange. Despite several attempts to retain some link to gold, all official links of the dollar to gold were severed in 1976. |
crs_RL31633 | crs_RL31633_0 | It may be necessary for a working mother to express milk during working hours, and/or to breastfeed her child during working hours. Other issues concern nursing and/or the expression of milk in public or semi-public places such as restaurants, public transportation facilities, and other locations where the public is present. Various states have enacted legislation and/or adopted court rules relating to nursing mothers and jury duty. Some states have vested nursing mothers with certain rights, including rights in the workplace. Other states exempt nursing mothers from jury service. Summary of State Breastfeeding Legislation
Below is a summary of state laws concerning breastfeeding. Conclusion
In recent years, there has been an expansion in the practice of breastfeeding. The laws vary considerably in their scope and in their coverage. | The practice of breastfeeding has expanded in recent years. Various legal issues have accompanied this development. The primary legal issues concern: 1) the ability of working mothers to breastfeed their children and/or to express milk during working hours; and 2) nursing and/or the expression of milk in public or semi-public places such as restaurants, public transportation facilities, and other locations where the public is present. Certain states have enacted legislation addressing breastfeeding in the workplace and exempting nursing mothers from laws dealing with indecent exposure and/or criminal behavior. Some states have enacted laws which excuse nursing mothers from jury service. State laws vary considerably in their scope and coverage. This report summarizes the various state laws concerning breastfeeding. |
crs_RL30785 | crs_RL30785_0 | Introduction
The Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) provides subsidies to assist low-income families in obtaining child care so that parents can work or participate in education or training activities. Discretionary funding for this program is authorized by the CCDBG Act, which is currently due for reauthorization. Mandatory funding for child care subsidies, authorized in Section 418 of the Social Security Act (sometimes referred to as the "Child Care Entitlement to States"), is also due for reauthorization. In combination, these two funding streams are commonly referred to as the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). The CCDF is administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and provides block grants to states, according to a formula, which are used to subsidize the child care expenses of working families with children under age 13. In addition to providing funding for child care services, funds are also used for activities intended to improve the overall quality and supply of child care for families in general. The CCDF is the primary source of federal funding dedicated solely to child care subsidies for low-income working and welfare families. Established in the CCDBG Act of 1990 (a component of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, P.L. 104-193 ) authorized and directly appropriated (or pre-appropriated) mandatory child care funding for each of FY1997 through FY2002. Temporary extensions provided mandatory child care funding into FY2006, when a spending budget reconciliation bill was enacted into law ( P.L. 109-171 ), reauthorizing and increasing mandatory child care funding by $1 billion over five years (for a total amount of $2.917 billion for each of FY2006 to FY2010). The authorization and pre-appropriations for mandatory child care funding were set to expire at the end of FY2010, but a series of short-term extensions maintained mandatory child care funding at the same level ($2.917 billion) for FY2011-FY2013. However, mandatory child care funding has since been restored at the $2.917 billion level via temporary extensions, the most recent of which (in P.L. 113-76 ) provides mandatory child care funding through the end of FY2014. Recent CCDBG Reauthorization Efforts
On September 15, 2014, the House approved the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 2014 ( S. 1086 , as amended) by voice vote. This is an amended version of the CCDBG reauthorization bill that was agreed to in the Senate, by a vote of 96-2, on March 13, 2014 ( S. 1086 , S.Rept. 113-138 ). HHS Office of Child Care
At the federal level, the CCDF is administered by the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) within HHS. Because these funds were directly appropriated by the welfare reform law, the mandatory CCDF funding does not generally go through the annual appropriations process. Finally, on February 8, 2006, a budget reconciliation bill ( S. 1932 , the Deficit Reduction Act), which included mandatory child care funding provisions, was passed into law ( P.L. 113-76 ), which provided $2.360 billion in discretionary CCDBG funding for FY2014. Prior to the enactment of P.L. Notably, however, Congress did not enact an FY2014 continuing resolution (CR) prior to the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013. This resulted in a funding gap and shutdown of the federal government that lasted until the first CR was signed into law on October 17, 2013. Mandatory Funding
Like discretionary CCDBG funding, mandatory child care funds were also subject to a funding gap at the beginning of FY2014. 113-73 ) and the full-year consolidated appropriations act ( P.L. FY2013 Appropriations
Discretionary Funding
According to HHS, the FY2013 operating level for the discretionary CCDBG was $2.206 billion. | The Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) provides subsidies to assist low-income families in obtaining child care so that parents can work or participate in education or training activities. Discretionary funding for this program is authorized by the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990 (as amended), which is currently due for reauthorization. Mandatory funding for child care subsidies authorized in Section 418 of the Social Security Act (sometimes referred to as the "Child Care Entitlement to States") is also due for reauthorization. In combination, these two funding streams are commonly referred to as the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). The CCDF is the primary source of federal funding dedicated solely to child care subsidies for low-income working and welfare families.
The CCDF is administered by the Office of Child Care at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and provides block grants to states, according to a formula, which are used to subsidize the child care expenses of working families with children under age 13. In addition to providing funding for child care services, funds are also used for activities intended to improve the overall quality and supply of child care for families in general.
In recent years, both Congress and the Obama Administration have demonstrated an interest in reauthorizing or otherwise reforming the CCDF. On September 15, 2014, the House approved, by voice vote, the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 2014 (S. 1086, as amended). This bill would reauthorize the CCDBG Act through FY2020. It is an amended version of the CCDBG reauthorization bill (S. 1086, S.Rept. 113-138) that was approved by the Senate last March, by a vote of 96-2. Previously, in May 2013, HHS issued a proposed rule intended to overhaul existing regulations on the CCDF. A final rule has not yet been published.
Discretionary child care funds are subject to the annual appropriations process. Congress did not enact FY2014 appropriations prior to the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2013. This resulted in a funding gap and 16-day shutdown of the federal government. Subsequently, two short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 113-46, P.L. 113-73) provided discretionary funding for the CCDBG until January 17, when the President signed into law a full-year consolidated appropriations act (P.L. 113-76). This law provided $2.360 billion in discretionary CCDBG funding for FY2014, which was reduced to $2.358 billion due to transfers within HHS. This funding level is about 7% more than the discretionary CCDBG's post-sequester FY2013 operating level of $2.206 billion and nearly 5% less than the FY2014 President's Budget request of $2.478 billion.
Mandatory child care funds are not typically included in annual appropriation bills. Mandatory funds were directly appropriated (or pre-appropriated) for fiscal years 1997 through 2002 by the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193), which created the mandatory component of the CCDF. Temporary extensions provided mandatory CCDF funding into FY2006. On February 8, 2006, a budget reconciliation bill was enacted into law (P.L. 109-171), increasing mandatory child care funding by $1 billion over five years (for a total of $2.917 billion for each of FY2006-FY2010). The authorization and pre-appropriations for mandatory child care funding were set to expire at the end of FY2010, but a series of six short-term extensions maintained mandatory child care funding at the same level ($2.917 billion) for FY2011-FY2013. Congress did not extend mandatory child care funding prior to the 16-day federal shutdown at the beginning of FY2014. However, mandatory child care funding has since been restored at the $2.917 billion level via temporary extensions, the most recent of which (in P.L. 113-76) provides mandatory child care funding through the end of FY2014. |
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