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crs_R42884 | crs_R42884_0 | Numerous expiring provisions, across-the-board spending cuts, and other short-term considerations having a major budgetary impact, were scheduled to take effect at the very end of 2012 or in early 2013. This combination of policies, estimated by CBO to reduce the deficit by $502 billion between FY2012 and FY2013, was referred to by some as the "fiscal cliff." Had these policies taken effect, CBO projected that the economy would likely have returned to recession in FY2013. On January 2, 2013, President Obama signed into law the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. Specifically, there are uncertainties associated with the debt limit and with appropriations for the final six months of the fiscal year. As Congress changed the trajectory of these policies by increasing spending and decreasing revenue, these policies have increased the deficit relative to the baseline. Therefore, as shown in Table 1 , the spending increases and revenue decreases in ATRA are estimated to increase the budget deficit by $330 billion in FY2013 and nearly $4 trillion over the FY2013-FY2022 period relative to current law. Major Fiscal Policy Issues Addressed in ATRA
ATRA addressed several revenue provisions that had been set to expire at the end of 2012. These included the "Bush-era tax cuts," provisions related to the estate tax, certain tax provisions enacted or expanded as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), and a number of temporary tax provisions (also known as "tax extenders"). In addition to these revenue provisions, ATRA also addressed several spending policies that were scheduled to reduce spending beginning in FY2013. These included temporary emergency unemployment benefits, payments to Medicare physicians under the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) system, the automatic spending cuts enacted as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011, and the 2008 farm bill. 111-5 ) made modifications to two provisions of the Bush-era tax cuts and enacted two new tax provisions. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the temporary extension of these four ARRA tax provisions will reduce revenues by $3 billion in FY2013 and $134 billion over the FY2013 to FY2022 period
Tax Extenders
A number of temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2011, and more expired at the end of 2012. 112-25 ). The BCA contained a variety of measures intended to reduce the deficit by at least $2.1 trillion over the FY2012-FY2021 period, along with a mechanism to increase the debt limit. In order to offset the cost of the changes related to the postponement and reduction of the BCA's automatic spending cuts, ATRA contains spending reductions and revenue increases. P.L. CBO estimates that this provision will increase the budget deficit by $11 billion in FY2013 and by $25 billion over the FY2013 to FY2022 period. Major Fiscal Policy Issues Not Addressed in ATRA
ATRA did not address two policies considered to be part of the "fiscal cliff"—the expiration at the end of 2012 of the two-percentage-point reduction in the Social Security payroll tax and the ACA taxes on higher-income tax filers, which are scheduled to take effect in 2013. Many policy issues affecting the federal budget over the next decade and beyond remain unresolved. | The federal budget deficit has exceeded $1 trillion in each of the last four fiscal years (FY2009-FY2012). Concern over these large deficits, as well as the long-term trajectory of the federal budget, resulted in significant debate during the 112th Congress over how to achieve meaningful deficit reduction and how to implement a plan to stabilize the federal debt. Numerous expiring provisions, across-the-board spending cuts, and other short-term considerations having a major budgetary impact, were scheduled to take effect at the very end of 2012 or in early 2013. This combination of policies, estimated by CBO to reduce the deficit by $502 billion between FY2012 and FY2013, was referred to by some as the "fiscal cliff." Had these policies taken effect, CBO projected that the economy would likely have returned to recession in FY2013.
On January 2, 2013, President Obama signed into law the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240), which addressed many of these tax and spending policies. As a result of the changes in ATRA which are set to increase spending and decrease revenue, the deficit is projected to rise relative to the current law baseline. The provisions of ATRA were estimated by CBO to increase the budget deficit by $330 billion in FY2013 and nearly $4 trillion over the FY2013-FY2022 period.
ATRA addressed several revenue provisions that had been set to expire at the end of 2012. These included the "Bush-era tax cuts," provisions related to the estate tax, certain tax provisions enacted or expanded as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), and a number of temporary tax provisions (also known as "tax extenders"). ATRA permanently extended a modified version of the "Bush-era tax cuts" and the estate tax, as well as a permanent AMT patch. The law also temporarily extended the ARRA tax provisions and a variety of "tax extenders." ATRA did not extend the two-percentage-point reduction in the Social Security payroll tax, which expired at the end of 2012, or delay the Affordable Care Act (ACA) taxes on higher-income tax filers, which are scheduled to take effect in 2013. Combined, these provisions were estimated by CBO and JCT to increase the deficit by $280 billion in FY2013 and $3.93 trillion over the FY2013-FY2022 period.
In addition to these revenue provisions, ATRA also addressed several spending policies that were scheduled to reduce spending beginning in FY2013. It extended the federal share of extended benefit payments for unemployment and postponed the expiration of the authorization for temporary emergency unemployment benefits through 2013. It delayed a reduction in payments to Medicare physicians under the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) system through 2013. It eliminated the first two months of the automatic spending cuts enacted as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), postponing their onset from January 2 to March 1. It extended the 2008 farm bill through 2013. These provisions, some of which were offset, were estimated by CBO to increase the deficit by $48 billion in FY2013 and $34 billion over the FY2013-FY2022 period.
Despite the enactment of ATRA, many policy issues affecting the federal budget remain unresolved. Specifically, in early 2013, Congress will likely consider a debt limit increase, additional actions related to the postponed BCA automatic spending reductions, and appropriations for the final six months of FY2013. Finally, long-term fiscal sustainability issues remain unresolved. |
crs_R44088 | crs_R44088_0 | Introduction
The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill ® )—enacted as Title V of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-252 ) —provides educational assistance payments to eligible individuals (servicemembers and veterans, and their dependents) from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in accordance with their military service. The Department of Education's (ED's) Federal Pell Grants, as authorized by Title IV-A-1 of the Higher Education Act (HEA), provide grant aid payments to eligible undergraduate students in accordance with their financial need, regardless of military service record. Timely, efficient, and student-friendly administration is important in ensuring that each federal program achieves its policy objectives with respect to the target population. This report compares and contrasts administration of Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits and Pell Grant payments. Since passage of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, the House Veterans' Affairs Committee has held several oversight hearings to ensure administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill meets the needs of servicemembers transitioning to civilian life. The Federal Pell Grant program, the single largest source of federal grant aid supporting postsecondary students, is intended to increase access to postsecondary education for financially needy individuals. Of those IHEs with Pell Grant recipients, there were, on average, over 1,000 Pell Grant recipients at each one. Key Differences
There are several differences in the administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill and Pell Grant programs. Because the Post-9/11 GI Bill was enacted in 2009 and the Pell Grant program was enacted in 1973, ED, IHEs, and Congress have had more time and resources to develop a suite of fully automated and integrated information systems, which administer Pell Grants in concert with the other HEA Title IV aid programs, and to improve process and system efficiency through administrative, regulatory, and legislative enhancements. The Post-9/11 GI Bill application requires most applicants to choose the most advantageous GI Bill. Qualifying individuals who are applying for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits and who are eligible for at least one of the MGIB-AD, MGIB-SR, or REAP programs must make and date an irrevocable election to receive Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits in lieu of one of the aforementioned programs. Educational Institution Responsibility to the VA
An educational institution may be liable for overpayments based on amounts that it received directly from the VA. (Training establishments are not generally responsible for overpayments since they do not receive payments directly from the VA.) An educational institution is liable for an overpayment of amounts received directly from the VA if the GI Bill participant fails to attend any classes, the participant withdraws on or before the first day of the term, the participant dies, the educational institution receives an erroneous payment (i.e., a duplicate payment, a payment above the certified amount, or a payment for the wrong student), or the institution submits an amended enrollment certification with reduced charges or a Yellow Ribbon amount that was not the result of the individual's change in enrollment. In addition, possible limitations that may arise from applying Pell Grant administrative processes to the Post-9/11 GI Bill processes are identified in order that they may be considered and mitigated. For example, VADIR lacks some service information, thus preventing an automated eligibility determination. The Post-9/11 GI Bill could consider a similar lump sum payment prior to the start of the academic term; although, this would likely increase the incidence and amount of overpayments and debts. Acronyms
Acronyms Related to the Post-9/11 GI Bill
Information Systems
Programs
Other Acronyms
Acronyms Related to the Pell Grant Program:
Information Systems
Other Acronyms
Appendix C. Post-9/11 GI Bill Secondary Processing and Disbursement of Funds for Additional Forms of Education and Training
The administration of Post-9/11 GI Bill vocational flight training, apprenticeships or on-the-job training (OJT), tutorial assistance, correspondence training, licensing and certification tests, national tests, and relocation differs significantly from the administration of other degree and non-college degree (NCD) programs at educational institutions. | This report compares and contrasts the administration of the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill®)—enacted as Title V of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252)—and Federal Pell Grants, as authorized by Title IV-A-1 of the Higher Education Act (HEA). The Post-9/11 GI Bill provides educational assistance payments to eligible servicemembers and veterans, and their dependents. One of its primary objectives is readjustment of veterans to civilian life and the workforce. The federal Pell Grant program provides grant aid payments to eligible and financially needy undergraduate students, regardless of military service record. One of its primary objectives is to increase postsecondary education access of low-income individuals. The report investigates whether the administrative processes supporting Pell Grants can provide lessons for achieving more timely, efficient, and student-friendly administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, thus ensuring that it achieves its policy objectives with respect to educational achievement of the target population.
There are several differences between the programs and their administration. Post-9/11 GI Bill eligibility is contingent on service in the uniformed services, whereas Pell Grant eligibility is contingent on financial need. Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits must be used within several years of discharge from active duty, whereas Pell Grants can be used at any stage of an individual's life. The Post-9/11 GI Bill benefit was designed to meet most costs of education, whereas the Pell Grants were designed to meet a portion of an individual's financial need. Eligible individuals may receive both benefits concurrently.
When comparing the administrative processes of the programs, there are at least three important considerations. One is the difference in the number of beneficiaries/recipients—estimates indicate there were fewer than 1 million Post-9/11 GI Bill participants and more than 9 million Pell Grant recipients in FY2014, which leads to economies of scale and greater familiarity for Pell Grant administrators. Another is the greater variety of programs of education approved for the Post-9/11 GI Bill, which increases administrative complexity. Finally, while the Post-9/11 GI Bill went into effect in 2009, the Pell Grant administrative processes are more mature, having been developed and administered for decades.
There are areas in which the Post-9/11 GI Bill processes and procedures arguably could be improved if compared to the Pell Grant program. The key area would be a larger investment in system automation and internal controls to more fully automate the processes and maintain them with respect to ongoing legislative changes. For example, Post-9/11 GI Bill eligibility determinations could be more fully automated. VA systems could choose the most advantageous GI Bill programs based on applicant information. Exact payments and unmet costs may be estimated for Post-9/11 GI Bill participants prior to enrollment to encourage informed enrollment. Providing payments to educational institutions to disburse to students may eliminate an extra processing step by the VA and speed payments and adjustments. Overpayments of Post-9/11 GI Bill payments could be resolved through deductions from subsequent Post-9/11 GI Bill payments or other VA benefit payments.
However, there may be underlying issues that prevent or hinder improvements and may suggest a limited advantage from them. For example, a single lump sum housing allowance payment before the start or at the beginning of the academic term may help pay early housing expenses; however, it may increase the incidence and amount of overpayments and debts. |
crs_RL32797 | crs_RL32797_0 | Concerns about regulatory agencies' abilities to protect the public are not unique to FDA or public health. Two regulatory frameworks exist for the review of prescription drugs. First, FDA reviews the safety and effectiveness of new drugs that manufacturers wish to market in the United States; this process is called premarket approval or preapproval review . Once a drug has passed that threshold and is FDA-approved , FDA acts through its postmarket or post-approval regulatory procedures. The Current System
A drug cannot be marketed in the United States without FDA approval, for which the manufacturer must demonstrate the drug's safety and effectiveness to FDA's satisfaction, see its manufacturing plant pass FDA inspection, and obtain FDA approval for the drug's labeling—a term that includes all written and electronic material about the drug, including packaging, prescribing information for physicians, and patient brochures. If there is no objection, a manufacturer may begin clinical testing after that time. Manufacturers must report all serious and unexpected adverse reactions within 15 days of becoming aware of them (21 C.F.R. That said, the six areas around which most recommendations revolve are:
FDA organization FDA budget Role of industry Opportunities to use the drug approval process to enhance postmarket activities Insufficient postmarket information Lack of public access to available data
Some of the proposed changes lie within FDA's legislative authority to implement. Others would require congressional action. The IOM Committee on the Assessment of the U. S. Drug Safety System issued its report in September 2006. Opportunities to Use the Drug Approval Process to Enhance Postmarket Activities
Aside from whether FDA is wholly independent, there is broad agreement among those who have looked closely at FDA's process for drug approval that a number of specific changes in the evaluation process could make FDA more likely to anticipate, identify, and handle problems in ensuring the safety and effectiveness of drugs. FDA reports industry-committed study status annually in the Federal Register , but many feel that not only does FDA not have adequate authority to compel compliance, it does not sufficiently follow through with the tools it does have to enforce those commitments. What are the limitations of a passive approach? In this 100 th year of the Food and Drug Administration, Congress is clearly poised to examine whether FDA needs more legal authority to regulate the safety and effectiveness of drugs. | COX-2 inhibitors and SSRIs—the U.S. public has become more familiar with these technical abbreviations for biochemical processes than one might expect from our general level of science knowledge. Safety concerns about these drugs—used primarily to treat pain and depression—have turned a spotlight on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and its approach to protecting the public from drug risks that had not been identified before FDA-approval allowed the drugs on the market.
Two regulatory frameworks exist for the review of prescription drugs. First, in the premarket approval process, FDA reviews the safety and effectiveness of new drugs that manufacturers wish to market in the United States. A large part of this review is FDA's examining the manufacturer-provided data from clinical testing—studies in which humans take the investigational new drug in carefully controlled, and usually randomized, trials—from progressively larger Phase I, II, and III trials.
Second, after a manufacturer has sufficiently demonstrated a drug's safety and effectiveness for a defined population and specified conditions, and the drug is FDA-approved, FDA acts through its postmarket regulatory procedures. Manufacturers must report all serious and unexpected adverse reactions to FDA and clinicians and patients may do so.
The law gives FDA authority to take limited action if it finds a drug's post-approval use presents an increased risk of an adverse event. However, many suggest that not only does FDA need a broader range of enforcement tools, but that FDA also is not taking full advantage of the authority it does have.
While critics of FDA differ in their assessment of what is wrong with FDA's approach to postmarket safety activities, there is broad agreement that it needs significant change. Discussion of the problems and possible solutions revolves around six areas: FDA organization, FDA budget, role of industry, opportunities to use the drug approval process to enhance postmarket activities, insufficient postmarket information, and lack of public access to available data. Some of the proposed changes lie within the power of FDA to implement. Others would require congressional action.
This report examines various options for strengthening FDA's ability to protect the public. It will be updated from time to time to reflect legislative action by Congress. |
crs_RS22953 | crs_RS22953_0 | Real Estate Price Volatility and Appraisal Regulation
Appraisers provide an estimate of the value of real estate prior to the completion of a sale or refinance of the property. Lenders typically rely on independent real estate appraisers because the property serves as collateral for the loan used to finance the transaction. 101-73 ) enacted after the Savings and Loan Crisis, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act, P.L. It did so by establishing the Appraisal Subcommittee (ASC) within the Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC), but the licensing and certifying of appraisers was left to the states. The Dodd-Frank Act transferred some of the regulation of residential mortgages to the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), established more specific criteria for residential property appraisals and the appraiser profession, and also required a property visit for appraisals financed by a high risk residential mortgage. The Appraisal Subcommittee (ASC)
The ASC is a federal agency that oversees state licensing and certification of appraisers and appraisal management companies. The ASC oversees the state codes of professional responsibility for real estate appraisers. The USPAP are not federal statutes, but they are the standards guiding industry professionals. Other significant provisions include a requirement of a property visit for appraisals financed by a high-risk mortgage; conditions for a second appraisal at no cost to the home purchaser; mandated independence for appraisers; portability of some residential property appraisals; rules for customary and reasonable fees; standards for appraiser education; and a mandatory annual report to Congress by the ASC on its activities. Appraisal Requirements for High Risk Loans
The Dodd-Frank Act, Title XIV, Subtitle F, set new standards for the independence of appraisers. Sunset of the HVCC
The Home Valuation Code of Conduct (HVCC) was an industry standard for appraisals created during the subprime mortgage crisis. The HVCC resulted from an out of court settlement of a legal investigation into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by the attorney general of the state of New York. Rulemaking Authority of the CFPB and the Financial Regulators
The DFA transferred authority and personnel for regulating many consumer-related issues from the banking regulators to the CFPB. It directs the regulators to jointly issue rules for the registration of AMCs. Specifically, AMCs must
(1) register with and be subject to supervision by a State appraiser certifying and licensing agency in each State in which such company operates;
(2) verify that only licensed or certified appraisers are used for federally related transactions;
(3) require that appraisals coordinated by an appraisal management company comply with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice; and
(4) require that appraisals are conducted independently and free from inappropriate influence and coercion pursuant to the appraisal independence standards established under section 129E of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). October 2010 Federal Reserve TILA Rule
The Federal Reserve issued an interim final rule for appraisal independence in October 2010. It sets the standards for the payment of reasonable and customary compensation to appraisers as required by the Dodd-Frank Act. Unlike the banking regulator's FIL, the CFPB rule applies to all lenders, not just banks. | Real estate appraisers attempt to measure the value of a property that is being purchased or refinanced. In mortgage contracts, the property serves as collateral for the loan. Banks and their regulators may rely on the appraisal to reduce the potential losses if the borrower fails to repay the loan. Property purchasers may also rely on an appraisal if they wish to reassure themselves that the price they offered was reasonable given market conditions. This report discusses the regulation of appraisers and provides information on related statutes and rules.
The fallout from the housing bubble raised questions about the effectiveness of the regulation of residential real estate appraisers before and during the financial crisis. Real estate prices rose rapidly in some areas, then fell rapidly. When the real estate bubble burst, questions arose about the accuracy of the appraisals that supported the mortgage loans during the housing bubble.
Traditionally, regulation of real estate appraisers was handled at the state level, with a federal agency, the Appraisal Subcommittee (ASC), overseeing the state boards that licensed and certified appraisers. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd Frank Act, P.L. 111-203) increased federal requirements for real estate appraisers and transferred some federal oversight powers from banking regulators to the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
The Appraisal Foundation, a professional organization, issues the specific standards for conducting appraisals. These standards form the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), but are not federal law. The Appraisal Subcommittee (ASC) of the Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC) provides some of the funding for the Appraisal Foundation and oversees its activities.
Business practices of banks and securities firms that offer or purchase a large share of mortgages can influence appraisal standards. The rules that banking regulators and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) set for these institutions can influence industry-wide standards, even when the rules do not technically apply to all firms. During the financial crisis, the Home Valuation Code of Conduct (HVCC) was an informal industry standard created as part of a settlement between the attorney general of New York and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are regulated by the FHFA. The Dodd-Frank Act included a sunset provision for the HVCC, and directed the banking regulators to propose interim regulations until the CFPB began operating.
Title XIV, subtitle F of the Dodd-Frank Act included other changes to the regulation of real estate appraisals. Major provisions of subtitle F include a requirement of a property visit for appraisals of a home financed by a high-risk mortgage; conditions for a second appraisal at no cost to the home purchaser; mandated independence for appraisers; portability of some residential property appraisals; rules for customary and reasonable fees; standards for appraiser education; and a mandatory annual report to Congress by the ASC on its activities.
The ASC, banking regulators, and the CFPB are proposing and implementing several new rules. For example, the agencies issued an interim final rule for reasonable and customary fees for appraisers, as required by Section 1472 of the Dodd-Frank Act. |
crs_R40225 | crs_R40225_0 | One section for each of the four major federal land management agencies—the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), National Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior—history; organizational structure; management responsibilities; procedures for land acquisition, disposal, and designation, where relevant; and statutory authorities. Background
The federal government owns and manages approximately 650 million acres of land in the United States—about 29% of the total land base of 2.27 billion acres. Current Federal Land Management
Four agencies administer 617.5 million acres (95%) of the roughly 650 million acres of federal land. The FWS administers 90.8 million acres (14%) and has secondary jurisdiction on another 1.6 million acres and easements or leases on 4.0 million acres. Revenues from Activities on Federal Lands
The federal land management agencies are among the relatively few federal agencies that generate revenues for the U.S. Treasury. Agency Appropriations
Annual Appropriations
Funding for all four of the federal land management agencies is contained in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. National forests also provide livestock grazing and recreation. They contain diverse resources, including fuels and minerals; timber; forage; wild horses and burros; fish and wildlife habitat; recreation sites; wilderness areas; cultural sites; and other natural heritage assets. Among other important provisions, the law provides that:
the national interest will be best realized if the public lands and their resources are periodically and systematically inventoried and their present and future use is projected through a land use planning process coordinated with other Federal and State planning efforts ...
management be on the basis of multiple use and sustained yield unless otherwise specified by law ...
the United States receive fair market value of the use of the public lands and their resources unless otherwise provided for by statute ...
the public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use ... Thus, FLPMA established the BLM as a multiple-use, sustained-yield agency. The agency is responsible for approximately 700 million acres of federal subsurface minerals, and supervises the mineral operations on about 56 million acres of Indian trust lands. There are three approaches to developing federal mineral resources. State and local governments get priority to acquire lands under the Recreation and Public Purposes Act. It is dedicated primarily to the conservation of animals and plants. Other units have been created by executive order. Management
Mandate
As stated above, the basic NPS mission is twofold: (1) to conserve, preserve, protect, and interpret the natural, cultural, and historic resources of the nation for the public and (2) to provide for their enjoyment by the public. Land Ownership99
Designation
Most units of the National Park System have been created by Acts of Congress. Special Systems on Federal Lands
There are currently three special management systems that include lands from more than one federal land management agency: the National Wilderness Preservation System, the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and the National Trails System. Management
Wilderness areas generally are managed to protect and preserve their natural conditions. Major Acronyms Used in This Report
ANILCA: Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
ANWR: Alaska National Wildlife Refuge
BLM: Bureau of Land Management
DOD: Department of Defense
DOI: Department of the Interior
ESA: Endangered Species Act
EIS: Environmental Impact Statement
FLPMA: Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
FS: Forest Service
FWS: Fish and Wildlife Service
LWCF: Land and Water Conservation Fund
MBCF: Migratory Bird Conservation Fund
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
NFMA: National Forest Management Act of 1976
NFS: National Forest System
NHA: National Heritage Area
NPS: National Park Service
NWRS: National Wildlife Refuge System
O&C: Oregon and California (grant lands)
PILT: Payments in Lieu of Taxes (Act and Program)
PRIA: Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978
RPA: Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974
USDA: United States Department of Agriculture
WCAs: Wildlife Coordination Areas
WPAs: Waterfowl Production Areas
Appendix B. | The federal government owns about 650 million acres (29%) of the 2.27 billion acres of land in the United States. Four agencies administer 617.5 million acres of the federal land: the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service, all in the Department of the Interior. Most of these lands are in the West, including Alaska. They generate revenues for the U.S. Treasury, some of which are shared with states and localities. The agencies receive funding through the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations laws, as well as in various trust funds and special accounts.
The lands administered by the four agencies are managed for a variety of purposes, primarily related to preservation, recreation, and development of natural resources. Yet each of these agencies has distinct responsibilities for the lands and resources it administers. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages 255.8 million acres and is responsible for 700 million acres of subsurface mineral resources. The BLM has a multiple-use, sustained-yield mandate that supports a variety of uses and programs, including energy development, recreation, grazing and wild horses and burros, and conservation. The Forest Service (FS) manages 192.8 million acres also for multiple uses and sustained yields of various products and services, including timber harvesting, recreation, grazing, watershed protection, and fish and wildlife habitats. Most of the lands are designated national forests, but there are national grasslands and other designations. Wildfire protection is an increasingly important activity for both agencies. The BLM and FS have several authorities to acquire and dispose of lands.
The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) manages 90.8 million acres of federal land, primarily to conserve and protect animals and plants. The National Wildlife Refuge System includes wildlife refuges, waterfowl production areas, and wildlife coordination units. Units can be created by an act of Congress or executive order, and the FWS also may acquire lands for migratory birds. The National Park Service (NPS) manages 78.1 million acres of federal land to conserve lands and resources and make them available for public use. Activities that harvest or remove resources generally are prohibited. The National Park System has diverse units ranging from historical structures to cultural and natural areas. Units are created by an act of Congress, but the President may proclaim national monuments.
There also are three special management systems that include lands from more than one agency. The National Wilderness Preservation System consists of 107.6 million acres of protected wilderness areas designated by Congress. The National Wild and Scenic Rivers System contains 11,944 miles of wild, scenic, and recreational rivers, primarily designated by Congress and managed to preserve their free-flowing condition. The National Trails System contains four classes of trails managed to provide recreation and access to outdoor areas and historic resources. |
crs_R41805 | crs_R41805_0 | Background
The seismic design criteria applied to siting commercial nuclear power plants operating in the United States received increased attention following the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami that devastated Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. Some Members of Congress have questioned whether U.S nuclear plants are more vulnerable to seismic threats than previously assessed, particularly given the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) ongoing reassessment of seismic risks at certain plant sites. Currently, 104 commercial nuclear power plants operating in the United States use variations in light water reactor designs and construction. Loss of Coolant Accident
The most severe operating condition affecting a BWR is a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The resulting heat buildup can damage the fuel or fuel cladding and lead to a fuel "meltdown." The ECCS must also be sized to provide adequate makeup water to compensate for a break of the largest diameter pipe in the primary system (i.e., the so-called "double-ended guillotine break" (DEGB)). The NRC views the DEGB as an extremely unlikely event (likely to occur only once per 100,000 years of reactor operation). In the event of a LOCA, the reactor's emergency core cooling system (ECCS) provides core cooling to minimize fuel damage by injecting large amounts of cool, borated water into the reactor coolant system from a storage tank. These accelerations and the corresponding shaking frequencies are factors in the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA, discussed below). Where DSHA had based peak ground acceleration (PGA) on a single earthquake source, PSHA uses up-to-date interpretations of earthquake sources, earthquake recurrence, and strong ground motion estimates to estimate the probability of exceeding various levels of earthquake-caused ground motion at a given location in a given future time period. National Seismic Hazard Maps
In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) released an update of the National Seismic Hazard Maps (NSHM). USGS notes that the 2008 hazard maps differ significantly from the 2002 maps in many parts of the United States:
The new maps generally show 10- to 15-percent reductions in acceleration across much of the Central and Eastern United States [CEUS] for 0.2-s [second] and 1.0-s spectral acceleration and peak horizontal ground acceleration for 2-percent probability of exceedance in 50 years. As discussed earlier, most of the nation's nuclear power plants are located in the CEUS. However, it recently considered the implications of updated USGS seismic hazard models on the seismic risk of nuclear power plants sites operating in the Central and Eastern United states. The data evaluated in the assessment suggest that the probability for earthquake ground motion above the seismic design basis for some nuclear plants in the CEUS, although still low, is larger than previous estimates. In March 2011, the NRC announced that it had identified 27 nuclear reactors operating in the CEUS (listed in Table 5 ) subject to priority earthquake safety reviews. Appendix C. Terms
Boiling water reactor (BWR) directly generates steam inside the reactor vessel. Pressurized water reactor (PWR) uses two major loops to convert the heat generated by the reactor core into steam outside of the reactor vessel. | The earthquake and subsequent tsunami that devastated Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station and the earthquake that forced the North Anna, VA, nuclear power plant's temporary shutdown have focused attention on the seismic criteria applied to siting and designing commercial nuclear power plants. Some Members of Congress have questioned whether U.S nuclear plants are more vulnerable to seismic threats than previously assessed, particularly given the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) ongoing reassessment of seismic risks at certain plant sites.
The design and operation of commercial nuclear power plants operating in the United States vary considerably because most were custom-designed and custom-built. Boiling water reactors (BWRs) directly generate steam inside the reactor vessel. Pressurized water reactors (PWRs) use heat exchangers to convert the heat generated by the reactor core into steam outside of the reactor vessel. U.S. utilities currently operate 104 nuclear power reactors at 65 sites in 31 states; 69 are PWR designs and the 35 are BWR designs.
One of the most severe operating conditions a reactor may face is a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), which can lead to a reactor core meltdown. The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) provides core cooling to minimize fuel damage by injecting large amounts of cool water containing boron (borated water slows the fission process) into the reactor coolant system following a pipe rupture or other water loss. The ECCS must be sized to provide adequate make-up water to compensate for a break of the largest diameter pipe in the primary system (i.e., the so-called "double-ended guillotine break" (DEGB)). The NRC considers the DEGB to be an extremely unlikely event; however, even unlikely events can occur, as the magnitude 9.0 earthquake and resulting tsunami that struck Fukushima Daiichi proves.
U.S. nuclear power plants designed in the 1960s and 1970s used a deterministic statistical approach to addressing the risk of damage from shaking caused by a large earthquake (termed Deterministic Seismic Hazard Analysis, or DSHA). Since then, engineers have adopted a more comprehensive approach to design known as Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA). PSHA estimates the likelihood that various levels of ground motion will be exceeded at a given location in a given future time period. New nuclear plant designs will apply PSHA.
In 2008, the U.S Geological Survey (USGS) updated the National Seismic Hazard Maps (NSHM) that were last revised in 2002. USGS notes that the 2008 hazard maps differ significantly from the 2002 maps in many parts of the United States, and generally show 10%-15% reductions in spectral and peak ground acceleration across much of the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS), and about 10% reductions for spectral and peak horizontal ground acceleration in the Western United States (WUS). Spectral acceleration refers to ground motion over a range, or spectra, of frequencies. Seismic hazards are greatest in the WUS, particularly in California, Oregon, and Washington, as well as Alaska and Hawaii.
In 2010, the NRC examined the implications of the updated NSHM for nuclear power plants operating in the CEUS, and concluded that NSHM data suggest that the probability for earthquake ground motions may be above the seismic design basis for some nuclear plants in the CEUS. In late March 2011, NRC announced that it had identified 27 nuclear reactors operating in the CEUS that would receive priority earthquake safety reviews. |
crs_R41066 | crs_R41066_0 | Introduction
Beginning with the widespread use of e-mail by Congress in the mid-1990's, the development and adoption of new electronic technologies has altered the traditional patterns of communication between Members of Congress and constituents. Many Members now use e-mail, official websites, blogs, YouTube channels, and Facebook pages to communicate with their constituents—technologies that were either non-existent or not widely available 15 years ago. These technologies have arguably served to enhance the ability of Members of Congress to fulfill their representational duties by providing greater opportunities for communication between the Member and individual constituents, supporting the fundamental democratic role of spreading information about public policy and government operations. Electronic communications, however, have raised some concerns. Existing law and chamber regulations on the use of communication media such as the United States Postal Service have proven difficult to adapt to the new electronic technologies. This report examines Member use of one specific new electronic communication medium: Twitter. After providing an overview and background of Twitter, the report analyzes patterns of Member use of Twitter during August and September 2009. This report is inherently a snapshot in time of a dynamic process. Thus, the conclusions drawn from this data can not be easily generalized nor can these results be used to predict future behavior. In addition, electronic technology has reduced the marginal cost of constituent communications; unlike postal letters, Members can reach large numbers of constituents for a relatively small fixed cost. As with any new technology, the number of Members using Twitter and the patterns of use may change rapidly in short periods of time. Member Registration with Twitter
As of September 30, 2009, a total of 205 Members of Congress were registered with Twitter, 39 Senators and 166 Representatives. Members sent a total of 7,078 tweets during August and September 2009, for an average of approximately 116 Member tweets per day. To assess the content of Member tweets, eight major message categories were hypothesized: position taking, policy statements, media or public relations, district or state, official or congressional action, personal, campaign, and other. | Beginning with the widespread use of e-mail by Congress in the mid-1990's, the development of new electronic technologies has altered the traditional patterns of communication between Members of Congress and constituents. Many Members now use e-mail, official websites, blogs, YouTube channels, and Facebook pages to communicate with their constituents—technologies that were either non-existent or not widely available 15 years ago.
These technologies have arguably served to enhance the ability of Members of Congress to fulfill their representational duties by providing greater opportunities for communication between the Member and individual constituents, supporting the fundamental democratic role of spreading information about public policy and government operations. In addition, electronic technology has reduced the marginal cost of constituent communications; unlike postal letters, Members can reach large numbers of constituents for a relatively small fixed cost. Despite these advantages, electronic communications have raised some concerns. Existing law and chamber regulations on the use of communication media such as the franking privilege have proven difficult to adapt to the new electronic technologies.
This report examines Member use of one specific new electronic communication medium: Twitter. After providing an overview and background of Twitter, the report analyzes patterns of Member use of Twitter during August and September 2009. This report is inherently a snapshot in time of a dynamic process. As with any new technology, the number of Members using Twitter and the patterns of use may change rapidly in short periods of time. Thus, the conclusions drawn from this data can not be easily generalized nor can these results be used to predict future behavior.
The data show that 205 Representatives and Senators are registered with Twitter (as of September 30, 2009) and issued a total of 7,078 "tweets" during the data collection period of August and September 2009. With approximately 38% of House Members and 39% of Senators registered with Twitter, Members sent an average of 116 tweets per day collectively.
Members' use of Twitter can be divided into eight categories: position taking, policy, district or state activities, official congressional action, personal, media, campaign activities, and other. The data suggest that the most frequent type of tweets were district or state tweets (24%), followed by policy tweets (23%), media tweets (14%), and position-taking tweets (14%). |
crs_R43666 | crs_R43666_0 | Introduction
On July 8, 2014, the Administration requested $4,346 million in FY2014 supplemental appropriations to address two issues:
the federal costs of managing the surge of both unaccompanied alien children (UAC) and escorted alien children illegally crossing the southwest border, and a projected shortfall in federal funding to pay the costs of wildfires. On July 23, 2014, the Senate introduced S. 2648 , which included $3,571 million in supplemental appropriations for those purposes as well as providing funding for defense assistance to Israel. The legislation would designate the appropriations as an emergency requirement, meaning the funding would not count against the discretionary budget caps for FY2014. On July 29, 2014, the House introduced H.R. 5230 , which included $659 million in supplemental appropriations to address the situation at the southwest border. The original legislation included $659 million in offsets. This amended bill passed the House by a vote of 223-189 on August 1, 2014. Overview
Table 1 below outlines the Administration's request for supplemental funding for FY2014, and the proposed new budget authority provided in response to those requests. Funding with the designation would not count against the discretionary spending caps for FY2014, and an offset would not be needed to avoid violating those caps. All funding in the bill would be designated as emergency funding, as the Administration requested. H.R. The analysis of this report only focuses on the first division of the House bill. | On July 8, 2014, the Administration requested $4,346 million in FY2014 supplemental appropriations to address two issues: the surge in both unaccompanied and escorted children illegally crossing the southwest border, and a shortfall in federal funding to pay the costs of wildfires. The appropriations were requested to be designated as emergency funding, meaning the requested funds would not count against the discretionary budget caps for FY2014.
On July 23, 2014, the Senate introduced S. 2648, which includes $3,571 million in supplemental appropriations for the Administration's requested purposes as well as for defense assistance to Israel. S. 2648 would designate the appropriations as an emergency, meaning they would not count against the discretionary budget caps for FY2014.
On July 29, 2014, the House introduced H.R. 5230, which included $659 million in supplemental appropriations to address the situation at the southwest border. The legislation also included $659 million in rescissions that would offset the budgetary impact of the bill. An amended version of H.R. 5230, which includes an additional $35 million to defray the cost to states of National Guard deployments to the southern border, $35 million more in offsets, and a different set of policy provisions, passed the House 223-189 on August 1, 2014.
The primary focus of this report is the Administration's request for supplemental appropriations, and the appropriations legislation considered in response to that request. Other policy-related provisions of the legislation will be analyzed in other CRS materials.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43984 | crs_R43984_0 | Introduction
Songwriters are legally entitled to get paid for reproductions and public performances of the notes and lyrics they create (the musical works). Recording artists are entitled to get paid for reproductio ns, distributions, and certain digital performances of the recorded sound of their voices combined with instruments in some sort of medium, such as a digital file, record, or compact disc (the sound recordings). Yet these copyright holders do not have total control over their music. Thus, as a singer who owns the rights to her sound recordings, Ms. The amount Ms. Swift gets paid for both her musical works and her sound recordings depends on market forces, contracts among a variety of private-sector entities, and federal laws governing copyright and competition policy. Congress wrote these laws, by and large, at a time when consumers primarily accessed music via radio broadcasts or physical media, such as sheet music and phonograph records, and when each medium offered consumers a distinct degree of control over which songs they could hear next. With the emergence of music distribution on the internet, Congress updated some copyright laws in the 1990s. The result, as the U.S. The services pay royalties to music publishers/songwriters for the right to reproduce and distribute the musical works and royalties to record labels/artists for the right to reproduce and distribute sound recordings. To address this concern about a potential monopoly, Congress established the first compulsory license in U.S. copyright law. 2. Growth in radio, as well as declining sales in sheet music and other traditional revenue sources for publishers, also prompted action from ASCAP. DOJ Consent Decrees
The dispute between the broadcast stations and the PROs led the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate whether the PROs were violating antitrust laws. As described in " Reproduction and Distribution Licenses (Mechanical Licenses) ," the rates that interactive services pay music publishers are tied to the rates that the services pay record labels for performance rights, which are negotiated in the free market. Prior to that point, several songwriters and publishers filed lawsuits charging Spotify and other online music services with illegally streaming their copyrighted musical works. 5447)
In April 2018, the House of Representatives voted 415-0 to pass H.R. 5447 , the Music Modernization Act, as amended. The bill would create a new nonprofit "mechanical licensing collective," funded by online music services, that would offer and administer broad blanket mechanical licenses for online music services. It also would change the process of suing for infringement of mechanical licenses, the standards used to set royalty rates for musical works used by preexisting subscription services (Music Choice and Muzak) and satellite digital audio services (SiriusXM), and the process by which judges in the federal district court for the Southern District of New York are assigned to oversee cases related to the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees. If a musical works copyright owner filed a lawsuit filed after January 1, 2018, against an online music service that has allegedly engaged in unauthorized reproduction or distribution of a musical work prior to the blanket "license availability date" (defined by the legislation as the next January 1 following the expiration of the two-year period beginning on the enactment date of the Music Modernization Act), the copyright owner could recover only royalties owed under the new system. | Songwriters and recording artists are legally entitled to get paid for (1) reproductions and public performances of the notes and lyrics they create (the musical works), as well as (2) reproductions, distributions, and certain digital performances of the recorded sound of their voices combined with instruments (the sound recordings). The amount they get paid, as well as their control over their music, depends on market forces, contracts among a variety of private-sector entities, and laws governing copyright and competition policy.
Congress first enacted laws governing music licensing in 1909, when music was primarily distributed through physical media such as sheet music and phonograph records. At the time, some Members of Congress expressed concerns that absent a statutory requirement to make musical works widely available, licensees could use exclusive access to musical works to thwart competition. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) expressed similar concerns in the 1940s, when it entered into antitrust consent decrees requiring music publishers to license their musical works to radio broadcast stations.
As technological changes made it possible to reproduce sound recordings on tape cassettes in the late 1960s and in the form of digital computer files in the 1990s, Congress extended exclusive reproduction and performance rights to sound recordings as well. Many of the laws resulted from compromises between those who own the rights to music and those who license those rights from copyright holders. In some cases, the government sets the rates for music licensing, and the rate-setting standards that it uses reflect those compromises among interested parties.
As consumers have purchased fewer albums over the last 20 years, overall spending on music has declined. Nevertheless, as streaming services that incorporate attributes of both radio and physical media have entered the market, consumer spending has increased during the last two years. In 2016, for the first time ever, streaming and other digital music services represented the majority of the recorded music industry's revenues. As these services have proliferated and the number of songs released has increased, the process of ensuring that the various copyright holders are paid for their musical works and their sound recordings has grown more complex. Performers, songwriters, producers, and others have complained that in some cases current copyright laws make it difficult to earn enough money to support their livelihoods and create new music. In addition, several songwriters and publishers have sued music streaming services, claiming that the services have streamed their songs while making little effort to locate and pay the rights holders.
In April 2018, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 415-0 to pass H.R. 5447, the Music Modernization Act, as amended. The bill would, among other things, modify copyright laws related to the process of granting, receiving, and suing for infringement of mechanical licenses, would create a new nonprofit "mechanical licensing collective" through which musical work copyright owners could collect royalties from online music services, and would change the standards used by a federal agency, the Copyright Royalty Board, to set royalty rates for certain statutory music licenses. |
crs_R44933 | crs_R44933_0 | T he Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury (Title I), the Executive Office of the President (EOP; Title II), the judiciary (Title III), the District of Columbia (Title IV), and more than two dozen independent agencies (Title V). The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. Although financial services are a major focus of the bills, FSGG appropriations bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are instead funded outside of the appropriations process. Administration and Congressional Action
President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request on May 23, 2017. The request included a total of $45.2 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $250 million for the CFTC. On July 17, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 3280 , H.Rept. 115-234 ). Total FY2018 funding in the reported bill would have been $42.5 billion, with another $248 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 3268 , H.Rept. 115-232 ). The combined total of $42.7 billion would have been about $2.5 billion below the President's FY2018 request, with most of this difference in the funding for the General Services Administration (GSA). Nearly all of H.R. 3280 's text was included as Division D of H.R. 3354 when it was considered by the House of Representatives beginning on September 6, 2017. The bill was amended numerous times, shifting funding among FSGG agencies but not changing the FSGG totals. 3354 passed on September 14, 2017. The Senate Committee on Appropriations released an FY2018 chairmen's recommended FSGG draft bill along with an explanatory statement on November 20, 2017. Funding in the recommended bill totaled $43.3 billion, about $1.9 billion below the President's FY2018 request with most of this difference in funding for the GSA. 115-56 . P.L. Four additional CRs were enacted—on December 8, 2017 ( P.L. 115-90 ), December 22, 2017 ( P.L. 115-96 ), January 22, 2018 ( P.L. 115-120 ), and February 8, 2018 ( P.L. P.L. 115-123 also included an additional $127 million for the GSA and $1.66 billion for the Small Business Administration (SBA), largely to address disaster costs from hurricanes in 2017. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 1625 , P.L. 115-141 ) was enacted on March 23, 2018. FSGG appropriations are included in Division E, with the CFTC funded in the Agriculture appropriations in Division A. FY2018 enacted appropriations in both P.L. 115-141 and P.L. 115-123 totaled $47.7 billion for the FSGG agencies, $2.5 billion above the original request with much of this difference resulting from the emergency funding for the SBA. 115-123 . H.R. Many of these provisions were included in other legislation, notably H.R. 10 , which passed the House on June 8, 2017. 3280 and H.R. P.L. 115-141 included the texts of H.R. 4792 , both of which address small business access to capital. H.R. 4267 and H.R. | The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate.
President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request on May 23, 2017. The request included a total of $45.2 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $250 million for the CFTC.
The House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 3280, H.Rept. 115-234) on July 17, 2017. Total FY2018 funding in the reported bill would have been $42.5 billion, with another $248 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 3268, H.Rept. 115-232). The combined total of $42.7 billion would have been about $2.5 billion below the President's FY2018 request, with the largest difference in the funding for the General Services Administration (GSA).
Nearly all of H.R. 3280's text was included as Division D of H.R. 3354, an omnibus appropriations bill, when it was considered by the House of Representatives beginning on September 6, 2017. The bill was amended numerous times, shifting funding among FSGG agencies but not changing the FSGG totals. H.R. 3354 passed on September 14, 2017.
The full Senate Committee on Appropriations did not act on an FY2018 FSGG appropriations bill. A draft FY2018 chairmen's recommended FSGG bill along with an explanatory statement was released on November 20, 2017. Funding in the draft bill would have totaled $43.3 billion, about $1.9 billion below the President's FY2018 request, with most of this difference in funding for the GSA.
No appropriations bills were passed prior to the start of FY2018. Five separate continuing resolutions (CR) were enacted—on September 8, 2017 (P.L. 115-56), December 8, 2017 (P.L. 115-90), December 22, 2017 (P.L. 115-96), January 22, 2018 (P.L. 115-120), and February 8, 2018 (P.L. 115-123). The CRs generally maintained FSGG funding based on FY2017 levels, with P.L. 115-123 also adding supplemental emergency funding for the GSA ($127 million) and the Small Business Administration (SBA; $1.66 billion) largely to address natural disasters.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 1625, P.L. 115-141) was enacted on March 23, 2018. FSGG appropriations were included as Division E, with the CFTC funded in the Agriculture appropriations in Division A. FY2018 enacted appropriations in P.L. 115-141 and P.L. 115-123 combined totaled $47.7 billion for the FSGG agencies, $2.5 billion above the original request with much of this difference resulting from the emergency funding for the SBA.
Although financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are funded outside of the appropriations process. The FSGG bills do, however, often contain additional legislative provisions relating to such agencies, as was the case with H.R. 3280 and H.R. 3354, which contained several provisions in Title IX and Title X that also appear in H.R. 10, a broad financial regulatory bill passed by the House on June 8, 2017. Although most of these provisions were not ultimately attached, P.L. 115-141 included the texts of H.R. 4267 and H.R. 4792, both of which addressed small business access to capital. |
crs_R44901 | crs_R44901_0 | Introduction
Senate Rule XXVI establishes specific requirements for Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules, which may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Senate committees also operate according to additional established practices that are not necessarily reflected in their adopted rules. This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committees. The report then provides four tables that summarize each committee's rules in regard to meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, and scheduling of witnesses ( Table 1 ); hearing quorum, business quorum, and amendment filing requirements ( Table 2 ); proxy voting, polling, and nominations ( Table 3 ); and investigations and subpoenas ( Table 4 ). Table 4 also identifies selected unique provisions some committees have included in their rules. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee's rules. Provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or essentially restatements of the Senate's standing rules are not included. Reporting. Some committees restate this rule in their own rules. | Senate Rule XXVI establishes specific requirements for certain Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules to govern its own proceedings. These rules may "not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate." Senate committees may also operate according to additional established practices that are not necessarily reflected in their adopted rules but are not specifically addressed by Senate rules. In sum, Senate committees are allowed some latitude to establish tailored procedures to govern certain activities, which can result in significant variation in the way different committees operate.
This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committee actions. The report then provides tables that summarize selected, key features of each committee's rules in regard to meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, scheduling of witnesses, hearing quorum, business quorum, amendment filing requirements, proxy voting, polling, nominations, investigations, and subpoenas. In addition, the report looks at selected unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in the miscellaneous category.
The tables represent only a portion of each committee's rules, and provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or essentially restatements of the Senate's Standing Rules are not included.
This report will be not be updated further during the 115th Congress. |
crs_RS22493 | crs_RS22493_0 | The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) administers the AWA. Animal fighting is prohibited by the AWA. 91-579 renamed the "Laboratory Animal Welfare Act" the Animal Welfare Act and expanded animal coverage to include all warm-blooded animals determined by the Secretary to be used for experimentation or exhibition, except horses not used in research and farm animals used in food and fiber research. The law, based on companion bills ( H.R. Animal Welfare Legislation in the 114th Congress
Horse Protection Act Legislation
The Horse Protection Act (HPA), enacted in 1970 (P.L. The Prevent All Soring Tactics (PAST) Act ( H.R. 3268 / S. 1121 ) would amend the HPA to ban "action devices" on horses, modify the existing DQP inspection system, and impose new penalties on HPA violations. The Horse Protection Amendments Act of 2015 ( H.R. The bill would direct USDA to establish the Horse Industry Organization governed by a nine-member board. Animal Welfare in Agricultural Research Endeavors Act(H.R. The research practices reported in the NYT article raised significant public concern about animal welfare standards at the center. The AWA currently excludes farm animals from AWA coverage, and also excludes federal research institutions from AWA registration and inspection. H.R. 746 / S. 388 (the Animal Welfare in Agricultural Research Endeavors Act) would amend the AWA to require that farm animals and federal laboratories using farm animals be subject to AWA regulations. The bill was referred to the House Agriculture Committee, but no further action was taken as of late 2015. The Pet Safety and Protection Act was reintroduced in the 114 th Congress as H.R. 2849 and would amend the AWA to limit the sources of random source dogs and cats to a licensed dealer (under Section 3 of the AWA) who has bred and raised the animal; a publicly owned or operated pound or shelter that meets certain qualifications; someone donating the dog or cat that bred and raised the animal or owned it for not less than one year; and research facilities licensed by the Secretary of Agriculture. Enforcement Transparency Act of 2015 (H.R. 3136)
The Enforcement Transparency Act would require the Secretary of Agriculture to publish guidelines on USDA's website relating to the calculation of civil fines for violations under the AWA. The Animal Emergency Planning Act would amend the AWA to require research facilities, animal dealers, handlers, exhibitors, and carriers to develop and document a contingency plan to provide for the humane handling, treatment, housing, and care of animals in the event of an emergency or disaster. 4019)
Humane care and handling of marine mammals are also covered under AWA regulation. The Orca Responsibility and Care Advancement Act would amend both the AWA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 to prohibit the capture, importation, and exportation of orcas for purposes of public display. The bill would also amend the AWA to prohibit the breeding of orcas for exhibition purposes. Safe Transport for Horses Act (S. 946) and the Horse Transportation Safety Act (H.R. 1282 would amend the Transportation title (49 U.S.C. 80502) to prohibit interstate transportation of horses in motor vehicles containing two or more levels stacked on top of one another. The Refuge from Cruel Trapping Act would amend the National Wildlife Refuge System Act of 1966 (16 U.S.C. The first petition, received in 2013, was from the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine. APHIS is currently considering public comments and supporting documents received by May 29, 2015. The New England Anti-Vivisection Society filed a petition with APHIS asking for specific rules on the care of all primates regarding their social and psychological well-being. | In 1966, Congress passed the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (P.L. 89-54) to prevent pets from being stolen for sale to research laboratories, and to regulate the humane care and handling of dogs, cats, and other laboratory animals. Farm animals are not covered by the AWA. The law was amended in 1970 (P.L. 91-579), changing the name to the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The AWA is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Congress periodically amends the act to strengthen enforcement, expand coverage to more animals and activities, or curtail practices viewed as cruel (e.g., animal fighting), among other things. Congress also addresses animal welfare issues through other legislation (e.g., the Horse Protection Act), but the AWA remains the central federal statute governing the humane care and handling of mammals, including marine mammals.
Animal welfare bills introduced in the 114th Congress include the Pet Safety and Protection Act (H.R. 2849), which would amend the AWA to ensure that all cats and dogs used in research were properly obtained. H.R. 3136, the Enforcement Transparency Act of 2015, would amend the AWA to require USDA to issue guidelines relating to civil fines imposed for violating the AWA. H.R. 3193, the Animal Emergency Planning Act of 2015, would amend the AWA to require that research facilities, animal dealers, exhibitors, handlers, and carriers under the AWA, develop and implement emergency contingency plans for animals in their charge. The Orca Responsibility and Care Advancement Act of 2015 (H.R. 4019) would amend both the AWA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 to prohibit the capture, importation, and exportation of orcas for public display. The bill would amend the AWA to prohibit the breeding of orcas for exhibition purposes. The Safe Transport for Horses Act (S. 946) and the Horse Transportation Safety Act (H.R. 1282) would amend the Transportation title (49 U.S.C. 80502) to prohibit the interstate transportation of horses in motor vehicles containing two or more levels stacked on top of one another. The Refuge from Cruel Trapping Act (S. 1081/H.R. 2016) would ban body-gripping traps from National Wildlife Refuges. Each of these bills has been referred to committees, but no further action was taken as of late 2015.
Following publication of USDA Inspector General's report on the inadequacy of the current horse soring inspection system, legislation to amend the Horse Protection Act (P.L. 91-540) was introduced. H.R. 3268/S. 1121, the Prevent All Soring Techniques (PAST) Act, would amend the current soring inspection system to place inspections under APHIS control rather than under the horse industry as it is currently. The Horse Protection Amendments Act (S. 1161) would also modify the inspection system, but retain inspection control within the horse industry.
Also introduced in the 114th Congress were bills that would end the exemption of farm animals from regulation under the AWA, and bring federal research under AWA registration and inspection. H.R. 746/S. 388, the Animal Welfare in Agricultural Research Endeavors Act, is a response to a widely reviewed article in the New York Times on the research activities at the Meat Animal Research Center, a USDA Agricultural Research Serviced facility.
Among APHIS regulatory actions in 2015 concerning the AWA, APHIS announced in May 2015 that it was seeking public comment on a petition from several animal welfare groups asking for specific rules on the care of all primates regarding their social and psychological well-being. APHIS also announced receiving a petition in 2013 from the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine to amend the AWA to define alternatives to procedures that may cause pain or distress to animals and to establish standards to consider these alternatives. APHIS is currently considering public comments that it received regarding these two petitions. |
crs_RS22272 | crs_RS22272_0 | FECA further defines "public communications" as broadcast, cable, satellite, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank communications made to the general public, "or any other form of general public political advertising." As a result, candidate and party committees can only use regulated federal funds to pay for such "federal election activity." Key aspects of the FEC regulations include the following:
Regulation of paid Internet ads as " public communications " —The definition of "public communication" includes paid Internet ads placed on another individual or entity's website as a form of "general public political advertising," with no dollar threshold required; the advertiser, not the website operator, is considered to be making the public communication. 4900 (Allen-Bass) would have exempted from FECA regulation most individual online communications and advertisements below a dollar threshold. 110th Congress
During the 110 th Congress, the regulation of political communications on the Internet was not the subject of major legislative action. 894 (Price, NC) would have extended "stand by your ad" disclaimer requirements to Internet communications, among others. H.R. H.R. 111th Congress
Similar legislation has not yet been introduced in the 111 th Congress. | The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) regulates "federal election activity," which is defined to include a "public communication" (i.e., a broadcast, cable, satellite, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank communication made to the general public) or "any other form of general public political advertising." In 2006, in response to a federal district court decision, the FEC promulgated regulations amending the definition of "public communication" to include paid Internet advertisements placed on another individual or entity's website. As a result, a key element of online political activity—paid political advertising—is subject to federal campaign finance law and regulations.
During the 110th Congress, the regulation of political communications on the Internet was not the subject of major legislative action. H.R. 894 (Price, NC) would have extended "stand by your ad" disclaimer requirements to Internet communications, among others. H.R. 5699 (Hensarling) would have exempted from treatment as a contribution or expenditure any uncompensated Internet services by individuals and certain corporations. Similar legislation has not yet been introduced in the 111th Congress. This report will be updated in the event of major legislative, regulatory, or legal developments. |
crs_R42939 | crs_R42939_0 | The result is a web of overlapping sanctions subject to differing restrictions, waiver provisions, expiration conditions, and reporting requirements. Six presidential executive orders (E.O.) These Burmese sanction regulations cover the import ban, the prohibition of the provision of financial services, and the prohibition of new investments in Burma. Since Burma's former ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), formally transferred power to a mixed military/civilian government in March 2011, Burma's Union Government and Union Parliament have implemented a number of political reforms that the Obama Administration sees as progress towards the fulfillment of U.S. objectives in Burma. A major element of the Obama's Administration's efforts to foster reforms in Burma has been the utilization of presidential authority to waive or terminate some of the existing political and economic sanctions on Burma. Although the presidential waivers effectively lift the sanctions, they do not revoke or remove the sanctions, which can be reimposed at any time. Brief History of U.S. Sanctions on Burma
U.S. sanctions on Burma are the result of a general, but uneven decline in U.S. relations with Burma and its military, the Tatmadaw, after World War II and continuing until the establishment of the Union Government. For the most part, the decline was due to what the U.S. government saw as a general disregard by the Burmese military for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. The George W. Bush Administration did not take significant action on Burma until after the attacks on the Burmese opposition in the spring of 2003 and the passage of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA). Third, Congress has been more proactive in pushing for the imposition of sanctions on Burma than the White House. Summary of Burma-Specific Sanctions
The existing U.S. sanctions specifically targeted at Burma can be generally divided into several broad categories:
Bans on issuing visas to certain past and present Burmese government officials (particularly the leadership of the State Peace and Development Council [SDPC] and the Union Solidarity Development Association [USDA]), members of their families, and their business associates. Additional Sanctions Based on Functional Issues
In addition to the targeted sanctions, Burma is currently subject to a number of sanctions specified in U.S. laws based on various functional issues. In many cases, the type of assistance or relations restricted or prohibited by these provisions is also addressed under Burma-specific sanction laws. Options for the 113th Congress
Various recent developments in Burma have sparked a general reexamination of U.S. policy towards Burma, and a discussion of whether U.S. sanctions continue to be an effective means of achieving policy goals or effecting change in Burma. The Obama Administration, however, is nearing the limits of steps it can take without Congress passing new legislation. It is unknown if and when the White House may approach Congress about the possible removal or amending of remaining sanctions on Burma. Serious human rights violations continue to occur in Burma. Issues for the 113th Congress
The 113 th Congress may be asked by the Administration either to waive or extend waivers for existing sanctions, or to take legislative action to fully remove sanctions. It will also play a role in U.S. policy towards Burma when it considers appropriating funds for various assistance programs in the country. | In March 2011, Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) formally dissolved itself and transferred power to a semi-military/semi-civilian government known as the Union Government, headed by President Thein Sein, ex-general and former prime minister for the SPDC. President Thein Sein, with the support of Burma's Union Parliament, has implemented a number of political and economic reforms, to which the Obama Administration has responded by waiving or easing sanctions.
Although the presidential waivers effectively lift the sanctions, they do not revoke or remove the sanctions, which can be reimposed at any time. Various recent developments in Burma have sparked a general reexamination of U.S. policy towards Burma, and a discussion of whether U.S. sanctions continue to be an effective means of achieving policy goals or effecting change in Burma. However, the continuation of serious human rights abuses has raised questions about the extent to which there has been significant political change in Burma, and if the easing of sanctions has been warranted.
The United States is nearing the limits of steps it can take to ease Burma sanctions without Congress passing new legislation. Thus, President Obama may approach Congress about the selective repeal or removal of one or more of the current sanctions on Burma. The 113th Congress allowed some of the sanctions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 to expire on July 26, 2013, when it did not pass an annual renewal resolution. The 113th Congress may consider either the imposition of additional sanctions or the removal of the remaining sanctions on Burma, depending on the conduct of the Burmese government and other developments in the country.
The current U.S. sanctions on Burma were enacted, for the most part, due to what the U.S. government saw as a general disregard by the SPDC for the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Burma. Burma-specific sanctions began following the Burmese military's violent suppression of popular protests in 1988, and have continued through several subsequent periods in which Congress perceived major human rights violations in Burma. The result is a web of overlapping sanctions with differing restrictions, waiver provisions, expiration conditions, and reporting requirements.
Existing U.S. sanctions on Burma are based on various U.S. laws and presidential executive orders. They can be generally divided into several broad categories, such as visa bans, restrictions on financial services, prohibitions of Burmese imported goods, a ban on new investments in Burma, and constraints on U.S. assistance to Burma. This report provides a brief history of U.S. policy towards Burma and the development of U.S. sanctions, a topical summary of those sanctions, and an overview of actions taken to waive or ease those sanctions by the Obama Administration. The report concludes with a discussion of actions taken by the 112th Congress and options for the 113th Congress.
In addition to the targeted sanctions, Burma may be subject to certain sanctions specified in U.S. laws addressing various functional issues, such as the use of child soldiers, drug trafficking, human trafficking. In many cases, the type of assistance or relations restricted or prohibited by these provisions is also addressed under Burma-specific sanction laws. Finally, Congress has used appropriation legislation to restrict or prevent the use of designated funds in Burma. This report will be updated as conditions warrant. |
crs_RL33711 | crs_RL33711_0 | Among major domestic entitlement programs, only Social Security costs more. As Medicaid entered the 1980s and 1990s, more attention—and blame—for steadily rising Medicaid costs was attributed to the economic incentive to provide more care under the fee-for-service (FFS) delivery system, in which payments are made for each unit of service delivered. Following the lead in the private sector among large employers, many states began to turn to managed care for their Medicaid programs. The goal, then and today, is both to rein in Medicaid costs by making payments on a predetermined, per-person-per-month basis, rather than for each unit of service delivered, and to provide a better, coordinated system of care for beneficiaries, with an emphasis on preventive and primary care services. Data from FY2003 (most recent available) indicate that while about two-thirds of Medicaid beneficiaries nationwide participate in some form of managed care, the majority of expenditures still occur in the FFS setting, mainly because expensive long-term care services are rarely offered through managed care. Oversight Responsibilities Under the Medicaid Managed Care and Fee-for-Service Delivery Systems
Under managed care, oversight responsibilities are shared among the State Medicaid Agency, the managed care plans, and the plan providers. Access to and Quality of Care Under Medicaid Managed Care and the Fee-for-Service Delivery Systems
There are several requirements in federal statute to assure access to and quality of care under both the Medicaid FFS and managed care delivery systems. Groups participating in these new programs include not only healthy children and adults, but in some cases, also the elderly and individuals with disabilities living in the community and those needing institutional care. Significant challenges still remain for serving the elderly and individuals with disabilities under traditional models of managed care, most likely because of the wide range and intensity of services they require to meet their on-going special health care needs. This report is not intended to provide a detailed review of this literature. For example, Congress could elect to expand the use of Medicaid managed care to address some of the issues identified in this report, in particular with respect to managed long-term care, and with holistic integration of primary, acute and long-term care for special needs populations. CRS Report RL32219, Long-Term Care: Consumer-Directed Services Under Medicaid . | In terms of federal spending, Medicaid is one of the largest major domestic entitlement programs in the U.S. today. During the 1980s and 1990s, steadily rising Medicaid costs were attributed to the economic incentive to provide more care under the traditional, widespread fee-for-service (FFS) delivery system in which provider payments are made for each unit of service delivered. During that time, following the lead in the employer health insurance market, many states began to turn to managed care for their Medicaid programs. The goal, then and today, is both to rein in Medicaid costs by making payments on a predetermined, per-person-per-month (PMPM) basis rather than for each unit of service rendered, and to provide a better, coordinated system of care for beneficiaries, with an emphasis on preventive and primary care services.
The reality of service delivery under Medicaid is gradually moving along this path. In terms of beneficiary participation, managed care is the dominant delivery system in Medicaid. Based on data from FY2003 (the latest available for all states), Medicaid managed care is widely used by children and adults, but less so among the elderly and those with disabilities. However, there is still significant penetration of managed care in these latter populations with special health care needs.
In terms of expenditures, the FFS delivery system still dominates Medicaid spending, largely because more expensive long-term care services available under Medicaid are seldom offered through managed care arrangements. Also, many users of long-term care services, the elderly and those with disabilities, are not enrolled in managed care programs. One of the next big challenges for Medicaid managed care is to develop and evaluate managed long-term care and holistic integration of primary, acute, and long-term care for special needs populations.
This report provides an overview of Medicaid managed care. It includes a discussion of the major features of both the managed care and the traditional fee-for-service delivery systems in Medicaid. The report also provides a series of tables that illustrate the distribution of people, services, and dollars across both systems of care. It concludes with a summary of some of the current policy issues facing Medicaid managed care, and a list of additional CRS resources. This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants. |
crs_R42953 | crs_R42953_0 | Introduction
In 2007, American International Group (AIG) was the fifth-largest insurer in the world with $110 billion in overall revenues. Although primarily operating as an insurer, prior to the crisis AIG was overseen at the holding company level by the federal Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) because the company owned a relatively small thrift subsidiary. Because AIG was primarily an insurer, it was largely outside of the normal Federal Reserve (Fed) facilities that lend to thrifts (and banks) facing liquidity difficulties and the normal Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) receivership provisions that apply to FDIC-insured depository institutions. AIG, as was true of most financial institutions, suffered losses on a wide variety of financial instruments in 2008. The exceptional losses which resulted in the essential failure of AIG arose primarily from two sources:
the derivative activities of the AIG Financial Products (AIGFP) subsidiary, and the securities lending activities managed by AIG Investments with securities largely from the AIG insurance subsidiaries. The 2010 Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) overhauled the financial regulatory structure in the United States. FSOC designated AIG for enhanced supervision by the Fed in July 2013, and the designation was removed in September 2017. Summary of Government Assistance to AIG
The extraordinary direct government assistance for AIG that began in September 2008 ended in 2013. All loans to assist AIG have been repaid and the assets purchased from AIG by Federal Reserve entities have been sold. The common equity holdings in AIG that resulted from both Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury TARP assistance for AIG have been sold. The Fed received a total of $8.2 billion in interest and dividends from these loans and the common equity stake resulting from the loans was sold by the Treasury for $17.55 billion. The Treasury received approximately $34.1 billion from its various sales of the TARP common equity, $20.3 billion from the preferred equity, $0.03 billion from the warrant sales, and $0.9 billion in cash dividends and other income. For example, TARP provided nearly $205 billion in additional capital to U.S. banks in 2008 and early 2009. Summing the various amounts of interest, dividends, and equity sales returned to the Treasury and Federal Reserve compared with the amount disbursed results in a positive return of $23.1 billion (including the CPFF amounts not included by Treasury in such calculations). This cash accounting, however, falls short of a full economic assessment of the assistance for AIG. The budgetary cost estimates undertaken by CBO incorporate some broader economic principles in assessing the costs of government actions. CBO estimates a budgetary cost of $15 billion attributed to the TARP portion of the AIG assistance, compared to a negative return of $12.5 billion using the simple cash accounting. The Federal Reserve actions which make up a majority of the returns from the government assistance for AIG are not subject to regular CBO or OMB budgetary cost assessment. CBO estimated a cost of $2 billion from the Federal Reserve loans to AIG at their inception, compared to a final positive return of $35.6 billion on a cash accounting basis. Troubled Asset Relief Program Assistance
Through TARP, the Treasury purchased $40 billion in preferred shares of AIG. The AIG loan, however, was subordinate to the Fed's. The Fed received approximately $5.9 billion in capital gains, with AIG receiving approximately $2.9 billion. Among other things, for applicable companies, the new language requires the adoption of standards by Treasury that
1. prohibit paying certain executives any bonus, retention, or incentive compensation other than certain long-term restricted stock that has a value not greater than one-third of the total annual compensation of the employee receiving the stock (the determination of how many executives will be subject to these limitations depends on the amount of funds received by the TARP recipient); 2. require the recovery of any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation paid to SEOs and the next 20 most highly compensated employees based on earnings, revenues, gains, or other criteria that are later found to be materially inaccurate; 3. prohibit any compensation plan that would encourage manipulation of the reported earnings of the firm to enhance the compensation of any of its employees; 4. prohibit the provision of "golden parachute" payment to an SEO and the next five most highly compensated employees for departure from a company for any reason, except for payments for services performed or benefits accrued; and 5. prohibit any compensation plan that would encourage manipulation of the reported earnings of the firm to enhance the compensation of any of its employees. | American International Group (AIG), one of the world's major insurers, was the largest recipient of government financial assistance during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. At the maximum, the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Treasury committed approximately $182.3 billion in specific extraordinary assistance for AIG and another $15.2 billion through a more widely available lending facility. The amount actually disbursed to assist AIG reached a maximum of $141.8 billion in April 2009. In return, AIG paid interest and dividends on the funding and the U.S. Treasury ultimately received a 92% ownership share in the company. The government assistance for AIG ended in 2013. All Federal Reserve loans have been repaid and the Treasury has sold all of the financial holdings that resulted from the assistance.
Going into the financial crisis, the overarching AIG holding company was regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), but most of its U.S. operating subsidiaries were regulated by various states. Because AIG was primarily an insurer, it was largely outside of the normal Federal Reserve facilities that lend to thrifts facing liquidity difficulties and the normal Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) receivership provisions that apply to banking institutions. September 2008 saw a panic in financial markets marked by the failure of large financial institutions, such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Lehman Brothers. In addition to suffering from the general market downturn, AIG faced extraordinary losses resulting largely from two sources: (1) the AIG Financial Products subsidiary, which specialized in financial derivatives and was primarily the regulatory responsibility of the OTS; and (2) a securities lending program, which used securities originating in the state-regulated insurance subsidiaries. In the panic conditions prevailing at the time, the Federal Reserve determined that "a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market fragility" and stepped in to support the company. Had AIG not been given assistance by the government, bankruptcy seemed a near certainty. The Federal Reserve support was later supplemented and ultimately replaced by assistance from the U.S. Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
The AIG rescue produced unexpected financial returns for the government. The Fed loans were completely repaid and it directly received approximately $18.1 billion in interest, dividends, and capital gains. In addition, another $17.55 billion in capital gains from the Fed assistance accrued to the Treasury. The $67.84 billion in TARP assistance, however, resulted in a negative return to the government, as $54.35 billion was recouped from asset sales and $0.96 billion was received in dividends, warrants, and other income. If one offsets the negative return to TARP of $12.5 billion with the $35.6 billion in positive returns for the Fed assistance, the entire assistance for AIG showed a positive return of approximately $23.1 billion. It should be noted that these figures are the simple cash returns from the AIG transactions and do not take into account the full economic costs of the assistance. Fully accounting for these costs would result in lower returns to the government, although no agency has performed such a full assessment of the AIG assistance. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates of the budgetary cost of the TARP assistance for AIG, which is a broader economic analysis of the cost, find a loss of $15 billion compared with the $12.52 billion cash loss. CBO does not, however, regularly perform cost estimates on Federal Reserve actions.
Under the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), the Financial Stability Oversight Council designated AIG for enhanced regulation by the Fed in July 2013. This designation was removed in September 2017. |
crs_R41530 | crs_R41530_0 | Introduction
This report examines the implications for agriculture of the ongoing but inconclusive debate about global climate change. Whatever the current or future Congresses may do regarding climate legislation, interest in existing and prospective governmental and private sector responses will surely continue. Existing governmental climate change activities affecting or potentially affecting agriculture include the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) initiative under the Clean Air Act to address emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs); U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) conservation programs that can encourage practices affecting agriculture's emissions or sequestration of GHGs; and provisions of law encouraging the use of biofuels. In the climate change debate, agriculture's role is multifaceted. Agriculture is both a source of several GHGs and a "sink" for absorbing carbon dioxide, the most common GHG, thereby partly offsetting emissions. Overall, agriculture is a comparatively modest source of U.S. GHG emissions: it accounts for approximately 7% of U.S. emissions, while transportation accounts for 27% and electricity generation for 35%. During the 111 th Congress, comprehensive climate change legislation passed the House and was reported by a Senate committee, but no comprehensive bill was enacted. One outcome was that the comprehensive climate change bills largely excluded agriculture from regulatory requirements, and another was that Congress through a funding bill excluded agriculture from certain EPA regulatory requirements concerning reporting of emissions (e.g., from manure management practices). One option would be to regulate agriculture and other sources of GHGs in order to mitigate or abate emissions. EPA Activities
Efforts have been underway in the Administration to develop policies and strategies to address GHGs and climate change. Two sets of actions by the EPA concerning GHG emissions have drawn stakeholders' attention. A number of agriculture stakeholders criticized the proposal. A key feature of H.R. Typically, conservation practices have been used for soil conservation and water quality improvement, not climate change abatement or mitigation. Strategies, technologies, and practices to reduce CH 4 and N 2 O emissions at the farm level are not mandated by federal policies. However, USDA and some states have started to focus additional attention on the potential for emissions reduction and carbon storage under certain existing programs. In general, conservation programs administered by USDA and state agencies encourage farmers to implement certain farming practices and often provide financial incentives and technical assistance to support their adoption. Results of the 2010 congressional elections have altered political dynamics in Congress on many issues, and leaders of both political parties have indicated that they currently do not plan to pursue comprehensive approaches to addressing climate change in the 112 th Congress, although some elements of previous proposals may move through the legislative process—for example, certain energy policy elements. How agriculture fits in these discussions has drawn interest in the past and likely will do so again. | This report examines the implications for agriculture of the ongoing but inconclusive debate about global climate change. In that debate, agriculture's role is multifaceted. Agriculture is both a source of several greenhouse gases (GHGs) and a "sink" for absorbing carbon dioxide, the most common GHG, thereby partly offsetting emissions. Overall, agriculture is a comparatively modest source of U.S. GHG emissions: it accounts for approximately 7% of U.S. emissions, while sectors such as transportation and electricity generation account for much larger shares. Agriculture's GHG emissions are principally in the form of methane and nitrous oxides emissions.
Whatever the current or future Congresses may do regarding climate legislation, interest in existing and prospective responses by government and others will continue. Administration efforts to develop policies and strategies to address GHGs and climate change have been underway for some time. Two actions by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have drawn the attention of the agriculture industry. One is regulating emissions of GHGs under the Clean Air Act (CAA) and subsequent GHG emission standards for new motor vehicles which, in turn, trigger certain CAA permitting requirements. A second, related action is a rule to require reporting of GHG emissions by certain facilities. Regarding both, EPA took steps to focus on the largest emitters and ensure that few agricultural sources would be subject to new GHG requirements. Still, EPA's overall initiatives have been widely criticized, and the 111th Congress intervened through a funding bill to largely exclude agriculture from EPA's regulatory requirements. During the 111th Congress, the House passed a comprehensive climate change bill (H.R. 2454), and a Senate committee reported a companion (S. 1733). Although no legislation was enacted, both bills included provisions excluding agriculture from regulatory requirements and promoting agricultural practices to reduce or offset emissions from regulated sources.
Traditionally, practices such as conservation tillage have been used for soil conservation and water quality improvement, but their value for climate change abatement or mitigation is receiving increased attention. A number of strategies, technologies, and practices exist to reduce methane and nitrous oxides emissions at the farm level, but implementation faces financial and monitoring challenges.
Programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provide financial incentives and technical assistance to encourage implementation of certain farming practices. While the focus of most programs is not on GHG emission reduction, USDA is giving greater attention to GHGs in administering its suite of existing programs.
Results of the 2010 congressional elections have altered political dynamics in Congress on many issues, and leadership of both political parties have indicated that neither currently plans to pursue comprehensive approaches to addressing climate change in the 112th Congress, although some elements of previous proposals may move through the legislative process. How agriculture fits in these discussions—both as a source of GHG emissions and contributions that the sector can make to mitigating climate change—has drawn interest in the past and likely will do so again. |
crs_RL34696 | crs_RL34696_0 | Many provisions of the 2002 farm bill expired in September 2007, but were continued under a series of temporary extensions to allow more time to resolve differences between the House- and Senate-passed bills. 110-246 ), replacing P.L. 2419 , the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008). On May 22, the 2008 farm bill was enacted into law ( P.L. 6124 on June 18, 2008. Brief Overview of Provisions
The enacted 2008 farm bill contains 15 titles covering support for commodity crops, horticulture and livestock production, conservation, nutrition, trade and food aid, agricultural research, farm credit, rural development, energy, forestry, and other related programs. It also includes tax-related provisions that make certain changes to tax laws in order to offset new spending initiatives in the rest of the bill. 107-171 ) and guides most federal farm and food policies through 2012. For commodities (Title I), the enacted 2008 farm bill generally continues the framework of the 2002 farm bill, but with changes to program eligibility criteria and payment limitations, and adjustments to target prices and loan rates for some commodities, covering the 2008 through 2012 crop years. It also adds new provisions to address horticulture and livestock issues, and creates two new titles to address these sectors (Title X and Title XI). The bill provides mandatory funding for specialty crop block grants and adds new provisions supporting pest and disease programs, new funding for growth of farmers' markets and for transitioning producers to organic production, and price reporting and organic data collection, among other provisions. Under the conservation (Title II), energy (Title IX), rural development (Title VI), and forestry titles (Title VIII), the 2008 farm bill reauthorizes, expands, and modifies many existing programs, creates new programs and initiatives, and allows some programs to expire. The bill also reauthorizes, expands, and modifies many of the existing provisions under the research title (Title VII) by requiring the reorganization of USDA's research, extension, and economic agencies. Projected Cost
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the total cost of the 2008 bill (i.e., baseline plus new funding, using the March 2007 baseline) at $284 billion over FY2008-FY2012 and $604 billion over FY2008-FY2017 ( Table 2 ). Of the $284 billion in projected total five-year net outlays for programs under the farm bill—including revenue and cost-offset provisions in the bill—about $42 billion in projected spending will support commodity crops, $189 billion will support the cost of food stamps and commodity assistance, $24 billion will support conservation programs, and $22 billion will support crop insurance. Another $10 billion is expected to be spent on trade, horticulture and livestock production, rural development, research, forestry and energy, and other programs. Other Programs
Another major initiative in the nutrition title is a dramatic increase in funding for the fresh fruit and vegetable program in schools. Country-of-Origin Labeling
The 2002 farm bill (Sec. Title XII: Crop Insurance and Disaster Assistance Programs
The enacted 2008 farm bill contains a new title covering crop insurance and disaster assistance programs (Title X). | The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246, "2008 farm bill") was enacted into law on June 18, 2008. It contains 15 titles covering support for commodity crops, horticulture and livestock production, conservation, nutrition, trade and food aid, agricultural research, farm credit, rural development, energy, forestry, and other related programs. It also includes provisions that make certain changes to tax laws, in order to offset some new spending initiatives in the final bill. The enacted bill succeeds the most recent 2002 farm bill (P.L. 107-171) and is to guide most federal farm and food policies through 2012. Many provisions of the 2002 farm bill expired in September 2007, but were extended under a series of temporary extensions prior to final enactment of the 2008 bill.
The enacted 2008 farm bill continues and/or modifies most existing farm and commodity programs, and also creates new programs and provisions. For farm commodities, the bill generally continues the framework of the 2002 farm bill, revises payment limitations (tightening certain limits and relaxing others), adjusts support prices for some commodities, and creates a new revenue support program, in addition to the traditional direct, counter-cyclical, and marketing loan programs for major supported crops. The bill also adds new stand-alone titles containing provisions to address horticulture and livestock issues, including new mandatory funding for specialty crop block grants and to support organic production; and provisions to address meat and poultry inspection, country-of-origin labeling, and livestock competition. Other provisions include changes to the current crop insurance program, a new provision for ongoing disaster assistance, and expanded borrowing opportunities for beginning and socially disadvantaged farmers.
The bill's nutrition title increases food stamp benefits and sets new standards that will make more households eligible, and also raises funding for fresh fruits and vegetables in most domestic food programs. For research, the bill requires the reorganization of USDA's research, extension, and economic agencies. For most other titles—conservation, international trade and food aid, rural development, forestry, and energy—the enacted law reauthorizes, expands, and/or modifies many of the existing programs, creates new programs and initiatives, and allows some programs to expire.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the total cost of the 2008 farm bill (i.e., baseline plus new spending, using its March 2007 baseline) at just under $284 billion in total budget authority over five years (FY2008-FY2012). About $42 billion (15%) in projected spending will support commodity crops, $189 billion (67%) will support the cost of domestic nutrition programs, $24 billion (9%) will support conservation programs, and $22 billion (8%) will support crop insurance. Another $14 billion is expected to be spent on supplemental disaster assistance, trade, horticulture and livestock production, rural development, research, forestry and energy, and other programs. Offsets from tax provisions and proceeds from the credit, crop insurance, and commodity program titles are estimated at $10 billion (FY2008-FY2012). |
crs_R40178 | crs_R40178_0 | In addition, reform of the current U.S. corporate tax system has been widely debated as an option to stimulate the economy. Most of the debate has focused on lowering the corporate tax rate and moving toward a territorial system. An exception to this is a plan to reduce the tax rate on repatriated dividends that has received some consideration. Under such a plan, the U.S. tax that U.S. firms pay when their overseas operations remit ("repatriate") their foreign earnings as dividends to their U.S. parent corporations would be reduced. Variations of a basic repatriation proposal have been introduced in several bills, including H.R. 937 , H.R. 1036 , H.R. 1834 , H.R. 2862 , S. 727 , and S. 1671 in the 112 th Congress. A conceptually similar proposal was enacted as part of the American Jobs Creation Act ( P.L. The provision provided a temporary reduced rate for repatriated earnings, with the condition that the repatriated earnings be used for domestic investment. While empirical evidence is clear that this provision resulted in a significant increase in repatriated earnings, empirical evidence is unable to show a corresponding increase in domestic investment or employment by firms that utilized the repatriation provisions. A similar provision was considered, but not adopted, as a floor amendment to a Senate version of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. However, proposals to adopt a phased-in repatriation at a lower tax rate have been coupled with proposals to make a permanent more to a territorial tax, where active earnings of foreign operations would not be subject to U.S. tax. 108-357 ) reduced the taxes due on repatriated earnings. Simply put, the more the repatriated earnings are used to shore up a corporation's balance sheet or paid to shareholders the less the simulative effect of the repatriations. This range of the stimulative effect for loss carrybacks should likely be viewed as an upper-bound estimate for the cash-flow effect of a repatriation rate reduction. | From the start of the 112th Congress, reform of the current U.S. corporate tax system has been widely debated as an option to stimulate the economy. Most of the debate has focused on lowering the corporate tax rate and moving toward a territorial system. An exception to this approach is a plan to reduce the tax rate on repatriated dividends that has received some consideration. Under such a plan, the U.S. tax that U.S. firms pay when their overseas operations remit ("repatriate") their foreign earnings as dividends to their U.S. parent corporations would be reduced. Variations of this type of proposal have been introduced in several bills, including H.R. 937, H.R. 1036, H.R. 1834, H.R. 2862, S. 727, and S. 1671 in the 112th Congress.
A conceptually similar proposal was enacted as part of the American Jobs Creation Act (P.L. 108-357). The provision provided a temporary reduced rate for repatriated earnings, with the condition that the repatriated earnings be used for domestic investment. While empirical evidence is clear that this provision resulted in a significant increase in repatriated earnings, empirical evidence is unable to show a corresponding increase in domestic investment or employment. A similar provision was considered, but not adopted, as a floor amendment to a Senate version of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.
Viewed in the current debate on how to most efficiently stimulate the economy, economic theory suggests that the simulative effect of a temporary tax cut for repatriations may be offset, or more than offset, by exchange rate adjustments that would reduce net exports. In addition, how businesses use repatriated earnings will impact the stimulative or contractionary effect of a tax cut for repatriations. For example, repatriated earnings will have a larger stimulative effect, or smaller contractionary effect, the greater the degree to which they are used to increase current investment. A smaller stimulative effect or a larger contractionary effect will result, in contrast, if more of the repatriated earnings are used to shore up "cash-flow" issues or pay dividends. This report will be updated as legislative events warrant.
Proposals to adopt a phased in repatriation at a lower tax rate have been coupled with more recent proposals to make a permanent more to a territorial tax, where active earnings of foreign operations would not be subject to U.S. tax. |
crs_RL32240 | crs_RL32240_0 | Introduction
Federal regulation, like taxing and spending, is one of the basic tools of government used to implement public policy. Regulations generally start with an act of Congress, and are one of the means through which statutes are implemented and specific requirements are established. The terms "rule" or "regulation" are often used interchangeably in discussions of the federal regulatory process. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 defines a rule as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." The process by which federal agencies develop, amend, or repeal rules is called "rulemaking," and is the subject of this report. Figure 1 illustrates the basic process that most federal agencies are generally required to follow in writing or revising a significant rule. Also, independent regulatory agencies are not required to submit their rules to the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review, and no agency is required to do so for rules that are not "significant." Implicit within the steps depicted in Figure 1 is an elaborate set of procedures and requirements that Congress and various Presidents have developed during the past 60 to 70 years to guide the federal rulemaking process. Collectively, these rulemaking provisions are voluminous and require a wide range of procedural, consultative, and analytical actions on the part of rulemaking agencies. Agency rulemaking is also often significantly influenced by court decisions interpreting these agency- or program-specific statutory requirements. The following discussion of statutory rulemaking requirements focuses solely on the cross-cutting requirements that are applicable to more than one agency. However, these rules do have to be published in the Federal Register . In response to a separate congressional requirement, in April 2004, OMB provided Congress with a report on the implementation of the IQA during FY2003. For each significant draft rule, the executive order requires the issuing agency to provide to OIRA the text of the draft rule, a description of why the rule is needed, and a general assessment of the rule's costs and benefits. Other Executive Orders and Directives
Agencies other than independent regulatory agencies must also be aware of an array of other rulemaking requirements contained in executive orders and presidential directives. The order gives agencies substantial discretion regarding its implementation. In this regard, Congress has enacted laws such as the Administrative Procedure Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act that require some type of procedure, review, and/or analysis of draft rules by the rulemaking agencies themselves or by outside parties. On the other hand, many of these statutory and executive order provisions provide the agencies substantial discretion regarding when and how the rulemaking requirements are to be applied. | Federal regulation, like taxing and spending, is one of the basic tools of government used to implement public policy. Although not as frequently examined as congressional or presidential policy making, the process of developing and framing rules is viewed by some as central to the definition and implementation of public policy in the United States.
Regulations generally start with an act of Congress, and are the means by which statutes are implemented and specific requirements are established. The terms "rule" or "regulation" are often used interchangeably in discussions of the federal regulatory process. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 defines a rule as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." The procedures that federal agencies are required to follow in writing regulations are called the rulemaking process, and are the subject of this report.
During the past 60 to 70 years, Congress and various Presidents have developed an elaborate set of procedures and requirements to guide the federal rulemaking process. Statutory rulemaking requirements applicable to a wide range of agencies include the Administrative Procedure Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and the Information Quality Act. These and other cross-cutting rulemaking requirements often require some type of analysis on the part of the rulemaking agency before issuing a covered rule, but also often give agencies substantial discretion regarding whether the requirements are applicable. Other statutorily based rulemaking requirements are contained in agency- or program-specific laws, which provide varying levels of discretion regarding the substance of agencies' rules and may impose (or exclude) additional analytical or procedural requirements.
In addition to statutory requirements, Presidents have also imposed their own requirements on federal agencies when issuing rules. The most important of the current set of presidential rulemaking requirements are in Executive Order 12866, which establishes presidential review of covered agencies' rulemaking within the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The executive order requires covered agencies to submit their significant rules to OIRA for review before they become final, and requires those rules to meet certain minimal standards. Other executive orders and presidential directives delineate other specific rulemaking requirements incumbent on covered agencies. However, these requirements also often provide substantial discretion to agencies regarding whether, and if so how, they are applied.
The purpose of this report is to provide Congress with an overview of the federal rulemaking process and a brief discussion of the major laws and executive orders that prescribe the procedures agencies are to apply when promulgating regulations. This report will be updated when new requirements are put in place or when the requirements in this report change. |
crs_RL30959 | crs_RL30959_0 | If the committee or committees report the nomination to the full Senate, or are discharged from further consideration of the nomination, it is placed on the Senate's Executive Calendar and may be called up for floor consideration. Referral of Nominations to Senate Committees
To start the process of making an appointment to an advice and consent position, the President submits a nomination to the Senate. Such referrals are guided by Senate Rule XXV, which establishes the subject matters under the purview of each committee and directs that "all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating primarily to [those] subjects" be referred to that committee. Precedents set by prior referrals, standing orders, and unanimous consent (UC) agreements pertaining to referral of nominations may also influence the referral process. Most nominations are sent to a single committee. Nominations that are referred to more than one committee may be referred jointly or sequentially. If a nomination is referred jointly, the committees receive it simultaneously and may consider it concurrently. All committees to which a nomination is referred must report it to the full Senate or be discharged from its further consideration before it may be considered on the floor. In the case of a sequential referral, the nomination is referred first to the committee of predominant jurisdiction and referred sequentially to another committee as specified by the UC agreement or standing order. Joint referral of a nomination has usually occurred when more than one committee appears to have had relatively equal jurisdictional claims. Usually, however, one committee has jurisdiction over most positions in a department or agency. Under the terms of the resolution, which operates as a standing order of the Senate, over 40 specified nominations or categories of nominations are, when received from the President, not referred to a Senate committee, but are instead placed directly on the Senate Executive Calendar under a newly created heading, "Privileged Nominations – Information Requested." The lists of presidentially appointed positions requiring Senate confirmation are based on referrals as of June 30, 2016. For each committee list, positions are categorized as full- or part-time and then grouped by department or agency. Where nominations have been referred to more than one committee, the positions are noted under each of the committees to which the nominations were referred. S. 679 , which became P.L. 112-166 , removed numerous presidentially appointed positions from the advice and consent process. A complete list of the presidentially appointed positions that no longer required Senate confirmation pursuant to the enactment of P.L. 112-166 may be found in the Appendix to this report. Some commissions, councils, and other multi-member entities are required, by their enabling statutes, to maintain political balance in some way. This is noted in parentheses where applicable. The information provided in this report was compiled from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System, which spans the 97 th Congress (1981-1982) to the present; data on departmental and agency websites; telephone conversations with agency officials; and the United States Code . | As part of the process of making an appointment to an advice and consent position, the President submits a nomination to the Senate. Most nominations are referred to the appropriate Senate committee or committees on the day they are received. Such referrals are guided by Senate Rule XXV, which establishes the subject matter under the purview of each committee and directs that "all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating primarily to [those] subjects" be referred to that committee. Precedents set by prior referrals, standing orders, and unanimous consent (UC) agreements adopted by the Senate pertaining to the referral of nominations may also influence the referral process.
Most nominations are referred to one committee. For some positions, a nomination or series of nominations to a position are referred to more than one committee, pursuant to a standing order, a UC agreement, or a statutory provision. A nomination may be jointly or sequentially referred to multiple committees. Joint referral has generally occurred when more than one committee has had a claim to jurisdiction over the subject matter related to the position. Under joint referral, the committees receive the nomination simultaneously and may consider it concurrently. All committees to which a nomination is referred must report it to the full Senate or be discharged from its further consideration before it may be considered on the floor. Sequential referral has generally occurred when one committee has had predominant jurisdiction over the subject matter related to the position, but another committee has had a claim as well. Under this process, a nomination is referred to the committee with predominant jurisdiction first and is then sequentially referred to additional committees. Consideration of subsequent referrals can be subject to a time limit after which the committee or committees without primary jurisdiction are automatically discharged from further consideration of the nomination.
Certain "privileged" nominations or categories of nominations are subject to a potentially more expedited Senate consideration pursuant to a standing order first adopted in the 112th Congress (2011-2012).
This report identifies, by Senate committee, presidentially appointed positions requiring Senate confirmation as of June 30, 2016. For each committee list, positions are categorized as full- or part-time and then grouped by department or agency. Where nominations have been referred to more than one committee, they are noted under each of the committees to which the nominations were referred. The lists also include the lengths of fixed terms, where applicable. Some commissions, councils, and other multi-member entities are required, by their enabling statutes, to maintain political balance in some way. This is noted in parentheses where applicable. S. 679, which became P.L. 112-166 on August 10, 2012, removed numerous presidentially appointed positions from the advice and consent process for relevant U.S. Senate committees. A complete list of the presidentially appointed positions that no longer require Senate confirmation may be found in the Appendix of this report.
The information provided in this report was compiled from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System available to both the congressional community and the public at https://www.congress.gov/nominations; data on departmental and agency websites; telephone conversations with agency officials; and the United States Code. For related information, see CRS Report RL31980, Senate Consideration of Presidential Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure, by Elizabeth Rybicki. |
crs_RL32237 | crs_RL32237_0 | While most insured Americans obtain health coverage through the private sector, public entities play an increasingly significant role. Definitions and Principles
People buy insurance to protect themselves against the possibility of financial loss in the future. Health insurance provides protection against the possibility of financial loss due to high health care expenses. Also, people do not know ahead of time exactly what their health care expenses will be, so paying for health insurance on a regular basis helps to smooth out their spending. 104-191 ), and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended). Sources of Health Insurance
Americans obtain health insurance through a variety of methods and from different sources (see Figure 1 ). In 2013, a majority (64.2%) of Americans obtained health insurance through the private sector, which includes both employer-sponsored and nongroup coverage. Public programs (Medicare, Medicaid/CHIP, or health care services for military servicemembers and veterans) provided coverage to 34.3% of Americans. Approximately 13.4% of Americans were uninsured for the entire year of 2013. ,
Within each of the sources, health insurance differs by the market structure itself—group versus nongroup, fully insured versus self-insured; self-only versus family coverage, etc. Those arrangements vary due to numerous factors such as how health care is financed, how much access to providers and services is controlled, and how much flexibility the enrollees have to use the services covered under her/his health plan. In this model of health care delivery, the financing of health services and the obtaining of those services are kept separate. One example that is at the heart of discussions about consumer-driven care is the health savings account (HSA). | People obtain insurance to protect themselves against the possibility of financial loss in the future. Health insurance provides protection against the possibility of financial loss due to high health care expenses. Also, people do not know ahead of time exactly what their health care expenses will be, so paying for health insurance on a regular basis helps ease their out-of-pocket spending.
While health coverage continues to be mostly a private enterprise in this country, government plays an increasingly significant role. Government has initiated and responded to dynamics in medicine, the economy, and the workplace through legislation and public policies. One of the most recent efforts was enactment and ongoing implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended). ACA includes provisions to encourage the expansion of health insurance coverage, and establish new federal health insurance standards, among other reforms.
Americans obtain health insurance in different settings and through a variety of methods. In 2013, a majority (64.2%) of Americans obtained health insurance through the private sector, which includes both employer-sponsored and individual market coverage. Public programs (Medicare, Medicaid/CHIP, or health services for military servicemembers and veterans) provided coverage to 34.3% of Americans. Approximately 13.4% of Americans were uninsured for the entire year of 2013.
Health insurance benefits are delivered and financed under different systems. The factors that distinguish one delivery system from another are many, including how health care is financed, how much access to providers and services is controlled, and how much authority the enrollee has to design her/his health plan. To illustrate, managed care is characterized by predetermined restrictions on accessing services and providers, whereas individual decision-making regarding use of health benefits is a hallmark of consumer driven health care, such as health savings accounts. As economic conditions change, a specific delivery system may gain or lose the interest of affected parties. |
crs_RS21886 | crs_RS21886_0 | The Navy disbanded its last airship unit in 1962, and since then, military use of lighter-than-air platforms has been limited to Air Force custodianship of a dozen aerostats. Third, DOD's growing orientation toward expeditionary operations has spawned studies on using airships as heavy lift vehicles. LTA platforms may fit into this category. Issues for Congress
Generally at issue is whether the operational need for airships and aerostats, and their ability to satisfy this need, outweigh the costs of developing and fielding them. Equipment will have to be light, and energy efficient. | The Department of Defense (DOD) has a history of using lighter-than-air (LTA) platforms. Aerostats have recently been fielded to protect deployed U.S. troops. Contemporary interest is growing in using airships for numerous missions. This report examines the various concepts being considered and describes the issues for Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34698 | crs_RL34698_0 | The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) role is to establish the public health and safety standards for high-level waste disposal; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses and regulates the repository, using EPA's standards as the compliance measure; the Department of Energy (DOE) constructs and operates the repository. On June 13, 2001, EPA issued a final Health and Safety Standard for the Yucca Mountain High-Level Radioactive Waste Repository. The State of Nevada, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) each challenged different aspects of the rule. The proposal retained the dose limits of the 2001 standard for the first 10,000 years but proposed a higher annual dose of 350 mrem/yr for the period of 10,000 years through 1 million years. Those in favor of the proposal focused on the unprecedented time frames and the reasonableness of drawing comparisons with natural levels of radioactivity; opponents claimed that the proposal violated EPA's basic principles of public health protection and was designed specifically to allow the facility to be built. The final 2008 regulation maintains this level for the first 10,000 years. Conclusion
Now that EPA has issued the final health and safety standard, attention will shift to the licensing process and the many technical and policy issues to be addressed in that context. As Congress continues to oversee the Yucca Mountain repository program, it will face issues related to whether DOE's technical work is sufficient to demonstrate compliance with EPA's standard and other safety issues surrounding storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste to the facility should it be licensed. Some have argued that it would be a better public policy choice to continue to store nuclear waste on-site at the power plants where it is produced while continuing to search for as a safer, more cost-effective solution to permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste. A larger issue is how will the continuing controversy over the Yucca Mountain Project affect the U.S. nuclear power industry and its role in broader national energy policy. | On September 30, 2008, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the long-awaited revision to its 2001 Public Health and Safety Standard for the proposed Yucca Mountain deep geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. While the issuance of the standard allows the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to issue its final conforming standards and move forward toward a final license decision for the facility, EPA's standard raises several unprecedented regulatory issues and is likely to be further challenged in court. EPA's final regulation represents the first time the federal government has attempted to regulate public health far into the future, for a period of up to 1 million years. The continued prospect of legal challenges creates an uncertain atmosphere around the licensing process. It has been argued that the government's difficulty promulgating a legally defensible public health and safety standard for the Yucca Mountain repository has far-reaching impacts on the nuclear industry and the viability of nuclear power as a long-term component of the United States' energy strategy.
Permanent disposition of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste has been the subject of substantial controversy for several decades. The creation of a deep geologic repository for this type of waste has been an element of U.S. nuclear policy since the early 1980s. The technical, legal, and policy challenges have delayed development of a repository and created an uncertain environment for high-level nuclear waste management in the United States.
Congress has held several hearings in the past few years focusing on the administration's progress toward finalizing the health and safety standard, the technical soundness of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) design for the facility, the relationship of the project to broader energy policy, and transportation safety issues for waste packages eventually sent to the facility, among other issues. Funding for the program has also been controversial. |
crs_R41863 | crs_R41863_0 | The law's purposes included allowing for the reconfiguration of land ownership patterns to better facilitate resource management, improving administrative efficiency, and increasing the effectiveness of the allocation of fiscal and human resources. FLTFA provided for the sale or exchange of land identified for disposal under BLM's land use plans "as in effect on July 25, 2000"—the date of enactment. Most of the proceeds were to be used for land acquisition, as described below. Proceeds from the sale or exchange of BLM lands under FLTFA were split between the state in which the lands were disposed of (4%) and a separate Treasury account (96%), called the Federal Land Disposal Account. The authority to sell or exchange BLM lands under FLTFA briefly expired on July 25, 2010—10 years after enactment. An issue for Congress is whether to reauthorize this authority and, if so, in what form. The funds in the Treasury account when FLTFA initially expired, an estimated $52 million, ceased to be available under the law. An estimated $2 million in the account at the end of the one-year extension (July 25, 2011) also has ceased to be available. The funds in the FLTFA account were available to both the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to acquire inholdings and other non-federal lands (or interests therein) that are adjacent to federal lands and contain exceptional resources, with no more than 20% for BLM's administrative expenses to carry out the land disposal program. Of the funds for acquisitions, at least 80% were to be used in the state in which the funds were generated, and the remaining funds could be used in any state. Further, not less than 80% of the funds for land purchases within a state were to be used to acquire inholdings. From the enactment of FLTFA through FY2010, a total of $115.7 million was raised through the sale or exchange of BLM lands, and 25,967 acres were sold. Over the same period, about $63.7 million in funding was disbursed, with $49.2 million spent on the purchase of 18,135 acres. Not less than 80% of the money in the FLTFA account was to be used to acquire lands or interests therein that were otherwise authorized by law to be acquired. While BLM alone disposed of land under FLTFA, the four major federal land management agencies could acquire lands with the proceeds. On July 29, 2010, FLTFA was subsequently extended for one year. Sale of land under FLTFA was concentrated in two states. Acreage Acquired and Expenditures on Acquisitions
The acquisition of lands and expenditures on acquisitions were less concentrated among states than land sales and receipts. Administrative and Legislative Action
The Obama Administration's FY2013 budget proposed making FLTFA permanent and using current land management plans for determining which lands to sell or exchange. S. 3525 , S. 714 , and H.R. One issue is the extent to which there is a need for this authority in the context of other laws authorizing the sale and acquisition of federal land and other sources of funding for these purposes. A second issue is whether any extension of FLTFA should be relatively short (e.g., one year) or relatively long (e.g., 10 years or more). A third issue is whether to require land use plans as of July 25, 2000, to continue to be used as the basis of land sales. A fourth set of issues relates to the retention and use of proceeds, including the extent to which any future proceeds should be retained by the agencies, used exclusively for land sales and acquisitions, and used primarily in the state in which they were generated, and whether previously generated proceeds should be returned to the FLTFA fund. | The Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act (FLTFA), which expired on July 25, 2011, provided for the sale or exchange of lands owned by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) that have been identified for disposal under BLM's land use plans. Most of the proceeds were to be used for land acquisition. The law's goals included allowing for reconfiguration of land ownership patterns to better facilitate resource management, improving administrative efficiency, and increasing the effectiveness of the allocation of fiscal and human resources.
The authority to sell or exchange BLM lands under FLTFA was initially authorized for 10 years, expiring on July 25, 2010. When it expired, an estimated $52 million in the account ceased to be available for purposes of the law. These funds have not been reinstated in the FLTFA account. On July 29, 2010, the authority was subsequently extended for one year, expiring on July 25, 2011. Upon expiration, there was $2 million in the FLTFA account, which also ceased to be available.
An issue for Congress is whether to reauthorize the FLTFA authority and, if so, in what form. One question is the extent to which there is a need for this authority, given other laws authorizing the sale and acquisition of federal land and other sources of funding for these purposes. A second question is whether any extension of FLTFA should be relatively short (e.g., one year) or relatively long (e.g., 10 years or more). A third question is whether to continue to require land use plans as of July 25, 2000, to be used as the basis of land sales, or to allow updated plans to be used. A fourth set of questions relates to the retention and use of proceeds, including the extent to which any future proceeds should be retained by the agencies, used exclusively for land sales and acquisitions, and used primarily in the state in which they were generated, and whether the previously generated funds should be returned to the FLTFA fund.
The Obama Administration has proposed making FLTFA permanent, and using current land management plans for determining which lands to sell or exchange. S. 3525, S. 714, and H.R. 3365 would extend the law for varying numbers of years. In other respects they are similar, for instance, in allowing BLM to use updated land management plans to sell and exchange land.
Proceeds from the sale or exchange of BLM lands under FLTFA were split between the state in which the lands were disposed of (4%) and a separate Treasury account (96%). No more than 20% of the funds in the account could be used for administrative expenses. While BLM alone disposed of land, not less than 80% of the funds in the account were used by the four major federal land management agencies to acquire lands. In addition to BLM, these agencies were the Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and Forest Service. The agencies could acquire inholdings and other non-federal lands (or interests therein) that are adjacent to federal lands and contain exceptional resources. Of the funds for acquisition, at least 80% were to be used in the state in which the funds were generated; remaining funds could be used in any state. Further, not less than 80% of the funds for land purchases within a state were for acquisition of inholdings.
From the enactment of FLTFA through FY2010, a total of $115.7 million was raised through the sale or exchange of BLM lands, and 25,967 acres were sold. Disposal of land under FLTFA was concentrated in Nevada and Oregon, with most of the revenues (76%) being generated in Nevada. Over the same period, about $63.7 million in funding was disbursed, of which $49.2 million was spent on the purchase of 18,135 acres (together with $9.7 million in other funds). The acquisition of lands and expenditures on acquisitions were less concentrated in particular states than land sales and receipts. |
crs_R43798 | crs_R43798_0 | On November 20, 2014, President Obama delivered a televised address wherein he broadly described the steps that his administration is taking to "fix" what he has repeatedly described as a "broken immigration system." Following the President's address, executive agencies made available intra-agency memoranda and fact sheets detailing specific actions that have already been taken, or will be taken in the future. These actions generally involve either border security, the current unlawfully present population, or future legal immigration. The announced executive actionsâparticularly the granting of deferred action and employment authorization to some unlawfully present aliens, discussed below (see " Unlawfully Present Population ")âhave revived debate about the executive's discretionary authority over immigration like that which followed the Administration's June 2012 announcement of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative. Some have argued that DACA constitutes an abdication of the executive's duty to enforce the laws and runs afoul of specific requirements found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) , among other things. Similar arguments will likely be made as to the November 2014 actions, which affect a significantly larger number of aliens than DACA. Arguably the most notable of these actions are the initiatives to grant deferred actionâone type of relief from removalâto some unlawfully present aliens who were brought to the United States as children and raised here, or who have children who are U.S. citizens or lawfully permanent resident (LPR) aliens. Previously, in June 2012, then-Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano announced a programâcommonly known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)âwhereby unlawfully present aliens who had been brought to the United States as children and met other criteria could receive deferred action and, in many cases, employment authorization. The eligibility criteria for DACA expressly excluded unlawfully present aliens who were over 31 years of age, or who had entered the United States on or after June 15, 2007. However, aliens who are over 31 years of age, or entered the United States between June 15, 2007, and January 1, 2010, could receive deferred action as part of the November 2014 initiative. In addition, unlawfully present aliens who have children who are U.S. citizens or LPRs will also be eligible for deferred action (and employment authorization) pursuant to the November 2014 initiatives, provided they meet specified criteria. These criteria include (1) "continuous residence" in the United States since before January 1, 2010; (2) physical presence in the United States both on the date the initiative was announced (i.e., November 20, 2014) and when they request deferred action; (3) not being an enforcement priority under the Administration's newly announced priorities, discussed below; and (4) "present[ing] no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, makes the grant of deferred action inappropriate." Thus, the district court concluded that DACA runs afoul of the INA because many of the aliens granted deferred action through DACA had never been placed in removal proceedings as required, in the court's view, by INA §235. (This same court, however, later ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the case. Standing requirements are concerned with who is a proper party to seek judicial relief from a federal court. However, because such discipline constitutes an adverse employment action, the same court subsequently found that the plaintiffs' case is within the jurisdiction of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), not the court's. | On November 20, 2014, President Obama delivered a televised address wherein he broadly described the steps that his administration is taking to "fix" what he has repeatedly described as a "broken immigration system." Following the President's address, executive agencies made available intra-agency memoranda and fact sheets detailing specific actions that have already been taken, or will be taken in the future. These actions generally involve either border security, the current unlawfully present population, or future legal immigration.
The most notable of these actions, for many commentators, are the initiatives to grant "deferred action"âone type of relief from removalâto some unlawfully present aliens who were brought to the United States as children and raised here, or who have children who are U.S. citizens or lawfully permanent resident (LPR) aliens. Previously, in June 2012, then Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano announced a programâcommonly known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)âwhereby unlawfully present aliens who had been brought to the United States as children and met other criteria could receive deferred action and, in many cases, employment authorization. The eligibility criteria for DACA expressly excluded unlawfully present aliens who were over 31 years of age, or who had entered the United States on or after June 15, 2007. However, aliens who are over 31 years of age, or entered between June 15, 2007, and January 1, 2010, could receive deferred action as part of the 2014 initiative.
Similarly, unlawfully present aliens who have children who are U.S. citizens or LPRs could also receive deferred action and employment authorization pursuant to the November 2014 initiatives, provided they meet specified criteria. These criteria include "continuous residence" in the United States since before January 1, 2010; physical presence in the United States both on the date the initiative was announced and on the date when they request deferred action; and not being an enforcement priority (e.g., not a threat to national or border security).
The announced executive actionsâparticularly the granting of deferred action and employment authorization to unlawfully present aliensâhave revived debate about the President's discretionary authority over immigration like that which followed the announcement of DACA in 2012. In the case of DACA, some argued that the initiative violates the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution, runs afoul of specific requirements found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), or is inconsistent with historical precedents. Others, however, asserted that DACA involves a valid exercise of the executive's prosecutorial or enforcement discretion, is consistent with the INA, and has ample historical precedent. Similar arguments will likely be made as to the November 2014 actions, which affect a significantly larger number of aliens than DACA.
Legal challenges to DACA have generally failed on standing grounds, because the plaintiffs bringing these challenges were not seen as the proper parties to seek judicial relief from a federal court. The one exception to thisâthe litigation in Crane v. Napolitano âresulted in the reviewing federal district court finding that DACA runs afoul of provisions in Section 235 of the INA which some assert require the executive to place unlawfully present aliens in removal proceedings. However, this same federal district court subsequently found that it lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff immigration officers alleged that they faced discipline by their employer, DHS, if they refused to implement DACA, and such claims are within the jurisdiction of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), not the court.
The 113 th Congress has also considered legislation to defund DACA (e.g., H.R. 5272 , H.R. 5316 ). |
crs_RL33452 | crs_RL33452_0 | Accordingly, it recommended that Speicher's status be maintained as missing, rather than killed. MIA (Missing In Action): Persons removed from control of U.S. forces due to enemy action, but not known to either be a prisoner of war or dead. Since 1973, only one U.S. military member has returned alive from Vietnam. Marine Corps PFC Robert Garwood was listed as a POW by U.S. authorities—but never by the Vietnamese—in 1965 and returned voluntarily to the U.S. in 1979. Vietnam POW/MIAs: U.S. Government Policy and Organization
Since 1982, the official U.S. position regarding live Americans has been as follows: "Although we have thus far been unable to prove that Americans are still being held against their will, the information available to us precludes ruling out that possibility. Some involved with the POW/MIA issue argue that Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue has actually been spotty and uneven at best, arguing that the U.S. government has tended to equate activity with results and resource inputs with true outputs in terms of the fate of unaccounted-for Americans. Some believe that the Vietnamese have documentary evidence about the fate of at least some of them. Those who believe Americans are still held, or were held after the war ended, feel that even if no specific report has thus far been proved, the numbers unaccounted for, and the cumulative mass of information about live Americans is compelling. Those who doubt Americans are still held, or were when the war ended, argue that despite numerous reports, exhaustive interrogations, and formidable technical means used by U.S. intelligence agencies, no report of an unaccounted-for live American (with the exception of Garwood) has been validated as to who, when, and where the individual is or was. Most U.S. government analysts have come to believe that it is extremely unlikely that the North Vietnamese kept U.S. prisoners after the end of the war, or transferred any to the USSR. The "Coverup" Issue
Some say the U.S. government has engaged in a "coverup" of evidence about live Americans still being held in Indochina; they attach greater credence to some sources than does the government, and suggest that the criteria set by the government for validating reports of live Americans are unreasonably, and perhaps deliberately, high. Have Americans Remained in Indochina Voluntarily? This suggests that the two communist enemies of the United States during the Korean War, as well as a Stalinist Soviet Union, might be inclined to hold live Americans—perhaps more so than Vietnam in the 1970s. POWs and MIAs from Cold War Incidents
During the Cold War (1946-1991), some U.S. military aircraft were shot down by the USSR, Eastern European countries, China, and North Korea. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 (Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm)
A total of 49 American military personnel were initially listed as missing in action during the Persian Gulf War. Significantly, the occupation of Iraq by U.S. and other coalition forces since March 2003, and extensive investigation of possible leads about Speicher, has not, so far, led to more substantive information about his fate, although some leads could not be pursued due to the security threat posed by the Iraqi insurgency. On April 9, 2004, one American soldier was captured by Iraqi insurgents. He was the first POW taken by the enemy in Iraq since the eight captured in the early part of the war were liberated by U.S. forces in April 2003. | There has been a long-running controversy about the fate of certain U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) and servicemembers missing in action (MIAs) as a result of various U.S. military operations. While few people familiar with the issue feel that any Americans are still being held against their will in communist countries associated with the Cold War, more feel that some may have been so held in the past in the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, or North Vietnam. Similarly, few believe there has been a "conspiracy" to cover up the existence of live POWs, but many would maintain that there was, at least during the 1970s, U.S. government mismanagement of the issue.
Normalization of relations with Vietnam exacerbated this longstanding debate. Normalization's supporters contend that Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue has greatly increased. Opponents argue that cooperation has in fact been much less than supporters say, and that the Vietnamese can only be induced to cooperate by firmness rather than conciliation. Those who believe Americans are now held, or were after the war ended, feel that even if no specific report of live Americans has thus far met rigorous proofs, the mass of information about live Americans is compelling. Those who doubt live Americans are still held, or were after the war ended, argue that despite vast efforts, only one live American military prisoner remained in Indochina after the war (a defector who returned in 1979). The U.S. government indicates the possibility that Americans are still being held in Indochina cannot be ruled out. Some say Americans may have been kept by the Vietnamese after the war but killed later. Increased U.S. access to Vietnam has not yet led to a large reduction in the number of Americans still listed as unaccounted for, although this may be due to some U.S. policies as well as the level of Vietnamese cooperation.
There is considerable evidence that prisoners from the end of World War II, the Korean War, and "Cold War shootdowns" of U.S. military aircraft may have been taken to the USSR and not returned. The evidence about POWs from Vietnam being taken to the Soviet Union is more questionable. There is evidence that Navy pilot Scott Speicher, shot down on the first night of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and until recently listed as "killed in action" rather than "missing in action," was almost certainly captured by the Iraqis. Information about his fate has not yet been discovered by U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. All American POWs captured by the Iraqis during the initial stage of the current war were returned to U.S. control; the remains of all others listed as MIA have been recovered. One U.S. Army soldier, captured by Iraqi insurgents, on April 9, 2004, is currently listed as a POW; there has been no word about his fate since his POW status was confirmed by DOD on April 23, 2004.
This report replaces Issue Brief IB92101 of the same name. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R42478 | crs_R42478_0 | Medicaid was established in 1965 to provide basic medical services to certain low-income populations. It is a means-tested entitlement program that financed the delivery of primary and acute medical services, as well as long-term services and supports, to more than an estimated 72 million people in FY2012. Below is a description of services available for Medicaid beneficiaries by eligibility classification. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. However, on June 28, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius . Examples of optional benefits for such Medicaid groups include prescribed drugs, physician-directed clinic services, services of other licensed practitioners (e.g., chiropractors, podiatrists, psychologists) services, nursing facility services for individuals under age 21, physical therapy, and prosthetic devices. Table 2 provides additional information for selected optional benefits covered by most states under the traditional Medicaid program. The breadth of coverage for a given benefit can and does vary from state to state, even for mandatory benefits. Medicaid Benchmark Benefit Packages
As an alternative to providing all the mandatory and selected optional benefits under traditional Medicaid, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA; P.L. These plans can exist in sub-state areas and can be limited to specific subpopulations. States can require "full benefit eligibles" (or specific subgroups of these individuals) to enroll in Medicaid benchmark benefits. The benchmark options include
the Blue Cross/Blue Shield standard provider plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), a plan offered to state employees, the largest commercial health maintenance organization (HMO) in the state, and other Secretary-approved coverage appropriate for the targeted population. Many of these essential health benefits are currently coverable under benchmark packages. Mental Health Parity Requirements Under Both Traditional Medicaid and Benchmark Plans
The federal mental health parity requirements, as established in the Public Health Service Act (Section 2726), generally require that, under a given insurance plan, coverage of mental health services (if offered) should be on par with coverage of medical and surgical services in terms of the treatment limitations (e.g., amount, duration and scope of benefits), financial requirements (e.g., beneficiary co-payments), in- and out-of-network covered benefits, and annual and lifetime dollar limits. It is unclear how these state experiences with Medicaid benchmark plans to date will influence the design of such benefit packages in 2014 among states that choose to cover the new optional group of non-elderly, non-pregnant adults with income up to 133% of the federal poverty level. Additional CRS Medicaid and CHIP Resources
CRS Report RL33202, Medicaid: A Primer
CRS Report R41210, Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Provisions in ACA: Summary and Timeline
CRS Report R40226, P.L. | The Medicaid program, which served 72 million people in FY2012, finances the delivery of a wide variety of preventive, primary, and acute care services as well as long-term services and supports for certain low-income populations. Benefits are available to beneficiaries through two avenues. First, the traditional Medicaid program covers a wide variety of mandatory services (e.g., inpatient hospital services, lab/x-ray services, physician care, nursing facility care for persons aged 21 and over), and other services at state option (e.g., prescribed drugs, physician-directed clinic services, physical therapy, prosthetic devices) to the majority of Medicaid beneficiaries across the United States. Within broad federal guidelines, states define the amount, duration, and scope of these benefits. Thus, even mandatory services are not identical from state to state.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA; P.L. 109-171) created an alternative benefit structure for Medicaid. Under this authority, states may enroll certain Medicaid subpopulations into benchmark benefit plans that include four choices: (1) the standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield preferred provider plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, (2) a plan offered to state employees, (3) the largest commercial health maintenance organization in the state, and (4) other coverage appropriate for the targeted population, subject to approval by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS).
Since the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended), benchmark benefits have taken on a new importance in the Medicaid program. As per the ACA, a new mandatory group of non-elderly, non-pregnant adults with income up to 133% of the federal poverty level will be eligible for Medicaid beginning in 2014, or sooner at state option. (For more information about a Supreme Court ruling regarding this group, see CRS Report RL33202, Medicaid: A Primer.) These individuals will be required to enroll in benchmark plans rather than traditional Medicaid (with some exceptions for subgroups with special medical needs). However, to date, only a handful of states have experience administering these plans, nearly all of which have been tailored to specific subpopulations.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that coverage expansion provisions in the ACA would increase enrollment by about 7 million in FY2014, rising to 11 million by FY2022 in both the Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Programs (Congressional Budget Office, Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act Updated for the Recent Supreme Court Decision, July 2012). Many of these new enrollees will get benchmark benefits. To assist Congress in evaluating the current scope of benefits available under Medicaid, this report outlines the major rules that govern and define both traditional Medicaid and benchmark benefits. It also compares the similarities and differences between these two benefit package designs. |
crs_RL34114 | crs_RL34114_0 | Introduction
Congress's contempt power is the means by which Congress responds to certain acts that in its view obstruct the legislative process. Contempt may be used either to coerce compliance, punish the contemnor, and/or to remove the obstruction. Although any action that directly obstructs the effort of Congress to exercise its constitutional powers may arguably constitute a contempt, in recent decades the contempt power has most often been employed in response to the refusal of a witness to comply with a congressional subpoena—whether in the form of a refusal to provide testimony, or a refusal to produce requested documents. Congress has three formal methods by which it can combat noncompliance with a duly issued subpoena. Each of these methods invokes the authority of a separate branch of government. First, the long dormant inherent contempt power permits Congress to rely on its own constitutional authority to detain and imprison a contemnor until the individual complies with congressional demands. Second, the criminal contempt statute permits Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal prosecution of the contemnor. Finally, Congress may rely on the judicial branch to enforce a congressional subpoena. Under this procedure, Congress may seek a civil judgment from a federal court declaring that the individual in question is legally obligated to comply with the congressional subpoena. This report examines the source of Congress's contempt power, analyzes the procedures associated with inherent contempt, criminal contempt, and the civil enforcement of subpoenas, and discusses the obstacles that face Congress in enforcing a contempt action against an executive branch official. A more fully developed and detailed version of this report, complete with sources and references, can be found at CRS Report RL34097, Congress's Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. First, Congress faces a number of obstacles in any attempt to enforce a subpoena issued against an executive branch official through the criminal contempt statute. Although the courts have reaffirmed Congress's constitutional authority to issue and enforce subpoenas, efforts to punish an executive branch official for noncompliance with a subpoena through criminal contempt will likely prove unavailing in many, if not most circumstances. Where the President directs or endorses the noncompliance of the official, such as where the official refuses to disclose information pursuant to the President's decision to assert executive privilege, past practice suggests that the DOJ will not pursue a prosecution for criminal contempt. Second, although it appears that Congress may be able to enforce its own subpoenas through a declaratory civil action, relying on this mechanism to enforce a subpoena directed at an executive official may prove an inadequate means of protecting congressional prerogatives due to the time required to achieve a final, enforceable ruling in the case. Although subject to practical limitations, Congress retains the ability to exercise its own constitutionally based authorities to enforce a subpoena through inherent contempt. | Congress's contempt power is the means by which Congress responds to certain acts that in its view obstruct the legislative process. Contempt may be used either to coerce compliance, punish the contemnor, and/or to remove the obstruction. Although arguably any action that directly obstructs the effort of Congress to exercise its constitutional powers may constitute a contempt, in recent times the contempt power has most often been employed in response to noncompliance with a duly issued congressional subpoena—whether in the form of a refusal to appear before a committee for purposes of providing testimony or a refusal to produce requested documents.
Congress has three formal methods by which it can combat noncompliance with a duly issued subpoena. Each of these methods invokes the authority of a separate branch of government. First, the long dormant inherent contempt power permits Congress to rely on its own constitutional authority to detain and imprison a contemnor until the individual complies with congressional demands. Second, the criminal contempt statute permits Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal prosecution of the contemnor. Finally, Congress may rely on the judicial branch to enforce a congressional subpoena. Under this procedure, Congress may seek a civil judgment from a federal court declaring that the individual in question is legally obligated to comply with the congressional subpoena.
A number of obstacles face Congress in any attempt to enforce a subpoena issued against an executive branch official. Although the courts have reaffirmed Congress's constitutional authority to issue and enforce subpoenas, efforts to punish an executive branch official for noncompliance with a subpoena through criminal contempt will likely prove unavailing in many, if not most, circumstances. Where the official refuses to disclose information pursuant to the President's decision that such information is protected under executive privilege, past practice suggests that the Department of Justice (DOJ) will not pursue a prosecution for criminal contempt. In addition, although it appears that Congress may be able to enforce its subpoenas through a declaratory civil action, relying on this mechanism to enforce a subpoena directed at an executive official may prove an inadequate means of protecting congressional prerogatives due to the time required to achieve a final, enforceable ruling in the case. Although subject to practical limitations, Congress retains the ability to exercise its own constitutionally based authorities to enforce a subpoena through inherent contempt.
This report examines the source of Congress's contempt power, analyzes the procedures associated with inherent contempt, criminal contempt, and the civil enforcement of subpoenas, and discusses the obstacles that face Congress in enforcing a contempt action against an executive branch official. A more fully developed and detailed version of this report, complete with sources and references, can be found at CRS Report RL34097, Congress's Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R40486 | crs_R40486_0 | Introduction
Block grants have been a part of the American federal system since 1966. They are one of three general types of grants-in-aid programs: categorical grants, block grants, and general revenue sharing. These grants differ along three dimensions: the range of federal control over who receives the grant; the range of recipient discretion concerning aided activities; and the type, number, detail, and scope of grant program conditions. Categorical grants can be used only for a specifically aided program and usually are limited to narrowly defined activities; legislation generally details the program's parameters and specifies the types of funded activities. There are four types of categorical grants: project categorical grants, formula-project categorical grants, formula categorical grants, and open-end reimbursement categorical grants. Block grants are a form of grant-in-aid that the federal government uses to provide state and local governments a specified amount of funding to assist them in addressing broad purposes, such as community development, social services, public health, or law enforcement. Project categorical grants and general revenue sharing represent the ends of a continuum on the three dimensions differentiating grant types, with block grants being at the mid-point. However, there is some overlap among grant types in the middle of the continuum. For example, some block grants have characteristics normally associated with formula categorical grants. This overlap, and the variation in characteristics among block grants, helps to explain why there is some disagreement concerning precisely what is a block grant, and how many of them exist. Block grant advocates view block grants as a means to increase government efficiency and program effectiveness by redistributing power and accountability through decentralization and partial devolution of decision-making authority from the federal government to state and local governments. For example, Representative Paul Ryan, chair of the House Committee on the Budget, has recommended that the federal share of Medicaid be converted into a block grant "tailored to meet each state's needs" as a means to improve "the health-care safety net for low-income Americans" and to save $732 billion over 10 years. Block grant critics argue that block grants can undermine the achievement of national objectives and can be used as a "backdoor" means to reduce government spending on domestic issues. They also claim that the decentralized nature of block grants makes it difficult to measure block grant performance and to hold state and local government officials accountable for their decisions. This report provides an overview of the six grant types, provides criteria for defining a block grant and uses those criteria to provide a list of current block grants, examines competing perspectives concerning the use of block grants versus other grant mechanisms to achieve national goals, provides a brief historical overview of the role of block grants in American federalism, and examines recent changes to existing block grants and proposals to create new ones. Opponents argue that
"Block-granting" Medicaid is simply code for deep, arbitrary cuts in support to the most vulnerable seniors, individuals with disabilities, and low-income children.… Claiming to "repair" Medicaid by cutting it by a third is like saving a drowning person by throwing them an anchor. | Block grants are a form of grant-in-aid that the federal government uses to provide state and local governments a specified amount of funding to assist them in addressing broad purposes, such as community development, social services, public health, or law enforcement.
Block grant advocates argue that block grants increase government efficiency and program effectiveness by redistributing power and accountability through decentralization and partial devolution of decision-making authority from the federal government to state and local governments. Advocates also view them as a means to reduce the federal deficit. For example, Representative Paul Ryan, chair of the House Committee on the Budget, has recommended that the federal share of Medicaid be converted into a block grant "tailored to meet each state's needs" as a means to improve "the health-care safety net for low-income Americans" and to save $732 billion over 10 years.
Block grant critics argue that block grants can undermine the achievement of national objectives and can be used as a "backdoor" means to reduce government spending on domestic issues. For example, opponents of converting Medicaid into a block grant argue that "block granting Medicaid is simply code for deep, arbitrary cuts in support to the most vulnerable seniors, individuals with disabilities, and low-income children." Block grant critics also argue that the decentralized nature of block grants makes it difficult to measure block grant performance and to hold state and local government officials accountable for their decisions.
Block grants, which have been a part of the American federal system since 1966, are one of three general types of grants-in-aid programs: categorical grants, block grants, and general revenue sharing. These grants differ along three dimensions: the range of federal control over who receives the grant; the range of recipient discretion concerning aided activities; and the type, number, detail, and scope of grant program conditions.
Categorical grants can be used only for a specifically aided program and usually are limited to narrowly defined activities; legislation generally details the program's parameters and specifies the types of funded activities. There are four types of categorical grants: project categorical grants, formula-project categorical grants, formula categorical grants, and open-end reimbursement categorical grants.
Project categorical grants and general revenue sharing represent the ends of a continuum on the three dimensions differentiating grant types, with block grants being at the mid-point. However, there is some overlap among grant types in the middle of the continuum. For example, some block grants have characteristics normally associated with formula categorical grants. This overlap, and the variation in characteristics among block grants, helps to explain why there is some disagreement concerning precisely what is a block grant, and how many of them exist.
This report provides an overview of the six grant types, provides criteria for defining a block grant and uses those criteria to provide a list of current block grants, examines competing perspectives concerning the use of block grants versus other grant mechanisms to achieve national goals, provides an historical overview of the role of block grants in American federalism, and examines recent changes to existing block grants and proposals to create new ones. |
crs_R43805 | crs_R43805_0 | Introduction
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible workers with relatively low earnings. Because the credit is refundable, an EITC recipient need not owe taxes to receive the benefit. For tax year 2015 (returns filed in 2016), a total of $68.5 billion was claimed by 28.1 million tax filers, making the EITC the largest need-tested antipoverty cash assistance program. Under current law, the EITC is calculated based on a recipient's earned income, using one of eight different formulas, which vary depending on several factors, including the number of qualifying children a tax filer has (zero, one, two, or three or more) and his or her marital status (unmarried or married). 111-5 ), extended by P.L. 111-312 and P.L. 112-240 , and made permanent by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act (Division Q of P.L. The first modification was a larger credit for families with three or more children, while the second reduced the EITC's marriage penalty. 6. There is no age requirement for tax filers with qualifying children. Calculating the EITC
The EITC amount is based on formulas that consider earned income, number of qualifying children, marital status, and adjusted gross income (AGI). In general, the EITC equals a fixed percentage (the "credit rate") of earned income until the credit reaches its maximum amount. The EITC then remains at its maximum level over a subsequent range of earned income, between the "earned income amount" and the "phase-out amount threshold." Finally, the credit gradually decreases in value to zero at a fixed rate (the "phase-out rate") for each additional dollar of earned income or AGI (whichever is greater) above the phase-out amount threshold. The specific values of these EITC parameters (e.g., credit rate, earned income amount, etc.) The $3,461 credit represents the maximum credit for a tax filer with one child in 2018. A tax filer can look up the correct amount of his or her EITC based on income, marital status, and number of qualifying children. Payment of the EITC
The EITC is provided to individuals and families annually in a lump sum payment after a taxpayer files a federal income tax return. It may be received in one of three ways:
1. a reduction in federal tax liability; 2. a cash payment from the Treasury if the tax filer has no tax liability, through a tax refund check; or 3. a combination of reduced federal tax liability and a refund. Thus, payments are generally based on the prior year's income, earnings, and family composition. That is, the EITC earned in 2018, based on a tax filer's earnings, income, and family composition, will be paid in 2019. Treatment of the EITC for Need-Tested Benefit Programs
By law, the EITC cannot be counted as income in determining eligibility for, or the amount of, any federally funded public benefit program including Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) food assistance, low-income housing, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). An EITC refund that is saved by the filer does not count against the resource limits of any federally funded public benefit program for 12 months after the refund is received. 114-113
Two temporary modifications to the EITC were enacted by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ) increased the amount of the credit by changing the credit formula. For 2015, 3% of all EITC dollars were claimed by tax filers with no qualifying children and 97% were claimed by tax filers with qualifying children. A greater share of returns filed in certain southern states claimed the EITC than returns in other regions of the country. | The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible workers earning relatively low wages. Because the credit is refundable, an EITC recipient need not owe taxes to receive the benefit. Eligibility for and the amount of the EITC are based on a variety of factors, including residence and taxpayer ID requirements, the presence of qualifying children, age requirements for childless recipients, and the recipient's investment income and earned income. Tax filers with income above certain thresholds—these thresholds are based on marital status and number of qualifying children—are ineligible for the credit.
The EITC varies based on a recipient's earnings. Specifically, the EITC equals a fixed percentage (the "credit rate") of earned income until the credit amount reaches its maximum level. The EITC then remains at its maximum level over a subsequent range of earned income, between the "earned income amount" and the "phase-out amount threshold." Finally, the credit gradually decreases to zero at a fixed rate (the "phase-out rate") for each additional dollar of adjusted gross income (AGI) (or earned income, whichever is greater) above the phase-out amount threshold. The specific values of these EITC parameters (e.g., credit rate, earned income amount) vary depending on several factors, including the number of qualifying children a tax filer has and his or her marital status. For the 2018 tax year, the maximum EITC for a tax filer without children is $519 per year. In contrast, the 2018 maximum EITC for a tax filer with one child is $3,461 per year; for two children, $5,716 per year; and for three or more children, $6,431 per year.
Two temporary modifications to the EITC were enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5), extended by P.L. 111-312 and P.L. 112-240, and made permanent by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act (Division Q of P.L. 114-113). The first modification was a larger credit for families with three or more children, while the second reduced the EITC's marriage penalty.
The EITC is provided to individuals and families once a year, in a lump sum payment after individuals and families file their federal income tax returns. The credit may be received in one of three ways: (1) a reduction in federal tax liability; (2) a refund from the Treasury if the tax filer has no income tax liability; or (3) a combination of a reduced federal tax liability and a refund. The amount of the credit a tax filer receives is based on the prior year's income, earnings, and family composition (marital status and number of qualifying children). That is, the EITC earned based on 2018 earned income will not be paid until 2019.
The EITC cannot be counted as income in determining eligibility for or the amount of any federally funded public benefit program. An EITC refund that is saved by a tax filer does not count against the resource limits of any federally funded public benefit program for 12 months after the refund is received.
For tax year 2015 (returns filed in 2016), a total of $68.5 billion was claimed by 28.1 million tax filers (19% of all tax filers), making the EITC the largest need-tested antipoverty cash assistance program. In that year, 97% of all EITC dollars were claimed by families with children. However, there was considerable variation in the share of returns claiming the EITC by state, with a greater share filed in certain southern states compared to other regions of the country. |
crs_RL34580 | crs_RL34580_0 | Introduction
This report discusses how drought is defined (e.g., why drought in one region of the country is different from drought in another region), and why drought occurs in the United States. What is the future of drought in the United States ? Although drought impacts can be significant, no comprehensive national drought policy exists. What Causes Drought in the United States? As of August 13, 2012, more than 1,400 U.S. counties in 33 states had been designated as drought disaster areas by the Secretary. As of April 17, 2013, more than 1,180 counties had been designated as drought disaster areas for the 2013 crop loss purposes (primary and contiguous county designations). Although agricultural losses typically dominate drought impacts, congressional interest in federal drought assistance is not limited to the USDA. For example, the 2012 drought raised interest in whether and to what extent other federal agencies have and are using authorities to assist with managing drought. For example, in addition to operations of federal water resource facilities (discussed below), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation also have limited emergency drought authorities and funding; the drought response and recovery authorities for the Corps, Reclamation, and the Farm Service Agency are provided in Appendix A . For example, the President in early August 2012 convened a White House Rural Council to review and assess federal agency activities and capabilities. Shortly following the gathering, the Administration announced new measures to address drought impact, as well as a listing of ongoing federal agency efforts to address the 2012 drought. The National Drought Commission and others have noted, however, that federal relief programs and emergency funding provide little incentive for state and local planning and efforts to reduce social and economic vulnerability to drought. The 2012 drought, like other recent severe weather events, has contributed to the ongoing public and policy discussion about the influence of human actions on climate and the future of U.S. actions on climate change mitigation. As background for its recommendations, the commission noted the patchwork nature of drought programs, and that despite a major federal role in responding to drought, no single federal agency leads or coordinates drought programs—instead, the federal role is more of "crisis management." Although the Senate version of H.R. With farm bill programs expiring in 2013, the 113th Congress is expected to consider the reauthorization of an omnibus farm bill, including agricultural disaster programs (see box on page 18 ). Congress may opt to revisit the commission's recommendations and reevaluate whether current federal practices could be supplemented with actions to coordinate, prepare for, and respond to the unpredictable but inevitable occurrence of drought. Given the daunting task of managing drought, Congress also may consider proposals to manage drought impacts, such as assisting localities, industries, and agriculture with developing or augmenting water supplies. Congress also may move to examine how the two major federal water management agencies, the Corps and Reclamation, plan for and respond to severe drought and account for its impacts. Appendix A. Drought-Related Federal Response and Recovery Authorities
Appendix B. Excerpts from the 2000 National Drought Policy Commission Report to Congress
In 2000, the National Drought Policy Commission published its report to Congress, Preparing for Drought in the 21 st Century—A Report of the National Drought Policy Commission. | Drought is a natural hazard with often significant societal, economic, and environmental consequences. Public policy issues related to drought range from how to identify and measure drought to how best to prepare for, mitigate, and respond to drought impacts, and who should bear associated costs. Severe drought in 2011 and 2012 fueled congressional interest in near-term issues, such as current (and recently expired) federal programs and their funding, and long-term issues, such as drought forecasting and various federal drought relief and mitigation actions. Continuing drought conditions throughout the country contribute to ongoing interest in federal drought policies and responses.
As of April 2013, drought has persisted across approximately two-thirds of the United States and is threatening agricultural production and other sectors. More than 1,180 counties so far have been designated as disaster areas for the 2013 crop season, including 286 counties contiguous to primary drought counties. In comparison, in August 2012, more than 1,400 counties in 33 states had been designated as disaster counties by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture. Most attention in the 112th Congress focused on the extension of expired disaster assistance programs in separate versions of a 2012 farm bill. Attention in the 113th Congress again is expected to focus on farm bill legislation; however, other bills addressing different aspects of drought policy and response have also been introduced. (For information regarding drought disaster assistance for agricultural producers, see CRS Report RS21212, Agricultural Disaster Assistance. For information on the 2012 bill, see CRS Report R42552, The 2012 Farm Bill: A Comparison of Senate-Passed S. 3240 and the House Agriculture Committee's H.R. 6083 with Current Law.)
Although agricultural losses typically dominate drought impacts, federal drought activities are not limited to agriculture. For example, the 2012 drought raised congressional interest in whether and to what extent other federal agencies have and are using authorities to address drought. Similarly, the President in August 2012 convened the White House Rural Council to assess executive branch agencies' responses to the ongoing drought. The Administration shortly thereafter announced several new administrative actions to address the drought.
While numerous federal programs address different aspects of drought, no comprehensive national drought policy exists. A 2000 National Drought Policy Commission noted the patchwork nature of drought programs, and that despite a major federal role in responding to drought, no single federal agency leads or coordinates drought programs—instead, the federal role is more of "crisis management." Congress may opt to revisit the commission's recommendations. Congress also may consider proposals to manage drought impacts, such as authorizing new assistance to develop or augment water supplies for localities, industries, and agriculture—or providing funding for such activities where authorities already exist. Congress also may address how the two major federal water management agencies, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, plan for and respond to drought.
This report describes the physical causes of drought, drought history in the United States, and policy challenges related to drought. It also provides examples of recurrent regional drought conditions. For information on federal agricultural disaster assistance and related legislation, see the CRS reports noted above.
This report will not be updated. For further information about the causes and current understanding of drought in the United States, see CRS Report R43407, Drought in the United States: Causes and Current Understanding. |
crs_RL33537 | crs_RL33537_0 | Other TRICARE plans include TRICARE Young Adult, TRICARE Reserve Select, and TRICARE Retired Reserve. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have also published important studies on the organization, coordination, and costs of the military health system, as well as its effectiveness addressing particular health challenges. Questions and Answers
1. How is the Military Health System Structured? The military health system serving 9.7 million beneficiaries through care purchased from private providers as well as directly through a system of DOD military treatment facilities that currently includes some 56 hospitals and 365 clinics. It operates worldwide and employs approximately 68,000 civilians and 86,000 military personnel. What is the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (MERHCF)? ") Within DOD, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for Health Affairs (HA), has as one of its missions operational oversight of the defense health program including management of the MERHCF. What is TRICARE? Since 1966, civilian care to millions of dependents and retirees (and retirees' dependents) has been provided through a program still known in law as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), but since 1994 more commonly known as TRICARE. TRICARE has four main benefit plans: a health maintenance organization option (TRICARE Prime), a preferred provider option (TRICARE Extra), a fee-for-service option (TRICARE Standard), and a Medicare wrap-around option (TRICARE for Life) for Medicare-eligible retirees. TRICARE also includes a Pharmacy program and optional dental plans. Options available to beneficiaries vary by the beneficiary's relationship to a sponsor, sponsor's duty status, and location. 5. Who Is Eligible to Receive Care? What are the Different TRICARE Plans? How Much Does Military Health Care Cost Beneficiaries? Active duty personnel, military retirees, and their respective dependents are not afforded equal access to care in military medical facilities. Retirees may also be eligible to receive medical care at Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical facilities. What are the Long-Term Trends in Defense Health Costs? How Does the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Affect TRICARE? How Are Private Health Care Providers Paid? What Is the Relationship of DOD Health Care to Medicare? This benefit is known as TRICARE for Life (TFL). Other Frequently Asked Questions
Does TRICARE Cover Abortion? | The primary objective of the military health system, which includes the Defense Department's hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel, is to maintain the health of military personnel so they can carry out their military missions and to be prepared to deliver health care during wartime. The military health system also covers dependents of active duty personnel, military retirees, and their dependents, including some members of the reserve components. The military health system provides health care services through either Department of Defense (DOD) medical facilities, known as "military treatment facilities" or "MTFs" as space is available, or through private health care providers. The military health system serves 9.7 million beneficiaries through care purchased from private providers as well as directly through a system of DOD military treatment facilities that currently includes some 56 hospitals and 365 clinics. It operates worldwide and employs some 58,369 civilians and 86,007 military personnel.
Since 1966, civilian care to millions of dependents and retirees (and retirees' dependents) has been provided through a program still known in law as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), but more commonly known as TRICARE. TRICARE has four main benefit plans: a health maintenance organization option (TRICARE Prime), a preferred provider option (TRICARE Extra), a fee-for-service option (TRICARE Standard), and a Medicare wrap-around option (TRICARE for Life) for Medicare-eligible retirees. Other TRICARE plans include TRICARE Young Adult, TRICARE Reserve Select and TRICARE Retired Reserve. TRICARE also includes a pharmacy program and optional dental plans. Options available to beneficiaries vary by the beneficiary's duty status and location.
This report answers several frequently asked questions about military health care, including
How is the military health system structured? What is TRICARE? What are the different TRICARE plans and who is eligible? What are the costs of military health care to beneficiaries? What is the relationship of TRICARE to Medicare? How does the Affordable Care Act affect TRICARE? What are the long-term trends in defense health care costs? What is the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care fund, which funds TRICARE for Life?
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) have also published important studies on the organization, coordination, and costs of the military health system, as well as its effectiveness addressing particular health challenges. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs Home Page, available at http://www.health.mil/, may also be of interest for additional information on the military health system. This report does not address issues specific to battlefield medicine, veterans, or the Veterans Health Administration. Veterans' health issues are addressed in CRS Report R42747, Health Care for Veterans: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS20517 | crs_RS20517_0 | Background
For some 45 years, the primary international organization for coordinating restrictions on dual-use exports was COCOM, the Coordinating Committee For Multilateral Export Controls. After meetings in early April and mid-July 1996, the Secretariat of the Arrangement was established in Vienna in 1996. The Wassenaar Arrangement (formally titled the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies) does not appear to break any new ground in the multilateral conventional arms control area. Regime Organization and Operations
Related to the questions concerning which items should be controlled is the issue of regime organization and operations. | This report provides background on the Wassenaar Arrangement, which was formally established in July 1996 as a multilateral arrangement aimed at controlling exports of conventional weapons and related dual-use goods and military technology. It is the successor to the expired Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). This report focuses on the current status, features, and issues raised by the establishment and functioning of the Wassenaar Arrangement. It will be updated only if warranted by notable events related to the Arrangement. |
crs_RL30638 | crs_RL30638_0 | Individuals and businesses lend their accumulated savings to borrowers. The federal government intervenes in the public capital market by granting the debt instruments of state and local governments a unique privilege—the exemption of interest income earned on these bonds from federal income tax. The tax exemption lowers the cost of capital for state and local governments, which should then induce an increase in state and local capital formation. Since state and local taxpayers are likely to be unwilling to provide these services to nonresidents without compensation, it is probable that state and local services will be under provided. Total Debt Outstanding
State and local governments were estimated to have $3.043 trillion in debt issuances outstanding at the end of the third quarter in 2017. Classifying State and Local Debt Instruments
State and local debt can be classified based on (1) the maturity (or term), which is the length of time before the principal is repaid; (2) the type of security , which is the financial backing for the debt; (3) the use of the proceeds for either new facilities or to refinance previously issued bonds; and (4) whether the type of activity being financed has a public or a private purpose. All tax-exempt interest income attributable to state and local governments does not appear in the form of bonds. New issues represent bonds issued to finance new capital facilities. Advance refunding bonds are issued prior to the date on which the original bonds are refunded, so that for a period of time there are two bond issues outstanding to finance the same capital facilities. The 2017 tax revision ( P.L. These selected activities can be financed with tax-exempt bonds. Table 2 provides the dollar value of new issues of tax-exempt private-activity bonds and their share of total private-activity volume capacity for 2014 and 2015. Private Activities Eligible for Tax Exemption
All tax-exempt private-activity bonds are subject to restrictions that do not apply to governmental bonds, chief among them was the now-repealed ability to issue advance refundings and the inclusion of the interest income in the alternative minimum income tax base. Bonds issued for several activities classified as private are not subject to the volume cap if the facilities are governmentally owned. Many individuals and businesses make money by engaging in arbitrage, borrowing money at one interest rate and lending that borrowed money to others at a higher interest rate. State and local governments do not pay federal income tax, and absent federal constraint, have unlimited capacity to issue debt at low interest rates and reinvest the bond proceeds in higher-yielding taxable debt instruments, thereby earning arbitrage profits. Unchecked, state and local governments could substitute arbitrage earnings for a substantial portion of their own citizens' tax effort. Congress has decided that such arbitrage should be limited, and that tax-exempt bond proceeds must be used as quickly as possible to pay contractors for the construction of the capital facilities for which the bonds were issued. Tax Credit Bonds (TCBs) are an alternative to tax-exempt bonds that offer investors a federal tax credit or the issuer a direct payment proportional to the bond's value in lieu of a federal tax exemption. The 2017 tax revision ( P.L. 115-97 ) repealed the authority to issue new TCBs after December 31, 2017. For more information on tax credit bonds, see CRS Report R40523, Tax Credit Bonds: Overview and Analysis . 1 ) that was passed in the House included provisions that would repeal authority to issue PABs and eliminate the use of tax-exempt bonds to fund professional sports stadiums. The direction of future changes to the federal tax code will likely dictate which modifications, if any, are made to the tax treatment of state and local government debt. | This report provides information about state and local government debt. State and local governments issue debt instruments in exchange for the use of individuals' and businesses' savings. This debt obligates state and local governments to make interest payments for the use of these savings and to repay, at some time in the future, the amount borrowed. State and local governments may finance capital facilities with debt rather than out of current tax revenue to more closely align benefits and tax payments. There was just over $3 trillion in state and local debt outstanding in the third quarter of 2017.
The federal government subsidizes the cost of most state and local debt by excluding the interest income from federal income taxation. This tax exemption is granted in part because it is believed that state and local capital facilities will be underprovided if state and local taxpayers have to pay the full cost. The federal government also provides a tax preference through tax credit bonds (TCBs), which either provide investors with a federal tax credit in lieu of interest payments or a direct payment to the issuer. P.L. 115-97, the 2017 tax revision, repealed the authority to issue TCBs beginning in 2018. For more on TCBs, see CRS Report R40523, Tax Credit Bonds: Overview and Analysis.
State and local debt is issued as bonds, to be repaid over a period of time greater than one year and perhaps exceeding 20 years, and as notes, to be repaid within one year. General obligation bonds are secured by the promise to repay with general tax revenue, and revenue bonds are secured with the promise to use a specific stream of tax revenue. Most debt is issued to finance new capital facilities, but some is issued to refund a prior bond issue (usually to take advantage of lower interest rates). Tax-exempt bonds issued for some activities are classified as governmental bonds and can be issued without federal constraint because most of the benefits from the capital facilities are enjoyed by the general public. Many tax-exempt revenue bonds are issued for activities Congress has classified as private because most of the benefits from the activities appear to be enjoyed by private individuals and businesses. The annual volume of a subset of these tax-exempt private-activity bonds (PABs) is capped. For more on private activity bonds, see CRS Report RL31457, Private Activity Bonds: An Introduction.
Arbitrage bonds devote a substantial share of the proceeds to the purchase of assets with higher interest rates than that being paid on the tax-exempt bonds. Such arbitrage bonds are not tax exempt because Congress does not want state and local governments to issue tax-exempt bonds and use the proceeds to earn arbitrage profits. The arbitrage profits could substitute for state and local taxes.
A number of tax reform proposals have been introduced that would modify the tax treatment of state and local government bonds. Another policy issue is whether constraints should be relaxed on the types of activities, such as infrastructure spending, for which entities can issue tax-exempt debt. The list of activities that classify tax-exempt private-activity bonds—and whether they should be included in the volume cap—is another area of potential change or reform. The 2017 tax revision repealed authority to issue TCBs and advanced refunding bonds, but did not otherwise modify tax-exempt bonds or PABs. |
crs_R43241 | crs_R43241_0 | Introduction
In 1986, the Commemorative Works Act (CWA) was enacted to guide the memorial and monument creation and siting process in the District of Columbia on land under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service (NPS) or the General Services Administration (GSA). As the statute specifies, the CWA was enacted
(1) to preserve the integrity of the comprehensive design of the L'Enfant and McMillan plans for the Nation's Capital;
(2) to ensure the continued public use and enjoyment of open space in the District of Columbia and its environs, and to encourage the location of commemorative works within the urban fabric of the District of Columbia;
(3) to preserve, protect and maintain the limited amount of open space available to residents of, and visitors to, the Nation's Capital; and
(4) to ensure that future commemorative works in areas administered by the National Park Service and the Administrator of General Services in the District of Columbia and its environs-
(A) are appropriately designed, constructed, and located; and
(B) reflect a consensus of the lasting national significance of the subjects involved. Pursuant to the CWA, from time to time Congress will authorize a sponsor group (i.e., an organization, often tax exempt, advocating for the creation of the new work) to design and build a monument or memorial in the District of Columbia without the use of federal funds. This report addresses four proposed exemptions from the CWA. These are memorial siting, including the addition of new elements to existing commemorative works; requiring the use of American materials during memorial construction; altering the deadline for completing an authorized memorial; and the siting of new museums within the statutorily defined commemorative works areas—where they would otherwise be prohibited pursuant to the CWA. Each exemption has been discussed in legislative proposals, at congressional hearings, or by one of the federal agencies charged with review and approval of commemorative works: the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA). Since the CWA's enactment, 33 commemorative works have been authorized, and numerous others have been proposed. For the authorized and proposed monuments and memorials, several sponsor groups have sought—and some have received—exemptions from certain provisions of the CWA. An act of Congress is required for Area I placement. Congress, however, has authorized new elements to existing monuments and memorials, and additional legislation has been introduced that would further that practice. Congress could amend the CWA to require congressional action for siting in Area II. Creating individual exemptions to 40 U.S.C. Use of American Materials
Once Congress authorizes a sponsor group to build a commemorative work in the District of Columbia, the group must work with NCPC, CFA, and either the Secretary of the Interior (through the NPS) or the Administrator of the GSA—depending on who has jurisdiction over the land that would house the proposed memorial—to choose a site and receive design approval for the memorial. When authorizing the National Museum of African American History and Culture in 2003, Congress specifically exempted it from the CWA prohibition against the creation of museums on NPS- or GSA-administered land. The granting of this exemption arguably suggests that Congress believes the CWA applies to museums at any District location, if they are located on NPS- or GSA-administered land. This application of the CWA to a museum would be in contrast to the specific CWA prohibition against the placement of a museum in Area I or East Potomac Park. | During the course of each Congress, numerous proposals to create new commemorative works (i.e., monuments and memorials) in the District of Columbia are introduced. In evaluating each proposal, Congress considers the subject of the proposed work; whether existing monuments and memorials commemorate similar subjects; and whether the sponsor group has requested an exemption from existing laws that might limit monument and memorial subjects and location within the District of Columbia. This report focuses on options for Congress for four types of exemptions to the Commemorative Works Act (CWA, 40 U.S.C. §§8901-8909): siting works, use of specific materials, memorial completion deadlines, and the placement and status of museums.
The CWA was enacted in 1986 to govern all monuments and memorials to be located on federal land in the District of Columbia under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service (NPS) or the General Services Administration (GSA). Further, the CWA sought to preserve the L'Enfant and McMillan plans for the capital; ensure continued public use and enjoyment of open spaces; and preserve, protect, and maintain the open space. Pursuant to the CWA, Congress statutorily authorizes a sponsor group to design and build a monument or memorial with the approval of regulatory bodies: the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC) and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA). Additionally, the National Capital Memorial Advisory Commission (NCMAC) was created to advise Congress, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Administrator of General Services on the commemorative works process. Unless otherwise stated in law, the sponsor group is responsible for funding the memorial without the use of federal funds.
Since CWA's enactment, 33 commemorative works have been authorized, and numerous others have been proposed. Among the authorized and proposed works, several sponsor groups have sought—and some have received—exemptions from certain CWA provisions.
The CWA divides the District of Columbia into three areas for the siting of monuments and memorials: an area where new commemorative works are prohibited (the Reserve); an area that requires congressional authorization (Area I); and all other NPS or GSA land (Area II). Some sponsor groups have been granted exemptions for siting monuments and memorials, and others have been approved to add new elements to existing commemorative works.
The CWA requires that the NCPC and CFA evaluate a memorial's proposed building materials to ensure they are "suitable to the outdoor environment." Some proposals have been made to require that those materials be American made, a requirement that does not currently exist. Additionally, sponsor groups are granted seven years in which to complete an authorized memorial or receive a construction permit to build the memorial. In many cases, memorials have needed additional time to be completed.
The CWA also prohibits the siting of museums on NPS- or GSA-administered land in the District of Columbia. In 2003, however, Congress provided an exemption to the National Museum of African American History and Culture. The granting of this exemption arguably suggests that Congress believes the CWA applies to museums at any District location, if they are located on NPS- or GSA-administered land. This application of the CWA to a museum would be in contrast to the specific CWA prohibition against the placement of a museum in Area I or East Potomac Park. |
crs_RL32882 | crs_RL32882_0 | Not only are Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea becomingmore dependent on China, but China also is becoming more dependent on these economies forimports and exports. At this level, the temperature of interaction is mixed. Taiwanese businesses have invested between $70billion and $100 billion in the PRC -- about half of all Taiwanese overseas investment. At the diplomatic and political level, relations are tepid -- not warm butnot cold either. (59) One example of such cooperation could be China's cooperation with Japan (and the United States,South Korea, and Russia) in the Six Party Talks on North Korea. The temperature of economic and financial relations has been hot as China has displaced theUnited States as South Korea's major trading partner, and South Korean businesses have movedlabor-intensive production processes to Chinese factories. Within the four strata of interaction (military,diplomatic, economic, and human), economic relations between China and the other states are thewarmest; human interaction is both warm and cool; diplomatic relations range from warm to cold,and military relations generally are cold or absolutely frigid. While the economic, political, and military relations in northeast Asia occurlargely on separate tracks, the sheer magnitude of the economic flows is affecting relations at otherstrata of interaction. For the United States, a question is how to promote and protectU.S. This colored, for example,efforts to reconstruct post-World War II Japan, to intervene in the Korean conflict, to providesupport to the Republic of China on Taiwan, to escalate the Vietnam War, to sometimes wink attrade barriers in Japan and South Korea in exchange for their support of the U.S. military, and topromote closer trade ties with Japan and South Korea rather than have them rely on China, theirtraditional trading partner. The policy choices with respect to northeast Asia include whether to:
continue current policies of promoting market economies, enablingglobalization, and encouraging democracy while projecting sufficient military power to keep thepeace in the region;
seek to contain China along the same lines of the containment of the formerSoviet Union;
actively counterbalance the rising economic influence of China and the tradingnetworks it is building by pursuing free trade agreements and closer investment relations with Japan,South Korea, and Taiwan and by strengthening free trade process under the Asia Pacific EconomicCooperation (APEC) forum;
bring China's external trade more into balance, ensure that China adheres toits World Trade Organization commitments, reduce the foreign exchange resources available toChina's central government, and slow the "bandwagon effect" by which Japanese, South Korean, andTaiwanese businesses are establishing factories in China with the intention of selling a part of theoutput in the U.S. market;
facilitate the globalization of China in order to strengthen forces of change,create centers of power outside of Beijing, and increase representation in Beijing by business andinternational interests; and
take into greater account the impact that the rise of China is having on thepolicies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Certainly, China's economic rise has provided the resources for it to build a modernizing andmore powerful Chinese military. The United States,likewise, is increasingly dependent on the Chinese market as a manufacturing platform, an exportmarket, and as a buyer of U.S. debt securities. In addition to ceding space in its decision making process to industrial interests, the currentCCP leadership is coming into power with experience in the transformation of society that comesfrom development and modernization after opening to the outside world. For these people, the country's dependence on international investment and trade for theeconomic growth needed to maintain the party's legitimacy has become an important considerationin policy making -- including security policy. Third Country Policies. The net result of this mutualdependency is that all parties now have much to lose by any crisis -- be it military or financial -- thatwould disrupt economic and financial flows in the region. All four governments, therefore, seek stability ininternational relations. | The economic rise of China and the growing network of trade and investment relations innortheast Asia are causing major changes in human, economic, political, and military interactionamong countries in the region. This is affecting U.S. relations with China, China's relations with itsneighbors, the calculus for war across the Taiwan Straits, and the basic interests and policies ofChina, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. These, in turn, affect U.S. strategy in Asia. China, forexample, has embarked on a "smile strategy" in which it is attempting to coopt the interests ofneighboring countries through trade and investment while putting forth a less threatening militaryface (to everyone but Taiwan). Under the rubric of the Six-Party Talks, the United States, China,Japan, Russia, and South Korea are cooperating to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Taiwanese businesses have invested an estimated $70 to $100 billion in factories in coastal China. China relies on foreign invested enterprises for about half its imports and exports. For Taiwan,Japan, and South Korea, China has displaced the United States as their major trading partner.
China interacts with Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea on four levels: human relations,economic and financial interaction, diplomatic and political intercourse, and military relations. Thetemperature of relations at each level ranges from cold to hot depending on the type of interactionand country or state being considered. At the human level the temperatures are mixed, at theeconomic level hot, at the diplomatic level cold for Taiwan to warm for South Korea, and at themilitary level, temperatures of interaction are cold.
The implications of China's globalization and rise as a major economic power can be seenin its impact both on Beijing and on policy deliberations in Taipei, Tokyo, and Seoul. The ChineseCommunist leadership not only is having to cede space in its decision making process to industrialinterests but the leaders themselves are coming into power with experience in the transformation ofsociety that comes from development and modernization after opening to the outside world. Chinanow depends on international investment and trade for the economic growth needed to maintain theparty's legitimacy. For China's trading partners, dependency on the Chinese market means thatBeijing is looming larger in all aspects of policy making. While this is not likely to challenge U.S.security ties with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, it raises several policy issues. One is how to dealwith a modernizing and more powerful Chinese military financed by the growing Chinese economy. Another is how to explicitly incorporate into U.S. policy the greater weight that Beijing is beinggiven in policy deliberations in Tokyo and Seoul. A further policy issue is whether to take explicitmeasures to offset the rising economic clout of China and attempts by Beijing to create East Asianinstitutions with China at the center and the United States pushed to the periphery. A positive resultof the mutual trade and financial dependency that has developed in northeast Asia is that all partiesnow have much to lose by an international military crisis that would interrupt economic and financialflows in the region. All four governments, therefore, seek stability in international relations. Thisreport will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R44539 | crs_R44539_0 | S tatements of Administration Policy, or SAPs, are one of the President's communication tools designed to communicate the Administration's position on legislation coming up on the House and Senate floor. Issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on behalf of the Executive Office of the President (EOP), SAPs provide the Administration's position on pending legislation. What Are Statements of Administration Policy? SAPs are written statements of the Administration's policy position towards a particular piece of legislation. SAP Structure and Key Components
In recent years, SAPs have generally adhered to the same structure from Administration to Administration. Veto Threats
While SAPs allow for the Administration to assert varying levels of support for or opposition to a bill, perhaps the most noticeable statement in a SAP is whether the Administration intends to veto the bill. Two types of veto threats appear in SAPs: a statement indicating that the President will veto the bill, or a statement that agencies or senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the bill. SAP Timing Within the Legislative Process
Generally, SAPs are released concurrent with action in the House Rules Committee, or on the floor of the House or Senate. Releasing a SAP at such a point in the legislative process may serve to maximize the Administration's influence. SAPs allow the Administration to go on record with its reasons for opposing and potentially vetoing legislation. SAPs also enable the Administration to identify key provisions of the legislation that it objects to or finds particularly favorable. | Presidents communicate their views on pending legislation in a variety of ways. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) formally communicates the Administration's views by way of Statements of Administration Policy. Statements of Administration Policy, or SAPs, are designed to signal the Administration's position on legislation scheduled on the House and Senate floor.
SAPs are often the first public document outlining the Administration's views on pending legislation and allow for the Administration to assert varying levels of support for or opposition to a bill. While Administrations vary as to how frequently and how many SAPs are released, a SAP's value comes in its ability to speak for the coordinated executive Administration as a whole.
SAPs grant the Administration the opportunity to go on record with its reasons for opposing and potentially vetoing legislation. SAPs also enable the Administration to identify key provisions of the legislation that it objects to or finds particularly favorable. SAPs may also provide Congress insights into the Administration's position towards possible bill implementation.
When a SAP indicates that the Administration may veto a bill, it appears in one of two ways: (1) a statement indicating that the President intends to veto the bill, or (2) a statement that agencies or senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the bill. These two types indicate degrees of veto threat certainty.
Statements of Administration Policy have generally adhered to the same structure from Administration to Administration. SAPs are released concurrent with action in the House Rules Committee, or on the floor of the House or the Senate. A SAP is released at such a time in the legislative process so as to maximize the Administration's influence in the policy outcome. |
crs_RS21619 | crs_RS21619_0 | Targeting and Employment Planning
During the Cold War, the United States maintained the numbers and types of nuclear weapons that it believed it needed to threaten the full range of potentialtargets in the Soviet Union. The Bush Administration has not described the specific capabilities it will target with this new strategy. According to the Administration, however, the United States cannot be certain where these threats will appear in the future. (7) The Administration has also linked themodernization of the nuclear weapons complex to its plans to reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Nevertheless, many analysts fear that the United States will eventually produce new weapons to supportan enhanced warfighting role for nuclearweapons. U.S. Nuclear Posture and Nonproliferation Policy
The Bush Administration has stated that nuclear weapons will play a role in U.S. security policy for the foreseeable future. Critics, however, arguethat the U.S. approach may undermine U.S. efforts to discourage nuclear proliferation. | In the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush Administration outlined a new role forU.S. nuclear weapons thatgoes beyond the concept of deterrence from the Cold War. It also identified a new targeting strategy that would seekto threaten specific capabilities inadversary nations. Furthermore, the Administration has pledged to restore and enhance the U.S. nuclear weaponsinfrastructure, as part of the U.S. effort todeter the emergence of new threats in the future. In implementing the NPR, the Administration has requestedfunding for studies on new types of nuclearweapons. The Administration claims these projects, if they eventually produce new weapons, would enhancedeterrence; critics claim they will make nuclearuse more likely and undermine U.S. nonproliferation goals. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_97-936 | crs_97-936_0 | Organization and Operations
Congressional oversight refers to the review, monitoring, and supervision of federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation. These include authorization, appropriations, investigative, and legislative hearings by standing committees; specialized investigations by select committees; and reviews and studies by congressional support agencies and staff. It is an integral part of the American system of checks and balances. James Madison, known as the "Father of the Constitution," described the system in Federalist No. There is a long history behind executive reports to Congress. Activities and Avenues
Oversight occurs through a wide variety of congressional activities and avenues. U.S. Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, Senate Manual, Containing the Standing Rules, Orders, Laws, and Resolutions Affecting the Business of the United States Senate , S.Doc. | Congressional oversight of policy implementation and administration has occurred throughout the history of the United States government under the Constitution. Oversight—the review, monitoring, and supervision of operations and activities—takes a variety of forms and utilizes various techniques. These range from specialized investigations by select committees to annual appropriations hearings, and from informal communications between Members or congressional staff and executive personnel to the use of extra-congressional mechanisms, such as offices of inspector general and study commissions. Oversight, moreover, is supported by a variety of authorities—the Constitution, public law, and chamber and committee rules—and is an integral part of the system of checks and balances between the legislative and executive branches. This report will be updated as events require. |
crs_RS20465 | crs_RS20465_0 | Once panels are organized they can begin the work of holding hearings and considering legislative proposals. Reporting Legislation6
At the end of a markup, a chair normally entertains a motion to report a measure favorably to the House. A clean bill would be introduced in the House and referred back to the committee. For example, most reports explain a measure's purpose and the need for the legislation, its cost, committee votes on amendments and the measure itself, the position of the executive branch, and the specific changes the bill would make in existing law. Oversight and Investigations
Committees periodically conduct reviews of agency performance in the implementation of legislation, called oversight, or conduct investigations into perceived wrongdoing, referred to as investigations. | Committees are integral to the work of Congress in determining the policy needs of the nation and acting on them. This report provides a brief overview of six features of the committee system in the House: organization, hearings, markup, reporting, oversight, and publications. Committees in the House have four primary powers: to conduct hearings and investigations, to consider bills and resolutions and amendments to them, to report legislation to the House for its possible consideration, and to monitor executive branch performance, that is, to conduct oversight. The report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40674 | crs_R40674_0 | Spectrum capacity is necessary to deliver mobile broadband to consumers and businesses and also to support the communications needs of industries that use fixed wireless broadband to transmit large quantities of information quickly and reliably. Spectrum Policy Provisions in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012
Title VI of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-96 , signed into law on February 22, 2012) contains provisions that include reallocation of spectrum, new assignments of spectrum rights, and changes in procedures for repurposing spectrum used by the federal government. Major provisions in the Spectrum Act that are summarized in this report cover
Deficit reduction; Directed auctions; Incentive auctions for television broadcasters; Reallocation of spectrum from federal to commercial use; and Unlicensed spectrum. The act also has provided for the establishment of a new authority to plan and develop a nationwide public safety broadband network and has included other measures in support of improved emergency communications. Distribution of Proceeds from Auctions Required by the Spectrum Act
Most of the proceeds from auctions of licenses in designated spectrum as specified in the act are to be deposited directly into a Public Safety Trust Fund, created by the act, with nearly $28 billion designated for purposes defined in the act, including $20.4 billion for deficit reduction. To NIST for public safety research: $100 million. These licenses would provide an additional 65MHz of spectrum for commercial broadband. In particular, the GAO noted the variable nature of a number of assumptions for costs and revenues, such as the characteristics of the spectrum to which services would be relocated, the availability of new technology, and market demand for spectrum. Innovation in applying the Internet Protocol (IP) to mobile networks has spurred jobs and economic growth. This expanding industry requires additional spectrum capacity, a key resource. The Spectrum Act employs three key policy tools for increasing the availability of radio frequency spectrum for wireless broadband: allocating additional spectrum; reassigning spectrum to new users; and opening up spectrum for unlicensed use. Facilitating the adoption of new wireless technologies that enable spectrum sharing is emerging as a major policy consideration for spectrum management. Future technological breakthroughs in fields such as quantum communications hold the promise of even greater transmission speeds and spectrum efficiencies. | The convergence of wireless telecommunications technology with the Internet Protocol (IP) is fostering new generations of mobile technologies. This transformation has created new demands for advanced communications infrastructure and radio frequency spectrum capacity that can support high-speed, content-rich uses. Furthermore, a number of services, in addition to consumer and business communications, rely at least in part on wireless links to broadband (high-speed/high-capacity) infrastructure such as the Internet and IP-enabled networks. Policies to provide additional spectrum for mobile broadband services are generally viewed as drivers that would stimulate technological innovation and economic growth.
The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96, signed February 22, 2012) contained provisions in Title VI that expedite the availability of spectrum for commercial use. The provisions in Title VI —also known as the Public Safety and Spectrum Act, or the Spectrum Act—included expediting auctions of licenses for spectrum designated for mobile broadband; authorizing incentive auctions, which would permit television broadcasters to receive compensation for steps they might take to release some of their airwaves for mobile broadband; requiring that specified federal holdings be auctioned or reassigned for commercial use; and providing for the availability of spectrum for unlicensed use. The act also included provisions to apply future spectrum license auction revenues toward deficit reduction; to establish a planning and governance structure to deploy public safety broadband networks, using some auction proceeds for that purpose; and to assign additional spectrum resources for public safety communications.
Increasing the amount of spectrum available to support new mobile technologies is one step toward meeting future demand for mobile services. This report discusses some of the commercial and federal spectrum policy changes required by the act. It also summarizes new policy directions for spectrum management under consideration in the 113th Congress, such as the encouragement of new technologies that use spectrum more efficiently. |
crs_98-186 | crs_98-186_0 | Introduction
The American impeachment process places in the legislative branch the authority to remove the President, Vice President, and other federal civil officers in the executive and judicial branches upon a determination that such officers have engaged in treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Summary of Impeachment Proceedings in the 111th Congress
On March 4, 2010, H.Res. In four separate unanimous votes, the House agreed to each of the articles of impeachment. The Senate, organized as a Court of Impeachment, then issued a summons to Judge Porteous requiring him to answer the articles brought against him by April 7, 2010, and appointed an Impeachment Trial Committee of 12 Senators to take evidence in the case. On March 11, 2010, the House voted to impeach Judge Porteous, and approved four articles of impeachment by four unanimous votes. On March 17, 2010, the House Managers appeared before the bar of the Senate to present the impeachment resolution and exhibit the articles of impeachment against Judge Porteous. S.Res. Pursuant to the rules that govern impeachment trials before the Senate, the Impeachment Trial Committee, after completing its work, submitted a certified record of its proceedings to the Senate and filed its report summarizing the articles of impeachment and the evidence received. On December 7, 2010, the full Senate heard oral arguments from the parties on pending motions and on the merits of the case. On December 8, 2010, the Senate voted to convict Judge Porteous on each of the four articles of impeachment. In rare additional judgment, the Senate, by a vote of 94 to 2, voted to disqualify Judge Porteous from holding any future federal office. On June 14, 2009, the House of Representatives impeached Judge Samuel B. Kent of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. 1:
The President ... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The power to determine whether impeachment is appropriate in a given instance rests solely with the House of Representatives. In addition, should an individual be convicted on any of the articles, the Senate must determine the appropriate judgment: either removal from office alone, or, alternatively, removal and disqualification from holding further offices of "honor, Trust or Profit under the United States." The precedents suggest that removal flows automatically from conviction on one or more articles of impeachment, but if the Senate chooses to impose an additional judgment disqualifying the individual convicted from holding future federal offices, a separate vote is necessary. Conviction on impeachment does not foreclose the possibility of criminal prosecution arising out of the same factual situation. That in the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer of the Senate, if the Senate so orders, shall appoint a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony at such times and places as the committee may determine, and for such purpose the committee so appointed and the chairman thereof, to be elected by the committee, shall (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) exercise all the powers and functions conferred upon the Senate and the Presiding Officer of the Senate, respectively, under the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials. U.S. An 18 th Senate trial, that of George W. English, U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Illinois, was commenced in the Senate, but did not go forward to a judgment on the merits of the case because of the judge's resignation and the House Managers' recommendation and the Senate's agreement that the impeachment proceedings be dismissed. The following are examples of those which went no further than committee or subcommittee referral: resolution to impeach the Ambassador to Iran (1976) (referred to House Judiciary Committee); resolution to impeach United States Ambassador to the United Nations (1977) (referred to House Judiciary Committee); resolution directing House Judiciary Committee to investigate whether to impeach Attorney General of United States (1978) (referred to House Rules and Administration); resolutions to impeach the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1983 and 1985) (referred to Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary); resolutions to impeach members of the Federal Open Market Committee (1983 and 1985) (referred to Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Committee); resolutions to impeach President Ronald Reagan (1983 and 1987) (referred to House Judiciary Committee); and resolutions to impeach President George W. Bush (two in 1991, one in 2006, two in 2008) (referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary); a resolution impeaching Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr (1998) (referred to House Judiciary Committee); a resolution directing the House Committee on the Judiciary to undertake an inquiry into whether grounds existed to impeach President William Jefferson Clinton, to report its findings, and, if the committee so determined, a resolution of impeachment (1998) (referred to House Committee on Rules); a resolution to impeach Secretary of Defense Donald R. Rumsfeld (2004) (referred to House Judiciary Committee, and then to the Subcommittee on the Constitution); a resolution to impeach Vice President Richard B. Cheney (two in 2007) (one referred to House Judiciary, the other to House Judiciary Committee, and then to the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties); and a resolution directing the House Judiciary Committee to investigate whether Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales should be impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors (2007) (referred to the House Rules Committee). For example, Judge John Pickering was convicted on all four of the articles of impeachment brought against him. These are then presented to the Senate for trial. A conviction on any article must be supported by a vote of two-thirds of the Senators present. If the Senate does vote to convict on an article, then it must determine what judgment is to flow from that decision. The Senate has two options: either to remove from office alone, or to remove from office and to prohibit the individual from holding other offices of public trust under the United States in the future. A two-thirds majority is not required. | For the first time since the judicial impeachments of 1986-1989, the House of Representatives has impeached two federal judges. On June 19, 2009, the House voted to impeach U.S. District Judge Samuel B. Kent of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The impeachment trial of Judge Kent before the Senate was dismissed after Judge Kent resigned from office and the House indicated that it did not wish to pursue the matter further.
The impeachment inquiry with respect to U.S. District Court Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., from the Eastern District of Louisiana was initiated in the 110th Congress and continued in the 111th Congress. H.Res. 1031, a resolution impeaching Judge Porteous for high crimes and misdemeanors, was introduced on January 21, 2010. On March 11, 2010, the House impeached Judge Porteous. In four unanimous votes, the House approved each of four articles of impeachment, then agreed to the impeachment resolution by a voice vote. On March 17, 2010, the House Managers presented these articles of impeachment before the bar of the Senate. Pursuant to S.Res. 457, the Senate issued a summons to Judge Porteous to respond to the articles of impeachment. Under S.Res. 458, the Senate created an Impeachment Trial Committee to take and report evidence in the case. After completing its work, the committee submitted a certified record of its proceedings to the Senate and filed its report summarizing the articles of impeachment and the evidence received. On December 7, 2010, the full Senate heard arguments on pending motions and on the merits of the case, then went into closed door deliberations on the motions and the articles of impeachment. On December 8, 2010, the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, voted to convict Judge Porteous on all four of the articles of impeachment brought against him. A judgment of removal from office flowed automatically from his conviction. In a rare additional judgment, the Senate disqualified him from holding federal office in the future.
The impeachment process provides a mechanism for removal of the President, Vice President, and other federal civil officers found to have engaged in "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." The Constitution places the responsibility and authority to determine whether to impeach and to draft articles of impeachment in the hands of the House of Representatives. Should the House vote to impeach and vote articles of impeachment specifying the grounds upon which impeachment is based, the matter is then presented to the Senate for trial. Under the Constitution, the Senate has the sole power to try an impeachment. The decision whether to convict on each of the articles must be made separately. A conviction must be supported by a two-thirds majority of the Senators present. A conviction on any one of the articles of impeachment brought against an individual is sufficient to constitute conviction in the trial of the impeachment. Should a conviction occur, the Senate must determine what the appropriate judgment is in the case. The Constitution limits the judgment to either removal from office or removal and prohibition against holding any future offices of "honor, Trust or Profit under the United States." Under the precedents in the Senate since 1936, removal from office flows automatically from conviction on an article of impeachment. However, a separate vote is necessary should the Senate deem it appropriate to disqualify the individual convicted from holding future federal offices of public trust. Such a vote requires a simple majority. Conviction on impeachment does not foreclose the possibility of criminal prosecution arising out of the same factual situation. The Constitution does not permit the President to extend executive clemency to anyone in order to preclude his or her impeachment by the House or trial or conviction by the Senate. The President has no power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States in cases of impeachment. |
crs_R43616 | crs_R43616_0 | A 1992 peace accord ended the war and assimilated the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla movement into the political process as a political party. Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a former FMLN commander, is in the final year of his five-year presidency. He leads the second consecutively elected FMLN government after years of conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) rule. With both the FMLN and ARENA tarnished by revelations of corruption by former presidents, the leading candidate in the February 3, 2019, presidential contest is Nayib Bukele, a 37-year-old who left the FMLN and is running for the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA) party (see " February 2018 Presidential Election "). El Salvador continues to contend with difficult security conditions despite reported reductions in homicides since 2015, modest economic growth (2.3% in 2017), and political polarization. Both ARENA and the FMLN have lost support due to the previously discussed revelations of corruption involving former presidents. U.S. Relations
U.S. relations with El Salvador have remained friendly, although recent changes in U.S. immigration policies, particularly the January 2018 termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for some 200,000 Salvadorans (discussed below), and U.S. threats to cut foreign assistance have tested relations. Current assistance to El Salvador is guided by the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is designed to promote economic prosperity, strengthen governance, and improve security in the region. The aid has been subject to two sets of legislative conditions that require the Salvadoran government to take steps to address a range of concerns, including border security, corruption, and human rights abuses, prior to receiving assistance. El Salvador also has received regional security assistance provided through the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). The FY2019 foreign aid budget request includes some $45.7 million in bilateral assistance for El Salvador, $12 million less than Congress appropriated in FY2018. The Senate and House Appropriations Committees reported their respective FY2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations measures ( S. 3108 and H.R. 115-282 , the Senate committee bill would provide $47.7 million for El Salvador and $254.7 million for CARSI. 115-829 , the House Appropriations Committee's bill would provide up to $595 million for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, but it does not specify an aid amount for El Salvador. 115-141 . Removals, Temporary Protected Status, and Deferred Action for Child Arrivals
Some 18,830 Salvadorans were removed (deported) from the United States in FY2017, making El Salvador the fourth-largest recipient of deportees in the world. The future of the DACA initiative remains uncertain, as dueling lawsuits are under way in federal courts to preserve DACA and to force its termination. The Trump Administration has changed U.S. asylum programs and policies that have affected Salvadorans. In August 2017, the Administration ended an in-country refugee/parole processing program known as the Central American Minors program for children with parents residing legally in the United States. Gangs
U.S. agencies have engaged with El Salvador and other Central American governments on gang issues for more than a decade, with some regional efforts housed in the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador. In 2017, the United States had a $1.3 billion trade surplus with El Salvador. | Congress has had significant interest in El Salvador, a small Central American nation that has had a large percentage of its population living in the United States since the country's civil conflict (1980-1992). During the 1980s, the U.S. government spent billions of dollars supporting the Salvadoran government's counterinsurgency efforts against the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Three decades later, the United States has worked relatively well with two consecutive, democratically elected FMLN administrations.
President Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a former guerrilla commander of the FMLN, is in the final year of his five-year term. Sánchez Cerén's approval ratings have been significantly lower than those of prior presidents, as security conditions remain serious and economic growth remains moderate (2.3% in 2017). Polarization between the FMLN government and the conservative Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)-dominated National Assembly has magnified those challenges.
Political attention is on the February 3, 2019, first-round presidential elections. Nayib Bukele, a former mayor of San Salvador (2015-2018) standing for the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA) party, leads the FMLN and ARENA candidates. Both of those parties have lost support due to revelations of corruption involving former presidents, including the August 2018 conviction of former ARENA president Tony Saca.
U.S. policy in El Salvador continues to focus on promoting economic prosperity, improving security, and strengthening governance, the three objectives of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. Congress appropriated $57.7 million in bilateral assistance for El Salvador in the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-141) to support those objectives. P.L. 115-141 withholds 75% of assistance for the Salvadoran central government until it addresses concerns such as border security, corruption, and human rights abuses. El Salvador also benefits from regional security assistance provided through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and a Millennium Challenge Corporation compact (MCC).
The Trump Administration requested $45.7 million for U.S. efforts in El Salvador in FY2019. The Senate Appropriations Committee's FY2019 foreign aid appropriations measure (S. 3108) would provide $47.7 million for El Salvador. The House Appropriations Committee's foreign aid appropriations bill (H.R. 6385) would not specify a funding level for El Salvador. Both bills maintain conditions on aid to the central government. A resolution adopted by the House, H.Res. 145, called on the Salvadoran government to support ongoing anti-corruption efforts, and a provision in the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-232) requires the Secretary of State to name Salvadoran officials known to have engaged in, or facilitated, acts of grand corruption or narcotics trafficking.
President Trump's shifts in U.S. immigration policies have tested bilateral relations. In January 2018, the Trump Administration rescinded the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) that has shielded some 200,000 Salvadorans from removal (deportation) since 2001. The future of TPS and the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals (DACA) initiative, which has protected some 26,500 Salvadorans brought to the United States as children from removal since 2012, remains uncertain pending litigation in federal courts.
For more information, see CRS Report RL34112, Gangs in Central America; CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and Current Issues; and CRS Report R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress. |
crs_RL31740 | crs_RL31740_0 | 108-792 ) to the FY2005 omnibus appropriations bill ( H.R. The Administration has threatened to veto the measure if it contained provisionsweakening Cuba sanctions. 647 ) to the FY2005 Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations bill, H.R. Political Conditions
Although Cuba has undertaken some limited economic reforms in recent years, politicallythe country remains a hard-line communist state. Legislative Initiatives. H.Res. S.Res. Economic Conditions(10)
With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severeeconomic deterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been improvement since 1994. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the islandnation through comprehensive economic sanctions. Another component of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the Cuban people, aso-called second track of U.S. policy. There has been considerable reaction to the Administration's June2004 tightening of restrictions for family visits and other categories of travel. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances .) Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
Overall Direction of U.S. Policy
Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective of U.S.policy toward Cuba -- to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island -- therehave been several schools of thought about how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policyof keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuingcurrent U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referredto as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting theCuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. 2494 . 4818 , H.Rept. The House-passed version of the FY2005 Transportation/Treasury appropriations bill, H.R. Several additional initiatives were introduced in the 108th Congress that would have liftedrestrictions in whole or in part on food and medical exports to Cuba, but no action was taken onthese measures. Three broad bills, H.R. In the second session of the 108th Congress, the House-passed version of the FY2005Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations bill, H.R. 4754 , included a provision(Section 801) that would have prohibited funds from being used to implement, administer, or enforcerecent amendments to the Cuba embargo regulations that tightened restrictions on gift parcels andbaggage taken by individuals for travel to Cuba. 5025 , and the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the bill, S. 2806 , had provisions that would have eased Cuba travel sanctions in various ways, but theseprovision were not included in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations measure ( H.R. H.R. Division A, covering agriculture appropriations, dropped the Cuba provision that had beenincluded in the Senate committee version of S. 2803 (Section 776) that would haveeased restrictions on travel to Cuba if it was related to the commercial sale of agricultural andmedical products. 5025 that would have eased Cuba sanctions on family and educational travel andon private commercial sales of agricultural and medical products; and one Senate provision in thecommittee version S. 2806 that would have prohibited funds from administering orenforcing restrictions on Cuba travel. S.Res. S.Res. Modification of Sanctions
H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. Transportation, Treasury,and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, FY2005. H.R. S. 403 (Baucus). S. 950 (Enzi). S. 2449 (Baucus)/ H.R. H.R. | Cuba under Fidel Castro remains a hard-line communist state with a poor record on humanrights that has deteriorated significantly since 2003. With the cutoff of assistance from the formerSoviet Union, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989 to 1993. While there hasbeen some improvement since 1994, as Cuba has implemented limited reforms, the economyremains in poor shape.
Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the islandnation through comprehensive economic sanctions. Another component of U.S. policy consists ofsupport measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations andU.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. The Bush Administration has furthertightened restrictions on travel for family visits, other categories of travel, and on sending privatehumanitarian assistance to Cuba. While there appears to be broad agreement on the overall objectiveof U.S. policy toward Cuba -- to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island,there are several schools of thought on how to achieve that objective. Some advocate maximumpressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted; others argue for lifting some U.S.sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people. Still others call for a swift normalizationof U.S.-Cuban relations.
Several FY2005 appropriations bills had provisions that would have eased Cuba sanctions,but ultimately these provisions were not included in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations measure( H.R. 4818 , H.Rept. 108-792 ). The House-passed version of the FY2005 Commerce,Justice, and State appropriations bill, H.R. 4754 , would have prohibited funds toimplement recent restrictions on gift parcels and on baggage for travelers. The House-passed versionof the FY2005 Transportation/Treasury appropriations bill, H.R. 5025 , had three Cubaprovisions that would have eased sanctions on family and educational travel, and on privatecommercial sales of agricultural and medical products; the Senate committee version of the bill, S. 2806 , would have prohibited funds from administering or enforcing restrictions onCuba travel. The Senate committee version of the FY2005 Agriculture appropriation bill, S. 2803 , would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba if it was related to thecommercial sale of agricultural and medical products. The Administration had threatened to vetoboth the Transportation/Treasury and Agriculture appropriations measures if they had provisionsweakening Cuba sanctions.
In other action, the 108th Congress demonstrated concern about the poor human rightssituation by approving four resolutions: S.Res. 97 , H.Res. 179 , S.Res. 62 , and S.Res. 328 . Numerous additional legislative initiatives wereintroduced that would have eased sanctions on Cuba, but no action was completed on these bills: H.R. 187 , H.R. 188 , H.R. 1698 , H.R. 2071 , H.R. 3422 , H.R. 4678 , S. 403 , S. 950 , and S. 2449 / H.R. 4457 . Two initiatives, H.R. 3470 and H.R. 3670 , would have tightened sanctions. H.R. 2494 / S. 2002 would have repealed a provision in law that prohibits trademark registration or courts fromconsidering trademark claims if the trademark was used in connection with confiscated assets inCuba; in contrast, H.R. 4225 / S. 2373 would have applied a narrow fix tothe law so that it conformed with a World Trade Organization ruling. |
crs_R41182 | crs_R41182_0 | Introduction
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has provided housing assistance for low-income households through numerous programs. In exchange for assistance from HUD, owners agreed to provide affordable housing to tenants for a period of time, anywhere from 20 to 50 years depending on the program. Efforts to maintain the affordability of the remaining HUD-assisted properties as their affordability restrictions come to an end are often referred to as "assisted housing preservation." This report focuses on assisted housing preservation efforts involving six specific HUD programs, three of which provided financing assistance to private owners through low-interest loans and/or mortgage insurance, and three of which provided rental assistance to owners. In some cases, property owners received both financing and rental assistance from HUD. The primary programs that used these incentives were the Section 202 loan program, the Section 221(d)(3) BMIR program, and the Section 236 program, each named for the section of the housing acts under which they were created. However, in order to attract developers to the Section 236 program, some contracts enabled owners to prepay their mortgages after 20 years. In addition, some tenants in Section 236 housing have their rents subsidized. Congress stopped providing funding for LMSA in FY1994. Under the Housing Preservation Program , HUD entered into project-based Section 8 contracts with owners of HUD-assisted multifamily properties (including Section 221(d)(3) and Section 236 insured mortgages) at risk of leaving the affordable housing stock as an incentive to owners keep their properties affordable. Financing Assistance: Mortgage Prepayment and Maturation
The federal affordability restrictions on assisted housing come to an end when owners prepay their mortgages (if prepayment is an option), when the mortgages mature, or if HUD chooses to terminate its contract with a housing provider. However, if the property is in poor condition, then the owner may not have the option to renew the contract, as HUD may choose not to renew. In some cases, families do not receive tenant protection or enhanced vouchers when affordability agreements end. While these laws are no longer in effect, the properties that went through their preservation processes are still governed by the agreements that were established at the time. Rental Assistance
Section 8 Expiring Contracts, Renewals, and the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Accountability Act (MAHRA)
Both ELIHPA and LIHPRHA were primarily focused on the stock of housing eligible for mortgage prepayment; neither law addressed another threat to the assisted housing stock identified in the 1987 Preservation Task Force report: the cost of renewing project-based rental-assistance contracts. A third possible cost may be providing incentives to owners to encourage them to maintain affordability or to sell to a purchaser who will. Roughly 42% are owned by for-profit owners. In recent years, particularly as concern about maturing mortgages has grown, there have been calls from low-income housing advocates, tenants'-rights organizations, and property owners to adopt policies that encourage preservation and expand the set of preservation tools available to HUD. Generally, when owners have received preservation incentives in the past they have been required to extend any affordability restrictions (for between five and 30 years, depending on the incentive) and, in some cases, renew any expiring rental-assistance contracts. Funding could also be provided for direct grants or loans to help preservation entities purchase and rehabilitate a property. In addition, the Administration has proposed a Rental Assistance Demonstration that is meant, in part, to preserve Rental Assistance Payment (RAP) program and Rent Supplement-subsidized units. | The term "assisted housing preservation" refers to public policy efforts to maintain the affordability of rental properties financed or subsidized by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) but owned by private for-profit or nonprofit organizations. Beginning in the late 1950s, HUD extended mortgage and/or rental assistance to owners, in exchange for which the owners agreed to make their units affordable to low- and, in some cases, moderate-income tenants. The agreements to maintain affordability, sometimes called "affordability restrictions," were to last between 20 years and 50 years depending on the program. When these affordability restrictions come to an end, owners have the option to stop providing affordable housing to tenants. In some, but not all, cases, tenants living in units that are leaving the assisted housing stock receive housing vouchers that are meant to prevent their displacement.
Properties at issue in assisted housing preservation were developed through various programs. HUD provided mortgage assistance or direct loans to owners through the Section 202 loan program and the Section 236 and Section 221(d)(3) Below Market Interest Rate (BMIR) mortgage insurance programs, all named for the sections of the housing acts under which they were created. HUD also subsidized tenant rents through programs such as the Rent Supplement program, the Rental Assistance Payment program, and the Section 8 project-based rental-assistance program. In some cases, owners received both mortgage financing assistance and rental assistance.
Property owners that received mortgage financing assistance can end their federal obligation to provide affordable housing early by prepaying their mortgages (in some cases), or end it when the mortgage terms come to an end. Owners that entered into rental-assistance contracts with HUD can choose not to renew their contracts when they end. In some cases, HUD can choose to terminate assistance contracts with owners when properties are in poor physical or financial condition. In the past, Congress attempted to reduce the number of property owners that leave HUD-assisted housing programs by restricting owners' abilities to prepay their mortgages. However, these laws (known by their acronyms, ELIHPA and LIHPRHA) faced legal challenges and are no longer in effect. Currently, the primary preservation tool available to HUD is the ability to restructure debt and rental assistance in Section 8 contracts, as authorized by the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Accountability Act (MAHRA).
There have been several proposals to expand the tools available to HUD to help preserve assisted housing. Recent proposals would, in general, focus on incentives to owners to remain in HUD programs or to encourage "preservation purchasers" to buy the properties and maintain affordability. However, any new incentives will require additional funding. In a limited funding environment, questions regarding preservation include whether all properties can and should be preserved, and, if not, which should be the highest priority.
This report introduces the concept of assisted housing preservation; provides background information; and discusses current public policy issues, HUD actions to promote preservation, and proposed legislation. |
crs_RL33346 | crs_RL33346_0 | Most Recent Developments
The Bush Administration's FY2007 budget request was released in February 2006. The request followed the reorganization of appropriations subcommittees in 2005, in which the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill acquired Department of Energy (DOE) programs that previously had been included in the appropriations bill for Interior and Related Agencies. Status
Overview
The Energy and Water Development bill has historically included funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), most of DOE, and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). Tables 4 through 15 provide budget details for Title I (Corps of Engineers), Title II (Department of the Interior), Title III (Department of Energy), and Title IV (independent agencies) for FY2005-FY2006. Title I: Army Corps of Engineers
Under P.L. The California Bay-Delta Restoration project was funded at the level requested by the President, but $1.5 million lower than the House. Nuclear Waste Disposal
DOE's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) is responsible for developing a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for disposal of nuclear reactor spent fuel and defense-related high-level radioactive waste. The committee called for the report to be submitted to Congress. 5427 as passed by the House provided that amount. These nonproliferation and national security programs are included in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill in the past included funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), most of the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies. For FY2006, the Congress reorganized the appropriations subcommittees and the content of the various appropriations bills to be introduced. In the case of Energy and Water Development, the only changes were the consolidation of DOE programs that had previously been funded by the Interior and Related Agencies bill. That organization was followed by the Administration in submitting its FY2007 budget request in February 2006.
Key budgetary issues involving these programs include
the need to balance efforts by the Army Corps of Engineers to prevent storm damage in Louisiana with the rest of the agency's portfolio of authorized projects (Title I); support of major ecosystem restoration initiatives, such as Florida Everglades (Title I) and California "Bay-Delta" (CALFED) (Title II); funding for the proposed national nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and proposals to store nuclear spent fuel temporarily (Title III: Nuclear Waste Disposal); and the Administration's proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership to supply plutonium-based fuel to other nations (Title III: Nuclear Energy). |
crs_R42358 | crs_R42358_0 | Introduction
The United States government utilizes the services of hundreds of thousands of employees and contractors overseas. In some instances, U.S. agreements with the host nation preclude local prosecution of the crimes they commit. Federal law, as now written, does not always permit federal prosecution. The Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act ( H.R. 2136 and S. 1145 ) would fill some of the perceived gaps. The 112 th Congress adjourned without taking further action on either proposal. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) applies to certain felonies committed by those employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces abroad. Who
The House and Senate bills in the 112 th Congress supplement rather than amend MEJA. Thus, prosecutors would be free to proceed under either MEJA or the bill's proposed section, in cases involving employees, dependants, or contractors of such civilian agencies whose activities related to support of a Defense Department mission. The bills would shift the burden to the Attorney General, to be shared by the departments and agencies with covered employees, contractors, and grantees. Under some circumstances, the applicable statute of limitations will be suspended. Both bills would afford the government an additional venue option. They would permit trial in the district in which the employing or contracting agency maintains its headquarters. 3272
(a) Whoever, while employed by or accompanying any department or agency of the United States other than the Department of Defense, knowingly engages in conduct (or conspires or attempts to engage in conduct) outside the United States that would constitute an offense enumerated in subsection (c) had the conduct been engaged in within the United States or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be punished as provided for that offense....
(c) The offenses covered by subsection (a) are the following:
(1) Any offense under chapter 5 (arson) of this title [18 U.S.C. | The United States government uses hundreds of thousands of civilian contractors and employees overseas. They and their dependants are often subject to local prosecution for the crimes they commit abroad. Whether by agreement, practice, or circumstance—sometimes they are not. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) permits federal prosecution of certain crimes committed abroad by Defense Department civilian employees, contractors, or their dependants. The Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA; H.R. 2136) (Representative Price of North Carolina) and S. 1145 (Senator Leahy) would permit federal prosecution for certain crimes committed abroad by the civilian employees, dependants, or contractors of other federal agencies.
The bills would supplement rather than replace MEJA or other provisions of federal extraterritorial jurisdiction. The crimes covered would include various federal violent, corruption, and trafficking offenses. The Attorney General would be responsible to ensure the availability of personnel and other resources necessary for investigation and prosecution of such offenses.
Otherwise applicable statutes of limitation would be suspended during the absence of a suspect from the United States. Prosecutors would be afforded the additional option of trying cases under CEJA in the district in which the employing or contracting agency maintained its headquarters.
S. 1145 was sent to the floor without a written report and essentially without amendment on June 23, 2011. The 112th Congress adjourned without taking further action on either bill. |
crs_R43313 | crs_R43313_0 | U.S. policymakers are closely monitoring the implementation of the December 2013 constitutional reforms and August 2014 implementing laws that, among other things, allow Mexico's Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) to partner with international companies and other industry entrants to boost Mexican production. At his inauguration, President Peña Nieto announced a reformist agenda aimed at bolstering Mexico's competitiveness that included energy sector reform. Key elements of the reforms include
Maintaining state ownership of subsoil hydrocarbons resources, but allowing companies to take ownership of those resources once they are extracted and to book reserves for accounting purposes; Creating four types of contracts for exploration and production: service contracts (companies are paid for activities done on behalf of the state), profit-sharing contracts, production sharing contracts, and licenses (enabling a company to obtain ownership of the oil or gas at the wellhead after it has paid taxes); Opening refining, transport, storage, natural gas processing, and petrochemicals sectors to private investment; Transforming Pemex into a productive state enterprise with an autonomous budget and a board of directors that does not include union representatives; Strengthening four federal entities with regulatory roles in the hydrocarbons industry (the Ministries of Energy and Finance, the National Hydrocarbons Commission or CNH, and the Energy Regulatory Commission) and creating a National Agency for Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection; and Establishing a sovereign wealth fund, the Mexican Petroleum Fund for Stabilization and Development, to be managed by the Central Bank. Even though Round Zero did not open up new fields for private companies to bid on, it did increase the opportunities for private involvement in exploration and production in Mexico. On December 14, 2014, the Mexican government announced the terms under which companies already incorporated in the country could bid on production-sharing contracts to explore 14 shallow-water fields of prospective light crude in the Gulf of Mexico. On July 15, 2015, Mexico's Energy Ministry announced the bidding results. The results have been deemed disappointing by energy analysts, as only 2 of the 14 blocks available were awarded. While analysts concur that there is still interest in Mexico's remaining "round one" offerings even though oil prices are low, they predict that the government will have to offer more competitive terms in order to garner greater interest. As a free trade partner, exports of U.S. natural gas to Mexico are assumed in the public interest by U.S. statute and permitted without delay, which has spurred U.S. natural gas exports to Mexico. Although Mexico is one of the world's largest crude oil exporters, it is a net importer of refined petroleum products. Since Mexico remains a top U.S. crude oil supplier and many of its untapped resources lie in deep waters in the Gulf of Mexico and in shale formations abutting the U.S. border, the countries want to ensure that Pemex (or other companies) develop those resources in an environmentally responsible way. Although Mexico is trying to diversify its energy sources, it, like the United States, is likely to continue relying on oil and natural gas from traditional and unconventional (i.e., shale) sources. Now that the United States and Mexico have approved the Agreement, the moratorium is considered moot. Impact on the U.S. Oil and Natural Gas Sectors and the Bilateral Energy Trade
The opening of Mexico's oil and natural gas sector to foreign investors poses significant changes in the U.S.-Mexico energy relationship that may have advantages and disadvantages for both sides. Reversing Mexico's production decline would add more oil to the global market and enhance U.S. energy security. The House approved a related bill on January 21, 2015 ( H.R. 161 ). The most important of those reforms may be the energy reforms promulgated on December 20, 2013, and implemented by secondary laws signed on August 11, 2014, that allow for private participation in Mexico's oil and gas sector in ways not possible since the sector was nationalized in 1938. This report will be updated periodically to inform the U.S. Congress on the implementation of oil and gas reforms in Mexico and to analyze how the reforms may impact Mexico's economic performance, the U.S. oil and natural gas sector, and bilateral energy relations. | The future of oil and natural gas production in Mexico is of importance for both Mexico's economic growth, as well as for U.S. energy security, a key congressional interest. Mexico is a top trade partner and the third-largest crude oil supplier to the United States. Mexico's state oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) remains an important source of government revenue even as it is struggling to counter declining oil production and reserves. Due to an inability to meet rising demand, Mexico has also significantly increased natural gas imports from the United States. Still, gas shortages have hindered the country's economic performance.
On December 20, 2013, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto signed historic constitutional reforms related to Mexico's energy sector aimed at reversing oil and gas production declines. On August 11, 2014, secondary laws to implement those reforms officially opened Mexico's oil, natural gas, and power sectors to private investment. As a result, Pemex can now partner with international companies that have the experience and capital required for exploring Mexico's vast deep water and shale resources. Leftist parties and others remain opposed to the reforms.
The energy reforms transform Pemex into a "productive state enterprise" with more autonomy and a lower tax burden than before, but make it subject to competition with private investors. They create different types of contracts for private companies interested in investing in Mexico, including production-sharing and licensing; allow companies to post reserves for accounting purposes; establish a sovereign wealth fund; and create new regulators. In December 2014, the Mexican government announced the terms of part one of Round 1, under which shallow-water offshore exploratory blocks available for public bidding would be auctioned. On July 15, 2015, Mexico's Energy Ministry announced that only 2 of the 14 blocks available were awarded to successful bidders. The government has altered the terms of the second round of bidding on September 30, including lowering the amount of upfront investment required by companies to bid and increasing the size of the blocks available, in order to attract more interest.
The U.S. Congress has legislative and oversight interests in examining the implications of Mexico's oil and natural gas reforms on U.S. hydrocarbon imports and exports, bilateral trade and investment, and economic conditions in Mexico. In December 2013, Congress approved the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement (P.L. 113-67), which aims to facilitate joint development of oil and natural gas in part of the Gulf of Mexico. The 114th Congress is likely to consider legislative proposals to speed up energy infrastructure development, including cross-border natural gas pipelines, as was approved by the House on January 21, 2015 (H.R. 161). Congress may also consider proposals to revise U.S. crude oil export policy. See also CRS Report R43442, U.S. Crude Oil Export Policy: Background and Considerations, by [author name scrubbed] et al.
The opening of Mexico's oil and natural gas sector could expand U.S.-Mexico energy trade and provide opportunities for U.S. companies involved in the hydrocarbons sector, as well as infrastructure and other oil field services. If these reforms accelerate growth and investment in Mexico (as the government has stated), they could also benefit North American competitiveness. Industry analysts maintain that the reforms are generally well-designed, but that the way they are implemented will likely determine their impact. The success of the reforms may also depend on trends in global oil prices. Should oil prices remain at current levels, shale resources and other unconventional fields may not be feasible to develop at this time. |
crs_R44428 | crs_R44428_0 | Overview
Each fiscal year, Congress and the President engage in a number of practices that influence short- and long-run revenue and expenditure trends. On the revenue side of the budget, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. On the spending side, baseline discretionary spending levels are largely constrained by the caps and automatic spending reductions enacted as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) and further modified by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74 ). Subsequent legislation has revised the spending reductions established in the BCA. Several months after the shutdown, the second piece of legislation modifying the BCA, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P.L. The BCA contained a variety of measures intended to reduce the deficit by at least $2.1 trillion over the FY2012-FY2021 period, along with a mechanism to increase the debt limit. ATRA included a number of spending provisions. 113-67 ). Various deficit reduction measures were included to offset the cost of increases to discretionary spending. Budget for FY2017
The Obama Administration submitted its FY2017 budget to Congress on February 9, 2016. If the policies are fully implemented, the Administration estimates that total FY2017 outlays would be $4,147 billion (21.5% of GDP) and revenues would be $3,644 billion (18.9% of GDP), resulting in a budget deficit of $503 billion (2.6% of GDP). Though the budget achieves net deficit reduction over the 10-year budget window, it does not identify which policy initiatives specifically offset the proposed increases in the discretionary caps. The budget also proposes to eliminate the sequester on mandatory programs through FY2025. Additional deficit reduction is proposed through various changes to the tax code, immigration reform, and other mandatory health programs. The proposals in the President's budget are projected to result in deficit reductions of $3,640 billion over the next decade relative to the Administration-calculated adjusted baseline. The FY2017 Congressional Budget Resolution
The Budget Committees in the House and Senate each work to develop a budget resolution as they receive information and testimony from various sources, such as the Administration, CBO, and congressional committees with jurisdiction over spending and revenues. In February, House Budget Committee Chairman Tom Price (R-GA) and Senate Budget Committee Chairman Mike Enzi (R-WY) began the process of preparing budget resolutions in advance of House and Senate consideration. Absent an agreement of a budget resolution conference report for FY2017 by the House and Senate, the BBA 2015 provides that the Senate Budget Committee chairman submit an allocation of FY2017 budgetary resources for publication in the Congressional Record between April 15, 2016, and May 15, 2016. As discussed above, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015) raised the caps on defense and nondefense budget authority as implemented by the BCA for FY2016 and FY2017. CBO, GAO, and the Administration agree that the current mix of federal fiscal policies is unsustainable in the long term. | The federal budget is a central component of the congressional "power of the purse." Each fiscal year, Congress and the President engage in a number of practices that influence short- and long-run revenue and expenditure trends. This report offers context for the current budget debate, and tracks legislative events related to the federal budget as they occur.
In recent years, policies enacted to decrease spending, along with a stronger economy, have led to reduced budget deficits. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) implemented several measures intended to reduce the deficit from FY2012-FY2021. Three subsequent pieces of legislation have modified the BCA since its enactment—the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P.L. 113-67), and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74). These measures modified the discretionary budget authority levels permitted under the BCA for FY2013 through FY2017. Various deficit reduction measures were included to offset the costs of the changes to spending levels in that legislation, including extensions of the mandatory portion of spending reductions established by the BCA. The BCA will continue to affect spending limits in FY2017 and beyond, and Congress may debate enacting further modifications.
The Obama Administration released its budget for FY2017 on February 9, 2016. If the policies included in the budget proposal are fully implemented, spending (outlays) would total an estimated $4,147 billion (21.5% of GDP) and revenues an estimated $3,644 billion (18.9% of GDP) in FY2017. Over the 10-year window, the proposed budget would decrease the deficit from an estimated 3.3% of GDP in FY2016 to 2.8% of GDP in FY2026, averaging 2.6% of GDP over the next decade.
The President's budget proposes a small decrease in the FY2017 cap on nondefense discretionary budget authority, followed by larger increases in the defense and nondefense discretionary caps for FY2018 through FY2021. The budget also proposes to eliminate the sequester on mandatory programs through FY2025. Deficit reduction is proposed through various changes to the tax code, immigration reform, and mandatory health programs.
Congressional consideration of the FY2017 budget is underway. The Budget Committees in the House and Senate each develop a budget resolution as they receive information and testimony from a number of sources, including the Administration, the Congressional Budget Office, and congressional committees with jurisdiction over spending and revenues. In February, House Budget Committee Chairman Tom Price (R-GA) and Senate Budget Committee Chairman Mike Enzi (R-WY) began the process of preparing budget resolutions in advance of consideration in the House and Senate. Absent an agreement on a budget resolution conference report for FY2017 by the House and Senate, the BBA 2015 provides that the Senate Budget Committee Chairman submit an allocation for publication in the Congressional Record of FY2017 budgetary resources between April 15, 2016, and May 15, 2016.
Though the federal budget deficit has fallen in recent years, trends resulting from current federal fiscal policies are generally thought by economists to be unsustainable in the long term. Projections suggest that achieving a sustainable long-term trajectory for the federal budget will require deficit reduction. Reductions in deficits could be accomplished through revenue increases, spending reductions, or some combination of the two. |
crs_R40431 | crs_R40431_0 | Introduction
P.L. 114-94 , the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, was signed by President Obama on December 4, 2015. The act reauthorizes federal highway and mass transit programs through the end of FY2020. It also authorizes to be appropriated about $305 billion for these programs, an increase of about 4.2% over current funding levels plus projected inflation for highway programs ($225.19 billion versus $216.122 billion) and 7.9% over current funding levels plus projected inflation for public transportation programs ($48.904 billion versus $45.331 billion). Although the federal presence, and influence, on surface transportation policy remains significant, FAST is a continuation of previous reauthorizations' emphasis on increasing state decisionmaking authority. State and local government officials contend that providing them added flexibility in surface transportation policy is justified because they are better able to identify surface transportation needs in their states than federal officials and are capable of administering federal grant funds with relatively minimal federal oversight. They also argue that states have a long history of learning from one another. In their view, providing flexibility in the use of federal funds results in better surface transportation policy because it enables states to experiment with innovative solutions to surface transportation problems and then share their experiences with other states. Others argue that the federal government has a responsibility to ensure that federal funds are used in the most efficient and effective manner possible to promote the national interest in expanding national economic growth and protecting the environment. In their view, providing states increased flexibility in the use of federal funds diminishes the federal government's ability to ensure that national needs are met. Still others have argued for a fundamental restructuring of federal and state government responsibilities in surface transportation policy, with some responsibilities devolved to states and others remaining with the federal government. This report provides a historical perspective on contemporary federalism issues in surface transportation policy since the beginning of the nation. It includes a discussion of the five multi-year reauthorizations of the Federal-Highway Act since 1987:
1. the $151 billion, six-year Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA; P.L. 102-240 ) signed by President George H. W. Bush on December 18, 1991; the $203.4 billion, six-year Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-21; P.L. 105-178 ) signed by President Bill Clinton on June 9, 1998; the $286 billion, six-year Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA; P.L. 109-59 ) signed by President George W. Bush on August 10, 2005; the $118 billion ($105.2 billion for FY2013 and FY2014), 27-month, Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ) signed by President Barack Obama on July 6, 2012; and the $305 billion, five year Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST; P.L. 114-94 ), signed by President Barack Obama on December 4, 2015. Of particular interest to state and local government officials, the Senate's DRIVE Act would have
expanded eligibility for TIFIA loans (e.g., to include state infrastructure banks, transit-oriented development, environmental mitigation, projects located in rural areas; smaller projects, and projects administered by local governments and public authorities); provided states greater flexibility in approving small highway improvement projects in rural areas; removed limitations on the conversion of HOV facilities on the Interstate System; removed the 80% federal cost share limitation for toll roads; authorized the establishment of a toll credit marketplace pilot program that would have allowed up to 10 participating states to sell or transfer "toll credits" among one another; required states (limited to three) participating in the Interstate System Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Pilot Program, which allows participating states to place tolls on existing Interstate highways under specified circumstances, to put the tolling project out to bid within one year of the state's acceptance into the program and under contract within two years; states already provided conditional approval have one year from enactment to put the tolling project out to bid and two to have the project under contract, otherwise the conditional approval will be canceled (use or lose provision); expanded upon MAP-21's project delivery reforms by (1) focusing on the use of "programmatic agreements" during project review to better delineate responsibilities, reduce duplication of effort, and establish clear expectations for review timeframes and processing options, (2) encouraging the expanded use of categorical exclusions (CEs) by directing the U.S. Department of Transportation to allow CEs to be implemented through a programmatic agreement, and (3) establishing review deadlines to reduce project review delays; provided additional funding for mass transit, particularly for the Bus and Bus Facilities Program; added public ports, intercity bus operators, and commuter vanpool providers as parties that Metropolitan Planning Organizations are required to give reasonable opportunity to comment on the area's transportation plan; consolidated nine existing Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) truck and bus safety grant programs into four and streamlined program requirements to reduce administrative costs and regulatory burdens on states; and eliminated the ability of states to transfer up to 50% of their Transportation Alternatives Program (TAP) to other highway programs (states would be required to sub-allocate 100% of their TAP apportionment to local areas based on population, rather than the 50% required under MAP-21). For example, FAST provides states greater flexibility in the use of federal highway assistance by converting the Surface Transportation Program (STP) into a block grant; rolling the Transportation Alternatives Program into the STP and allowing 50% of local government transportation alternatives funding to be used on any STP-eligible project; and consolidating truck and bus safety grant programs. FAST also includes changes to the project delivery approval process in an effort to reduce the average project delivery time for highway and mass transit construction projects. | P.L. 114-94, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, was signed by President Obama on December 4, 2015. The act reauthorizes federal highway and mass transit programs through the end of FY2020. It also authorizes to be appropriated about $305 billion for these programs, an increase of about 4.2% over current funding levels plus projected inflation for highway programs and 7.9% over current funding levels plus projected inflation for public transportation programs.
Although the federal presence, and influence, on surface transportation policy remains significant, FAST is a continuation of previous reauthorizations' emphasis on increasing state decisionmaking authority. For example, FAST provides states greater flexibility in the use of federal highway assistance by converting the Surface Transportation Program (STP) into a block grant; rolling the Transportation Alternatives Program into the STP and allowing 50% of local government transportation alternatives funding to be used on any STP-eligible project; and consolidating truck and bus safety grant programs. FAST also includes changes to the project delivery approval process in an effort to reduce the average project delivery time for highway and mass transit construction projects.
For many years, state and local government officials have lobbied for increased federal assistance for surface transportation grants and increased flexibility in the use of those funds. They argue that they are better able to identify surface transportation needs in their states than federal officials and are capable of administering federal grant funds with relatively minimal federal oversight. They also argue that states have a long history of learning from one another. In their view, providing states added flexibility in the use of federal funds results in better surface transportation policy because it enables states to experiment with innovative solutions to surface transportation problems and then share their experiences with other states.
Others argue that the federal government has a responsibility to ensure that federal funds are used in the most efficient and effective manner possible to promote the national interest in expanding national economic growth and protecting the environment. In their view, providing states increased flexibility in the use of federal funds diminishes the federal government's ability to ensure that national needs are met. Still others have argued for a fundamental restructuring of federal and state government responsibilities in surface transportation policy, with some responsibilities devolved to states and others remaining with the federal government.
This report provides a historical perspective on contemporary federalism issues in surface transportation policy since the beginning of the nation. It includes a discussion of the five multi-year reauthorizations of the Federal-Highway Act since 1987:
1. the $151 billion, six-year Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA; P.L. 102-240) signed by President George H. W. Bush on December 18, 1991. 2. the $203.4 billion, six-year Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21; P.L. 105-178) signed by President Bill Clinton on June 9, 1998. 3. the $286 billion, six-year Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA; P.L. 109-59) signed by President George W. Bush on August 10, 2005. 4. the $118 billion ($105.2 billion for FY2013 and FY2014), 27-month, Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141) signed by President Barack Obama on July 6, 2012. 5. the $305 billion, five-year Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST; P.L. 114-94), signed by President Barack Obama on December 4, 2015. |
crs_R42476 | crs_R42476_0 | Overview
The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. The President requested $13.24 billion for the Treasury Department for FY2013, an increase of $1.03 billion above FY2012 enacted amounts. Title III: The Judiciary
Title III of the FSGG appropriations bill provides funding for the judicial branch of the federal government, including the Supreme Court. | The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. Among those independent agencies are the General Services Administration (GSA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the United States Postal Service (USPS). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded in the House through the Agriculture appropriations bill and in the Senate through the Financial Services and General Government bill. CFTC funding is included in all FSGG funding tables in this report. For FY2013, the President has requested $45.83 billion for agencies funded through FSGG appropriations, an increase of $1.41 billion above amounts enacted for FY2012. |
crs_RS20962 | crs_RS20962_0 | Morocco and Mauritania opposed Spain's plan and each claimed the territory. The independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro, or Polisario resisted the Moroccan-Mauritanian takeover. Morocco's armed forces and Polisario guerrillas fought a long war in the desert until the United Nations (U.N.) proposed a settlement plan in 1988 and arranged a cease-fire in 1991. U.N. Security Council Resolution 690 (1991) established the United Nations Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) and called for a referendum to offer a choice between independence and integration into Morocco. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1301 (2000) asked the parties to consider alternatives to a referendum. Algeria declined to negotiate with Morocco, insisting that it is not a party to the dispute and not a substitute for the Sahrawis. Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007) called on Morocco and the Polisario to negotiate without preconditions on a political solution that would provide for the self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara. On April 11, 2007, Morocco presented an autonomy plan for the Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty, without the prospect of independence, for negotiation to the U.N. Secretary-General. The Polisario, along with human rights advocates and some diplomats, has called for the U.N. Security Council to add human rights monitoring to MINURSO's mandate. United States Policy
The United States has recognized neither Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara nor the SADR. In November 2009, during a visit to Morocco, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that there had been "no change" in U.S. policy on Western Sahara—that is, that the United States supported the U.N.-led mediation effort and would not stake out positions about how U.N. mediation might best resolve the issue. In an appearance in 2011 with then-Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri, Clinton referred to Morocco's autonomy plan as "serious, realistic, and credible—a potential approach to satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity." Congressional Activities
Many Members of Congress have endorsed Morocco's autonomy initiative. Others support a referendum and/or are concerned about human rights in Moroccan-administered areas of the territory. Congressional positions have been regularly expressed through provisions in foreign aid appropriations legislation and related reporting requirements:
Implementation of Morocco aid in Western Sahara. The FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 113-76 , January 17, 2014) states that bilateral economic assistance appropriated for Morocco "should also be available for assistance for the territory of the Western Sahara." It has been the policy of successive Administrations that funds appropriated for bilateral foreign assistance to Morocco may not be programmed in Western Sahara, as this could represent a tacit acknowledgment of Moroccan sovereignty. 113-81 , the update should include "steps taken during the previous 12 months by the Government of Morocco to release political prisoners and support a human rights monitoring and reporting role for the U.N. Mission in Western Sahara in cooperation with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights." For its part, Morocco continues to insist that its autonomy proposal is the only basis for a solution. These reports are designed to inform what King Mohammed VI has portrayed as a broader process of decentralization or "regionalization" that he says will empower residents of his "southern provinces" as well as other Moroccans. As noted, there are few independent reports on conditions in the camps, and the number of refugees is disputed. | Since the 1970s, Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have vied, at times violently, for control of the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony. In 1991, the United Nations (U.N.) arranged a cease-fire and proposed a settlement plan calling for a referendum to allow the people of the Western Sahara to choose between independence and integration into Morocco. A long deadlock on determining the electorate for a referendum ensued. (The number of Sahrawis, as the indigenous people of Western Sahara are known, is disputed and politically fraught.) The U.N. then unsuccessfully suggested alternatives to the unfulfilled settlement plan and ultimately, in 2007, called on the parties to negotiate. In April 2007, Morocco offered a plan for increased regional autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The Polisario, for its part, has continued to call for a referendum on independence. The current Personal Envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General on Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, a U.S. diplomat, has attempted to facilitate negotiations. However, there has been no concrete progress toward a settlement due to an apparent unwillingness on either side to compromise. The stalemate has received new international interest due to concerns over regional security threats, but a breakthrough does not appear imminent.
Morocco controls roughly 85% of the disputed territory and considers the whole area part of its sovereign territory. In line with his autonomy initiative, Morocco's King Mohammed VI has pursued policies of decentralization that he says are intended to empower residents of his Saharan provinces. The Polisario has a government in exile, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which is hosted and backed by neighboring Algeria. The Western Sahara issue has stymied Moroccan-Algerian bilateral relations, Moroccan relations with the African Union, and regional cooperation on economic and security issues.
The United States has not recognized the SADR or Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The United States supports the U.N. mediation effort, has referred to the Moroccan autonomy proposal as "serious, realistic, and credible," and has urged the parties to reach a mutually acceptable solution—an outcome that would not destabilize its ally, Morocco. The United States contributes funds, but no manpower, to the U.N. Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO). MINURSO was initially created to organize a referendum, but its role now is to monitor the 1991 cease-fire. Human rights advocates and some international diplomats support mandating MINURSO to monitor human rights, but Morocco is adamantly opposed, and portrays such proposals as an affront to its sovereignty.
Morocco and the Polisario, and advocates on both sides, regularly appeal to Congress to support their positions. Many Members have expressed support for Morocco's position, while others support an independence referendum and/or are concerned about human rights conditions in Moroccan-administered areas. Congressional positions have been regularly expressed through provisions in foreign aid appropriations legislation and related reporting requirements. The FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76, January 17, 2014) states that bilateral economic assistance appropriated for Morocco "should also be available for assistance for the territory of the Western Sahara." It has been the policy of successive Administrations that bilateral foreign assistance funds appropriated for Morocco may not be used in Western Sahara, as this could be interpreted as tacitly accepting Morocco's claim of sovereignty. See also CRS Report RS21579, Morocco: Current Issues, and CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues. |
crs_R44080 | crs_R44080_0 | Background
Broadband—also referred to as high-speed Internet service—has been deployed in the United States since the late 1990s, primarily by private sector providers. While broadband deployment has been rapid and robust overall, there are parts of the nation where broadband is less deployed (primarily rural areas) and there remain regions and communities that are dissatisfied with the level of broadband service currently offered by private sector providers. As a solution, some communities have turned to public entities as possible broadband providers. These communities anticipate that public entities may be able to provide municipal broadband at superior levels of speed, performance, and affordability than what is currently offered by private providers. Public entities that provide broadband service can be local governments or public utilities, for example, and may construct and manage broadband networks either solely or in partnership with private companies. There are a number of municipal broadband models that have been implemented across the nation. Since each community is different and each faces unique challenges, there is no one size that fits all. Many local communities cite low speeds, high prices, a lack of competition, or even an absence of any broadband service in particularly sparsely populated areas, and argue that they should be able to provide this service to meet their citizens' needs and to support the community's economic development. Municipal broadband can address unmet public interest needs. Because of the market-distorting effects of municipal broadband, continued private sector investment in broadband networks might be discouraged in some cases. After consideration of record the FCC, in a February 26, 2015, action, granted the petitions to preempt state laws in North Carolina and Tennessee that restricted the expansion of community broadband services. Whether the FCC does, or does not, have the legal authority under Section 706 to preempt state laws that restrict municipal broadband deployment remains controversial. Both the state of Tennessee and the state of North Carolina filed lawsuits (petitions for review) challenging the FCC's authority to preempt these restrictions. The U.S. Court of Appeals, in an August 10, 2016, decision reversed the FCC's Order. Congressional Activity—114th Congress
Four bills ( S. 240 , S. 597 , H.R. 1106 , and H.R. 6013 ) were introduced, and one draft measure (H.R.__) was released, in the 114 th Congress that addressed the municipal broadband debate. None of these measures were enacted. With respect to municipal broadband, the issue for Congress is whether locally owned and/or supported networks should be encouraged or restricted. The debate is complicated by the diversity of municipal broadband projects. Ultimately, as discussed above, on March 12, 2015, the FCC released an order lifting restrictions on municipal broadband networks in Wilson, NC, and Chattanooga, TN. Municipal broadband opponents argue that public entities are ill-equipped to efficiently develop, operate, and maintain commercial broadband networks, and that municipally owned and supported broadband networks constitute unfair competition to private sector providers, and may ultimately impede private investment in broadband infrastructure. Ultimately, whether municipal broadband should be encouraged or restricted is one of many policies that Congress continues to consider for promoting broadband deployment. | Since the late 1990s, broadband Internet service has been deployed in the United States, primarily by private sector providers. While broadband deployment has been rapid and robust overall, there remain communities that are dissatisfied with their broadband service. Some of these communities have turned to public entities as possible broadband providers, with the expectation that municipal broadband networks (also referred to as "community broadband") can deliver superior levels of speed, performance, and/or affordability than what is currently offered by private providers. Public entities that provide broadband service can be local governments or public utilities, for example, and may construct and manage broadband networks either solely or in partnership with private companies. There are a number of municipal broadband models that have been implemented across the nation. Since each community is different and each faces unique challenges, there is no one size that fits all.
Municipal broadband is controversial, because it involves governmental entities entering a commercial telecommunications marketplace that had previously been the exclusive domain of private sector providers. Supporters of municipal broadband argue that in view of substandard broadband service, communities and local governments should be able to provide this service to meet their citizens' needs and to support the community's economic development. Municipal broadband opponents argue that public entities are ill-equipped to efficiently develop, operate, and maintain commercial broadband networks, and that municipally owned and supported broadband networks constitute unfair competition to private sector providers, which may ultimately impede private investment in broadband infrastructure.
With under 500 municipalities across the nation embarking on some form of municipal broadband, 20 states have passed laws placing restrictions (or in some cases, bans) on local broadband networks. The issue for Congress is whether municipal broadband should be promoted or discouraged, and more specifically, whether those state restrictions on municipal broadband should be overridden or affirmed.
On March 12, 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the petitions filed by two municipal broadband providers in Wilson, NC, and Chattanooga, TN, to preempt state laws in their respective states that restricted the expansion of community broadband services. The Order and the decision by the FCC to rely on Section 706 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act for its authority remain controversial. Both states filed petitions for review consolidated in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, Cincinnati, challenging the FCC's authority to preempt these restrictions. The court, in an August 10, 2016, decision, reversed the FCC's Order.
Four bills (S. 240, S. 597, H.R. 1106, and H.R. 6013) were introduced and one draft measure was released in the 114th Congress addressing the municipal broadband debate, but none of these measures were enacted. The role of municipal broadband and the appropriate role of the states and the FCC to address the relationship between the public and private sector is just one facet in the overall debate regarding broadband deployment. Whether municipal broadband should be encouraged or restricted is one of the many policies that Congress continues to consider. |
crs_RL30506 | crs_RL30506_0 | 4578 ( H.Rept. 106-646 ) by a vote of 204-172. The FY2001recommended level of $14.6 billion is $1.7 billion below the President's request and$302 million below the FY2000 enacted level. On July 18,2000, the Senate passed H.R. 4578 ( S.Rept. 106-312 ) by a vote of 97-2. Introduction
The annual Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill includes fundingfor agencies and programs in four separate federal departments, as well as numeroussmaller agencies and diverse programs. The bill includes funding for the InteriorDepartment except the Bureau of Reclamation, but only segments of the funding ofthe other three departments, Agriculture, Energy, and Health and Human Services.The President's FY2001 budget request for Interior and Related Agencies totals$16.32 billion compared to the $14.91billion enacted by Congress for FY2000. Status of Department of the Interior and RelatedAgencies Appropriations, FY2001
On February 7, 2000, President Clinton submitted his FY2001 budget to Congress. 106-113 ), anincrease of $1.41 billion. (With scorekeeping adjustments, including anacross-the-board cut of 0.38% for FY2000, the figures are $16.49 billion requestedfor FY2001 compared with $14.90 billion enacted for FY2000.) The Interior Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee marked up the FY2001 Interior Appropriations bill on May 17, 2000. The Interior Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the full Senate Appropriations Committee marked up the Interior bill on June 20, 2000 andJune 22, 2000, respectively. The FY2001 recommended level of $15.8 billion in total budget authorityis some $1.16 billion above the House-passed mark. A House-Senate conference met on September 20 and September 21 and after further discussion between the conferees and the Administration agreed to a fundinglevel of $18.8 billion, some $3.8 billion above the FY2000 enacted level. Theconference agreement included $1.8 billion in emergency and supplemental funding($300 million above the President's request) for expenditures already incurred infirefighting and to restore areas damaged by Western wildfires. The conference alsoincluded a new Title VIII that would implement a modified version of the President'sLands Legacy Initiative over 6 years. Funding would start at a total of $1.6 billionin FY2001 ($1.2 billion for Interior Appropriations programs) and rise to $2.4 billionin FY2006. In addition, the conference provided significant increases for the IndianHealth Service (+ $214 million), Bureau of Indian Affairs programs (+ $272 million),Energy Conservation programs (+ $94.7 million), and Bureau of Land ManagementOperations (+ $66 million). (See Table 5 for the House, Senate, and Conferenceapproved funding levels.) The conference report ( H.Rept. 106-914 ) was passed by the House on October 3, 2000 by a vote of 348-69 and was passed by the Senate on October 5, 2000, by avote of 83-13. 4578 into law ( P.L.106-291 ) on October 11, 2000. In H.R. Land Management Planning. P.L. | The Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill includes funding for agencies and programs in four separate federal departments as well as numerous smaller agencies and diverseprograms. The bill includes funding for the Interior Department except the Bureau of Reclamation,but only segments of the funding of the other three departments, Agriculture, Energy, and Health andHuman Services.
On February 7, 2000, President Clinton submitted his FY2001 budget to Congress. The FY2001 request for Interior and Related Agencies totals $16.32 billion compared to the $14.91billion enacted for FY2000 ( P.L. 106-113 ), an increase of $1.41 billion. (With scorekeepingadjustments, including an across-the-board cut of 0.38% for FY2000, the figures are $16.49 billionrequested for FY2001 compared with $14.90 billion enacted for FY2000.)
The Interior Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee and the full House Appropriations Committee marked up the FY2001 Interior Appropriations bill on May 17, 2000 andMay 25, 2000, respectively. On June 16, 2000, the House passed H.R. 4578 ( H.Rept.106-646 ) by a vote of 204-172. The FY2001 recommended level of $14.6 billion is $1.7 billionbelow the President's request and $302 million below the FY2000 enacted level.
The Interior Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the full Senate Appropriations Committee marked up the Interior bill on June 20, 2000 and June 22, 2000,respectively. On July 18, 2000, the Senate passed H.R. 4578 ( S.Rept. 106-312 ) by avote of 97-2. The FY2001 recommended level of $15.8 billion in total budget authority is some$1.16 billion above the House-passed mark.
A House-Senate conference met on September 20 and September 21 and after further discussions between the conferees and the Administration agreed to a funding level of $18.8 billion,some $3.8 billion above the FY2000 enacted level. The conference agreement included $1.8 billionin emergency and supplemental funding ($300 million above the President's request) forexpenditures already incurred in firefighting and to restore areas damaged by Western wildfires. Theconference also included a new Title VIII that would implement a modified version of thePresident's Lands Legacy Initiative over 6 years. Funding would start at a total of $1.6 billion inFY2001 ($1.2 billion for Interior Appropriations programs) and rise to $2.4 billion in FY2006. Inaddition, the conference provided significant increases for the Indian Health Service (+ $214million), Bureau of Indian Affairs programs (+ $272 million), Energy Conservation programs (+$94.7 million), and Bureau of Land Management Operations (+ $66 million). (See Table 5 fortheHouse, Senate, and Conference approved funding levels.)
The conference report ( H.Rept. 106-914 ) was passed by the House on October 3, 2000 by a vote of 348-69 and was passed by the Senate on October 5, 2000, by a vote of 83-13. President Clintonsigned H.R. 4578 into law ( P.L. 106-291 ) on October 11, 2000.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: DSP = Domestic Social Policy; G&F = Government and Finance; RSI =Resources, Science, and Industry. |
crs_R43716 | crs_R43716_0 | The recent increase in the number of unaccompanied alien children (UACs) apprehended at the border between Mexico and the United States has raised questions about the role that gang-related violence in Central America may play in determining eligibility for refugee status and asylum. Refugee status and asylum are two forms of discretionary relief that could enable UACs to enter or remain in the United States, and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) relies upon the same definition in determining eligibility for both. Applicants for refugee status are also barred from appealing denials of their applications, while applicants for asylum are not. It also discusses how key elements of the INA's definition of refugee have been construed and applied in gang-related asylum cases. Among other things, the Refugee Act amended Section 101(a)(42) of the INA to define refugee in largely the same terms used by the Convention and Protocol:
The term "refugee" means ... any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Instead, their meaning has been determined by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—the highest administrative tribunal for interpreting and applying immigration law—through case-by-case adjudication, with the federal courts generally deferring to the BIA's interpretation so long as it is based on a "permissible construction" of the INA. Perhaps the most notable example of this is the REAL ID Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-13 ), which amended the INA to require that a protected ground (e.g., race, religion, nationality) "was or will be at least one central reason" for the persecution. There, the BIA characterized persecution as
[t]he infliction of suffering or harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as offensive (e.g., race, religion, political opinion, etc. ), in a manner condemned by civilized governments. If such toleration, or unwillingness or inability to control, is found, the BIA and the federal courts may recognize harm arising to the level of persecution. "Well-Founded Fear"
A showing of past persecution gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the alien has a well-founded fear of future persecution. The regulations do not define what is meant by a reasonable possibility of persecution. A well-founded fear of persecution has been found to be lacking in some gang-related asylum cases, often in cases where past harms are not viewed as persecution. However, such fear can be seen as unreasonable in light of the circumstances. "On Account of"
The refugee definition's proviso that the persecution be "on account of" a protected ground has been construed to require that there be a "nexus" between the harm that the alien has incurred or fears and the alien's race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. A central reason has been construed to mean a reason that is more than "incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm." Especially since the BIA's decision in Matter of C-A- , these claims have generally failed, in part, because the various social groups articulated by individual aliens are seen as lacking social visibility and/or particularity. Persons Resistant to Gang Recruitment
In a number of cases, courts have upheld the denial of asylum to aliens based on their purported membership in particular social groups made up of persons who are targeted for or resist gang recruitment, generally because the courts view the proposed group as lacking both social visibility (now, distinction) and/or particularity. | The recent increase in the number of unaccompanied alien children (UACs) apprehended at the border between Mexico and the United States has raised questions about the role that gang-related violence in Central America may play in determining whether such children are eligible for refugee status and asylum. Only aliens who are "refugees," as that term is defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), qualify for potential refugee status or asylum (two forms of discretionary relief that could enable UACs to enter or remain in the United States).
The INA's definition, in turn, generally encompasses individuals outside their home country who are unable or unwilling to return to that country because of "persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." However, key terms within this definition—including persecution and particular social group—are not defined by statute or regulation. Instead, they have been construed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative tribunal for interpreting and applying immigration law, through a process of case-by-case adjudication, with the federal courts generally deferring to the BIA's interpretation insofar as it is based on a "permissible construction" of the INA. These cases center upon eligibility for asylum, because denials of applications for refugee status cannot be appealed. Denials of asylum by immigration judges in the course of formal removal proceedings, in contrast, may be appealed to the BIA and the federal courts of appeals.
Persecution has been construed to mean the infliction of harm by the government, or an entity the government is unable or unwilling to control, "upon persons who differ in a way regarded as offensive ..., in a manner condemned by civilized governments." A showing of past persecution establishes a rebuttable presumption that the alien has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Otherwise, aliens must prove they subjectively fear persecution, and there is a "reasonable possibility" they would suffer persecution if returned to their home country. Such a "reasonable possibility" can exist when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place. This persecution must also be "on account of" a protected ground (e.g., race). The REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13) amended the INA to require that a protected ground "was or will be at least one central reason" for the persecution. However, central reason has been construed to mean a reason that is more than "incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason," not as the only or primary reason. Most protected grounds (i.e., race, religion, nationality, political opinion) are fairly straightforward in their definition, if not in their application in specific cases. Particular social group, however, has been construed in various ways by the BIA over the years.
When considered by the BIA or appellate courts in light of how the INA's definition of refugee is construed, claims to asylum based on gang-related violence frequently (although not inevitably) fail. In some cases, this is because the harm experienced or feared by the alien is seen not as persecution, but as generalized lawlessness or criminal activity. In other cases, persecution has been found to be lacking because governmental ineffectiveness in controlling the gangs is distinguished from inability or unwillingness to control them. In yet other cases, any persecution that is found is seen as lacking the requisite connection to a protected ground, and instead arising from activities "typical" to gangs, such as extortion and recruitment of new members. The particular social group articulated by the alien (e.g., former gang members, recruits) may also been seen as lacking a "common, immutable characteristic," social visibility (now, social distinction), or particularity. |
crs_RL33610 | crs_RL33610_0 | One of the majority's prerogatives is writing the House's rules and using its majority status to effect the chamber's rules on the day the new House convenes. It is a feature of the House, but not of the Senate, that it must adopt rules at the convening of each Congress. Although each new House largely adopts the chamber rules that existed in the previous Congress, each new House also adopts changes to those rules. This report is the first in a series on House rules changes. A second report currently covers changes for the 110 th through 112 th Congresses: CRS Report R42395, A Retrospective of House Rules Changes Since the 110 th Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. The 103rd Congress: Prelude to Change
The House rules changes made in the 104 th Congress reflected a Republican frame of reference that was built over many years as the minority party, including more democratic floor processes, minority party rights, a subordinate role for seniority, accountability in House operations, and streamlining of the House's organization and staffing. Floor Procedure
A minority motion to recommit with instructions should be guaranteed. The provisions of the platform that related to Congress as an institution were as follows:
On the first day of the 104 th Congress, the new Republican majority will immediately pass the following major reforms, aimed at restoring the faith and trust of the American people in their government:
First, require all laws that apply to the rest of the country also apply equally to the Congress;
Second, select a major, independent auditing firm to conduct a comprehensive audit of Congress for waste, fraud or abuse;
Third, cut the number of House committees, and cut committee staff by one-third;
Fourth, limit the terms of all committee chairs;
Fifth, ban the casting of proxy votes in committee;
Sixth, require committee meetings to be open to the public;
Seventh, require a three-fifths majority vote to pass a tax increase;
Eighth, guarantee an honest accounting of our Federal Budget by implementing zero base-line budgeting. Changes to the committee system made in rules resolutions in the 104 th Congress and subsequently addressed most aspects of the committee system. Commemorative Legislation
H.Res. Previously, the names of signatories were made public only after a majority of Members had signed a discharge petition. Changes related to budgetary legislation also appear in " Rules Changes Affecting the Chamber and Floor ," including
A three-fifths vote was required to pass legislation containing a federal income tax rate increase. Some offices were abolished, while others were created. Responsibilities were shifted, and accountability was increased. (For changes affecting the structure of the Ethics Committee, see " Structure and Organization " under " Rules Changes Affecting Committees .") Republican criticisms of changes in the House made at the direction of the Democratic Caucus beginning after the 1974 election and continuing through the 103 rd Congress, the ideas of the Conservative Opportunity Society in the 1980s, the Republican '92 Group, the Republican rules package of the 103 rd Congress, the recommendations of the bipartisan Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, the Contract with America, and other sources came together in the rules package the Republicans put before the House in the 104 th Congress. At the same time, a number of rules did not change, either at all or substantially. The great bulk of House rules was continued from Congress to Congress since the rules had been built up over decades to support the majority in its organization and operation of the House. Rules changes do not necessarily enable a majority to pass legislation, to keep all the party's Members together, to work smoothly with the minority, to achieve the same outcomes as the other body, or to overcome voter sentiments. Rules facilitate the majority's organization and operation of the House, but they do not dictate to party leaders and others how to run the House. | One of the majority party's prerogatives is writing the House rules and using its majority status to effect the chamber's rules on the day the new House convenes. It is a feature of the House that it must adopt rules at the convening of each Congress. While each new House largely adopts the chamber rules that existed in the previous Congress, each new House also adopts changes to those rules. Institutional and political developments during the Democratic majority, particularly during the 103rd Congress, were a prelude to the rules changes made by the Republicans when they took control of the House in the 104th Congress.
Rules changes made at the convening of the 104th Congress addressed most aspects of the committee system: decision-making autonomy, jurisdictions, internal committee procedures and structure, and staff. Rules changes for the 104th Congress and after also addressed most aspects of legislation deliberations on the House floor and organization of the chamber. For example, the minority was guaranteed the ability to offer the motion to recommit with instructions, commemorative legislation was banned, the names of signatories of discharge petitions were publicized, provisions were made for convening a House with a reduced membership due to a terrorist attack, and the Speaker was subjected to a term limit that was later repealed.
Two of the eight goals of the Republicans' 1994 Contract with America dealt with budgetary legislation. House rules were changed to require a three-fifths vote to pass a federal income tax rate increase, and cost estimates replaced baselines as the preferred way of understanding the year-to-year changes in federal spending.
Rules changes in the administration of the House were extensive. Offices were abolished and others created. Responsibilities were shifted and accountability clarified. Rules changes affecting ethical standards were largely technical, with most major changes taking place through freestanding and other legislation.
The House rules changes made starting in the 104th Congress reflected a Republican frame of reference that was built over many years as the minority party. Most rules, however, did not change, either at all or substantially, since they had evolved over decades to support the majority in its organization and operation of the House. Rules changes do not necessarily enable a majority to pass legislation, to overcome voter sentiments, or to work smoothly with the minority. Rules facilitate the majority's organization and operation of the House; they do not dictate to party leaders and others how to run the House or what outcomes can be achieved.
This report describes and analyzes only rules changes made on the opening day of a new Congress, but it references in footnotes selected other legislation and actions that also changed or affected House rules during the 104th Congress and during subsequent Congresses.
This report is the first in a series on House rules changes at the beginning of a Congress. For changes in the 110th, 111th, and 112th Congresses, see CRS Report R42395, A Retrospective of House Rules Changes Since the 110th Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33021 | crs_RL33021_0 | In this report, the focus is on total profits and the growth of profits within the oil industry andthe likely uses of profits by the industry, specifically the potential ability of the industry to invest inoil supply related projects. Major Oil Company Profits in 2004
Oil industry profits are widely identified as related to world oil price levels. If the profit performance of the oil industry wasbased, or related, only to the price of oil, given normal lags in the production chain betweenproducing crude oil and distributing petroleum products, it might have been expected that profitsmight have risen late in 2004 and into 2005. The productionresults for natural gas are even more uniform. The recent record of the major integrated oil companies in expanding production of crude oil and oil products may be the result of several factors. It is possible that because of limitations on the ability of the firms to investin additional oil and gas production in the short term, profits have been returned to investors in theform of dividends, or the buy back of shares to enhance the market capitalization of the companies. Independent Refiners and Marketers
Independent refiners and marketers are typically only involved in thedownstream activities of the oil industry. This performance, coupled withthe downstream profitability of the major integrated oil companies, gives somesupport to the viewpoint that, in addition to high oil prices, conditions in thepetroleum product markets, especially gasoline, decoupled from their traditionallinkage to crude oil and generated independent market tightness and higher prices. Key profit indicators in the refining industry are the gross and net refiningmargins. Use of Oil Profits
Refinery Investment
An expansion of refinery capacity in the United States might alleviate theportion of petroleum product price increases not due to the high price of crude oil. Individually, they are able to accomplish thesegoals through mergers and acquisitions. Conclusion
Since oil price increases began in 2004, the oil industry has earned increasedprofits. Historically volatile prices and profit levels coupled with a tightregulatory environment contribute to industry uncertainty. As a result of significant time lags that tend to occur in the oil industry, it maybe too soon to know whether or not investments in the industry, if taken, will resultin the increased supply of oil and petroleum products needed to reduce prices andconsumers' costs. Another key factor in the profit calculation is how easily the increase in thecost of crude oil can be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices forgasoline and other refined products without suffering a more than proportionatedecrease in sales. All stakeholders in a company do not necessarily have an interest in the sameconceptual definition of profit. | High prices for crude oil in 2004 and into 2005 have reduced consumers' purchasing powerand raised costs for businesses while providing billions of dollars to the oil industry and oil exportingcountries. The industry's increased revenues have led to record profit levels. As the 109th Congressengages in oversight of recent broad energy legislation which aims to increase the domestic supplyof crude oil to mitigate oil price increases in the longer term, another key factor in determiningincreased supply is how oil companies decide to allocate their profits between shareholder returnsand investment in oil production. This report is written in response to a number of requests fromCongress concerning profits in the oil industry. This report provides background informationconcerning the level of oil industry profits, the sources of those profits, and a discussion of thepotential uses of profits.
In response to the increased price of crude oil since the fall of 2004, profits of virtually allfirms in all segments of the oil industry have increased. However, the greatest increases have beenin the downstream, or refining and marketing, segments of the industry. These increases in profitare apparent whether the major integrated oil companies, the independents, or refiners areconsidered, lending some credence to the viewpoint that industry profits are the result of factorsbeyond the elevated price of crude oil. Historically, the current combination of high oil prices andhigh profits have been seen before, and periods of low prices and profits tended to follow.
The relatively high profit levels earned in refining and marketing suggest that conditions inthe petroleum products markets, including the gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel segments, contributedto earned profits above and beyond the effect of higher crude oil prices. Key factors in these marketsincluded tight refining capacity and low inventory levels. Mergers, acquisitions, and asset sales mayalso have changed the relative profit positions of many firms in the industry. All of these factorshave been influenced by investment decisions in the oil industry.
Firms in the oil industry are likely to use their recently earned profits in a variety of ways. They are holding record cash balances, buying back their shares and increasing dividends. Mergerand acquisition activity in the industry again appears to be on the rise. In addition, the major oilcompanies are investing in a variety of energy related projects, although not necessarily oil, includingliquified natural gas and gas-to-liquids technologies. These projects tend to be international inscope. In the longer term, investments in exploration, production, and refining capacity are likelyto be needed to mitigate the high prices of 2004-2005.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43671 | crs_R43671_0 | T he Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank or the Bank) operates under a renewable general statutory charter (Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended), extended through September 30, 2019, by the Export-Import Bank Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2015 (Division E of P.L. 114-94 , a surface transportation authorization measure). Enacted on December 4, 2015, this act generally lowered Ex-Im Bank's statutory lending authority ("exposure cap" for outstanding portfolio) to $135 billion for each of FY2015-FY2019, and made reforms in a number of areas, including to Ex-Im Bank's policies or operations in risk management, fraud controls, and ethics, as well as to the U.S. approach to international negotiations on export credit financing. Ex-Im Bank, a wholly owned U.S. government corporation, is the official export credit agency (ECA) of the United States. Its mission is to assist in financing and facilitating U.S. exports of goods and services and, in doing so, to contribute to U.S. employment. What are Ex-Im Bank's origins and early history?5
Ex-Im Bank, established by the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended (P.L. Congress also provides an annual appropriation for the Bank, and conducts oversight of its activities. Those in favor of Ex-Im Bank assert that it supports U.S. exports and jobs by addressing shortfalls in private sector financing and helping U.S. exporters compete against foreign companies backed by their governments' ECAs. Critics assert that it crowds out private sector activity, picks winners and losers through its support, operates as a form of "corporate welfare," and poses a risk to taxpayers. What is its leadership structure? Ex-Im Bank also has an Advisory Committee, which is required by its charter to consist of 17 members appointed by the Board of Directors on the recommendation of the President of the Bank. Without a quorum, it cannot approve transactions above $10 million. Nominations of members to the Board would be subject to Senate approval. What are sources of export financing? International Context
What is the global ECA marketplace? Policies and requirements. What is the debate over Ex-Im Bank's risk management practices? Ex-Im Bank's reauthorization in 2015 was preceded by debate in Congress over the adequacy of Ex-Im Bank's existing fraud control and ethics practices. Sunset in Authority
What are the implications of a sunset in Ex-Im Bank's authority for the agency's activities?190
Ex-Im Bank's general statutory authority expired for about five months in 2015 (July 31-December 3, 2015) when Congress did not take action to renew its charter. Historical and Current Approaches to Reauthorization
Historically, for how long has Congress extended Ex-Im Bank's authority? Members of the 114 th Congress actively debated Ex-Im Bank and ultimately reauthorized the Bank with bipartisan support. Selected CRS Resources
General Resources
CRS Report R43581, Export-Import Bank: Overview and Reauthorization Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS In Focus IF10017, Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) , by [author name scrubbed]. | The Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank or the Bank), a wholly owned federal government corporation, is the official export credit agency (ECA) of the U.S. government. Its mission is to assist in financing and facilitating U.S. exports of goods and services to support U.S. employment. Ex-Im Bank operates under a renewable general statutory charter (Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended). In the 114th Congress, Ex-Im Bank's charter was extended through September 30, 2019, by the Export-Import Bank Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2015 (Division E of P.L. 114-94, a surface transportation authorization measure). Enacted on December 4, 2015, this act generally lowered Ex-Im Bank's statutory lending authority ("exposure cap" for outstanding portfolio) to $135 billion for each of FY2015-FY2019, and made reforms to, among other things, Ex-Im Bank's policies or operations in risk management, fraud controls, and ethics, as well as the U.S. approach to international negotiations on export credit financing. Ex-Im Bank's reauthorization, ultimately on a bipartisan basis in Congress, was preceded by active debate among Members about whether to renew Ex-Im Bank's authority and if so, for how long and under what terms.
Debate continues in Congress over Ex-Im Bank's rationales. Proponents contend that the Bank supports U.S. exports and jobs by filling gaps in private sector financing and helping U.S. exporters compete against foreign companies backed by their ECAs. Critics contend that Ex-Im Bank crowds out private sector activity, provides "corporate welfare," and poses a risk to taxpayers. Members also may consider other issues, particularly possible nominations of members to Ex-Im Bank's five-member Board of Directors. The Board, whose members are appointed by the President and with the Senate's advice and consent, is responsible for approving Ex-Im Bank transactions for financing and insurance. Due to current vacancies on the Board, the Board does not have a quorum and cannot approve financial commitments above $10 million. Congress also may conduct oversight of Ex-Im Bank's implementation of reforms required by the 2015 reauthorization act, as well as issues presented by the international context for ECA activity, among other issues.
Congressional consideration of Ex-Im Bank raises a range of questions. This report addresses a number of those questions that are frequently asked, including:
What is the Export-Import Bank and what is the debate over its reauthorization? What is its leadership structure? What are its programs, policies, and activities? What is its international context? How does its budget work? How does it manage risk? What are the implications of a sunset in authority for the Bank's activities? What are historical and current approaches to Ex-Im Bank reauthorization?
Additional CRS resources on Ex-Im Bank include CRS Report R43581, Export-Import Bank: Overview and Reauthorization Issues, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS In Focus IF10017, Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank), by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34762 | crs_RL34762_0 | On October 17, 2006, EPA published its revisions to the NAAQS for particulates to provide protection against potential health effects associated with short- and long-term exposure to particulate matter (including chronic respiratory disease and premature mortality). Specifically, the agency lowered the allowable daily concentration averaged over 24-hour periods of PM 2.5 in the air from 65 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m 3 ) to 35 µg/m 3 . The annual PM 2.5 standard, which is set in addition to the daily standard to address human health effects from chronic exposures to the pollutants, was unchanged. The 2006 particulates NAAQS also retained the 24-hour standard and revoked the annual standard for slightly larger, but still inhalable, particles less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM 10 ). While the 2006 particulates NAAQS generally tightened the air quality standards for fine particulate matter, the action caused considerable controversy, including concerns that the standards were outside the range recommended by both EPA staff and by the scientific advisory panel (Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, or CASAC ) established by the CAA. Although implementation of the 2006 PM NAAQS continues, EPA initiated its statutorily required review of the PM NAAQS, in part in response to the decision, not long after the 2006 promulgation of the PM NAAQS. The range of issues raised prior to and shortly after the promulgation of the 2006 PM 2.5 NAAQS could provide relevant insights as EPA proceeds with finalizing its decisions with regard to revising particulates NAAQS. The 2006 tightening of the PM 2.5 standards resulted in an increase in the number of areas (typically defined by counties or portions of counties) designated nonattainment. The designations, based on 2006 through 2008 air quality monitoring data, included a few counties that were designated nonattainment for PM 2.5 for the first time, but the majority of the counties identified overlapped with EPA's final nonattainment designations for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit's February 24, 2009, Decision68
In December 2006, a diverse mix of petitioners, including states and state agencies, environmental and public health advocacy organizations, and groups representing various industry and agriculture interests, petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Although aspects of the 2006 PM standard remanded to EPA for reconsideration by the court remain in effect and EPA's tightening of the 24-hour PM 2.5 standard was not affected, EPA's completion of its next round of periodic review and June 2012 proposed revisions to the PM standards has generated concerns with respect to the implementation process for the 2006 standards. Petitions from several states and state agencies, as well as the American Lung Association, Environmental Defense, and the National Parks Conservation Association, challenged EPA's decision not to strengthen the primary annual NAAQS standard for PM 2.5 (15µg/m 3 ). In its February 24, 2009, decision, the court granted this part of the petition and remanded the standard to EPA for reconsideration, but did not vacate the standard. For attainment of the 2006 standards (15/35 µg/m 3 ), EPA estimated 1,200 to 13,000 fewer premature deaths based on the expert elicitation. As a result, the D.C. Circuit's February 2009 decision regarding challenges to the 2006 PM NAAQS, delays in implementing the 2006 PM 2.5 NAAQS resulting from the Administration's review of the final designations, and EPA's next round of periodic review of the particulate NAAQS and subsequent June 2012 proposal to revise the standards, have prompted renewed interest in several of the issues associated with the promulgation of the 2006 PM NAAQS discussed throughout this report. | On October 17, 2006, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published its final revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for particulate matter (particulates, or PM). Several states and industry, agriculture, business, and environmental and public health advocacy groups petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, challenging certain aspects of EPA's revisions. A February 24, 2009, decision by the D.C. Circuit granted the petitions in part, denying other challenges, and remanded the standards to EPA for further consideration but did not specifically vacate the 2006 PM standards. EPA initiated its next round of the periodic review of the PM NAAQS, in part, in response to the court's decision and on June 29, 2012, published a proposal to strengthen the standards. These actions, and the ongoing implementation of the 2006 PM NAAQS, have prompted renewed interest among Members of Congress.
Experiences and issues leading up to and following the promulgation of the 2006 PM2.5 NAAQS could provide relevant insights as EPA proceeds with its current review. Although a tightening of the standards, the particulates NAAQS established in 2006 were not as stringent as recommended by EPA staff or the independent scientific advisory committee mandated under the Clean Air Act (Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, or CASAC). The divergence from the CASAC's recommendations proved controversial, as did several other elements of the 2006 particulates NAAQS, including the decision not to exclude rural sources from the coarse particle standard.
EPA found that the evidence continued to support associations between exposure to particulates in ambient air and numerous health problems. Based on several analytical approaches, EPA estimated that compliance with the revised NAAQS would prevent 1,200 to 13,000 premature deaths annually, as well as substantial numbers of hospital admissions and missed work days due to illness. EPA revised the PM NAAQS by strengthening the 1997 standard for "fine" particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter (PM2.5). Specifically, the agency lowered the allowable daily concentration averaged over 24-hour periods of PM2.5 in the air from 65 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) to 35 µg/m3. The annual PM2.5 standard, which is set in addition to the daily standard to address human health effects from chronic exposures to the pollutants, was unchanged from the 1997 standard. The decision not to tighten the annual standard was overturned by the D.C. Circuit and remanded to EPA for consideration.
The 2006 particulates NAAQS also retained the 24-hour standard and revoked the annual standard for slightly larger, but still inhalable, particles less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM10). EPA abandoned its proposal to replace the particle size indicator of PM10 with a range of 10 to 2.5 micrometers (PM10-2.5). The D.C. Circuit's February 24, 2009, decision upheld EPA's decisions with regard to PM10 NAAQS.
EPA's ongoing implementation of the 2006 NAAQS, including EPA's November 13, 2009, final designation of those geographical areas not in compliance (typically defined by counties or portions of counties), has been an area of debate among some Members of Congress, states, and other stakeholders. Although EPA did not require new nonattainment designations for PM10, the tightening of the PM2.5 standard resulted in an increased number of areas in nonattainment compared to the designations for the 1997 PM NAAQS. EPA's November 2009 final designations for the 2006 PM NAAQS included 120 counties and portions of counties in 18 states as nonattainment areas based on 2006 through 2008 air quality monitoring data. |
crs_RL31845 | crs_RL31845_0 | Introduction
This report (1) summarizes provisions of several laws and regulations, including the PatentLaw, the Atomic Energy Act, International Traffic in Arms Control regulations, the USA PATRIOTAct ( P.L. 107-56 ), the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of2002 ( P.L. 107-188 ), and the Homeland Security Act ( P.L. 107-296 ), that permit the federalgovernment to restrict disclosure of scientific and technical information that could harm nationalsecurity; (2) describes the development of federal controls on "sensitive but unclassified" (SBU)scientific and technical information; (3) summarizes current controversies about White House policyon "Sensitive But Unclassified Information," and "Sensitive Homeland Security Information" (SHSI)issued in March 2002; and (4) identifies controversial issues which might affect the development ofOffice of Management and Budget (OMB) and agency guidelines for sensitive unclassifiedinformation, which were expected to be released during 2003. Federal Controls on Privately Generated Scientific and Technical Information
Several laws permit the federal government to classify privately-generated scientific andtechnical information that could harm national security, even when it is not held by federal agencies. 12958,National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189, and rules related to pre-publication review. These controls will be administered by the Justice Department. (52)
However, major federal agencies started to apply the label SBU to information defined as "sensitive" in the Computer Security Act and to information exempt from disclosure under theFreedom of Information Act (especially as governed by provisions 2 and 4). In addition , as will be described below, since the terrorist attacks of 2001, the Bush Administration has given agencies discretion to make nondisclosure decisions under FOIAin relation to homeland security and the thwarting of terrorist attacks. (59)
Defense Agencies' Use of SBU. Department of Energy. Other agencies have issued directives to define andprescribe safeguards that should be taken and penalties used for releasing SBU information. 306 (a)). (88)
Protection of Critical Infrastructure Information
P.L. 107-296 to theSecretary of the Department of Homeland Security (pursuant to Executive Order 13311). National Academies' Policy. (140)
Policy Options. ... Security professionals find it difficult to design clear standards for protection. Under the expanded definition of scientific and technological informationsubject to classification in Executive Order 13292, will agencies classify information that might haveotherwise been categorized as SBU? Appeals Process for SBU Information. No restriction is required. (191)
The equity of procedures for "tiered" or selective access; the need to create public and or private panels to examine controls on the release of some information; and the need to clarify relationshipsbetween the private sector and the government with respect to safeguarding information in scientificpublications to protect the public interest are issues which may be raised in the legislative context. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 amendedthe 1946 act to include "an increased emphasis on wider dissemination of atomic energy information,to make more of it accessible to U.S. industry and to the world in order to permit the developmentof nuclear reactors for commercial production of electric power ... as a consequence of PresidentEisenhower's [1953] Atoms For Peace initiative ...." The Quist document says:
With respect to the control of information, the 1954 Act stated:
"It shall be the policy of the Commission to control thedissemination and declassification of Restricted Data in such a manner as to assure the commondefense and security. b. SBU information may be sent via the U.S. | The U.S. Government has always protected scientific and technical information that might compromise national security. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, controls have been widened onaccess to information and scientific components that could threaten national security. The policychallenge is to balance science and security without compromising national security, scientificprogress, and constitutional and statutory protections. This report summarizes (1) provisions of thePatent Law; Atomic Energy Act; International Traffic in Arms Control regulations; the USAPATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56 ; the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and ResponseAct of 2002, P.L. 107-188 ; and the Homeland Security Act, P.L. 107-296 , that permit governmentalrestrictions on either privately generated or federally owned scientific and technical information thatcould harm national security; (2) the evolution of federal concepts of "sensitive but unclassified"(SBU) information; (3) controversies about pending Department of Homeland Security guidance onfederal SBU and "Sensitive Homeland Security Information" (SHSI); and (4) policy options.
Even before the terrorist attacks of 2001, federal agencies used the label SBU to safeguard from public disclosure information that does not meet standards for classification in Executive Order12958 or National Security Decision Directive 189. New Executive Order 13292 might widen thescope of scientific and technological information to be classified to deter terrorism. SBU has notbeen defined in statutory law. When using the term, some agencies refer to definitions for controlledinformation, such as "sensitive," in the Computer Security Act, and to information exempt fromdisclosure in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act. The identification ofinformation to be released pursuant to these laws may be discretionary, subject to agencyinterpretation and risk analysis. The White House and the Department of Justice recently widenedthe applicability of SBU.
Critics say the lack of a clear SBU definition complicates designing policies to safeguard such information and that, if information needs to be safeguarded, it should be classified. Others say thatwider controls will deny access to information needed for oversight and scientific communication. P.L. 107-296 required the President to issue guidance on safeguarding SBU homeland securityinformation, a function assigned to the Department of Homeland Security Secretary in ExecutiveOrder 13311; action is pending. Issues of possible interest to Congress include designing uniformconcepts and procedures to share and safeguard SBU information; standardizing penalties forunauthorized disclosure; designing an appeals process; assessing the pros and cons of wider SBUcontrols; and evaluating the implications of giving some research agency heads originalclassification authority. On February 20, 2004, DHS published a rule to protect voluntarilysubmitted critical infrastructure information. Some professional groups are starting to limitpublication of some "sensitive" privately controlled scientific and technical information. Theiractions may be guided by federal policy. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43208 | crs_R43208_0 | Recent Developments
On December 16, 2014, the President signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of FY2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), which included $3.066 billion for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program and a $500 million loan commitment ceiling for the CDBG Section 108 loan guarantee program. FY2015 Appropriations
The CDF account administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) includes the Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), and Section 108 loan guarantees. The Administration's FY2015 budget proposal would decrease total funding for CDF activities by $230 million from $3.100 billion in FY2014 to $2.870 billion. The proposed budget would decrease total funding for the CDF account and the CDBG formula grants by 7.6%, reducing funding for CDBG formula grants from $3.030 billion appropriated in FY2014 to $2.800 billion. 4745 ) recommended $3.060 billion for activities funded under the CDF account, including $3.0 billion for CDBG formula grants awarded to states, entitlement communities, and insular areas. Senate Appropriations Committee-Passed Bill (S. 2438)
On June 5, 2014, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the THUD Appropriations Bill for FY2015, S. 2438 . The Senate Committee-passed bill ( S. 2438 ) recommended $3.090 billion for activities funded under the CDF account, including $3.020 billion for CDBG formula grants awarded to states, entitlement communities, and insular areas. 113-235
On December 16, 2014, the President signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act ( P.L. 113-235 also supported a fee-based loan commitment ceiling of $500 million for the CDBG Section 108 loan guarantee program. FY2014 Appropriations
The Administration's Budget Request
The Obama Administration's budget request for FY2014, released on April 10, 2013, included $3.143 billion for activities funded under HUD's CDF account. The Administration's FY2014 budget proposal would have increased total funding for CDF activities by a modest $8 million from $3.135 billion in FY2013 to $3.143 billion. It would have redirected most of the $280 million to two other activities within the CDF account:
$75 million for regional planning grants; and $200 million for a new Neighborhood Stabilization Initiative intended to assist local governments in identifying and demolishing an oversupply of abandoned and foreclosed properties. As reported by the Senate committee, the bill also supported the Administration's budget request calling for the conversion of Section 108 loan guarantees to a fee-based program, and an increase in the program's loan guarantee commitment to $500 million for FY2014 from the $229 million approved for FY2013. The report ( S.Rept. 2610)
The House Appropriations Committee reported the THUD Appropriations Act for FY2014 on July 2, 2013. On June 30, 2014, the House began floor consideration of the bill. H.R. 113-76
On January 17, 2014, President Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014, P.L. 113-76 , which includes $3.100 billion in funding for the Community Development Fund. The act also appropriated $70 million in CDBG competitively awarded funds to Indian tribes. In addition to an increase in the loan commitment ceiling, the Administration proposed revamping the program by charging a fee-based assessment to borrowers accessing the program, which would have eliminated the need for an appropriated credit subsidy. H.R. 113-6
The 112 th Congress began, but did not complete, consideration of appropriation measures that would have provided full year funding for the Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development and Related Agencies for FY2013, before adjourning. On March 6, 2013, the House approved H.R. On March 26, 2013, the President signed into law P.L. 152 , a FY2013 disaster supplemental appropriations bill to support disaster relief and recovery activities for victims of Hurricane Sandy and other disasters occurring in 2011, 2012, and 2013. 113-2 by the President on January 29, 2013, included $16 billion for HUD, all allocated to the CDF, and subject to sequestration under the Budget Control Act, as amended. 2610 . | On March 4, 2014, the Obama Administration released its FY2015 budget request, which included $2.870 billion for activities under the Community Development Fund (CDF) administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), including $2.8 billion for formula grants. On June 5, 2014, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 2438, its version of the Departments of Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill for FY2015 (THUD), which recommended $3.090 billion for activities funded under the Community Development Fund (CDF) account, including $3.020 billion for Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) formula grants. On June 10, 2014, the House approved its version of the THUD bill for FY2015, H.R. 4745, which recommended $3.060 billion for CDF activities, including $3.0 billion for CDBG formula grants. On December 16, 2014, the President signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of FY2015 (P.L. 113-235), which included $3.066 billion for the CDBG program and a $500 million loan commitment ceiling for the CDBG Section 108 loan guarantee program.
On January 17, 2014, President Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014, P.L. 113-76, which included $3.100 billion in funding for the CDF, including $3.030 billion for formula allocations to CDBG entitlement communities, states, and insular areas. The act also appropriated $70 million in competitively awarded funds to Indian tribes and converted Section 108 loan guarantees to a fee-based program.
On July 30, 2013, the House began floor consideration of H.R. 2610, a bill that would have appropriated funds for THUD for FY2014. On July 31, 2013, the Senate began consideration of S. 1243, its version of the THUD Appropriations Act for FY2014. The bill, which was reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 27, 2013 (S.Rept. 113-45), recommended $3.295 billion for activities funded under the CDF account.
The Obama Administration's budget request for FY2014, released on April 10, 2014, included $3.143 billion for activities funded under HUD's CDF account. The Administration's FY2014 budget proposal would have increased total funding for CDF activities by a modest $8 million from $3.135 billion in FY2013 to $3.143 billion. The proposed budget would have reduced funding for CDBG formula grants by $280 million to $2.798 billion and would have redirected most of those funds to two other activities within the CDF account:
$75 million for regional planning grants, which was a component of the Administration's Sustainable Communities Initiative; and $200 million for a new Neighborhood Stabilization Initiative that was intended to assist local governments to identify and demolish an oversupply of abandoned and foreclosed properties.
The Administration's FY2014 budget included a proposal that doubled the Section 108 loan guarantee program's loan commitment ceiling from $229 million in FY2013 to $500 million in FY2014. In addition, the Administration proposed revamping the program by charging a fee-based assessment to borrowers accessing the program, which would have eliminated the need for an appropriated credit subsidy. The House Appropriations Committee report accompanying H.R. 2610 supported the Administration's Section 108 loan guarantee proposals that recommended an increase in the loan commitment ceiling and conversion of the program to a fee-based approach.
The 112th Congress began, but did not complete, consideration of appropriation measures that would have provided full-year funding for THUD for FY2013, before adjourning. The 113th Congress took up consideration of HUD's FY2013 appropriations as part of a larger measure providing consolidated appropriations for a number of federal departments. On March 26, 2013, the President signed into law P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013. The act included $3.1 billion for CDF activities. In late January 2013, Congress approved and the President signed P.L. 113-2, a disaster supplemental appropriation that included $15.2 billion for CDBG disaster relief and recovery activities in response to Hurricane Sandy and other disasters. Both the CDF FY2013 regular appropriation and the CDF disaster funds were subject to 5% sequestration mandated by the Budget Control Act. |
crs_R43452 | crs_R43452_0 | One facet of the broader debate over aliens who are present in the United States in violation of federal immigration law has been their eligibility for driver's licenses and other forms of government-issued identification documents (IDs). The issuance of driver's licenses has historically been considered a state matter, and states have taken a variety of approaches here. These CFDs or DPCs note, on their face, that they are valid for driving, but not for purposes of identification. The federal government has generally not intruded on state control over the issuance of driver's licenses, although the REAL ID Act of 2005 will, when fully implemented, bar federal agencies from accepting, "for any official purpose," licenses or ID cards issued by states that do not meet specific requirements. Basic Legal Principles
State measures that would deny or provide driver's licenses and other forms of government-issued ID to unlawfully present aliens have been challenged on various grounds. These grounds can vary depending upon the specific statute or practice in question. However, the grounds most commonly asserted appear to be violations of the Equal Protection and Supremacy Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars states from "deny[ing] to any person within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Aliens have been found to be encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's usage of "person." As a result, measures that would treat aliens differently than citizens may be subject to challenge on equal protection grounds. Denying Driver's Licenses and Other ID
Several states have adopted measures that bar unlawfully present aliens from obtaining driver's licenses and other state-issued ID. Arguably key to the courts' findings here has been their determination that measures denying driver's licenses to unlawfully present aliens are subject to rational basis review, not some type of heightened scrutiny. In reaching this conclusion, courts have taken the view that the fundamental right to interstate travel is not implicated by such measures because restrictions on one mode of travel do not constitute deprivations of the right to travel, and aliens' right to travel is less extensive than citizens' right. However, while state measures denying driver's licenses to unlawfully present aliens have thus far been found to be generally permissible, there have been circumstances wherein the denial of licenses to particular aliens who entered or remained in the United States in violation of federal immigration law have been found to violate the Equal Protection Clause. A measure that denied licenses to unlawfully present aliens without distinguishing between categories of aliens, or relying on state officials' determinations of aliens' status, would likely be distinguished from the Arizona and Nebraska measures. Some have suggested that such measures are per se preempted by federal law because they regulate immigration, or are impliedly preempted by the REAL ID Act or PRWORA. Moreover, even if a plaintiff were found to have standing to challenge these measures, the argument that they are preempted by federal law could be difficult to maintain given that (1) state measures denying driver's licenses to unlawfully present aliens have generally not been viewed as regulations of immigration; (2) the REAL ID Act contemplates states issuing driver's licenses and other ID that are not recognized by federal agencies; and (3) PROWRA expressly permits states to provide public benefits to unlawfully present aliens by enacting legislation that affirmatively provides for their eligibility. Arguments that the REAL ID Act generally preempts states from issuing driver's licenses and other IDs that do not comply with the act's minimum standard requirements also seem undercut by the language of Section 202(d)(11) of the act, which states the following:
In any case in which the State issues a driver's license or identification card that does not satisfy the requirements of this section, [States shall adopt practices which] ensure that such license or identification card—
(A) clearly states on its face that it may not be accepted by any Federal agency for federal identification or any other official purpose; and
(B) uses a unique design or color indicator to alert Federal agency and other law enforcement personnel that it may not be accepted for any such purpose. | One aspect of the broader debate over aliens who are present in the United States in violation of federal immigration law has been their eligibility for driver's licenses and other forms of state-issued identification documents (IDs). The issuance of driver's licenses has historically been considered a state matter, and states have taken a variety of approaches. Some have barred the issuance of driver's licenses and other state-issued ID to unlawfully present aliens; others permit their issuance; and yet others instead grant unlawfully present aliens Certificates for Driving (CFDs) or Driving Privilege Cards (DPCs). CFDs or DPCs expressly state, on their face, that they are valid for driving, but not for other purposes. The federal government has generally not intruded on state control over the issuance of driver's licenses, although the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, Div. B) will, when implemented, bar federal agencies from accepting, "for any official purpose," licenses or ID cards issued by states that do not meet specific requirements.
Regardless of whether they would deny or grant driver's licenses and other state-issued ID to unlawfully present aliens, such state measures have been challenged on various grounds. While these grounds can vary depending upon the specific statute or practice in question, the grounds most commonly asserted appear to be violations of the Equal Protection and Supremacy Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause bars states from "deny[ing] to any person within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," and aliens have been found to be encompassed by the Clause's usage of "person." As a result, measures that would treat aliens differently than citizens may be subject to challenge on equal protection grounds. In particular, state measures that distinguish between aliens and citizens are generally subject to some type of heightened scrutiny, although the exact degree of scrutiny can vary depending upon the persons and rights affected. The Supremacy Clause, in turn, establishes that federal law is "the supreme Law of the Land," and may preempt any incompatible provisions of state law.
State measures that would deny driver's licenses and other state-issued ID to unlawfully present aliens have historically not been found to violate either the Equal Protection or the Supremacy Clause, as a general matter. The various courts that have reviewed such challenges, to date, have found that these measures do not infringe upon the fundamental right to travel because restrictions upon a single mode of travel (i.e., driving) are not tantamount to restrictions on the right to travel, and aliens' right to travel is more limited than citizens' right. The courts have similarly found that such measures do not impermissibly distinguish between unlawfully present aliens and other persons because unlawfully present aliens are not a "suspect classification," and the measures serve "legitimate" government interests. The courts have also found these measures are not, as a general matter, per se preempted on the grounds that they regulate immigration, or preempted by the REAL ID Act. However, state measures that distinguish, without a legitimate interest, between categories of aliens, or that rely upon state definitions or determinations of aliens' status, may be found to be impermissible.
Although some commentators have suggested that they are preempted, state measures that grant driver's licenses and state-issued ID to unlawfully present aliens do not appear to have been subject to litigation. The argument that such measures are preempted could, however, be difficult to maintain, because the REAL ID Act arguably contemplates states issuing licenses and other IDs that federal agencies do not recognize for official purposes, and it seems unlikely that granting licenses to unlawfully present aliens would be seen to regulate immigration. Similarly, while federal law generally restricts the circumstances in which states may provide "public benefits" to unlawfully present aliens, driver's licenses are unlikely to be seen as public benefits. |
crs_R43066 | crs_R43066_0 | A health insurance exchange has been established in every state, as required by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Each exchange has two parts, a marketplace where individuals can shop for and enroll in health insurance coverage, and a small business health options program (SHOP) exchange for small employers. A state can choose to establish its own state-based exchange (SBE). If a state opts not to, or if the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) determines that the state is not in a position to administer its own exchange, then HHS will establish and administer the exchange in the state as a federally facilitated exchange (FFE). Fourteen states and DC established SBEs in 2014, while the remaining 36 states have FFEs. There are varying levels of state involvement in FFEs. In many states with FFEs, the exchange is wholly operated and administered by HHS. To fund the establishment of exchanges, the ACA authorizes the HHS Secretary to award grants to states through 2014. Each exchange is expected to generate its own funds to sustain its operations beginning January 1, 2015. It then briefly describes the requirement for exchanges to be self-sustaining, and concludes with a discussion of the sources and amounts of funding that HHS has used and plans to use to support FFE operations. Federal Grants for Health Insurance Exchanges
Section 1311 of the ACA appropriated indefinite (i.e., unspecified) amounts for planning and establishment grants for health insurance exchanges. For each fiscal year, the HHS Secretary is to determine the total amount that will be made available to each state for exchange grants. No grants will be awarded after December 31, 2014. HHS has awarded three different types of exchange grants, which are described below. Exchange Planning Grants
Exchange planning grants were given to 49 states and DC. These grants of about $1 million each were used by states to conduct the research and planning needed to determine how their exchanges would be administered and operated. Exchange Establishment Grants
There are two levels of exchange establishment grants. Level one establishment grants provide up to one year of funding to states that have made some progress under their exchange planning grants. Level two establishment grants are designed to provide funding through December 31, 2014, to states that are farther along in the establishment of an exchange. Early Innovator Grants
On February 16, 2011, HHS announced that it was awarding seven grants to help a group of "early innovator" states design and implement the information technology (IT) infrastructure needed to operate health insurance exchanges. Six states and a consortium of New England states received a total of $249 million in early innovator grant funding. The ACA provides that an exchange may charge an assessment or user fee to participating issuers, but also allows an exchange to find other ways to generate funds to sustain its operations. The fee for an issuer is equal to the product of the billable members enrolled in the plan through an FFE and a monthly user fee rate. Federal Administrative Funding for Exchanges
CMS is incurring significant administrative costs supporting exchange operations. During the period FY2010 through FY2012, a total of $456 million was used to support exchange operations. CMS's administrative costs to support exchange operations totaled $1,545 million in FY2013. Those funds included (1) discretionary funds transferred from other HHS accounts under the Secretary's transfer authority; (2) expired discretionary funds from the Nonrecurring Expenses Fund (NEF); (3) mandatory funds from the HIRIF; and (4) mandatory funds from the Prevention and Public Health Fund (see Table 2 ). | Pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended), a health insurance exchange has been established in each state and the District of Columbia (DC). Exchanges are marketplaces where individuals and small businesses can "shop" for health insurance coverage.
The ACA instructed each state to establish its own state-based exchange (SBE). If a state elected not to create an exchange or if the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined a state was not prepared to operate an exchange, the law directed HHS to establish a federally facilitated exchange (FFE) in the state. Fourteen states and DC established SBEs in 2014, while the remaining 36 states have FFEs. In some states that have FFEs, the states carry out certain functions of the exchange; in other states, the exchange is wholly operated and administered by HHS.
The ACA provided an indefinite appropriation for HHS grants to states to support the planning and establishment of exchanges. For each fiscal year, the HHS Secretary is to determine the total amount that will be made available to each state for exchange grants. No grant may be awarded after January 1, 2015.
There are three different types of exchange grants. First, planning grants were awarded to 49 states and DC. These grants of about $1 million each were intended to provide resources to states to help them plan their health insurance exchanges. Second, there have been multiple rounds of exchange establishment grants. There are two levels of exchange establishment grants: level one establishment grants are awarded to states that have made some progress using their planning funds, and level two establishment grants are designed to provide funding to states that are farther along in the establishment of an exchange. Finally, HHS awarded seven early innovator grants to states (including one award to a consortium of New England states) to support the design and implementation of the information technology systems needed to operate the exchanges. To date, HHS has awarded a total of more than $4.8 billion to states and DC in planning, establishment, and early innovator grants.
Under the ACA, each exchange is expected to be self-sustaining beginning January 1, 2015. The law authorizes exchanges to generate funding to sustain their operations, including by assessing fees on participating health insurance issuers. To raise funds for each of the FFEs, beginning in 2014, HHS is assessing a monthly fee on each health insurance issuer that offers plans through an FFE.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is incurring significant administrative costs to support FFE operations. According to CMS, a total of $456 million was used to support exchange operations over the period FY2010-FY2012. CMS spent $1,545 million on exchange operations in FY2013 and an estimated $1,390 million in FY2014. The agency has relied on a mix of annual discretionary appropriations and funding from other sources for these expenditures. Those sources include expired discretionary funds from the Nonrecurring Expenses Fund, mandatory funding from the Health Insurance Reform Implementation Fund and the Prevention and Public Health Fund, and FFE user fees. CMS has budgeted $1.8 billion for exchange operations in FY2015. Most of that funding is projected to come from FFE user fees. |
crs_R45217 | crs_R45217_0 | Overview
The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill provides funding for the planning, design, construction, alteration, and improvement of Department of Defense (DOD) facilities used by active and reserve components worldwide. Administration's FY2018 Budget Request
On May 23, 2017, the Trump Administration delivered its first budget proposal to the 115 th Congress, a request that included $646.9 billion for Department of Defense Military (051) spending. Of this amount, the Administration requested $9.8 billion for military construction and family housing in the base budget, and $0.6 billion in OCO funds, for a total of $10.4 billion. 115-96 , the third of five Continuing Resolutions enacted in FY2018. Result: Congress fully funded this supplemental request in H.R. 1892 ( P.L. 115-123 ), the fourth extensions of the CR, Division D of H.R. Division B of the bill would have authorized $10.5 billion in appropriations for military construction, family housing, and base closure activities for FY2018. The final bill, H.R. 2810 , was subsequently passed by the House on November 14, 2017, and by the Senate on November 16, 2017. The bill was presented to the President on November 30, 2017, and two weeks later, on December 12, 2017, the bill was signed and enacted as P.L. P.L. 115-91 authorized $10.7 billion for military construction, family housing, and Base Realignment and Closure activities, or roughly $309 million more than the President's Budget Request (PBR). During the course of the final NDAA conference negotiations, the President's Budget Request (PBR) was adjusted upward by $200 million in response to a November 6, 2017, supplemental request ( missile amendment) by the Administration to "support urgent missile defeat and defense enhancements to counter the threat from North Korea." 3354 , a 12-measure appropriations omnibus passed by the House on September 14, 2017, combined several bills. 2998 : FY2018 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act; H.R. 3219 : Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2018; and H.R. 3219 , passed by the House on July 27, 2017, retained the number assigned to the defense appropriations bill contained in the act and was referred to as the "Make America Secure Appropriations Act", 2018. 2998 ), which was reported by the House Committee on Appropriations on June 15, 2017. Enacted Appropriations
On March 22, 2018, the House passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 ( H.R. 1625 , P.L. 115-141 ), a legislative vehicle comprising the 12 appropriations bills Congress enacts on an annual basis. Division J of the omnibus, which makes appropriations for Military Construction Veterans Affairs, and Related agencies for FY2018, provided $10.1 billion for military construction in Title I (base account), and $750 million in Title IV (Overseas Contingency Operations, or OCO). The Senate passed the bill in the early hours of March 23, 2018, and the President signed it later the same day. Enacted Appropriations
The FY2018 Military Construction appropriations bill (Division J. of P.L. H.R. H.R. Senate Authorization
S. 1557 , as reported by the committee on July 13, 2017, would have authorized $2.5 billion in appropriated amounts for Air Force military construction projects for FY2018, $92 million more than the Administration requested. Appropriations Actions
House Appropriations Committee Actions
The House version of the FY2018 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. | On May 23, 2017, the Trump Administration delivered its first full budget proposal to the 115th Congress, a request that included $10.4 billion for military construction activities. Of this amount, the Administration requested $9.8 billion for military construction and family housing in the base budget, and $0.6 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations funds.
House and Senate negotiations on the annual National Defense Authorization Act, which authorizes funding for military construction projects for the Department of Defense, concluded early in November 2017. The final bill, H.R. 2810, passed the House on November 14, 2017, and the Senate on November 16, 2017. The final legislation was sent to the President for his signature on November 30, 2017, and was signed two weeks later, on December 12, 2017.
The FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91) authorizes for appropriations $10.7 billion for military construction, family housing, and base realignment and closure (BRAC) activities, or roughly $309 million more than the President's Budget Request (PBR).
Military construction appropriations are provided in the annual Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, one of 12 appropriations bills Congress considers on an annual basis. The legislation funds military construction activities for the active and reserve components, as well as military family housing, U.S. contributions to NATO, and BRAC actions.
In the House, the FY2018 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2998), was first reported by the Committee on Appropriations on June 22, 2017, and subsequently combined with three additional appropriations bills in H.R. 3219, which passed the House on July 27, 2017. This bill, in turn, was consolidated into a larger appropriations omnibus (H.R. 3354) that passed the House on September 14, 2017. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the FY2018 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (S. 1557) was reported by the Committee on Appropriations on July 13, 2017.
In lieu of passing any of the 12 appropriations acts, on September 8, 2017, Congress passed and the President signed H.R. 601 (P.L. 115-56), the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018, and Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2017.
Division D of H.R. 601 was extended four times through March 23, 2018, by allowing the government continued to operate for the first six months of the fiscal year under continuing resolutions.
During this period, Congress enacted several measures that provided military construction funding outside of the routine appropriations process in response to new requests by the Administration. Division B of H.R. 1370 (P.L. 115-96), the "Department of Defense Missile Defeat and Defense Enhancements Appropriations Act, 2018" (known as the missile amendment), provided $200 million in military construction funds to carry out construction of a missile field in Alaska in response to provocative actions by North Korea. A second supplemental, Division B of H.R. 1892 (P.L. 115-123, Title X), provided $721 million in hurricane relief military construction funding in areas struck hardest by disasters along U.S. Southeastern and Gulf coastlines.
On March 23, 2018, Congress passed and the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 1625, P.L. 115-141). Division J. of the act provides $10.1 billion in base and $750 million for Overseas Contingency Operations funding, a combined total of $10.8 billion. These appropriated amounts represent 4% more than the Administration requested for military construction funds in FY2018 ($10.4 billion), and 33% more than the FY2017 enacted levels ($8.1 billion). |
crs_RL34177 | crs_RL34177_0 | Introduction
This report summarizes the main points of CRS Report RL34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress , by John Rollins. It highlights the value proposition of such centers, as well as the obstacles and risks they face. All of the information provided herein is provided in greater detail in the original report, which will be updated as necessary. Background
The creation of post-9/11 intelligence/information fusion centers does not represent a totally new concept, but suggests an extension of pre-9/11 state and local law enforcement intelligence activities. From the perspective of intelligence collection, the 28 CFR, Part 23 standard is reasonable suspicion. A little more than 40% of fusion centers interviewed for this report describe their center as "all-hazards" as well as all-crimes. At some centers, all-hazards denotes the entity's mission and scope—meaning the fusion center is responsible for preventing and helping to mitigate both man-made events and natural disasters. While some states have seen limited success in integrating federal intelligence community analysis into their fusion centers, research indicates most continue to struggle with developing a "true fusion process" which includes value added analysis of broad streams of intelligence, identification of gaps, and proactive collection of information to fulfill those gaps to prevent criminal and terrorist acts. That is, while fusion centers were largely established by states, if the federal intent is to create a network of fusion centers that can be leveraged for both state, local, and federal public safety and homeland security purposes, there are several challenges that must be overcome. As elements of the states and regions they serve, fusion centers began to develop critical mass or staying power in the years immediately following the terrorist attacks of 2001. Federal versus state, local, and tribal (SLT) roles and responsibilities, to include funding. Ultimate goals and performance measures. | This report summarizes the main points of CRS Report RL34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, by John Rollins. It highlights the value proposition of such centers, as well as the obstacles and risks they face. All of the information provided herein is provided in greater detail in the original report, which will be updated as necessary.
Although elements of the information and intelligence fusion function were conducted prior to 9/11, often at state police criminal intelligence bureaus, the events of 9/11 provided the primary catalyst for the formal establishment of more than 40 state, local, and regional fusion centers across the country. The value proposition for fusion centers is that by integrating various streams of information and intelligence, including that flowing from the federal government, state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, a more accurate picture of risks to people, economic infrastructure, and communities can be developed and translated into protective action. The ultimate goal of fusion is to prevent man-made (terrorist) attacks and to respond to natural disasters and man-made threats quickly and efficiently should they occur. Fusion centers are state-created entities largely financed and staffed by the states, and there is no one "model" for how a center should be structured. State and local law enforcement and criminal intelligence seem to be at the core of many of the centers. While many of the centers have prevention of attacks as a high priority, little "true fusion"—analysis of disparate data sources, identification of intelligence gaps, and pro-active collection of intelligence against those gaps which could contribute to prevention—is occurring. |
crs_R43995 | crs_R43995_0 | President Obama's FY2015 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies (MilCon/VA) budget request complied with the applicable cap, as did the versions of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that were passed by the House ( H.R. 3979 , P.L. 113-291 ). 83 , Division I; P.L. The Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 constituted Division B of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 ( P.L. The amount of military construction new budget authority requested for FY2015 ($6.6 billion) was 40% less than the request for FY2014 ($11.0 billion). The final act authorized the appropriation of $6.6 billion for military construction and family housing, $220 million for additional overseas contingency operations construction, and authorized several "unfunded" construction projects for which DOD had planned but had not requested funding. necessary to carry them out and appropriated funds to them through the military construction appropriation. Limits on construction in European Command. 113-235)
The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill provides funding for the planning, design, construction, alteration, and improvement of facilities used by active and reserve military components worldwide. It capitalizes military family housing and the U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program and finances the implementation of installation closures and realignments. It underwrites veterans benefit and health care programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), provides for the creation and maintenance of U.S. cemeteries and battlefield monuments within the United States and abroad, and supports the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Armed Forces Retirement Homes, and Arlington National Cemetery. The bill also funds advance appropriations for veterans' medical services. 354) on December 13. The major appropriations categories include military construction and family housing construction and operation for the various active and reserve components of the armed forces and defense agencies, U.S. contributions the NATO Security Investment Program, construction associated with the demilitarization of the U.S. chemical munitions stockpile, the DOD homeowners assistance program, the DOD family housing improvement program, and activities associated with the five formal military base closure and realignment (BRAC) rounds that Congress has authorized. Trends in Appropriations. However, the final $159.14 billion enacted FY2015 appropriation for the VA was $11.21 billion (7.6%) over the FY2014 enacted amount, and approximately $505 million (.34%) above the Administration's FY2015 request. Additionally, the 2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act ( H.R. 113-235 contained a final total of $16 million in rescissions. 113-76 ), for the combined $45.225 billion in new budget authority included in Table 8 . Military Construction Appropriations, FY2014-FY2015 | The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill provides funding for the planning, design, construction, alteration, and improvement of facilities used by active and reserve military components worldwide. It capitalizes military family housing and the U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program and finances the implementation of installation closures and realignments. It underwrites veterans benefit and health care programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), provides for the creation and maintenance of U.S. cemeteries and battlefield monuments within the United States and abroad, and supports the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Armed Forces Retirement Homes, and Arlington National Cemetery. The bill also funds advance appropriations for veterans' medical services.
Military construction appropriations must be both authorized (usually in the annual National Defense Authorization Act) and appropriated. For FY2015, the President requested $6.6 billion in new budget authority for regular (base budget) military construction and an additional $46 million for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) construction associated with ongoing active military operations. Congress appropriated what the President requested, included a small amount of additional new budget authority, and added to that unexpired appropriations rescinded from prior fiscal years, bringing the base plus OCO military construction appropriation to $6.8 billion. In the spring of 2014, the President initiated a European Reassurance Initiative intended to strengthen confidence in U.S. support of its allies' security and territorial integrity. Congress thereupon added $221 million in military construction funding to the appropriation, bringing the total budget authority available for military construction in FY2015 to $7.0 billion.
For Veterans Affairs, the President requested $154.6 billion, an increase of $10.7 billion above the amount enacted for FY2014. The final appropriation of $159.1 billion augmented the President's request by approximately $505 million. The Administration requested $212.6 million to support the other agencies (the American Battle Monuments Commission, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Arlington National Cemetery, and the Armed Forces Retirement Home) funded by the act. The final combined appropriation for these agencies for FY2015 was $236.6 million.
The Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291), which authorizes military construction appropriations and other related activities, was enacted on December 19, 2014. The final version of the FY2015 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015; H.R. 83, Division I/P.L. 113-265) was enacted on December 16, 2014. |
crs_RS20846 | crs_RS20846_0 | The definitions of these instruments, including the differences between them, are not easily discernible, as the U.S. Constitution does not contain any provision referring to these terms or the manner in which the President may communicate directives to the executive branch. When they are founded on the authority of the President derived from the Constitution or statute, they may have the force and effect of law.... As such, authority for the execution and implementation of these written instruments stems from implied constitutional and statutory authority. Despite the amorphous nature of the authority to issue executive orders, presidential memoranda, and proclamations, these instruments have been employed by every President since the inception of the Republic. Jackson's concurrence, as discussed below, is based on the proposition that presidential powers may be influenced by congressional action. Presidential Revocation and Modification of Executive Orders
Executive orders are undoubtedly one of many tools available to Presidents to further policy goals during his Administration. | Executive orders, presidential memoranda, and proclamations are used extensively by Presidents to achieve policy goals, set uniform standards for managing the executive branch, or outline a policy view intended to influence the behavior of private citizens. The U.S. Constitution does not define these presidential instruments and does not explicitly vest the President with the authority to issue them. Nonetheless, such orders are accepted as an inherent aspect of presidential power. Moreover, if they are based on appropriate authority, they have the force and effect of law. This report discusses the nature of these written instruments, executive orders in particular, with a focus on the scope of presidential authority to execute such instruments, as well as judicial and congressional responses to their issuance. |
crs_RL33467 | crs_RL33467_0 | I n 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Roe v. Wade that the U.S. Constitution protects a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. In a companion decision, Doe v. Bolton , the Court found that a state may not unduly burden t he exercise of that fundamental right with regulations that prohibit or substantially limit access to the procedure. Rather than settle the issue, the Court's rulings since Roe and Doe have continued to generate debate and have precipitated a variety of governmental actions at the national, state, and local levels designed either to nullify the rulings or limit their effect. These governmental regulations have, in turn, spawned further litigation in which resulting judicial refinements in the law have been no more successful in dampening the controversy. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey illustrate the Court's shift from the type of constitutional analysis it articulated in Roe . The "undue burden" standard allowed greater regulation during that period. After several attempts to pass federal legislation that would prohibit the performance of partial-birth abortions, Congress passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 during the 108 th Congress. This section examines the history of the federal legislative response to the abortion issue. The Freedom of Choice Act, for example, attempted to codify Roe and was introduced in several Congresses. Since Roe , Congress has attached abortion funding restrictions to several other appropriations bills. Although the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 included the first of such restrictions, the greatest focus has arguably been on the Hyde Amendment, which generally restricts Medicaid abortions under the annual appropriations for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). That Congress passed language prohibiting the use of FEHBP funds for abortions, except in cases where the life of the mother would be endangered or in cases of rape or incest. Health Reform
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was enacted on March 23, 2010, to reduce the number of uninsured individuals and restructure the private health insurance market. The ACA includes provisions that address the coverage of abortion services by qualified health plans that are available through health benefit exchanges (exchanges). The ACA's abortion provisions have been controversial, particularly with regard to the use of premium tax credits or cost-sharing subsidies to obtain health coverage that includes coverage for elective or nontherapeutic abortion services. In addressing the coverage of abortion services by qualified health plans offered through an exchange, the ACA refers to the Hyde Amendment to distinguish between two types of abortions: abortions for which federal funds appropriated for HHS may be used, and abortions for which such funds may not be used (elective abortions). Under the ACA, individuals who receive a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy are permitted to select a qualified health plan that includes coverage for elective abortions. The measure provided FY2017 funds for foreign operations, the District of Columbia, HHS, and other federal agencies. Contributions to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) were conditioned on the entity not funding abortions. Funds provided to the Department of Justice could also not be used to pay for an abortion, except when the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or in the case of rape or incest. | In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Roe v. Wade that the U.S. Constitution protects a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. In a companion decision, Doe v. Bolton, the Court found that a state may not unduly burden the exercise of that fundamental right with regulations that prohibit or substantially limit access to the procedure. Rather than settle the issue, the Court's rulings since Roe and Doe have continued to generate debate and have precipitated a variety of governmental actions at the national, state, and local levels designed either to nullify the rulings or limit their effect. These governmental regulations have, in turn, spawned further litigation in which resulting judicial refinements in the law have been no more successful in dampening the controversy.
Following Roe, the right identified in that case was affected by decisions such as Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, which gave greater leeway to the states to restrict abortion, and Rust v. Sullivan, which narrowed the scope of permissible abortion-related activities that are linked to federal funding. The Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which established the "undue burden" standard for determining whether abortion restrictions are permissible, gave Congress additional impetus to move on statutory responses to the abortion issue, such as the Freedom of Choice Act.
Legislation to prohibit a specific abortion procedure, the so-called "partial-birth" abortion procedure, was passed in the 108th Congress. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act appears to be one of the only examples of Congress restricting the performance of a medical procedure. Legislation that would prohibit the performance of an abortion once the fetus reaches a specified gestational age has also been introduced in numerous Congresses.
Since Roe, Congress has attached abortion funding restrictions to various appropriations measures. The greatest focus has arguably been on restricting Medicaid abortions under the annual appropriations for the Department of Health and Human Services. This restriction is commonly referred to as the "Hyde Amendment" because of its original sponsor. Similar restrictions affect the appropriations for other federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, where federal funds may not be used to perform abortions in the federal prison system, except in cases of rape or if the life of the mother would be endangered. Hyde-type amendments also have an impact in the District of Columbia, where federal and local funds may not be used to perform abortions except in cases of rape or incest, or where the life of the mother would be endangered, and affect international organizations like the United Nations Population Fund, which receives funds through the annual Foreign Operations appropriations measure.
The debate over abortion also continued in the context of health reform. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), enacted on March 23, 2010, includes provisions that address the coverage of abortion services by qualified health plans that are available through health benefit exchanges. The ACA's abortion provisions have been controversial, particularly with regard to the use of premium tax credits or cost-sharing subsidies to obtain health coverage that includes coverage for elective or nontherapeutic abortion services. Under the ACA, individuals who receive a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy are permitted to select a qualified health plan that includes coverage for elective abortions, subject to funding segregation requirements that are imposed on both the plan issuer and the enrollees in such a plan. |
crs_R44798 | crs_R44798_0 | As the 2020 round of redistricting approaches, these decisions are likely to be of particular interest to Congress. During its current term, the Court has decided one case regarding the degree to which racial considerations are permitted to impact how district lines are drawn and is considering another such case. Furthermore, the Supreme Court is currently considering an appeal from a three-judge federal district court ruling involving partisan gerrymandering. This case presents the Court with an opportunity to establish a standard for determining what constitutes unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. The report then analyzes key foundational and recent Supreme Court and lower court redistricting decisions addressing four general topics: (1) the constitutional requirement of population equality among districts; (2) the intersection between the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause, also known as claims of racial gerrymandering; (3) the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering; and (4) the constitutionality of state ballot initiatives providing for redistricting by independent commissions. In addition to various state processes, the legal framework for congressional redistricting involves constitutional and federal statutory requirements. This includes congressional redistricting plans. Equality Standard: One Person, One Vote
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to require that each congressional district within a state contain an approximately equal number of persons. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "equality standard" or the principle of "one person, one vote." In several cases since 1964, the Supreme Court has described the extent to which precise or ideal mathematical population equality among districts is required. It is important to note that for congressional districts, less deviation from precise equality has been held by the Court to be permissible than is permissible for state legislative districts. Equal Protection and the Voting Rights Act
Much of the Supreme Court's redistricting jurisprudence has been prompted by disputes concerning the interplay between the requirements of the VRA and the constitutional standards of equal protection. A majority-minority district is one in which a racial or language minority group comprises a voting majority. The Court further listed the following factors, which originated in legislative history materials accompanying enactment of Section 2, as relevant in assessing the totality of the circumstances:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivisions is racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; [and] 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. These cases are often referred to as "racial gerrymandering" claims because the plaintiffs argue that race was improperly used in the drawing of district boundaries. In conclusion, while the VRA may require, under certain circumstances, the creation of one or more "majority-minority" districts in a congressional redistricting plan in order to prevent the denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a language minority, redistricting maps are also subject to the constitutional standards of equal protection. If race is the predominant factor in the drawing of district lines, above other traditional redistricting considerations, then the state must demonstrate that it had a compelling governmental interest in creating a majority-minority district and the redistricting plan was narrowly tailored to further that interest. While leaving open the possibility that a claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering could be within the scope of judicial review, as discussed below, the Supreme Court has been unable to decide on a manageable standard for making such a determination. However, the Supreme Court disagreed. Interpreting such requirements, in a series of cases and evolving jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued rulings that have significantly shaped how congressional districts are drawn and the degree to which challenges to redistricting plans may be successful. Finally, a 2015 Supreme Court ruling held that the Elections Clause of the Constitution permits states to create, by ballot initiatives and referenda, nonpartisan independent commissions for drawing congressional districts. | In addition to various state processes, the legal framework for congressional redistricting involves constitutional and federal statutory requirements. Interpreting these requirements, in a series of cases and evolving jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued rulings that have significantly shaped how congressional districts are drawn and the degree to which challenges to redistricting plans may succeed. As the 2020 round of redistricting approaches, foundational and recent rulings by the Court regarding redistricting are likely to be of particular interest to Congress. This report analyzes key Supreme Court and lower court redistricting decisions addressing four general topics: (1) the constitutional requirement of population equality among districts; (2) the intersection between the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause; (3) the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering; and (4) the constitutionality of state ballot initiatives providing for redistricting by independent commissions.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to require that each congressional district within a state contain approximately an equal number of persons. This requirement is sometimes referred to as the "equality standard" or the principle of "one person, one vote." In several cases, the Supreme Court has described the extent to which population equality among districts is required. For congressional districts, less deviation from precise equality has been held by the Court to be permissible than is permissible for state legislative districts.
In addition, congressional districts are required to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which prohibits any voting qualification or practice that results in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a language minority. This includes congressional redistricting plans. Under certain circumstances, the VRA may require the creation of one or more "majority-minority" districts, in which a racial or language minority group comprises a voting majority. However, under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, if race is the predominant factor in the drawing of district lines, then a "strict scrutiny" standard of review applies. To withstand strict scrutiny in this context, the state must demonstrate that it had a compelling governmental interest in creating a majority-minority district and the redistricting plan was narrowly tailored to further that compelling interest. These cases are often referred to as "racial gerrymandering" claims because the plaintiffs argue that race was improperly used in the drawing of district boundaries. Much of the Supreme Court's redistricting jurisprudence has been triggered by disputes involving the intersection between requirements under the VRA and the constitutional standards of equal protection. For example, during its current term, the Court has decided one case regarding the degree to which racial considerations are permitted to impact how district lines are drawn and is considering another such case.
While racial gerrymandering claims have been a recent focus of litigation, the Supreme Court is also currently considering an appeal of a case involving partisan gerrymandering. In February 2017, a state appealed a three-judge federal district court ruling that invalidated a redistricting map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. This case presents the Court with an opportunity to establish a standard for determining what constitutes unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. While leaving open the possibility that such claims may be justiciable (that is, within the scope of judicial review), to date, the Supreme Court has yet not decided on a standard for assessing such claims.
Finally, a 2015 Supreme Court ruling held that the Elections Clause of the Constitution permits states to create nonpartisan independent redistricting commissions for congressional redistricting by ballot initiatives and referenda. If more states adopt similar laws, it could change the process of congressional redistricting nationwide. |
crs_R41701 | crs_R41701_0 | Military Strategy
The military strategy designed to support the grand strategy, it has been suggested, might be based on these considerations:
the operational-level military objectives that need to be achieved, to support the overall grand strategy, and the extent to which a no-fly zone—as one set of ways and means—helps achieve those objectives. International Authorization
Practitioners and observers have debated what constitutes international "authorization" for the establishment of a no-fly zone. Given the paucity of relevant precedents, and the dissimilarities among them, there may not exist a single, clear, agreed model. In turn, the concept of authorization is typically considered to be linked to the ideas of both "legality" and "legitimacy"—the three concepts overlap but are all distinct. The precise meaning of each of the terms is still debated. Express authorization from the Security Council provides the clearest legal basis for imposing a no-fly zone. Congressional Authorization12
In addition to international authorization, debates have addressed the question of congressional authorization—whether and when there is a need for congressional approval based on the War Powers Resolution for a proposed no-fly zone. The question of whether and how congressional authorization is sought for a proposed operation could have an impact on congressional support—including policy, funding, and outreach to the American people—for the operation. Since the War Powers Resolution gives the President the authority to launch U.S. military actions prior to receiving an authorization from Congress for 60-90 days, it is possible that the President could direct U.S. Armed Forces to take or support military actions in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions, or in support of NATO operations, and then seek statutory authority for such actions from Congress. Operations13
No-fly zone operations can conceivably take a number of different forms, and can themselves vary a great deal over time. Key considerations include, but are not limited to, the following factors. Costs14
The costs of establishing and maintaining a no-fly zone are likely to vary widely based on several key parameters:
the specific military tasks that a given no-fly zone operation calls for. the geography of the adversary's country—the surface area and type of terrain over which U.S. and partner forces would have to operate. the duration of the no-fly zone. the extent to which the United States is joined by international partners in the effort. the extent of "mission creep"—how, if at all, the operation expands to include a broader array of activities designed to achieve the same military, and strategic, objectives. | In conflicts in Kosovo, Iraq, and Libya, the United States has taken part in establishing and maintaining no-fly zones. As no-fly zones represent a significant commitment of U.S. forces, and may prove a precursor to other military actions, Congress may wish to consider issues surrounding the strategy, international authorization, congressional authorization, operations, and costs of establishing and maintaining no-fly zones.
The military strategy designed to support U.S. grand strategy, it has been suggested, might be based on these considerations: the operational-level military objectives that need to be achieved, to support the overall grand strategy; and the extent to which a no-fly zone—as one set of ways and means—helps achieve those objectives.
Practitioners and observers have debated what constitutes international "authorization" for the establishment of a no-fly zone. Given the paucity of relevant precedents, and the dissimilarities among them, there may not exist a single, clear, agreed model. The concept of authorization is typically considered to be linked to the ideas of both "legality" and "legitimacy"—the three concepts overlap but are all distinct. The precise meaning of each of the terms is still debated. Express authorization from the U.N. Security Council provides the clearest legal basis for imposing a no-fly zone.
In addition to international authorization, debates have addressed the question of congressional authorization—whether and when there is a need for congressional approval based on the War Powers Resolution for a proposed no-fly zone. The question of whether and how congressional authorization is sought for a proposed operation could have an impact on congressional support—including policy, funding, and outreach to the American people—for the operation. Since the War Powers Resolution gives the President the authority to launch U.S. military actions prior to receiving an authorization from Congress for 60-90 days, it is possible that the President could direct U.S. Armed Forces to take or support military actions in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, or in support of NATO operations, and then seek statutory authority for such actions from Congress.
No-fly zone operations can conceivably take a number of different forms, and can themselves vary a great deal over time. Key considerations include, but are not limited to, the following factors: the nature, density, quantity, and quality of adversary air assets; geography; the availability of "friendly" assets; the adversary's military capabilities and responses; the U.S. military's concept of operations; and the rules of engagement.
The costs of establishing and maintaining a no-fly zone are likely to vary widely based on several key parameters. They could be the specific military tasks that a given no-fly zone operation calls for, the geography of the adversary's country, the duration of the no-fly zone, the extent to which the United States is joined by international partners in the effort, and the extent of "mission creep"—how, if at all, the operation expands to include a broader array of activities designed to achieve the same military, and strategic, objectives. |
crs_R43062 | crs_R43062_0 | This report outlines the authority of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate dietary supplements and summarizes dietary supplement-specific regulations for new dietary ingredients (NDI), good manufacturing practices (GMP), labeling, and claims. Dietary supplement advertising, which is regulated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in coordination with the FDA, is also discussed. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act required registration of food (including dietary supplement) manufacturers, processors, and packers with the FDA. Under the Dietary Supplement and Non-Prescription Drug Consumer Protection Act, Congress added requirements for mandatory reporting of adverse events for dietary supplements. Under the FFDCA, a dietary supplement is considered adulterated under specified circumstances related to the product's contents and manufacturing processes:
if the dietary supplement or dietary ingredient presents a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury either (1) under conditions of use recommended or suggested in the product's labeling, or (2) under normal conditions of use, if none are set forth in the product's labeling; if the dietary supplement contains a NDI for which there is inadequate information as to whether or not it presents a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury; if the Secretary declares the dietary supplement or a dietary ingredient therein to pose an imminent hazard to public health or safety; or if the dietary supplement contains a dietary ingredient that renders it adulterated because it is a poisonous or deleterious substance rendering the product injurious to one's health. Issues for Congress
Consumers, the health care and dietary supplement industries, Congress, and federal regulators all have a stake in supplement identification, effectiveness, and safety. Current federal policy toward regulating dietary supplements was intended to balance these competing interests. DSHEA provided FDA the authority to step in against products that were unsafe or adulterated, but "not to take any actions to impose unreasonable regulatory barriers limiting or slowing the flow of safe products and accurate information to consumers." Under current law, dietary supplements are generally regulated as food—meaning that the FDA does not take regulatory action until something goes wrong (as opposed to drug regulation, where proof of safety and efficacy are required prior to putting a product on the market). As the dietary supplement market has grown, regulatory and research questions have become more complex. The following sections discuss current areas of regulatory and legislative concern, including the identification of products as dietary supplements; their role in individuals' health and health care; and recent issues regarding supplement safety. According to public opinion polls, the American public overwhelmingly assumes that FDA reviews the safety and effectiveness of dietary supplements before they are marketed. While this is the case for drugs and some medical devices, it is not the case for dietary supplements. As noted earlier in this report, the FDA has the authority to regulate dietary supplements once they are on the market, and can inspect facilities to ensure compliance with GMP; ensure proper labeling and use of claims; and monitor adverse event reports. Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act ( P.L. 111-353 )
FSMA provides FDA with mandatory recall authority for food, including dietary supplements. Department of Health and Human Services
NIH —National Institutes of Health
OIG —Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Legislation
DSHEA —Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994
FDAMA — FDA Modernization Act
FFDCA —Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
FSMA —FDA Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011
NLEA —Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990
Miscellaneous
CFR— Code of Federal Regulations
FAERS— FDA Adverse Event Reporting System
GMP —Good Manufacturing Practices
GRAS —Generally Recognized as Safe
NDI— New Dietary Ingredient
SSA— FDA's Significant Scientific Agreement Standard for approved health claims
IND —Investigational New Drug | Many Americans take dietary supplements (e.g., vitamins, herbs, sports nutrition supplements) with the intention of meeting their nutritional needs, as well as to improve or maintain their overall health. These consumers want accurate information on the effectiveness and proper use of dietary supplements and access to the dietary supplements of their choice. The federal government has an interest in ensuring that the supplements Americans consume are high quality, free from contaminants, and accurately labeled. Because dietary supplements are intended to supplement the diet, their processing and manufacture are regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in a manner similar to food, with some differences that will be outlined in this report. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in coordination with the FDA, regulates dietary supplement advertising.
In contrast with the authority under which drugs and medical devices are regulated, dietary supplements are regulated as food under the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), and the FDA does not take regulatory action on food or dietary supplements until something goes wrong with a product that is on the market. The FDA has the authority to take action regarding supplements that are labeled incorrectly (misbranded) or contain unsafe ingredients (adulterated). The FDA is made aware of potential misbranding or adulteration through inspections, adverse event reports, and citizen petitions.
According to public opinion polls, the American public overwhelmingly assumes that FDA reviews the safety and effectiveness of dietary supplements before they are marketed. While this is the case for drugs and medical devices, it is not the case for dietary supplements.
The Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA, P.L. 103-417) authorized the FDA to promulgate regulations for dietary supplement-specific good manufacturing practices (GMP), and established requirements for new dietary ingredients (NDI), labeling, and certain health claims for dietary supplements. Under the Dietary Supplement and Non-Prescription Drug Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 109-462), Congress added requirements for mandatory reporting of adverse events, and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (P.L. 107-188) required registration of food (including dietary supplement) manufacturers, processors, and packers with the FDA. The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, P.L. 111-353) provided the FDA with mandatory recall authority for adulterated food (including dietary supplements) and food containing undisclosed allergens.
Consumers, the health care and dietary supplement industries, Congress, and federal regulators all have a stake in supplement identification, effectiveness, and safety. Current federal policy toward regulating dietary supplements was intended to balance these competing interests. DSHEA provided FDA the authority to take action against products that were unsafe or adulterated, but emphasized that FDA should not take actions that would impose unreasonable regulatory barriers limiting or slowing the flow of safe products and accurate information to consumers. As the supplement market has grown and diversified, the regulatory and research questions have become more complex. This report discusses current areas of regulatory and legislative concern, including the identification of products as dietary supplements, their role in individuals' health and health care, and recent issues regarding supplement safety. |
crs_R43531 | crs_R43531_0 | Introduction
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), insures private mortgage lenders against the possibility that a borrower will default on his or her mortgage. FHA insurance is intended to encourage lenders to offer affordable mortgages to certain eligible borrowers who might find it difficult to obtain a conventional (that is, non-government-insured) mortgage, such as households with small down payments. Borrowers also pay fees, called premiums, in exchange for the insurance. The money that it brings in from the fees charged to borrowers and any amounts that it recoups from the sale of foreclosed homes is intended to cover the costs of any claims paid to lenders when mortgages default. However, in recent years increasing foreclosures on FHA-insured mortgages and factors such as house price declines have put pressure on the single-family mortgage insurance fund, known as the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund). At the end of FY2013, FHA was required to take a $1.7 billion mandatory appropriation from Treasury to ensure that it would have sufficient funds to cover all of its expected future losses on the loans that it was currently insuring. FHA did not need any funds from Treasury for this purpose in FY2014. FHA has made a number of policy changes in recent years to attempt to improve its financial condition. Congress has also been considering additional reforms to FHA. Some of the changes that FHA has initiated over the past several years involve increasing the premiums that borrowers pay for FHA-insured mortgages and strengthening the underwriting guidelines for its single-family program. In recent years, FHA has taken a number of steps to increase its oversight of FHA-approved lenders and otherwise manage its counterparty risk. Such provisions have been included in some FHA reform legislation that has been considered by Congress, discussed in the " Legislative Proposals in the 113th Congress " section of this report. Such proposals have included additional changes in underwriting or eligibility requirements to reduce the risk on FHA-insured loans and changes to FHA's capital requirements to require it to hold more funds in reserve to pay for unexpected losses. Two additional bills related to FHA were ordered to be reported out of committee in the 113 th Congress: the FHA Solvency Act of 2013 ( S. 1376 ), which was reported in the Senate, and the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners (PATH) Act ( H.R. 1145 and S. 1376 only address FHA, the PATH Act includes FHA provisions as part of a broader bill to reform the housing finance system. H.R. Other provisions would have made additional, more far-reaching changes to FHA, including making it an independent agency, taking steps to more narrowly target FHA insurance, and reducing the amount of FHA's insurance coverage and increasing the role of private capital. FHA's financial reports would have been required to use accounting methods that are used in the private sector. | The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), insures private mortgage lenders against losses on eligible mortgages. If a borrower defaults on an FHA-insured mortgage, FHA will repay the lender the remaining amount owed. FHA insurance is intended to encourage lenders to offer mortgages to households who might otherwise have difficulty obtaining a loan at an affordable interest rate, such as households with small down payments. Borrowers pay fees, called premiums, in exchange for the insurance, and these fees are supposed to pay for the costs of any mortgage defaults.
In recent years, increasing foreclosure rates and falling house prices have strained FHA's single-family mortgage insurance fund, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund). At the end of FY2013, FHA received $1.7 billion from Treasury to ensure that it had sufficient funds to cover all of its expected future losses on the mortgages that it was currently insuring. This was the first time that FHA had ever required funds from Treasury for this purpose for its single-family program.
In response to concerns about the financial condition of the MMI Fund, FHA has taken a number of steps in recent years to attempt to improve its financial position. These changes have included increasing the fees that it charges to borrowers, adjusting its underwriting standards, and making changes to the way that it manages delinquent mortgages and foreclosed properties. FHA has also requested additional authorities from Congress, such as improving its ability to hold FHA-approved lenders accountable for the mortgages they submit for FHA insurance. These authorities have been included in legislation that Congress has considered but have not been enacted to date.
Congress has also been considering additional reforms to FHA. Proposed reforms include increasing the amount of capital that FHA is required to hold in reserve to pay for unexpected increases in future losses and specifying actions that FHA must take if its capital reserves fall below certain thresholds. Some of these proposed additional reforms have been included in several stand-alone bills that have been introduced in recent Congresses, including H.R. 1145 and S. 1376 in the 113th Congress.
Additionally, reforms to FHA are being considered in the context of broader reforms to the housing finance system. One housing finance reform bill in the 113th Congress, the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners (PATH) Act (H.R. 2767), would have made more far-reaching changes to FHA than those that have been included in other bills. These changes would have included limiting FHA-insured mortgages to only low- and moderate-income borrowers and first-time homebuyers in most circumstances, reducing the share of a mortgage that FHA can insure, and requiring greater risk-sharing with the private sector. The PATH Act would also have removed FHA from HUD and made it an independent agency. |
crs_RL32908 | crs_RL32908_0 | Introduction
The practice of breastfeeding has gained significant popularity in recent years. Congress has also enacted legislation, in appropriations measures, to affirm the right of a mother to breastfeed her child at any location in a federal building or on federal property, if the mother and child are otherwise authorized to be present at that location. This practice has been promulgated into federal regulations. This proposal, contained in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2005 ( H.R. At the present time, all of these measures are in committee. The proposed Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention America Act (HeLP America Act) ( S. 1074 ) contains various provisions to encourage breastfeeding. The proposed Child Health Investment for Long-term Development (CHILD and Newborn) Act of 2005 ( H.R. 403 would recognize the health, economic, and social benefits of breastfeeding and urge the states to protect a mother's right to breastfeed and to remove legal barriers faced by women who breastfeed. Enacted Federal Legislation Relating to Breastfeeding
The Breastfeeding Promotion Program
The Breastfeeding Promotion Program ("Program") is a part of the Child Nutrition Programs administered by the Secretary of Agriculture ("Secretary"). The most recent affirmation of this practice was contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005:
Sec. 109th Congress
Several bills and one resolution have been introduced in the 109 th Congress to deal with certain aspects of breastfeeding. The bill has three main provisions: to amend the employment discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to protect breastfeeding by new mothers; to provide tax incentives to encourage breastfeeding; and to provide for a performance standard for breast pumps. S. 1074 , the Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention Act America (or the HeLP America Act), was introduced by Senator Tom Harkin on May 18, 2005. The companion bills, H.R. The bill(s) would amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize the President to furnish assistance to improve the health of newborns, children, and mothers in developing countries. S.Res. It is possible that other legislation concerning breastfeeding may be introduced in the 109 th Congress. | There has been significant growth in the practice of breastfeeding in recent years. As a result, Congress and numerous state legislatures have considered various proposals concerning different aspects of breastfeeding.
Congress has authorized and funded the Breastfeeding Promotion Program ("Program") as part of the Child Nutrition Programs administered by the Secretary of Agriculture ("Secretary"). Under this Program, the Secretary is directed to establish a breastfeeding promotion program to encourage breastfeeding. Through appropriations legislation, Congress has repeatedly affirmed a mother's right to breastfeed on federal property or in a federal building, if the mother and child are authorized to be in that location. This practice was most recently affirmed in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, and the practice has been promulgated into federal regulations.
In the 109th Congress, several bills have been introduced concerning breastfeeding. At this time all of the bills are in committee. H.R. 2122, the proposed Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2005, was introduced on May 5, 2005. The bill contains provisions which if enacted, would amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (equal employment opportunity) to protect breastfeeding by new mothers; provide tax incentives to employers to encourage breastfeeding by employees; and provide a performance standard for breast pumps. S. 1074, the proposed Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention America Act (or the HeLP America Act), was introduced on May 18, 2005, and contains various provisions dealing with the encouragement of breastfeeding. H.R. 4222, the proposed Child Health Investment for Long-term Development (CHILD and Newborn) Act of 2005, would authorize the President to furnish assistance to improve the health of newborns, children, and mothers in developing countries. The bill was introduced on November 3, 2005. S. 2765, the companion bill to H.R. 4222, was introduced on May 9, 2006. S.Res. 403, introduced on March 16, 2006, would recognize the health, economic, and social benefits of breastfeeding and urge the states to protect a mother's right to breastfeed and to remove the legal barriers faced by women who breastfeed.
This report will be updated as needed. It is expected that legislation concerning breastfeeding may be introduced in the 110th Congress. |
crs_R43622 | crs_R43622_0 | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, as amended) provides a notable example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. He went on to say that the "Constitution's grant of legislative power to Congress encompasses a responsibility to ensure that delegated authority is exercised according to appropriate procedures." Congressional oversight of rulemaking can deal with a variety of issues, including the substance of the rules issued pursuant to congressional delegations of authority and the process by which those rules are issued. Having an early sense of what rules agencies are going to issue, and when they are going to issue those rules, can help Congress conduct oversight over the regulations that are issued pursuant to the ACA. The Unified Agenda
A potentially effective way for Congress to identify upcoming ACA rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (hereafter Unified Agenda), which is usually published twice each year—in the spring and fall. The Unified Agenda is published by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the General Services Administration (GSA), for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The Unified Agenda lists upcoming activities, by agency, in three separate categories:
"active" actions, including rules in the prerule stage (e.g., advance notices of proposed rulemaking that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months); proposed rule stage (i.e., notices of proposed rulemaking that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months, or for which the closing date of the comment period is the next step); and final rule stage (i.e., final rules or other final actions that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months); "completed" actions (i.e., final rules or rules that have been withdrawn since the last edition of the Unified Agenda); and "long-term" actions (i.e., items under development that agencies do not expect to take action on in the next 12 months). All entries in the Unified Agenda usually have uniform data elements, which typically include the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, the Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date (sometimes just the projected month and year) for the next regulatory action. Each entry also contains an element indicating the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act). Scope and Methodology of This Report
The Spring 2014 edition of the Unified Agenda, published on May 23, 2014, is the seventh edition compiled and issued by RISC since enactment of the ACA. This report examines the Spring 2014 edition of the Unified Agenda and identifies upcoming proposed and final rules and long-term regulatory actions expected to be issued pursuant to the ACA in the next 12 months. In this edition, agencies reported 14 proposed rules and 17 final rules they expect to issue pursuant to the ACA within the next 12 months. Agencies also reported a total of four long-term regulatory actions. Appendix. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, as amended) was signed into law by President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010. As is often the case with legislation, the ACA granted rulemaking authority to federal agencies to implement many of its provisions. The regulations issued pursuant to the ACA and other statutes carry the force and effect of law. Therefore, scholars and practitioners have long noted the importance of rulemaking to the policy process, as well as the importance of congressional oversight of rulemaking. For example, one scholar noted that the "Constitution's grant of legislative power to Congress encompasses a responsibility to ensure that delegated authority is exercised according to appropriate procedures." Congressional oversight of rulemaking can deal with a variety of issues, including the substance of the rules issued pursuant to congressional delegations of authority and the process by which those rules are issued.
Having a sense of what rules agencies are going to issue and when they are going to issue those rules can help Congress conduct oversight over the regulations that are issued pursuant to the ACA. One way in which Congress can identify upcoming ACA rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, which is published by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The Unified Agenda lists upcoming activities, by agency, in three separate categories:
"active" actions, including rules in the prerule stage (e.g., advance notices of proposed rulemaking that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months); proposed rule stage (i.e., notices of proposed rulemaking that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months, or for which the closing date of the comment period is the next step); and final rule stage (i.e., final rules or other final actions that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months); "completed" actions (i.e., final rules or rules that have been withdrawn since the last edition of the Unified Agenda); and "long-term" actions (i.e., items under development that agencies do not expect to take action on in the next 12 months).
All entries in the Unified Agenda usually provide uniform data elements, which typically include the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, the Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of the action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date for the next regulatory action. Each entry also indicates the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act).
The most recent edition of the Unified Agenda, which was published on May 23, 2014, is the seventh edition of the agenda since enactment of the ACA. In this edition, agencies reported 14 proposed rules and 17 final rules that they expect to issue pursuant to the ACA within the next 12 months. Agencies also reported a total of four long-term regulatory actions.
The Appendix of this report lists the upcoming proposed and final rules published in the Spring 2014 Unified Agenda in a table. |
crs_R43720 | crs_R43720_0 | Introduction
Ongoing U.S. military operations against the Islamic State (which formerly referred to itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and is also commonly referred to as IS, ISIS, or ISIL) raise issues concerning the allocation of war powers between Congress and the President, including whether such operations have been (or are required to be) authorized by an act of Congress. In August 2014, President Obama ordered U.S. forces to commence airstrikes against IS targets in Iraq to assist the Iraqi government in combating the insurgent force, protect U.S. military and nonmilitary personnel in Iraq, and support certain humanitarian operations. On September 23, 2014, the United States began airstrikes in Syria targeting IS forces and certain other groups within that country believed to be affiliated with Al Qaeda. In a public address on September, 10, 2014, President Obama announced the pursuit of a strategy to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Islamic State, including through the escalation of U.S. airstrikes of IS forces in Iraq, as well as the possible initiation of U.S. airstrikes against IS forces located in neighboring Syria. Initially, the Obama Administration cited the President's authority under Article II of the Constitution as the legal basis for U.S. operations against the Islamic State. More recently, however, the Administration has claimed that the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (2002 Iraq AUMF; P.L. 107-243 ) and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L. 107-40 ) confer congressional authorization for military operations against the Islamic State. Some observers and Members of Congress have expressed disagreement with this interpretation, though it is unclear whether any dispute over application of these statutes to the Islamic State would give rise to a cognizable claim that would be resolved by the courts. As of the date of this report, Congress has not enacted legislation specifically authorizing U.S. force against the Islamic State. 113-164 ), which was signed into law on September 19, 2014, Congress authorized the President to arm and train vetted elements of Syrian opposition groups, including for purposes of deterring attacks on the Syrian populace by the Islamic State, but the legislation expressly provides that it does not constitute statutory authorization for the introduction of U.S. forces into actual or imminent hostilities. This report addresses select legal questions raised by the use of military force against the Islamic State. Questions addressed in this report include potential sources (and limitations) of presidential authority to use military force against the Islamic State assuming the absence of express congressional authorization; the potential relevance of the 2002 Iraq AUMF, the 2001 AUMF, and the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 (2015 CR, P.L. 113-164 ); the constraints imposed by the War Powers Resolution upon U.S. military action that has not been authorized by Congress; and the applicability of the United Nations Charter to ongoing U.S. military strikes in Iraq and Syria. The report will be updated as warranted by events. Many of the legal issues discussed in this report concerning congressional oversight of U.S. military action are addressed in greater detail in CRS Report R41989, Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. Further discussion regarding U.S. operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria can be found in CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" Crisis and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed] et al. ; Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed] et al. ; and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. | Ongoing U.S. military operations against the Islamic State (which formerly referred to itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and is also commonly referred to as IS, ISIS, or ISIL) raise issues concerning the allocation of war powers between Congress and the President, including whether such operations have been (or are required to be) authorized by an act of Congress. In August 2014, President Obama ordered U.S. forces to commence airstrikes against IS targets in Iraq to assist the Iraqi government in combating the insurgent force, protect U.S. military and nonmilitary personnel in Iraq, and support certain humanitarian operations. In a public address on September 10, 2014, President Obama announced the pursuit of a strategy to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Islamic State, including through the escalation of U.S. airstrikes against IS forces in Iraq, as well as the possible initiation of U.S. airstrikes against IS forces located in neighboring Syria. On September 23, 2014, the United States began airstrikes in Syria targeting IS forces and certain other groups within that country believed to be affiliated with Al Qaeda.
As of the date of this report, Congress has not enacted legislation specifically authorizing U.S. force against the Islamic State. In enacting the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 (P.L. 113-164), which was signed into law on September 19, 2014, Congress authorized the President to arm and train vetted elements of Syrian opposition groups, including for purposes of deterring attacks on the Syrian populace by the Islamic State, but the legislation expressly provides that it does not constitute statutory authorization for the introduction of U.S. forces into actual or imminent hostilities. Initially, the Obama Administration cited the President's authority under Article II of the Constitution as the legal basis for U.S. operations against the Islamic State. More recently, however, the Administration has claimed that the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (2002 Iraq AUMF; P.L. 107-243) and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L. 107-40), provide congressional authority for military operations against the Islamic State. Some observers and Members of Congress have expressed disagreement with this interpretation, though it is unclear whether any dispute over application of these statutes to the Islamic State would give rise to a cognizable claim that would be resolved by the courts.
This report addresses select legal questions raised by the use of military force against the Islamic State. Questions addressed in this report include potential sources (and limitations) of presidential authority to use military force against the Islamic State without express congressional authorization; the potential relevance of the 2002 Iraq AUMF, the 2001 AUMF, and the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015; the constraints imposed by the War Powers Resolution upon U.S. military action that has not been authorized by Congress; and the applicability of the United Nations Charter to ongoing U.S. military strikes in Iraq and Syria. The report will be updated as warranted by events.
Many of the legal issues discussed in this report concerning congressional oversight of U.S. military action are addressed in greater detail in CRS Report R41989, Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. Further discussion regarding U.S. operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria can be found in CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" Crisis and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] et al.; Iraq Crisis and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] et al.; and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32817 | crs_RL32817_0 | 109-383 , signed into law December 9, 2006, provided funding for government operations (including the Departments of Health and Human Services and Education) through February 15, 2007, based on the FY2006 rate. For information on FY2007 Labor-HHS-Education the appropriations bills that were approved by House and Senate committees, but did not receive floor action, see the section " FY2007 Appropriations Process ," later in this report. Federal Child Care-Related Programs and Tax Provisions
Several federal programs support child care or related services, primarily for low-income working families. Several programs were due for reauthorization in the 109 th Congress (i.e., Child Care and Development Block Grant and Head Start), but remained unauthorized at the end of the 109 th Congress, whereas others (TANF and mandatory child care funding) were reauthorized in the second session. Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG)3
The primary federal grant program funding child care is the CCDBG, which was created in 1990, and reauthorized and substantially expanded in 1996, as part of welfare reform. (See the " Legislative Activity in the 109 th Congress " section of this report for more on the unsuccessful reauthorization efforts.) Ultimately, funding for a longer, five-year period (FY2006-FY2010) was included in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, a budget spending reconciliation bill ( S. 1932 ), which was signed into law ( P.L. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
TANF, created in the 1996 welfare reform law ( P.L. Child care is one of many services for which states may use TANF funding. 109-148 ), targeted for needs arising from the Gulf Coast Hurricanes of 2005. 107-110 ). IDEA was reauthorized during the 108 th Congress. The FY2006 Appropriations Act ( P.L. An across-the-board rescission of 1% was applied to discretionary programs funded under P.L. Note that the FY2007 appropriations process was still under way at the close of the 109 th Congress, with funding being provided (through February 15, 2007) under a third continuing resolution ( P.L. (Note: the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-149 )). The Administration's Early Childhood Initiative
Good Start, Grow Smart: The Bush Administration's Early Childhood Initiative, was first announced by the President in April of 2002 and has been reflected in budget proposals and program initiatives since that date. In the President's FY2004 budget, he proposed to transfer the Head Start program to the Department of Education, as well as to provide states with the option to administer the program. The Head Start reauthorization bill passed by the House during the 108 th Congress ( H.R. 2123 and S. 2206 ) emphasized increased coordination among early childhood programs, but neither proposed either a departmental transfer of the program or state demonstration projects. 109-171 ), finally reauthorizing TANF and the mandatory portion of child care funding for FY2006-2010. 240 ). The bill also proposed to provide an additional $1 billion over five years to the Social Services Block Grant. Major provisions would have authorized CCDBG discretionary funding at a level of $2.3 billion for FY2006, rising in $200 million increments up to $3.1 billion for FY2010; increased the percentage of funds that must be used for quality activities (newly specified in the proposal) from at least 4% to at least 6%; instructed states to use not less than 70% of funds remaining after quality and administrative set-asides for direct services (as defined by states); added three new goals to the act: (1) improving the quality of child care, (2) promoting school preparedness through developmentally and age-appropriate activities in child care, and (3) promoting parental and family involvement in the education of young children in child care settings; eliminated the federal eligibility maximum limit of 85% of state median income (SMI); required states to describe in their state plans how they would coordinate with other early childhood programs such as Head Start, state pre-kindergarten, and IDEA to expand accessibility to and continuity of care; required states to conduct statistically valid market rate surveys within two years preceding their state plans, and to set rates in accordance with the results (without reducing the number of children served); expanded data collection requirements; and required states beginning in FY2006 to submit a plan addressing the quality of child care services provided. Other Child Care-Related Legislation
Other bills related to child care that were introduced in the 109 th Congress include H.R. | Federal support for child care comes in many forms, ranging from grant programs to tax provisions. Some programs serve as specifically dedicated funding sources for child care services (e.g., the Child Care and Development Block Grant, or CCDBG), while for others (e.g., Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF), child care is just one of many purposes for which funds may be used. In many cases, federal programs target low-income families in need of child care assistance, but in the case of certain tax provisions, the benefits reach middle- and upper-income families as well. This report provides an overview of federal child care and related programs as they were addressed by the 109 th Congress.
The 109 th Congress inherited several child care-related agenda items from the previous Congress(es), but resolved only a few. Efforts to reauthorize the CCDBG and TANF block grants, as well as the Head Start program, had started in the 108 th Congress, and ultimately, in February 2006, after 12 temporary extensions, the TANF block grant and the mandatory portion of child care funding was reauthorized for a five-year period via the Deficit Reduction Act ( P.L. 109-171 ). Whereas bills to reauthorize the Child Care and Development Block Grant itself ( H.R. 240 and S. 525 ) and the Head Start Program ( H.R. 2123 and S. 2206 ) failed to make their way to enactment in law, and remain on the agenda for the 110 th Congress.
Funding for many child care and related programs is provided each year as part of the annual appropriations process for the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Education (ED). Fiscal Year 2007 appropriations bills for those departments (among most others) did not receive floor action in the House or Senate during the 109 th Congress, although the 2007 fiscal year began on October 1, 2006. The process extended into the 110 th Congress, with a third continuing resolution ( P.L. 109-383 ) temporarily funding government operations (through February 15, 2007) at rates based on the FY2006 funding levels. The FY2006 appropriations ( P.L. 109-149 ) included funding slightly below FY2005 amounts for most child care and related programs, as a result of an across-the-board rescission of 1% applied to most discretionary programs. Additional targeted funding for Head Start and the Social Services Block Grantâsupplemental funding targeted specifically in response to needs arising from the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005âwas included in the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-148 ).
The President's FY2007 budget proposals in areas related to child care and early childhood development were framed in the context of the Administration's Early Childhood Initiativeâ"Good Start, Grow Smart"âwhich was initially launched in April 2002. The initiative emphasized the importance of promoting school readiness, a key focus of the President's Head Start reauthorization proposals. In efforts to promote school readiness among pre-school children, there has also been a growing emphasis on better coordination of early childhood programs, including most of the federal programs described in this report, as well as state pre-kindergarten programs and other state-funded efforts.
This is the final update of this report; the 109 th Congress has adjourned. |
crs_R43136 | crs_R43136_0 | Introduction
In 1976, President Gerald R. Ford signed the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) , giving the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to regulate production and use of industrial chemicals in U.S. commerce in the interest of protecting health and the environment from unreasonable risks. Thirty-seven years of experience with TSCA implementation and enforcement have demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the law and led many to propose legislative changes to TSCA's core provisions in Title I. This CRS report compares key provisions of S. 696 and S. 1009 with provisions of TSCA Title I (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.) S. 1009 also would amend TSCA Title I provisions significantly but without adding most of the new provisions in S. 696 . S. 696 would require submission to EPA of a minimum information set by each manufacturer and processor of a new chemical substance or, as specified by the Administrator, of an existing chemical. S. 1009 would require EPA to publish a statement identifying and explaining the need for data. The bill would require the EPA Administrator to screen and prioritize all chemicals on the inventory for the purposes of risk assessment, safety standard determinations, and risk management. If EPA demonstrates that a risk associated with a chemical is unreasonable (relative to the benefits provided by the chemical and the estimated risks and benefits of any alternatives), the Agency is required to initiate rulemaking, but only to the extent necessary to reduce that risk to a reasonable level and using "the least burdensome" restriction. S. 696 would require manufacturers of chemicals to supply scientific data sufficient for EPA to conclude, based on a risk assessment, that the chemical would meet the safety standard: "there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result to human health or the environment from aggregate exposure to the chemical substance" under the use conditions evaluated and specified by EPA. S. 1009 is similar to the current statute in that it would allow manufacture and processing of, and commerce in, a chemical until EPA identified it as high priority and determined that it did not meet the safety standard for the intended conditions of use. The proposed amendments to TSCA also would increase public access to information about EPA's decisions and to some information about chemicals that currently is treated as confidential business information. S. 696 would authorize EPA activities not currently authorized under TSCA to allow implementation of three international agreements pertaining to persistent organic pollutants and other hazardous chemicals. For example, the proposal would authorize EPA to regulate chemicals manufactured solely for export. S. 1009 is similar to the current statute, providing EPA with broad authority and mandates to require data and to restrict chemical use to ensure no unreasonable risk of harm from exposure. S. 696 would significantly simplify this section of TSCA. S. 1009 would preempt state laws, new and existing , that (1) require testing or information "reasonably likely to produce the same data and information required" by rule, consent agreement, or order under proposed TSCA Section 4, 5, or 6; (2) prohibit or restrict the manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, or use of a chemical after issuance of a completed safety determination under proposed TSCA Section 6; or (3) require notification for a significant new use of a chemical if EPA requires notification under proposed TSCA Section 5. 2613] protects proprietary confidential information submitted to EPA about chemicals in commerce. Disclosure of confidential business information (CBI) is required when "necessary to protect health or the environment against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." Miscellaneous Provisions
Several new provisions would be included in an amended TSCA under S. 696 , but not under S. 1009 . EPA would be directed to develop an action plan to reduce exposure in such "hot spots." The study would be designed to determine whether the chemical in fact was present in pregnant women and infants. Children's environmental health also is addressed by S. 696 . In addition, "green chemistry and engineering" would be promoted through grants. In the remainder of this CRS report, Tables 1 through 6 summarize selected provisions of S. 696 and S. 1009 , as introduced, and current TSCA. | Thirty-seven years of experience implementing and enforcing the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) since its enactment have demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of the law and led many to propose legislative changes to TSCA's core provisions. The Safe Chemicals Act (S. 696) and the Chemical Safety Improvement Act (S. 1009) introduced in the 113th Congress would amend TSCA Title I. This CRS report compares key provisions of S. 696 and S. 1009 with the language of the current statute (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.).
Existing Law
TSCA as enacted authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to require manufacturers to develop data about chemical toxicity and exposure if EPA determines that a chemical may pose an unreasonable risk, or if chemical exposure is expected to be substantial. TSCA allows a chemical to enter and remain in commerce unless EPA can show that it poses "an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." EPA then must regulate to control unreasonable risk, but only to the extent necessary using the "least burdensome" means of available control. This TSCA standard has been interpreted to require cost-benefit balancing. The current statute preempts state and local laws regarding chemicals specifically regulated by EPA.
Proposed Legislation
S. 696 would amend TSCA to require chemical manufacturers and processors to submit specified information about the toxicity and usage of chemicals in commerce to EPA. The information would be used by EPA to determine whether a chemical would meet the safety standard of "a reasonable certainty of no harm from aggregate exposure," given the imposition of any needed restrictions on manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal. S. 696 would prohibit uses of evaluated chemical substances unless they were determined by EPA to meet the safety standard. S. 696 would increase public access to information about EPA's decisions and to some information about chemicals that currently is treated as confidential business information. S. 696 would rarely preempt state and local laws.
S. 1009 would authorize EPA to require manufacturers to develop new information if EPA can show need in the context of an evaluative framework for chemical risk assessment and management. The bill would require EPA to screen all chemicals in commerce and assign each to one of three categories:
high priority for risk assessment, low priority for risk assessment, or in need of additional information.
S. 1009 would require EPA regulation, by rule or order, ensuring "no unreasonable risk of harm from exposure" to a chemical under the intended conditions of use. S. 1009 would preempt new state and local laws for chemicals identified as high or low priority.
Both Senate bills would evaluate the existing inventory of chemicals in U.S. commerce since 1976 to allow prioritization of the estimated 9,000 chemicals currently produced and used in the United States. In addition, both bills would explicitly require manufacturers to substantiate some requests for protection of confidential business information from public disclosure.
S. 696 (but not S. 1009) also would add a new section to TSCA to allow U.S. implementation of three international agreements. S. 1009 would amend an existing section of TSCA to allow implementation of one treaty. Other provisions included in S. 696 would authorize EPA to support research in "green" engineering and chemistry, promote alternatives to toxicity testing on animals, encourage research on children's environmental health, require biomonitoring of pregnant women and infants, require EPA to identify "hot spots" where residents are exposed disproportionately to pollution, and direct EPA to develop strategies for reducing their risks.
Key provisions of S. 696 and S. 1009 are compared with current statute in Tables 1 through 6 of this CRS report. |
crs_R41654 | crs_R41654_0 | While public housing is a federally created and funded program, administered at the federal level by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the properties are owned and managed at the local level by quasi-governmental public housing authorities (PHAs) under contract with the federal government. Given this unique federal-local relationship, the program is governed in part by federal rules and regulations and in part by policies set at the local level. Today's roughly 1.2 million units of public housing are home to some of the poorest families in the nation, including persons who are elderly, persons living with disabilities, and other families with and without children. This report is meant to serve as an introduction to the federal public housing program. It provides information on the history of the program, how it is administered and funded, and the characteristics of public housing properties and the households they serve. While it introduces current policy issues, a full analysis of those issues and discussion of current legislation is not included in this report. Several new programs were developed to subsidize privately owned rental properties, as opposed to publicly owned properties, including the Section 236 rent supplement program serving low-income families and seniors; the Section 202 program serving the elderly; and the Section 221d(3) program serving families with incomes too high for public housing but too low to afford housing in the private market. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of smaller PHAs that have merged or formed consortia. Specifically, the annual plan must include information regarding, among other things,
housing needs in the PHA's community; the PHA's policies that govern eligibility, selection, and admissions (as described in the agency's Admissions and Continued Occupancy Plan); the PHA's financial resources, as well as its most recent audit; the PHA's rent determination policies; the PHA's operation and management, including rules, standards, and policies that govern maintenance and management of housing owned, assisted, or operated by the PHA; the extent of capital improvement needs at the PHA's properties; any public housing developments designated as housing for the elderly or disabled; any plans to demolish or dispose of public housing, or convert any public housing to vouchers; the PHA's community service and self-sufficiency programs; and the PHA's safety and crime prevention measures. Public Housing Homeownership
PHAs are permitted to promote public housing resident homeownership in three ways: (1) by selling portions of public housing properties to residents, (2) by using some of their public housing capital funds to provide assistance to public housing residents wishing to become homeowners, or (3) by using some of their public housing capital funds to purchase homes to resell to public housing residents. The public housing program peaked at just over 1.4 million units in the mid-1990s, and the number of units has declined fairly steadily since. Because the incomes of families living in public housing are quite low, the rents paid by those families are also quite low. As previously noted, operating funds are meant to supplement the funds that PHAs receive from tenant rents, their own investments, and other sources. The program initially provided competitive grant funding to PHAs, and later provided formula grants to PHAs, to be used for a variety of safety and security activities. The sharp rise in funding per unit in FY2009 is primarily attributable to the $4 billion in capital funding provided in the economic stimulus legislation. The declining physical state of the public housing stock may be due in part to federal funding levels that, paired with federal rent collection rules, left PHAs with inadequate budgets to meet their properties' capital needs. The Role of Public Housing
In light of the decline in the number of public housing units over time and the lack of authority to construct new units, the future role of the public housing program in federal housing policy is uncertain. | "Public housing" is often used as a generic term to refer to all publicly assisted housing, but the term "public housing" actually refers to a specific federal program. Created in 1937, the low-rent public housing program was the first major federal rental housing assistance program. The program initially subsidized the construction, and later the ongoing operation and maintenance, of multifamily rental housing properties for low-income families. While public housing is a federally created and funded program, the properties are owned and managed at the local level by quasi-governmental public housing authorities (PHAs) under contract with the federal government. Given this unique federal-local relationship, the program is governed in part by federal rules and regulations and in part by policies set at the local level.
The public housing program serves some of the poorest families in the nation, including persons who are elderly, persons who are living with disabilities, and other families with and without children. Families who live in public housing generally pay rent equal to 30% of their adjusted gross income; average rents paid by public housing families lag substantially behind private market rents paid by similar families.
Public housing properties themselves can be high-rise buildings, low-rise buildings, scattered site properties, and even part of mixed-income housing developments. Construction and acquisition of new public housing units effectively ended after the federal government stopped funding new development in the mid-1990s, although they began significantly decreasing much earlier as other models of providing housing assistance grew in popularity. As public housing properties have fallen into disrepair and been demolished, the number of public housing units has begun to decrease. Today, there are roughly 1.2 million units under contract and receiving federal funding, down from over 1.4 million units at the program's peak. Federal funding comes from two main formula grants—the Public Housing Capital Fund and the Public Housing Operating Fund—which are meant to supplement the rents collected by PHAs to meet the operation, maintenance, and capital needs of public housing. There have also been several competitive grant programs that provide additional funding to PHAs, including the HOPE VI program. In recent years, regular annual appropriations for public housing have generally been in the range of $6 billion to $7 billion per year, with an additional $4 billion provided by the 2009 economic stimulus legislation.
In response to concerns about the adequacy of federal funding levels—paired with federal restrictions on tenant rents—to meet the capital needs of public housing, proposals have been introduced to promote private investment in public housing in order to preserve the existing stock. An increasing number of PHAs have pursued private financing to meet their capital needs in recent years. However, recent proposals calling for an expansion in the role of private finance in public housing have been met with concerns about the potential for the "privatization" of public housing and a loss of affordability. As the program continues to decline in terms of the number of families it serves, questions are arising about the role the program plays, and should play in the future, in terms of federal housing policy.
This report is meant to serve as an introduction to the federal public housing program. It provides information on the history of the program, how it is administered and funded, and the characteristics of public housing properties and the households they serve. While it introduces current policy issues, a full analysis of those issues and discussion of current legislation is not included in this report. |
crs_RL32021 | crs_RL32021_0 | 2506 / P.L. Congress fully funded the President's request for Colombia, with various human rightsconditions, and it granted broader authority to pursue new activities in Colombia, but withmodifications that blended the House and Senate provisions. (7)
FY2003 Request. On February 4, 2002, PresidentBush submitted a FY2003 budget request of $979.8 million for the Andean Regional Initiative(ARI), with $731 million in counternarcotics assistance under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative(ACI). Both chambers approved theconference report ( H.Rept. On February 3, 2003,President Bush requested $990.7 million for the Andean Regional Initiative countries in the accountscomprising ARI funding, including military funding for Colombia. Congress approved $105.1 million, consisting of $34 million ofState Department for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, $34 million of DOD funds for DrugInterdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, and fully funded the Foreign Military Financing Program,out of which it provided that $20 million could be transferred to the ACI account. Congress provided $731 million for the ACI in the FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Bill( H.R. 108-401 ), passed by the House on December 8, 2003, and stillpending in the Senate. For FY2004, the Administration requested $35 million in ACI funding,consisting of $20 million for interdiction and law enforcement, and $15 million for alternativedevelopment. 2673 / H.Rept. It also included requests for counterdrug and military funding for Colombia. The Senate passed H.R. 108-11 ). 2800 / H.Rept. 2800 passed the House on July 23, 2003. The Senate Committee onAppropriations reported out their bill ( S. 1426 / S.Rept. 108-106 ) on July 17, 2003,providing $660 million of the President's ACI request, with the authority to transfer an additional$37 million from the State Department's INCLE account to ACI. The measure passed the House on December 8,2003, and the Senate on January 22, 2004 ( P.L. 108-199 ). FY2004-FY2005 Foreign Relations Authorization
House Action. 1646 / P.L. assistance in interdicting." On April 24, 2003, the SenateForeign Relations Committee reported out S. 925 ( S.Rept. 108-39 ), the ForeignRelations Authorization Act of 2004, with one provision related to Colombia and the Andean region. FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization
Senate Action. 108-56 ), with several provisions on assistance to Colombia andthe Andean region. 108-136 ). Section 1021 providesauthority for the Defense Department to provide support for counterdrug activities by extendingauthority in Section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1998 ( P.L. 108-177 ). H.R. These data include fundingfrom accounts that comprise the Andean Regional Initiative: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), AndeanCounterdrug Initiative, development aid, child survival and health aid, and foreign military financing. Note: Amounts for Colombia include the FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental. | In 2003, Congress considered President Bush's requests for FY2004 and FY2003supplemental assistance for Colombia and six regional neighbors in a continuation of the AndeanRegional Initiative (ARI) launched in 2001. ARI was proposed as an expansion of support for PlanColombia, under the Clinton Administration, with more funding for social and economicdevelopment programs for Colombia and its neighbors, who are affected by Colombia's struggleagainst guerrillas and drug traffickers. From FY2000 through FY2003, Colombia and other ARIrecipients have received more than $3 billion in U.S. funding.
In early 2003, an FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental bill ( H.Rept. 108-76 / P.L.108-11 ) provided $105 million in additional assistance for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative andrelated programs. This included $34 million for the State Department's International NarcoticsControl and Law Enforcement account, $34 million for the Department of Defense's DrugInterdiction and Counter-Drug Activities account, and $37.1 million in Foreign Military FinancingProgram funds.
The President submitted his FY2004 budget request to Congress on February 3, 2003,including $990.7 million for countries comprising the Andean Regional Initiative, including militaryfunding for Colombia. Of the $990.7 million requested, $731 million is for the Andean CounterdrugInitiative, $133.5 million for the Foreign Military Financing Program, with the remainder of theoverall figure in development, economic, and health programs.
The House passed H.R. 2800 , ( H.Rept. 108-222 ) the FY2004 ForeignOperations Appropriations Bill, on July 23, 2003, fully funding the President's request for $731million for ACI. The Senate passed S. 1426 ( S.Rept.108-106 ) on October 24, 2003,providing $660 million for ACI, with authority to transfer an additional $37 million from the StateDepartment's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account to ACI. Theconference report ( H.R. 2673 / H.Rept. 108-401 ), passed by the House on December 8,2003, and the Senate on January 22, 2004, provides $731 million. ( P.L. 108-199 signed January 23,2004.)
Both the House and Senate passed the FY2003-FY2004 Foreign Relations Authorization Act( H.R. 1950 / S. 925 ), with provisions relating to Colombia and druginterdiction programs in the Andean region. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported outthe FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization Act ( S. 1161 / S.Rept.108-56 ) with severalmodifications on assistance to Colombia and the Andean region. Congress completed the FY2004National Defense Authorization Act, ( P.L. 108-136 ) providing authorization for drug interdictionand counterdrug activities for DOD programs. It also passed the FY2004 Intelligence AuthorizationAct ( P.L. 108-177 ) authorizing continuing counterdrug and counterterrorism activities. This reportwill not be updated. |
crs_R45119 | crs_R45119_0 | Introduction
In October 2017, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed to repeal the Clean Power Plan (CPP), a rule that the agency had finalized in 2015 to limit carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from existing fossil-fuel-fired power plants. EPA did not conduct new power sector modeling for the 2017 analysis but used two existing power sector projections to estimate two sets of the benefits and costs of the proposed repeal. In addition, EPA changed the accounting treatment of cost savings from demand-side energy efficiency measures. "Net benefits" result when the benefits outweigh the costs, and "net costs" result when the costs outweigh the benefits. In contrast, the 2017 net impact estimates ranged from costs outweighing benefits (i.e., net costs of the proposed repeal) to benefits outweighing costs (i.e., net benefits of the proposed repeal). The estimates for 2030 ranged from $28.3 billion in net costs of the proposed repeal to $14 billion in net benefits of the proposed repeal. The effect of updated power sector projections on the proposed repeal's benefit-cost estimates is unclear. EPA noted that the benefit-cost estimates based on its 2015 power sector modeling did not reflect changes that have since occurred in the power sector. These changes are potentially important and include changes in expected electricity demand, expected growth in electricity generation by renewable energy technologies, retirements of older generating units, changes in the prices and availability of different fuels and renewables, and state and federal regulations. Rather, EPA said it plans to update its power sector modeling and make it available for public comment before it finalizes the proposed repeal. What Changed in EPA's 2017 Benefit-Cost Analysis
Compared to the 2015 analysis, EPA changed its analysis of the CPP's benefits and costs in three primary ways. The domestic perspective and use of a 7% rate lowered the SCC estimates and therefore reduced the estimates of climate benefits under the CPP—that is, the forgone climate benefits of the proposed repeal. Thresholds Reduced Some Human Health Co-Benefit Estimates
EPA's 2017 analysis also diverged from the 2015 analysis by excluding the forgone human health co-benefits from some of the benefit-cost comparisons. EPA stated that it intends to conduct, "to the extent feasible," detailed air quality modeling that would, among other things, inform threshold-based analysis of PM benefits. EPA's 2015 analysis treated savings from energy efficiency measures as a negative cost, which reduced the compliance cost estimates. In the analysis of the proposed repeal, EPA removed the energy savings (as a negative value) from the total cost estimate, which resulted in a larger cost estimate, and added the energy savings (as a positive value) to the estimated benefits, which resulted in a larger benefits estimate. Using the terminology of the proposed repeal, EPA moved energy savings from the cost savings estimate to the forgone benefits estimate. There was no change in the difference between benefits and costs, because the benefits and costs increased by the same amount. This change took on more significance in a cost analysis EPA conducted under E.O. | In 2015, when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the Clean Power Plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fueled electric power plants, it concluded that the benefits of reducing emissions would outweigh the costs by a substantial margin under the scenarios analyzed. EPA estimated benefits ranging from $31 billion to $54 billion in 2030 and costs ranging from $5.1 billion to $8.4 billion in 2030, when the rule would be fully implemented.
In proposing to repeal the rule in October 2017, EPA revised the estimates of both its benefits and costs, finding in most cases that the benefits of the proposed repeal would outweigh the costs of the proposed repeal. However, EPA found that under other assumptions, the costs of the proposed repeal would outweigh the benefits of the proposed repeal. This report examines the changes in EPA's methodology that led to the revised conclusions about how benefits compare to costs.
Three changes to the benefits estimates of the proposed repeal drive the agency's new conclusions.
First, it considered only domestic benefits of the Clean Power Plan in its main analysis, excluding benefits that occur outside the United States. Second, it used different discount rates, including one higher rate, than the 2015 analysis to state the present value of future climate benefits expected from the Clean Power Plan. Third, the analysis reduced some estimates of the human health "co-benefits"—that is, the benefits resulting from pollutant reductions not directly targeted by the Clean Power Plan. Specifically, several scenarios assumed no health benefits below specified thresholds for some air pollutants.
EPA also changed the accounting treatment of demand-side energy efficiency savings. EPA's 2015 analysis treated savings from energy efficiency measures as a negative cost, whereas the 2017 analysis treated them as a benefit. Using the terminology of the proposed repeal, EPA moved energy savings from the cost savings estimate to the forgone benefits estimate. There was no change in the difference between benefits and costs because the benefits and costs increased by the same amount. This change took on more significance in a separate analysis that EPA conducted to analyze the cost savings of the proposed repeal.
EPA based one set of benefit-cost estimates of the proposed repeal on its 2015 power sector modeling, which does not reflect changes that have since occurred in the power sector. EPA based the other set of benefit-cost estimates on more recent power sector projections from the Annual Energy Outlook 2017. The power sector changes subsequent to 2015 are potentially important and include changes in expected electricity demand, expected growth in electricity generation by renewable energy technologies, retirements of older generating units, changes in the prices and availability of different fuels and renewables, and state and federal regulations. While modeling differences render the two sets of estimates incomparable, both sets of estimates show a range of costs exceeding benefits (i.e., net costs), and benefits exceeding costs (i.e., net benefits) of the proposed repeal. EPA stated that it plans to update the power sector modeling and make it available for public comment before it finalizes the proposed repeal. This forthcoming analysis may show the extent to which updated power sector projections may change EPA's benefit-cost estimates. |
crs_R42621 | crs_R42621_0 | Introduction
Facing significant pressure to reduce the federal budget deficit, some in the 112 th Congress viewed international affairs spending, particularly for foreign aid programs, as expenditures of limited benefit to U.S. taxpayers and eligible for cuts. Others favored a more robust foreign affairs budget for various reasons. Congress delayed passing most appropriations bills, including State-Foreign Operations, until after the start of the new fiscal year and the fall elections. The legislation was signed into law on March 26, 2013 ( P.L. 113-6 ). The report focuses on the accounts funded through the State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill (see Appendix C for data), and it also provides appropriations figures for the entire international affairs (Function 150) budget in Appendix D .
Most Recent Developments and Legislative Status
In order of the most recent events, congressional activity related to the State-Foreign Operations appropriations includes the following as summarized in Table 1 below:
On March 26, 2013, President Obama signed the FY2013 Defense and Military Construction/VA, Full Year Continuing Resolution, P.L. 117 into law ( P.L. On May 24, 2012, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved by a vote of 29-1 its FY2013 State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill ( S. 3241 / S.Rept. 112-172 ). The bill provided a total of $52.3 billion, including $2.3 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds. 5857 / H.Rept. Within the total, the bill provided $15.8 billion for the Department of State and Related Agencies accounts, including $2.9 billion in OCO funding and $32.9 billion for Foreign Operations accounts, including $5.4 billion in OCO funding On April 25, using the caps in the March 29, 2012, House-passed budget resolution ( H.Con.Res. The FY2013 Request and Congressional Action
On February 13, 2012, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2013 budget proposal. The Administration's priorities on foreign affairs funding for FY2013 did not differ significantly from the congressional priorities indicated by the enacted FY2012 funding levels. The FY2013 request totaled $54.9 billion for the State-Foreign Operations appropriations, including a core budget proposal of $46.6 billion plus $8.2 billion for extraordinary and temporary war-related Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in frontline states. The total request represented an increase of 2.6% over the estimated FY2012 funding level for State-Foreign Operations, including a 4.5% increase in State Department and Related Agencies accounts and a 0.1% increase in Foreign Operations accounts. Within the budget, the Administration requested authority and $770 million in funds for a new bilateral economic aid account—the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA IF)—to provide flexible and transparent support for Arab Spring countries in transition toward democracy. State Department FY2013 Budget Request―Key Issues
The State Department and Related Agencies portion of the international affairs budget request included funding for State Department operations, International Organizations (including U.S. assessed dues to the U.N. system) and International Peacekeeping activities, International Broadcasting, and entities such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP). The House appropriations bill included a total of $2.8 billion for State Department operations in the three frontline states (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan); funding for increased security for staff in these states was provided, but funding for increased staff was not. House and Senate committee action indicated that these priorities may not be shared by all in Congress. In addition to funding levels, policy issues such as restrictions on funding for international family planning programs and conditions on aid to certain countries and entities continued to be a focus of the congressional foreign aid funding debate. Compared to the FY2012-enacted amount, the request included decreases for each global health activity area, except for a 1.2% increase in funding for international family planning and reproductive health and a 57% increase in funding ($1.7 billion) for the Global Fund to Fight HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund). Both House and Senate would have provided more than the request. The proposed FY2013 House legislation included $461 million for family planning and reproductive health activities and prohibited funding for UNFPA, while the Senate legislation included $700 million for family planning and reproductive health, including $44.5 million for UNFPA. The Senate bill designated $2.3 billion as OCO, or 72% less than requested, largely because it provided no funding for the Iraq Police Development program, as mentioned above, and would fund disaster assistance and migration and refugee assistance accounts entirely through the base budget. This changed in FY2011 when Congress significantly reduced foreign affairs spending to help meet deficit reduction goals. | International affairs expenditures typically amount to about 1.5% of the total federal budget. While some foreign policy and defense experts view that share as a small price to pay for a robust foreign affairs budget that they believe is essential to meeting national security and foreign policy objectives, others see international affairs spending, particularly foreign aid, as an attractive target for significant spending cuts in order to reduce deficit spending.
On February 13, 2012, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2013 budget proposal. The FY2013 request totaled $54.87 billion for the State-Foreign Operations appropriations, including a core budget proposal of $46.63 billion plus $8.24 billion for extraordinary and temporary war-related Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in frontline states. The total request represented an increase of 2.6% over the estimated FY2012 funding level for the foreign affairs accounts, including $18.8 billion (a 4.5% increase) for State Department and Related Agencies and $36.1 billion (a 0.1% increase) for Foreign Operations. Within the regular budget process, the Administration requested authority in addition to appropriations ($770 million) for a new account—the Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA IF)—to provide flexible and transparent support for Arab Spring countries in transition toward democracy. The foreign affairs request included $8.2 billion for the frontline states of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. For other key accounts, the Administration sought $7.9 billion for the Global Health Programs (GHP) account, $770 million for global climate change activities, and $643 million for family planning and reproductive health activities, including $39 million for the controversial U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA).
Early action by the House and Senate appropriators demonstrated differing priorities and funding levels. The House Appropriations Committee-approved State-Foreign Operations FY2013 funding bill (H.R. 5857/H.Rept. 112-494) would have provided a total of $48.5 billion (including $8.3 billion in OCO and $160 million in rescissions), while the Senate committee bill (S. 3241/S.Rept. 112-172) would have provided a total of $52.3 billion (including $2.3 billion in OCO). Both House and Senate committees provided more than requested for GHP, but differed significantly on funding MENA IF—the House committee provided no funding for it, and the Senate committee recommended $1 billion. The House bill provided $461 million for international family planning and reproductive health activities, prohibited funding for UNFPA, and included a "Mexico City Policy" provision prohibiting funding for organizations that perform or promote abortions. In contrast, the Senate bill included $700 million for international family planning, including $44.5 million for UNFPA, and did not include "Mexico City Policy" language.
The State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies appropriations legislation, in addition to funding U.S. diplomatic and foreign aid activities, has been the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. international affairs budget and influences executive branch foreign policy making in recent years. (Congress has not addressed foreign policy issues through a complete authorization process for State Department diplomatic activities since 2003 and since 1985 for foreign aid programs.) After a period of reductions in the late 1980s and 1990s, funding for State Department operations, international broadcasting, and foreign aid rose steadily from FY2002 to FY2010, largely because of ongoing assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan, new global health programs, and increasing assistance to Pakistan. Funding declined by 11.6% in FY2011 when Congress passed a continuing resolution (P.L. 112-10) significantly reducing U.S. government-wide expenditures, including foreign affairs. The FY2012 funding represented a 2.3% increase from the previous year, largely reflecting OCO support for frontline states.
Congress delayed floor consideration of FY2013 appropriations bills until after the start of the new fiscal year and the November 2012 elections, instead enacting a six-month stopgap funding measure that expired in March 2013 (P.L. 112-175). Before that measure expired, Congress approved new legislation on March 21, signed by the President on March 26, 2013 (P.L. 113-6), to fund federal programs through the end of FY2013. Under P.L. 113-6, State-Foreign Operations accounts are funded through a continuing resolution at the same level as in FY2012, though several anomalies were specified in the legislation. For example, funding for Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance was increased significantly and offset largely by a rescission in unobligated Diplomatic and Consular Programs funds, while the International Disaster and Famine Assistance account received OCO funding, which was not in the FY2012 appropriation. While this report lists FY2013-enacted account level estimates in Appendix C, these funds are subject to the budget sequestration process that is currently in effect, which may significantly reduce the actual funding levels that are made available to agencies. |
crs_RL32766 | crs_RL32766_0 | Introduction
On January 12, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury requires that federal sentencing guidelines be advisory, rather than mandatory. In doing so, the Court struck down a provision in law that made the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory as well as a provision that permitted appellate review of departures from the guidelines. In essence, the Court's ruling gives federal judges discretion in sentencing offenders by not requiring them to adhere to the guidelines; rather, the guidelines can be used by judges on an advisory basis. In light of these rulings, the issue for Congress is whether to amend current law to require federal judges to follow guided sentences (hence, codify specified sentencing ranges that are in the guidelines), or to continue the status quo and permit federal judges to use their discretion in sentencing, under certain circumstances. Penal Policy
Historically, the way in which convicted offenders are sentenced in the United States falls under one of two penal policies—indeterminate and determinate sentences. Indeterminate sentencing practices were predominant for several decades, leading up to the major reform efforts undertaken by many states and the federal government in the mid- to late 1970s and early 1980s (see discussion in the next section). It wasn't until 1984, however, that Congress passed a sentencing reform measure, which abolished indeterminate sentencing at the federal level and created a determinate sentencing structure through the federal sentencing guidelines (see discussion below). The perceived failure of the indeterminate system to "cure" the criminal (usually measured by recidivism rates), coupled with a concern about rising crime rates throughout the nation in the mid-1970s, resulted in experimentation with sentencing systems by several states and the creation of sentencing guidelines at the federal level. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
In 1984, Congress passed legislation that led to the creation of federal sentencing guidelines. Sentencing Commission and charging it with establishing sentencing guidelines. In the first opinion, the Court sought to restore the jury's significance in its finding of the underlying crime. Maintain the Sentencing Guidelines
One option Congress may wish to consider could be to maintain the sentencing guidelines by specifying mandatory minimum sentences and increasing the top of each guideline range to a statutory maximum for specified offenses (hence, codify specified sentencing ranges that are in the guidelines). Under this scheme, for each enhancement that would increase the sentence beyond the guideline maximum for which the defendant did not waive his or her rights, the judge has the option of trying aggravating factors before the jury, either during the main trial or in a separate, bifurcated proceeding. Permit Judicial Discretion in Sentencing
Congress may also allow federal judges to exercise their discretion in sentencing in cases where Congress has not specified a mandatory term of sentence. | Historically, the way in which convicted offenders are sentenced falls under one of two penal policies—indeterminate and determinate sentences. Indeterminate sentencing practices were predominant for several decades, leading up to the major reform efforts undertaken by many states and the federal government in the mid- to-late 1970s and early 1980s. The perceived failure of the indeterminate system to "cure" the criminal, coupled with renewed concern about the rising crime rate throughout the nation in the mid-1970s, resulted in wide experimentation with sentencing systems by many states and the creation of sentencing guidelines at the federal level. In 1984, Congress passed a sentencing reform measure, which abolished indeterminate sentencing at the federal level and created a determinate sentencing structure through the federal sentencing guidelines. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 reformed the federal sentencing system by (1) dropping rehabilitation as one of the goals of punishment; (2) creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission and charging it with establishing sentencing guidelines; (3) making all federal sentences determinate; and (4) authorizing appellate review of sentences.
In United States v. Booker (Booker), an unusual two-part opinion transformed federal criminal sentencing by restoring to judges much of the discretion that Congress took away when it put mandatory sentencing guidelines in place. In the first opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that the mandatory sentencing guidelines violated defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury by giving judges the power to make factual findings that increased sentences beyond the maximum that the jury's finding alone would support. In the second part, a different majority concluded that the constitutional deficiency could be remedied if the guidelines were treated as discretionary or advisory rather than mandatory. As a result of the decisions, the Court struck down a provision in law that made the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory as well as a provision that permitted appellate review of departures from the guidelines. In essence, the high Court's ruling gives federal judges discretion in sentencing offenders by not requiring them to adhere to the guidelines; rather, the guidelines can be used by judges on an advisory basis.
In light of the Court ruling in Booker and subsequent cases, the issue for Congress is whether to amend current law to require federal judges to follow guided sentences, or permit federal judges to use their discretion in sentencing under certain circumstances. Congressional options include (1) maintain the sentencing guidelines by specifying mandatory minimum sentences and increasing the top of each guideline range to a statutory maximum for specified offenses (hence, codify specified sentencing ranges that are in the guidelines); (2) require jury trials for any enhancement factor that would increase the sentence for which the defendant did not waive his or her rights; or (3) take no action, thus permitting judicial discretion in sentencing in cases where Congress has not specified mandatory sentences. |
crs_R42077 | crs_R42077_0 | Introduction
The Unified Command Plan (UCP) and associated Combatant Commands (COCOMs) provide operational instructions and command and control to the Armed Forces and have a significant impact on how they are organized, trained, and resourced—areas over which Congress has constitutional authority. The UCP is a classified executive branch document prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and reviewed and updated at a minimum every two years. As noted, the UCP assigns missions; planning, training, and operational responsibilities; and geographic areas of responsibilities to COCOMs. Functional Combatant Commands
Functional combatant commands operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide unique capabilities to geographic combatant commands and the services:
USSOCOM: U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL; USSTRATCOM: U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE; and USTRANSCOM: U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL. Geographic Combatant Commands
Geographic combatant commands operate in clearly delineated areas of operation and have a distinctive regional military focus. USAFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command, Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany; USCENTCOM: U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL; USEUCOM: U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany; USNORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO; USPACOM: U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI; and USSOUTHCOM: U.S. Southern Command, Miami, FL. The UCP and COCOMs are covered under Title 10 - Armed Forces; Subtitle A - General Military Law; Part I–Organization and General Military Powers; Chapter 6–Combatant Commands. A map with the UCP COCOM Areas of Responsibility is included in the Appendix . Origins of the COCOMs
The non-statutory origins of COCOMs are rooted in the U.S. experience in World War II. Potential Issues for Congress
Congress is presented with a wide range of national security policy issues that are impacted by the provisions of the UCP as well as the COCOM construct. What Are the Implications of the Asia-Pacific Strategic Shift for the UCP and COCOMs? Has U.S. Foreign Policy Become "Too Militarized" as a Result of the Geographic COCOMs? Aside from Geographic COCOMs, there might also be cause to re-examine Functional COCOMs. These are but two possible alternatives to the current COCOM construct. | The Unified Command Plan (UCP) and associated Combatant Commands (COCOMs) provide operational instructions and command and control to the Armed Forces and have a significant impact on how they are organized, trained, and resourced—areas over which Congress has constitutional authority. The UCP is a classified executive branch document prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and reviewed and updated every two years that assigns missions; planning, training, and operational responsibilities; and geographic areas of responsibilities to COCOMs. Functional COCOMs operate worldwide across geographic boundaries and provide unique capabilities to geographic combatant commands and the services while Geographic COCOMs operate in clearly delineated areas of operation and have a distinctive regional military focus. There are currently nine COCOMs:
USSOCOM: U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL. USSTRATCOM: U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, NE. USTRANSCOM: U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, IL. USAFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command, Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany. USCENTCOM: U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL. USEUCOM: U.S. European Command, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany. USNORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO. USPACOM: U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI. USSOUTHCOM: U.S. Southern Command, Miami, FL.
This report provides information on the history, mission, and operational considerations for each of these organizations as well as a brief discussion of current issues associated with the UCP and these commands.
The origins of the UCP and COCOMs are rooted in World War II. After the war, U.S. leaders, taking advantage of the lessons learned in both theaters, initiated a series of legislative changes that resulted in the current UCP process and COCOM construct.
The UCP and COCOMs are covered under Title 10 - Armed Forces; Subtitle A - General Military Law; Part I–Organization and General Military Powers; Chapter 6–Combatant Commands. These provisions detail the responsibilities and authorities of COCOMs as well as legal requirements related to the UCP.
Potential issues for Congress include the implications of a strategic shift to the Asia-Pacific region. Another issue is whether there is a need for greater interagency involvement in the UCP development process. A possible area for congressional concern is if Geographical COCOMs have made U.S. foreign policy "too militarized." Some have also suggested there might be a need for separate COCOMs apart from the current nine to better address emerging regional and ethnic alignments as well as emerging threats such as cyber warfare. Finally, if Congress believes the current COCOM construct does not meet contemporary or future security requirements, there are proposals for alternative organizational structures that might prove more effective. |
crs_RS22564 | crs_RS22564_0 | Introduction
The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), each operating in a distinct geographic area (see Figure 1 ). PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives, and sell their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. Since passage of the Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act of 1974 (16 U.S.C. SWPA returns revenues to the U.S. Treasury for repayment, with interest, of the federal investment in generation and transmission facilities and, like SEPA and WAPA, for repayment of annual appropriations. | The U.S. Department of Energy operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs)—the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). These agencies all operate on the principle of selling wholesale electric power with preference given to publicly or cooperatively owned utilities "at the lowest possible rates to consumers consistent with sound business practices" under the Flood Control Act of 1944 (16 U.S.C. §825s). Maintaining competitive rates sufficient to cover operating costs and repay the federal investment in the hydropower dams and transmission systems amid drought, legal challenges, and customer pressure for cost reductions are some of the challenges faced by these agencies, and issues tied to these challenges may come before Congress. |
crs_RL30273 | crs_RL30273_0 | (11)
Encryption is subject to U.S. export controls under both the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA). Originally, virtually all encryption was classified as a defense article and regulated under the AECA. (20) As a general policy, theState Department allowedexports of commercial encryption with 40-bit keys, although some software with DES could be exported toU.S.-controlledsubsidiaries and financial institutions. (24)
Further relaxation of encryption export controls took place in September 1999, when the Clinton Administration announcedthat encryption items of any key length may now be exported under a license exception, after a technical review,toindividuals, firms, and other non-government end-users in any country except for seven state supporters ofterrorism. Following criticism by companies, privacy groups, and Internet proponents, the Administration postponedpublication ofthe implementing regulations and expanded certain aspects of the earlier proposal in new rules that were issuedJanuary 14,2000. (31) Federal district courts addressing this issue overthe last three years have both upheld and dismissed First Amendment challenges to export licensing schemes forencryption. (35) The court later ruled that AECA licensing requirementswere an unconstitutional prior restraint on such speech. (78) The court allowed the plaintiffto proceed with his constitutional challenge, directing the district courtto examine the new encryption regulations issued in January 2000 to examine whether the plaintiff could bring afacialchallenge on First Amendment grounds. 106th Congress Legislative Proposals
Two bills introduced in the 106th Congress, H.R. (79)S. 798 , the Promote Reliable On-Line Transactions toEncourage Commerce and Trade (PROTECT) Act, was introduced April 14, 1999, by Mr. McCain and 5 (later 7)co-sponsors. 850 was reported by the House Judiciary Committee, the House Commerce Committee, the House International Relations Committee, the House Armed Service Committee, and the House Permanent SelectCommittee onIntelligence, resulting in differing versions of the bill, two of which would allow strict export controls on encryption. No further action was taken on any of these bills. The House Commerce Committee reported the bill as amended July 2 ( H.Rept. 106-117 , Part2). The amended version would have alsoexpanded the 15-day technical review periods to 30 "working days"; required DOC to consult with the SecretariesofDefense and State, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence before the licensing policiesprovided forin the bill took effect; allowed DOC to prohibit exports of strong encryption and specific encryption products to endusersin specific countries for the additional reasons of harm to U.S. national security, use in sexual exploitation ofminors, or usein illegal activities involving organized crime; and provided that encryption products could be controlled for anyreasonother than their encryption capability and that nothing in the SAFE Act or its amendment of the EAA altered theability ofthe Secretary of Commerce to control exports for reasons other than encryption. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence July 23 reported an amendment to H.R. An encryption product of 64bits or less would have been eligible for a license exception, provided (1) the product was submitted for a one-timetechnical review (a maximum 45-day process with required information to be determined by the President); (2) theitem didnot require licensing under otherwise applicable regulations; (3) the item was not intended for a country, end user,or enduse that was by regulation ineligible to receive the product and the encryption was otherwise qualified for export;(4) theexporter, within 180 days after export, submitted a certification identifying the intended end use of the products andthename and address of the intended recipient, if available; (5) the exporter, within 180 days after export, provided thenamesand addresses of its distribution chain partners; and (6) the exporter, at the time the product was submitted fortechnicalreview, provided proof that its distribution chain partners had contractually agreed to abide by all U.S. laws andregulationsinvolving the export or reexport of U.S.-origin encryption products. | Encryption exports are controlled under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Export Administration Act (EAA),the latter statute to expire August 20, 2001. The more stringent AECA controls, administered by the StateDepartment,apply to encryption items classified as defense articles or services. Items not so classified are subject to regulationby theDepartment of Commerce (DOC) under the extended EAA authorities. DOC requires licenses for certaincommodities andsoftware, but allows other encryption items to be exported under license exceptions.
The U.S. Government has traditionally maintained that controls over strong encryption are necessary for nationalsecurity, foreign policy, and law enforcement reasons. Industry has argued that federal regulatory policiesinsufficientlyaddress rapid technological developments, prevent manufacturers from marketing products available abroad, andharm U.S.national interests by making strong U.S. encryption unobtainable by legitimate users worldwide. While mostencryptionwas originally controlled under the AECA, in late 1996 the President transferred jurisdiction over nonmilitary itemstoDOC, which at the same time eased controls over commercial encryption that used a key recovery feature or wasdestinedfor financial institutions. In 1998 the Administration further relaxed controls over 56-bit technology generally andstrongerencryption destined for U.S. subsidiaries, insurance companies, and other end-users, retreating from earlier keyrecoveryrequirements. Further modifications were announced in September 1999, allowing license exceptions for the exportofencryption of any key length after a technical review to most end-users in all but terrorist countries; draft regulationswereissued in late 1999. Following criticism by companies, privacy groups and Internet proponents, DOC expandedaspects ofits original proposal and issued new regulations in January 2000. Regulations issued in October 2000 furtherstreamlinedcontrols over encryption exports to 23 countries including European Member states. Restrictive export licensingregulations have raised constitutional concerns, some arguing that they impose a prior restraint on speech inviolation of theFirst Amendment. Federal courts have both upheld and dismissed First Amendment challenges to export controls,theoutcome generally turning on whether the court viewed the encryption item and its export as essentially expressiveorfunctional. Courts in California and Ohio have allowed challenges to proceed, holding that encryption source codeisprotected speech for First Amendment purposes.
Legislation introduced in the 106th Congress would have required increased liberalization of encryption export controls. H.R. 850 , the Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act, was reported fromthe HouseJudiciary Committee, House Commerce Committee (as amended), and House International Relations Committee(asamended); significantly more restrictive versions of the bill had been reported by the House Armed ServicesCommitteeand House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence ( H.Rept. 106-117 , Pts 1-5). S. 798 , the PromoteReliable On-Line Transactions to Encourage Commerce and Trade (PROTECT) Act of 1999, was reported favorablyandwithout amendment by the Senate Commerce Committee ( S.Rept. 106-142 ). No further action was taken on thesebills. This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_RL32175 | crs_RL32175_0 | The analogy of insurers to banks is useful—insurers and banks are both financial intermediaries performing similar important functions in the U.S. economy. The federal insurance funds of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), and the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) provide similar protections. How Insurance Guaranty Funds Work
Provision for policyholders of insolvent insurers began slowly in the late 1930s. Cooperation among the states where the insolvent insurer operated is essential. There are other differences among the protection systems, too, including whether the protection fund exists before the insolvency, whether the contributors to the fund pay based on the risk each presents to the system's solvency, and whether those contributors can recoup the costs of their payments to the system. Whether to change the current system of policyholder protection would be a significant policy issue in any legislation to authorize or require federal regulation of insurers. In the 110 th Congress, Senators John Sununu and Tim Johnson introduced the Senate version of the National Insurance Act of 2007 ( S. 40 ), and Representatives Melissa Bean and Ed Royce introduced a House version ( H.R. 3200 ). Both bills would require all federally licensed insurers to participate in state guaranty funds, with the possibility of a federal guaranty fund if the state guaranty funds do not treat national insurers in the same manner as state insurers. 3766 ) to allow insurers to elect federal licensing and regulation. It also would have required federally regulated insurers to participate in a state-based system of policyholder protection operating generally as it does now. Some of the policy issues that Congress might confront should it consider federal chartering for insurers are as follows:
Should federal legislation create a federally based protection system for federally chartered insurers, or instead require them to participate in the state-based guaranty fund system? Requiring federally regulated insurers to participate in a state-based protection system would entail significant, though unquantifiable, indirect costs to policyholders, insurers, and taxpayers. This is because incentives would be misaligned: that is, the costs of insolvencies would fall on the states, not on the federal regulator, and the states, though bearing the financial burden, would have no control over the effectiveness of federal regulation for solvency. These conflicting objectives could create the potential for significant economic inefficiencies. The principal issues would be deciding what types of policyholders would be protected in the event of an insurer's insolvency and what the limits on their recovery should be. Also, if Congress wished to protect only policyholders of federally regulated insurers, then constituents might have different levels of protection depending on whether their insurers were state-regulated or federally regulated. Should Congress decide to offer federal protection, technical issues could include how to fund the protection, its scope, the location of the administering agency in the executive branch, and how to enforce market discipline fairly. | Some constituencies are urging Congress to allow insurers to become federally regulated, like banks. Other constituencies are urging Congress to instead ratify its 1945 delegation of insurance regulation to the states. In the past few years, various pieces of legislation have been introduced to implement some form of federal charter for insurance companies. The latest such legislation is the National Insurance Act of 2007 (S. 40 and H.R. 3200).
How to protect insurance policyholders in the event of their insurer's insolvency is among the thorniest issues in insurance regulation, whether federal or state-based. The current system of protection for insurance policyholders is called "insurance guaranty funds." This interdependent system is a cooperative effort among regulators and insurers in the states where the insolvent insurer operated. It is administered state-by-state and funded by assessments on insurers. Though it has developed relatively recently, the system has provided some protection for policyholders of both large and small insolvent insurers.
If Congress were to consider regulating insurers federally, it would confront the issues of whether and how to provide that policyholder protection. Should Congress wish to protect insurance policyholders in an insolvency, it might choose to establish or expand a federal program like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, or the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund. Another option would be to require federally regulated insurers to participate in the state-based guaranty fund system.
Establishing federal protection for policyholders of insolvent federally regulated insurers would have costs and benefits. Direct costs would include, at the least, the costs of establishing and administering the system. Costs could also include funding of catastrophic shortfalls, as happened in the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s. Indirect costs could include inefficiencies that might result from dampening market discipline. The measure of benefit to policyholders would depend on the scope of protection offered. The potential benefit to the U.S. economy would require further analysis.
Requiring federally regulated insurers to participate in state guaranty funds would have costs and benefits as well. The costs would include the economic inefficiencies created by externalizing the costs of ineffective solvency regulation. The benefits would be simplicity and a consolidated assessment base.
This report describes generally how state-based insurance guaranty funds operate currently. It also compares the extant insurance system to protections offered bank depositors, potential and current pensioners, and credit union participants. It was originally prepared by [author name scrubbed], Insurance Consultant, Government and Finance Division, and will be updated as warranted by legislative events. |
crs_R43294 | crs_R43294_0 | Introduction
Under federal law, corporations and most other legal entities may be criminally liable for the crimes of their employees and agents. Prosecutorial Discretion
The decision to prosecute a corporation or its culpable employees or both is vested in the Justice Department. Here perhaps the most easily assessed factor is the strength of the case against the defendant or defendants. Federal Interests : Whether to proceed with a prosecutable case ordinarily turns on the nature and seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the defendants. The factors identified in the business organization guidelines include (1) the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the corporation; (2) the corporation's history of misconduct; (3) the existence and performance of compliance programs; (4) the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing; (5) the corporation's cooperation; (6) an absence of obstruction; (7) collateral consequences; and (8) restitution. Alternatives to Criminal Trial : Prosecutors have several alternatives to criminal trial. They may defer prosecution of the corporation under a deferred prosecution agreement. They also discourage agreements that shield individual corporate officers, employees, or agents from liability. Constitutional Rights
During a criminal investigation and throughout the course of criminal proceedings, corporations and other legal entities enjoy many, but not all, of the constitutional rights implicated in the criminal investigation or prosecution of an individual. Fourth Amendment : The Fourth Amendment condemns unreasonable searches and seizures. "[A] corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege" against self-incrimination, nor does it have a right to grand jury indictment. Moreover, the courts have acknowledged the access of corporations to various due process rights, for example, the right to challenge a court's personal jurisdiction over them or "the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner before being deprived of a protected interest in liberty or property." Double Jeopardy : The circuit courts have concluded that corporations are entitled to Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. Sixth Amendment : The Sixth Amendment guarantees anyone accused of a federal crime several rights: the right to notice of the charges, to the assistance of counsel, to a public and speedy trial before a jury where the crime occurred, to call witnesses, and to confront his accusers. Sentencing Guidelines
Corporations cannot be incarcerated. Otherwise, corporations and individuals face many of the same consequences following conviction. Corporations can be fined. They can be placed on probation. They can be ordered to pay restitution. Their property can be confiscated. They can be barred from engaging in various types of commercial activity. Corporations and individuals alike are sentenced in the shadow of the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Fines : The corporate fine Guidelines begin with the premise that a totally corrupt corporation should be fined out of existence, if the statutory maximum permits. A corporation operated for criminal purposes or by criminal means should be fined at a level sufficient to strip it of all of its assets. | A corporation is criminally liable for the federal crimes its employees or agents commit in its interest. Corporate officers, employees, and agents are individually liable for the crimes they commit, for the crimes they conspire to commit, for the foreseeable crimes their coconspirators commit, for the crimes whose commission they aid and abet, and for the crimes whose perpetrators they assist after the fact.
The decision whether to prosecute a corporation rests with the Justice Department. Internal guidelines identify the factors that are to be weighed: the strength of the case against the corporation; the extent and history of misconduct; the existence of a compliance program; the corporation's cooperation with the investigation; the collateral consequences; whether the corporation has made restitution or taken other remedial measures; and the alternatives to federal prosecution. As in the case of individual defendants, corporation prosecutions rarely result in a criminal trial. More often, the corporation pleads guilty or enters into a deferred or delayed prosecution agreement.
During a criminal investigation and throughout the course of criminal proceedings, corporations enjoy many, but not all, of the constitutional rights implicated in the criminal investigation or prosecution of an individual. Corporations have no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On the other hand, the courts have recognized or have assumed that corporations have a First Amendment right to free speech; a Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures; a Fifth Amendment right to due process and protection against double jeopardy; Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, jury trial, speedy trial, and to confront accusers, and to subpoena witnesses; and Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines.
Corporations cannot be jailed. Otherwise, corporations and individuals face many of the same consequences following conviction. The federal Sentencing Guidelines influence the sentencing consequences of conviction in many instances. Corporations can be fined. They can be placed on probation. They can be ordered to pay restitution. Their property can be confiscated. They can be barred from engaging in various types of commercial activity. The Guidelines speak to all of these.
For example, the corporate fine Guidelines begin with the premise that a totally corrupt corporation should be fined out of existence, if the statutory maximum permits. A corporation operated for criminal purposes or by criminal means should be fined at a level sufficient to strip it of all of its assets. In other cases, the Guidelines recommend fines and sentencing features that reflect the nature and seriousness of the crime of conviction and the level of corporate culpability and remedial efforts.
This is an abbreviated version of a longer CRS Report, without the footnotes or citations and attributions to authorities that appear in the longer report. The parent report is entitled CRS Report R43293, Corporate Criminal Liability: An Overview of Federal Law. |
crs_RL30699 | crs_RL30699_0 | Accordingly, Congress has been concerned about the countries and groups that have nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, are developing or trying to acquire them, and about those who have or seek missile delivery systems. Others emphasize the negative impact of the nuclear tests by India, Pakistan and North Korea; missile tests by North Korea, Iran, India, and Pakistan; continuing transfers of dangerous technology by states such as China, Russia, and North Korea; the activities of clandestine procurement networks; and a growing interest in NBC weapons among terrorists. In addition, the status and trends of these weapons are key factors in national and international debates regarding:
the character of the threat to U.S. security posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons delivered by terrorists, missiles, aircraft, or ships whether states or groups are acquiring NBC weapons and missiles to deter or to attack regional powers or the United States whether intelligence estimates should be based on the capability and/or intent of countries and terrorist groups to use NBC weapons and missiles whether U.S. intelligence collection and analysis resources are adequate whether the United States should emphasize a strategy of deterrence, preemption, or national defense the appropriate mix of defense (active and passive), export control, assistance, and arms control the appropriate mix of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral approaches. Increasingly free flow of information, people and goods. The potential for additional countries, or possibly terrorist groups, to produce NBC weapons using available technology, has become a greater concern in recent years. Nuclear Weapon Arsenals and Programs
Five states are considered nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Four of these countries have declared that they have stopped producing fissile material; China is believed to have stopped. Suspected Nuclear Weapons Programs
Iran has long been suspectedof pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The total number of nuclear warheads in the world will continue to decline over the next few decades as the United States and Russia reduce their stockpiles, even as the number of nations with nuclear weapons may increase. The nuclear inventories of China, India, and Pakistan are small, but all will probably be expanded. International trade in BW material, equipment, and technology remains a concern. It is expected that terrorist groups will continue their efforts to obtain a CW capability, and could be assisted in this by state sponsors of terrorism. Missile Arsenals and Programs
Nearly all countries that reportedly have or are seeking nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons also have ballistic missiles—four do not (Cuba, Sudan, Myanmar, Thailand). At least 25 other countries have short-range ballistic missiles with ranges under1000 km. Cruise missiles are more widely distributed. About 81 countries possess them, and 18 countries can manufacture them. | The United States has long recognized the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and missiles. This report, which analyzes NBC weapons programs potential threat patterns around the globe, is updated as needed.
The total number of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the world is shrinking as the major powers scale back their inventories through unilateral reductions and arms control, but other countries and groups still try to acquire these weapons. There are five established nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). India and Pakistan declared their nuclear weapons capability with nuclear tests in 1998, as did North Korea in 2006. Israel is also widely believed to have a nuclear weapon arsenal.
About a dozen countries have offensive biological weapons (BW) programs, and the same number have chemical weapons (CW) programs. That number could grow, as new technologies are developed and the international flow of information, goods, expertise, and technology continues. While the United States and Russia eliminated intermediate-range missiles and are reducing their intercontinental missile inventories, China is modernizing and expanding its missile force. North Korea, Iran, Israel, India, and Pakistan are building short- and medium-range missiles and are developing longer-range missiles. Dozens of countries have or are developing short-range ballistic missiles and more are likely to buy them. Over 80 countries have cruise missiles; about 40 manufacture or have the ability to manufacture them. And terrorists continue their efforts to acquire NBC capabilities.
Elements in North Korea, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and other countries continue to export weapons technology. The potential for secondary proliferation markets has grown, and concern about the ability of individual actors like the Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, to peddle nuclear technology has grown considerably.
The number of countries or groups that will acquire or produce NBC weapons may decrease if diplomacy, arms control treaties, nonproliferation regimes, and security and assistance strategies are effective. NBC weapons and missiles will remain a potential threat for the foreseeable future, but most observers readily agree that, even if nonproliferation policies alone are insufficient to halt NBC programs, such measures can slow those programs until states are persuaded that NBC weapons are not in their national security interest. |
crs_R40432 | crs_R40432_0 | Background
The major federally funded community service and volunteer programs are authorized under two statutes: the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (NCSA) and the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973 (DVSA). In general, these programs are administered by the Corporation for National and Community Service (hereafter referred to as the Corporation), an independent federal agency. The NCSA is designed to address unmet human, educational, environmental, and public safety needs and to renew an ethic of civic responsibility by encouraging citizens to participate in national service programs. The central purpose of the DVSA, which authorizes the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) program and the National Senior Volunteer Corps, is to foster and expand voluntary service in communities while helping the vulnerable, the disadvantaged, the elderly, and the poor. 1388 , the Generations Invigorating Volunteerism and Education (GIVE) Act, to amend and reauthorize NCSA and DVSA. The bill was signed into law on April 21, 2009 ( P.L. This report will not be updated. 111-13 authorizes a summer of service program under which students entering grades 6 through 12 at the end of the summer who complete 100 hours of service in an approved position would be eligible for an educational award of $500 from funds deposited in the National Service Trust. 111-13 , the educational award for full-time service will be equal to the maximum amount of a Pell Grant in the year in which the Corporation approves the national service position. In the 2009-2010 academic year the maximum Pell Grant amount is $5,350. 111-13 authorizes the ServeAmerica Fellowship program to allow individuals to design their own plans for serving their communities to address national needs. Under this program, individuals age 55 and older who complete 350 hours of service are eligible to receive a $1,000 educational award, which could be transferred to a child or grandchild. Social Innovation Funds Pilot Program (Part III)
Section 198K of P.L. 111-13 authorizes a Volunteer Generation Fund with which the Corporation may make grants to State Commissions and nonprofit organizations to carry out or to develop and support community-based entities that recruit, manage, or support volunteers. 111-13 requires the Corporation to establish a Nonprofit Capacity Building Program to make grants to intermediary organizations to support the organizational development of small and midsize nonprofit organizations, especially those nonprofit organizations "facing resource hardship challenges." 111-13 , individuals whose income was 125% of the poverty level or less could receive a stipend in the Foster Grandparent and Senior Companion Programs. | The major federally funded community service and volunteer programs in this country are authorized under two statutes: the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (NCSA), as amended, and the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973 (DVSA), as amended. The programs authorized by these statutes are administered by the Corporation for National and Community Service, an independent federal agency.
The NCSA is designed to address unmet human, educational, environmental, and public safety needs, to renew the ethic of civic responsibility, and encourage citizens to engage in national service. The central purpose of the DVSA is to foster and expand voluntary service in communities while helping the vulnerable, the disadvantaged, the elderly, and the poor.
On April 21, 2009, the President signed P.L. 111-13, The Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act, to amend and reauthorize NCSA and DVSA through FY2014. Among other things, P.L. 111-13, which is effective on October 1, 2009, does the following:
requires the Corporation to develop a plan to increase the number of approved national service positions from 88,000 in FY2010 to 250,000 in FY2017; authorizes a "Summer of Service" program, which would provide an educational award of $500 for students entering grades 6 through 12 at the end of the summer who complete 100 hours of service in approved positions; provides that AmeriCorps State and National Programs can be funded through an Education Corps, a Healthy Futures Corps, a Clean Energy Corps, a Veterans Corps, or an Opportunity Corps; increases the national service educational award for full-time service from $4,725 to the maximum amount of a Pell Grant, which in the 2009-2010 academic year is $5,350; authorizes a ServeAmerica Fellowship program to allow individuals to design their own plans for serving their communities to address national needs; authorizes a Silver Scholarship Grant Program under which individuals age 55 and older who complete 350 hours of service are eligible to receive a $1,000 silver scholarship educational award; authorizes a Social Innovation Funds Pilot Program to increase private and public investment in nonprofit community organizations; authorizes a Volunteer Generation Fund to develop and support community-based entities that recruit, manage, or support volunteers; requires the Corporation to establish a Nonprofit Capacity Building Program to support the organizational development of small and midsize nonprofit organizations; and increases the income eligibility of participants in the Foster Grandparent and Senior Companion Programs from 125% of the poverty level to 200%.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL34345 | crs_RL34345_0 | Typically, these measures have sought to (1) limit the hiring and employment of unauthorized aliens, including through the denial of permits to persons that employ unauthorized aliens and the regulation of day labor centers; (2) restrict the ability of unlawfully present aliens to rent or occupy dwellings within a state or locality's jurisdiction; and/or (3) deny unlawfully present aliens access to state or local services or benefits. These cases illustrate the difficulties that states and localities face in attempting to regulate the presence and rights of aliens within their jurisdictions in a manner consistent with federal law. This term, the Supreme Court is considering the case of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting , which involves arguments as to whether federal law preempts an Arizona statute that requires employers to use the federal government's E-Verify system to determine the work eligibility of employees and suspends or revokes the business licenses of entities found to have hired unauthorized aliens. This report discusses the constitutional issues raised by state and local laws intended to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens by limiting their access to housing, employment, and public benefits, as well as the implications that federal civil rights statutes might have for the implementation and enforcement of these laws. It also discusses recent federal court cases addressing the constitutionality of such measures. A separate report, CRS Report R41221, State Efforts to Deter Unauthorized Aliens: Legal Analysis of Arizona's S.B. 1070 , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed], discusses state laws that require state and local police to enforce federal immigration law or criminalize conduct that may facilitate unauthorized immigration. Factual Background
An estimated 37 million foreign-born persons currently reside in the United States, almost a third of whom may be present without authorization. Relevant Immigration-Related Legal Issues
State or local restrictions upon unlawfully present aliens' access to employment or housing and eligibility for public benefits have been challenged upon various grounds. Among other things, plaintiffs challenging such restrictions have alleged that they: (1) are preempted by federal immigration law and thus unenforceable by federal or state courts; (2) deprive persons of equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and/or (3) deprive persons of property or liberty interests without providing them due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Procedural Due Process
State and local restrictions on the hiring and employment of unauthorized aliens could also be challenged on procedural due process grounds, depending upon the form such restrictions take. Issues Raised by State or Local Restrictions on Public Benefits or Services
Some localities have attempted to deter the presence of illegal aliens within their borders via the denial of services and/or benefits. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, employers are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. § 1981. | An estimated 37 million foreign-born persons currently reside in the United States, almost a third of whom may be present without legal authorization. The reaction of state and local jurisdictions to unauthorized immigration has varied. In some cases, states and localities have adopted measures intended to deter unlawfully present aliens from arriving and settling within their jurisdictions, including by restricting such aliens' access to work, housing, and benefits. Typically, such measures have sought to (1) limit the hiring and employment of unauthorized aliens, including through the denial of permits to persons that employ unauthorized aliens and the regulation of day labor centers; (2) restrict the ability of unlawfully present aliens to rent or occupy dwellings within the state or locality; and/or (3) deny unlawfully present aliens access to state or local services or benefits.
State or local restrictions upon unlawfully present aliens' access to employment or housing and eligibility for public benefits have been challenged on various grounds, including on the grounds that they (1) are preempted by federal law, including the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and thus unenforceable by federal or state courts; (2) deprive persons of equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (3) deprive persons of property or liberty interests without providing them due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) run afoul of federal civil rights statutes, including the Fair Housing Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The outcomes of such challenges have varied, depending upon the specific restrictions at issue and the jurisdiction of the courts reviewing the restrictions. However, based upon the cases decided to date, these challenges appear to be more significant with regard to state and local restrictions on employing or renting property to unlawfully present aliens than they are with regard to state and local restrictions on unlawfully present aliens' access to public services and benefits. This term, the Supreme Court is considering the case of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, which involves arguments as to whether federal law preempts a 2007 Arizona statute that requires employers to use the federal government's E-Verify system to determine the work eligibility of employees and suspends or revokes the business licenses of entities found to have hired unauthorized aliens.
This report discusses the constitutional issues raised by state and local laws intended to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens by limiting their access to housing, employment, and public benefits, as well as the implications that federal civil rights statutes might have for the implementation and enforcement of these laws. It also discusses recent federal court cases addressing the constitutionality of such measures. The report does not discuss recent state laws that seek to deter the presence of unauthorized aliens by requiring state law enforcement to enforce federal immigration law, or that criminalize conduct that may facilitate the presence of unauthorized aliens within the state. Such laws are discussed in a separate report, CRS Report R41221, State Efforts to Deter Unauthorized Aliens: Legal Analysis of Arizona's S.B. 1070, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS21118 | crs_RS21118_0 | Recent Investments
The United States occupies a unique position in the global economy as the largest investor and the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI). A sharp drop in USDIA that occurred in 2005 reflects actions by U.S. parent firms to reduce the amount of reinvested earnings going to their foreign affiliates for distribution to the U.S. parent firms in order to take advantage of one-time tax provisions in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ( P.L. About 71% of the accumulated U.S. foreign direct investment is concentrated in high-income developed countries that are members of the OECD: investments in Europe alone account for over half of all U.S. direct investment abroad, or $2.9 trillion. U.S. They argue that such shifts reduce employment in the United States and increase imports, thereby negatively affecting U.S. employment, the trade deficit, and economic growth. U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) rank among the largest U.S. firms. As a result, most data on the activity of U.S. firms shifting plants or jobs abroad are anecdotal. These questions seem pertinent since American multinational corporations lost shares of U.S. GDP over the last decade and their domestic employment had declined until the mid-1990s. Increased economic activity abroad relative to that in the United States increased overseas affiliate employment in some industries, including manufacturing. Some observers believe U.S. direct investment abroad is harmful to U.S. workers because it shifts jobs abroad. In the 114 th and 115 th Congresses, Members of Congress expressed concerns about U.S. direct investment abroad through measures that would offer certain tax advantages to U.S. firms that shifted parts of their operations back to the United States and through measures that are directed at curbing tax havens and tax inversions and other practices that shift taxes from the United States to foreign locations. | The United States is the largest direct investor abroad and the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the world. For some Americans, the national gains attributed to investing overseas are offset by such perceived losses as offshoring facilities, displacing U.S. workers, and lowering wages. Some observers believe U.S. firms invest abroad to avoid U.S. labor unions or high U.S. wages, but 74% of the accumulated U.S. foreign direct investment is concentrated in high-income developed countries. In recent years, the share of investment going to developing countries has fallen. Most economists argue that there is no conclusive evidence that direct investment abroad as a whole leads to fewer jobs or lower incomes overall for Americans. Instead, they argue that the majority of jobs lost among U.S. manufacturing firms over the past decade reflect a broad restructuring of U.S. manufacturing industries responding primarily to domestic economic forces.
In recent Congresses, Members have introduced a number of measures that would affect U.S. multinational companies in their foreign investment activities. In the 115th Congress, H.R. 685 and S. 247 (Bring Jobs Home Act) would provide certain tax exemptions to U.S. multinational firms to induce them to redirect economic activity from a foreign subsidiary to a domestic U.S. operation. In the 114th Congress, Members also introduced similar measures, including H.R. 297, the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act of 2015, introduced by Representative Lloyd Doggett on January 13, 2015, and companion measure S. 174, introduced by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse; and H.R. 415, the Stop Corporate Inversions Act of 2015, introduced by Representative Sander Levin on January 20, 2015, and companion measure S. 198, introduced by Senator Richard Durbin. While H.R. 415 and S. 198 are directed at tax inversions, H.R. 297 and S. 174 address a number of tax and financial issues relative to U.S. multinational firms, including the use of foreign tax havens to evade U.S. taxes; money laundering; corporate offshore tax avoidance; and corporate tax inversions. |
crs_R43428 | crs_R43428_0 | Background
Congress is involved in the long-running and costly decision regarding the future production of "pits"; a pit is the plutonium core of the primary stage of a nuclear weapon. During the Cold War, the Rocky Flats Plant (CO) made pits on an industrial scale, sometimes over 1,000 pits per year (ppy). Rocky Flats ceased pit production in 1989. Yet the Department of Defense (DOD) requires the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the separately organized component of the Department of Energy (DOE) in charge of the U.S. nuclear weapons program, to have the capacity to make 50-80 ppy by 2030. This report summarizes the much more detailed CRS Report R43406, U.S. Nuclear Weapon "Pit" Production Options for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. Currently, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (NM) produces pits at its PF-4 building, and conducts AC and other supporting tasks at its Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) building. Pit Fabrication Options
The basis for the following options is that PF-4 is the only U.S. building able to produce pits, as it has high security, a high MAR allowance, and pit production equipment. Increasing its capacity to 80 ppy would entail more production equipment and more MAR. Thus higher capacity requires making MAR and space available. Options Using Modules
One option is to build "modules" at LANL so high-MAR work like processing Pu-238 or casting pits could be moved from PF-4. Each would be built for a specific task. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Savannah River Site (SRS) (SC) have both done work with Pu-238. Higher capacity also requires more AC, as the two increase in tandem. PF-4 is not suitable for most AC work. Thus increased pit production would also require finding one or more sites for AC. Options at Los Alamos
Analysts have argued that it would not be desirable to perform all AC at a site other than LANL. All plutonium work requires AC. It would be very costly, if not impossible, to retrofit that capacity into PF-4. Another possibility is to use an existing building at LANL, the Radiological Laboratory-Utility-Office Building (RLUOB, pronounced rulob). Similarly, LANL has not studied in detail how much floor space the AC for 80 ppy would require, but estimates that if all laboratory space in RLUOB could be used with 500-1,000 grams of plutonium and if some additional space could be made available for AC in PF-4, that might suffice. This approach would probably permit NNSA to halt work in CMR by 2019, removing workers and plutonium from a building that is much more at risk of collapse from an earthquake than is RLUOB. Questions for Congress
This report shows that many options could address DOD's requirement for 80 ppy, but it cannot determine which, if any, could meet this requirement because data do not exist on how much MAR and space are needed for AC and pit fabrication for 80 ppy. Likewise, there are little to no data on cost. However, this report raises questions that Congress may wish to have answered in order to decide how to proceed. Questions include:
Is an 80-ppy capacity needed? If so, how much space and MAR in PF-4 would fabrication of 80 ppy require? Could that amount of space be made available by repurposing PF-4 space? How could enough MAR allowance be made available? What would be the cost? What are the pros, cons, and costs of Pu-238 options? Are modules needed, or are other options preferable? Would the additional freed-up MAR and space permit PF-4 to fabricate 80 ppy? How much space and MAR would AC for 80 ppy require? What are the pros, cons, and costs of having SRS or LLNL perform some AC? What would it cost to convert RLUOB to HC-3? | Congress is involved in the long-running and costly decision regarding the future production of "pits"; a pit is a nuclear weapon's plutonium core. Rocky Flats Plant (CO) mass-produced pits during the Cold War; production ceased in 1989. The Department of Energy (DOE), which maintains U.S. nuclear weapons, then established a small pit manufacturing capability at PF-4, a building at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (NM). PF-4 has made at most 11 pits per year (ppy). DOE also proposed higher-capacity facilities; none came to fruition.
U.S. policy is to maintain existing nuclear weapons. To do this, the Department of Defense has stated that it needs DOE to have the capacity to produce 50-80 ppy by 2030. This report focuses on options to reach 80 ppy. A separate debate, not discussed here, is the validity of the requirement; a lower capacity would be simpler and less costly to attain.
Pit production requires many tasks, but this report focuses on two: pit fabrication, which forms plutonium into precise shapes, and analytical chemistry (AC), which monitors the composition of each pit. Any feasible option requires sufficient "space" (laboratory floor space) and "Material At Risk" (MAR) allowance. Each building for plutonium work is permitted a specified amount of MAR, that is, radioactive material (adjusted for radioactivity) that could be released by an event like an earthquake.
Pits can only be fabricated in PF-4. Increasing its capacity to 80 ppy would require making more MAR and more space available in that building, which in turn would require moving out radioactive material and freeing up space. Both could be done, for example, by moving pit casting or work on plutonium-238 (Pu-238), which is much more radioactive than the plutonium used in weapons, out of PF-4.
One pit fabrication option is to build one or more "modules" to move high-MAR work from PF-4. Modules would be reinforced-concrete structures buried near PF-4. Another option is to use buildings at Idaho National Laboratory or Savannah River Site (SRS) (SC); both sites have done work with Pu-238.
Higher capacity also requires more AC, which increases in tandem with capacity. Most AC is not time-sensitive, so some of it could be done at sites other than LANL. PF-4 is not suitable for most AC work. Thus increasing pit production would also require finding one or more sites for AC. AC requires much less MAR and much more space than pit fabrication, so AC options differ from pit fabrication options. Buildings at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (CA) and SRS have ample space suitable for AC. LANL would also need a significant AC capacity to support pit production and other work. An option would be to modify the new Radiological Laboratory-Utility-Office Building (RLUOB) so it could handle more plutonium, permitting it to do more AC.
This report shows that many options are available for making 80 ppy, but it cannot determine which, if any, could support that capacity because data do not exist on how much MAR and space are needed for AC and pit fabrication for 80 ppy. Likewise, there are little to no data on cost. However, the report raises questions that Congress may wish to have answered in order to decide how to proceed:
Is an 80-ppy capacity needed? If so, how much space and MAR in PF-4 would fabrication of 80 ppy require? Could sufficient space be made available by repurposing PF-4 space? How might enough MAR allowance be made available? What are the pros, cons, and costs of Pu-238 options? If modules are built, how many would be needed and what would they cost? How much space and MAR would AC for 80 ppy require? What are the pros, cons, and costs of having SRS or LLNL perform some AC? What would it cost to modify RLUOB?
This report summarizes a more detailed report, CRS Report R43406, U.S. Nuclear Weapon "Pit" Production Options for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34518 | crs_RL34518_0 | Ongoing U.N. system efforts to address VAW range from large-scale interagency initiatives to smaller grants and programs implemented by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), national governments, and individual U.N. agencies. A number of U.N. system activities address VAW directly; however, many are also implemented in the context of broader issues such as humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, global health, and human rights. Most U.N. entities do not specifically track the cost of programs or activities with anti-VAW components. Therefore, it is unclear how much the U.N. system, including individual U.N. agencies and programs, spends annually on programs to combat violence against women. Many U.N. member states have also ratified international treaties that address violence against women, including the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). It also discusses selected U.N. agreements, mechanisms, agencies, funds, and programs that—either in whole or in part—work to eliminate violence against women. This report supplements CRS Report RL34438, International Violence Against Women: U.S. Were Congress to decide to use U.N. mechanisms to combat VAW, a number of policy issues and U.N. system activities might be considered. Others argue that the U.S. government should focus on its own anti-VAW activities, and emphasize that U.N. anti-VAW activities may not always align with U.S. foreign assistance priorities. Moreover, some policymakers may contend that U.S. contributions to multilateral anti-VAW efforts be reduced in light of the global economic downturn, economic recession, and subsequent calls to reduce the U.S. budget deficit. Funding U.N. Anti-VAW Efforts
Some maintain that the U.S. government should increase its contributions to U.N. programs and mechanisms that combat violence against women—particularly the U.N. Trust Fund in Support of Actions to Eliminate Violence Against Women. These include the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), UN Women, and U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). United States Anti-VAW Activities in U.N. Fora
The United States may address VAW through several U.N. mechanisms, including multilateral treaties that focus on types or circumstances of violence against women. The study provided a statistical overview of types of VAW, including information on its causes and consequences. It does not measure the extent to which VAW is directly addressed or is part of a larger initiative or program. Examples include:
raising awareness of VAW in local and national governments—particularly among law enforcement, parliamentarians, government ministries, and the judiciary (formerly UNIFEM); strengthening anti-VAW legislation and policies related to domestic violence, trafficking, and forced marriage, and assisting governments and organizations in implementing such efforts (formerly UNIFEM); supporting data collection and research on international violence against women (formerly UNIFEM, DAW, and INSTRAW); supporting and servicing agenda items and discussions for U.N. intergovernmental bodies that promote gender equality, including the General Assembly, ECOSOC, and CSW (formerly DAW); conducting research and compiling reports for the Secretary-General on violence against women, including the Secretary-General's In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women and its updates (formerly DAW); supporting the U.N. Special Adviser on Gender Issues, promoting interagency collaboration to eliminate VAW, and developing new strategies, programs, and policies to address gender equality in the U.N. system (formerly OSAGI); and coordinating and implementing outcomes and follow-up to the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, and U.N. Security Council 1325 resolution on Women, Peace, and Security, both of which address violence against women (formerly OSAGI). | The United Nations (U.N.) system supports a number of programs that address international violence against women (VAW). These activities, which are implemented by 36 U.N. entities, range from large-scale interagency initiatives to smaller grants and programs that are implemented by a range of partners, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), national governments, and individual U.N. agencies. U.N. member states, including the United States, address VAW by ratifying multilateral treaties, adopting resolutions and decisions, and supporting U.N. mechanisms and bodies that focus on the issue.
Many U.N. activities and mechanisms address VAW directly, while others focus on it in the context of broader issues such as humanitarian assistance, U.N. peacekeeping, and global health. U.N. entities do not specifically track the cost of programs or activities with anti-VAW components. As a result, it is unclear how much the U.N. system, including individual U.N. agencies, funds, and programs, spends annually on programs to combat violence against women.
The U.S. government supports many activities that, either in whole or in part, work to combat international violence against women. Some experts argue that when considering the most effective ways to address VAW on an international scale, the United States should take into account the efforts of international organizations such as the United Nations. Were the 112th Congress to decide to use U.N. mechanisms to combat VAW, a number of programs and options might be considered. Congress has appropriated funds to the U.N. Trust Fund in Support of Actions to Eliminate Violence Against Women, for example, as well as to U.N. agencies, funds, and programs that address types or circumstances of violence against women and girls. These include the U.N. Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), World Health Organization (WHO), U.N. Development Program (UNDP), U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Senate has also provided its advice and consent to U.S. ratification of treaties that address international violence against women and girls—including the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.
At the same time, however, some policymakers contend that U.N. anti-VAW activities may not always align with U.S. foreign assistance priorities. They emphasize that rather than focusing on multilateral efforts, the U.S. government should focus on its own anti-VAW activities. Additionally, others may suggest that the U.S. government reconsider its efforts to combat international VAW in light of the global economic crisis, economic recession, and consequent calls to lower the U.S. budget deficit.
This report provides an overview of recent U.N. efforts to address VAW and highlights key U.N. interagency efforts. It also discusses selected U.N. funds, programs, and agencies that address international violence against women. It does not assess the extent to which VAW is directly addressed or is part of a larger initiative or program.
For information on international violence against women, including its causes, consequences, and U.S. policy, see CRS Report RL34438, International Violence Against Women: U.S. Response and Policy Issues.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33810 | crs_RL33810_0 | Introduction
Hyperlinking, in-line linking, caching, framing, thumbnails. Terms that describe Internet functionality pose interpretative challenges for the courts as they determine how these activities relate to a copyright holder's traditional right to control reproduction, display, and distribution of protected works. At issue is whether basic operation of the Internet, in some cases, constitutes or facilitates copyright infringement. If so, is the activity is a "fair use" protected by the Copyright Act? These issues frequently implicate search engines, which scan the web to allow users to find posted content. In 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. , which held that a search engine's online display of protected "thumbnail" images was a fair use of copyright protected work. More recently, courts have considered an Internet search engine's caching, linking, and the display of thumbnails in a context other than that approved in Kelly. In Field v. Google , a U.S. district court found that Google's system of displaying cached images did not infringe the content owner's copyright. And in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com Inc. , the Ninth Circuit reconsidered issues relating to a search engine's practice using thumbnail images, in-line linking, and framing, finding the uses to be noninfringing. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). It left open the questions of possible liability for contributory copyright infringement and/or immunity therefor under the DMCA, remanding the case to the district court for appropriate findings. Secondary Liability. Taken together, these cases indicate a willingness by the courts to acknowledge the social utility of online indexing, and factor it into fair use analysis; to adapt copyright law to the core functionality and purpose of Internet, even when that means requiring content owners to act affirmatively, such as by the use of meta-tags; and to weigh and balance conflicts between useful functions, such as online indexing and caching, against emerging, viable new markets for content owners. | Hyperlinking, in-line linking, caching, framing, thumbnails. Terms that describe Internet functionality pose interpretative challenges for the courts as they determine how these activities relate to a copyright holder's traditional right to control reproduction, display, and distribution of protected works. At issue is whether basic operation of the Internet, in some cases, constitutes or facilitates copyright infringement. If so, is the activity a "fair use" protected by the Copyright Act? These issues frequently implicate search engines, which scan the web to allow users to find content for uses, both legitimate and illegitimate.
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. , holding that a search engine's online display of "thumbnail" images was a fair use of copyright protected work. More recently, a U.S. district court considered an Internet search engine's caching, linking, and the display of thumbnails in a context other than that approved in Kelly. In Field v. Google , the district court found that Google's system of displaying cached images did not infringe the content owner's copyright. And in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com Inc. , the Ninth Circuit revisited and expanded upon its holding in Kelly , finding that a search engine's use of thumbnail images and practice of in-line linking, framing, and caching were not infringing. But it left open the question of possible secondary liability for contributory copyright infringement and possible immunity under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Taken together, these cases indicate a willingness by the courts to acknowledge the social utility of online indexing, and factor it into fair use analysis; to adapt copyright law to the core functionality and purpose of Internet, even when that means requiring content owners to affirmatively act, such as by the use of meta-tags; and to consider and balance conflicts between useful functions, such as online indexing and caching, against emerging, viable new markets for content owners. |
crs_RS21922 | crs_RS21922_0 | Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority and Politics
Afghanistan's governing structure has historically consisted of a weak central government unwilling or unable to enforce significant financial or administrative mandates on all of Afghanistan's diverse ethnic communities or on the 80% of Afghans who live in rural areas. The major groups are discussed below. His successor, Ashraf Ghani, is from a prominent Ghilzai clan. Another is Karim Khalili, who served as second vice president during Karzai's presidency. There are also tensions between the Hazaras and the Tajiks, even though both oppose Pashtun dominance. Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape
U.S. policy has been to help expand the capacity of formal Afghan governing institutions. The ouster of that government in late 2001 paved the way for the success of a long-stalled U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government. To implement the September 21, 2014, power-sharing agreement that resolved the presidential election dispute, Ghani agreed to delegate some of his presidential powers to "Chief Executive Officer" (CEO) of the government, Abdullah. The Informal Power Structure: Faction Leaders and Traditional Decisionmaking Mechanisms
An informal power structure exists outside the formal governing institutions—consisting of locally popular faction leaders with armed militia forces and traditional decisionmaking mechanisms. 2014 Presidential and Provincial Elections25
U.S. officials and many Afghans were concerned that the 2009 presidential election fraud would recur in the 2014 presidential elections, which occurred as international forces have been drawing down. The April 5, 2014, first round appeared largely free of widespread fraud, but the June 14, 2014, runoff was clouded by allegations, leveled particularly by Dr. Abdullah, of systematic fraud. Acting under the newly signed election laws, a committee of lawyers, human rights activists, the speakers of the two chambers of the National Assembly, and judicial officials nominated IEC and ECC candidates. Candidate Requirements . Efforts to Promote Women . President Obama spoke by phone with Dr. Abdullah on July 8 and sent Secretary of State John Kerry to Kabul to broker a resolution. On July 12, Secretary Kerry, Abdullah, and Ghani announced an agreement at a joint press conference providing for:
a recount of all 23,000 ballot boxes by Afghan election officials, with monitoring from diplomats posted to various embassies in Afghanistan and other officials. It was completed by the end of August but results were withheld to allow time for the Abdullah and Ghani camps to bridge differences over a post-election power-sharing arrangement. Ghani was inaugurated President on September 29 and immediately issued a decree appointing Abdullah as "CEO." The CEO is to have powers approximating those of a Prime Minister. The CEO will lead weekly meetings of a "Council of Ministers" (the ministers plus the CEO and deputy CEOs) that will implement the strategic direction given it by the "cabinet" that is led by the President. Ghani has sought to assert the full extent of his constitutional role, and has announced initiatives to curb corruption and hold corrupt individuals accountable, to install officials based on merit, to promote women, and, through several trips to regional countries with a stake in Afghanistan's future, to explore new ways to settle the conflict with the Taliban insurgency. Doing so complicated the need to balance competence and factional interests, and delayed the nomination process until January 12, 2015, well beyond the constitutionally required 30 day period for such nominations (October 28, 2014). Many of the shortcomings in governance are attributed to all of the political disputes, governmental corruption, nepotism and favoritism, and the lack of trained or skilled workers. Many Afghans have come to view the central government as "predatory." However, the results of these initiatives remain unclear. Auditing Capabilities . Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society61
Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to build capacity in human rights institutions in Afghanistan and to promote civil society and political participation. Advancement of Women
Women and women's groups are a large component of the burgeoning of civil society in post-Taliban Afghanistan. For tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed]. | The capacity, transparency, legitimacy, and cohesiveness of Afghan governance are crucial to Afghan stability as nearly all international forces exit Afghanistan by the end of 2016. The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but the government remains rife with corruption and ethnic and political tensions among its major factions are ever present. Its recent elections have been marred by allegations of vast fraud and resulting post-election political crises.
Hamid Karzai, who served as president since late 2001, was constitutionally term-limited and left office when his successor, Ashraf Ghani, was inaugurated on September 29. The inauguration represented a resolution of a presidential election dispute that consumed Afghan and U.S. official attention from April to September. The results of the April 5, 2014, first round of the election required a June 14 runoff between Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah—increasing tensions between Ghani's Pashtun community, Afghanistan's largest group, and the Tajik community with which Abdullah is identified. Amid accusations by Abdullah of widespread fraud in the runoff, Secretary of State John Kerry brokered an agreement for a recount of all 23,000 ballot boxes and formation of a post-election unity government under which Abdullah, the losing candidate, became "Chief Executive Officer" (CEO) of the government. The CEO is to function as a prime minister, pending a subsequent national deliberation over changing the constitution to create a formal prime ministerial post. The resolution of the election dispute paved the way for the long-delayed signing of formal agreements to permit U.S. and NATO deployments in post-2014 international missions to train Afghan forces (Resolute Support Mission) and conduct counterterrorism operations (Operation Freedom Sentinel).
To date, the power-sharing arrangement has nearly paralyzed the Afghan central government. Abdullah's role in governance has been limited and, until early January 2015, the two were unable to agree to new cabinet appointments despite a constitutional requirement to form a cabinet within 30 days of taking office. The government has been run in the interim by caretaker officials and bureaucrats lacking high-level policy direction. The cabinet choices reportedly represent efforts to balance the need for competent officials with the demands to satisfy both leaders' key constituencies. Government authority remains constrained not only by the power-sharing arrangement but also by the exertion of influence by the long-standing informal power structure consisting of regional and ethnic leaders. Faction leaders often maintain groups of armed fighters who often exercise arbitrary administration of justice and commit human rights abuses. These constraints could slow Ghani's efforts to prioritize curbing governmental corruption and promoting women's rights.
International officials and groups are attempting to help ensure that the significant gains in civil society, women's rights, and media freedoms achieved since 2001 are preserved. Those gains have come despite the persistence of traditional attitudes and Islamic conservatism in many parts of Afghanistan—attitudes that cause the judicial and political system to tolerate child marriages and imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence. Islamist influence and tradition has also frequently led to persecution of converts from Islam to Christianity, and to curbs on the sale of alcohol and on Western-oriented media programs. Afghan civil society activists, particularly women's groups, assert that many of these gains are at risk as international forces depart, especially should there be a reconciliation agreement between the government and insurgent leaders. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41833 | crs_R41833_0 | In the 2016-2017 school year (SY), 6.8 million children ages 3 through 21 received special education and related services under Part B of the IDEA. In SY2016-2017, approximately 13.4% of all public school students ages 3 through 21 received services under the IDEA. Since 1975, IDEA has been the subject of numerous reauthorizations to extend services and rights to children with disabilities. The most recent reauthorization was P.L. 108-446 in 2004. Funding for Part B, Assistance for Education of all Children with Disabilities, is permanently authorized. Funding for Part C, Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, and Part D, National Activities, was authorized through FY2011. Funding for the programs continues to be provided through annual appropriations acts. Children with Disabilities
To be covered under IDEA, a child with a disability must meet two criteria. First, the child must be in one of several categories of disabilities, and second, the child must require special education and related services as a result of the disability in order to benefit from public education. The Individualized Education Program (IEP)
FAPE is implemented through the IEP, which is the program plan that lays out how the LEA will provide special education and related services to each child with a disability. The IEP is developed by an IEP team composed of school personnel and parents. Content of IEP49
Specifically, IDEA requires that the IEP include the following:
the child's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance; measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals, designed to meet the child's needs that result from the child's disability to enable the child to be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum; and meet each of the child's other educational needs that result from the child's disability; how the child's progress toward meeting the above annual goals will be measured and when periodic reports on the progress the child is making toward meeting the annual goals will be provided; the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child, or on behalf of the child, and the program modifications or supports for school personnel that will be provided for the child to advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals; be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum and participate in extracurricular and other nonacademic activities; and be educated and participate with other children with disabilities and nondisabled children; the extent, if any, to which the child will not participate with nondisabled children in the regular class; any individual appropriate accommodations that are necessary to measure the academic achievement and functional performance of the child on state and district-wide assessments; if the IEP team determines that the child will take an alternate assessment on a particular state or district-wide assessment of student achievement, the IEP should detail why the child cannot participate in the regular assessment and why the particular alternate assessment selected is appropriate for the child; the projected date for the beginning of the assessments and their frequency, location, and duration. The Educational Environment
IDEA requires that children with disabilities be educated in the least restrictive environment possible. In other words, to the maximum extent that is appropriate they are to be educated with children who are not disabled. The various types of procedures include parental rights to
inspect and review educational records; participate in meetings related to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of their child; obtain an independent educational evaluation at public expense if the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the LEA; receive prior written notice in the native language of the parents when an LEA proposes to initiate or change, or refuses to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of FAPE to the child; receive a procedural safeguards notice, which is a comprehensive written explanation of IDEA's legal rights and protections for children with disabilities and their parents; resolve disputes through a mediation process; present and resolve complaints through the due process complaint procedures, which include a right to file suit in federal district court; and present and resolve complaints through state complaint procedures. The remainder of the funds are allocated by a formula to the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. State and LEA Expenditure Requirements
IDEA state and LEA expenditure requirements are aimed at increasing overall educational spending, rather than substituting federal funds for education spending at the state and local levels. Part B—Assistance for Education of All Children with Disabilities
Part B provides federal funding for the education of children with disabilities and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to children with disabilities between the ages of 3 and 21. | The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a statute that authorizes grant programs that support special education services. Under the IDEA, a series of conditions are attached to the receipt of grant funds. These conditions aim to provide certain educational and procedural guarantees for students with disabilities and their families.
The grant programs authorized under the IDEA provide federal funding for special education and early intervention services for children with disabilities (birth to 21 years old) and require, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) (i.e., specially designed instruction provided at no cost to parents that meets the needs of a child with a disability) and an accessible early intervention system (a statewide system to provide and coordinate early intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and their families). The IDEA also outlines and requires the use of procedural safeguards pertaining to the identification, evaluation, and placement of students in special education services that are intended to protect the rights of parents and children with disabilities. These procedures include parental rights to resolve disputes through a mediation process, and present and resolve complaints through a due process complaint procedure and through state complaint procedures.
In the 2016-2017 school year, 6.8 million children ages 3 through 21, approximately 13% of all public school students, received educational services under Part B of the IDEA. To be covered under IDEA, a child with a disability must meet the categorical definition of disability in the act, and the child must require special education and related services as a result of the disability in order to benefit from public education. Once a child meets IDEA's eligibility criteria, FAPE is implemented through the Individualized Education Program (IEP), which is the plan for providing special education and related services by the local educational agency (LEA). The IEP is developed by an IEP team composed of school personnel and the child's parents or guardian. IDEA requires that children with disabilities be educated in the least restrictive environment. That is, to the maximum extent appropriate they are to be educated with children who are not disabled. In the fall of 2016, approximately 63% of all school-aged children with disabilities served by IDEA spent 80% or more of their time in a regular classroom.
To implement IDEA, states and other entities (i.e., the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Bureau of Indian Education, the outlying areas, and the freely associated states) receive grants based on a statutory formula. In FY2017, $13.4 billion was appropriated for IDEA. Most of the federal funds received by states are passed on to LEAs based on a statutory formula. IDEA also contains state and local maintenance of effort (MOE) requirements and supplement, not supplant (SNS) requirements aimed at increasing overall educational spending, rather than substituting federal funds for education spending at the state and local levels.
Originally enacted in 1975, IDEA has been the subject of numerous reauthorizations to extend services and rights to children with disabilities. The most recent reauthorization of IDEA was P.L. 108-446, enacted in 2004. Funding for Part B, Assistance for Education of all Children with Disabilities, the largest and most often discussed part of the act, is permanently authorized. Funding for Part C, Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, and Part D, National Activities, was authorized through FY2011. Funding for the programs continues to be provided through annual appropriations acts. |
crs_R45182 | crs_R45182_0 | Introduction
Workers who lose their jobs due to a natural or other disaster can seek assistance through several federally supported programs. In many cases, disaster-affected workers will be served by permanent programs and systems that provide assistance to workers who involuntarily lose their jobs. In some cases, entities located within geographic areas affected by disasters can qualify for additional support that is limited to serving disaster-affected workers. This report discusses two income support programs and two employment service programs. In each benefit category, there is a broader permanent program and a more-targeted program for disaster-affected workers. Unemployment C ompensation 1 (UC) provides a weekly cash payment to workers who are involuntarily unemployed and meet other criteria. States administer UC benefits with U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) oversight. UC benefits are considered entitlements for eligible workers and are required to be paid promptly. Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) provides a weekly cash payment to individuals who become unemployed as a direct result of a major disaster and are not eligible for UC benefits. DUA is funded through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and administered by DOL through each state's UC agency. Dislocated Worker Activities under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA-DW) provides federal formula grants to states to provide training and career services to workers who involuntarily lose their jobs and meet other criteria. WIOA-DW grants are funded via discretionary appropriations to DOL and administered by state workforce agencies and local partners with DOL oversight. Disaster Dislocated Worker Grants (DDWGs) provide competitive federal grants that support temporary disaster response jobs for workers who are unemployed as a direct result of a disaster. DDWGs are awarded by DOL to the state and local partners that receive WIOA-DW funds. Because UC and DUA outlays increase as the need grows, these funds can be responsive to the scale of a disaster. Conversely, WIOA-DW and DDWG funds are typically limited by annual appropriations and therefore may be less scalable than UC and DUA, which are entitlements for individuals. In particular, the DUA regulation defines eligible unemployed workers to include
the self-employed, workers who experience a "week of unemployment" following the date the major disaster began when such unemployment is a direct result of the major disaster, workers unable to reach the place of employment as a direct result of the major disaster, workers who were to begin employment and do not have a job or are unable to reach the job as a direct result of the major disaster, individuals who have become the breadwinner or major provider of support for a household because the head of the household has died as a direct result of the major disaster, and workers who cannot work because of injuries caused as a direct result of the major disaster. This deadline may be extended. | The federal government supports several programs that can provide assistance to workers who lose their jobs as a result of a natural or other disaster. In many cases, disaster-affected workers will be served by permanent programs and systems that generally provide assistance to workers who involuntarily lose their jobs. In some cases, disaster-triggered federal supports may be made available to provide additional assistance or aid to workers who do not qualify for assistance under the permanent programs.
This report discusses two income support programs and two workforce service programs. In each benefit category, there is a broader permanent program and a more-targeted program for disaster-affected workers. All of these programs are administered through state agencies and some programmatic details may be state-specific.
Unemployment Compensation (UC) provides a weekly cash payment to workers who are involuntarily unemployed and meet other criteria. States administer UC benefits with U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) oversight. UC benefits are considered entitlements for eligible workers and funded via payroll taxes paid by employers. Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) provides a weekly cash payment to individuals who become unemployed as a direct result of a major disaster and are not eligible for UC benefits. DUA is funded by the federal government and benefits are paid through each state's UC agency. Dislocated Worker Activities under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA-DW) are federal formula grants to states to provide training and career services to workers who involuntarily lose their jobs and meet other criteria. WIOA-DW grants are funded via DOL appropriations and administered by state workforce agencies and local partners with DOL oversight. Disaster Dislocated Worker Grants (DDWGs) are competitive federal grants that support temporary disaster response jobs for workers who are unemployed as a direct result of a disaster. DDWGs are awarded by DOL to the state and local partners that receive WIOA-DW funds.
Since UC and DUA outlays increase as the need grows, these funds can be responsive to the scale of a disaster. Conversely, WIOA-DW and DDWG funds are limited by appropriations levels and therefore may be less immediately scalable than UC and DUA, which are entitlements for individuals.
In some instances, Congress has enacted legislation to temporarily expand these programs that serve disaster-affected workers or otherwise extend supplemental support to the states administering them. These prior efforts may serve as a model when Congress considers legislation to support workers affected by disasters. |
crs_R41741 | crs_R41741_0 | Introduction
The state secrets privilege, primarily a construct of the judiciary that has been derived from common law, is an evidentiary privilege that allows the government to resist court-ordered disclosure of information during civil litigation if there is a reasonable danger that such disclosure would harm the national security of the United States. While the state secrets privilege arises in a wide array of cases, recently the privilege has been characterized by a number of high-profile assertions—including invocation of the privilege to defend against claims arising from the government's "extraordinary rendition" practices, challenges to the terrorist surveillance program, and claims against various national security agencies for unlawful employment practices. The government has also intervened and invoked the privilege in a significant number of cases involving claims against government contractors. This report is intended to present an overview of the protections afforded by the state secrets privilege; a discussion of some of the many unresolved issues associated with the privilege; and, a selection of high-profile examples of how the privilege has been applied in practice. United States v. Reynolds: The Seminal Case
Although previously established, the Supreme Court first articulated the modern analytical framework of the state secrets privilege in the 1953 case of United States v. Reynolds . The Supreme Court reversed. In its opinion, the Court laid out a two-step procedure to be used when evaluating a claim of privilege to protect state secrets. First, "there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer." Second, "the court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect." If the privilege is appropriately invoked, it is absolute and the disclosure of the underlying information cannot be compelled by the court. Still, a valid invocation of the privilege does not necessarily require dismissal of the claim. In Reynolds , for instance, the Supreme Court did not dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, but rather remanded the case to determine whether the claims could proceed absent the privileged evidence. Yet, significant controversy has arisen with respect to the question of how a case should proceed in light of the successful claim of privilege. Courts have varied greatly in their willingness to either dismiss a claim in its entirety or allow a case to proceed "with no consequences save those resulting from the loss of evidence." Some courts have taken a more restrained view of the consequences of a valid privilege, holding that the privilege protects only specific pieces of privileged evidence; while others have taken a more expansive view, arguing that the privilege, with its constitutional underpinnings, often requires deference to executive branch assertions and ultimate dismissal. In General Dynamics Corporation v. United States , the federal government validly asserted the privilege to prevent the disclosure of sensitive stealth technology in a defense contract dispute with a government contractor. | The state secrets privilege is a judicially created evidentiary privilege that allows the federal government to resist court-ordered disclosure of information during litigation if there is a reasonable danger that such disclosure would harm the national security of the United States. Although the common law privilege has a long history, the Supreme Court first described the modern analytical framework of the state secrets privilege in the 1953 case of United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). In Reynolds, the Court laid out a two-step procedure to be used when evaluating a claim of privilege to protect state secrets. First, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department that has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. Second, a court must independently determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very matter the privilege is designed to protect. If the privilege is appropriately invoked, it is absolute and the disclosure of the underlying information cannot be compelled by a court.
A valid invocation of the privilege does not necessarily require dismissal of the claim. In Reynolds, for instance, the Supreme Court did not dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, but rather remanded the case to determine whether the claims could proceed absent the privileged evidence. Yet, significant controversy has arisen with respect to the question of how a case should proceed in light of a successful claim of privilege. Courts have varied greatly in their willingness to either grant government motions to dismiss a claim in its entirety or allow a case to proceed "with no consequences save those resulting from the loss of evidence." Some courts have taken a more restrained view of the consequences of a valid privilege, holding that the privilege protects only specific pieces of privileged evidence. In contrast, other courts have taken a more expansive view, arguing that the privilege, with its constitutional underpinnings, often requires deference to executive branch assertions and ultimately, leaves a party with no other available remedy.
The state secrets privilege arises in a wide array of cases, generally where the government is a defendant or where the government has intervened in a case between private parties to prevent the disclosure of state secrets. Recently, the privilege has been characterized by a number of high-profile assertions—including invocation of the privilege to defend against claims arising from the government's "extraordinary rendition" practices, challenges to the terrorist surveillance program, and claims against various national security agencies for unlawful employment practices. The government has also intervened and invoked the privilege in a significant number of cases involving claims against government contractors. Most recently, in May 2011, the Supreme Court held that the valid invocation of the state secrets privilege could render a defense contracting dispute nonjusticiable, leaving both the defense contractor and the Pentagon without any judicial remedies to enforce the contract.
This report is intended to present an overview of the protections afforded by the state secrets privilege; a discussion of some of the many unresolved issues associated with the privilege; and a selection of high-profile examples of how the privilege has been applied in practice. |
crs_RL33867 | crs_RL33867_0 | MTBs may also include minor technical corrections to U.S. trade laws and specific instructions to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regarding shipments of certain imported products. In order to be included in an MTB, duty suspensions must be noncontroversial (no domestic producer, federal agency, or Member objects), revenue-neutral (defined as revenue loss of no more than $500,000 in foregone tariffs per item), and able to be administered by CBP and other agencies. Thus, the last MTB to be enacted was the United States Manufacturing Enhancement Act of 2010 ( P.L. This report, first, discusses recent developments on new legislation proposing a revised process for vetting duty suspension bills. Second, the previous MTB process that involved Member introduction and vetting by House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committee staff, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), and other relevant agencies is described. Third, the report tracks MTB legislation introduced from the 109th to the 114th Congresses. Legislation and House and Senate rules covering "earmarks" and "limited tariff benefits" that may have impact on the current MTB debate are also highlighted. The Trade Facilitation and Enforcement Act of 2015, P.L. 114-125 , enacted on February 24, 2016, included a sense of Congress that urged the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees to "advance, as soon as possible, after consultation with the public and Members of the Senate and House of Representatives, a regular and predictable legislative process for the temporary suspension and reduction of duties that is consistent with the rules of the Senate and of the House." The subcommittee considers duty suspensions for inclusion in the MTB only if the corresponding goods or materials are deemed "noncontroversial" or "noncompetitive," meaning that (1) there is no domestic producer objecting to the duty suspension, and (2) the suspension or reduction of the tariff is seen to be in the interest of U.S. "downstream" manufacturers and consumers. USTR Role
The USTR also commented occasionally on individual duty suspension bills, but generally focused on larger issues in the legislation that could more permanently affect U.S. trade policy. 6406 proposed to suspend or reduce tariffs on about 380 additional products. H.R. 6111 ) that subsequently passed the Senate on December 9. 110th Congress
In the 110 th Congress, no MTB legislation was introduced in either house. Section 521 (Senate Rule XLIV) amended the standing rules of the Senate to provide that it will not be in order to consider a bill or joint resolution reported by any committee, a bill or joint resolution not reported by a committee, or the adoption of a conference committee report, unless the chairman of the committee of jurisdiction, the majority leader, or his or her designee, certifies that any congressionally directed spending items, limited tariff benefits, or limited tax benefits (1) have been identified ("through lists, charts, or other similar means including the name of each Senator who submitted the request"); and (2) are searchable "on a publicly accessible congressional website" at least 48 hours (or "as soon as practicable" in the case of spending items proposed in floor amendments) prior to the vote. The bill covered more than 600 products, most of which were manufacturing inputs for finished goods made in the United States. 4380 ) and attempting to differentiate MTB legislation from earmarks. The House passed H.R. H.R. Issues for Congress
MTB Process Reform
Since the 111 th Congress, several Members have introduced legislation seeking to change the MTB process, primarily by authorizing the ITC to receive duty suspensions and develop draft MTB legislation to be submitted to Congress for additional action. Transparency
MTB supporters assert that, unlike most earmarks, MTB provisions go through an intensive and transparent vetting process that includes posting prospective duty suspensions on committee websites for public comment, review by the ITC and executive branch agencies, and scoring by the Congressional Budget Office. | U.S. importers often request that Members of Congress introduce bills seeking to temporarily suspend or reduce tariffs on certain imports. The rationale for these requests is that they cut costs for U.S manufacturers, thus enabling them to hire more workers, invest in research and development, and reduce costs for consumers.
In recent congressional practice, the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, the committees of jurisdiction over tariffs, have combined individual duty suspension bills and other technical trade provisions into larger pieces of legislation known as miscellaneous tariff (or trade) bills (MTBs). When Members introduce bills, they must also file disclosure forms indicating that they have no economic interest in the entity requesting the suspension. Before inclusion in an MTB, the individual bills are reviewed by the trade subcommittee staff in each of the relevant committees, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), and executive branch agencies to ensure that they are noncontroversial (generally, that no domestic producer, Member, or government agency objects), relatively revenue-neutral (revenue loss due to the duty suspension of no more than $500,000 per product), and are able to be administered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). All bills, bill reports, and disclosure forms are also placed on committee websites for public comment.
Duty suspensions in MTBs are only available for a limited time (generally, three years from the date of enactment), and if no subsequent MTB legislation is passed, the duty-free or reduced duty status of the products expires. Expired duty suspensions must be re-introduced to be included in new MTB legislation, and in most cases, the favorable duty status is not retroactively renewed. The last enacted MTB expired on December 31, 2012. This MTB, the United States Manufacturing Enhancement Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-227), suspended entirely or reduced duties on over 600 products. Since legislative attempts to pass an additional MTB extending the duty suspension on these products were not successful, currently, duties must be paid on these products, most of which are inputs in various U.S. manufactured products. Additional MTB legislation was introduced in the 112th Congress (H.R. 6727) and 113th Congress (H.R. 2708), but neither bill was taken up in either the House or the Senate, possibly due to controversy over whether MTB legislation violated House and Senate rules on congressionally directed spending.
The Trade Facilitation and Enforcement Act of 2015, P.L. 114-125, enacted on February 24, 2016, included a sense of Congress that urged the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees to "advance, as soon as possible, after consultation with the public and Members of the Senate and House of Representatives, a regular and predictable legislative process for the temporary suspension and reduction of duties that is consistent with the rules of the Senate and of the House." Some in Congress propose changing the MTB process by requiring an agency outside Congress, such as the ITC, to receive petitions and vet products for duty suspensions. Bills supporting this approach have been introduced in 114th Congress (S. 2794, H.R. 4923). Thus, Congress may discuss a procedure to change the MTB process in the second session of the 114th Congress.
This report provides recent developments regarding the proposed MTB process, and compares this proposal for vetting MTBs with the existing review process. It also tracks the current proposal and provides information on MTB legislation introduced from the 109th to the 113th Congresses. Legislation and House and Senate rules covering "earmarks" and "limited tariff benefits" that may affect the current MTB debate are also discussed. The report also presents issues for Congress. |
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