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crs_RL31547 | crs_RL31547_0 | Both the House and Senate versions of the Homeland Security Act ( H.R. These activities and services have been referred to as components of the nation's critical infrastructure. In July 1996, President Clinton established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). The government is reluctant to disclose threat information that might compromise intelligence activities or investigations. The Commission noted that this might require that a legal vehicle be established within the critical infrastructure information sharing mechanism that would protect confidential information, and examined the ramifications of different approaches and strategies related to the federal government's protection of private sector information. 5005 and S. 2452 , respectively) included more detailed language exempting critical infrastructure information from FOIA. The purpose of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was to ensure by statute citizen access to government information. With respect to the Freedom of Information Act, three of the nine exemptions from public disclosure provide possible protections against the release of homeland security and critical infrastructure information: exemption 1 (national security information), exemption 3 (information exempted by statute), and exemption 4 (confidential business information). H.R. 107-296 ). Generally, the legislation has specifically exempted the covered information from disclosure under FOIA, in effect creating an exemption 3 statute for purposes of FOIA. The D.C. The House language prevailed as Title II, Subtitle B, Section 214, in P.L. 5005 and S. 2452 , 107 th Congress . P.L. 107-269 ) exempted from disclosure under FOIA "critical infrastructure information (including the identity of the submitting person or entity) that is voluntarily submitted to a covered agency for use by that agency regarding the security of critical infrastructure (as defined in the USA PATRIOT Act) ... , when accompanied by an express statement.... " The Homeland Security Act defines critical infrastructure information to mean "information not customarily in the public domain and related to the security of critical infrastructure or protected systems—
(A) actual, potential, or threatened interference with, attack on, compromise of, or incapacitation of critical infrastructure or protected systems by either physical or computer-based attack or other similar conduct (including misuse of or unauthorized access to all types of communications and data transmission systems) that violates federal, state, or local law, harms interstate commerce of the United States, or threatens public health and safety;
(B) the ability of critical infrastructures or protected systems to resist such interference, compromise, or incapacitation, including any planned or past assessment, projection or estimate of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or a protected system, including security testing, risk evaluation thereto, risk management planning, or risk audit; or,
(C)any planned or past operational problem or solution regarding critical infrastructure ... including repair, recovery, reconstruction, insurance, or continuity to the extent it relates to such interference, compromise, or incapacitation." 107-296 ) and S. 2452 . These differences included the scope of the information protection; the type of information covered and exempted from FOIA; the definition of a voluntary submission; the other purposes authorized for use or disclosure of the information; the disclosure of information with the consent of the submitter; the permissibility of disclosures of related information by other agencies; immunity from civil liability; preemption; and criminal penalties. Some public interest groups are concerned that the breadth of information that could be exempted from disclosure, combined with the prohibition on use of critical infrastructure information in any civil suit, could give owners or operators of critical infrastructures an "unprecedented immunity" from complying with a variety of laws (i.e., antitrust, tort, tax, civil rights, environmental, labor, consumer protection, and health and safety laws). Another argument made by the public interest groups is that existing FOIA exemptions and case law offer sufficient protections to owner/operators. Conclusion
Compelling arguments existed on both sides of the debate for and against exempting critical infrastructure information from the Freedom of Information Act. The provisions regarding the exemption of Critical Infrastructure Information from FOIA adopted the House language in total. | Critical infrastructures have been defined as those systems and assets so vital to the United States that the incapacity of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on the United States. One of the findings of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, established by President Clinton in 1996, was the need for the federal government and owners and operators of the nation's critical infrastructures to share information on vulnerabilities and threats. However, the Commission noted that owners and operators are reluctant to share confidential business information, and the government is reluctant to share information that might compromise intelligence sources or investigations. Among the strategies to promote information sharing was a proposal to exempt critical infrastructure information from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was passed to ensure by citizen access to government information. Nine categories of information may be exempted from disclosure. Three of the nine exemptions provide possible protection against the release of critical infrastructure information: exemption 1 (national security information); exemption 3 (information exempted by statute); and exemption 4 (confidential business information). Congress has considered several proposals to exempt critical infrastructure information from FOIA. Generally, the legislation has created an exemption 3 statute, or adopted the exemption 4 D.C. Circuit standard.
Prior to passage of the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296), the House (H.R. 5005) and Senate (S. 2452) bills differed significantly on language providing a FOIA exemption. Differences included the type of information covered and exempted from FOIA; the scope of the protections provided; the authorized uses or disclosures; the permissibility of disclosures of related information by other agencies; immunity from civil liability; preemption; and criminal penalties. The Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296, section 214 ) provisions regarding the exemption of critical infrastructure information from FOIA adopted the House language in its entirety.
Public interest groups question the necessity of a FOIA exemption suggesting that existing FOIA exemptions provide sufficient protections.. They also argued that the House language (which passed) was too broad and would allow a wider range of information to be protected (including information previously available under FOIA). They favored the more limited protections proposed in the S. 2452. Public interest groups also expressed concern that the provision which bars use of the protected information in civil actions would shield owners and operators from liability under antitrust, tort, tax, civil rights, environmental, labor, consumer protection, and health and safety laws. Owners and operators of critical infrastructures insisted that current law did not provide the certainty of protection needed. While they viewed the Senate language as a workable compromise, they favored the protections in H.R. 5005. Compelling arguments existed on both sides of the debate for and against exempting critical infrastructure information from the Freedom of Information Act. S. 6, introduced in the 108th Congress, resurrects S. 2452 (107th Congress). This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R41529 | crs_R41529_0 | Introduction
On July 21, 2010, Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 , became effective upon enactment. Title VIII authorizes the Federal Reserve, in coordination with other federal agencies, to supervise and regulate the infrastructure that enables financial intermediaries to process and complete financial transactions. PCS systems serve a critical role in the financial services sector and the broader economy. Title VIII introduces the term "financial market utility" (FMU or utility) for those multilateral systems that transfer, clear, or settle payments, securities, or other financial transactions among financial institutions (FI) or between a FMU and a financial institution. Financial transactions processed daily in the U.S. economy include payment transfers ranging from small-dollar retail purchase transactions to large-value purchases of securities; clearing transactions for derivatives trading; and securities settlement. Title VIII regulatory powers apply specifically to those financial market utilities and PCS activities (of financial institutions) that are designated as systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), also created by the Dodd-Frank Act. S. 3497 , introduced on August 2, 2012, seeks to repeal Title VIII, stripping FSOC of its authority to designate FMUs as systemically important. Listed below are some of the major systems currently operating in the United States. FMUs Designated by the FSOC
On July 18, 2012, FSOC voted unanimously to designate eight FMUs as systemically important. The Fedwire services enable depository institutions, the U.S. Treasury and other government agencies to transfer funds and book-entry securities nationwide. The Appendix to this report provides additional information regarding these systems. Basics of Payment, Clearing, and Settlement
The existing infrastructure in the United States for those activities consists of systems operated by the Federal Reserve through the Federal Reserve Banks, and by the private sector. A settlement system is used to facilitate the settlement of transfers of funds or financial instruments. In those proposals for heightened supervision by the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Department of the Treasury noted concerns about the ability of payment and settlement systems to contribute to financial crises, rather than reduce them, potentially threatening the stability of U.S. and foreign financial markets. The goal of the Interagency Paper was to ensure the smooth operation of the financial system in the event of a wide-scale disruption. Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act
Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act , P.L. The Dodd-Frank Act also affects PCS systems and activities through Title VII, the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 , which establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework in regard to the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market and swap transactions. Title VII establishes requirements for the clearing of certain bilateral swap transactions through derivatives clearinghouses. The following provisions illustrate examples of required regulatory coordination under Title VIII:
the Council must consult with the Fed and Supervisory Agencies in making systemic importance determinations under Section 804; the Fed or the Council must coordinate with a utility's Supervisory Agency or a financial institution's supervisor to request material information from or impose reporting or recordkeeping requirements on the entity under Section 809; the Fed, Council, Supervisory Agency, and appropriate financial regulator are authorized to promptly notify each other of material concerns about a designated utility or financial institution engaged in designated activities and share appropriate reports, information, or data relating to such concerns under Section 809(e); and coordination of examination and enforcement authority under Sections 807 and 808 is required, except to the extent that the Fed may exercise back-up or independent authority in limited circumstances. It comprises much of the same material that was included in the proposed rules. | The U.S. financial system processes millions of transactions each day representing daily transfers of trillions of dollars, securities, and other assets to facilitate purchases and payments. Concerns had been raised, even prior to the recent financial crisis, about the vulnerability of the U.S. financial system to infrastructure failure. These concerns about the "plumbing" of the financial system were heightened following the market disruptions of the recent crisis.
The financial market infrastructure consists of the various systems, networks, and technological processes that are necessary for conducting and completing financial transactions. Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, P.L. 111-203, the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010, introduces the term "financial market utility" (FMU or utility) for those multilateral systems that transfer, clear, or settle payments, securities, or other financial transactions among financial institutions (FI) or between an FMU and a financial institution. Utilities and FIs transfer funds and settle accounts with other financial institutions to facilitate normal day-to-day transactions occurring in the U.S. economy. Those transfers include payroll and mortgage payments, foreign currency exchanges, purchases of U.S. treasury bonds and corporate securities, and derivatives trades. Further, financial institutions engage in commercial paper and securities repurchase agreements (repo) markets that contribute to liquidity in the U.S. economy. In the United States, some of the key payment, clearing, and settlement (PCS) systems are operated by the Federal Reserve, and other systems are operated by private sector organizations.
With Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, which was enacted on July 21, 2010, Congress added a new regulatory framework for the FMUs and PCS activities (of FIs) designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council as systemically important. On July 18, 2012, the Council voted unanimously to designate eight FMUs as systemically important. Title VIII expands the Federal Reserve's role, in coordination with those of other prudential regulators, in the supervision, examination, and rule enforcement with respect to those FMUs and PCS activities of financial institutions. Additionally, FMUs may borrow from the discount window of the Federal Reserve in certain unusual and exigent circumstances.
Although Title VIII primarily affects the scope of regulatory powers, certain provisions directly affect a utility's business operations. For example, Title VIII allows FMUs to maintain accounts at a Federal Reserve Bank and provides access to the Fed's discount window in unusual and exigent circumstances. Related to PCS, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act imposes requirements that will significantly affect the business of clearinghouses in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives (swaps) market. By requiring clearing of certain swap transactions through central counterparties (CCPs or clearinghouses), Title VII is expected to increase the volume of transactions processed by clearing systems subject to Title VIII.
Critics contend that Title VIII grants too much discretionary authority to the Fed in an area that they argue was not a source of systemic risk during the recent financial crisis. S. 3497 seeks to repeal Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, stripping FSOC of it's authority to designate FMUs as systemically important.
This report outlines the changes to the supervision of key market infrastructure that are embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act. It is intended to be used as a reference for those interested in the financial system's "plumbing," and how the associated systems are currently overseen and regulated. |
crs_RL30853 | crs_RL30853_0 | Introduction
The authorities and responsibilities of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) derive primarily from a dozen major environmental statutes. This report provides a concise summary of one of those statutes, the Clean Air Act. In addition, the report describes the statute largely without discussing its implementation. Overview
The Clean Air Act, codified as 42 U.S.C. It requires the Environmental Protection Agency to establish minimum national standards for air quality, and assigns primary responsibility to the states to assure compliance with the standards. The act establishes federal standards for mobile sources of air pollution and their fuels and for sources of 187 hazardous air pollutants, and it establishes a cap-and-trade program for the emissions that cause acid rain. The federal role was strengthened in subsequent amendments, notably the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 1977, and 1990. Changes to the act in 1990 included provisions to (1) classify most nonattainment areas according to the extent to which they exceed the standard, tailoring deadlines, planning, and controls to each area's status; (2) tighten auto and other mobile source emission standards; (3) require reformulated and alternative fuels in the most polluted areas; (4) revise the air toxics section, establishing a new program of technology-based standards and addressing the problem of sudden, catastrophic releases of air toxics; (5) establish an acid rain control program, with a marketable allowance scheme to provide flexibility in implementation; (6) require a state-run permit program for the operation of major sources of air pollutants; (7) implement the Montreal Protocol to phase out most ozone-depleting chemicals; and (8) update the enforcement provisions so that they parallel those in other pollution control acts, including authority for EPA to assess administrative penalties. The remainder of this report describes major programs required by the act, with an emphasis on the changes established by the 1990 amendments. Prevention of Significant Deterioration / Regional Haze
Sections 160-169 of the act establish requirements for the prevention of significant deterioration of air quality (PSD). | This report summarizes the Clean Air Act and its major regulatory requirements. It excerpts, with minor modifications, the Clean Air Act chapter of CRS Report RL30798, Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, which summarizes a dozen environmental statutes that form the basis for the programs of the Environmental Protection Agency.
The principal statute addressing air quality concerns, the Clean Air Act was first enacted in 1955, with major revisions in 1970, 1977, and 1990. The act requires EPA to set health-based standards for ambient air quality, sets deadlines for the achievement of those standards by state and local governments, and requires EPA to set national emission standards for large or ubiquitous sources of air pollution, including motor vehicles, power plants, and other industrial sources. In addition, the act mandates emission controls for sources of 187 hazardous air pollutants, establishes a cap-and-trade program to limit acid rain, requires the prevention of significant deterioration of air quality in areas with clean air, requires a program to restore visibility impaired by regional haze in national parks and wilderness areas, and implements the Montreal Protocol to phase out most ozone-depleting chemicals.
This report describes the act's major provisions and provides tables listing all major amendments, with the year of enactment and Public Law number, and cross-referencing sections of the act with the major U.S. Code sections of the codified statute. |
crs_R45081 | crs_R45081_0 | T he banking industry plays a critical role in the United States economy, channeling funds from savers to borrowers and thereby facilitating economic activity. This report provides an overview of the respective roles of the federal and state governments in regulating banking. The report begins by providing a general overview of the doctrine of federal preemption, before discussing the American "dual banking system." It then addresses several key areas where preemption issues have arisen with respect to banking law, including (1) the standard for implied preemption of state laws that interfere with the powers of national banks adopted by the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson ; (2) the Court's decisions in two cases concerning "visitorial powers" over national banks, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. and Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L.L.C. ; and (3) interpretive letters and rules concerning federal preemption issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the OCC). The report also discusses the provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) concerning preemption of state consumer protection laws, and their interpretation by courts and the OCC. Finally, the report concludes by discussing issues that are likely of interest to the 115th Congress concerning preemption, including provisions in the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 concerning which entities may benefit from National Bank Act (NBA) preemption of state usury laws. And the Supreme Court has held that the NBA impliedly preempts state laws that "significantly interfere with" a national bank's exercise of the powers conferred by that Act. Since that time, banks have had the option of applying for a national charter from the OCC or a state charter from a state's primary banking regulator. A bank's "choice of chartering authority is also a choice of primary regulator," as the OCC serves as the primary regulator of national banks, and state banking authorities serve as the primary regulators for state-chartered banks. Despite receiving their authorities from federal law, national banks are not wholly immune from state law. Just as national banks are often subject to state law despite receiving their powers from federal law, state banks are often subject to federal laws despite receiving their powers from state law. Among other federal laws, state banks are subject to certain federal tax, consumer protection, and antidiscrimination laws, in addition to any federal laws applicable to state banks by virtue of their membership in the FRS or supervision by the FDIC. that the NBA's preemption provision concerning "visitorial powers" does not implicate judicial law enforcement actions brought against national banks. Section 1044 provides that a "state consumer financial law" is preempted only if:
(A) application of a State consumer financial law would have a discriminatory effect on national banks, in comparison with the effect of the law on a bank chartered by that State;
(B) in accordance with the legal standard for preemption in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in [ Barnett Bank ], the State consumer financial law prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers; and any preemption determination under this subparagraph may be made by a court, or by regulation or order of the Comptroller of the Currency on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with applicable law; or
(C) the State consumer financial law is preempted by a provision of Federal law other than title 62 of the Revised Statutes. | Banks play a critical role in the United States economy, channeling funds from savers to borrowers and thereby facilitating economic activity. To address the risks of bank failures and excessive risk-taking, and the problem that consumers at times lack the information or expertise to make sound choices concerning financial products and services, both federal and state lawmakers have imposed a host of regulations on commercial banks.
The United States has what is referred to as a "dual banking system," in which banks can choose to apply for a charter from a state banking authority or a federal charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a bureau within the Department of the Treasury. A bank's choice of chartering authority is also a choice of primary regulator, as state regulatory agencies serve as the primary regulators of state-chartered banks, and the OCC serves as the primary regulator of national banks. Despite receiving their authorities from state law, state banks are subject to many federal laws. Among other federal laws, state banks are subject to certain federal tax, consumer protection, and antidiscrimination laws. Similarly, although they receive their powers from federal law, national banks are not wholly immune from state law. Rather, national banks are often subject to generally applicable state laws concerning contracts, torts, property rights, and debt collection when those laws do not conflict with or frustrate the purpose of federal law.
Nonetheless, federal law preempts state laws that interfere with the powers of national banks. In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, the Supreme Court held that the National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) preempts state laws that "significantly interfere" with a "national bank's exercise of its powers"—a standard that lower courts have applied to hold a wide variety of state laws preempted. The Court has also issued two decisions on the preemptive scope of a provision of the NBA limiting "visitorial powers" over national banks to the OCC, holding that the provision extends to the operating subsidiaries of national banks, but does not bar state judicial law enforcement actions against national banks. Finally, the OCC has taken a broad view of the preemptive effects of the NBA, a view that it has reaffirmed after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).
This report provides an overview of the respective roles of the federal government and the states in regulating banking. The report begins by providing a general overview of the doctrine of federal preemption, before discussing the American "dual banking system." It then addresses several key areas where preemption issues have arisen with respect to banking law, including (1) the standard for implied preemption of state laws that interfere with the powers of national banks adopted by the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank; (2) the Court's decisions in two cases concerning "visitorial powers" over national banks, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. and Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L.L.C.; and (3) interpretive letters and rules concerning federal preemption issued by the OCC. The report also discusses the provisions in Dodd-Frank concerning preemption of state consumer protection laws, and their interpretation by courts and the OCC. Finally, the report concludes by discussing issues that are likely of interest to the 115th Congress concerning preemption, including provisions in the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 regarding which entities may benefit from NBA preemption of state usury laws. |
crs_RL34180 | crs_RL34180_0 | The political culture has remained a product of the country's authoritarian past with pervasive corruption and clientelism. Corruption
Observers maintain that corruption remains a major impediment to the emergence of stronger democratic institutions and sustainable economic development in Paraguay. There were three major candidates in the presidential race: former minister of education Blanca Ovelar of the long-ruling Colorado Party; Fernando Lugo, the former Roman Catholic Bishop of an impoverished rural diocese, running on an electoral coalition known as the Patriotic Alliance for Change (APC); and former military commander Lino Oviedo, the leader of a failed 1996 coup who was released from prison in early September 2007, running as a candidate of party that he founded, the National Union of Ethical Citizens (UNACE). The election indeed was historic, and will end more than 60 years of Colorado Party rule when Lugo is inaugurated on August 15, 2008. While triumphant at the polls, President-elect Lugo will face tough challenges when he takes office in August. Most significantly, his ability to government effectively could be affected by his coalition's lack of a majority in Paraguay's Congress. Another potential difficulty for President Lugo is his ability to deal with entrenched government bureaucracy that essentially been controlled by the long-ruling Colorado Party. Other observers, however, stress that Lugo's victory as a chance to further strengthen Paraguay's democratic transition and break its link with the authoritarian past of the Stroessner dictatorship. Most analysts expect that Lugo will govern as a moderate. While Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and other leftist leaders in the region such as Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega and Ecuador's Rafael Correa welcomed Lugo's victory, most observers contend that Lugo will have to govern more moderately than these leaders since the electoral alliance that brought him to power is dominated by a center-right party. After the elections, U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay James Cason congratulated Lugo and the APC on their victory and expressed a commitment to work and strengthen bilateral relations. The protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) has been a U.S. concern, especially piracy, counterfeiting, and contraband. U.S. Aid
The United States provided about $12.5 million in aid to Paraguay in FY2007 and an estimated $11.6 million in FY2008. In addition to regular foreign assistance funding, Paraguay signed a $34.65 million Threshold Program agreement with the Millennium Challenge Corporation in May 2006, with the funds targeted specifically at programs to strengthen the rule of law and build a transparent business environment. The Chaco region in the northwestern part of the country is a major transshipment point of illegal drugs, along with the tri-border area (TBA) with neighboring Argentina and Brazil. TBA and Terrorism
The United States is particularly concerned about illicit activities in the TBA, where money laundering, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and trade in counterfeit and contraband goods are prevalent. | The demise of the long-ruling Stroessner military dictatorship in 1989 initiated a political transition in Paraguay that has been difficult at times. Current President Nicanor Duarte Frutos has implemented some reforms that have addressed corruption and contributed to economic growth. Yet, due in large part to the country's authoritarian past, Paraguay's state institutions remain weak while corruption remains ingrained in the political culture, impeding democratic consolidation and economic development.
In Paraguay's April 20, 2008, presidential election, former Roman Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo, running on an electoral coalition known as the Patriotic Alliance for Change (APC) won with 41% of the vote. He defeated the candidate of the long-ruling Colorado Party, Blanca Ovelar, who received 31%, and former military commander Lino Oviedo, who ran as the candidate of the National Union of Ethical Citizens (UNACE). The election was historic, and will end more than 60 years of Colorado Party rule when Lugo is inaugurated on August 15, 2008. For some observers, Lugo's victory is a chance for Paraguay to further strengthen its democratic transition, breaking a link with its authoritarian past.
While victorious at the polls, President-elect Lugo will face tough challenges when he takes office in August. Most significantly, his ability to govern could be affected by his coalition's lack of a majority in Congress. Another potential difficulty for President Lugo is his ability to deal with entrenched government bureaucracy that essentially been controlled by the long-ruling Colorado Party. Most observers expect that Lugo will govern as a moderate since the electoral alliance that brought him to power is dominated by a center-right party.
U.S.-Paraguayan relations have been strong, with extensive cooperation on counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts. After Lugo's victory, U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay James Cason congratulated Lugo and the APC on their victory and expressed a commitment to work and strengthen bilateral relations. The United States remains concerned about illegal activities in the tri-border area with neighboring Argentina and Brazil, such as money-laundering, drugs and arms trafficking, and trade in counterfeit and contraband goods. The protection of intellectual property rights has been a U.S. concern, especially piracy, counterfeiting, and contraband. The United States provided about $12.5 million in aid to Paraguay in FY2007, an estimated $11.6 million in FY2008, and an FY2009 request for $11.8 million, including $3.4 million for a Peace Corps program. In addition to regular foreign assistance funding, Paraguay signed a $34.7 million Threshold Program agreement with the Millennium Challenge Corporation in May 2006, with the funds targeted specifically at programs to strengthen the rule of law and build a transparent business environment.
For additional information, see CRS Report RL33620, Mercosur: Evolution and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43961 | crs_R43961_0 | I n United States v. Windsor , the U.S. Supreme Court held that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was unconstitutional, finding, in part, that it violated the Constitution's equal protection and substantive due process guarantees. Section 3 had required that marriage be defined as the union of one man and one woman for the purpose of federal enactments. Therefore, according to the court, federal statutes that refer to a marriage for federal purposes should be interpreted as applying equally to legally married same-sex couples. The Court did not address Section 2 of DOMA, which allows individual states to refuse recognition of same-sex marriages. In response to the Windsor decision, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has started processing Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) applications for some claimants in a same-sex marriage. OASDI is commonly known as Social Security. Eligibility for spousal benefits depends on marital status as defined by the state. However, the definition of marriage for the purposes of Social Security determinations remains in flux as state legislatures and courts continue to change and interpret these laws. It has been reported that SSA is currently working with the Department of Justice on interpreting the Windsor decision and state laws regarding same-sex marriage. This report addresses a number of frequently asked questions regarding the eligibility of same-sex couples for Social Security benefits and the interpretation of state marriage laws. These questions include those relating to general eligibility and the application process for same-sex couples and those in other types of legal relationships. | In United States v. Windsor, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was unconstitutional, finding, in part, that it violated the Constitution's equal protection and substantive due process guarantees. Section 3 had required that marriage be defined as the union of one man and one woman for the purpose of federal enactments. According to the court, federal statutes that refer to a marriage for federal purposes should be interpreted as applying equally to married same-sex couples. The Court did not address Section 2 of DOMA, which allows individual states to refuse recognition of same-sex marriages.
In response to the Windsor decision, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has started processing Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) applications for some claimants in same-sex marriages. OASDI is commonly known as Social Security. Eligibility for spousal benefits depends on marital status as defined by the state. However, the definition of marriage for the purposes of Social Security determinations remains in flux as state legislatures and courts continue to change and interpret these laws. It has been reported that SSA is currently working with the Department of Justice on interpreting the Windsor decision and state laws regarding same-sex marriage.
This report addresses a number of frequently asked questions regarding the eligibility of same-sex couples for Social Security benefits and the interpretation of state marriage laws. These questions include those relating to general eligibility and the application process for same-sex couples and those in other types of legal relationships. |
crs_RL33773 | crs_RL33773_0 | In civil cases, courts sometimes award punitive (or exemplary) damages in addition to compensatory damages. Compensatory damages are meant to redress the "loss the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct," in an attempt to "compensate" the injured person for the loss suffered. Where a defendant has engaged in particularly egregious conduct, however, punitive damages can be awarded in addition to compensatory damages. A punitive damages award will generally exceed the actual value of the harm caused by the defendant. Although the permissible motivations behind awarding punitive damages are somewhat unsettled, it is generally accepted that punitive damages serve the dual purposes of deterrence and retribution. The U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, has characterized the imposition of punitive damages as "quasi criminal … private fines" that act as "an expression of [the jury's] moral condemnation." After initially assessing the validity of punitive damage awards based on "general concerns of reasonableness," the modern Court now applies a more detailed, multi-factor framework in reviewing punitive damages. However, the fundamental underlying principle—that punitive damages awards that are grossly excessive or imposed without adequate procedural protections violate Due Process—continues to hold. This report summarizes decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court on punitive damages, synthesizes key factors the Court has employed in considering the constitutionality of punitive damages awards, and discusses the uncertainty surrounding the future of the Court's punitive damages jurisprudence. Historically, large punitive damages awards have been alleged to violate both the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court, however, has rejected the notion that large punitive damage awards can violate the former provision, holding that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable where "the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded." The Due Process clause, on the other hand, has been interpreted to limit large punitive damages awards. Although the Court has been ambiguous as to whether punitive damages limits exist as a result of procedural or substantive due process, the Court has been clear that while the states have "broad discretion … with respect to the imposition of … punitive damages," the Due Process Clause bans punitive damages awards that are grossly excessive or imposed without adequate procedural protections. | In civil cases, courts sometimes award punitive (or exemplary) damages in addition to compensatory damages. Compensatory damages are meant to redress the "loss the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct," in an attempt to "compensate" the injured person for the loss suffered. Where a defendant has engaged in particularly egregious conduct, however, punitive damages can be awarded in addition to compensatory damages. A punitive damages award will generally exceed the actual value of the harm caused by the defendant. Although the permissible motivations behind awarding punitive damages are somewhat unsettled, it is generally accepted that punitive damages serve the dual purposes of deterrence and retribution. The U.S. Supreme Court, for instance, has characterized the imposition of punitive damages as "quasi criminal … private fines" that act as "an expression of [the jury's] moral condemnation."
Historically, large punitive damages awards have been alleged to violate both the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court, however, has rejected the notion that large punitive damage awards can violate the former provision, holding that the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable where "the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded." The Due Process clause, on the other hand, has been interpreted by the court to place certain constitutional limitations on large punitive damages awards. After initially assessing the validity of punitive damage awards based on "general concerns of reasonableness," the modern Court now applies a more detailed, multi-factor framework in reviewing punitive damages. However, the fundamental underlying principle—that punitive damages awards that are grossly excessive or imposed without adequate procedural protections violate Due Process—has consistently formed the foundation of the Court's constitutional analysis. Although the Court has been ambiguous as to whether punitive damages limits exist as a result of procedural or substantive due process, the Court has been clear that while the states have "broad discretion … with respect to the imposition of … punitive damages," the Due Process Clause bans punitive damages awards that are grossly excessive or imposed without adequate procedural protections.
This report summarizes decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court in relevant punitive damages cases, provides a synthesis of the key factors the Court has employed in considering the constitutionality of punitive damages awards, and details the uncertainty surrounding the future of the Court's punitive damages jurisprudence. |
crs_RL34531 | crs_RL34531_0 | These agreements, commonly referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country. SOFAs provide for rights and privileges of covered individuals while in a foreign jurisdiction and address how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction apply to U.S. personnel. SOFAs may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. The United States is currently party to more than 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs. While a SOFA as a stand-alone document may not exist with a particular country, that does not necessarily mean that the status of U.S. personnel in that country has not been addressed. The Senate reservations to the NATO SOFA include four conditions: (1) the criminal jurisdiction provisions contained in Article VII of the agreement do not constitute a precedent for future agreements; (2) when a servicemember is to be tried by authorities in a receiving state, the commanding officer of the U.S. Armed Forces in that state shall review the laws of the receiving state with reference to the procedural safeguards of the U.S. Constitution; (3) if the commanding officer believes there is danger that the servicemember will not be protected because of the absence or denial of constitutional rights the accused would receive in the United States, the commanding officer shall request that the receiving state waive its jurisdiction; and, (4) a representative of the United States be appointed to attend the trial of any servicemember being tried by the receiving state and act to protect the constitutional rights of the servicemember. A SOFA may address, but is not limited to, criminal and civil jurisdiction, the wearing of uniforms, taxes and fees, carrying of weapons, use of radio frequencies, license requirements, and customs regulations. SOFAs are often included, along with other types of military agreements (i.e., basing, access, and pre-positioning), as part of a comprehensive security arrangement. A SOFA may be based on the authority found in previous treaties, congressional action, or sole executive agreements comprising the security arrangement. Such personnel are to be accorded "a status equivalent to that accorded to the administrative and technical staff" of the U.S. Embassy under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. Accordingly, U.S. personnel are immune from criminal prosecution by Afghan authorities, and are immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction except with respect to acts performed outside the course of their duties. Survey of Current Status of Forces Agreements
The charts below provide a list of current agreements according to the underlying source of authority, if any, for each of the SOFAs. Some of the agreements apply to U.S. personnel "present" in a country, others apply to U.S. personnel "temporarily present" in a country. | The deadly attacks on Afghan civilians allegedly by a U.S. servicemember have raised questions regarding the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in place between the United States and Afghanistan that would govern whether Afghan law would apply in this circumstance. SOFAs are multilateral or bilateral agreements that generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country and how domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction apply toward U.S. personnel in that country.
Formal requirements concerning form, content, length, or title of a SOFA do not exist. A SOFA may be written for a specific purpose or activity, or it may anticipate a longer-term relationship and provide for maximum flexibility and applicability. It is generally a stand-alone document concluded as an executive agreement. A SOFA may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Other provisions that may be found in a SOFA include, but are not limited to, the wearing of uniforms, taxes and fees, carrying of weapons, use of radio frequencies, licenses, and customs regulations.
SOFAs are often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a comprehensive security arrangement with a particular country. A SOFA itself does not constitute a security arrangement; rather, it establishes the rights and privileges of U.S. personnel present in a country in support of the larger security arrangement. SOFAs may be entered based on authority found in previous treaties and congressional actions or as sole executive agreements. The United States is currently party to more than 100 agreements that may be considered SOFAs. A list of current agreements included at the end of this report is categorized in tables according to the underlying source of authority, if any, for each of the SOFAs.
In the case of Afghanistan, the SOFA, in force since 2003, provides that U.S. Department of Defense military and civilian personnel are to be accorded status equivalent to that of U.S. Embassy administrative and technical staff under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. Accordingly, U.S. personnel are immune from criminal prosecution by Afghan authorities and are immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction except with respect to acts performed outside the course of their duties. The Government of Afghanistan has further explicitly authorized the U.S. government to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Thus, under the existing SOFA, the United States would have jurisdiction over the prosecution of the servicemember who allegedly attacked the Afghan civilians. |
crs_R43021 | crs_R43021_0 | Sequestration affects Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operations in different ways. In anticipation of the sequester cuts, Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood and FAA Administrator Michael Huerta issued a joint letter on February 22, 2013, announcing cost-cutting measures under consideration including furloughs for most FAA employees, elimination of late-night shifts in as many as 72 air traffic control facilities, and the complete closure of up to 238 control towers at airports that have fewer than 150,000 flight operations or fewer than 10,000 commercial operations per year. On April 5, 2013, citing a need for additional time to address multiple legal challenges to its tower closure decisions, FAA delayed the closures and set June 15, 2013, as the date it would cease funding the 149 FCT program towers. On May 1, 2013, following a week of FAA air traffic controller furloughs that contributed to some isolated air traffic system delays, particularly at the nation's busiest airports, the Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-9 ) was enacted. While this action appears to have settled debate over the pending closure of control towers in FY2013, long-range plans for tower closures, cutbacks in operating hours, or both may be revisited in future policy debates regarding the FAA budget. Air Traffic Control Tower Funding
In general, the funding and operation of civil air traffic control towers in the United States and U.S. territories fall into one of four categories: (1) tower operations funded through FAA's operations budget and staffed with federal air traffic controllers; (2) contract tower operations fully funded through FAA's operations budget but staffed with controllers employed by the contractor under the federal contract tower (FCT) program (also known as the contract tower base program); (3) contract tower operations partially funded through the FAA's operations budget and partially funded by local or state government funding and managed and staffed by contractor personnel, referred to as the contract tower cost-share program; and (4) non-federal control towers that receive no funding from the federal government and are staffed with non-federal controllers. Several of the towers listed have radar approach capabilities. FAA's Benefit-to-Cost Methodology
Historically, FAA has relied on a formal benefit-to-cost assessment process for establishing and discontinuing air traffic control tower operations. The analysis yields a single benefit-to-cost ratio which serves as FAA's criterion for determining whether a tower should be established or discontinued: If the ratio is greater than or equal to one, a recommendation to establish a tower may be made, whereas if the ratio falls below one, an existing tower would be subject to closure, to continuation under the cost-share program, or to conversion to a non-federal control tower if a local entity is willing to assume the costs. Currently, all airport towers in the contract tower program have benefit-to-cost ratios greater than or equal to one under FAA's valuation methodology, except for the 16 cost-share towers where local communities contribute to fund costs that outweigh the benefits, up to 20% of the total cost. The quantified benefits include prevention of collisions between aircraft, prevention of other accidents, and benefits from reduced flight time. While the impact of tower closures on individual operators' efficiency is relatively small, tower closures can also be viewed as having a negative cumulative impact on energy and the environment by increasing aircraft fuel burn, emissions, and noise as a result of these extended flying times, assuming flight activity remains constant after closure of the tower. A tower closure would not preclude commercial air service, but it could affect airlines' decisions regarding whether to reduce or eliminate service to an airport. Also, tower closures may affect private and business aircraft operators' decisions regarding where to base and to operate their aircraft, and could result in the diversion of some general aviation traffic from designated reliever airports to busier commercial airports. Related Legislation
S.Amdt. 45 , amending H.R. The measure would not protect contract towers from budget reductions beyond FY2013 and does not address possible closures of FAA-staffed towers. Subsequently, S. 687 was introduced on April 9, 2013. Due to budget limitations, a requirement for additional staffing at certain towers could result in a larger number of towers closing. | Budgetary flexibility enacted under the Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-9) has permitted the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to cancel plans to close 149 air traffic control towers operated by contractors, a measure it had proposed to address funding decreases brought about by the budget sequester. On March 22, 2013, FAA announced the planned tower closures. The closures were originally planned for April 2013, but the closure was pushed back to June 2013 and then abandoned due to receipt of new authority in P.L. 113-9 allowing funds to be transferred from other FAA accounts to FAA operations. FAA had also named 72 air traffic control facilities that would cease operations late at night as a cost-saving measure, but elimination of FAA controller furloughs subsequent to passage of P.L. 113-9 led FAA to cancel these plans as well.
Roughly 10% of U.S. airports have operating control towers, although many towers close at night when flight activity is low. Closure of a tower does not mean closure of an airport: At airports where no tower is operating, pilots use established traffic patterns and procedures to avoid other aircraft. The towers that were slated for closure have no radar approach control capabilities and perform air traffic separation functions using procedures for visual flight. These airports can handle aircraft in poor weather on a limited basis, but unlike airports with radar approach control they cannot handle multiple aircraft on approach in low visibility and clouds.
About half of the roughly 500 towers in the United States are operated by private firms under contract to FAA. Sixteen of the contract towers are partially funded through local (non-federal) shares of up to 20%, while 235, including the 149 identified for closure, have been fully funded by FAA. The cost-share towers are currently partially funded through a separate federal appropriation that is subject to the 5.3% sequester cut, but they were not slated to be closed in FY2013. A tower scheduled to close could be converted to a non-federal tower if a local community were willing to fully fund the tower's operation. Non-federal towers are still regulated, but not funded, by FAA.
FAA has historically relied on a benefit-to-cost ratio methodology for establishing and discontinuing air traffic control tower operations. This methodology quantifies the safety and efficiency benefits of a tower in reducing aircraft collisions and other accidents and reducing flight times, and identifies established towers for possible closure or conversion to cost-share or non-federal towers if their benefit-to-cost ratio falls below one. However, all towers identified for closure under the sequestration cuts have benefit-to-cost ratios greater than one. Long-term tower closures would have relatively small but measureable impacts on safety and efficiency, and could cause a shift in both commercial and general aviation traffic to busier airports where towers remain open, depending on how airlines and other aircraft operators respond.
Legislation to maintain federal control tower funding and a measure to increase tower staffing at busy airports are under consideration in the 113th Congress. S. 687 would prohibit the closure of any air traffic control tower in FY2013 and FY2014. S.Amdt. 45 had sought to maintain funding for the FAA contract towers to prevent their closure, but was not considered on the floor in the Senate. H.R. 66, pending in the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, would increase staffing minimums for towers at busier commercial airports, which could put additional fiscal pressures on FAA to close low-activity towers or reduce their operating hours. |
crs_RS22827 | crs_RS22827_0 | One controversial issue with respect to breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA is that while an individual plaintiff ( e.g. , a plan participant) may bring a civil action under Section 502(a)(2), the Supreme Court has found that any recovery must "inure[] to the benefit of a plan as a whole." LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates
In LaRue , the plaintiff, a participant in a 401(k) plan administered by his former employer, requested that plan administrators change an investment in his individual account. The plan administrators failed to make this change, and the individual's account allegedly suffered losses of approximately $150,000. LaRue brought an action against his former employer and the 401(k) plan, claiming the plan administrator breached his fiduciary duty by neglecting to properly follow the investment instructions. Given that the plaintiff sought to recover losses only for himself, the participant could not sue under Section 502(a)(2). | In LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates , a participant in a 401(k) plan requested that plan administrators change an investment in his individual account. The plan administrators failed to make this change, and the individual's account allegedly suffered losses. The participant brought an action against his former employer and the 401(k) plan, claiming the plan administrator breached his fiduciary duty by neglecting to properly follow the investment instructions. At issue in the LaRue case was whether an individual could bring an action under ERISA to recover the losses. The Supreme Court held that a plan participant in a 401(k) plan could sue a plan fiduciary under Section 502(a)(2) of ERISA to recover losses caused by a fiduciary breach that only affected his individual account. This report discusses breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA Section 502(a)(2) and the LaRue case, and will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS20864 | crs_RS20864_0 | This trend raised the prospect of a previously unrealized idea—a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) among 34 nations of the region. The first draft of the FTAA was adopted at the Quebec City Summit in 2001 and a second draft at the Quito ministerial in November 2002. Soon thereafter the negotiations stalled and the January 1, 2005 completion deadline was missed, exposing more clearly challenges to the negotiation process, especially the need to resolve differences between the United States and Brazil if the FTAA is to move forward. The breadth of an emerging resistance to the FTAA became clearer at the fourth Summit of the Americas held on November 4-5, 2005, in Mar del Plata, Argentina. Status of Negotiations: A Two-Tier FTAA? This issue is highlighted in the debate between Brazil and the United States and formed the basis for the November 2003 Miami Ministerial compromise. The FTAA was initially proposed to simplify trade relations with a balanced, comprehensive, single undertaking in which all countries would be treated equally. | In 1994, 34 Western Hemisphere nations met at the first Summit of the Americas, envisioning a plan to complete a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 1, 2005. Faced with deadlocked negotiations, the United States and Brazil, the FTAA co-chairs, brokered a compromise at the November 2003 Miami trade ministerial. It moved the FTAA away from the comprehensive, single undertaking principle, toward a two-tier framework comprising a set of "common rights and obligations" for all countries, combined with voluntary plurilateral arrangements with country benefits related to commitments. So far, defining this concept has proven elusive, causing the FTAA talks to stall and the January 1, 2005 deadline to be missed. At the fourth Summit of the Americas held in November 2005, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela blocked an effort to restart negotiations, and further action has not occurred. This report follows the FTAA process and will be updated periodically. |
crs_R41259 | crs_R41259_0 | Introduction
North Korea's threatening behavior; development of proscribed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities; and pursuit of a range of illicit activities, including proliferation, has posed one of the most vexing and perpetual problems in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. Congress has both direct and indirect influence on the U.S. policy on North Korea. U.S.-DPRK Relations in 2018
Advances in North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
North Korea's rapid advances in missile and nuclear weapons capabilities in 2016 and 2017 have shifted U.S. policymakers' assessment of the regime's threat to the United States. According to satellite imagery, Pyongyang appears to be developing its submarine-based ballistic missile program that could potentially help it evade U.S. missile defense programs. Following the summit, Trump and Kim issued a brief joint statement in which Trump "committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK," and Kim "reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." The two sides "commit to establish" new bilateral relations. Denuclearization. The agreement made no mention of the DPRK's ballistic missile program. In the press conference following the summit, Trump announced that the United States would suspend annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises, which Trump called "war games" and "provocative." Trump also expressed a hope of eventually withdrawing the approximately 30,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. U.S. foreign aid is minimal, emergency in nature, and administered through centrally funded programs to remove any possibility of the government of North Korea benefiting; U.S. persons are prohibited from entering into trade and transaction with those North Korean individuals, entities, and vessels designated by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC); foreign financial institutions could become subject to U.S. sanctions for facilitating transactions for designated DPRK entities; U.S. persons and entities are prohibited from entering into trade and transactions with Kim Jong-un, the Korean Workers' Party, and others; and U.S. travel to North Korea is limited and requires a special validation passport issued by the State Department. North Korean Demands and Motivations
Over the years, North Korea's stated demands in negotiating the cessation of its weapons programs have repeatedly changed, and have at times included U.S. recognition of the regime as a nuclear weapons state and a peace treaty with the United States as a prerequisite to denuclearization. History of Nuclear Negotiations22
Prior to the Trump Administration's efforts, the United States engaged in four major sets of formal nuclear and missile negotiations with North Korea: the bilateral Agreed Framework (1994-2002), the bilateral missile negotiations (1996-2000), the multilateral Six-Party Talks (2003-2009), and the bilateral Leap Day Deal (2012). However, according to a number of indicators China in 2017 significantly increased its enforcement of UNSC sanctions, perhaps to convince the United States not to follow through on the Trump Administration's threats of a military strike against North Korea. Relations between Beijing and Pyongyang suffered after Kim Jong-un's rise to power in 2011. Chinese President Xi Jinping had several summits with former South Korean President Park Geun-hye, as well as with current President Moon, without meeting with Kim. Kim has promoted a two-track policy (the so-called byungjin line) of economic development and nuclear weapons development, explicitly rejecting the efforts of external forces to make North Korea choose between one or the other. He has carried out a series of purges of senior-level officials, including the execution of Jang Song-taek, his uncle by marriage, in 2013. North Korea Economic Conditions
North Korea is one of the world's poorest countries, with an estimated per capita GDP of under $2,000, about 5% of South Korea's level. Analysts debate the extent to which Kim's changes can be considered "reforms" because it is unclear whether they are as sweeping as those adopted in the past by socialist countries that made a more definitive break from past economic policies. Human Rights Diplomacy at the United Nations
For years, the United Nations has been the central forum calling attention to human rights violations in North Korea. | North Korea has posed one of the most persistent U.S. foreign policy challenges of the post-Cold War period due to its pursuit of proscribed weapons technology and belligerence toward the United States and its allies. With North Korea's advances in 2016 and 2017 in its nuclear and missile capabilities under 34-year-old leader Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang has evolved from a threat to U.S. interests in East Asia to a potentially direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Efforts to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program have occupied the past four U.S. Administrations, and North Korea is the target of scores of U.S. and United Nations Security Council sanctions. Although the weapons programs have been the primary focus of U.S. policy toward North Korea, other U.S. concerns include North Korea's illicit activities, such as counterfeiting currency and narcotics trafficking, small-scale armed attacks against South Korea, and egregious human rights violations.
In 2018, the Trump Administration and Kim regime appeared to open a new chapter in the relationship. After months of rising tension and hostile rhetoric from both capitals in 2017, including a significant expansion of U.S. and international sanctions against North Korea, Trump and Kim held a leaders' summit in Singapore in June 2018. The meeting produced an agreement on principles for establishing a positive relationship. The United States agreed to provide security guarantees to North Korea, which committed to "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." The agreement made no mention of resolving significant differences between the two countries, including the DPRK's ballistic missile program. Trump also said he would suspend annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises, labeling them "provocative," during the coming U.S.-DPRK nuclear negotiations. Trump also expressed a hope of eventually withdrawing the approximately 30,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.
The history of negotiating with the Pyongyang regime suggests a difficult road ahead, as officials try to implement the Singapore agreement, which contains few details on timing, verification mechanisms, or the definition of "denuclearization," challenges that the United States has struggled to implement in the previous four major sets of formal nuclear and missile negotiations with North Korea that were held since the end of the Cold War. During that period, the United States provided over $1 billion in humanitarian aid and energy assistance. It is unclear how much assistance, if any, the Trump Administration is planning to commit to facilitate the current denuclearization talks.
The Singapore summit, which was partially brokered by South Korean President Moon Jae-in, has reshuffled regional diplomacy. In particular, the Chinese-North Korean relationship, which had cooled significantly in the past several years, appears to be restored, with Beijing offering its backing to Pyongyang and Kim able to deliver some benefits for Chinese interests as well. North Korea and South Korea also have restored more positive relations.
Kim Jong-un appears to have consolidated authority as the supreme leader of North Korea. Kim has ruled brutally, carrying out large-scale purges of senior officials. In 2013, he announced a two-track policy (the byungjin line) of simultaneously pursuing economic development and nuclear weapons development. Five years later, after significant advances, including successful tests of long-range missiles that could potentially reach the United States, Kim declared victory on the nuclear front, and announced a new "strategic line" of pursuing economic development. Market-oriented reforms announced in 2014 appear to be producing modest economic growth for many citizens. The economic policy changes, however, remain relatively limited in scope. North Korea is one of the world's poorest countries, and more than a third of the population is believed to live under conditions of chronic food insecurity and undernutrition.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R43152 | crs_R43152_0 | Introduction
Hydraulic fracturing is a technique used to recover oil and natural gas from underground low permeability rock formations. The technique has been the subject of controversy because of the potential effects that hydraulic fracturing and related oil and gas production activities may have on the environment and health. On August 16, 2012, EPA issued new regulations covering, among other things, emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from onshore natural gas hydraulic fracturing operations. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act62
Federal and state authorities to regulate wastes are established under the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). Although the sites at which hydraulic fracturing is conducted may not fit the typical mold of Superfund sites, it is possible that hydraulic fracturing operations could result in the release of hazardous substances into the environment at or under the surface in a manner that may endanger public health or the environment. If a release were to occur as a result of hydraulic fracturing, the facility owner and operator and other potentially responsible parties could face liability under CERCLA. CERCLA defines a federally permitted release to include any underground injection of fluids authorized under the Safe Drinking Water Act, any discharges of wastewater authorized under the Clean Water Act, and other discharges or emissions authorized under certain other federal statutes. National Environmental Policy Act111
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to consider the potential environmental consequences of proposed federal actions and to involve the public in the federal decisionmaking process, but does not compel agencies to choose a particular course of action. Because the requirements of NEPA apply only to federal actions, NEPA applies to hydraulic fracturing activities only when such activities take place on federal lands or when there is otherwise a sufficient federal nexus to hydraulic fracturing. Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), owners or operators of facilities where certain hazardous hydraulic fracturing chemicals are present above certain thresholds may have to comply with emergency planning requirements; emergency release notification obligations; and hazardous chemical storage reporting requirements. The rule would require operators that plan to employ fracking as part of an oil or natural gas drilling operation on federal or Indian land to document to BLM compliance with the following requirements:
Submit a plan with detailed information about the proposed operation, including wellbore geology, the location of faults and fractures, the depths of all usable water, estimated volume of fluid to be used, and estimated direction and length of fractures; Design and implement a casing and cementing program that follows best practices and meets performance standards to protect and isolate usable water, monitor the cementing operations during well construction, and take remedial action if there are indications that the cementing is inadequate; Perform a successful Mechanical Integrity Test prior to the fracking operation; Monitor well pressure during the fracking operation and cease operations if it exceeds 500 pounds per square inch; Manage the recovered "flowback" fluids in above-ground storage tanks that meet certain specifications; and Disclose the chemicals used in the fracking operation to the BLM and to the public (with limited exceptions for trade secrets as demonstrated through an affidavit). The Tenth Circuit's decision on this matter will set an important precedent with respect to the federal government's ability to regulate hydraulic fracturing and potentially other environmental concerns related to oil and natural gas exploration and production on federal lands. Conclusion
Environmental statutes enforced by EPA contain several key exemptions for hydraulic fracturing and related oil and gas production activities. For example, an amendment to the SDWA passed as a part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 clarified that the underground injection control requirements found in the SDWA do not apply to hydraulic fracturing, although the exclusion does not extend to the use of diesel fuel in hydraulic fracturing operations. In September 2010, an environmental advocacy group filed a petition seeking to have EPA regulate drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil, natural gas, or geothermal energy as hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA. In August 2011, environmental advocacy organizations petitioned EPA to promulgate rules under Section 4 and Section 8 of TSCA for chemical substances and mixtures used in oil and gas exploration or production. Regulation of hydraulic fracturing by local governments has raised questions about state preemption of municipal land use and zoning powers. Although this litigation is still in its early stages, it appears that courts have already faced questions about causation; whether hydraulic fracturing is an abnormally dangerous activity; and whether hydraulic fracturing may constitute a subsurface trespass to land. | Hydraulic fracturing is a technique used to recover oil and natural gas from underground low permeability rock formations, such as shales and other unconventional formations. Its use along with horizontal drilling has been responsible for an increase in estimated U.S. oil and natural gas reserves. Hydraulic fracturing and related oil and gas production activities have been controversial because of their potential effects on public health and the environment. Several environmental statutes have implications for the regulation of hydraulic fracturing by the federal government and states.
An amendment to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) passed as a part of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) clarified that the Underground Injection Control (UIC) requirements found in the SDWA do not apply to hydraulic fracturing, although the exclusion does not extend to the use of diesel fuel in hydraulic fracturing operations. The underground injection of wastewater generated during oil and gas production (including hydraulic fracturing) does require a UIC permit under the SDWA, as do injections for enhanced oil and gas recovery operations. Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), parties seeking to discharge produced water may have to apply for a permit under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has issued new rules covering emissions of volatile organic compounds from hydraulic fracturing operations.
Provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) exempt drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil, natural gas, or geothermal energy from regulation as hazardous wastes under Subtitle C of RCRA. However, these wastes are subject to other federal laws (such as the SDWA and the CWA), as well as to state requirements. Facility owners and operators and other potentially responsible parties could potentially face liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) for cleanup costs, natural resource damages, and the costs of federal public health studies, if hydraulic fracturing results in the release of hazardous substances at or under the surface in a manner that may endanger public health or the environment.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of proposed federal actions before proceeding with them. An agency would be obligated to consider the impacts of an action that involves hydraulic fracturing if that action takes place on federal lands or when there is otherwise a sufficient federal nexus to hydraulic fracturing.
Under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), owners or operators of facilities where certain hazardous hydraulic fracturing chemicals are present above certain thresholds may have to comply with emergency planning requirements; emergency release notification obligations; and hazardous chemical storage reporting requirements. In August 2011, environmental groups petitioned EPA to promulgate rules under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) for chemical substances and mixtures used in oil and gas exploration or production.
While the federal government's oversight of hydraulic fracturing generally is limited to protection of the environment and public health pursuant to the aforementioned statutes, it does have some authority to regulate oil and natural gas exploration and production on federal lands. Whether this authority extends to particular regulations governing hydraulic fracturing is currently in dispute. The Bureau of Land Management published a rule on hydraulic fracturing on federal and Indian lands in March 2015; however, the rule was struck down by a U.S. District Court in June 2016. The matter is currently on appeal.
At the state level, hydraulic fracturing tort litigation has raised questions about causation; whether hydraulic fracturing is an abnormally dangerous activity; and whether hydraulic fracturing may constitute a subsurface trespass to land. Also, several municipalities have attempted to ban hydraulic fracturing through zoning restrictions and other local laws, creating potential conflicts with oil and gas industry regulation at the state level. |
crs_R43941 | crs_R43941_0 | Introduction
Over the course of the last year, a host of cyberattacks have been perpetrated on a number of high profile American companies. The high profile cyberattacks of 2014 and early 2015 appear to be indicative of a broader trend: the frequency and ferocity of cyberattacks are increasing, posing grave threats to the national interests of the United States. While considerable debate exists with regard to the best strategies and methods for protecting America's various cyber-systems, one point of "general agreement" amongst cyber-analysts is the perceived need for enhanced and timely exchange of cyber-threat intelligence both within the private sector and between the private sector and the government. While there may be many reasons why entities may opt to not participate in a cyber-information sharing scheme, a primary rationale for such a decision concerns the potential liability that could result from sharing internal cyber-threat information with other private companies or the government. More broadly, the legal issues surrounding cybersecurity information sharing—whether it be with regard to sharing between two private companies or the dissemination of cyber-intelligence within the federal government—are complex and have few certain resolutions. In this vein, this report analyzes the major legal issues regarding cyber-threat information sharing by beginning with a discussion of the current legal authorities respecting the exchange of cyber-intelligence. The report concludes by discussing several of the major legislative proposals aimed at reforming federal cyber-information sharing laws and potential legal issues that such laws could prompt. Sharing Cyber-Information in the Possession of the Government
Perhaps the area in which there is the most legal clarity with respect to cyber-information sharing pertains to the authority of the federal government –and its subcomponents—to disseminate cyber threat information within the government and with the private sector. As noted above, while ample legal authority currently exists for DHS to serve as the central repository and distributor of cyber-intelligence for the federal government, the legal authorities that do exist often overlap, perhaps resulting in confusion as to which of the multiple sub-agencies within DHS or even outside of DHS, like the newly formed CTICC, should be leading efforts on cybersecurity information sharing. As discussed above, while the government has wide authority to disclose cyber-intelligence within its possession, that authority is not limitless and is necessarily tied to laws that restrict the government's ability to release sensitive information within its possession. As noted above, those in the private sector that wish to engage in cyber-information sharing may be exposed to civil and even criminal liability from a host of different federal and state laws. Moreover, because of the uncertainty that pervades the interplay between laws of general applicability—like federal antitrust or privacy law—and their specific application to cyber-intelligence sharing, it may be very difficult for any private entity to accurately assess potential liability that could arise by participating in a sharing scheme. Preventing Government Misuse of Acquired Cyber-Intelligence
Finally, the last major issue for cybersecurity information sharing legislation is to assuage public fears associated with the government collecting privately held cyber-intelligence, including concerns that the information disclosed to the government could (1) be released through a FOIA request; (2) result in the forfeiting of certain intellectual property rights; (3) be used against a private entity in a subsequent regulatory action; or (4) risk the privacy rights of individuals whose information may be encompassed in disclosed cyber-intelligence. | Over the course of the last year, a host of cyberattacks has been perpetrated on a number of high profile American companies. The high profile cyberattacks of 2014 and early 2015 appear to be indicative of a broader trend: the frequency and ferocity of cyberattacks are increasing, posing grave threats to the national interests of the United States. While considerable debate exists with regard to the best strategies for protecting America's various cyber-systems and promoting cybersecurity, one point of general agreement amongst cyber-analysts is the perceived need for enhanced and timely exchange of cyber-threat intelligence both within the private sector and between the private sector and the government. Nonetheless, there are many reasons why entities may opt to not participate in a cyber-information sharing scheme, including the potential liability that could result from sharing internal cyber-threat information with other private companies or the government. More broadly, the legal issues surrounding cybersecurity information sharing—whether it be with regard to sharing between two private companies or the dissemination of cyber-intelligence within the federal government—are complex and have few certain resolutions. In this vein, this report examines the various legal issues that arise with respect to the sharing of cybersecurity intelligence, with a special focus on two distinct concepts: (1) sharing of cyber-information within the government's possession and (2) sharing of cyber-information within the possession of the private sector.
With regard to cyber-intelligence that is possessed by the federal government, the legal landscape is relatively clear: ample legal authority exists for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to serve as the central repository and distributor of cyber-intelligence for the federal government. Nonetheless, the legal authorities that do exist often overlap, perhaps resulting in confusion as to which of the multiple sub-agencies within DHS or even outside of DHS should be leading efforts on the distribution of cyber-information within the government and with the public. Moreover, while the government has wide authority to disclose cyber-intelligence within its possession, that authority is not limitless and is necessarily tied to laws that restrict the government's ability to release sensitive information within its possession.
With regard to cyber-intelligence that is possessed by the private sector, legal issues are clouded with uncertainty. A private entity that wishes to share cyber-intelligence with another company, an information sharing organization like an Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO) or an Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), or the federal government may be exposed to civil or even criminal liability from a variety of different federal and state laws. Moreover, because of the uncertainty that pervades the interplay between laws of general applicability—like federal antitrust or privacy law—and their specific application to cyber-intelligence sharing, it may be very difficult for any private entity to accurately assess potential liability that could arise by participating in a sharing scheme. In addition, concerns may arise with regard to how the government collects and maintains privately held cyber-intelligence, including fears that the information disclosed to the government could (1) be released through a public records request; (2) result in the forfeit of certain intellectual property rights; (3) be used against a private entity in a subsequent regulatory action; or (4) risk the privacy rights of individuals whose information may be encompassed in disclosed cyber-intelligence.
The report concludes by examining the major legislative proposal—including the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), and the Cyber Threat Sharing Act (CTSA)—and the potential legal issues that such laws could prompt. |
crs_RS22186 | crs_RS22186_0 | In 2006, the Supreme Court ordered the case be dismissed because the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit in federal court. The Supreme Court, in holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit in federal court, did not address whether the tax credit violated the Commerce Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the investment tax credit violated the Commerce Clause and reversed this part of the lower court's decision. Legislation introduced in the 109th Congress
The Economic Development Act of 2005 ( H.R. 2471 and S. 1066 ) would give states the authority to offer incentives like the investment tax credit struck down by the Sixth Circuit in Cuno . | In 2005, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Cuno v. DaimlerChrsyler that Ohio's investment tax credit violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The case received significant attention because most states have similar credits. In 2006, the Supreme Court held that the Cuno plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the credit in federal court. Because the Supreme Court based its decision on the issue of standing, it did not address whether the credit violated the Commerce Clause. Introduced prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the Economic Development Act of 2005 ( H.R. 2471 and S. 1066 ) would authorize states to offer tax incentives similar to Ohio's investment tax credit. |
crs_R42442 | crs_R42442_0 | Provisions in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 farm bill; P.L. 112-240 ; January 2, 2013) extended all 2008 farm bill provisions that were in effect on September 30, 2012, for one additional year—that is, for FY2013 and the 2013 crop year. After the passage of the Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 farm bill; P.L. 113-79 ) on February 7, 2014, expiration will not be an issue again until 2018. Funding Sources Affect Consequences of Expiration
Farm bills include a wide range of authorities, some of which are authorized and funded in the farm bill (mandatory spending), while others are only authorized in the farm bill for their scope but wait for appropriations acts to determine their funding (discretionary spending). The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)—a mandatory program—also requires an appropriation. Mandatory Funding
Most farm bill programs with mandatory funding have an expiration date either on their program authority or their funding authority. Mandatory spending is used primarily for the farm commodity programs, crop insurance, nutrition assistance programs, and some conservation and trade programs. However, another subset of mandatory programs did not have baseline beyond FY2012. Brief History of Farm Bill Formulation, Enactment, and Extension
Farm bills, like other legislation, have become more complicated and politically sensitive. They are taking longer to enact than in previous decades. The 1996 farm bill did not need to be extended because the 2002 farm bill was enacted earlier than necessary. On January 1, 2013, the entire 2008 farm bill, as it existed on September 30, 2012, was extended for the 2013 fiscal year and the 2013 crop year ( P.L. Some programs ceased new operations, while others were able to continue under appropriations. From January 1, 2014, until enactment of the 2014 farm bill on February 7, 2014, the dairy program technically had reverted to the outdated 1949-era permanent law, though USDA did not implement it since conference negotiations were proceeding. In their place, the new farm commodity program would have become the permanent law since it would have applied to "the 2014 crop year and each succeeding crop year." The Conservation Reserve Program's (CRP's) funding and program authority expired at the end of FY2012 and was extended to the end of FY2013 in the one-year farm bill extension. Thus, even without a reauthorization of the 2008 farm bill, the five programs continued to operate. Programs that can be continued solely by appropriations action, or
3. Programs Continued via Appropriations Action56
Appropriations can allow a program to continue even if the underlying authorization has not been extended. However, all program operations continued under CSFP appropriations. The 2008 farm bill was vetoed and overridden twice. Yet, the 1970 and 1973 farm bills, for example, generally were written into the 1938 and/or 1949 farm bills, as amended, with provisions that were applicable only for the new period of the farm bill. | Farm bills, like many other pieces of legislation, have become more complicated and politically sensitive. They are taking longer to enact than in previous decades. Legislative delays have caused the past two farm bills (the 2002 and 2008 farm bills) to expire for short periods, and to be extended for months or a year while a new farm bill was developed.
The 2008 farm bill (the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246) expired twice; the first time was from October 1, 2012 through January 1, 2013, and the second time was from October 1, 2013, through February 6, 2014. Some programs ceased new operations, while others were able to continue. However, neither expiration lasted long enough for the farm commodity programs to revert to an outdated "permanent law" that would have raised support prices and increased federal outlays.
On January 2, 2013, the 2008 farm bill was extended for one year (P.L. 112-240). All provisions that were in effect on September 30, 2012, were extended through FY2013 or for the 2013 crop year. On February 7, 2014, the Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 farm bill; P.L. 113-79) was enacted to cover the 2014-2018 crop years and other programs through September 30, 2018.
Farm bill expiration does not affect all programs equally. For example:
An appropriations act or a continuing resolution can continue some farm bill programs even though a program's authority has expired. Programs using discretionary funding—and programs using appropriated mandatory funding like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) account—can be continued via appropriations action. Most farm bill programs with mandatory funding, with the exception of SNAP, generally cease new operations when they expire (e.g., the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Market Assistance Program, and Specialty Crop Block Grants). However, existing contracts under prior-year authority can continue to be paid. The mandatory farm commodity programs of the 2008 farm bill not only ended with the 2013 crop, but without congressional action an outdated and expensive "permanent law" from the 1938 and 1949 farm bills stood ready to be implemented to cover the 2014 crop, beginning with dairy, on January 1, 2014. Crop insurance is an example of a permanently authorized and funded mandatory program that does not expire. Lastly, a subset of mandatory conservation programs had been extended through FY2014 prior to expiration and did not expire like other programs (e.g., the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, EQIP).
The one-year extension of the 2008 farm bill was budget-neutral. Congress extended those programs using an existing budget baseline. However, a subset of farm bill programs did not continue because they did not have a baseline. To be continued, those programs needed budgetary offsets. Likewise, budget reductions targeted in the 2014 farm bill were not achieved in the extension. |
crs_RL33536 | crs_RL33536_0 | Most Recent Developments
U.S.-China commercial ties are complex and have become increasingly contentious, due largely to China's incomplete transition to a free market economy. On March 8, 2018, the Trump Administration announced that it would impose additional imports tariffs on steel (by 25%) and aluminum (10%), based on "national security" justifications under the 1962 Trade Act, as amended. In 2017, total U.S. merchandise trade with China was $636 billion, making China the United States' largest trading partner (see Table 1 ). Merchandise Trade Deficit with China
A major concern among some U.S. policymakers is the size of the U.S. merchandise trade deficit with China, which rose from $10 billion in 1990 to $367 billion in 2015 (see Figure 4 ). China Trade and U.S. Jobs
Measuring and assessing the benefits and costs of growing U.S.-China economic ties are often hotly debated among U.S. policymakers and economists, particularly in regard to its impact on various manufacturing sectors and workers. Although growing U.S.-China economic ties are considered by most analysts to be mutually beneficial overall, tensions have risen over a number of Chinese economic and trade policies that many U.S. critics charge are protectionist, economically distortive, and damaging to U.S. economic interests. Major areas of concern for U.S. stakeholders include China's
Extensive network of industrial policies (including widespread use of trade and investment barriers, financial support, and indigenous innovation policies) that seek to promote and protect domestic sectors and firms, especially SOEs, deemed by the government to be critical to the country's future economic growth; Failure to provide adequate protection of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR) and (alleged) widespread government-directed cyber-theft of U.S. trade secrets security to help Chinese firms; Mixed record on implementing its WTO obligations; and Government-directed financial policies that promote high savings (but reduce private consumption), encourage high fixed investment levels (but may contribute to overcapacity in many industries), and a managed exchange rate policy that may distort trade flows. It also seeks to sharply reduce the country's dependence on foreign technology. However, on May 29, the White House announced that it planned to move ahead with the proposed Section 301 sanctions against China by imposing 25% ad valorem tariffs on $50 billion worth of imports from China, including those related to the Made in China 2025 initiative (final list of imports to be issued by June 15); (2) implementing new investment restrictions and enhanced export controls on Chinese entities and persons in regards to the acquisition of "industrially significant technology" for national security purposes (details to be released by June 30); and (3) continuing to pursue the WTO case against China's licensing policies (initiated on March 23). On June 15, the USTR announced a two-stage plan to impose 25% ad valorem tariffs on $50 billion worth of Chinese imports. For the second stage, the USTR proposed increasing tariffs on 228 tariff lines on $16 billion worth of Chinese imports, mainly targeting China's industrial policies. China on June 16 issued its own two-stage retaliation plan against the United States. In response to China's actions, President Trump directed the USTR on June 18 to come up with a new list of that would increase tariffs by 10% tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese products, which would be imposed if China retaliated against U.S. tariffs, and he further warned that if China raised its tariffs yet again, the United States would pursue tariffs on another $200 billion worth of Chinese products. On July 6, the Trump Administration implemented the first round of tariff increases on $34 billion worth of Chinese products. For example, in addition to raising tariffs on imported U.S. products, China could
Encourage its citizens to boycott American products and services; Impose new restrictions on the commercial activities of U.S. firms in China (such as limiting U.S. FDI in China or halting production of iPhones and other major consumer goods); Selectively increase "enforcement" of its laws and regulations against U.S. entities (e.g., boosting health and safety inspections of imported U.S. commodities or delaying customs clearance); Reduce its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities; Urge Chinese firms to seek non-U.S. suppliers of goods as services, such as buying more planes from Airbus and fewer from Boeing; and Ban the export of certain critical minerals to the United States where China is a major producer and global supplier, such as rare earth elements. Section 301 action) could have based on three scenarios: (1) the United States increases tariffs on $50 billion worth of Chinese imports and China does not respond; (2) the United States increases tariffs on $50 worth of Chinese imports and China retaliates in kind; and (3): both the United States and China impose tariffs on $150 billion worth of imports from each other. On April 1, 2018, China announced that it had raised duties (by 15% to 25%) on 128 tariff lines covering imports from the United States, including pork products, aluminum waste and scrap, and fruits and nuts, which together totaled about $3 billion in 2017. On the one hand, China's past economic and trade reforms have made China an increasingly significant market for U.S. exporters, a central factor in U.S. global supply chains, and a major source of low-cost goods for U.S. consumers. | U.S.-China economic ties have expanded substantially since China began reforming its economy and liberalizing its trade regime in the late 1970s. Total U.S.-China merchandise trade rose from $2 billion in 1979 (when China's economic reforms began) to $636 billion in 2017. China is currently the United States' largest merchandise trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its biggest source of imports. In 2015, sales by U.S. foreign affiliates in China totaled $482 billion. Many U.S. firms view participation in China's market as critical to their global competitiveness. U.S. imports of lower-cost goods from China greatly benefit U.S. consumers. U.S. firms that use China as the final point of assembly for their products, or use Chinese-made inputs for production in the United States, are able to lower costs. China is also the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities (at $1.2 trillion as of April 2018). China's purchases of U.S. debt securities help keep U.S. interest rates low.
Despite growing commercial ties, the bilateral economic relationship has become increasingly complex and often fraught with tension. From the U.S. perspective, many trade tensions stem from China's incomplete transition to a free market economy. While China has significantly liberalized its economic and trade regimes over the past three decades, it continues to maintain (or has recently imposed) a number of state-directed policies that appear to distort trade and investment flows. Major areas of concern expressed by U.S. policymakers and stakeholders include China's alleged widespread cyber economic espionage against U.S. firms; relatively ineffective record of enforcing intellectual property rights (IPR); discriminatory innovation policies; mixed record on implementing its World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations; extensive use of industrial policies (such as subsidies and trade and investment barriers) to promote and protect industries favored by the government; and interventionist policies to influence the value of its currency. Many U.S. policymakers argue that such policies adversely impact U.S. economic interests and have contributed to U.S. job losses in some sectors.
The Trump Administration has pledged to take a more aggressive stance to reduce U.S. bilateral trade deficits, enforce U.S. trade laws and agreements, and promote "free and fair trade," including in regard to China. On March 8, 2018, President Trump announced a proclamation imposing additional tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%), based on Section 232 national security justifications (China is the world's largest producer of both of these commodities). On April 1, China announced that it had retaliated against the U.S. action by raising tariffs (from 15% to 25%) on various U.S. products, which together totaled $3 billion in 2017. On March 22, President Trump announced that action would be taken against China under Section 301 over its IPR policies deemed harmful to U.S. stakeholders. In addition, he stated that he would seek commitments from China to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance and to achieve "reciprocity" on tariff levels. On June 15, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced a two-stage plan to impose 25% ad valorem tariffs on $50 billion worth of Chinese imports. Under the first stage, U.S. tariffs would be increased on $34 billion worth of Chinese products and effective July 6. For the second stage, the USTR proposed increasing tariffs on $16 billion worth of Chinese imports, mainly targeting China's industrial policies. China released its own two-stage list of counter-retaliation of equal magnitude. President Trump then threatened 10% ad valorem tariffs on another $400 billion worth of Chinese products. On July 6, the Trump Administration implemented the first round of tariff increases and China retaliated in kind. These tit-for-tat actions threaten to sharply reduce U.S.-China commercial ties, disrupt global supply chains, raise import prices for U.S. consumers and importers of Chinese inputs, and diminish economic growth in the United States and abroad. |
crs_RL33316 | crs_RL33316_0 | Major developments included:
the announcement of a formal "Security Dialogue" on political-military issues, a process that the United States has with four other Southeast Asian countries; the launch of bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotiations; the Bush Administration's announcement that it would begin the process of exploring whether to add Vietnam to the Generalized System of Payments (GSP) program, which extends duty-free treatment to certain products that are imported from designated developing countries; an agreement in principle to introduce a Peace Corps program in Vietnam; the launch of a "high-level" bilateral Education Task Force; the announcement of new initiatives on adoptions, nuclear safety, aviation, climate change, food safety, and other issues. Vietnam's Economic Troubles
Since late 2007, Vietnam's economy has been buffeted by economic difficulties that have increased social strife and raised concerns about the country's economic stability. Vietnamese Americans have been among those arrested for aiding groups that have called for peaceful democratic change. Many Vietnamese are believed to be wary of China's increased influence in Southeast Asia. Introduction
Since the early 1990s, U.S.-Vietnam relations have gradually been normalizing, as the end of the Cold War erased the need for the United States to attempt to isolate the communist government that defeated the U.S.-backed South Vietnam in 1975. There are a number of strategic and tactical reasons behind Vietnam's efforts to upgrade its relationship with the United States. Ultimately, the pace and extent of the improvement in bilateral relations likely is limited by several factors, including Hanoi's concerns about upsetting Beijing, U.S. scrutiny of Vietnam's human rights record, Vietnamese conservatives' historical wariness of working with the United States, and Vietnamese suspicions that the United States' long-term goal is to end the Vietnamese Communist Party's (VCP) monopoly on power through a "peaceful evolution" strategy. Throughout the process of normalizing relations with Vietnam, Congress has played a significant role. U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 1975-2000
U.S.-Vietnam diplomatic and economic relations were virtually nonexistent for more than 15 years following communist North Vietnam's victory in 1975 over U.S. ally South Vietnam. Economic Ties
Economic ties are the most mature aspect of the bilateral relationship. PNTR/WTO Membership
The final step toward full economic normalization between the United States and Vietnam was accomplished in December 2006, when Congress passed and President Bush signed H.R. 6111 ( P.L. 109 - 432 ), extending permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to Vietnam. U.S. aid was over $75 million in FY2006, about three-and-a-half times the level in FY2000, and is estimated to have surpassed $90 million in FY2007, making Vietnam one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid in East Asia. The Vietnam Human Rights Acts
In large measure due to Vietnam's crackdowns in the Central Highlands earlier in the decade, attempts have been made since the 107 th Congress to link U.S. aid to the human rights situation in Vietnam. Proponents of the Vietnam Human Rights Act argue that additional pressure should be placed on the Vietnamese government to improve its human rights record. In May 2008, the House passed H.Res. China also is Vietnam's largest trading partner. H.R. | After communist North Vietnam's victory over U.S.-backed South Vietnam in 1975, U.S.-Vietnam relations remained essentially frozen until the mid-1990s. Since then, bilateral ties have expanded remarkably, to the point where the relationship has been virtually normalized. Indeed, since 2002, overlapping strategic and economic interests have compelled the United States and Vietnam to improve relations across a wide spectrum of issues. Congress played a significant role in the normalization process and continues to influence the state of bilateral relations. Voices favoring improved relations have included those reflecting U.S. business interests in Vietnam's reforming economy and U.S. strategic interests in expanding cooperation with a populous country—Vietnam has over 85 million people—that has an ambivalent relationship with China. Others argue that improvements in bilateral relations should be conditioned upon Vietnam's authoritarian government improving its record on human rights. The population of over 1 million Vietnamese Americans, as well as legacies of the Vietnam War, also drive continued U.S. interest.
Economic ties are the most mature aspect of the bilateral relationship. The United States is Vietnam's largest export market. The final step toward full economic normalization was accomplished in December 2006, when Congress passed and President Bush signed H.R. 6111 (P.L. 109-432), extending permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to Vietnam. For years, the United States has supported Vietnam's market-oriented economic reforms, which many credit with Vietnam's extraordinary economic performance; from 1987-2007, annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth has averaged over 7%. Since the early 1990s, poverty levels have been halved, to less than 30%. In 2008, the two countries launched bilateral investment treaty (BIT) talks and the Bush Administration announced that it would explore whether to add Vietnam to the Generalized System of Payments (GSP) program, which extends duty-free treatment to certain products that are imported from designated developing countries.
Since 2002, the United States and Vietnam have expanded political and security ties, symbolized by reciprocal summits that have been held annually since 2005. Vietnam is one of the largest recipients of U.S. assistance in East Asia; estimated U.S. aid in FY2008 surpassed $100 million, much of it for health-related activities. In September 2007, the House passed the Vietnam Human Rights Act, H.R. 3096, which would freeze some non-humanitarian U.S. assistance programs at existing levels if Vietnam does not improve its human rights situation. Since 2006, arrests of dissidents and other developments have increased concerns about human rights.
Vietnamese leaders have sought to upgrade relations with the United States due in part to worries about China's expanding influence in Southeast Asia and the desire for continued U.S. support for their economic reforms. Many argue, however, that there is little evidence that Hanoi seeks to balance Beijing's rising power. Also, some Vietnamese remain suspicious that the United States' long-term goal is to end the Vietnamese communist party's monopoly on power through a "peaceful evolution" strategy. |
crs_RL34307 | crs_RL34307_0 | Introduction
The last few years have seen a surge in interest in geologic carbon sequestration, also referred to commonly as carbon capture and sequestration or carbon capture and storage (CCS), as a way to reduce carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions, and thereby help to address concerns about climate change. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, P.L. 110-140 , contains measures to promote research and development of CCS technology and assess sequestration capacity, including a measure to clarify the framework for issuance of CO 2 pipeline rights-of-way on public land. Among the emerging legal issues associated with CCS technology are:
1. determinations of ownership and control of the underground pore space where the CO 2 would be "sequestered" under many of the CCS facility models proposed to date; 2. the question of which federal and state agencies would permit and regulate CO 2 pipelines transporting the gas from the point of emission to the sequestration site; and 3. concerns over liability exposure that may hinder development of CCS technology. | In the last few years there has been a surge in interest in the geologic sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO2), a process often referred to as carbon capture and storage, or carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), as a way to mitigate man-made CO2 emissions and thereby help address climate change concerns. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) contains measures to promote research and development of CCS technology, to assess sequestration capacity, and to clarify the framework for issuance of CO2 pipeline rights-of-way on public land. Other legislative proposals have also sought to encourage the development of CO2 sequestration, capture, and transportation technology.
This report discusses the myriad legal issues associated with the development of CCS technology. These issues include, but are not limited to determinations of ownership and control of the underground pore space where the CO2 would be "sequestered" under most of the contemplated technology; the question of which federal and state agencies would permit and regulate CO2 pipelines transporting the gas to the sequestration site; and concerns over liability exposure that may hinder the development of CCS technology. |
crs_R44450 | crs_R44450_0 | The House filed the authorized lawsuit against the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), as discussed in detail below, on November 21, 2014. This report discusses one justiciability question raised in the House's lawsuit: whether or not an authorized house of Congress has standing to sue the executive branch regarding the manner in which it executes the law. The suit may seek relief regarding
the failure of the President, the head of any department or agency, or any other officer or employee of the executive branch, to act in a manner consistent with that official's duties under the Constitution and laws of the United States with respect to implementation of any provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, title I or subtitle B of title II of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, including any amendment made by such provision, or any other related provision of law, including a failure to implement any such provision. H.Res. House of Representatives v. Burwell Claims
The House filed its suit in November 2014, entitled U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell . To satisfy the constitutional standing requirements in Article III, the Supreme Court imposes three required elements. Congressional Standing
As applied to congressional plaintiffs, the doctrine of standing has generally been invoked only in cases challenging executive branch actions or acts of Congress and has focused on the injury prong of standing. The case law with respect to congressional plaintiffs can be broken down into two categories: (1) cases where individual Members file suit and (2) cases where congressional institutions (committees or houses of Congress) file suit. Following the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd , the case law regarding category one, individual Member suits, has been fairly settled. Burwell is the first suit to examine congressional institutional plaintiff standing based on an injury unrelated to information access. Congressional Institutions as Plaintiffs
Before Burwell , congressional institutions had been successful at establishing standing in a handful of cases regarding access to information. Congressional Authorization Is Required to Establish Standing
Two recent cases illustrate how courts have analyzed institutional plaintiffs' standing to sue to enforce a subpoena, even after Raines . Finally, the House argued against the notion that the existence of other legislative remedies should affect the outcome of the court's standing analysis, reiterating its conclusion that the House had suffered an institutional injury sufficient to establish standing. First, the plaintiff in this suit is an institution, and not an individual Member. Unresolved Questions
While the district court's opinion does not have any binding precedential value, it is the first opinion to directly address the question of whether a congressional institutional plaintiff has standing to bring a claim alleging an institutional injury unrelated to information access. Following the court's ruling granting standing to the House on one of its claims, the agencies filed a motion seeking interlocutory appeal of the court's order. The district court denied the motion. The court issued its opinion on the merits in May 2016, in which the House prevailed on its cost sharing subsidy claim. The agencies filed a notice of appeal to the D.C. Circuit in July 2016, appealing both the standing and merits decisions. | On November 21, 2014, the House of Representatives filed a lawsuit against the Departments of Health and Human Services and the Treasury, pursuant to H.Res. 676. House of Representatives v. Burwell included two claims regarding the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). In September 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion addressing the preliminary jurisdictional and justiciability questions at issue in the case. In May 2016, the district court issued its decision on the merits, in which the House prevailed as to one of its claims. The agencies filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in July 2016.
This report discusses one preliminary justiciability question: whether or not an authorized house of Congress has standing to sue the executive branch regarding the manner in which it executes the law. Generally, to participate as party litigants, all plaintiffs, including congressional plaintiffs, must demonstrate that they meet the requirements of the standing doctrine, derived from Article III of the Constitution. The failure to satisfy the standing requirements is fatal to the litigation and will result in its dismissal without a decision by the court on the merits of the presented claims.
As applied to congressional plaintiffs, the doctrine of standing has generally been invoked in cases challenging executive branch actions or acts of Congress. This case law can be broken down into two categories: (1) cases where individual Members file suit and (2) cases where congressional institutions (committees or houses of Congress) file suit. The case law regarding individual Member suits has been fairly settled following the Supreme Court's 1997 Raines v. Byrd decision. In contrast, suits by congressional plaintiffs have been rare. While the courts have grappled with several cases regarding access to information, Burwell is the first case to analyze the House's standing to assert an institutional injury unrelated to information access.
This report begins by examining areas in which the courts have provided relatively definitive analysis regarding congressional standing. First, it examines Raines and its progeny, to explain how a court analyzes assertions of institutional injuries when the plaintiff is an individual Member. Next, the report discusses cases brought by institutional plaintiffs based on institutional injuries regarding information access, namely suits seeking to enforce a congressional subpoena. By looking at these cases, one can identify whether the courts have established criteria that are necessary, but not sufficient, for institutional plaintiffs to establish standing.
The report then describes and analyzes the district court's ruling on standing in Burwell, in which the court determined that the House had suffered an injury sufficient to establish standing on one of its two claims. Finally, it addresses unresolved questions raised by the reasoning developed in Burwell and how it may be applied in future cases. |
crs_R44826 | crs_R44826_0 | One way in which the federal government supports homeownership is through programs that insure, guarantee, or directly provide mortgages to certain eligible homebuyers. In other cases, the programs may increase the amount of capital available for mortgage lending by bringing more investors into the mortgage market. This report analyzes the following four federal programs or entities that provide guarantees to lenders or investors on certain types of mortgages, and discusses the maximum mortgage amounts eligible under these programs:
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, congressionally chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), purchase mortgages from companies that originate them. There is a maximum guaranty amount, but not a maximum mortgage or income limit. One guarantees mortgages, and the other makes direct mortgages in rural areas. These programs have income limits and limits on the value of the homes purchased. These differences are discussed in the " Possible Policy Considerations " section. Conforming Loan Limits
Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's charters limit the maximum size of a mortgage that they can purchase. If the borrower defaults on the mortgage, FHA will repay the lender the remaining principal amount owed on the mortgage. Department of Veterans Affairs Loan Guaranty
The VA loan guaranty program assists eligible veterans by guaranteeing mortgages made by private lenders. Unlike conforming and FHA-insured mortgages, in many cases the VA program does not require the borrower to make a down payment. If the amount of a loan exceeds the maximum amount at which the VA will guarantee 25% of the loan, a veteran may have to make a down payment equal to 25% of the amount over the loan limit to qualify for the loan. U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural Mortgage Programs
The USDA's Rural Housing Service (RHS) administers a variety of housing loan and grant programs for rural residents authorized under the Housing Act of 1949. The FHA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac are intended to increase liquidity in the mortgage market more broadly by making it easier for lenders to sell mortgages to investors. The FHA and the conforming loan limits attempt to reduce risk by limiting the size of the mortgages guaranteed, thereby limiting the amount of risk transferred from the lender to the federal government. The VA limits the amount of the guaranty, but not the amount of the mortgage it will provide, which shares the risk with the lender instead of assuming all of it. (In economic terms, to the extent that the fees do not cover the government's costs, the programs are subsidized.) Higher loan limits may have the effect of increasing financial risk to the federal government, both because they can lead to the government insuring or guaranteeing larger individual mortgages and because they may increase the overall number of mortgages backed by the federal government, as more borrowers may qualify for and seek out these types of mortgages. It may reduce the financial risks facing the government but may also limit credit availability for some borrowers. | The federal government supports homeownership in different ways. One of the main ways is through programs or quasi-government entities that promise lenders or investors that if a homeowner defaults on a covered mortgage, the lender or investor will still receive some—or all—of the amount it was owed. In some cases, the guarantees support homeownership by making private lenders more willing to offer certain types of mortgages. In other cases, the guarantees provided by these entities may increase the number of private investors who are willing to invest in mortgages, thereby increasing the amount of capital available for mortgage lending. The details of the programs differ, but most have maximum guarantee amounts that limit the size of mortgages that are eligible. This report contains brief program descriptions and discusses the maximum guarantee amounts for each.
The government or quasi-government entities that insure or guarantee mortgages and are discussed in this report are the following:
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Lenders sell mortgages to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are congressionally chartered government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). These mortgages are called conforming loans because they conform to Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's credit rules and are less than the conforming loan limit. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The FHA insures mortgages that meet its standards, including a maximum mortgage amount. If a homeowner defaults, FHA pays the lender the remaining amount owed on the mortgage. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA guarantees mortgages made to eligible veterans who meet its standards. If a covered veteran defaults, the VA will pay the lender. Unlike the first two programs, the VA coverage is not always 100% of the unpaid balance. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service (RHS). RHS provides direct loans and loan guarantees for certain home mortgages in rural areas. RHS does not have a maximum mortgage size, but does have limits on income and the value of the home purchased.
Mortgage guarantee programs transfer risk to the government from the private sector, but may also expand credit availability and lower rates for borrowers. Loan limits for mortgages that are eligible for the programs attempt to achieve a balance by limiting the size of the mortgages that are guaranteed or insured, in part to limit the amount of risk that is transferred from the lender to the federal government and also to tailor the programs to the borrowers to whom the government would like to provide assistance. The size of the loan limits may affect which homes, and by extension which prospective homebuyers, can qualify for these types of mortgages. To the extent that these types of mortgages represent the most affordable or only available mortgage option for some prospective homebuyers, any increase or decrease in the loan limits can affect access to mortgage credit for a subset of potential homebuyers. |
crs_R44564 | crs_R44564_0 | T he Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) is a potential reciprocal free trade agree ment that the United States and the European Union (EU) are negotiating with each other. Formal negotiations commenced in July 2013. Agricultural imports from Europe currently exceed U.S. exports to the EU. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that the EU's import tariffs on U.S. agricultural products average well above U.S. tariffs on EU agricultural products. Agricultural Issues in the Negotiation
The United States is among the world's largest net exporters of agricultural products, averaging more than $140 billion per year (2010-2015) worldwide. The EU is a leading export market for U.S. agricultural exports—absorbing roughly 10% of exports—and is ranked as the fifth largest market for U.S. food and farm exports. In recent years, however, growth in U.S. agricultural exports to the EU has not kept pace with growth in trade to other U.S. markets, and imports from Europe currently exceed U.S. exports to the EU. In 2015, U.S. exports of agricultural products to the EU totaled $12 billion, while EU exports of agricultural products totaled $20 billion, resulting in a substantial trade deficit of nearly $8 billion for the United States. This reverses the net trade surplus in U.S. agricultural exports during the early 1990s (see Figure 1 ). These statistics include data for all current 28 EU member states, including the United Kingdom (covering England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), which voted in June 2016 to exit the EU (referred to as "Brexit"). Studies of Potential Trade Gains
A USDA study reports that removing tariffs and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) in U.S.-EU trade could have increased U.S. agricultural exports to the EU by an estimated $5.5 billion, measured against a 2011 base year. EU exports to the United States are also estimated to be higher by $0.8 billion compared to the study's 2011 base year ( Table 1 ). USDA further reports that removing selected non-tariff barriers, in addition to removing tariffs and TRQs in U.S.-EU trade, could increase U.S. agricultural exports to the EU by an additional estimated $4.1 billion annually (measured against a 2011 base year). TRQs on agricultural products are also a concern for U.S. exporters. Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade
High tariff barriers are further exacerbated by additional non-tariff barriers that may limit U.S. agricultural exports, including SPS measures and other types of non-tariff barriers. Non-tariff barriers affect agricultural trade in various ways, including delays in reviews of biotech products (creating barriers to U.S. exports of grain and oilseed products), prohibitions on growth hormones in beef production and certain antimicrobial and pathogen reduction treatments (creating barriers to U.S. meat and poultry exports), and burdensome and complex certification requirements (creating barriers to U.S. processed foods, animal products, and dairy products). U.S. businesses report concerns about the lack of a science-based focus in establishing SPS measures, difficulty meeting food safety standards and obtaining product certification, differences across countries in food labeling requirements, and stringent testing requirements that are often applied inconsistently across EU member nations. Regulatory differences between the United States and EU have likely contributed to some long-standing trade disputes regarding SPS and TBT rules between the two trading blocs. These goals include to:
eliminate or reduce non-tariff barriers that decrease opportunities for U.S. exports, provide a competitive advantage to products of the EU, or otherwise distort trade, such as unwarranted SPS restrictions that are not based on science, unjustified TBT restrictions, and other "behind-the-border" barriers, including the restrictive administration of tariff-rate quotas and permit and licensing barriers, which impose unnecessary costs and limit competitive opportunities for U.S. exports; achieve greater compatibility of U.S. and EU regulations and related standards development processes (while maintaining health, safety and environmental protection), with the objective of reducing costs associated with unnecessary regulatory differences and facilitating trade, inter alia by promoting transparency in the development and implementation of regulations and good regulatory practices, establishing mechanisms for future progress, and pursuing regulatory cooperation initiatives where appropriate; build on key principles and disciplines of the TBT agreement through strong cross-cutting disciplines and, as appropriate, sectoral approaches to achieve meaningful market access and establish ongoing mechanisms for improved dialogue and cooperation on TBT issues; build on key principles and disciplines of the SPS agreement to achieve meaningful market access, including commitments to base SPS measures on science and international standards or scientific risk assessments; apply them only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; develop such measures in a transparent manner without undue delay; and establish an ongoing mechanism for improved dialogue and cooperation addressing bilateral SPS issues. In the T-TIP negotiation, GIs have been an active area of debate between the United States and EU. For more information on the protection of GIs in the United States, see CRS Report R44556, Geographical Indications in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) Negotiations . | The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) is a potential reciprocal free trade agreement being negotiated between the United States and the European Union (EU). Formal negotiations began in July 2013. Through the negotiations, both sides are seeking to liberalize transatlantic trade and investment, set globally relevant rules and disciplines that could boost economic growth, support multilateral trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization (WTO), and address third-country trade policy challenges. Agricultural issues have been an active topic of debate in the negotiations, given the potential market access gains for both sides and the potential to address a series of regulatory and intellectual property rights issues.
The United States is among the world's largest net exporters of agricultural products. The EU is an important export market for U.S. agricultural exports and ranks as the fifth largest market for U.S. food and farm exports. However, in recent years, growth in U.S. agricultural exports to the EU has not kept pace with growth in trade to other U.S. markets, and imports from Europe currently exceed U.S. exports to the EU. In 2015, U.S. exports of agricultural products to the EU totaled $12 billion, while EU exports of agricultural products to the United States totaled $20 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of nearly $8 billion for the United States and reversing the net trade surplus in U.S. agricultural exports to the EU during the 1990s. (These statistics include data for all current 28 EU member states, including the United Kingdom, which voted in June 2016 to leave the EU, a process that could take many years.)
Addressing market access for U.S. agricultural exports to the EU is among the major goals of the T-TIP negotiation. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that the EU's average agricultural tariff is 30%, well above the average U.S. agricultural tariff of 12%. Restrictive tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on agricultural products are also a concern for U.S. exporters. A USDA study reports that removing tariffs and TRQs could increase U.S. agricultural exports to the EU by an estimated $5.5 billion (compared to a 2011 base year). EU exports to the United States are estimated to rise by $0.8 billion. These totals cover all current 28 EU member states.
High tariff barriers are further exacerbated by additional non-tariff barriers that may limit U.S. agricultural exports. Addressing non-tariff barriers is another major goal of the U.S. agricultural sectors in the negotiation, covering certain sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) concerns. These include delays in reviews of biotech products (limiting U.S. exports of grain and oilseed products), prohibitions on growth hormones in beef production and certain antimicrobial and pathogen reduction treatments (limiting U.S. meat and poultry exports), and burdensome and complex certification requirements (limiting U.S. exports of processed foods, animal products, and dairy products). As such, T-TIP negotiations on agricultural products are conditioned by a number of these long-standing, high-profile transatlantic trade disputes between the United States and EU. Other EU regulations of concern to U.S. exporters include lack of a science-based focus in establishing SPS measures, difficulty meeting food safety standards and obtaining product certification, lack of cohesive labeling requirements, and stringent testing requirements that are often applied inconsistently across EU member nations. USDA reports that removing select non-tariff barriers affecting meats, field crops, and fruits and vegetables could raise U.S. exports to the EU by an additional $4.1 billion over gains estimated from removing tariffs and TRQs (compared to a 2011 base year) across all current 28 EU member states.
Other U.S. concerns involve the EU's use of geographical indications (GIs)—certain protected product names that many U.S. food producers consider to be generic names. Further complicating negotiations regarding GIs are underlying regulatory and administrative differences between the United States and the EU in how each addresses GIs within their respective borders. |
crs_R44694 | crs_R44694_0 | Background
The MBTA is a criminal environmental statute, enacted in 1918 to implement a 1916 treaty signed by the United States a nd Great Britain (acting for Canada) aimed at protecting birds that migrate between the two countries. The MBTA regulations define the term "take" as "to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" or to attempt to do so. Whether these actions violate the MBTA take prohibitions depends on whether federal agencies are subject to the MBTA. The courts have differing opinions on the applicability of the MBTA to federal agencies. However, courts have declined to apply the MBTA to regulatory actions related to third-party projects based on two main principles: (1) agencies are not subject to the MBTA when their regulatory actions do not directly take migratory birds; and (2) agencies have no affirmative duty to guarantee a third-party's future compliance with the MBTA. In general, the courts have looked at three different types of actions or omissions that result in the taking of migratory birds:
1. direct and intentional acts or omissions; 2. direct and unintentional acts or omissions; and 3. indirect and unintentional acts or omissions (incidental takes). There is a wide range of federal district and appellate court cases that have addressed this issue. Direct and Intentional Takes
Courts generally agree that FWS's regulatory definition of "take" prohibits unpermitted direct and intentional actions that include hunting, shooting, wounding, killing, trapping, and capturing migratory birds. Direct and Unintentional Takes
Several cases involve direct actions that violate the MBTA prohibitions but lacked intention or "guilty knowledge." In the context of the MBTA, the prohibitions under Section 703(a) are generally viewed as strict liability crimes, and proof of intent to take or knowledge of taking a migratory bird is not needed to establish a misdemeanor violation of the Act. Indirect and Unintentional (Incidental) Takes
FWS has stated that the MBTA applies to the take of migratory birds that occurs incidental to, and is not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful activity. Recent enforcement actions against wind energy developers reinforce the Service's broad interpretation that the MBTA prohibitions on taking migratory birds extend to actions that unintentionally result in bird deaths. Fifth Circuit Approach Limiting Strict Liability of the Takings Prohibition
The Fifth Circuit has sought to bridge the gap between the Second and Tenth Circuit courts that hold that incidental takings violate the MBTA as a strict liability offense, and the Eighth and Ninth Circuit courts that hold that only direct and intentional takings, such as hunting and poaching, violate the taking prohibition. Judicial Interpretation of Congressional Intent
The legislative history of the MBTA supports differing interpretations of the nature and scope of takings prohibited and types of migratory birds protected by the MBTA. FWS's Proposed Incidental Take Permitting Program
To address some of the uncertainty regarding incidental takes and compliance with the MBTA, in May 2015, FWS announced that it was considering developing an MBTA permitting program to authorize incidental takes of migratory birds. If FWS adopts incidental take regulations under the MBTA, the final regulations are likely to be challenged in the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, where the courts have more narrowly construed FWS authority and the scope of the MBTA to regulate only direct and intentional takings of migratory birds and not the taking of migratory birds that occurs incidental to, and is not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful activity. | The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) (16 U.S.C. §§703-712) is a criminal environmental statute, enacted in 1918 to implement a 1916 treaty signed by the United States and Great Britain (acting for Canada) aimed at protecting birds that migrate between the two countries. The MBTA prohibits the taking and killing of migratory birds, but does not itself define the term "take." U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS's) regulations define "take" as "to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" or to attempt to do so.
The courts are divided on whether federal agencies are subject to the MBTA take prohibitions. In cases where federal agencies have been considered subject to the MBTA take prohibitions, some courts have declined to apply the MBTA to regulatory actions such as permit and project approvals, holding that agencies (1) have no affirmative duty to guarantee a third-party permit holder's future compliance with the MBTA and (2) are not subject to the MBTA when their regulatory actions do not directly take migratory birds.
A wide range of federal district and appellate court cases have addressed the nature and scope of takings prohibited under the MBTA. In general, the courts have looked at three different types of taking of migratory birds: (1) direct and intentional; (2) direct and unintentional; and (3) indirect and unintentional (incidental). Courts generally agree that the MBTA prohibits unpermitted direct and intentional actions that include hunting, shooting, wounding, killing, trapping, and capturing migratory birds. Cases that involve direct actions that violate the MBTA prohibitions but lack intention or "guilty knowledge" are generally viewed as strict liability crimes where proof of intent to take or knowledge of taking a migratory bird is not needed to establish a misdemeanor violation of the MBTA. For incidental takes, FWS has stated that the MBTA applies to the take of migratory birds that is incidental to, but not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful activity. FWS's recent enforcement actions against wind energy developers for incidental bird deaths caused by wind turbines reinforce this broad interpretation of its enforcement authority.
However, jurisprudence on the applicability of the MBTA to incidental taking of migratory birds is less clear. Federal Courts of Appeals for the Second and Tenth Circuits have agreed with FWS that the MBTA is a strict liability statute that applies to bird deaths that incidentally result from otherwise lawful activity. However, courts in the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have taken the opposite view, holding that the statute only applies to purposeful actions directed against migratory birds, such as hunting and poaching. The legislative history of the MBTA supports differing interpretations of the nature and scope of MBTA's taking prohibitions.
In the absence of direction or guidance from the Supreme Court or Congress on the scope of MBTA's take prohibitions, FWS plans to address some of the uncertainty regarding incidental takes and compliance with the MBTA through a proposed incidental take permitting program. An incidental take permitting program is likely to be challenged in Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits where the courts have narrowly construed FWS authority and the scope of the MBTA.
This report reviews the major provisions of the MBTA; examines the types of government action that are subject to the MBTA; analyzes the conflicting judicial interpretations of the taking provisions; and outlines FWS's proposed incidental take permitting program. |
crs_R43076 | crs_R43076_0 | Introduction and Chronology
Congress periodically establishes agricultural and food policy in an omnibus farm bill. Following nearly three years of debate, Congress completed action in February 2014 on the most recent farm bill (The Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. The 2014 farm bill establishes policy for the next five years in its 12 titles, covering farm commodity price and income support, crop insurance, conservation, domestic food assistance, agricultural trade and international food aid, credit, rural development, research, horticulture, forestry, and bioenergy, among others. Within the various titles of the enacted 2014 farm bill are provisions that reshape the structure of farm commodity support, expand crop insurance coverage, consolidate conservation programs, reauthorize and revise nutrition assistance, and extend authority to appropriate funds for many U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) discretionary programs through FY2018. The 112 th Congress began work on a new farm bill but did not complete action before the conclusion of the Congress, requiring new bills to be introduced in the 113 th Congress. 113-79 ) on February 7, 2014. 113-333 ) on January 27, 2014. The President signed it into law ( P.L. 113-79 to Senate and House versions of the farm bill—including S. 954 as passed by the Senate (also referred to as the Senate amendment to H.R. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that the mandatory programs of the 2008 farm bill would have cost $973 billion if continued for the next 10 years (FY2014-FY2023). Compared to this post-sequestration baseline, the 2014 farm bill ( P.L. 113-79 ) reduces projected spending and the deficit by $16.6 billion (-1.7%) over 10 years. 2642 and H.R. 113-79 remains as savings of $16.6 billion over 10 years. The final 2014 farm bill is projected to spend $956 billion over the next 10 years, of which $756 billion is for nutrition assistance and $200 billion is for the agriculture portion. 113-79 ), farm support for traditional program crops is restructured by eliminating direct payments, the counter-cyclical price (CCP) program, and the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program. Approximately three-fourths of the 10-year, $47 billion in savings associated with the elimination of current farm programs was used to offset the costs of revising farm programs in Title I, adding permanent disaster assistance in Title I, and enhancing crop insurance in Title XI. As in the House- and Senate-passed bills, P.L. 113-79 amends how Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) payments are treated in the calculation of SNAP benefits. 113-79 does reauthorize several other forestry assistance programs through FY2018. One particularly controversial issue that was deleted in conference was the interstate commerce provision originally in the House bill that would have prohibited states from imposing production or manufacturing standards on agricultural products from other states. Of interest to the livestock and poultry industry, provisions repealing marketing and competition rules proposed by USDA (the GIPSA rule) were excluded. | Congress periodically establishes agricultural and food policy in a multi-year, omnibus farm bill. The 2008 farm bill governed policy for farm commodity support, horticulture, livestock, conservation, nutrition assistance, trade and international food aid, agricultural research, farm credit, rural development, bioenergy, and forestry. It originally expired in 2012, but the 112th Congress did not complete action and instead extended the law for one year (P.L. 112-240), leaving consideration of a new farm bill to the 113th Congress.
After nearly three years of deliberations, Congress completed action on a new omnibus farm bill when conferees reported a conference agreement on January 27, 2014 (the Agricultural Act of 2014, H.R. 2642/H.Rept. 113-333); the full House and Senate approved the conference agreement on January 29 and February 4, respectively. The President signed the measure into law (P.L. 113-79) on February 7, 2014.
Within P.L. 113-79 are provisions that reshape the structure of farm commodity support, expand crop insurance coverage, consolidate conservation programs, reauthorize and revise nutrition assistance, and extend authority to appropriate funds for many U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs through FY2018, among many other provisions.
The new 2014 farm bill restructures farm support for traditional program crops by eliminating direct payments, the counter-cyclical price (CCP) program, and the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program. Much of the savings associated with the elimination of these farm programs was used to offset the costs of revising the remaining programs, adding permanent disaster assistance, and enhancing crop insurance.
P.L. 113-79 also reauthorizes the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps) through FY2018. The new measure restricts how a household's receipt of Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) benefits can affect SNAP benefits, accounting for most of the nutrition budget savings. Not adopted were House provisions to restrict categorical eligibility and change several time limit and work requirements.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that if the mandatory programs of the 2008 farm bill were to continue, they would cost $973 billion over the next 10 years (FY2014-FY2023), which served as a baseline budget for deliberations on the 2014 farm bill. The enacted 2014 farm bill is projected to spend $956 billion over the next 10 years, of which $756 billion is for nutrition assistance and $200 billion is for the agriculture portion. Compared to the baseline, the 2014 farm bill reduces projected spending and the deficit by $16.6 billion (-1.7%) over 10 years. This projected 10-year savings is closer to the Senate-passed bill level of $17.8 billion than the projected House-passed savings of $51.8 billion.
Not included in the final conference agreement were a number of controversial miscellaneous provisions such as a House provision that would have prohibited states from imposing production or manufacturing standards on agricultural products from other states, and a House provision that would have repealed livestock and poultry marketing and competition rules proposed by USDA. |
crs_R42878 | crs_R42878_0 | Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010
Background
In an effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate billions of dollars in improper payments made by federal agencies each fiscal year, Congress passed the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA; P.L. 107-300 ; 116 Stat. 2350) in 2002. IPIA established an initial framework for identifying, measuring, preventing, and reporting on improper payments at each agency. Separately, Congress also passed legislation, the Recovery Audit Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-107 ; Section 831; 115 Stat. 1186), which required agencies that awarded more than $500 million annually in contracts to implement plans to recover overpayments to contractors. After five years of reporting, the data showed that progress under IPIA was uneven—while many individual programs reduced their improper payment rates, the total amount of improper payments and the government-wide improper payment rate both increased between FY2004 and FY2008. In response, Congress passed new legislation, the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA; P.L. 111-204 ; 124 Stat. 2224), which replaced and consolidated the requirements of both IPIA and the Recovery Audit Act. As discussed below, IPERA retained the core provisions of the IPIA while requiring improvements in agency improper payment estimation methodologies and improper payment reduction plans. It also significantly expanded the scope and reporting requirements of recovery audit programs. Improper Payments
IPERA defines an improper payment as a payment that should not have been made or that was made in an incorrect amount, including both overpayments and underpayments. Risk Assessments
A-123, like IPERA, requires agencies to (1) review all programs and identify those susceptible to improper payments; (2) develop a valid estimate of the amount of improper payments for those programs identified as susceptible to "significant" improper payments; (3) implement a plan to reduce improper payments; and (4) report estimates of the annual amounts of improper payments and progress in reducing them. Since the IPIA reporting requirements took effect, agencies have made over half a trillion dollars ($688 billion) in improper payments. Since then, agencies have expanded the number of programs reported each year as they develop valid improper payment estimates for them. During this same time, the annual dollar amount of improper payments reported has more than doubled, rising from $45 billion in FY2004 to $108 billion in FY2012. Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Audit Improvement Act of 2012
In an attempt to expand the scope of data used to verify that payments are being made to eligible recipients and for the correct amount, Congress passed the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Audit Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA; P.L. 112-248 ). | As Congress searches for ways to generate savings, reduce the deficit, and fund federal programs, it has held hearings and passed legislation to prevent and recover improper payments. Improper payments—which exceeded $115 billion in FY2011—are payments made in an incorrect amount, payments that should not have been made at all, or payments made to an ineligible recipient or for an ineligible purpose. The total amount of improper payments may be even higher than reported because several agencies have yet to determine improper payment amounts for many programs, including some with billions of dollars in annual expenditures.
In 2002, Congress passed the Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA; P.L. 107-300; 116 Stat. 2350), which established an initial framework for identifying, measuring, preventing, and reporting on improper payments at each agency. That same year, Congress also passed legislation, the Recovery Audit Act (P.L. 107-107; Section 831; 115 Stat. 1186), which required agencies that awarded more than $500 million annually in contracts to establish programs to recover overpayments to contractors.
After five years of reporting, the data indicated that while many individual programs reduced their improper payment rates, the total amount of improper payments and the government-wide improper payment rate both increased. Since the IPIA reporting requirements took effect, agencies have expanded the number of programs reported each year. One potential consequence of this expansion is that the annual dollar amount of improper payments reported has more than doubled over time from $45 billion in FY2004 to $108 billion in FY2012.
In response, Congress passed new legislation, the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA, P.L. 111-204; 124 Stat. 2224), which replaced and consolidated the requirements of both IPIA and the Recovery Audit Act. IPERA retained the core provisions of the IPIA while requiring improvements in agency improper payment estimation methodologies and improper payment reduction plans. It also significantly expanded the scope and reporting requirements of recovery audit programs.
A subsequent statute, the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA; P.L. 112-248), signed into law on January 10, 2013, addresses some of the weaknesses in agency improper payment prevention controls and recovery audit programs. In particular, IPERIA requires agencies to improve the quality of oversight for high-dollar and high-risk programs, and it mandates that agencies share data regarding recipient eligibility and payment amounts. In addition, IPERIA requires the Office of Management and Budget to examine the rates and amounts of improper payments that agencies have recovered and establish targets for increasing those amounts.
This report will be updated to reflect significant developments. |
crs_R43858 | crs_R43858_0 | Introduction
The funding authorization for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), included in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-95 ), expires on September 30, 2015. In addition to setting spending levels, FAA authorization acts typically set policy on a wide range of issues related to civil aviation. This report considers topics that are likely to arise as the 114 th Congress debates reauthorization. It does not attempt to be comprehensive. Many issues debated prior to passage of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 are not discussed unless further congressional consideration appears probable. Additional issues, not discussed in this report, may arise as Congress moves forward. Aviation Funding
Most FAA programs are financed through the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), sometimes referred to as the Aviation Trust Fund. The trust fund balance is projected to grow in the near term, as AATF revenue continues to rise and airport capital needs are projected to decline over the next five years. In the longer term, however, the vitality of the AATF remains a concern, as reductions in general fund appropriations to FAA have increased the proportion of FAA funding that is derived from the trust fund. Changes in airline business practices pose a risk to the AATF revenue structure. Trust fund revenue is largely dependent on airlines' ticket sales, and the spread of low-cost air carrier models has held down ticket prices and therefore AATF receipts. In addition, airlines increasingly impose fees for a variety of options and amenities, such as checked bags and onboard meals, rather than including them in the base ticket price. Participation in the APPP has been limited. 112-95 ) increased the number of airports that may participate from 5 to 10. The many proposals and bills on this subject put forth over the years have distinguished two main alternatives to continued operation of the air traffic control system by a federal agency:
corporatization , which, in this context, generally refers to establishing air traffic services as a wholly owned government corporation or quasi-governmental entity; and privatization , which would entail creating some form of private ownership and control of an air traffic services corporation. One is funding. In November 2014, the ruling was reversed by the full NTSB. Although a number of steps have been taken to implement these recommendations, an independent assessment of the progress made or the effectiveness of revised certification practices has not been made. The bill would have allowed airlines' advertisements and websites to give greatest prominence to "base airfare," as long as they "clearly and separately" disclose government taxes and fees and the total cost of air transportation. The Senate did not act on the legislation. | The funding authorization for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), included in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95), expires on September 30, 2015. In addition to setting spending levels, FAA authorization acts typically set policy on a wide range of issues related to civil aviation. This report considers topics that are likely to arise as the 114th Congress debates reauthorization.
Most FAA programs are financed through the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), sometimes referred to as the Aviation Trust Fund. The financial health of the AATF, which is funded by a variety of taxes and fees on air transportation, has been a growing concern. Although the trust fund balance is projected to grow in the near term—as AATF revenue continues to rise and airport capital needs are projected to decline—reductions in general fund appropriations to FAA have increased the proportion of FAA funding that is derived from the trust fund. In addition, changes in airline business practices pose a risk to the AATF revenue structure: trust fund revenue is largely dependent on airlines' ticket sales, and airlines' increasing use of fees charged for options that may once have been included in the base ticket price, such as checked bags and onboard meals, has reduced the amount of money flowing into the fund.
Other major issues likely to arise during the reauthorization debate include the following:
Unmanned aerial vehicles. FAA has failed to issue rules for commercial and government use of drone aircraft within the time directed by the 2012 law, frustrating potential commercial operators. Meanwhile, large numbers of drones have come into use, and there have been numerous reports of near-collisions between drones and manned aircraft. Air traffic control privatization. Many commissions over the years have recommended moving responsibility for air traffic control from FAA, a government agency, to either an independent government-owned corporation or a private entity controlled by aviation stakeholders. Delays in implementing the satellite-based NextGen air traffic control system have renewed interest in this possibility. Essential Airline Service (EAS). In 2012, Congress attempted to limit the number of localities eligible to participate in this program to subsidize flights to communities that would otherwise lose all commercial airline service, as well as to limit the amount of subsidies per passenger. These efforts were largely unsuccessful. Airfare disclosure. The House of Representatives approved a bill in 2014 that would reverse an FAA regulation requiring airlines and website operators to give greater prominence to the final price, including fees and taxes, than to the "base airfare" charged by the carrier. The Senate did not approve this legislation, but the issue is likely to reappear in the context of FAA reauthorization.
This report does not attempt to be comprehensive. Many issues debated prior to passage of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 are not discussed unless further congressional consideration appears probable. Additional issues, not discussed in this report, may arise as Congress moves forward with reauthorization. |
crs_RL34266 | crs_RL34266_0 | Focus has turned to debate over the magnitude and patterns of future climate change, how adverse such changes may be, and how projections may inform mitigation and adaptation policy choices. The principal scientific findings from the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) continue to stand, and will be summarized in this report. A fuller explanation of climate change processes, analytical methods, uncertainties, and controversies is provided in CRS Report RL33849, Climate Change: Science and Policy Implications , by [author name scrubbed]. Attribution of Observed Changes Mostly to Greenhouse Gases
In 2007, the IPCC fourth assessment report concluded that "[m]ost of the observed increase in globally-averaged temperatures since the mid-20 th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations." According to the report, natural phenomena, such as volcanoes, solar variability and land cover change, have undoubtedly influenced the observed climate change, but the dominant driver of change since the 1970s is estimated to be the increase of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the Earth's atmosphere due to emissions from human-related activities. Less policy attention has been give to other GHG and other human-related "forcings" of climate change, which might also offer climate change abatement opportunities:
certain synthetic chlorinated and fluorinated chemicals (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons (CFC), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC), the production of which is controlled to reverse destruction of the ozone layer in the stratosphere (but which continue to be emitted from certain sources); tropospheric ozone (or "smog"), which is controlled in many countries as an air pollutant with adverse health and environmental effects, and is not emitted but is formed in the atmosphere due to emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), volatile organic compounds (VOC), and carbon monoxide (CO); regional scale air pollutants, such as sulfates, and tiny carbon-containing particles called black carbon aerosols . Trends in Atmospheric Concentrations of Greenhouse Gases
Carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) concentrations have grown from a pre-industrial concentration of about 280 parts per million volume (ppm) to 386 ppm in 2008 (see Figure 2 ). Observed Impacts of Climate Changes
The IPCC concluded in 2007 that: "... discernible human influences extend beyond average temperature to other aspects of climate." Results from a few released in 2008 are highlighted here. Without Further GHG Mitigation Policies, GHG Emissions Will Grow
The U.S. This research produced new scenarios of future GHG emissions and concluded that "In the reference scenarios, economic and energy growth, combined with continued fossil fuel use, lead to changes in the Earth's radiation balance that are three to four times that already experienced since the beginning of the industrial age." Wet regions are expected to get more precipitation and dry regions are expected to become drier. Concern About Abrupt "Tipping Points" in the Climate System
Some people are concerned less about chronic damages due to slow and continuing climate change than they are about the potential for abrupt "tipping points" in the current climate system. In other words, according to the estimates represented in this figure, it is most likely that greenhouse gas emissions from 1750 to 2005 will lead to global average warming of 1 o -3 o C, and potentially result in ice-free Arctic summers, major reduction of area and volume of the Hindu-Kush-Himalaya-Tibetan (HKHT) glaciers, major melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet, and so non. Snowfall in some regions is expected to increase, however, with greater atmospheric moisture. As the degree and distribution of climate changes continue, ranges of species are likely to change. Afterwards, temperature projections increasingly depend on specific emission scenarios." (p. 11)
"Sea level rise under warming is inevitable.... | Scientific conclusions have become more compelling regarding the influence of human activities on the Earth's climate. In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declared that evidence of global warming was "unequivocal." It concluded that "[m]ost of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic [human-related] greenhouse gas [GHG] concentrations."
The IPCC concluded that human activities have markedly increased atmospheric concentrations of "greenhouse gases" (GHG), including carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and gases (such as chlorofluorocarbons, CFC) that are controlled under the Montreal Protocol to protect the stratospheric ozone layer. From the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, CO2 has risen from about 280 parts per million (ppm) to about 386 ppm today (up 38%). The concentration of CO2 is higher now than in at least 800,000 years before present.
Additional human influences on the climate that are not easily compared to GHG emissions could, nonetheless, be managed to moderate regional and global climate change. These include tropospheric ozone pollution (i.e., smog), particulate and aerosol emissions, and land cover change. New chemicals, such as nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), also may play a small role.
Without radical changes globally from current policies and economic trajectories, experts uniformly expect that GHG emissions will continue to grow and lead to continued warming of the Earth's climate. Experts disagree, however, on the timing, magnitude and patterns of future climate changes. In the absence of concerted climate change mitigation policies, for a wide range of plausible GHG scenarios to 2100, the IPCC projected "best guess" increases in global average temperatures from 1.8oC to 4.0oC (3.2oF to 7.2oF). Although these temperature changes may seem small, they compare to the current global, annual average temperature of around 14oC (57oF). While precipitation overall is expected to increase, its distribution may become more uneven: regions that now are dry are likely to get drier, while regions that now are wet, are likely to get wetter. Extreme precipitation and droughts are expected to become more frequent. Experts project that warming ocean waters will expand, and melting glaciers and ice sheets will further add to sea level rise. The Arctic Ocean could become ice free in summers within a few decades. Ocean salinity is expected to fall, and the Meridional Overturning Circulation in the Atlantic Ocean could slow, reducing ocean productivity and altering regional climates in both North America and Europe. The climate would continue changing for hundreds of years after GHG concentrations were stabilized, according to most models. There are also possibilities of abrupt changes in the state of the climate system, with unpredictable and potentially catastrophic consequences. Much concern is focused now, among scientists and economists, about the likelihoods and implications of exceeding such thresholds of abrupt change, sometimes called "tipping points."
This report summarizes highlights of scientific research and assessments related to human-induced climate change. For more extensive explanation of climate change science and analytical methods, see CRS Report RL33849, Climate Change: Science and Policy Implications. |
crs_RL33175 | crs_RL33175_0 | Introduction
In recent years, as prices of prescription drugs have risen, many in Congress have sponsoredlegislation to permit the importation of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved drugs fromless expensive foreign sources. In the 109th Congress, three pairs of bills have been introduced torepeal the existing import restrictions and provide for limited forms of importation of prescriptiondrugs. Current law and the bills all seek to balance the availability of imported prescription drugs-- both for commercial and personal use -- and the assurance that those imports would be safe andeffective. An underlying goal is to reduce or restrain the growth of the financial burden thatprescription drugs place on U.S. consumers. Current law bars importation unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)certifies that imports are safe and offers cost savings to U.S. consumers. Congress reaffirmed thisrequirement, first established by the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety (MEDS) Act of 2000, mostrecently in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA, P.L.108-173 ) in December 2003. (1) The three bill pairsare:
The Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2005 : S. 109 ,introduced by Senator Vitter on January 24, 2005, and H.R. The Safe Importation of Medical Products and Other Rx Therapies Actof 2005, or the Safe IMPORT Act of 2005 : S. 184 , introduced by Senator Gregg onJanuary 26, 2005, and H.R. The Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2005 : S. 334 , introduced by Senator Dorgan on February 9, 2005, and H.R. All three bills haveextensive registration requirements. Whilecurrent law relies on laboratory testing of samples of every shipment of imported drugs to verify theircontent, potency, and labeling, the three proposed bills focus on documentation of a monitored,uninterrupted chain of custody from manufacturing facility to importer. Internet Pharmacies. Administration of Importation Provisions
The timing and funding of importation activities vary across current law and the proposedbills. The bills would require that these fees be used only for the administration of the importationprovisions that the bills would add. Effective Dates
Current law does not specify when importation could begin, other than linking it to therequired safety and cost certification by the Secretary. It also states that the importation provisions shall "permit theimportation of qualifying drugs ⦠without regard to the status of the issuance of implementingregulations" from registered exporters 90 days after enactment and from permitted countries byregistered importers one year after enactment. Comparison of Prescription Drug Importation Provisions in Current Law, S. 109/H.R. 328,S. 184/H.R. 753, and S. 334/H.R. 700 | As prices of prescription drugs have risen, many in Congress have sponsored legislation topermit the importation of FDA-approved drugs from less expensive foreign sources. In the 109thCongress, three pairs of bills have been introduced to repeal the existing import restrictions andprovide for limited forms of importation of prescription drugs. Current law and the bills all seek tobalance the availability of imported prescription drugs -- both for commercial and personal use --and the assurance that those imports would be safe and effective. An underlying goal is to reduceor restrain the growth of the financial burden that prescription drugs place on U.S. consumers.
The drug importation provisions in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, andModernization Act of 2003 (MMA, P.L. 108-173 ) effectively do not allow the commercial orpersonal-use importation of prescription drugs. Congress, with the MMA, continued the major legalobstacle to importation: the requirement that the Secretary of Health and Human Services firstcertify that imports are safe and offer cost savings to U.S. consumers -- something no Secretary hasbeen willing to do. This report, which will be updated, briefly discusses major differences amongcurrent law and the introduced bills, and presents a side-by-side comparison of their provisions. Thebills are the Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2005 ( S. 109 , H.R. 328 ),the Safe Importation of Medical Products and Other Rx Therapies Act of 2005 (the Safe IMPORTAct of 2005; S. 184 , H.R. 753 ), and the Pharmaceutical Market Access andDrug Safety Act of 2005 ( S. 334 , H.R. 700 ).
Although all three pairs of bills seek to make lower-priced prescription drugs available toU.S. consumers by allowing importation while also ensuring that the drugs are safe and effective,they take different approaches. The proposed bills use extensive registration, licensing, facilityinspection, and records requirements to document an imported shipment's chain-of-custodyrequirements, rather than the MMA's use of mandated laboratory testing of imported drugs to verifytheir content, potency, and labeling. Current law and the bills each have different lists of countriesfrom which imports could be imported, and they provide the Secretary with different time framesand criteria for determining whether to permit commercial or personal-use importation. Secretarialreporting requirements vary as do mechanisms to fund the import activities: current law relies onappropriations alone, while the proposed bills each create specific user-fee provisions. The proposedbills also address the regulation of Internet pharmacies. S. 109 / H.R. 328 and S. 334 / H.R. 700 propose links to patent law to influence industrybehavior. While current law does not specify when importation could begin, S. 109/H.R.328 requires regulations to allow personal-use and commercial imports 180 days afterenactment. S. 184 / H.R. 753 provides for personal-use imports atenactment and commercial imports one year later. S. 334/ H.R. 7000 beginsimports from registered exporters 90 days after enactment and by registered importers one year afterenactment. |
crs_R42846 | crs_R42846_0 | Lifeline is a federal program, established in 1984, that assists eligible individuals in paying the recurring monthly service charges associated with either wireline or wireless telephone usage. The program is part of the Low Income Program supported by the Universal Service Fund. Support is not given directly to the subscriber, but to the service provider. The Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), an independent not-for-profit organization, is the designated administrator of the Universal Service Fund (USF), of which the Lifeline Program is a part. USAC administers the USF programs for the Federal Communications Commission and does not set or advocate policy. The Lifeline program covers the minutes of use for the eligible subscriber. A failure to recertify eligibility will result in removal from the program. | The concept that all Americans should have affordable access to the telecommunications network, commonly called the "universal service concept," can trace its origins back to the 1934 Communications Act. The preservation and advancement of universal service has remained a basic tenet of federal communications policy, and in the mid-1980s the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) established the Lifeline program to provide support for low-income subscribers. The Lifeline program, which is administered under the Universal Service Fund (USF) Low Income Program, was established by the FCC in 1984 to assist eligible low-income subscribers to cover the recurring monthly service charges incurred for telephone usage. Although the program solely covers costs associated with the minutes of use, not the telephone, misinformation connecting the program to payment for a "free phone" has resulted in a significant number of constituent inquiries. |
crs_RL34303 | crs_RL34303_0 | This is a brief description of some of the more prominent. 1512 (tampering with federal witnesses), 1513 (retaliating against federal witnesses), 1503 (obstruction of pending federal court proceedings), 1505 (obstruction of pending congressional or federal administrative proceedings), 371 (conspiracy), and contempt. In addition to these, there are a host of other statutes that penalize obstruction by violence, corruption, destruction of evidence, or deceit. Nevertheless, it condemns obstructing pending judicial proceedings by means of any of four methods. Those who aid and abet a §1503 offense are liable as principals and are punishable as if they committed the offense themselves. In the wake of McNally , Congress expanded the scope of the mail and wire fraud statutes with the passage of 18 U.S.C. Mail fraud and wire fraud are both RICO and money laundering predicate offenses. Obstruction of Justice by Destruction of Evidence
Other than subsection 1512(c), three federal statutes expressly outlaw the destruction of evidence in order to obstruct justice: 18 U.S.C. Obstruction of Justice by "Tip-Off"
Although an individual who obstructs a federal investigation by tipping off the targets of the investigation is likely to incur liability either as a principal under 18 U.S.C. 1518 that condemns obstruction of federal criminal investigation of possible health care offenses; 18 U.S.C. §3C1.1)
Regardless of the offense for which an individual is convicted, his sentence may be enhanced as a consequence of any obstruction of justice for which he is responsible, if committed during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing for the offense of his conviction. The enhancement may result in an increase in his term of imprisonment by as much as 4 years. The examples in the section's commentary cover conduct:
(B) committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury, including during the course of a civil proceeding if such perjury pertains to conduct that forms the basis of the offense of conviction;
(F) providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate;
(G) providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense;
(H) providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court; [and]
(I) other conduct prohibited by obstruction of justice provisions under Title 18, United States Code (e.g., 18 U.S.C. | Obstruction of justice is the impediment of governmental activities. There are a host of federal criminal laws that prohibit obstructions of justice. The six most general outlaw obstruction of judicial proceedings (18 U.S.C. 1503), witness tampering (18 U.S.C. 1512), witness retaliation (18 U.S.C. 1513), obstruction of congressional or administrative proceedings (18 U.S.C. 1505), conspiracy to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. 371), and contempt (a creature of statute, rule and common law).
The laws that supplement, and sometimes mirror, the basic six tend to proscribe a particular means of obstruction. Some, like the perjury and false statement statutes, condemn obstruction by lies and deception. Others, like the bribery, mail fraud, and wire fraud statutes, prohibit obstruction by corruption of public employees or officials. Some outlaw the use of violence as a means of obstruction. Still others ban the destruction of evidence. A few simply punish "tipping off" those who are the targets of an investigation.
Many of these offenses may also provide the basis for racketeering and money laundering prosecutions, and each provides the basis for criminal prosecution of anyone who aids and abets in or conspires for their commission.
Moreover, regardless of the offense for which an individual is convicted, his sentence may be enhanced as a consequence of any obstruction of justice for which he is responsible, if committed during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing for the offense of his conviction. The enhancement may result in an increase in his term of imprisonment by as much as four years.
This report is available in abbreviated form—without footnotes, quotations, or citations—as CRS Report RS22783, Obstruction of Justice: An Abridged Overview of Related Federal Criminal Laws. Excerpted portions of this report are available as follows: CRS Report RL34304, Obstruction of Congress: A Brief Overview of Federal Law Relating to Interference with Congressional Activities; CRS Report RS22784, Obstruction of Congress: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal Laws Relating to Interference with Congressional Activities; CRS Report 98-808, Perjury Under Federal Law: A Brief Overview; and CRS Report 98-807, Perjury Under Federal Law: A Sketch of the Elements. All by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS20892 | crs_RS20892_0 | Background
The FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 5408 ) enacted into law by P.L. The name of the new facility is The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). This Institute is the successor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas, whose authorities were repealed in the legislation establishing the Institute. In this context, Congress authorized the creation of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, while at the same time disestablishing the U.S. Army School of the Americas in the FY2001 Defense Department authorization , enacted into law on October 30, 2000. | The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation was created pursuant to language contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 ( H.R. 5408 ), which was incorporated into the H.R. 4205 conference report ( H.Rept. 106-945 ), enacted into law on October 30, 2000 ( P.L. 106-398 ). The Institute was created by Congress in response to a legislative initiative sponsored by the Clinton Administration. When the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation was formally established in Section 2166 of Title 10 U.S.C., the authorities of its controversial predecessor, the U.S. Army School of the Americas, were repealed. This report provides background on the purpose, structure, and other aspects of the new Institute. It will be revised as events warrant. |
crs_RL34448 | crs_RL34448_0 | In February 2008, President Bush requested $147.0 billion for R&D in FY2009, a 2.7% increase over FY2008 R&D funding which was estimated to be $143.1 billion. 110-329 and P.L. President Bush's FY2009 request included $29.3 billion for basic research, up $847 million (3.0%) from FY2008; $27.1 billion for applied research, down $1.0 billion (-3.6%); $84.0 billion for development, up $1.6 billion (1.9%); and $6.5 billion for facilities and equipment, up $2.5 billion (61.7%). FY2009 Federal R&D Appropriations Status
Regular Appropriations
On September 30, 2008, President Bush signed into law H.R. 110-329 ). This act provides FY2009 appropriations for the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, as well as supplemental funding for disaster relief. On February 23, 2009, H.R. 111-8 ) was introduced in the House, and passed two days later, providing specific appropriations for the agencies covered under the continuing appropriations provisions of P.L. With the Omnibus bill under consideration in the Senate, on March 6, Congress passed and President Obama signed H.J.Res. 111-6 ), extending the continuing appropriations provisions of P.L. 110-329 through March 11, 2009. On March 10, the Senate passed H.R. 1105 without amendment. President Obama signed the act on March 11. Appropriations Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
On February 13, 2009, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. The final version of the act includes approximately $22.7 billion for R&D, facilities, and equipment and related activities. Effect of FY2007-FY2008 Appropriations Process on R&D
For the past two fiscal years, federal R&D funding levels and execution have been affected by the mechanisms used to complete the annual appropriations process—the year-long continuing resolution for FY2007 ( P.L. 110-5 ) and the combining of 11 appropriations bills into the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 for FY2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ). For example, FY2008 R&D funding for some agencies and programs was below the level requested by President Bush, and originally passed by House and Senate appropriations committees. The Senate recommended the requested level of $34 million. Each IC plans and manages its own research programs in coordination with the Office of the Director. 1 . On March 11, 2009, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 1 ). As passed by the House, H.R. On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed into law H.R. 111-5 ). Division A of this act provides continuing appropriations for FY2009 at their FY2008 levels to agencies not otherwise addressed in the act through March 6, 2009, or until the enactment into law of an appropriation for any project or activity provided for in the act, or the enactment into law of the applicable appropriations act for FY2009 without any provision for such project or activity, whichever occurs first. 111-8 ), which provides specific appropriations for the Interior Department and other agencies covered under Division A of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, was introduced in the House, and passed two days later. 38 ( P.L. No final FY2009 appropriations legislation was enacted by the beginning of that fiscal year. | In February 2008, President Bush proposed total research and development (R&D) funding of $147.0 billion in his FY2009 budget request to Congress, a $3.9 billion (2.7%) increase over the estimated FY2008 level of $143.1 billion. President Bush's request included $29.3 billion for basic research, up $847 million (3.0%) from FY2008; $27.1 billion for applied research, down $1.0 billion (-3.6%); $84.0 billion for development, up 1.6 billion (1.9%); and $6.5 billion for R&D facilities and equipment, up $2.5 billion (61.7%).
In the absence of final action on the regular FY2009 appropriations bills, Congress passed H.R. 2638 (110th Congress), the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329) which President Bush signed on September 30, 2008. This act provides FY2009 appropriations for the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs; continued funding for agencies not covered under these provisions at their FY2008 funding levels through March 6, 2009; and supplemental funding for disaster relief. The uncompleted regular appropriations bills considered by the 110th Congress expired with the beginning of the 111th Congress.
On February 23, 2009, H.R. 1105, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), which provides specific FY2009 appropriations for the agencies covered under the continuing appropriations provisions of P.L. 110-329, was introduced in the House and passed two days later. With the Omnibus bill under consideration in the Senate, on March 6 Congress passed and President Obama signed H.J.Res. 38 (P.L. 111-6), extending the continuing appropriations provisions of P.L. 110-329 through March 11, 2009. On March 10, the Senate passed H.R. 1105 without amendment. President Obama signed the act on March 11.
Additional funding for research and development was provided under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (H.R. 1), often referred to informally as "the stimulus bill." H.R. 1 was passed by the House and Senate on February 13, and signed into law (P.L. 111-5) by President Obama on February 17. The act includes approximately $22.7 billion for R&D, facilities, equipment and related activities.
For the past two fiscal years, federal R&D funding and execution has been affected by mechanisms used to complete the annual appropriations process—the year-long continuing resolution for FY2007 (P.L. 110-5) and the combining of 11 appropriations bills into the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161). For example, FY2008 R&D funding for some agencies and programs was below the level requested by President Bush and passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate. Completion of appropriations after the beginning of each fiscal year also resulted in delays or cancellation of planned R&D and equipment acquisition.
While the annual budget requests of incumbent Presidents are usually delivered to Congress in early February for the next fiscal year, the change of presidential administrations delayed the initial release of President Obama's FY2010 budget until February 26, 2009. The director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, Peter R. Orzag, has testified that a more detailed version of the budget will be released in the spring. |
crs_R40451 | crs_R40451_0 | The current authorization, under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: a Legacy for Users (SAFETEA; P.L. 109-59 ), expires September 30, 2009. FHWA has a process to estimate each states share of payments to the highway account. The Donor-Donee State Arguments
The donor state argument is that for the sake of equity each state should receive federal highway funding roughly equal to the fees and taxes that their state's highway users pay into the HTF. Donor state advocates generally contend that they have been subsidizing the repair and improvement of donee state infrastructure, especially of the older highway infrastructure in the Northeast. Donee states argue that fairness should not be separated from needs. They assert that the age of their highway infrastructures (especially those in the Northeast), the high cost of working on heavily congested urban roads, as well as the limited financial resources of large, sparsely populated western states justify their donee status. They also argue that some needs exist that are inherently federal, such as a national highway network, that cannot be based solely on state or regional boundaries. In a broader sense, the debate over equity remedies has implications for a number of issues. In recent years, the authorization legislation has been intentionally drawing down what was the unexpended balance of the highway account. Because the HTF was paying out more than was flowing into the highway account for these years, most states' ratios have exceeded 1.0 and for FY2007 all 50 states received more than they were estimated to have paid in and there were, on a dollar-in/dollar-out basis, no donor states. Relative Ratio of Apportionments and Allocations to Payments (Percentage- in/Percentage-Out Method)
Some participants in the donor-donee debate, usually donor state advocates, have argued that the dollar-in/dollar-out method of calculating the ratio is misleading because in years when the trust fund balance is drawn down, it makes many states that historically have been donor states look like donee states. Equity Bonus Reauthorization Issues
The persistence of the donor-donee debate in the reauthorization of federal surface transportation programs is a reflection of the differing views and expressed needs of the many stakeholders in federal highway spending policy and the difficulty in addressing these differences. Determine Program Size Based on Total Annual Payments to the Highway Account of the HTF
The uncertainties of projecting total program size based on share has led to some discussion of eliminating this process (see step 7 in the earlier section on the EB calculation) and simply using the total annual payments to the highway account of the HTF to determine the program size for each fiscal year. Integrate the Guaranteed Rate of Return Into All Federal-Aid Highways Programs
If the assumption is that the ultimate goal of federal-aid highway programs is to guarantee each state a certain percentage rate-of-return, for example 95%, then one way to accomplish this would be to eliminate all other formula criteria and weight all the programs within the scope of the EB based on that rate-of-return. General Fund Transfers to the HTF and the Donor-Donee Debate
Over the first 50 years of the life of the HTF significant amounts of money have been transferred from the Treasury's general fund to the HTF. The use of general funds are problematic for the basic donor-donee argument which is based on return of user fees and taxes paid by highway users. This bill would have devolved much of the federal highway program role to the states. | Few issues in the history of the Federal-Aid Highway Program have raised such heated debate as the argument over how closely the program's payments to the individual states should match the amount of federal highway taxes each state's highway users pay to the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). Referred to as the donor-donee state issue, it is expected to re-emerge during the debate over the reauthorization of federal surface transportation programs. The current authorization, under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: a Legacy for Users (SAFETEA; P.L. 109-59), expires on September 30, 2009.
"Donor states" are states whose highway users are estimated to pay more to the highway account of the HTF than they receive. "Donee states" receive more than they pay. The basic donor state argument is a relatively straightforward call for what they view as equity or fairness. Donor state advocates generally contend that for too many years they have been subsidizing the repair and improvement of donee state infrastructure, especially the older highway infrastructure in the Northeast.
Donee state advocates argue that fairness is in the eye of the beholder and should not be separated from needs. They assert that the age of their highway infrastructure, especially in the Northeast, the high cost of working on heavily congested urban roads, and also the limited financial resources of large sparsely populated Western States justify their donee status. They further argue that there are needs that are inherently federal rather than state, and that a national highway network cannot be based solely on state or regional boundaries.
A number of interest groups and State Departments of Transportation (state DOTs) are expected to propose that reauthorization increase the rate-of-return guarantee (currently 92%) and expand the scope of the statutory guarantee to cover more Federal-Aid Highway Program funding. This may be difficult to achieve in a tight budget environment. The Equity Bonus (EB) program, which is the principal means by which the rate-of-return adjustment is facilitated, is already the largest federal highway program. Others would restructure, modify or eliminate the EB altogether.
The Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) donor-donee figures indicate that for FY2007 all 50 states were donee states. For FY2006 there were 41 donee states and no donor states fell below a 91% rate-of-return (based on a dollar in-dollar out calculation method). Some donor state advocates argue that this situation is anomalous and have argued for a method of calculation that relies on share percentages, rather than dollars, because this would eliminate the modifying effect of the recent drawing down of the unexpended balances of the HTF.
Near the end of FY2008, the balance in the highway account of the HTF had fallen to the point that Congress provided for a transfer of roughly $8 billion from the Treasury's general fund to the highway account of the HTF in the hope that the transfer would be sufficient to support the guaranteed funding authorized in SAFETEA for FY2009. This transfer of general fund monies has no connection to the transportation taxes paid by highway users to the HTF and raises questions about basing an equity guarantee primarily on the states' shares of payments to the HTF. |
crs_RS22794 | crs_RS22794_0 | U.S. and other international criticism of the crackdown may have influenced Saakashvili's decision to step down as president on November 25, 2007, so that early presidential elections could be held on January 5, 2008, "because I, as this country's leader, need an unequivocal mandate to cope with all foreign threats and all kinds of pressure on Georgia." Implications for Georgia and Saakashvili
Many observers regarded the relative peacefulness of the election campaign (compared to the November 2007 violence) as a positive sign that at least fitful democratization might be preserved in Georgia. Implications for U.S. | This report discusses the campaign and results of Georgia's January 5, 2008, presidential election and implications for Russia and U.S. interests. The election took place after the sitting president, Mikheil Saakashvili, suddenly resigned in the face of domestic and international criticism over his crackdown on political dissidents. Many observers viewed Saakashvili's re-election as marking some democratization progress, but some raised concerns that political instability might endure and that Georgia's ties with NATO might suffer. This report may be updated. Related reports include CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42087 | crs_R42087_0 | Overview
Beginning with the 1948 Hook Commission, few military subjects have generated as much interest or commentary as the military retirement system. The number of reports, analyses and studies aimed at modifying or reforming the system have been voluminous. The Military Retirement System
The military retirement system is a noncontributory, defined benefit system that is viewed as a significant incentive in retaining a career military force. Disability retirement offers a choice between two retirement options: one based on years of service and one on the severity of the disability. In contrast to many private sector plans, the military retirement system also does not provide for the gradual vesting of benefits, it is an "all-or-nothing" proposition based on serving a minimum of 20 years. Under Redux, a member retiring at 20 years of service will only receive 40% of their High-3. Major Legislative Reforms of Military Retirement
Although there has been a military retirement system since 1861, the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948 established the general framework for today's military retirement system. As explained in the Senate Report on the FY1981 Authorization Act:
The committee recommends this change because of the high and increasing costs of military retired pay and because of the need to increase pay for military personnel while they serve on active duty and instead of after their active duty careers are finished. A $30,000 bonus was added to the Redux retirement program at the 15 th year of service and, most significantly from the perspective of retirement, service members were allowed to choose between Redux and the High-3 programs. Past Administration Proposals
There have been two major administration military retirement reform proposals in the past five years. The committee noted three common criticisms of the current retirement system: (1) it is perceived to be inefficient because it defers too much compensation; (2) it appears to be inflexible because it does not facilitate force management; and (3) it is inequitable because most servicemembers never qualify (or vest) for the retirement benefit. This methodology resulted in minor modifications to the DACMC's proposal but appears to have resulted in a more refined proposal. New Retirement Reform Proposals
The ongoing economic recession, persistently high unemployment, and the growing national deficit resulted in a number of studies and reports during 2010 and 2011 that focused on reducing the cost of government, including defense. 3. The report specifically notes that any recommendations enacted would apply to new entrants only and that military personnel currently serving would be grandfathered. Cost
Most of the new, more recent reform proposals have focused on the cost of the military retirement system and specific cost-cutting initiatives. As noted in Table 1 , in FY2010 there was a total of $50.842 billion paid to 2,271,000 military retirees and survivors from the Military Retirement Fund within the U.S. Treasury. These observers disagree with the military's emphasis on youth and vigor. Consider a Retirement System Similar to that Recommended by the Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC)
Using the work of the DACMC and the QRMC to establish the foundation of a reformed retirement system, other options could be added or deleted to reduce costs or provide additional incentives. | Few military subjects have generated as much interest or commentary as the military retirement system and efforts to reform the system have been many. Heightened concern over the national debt crisis, the economic recession, and stubbornly high unemployment has resulted in renewed congressional interest in the cost and effectiveness of the system. This report reviews various reform proposals and presents several potential options for Congress, ranging from maintaining the current system to a national commission to review military compensation, benefits, and retirement.
The military retirement system is a noncontributory, defined benefit plan which guarantees a specific monthly payment after 20 or more years of service. Vesting occurs at 20 years of service, regardless of age, and is therefore an "all or nothing" proposition. Retirement age varies, but most military retirees are young enough to pursue private-sector careers following their military service. Most observers note that ,while effective as a retention tool, military retirement is also very expensive—in FY2010 there were 2,271,000 retirees and survivors receiving a total of $50.842 billion from the federal government. However, because of the way the government accounts for military retirement, the direct cost to the Department of Defense (DOD) is significantly less. In FY2009, DOD paid $17.5 billion to the Military Retirement Fund to fund the future retirement of the military cohort who entered the military during 2009.
Critics of the military retirement system frequently cite several points in addition to cost: (1) It is inefficient because it defers too much compensation until the completion of a military career; (2) It is inflexible because it does not facilitate force management or encourage longer careers; and (3) It is inequitable because most servicemembers never qualify or vest.
The military retirement system has evolved over time (see "Major Legislative Reforms of Military Retirement"). Today, active component servicemembers choose between two retirement systems at their 15th year of service (either High-3 or Redux), reservists are restricted to one system (a modified version of High-3), and disability retirees also have the opportunity to choose between two systems (High-3 or Disability retirement). Many observers have agreed that a reformed retirement system could enhance retention, provide an improved force management tool, and provide an equitable retirement regardless of component or special situation. A review of past legislative proposals finds that they have been controversial, unpopular with DOD and servicemembers, and generally focused on reducing the cost of military retirement. The Redux option, in particular, has become a less attractive option and fewer and fewer servicemembers are selecting it.
The cost factor, combined with the recent emphasis on reducing costs in DOD and the overall federal deficit, resulted in a number of studies, commissions and reports in 2010. However, these efforts did not result in comprehensive policy changes. In addition to the most recent commission and think tank reports, two other efforts within the past five years included detailed recommendations for retirement reform. The 2005 Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation (DACMC) established a framework for a comprehensive restructuring of military retirement. This was followed in 2008 by the 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) that further modeled, refined, and amplified on the work of the DACMC. Both efforts supported applying a reformed military retirement system to new entrants only; currently serving and already retired members would be grandfathered. |
crs_R43057 | crs_R43057_0 | Introduction
Americans financially prepare for retirement in a variety of ways: most individuals who work are eligible for Social Security benefits; about half the workforce is covered by an employer-sponsored pension; some save for retirement using Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs); others accumulate non-retirement financial assets, such as stocks, bonds, and mutual funds; and some accumulate non-financial assets, such as homes or other real estate or business ownerships. Employers who offer pension plans for their workers sponsor one or both types: defined benefit (DB) pension plans or defined contribution (DC) pension plans. Congress has expressed support for the goal of increasing U.S. household retirement income security. The nature of employer-sponsored pensions has changed over the past 30 years. Because of this shift, an increasing number of households have greater responsibility for their economic well-being in retirement. Types of Retirement Plans and Accounts
Congress has authorized a variety of tax incentives to encourage employers and workers to save for retirement. Data in this report are from the 2010 SCF, which is a triennial household survey conducted by the Federal Reserve. Within each age group, median net worth was higher for married households than for single households. Possible explanations for the low percentage among households in which the head is older than 74 years include (1) these households are most likely to be retired and thus have been drawing down their retirement assets and (2) these households are more likely to have a DB pension plan, which is a source of income in retirement but is not measured by the SCF. Table 1 and Table 2 also show that there was a large increase in the median and average amounts of non-retirement financial assets for single households in which the age of the head of household is 75 or older compared with single households in which the age of the householder is 65 to 74. For all single and married households, the average amount of non-retirement financial assets was larger than the amount of retirement assets. Younger households are less likely than older households to be covered by DB pension plans and so may need to prepare for retirement differently than previous generations. Households in which neither the head of the household nor the spouse were in the labor force would likely not have made a contribution to a retirement account in 2010 because (1) they would not have been working for an employer that offered a defined contribution retirement plan and (2) they would not have had income from wages from which to make a contribution to an IRA. Section 415(b)(1)(A), the maximum benefit allowed from a DB plan is $205,000 in 2013. The proposed FY2014 budget estimates that the amount of DC plan assets needed to fund an annuity equal to $205,000 would be approximately $3.4 million. Less than 1.0% of U.S. households had IRA or DC assets of $1.0 million or more. Except for households in which the head of the household was aged 75 or older, the percentage of housing as a percentage of total assets generally declined as the age of the head of the household increased. Although this report does not address whether households have sufficient resources from which to ensure an adequate standard of living in retirement, the data in this report highlight the importance of understanding the context in which decisions about saving for retirement occur. Some of the factors that might affect the accumulation of retirement assets include demographic characteristics of the household (e.g., age of the head of the household, marital status, number of children, if any); the financial situation of the household (e.g., ownership of other assets and the amount and type of household debt); and the employment situation of the household (e.g., whether employed, the worker's participation in other retirement plans, and the amount of Social Security benefits the household expects to receive). Figure 3 indicates that in 2010 households in which the head was younger than 55 years old were more likely to have a DC plan than an IRA or a DB plan. Retirement income adequacy is an important concern for both working and non-working households. | Whether households have sufficient savings from which to ensure adequate income throughout retirement is a concern of households and, therefore, policymakers. The retirement income landscape has been changing over the past few decades. Although most households are eligible to receive Social Security benefits in retirement, over the past 30 years, the types of non-Social Security sources of retirement income have been changing. About half of the U.S. workforce is covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan. An increasing number of employers offer defined contributions (DC) pension plans (i.e., tax-advantaged accounts in which employee, and sometimes employer, contributions accrue investment returns) in lieu of traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plans (i.e., monthly payments to a retiree by a former employer). This shift in the nature of employer-sponsored pensions places more responsibility on workers to financially prepare for their own retirement. Households also save for retirement using Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), into which contributions, up to a specified limit, are tax-deductible for some individuals.
Congress has several reasons for its interest in the retirement preparedness of American households: income from Social Security may be insufficient to provide for an adequate standard of living in retirement for U.S. households; congressional actions may encourage or discourage employer and household efforts to provide for their own well-being in retirement; and the U.S. Treasury will forego $117 billion in FY2013 as a result of tax policies that are designed to encourage employer and worker retirement savings. President Obama's FY2014 budget would prohibit contributions to DC pension plans and IRAs that have a value over $3.4 million. This threshold is specified to be equivalent to the maximum annual payment allowed from a DB pension plan, which is $205,000 in 2013.
This report provides data on a variety of household wealth measures in 2010 from the Federal Reserve's triennial Survey of Consumer Finances. Although the amount of retirement assets is the primary focus of the report, other measures of wealth (such as the amount of total assets, financial assets, total debt, net worth, and housing equity) are also included. The report classifies the amount of assets and debt by the age of the head of the household for both single and married households. In general, the amount of household wealth is higher for married households than for single households. Household wealth generally increased as the age of the head of the household increased, although some measures decreased for those households in which the head of the household was aged 75 or older. In general, the median values were less than the average values, which is an indication that some households held relatively large amounts of wealth compared with most households.
Among households with retirement assets, households in which the head is younger than 55 years old are more likely to own DC pension plan assets than they are likely to own assets from IRAs, whereas households in which the head is aged 55 or older are more likely to have IRA assets. In 2010, less than 1.0% of U.S. households had IRA or DC assets of $1.0 million or more.
Ownership of a principal residence is likely to be a factor that affects the accumulation of retirement assets. Survey data suggest an important saving goal for younger households is home ownership, whereas preparing for retirement is an important saving goal for older households. As the age of the head of the household increases, the percentage of assets represented by the household's principal residence decreases, although there is not a discernible pattern to the percentage of wealth that retirement assets represent. |
crs_RL33782 | crs_RL33782_0 | Introduction
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) established a prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries under Part D, which began on January 1, 2006. One provision of MMA, the "noninterference" clause, expressly forbids the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) from interfering with drug price negotiation between manufacturers and Medicare drug plan sponsors, and from instituting a formulary or price structure for prescription drugs. The framework created by the law emphasizes competition among the Medicare drug plans to obtain price discounts. Conceptual Framework for Federal Involvement in Determining Drug Prices and Costs
There are a number of approaches that the federal government could adopt to affect prescription drug prices and expenditures. Others emphasize more market-oriented approaches, such as soliciting competitive bids from voluntary participants. A reference pricing approach combines elements of both by dictating some aspects of the price but also allowing market forces to work. The price the VA pays for a drug is the lowest price as determined through one of four methods, less an additional five percent prime vendor discount. The four approaches available to the VA are: (1) the federal ceiling price, (2) the federal supply schedule, (3) the blanket purchasing agreements/performance-based incentive agreements, or (4) the national standardization contracts. The VA Experience and Medicare Part D
There are many practical and legislative steps necessary before federal drug price negotiation for Medicare beneficiaries could take place. However, repealing the noninterference clause may not, in itself, be sufficient to lead to federally negotiated prices. Federal Upper Limit (FUL)
For most multiple-source drugs (where more than one FDA-approved product is available), the FULs are applied in the aggregate based on a predetermined percentage of a defined reference price. 101-508 ) requires drug manufacturers to enter into agreements with the Secretary of HHS to provide rebates to the states that reflect the lowest price that manufacturers offer to other purchasers for their drugs. Consequences of Increased Federal Involvement in the Determination of Drug Prices and Costs
If the Secretary were to engage in activities that affect drug prices on behalf of Medicare Part D beneficiaries, the implications could be wide-ranging and potentially quite significant. 4
On January 12, 2007, the House passed H.R. 4 , the Medicare Prescription Drug Price Negotiation Act of 2007. This bill would amend the Social Security Act by (1) striking section 1860D—11(i) (relating to noninterference), (2) add language that would require the Secretary of HHS to negotiate prescription drug prices, and (3) maintain the prohibition against the establishment of a formulary by the Secretary while (4) allowing prescription drug plans to obtain discounts or price reductions below those negotiated by the Secretary. CBO has scored the bill as having "a negligible effect on federal spending." Specifically, the absence of the authority to establish a formulary would limit the Secretary's ability to influence the outcome of negotiations, as bargaining leverage would be limited. S. 3 would also require the CBO to study the effect of market competition on prices for drugs under Part D. The study would (1) examine the number and extent of discounts and other price concessions received by prescription drug plans and MA-PD plans for covered Part D drugs, (2) examine the relationship between discounts and price concessions and drug utilization, (3) compare the Medicare Part D discounts and price concessions with those obtained under the Medicaid program, and (4) examine the extent to which the efforts of the Secretary of Health and Human Services would have an effect upon payers in non-Medicare markets. On April 18, 2007, the Senate did not invoke cloture on S. 3 . This report will be updated. | The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) established a prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries under Part D, which began on January 1, 2006. One provision of MMA, the "noninterference" clause, expressly forbids the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) from interfering with drug price negotiation between manufacturers and Medicare drug plan sponsors, and from instituting a formulary or price structure for prescription drugs. The framework created by the law emphasizes competition among the Medicare drug plans to obtain price discounts.
Approaches that the federal government could adopt to affect prescription drug prices range from dictating an outcome, such as imposing statutory mandates or establishing price ceilings, to more market-oriented approaches such as soliciting competitive bids from voluntary participants. A reference pricing approach combines elements of both. Some of these methods are currently employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Medicaid program. The price the VA pays for a drug is the lowest price as determined through one of four methods, less an additional 5% prime vendor discount: (1) the federal ceiling price, (2) federal supply schedule, (3) performance-based incentive agreement, or (4) national standardization contract. Drug reimbursement costs under Medicaid are calculated differently for single-source (only one Food and Drug Administration-approved product) and multiple-source drugs (more than one FDA-approved product). However, for both types of drugs, state reimbursements are determined in aggregate based on either the federal upper limit price (FUL)—a predetermined percentage of a defined reference price—or the estimated acquisition cost. Drug manufacturers also enter into agreements with the Secretary of HHS and provide rebates to the states that reflect the lowest price that manufacturers offer to other purchasers of their drugs.
There are many practical and legislative steps necessary before federal drug price negotiation for Medicare beneficiaries could take place. Repealing the noninterference clause is a necessary first step, but may not be sufficient to lead to federally negotiated prices. If the Secretary were to engage in activities that affect drug prices on behalf of Medicare Part D beneficiaries, there might be consequences that affect the price of drugs for Medicare beneficiaries as well as other public and private patients, the number and types of drugs that would be available to Part D beneficiaries, the amount of research and development and innovation by pharmaceutical companies, and other sectors of the industry. Both H.R. 4 and S. 3 would strike the noninterference provision in MMA while maintaining the prohibition against price setting and the establishment of a formulary, but H.R. 4 would also require the Secretary of HHS to negotiate prescription drug prices. Because the absence of a formulary would limit the Secretary's bargaining leverage, CBO has scored each bill as having "a negligible effect on federal spending." On January 12, 2007, the House passed H.R. 4, the Medicare Prescription Drug Price Negotiation Act of 2007, and on April 18, 2007, the Senate did not invoke cloture on S. 3, the Medicare Fair Prescription Drug Price Act of 2007. This report will be updated. |
crs_R41715 | crs_R41715_0 | Background
The financial crisis implicated the unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market as a major source of systemic risk. In the wake of the crisis, lawmakers sought to introduce regulatory controls over this market, which many viewed as opaque and unregulated. This report examines how conflicts of interest in derivatives clearinghouses may arise, and what impact such conflicts could have on derivatives reform. It analyzes the measures that the CFTC and SEC have proposed to address such conflicts, and whether such proposed measures effectively address the types of conflicts of interest that are of concern to some in the 112 th Congress. These rulemakings may interest the 112 th Congress as part of its oversight authority over the CFTC and SEC. The effect of the margin system is to eliminate the possibility that any market participant can build up an uncapitalized exposure (or paper loss) so large that default would cause the clearinghouse to fail. No futures clearinghouse in the United States has ever failed. Clearinghouses limit the size of a cleared position based on a firm's ability to post margin to cover its potential losses. Futures contracts are traded on exchanges regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Stock options are traded on exchanges regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Dodd-Frank Act seeks to make standardized clearing of all forms of derivatives the norm, especially in transactions where the counterparties are systemically important financial institutions. Difficulty in pricing swaps could be a source of systemic risk. The regulators must approve the swap for clearing . Conflicts of Interest in Clearing
As lawmakers focused on clearing, concerns arose as to whether the small number of large swaps dealers in existence might influence clearinghouses or trading platforms in ways that could undermine the potential efficacy of clearing in mitigating systemic risk. 4173 , which would have restricted ownership interest and governance of the new derivatives clearinghouses by certain large financial institutions and major swap participants. The Senate, however, did not take the approach of the Lynch amendment in its version of H.R. In the final Dodd-Frank Act, Sections 726 and 765 mandate that the CFTC and SEC, respectively, must adopt rules to mitigate conflicts of interest; but leave it to the agencies themselves to decide whether those rules should include strict numerical limits on ownership or control. In the CFTC's proposed rules to mitigate conflicts of interest, published on October 18, 2010, and on January 6, 2011, the CFTC did choose to propose strict ownership limits, along the lines of the Lynch amendment. The SEC's proposed rules also adopt such limits. They also argue that limiting the ownership of large banks who are the major swap dealers would also limit the crucial expertise on swaps that DCOs need in order to accurately assess the riskiness of various derivatives, and to decide whether to clear them, and if so, how to set margin requirements accurately. We saw the same large banks fail to require sufficient collateral from AIG in the lead-up to the financial crisis, they explain; and as a result of the "undercapitalization" of these banks, billions of dollars were needed from Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC to prevent widespread default. Appendix. For the OTC market as a whole, the interest rate swaps market is by far the largest OTC product traded, representing about 93% of the notional amount of OTC derivatives. | The financial crisis implicated the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market as a source of systemic risk. In the wake of the crisis, lawmakers sought to reduce systemic risk to the financial system by regulating this market. One of the reforms that Congress introduced in the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) was mandatory clearing of OTC derivatives through clearinghouses, in an effort to remake the OTC market more in the image of the regulated futures exchanges. Clearinghouses require traders to put down cash or liquid assets, called margin, to cover potential losses and prevent any firm from building up a large uncapitalized exposure, as happened in the case of the American International Group (AIG). Clearinghouses thus limit the size of a cleared position based on a firm's ability to post margin to cover its potential losses.
As lawmakers focused on clearing requirements to reduce systemic risk, concerns also arose as to whether the small number of large swaps dealers in existence—mostly the largest banks—might influence clearinghouses or trading platforms in ways that could undermine the efficacy of the approach. Concerns about conflicts of interest in clearing center around whether, if large swap dealers dominate a clearinghouse, they might directly or indirectly restrict access to the clearinghouse; whether they might limit the scope of derivatives products eligible for clearing; or whether they might influence a clearinghouse to lower margin requirements.
Trading in OTC derivatives is in fact concentrated around a dozen or so major dealers. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) estimated that, as of the third quarter of 2010, five large commercial banks in the United States represented 96% of the banking industry's total notional amounts of all derivatives; and those five banks represented 81% of the industry's net credit exposure to derivatives. The first group of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients included nearly all the large derivatives dealers. As a result of the high degree of market concentration, the failure of a large swaps dealer still has the potential to result in the nullification of tens of billions of dollars worth of contracts, which could pose a systemic threat.
A 2009-proposed amendment proposed to H.R. 4173, which passed the House, would have limited ownership interest and governance of the new derivatives clearinghouses by certain large financial institutions and major swap participants. Sections 726 and 765 in the final version of the Dodd-Frank Act mandate that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), respectively, must adopt rules to mitigate conflicts of interest. However, it allowed the agencies to decide whether those rules include strict numerical limits on ownership or control. In the CFTC's proposed rules to mitigate conflicts of interest, published on October 18, 2010, and on January 6, 2011, the CFTC did choose to adopt strict ownership limits, along the lines of the Lynch amendment. The SEC's proposed rule, published on October 13, 2010, does the same.
This report examines how conflicts of interest may arise and analyzes the measures that the CFTC and SEC proposed to address them. It discusses what effect, if any, ownership and control limits may have on derivatives clearing; and whether such limits effectively address the types of conflicts of interest that are of concern to some in the 112th Congress. These rulemakings may interest the 112th Congress as part of its oversight authority for the CFTC and SEC. Trends in clearing and trading derivatives, and the ownership of swap clearinghouses, are discussed in the Appendix. |
crs_95-717 | crs_95-717_0 | Introduction
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, is the statute by which the United States authorizes tort suits to be brought against itself. With exceptions, it made the United States liable:
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. Thus, the FTCA makes the United States liable for the torts of its employees to the extent that private employers are liable under state law for the torts of their employees. The FTCA, however, contains exceptions under which the United States may not be held liable even though a private employer could be held liable under state law. Three of these exceptions are examined in separate sections of this report: the Feres doctrine, which prohibits suits by military personnel for injuries sustained incident to service; the discretionary function exception; and the intentional tort exception. Suits Against Federal Employees
The Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, P.L. As for Congress, some Members in the past have shown interest in amending the Feres doctrine to the extent of authorizing medical malpractice suits. In the 111 th Congress, the Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009 ( H.R. 1478 / S. 1347 ) was introduced. Federal law, however, bars victims of atomic testing from suing federal government contractors. | The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is the statute by which the United States authorizes tort suits to be brought against itself. With exceptions, it makes the United States liable for injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any federal employee acting within the scope of his employment, in accordance with the law of the state where the act or omission occurred. Three major exceptions, under which the United States may not be held liable, even in circumstances where a private person could be held liable under state law, are the Feres doctrine, which prohibits suits by military personnel for injuries sustained incident to service; the discretionary function exception, which immunizes the United States for acts or omissions of its employees that involve policy decisions; and the intentional tort exception, which precludes suits against the United States for assault and battery, among some other intentional torts, unless they are committed by federal law enforcement or investigative officials.
This report discusses, among other things, the application of the Feres doctrine to suits for injuries caused by medical malpractice in the military, the prohibition of suits by victims of atomic testing, Supreme Court cases interpreting the discretionary function exception, the extent to which federal employees may be held liable for torts they commit in the scope of their employment, and the government contractor defense to products liability design defect suits.
In the 111th Congress, three bills have been introduced that would amend the Federal Tort Claims Act: H.R. 1478/S. 1347, the Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 3285, and S. 1578. |
crs_R41094 | crs_R41094_0 | Background
International child custody disputes figure to increase in frequency as the global society becomes more integrated and mobile. What is more, a child custody dispute between two parents can become a diplomatic imbroglio between two countries. In Abbott v. Abbott the U.S. Supreme Court will address an issue that has divided the Circuit Courts of Appeals: Whether a ne exeat right is a "right of custody" for purposes of the Hague Convention? Hague Convention
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Hague Convention") protects children from wrongful removal across international borders and provides procedures to aid in their safe return. While the Convention has been the principal mechanism for enforcing the return of abducted children to the United States, it is not without limitations. As such, the proceeding is brought in the country to which the child was abducted or in which the child is retained. Procedures and remedies available under the Convention differ depending on the parental rights infringed. Article 5 in turn defines "rights of custody," and distinguishes those rights from "rights of access":
(a) "rights of custody" shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence;
(b) "rights of access" shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence. Significance of Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court's decision will address the question of whether the Hague Convention requires the return of a child to the home country if the child was removed to the United States in violation of a ne exeat order or statute. | International child custody disputes figure to increase in frequency as the global society becomes more integrated and mobile. A child custody dispute between two parents can become a diplomatic imbroglio between two countries. Thus in 2000, Members of Congress and Vice President Al Gore backed legislation to grant Cuban refugee Elian Gonzalez permanent residency status, even after President Fidel Castro demanded the boy's return. More recently, in the 111th Congress, both houses passed resolutions (S.Res. 37 and H.R. 125) calling on the Brazilian government to return Sean Goldman, the son of New Jersey resident David Goldman, to the United States.
In the case of the Goldman family, the father's legal argument for return was based on the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("Hague Convention"). This treaty was entered into force in the United States in 1988, and has since been the principal mechanism for enforcing parental rights in international custody disputes. However, judicial interpretation of certain Hague Convention provisions has been inconsistent among federal Circuit Courts of Appeals. The lives of one British-American family—the Abbotts—and the lives of families similarly situated may be affected by how the United States Supreme Court resolves this circuit split in Abbott v. Abbott.
In this case, the Court will determine whether a ne exeat, or "no exit" order granting one parent the right to veto another parent's decision to remove their child from his or her home country is a "right of custody" under the Hague Convention. Such a determination is necessary to determine the Convention's applicability, as it only provides for a child's return to the country which issued the ne exeat order if the removal was "wrongful" and in breach of "rights of custody."
This report discusses the circuit split on the treaty interpretation issue, the arguments made before the Supreme Court in Abbott, and the significance of the case. |
crs_R40619 | crs_R40619_0 | The Federal Response to a Flu Pandemic
A flu pandemic is a worldwide epidemic of an influenza virus. As such, the United States' response to a flu pandemic would have both international and domestic components. Additionally, the domestic response effort would depend upon contributions from every governmental level (local, state, tribal, and federal), non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. This report will focus largely on the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in supporting the nation's domestic response effort, although it will also touch on DOD's international role. Like the NRF, it affirms that the Secretary of State would be responsible for the coordination of the international response, the Secretary of Homeland Security would have overall responsibility for the federal government's response to a pandemic, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services would be responsible for the "overall coordination of the public health and medical emergency response during a pandemic...." It describes the role to the Secretary of Defense as follows:
The Secretary of Defense will be responsible for protecting American interests at home and abroad. Of the tasks assigned primarily to DoD, most were related to one of these four objectives:
Assisting in disease surveillance Assisting partner nations, particularly through military-to-military assistance Protecting and treating US forces and dependents Providing support to civil authorities in the United States Each of these general objectives is discussed in more detail below. Note, however, that DOD's ability to support these requests would be limited by its national defense and force protection responsibilities. providing disease surveillance and laboratory diagnostics transporting response teams, vaccines, medical equipment, supplies, diagnostic devices, pharmaceuticals and blood products treating patients evacuating the ill and injured processing and tracking patients providing base and installation support to federal, state, local, and tribal agencies controlling movement into and out of areas, or across borders, with affected populations supporting law enforcement supporting quarantine enforcement restoring damaged public utilities providing mortuary services
Mechanisms for Providing DSCA
The two principal ways in which such support could be provided are by way of an "immediate response," or in response to a formal "request for assistance" (RFA). Additionally, in extreme circumstances the federal government may expedite or suspend the RFA process and initiate a "proactive federal response." Current DOD plans do not anticipate the mobilization of Reserve or National Guard personnel . However, these plans could be modified if circumstances warranted (for example, if the severity of the pandemic significantly exceeded DOD's planning assumptions). Activating the National Guard for Pandemic Flu Response
National Guard personnel would almost certainly be involved in state efforts to respond to a flu pandemic as members of their state militia under the control of their governor. For example, the activation of Reserve and National Guard medical personnel may pull them out of local hospitals where they are already engaged in the response effort, thereby undermining state and local response efforts. | A flu pandemic is a worldwide epidemic of an influenza virus. As such, the United States' response to a flu pandemic would have both international and domestic components. Additionally, the domestic response effort would include contributions from every governmental level (local, state, tribal, and federal), non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. This report will focus largely on the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in supporting the nation's domestic response effort, although it will also touch on DOD's international role.
The Department of State would lead the federal government's international response efforts, while the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services would lead the federal government's domestic response. The Department of Defense would likely be called upon to support both the international and domestic efforts. An analysis of the tasks assigned by the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan indicates that DOD's role during a flu pandemic would center on the following objectives: assisting in disease surveillance; assisting partner nations, particularly through military-to-military assistance; protecting and treating US forces and dependents; and providing support to civil authorities in the United States
With respect to providing support to civil authorities in the United States, the types of defense support which would likely be in greatest demand during a flu pandemic include: providing disease surveillance and laboratory diagnostics; transporting response teams, vaccines, medical equipment, supplies, diagnostic devices, pharmaceuticals and blood products; treating patients; evacuating the ill and injured; processing and tracking patients; providing base and installation support to federal, state, local, and tribal agencies; controlling movement into and out of areas, or across borders, with affected populations; supporting law enforcement; supporting quarantine enforcement; restoring damaged public utilities; and providing mortuary services. Note, however, that DOD's ability to support these requests would be limited by its national defense and force protection responsibilities. The two principal ways in which defense support could be provided to civil authorities are by way of an "immediate response," or in response to a formal "request for assistance" (RFA). Additionally, in extreme circumstances the federal government may expedite or suspend the RFA process and initiate a "proactive federal response."
National Guard personnel would almost certainly be involved in domestic response efforts as members of their state militia under the control of their governor. Current DOD plans do not anticipate federal mobilization of the National Guard or Reserves to respond to a flu pandemic. However, these plans could be modified if circumstances warranted it (for example, if the severity of the pandemic significantly exceeded DOD's planning assumptions). In the event such a federal mobilization is contemplated, an important consideration would be the impact it would have on any response efforts that were already occurring at the state and local levels. For example, the activation of Reserve and National Guard medical personnel may pull them out of local hospitals where they are already engaged in the response effort, thereby undermining state and local response efforts. |
crs_R42892 | crs_R42892_0 | Overview and Legislative History
In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy impacted a wide swath of the East Coast of the United States. The President had, as of January 31, 2013, declared major disasters for 12 states plus the District of Columbia under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. The Administration submitted a request to Congress on December 7, 2012, for $60.4 billion in supplemental funding and legislative provisions to address both the immediate losses and damages from Hurricane Sandy, as well as to mitigate the damage from future disasters in the impacted region. 3338 , entitled the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, was introduced as an amendment to H.R. This legislation would have provided $60.41 billion in supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance, as well as a suite of legislative provisions that included reforms to disaster assistance authorities. The Senate made several changes to the amendment (which was passed by voice vote), and then passed the supplemental appropriations legislation on December 28, 2012, by a vote of 62-32. The House did not act on the legislation before the end of the 112 th Congress. 113th Congress
On January 4, 2013, the House and Senate both passed H.R. 41 , legislation providing an additional $9.7 billion in borrowing authority for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which had been a part of the Administration's request. The President signed it into law as P.L. 113-1 on January 6, 2013. H.R. The House Appropriations Committee described H.R. The House took up the legislation on January 15, 2013. The rule for consideration of the bill combined H.R. 219 , a House-passed package of legislative provisions reforming disaster assistance programs, with the appropriations legislation upon engrossment of H.R. 152 , and sent them to the Senate as a single package. The Senate passed H.R. 152 unchanged on January 28, 2013 by a vote of 62-36, and it was signed into law as P.L. 113-2 the next day. A breakdown of the Administration's request that illuminates the Administration's separate request for mitigation funding is included in CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief . 152 as it passed both House and Senate and was ultimately signed into law. Senate-passed H.R. P.L. 1 , and P.L. However, an amendment was offered in the House to offset $17 billion of disaster assistance from H.R. A Senate amendment to offset the entire cost of H.R. P.L. This issue was discussed by the Administrator of FEMA in testimony on Hurricane Sandy. | On January 29, 2013, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, a $50.5 billion package of disaster assistance largely focused on responding to Hurricane Sandy, was enacted as P.L. 113-2.
In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy impacted a wide swath of the East Coast of the United States, resulting in more than 120 deaths and major disaster declarations for 12 states plus the District of Columbia. The Administration submitted a request to Congress on December 7, 2012, for $60.4 billion in supplemental funding and legislative provisions to address both the immediate losses and damages from Hurricane Sandy, as well as to mitigate the damage from future disasters in the impacted region.
On January 15, 2013, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 152, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013. This bill included $50.5 billion in disaster assistance. This was the third piece of disaster legislation considered by the House in the 113th Congress. H.R. 41, which passed the House and Senate on January 4, 2013 and was signed into law two days later as P.L. 113-1, provided $9.7 billion in additional borrowing authority for the National Flood Insurance Program. On January 14, the House passed H.R. 219, legislation making changes to disaster assistance programs. The rule for consideration of H.R. 152 combined the text of H.R. 219 with H.R. 152 upon its engrossment, to send them to the Senate as a single package.
The Senate passed H.R. 152 unchanged on January 28, 2013 by a vote of 62-36, and it was signed into law as P.L. 113-2 the next day.
H.R. 152 was not the initial legislative response to the storm. In the 112th Congress, the Senate passed a separate package of disaster assistance totaling $60.4 billion, as well as several legislative provisions reforming federal disaster programs. While appropriations legislation generally originates in the House of Representatives, the Senate chose to act on the Administration's request first by amending an existing piece of House-passed appropriations legislation—H.R. 1. This passed the Senate December 28, 2012, by a vote of 62-32. The House did not act on the legislation before the end of the 112th Congress.
This summary report analyzes the Administration's request, the initial Senate position from the 112th Congress, and H.R. 152, the legislative package developed in the House that was ultimately enacted as P.L. 113-2.
For details concerning the legislative provisions requested by the Administration, as well as those included in Senate-amended H.R. 1, see CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief. Division B of P.L. 113-2, which amends several disaster assistance programs managed by FEMA, is discussed separately in CRS Report R42991, Analysis of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013. |
crs_RL34006 | crs_RL34006_0 | Introduction
As policymakers contemplate ways to address Social Security's long-term financial challenges, pension reforms across the world have gained new attention. This report focuses on Chile, one of the most oft-cited cases of pension reform internationally. In 1981, Chile initiated sweeping reforms that replaced a state-run, pay-as-you-go defined benefit retirement system with a private, defined contribution individual retirement accounts system. As a pioneer of individual accounts, Chile has become a case study for many countries seeking to reform their retirement systems. Although the Chilean experience is not directly comparable to the United States situation because of large differences between the countries, the case may offer some valuable insights for policymakers who are interested in individual retirement accounts. The report begins with a description of the U.S. Social Security policy debate and a brief comparison of Chile and the United States. Next, the report explains what Chile's individual retirement accounts system is and how it works. The final section provides an assessment of the individual retirement accounts system's performance relative to some of its initial goals. Under the intermediate assumptions of the Social Security trustees, the system is projected to begin running cash flow deficits in the year 2017, at which point the system must begin redeeming any bonds (including interest) accumulated in previous years. The Social Security Debate
The longer it takes to address Social Security's financing challenge, the greater the changes will need to be. The Debate and the Chilean Case
As policymakers consider how to address Social Security's challenges in the United States, other countries' experiences with retirement reforms have gained attention. This CRS report focuses on the retirement component of Chile's social security system. Gender equity is also addressed in the pension reform bill. These trends reflect a growing concern in Chile that the current system does not cover the entire labor force and provides inadequate benefits to an important segment of workers. Individual retirement accounts have contributed to the Chilean economy in a number of ways and the returns on pension fund investments have been greater than expected. Analysts also agree that administrative costs have been too high. | Over the past few years, there has been intense debate about Social Security reform in the United States. A number of options, ranging from changing the benefit formula to adding individual accounts, has been discussed. The policy debate takes place against the backdrop of an aging population, rising longevity, and relatively low fertility rates, which pose long-range financial challenges to the Social Security system. According to the 2007 Social Security Trustees Report's intermediate assumptions, the Social Security trust funds are projected to experience cash-flow deficits in 2017 and to become exhausted in 2041.
As policymakers consider how to address Social Security's financing challenges, efforts of Social Security reform across the world have gained attention. One of the most oft-cited international cases of reform is Chile. Chile initiated sweeping retirement reforms in 1981 that replaced a state-run, pay-as-you-go defined benefit retirement system with a private, mandatory system of individual retirement accounts where benefits are dependent on the account balance. As a pioneer of individual retirement accounts, Chile has become a case study of pension reform around the world. Although Chile's experience is not directly comparable to the situation in the United States because of large differences between the countries, knowledge of the case may be useful for American policymakers.
This CRS report focuses on the Chilean individual retirement accounts system. It begins with a description of the U.S. Social Security policy debate, along with a brief comparison of Chile and the United States. Next, the report explains what Chile's individual retirement accounts system is and how it works. The pension reform bill sent to the Chilean Congress for debate in 2007 is also discussed. The report does not address other components of Chile's social security system, such as maternity, work injury, and unemployment.
The final section provides an assessment of Chile's now 26-year-old individual retirement accounts system. Pension reforms have contributed to the rapid growth in the Chilean economy over the past two decades and returns on pension fund investments have been greater than expected. Administrative costs, however, have been high and participation rates have been modest at best. There is concern that the system does not cover the entire labor force and provides inadequate benefits to low income workers.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40754 | crs_R40754_0 | Introduction
Prompted in part by proposals to close the detention facility or transfer detainees to the United States, the continued detention of alleged enemy combatants at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was the subject of considerable interest during the 111 th Congress. However, Congress temporarily extended conditions imposed by FY2010 appropriations measures through March 4, 2011. Additionally, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (2011 NDAA, P.L. The act also imposes restrictions on the transfer of detainees to the custody of certain foreign countries, in an effort to minimize the likelihood that transferred detainees return to hostilities. 111-32 ); the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-83 ); the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 111-84 ); the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-88 ); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ); the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-118 ); and the 2011 NDAA ( P.L. The majority of these enactments contain restrictions on the use of appropriated funds to transfer or release Guantanamo detainees into the United States; the most stringent restriction being found in the 2011 NDAA, which includes a blanket prohibition on the use of authorized funds to transfer or release Guantanamo detainees into the country for any purpose. Two other measures enacted in the 111 th Congress, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-212 ), and the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2010 ( P.L. 111-322 ) into law. Pursuant to the fourth Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 ( P.L. Although several FY2010 appropriations measures restricted appropriated funds from being used to transfer or release Guantanamo detainees into the United States, they permitted transfers for purposes of criminal prosecution or detention during legal proceedings, contingent upon certain reporting requirements being fulfilled. 111-383 ) which was signed into law on January 7, 2011, imposes more significant restrictions on detainee transfers than previous enactments. In addition to establishing an absolute bar on the use of authorized Department of Defense (DOD) funds to transfer or release detainees into the United States, this provision also bars funds from being used to assist in the transfer or release of such persons. Because Guantanamo detainees are presently in military custody, the 2011 NDAA appears to effectively bar the transfer of any Guantanamo detainee into the country, despite language in previously enacted measures that permitted other federal agencies to use appropriated funds to transfer detainees into the country for criminal prosecution. While highly critical of these provisions' effect on executive discretion, President Obama's signing statement did not allege that they represented an unconstitutional infringement upon executive authority, or claim that the executive branch was not legally bound to comply with the provisions' requirements. The 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, the first measure to be enacted, required the President to submit a classified report to Congress concerning the proposed transfer of an individual to the United States that would, at minimum, contain (1) "findings of an analysis regarding any risk to the national security of the United States that is posed by the transfer"; (2) "costs associated with transferring the individual"; (3) "[t]he legal rationale and associated court demands for transfer"; (4) "[a] plan for mitigation of any risk" posed by the transferee to the national security of the United States; and (5) "[a] copy of a notification to the Governor of the State to which the individual will be transferred ... with a certification by the Attorney General of the United States in classified form at least 14 days prior to such transfer (together with supporting documentation and justification) that the individual poses little or no security risk to the United States." First, Title XVIII of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. Other Selected Proposals Considered in the 111th Congress
Numerous legislative proposals introduced during the 111 th Congress addressed the disposition or treatment of Guantanamo detainees. 111-383 ). Other changes effected by legislation enacted in the 111 th Congress, such as the establishment of new military commission procedures, may also significantly impact the treatment and disposition of Guantanamo detainees. | The detention of alleged enemy belligerents at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, together with proposals to transfer some such individuals to the United States for prosecution or continued detention, has been a subject of considerable interest for Congress. Several authorization and appropriations measures enacted during the 111th Congress addressed the disposition and treatment of Guantanamo detainees. This report analyzes legislation enacted in the 111th Congress concerning persons held at the Guantanamo detention facility.
Nine laws that were enacted during the 111th Congress contained provisions directly relating to Guantanamo detainees: the 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-32); the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-83); the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84); the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-88); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117); the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-118); the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-212); the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-259); and the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (2011 NDAA, P.L. 111-383). Many of these measures imposed conditions on the use of appropriated funds to transfer or release Guantanamo detainees into the United States. The fourth Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 111-322), has effectively extended the restrictions imposed by FY2010 appropriations enactments through March 4, 2011.
Several appropriations measures enacted in the 111th Congress restricted appropriated funds from being used to transfer or release Guantanamo detainees into the United States; they permitted transfers for purposes of criminal prosecution or detention during legal proceedings, contingent upon certain reporting requirements being fulfilled. However, the 2011 NDAA (P.L. 111-383), which was signed into law on January 7, 2011, prohibits any funds it authorizes to be appropriated to the Department of Defense (DOD) from being used to transfer Guantanamo detainees into the United States for any purpose, and also bars such funds from being used to assist in the transfer of such persons. Because Guantanamo detainees are presently in military custody, the act could be interpreted as effectively barring the transfer of any Guantanamo detainee into the United States, despite language in authorizing appropriations measures for other federal agencies that permits the use of funds to transfer detainees into the country for criminal prosecution. In addition to these restrictions, the 2011 NDAA bars authorized funds from being used to construct facilities in the United States to house transferred Guantanamo detainees, and also imposes restrictions on the transfer of detainees to certain foreign countries in order to deter the return of transferred detainees to hostilities. Upon signing the act into law, President Obama issued a statement describing his opposition to the legislation's restrictions on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees, and claimed that his Administration will work with Congress to seek to repeal or mitigate the effect of these restrictions. He did not allege that these provisions are an unconstitutional infringement on executive discretion, or state that the provisions would not be enforced.
Legislation enacted in the 111th Congress also addressed issues related to the treatment and disposition of Guantanamo detainees. For example, Title XVIII of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act establishes new procedures for military commissions. Section 552 of the FY2010 Department of Homeland Security Act requires that former Guantanamo detainees be included on the "No Fly List" in most circumstances and restricts their access to immigration benefits. |
crs_R44388 | crs_R44388_0 | FAST Act: Overview
On December 4, 2015, President Barack Obama signed the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94 ). The act authorizes spending on federal highway and public transportation programs and surface transportation safety and research activities for five years, through September 30, 2020. The act's authorization totals about $305 billion for FY2016 through FY2020. This includes $233 billion for highways and highway safety, $61 billion for public transportation, and more than $10 billion for Amtrak. Surface Transportation Finance and the Highway Trust Fund (HTF)
Almost all of federal highway funding and about 80% of federal public transportation funding comes from the HTF. Under the FAST Act, $70 billion will be transferred from the general fund to the HTF to fund the projected difference between HTF revenues and authorized spending for FY2016 through FY2020. Of this, an average of $41 billion is provided annually for Federal-Aid Highway programs. The act includes no new congressional earmarks for highway projects. A major focus of the FAST Act is the movement of freight. The Transportation Alternatives program authorized under the previous transportation authorization law, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. In recent years, well over $1 billion of annual CMAQ funding has been transferred to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) for local public transportation projects. Financing
The FAST Act cuts the direct authorization of funding for the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program from $1 billion in FY2015 to $275 million in both FY2016 and FY2017, $285 million in FY2018, and $300 million in both FY2019 and FY2020. The five-year total of public transportation funding authorized is $61.1 billion, an average of $12.2 billion per year ( Table 3 ). Program Changes
The biggest programmatic change related to public transportation is the creation of a competitive discretionary component within the Bus and Bus Facilities Grant Program. The FAST Act also changes NHTSA's safety grant programs. Other provisions include
an increase in the cap on claims against Amtrak arising from the May 12, 2015, derailment in Philadelphia, PA, to $295 million, and a provision that the general $200 million cap on claims will be adjusted based on changes in the Consumer Price Index (which will increase the statutory cap to approximately $295 million) and readjusted every five years; a requirement that Amtrak implement a plan to eliminate its operating loss on food and beverage service by December 2020; a requirement that Amtrak develop a pilot program allowing passengers to carry domesticated dogs and cats; a requirement that DOT convene a working group to evaluate restoration of intercity rail passenger service between New Orleans, LA, and Orlando, FL, which was disrupted by infrastructure damage caused by hurricanes in 2007; a requirement that DOT implement a pilot program allowing bidding for the right to operate up to three long-distance passenger routes; a requirement that DOT promulgate a rule requiring intercity passenger and commuter rail carriers to install inward- and outward-facing audio and image recorders to monitor train operators; a requirement that DOT, Amtrak, states and other stakeholders submit a study evaluating the shared use of right-of-way by passenger and freight rail systems; and statutory language requiring that the recipient of a high-speed rail grant for more than $1 billion must demonstrate that it has funding committed to fulfill the nonfederal share required for the grant, that it has identified nonfederal funding required for any subsequent phases of the project, and that the grant will result in a useable segment that has operational independence. | On December 4, 2015, President Barack Obama signed the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94). The act authorized spending on federal highway and public transportation programs, surface transportation safety and research activities, and rail programs for five years, through September 30, 2020. The act's authorization totaled roughly $305 billion for FY2016 through FY2020. This included $233 billion for highways and highway safety, $61 billion for public transportation, and more than $10 billion for Amtrak.
Most of the funding for surface transportation bills has been drawn from the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) since its creation in 1956, but the principal revenue source for the HTF, federal motor fuel taxes, has not generated sufficient revenue to cover HTF outlays since 2008. To fill this shortfall, Congress has relied on Treasury general fund transfers to make up the difference. Although Congress was unable to agree on a long-term solution to the HTF revenue issue, the FAST Act identified roughly $70 billion in budgetary offsets to support general fund transfers sufficient to pay for the five-year bill.
The FAST Act builds upon the many programmatic changes made in the previous multiyear reauthorization bill, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141). The act also continues initiatives intended to increase program efficiency through performance-based planning and the streamlining of project development. Among FAST Act's major attributes are
$225 billion authorized from the HTF over five years, an average of $45 billion annually, for Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) programs; $61 billion authorized from the HTF and the general fund, an average of $12.2 billion per year, for Federal Transit Administration (FTA) programs; a major redirection of funding toward highway freight projects via a new formula program and a competitive grant program; direct funding for the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program of $275 million, down from $1 billion in FY2015; competitive grant component added to the Bus and Bus Facilities Program; provisions on intercity passenger rail transportation included in a surface transportation act for the first time; and no project earmarks.
The FAST Act does not increase motor fuels taxes or provide another sustainable source of revenues to be paid into the HTF. Unless new revenue sources are found, Congress will face projections of a large gap between HTF tax receipts and spending plans when it begins debating the reauthorization of the FAST Act in 2020. |
crs_R44753 | crs_R44753_0 | Overview
The Pacific Islands region, also known as the South Pacific or Southwest Pacific, presents Congress with a diverse array of policy issues. It is a strategically important region that encompasses U.S. Pacific territories. U.S. relations with Australia and New Zealand include pursuing common interests in the Southwest Pacific, which also has attracted Chinese diplomatic attention and economic engagement. Congress plays key roles in approving and overseeing the administration of the Compacts of Free Association that govern U.S. relations with the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau (also referred to as the Freely Associated States or FAS). The United States has economic interests in the region, particularly fishing. The region includes 14 sovereign states with approximately 9 million people, including three countries in "free association" with the United States—the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. The Pacific Islands and U.S. In the Micronesian region lie the U.S. territories Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands as well as the Freely Associated States. U.S. policymakers have emphasized the importance of the Pacific Islands region for U.S. strategic and security interests. Some analysts have expressed concerns about the long-term strategic implications of China's growing engagement in the region. Other experts have argued that China's diplomatic outreach and economic influence have not translated into significantly greater political sway over South Pacific countries, and that Australia, a U.S. ally, remains the dominant power and provider of development assistance in the region. U.S. Policies in the South Pacific
Broad U.S. objectives and policies in the region have included promoting sustainable economic development and good governance, addressing the effects of climate change, administering the Compacts of Free Association, supporting regional organizations, projecting a presence in the region, and cooperating with Australia and regional aid donors. Other areas of concern and cooperation include combating illegal fishing, supporting peacekeeping operations, and responding to natural disasters. Areas of particular concern to Congress include overseeing U.S. policies in the Southwest Pacific and the administration of the Compacts of Free Association; regional foreign aid programs and appropriations; approving the U.S.-Palau agreement to provide U.S. economic assistance through 2024; and supporting the U.S. tuna fleet. The Obama Administration asserted that as part of its "rebalancing" to the Asia-Pacific region, it had increased its level of engagement in the Southwest Pacific, including expanding staffing and programming and increasing the frequency of high-level meetings with Pacific leaders. Other observers contended that the rebalancing policy had not included a corresponding change in the level of attention paid to the Pacific Islands region. U.S. foreign assistance activities include regional environmental programs; military training; disaster assistance and preparedness; fisheries management; HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment programs in Papua New Guinea; and strengthening democratic institutions in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and elsewhere. New Zealand also has provided development and disaster assistance to the region. Referenda on Self-Determination
New Caledonia, a territory of France, and Bougainville, which is part of Papua New Guinea, are to hold referenda on independence in 2018 and 2019. | The Pacific Islands region, also known as the South Pacific or Southwest Pacific, presents Congress with a diverse array of policy issues. It is a strategically important region with which the United States shares many interests with Australia and New Zealand. The region has attracted growing diplomatic and economic engagement from China, a potential competitor to the influence of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Congress plays key roles in approving and overseeing the administration of the Compacts of Free Association that govern U.S. relations with the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. The United States has economic interests in the region, particularly fishing, and provides about $38 million annually in bilateral and regional foreign assistance, not including Compact grant assistance.
This report provides background on the Pacific Islands region and discusses related issues for Congress. It discusses U.S. relations with Pacific Island countries as well as the influence of other powers in the region, including Australia, China, and other external actors. It includes sections on U.S. foreign assistance to the region, the Compacts of Free Association, and issues related to climate change, which has impacted many Pacific Island countries. The report does not focus on U.S. territories in the Pacific, such as Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa.
The Southwest Pacific includes 14 sovereign states with approximately 9 million people, including three countries in "free association" with the United States—the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. New Caledonia, a territory of France, and Bougainville, which is part of Papua New Guinea (PNG), are to hold referenda on independence in 2018 and 2019. U.S. officials have emphasized the diplomatic and strategic importance of the Pacific Islands region to the United States, and some analysts have expressed concerns about the long-term strategic implications of China's growing engagement in the region. Other experts have argued that China's mostly diplomatic and economic inroads have not translated into significantly greater political influence over South Pacific countries, and that Australia remains the dominant power and provider of development assistance in the region.
Major U.S. objectives and responsibilities in the Southwest Pacific include promoting sustainable economic development and good governance, administering the Compacts of Free Association, supporting regional organizations, helping to address the effects of climate change, and cooperating with Australia, New Zealand, and other major foreign aid donors. U.S. foreign assistance activities include regional environmental programs, military training, disaster assistance and preparedness, fisheries management, HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment programs in Papua New Guinea, and strengthening democratic institutions in PNG, Fiji, and elsewhere. Other areas of U.S. concern and cooperation include illegal fishing and peacekeeping operations.
Congressional interests include overseeing U.S. policies in the Southwest Pacific and helping to set the future course of U.S. policy in the region, approving the U.S.-Palau agreement to provide U.S. economic assistance through 2024, and funding and shaping ongoing foreign assistance efforts. The Obama Administration asserted that as part of its "rebalancing" to the Asia-Pacific region, it had increased its level of engagement in the region. Other observers contended that the rebalancing policy had not included a corresponding change in the level of attention paid to the Pacific Islands. |
crs_R41636 | crs_R41636_0 | The U.S. Constitution determines the maximum and minimum size of the House of Representatives as well as the nature of the population upon which any apportionment is determined. From time to time, commentators and Members of Congress raise the issue, proposing to change the population upon which the apportionment of House seats is based from "persons" to "citizens." This report examines the impact on the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives if such a change were to occur, using an estimate of the 2013 citizen population in place of the 2010 apportionment population to determine the distribution of seats in the House of Representatives for the 114 th Congress. In addition, the apportionment of seats in the 114 th Congress is shown using an estimate of the 2013 total apportionment population as well. Constitutional Issue
According to Section 2 of the 14 th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State , excluding Indians not taxed. 11 , a constitutional amendment that provided for the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives based on the citizen population rather than total population. 2010 Apportionment Population and Its Components
Table 1 shows this information for each state for the 2010 apportionment population. The values in columns 2-4 in Table 1 were the population values used in determining the allocation of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives to the states for the 2012 apportionment process, which produced the seat distribution in the U.S. House of Representatives for the 113 th Congress. Apportioning Seats to the House of Representatives Using Citizen Population Estimates
If the citizen population had been the basis of apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives after the 2000 census, it was estimated that nine seats would have shifted among 13 states relative to the actual apportionment. California would lose 4 seats, and Florida, New York, and Texas would each lose 1 seat. On the other hand, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia would each pick up a single seat, if the estimated 2013 citizen population were used to apportion seats today rather than the 2010 census population. Using the Citizen Population in the Redistricting Process Rather than in the Apportionment Process
The apportionment process determines the number of House seats that are allocated to each state (and, subsequently, the number of electoral votes). Changing the Apportionment Method
The apportionment of the seats in the U.S. House of Representatives is determined by four factors: the population size within the states, the number of seats to be allocated, the method or formula used, and the number of states in which seats are apportioned. As a consequence, it could be argued that such a method is less representative than the current method. | Congressional apportionment is the process of determining the number of Representatives to which each state is entitled in the U.S. House of Representatives based on the decennial census of population. Congressional redistricting, often confused with apportionment, is the process of revising the geographic boundaries of areas from which voters elect Representatives to the House. The apportionment process is a function of four factors: (1) population size, (2) the number of Representatives or seats to be apportioned, (3) the number of states, and (4) the method of apportionment.
Recently, some commentators and Members of Congress have called for a change in the nature of the population used to apportion seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, advocating a change from using all "persons" to using all "citizens." Section 2 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed." Consequently, such a change would appear to necessitate a constitutional amendment.
This report examines the impact on the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives if such a change were to occur, using an estimate of the 2013 citizen population in place of the 2010 apportionment population to determine the potential distribution of seats in the House of Representatives for the 114th Congress. In addition, the apportionment of the House of Representatives is shown using an estimate of the 2013 total apportionment population, as well.
If the apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives for the 114th Congress were to be based on the 2013 estimated citizen apportionment population rather than the 2010 total apportionment population, as required by the Constitution, it is estimated that seven seats would shift among 11 states. California would lose four seats relative to its actual distribution of seats as a result of the 2010 apportionment. Texas, Florida, and New York would each lose one seat relative to the number of seats received in the 2010 apportionment.
On the other hand, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia would each pick up a single seat, if the 2013 citizen population were used to apportion seats rather than the 2010 total apportionment population. Using citizenship status to apportion the seats in the U.S. House of Representatives tends to benefit states with smaller immigrant populations and cost states with larger immigrant populations.
For those seeking to change the current population standard for apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives, there appears to be at least three possible choices. First, and most obvious, amend the U.S. Constitution. Second, use the citizen population in the redistricting process to geographically define the congressional districts. Or third, change the apportionment law to adopt an apportionment formula that, when used with the total population, mimics the apportionment distribution that occurs when using the citizen population. |
crs_RL34299 | crs_RL34299_0 | This report tracks foreign aid funding levels to Latin America and the Caribbean over the last three years. The annual State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bills are the vehicles by which Congress funds foreign assistance programs. Congress will likely continue to take interest in a number of related issues, including the level of aid, the effectiveness of counternarcotics assistance, and how best to address the spread of HIV/AIDS, and address poverty in the region. This report will be updated as country specific aid levels for FY2008 become available. Historical Trends
Trends in U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America generally reflect the trends and rationales for U.S. foreign aid programs globally. U.S. assistance has not returned to levels attained during the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s. When including an additional $550 million in counternarcotics funds for Mexico and Central America requested as part of the supplemental budget, the FY2008 request is $2.1 billion, an increase from the previous year. U.S. assistance to Mexico may increase significantly in the near-term if Congress approves a new counternarcotics initiative (the Merida Initiative). The Administration's FY2008 regular budget request cuts aid to Mexico by 30% from FY2007 funding levels. Panama is not slated to receive DA assistance. Three Central American nations—Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador—also receive economic assistance through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), totaling $851 million. Including two regional funds (Latin America and Caribbean Regional, and Western Hemisphere Regional), and the portion of the Migration and Refugee account allocated for Latin America, funding in FY2007 amounted to $110 million, and a requested $88 million for FY2008. Each category represents common development challenges around which aid programs are to be designed, and linked to strategic objectives. The response to the AIDS epidemic in the Caribbean and Central America has involved a mix of support by governments in the region, bilateral donors (such as the United States, Canada, and European nations), regional and multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Because of the inclusion of Guyana and Haiti as focus countries in the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), funded largely through the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) account, U.S. assistance to the region for HIV/AIDS increased to $47 million in FY2004, $83 million in FY2005, $93 million in FY2006, and an estimated $118 million in FY2007. Mexico would receive $27.8 million in the regular FY2008 budget. Child Survival and Health
CSH funds focus on combating infectious disease and promoting child and maternal health, family planning, and reproductive health. Development Assistance
DA funds aim to achieve measurable improvements in key areas to foster sustainable economic growth: trade and investment, agriculture, education, environment, health, and democracy. ESF assistance in the Andean region, Mexico, and Central America is used to pursue justice sector reform, facilitate implementation of free trade agreements, improve local governance, fight corruption, and promote respect for human rights. Foreign Military Financing
FMF provides grants to foreign nations to purchase U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. | Trends in U.S. assistance to the Latin America and Caribbean region generally reflect the trends and rationales for U.S. foreign aid programs globally. Aid to the region increased during the 1960s with the Alliance for Progress, and during the 1980s with aid to Central America. Since 2000, aid levels have increased, especially in the Andean region, as the focus has shifted from Cold War issues to counternarcotics and security assistance. Current aid levels to Latin America and the Caribbean comprise about 5.8% of the worldwide FY2007 aid budget, including both bilateral and multilateral assistance. Amounts requested for the regular FY2008 budget would increase this ratio to 6.1%, and to 7.2% if Congress approves supplemental funds for a new counternarcotics initiative in Mexico and Central America. Three countries—Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador—have signed compacts for Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) funds worth a combined $851 million. Aid levels to the region could increase further as more countries become eligible for MCA. Both Haiti and Guyana are focus countries for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).
For the FY2008 regular budget, the Administration has requested $1.57 billion in assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, the largest portion of which would be allocated to the Andean region, or $823.8 million. Mexico and Central America are slated to receive $220.4 million in regular funds, plus $550 million in supplemental counternarcotics funds. The Caribbean would receive $365.5 million. Brazil and the Southern Cone of South America are to receive an estimated $18.5 million.
Aid programs are designed to achieve a variety of goals, from poverty reduction to economic growth. Child Survival and Health (CSH) funds focus on combating infectious diseases and promoting child and maternal health. Development Assistance (DA) promotes sustainable economic growth in key areas such as trade, agriculture, education, the environment, and democracy. The Economic Support Fund (ESF) assists countries of strategic importance to the United States, and funds programs relating to justice sector reforms, local governance, anti-corruption, and respect for human rights. Counternarcotics programs seek to assist countries to reduce drug production, interdict trafficking, and promote alternative crop development. Military assistance provides grants to nations for the purchase of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training.
The annual State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bills are the vehicles by which Congress provides funding for foreign assistance programs. Congress will likely continue to take interest in a number of related issues, including the level of aid, the effectiveness of counternarcotics assistance, and how best to address the spread of HIV/AIDS, and address poverty in the region. This report will be updated as country level funding figures for FY2008 become available. |
crs_RL33335 | crs_RL33335_0 | Background
Starting in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization, manycriminal organizations ramped up their operations and expanded them worldwide. Theseorganizations are believed to have been helped by weakening government institutions in somecountries, more open borders, and the resurgence of ethnic and regional conflicts across the formerSoviet Union and many other regions. Collaboration between the two groups could heighten threats to the United States and its interests. Definitionsof transnational organized crime often differentiate between traditional crime organizations and moremodern criminal networks. Terrorists are increasingly seen as supporting themselves through criminal activity. It aims to assist in"integrating all facets of the federal response to international crime." Many programs involve foreign cooperation. The U.S. response to nuclearsmuggling is often termed a "layered defense." The State Department's Bureauof International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) advises the President, Secretary ofState, other bureaus in the Department of State, as well as other departments and agencies of the U.S.government on programs and policies to combat international narcotics and crime. (37)
Trafficking in Persons. Appendix: U.S. Efforts Against Transnational Organized Crime: Agency Roles and Congressional Action
This appendix describes key U.S. programs, initiatives, and legislation to combattransnational crime. (68)
Money Laundering
U.S. anti-money laundering efforts are coordinated by the Departments of Treasury, Justice,Homeland Security, and other agencies. Recent Legislative Activity. | This report examines the growing threat of transnational organized crime to U.S. nationalsecurity and global stability. The end of the Cold War -- along with increasing globalizationbeginning in the 1990s -- has helped criminal organizations expand their activities and gain globalreach. Criminal networks are believed to have benefitted from the weakening of certain governmentinstitutions, more open borders, and the resurgence of ethnic and regional conflicts across the formerSoviet Union and many other regions. Transnational criminal organizations have also exploitedexpanding financial markets and rapid technological developments. In addition, terrorist networksare believed to be increasingly supporting themselves through traditional crime, and have beenlinked to criminal organizations. Alliances between the two groups could amplify threats toAmerican security. Transnational criminals engage in a spectrum of illicit activities, includingnarcotics and arms smuggling, trafficking in persons, counterfeiting, and money laundering and otherfinancial crimes.
The report also outlines the U.S. response to international crime. While U.S. policy is framedwithin the 1998 International Crime Control Strategy, it is also shaped by other more recent federaland agency plans. Agencies heading government efforts include the Departments of State, Defense,Justice, Treasury, and Homeland Security. Key federal programs and initiatives and theirinteragency coordination are discussed. International cooperation and agreements are vital to U.S.strategy; also, many programs seek to assist and train foreign law enforcement. Finally, this reportexamines likely Congressional concerns related to U.S. efforts to combat transnational crime. Thereport will not be updated. |
crs_R40853 | crs_R40853_0 | Overview
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110 ) established the Rural Education Achievement Program (REAP) under Title VI-B of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). Congress created this program to address the unique needs of rural schools that disadvantage them relative to nonrural schools. To compensate for the challenges facing rural schools, REAP awards two types of formula grants; one goes directly to eligible school districts, or local educational agencies (LEAs), and a second grant goes to states, which then award subgrants to LEAs. The authorization for REAP, along with the rest of the ESEA, expired at the end of FY2008. However, these programs continue to operate as long as appropriations are provided. Congress is expected to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA programs, including REAP. This report will discuss the challenges facing rural schools, the manner in which REAP addresses these challenges, and reauthorization issues that may arise as Congress takes up the ESEA. A study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) confirmed these problems. Program Eligibility
To be eligible for REAP funds, LEAs must be designated rural by the ED. Grant Determination
Amounts that LEAs receive and aggregate state amounts are determined differently under the SRSA and RLIS programs. Under the SRSA program, an initial amount is calculated for each eligible LEA and then funds are added based on enrollment and subtracted based on "offsetting" amounts received from other ESEA programs. Under RLIS, grants are first made to states based on a formula and then subgranted to LEAs either on a formula or competitive basis. Use of Funds
Recipients of SRSA grants may use funds for activities authorized by several ESEA programs:
Improving Basic Programs Operated by Local Educational Agencies (Part A of Title I), Teacher and Principal Training and Recruiting Fund and Enhancing Education Through Technology (Part A or D of Title II), Language Instruction for Limited English Proficient and Immigrant Students (Title III), Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities and 21 st Century Community Learning Centers (Part A or B of Title IV), and Innovative Programs (Part A of Title V). In addition, under the so-called REAP-Flex provision, all LEAs that are eligible for SRSA grants (whether or not they receive grants because offsetting ESEA funding exceeds initial grant calculations) have the flexibility to use "offsetting funds" from other ESEA programs for any activities authorized by the above ESEA programs. The GAO found that flexibility under the SRSA program allowed small, rural LEAs to redirect funds to crucial NCLB needs. | The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110) established the Rural Education Achievement Program (REAP) under Title VI, Part B of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). Congress created this program to address the unique needs of rural schools that disadvantage them relative to nonrural schools.
To be eligible for REAP funds, a local education agency (LEA) must be designated rural and must meet one of three additional requirements involving enrollment size, population density, and poverty status. Currently, REAP provides awards to nearly 6,000 LEAs, out of a total of about 14,000 nationwide. REAP authorizes formula grants through two subprograms: the Small Rural School Achievement (SRSA) program provides grants directly to LEAs and the Rural Low-Income School (RLIS) program provides grants to states, which then award subgrants to LEAs.
The amount of funds received by eligible LEAs is determined differently by the SRSA and RLIS programs. Under the SRSA program formula, an initial amount is calculated for each eligible LEA based on enrollment; these amounts are then reduced based on offsetting amounts received from other ESEA programs. Under RLIS, formula grants are awarded to states based on the state's share of eligible students; states then subgrant funds to LEAs either on a formula or competitive basis.
REAP funds may be used for a wide range of activities authorized throughout the ESEA, including Titles I-A, II-A, II-D, III, IV-A, IV-B, and V-A. In addition, the so-called REAP-Flex provision (ESEA, Sec. 6211) allows SRSA-eligible LEAs to use ESEA funds for certain activities not authorized by the program through which the LEA received such funds. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found that a large majority of LEAs use REAP funds to meet the NCLB highly qualified teacher requirement as well as the district's technology needs.
The authorization for REAP, along with the rest of the ESEA, expired at the end of FY2008. However, these programs continue to operate as long as appropriations are provided. Congress is expected to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA programs, including REAP. This report will conclude with a discussion of reauthorization issues related to REAP that may arise as Congress takes up the ESEA. |
crs_R43898 | crs_R43898_0 | The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ), signed into law on December 18, 2015, either made permanent or temporarily extended all tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2014. Collectively, temporary tax provisions that are regularly extended by Congress rather than being allowed to expire as scheduled are often referred to as "tax extenders." In P.L. However, as not all expired provisions were made permanent, there are still a number of tax extenders set to expire at the end of 2016. This report provides a broad overview of the tax extenders. Additional information on specific extender provisions may be found in other CRS reports, including the following:
CRS Report R43510, Selected Recently Expired Business Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders") , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43688, Selected Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43517, Recently Expired Charitable Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43541, Recently Expired Community Assistance-Related Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R43449, Recently Expired Housing Related Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief , by [author name scrubbed]. Enacting provisions on a temporary basis, in theory, would provide Congress with an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of specific provisions before providing further extension. Reasons for Temporary Tax Provisions
There are several reasons why Congress may choose to enact tax provisions on a temporary basis. Tax policy may also be used to address temporary circumstances in the form of economic stimulus or disaster relief. Congress may also choose to enact tax policies on a temporary basis for budgetary reasons. Tax Provisions that Expired in 2014
Dozens of temporary tax provisions had expired at the end of 2014, all of which were extended in P.L. Most of these provisions have been extended as part of previous "tax extender" legislation. Other individual provisions that have been extended more than once include the deduction for state and local sales taxes, the above-the-line deduction for tuition and related expenses, the deduction for mortgage insurance premiums, and the parity for the exclusion of employer-provided mass transit and parking benefits. 114-113 . Long-standing provisions that expired at the end of 2014 include the research tax credit, the rum excise tax cover-over, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, the Qualified Zone Academy Bond (QZAB) allocation limitation, and the active financing exception under Subpart F. The New Markets Tax Credit, first enacted in 2000 to promote investment in low-income communities, also expired at the end of 2014. P.L. 114-113 , made permanent a number of temporary tax provisions, while temporarily extending other expired tax provisions. 644 ): (1) the enhanced deduction for contributions of food inventory; (2) the provision allowing for tax-free distributions from Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) for charitable purposes; and (3) the special rules for contributions of capital gain real property for conservation purposes. 113-295] was signed into law on December 19, 2014). 113-295
Several provisions that had expired at the end of 2013 were not extended as part of the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 ( P.L. | In the past, Congress has regularly acted to extend expired or expiring temporary tax provisions. Collectively, these temporary tax provisions are often referred to as "tax extenders." Fifty-two temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2014. All of these provisions were either temporarily or permanently extended as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), signed into law on December 18, 2015. Unlike previous tax extenders legislation, P.L. 114-113 made a number of provisions permanent, and provided longer-term extensions for other provisions. This report provides a broad overview of the tax extenders.
Congress had previously addressed tax extenders toward the end of the 113th Congress. The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-295), signed into law on December 19, 2014, made tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2013 available to taxpayers for the 2014 tax year. The law extended most (but not all) provisions that had expired at the end of 2013. Most of the provisions in P.L. 113-295 had been included in previous "tax extender" packages.
There are several reasons why Congress may choose to enact tax provisions on a temporary basis. Enacting provisions on a temporary basis provides legislators with an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of tax policies prior to expiration or extension. Temporary tax provisions may also be used to provide temporary economic stimulus or disaster relief. Congress may also choose to enact tax provisions on a temporary rather than permanent basis due to budgetary considerations, as the foregone revenue from a temporary provision will generally be less than if it were permanent.
The provisions that expired at the end of 2014 are diverse in purpose, including provisions for individuals, businesses, the charitable sector, and energy-related activities. Among the individual provisions that expired are deductions for teachers' out-of-pocket expenses, state and local sales taxes, qualified tuition and related expenses, and mortgage insurance premiums. On the business side, under current law, the research and development (R&D) tax credit, the work opportunity tax credit (WOTC), the active financing exceptions under Subpart F, the new markets tax credit, and increased expensing and bonus depreciation allowances will not be available for taxpayers after 2014. Expired charitable provisions include the enhanced deduction for contributions of food inventory and provisions allowing for tax-free distributions from retirement accounts for charitable purposes. The renewable energy production tax credit (PTC) expired at the end of 2014, along with a number of other incentives for energy efficiency and renewable and alternative fuels. As discussed in this report, many of these provisions were made permanent in P.L. 114-113.
Additional information on specific extender provisions may be found in other CRS reports, including the following:
CRS Report R43510, Selected Recently Expired Business Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"), by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43688, Selected Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43517, Recently Expired Charitable Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43541, Recently Expired Community Assistance-Related Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R43449, Recently Expired Housing Related Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42821 | crs_R42821_0 | When issuing regulations, agencies are required to follow certain procedures. The APA set up the basic framework for rulemaking: agencies are required to publish a notice of rulemaking in the Federal Registe r , take comments on the proposed rule, and publish a final rule in the Federal Register . Since the passage of the APA, additional procedures have been established in various statutes, executive orders, and guidance documents. This report discusses one potential change to the rulemaking process that has been discussed over the past three decades and proposed in legislation in the 112 th Congress: extension of the requirements of Executive Order (E.O.) 12866 to the independent regulatory agencies, also known as independent regulatory commissions (hereafter referred to as IRCs). 12866 contains two major requirements: First, it requires that agencies complete cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of "economically significant" rules, considering the potential costs, benefits, and feasible alternatives to proposed and final rules. Second, the order requires centralized review of "significant" rules in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Historically, the IRCs have been exempted from requirements for CBA and centralized review. Senator Rob Portman introduced a bill in the 112 th Congress, S. 3468 , which would authorize the President to extend to the IRCs, through the issuance of an executive order, E.O. 12866's requirements for CBA and OIRA review. 12866 were extended to the IRCs, there could be significant implications for those agencies. Proponents of extending the requirements argue that subjecting the IRCs to CBA requirements and OIRA review could improve the quality of regulations issued by those agencies. On the other hand, extending CBA requirements and OIRA review to the IRCs could grant OIRA (and by extension, the President) the potential authority to influence or delay rulemaking proceedings, and such a requirement could potentially decrease the independence of the IRCs. E.O. 12866, E.O. Cross-Cutting Analytical Requirements
The following statutes contain analytical requirements that apply to all agencies of the federal government, including the IRCs:
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 requires federal agencies to provide a detailed environmental impact statement for all major federal actions that will significantly affect the quality of the human environment; the RFA requires all federal agencies to assess the impact of their proposed regulations on "small entities" (e.g., small businesses, small governmental jurisdictions, and certain small not-for-profit organizations) and conduct a "regulatory flexibility analysis" at the time certain proposed and final rules are issued; and the PRA requires all federal agencies to assess and minimize the paperwork burden for individuals, small businesses, and others resulting from the collection of information (from 10 or more nonfederal persons) by or for the federal government. For example, an independent agency with fewer mandatory or discretionary rulemaking responsibilities that issues relatively fewer "significant" rules each year may find the additional requirements of S. 3468 minimally burdensome, even if their current cost-benefit practices are less rigorous. Conversely, the additional cost-benefit requirements may be more burdensome for agencies with relatively greater regulatory responsibilities and for agencies with recently expanded regulatory responsibilities. These agencies may not have the staff with the technical expertise necessary to conduct cost-benefit analysis that is more extensive than their current requirements. Under E.O. OIRA Review of Regulations Under Executive Order 12866
The second major requirement of E.O. During the review process, OIRA examines each regulation to ensure that the agency followed the principles and procedures outlined in E.O. 12866, including the applicable requirements for conducting CBA, and that the regulation is consistent with the policy preferences of the President. Analysis of Possible Extension of OIRA Review to IRCs
Many administrative law scholars and other observers of the rulemaking process have expressed support for OIRA review, and some have spoken directly in support of extending the requirement for review to the IRCs. Much of this support for OIRA review relies on the underlying premise that increased presidential control, through OIRA review, of rulemaking could improve the both rulemaking process within agencies and the quality of the regulations themselves. Some organizations have also expressed support for the extension of OIRA review to the IRCs. | When issuing regulations that have the full force and effect of law, agencies are required to follow certain procedures. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 set up the basic framework for rulemaking: agencies are required to publish a notice of rulemaking in the Federal Register, take comments on the proposed rule, and publish a final rule in the Federal Register. Since the passage of the APA, additional procedures have been established in various statutes, executive orders, and guidance documents.
One potential change to the rulemaking process that has been discussed over the past three decades and proposed in legislation in the 112th Congress is the extension of the requirements of Executive Order (E.O.) 12866 to the independent regulatory agencies, also known as independent regulatory commissions (hereafter referred to as IRCs). E.O. 12866 contains two major requirements: first, it requires that agencies complete cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of "economically significant" rules, considering the potential costs, benefits, and feasible alternatives to proposed and final rules. Second, the order requires centralized review of "significant" rules in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Historically, the IRCs have been exempted from requirements for CBA and centralized review. Senator Rob Portman introduced a bill in the 112th Congress, S. 3468, that would authorize the President to extend to the IRCs, by executive order, E.O. 12866's requirements for CBA and OIRA review. If the requirements of E.O. 12866 were extended to the IRCs, there could be significant implications for those agencies.
Potential Extension of CBA Requirements. Proponents of extending the requirements argue that subjecting the IRCs to CBA requirements and OIRA review could improve the quality of regulations issued by those agencies. On the other hand, extending CBA requirements and OIRA review to the IRCs could grant OIRA (and by extension, the President) the potential authority to influence or delay rulemaking proceedings, and such a requirement could potentially decrease the independence of the IRCs. The IRCs with fewer regulatory responsibilities that issue relatively fewer "significant" rules each year may find the additional requirements of S. 3468 minimally burdensome, even if their current cost-benefit practices are not as rigorous as what would be required under E.O. 12866. Conversely, the IRCs with greater regulatory responsibilities or the IRCs with recently expanded regulatory responsibilities may find the additional CBA requirements more burdensome. It is also possible that some IRCs may not have the staff with the technical expertise necessary to conduct cost-benefit analysis that is more extensive than their current requirements.
Potential Extension of OIRA Review. The second major element of E.O. 12866 is OIRA review of "significant" regulations. During the review process, OIRA examines each regulation to ensure that the agency followed the principles and procedures outlined in E.O. 12866, including the applicable requirements for conducting CBA, and that the regulation is consistent with the policy preferences of the President. Numerous individuals, including former OIRA officials and several administrative law scholars, have spoken in support of potential OIRA review of regulations issued by IRCs. Much of this support for OIRA review relies on the underlying premise that increased presidential control, through OIRA review, of rulemaking could improve both the rulemaking process within agencies and the quality of the regulations themselves. On the other hand, some have expressed hesitation or opposition to the extension of OIRA review to the IRCs, suggesting that the independence of the IRCs could be compromised and that OIRA review of IRCs' rules could lead to delay. |
crs_RL34308 | crs_RL34308_0 | In 1973, the smaller, largely English-speaking countries of the Eastern Caribbean launched the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), an integration plan intended to coordinate and enhance their collective economic and social development. CARICOM's strategy for finally achieving a "single economic space" rests on implementing the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), formally established on January 1, 2006 and intended to be fully in place by 2015. CARICOM is a highly trade dependent region undergoing major changes to its economic relationship with the world. Adjusting to these changes through the CSME is its primary development challenge. To fulfill the CSME vision, its members would have to adopt considerably deeper commitments to economic integration. The Caribbean Basin has been a longstanding interest of the United States, and the success of CARICOM directly affects stability in the region. It therefore has important implications for U.S. trade, investment, immigration, drug interdiction, and national security policies. Although small in size, CARICOM's trade and investment relationship with the United States may be poised to become a more prominent issue as the region adjusts to the changing external environment, not the least of which includes the ongoing erosion of trade preferences with Europe and the United States, as well as the concomitant rise of bilateral and regional free trade agreements in the region. This report evaluates CARICOM's development and implications for U.S. foreign economic policy. It will be updated periodically. The trends suggest that CARICOM trade policies were limited in advancing intraregional integration. Unilateral preferences with the EU are being replaced by a reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), while the relative benefit of unilateral trade preferences with the United States continues to erode as multilateral liberalization and U.S. reciprocal trade agreements, beginning with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, expand. The strong dependence on external markets reinforces the rationale for completing the CSME. EU and the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)
CARICOM's most immediate trade policy challenge is to implement the EPA concluded with the EU on December 16, 2007. Third, the importance of the U.S. economy as a trade partner will likely hinge, in part, on how U.S. trade policy responds to changes in CARICOM countries, particularly given diminishing role of the U.S. preferences. Managing the process of "insertion" into the global economy is the overriding task. | In 1973, the smaller, largely English-speaking countries of the Eastern Caribbean launched the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), an integration plan intended to coordinate and enhance the collective economic and social development of 15 countries. After three decades of incremental success, CARICOM's strategy for achieving complete economic integration now rests on implementing the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), formally established on January 1, 2006, and intended to be fully in place by 2015. CARICOM is a highly trade-dependent region undergoing major changes to its economic relationships with the world. Adjusting to these changes through the CSME is its primary development challenge. To realize the CSME vision, the member countries would have to implement considerably deeper commitments to integration.
The Caribbean Basin has been a long-standing strategic interest of the United States. The success of CARICOM, as well as the continued stability of the region, have important implications for U.S. trade, investment, immigration, drug interdiction, and national security policies. Although small in size, CARICOM's trade and investment relationship with the United States may become a more prominent issue as the region adjusts to the changing external environment.
CARICOM faces dual challenges in its quest for economic integration through the CSME. First, it must complete the intraregional integration scheme, including tightening a loose common external tariff and intraregional trade policy, integrating more fully labor and capital markets, and deepening "functional cooperation" – pooling resources to improve efficiency in the delivery of public services. Second, it must devise and implement strategies for "inserting" the CARICOM economies into a dynamic and competitive global economy in the wake of expiring preferential trade arrangements with its two largest trade partners, the United States and the European Union (EU).
Two trade policy issues command immediate attention. Implementing the EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), completed in December 2007, is the first. The EPA is a reciprocal, WTO-compliant accord that replaces unilateral preferential arrangements in place since 1975. Second, the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) preferences will expire on September 30, 2008, unless extended by the U.S. Congress. Although these preferences currently apply to only seven CARICOM members and have already been eroded considerably by U.S. free trade agreements with other countries in the region, CARICOM strongly advocates their renewal and expansion as it evaluates the costs and benefits of pursuing a reciprocal FTA of its own with the United States. This report evaluates CARICOM's development and implications for U.S. foreign economic policy. It will be updated periodically. For more on Caribbean issues, see CRS Report RL34157, Caribbean-U.S. Relations: Issues in the 110th Congress, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33951, U.S. Trade Policy and the Caribbean: From Trade Preferences to Free Trade Agreements, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33814 | crs_RL33814_0 | The second is the interplay between the concepts of public financing and campaign spending limits, which are often linked but which have very distinct characteristics; the 1976 landmark Supreme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo contributed to that linkage because of its allowance for only voluntary spending limits, such as in conjunction with a public financing system. As developments in this area become clearer over time, this report will be updated. The final section reviews the experience from public finance systems at both the state and presidential levels to offer some overarching observations for Congress possibly to consider in devising a public finance system for its elections, should it choose to do so. A third bill introduced in the 112 th Congress, S. 749 (Durbin), provides a separate funding mechanism for the public financing program proposed in S. 750 . Additional discussion appears in the " 112th Congress " section of this report and in Appendix E at the end of this report. First, the nation has had public financing in presidential elections since 1976. Some of this testimony included empirical analysis of claims about potentially corrupting influences from private money in campaign politics and related issues. Since that time, legislative proposals have been offered in nearly every Congress, while the extent of legislative activity around the issue has varied according to the political climate and circumstances. Bills comparable to those passed in the 101 st Congress were approved by the Senate and House and reconciled in conference, but vetoed by President George H.W. The other two bills— H.R. 1826 , and S. 752 . 112th Congress
The two current versions of the Fair Elections Now Act, also known as FENA ( S. 750 and H.R. 1404 ), are similar to H.R. 6116 (which superseded H.R. Like their predecessors, the current versions of FENA propose to provide participating candidates with a mix of base subsidies, matching funds, and other incentives in exchange for limiting private fundraising to small contributions. Major Differences Between Versions of FENA Introduced During the 111th and 112th Congresses
The 112 th and 111 th Congress versions of FENA are substantially similar. Sixteen states offer some form of direct public financing to candidates' campaigns (see Figure 1 ). Potential Considerations for Congressional Public Financing
Public financing has been debated in Congress and the states for decades. S. 750 (Durbin)—Fair Elections Now Act (Introduced April 6, 2011, referred to Committee on Rules and Administration)
Public finance provisions:
Would apply to Senate candidates voluntarily participating in public financing; Participants would qualify for public financing by raising qualifying contributions of no more than $100 per individual contributor (limited to state residents) to the sum of 2,000 plus 500 for each congressional district in the state, provided that the total dollar amount is at least 10% of the candidate's base allocation for the primary election; Would provide base subsidy (allocation) of $750,000 plus $150,000 for each congressional district in the state; subsidy would be adjusted to 67% of the base for primary elections; Would provide matching funds equal to 500% (up to 300% of the base) of "small dollar" contributions (no more than $100 per individual contributor, per election); For the general election, would provide $100,000 in broadcast vouchers multiplied by the number of congressional districts in the state; Would provide lesser amounts of the benefits discussed above to minor-party candidates or those in uncontested or runoff elections; Would permit participants to purchase additional broadcast time at 80% of the lowest unit charge (lowest unit rate) for 45 days before the primary and 60 days before the general election; Would extend lowest unit charge to national parties; Would prohibit participating candidates from spending funds other than qualifying contributions, "small dollar" contributions, allocations from the proposed Fair Elections Fund, and broadcast vouchers; Would not limit coordinated party expenditures made on behalf of publicly financed candidates if the funds used for those expenditures came from individual contributions of no more than $500; Includes sense of the Senate language calling for proceeds from a proposed 0.5% tax on government contacts of more than $10 million to be appropriated to fund Senate public financing (see separate funding legislation, S. 749 (Durbin)); proceeds from fines and voluntary contributions would also fund Senate campaigns; Would create Fair Elections Oversight Board within the FEC to monitor functioning of congressional public financing program, including program benefits and limitations, and perform other duties delegated by the FEC; Would establish penalties for prohibited spending (or accepting prohibited contributions) by publicly financed candidates. | To critics, public campaign financing, generally in conjunction with spending limits, is the ultimate solution to perceived problems arising from ever-growing costs of campaigns and the accompanying need for privately donated campaign funds. Public financing supporters maintain that replacing private funds with public money would most effectively reduce potentially corrupting influence from "interested" money. On the other hand, opponents of public financing question whether real or apparent corruption from private fundraising is as serious a problem as critics claim. They also argue that public financing would be an inappropriate use of taxpayer dollars and would compel taxpayers to fund candidates they find objectionable.
In the early 1970s, supporters succeeded in enacting public financing in presidential elections, a system that has been available since 1976. In addition, many states and localities have provided public financing in their elections since the 1970s (or before). Today, 16 states offer some form of direct aid to candidates' campaigns through fixed subsidies or matching funds. Perceptions about the presidential and state public financing systems have shaped opinions about adding public financing to congressional elections. Also shaping that debate was the Supreme Court's landmark 1976 Buckley v. Valeo ruling, which struck down mandatory spending limits, but sanctioned voluntary spending limits accompanying public financing.
Proposals for publicly funded congressional elections have been offered in almost every Congress since 1956; the issue was prominently debated in the mid-1970s and the late 1980s through early 1990s. Proposals were passed twice by the Senate in the 93rd Congress and by both the House and Senate in the 101st, 102nd, and 103rd Congresses. Only the 102nd Congress proposal was reconciled in conference but was vetoed by the President.
Thus far in the 112th Congress, Senator Durbin and Representative Larson introduced the latest versions of the Fair Elections Now Act (FENA) on April 6, 2011. These include S. 750 and H.R. 1404; S. 749 is a separate measure that would finance the program proposed in S. 750. The two versions of FENA, S. 750 and H.R. 1404, are similar to three bills introduced during the 111th Congress (H.R. 6116, which superseded H.R. 1826, and S. 752). Like their predecessors, the current versions of FENA propose to provide participating candidates with a mix of base subsidies, matching funds, and broadcast vouchers. The current versions of FENA propose two changes in incentives for participating candidates compared with 111th Congress versions of the legislation. First, although the types of available funding remain consistent, participants would be eligible for larger funding amounts. Second, coordinated party expenditures would be unlimited if funds used for those expenditures came from individual contributions of less than $500. Appendix D and Appendix E at the end of the report summarize major provisions of legislation introduced in the 111th and 112th Congresses respectively.
In addition to discussing recent legislation, this report reviews past proposals for, and debate over, congressional public financing. It also discusses experiences with the presidential and state public financing systems. Finally, the report offers potential considerations for Congress in devising a public financing system for its elections. The report will be updated periodically, on the basis of congressional and state activities. |
crs_R43869 | crs_R43869_0 | The following is a profile of the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). Party Breakdown
In the 114 th Congress, the current party alignments as of December 5, 2016, are as follows:
House of Representatives: 248 Republicans (including one Delegate), 192 Democrats (including 4 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner) and one vacancy. Senate: 54 Republicans, 44 Democrats, and 2 Independents who caucus with the Democrats. Congressional Service
The average length of service for Members of the House at the beginning of the 114 th Congress was 8.8 years (4.4 terms) and for Senators 9.7 years (1.6 terms). Statistics gathered by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, which studies the religious affiliation of Members, and CQ Roll Call at the beginning of the 114 th Congress showed the following:
57% of the Members (251 in the House, 55 in the Senate) are Protestant, with Baptist as the most represented denomination, followed by Methodist; 31% of the Members (138 in the House, 26 in the Senate) are Catholic; 5.2% of the Members (19 in the House, 9 in the Senate) are Jewish; 3% of the Members (9 in the House, 7 in the Senate) are Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints); two Members (one in the House, one in the Senate) are Buddhist , two House Members are Muslim, and one House Member is Hindu; and other religious affiliations represented include Greek Orthodox, Unitarian Universalist, and Christian Science. Eighty-eight women, including 4 Delegates, serve in the House and 20 in the Senate. Twenty African American women, including two Delegates, serve in the House. Hispanic/Latino American Members
There are 38 Hispanic or Latino Members in the 114 th Congress, 7.0% of the total membership and a record number. Of the Members of the House, 25 are Democrats (including 1 Delegate and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico), 9 are Republicans, and 9 are women. American Indian Members
There are two American Indian (Native American) Members of the 114 th Congress, both of whom are Republican Members of the House. | This report presents a profile of the membership of the 114th Congress (2015-2016). Statistical information is included on selected characteristics of Members, including data on party affiliation, average age, occupation, education, length of congressional service, religious affiliation, gender, ethnicity, foreign births, and military service.
As of December 5, 2016, in the House of Representatives, there are 248 Republicans (including 1 Delegate), 192 Democrats (including 4 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico), and one vacancy. The Senate has 54 Republicans, 44 Democrats, and 2 Independents, who both caucus with the Democrats.
The average age of Members of the House at the beginning of the 114th Congress was 57.0 years; of Senators, 61.0 years. The overwhelming majority of Members of Congress have a college education. The dominant professions of Members are public service/politics, business, and law. Most Members identify as Christians, and Protestants collectively constitute the majority religious affiliation. Roman Catholics account for the largest single religious denomination, and numerous other affiliations are represented.
The average length of service for Representatives at the beginning of the 114th Congress was 8.8 years (4.4 terms); for Senators, 9.7 years (1.6 terms).
One hundred eight women (a record number) serve in the 114th Congress: 88 in the House, including 4 Delegates, and 20 in the Senate. There are 46 African American Members of the House and 2 in the Senate. This House number includes two Delegates. There are 38 Hispanic or Latino Members (a record number) serving: 34 in the House, including 1 Delegate and the Resident Commissioner, and 4 in the Senate. Fourteen Members (11 Representatives, 2 Delegates, and 1 Senator) are Asian Americans or Pacific Islanders. Two American Indians (Native Americans) serve in the House.
The portions of this report covering political party affiliation, gender, ethnicity, and vacant seats will be updated as events warrant. The remainder of the report will not be updated. |
crs_R41442 | crs_R41442_0 | Introduction
The New Starts program provides federal funds to public transit agencies on a largely competitive basis for the construction of new fixed-guideway transit systems and the expansion of existing fixed-guideway systems (49 U.S.C. New Starts has funded the development of bus rapid transit (BRT) and ferries, as these are eligible under the definition of fixed-guideway, but the vast majority of funding has gone to transit rail systems. Between 1985 and 2008, consequently, rail transit route-mileage almost doubled, with light rail mileage more than tripling, commuter rail mileage doubling, and subway mileage growing by 25%. The federal transit program is authorized by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA) ( P.L. 109-59 ). Since SAFETEA expired on September 30, 2009, the program has operated under a series of authorization extensions. The New Starts program underwent several significant changes in SAFETEA, and a long-term reauthorization of the surface transportation program provides a major opportunity for Congress to consider more changes. These include the size of the overall program and how those funds are distributed in terms of project size and the required local match; the types of transit modes that are eligible and favored within the program; the New Starts approval process, including the way in which projects are evaluated and rated for funding; and private sector participation in New Starts projects. Issues and Options for Congress
New Starts Program Funding
One of the most important issues in the reauthorization of the New Starts program will be the amount of funding authorized for New Starts projects. Overall, APTA recommends that federal transit funding be authorized for a total of $123 billion over six years, an average of $20.5 billion per year, compared with the SAFETEA average of $9.1 billion per year. Another possibility is redirecting New Starts monies to rehabilitating existing transit rail systems, many of which were built using New Starts funding. | The New Starts program provides federal funds to public transit agencies on a largely competitive basis for the construction of new fixed-guideway transit systems and the expansion of existing fixed-guideway systems. New Starts has funded the development of bus rapid transit (BRT) and ferries, as these are eligible under the definition of fixed-guideway, but the vast majority of funding has gone to transit rail systems. Partly as a result of federal support, rail transit route-mileage in the United States almost doubled between 1985 and 2008, and rail transit passenger trips and passenger miles grew by 66% and 73%, respectively.
The federal transit program, of which New Starts is a part, is authorized by the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA) (P.L. 109-59). Since SAFETEA expired on September 30, 2009, the program has operated under a series of authorization extensions. The program underwent several significant changes in SAFETEA, and a long-term reauthorization of the surface transportation program provides a major opportunity for Congress to make more changes.
Four of the most important issues that might arise in the reauthorization debate are:
The amount of funding authorized for New Starts projects. The American Public Transportation Association (APTA), for instance, recommends increasing the program from an average of about $1.5 billion per year, as authorized by SAFETEA, to an average of $3.5 billion per year. Other policy analysts advocate shrinking federal government support for transit, particularly expensive new rail systems. Another option is to redirect New Starts funding to rehabilitating existing transit rail systems. The types of projects favored within the New Starts program. Some advocate a continuation of building major commuter, heavy (subway), and light rail transit systems and extensions, while others favor more emphasis on cheaper, but slower, streetcar projects, and still others favor bus and bus rapid transit (BRT). The New Starts approval process. Several proposals are pending to simplify the approval process or to change the way projects are rated. Encouragement of more private sector participation in New Starts projects. Formation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) might increase investment in rail transit, but attracting private money may require simplification of the approval process. |
crs_RL34097 | crs_RL34097_0 | Introduction
Congress's contempt power is the means by which Congress responds to certain acts that in its view obstruct the legislative process. Contempt may be used either to coerce compliance, to punish the contemnor, and/or to remove the obstruction. Although any action that directly obstructs the effort of Congress to exercise its constitutional powers may arguably constitute a contempt, in recent decades the contempt power has most often been employed in response to the refusal of a witness to comply with a congressional subpoena—whether in the form of a refusal to provide testimony, or a refusal to produce requested documents. Congress has three formal methods by which it can combat non-compliance with a duly issued subpoena. Each of these methods invokes the authority of a separate branch of government. First, the long dormant inherent contempt power permits Congress to rely on its own constitutional authority to detain and imprison a contemnor until the individual complies with congressional demands. Second, the criminal contempt statute permits Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal prosecution of the contemnor. Finally, Congress may rely on the judicial branch to enforce a congressional subpoena. Under this procedure, Congress may seek a civil judgment from a federal court declaring that the individual in question is legally obligated to comply with the congressional subpoena. This report examines the source of the contempt power; reviews the historical development of the early case law; discusses noteworthy contempt proceedings; outlines the statutory, common law, and constitutional limitations on the contempt power; and analyzes the procedures associated with inherent contempt, criminal contempt, and the civil enforcement of congressional subpoenas. In Miers , the House Judiciary Committee was authorized, by resolution, to pursue civil enforcement of subpoenas issued against former White House Counsel Harriet Miers and White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Constitution." First, Congress faces a number of obstacles in any attempt to enforce a subpoena issued against an executive branch official through the criminal contempt statute. Although the courts have reaffirmed Congress's constitutional authority to issue and enforce subpoenas, efforts to punish an executive branch official for non-compliance with a subpoena through criminal contempt will likely prove unavailing in many, if not most circumstances. Where the President directs or endorses the non-compliance of the official, such as where the official refuses to disclose information pursuant to the President's decision that such information is protected under executive privilege, past practice suggests that the DOJ will not pursue a prosecution for criminal contempt. Second, although it appears that Congress may be able to enforce its own subpoenas through a declaratory civil action, relying on this mechanism to enforce a subpoena directed at an executive official may prove an inadequate means of protecting congressional prerogatives due to the time required to achieve a final, enforceable ruling in the case. Although subject to practical limitations, Congress retains the ability to exercise its own constitutionally based authority to enforce a subpoena through inherent contempt. | Congress's contempt power is the means by which Congress responds to certain acts that in its view obstruct the legislative process. Contempt may be used either to coerce compliance, to punish the contemnor, and/or to remove the obstruction. Although arguably any action that directly obstructs the effort of Congress to exercise its constitutional powers may constitute a contempt, in recent times the contempt power has most often been employed in response to non-compliance with a duly issued congressional subpoena—whether in the form of a refusal to appear before a committee for purposes of providing testimony, or a refusal to produce requested documents.
Congress has three formal methods by which it can combat non-compliance with a duly issued subpoena. Each of these methods invokes the authority of a separate branch of government. First, the long dormant inherent contempt power permits Congress to rely on its own constitutional authority to detain and imprison a contemnor until the individual complies with congressional demands. Second, the criminal contempt statute permits Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal prosecution of the contemnor. Finally, Congress may rely on the judicial branch to enforce a congressional subpoena. Under this procedure, Congress may seek a civil judgment from a federal court declaring that the individual in question is legally obligated to comply with the congressional subpoena.
A number of obstacles face Congress in any attempt to enforce a subpoena issued against an executive branch official. Although the courts have reaffirmed Congress's constitutional authority to issue and enforce subpoenas, efforts to punish an executive branch official for non-compliance with a subpoena through criminal contempt will likely prove unavailing in many, if not most, circumstances. Where the official refuses to disclose information pursuant to the President's decision that such information is protected under executive privilege, past practice suggests that the Department of Justice (DOJ) will not pursue a prosecution for criminal contempt. In addition, although it appears that Congress may be able to enforce its own subpoenas through a declaratory civil action, relying on this mechanism to enforce a subpoena directed at an executive official may prove an inadequate means of protecting congressional prerogatives due to the time required to achieve a final, enforceable ruling in the case. Although subject to practical limitations, Congress retains the ability to exercise its own constitutionally based authorities to enforce a subpoena through inherent contempt.
This report examines the source of the contempt power, reviews the historical development of the early case law, outlines the statutory and common law basis for Congress's contempt power, and analyzes the procedures associated with inherent contempt, criminal contempt, and the civil enforcement of subpoenas. The report also includes a detailed discussion of two recent information access disputes that led to the approval of contempt citations in the House against then-White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten and former White House Counsel Harriet Miers, as well as Attorney General Eric Holder. Finally, the report discusses both non-constitutional and constitutionally based limitations on the contempt power. |
crs_R41267 | crs_R41267_0 | In establishing the student performance standards and accountability provisions in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. Thus, in enacting NCLB, Congress amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) to establish a requirement that all teachers be highly qualified and authorized the Title II, Teacher and Principal Training and Recruiting Fund to assist schools' efforts to meet this new requirement. Congress passed provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. Nationwide, nearly 4 million teachers are employed in almost 100,000 public schools located in about 14,000 school districts. There are just under 3.9 million public school teachers in the United States. The teaching workforce is aging. Nearly two-fifths (19%) have less than four years of teaching experience and over a third (36%) have been in their current school less than four years. About 100,000 bachelor's degrees in education are awarded each year. Features of the Teaching Workplace
Certification and Licensure
Teacher certification or licensure is a state function. Every state has a law addressing these issues that is specifically targeted to elementary and secondary school teachers. Since that time, funding for this purpose has increased roughly fivefold. Five other programs accounted for the remainder ($163 million) of ED's FY1998 funding to support K-12 teaching. Pre-service Training and Class Size Reduction
The 105 th Congress began a change in the focus of federal teacher policy through two measures: (1) amending the HEA to include a new Teacher Quality Enhancement program, and (2) appropriating funds for a new Class Size Reduction program under broad authority provided in Title VI of the ESEA. Effectiveness
Recently, Congress has signaled that, as opposed to continuing to emphasize teacher quality, increasingly federal policy may focus on teacher effectiveness. In November 2009, the Department of Education published a notice of final priorities for the Race to the Top program. Current Federal Teacher Programs
This section provides descriptions of the major federal programs currently authorized to address K-12 teaching. The primary focus of this discussion is on the programs in the ESEA as amended by NCLB. Among the authorized activities are the following:
assistance to schools in the recruitment and retention of highly qualified teachers (see definition above), principals, and, under certain conditions, pupil services personnel; assistance in recruiting and hiring highly qualified teachers through such means as scholarships and signing bonuses; use of these teachers to reduce class sizes; initiatives to increase retention of highly qualified teachers and principals, particularly in schools with high percentages of low-achieving students, through mentoring, induction services during the initial three years of service, and financial incentives for those effectively serving all students; professional development, including professional development that involves technology in teaching and curriculum and professional development delivered through technology; improvement of the quality of the teaching force through such activities as tenure reform, merit pay, and teacher testing in their subject areas; and professional development for principals and superintendents. Teacher Quality Partnership Grants
Title II, Part A of the HEA authorizes Teacher Quality Partnership grants to improve the quality of teachers working in high-need schools and early childhood education programs by improving the preparation of teachers and enhancing professional development activities for teachers; holding teacher preparation programs accountable for preparing effective teachers; and recruiting highly qualified individuals into the teaching force. The second and third of these reform areas have particular importance for federal teacher policy. ESEA Reauthorization Issues
The authorization for ESEA programs expired at the end of FY2008, and the 113 th Congress is considering whether to amend and extend the ESEA. With the knowledge that these decisions are often made at the local level of our educational system, Congress may consider
whether the federal government will have a sustained role in teacher and principal compensation and whether this role will focus on seeding efforts to develop the capacity to link compensation to performance; whether performance-based teacher compensation efforts have triggered reforms in other areas such as evaluation procedures, leadership development, and data systems; whether successful reforms in a limited set of school districts can be replicated by scaling up the federal investment; and whether federal policy should address other barriers (i.e., beyond failure to identify poor teacher performance) that limit the role of teacher evaluations in high-stakes decision-making. Congress included similar provisions concerning the equitable distribution of teacher effectiveness in RTT. | The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) is the primary legislative vehicle for federal policymaking regarding teachers and instructional quality in the nation's elementary and secondary schools. Authorization for ESEA programs and policies, enacted through the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), expired at the end of FY2008 and the 113th Congress is likely to consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA. Notable ESEA provisions concerning K-12 teaching include requirements for minimum teacher qualifications and authority for a teacher training and class size reduction program funded at roughly $3 billion.
The size of the teaching workforce and diversity of the teaching workplace present many challenges to federal policy makers. The workforce of roughly 4 million teachers in the United States is both aging and "greening"—with well over one-third (37%) on the job for over 15 years and an equal share (36%) having taught less than four years in their current school. The teaching workplace of about 14,000 school districts nationwide is a highly dynamic one—with certain schools experiencing high rates of staff turnover each year and many schools instituting major reforms of teacher evaluation procedures.
The federal role in K-12 teacher policy has evolved rapidly since passage of NCLB. Federal policy has historically focused mainly on in-service training (or professional development). This focus began to change as the 105th Congress tripled funding for federal teacher programs by enacting a hiring program known as Class Size Reduction. With NCLB, the focus of federal policy moved squarely to the issue of teacher quality. The law mandated that all "core" subject-matter teachers possess minimum qualifications including a bachelor's degree, full state certification, and subject-matter knowledge. More recently, the focus of federal policy in this area has shifted to teacher effectiveness, particularly with passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which authorized the Race to the Top program. Legislative action in the 112th Congress, including bills passed by authorizing committees in both chambers, also contained provisions that would continue federal involvement in state and local efforts to evaluate teacher effectiveness.
At the present time, the Department of Education (ED) administers a dozen programs that support elementary and secondary school teachers and instructional quality. By far the largest of these, both in terms of appropriations and number of teachers served, is authorized in Part A of Title II of the ESEA—the Teacher and Principal Training and Recruiting Fund. In FY2013, this program provided roughly $3 billion primarily for teacher professional development to support meeting the NCLB highly qualified-teacher requirement. The second- and third-largest federal teacher programs are Race to the Top ($550 million in FY2013, though not all funds are used to improve teaching) and the Teacher Incentive Fund ($300 million in FY2013). Both of these programs support improved teacher effectiveness, the former through teacher evaluation reform and the latter by providing pay compensation to high-performing teachers.
If the 113th Congress considers reauthorizing the ESEA, teacher effectiveness will likely continue to be central to this discussion. Other issues of importance include compensation and high-stakes school staffing decision-making, distributional equity across schools and districts, teacher preparation programs—both traditional and alternative—and professional development. |
crs_RL34697 | crs_RL34697_0 | Introduction
The U.S. military justice system exercises jurisdiction over criminal cases pursuant to Article I of the U.S. Constitution and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). In Stevenson , the Navy prosecuted the defendant for rape, a crime routinely tried in non-military courts with civilian defendants. Companion bills introduced in the 111 th Congress, H.R. The UCMJ includes some crimes that are unique to military service. Appellate Structure for Military Cases
Article I military courts handle military cases throughout the chain of appellate review. After a Court of Criminal Appeals has reviewed a case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) provides the final opportunity for appellate review within the military court system. In contrast, criminal appellants in Article III courts have an automatic right of appeal to federal courts of appeals and then a right to petition the Supreme Court for review. Except for limited interaction with the U.S. Supreme Court, Article I military courts operate separately from the Article III judicial system. However, the CAAF declined to follow Lawrence . Legislative Proposals to Expand Jurisdiction
Bills introduced during the 111 th Congress, the Equal Justice for Our Military Act of 2010 ( H.R. 569 ) and the Equal Justice for United States Military Personnel Act of 2009 ( S. 357 ), would have expanded the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over military cases. To date, similar legislation has not been introduced in the 112 th Congress. Military cases follow a unique process of appellate review, moving from courts-martial through the following steps: (1) automatic appeals to Courts of Criminal Appeals for each armed forces branch; (2) potential discretionary review by the highest military court, the CAAF; and (3) review by the U.S. Supreme Court in limited circumstances, usually only when the CAAF has also granted review. | Military courts, authorized by Article I of the U.S. Constitution, have jurisdiction over cases involving military servicemembers, including, in some cases, retired servicemembers. They have the power to convict for crimes defined in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including both uniquely military offenses and crimes with equivalent definitions in civilian laws. For example, in United States v. Stevenson, military courts prosecuted a retired serviceman for rape, a crime often tried in civilian courts.
The military court system includes military courts-martial; a Criminal Court of Appeals for each branch of the armed services; and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), which has discretionary appellate jurisdiction over all military cases. With the exception of potential final review by the U.S. Supreme Court, these Article I courts handle review of military cases in an appellate system that rarely interacts with Article III courts.
Criminal defendants in the Article III judicial system have an automatic right to appeal to federal courts of appeal and then a right to petition the Supreme Court for final review. In contrast, defendants in military cases typically may not appeal their cases to the U.S. Supreme Court unless the highest military court, the CAAF, had also granted discretionary review in the case.
Companion bills introduced in the 111th Congress, the Equal Justice for Our Military Act of 2010 (H.R. 569) and the Equal Justice for United States Military Personnel Act of 2009 (S. 357), would have authorized appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court for all military cases, including cases that the CAAF declined to review. While neither of the companion bills passed their respective chamber, the House passed a similar measure, H.R. 3174, during the 110th Congress. To date, however, similar legislation has not been introduced in the 112th Congress. |
crs_R44330 | crs_R44330_0 | House rules specifically prohibit the House Committee on Rules from reporting a special rule that would prevent the motion to recommit from being offered on initial passage of a bill or joint resolution. Types of Motions to Recommit
Motions to recommit are characterized as being of two types. If adopted by the House, it returns the underlying measure to committee. The other type of motion to recommit, offered much more frequently, includes instructions and must contain language directing that the legislation be reported "forthwith," meaning that if the House adopts such a motion, the measure remains on the House floor, and the committee chair (or designee) immediately rises and reports the bill back to the House with any amendment(s) contained in the instructions of the recommittal motion. Potential Procedural Effects of the Motion to Recommit
A motion to recommit may have several procedural effects. Additionally, the motion to recommit might seek to send the bill to a committee to which it was not referred due to jurisdictional issues. Potential Political Effects of the Motion to Recommit
As described below, the motion to recommit underwent fundamental changes in 1909 with the stated purpose of giving the minority the right "to have a vote upon its position upon great public questions." This seems to imply that the motion was intended to have not only procedural effects but also political ones, allowing Members to go on record as supporting or opposing a specific policy, an opportunity that may be important for demonstrating their policy preference to constituents that might not otherwise occur in the absence of the motion. A motion to recommit may combine several proposed amendments, providing the opportunity to package together a set of views as a way to create a comprehensive public record to emphasize the minority party's differences from the platform of the majority. Prior to 1909, however, it operated differently than it does today, and priority in recognition for the offering of the motion to recommit was not reserved for a Member opposed to the measure. This solidified the motion as a "minority right." These arguments led the House to amend its rules. | The motion to recommit provides a final opportunity for the House to affect a measure before passage, either by amending the measure or sending it back to committee.
The motion to recommit is often referred to as "the minority's motion," because preference in recognition for offering a motion to recommit is given to a member of the minority party who is opposed to the bill. The stated purpose of giving the minority party this right was to allow them to "have a vote upon its position upon great public questions." House rules protect this minority right, as it is not in order for the House Committee on Rules to report a special rule that would preclude offering a motion to recommit a bill or joint resolution prior to its initial passage.
Motions to recommit are of two types: "straight" motions and motions that include instructions. A Member offering a "straight" motion to recommit seeks to send the measure to committee with no requirement for further consideration by the House. A Member offering a motion to recommit with instructions seeks to immediately amend the underlying bill on the House floor.
A motion to recommit may have various procedural effects, including amending an underlying measure, sending it to one or more committees, providing additional time for its consideration, or potentially disposing of the legislation. Due to its inclusion of policy language, the motion to recommit might also have political effects, such as allowing Members to go on record as supporting or opposing a specific policy and creating a comprehensive public record to emphasize the minority party's differences from the platform of the majority.
This report provides an overview of House rules and precedents governing the motion to recommit and describes procedural and political effects of the motion. This report will be updated to reflect any changes in House rules governing the usage of the motion to recommit. |
crs_RL31948 | crs_RL31948_0 | Introduction
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Counsels, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all Other Officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law…." John Adams, however, thought the Senate would play a far bigger role. The Senate has played a large role in the process during some administrations and a lesser role in others, which has been largely a function of the President's ability to translate his power into influence with Congress. Development of Senate Procedures
Over time, the Senate has developed or adapted practices to deal with the confirmation process, none of which are explicitly contained in Senate rules but all of which have been adhered to and recognized by the chamber at one time or another. Through the custom of senatorial courtesy, the senators may exercise a virtual veto over the president's choice. Along the same lines is the "blue slip," a tradition emanating from the Judiciary Committee, which can allow a home-state Senator to block a judicial nomination. Also, Senators have used the informal tradition of "holds" to prevent or delay the Senate from acting on a nomination. Senators also have used the tool of extended debate, known as a filibuster, to delay or prevent a nominee from being confirmed. This unwritten tradition has meant that Senators from the home state of a nominee and also of the party of the President can block a nomination to a federal office within their state merely by objecting to it. The blue slip practice is not a formal part of the Judiciary Committee's rules, and the determination of just how much weight to give to a Senator's opposition to a nomination is left largely up to the chair of the committee. Including the Fortas nomination, cloture has been sought on 36 judicial nominations and 32 executive branch nominations between 1968 and 2008. | Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Counsels, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all Other Officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law…."
Exactly what the phrase "advice and consent" means in terms of distribution of power between the legislative and executive branches has been disputed almost since the beginning of the Republic. While some drafters of the Constitution believed the Senate's role would be minimal, others said the Senate would play a large role.
The role the Senate has played in the nomination process has depended, in part, upon the relationship between the President and the Senate. Nonetheless, while there have been many controversies over nominations, the vast majority of nominees eventually make it through the process and are confirmed.
Over time, the Senate has developed a series of procedures to deal with the concerns of its Members on nominations. First is the custom of senatorial courtesy, whereby Senators from the same party as the President might influence a nomination or kill it by objecting to it. This custom has not always been observed absolutely, but it has allowed Senators to play a fairly large role, particularly in the selection of nominees within a Senator's home state, such as for district court judgeships.
For judicial nominations, the Judiciary Committee has developed a tradition of "blue slips," a document used to get a home-state Senator's opinion on a judicial nomination. The chair of the committee determines how much weight to give a home-state Senator's objection to a judicial nominee.
Other procedures that Senators have used to express their position on a nomination include holds, an informal procedure that can allow a single Senator to block action on a nomination (or legislation), and filibusters, extended debate that can block an up-or-down vote on a nomination (or legislation). Both procedures have been used to delay or block action on nominations.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42524 | crs_R42524_0 | Introduction
Broadband deployment is increasingly seen as providing a path towards increased regional economic development and, in the long term, creating jobs. According to the 2010 National Broadband Plan, the lack of adequate broadband infrastructure is most pressing in rural America, where the costs of serving large geographical areas, coupled with low population densities, often reduce economic incentives for telecommunications providers to invest in and maintain broadband service. Historically, the federal government has provided assistance to rural telecommunications providers, helping them obtain capital to invest in rural telecommunications infrastructure and to maintain an adequate return on their investment. Currently, there are two ongoing federal vehicles which direct money to fund broadband in rural areas: the broadband and telecommunications programs at the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Universal Service Fund (USF) programs under the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). While both the RUS and USF programs share some of the same goals (e.g., improving broadband availability and adoption in rural areas), the two programs differ in their funding mechanism, scope, and emphasis. The 113 th Congress may assess how best to shape the evolution of both the RUS and USF broadband programs. RUS grants and loans are used as up-front capital to invest in broadband infrastructure, whereas the USF provides ongoing subsidies to keep the operation of telecommunications—and most recently broadband networks in high-cost areas—economically viable for providers. Finally, the RUS programs are funded through annual appropriations and are subject to the annual congressional budget process. By contrast, USF is not funded through annual appropriations, but is funded by mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers that provide interstate service. Role of Congress
Congress is seeking ways to best leverage federal programs to ensure that the goals of the National Broadband Plan—including universal broadband service by 2020—are met to the greatest extent possible. The statute authorizing the Rural Broadband Loan and Loan Guarantee—Section 601 of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936—was significantly modified in the 2008 farm bill, and is being addressed once more in the 2013 farm bill. Meanwhile, the USF is undergoing a major and unprecedented transition through a series of reforms being implemented by the FCC. Congress has largely adopted an oversight role and a "wait and see" posture with respect to the FCC's USF reforms. | Since the initial deployment of broadband in the late 1990s, Congress has viewed broadband infrastructure deployment as a means towards improving regional economic development, and in the long term, to create jobs. According to the National Broadband Plan, the lack of adequate broadband infrastructure is most pressing in rural America, where the costs of serving large geographical areas, coupled with low population densities, often reduce economic incentives for telecommunications providers to invest in and maintain broadband infrastructure and service.
Historically, the federal government has provided financial assistance to give telecommunications providers the capital to invest in rural telecommunications infrastructure and to maintain an adequate return on their investment. Currently, there are two ongoing federal vehicles which direct money to fund broadband in rural areas: the broadband and telecommunications programs at the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Universal Service Fund (USF) programs under the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
While both the RUS and USF programs share some of the same goals (e.g., improving broadband availability and adoption in rural areas), the two programs are different with respect to their funding mechanism, scope, and emphasis. For example, RUS grants and loans are used as up-front capital to invest in broadband infrastructure, while the USF provides ongoing subsidies to keep the operation of telecommunications and broadband networks in high cost areas economically viable for providers. Another key difference is that the RUS programs are funded through annual appropriations, while USF is funded through mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers that provide interstate service, and is not subject to the annual congressional budget process.
Both programs are at a pivotal point in the 113th Congress. The statute authorizing the Rural Broadband Loan and Loan Guarantee program was significantly modified in the 2008 farm bill, and is being addressed once more in the 2013 farm bill. Meanwhile, the USF is undergoing a major and unprecedented transition through a series of reforms being developed by the FCC, and Congress has adopted an oversight role with respect to those reforms. In shaping and monitoring the future evolution of these programs, Congress is assessing how best to leverage these programs to ensure that the goals of the National Broadband Plan—including universal broadband service by 2020—are met to the greatest extent possible. |
crs_R42645 | crs_R42645_0 | Background
Despite the prominence of the U.S.-Japan alliance in America's overall strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific region, local concerns about the U.S. military presence on Okinawa have challenged the management of the alliance for decades. The Japanese islands serve as the most significant forward-operating platform for the U.S. military in the region. With the United States pledging to rebalance its defense posture towards Asia, the uncertainty surrounding the medium and long-term presence of American forces on Okinawa remains a critical concern for national security decision-makers. The relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) is the largest and most problematic part of a broad overhaul of the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. A 2006 agreement between the U.S. and Japanese governments to relocate the Futenma base from its current location in the crowded city of Ginowan to Camp Schwab in Henoko, a less congested part of the island, was envisioned as the centerpiece of a planned realignment of U.S. forces. The anticipated air station is often referred to as the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). The arrangement was designed to reduce the local community's burden of hosting a loud air base that has generated safety concerns and, eventually, to return control of the Futenma land to local authorities as a way to boost economic development in the area. In addition, the relocation would have triggered the transfer of roughly 8,000 marines and their dependents from Japan to new facilities in Guam. In addition, the U.S. Congress raised major concerns about the ballooning costs of moving the Marines to Guam and for several years blocked funds dedicated to the Marine Corps realignment. In April 2012, the United States and Japan officially adjusted the policy by "de-linking" the transfer of marines to Guam with progress on the new base in the Henoko area of Camp Schwab. As under the previous plan, about 9,000 U.S. marines are slated be transferred to locations outside of Japan: 5,000 marines to Guam, 1,500 to Hawaii, and 2,500 on a rotational basis to Australia. His political stance has reenergized the anti-base movement on Okinawa and renewed the political contestation over the U.S. military presence on Okinawa and the fate of the Futenma base. Overall Progress on Realignment Process
The controversy surrounding relocation of MCAS Futenma has overshadowed progress in implementing other elements of the DPRI. Due to the legacy of the U.S. occupation and the islands' key strategic location, Okinawa hosts a disproportionate share of the continuing U.S. military presence. According to the Okinawan government, about 25% of all facilities used by U.S. Forces Japan are located in the prefecture, which comprises less than 1% of Japan's total land area, and roughly half of all U.S. military personnel are stationed in Okinawa. Many observers assert that Tokyo has failed to communicate effectively to Okinawans the necessity and benefits of the alliance. However, Okinawa has received millions of dollars in subsidies from the central government in exchange for the burden of hosting U.S. troops. Takeshi Onaga, Nakaima's successor as governor and a former member of the conservative LDP, opposes the plan to relocate Futenma inside Okinawa. Governor Onaga's Multi-Pronged Struggle against Futenma Relocation
Governor Onaga has used a variety of tactics to prevent or delay the construction of the FRF at the Henoko site. | Although the U.S.-Japan alliance is often labeled as "the cornerstone" of security in the Asia Pacific region, local concerns about the U.S. military presence on the Japanese island of Okinawa have challenged the management of the alliance for decades. The Japanese archipelago serves as the most significant forward-operating platform for the U.S. military in the region; approximately 53,000 military personnel (39,000 onshore and 14,000 afloat in nearby waters), 43,000 dependents, and 5,000 Department of Defense civilian employees live in Japan. With the United States rebalancing its defense posture towards Asia, the uncertainty surrounding the medium and long-term presence of American forces on Okinawa remains a critical concern for national security decision-makers.
Due to the legacy of the U.S. occupation and the island's key strategic location, Okinawa hosts a disproportionate share of the continuing U.S. military presence. About 25% of all facilities used by U.S. Forces Japan and about half of the U.S. military personnel are located in the prefecture, which comprises less than 1% of Japan's total land area. Many Okinawans oppose the U.S. military presence, although some observers assert that Tokyo has failed to communicate effectively to Okinawans the benefits of the alliance. However, Okinawa has received billions of dollars in subsidies from the central government to offset the "burden" of hosting U.S. troops.
In 2006, as part of a broad realignment of U.S. basing in Japan, the United States and Japan agreed to relocate Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to a less-congested area on Okinawa and then redeploy 8,000 marines to U.S. bases in Guam. The arrangement was designed to reduce the local community's burden of hosting a loud air base that has generated safety concerns and, eventually, to return control of the Futenma land to local authorities as a way to boost economic development in the area. The controversy surrounding relocation of MCAS Futenma has overshadowed progress in other elements of the realignment of U.S. Forces Japan.
Facing delays in relocating the Futenma base, in 2012 the United States and Japan agreed to "de-link" the replacement facility with the transfer of marines to Guam. The current plan is to relocate 9,000 marines (and their dependents) from Okinawa, deploying 5,000 to Guam, 2,500 to Australia on a rotational basis, and 1,500 to Hawaii as soon as the receiving facilities are ready. From 2011 to 2014, Members of Congress continually raised concerns about the cost and feasibility of moving the Marines to Guam and other locations, and blocked some funds dedicated to the realignment. These concerns appear to have diminished since 2014.
In the last days of 2013, the United States and Japan cleared an important political hurdle in their long-delayed plan to relocate the Futenma base when Hirokazu Nakaima, then-Governor of Okinawa, approved construction of an offshore landfill necessary to build the replacement facility. Nakaima lost his reelection bid in late 2014, however, and his successor as Governor of Okinawa has used a variety of administrative, legal, and political tactics to prevent or delay construction of the Futenma replacement facility. A U.S.-Japan joint planning document in April 2013 indicated that the new base at Henoko would be completed no earlier than 2022.
Many challenges remain to implementation of the Futenma relocation plan. Most Okinawans oppose the construction of a new U.S. base for a mix of political, environmental, and quality-of-life reasons. Okinawan anti-base civic groups may take extreme measures to prevent construction of the facility at Henoko. Any heavy-handed actions by Tokyo or Washington could lead to broader sympathy and support for the anti-base protesters from the public in Okinawa and mainland Japan. Meanwhile, the Futenma base remains in operation, raising fears that an accident might further inflame Okinawan opposition. |
crs_R41969 | crs_R41969_0 | With important responsibilities for the formulation of U.S. international trade and financial policies, Congress has an interest in understanding how these shifts of wealth and power are affecting U.S. economic interests. This report addresses these concerns in two parts by (1) describing and analyzing trends that are transforming the global economy, and (2) highlighting varied policy challenges raised by the new global economy for congressional consideration. Often referred to as "Factory Asia," this development has been driven by the proliferation of global supply chains that rely on significant amounts of goods and services inputs from different countries, including from the United States. The rising economic powers have also increased their financial holdings and wealth and are becoming more important players in international financial markets. While a dominant share of financial assets, financial centers, and financial regulatory power remains concentrated in the United States and Europe, these emerging economies have accumulated large volumes of foreign exchange reserves, established sovereign wealth funds, borrowed capital from international financial markets, attracted foreign direct investment, and begun investing some of their assets abroad. As a result of these changes, the long-standing division between advanced and developing countries has eroded, particularly for the handful of rising economic powers. The advanced or developed countries may still be the richest countries in terms of per capita incomes, but their economies may no longer be the largest, the fastest-growing, or the most dynamic. This development, in turn, has implications for U.S. economic well-being and global economic leadership that are subject to debate. Shifts in Global Production and Trade
World GDP Rankings
The balance of international economic power is shifting from the United States and European powers that have dominated the world economy since the end of World War II to a few dozen developing countries located in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Sources of World Growth
Led by China, India, and Brazil, rising economic powers are responsible for a dramatic shift in the sources of world GDP growth. Some research sees these changes contributing to growing income and employment changes throughout the U.S. economy with highly educated workers enjoying more job opportunities and higher wages than workers with less education. Issues for Congress
The changing global economic landscape poses numerous challenges and opportunities for U.S. international trade and financial policies, including the functioning of the global economic institutions. The future direction of U.S. trade negotiations—multilateral, regional, and bilateral—as well as analysis of trade relations, may need to take into better account the growing role that production chains and trade in intermediate products are playing in today's global economy. New issues raised by the changing global landscape include the role of state-owned enterprises, access to developing country markets for procurement, and distinctions among developing countries concerning their world trade obligations. These include concerns about the adequacy of the regulatory system for integrating developing countries into international financial arrangements, rules for direct investment, the role and operation of sovereign wealth funds, and the future of the dollar as world's primary reserve currency. The emergence of developing country multinational firms may also create greater competition for U.S. firms for natural resources, technology, and access to capital markets. U.S. Trade Negotiations and New Trade Policy Challenges
The growing redistribution of global economic power and rise of global supply chains has raised challenges for U.S. trade negotiations and trade policy. Shifts in relative economic power positions also raise broader questions concerning possible impacts on U.S. influence and leadership of the global economy. | A small group of developing countries are transforming the global economic landscape. Led by China, India, and Brazil, these rising economic powers pose varied challenges and opportunities for U.S. economic interests and leadership of the global economy. They also raise significant policy issues for Congress, including the future direction of U.S. trade policy and negotiations, as well as for the multilateral economic institutions that have historically served as the foundation of an open and rules-based global economy.
This report addresses ongoing shifts in global trade and finance and projected future trends resulting from the emergence of these economies. It is the first of a three-part CRS series that focuses on how the Rising Economic Powers are affecting U.S. interests and raising challenges for congressional oversight of U.S. international trade and financial policies.
The major trends in the global economy identified and discussed in this report are:
The balance of global economic power is shifting from the United States and Europe to a number of fast-growing and large developing countries. These economies account for rising shares of global GDP, manufacturing, and trade, including a significant expansion of trade among the developing countries (South-South trade). These shifts are driven by growing economic integration and interdependence among economies, particularly through new global production and supply chains that incorporate inputs from many different countries. Rising economic powers are becoming more important players in international finance. They have increased holdings of foreign exchange reserves, established sovereign wealth funds, borrowed capital from international capital markets, and attracted substantial foreign investment. Their multinational corporations, many state-owned, are investing assets globally and are competing with U.S. firms for natural resources and access to other developing-country markets. The long-standing distinction between advanced and developing countries, particularly for rising economic powers, is blurring. The advanced countries may still be the richest countries in terms of per capita income, but their economies may no longer be the largest, the fastest-growing, or the most dynamic. Rising economic powers are exerting greater influence in global trade and financial policies and in the multilateral institutions that have underpinned the global economy since World War II. These developments, in turn, have implications for U.S. global leadership that are subject to debate. While the impact of the rising economic powers is considered by most economists to be strongly positive for the U.S. economy overall, not all groups of Americans have benefitted equally. Highly educated workers are seen gaining more job opportunities and higher wages than workers with less education.
Issues for Congress on the international trade and finance policies raised by the changing global landscape could include:
Seizing full advantage of growing markets for U.S. manufacturers, service providers, agricultural producers, and their workers, including preparing for increased competition. The future direction of U.S. trade negotiations and the global trading system, as well as specific policies and issues raised by the global economy. These might include the increasing role of state-owned enterprises, access to developing country markets for services and government procurement, the future role of the dollar as the primary reserve currency, and U.S. participation in global supply chains, among other issues. The evolution of international frameworks for financial integration, as well as multilateral and bilateral frameworks for foreign direct investment and sovereign wealth funds.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33505 | crs_RL33505_0 | Tax Benefits in Current Law
Current law provides significant tax benefits for health insurance and expenses. In addition, the tax benefits affect the distribution and cost of health care. Health insurance paid by employers generally is excluded from employees' gross income in determining their income tax liability; it also is not considered for either the employees' or the employer's share of employment taxes (i.e., Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment taxes). The exclusion for employer-paid insurance should be distinguished from the tax deduction employers are allowed for the payments they make and other costs they incur. For income taxes, the exclusion applies to employees as individual taxpayers, while the deduction applies to employers. Cafeteria plans may be simple or complex. Health Savings Accounts
Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) are one way that people can pay on a tax-advantaged basis for unreimbursed medical expenses (deductibles, copayments, and services not covered by insurance). Health Coverage Tax Credit
Three groups of taxpayers are potentially eligible for the health coverage tax credit (HCTC):
individuals receiving a Trade Readjustment Allowance under the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, including those eligible for but not yet receiving the allowance because they have not yet exhausted their state unemployment benefits; individuals receiving wage subsidies in the form of Re-employment Trade Adjustment Assistance (RTAA) benefits; and individuals aged 55 and older receiving a Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) pension payment. Coverage under veterans health care programs and the benefits they provide are not considered taxable. However, other specifications differ depending on the plan. Some Consequences of the Tax Benefits60
Increases in Coverage
By lowering the after-tax cost of insurance, some of the tax benefits described above help extend coverage to more people. Tax benefits also lead some people to obtain more coverage than they might otherwise choose. The uncapped exclusion for employer-paid insurance, which can benefit nearly all workers and is easy to administer, is partly responsible for the predominance of employment-based insurance in the United States. Increases in Health Care Use and Cost
Tax benefits increase the demand for health care by enabling insured people to obtain services at discounted prices. Consumer-driven health care (most commonly associated with high-deductible insurance plans coupled with Health Reimbursement Accounts and Health Savings Accounts) is a recent attempt to help people obtain coverage without driving up costs as much. Even if these individuals itemize their deductions, they may deduct health insurance premiums only to the extent that they (and other health care expenditures) exceed 7.5% of AGI. However, to the extent that health insurance is considered a way of spreading an individual's catastrophic economic risk over multiple years, basing tax savings on marginal tax rates might be justified. Tax Policy for Health Insurance . Consumer-Directed Health Plans: Potential Effects on Health Care Spending and Outcomes . | How tax policy affects health insurance and health care spending is a perennial subject of discussion in Washington. The issue is prompted by the size of the tax benefits, by their effect on the cost and allocation of health care resources, and by interest in comprehensive tax reform.
Current law contains significant tax benefits for health insurance and expenses. By far the largest is the exclusion for employer-paid coverage, which employees may omit from their individual income taxes. The exclusion also applies to employment taxes and to health benefits in cafeteria plans. (The exclusion should be distinguished from the deduction employers may take for the payments they make and other costs they incur.) Other important tax benefits include the following:
Self-employed taxpayers may deduct 100% of their health insurance, even if they do not itemize deductions, and taxpayers who itemize may deduct insurance payments and other unreimbursed medical expenses to the extent they exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income; Some workers eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance or receiving a pension paid by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation can receive the Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) to purchase certain types of insurance; Four tax-advantaged accounts are available to help taxpayers pay their health care expenses: Flexible Spending Accounts, Health Reimbursement Accounts, Health Savings Accounts, and Medical Savings Accounts; Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association plans (VEBAs) are vehicles for prefunding retiree health benefits on a tax-advantaged basis for certain groups of workers, particularly unionized workers; and Coverage under Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and military and veterans health care programs is not considered taxable income.
By lowering the after-tax cost of insurance, these tax benefits generally help extend coverage to more people; they also lead some people to obtain more coverage than they otherwise would. The incentives influence how coverage is acquired: the uncapped exclusion for employer-paid insurance is partly responsible for the predominance of employment-based insurance in the United States. In addition, the tax benefits increase the demand for health care by enabling insured people to obtain services at discounted prices; this in turn contributes to rising health care costs. When insurance is viewed as a form of personal consumption, most tax benefits appear to be inequitable because taxpayers' savings depend on marginal tax rates. When viewed as spreading catastrophic economic risk over multiple years, however, basing those savings on marginal rates might be justified as the proper treatment for losses under a progressive tax system.
This report details the current law for various tax benefits for health insurance coverage and identifies changes in certain provisions affected by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148) as amended. |
crs_RL34745 | crs_RL34745_0 | Evacuations, however, can create complex challenges for officials and emergency managers. Evacuations can also be hazardous. In such cases, it may be safer to have the special-needs population remain in the area and "shelter in place." Much of this concern is attributable to the New Orleans evacuation during the 2005 hurricane season, which has spurred numerous changes in federal evacuation policy. Examples of Federal Evacuation Policy
In general, federal policy defers to the states to enact laws pertinent to evacuation. As amended by the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (hereafter the Post Katrina Act), Section 425 of the Stafford Act states that the President may provide transportation assistance to "relocate individuals displaced from their predisaster primary residences as a result of an incident ... or otherwise transported from their predisaster primary residences ... to and from alternative locations for short or long-term accommodation or to return an individual or household to their predisaster primary residence or alternative location, as determined by the President." For example, the NRF identifies state, local, and tribal governments as having the responsibility of "ordering the evacuation of persons from any portions of the state threatened by the incident, giving consideration to the requirements of special-needs populations and those with household pets or service animals." Evacuations: Lessons Learned
General Lessons Learned from Evacuations
Studies of evacuations have identified several techniques that can make evacuations more effective. Another factor that influenced the way in which people were evacuated for Hurricane Ike was the experience of gasoline shortages and gridlock. According to one congressional report, a more complete evacuation of these areas could have saved lives and reduced human suffering. Table A-1 in the Appendix to this report includes some of this legislation. Potential Congressional Issues
During a review of issues related to evacuation, displacement, and sheltering policies, Congress might move to consider options for better integrating federal, state, and local efforts during evacuation. Congress might also review options that address issues of inequity or reform evacuation policy to make the decision to evacuate more precise, or take no action. FEMA has responsibility to provide for the evacuation of disaster victims and provide for evacuation as part of federal emergency preparedness efforts. The act also required FEMA to establish a disability coordinator to ensure that the needs of individuals with disabilities in disasters are addressed. As it currently stands, states and localities will have to increase planning, dedicate resources, and possibly shift priorities as they work to ensure that special-needs groups are not left out of evacuation plans. | When government officials become aware of an impending disaster, they may take steps to protect citizens before the incident occurs. Evacuation of the geographic area that may be affected is one option to ensure public safety. If implemented properly, evacuation can be an effective strategy for saving lives. Evacuations and decisions to evacuate, however, can also entail complex factors and elevated risks. Decisions to evacuate may require officials to balance potentially costly, hazardous, or unnecessary evacuations against the possibility of loss of life due to a delayed order to evacuate.
Some observers of evacuations, notably those from New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, claim evacuations pose unique challenges to certain segments of society. From their perspective, special-needs populations, the transit-dependent, and individuals with pets faced particular hardships associated with the storm. This, they claim, is because some evacuation plans, and the way in which they were carried out, appeared to inadequately address their unique circumstances or needs.
In responding to these challenges, then-Senator Obama introduced S. 1685 in the 109 th Congress, which would have directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure that each state provided detailed and comprehensive information regarding its pre-disaster and post-disaster plans for the evacuation of individuals with special needs in emergencies. President Barack Obama indicated during his campaign that he would continue to pursue similar evacuation polices.
Another facet of evacuation is sheltering displaced individuals. For short-term sheltering, federally provided resources include food, water, cots, and essential toiletries. When displaced individuals need long-term sheltering, federal policy provides financial assistance for alternative accommodations such as apartments, motels and hotels, recreational vehicles, and modular units.
While federal law provides for certain aspects of civilian emergency evacuation, evacuation policy generally is established and enforced by state and local officials. In recent years, Members of Congress have focused, in part, on policy options that addressed issues of equity during evacuations as well as attempts to integrate federal, state, and local evacuation efforts more fully.
This report discusses federal evacuation policy and analyzes potential lessons learned from the evacuations of individuals in response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005. Several issue areas that might arise concerning potential lawmaking and oversight on evacuation policy are also highlighted. This report will be updated as significant legislative or administrative changes occur. |
crs_R43207 | crs_R43207_0 | 112-25 ) as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ). 112-175 , H.J.Res. 113-6 required EPA and other federal departments and agencies funded in Division F of the law to report to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations to identify the allocations of FY2013 funding by program, project, or activity within each statutory appropriations account, including the application of sequestration and rescissions, within 30 days of enactment. The FY2013 enacted level is $443.4 million (5.3%) below the President's FY2013 request and $548.3 million (6.5%) below the FY2012 enacted level. EPA reported an additional $577.3 million (post-sequestration) in supplemental funding for the agency, increasing the total FY2013 enacted discretionary appropriations for EPA to $8.48 billion. The supplemental appropriations were allocated for water infrastructure, cleanup, and other recovery efforts in areas of states affected by Hurricane Sandy. 113-6 , including the partial-year continuing resolution for FY2013 in P.L. 112-589 ), reported by the House Committee on Appropriations on July 10, 2012, and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies draft bill released on September 25, 2012. The levels of FY2013 appropriations indicated in this report are as presented in EPA's Operating Plan provided to CRS by the House Committee on Appropriations, reflecting the application of sequestration under the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 113-2 ), enacted prior to P.L. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013
Division F of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. 113-6 ), enacted March 26, 2013, provided discretionary appropriations for the full fiscal year through September 30, 2013, for seven regular appropriations acts, including Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies, which funds EPA. 113-6 ultimately available to EPA and other federal departments and agencies include the application of an across-the-board (0.2%) rescission required by the law and the executive branch's calculations of spending reductions triggered by the BCA ( P.L. Section 1113 of P.L. As shown in Table 1 , EPA reported a total FY2013 enacted funding level of $7.90 billion after the application of the 0.2% across-the-board rescission and reductions triggered by sequestration. 113-6 did not specify the final FY2013 enacted funding levels available to EPA and other federal departments and agencies funded in Division F of the law. On September 28, 2012, the President signed the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013 ( P.L. 112-175 generally continued the rate of appropriations for the operations of EPA and most other federal departments and agencies on an apportioned basis at 0.612% above the FY2012 enacted level, with the exception of activities (none administered by EPA) funded in the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. Other Actions in the 112th Congress
H.R. 112-175 during the 112 th Congress, the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies released a draft bill on September 25, 2012, reflecting divergent funding priorities from the House. The draft bill included $8.52 billion for EPA for FY2013, $1.46 billion (20.7%) more than the House Committee on Appropriations recommended in H.R. 6091 . The following sections of this report discuss the levels of FY2013 appropriations for selected EPA programs and activities within the above areas that received prominent attention in the congressional debate leading to the enactment of P.L. 113-6 and automatic spending reductions triggered by sequestration, as presented by EPA in its FY2013 Operating Plan. Although generally not included in P.L. Some of these provisions were similar to those included for FY2012 in Division E of P.L. Table 6 presents the FY2013 enacted levels for EPA's Brownfields program, compared to the President's FY2013 request and the FY2012 enacted appropriations. | Enacted March 26, 2013, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6), appropriated funding for the full fiscal year through September 30, 2013. Seven regular appropriations acts, including Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies, which funds EPA, are covered by the full-year continuing appropriations provided in Division F of P.L. 113-6. The final level of appropriations ultimately available to EPA and other federal departments and agencies in FY2013 includes the application of an across-the-board rescission required by P.L. 113-6 and the executive branch calculations of the automatic spending reductions triggered by sequestration under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA; P.L. 112-240). Section 1113 of P.L. 113-6 required federal departments and agencies funded in Division F of the law to report to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations to identify the allocations of FY2013 enacted funding by program, project, or activity within each statutory appropriations account, including the application of rescissions and sequestration, within 30 days of enactment.
In its FY2013 Operating Plan submitted to the committees on May 7, 2013, EPA reported a total enacted FY2013 post-sequestration funding level of $7.90 billion, $443.4 million (5.3%) less than the President's FY2013 request and $548.3 million (6.5%) below the FY2012 enacted level. The Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-2), provided another $577.3 million (post-sequestration) to EPA in FY2013 for water infrastructure, cleanup, and other recovery efforts in areas of states affected by Hurricane Sandy, for a combined agency total of $8.48 billion.
Prior to the enactment of P.L. 113-6, EPA and other federal departments and agencies had operated under the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013 (P.L. 112-175, H.J.Res. 117), enacted September 28, 2012, in the 112th Congress. With a few exceptions, P.L. 112-175 generally had provided FY2013 appropriations for EPA and most other federal departments and agencies apportioned at 0.612% above the FY2012 enacted levels. Although not enacted, Title II of H.R. 6091, the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013, as reported by the House Committee on Appropriations on July 10, 2012, had included $7.06 billion for EPA for FY2013. The bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies also had released a draft bill on September 25, 2012, which included different funding priorities and proposed $8.52 billion for EPA in FY2013.
In addition to funding levels for EPA programs and activities, several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions received considerable interest during the consideration of the FY2013 appropriations debate similar to recent fiscal-year appropriations. Although several directive provisions to prohibit or restrict funding for certain EPA actions were included in H.R. 6091 as reported by the House Committee on Appropriations, these provisions were not included in the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee leadership draft bill, the partial-year continuing resolution for FY2013 in P.L. 112-175, or P.L. 113-6, which provided funding for the full fiscal year.
This report summarizes actions on FY2013 appropriations for EPA and presents the FY2013 enacted levels after the application of the across-the-board rescission and reductions triggered by sequestration, as reported in EPA's Operating Plan. A breakout of the agency total is presented for each account and selected programs and activities within those accounts that received prominent attention in the congressional debate. A comparison of the FY2013 enacted levels to the President's FY2013 budget request and the FY2012 enacted levels is included. |
crs_R43400 | crs_R43400_0 | Introduction
Congress is again debating how to promote work in the context of programs to aid poor and low-income people and families, including the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps) and federal rental housing assistance programs (public housing and the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program). The last major debate over the role of work in social assistance programs culminated in the 1996 welfare reform law (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, P.L. 104-193 ), which created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. Work requirements for SNAP were part of the 2014 "Farm Bill" debate ( P.L. 113-79 , Agricultural Act of 2014); ultimately Congress retained existing SNAP work rules but required and funded up to 10 pilot projects to test alternative employment and training strategies, including some features similar to those of TANF work programs. Rationales for Work-Related Provisions in Low-Income Assistance Programs
In order to understand the current set of policies in TANF, SNAP and federal rental housing assistance, it is useful to be familiar with the rationales for work-related requirement and incentive policies, including time limits, in social assistance programs. Combating Poverty
In most cases, without income from work, a person and his or her family members are almost certain to be poor. The cash public assistance program for needy families with children was eventually converted into the TANF block grant, with work requirements and time limits that apply with respect to recipients of cash assistance. 104-193 ) added the time limit for nonworking able-bodied adults without dependents and amended some of the work registration requirements. These programs serve low-income households who do not work, as well as those who do and they serve a more heterogeneous population than TANF, including elderly and disabled individuals, singles and couples without children, as well as families with children. Federal law requires most able-bodied adults receiving SNAP benefits to engage in work activities (e.g., register for work). Federal housing law has an 8-hour per month community service or economic self-sufficiency requirement for public housing residents not otherwise exempted or engaged in work; no such requirement exists for recipients of Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers. Public housing has an earned income disregard for two years; the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program has the same disregard, but only for households with disabilities. These policies may differ significantly in their implementation. In contrast, SNAP work requirements apply to individuals (although some requirements vary based on state options). However, some public housing authorities participating in the "Moving-to-Work" demonstration can place work requirements on individuals and/or households (see "Housing Assistance: The Moving to Work Demonstration"). In addition to earnings disregard policies, these programs also sometimes disregard certain accumulated savings. However, while there were fewer families eligible for assistance, the share of total eligible families actually receiving assistance also declined. Research subsequent to the enactment of TANF has found that the decline in the cash assistance caseload resulted both from families leaving the rolls more quickly and also from a decline in the number of families entering the program. Considerations in Extending Work Requirements and Time Limits to SNAP and Housing Assistance
As noted at the beginning of this report, work requirement, time limit, and work incentive policies are designed to meet any or all of several objectives, including offsetting work disincentives inherent in the benefit design of social programs; promoting a culture of work rather than a culture of dependency; prioritizing limited federal resources; and increasing the anti-poverty effectiveness of social assistance programs. Implementing time limit and work requirement policies, along with TANF-like sanctions, in SNAP and housing assistance may raise unique considerations specific to those programs, given that food and shelter (which are provided by SNAP and housing assistance) are considered basic needs in a way that cash (as provided by TANF) is not. The impacts were often modest. The other major set of changes were those intended to "make work pay" more than welfare. Childless individuals and couples—who might be subject to work requirements in SNAP and housing assistance if such policies were adopted—benefit less from the policy changes made through the 1990s to "make work pay" more than receipt of assistance. Further, it appears that the enactment of TANF policies, along with other income supplement policies and the strong economy of the 1990s, led to increased work for a population (single mothers) who were not previously engaged in the labor force. Whether these same policies, in the absence of new income supplement policies and in a less robust economy, would have the same effect for the subpopulation of SNAP and housing assistance recipients who are not working and are expected to work, is an outstanding question. | Congress is again debating work requirements in the context of programs to aid poor and low-income individuals and families. The last major debate in the 1990s both significantly expanded financial supports for working poor families with children and led to the enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law. That law created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, which time-limited federally funded aid and required work for families receiving cash assistance. Work requirements, time limits, and work incentives are intended to offset work disincentives in social assistance programs, promote a culture of work over dependency, and prioritize governmental resources. Another rationale for such policies is that without income from work, a person and his or her family members are almost certain to be poor. For many of these same reasons, some policymakers recently have expressed interest in extending mandatory work requirements and related policies—similar to those included in TANF—to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and housing assistance (public housing and the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program).
Some work rules and related policies already exist for SNAP and housing assistance. For example, SNAP time-limits aid for able-bodied adult recipients without dependents who do not work. However, for other able-bodied, nonelderly adults, for the most part, states are only required to have those who are unemployed or underemployed register for work. States may opt to make other SNAP employment and training mandatory or voluntary for recipients. Public housing has an eight-hour-per-month community service and economic self-sufficiency requirement for nonworking, nonexempted individuals. No work requirements apply to those receiving rent subsidies through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, and neither program has statutory time limits. However, public housing authorities that administer public housing and/or the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program may impose work requirements and time limits if they are participating in the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration program. Further, all three programs—TANF, SNAP, and housing assistance—include some form of earnings disregard policy intended to alleviate the work disincentive inherent in the structure of the benefits provided.
Over time, TANF data have reflected relatively modest participation among recipients in work or related activities. However, the cash assistance caseload declined substantially after enactment of TANF, owing mostly to a decline in the share of eligible families actually receiving benefits. TANF work requirements and time limits are likely a part of the cause of that decline, contributing to the behavioral changes of recipients leaving the rolls quicker and some eligible households not coming onto the rolls in the first place. In addition to TANF changes, other policies were put in place in the 1980s and 1990s that helped "make work pay" more than welfare.
If Congress considers extending the "lessons" of TANF through additional work-related policies in food and housing assistance programs, policymakers face numerous considerations, including the various ways in which TANF differs from SNAP and housing programs. The populations differ: TANF requirements apply mostly to single mothers with children, while SNAP and housing assistance programs serve more men. Additionally, TANF work requirements were intended to spur nonworking recipients into the labor force. SNAP and housing programs often serve households that already include workers, albeit those who earn low wages, as well as a substantial number of individuals not typically expected to work, such as the elderly and persons with disabilities. Additional considerations include whether to implement any new requirements as performance measures applicable to states or other administering entities (like TANF) or as direct requirements for individual recipients. Enforcing these policies, and/or offering supports to ensure their success, also costs money and requires an administrative structure.
TANF requirements were put into place following a decades-long period of experimentation and research on "welfare-to-work" programs. The 2014 "Farm Bill" (P.L. 113-79) requires USDA to conduct pilot projects to test work and job readiness strategies for SNAP participants. These pilots will provide information in future years on the impact of SNAP work pilots; it is too soon for research results from these pilots to be available. The existing MTW program, while called a demonstration, was not originally implemented in a way that would allow it to be rigorously evaluated. Therefore, there is not sufficient information to evaluate the effectiveness of the various reforms adopted by MTW agencies. However, in the FY2016 appropriations law (P.L. 114-113) Congress directed HUD to expand the MTW demonstration and added new evaluation requirements. |
crs_R42028 | crs_R42028_0 | Introduction
More than 4 billion incandescent light bulbs (technically referred to as "lamps") are in use in the United States. The basic technology in these bulbs has not changed substantially in the past 125 years, despite the fact that they convert less than 10% of the energy they use into light. Improving light bulb performance can reduce overall U.S. energy use. As much as 20% of the electricity consumed in the United States is used for lighting homes, offices, stores, factories, and outdoor spaces. Lighting represents about 14% of all U.S. residential electricity use. In the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140 ), Congress imposed higher efficiency standards for manufacturers and importers of general use, screw-base light bulbs commonly used in residential fixtures, beginning on January 1, 2012. EISA did not ban incandescent light bulbs. Instead, the law mandated that bulbs manufactured or imported after phase-in dates specified in the bill meet higher efficiency standards—about 25%-30% more efficient on average. Energy-efficient alternatives such as compact fluorescent bulbs (CFLs) and light emitting diodes (LEDs) are expected to gain a larger U.S. market share after EISA is implemented, but government estimates project that incandescent bulbs will be widely available, and widely used, for years to come (see Figure 1 ). U.S. and foreign manufacturers have developed higher-efficiency halogen incandescent bulbs, available at many U.S. retailers, which meet the law's minimum standards for electricity savings. Consumers also have expressed concerns about possible lack of access to affordable light bulbs. Some companies shut down domestic incandescent bulb factories rather than retool machinery to make more efficient products. On December 23, 2011, President Barack H. Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ). Title III provided FY2012 appropriations for DOE, including identical language to the Burgess amendment that bars the use of any FY2012 DOE funds to enforce the standards. The EISA provisions remain in effect. Major lighting industry executives argue that outright repeal of the lighting provisions of EISA could undercut energy conservation efforts as well as efforts to manufacture next-generation products such as LEDs, where U.S. companies have a technological edge. Indeed, the standards are taking effect at a time when the lighting industry is undergoing another, revolutionary change. LEDs are not only more energy-efficient—most exceeding standards in EISA—but they allow the industry to devise integrated fixtures that can be specially programmed to emit differing colors and types of light for various needs. The LED industry already is the fastest-growing part of the global lighting market, propelled by technological breakthroughs and higher demand spurred in part by energy-efficiency laws in the United States and other nations. Some analysts project that LEDs could make up about half the global lighting market by 2020. The Obama Administration opposed efforts to repeal EISA, noting that the industry has invested to prepare for the new standards and to develop next-generation lighting. Most CFLs and LEDs already meet that standard. Most of the incandescent and CFL bulbs used in the United States are imported. Solid-state lighting, a semiconductor-based technology that coverts electrical energy into light, is already the fastest-growing part of the global lighting industry and is expected by some analysts to make up one-third of the U.S. lighting market, on a unit basis, and three-fourths of the market, on a revenue basis, by 2015. China and other countries are offering tax breaks and other incentives to lure existing companies. LED manufacturing. | More than 4 billion incandescent light bulbs (sometimes referred to as "lamps") are in use in the United States. The basic technology in these bulbs has not changed substantially in the past 125 years, despite the fact that they convert less than 10% of their energy input into light. Improving light bulb performance can reduce overall U.S. energy use. About 20% of electricity consumed in the United States is used for lighting homes, offices, stores, factories, and outdoor spaces. Lighting represents about 14% of residential electricity use.
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140) imposed higher efficiency standards for manufacturers and importers of general use, screw-base light bulbs commonly used in residential fixtures, that began January 1, 2012. EISA did not ban incandescent light bulbs. Instead, the law mandated that bulbs manufactured or imported after phase-in dates specified in the bill meet higher efficiency standards—about 25%-30% more efficient on average. The law allows industry to determine which products best meet those requirements. On December 23, 2011, President Barack H. Obama signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74). Title III of the law provided FY2012 appropriations for the Department of Energy (DOE), including language barring use of any DOE funds to enforce the lighting standards. That prohibition remains in effect.
Lawmakers have cited several reasons for efforts to delay or repeal the law, including consumer concerns about lack of access to affordable incandescent light bulbs, and reports that companies have shut down incandescent bulb factories because they could not afford to retool to make more efficient products. While DOE predicts that energy-efficient alternatives such as compact fluorescent bulbs (CFLs) and light-emitting diodes (LEDs) will gain a larger U.S. market share after EISA is implemented, it also forecasts that incandescent bulbs will be widely available, and widely used, for years to come. U.S. and foreign manufacturers have developed higher-efficiency halogen incandescent bulbs, available at retailers, that meet the law's minimum standards for 25%-30% electricity savings (compared to 75%-80% savings from CFLs and LEDs) and are competitive in price.
The Obama Administration and major lighting companies oppose efforts to repeal the 2007 law, noting that the industry has invested billions of dollars to prepare for the new standards and develop next-generation lighting. The new light bulb standards are taking effect at a time when the lighting industry, due to advances in LED products that often exceed EISA standards, is undergoing the most sweeping technological changes in decades. The LED industry is producing not just more efficient bulbs, but integrated fixtures that can be specially programmed to emit differing colors and types of light and have other potential applications.
DOE has been funding solid state lighting research projects to bolster the LED industry, which is already the fastest-growing part of the global lighting market. Some analysts project that LEDs will make up at least half the global lighting market by 2020, driven by technical breakthroughs and enhanced demand from energy-efficiency laws in the United States and other nations. Some lighting executives argue that repealing EISA could undercut LED manufacturing efforts, where U.S. companies have a technological edge. The vast majority of the incandescent and CFL light bulbs Americans now use are imported from China and Mexico. China and other countries are investing heavily in LED production. |
crs_RL34246 | crs_RL34246_0 | Over the past decade, there has been considerable debate about countries' abilities to contain and prevent infectious disease outbreaks. In 2003, when the disease was ultimately contained, scientists called the agent severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that someone contracts TB every second and that about one-third of all people in the world are currently infected with TB; most of these cases, however, are latent. The TB bacteria most often becomes active and causes sickness when one's immune system is weakened, such as with human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS). Global TB Statistics6
Although TB is curable, WHO estimates that in 2006 (the year for which the most current data are available), there were 14.4 million prevalent cases of TB, including some 9.2 million people who contracted the disease that year. About 80% of annual TB cases occur in 22 high-burden countries (see Figure A-1 in the Appendix ). In 2006, about 3.10 million people in Southeast Asia were newly infected with TB (109 per 100,000 people) and about 2.81 million in sub-Saharan Africa (363 per 100,000). WHO asserts that a number of factors contribute to Africa's relatively high per capita rate. Key factors include weak health systems, low quality health care, poor access to health facilities, insufficient staffing and other human resource constraints, ill-equipped and substandard laboratory services, and little collaboration between TB and HIV programs. South Africa, with 0.7% of the world's population and the most number of people living with HIV/AIDS, had 28% of all HIV/TB co-infection cases and 33% of HIV-positive cases in sub-Saharan Africa. Global TB Efforts
A number of U.S. agencies, centers, and departments implement a range of programs aimed at treating and containing the global spread of tuberculosis. The Administration requested $97.1 million for USAID's FY2009 international TB interventions. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
CDC supports global TB efforts by providing epidemiologic, laboratory, and programmatic support to USAID, WHO, and the International Union Against TB and Lung Diseases. 108-25 , the U.S. Global Fund contributions. The foundation has pledged an additional $650 million to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, of which $350 million has been paid to date. In FY2008, Congress significantly boosted support for global TB programs, providing $162.2 million to USAID for international TB efforts and directing OGAC to provide not less than $150 million for joint HIV/TB programs. Although Congress voted to increase support for global TB efforts, some Members expressed concern that the additional funds might be provided at the expense of other global health programs. The section below presents some issues Congress might consider as it debates the appropriate level of funding for global TB initiatives. In October 2007, the House passed and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees reported out companion TB bills, S. 968 and H.R. 1567 , the Stop Tuberculosis (TB) Now Act. The bills are aimed at fighting tuberculosis overseas and authorize $330 million in FY2008 and $450 million in FY2009 for related foreign assistance programs. They also authorize $70 million in FY2008 and $100 million in FY2009 for anti-TB programs at CDC. | Infectious diseases are estimated to cause more than 25% of all deaths around the world. A number of infectious disease outbreaks over the past decade, such as H5N1 avian influenza and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), have heightened concerns about how infectious diseases might threaten global security. International air travel and trade have complicated efforts to detect and contain infectious diseases. People could cross borders carrying a highly contagious disease before an infectious agent causes symptoms.
Non-health officials are becoming increasingly aware of the threat that infectious diseases pose. An event that illuminated the issue occurred in May 2007, when a man known to be carrying a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis (TB) crossed a number of international borders unabated. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that someone contracts TB every second and that about one-third of all people in the world carry TB; most of these cases, however, are latent. In 2006, an estimated 14.4 million people were living with TB globally, including 9.2 million who contracted the disease that year. About 1.7 million people carrying TB died in 2006, including 200,000 people co-infected with HIV/AIDS. About 80% of all estimated new TB cases arising in the world each year occur in 22 high-burden countries (HBCs).
WHO indicates that the global incidence of TB per capita peaked around 2003 and since then, incidence per 100,000 population stabilized in Europe and declined in all five WHO regions, although the absolute number of new cases increased between 2005 and 2006 in Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia. In sub-Saharan Africa, weak health systems, minimal access to health facilities, insufficient staffing and little human resource development, ill-equipped and substandard laboratories, and human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) co-infection have limited countries' ability to contain TB.
In FY2008, Congress funded U.S. global TB operations at unprecedented levels. Through FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations, Congress provided $162.2 million to international TB programs and an additional $840.3 million for a U.S. contribution to the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria (Global Fund). The House passed and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees reported out companion TB bills, Stop TB Now Act (H.R. 1567 and S. 968) to support global TB efforts and authorize $330 million in FY2008 and $450 million in FY2009. They also authorized $70 million and $100 million for anti-TB programs at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in FY2008 and FY2009, respectively. Although Congress voted to increase support for global TB efforts, some Members expressed concern that the additional funds might be provided at the expense of other global health programs. The Administration requested $97.1 million for FY2009 global TB efforts, some $55 million less than appropriated in FY2008. This report, which will be updated periodically, discusses some key issues Congress might consider as debate ensues about the proper level and use of global TB funds. |
crs_R42083 | crs_R42083_0 | Introduction: The Regulation of Bank and Non-Bank Financial Institutions
In 2010, the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( P.L. The FSOC has its own permanent staff in the newly created Office of Financial Research (OFR) that collects data on the financial system and provides information and technical expertise to the FSOC. The FSOC has the ability to classify (or "designate" as used in the law and this report) certain non-banks as systemic, and therefore subject to prudential supervision by the Federal Reserve (the Fed). The DFA establishes a regulatory framework of which the FSOC is a consultative council. Coordination. The council facilitates communication among the heads of financial regulators. Data collection and evaluation . The FSOC establishes the criteria and designates which financial market utilities be subjected to safety and soundness regulation. Upon a determination of a threat to financial stability, a covered non-bank in danger of failing may under certain conditions be resolved by the FDIC rather than through the bankruptcy process. The FSOC may set aside some financial regulations for consumers if the rules might cause systemic risk, under certain circumstances. Financial Stability Oversight Council Mission
Section 112 of DFA lists three purposes of the FSOC: (1) identify risks to the financial system that may arise from large, complex financial institutions; (2) promote market discipline by reducing expectations of federal financial support for failing institutions; and (3 ) respond to emerging threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system. The chair has a number of powers and responsibilities related to FSOC meetings, congressional reports and testimony, and certain rulemakings and recommendations of the council. The Secretary's determination must address (1) the likelihood that the firm will default or is in default; (2) the likely effect of the firm's failure on financial stability; (3) the viability of private sector alternatives available to prevent the default; (4) the impact on the firm's creditors and other counterparties; (5) the likelihood of FSOC resolution avoiding or mitigating systemic risks, its likely cost to the general fund of the Treasury, and the potential of receivership resulting in excessive risk taking by the firm or its creditors and other counterparties (i.e., moral hazard); (6) a federal regulatory agency has ordered the firm to convert all of its convertible debt instruments that are subject to the regulatory order; and (7) the company satisfies the definition of a financial company. Examples of wholesale funding sources include money market mutual funds and repurchase agreements (repos). FSOC's Perspective
The 2013 annual report says that there has been significant improvement in mortgage markets, but additional progress is needed. FSOC's Perspective
The 2013 annual report noted several initiatives to address operational issues. Interest Rate Risks: Especially Rising Rates and Benchmarks33
Issue Area
Future interest rate changes may be a source of financial instability. Even if rates rise for the "wrong" reason, a second credit crunch, the FSOC notes that the measurable financial resilience of major banks (such as capital levels and measures of liquidity) have improved. Exposures to Risks from Other Countries36
Issue Area
Financial markets are global; therefore, financial instability overseas can threaten financial stability in the United States. FSOC's Perspective
The 2013 FSOC report addressed several issues related to global financial stability. Government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) —GSEs are private companies with government charters. In the United States, the Fed has this role. 111-203 ) to support the Financial Stability Oversight Council and member agencies by collecting and standardizing financial data, performing applied and long-term research, developing tools for risk measurement and monitoring. In other circumstances, systemic risk is defined as the risk that the linkages between institutions may affect the financial system as a whole, through a dynamic sometimes referred to as contagion. | The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA; P.L. 111-203) in 2010 as part of a comprehensive reform of banking and securities market regulators. The council is charged with monitoring systemic risk in the financial system and coordinating several federal financial regulators. The 113th Congress may wish to monitor the performance, rulemaking, and policy recommendations of the council.
This report describes the mission, membership, and scope of the FSOC. It provides an analysis of several major policy issues related to the FSOC that may come before the 113th Congress.
The DFA establishes a regulatory framework of which the FSOC is a consultative council. The new regulatory regime incorporates several policy tools to address systemic risk. The FSOC facilitates communication among financial regulators, collects and evaluates financial data to monitor systemic risk, and designates which financial institutions and financial market utilities will be subject to prudential regulation by the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed). Upon a determination of a threat to financial stability, a covered non-bank financial institution in danger of failing may under certain conditions be resolved by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), rather than through the bankruptcy process. The FSOC may under certain circumstances set aside some financial regulations for consumers if the rules create systemic risk.
The Office of Financial Research (OFR), a permanent staff of financial experts, supports the members of the FSOC. The OFR processes, monitors, and analyzes financial data gathered from member agencies and collected from reporting firms. The OFR contributes to the annual report issued by the FSOC. In the 2013 annual report, the OFR noted a number of positive trends, including increased capital levels and liquidity among financial intermediaries.
However, the 2013 report includes several areas of continuing concern. For example, several sources of wholesale funding (such as money market mutual funds and repurchase agreements) remain vulnerable to the risk of runs or fire sales. The housing finance system still relies on government support, although financial trends for the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) have improved. A number of operational issues, such as information technology and resilience against cyber-attacks, are ongoing concerns. Interest rates create additional concerns, including the reliability of benchmarks such as LIBOR, and the exposure of financial intermediaries to significant losses should market interest rates rise (sometimes referred to as yield spikes). Long-term budget issues, so-called fiscal imbalances, remain a concern although revenues have recently been rising as general economic conditions improve in the United States. Finally, the 2013 annual report discusses several factors in other countries that could negatively affect financial stability in the United States if conditions overseas deteriorate, including the resolution of European financial turmoil and Japanese macroeconomic policies.
This report is intended to be used as a reference by congressional staff working on financial issues. The macroeconomic policy rationales for various financial crisis-related issues are summarized, and a glossary is provided to assist in understanding technical terms. This report is not intended to be read from cover to cover, but instead may be more useful as issues related to the FSOC arise. |
crs_R41689 | crs_R41689_0 | Both Congress and the international community have invested significant resources in the political, economic, and social development of Haiti, and closely monitored the conduct of the 2010-2011 elections as a prelude to the next steps in Haiti's development. In the short term, elections have usually been a source of increased political tensions and instability in Haiti. In the long term, elections in Haiti have contributed to the slow strengthening of government capacity and transparency. The Obama Administration, which considers Haiti its top priority in the Latin American and Caribbean region, provided $16 million in election support through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The first round of both the presidential and legislative elections took place on November 28, 2010. Investigations And Revised Results
Negotiations between the OAS and the Haitian government ensued, resulting in the OAS sending a team of election experts to Haiti on December 30, 2010, to verify the results of the presidential election. Concluding that phase, the CEP released the final presidential and legislative election results on February 3, accepting that Mirlande Manigat and Michel Martelly would proceed to the second round of presidential elections. The Final Round of Voting
The final round of voting for president and the legislature was held on March 20, 2011. The Newly Elected Government
President Martelly
Michel Martelly was sworn into office as Haiti's new President on May 14, 2011. Martelly is having difficulty forming his new government. Martelly is still finalizing the list of other cabinet ministers. Since the flurry of activity passing amendments between their installation and that of the president, the legislature has focused primarily on consideration of a new prime minister. Issues and Concerns Regarding Elections and Post-Election Governance
The concerns over this particular election cycle in Haiti are shared by the international donor community, Congress, and the Obama Administration. Short-term Issues
Election Monitoring
The Organization of American States (OAS) /Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Joint Election Observation Mission was the only major international monitor of the recent election process. The OAS deployed 200 observers for the March 20 second round elections. As mentioned above, after the CEP announced results for the legislative elections, with final tallies that changed the outcome for 19 districts in favor of the ruling Inite coalition, the OAS/CARICOM mission demanded that those results be annulled. The CEP reverted the outcomes to the original tally in 15 cases; four seats in the chamber of deputies are still to be resolved. Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier returned unexpectedly from 25 years in exile on January 16, 2011. Outlook
In proximity to the United States, and with such a chronically unstable political environment and fragile economy, Haiti has been a constant policy issue for the United States. Congress views the stability of the nation with great concern and commitment to improving conditions there. Activities include training in poll watching, participation in candidate debates, and election dispute resolution; Support of domestic and international electoral observation to monitor the entire election period, to increase the confidence and participation of voters and political parties; Support for the organization of presidential debates to provide the electorate with greater access to information about candidates and issues; Support for procurement of elections material, such as ballots and ballot boxes, through a contribution to the elections trust fund managed by the United Nations Development Program; and After the elections, programs to build broad national support for electoral reform, including the establishment of an independent, permanent electoral council. | In proximity to the United States, and with such a chronically unstable political environment and fragile economy, Haiti has been a constant policy issue for the United States. Congress views the stability of the nation with great concern and commitment to improving conditions there. The Obama Administration considers Haiti its top priority in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Both Congress and the international community have invested significant resources in the political, economic, and social development of Haiti, and have closely monitored the election process as a prelude to the next steps in Haiti's development. For the past 25 years, Haiti has been making the transition from a legacy of authoritarian rule to a democratic government. Elections are a part of that process. In the short term, elections have usually been a source of increased political tensions and instability in Haiti. In the long term, elected governments in Haiti have contributed to the gradual strengthening of government capacity and transparency.
Haiti has concluded its latest election cycle, although it is still finalizing the results of a few legislative seats. The United States provided $16 million in election support through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Like many of the previous Haitian elections, the recent process has been riddled with political tensions, violence, allegations of irregularities, and low voter turnout. The first round of voting for president and the legislature, held on November 28, 2010, was marred by opposition charges of fraud, especially in the presidential race. The Haitian government asked the Organization of American States (OAS) for help and delayed releasing final results, while the OAS team of international elections experts investigated and verified the process. On February 3, following the OAS team's recommendations, the Haitian Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) reversed their original finding by eliminating Jude Celestin, the governing party's candidate, from the race by a narrow margin. Instead, Michel "Sweet Micky" Martelly, a popular singer, proceeded to the run-off race against Mirlande Manigat, a constitutional lawyer and university administrator.
After months of dispute, the second round of elections took place on March 20. The OAS electoral observation mission reported that the second round was more organized, transparent, and peaceful than the first. When final results were announced, controversy again erupted, this time over legislative races. The CEP's final tallies changed the outcome in favor of the ruling Inite party for 19 legislative districts. Under pressure from the public and the OAS mission, the CEP eventually reverted to 15 of the 19 original results; four seats in the chamber of deputies are still to be decided. The outcome of the presidential race was not challenged, and Michel Martelly was sworn into office peacefully on May 14. Local elections are due to be held, but haven't yet been scheduled.
President Martelly is having difficulty forming his administration. The legislature passed several constitutional amendments in a flurry of activity in its first three weeks. Since then it has focused on the selection of a prime minister. The majority Inite parliament blocked Martelly's first choice, and over half of the Senate asked him to rescind his second candidate.
In addition to ongoing issues regarding the legitimacy of the March 20 elections, other questions have raised concerns within the international community and Congress. These include the destabilizing presence of former dictator Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier and former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the newly elected government's ability to handle the complex post-earthquake reconstruction process and its relationship with the donor community. |
crs_R42735 | crs_R42735_0 | Consumers who enroll in health insurance plans pay premiums for a specified set of benefits. In broad terms, a medical loss ratio (MLR) measures the share of enrollee premiums that health insurance companies spend on medical claims, as opposed to other non-claims expenses such as administration or profits. In general, the higher the MLR, the more value a consumer receives for each dollar of paid premium. The MLR is an aggregate measure. Section 1001 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 , as amended) imposes a federal, minimum MLR requirement on fully funded health plans, which are plans where insurance companies assume the full risk for medical expenses incurred. Beginning with calendar year 2011, covered insurers have been required to submit reports to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) detailing the share of premium dollars spent for medical benefits (which may include certain quality improvements), and the share allocated to administrative expenses and profits (minus certain taxes, fees, and other expenses). The MLR requirement is intended to provide "greater transparency and accountability around the expenditures made by health insurers and to help bring down the cost of health care." MLR Reporting Requirements Under the ACA
Minimum Standards Required
The ACA MLR standards require that covered insurers in the individual and small group markets meet a minimum MLR of 80%. Effective in 2014, the ACA requires coverage sold through these programs, with some exceptions, to achieve a minimum 85% MLR. 83 , P.L. 113-235 ) exempting expatriate insurance plans from MLR reporting requirements, beginning with plans issued or renewed after July 2015. The MLR requirement does not apply to self-funded plans, which are health care plans offered by businesses in which the employer assumes the financial risk for medical care. In addition, MLR rebates to policyholders are excluded from the medical claims measure. Congress included language in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015 allowing the non-profit plans to count spending for "activities that improve health care quality," retroactive to 2010. ACA regulations allowed the HHS to consider a set of factors regarding such waivers, including (1) the number of insurers likely to exit a state or to cease offering coverage absent an adjustment to the MLR; (2) the number of individual market enrollees covered by insurers reasonably likely to exit the state; (3) the impact of the MLR standard on consumer access to insurance agents and brokers; (4) alternate coverage options in a state; (5) the impact on premiums and benefits to remaining consumers if insurers withdrew from the market; and (6) any other relevant information submitted by a state's insurance commissioner. For example, if the aggregate data from the large group plans offered by an insurer in a state indicate that the insurer has reached an 82% MLR, rather than the required 85% MLR, all enrollees in the large group plans are eligible for a 3% of premium rebate—even if they are in a plan that is less, or more, efficient than the average. De Minimis Rebates
There are special rules for de minimis, or minor, rebates defined as
group policies where the insurer distributes the rebate to the policyholder (generally an employer), and the total rebate owed to the policyholder and the enrollees combined is less than $20 for a given year; or group policies where the insurer issues the rebate directly to the enrollee and the enrollee rebate is less than $5 for a given year; or individual policies, where total rebate owed by the insurer to each subscriber is less than $5 for a given MLR reporting year. Insurers that do not meet annual MLR requirements must notify enrollees about the federal MLR, its purpose, and the amount of the rebate being provided. That compares to $504 million in rebates to 8.5 million individuals for the 2012 plan year, and $1.1 billion in rebates to 12.8 million individuals for 2011 plan performance. In general, health insurers subject to the ACA MLR provisions have reduced the share of premium dollars spent on overhead since the ACA provisions took effect. Insurance companies are not allowed to deduct broker fees and commissions from their administrative expenses when calculating the ACA MLR. State MLRs
State governments are the primary regulators of health insurance. | The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148) requires certain health insurers to provide consumer rebates if they do not meet a set financial target known as a medical loss ratio (MLR). At its most basic, a MLR measures the share of health care premium dollars spent on medical benefits, as opposed to company expenses such as overhead or profits. For example, if an insurer collects $100,000 in premiums and spends $85,000 on medical care, the MLR is 85%. In general, the higher the MLR, the more value a policyholder receives for his or her premium dollar. The ACA requires an annual, minimum 80% MLR for individual and small group insurance plans, and an annual, minimum 85% MLR for large group plans. Congress imposed the MLR to provide "greater transparency and accountability around the expenditures made by health insurers and to help bring down the cost of health care."
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued rules to implement the MLR with input from state insurance commissioners, who are the main regulators of health insurance. The ACA statute and regulations allow companies to include both quality improvements and medical services when calculating total MLR medical spending. Insurers may subtract (i.e., disregard) state and local taxes and some licensing fees from total MLR expenses. The federal ACA requirements differ from many state MLR laws, which generally compare medical claims to premiums. The ACA MLR is now the national minimum standard that must be met by covered health insurers.
The ACA MLR is based on an insurer's annual aggregate performance, not on each individual's policy history. A consumer who paid health insurance premiums but did not file any medical claims during a plan year would not qualify for a rebate if his or her insurer met minimum MLR requirements. In addition, many Americans are enrolled in health plans that are not covered by the ACA MLR. The MLR provisions apply to fully funded health plans, which are plans where insurance companies assume full risk for incurred medical expenses. The MLR does not extend to self-funded plans, which are health care plans offered by businesses where the employer assumes the risk for, and pays for, medical care. Medicare plans were not subject to the MLR during the first two years the ACA was in effect. These insurers began complying with MLR provisions beginning in calendar 2014. The HHS granted three-year MLR waivers to select states where it determined that MLR implementation could harm the individual insurance market. Congress included language in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015 (H.R. 83, P.L. 113-235) exempting expatriate insurance plans from MLR reporting requirements.
For the 2013 plan year, insurers owed $332 million in MLR rebate payments to 6.8 million consumers. That is significantly less than the $1.1 billion in rebates to 12.8 million individuals in 2011, the first year the MLR was in effect. Insurers and employers may provide the rebates via a check, an electronic deposit in a bank account, a reduction in insurance premiums, or by spending the funds for the benefit of employees. Lawmakers have raised some concerns about the MLR provisions, including the fact that insurers are not allowed to deduct insurance agent and broker bonuses and commissions from their MLR expenses. |
crs_RS21502 | crs_RS21502_0 | Current Economic Conditions. (4) Bysome measurements, India is among the world's largest economies. Currently, more than 60% of India's software and service exports go to North America, mainlyto theUnited States. Major U.S.-Indo Trade Issues. India's sizable population and large and growing middle class make it a potentially large market for U.S. goods and services. | India is a country with a long history and a large population (more than onebillion people, nearly half living in poverty). Given that it is the world's most populous democracy, a U.S. ally inanti-terrorism efforts, and a potentially major export market, India's economic development and its trade relationswith theUnited States are of concern to Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32986 | crs_RL32986_0 | Overview
In the past few years, U.S. policy toward the Kingdom of Cambodia has broadened from a human rights focus to a multi-faceted approach. A key challenge for U.S. policy toward Cambodia lies in combining and balancing efforts to improve relations and to promote human rights in the kingdom. During the past decade, Cambodia has made progress in some areas of U.S. interest and concern, including the development of civil society, improvements in the conduct of elections, labor rights, counterterrorism, HIV/AIDS prevention, and bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to justice. However, government abuses of power and violations of human rights remain serious problems. Political violence and corruption also continue to mar democracy and governance in the kingdom. The return to relative political stability in Cambodia in 2006 after parliamentary crises during the 2003-05 period ushered in a movement toward deeper U.S.-Cambodia ties. This trend also has been driven by U.S. interests in cooperating with Cambodia on counterterrorism efforts and responding to China's growing economic influence in the region and in Burma, Laos, and Cambodia in particular. The Cambodian government has urged the U.S. government to grant its garment exports preferential treatment so that it can better compete with larger economies such as China. The Cambodian government also has requested that a portion of payments on the $339 million debt owed to the United States, incurred during the 1970s, be used to pay for development programs in Cambodia. The United States Congress passed several measures supporting non-communist resistance forces and humanitarian assistance in Cambodia and prohibiting assistance for the Khmer Rouge. Cambodian Textile Exports
Many Cambodians have expressed fear that the country's garment sector is threatened by competition from more efficient manufacturers of more developed countries, particularly since quotas on textile exports by WTO member states ended in 2005. In January 2008, temporary safeguard measures imposed by the European Union against textile and apparel imports from China expired. U.S.-Cambodian Trade
The United States has a large economic impact on Cambodia through trade. The United States is the largest overseas market for Cambodian products, accounting for nearly 60% of the kingdom's total exports and 70% of its clothing exports in 2008. Foreign Assistance
Foreign aid from a variety of sources is equal to over half of Cambodia's government budget. By some calculations, China has become the largest or second largest foreign aid provider to Cambodia. United States Assistance to Cambodia
Cambodia is the fourth largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in Southeast Asia after Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and the second largest recipient per capita after East Timor. Much of this assistance is channeled through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The United States provided $57 million, $55 million, and $45 million in 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively, for foreign aid programs, especially for health care, HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, civil society, and economic competitiveness programs. Roughly one-third of the debt is owed to Russia and the United States. The Cambodian government reportedly has sought additional U.S. concessions on the Lon Nol loans. Cambodia's human rights record remains a constant source of friction between Prime Minister Hun Sen and major ODA donors, such as Japan, Australia, Germany, and France; the kingdom's dependence on foreign aid has helped to keep pressure on the government to maintain or strengthen basic democratic norms and institutions. In September 2006, U.S. | In the past few years, U.S. policy toward the Kingdom of Cambodia has broadened from a human rights focus to a multi-faceted approach. A key challenge for U.S. policy toward Cambodia lies in combining and balancing efforts to improve relations and to promote human rights and democracy in the kingdom. Cambodia's human rights record has been a constant source of friction between Prime Minister Hun Sen and major providers of foreign aid, which is equal to roughly half of the country's government budget. The kingdom's dependence on this aid has helped to keep pressure on the government to maintain or strengthen basic freedoms and democratic institutions. However, weak rule of law, corruption, and abuses of power have continued and in some cases become worse.
During the past decade, Cambodia has made progress in some areas of U.S. interest and concern, including economic growth, the development of civil society, the conduct of elections, labor rights, HIV/AIDS prevention, counterterrorism, and bringing Khmer Rouge leaders to justice. The return to relative political stability in Cambodia in 2006 after parliamentary crises during the 2003-2005 period ushered in a movement toward deeper U.S.-Cambodia ties. This trend also has been driven by U.S. interests in cooperating with Cambodia on counterterrorism efforts and responding to China's growing economic influence in the region. China has become a primary source of development financing, aid, and investment in Cambodia and Southeast Asia.
The United States and Cambodia maintain strong ties through aid and trade. Cambodia is the fourth largest recipient of United States assistance in Southeast Asia while the United States is Cambodia's largest export partner, buying 70% of its apparel exports. The United States provided $57 million, $55 million, and $45 million in 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively, for foreign aid programs, especially for health care, HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, civil society, and economic competitiveness programs. The United States also supports de-mining efforts in the kingdom. Most U.S. assistance has been channeled through the many non-governmental organizations that are active in Cambodia.
Cambodia's economic growth has been fueled largely by the development of the textile and apparel industry and by tourism. With the termination of quotas on textiles by WTO member states in 2005 and the expiration of U.S. safeguards against garments from China in 2008, Cambodian textile exports are threatened by competition from China and other large producers. Cambodia has pressed the United States to grant its apparel exports preferential treatment. The Hun Sen government also has sought U.S. concessions on foreign debt incurred by the Lon Nol regime during the early 1970s.
The first trial of the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), an international tribunal set up by the United Nations and the Cambodian government to try former Khmer Rouge leaders of crimes against humanity and war crimes, commenced in February 2009. Five former officials have been indicted. Due to unexpected costs and delays, the court has struggled to raise more funding in order to continue its operations. The U.S. government contributed $1.8 million to the ECCC in September 2008. The U.S. government had withheld funding for several years due to concerns about whether the trials would be conducted fairly and without political interference. |
crs_R41719 | crs_R41719_0 | Background
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that have played a central role in mortgage finance. Because private capital has not yet returned to the market, over 90% of new mortgages are purchased, guaranteed, and securitized by Fannie, Freddie, or full-faith-and-credit government agencies, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae). Continued support for Fannie and Freddie has been costly. As of the fourth quarter of 2010, these purchases have totaled $90.2 billion for Fannie Mae and $63.7 billion for Freddie Mac. In February 2011, the Obama Administration released a report that set out several options for the future of housing finance. Fannie and Freddie in the Obama Administration's Report
"Reforming America's Housing Finance Market: A Report to Congress," the Obama Administration's reform proposal, identifies four principal reasons why Fannie and Freddie failed. 1. To maximize profits, both firms took on excessive risks. Rather than address the identified problems through specific legislative or regulatory proposals, the Administration proposes to wind down Fannie and Freddie's participation in the housing market. This would be done by removing their competitive advantages and further restricting the kinds of mortgages that they are allowed to purchase. This would allow private firms to compete on more even terms, and should reduce Fannie and Freddie's market share over time. 3. The Administration's report does not set out specific timetables, but notes that reducing Fannie and Freddie's role depends on the return of private capital to the housing market. In congressional testimony, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has estimated that the process may take five to seven years. Broad Options for the Housing Market
The Administration's report sets out three long-range scenarios for the future government role in the housing market. Option 3 exposes government to more risk than the first two, and has more potential to distort private economic decisions than option 1 or option 2. The regulated mortgage insurers to whom the government would provide mortgage reinsurance may be subject to some of the same conflicts and incentive problems that afflicted Fannie and Freddie. That is, the basic policy choice is between the extent to which taxpayers are protected from loss and the amount of support and liquidity government provides to the mortgage market. (For a broader survey of options for restructuring Fannie and Freddie, see CRS Report R40800, GSEs and the Government's Role in Housing Finance: Issues for the 112 th Congress , by [author name scrubbed].) Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
There have been calls to stem taxpayer losses by bringing Treasury support for Fannie and Freddie to a speedier end—a frequent criticism of the Dodd-Frank Act was that it failed to address the GSE problem. 1182 (Representative Hensarling)—proposes to set a term certain for ending the conservatorship and government assistance. Under H.R. The value of assets in the investment portfolio would have to shrink to no more than $250 billion within three years of the end of conservatorship. 1182 proposes, but would take effect over a longer time frame. For example, the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) and the Center for American Progress (CAP) have published position papers that would preserve more of the functions currently performed by Fannie and Freddie in government-chartered or regulated entities. However, given the size of the losses, the Administration does not appear willing to expose the taxpayer to the pre-crisis level of mortgage risk, even though that risk—if managed properly over the long-term—could make mortgage credit more available and affordable to American households. | In February 2011, the Obama Administration released a report, "Reforming America's Housing Finance Market," setting out several options for the future of housing finance. In the past, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have played a crucial role in government support for the mortgage market. In 2008, however, both firms were taken over by the government and have received government life support since then. Fannie and Freddie continue to provide funds for mortgage lending, at a time when private capital has largely exited the market and not yet returned, but the expense to the government has been high: through the end of 2010, the Treasury has contributed $90.2 billion to Fannie and $63.7 billion to Freddie.
The Administration's report argues that Fannie and Freddie's failures expose basic flaws in the GSE model. Poor regulation, excessive risk-taking, and an implicit government guarantee of Fannie and Freddie debt contributed to a situation in which GSE profits went to private management and shareholders, but losses fell to the taxpayers. The Administration proposes to shrink Fannie and Freddie's role in housing markets as private capital returns. No specific timetable is set out in the report, but Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has estimated that the process of winding down Fannie and Freddie may take five to seven years.
The Administration proposes to raise the fees Fannie and Freddie charge for guaranteeing mortgage debt, limit the types of mortgages they can buy, and reduce the size of their investment portfolios. These steps can occur without congressional action—the effect would be to remove the GSEs' competitive advantages and allow private firms to compete on a more equal footing.
For the long-term, the report sets out three options: (1) a private system of housing finance, with government intervention only to support homeownership among specific groups, such as veterans or low-income families; (2) a private system with a federal backstop that would only operate in a crisis; and (3) a system of regulated private mortgage insurers backed by a federal reinsurance system, with premiums set high enough that taxpayers would bear losses only after significant amounts of private capital had been wiped out. In general, option 1 implies less risk for taxpayers, but more expensive or less available mortgage credit. Option 3 would provide the most support to the broad mortgage market, but would expose taxpayers to more risk and also have more potential to distort market incentives and private investment decisions.
Other proposals would lie on either end of the continuum represented by the Administration's three options. H.R. 1182 (Representative Hensarling) seeks to stem taxpayer losses by setting a two-year limit for the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and providing conditions for the continued operation of the firms or for the dissolution of the GSEs if they are judged to be not financially viable.
Proposals from the Mortgage Bankers Association and the Center for American Progress envision a more active federal role in the housing market, with new government-chartered entities taking on some of Fannie and Freddie's functions, but with additional regulation and safeguards. In short, in reforming the GSEs, Congress faces a trade-off between placing the taxpayer at risk to downturns in the mortgage market and reducing that risk, which could make mortgage credit less available and affordable to American households.
For a broader discussion of GSE reform, see CRS Report R40800, GSEs and the Government's Role in Housing Finance: Issues for the 112th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32672 | crs_RL32672_0 | Background1
The history of federal legislation significantly affecting banking, securities, capital markets, and financial services in general, may conveniently be divided into three chronological periods: Civil War to New Deal; New Deal Era; and 1956 to the present. This has prompted increasing federal regulation of customer financial information to protect customer privacy, deter criminal activity, and in the interest of national security. It was originally enacted during the Civil War by the National Bank Act of 1863 (Currency Act) (12 Stat. See Home Owner's Loan Act, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act. This early legislation of President Roosevelt's New Deal included many amendments to the Federal Reserve Act and the National Bank Act including the creation of the Federal Open Market Committee, which regulates and coordinates the purchase and sale of securities by Federal Reserve Banks. At the time, insurance was viewed more as a protective service business than as a "financial" service industry. It authorizes and requires additional record keeping and reporting by financial institutions and closer scrutiny of accounts held for foreign banks and of private banking conducted for foreign persons. | This report provides brief summaries of the major federal laws affecting financial institutions and markets. Arrangement is chronological according to the order of original enactment, with divisions into three periods. The first period begins with the Civil War era and includes the creation of national banks and the Federal Reserve System. The second period encompasses the New Deal and its aftermath, during which a wall was erected and reinforced between commerce and banking. The third or current period is characterized by statutes designed to modernize the financial services industry and, consistent with safety and soundness, eliminate barriers to the provision of nationwide integrated financial services. In the interest of national security, criminal law enforcement, and protecting personal privacy, the current period is also marked by increased federal regulation of customer information maintained by financial institutions.
For CRS reports on current topics, consult the "Financial Sector" subheading under "Issues in Focus" on the CRS home page: http://www.crs.gov/. |
crs_R44466 | crs_R44466_0 | Introduction1
Many analysts and officials have indicated that this is a critical time in the research, development, and deployment of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), both in the United States and throughout the world. Congress has an important role to play, either as part of the public discourse regarding the future of such capabilities and appropriate policy to address them, or "behind the scenes" via its funding authority and oversight responsibilities
Role of Congress
Questions related to the research on, and development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) have been controversial for many years. LAWS are a component of the DOD's ongoing "third offset" strategy. Robotics and autonomous systems have been highlighted by the DOD as a component of this overall future effort of the U.S. military. The use of LAWS involves many moral, ethical, and strategic issues beyond considerations of military advantage. For example, as discussed below, opponents of the development of LAWS argue, variously, that such weapon systems entail unrecognized long-term risks: strategic, such as undesirable escalation or difficulty maintaining control of the technology; legal, such as the inability of LAWs to discriminate between civilian and military targets; and ethical, because they place a machine in position to make a "discretionary" decision about human lives. The DOD currently internally regulates the research, development, and deployment of autonomous weapon systems via DOD Directive (DODD) 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems (2012). There has been some recent consideration of LAWS at the United Nations via the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the treaty that serves to restrict or ban internationally the use of certain weapons that are indiscriminant or that cause unnecessary suffering, which the United States ratified in 1995. Even in the absence of statutory regulatory action, congressional budgetary action on weapon system funding, as well as areas of research and development, will provide a direction for military development. Leverage Civilian Technology
Focus on lethal autonomous weapon systems may also be potentially beneficial for the United States because it capitalizes on current advances in civilian autonomous technology. First, many contend that an arms race is already in progress, with peer and near-peer competitors currently developing autonomous weapon systems—regardless of U.S. development of these systems. Hacking/Subversion
Another perceived risk with the use of autonomous weapon systems is that reliance on autonomous systems increases the military's vulnerability to hacking or subversion of software and hardware. "Military advantage" is perceived to be an inherently complex and flexible value, not susceptible to simulation by an autonomous system. These concerns are further discussed below. | The current research and future deployment of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) is actively under discussion throughout the military, nongovernmental, and international communities. This discussion is focused, to various degrees, on the military advantage to be gained from current and future systems, the risks and potential benefits inherent in the research and deployment of autonomous weapon systems, and the ethics of their use. Restrictions, if any, in treaty and domestic law, as well as the specific rules governing procurement and use of LAWS by the military, will all rely to varying degrees on congressional action, and likely face future legislative debate.
Although autonomous weapons have historically been an artifact of fiction, recent commercial and military developments are driving widespread consideration of autonomous weapon systems. Military experience and success with semi-autonomous systems make fully autonomous weapon systems increasingly conceivable for military professionals. Moreover, the commercial development of robotics and expert systems (software that models relatively nuanced decision-making by humans during performance of specific skills) potentially applicable to military purposes makes lethal autonomy more attainable. The Department of Defense (DOD) "third offset" strategy (a plan for incorporating advanced technology into U.S. warfighting), with its focus on technological innovation and "outside the box" solutions to manpower and monetary limitations, includes these systems among other elements. Finally, the development of LAWS is perceived as occurring or likely to occur among many potential peer and asymmetric adversaries.
Congress is, or may be, involved in the development of LAWS in many ways. First, because no statute currently governs research, development, or deployment of LAWS, the DOD regulation issued on the subject has become the de facto national policy on military autonomous weapons. Congressional action could clarify DOD priorities in these weapon systems' development. Also, congressional involvement in LAWS may include specific budgetary decisions, as well as overall appropriations. Key nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch, among others, are urging international action, and—partially in response—the United Nations has been considering lethal autonomous weapons for a number of years as part of its responsibility to consider new protocols under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the treaty that serves to restrict or ban internationally the use of certain weapons that are indiscriminant or that cause unnecessary suffering.
This report seeks to familiarize congressional readers with some existing semi-autonomous weapon systems and outline the current debate and discussion involving the research, development, and use of fully autonomous systems. |
crs_R40106 | crs_R40106_0 | In Olmstead v. L.C. In addition to these judicial developments, the recent health care reform package, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148 ) as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA, P.L. 111-152 ) (collectively the Affordable Care Act, or ACA), has the potential to influence states' Olmstead initiatives. Specifically, the Affordable Care Act revised the federal Medicaid statute to give states greater incentives to provide home and community-based care services to people with disabilities, offer states greater flexibility in the kinds of packages of home and community-based services they can offer, and, perhaps, enable states to provide more Medicaid beneficiaries with long-term care services in their communities. Because judicial developments under Olmstead often take federal Medicaid law into account, PPACA amendments to that law may affect the outcome of future cases on deinstitutionalization. , the Supreme Court held that "unjustified isolation ... is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability" under Title II of the ADA and its implementing regulations. Specifically, the Court held that the ADA defines discrimination to include the unjustified segregation of individuals with disabilities and thereby requires states to provide community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when three conditions are satisfied: (1) the state's treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, (2) the affected persons do not oppose it, and (3) the placement can be reasonably accommodated given the state's resources and the needs of others with mental disabilities. A Prima Facie Case of Discrimination by Segregation
The appellate courts have generally rejected interpretations of Olmstead that would make it more difficult for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case that the state has failed to fulfill the ADA's integration requirement. | The Supreme Court ruled in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), that, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its implementing regulations, states must transfer individuals with mental disabilities into non-institutional settings when: a state treatment professional has determined such an environment is appropriate; the community placement is not opposed by the individual with a disability; and the placement can be reasonably accommodated. In subsequent litigation, appellate courts have (1) rejected interpretations of Olmstead that would make it more difficult to establish a prima facie violation and (2) distinguished "reasonable accommodations," which Olmstead requires states to make to their programs and services, from "fundamental alterations," which it does not.
In addition to these judicial developments, the 2010 health care reform package, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148) as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA, P.L. 111-152) (collectively, the Affordable Care Act, or ACA), has the potential to influence states' Olmstead initiatives. The health care reform law revises the federal Medicaid statute to give states greater incentives to provide home and community-based care services to people with disabilities, offer states greater flexibility in the kinds of packages of home and community-based services they can offer, and, perhaps, enable states to provide more Medicaid beneficiaries with long-term care services in their communities. Because judicial developments under Olmstead often occur in the context of federal Medicaid law, particularly Medicaid waiver programs, the health care reform law's changes to the Medicaid program may affect the outcome of future cases on deinstitutionalization.
This report will discuss the Supreme Court's decision, selected subsequent appellate court decisions, the implications of health care reform for future developments, and methods of Olmstead enforcement. |
crs_RL34363 | crs_RL34363_0 | These officials are therefore critical not only to the successful administration of federal elections, but also to the implementation of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. 107-252 ). Who Are Local Election Officials? They differ from those of other local government employees. Voting Systems
Current Voting System
The kinds of voting systems used in the United States changed significantly between 2004 and 2006, with a substantial increase in the use of precinct-count optical scan (PCOS) and direct-recording electronic systems (DREs)
Respondents reported that the percentage of jurisdictions using lever machines, punchcards, hand-counted paper ballots, and central-count optical scan (CCOS) as their primary voting system decreased substantially, while the percentage using PCOS and DREs increased (see Figure 7 ). LEOs believed that the federal government has too great an influence on the acquisition of voting systems and local elected officials have too little
The results are presented in Figure 9 . LEOs have become more concerned about the influence of the media, political parties, advocacy groups, and vendors
Some of the differences between the 2004 and 2006 results are notable. LEOs rated their primary voting systems as very accurate, secure, reliable, and voter- and pollworker-friendly, no matter what voting system they used
To further assess voting system preferences, both surveys asked LEOs to assess their primary voting systems on fifteen specific characteristics ( Figure 13 ). Most DRE users did not believe that VVPAT should be required, but nonusers believed they should be
In the 2006 survey, only DRE users were asked if VVPAT should be required. Most VVPAT users in 2006 were satisfied with them
About three-quarters of LEOs who used a VVPAT were somewhat to very satisfied with it. LEOs believed that HAVA is making moderate improvements in the electoral process overall in their jurisdictions
However, more LEOs believed that the law resulted in no improvements than in major improvements, and the level of support was lower in 2006 than in 2004 ( Figure 21 ). LEOS reported that HAVA has increased the accessibility of voting but has made elections more complicated to administer
LEOs were also asked in 2006 to respond to a set of statements about the impacts of HAVA ( Figure 25 ). Most LEOs found the activities of the EAC only moderately beneficial to them
The results are presented in Figure 26 . LEOs supported requiring photo identification for all voters, even though they believed it will negatively affect turnout and did not believe that voter fraud is a serious problem in their jurisdictions
One of the principal policy arguments for tightening voter-identification requirements is concern about the risk of significant levels of voting by ineligible voters. On average, LEOs mildly supported a requirement for photo identification. Election Administration Issues
2006 Election
LEOs spent much more time preparing for the election in 2006 than the one in 2004
The 2006 election was the first under which all HAVA requirements were in effect. On average, there were 5-6 pollworkers per polling place. Some survey results suggest areas of potential professional improvement, such as in education and in professional involvement at the national level. The topics for the two surveys were developed collaboratively by the CRS and Texas A&M participants. | Local election officials (LEOs) are critical to the administration of federal elections and the implementation of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. 107-252). Two surveys of LEOs were performed, in 2004 and 2006, by Texas A&M University; the surveys were sponsored and coordinated by CRS. Although care needs to be taken in interpreting the results, they may have implications for several policy issues, such as how election officials are chosen and trained, the best ways to ensure that voting systems and election procedures are sufficiently effective, secure, and voter-friendly, and whether adjustments should be made to HAVA requirements. Major results include the following:
The demographic characteristics of LEOs differ from those of other government officials. Almost three-quarters are women, and 5% are minorities. Most do not have a college degree, and most were elected. Some results suggest areas of potential improvement such as in training and participation in professional associations.
LEOs believed that the federal government has too great an influence on the acquisition of voting systems, and that local elected officials have too little. Their concerns increased from 2004 to 2006 about the influence of the media, political parties, advocacy groups, and vendors.
LEOs were highly satisfied with whatever voting system they used but were less supportive of other kinds. However, their satisfaction declined from 2004 to 2006 for all systems except lever machines. They also rated their primary voting systems as very accurate, secure, reliable, and voter- and pollworker-friendly, no matter what system they used. However, the most common incident reported by respondents in the 2006 election was malfunction of a direct recording (DRE) or optical scan (OS) electronic voting system. The incidence of long lines at polling places was highest in jurisdictions using DREs. Most DRE users did not believe that voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT) should be required, but nonusers believed they should be. However, the percentage of DRE users who supported VVPAT increased in 2006, and most VVPAT users were satisfied with them.
On average, LEOs mildly supported requiring photo identification for all voters, even though they strongly believed that it will negatively affect turnout and did not believe that voter fraud is a problem in their jurisdictions.
LEOs believed that HAVA is making moderate improvements in the electoral process, but the level of support declined from 2004 to 2006. They reported that HAVA has increased the accessibility of voting but has made elections more complicated and has increased their cost. LEOs spent much more time preparing for the election in 2006 than in 2004. They also believed that the increased complexity of elections is hindering recruitment of pollworkers. Most found the activities of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) that HAVA created only moderately beneficial to them. They were neutral on average about the impacts of the requirement for a statewide voter-registration database. |
crs_RS21278 | crs_RS21278_0 | Government-Sponsored Enterprise (GSE)
As a GSE, FCS is a privately owned, federally chartered cooperative designed to provide credit nationwide. FCS is the only direct lender among the GSEs. The FCS has a statutory mandate to serve agriculture, certain agribusinesses, and rural homeowners (e.g., 12 U.S.C. Farming-related businesses. Farmer Mac—Another Farm Credit Act Institution
The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Company (Farmer Mac) was established in the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 as a secondary market for agricultural loans. Although Farmer Mac is statutorily part of the Farm Credit Act and is regulated by FCA, it has no liability for the debt of any other FCS institution, and the other FCS institutions have no liability for Farmer Mac debt. It is considered a separate GSE. | The Farm Credit System (FCS) is a nationwide financial cooperative lending to agricultural and aquatic producers, rural homeowners, and certain agriculture-related businesses and cooperatives. Established in 1916, this government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) has a statutory mandate to serve agriculture. It receives tax benefits but no federal appropriations or guarantees. FCS is the only direct lender among the GSEs. Farmer Mac, a separate GSE but regulated under the umbrella of FCS, is a secondary market for farm loans. Federal oversight by the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) provides for the safety and soundness of FCS institutions.
Current issues and legislation affecting the FCS are discussed in CRS Report RS21977, Agricultural Credit: Institutions and Issues. |
crs_R44708 | crs_R44708_0 | Introduction
Rockets, satellites, and the services they provide, once the domain of governments, are increasingly launched and managed by privately owned companies. Until 1982, the U.S. government launched all civil and commercial payloads into orbit, and U.S. launch vehicle manufacturers produced vehicles only under contract to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or the Department of Defense (DOD). To foster its growth, the commercial space industry has purposely been insulated from some types of federal regulation often applied to other industries. The Commercial Space Industry
Global spending on space activity reached an estimated $323 billion in 2015. Of this amount, nearly 40% was generated by commercial space products and services and 37% by commercial infrastructure and support industries. The U.S. government—including military and national security agencies and NASA—accounted for about 14% of global spending, and government spending by other countries the remaining 10%. Satellites
The satellite supply chain is global, with a small number of manufacturers. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified three factors spurring the growth of the U.S. launch industry:
the NASA commercial cargo program and other federal contracts; aggressive pricing by SpaceX and some other private providers, which are "more price competitive compared with foreign launch providers"; and the emerging space tourism and small satellite industries. With more than $100 billion in revenue, ground stations and related equipment comprise the largest part of commercial infrastructure. Space-Related Products and Services
Global commercial space products and services generated $126 billion in revenue in 2015. New Entrants Change the Industry
Three developments are changing the shape of the commercial space industry: a shift in government space activities toward the use of commercial services, an increase in private financing, and an increase in the launch of small satellites. These changes are supporting the development of new entrants with new launch products. One example of the new approach is procurement of transportation of astronauts to the ISS. SpaceX's entry into the launch market provides NASA and DOD with new options, and it is also cutting into the international launch market formerly dominated by foreign providers. Policy Issues for Congress
Three overarching issues will affect the development of commercial space in the future: how the industry is regulated by diverse federal agencies, the effects of new export control laws and regulations that seek to increase U.S. space industry competitiveness, and the allocation of spectrum for satellite use. Some of this spectrum was obtained by sharing frequencies in the 28 GHz band previously dedicated to satellite transmissions. There has been congressional interest in the FCC's activities with regard to satellite spectrum. | Rockets, satellites, and the services they provide, once the domain of governments, are increasingly launched and managed by privately owned companies. Although private aerospace firms have contracted with federal agencies since the onset of the Space Age six decades ago, U.S. government policy has sought to spur innovation and drive down costs by expanding the roles of satellite manufacturers and commercial launch providers.
Global spending on space activity reached an estimated $323 billion in 2015. Of this amount, nearly 40% was generated by commercial space products and services and 37% by commercial infrastructure and support industries. The U.S. government—including national security agencies and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—accounted for about 14% of global spending; government spending by other countries was responsible for the remaining 10%.
The satellite and launch vehicle supply chains are global, with a small number of manufacturers. In 2015, global satellite manufacturing revenues were $6 billion; launches booked $2.6 billion in revenue. Ground stations—the largest part of the commercial space infrastructure—generated more than $100 billion in revenue, largely from geolocation and navigation equipment.
The face of the U.S. space industry is changing with a government shift toward use of fixed price contracts for commercial services, new entrants with new launch products, and an increase in the use of smaller satellites:
NASA's commercial cargo program and other federal contracts are supporting the growth of the commercial launch industry, with less expensive rockets, some of which are planned to be reusable. Many of the new space-related companies are attracting rising levels of venture capital. Aggressive pricing by U.S. entrants is cutting into the international launch market once dominated by foreign providers. A renewed interest in low-cost satellites, some of which are small enough to be held in one hand, is prompting a range of start-ups and providing new accessibility to space by educational institutions, small businesses, and individual researchers.
In order to spur innovation and growth, the commercial space industry has been purposely insulated from some types of federal regulation often applied to other industries. Nevertheless, three broad federal issues will affect the industry's future development. One is the structure of federal regulation and management; those responsibilities currently are dispersed among many agencies, and there is congressional interest in reorganizing commercial space functions at NASA and the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Transportation, and State. A second issue is the extent to which U.S. export controls are hampering U.S. satellite industry sales abroad. Export controls have recently been revamped to enable export of more commercial space products and services, but impediments may remain to reestablishing U.S. space product competitiveness. A third concern is that new Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations allowing wireless communication providers to share spectrum previously dedicated to satellite transmissions may result in interference. The commission has pledged to continue studying the issue. |
crs_RL34139 | crs_RL34139_0 | Restitution legislation in the 110 th Congress falls into three categories. Some proposals such as the gang crime bills would have create new federal crimes or amend specific existing federal offenses and in doing so include restitution provisions particular to those offenses. By virtue of section 206 of the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, P.L. Identity Theft
The Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act, among other things, authorizes federal courts to order restitution for the victims of identity theft (18 U.S.C. Organized Retail Crime
H.R. They included H.R. H.R. S. 149 / H.R. General Revisions
Two bills – H.R. 845 , the Criminal Restitution Improvement Act, introduced by Representative Chabot, and S. 973 / H.R. 4110 , the Restitution for Victims of Crime Act, introduced by Senator Dorgan in the Senate and Representative Shea-Porter in the House – would have substantially changed federal restitution law. The proposals called for three kinds of modifications: (1) an expansion of offenses for which restitution may be ordered without recourse to the laws relating to probation and supervised release; (2) an overhaul of the procedures governing the issuance and enforcement of restitution orders to afford prosecutors greater enforcement flexibility without having to seek the approval of the sentencing court; and (3) authority for preconviction and presentencing restraining orders and other protective measures to prevent dissipation of assets by those who may subsequently owe restitution. Although similar in many respects, S. 973 / H.R. 4110 more closely resembled the proposals transmitted by the Justice Department. It does not permit restitution orders in the case of most securities offenses, environmental offenses, drug offenses, or most of the other property crimes outlawed in other titles of the Code. H.R. H.R. H.R. All of which appears to mean that H.R. H.R. . . direct the defendant to make . Collection Act (H.R. 4110 and H.R. 845 and S. 973/H.R. Moreover, in the case of H.R. As part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. | Congress enacted two restitution provisions in the 110th Congress, one as part of the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 (Title II of P.L. 110-326)(H.R. 5938), and the other as part of the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-403)(S. 3325). It devoted considerable time and attention to other restitution proposals as well.
Restitution legislation in the 110th Congress fell into three categories. Some proposals, such as two provisions enacted, create or would have created new federal crimes or amend specific existing federal offenses and in doing so include restitution provisions particular to those offenses, e.g., P.L. 110-326 (intellectual property), P.L. 110-403 (identity theft); H.R. 880, H.R. 1582, H.R. 1692, S. 456, and S. 990 (gang bills); H.R. 6491 (organized retail offenses), H.R. 3148 (Mann Act), H.R. 3990 (sexual military offenses), and H.R. 871 (spousal support offenses). Other proposals would have addressed a particular aspect of the law such as abatement which limits restitution collection after the defendant's death (S. 149/H.R. 4111). Two bills – H.R. 845, the Criminal Restitution Improvement Act, and S. 973/H.R. 4110, the Restitution for Victims of Crime Act – sought to make substantial changes in federal restitution law. They anticipated three kinds of adjustments: (1) an expansion of offenses for which restitution may be ordered without recourse to the laws relating to probation and supervised release; (2) an overhaul of the procedures governing the issuance and enforcement of restitution orders to afford prosecutors greater enforcement flexibility without having to seek the approval of the sentencing court; and (3) authority for preindictment and presentencing restraining orders and other protective measures to prevent dissipation of assets by those who may subsequently owe restitution. Although similar in many respects, S. 973/H.R. 4110 more closely resembles the proposals transmitted by the Justice Department. The provisions of H.R. 845 also appeared as Title V of the Violent Crime Control Act of 2007 (H.R. 3156/S. 1860); most of the language in S. 973/H.R. 4110 also appeared in Title VII of a subsequently tabled version of the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations bill (H.R. 3903).
This report is available in an abridged form – without footnotes, citations to most authorities and appendices – as CRS Report RS22709, Criminal Restitution in the 110th Congress: A Sketch. Related reports include CRS Report RL34138, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases, available in abridged form as CRS Report RS22708, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases: A Sketch, all by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41049 | crs_R41049_0 | The EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS) covers more than 10,000 energy-intensive facilities across the 27 EU Member countries, including oil refineries, powerplants over 20 megawatts (MW) in capacity, coke ovens, and iron and steel plants, along with cement, glass, lime, brick, ceramics, and pulp and paper installations. These covered entities emit about 40%-45% of the EU's total greenhouse gas emissions, and almost two-thirds of them are combustion installations. A Phase 2 trading period began January 1, 2008, covering the period of the Kyoto Protocol, and a Phase 3 has been finalized to begin in 2013. The European Commission (EC) believes that the Phase 1 "learning by doing" exercise prepared the community for the difficult task of achieving the reduction requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. Several positive results from the Phase 1 experience assisted the ETS in making the Phase 2 process run smoothly, at least so far. Second, the ETS helped jump-start the project-based mechanisms—Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)—created under the Kyoto Protocol. However, several issues that arose during the first phase remained contentious as the ETS implemented Phase 2, including allocation (including use of auctions and reliance on model projections), new entrant reserves, and others. NAPs are central to the EU's effort to achieve its Kyoto obligations under Phase 2. However, through five years of carbon emissions trading, the EU has gained valuable experience. This experience, along with the process of developing Phase 3, may provide some insight into current cap-and-trade design issues in the United States. As suggested by the EU-ETS experience, expanding equivalent data requirements to all facilities covered under a cap-and-trade program would be the foundation for developing allocation systems, reduction targets, and enforcement provisions. As noted, the EU's experience with the ETS suggests that adding sectors to an emission trading scheme can be a slow and contentious process. Like the situation in the ETS, most U.S. industry groups either oppose auctions outright or want them to be supplemental to a base free allocation. Given the experience with the ETS where the EC and individual governments have been unwilling or unable to move away from free allocation, the Congress, like the EU, may ultimately be asked to consider specifying any auction requirement if it wishes to incorporate market economics more fully into compliance decisions. Analysis of ETS allowance prices during Phase 1 suggests the most important variables in determining allowance price changes were oil and natural gas price changes. This apparent linkage between allowance price changes and price changes in two commodities markets raises the possibility of market manipulation, particularly with the inclusion of financial instruments such as options and futures contracts. | The European Union's (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is a cornerstone of the EU's efforts to meet its obligation under the Kyoto Protocol. It covers more than 10,000 energy intensive facilities across the 27 EU Member countries; covered entities emit about 45% of the EU's carbon dioxide emissions. A "Phase 1" trading period began January 1, 2005. A second, Phase 2, trading period began in 2008, covering the period of the Kyoto Protocol. A Phase 3 will begin in 2013 designed to reduce emissions by 21% from 2005 levels.
Several positive results from the Phase 1 "learning by doing" exercise assisted the ETS in making the Phase 2 process run more smoothly, including: (1) greatly improving emissions data, (2) encouraging development of the Kyoto Protocol's project-based mechanisms—Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), and (3) influencing corporate behavior to begin pricing in the value of allowances in decision-making, particularly in the electric utility sector.
However, several issues that arose during the first phase were not resolved as the ETS implemented Phase 2, including allocation schemes and new entrant reserves, and others. A more comprehensive and coordinated response has been designed for Phase 3 with harmonized and coordinated rules being developed by the European Commission.
The United States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol. However, six years of carbon emissions trading has given the EU valuable experience in designing and operating a greenhouse gas trading system. This experience may provide some insight into cap-and-trade design issues as the United States debates the issue and some states and regions implement their own programs.
The EU-ETS experience illustrates the importance of having reliable emissions data for all facilities covered under a cap-and-trade scheme; data that are pivotal for developing allocation systems, reduction targets, and enforcement provisions. In the United States debate continues on comprehensive versus sector-specific reduction programs; the EU-ETS experience suggests that adding sectors to a trading scheme once established may be a slow, contentious process. As with most EU industries, most U.S. industry groups either oppose auctions outright or want them to be supplemental to a base free allocation. The EU-ETS experience suggests Congress and/or states may want to consider specifying any auction requirement if it wishes to incorporate market economics more fully into compliance decisions. EU-ETS analysis suggests the most important variables in determining Phase 1 allowance price changes were oil and natural gas price changes; this apparent linkage raises possible market manipulation issues, particularly with the inclusion of financial instruments such as options and futures contracts. The EU will examine the matter in preparation for Phase 3. Congress may consider whether the government currently has sufficient regulatory and oversight authority over such instruments. |
crs_RL34336 | crs_RL34336_0 | Introduction
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are investment funds owned and managed by national governments. Although their lack of transparency makes estimating SWF investment levels difficult, it is estimated that they currently manage between $1.9 and $2.9 trillion. This report provides background on SWFs, including what countries operate SWFs and the size of the SWF market, and discusses two broad areas of concern to Members of Congress and the international financial community:
governance and transparency-related issues, and possible non-commercial investment goals, including the potential use of government-controlled investment vehicles to attain global strategic and political goals. As noted previously, the recent growth of SWFs is a consequence of rapid growth in emerging market reserves driven by (1) the impact of rising oil prices for Middle Eastern economies and (2) large trade surpluses, net foreign direct investment flows, and high savings rates among Asian economies. Policy Issues for Congress
The magnitude of financial impact combined with the lack of transparency and possibly political investment motivations of non-commercial entities has sparked concern among some analysts and Members of Congress about the rapidly growing wealth of emerging market countries and how this wealth is being invested in the United States. Hearings on SWFs have been held in several congressional committees including the Senate Banking Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Financial Services, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Joint Economic Committee. These concerns as applied to specific SWFs are mapped in Figure 3 . Minimal SWF transparency masks SWF investment activity and can obscure governance and risk-management problems within the funds. This can have distressing consequences for policy makers. Many U.S. policy makers are concerned that countries will use SWFs to support what one analyst has called "state capitalism," using government-controlled assets to secure strategic stakes around the world in areas such as telecommunications, energy resources, and financial services, among other sectors. On the other hand, many are concerned that countries may use their SWFs to gain access to other countries' natural resource industries or other politically sensitive sectors. To address concerns related to the lack of SWF transparency, some have called for an international body, such as the IMF, to establish guidelines and monitor countries' compliance with transparency efforts. | Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are investment funds owned and managed by national governments. Such funds currently manage between $1.9 and $2.9 trillion and are expected to grow to over $10 trillion by 2015. This is due to the rapid growth of commodity prices and large trade surpluses in several emerging market economies. Beginning in 2007, interest in SWFs increased as Asian and Middle Eastern SWFs, fueled by surging foreign exchange reserves, invested large sums of capital in U.S. and other Western companies.
Policy makers in the United States have raised two broad policy concerns about SWFs: (1) their lack of transparency and (2) their possible misuse for political or other non-commercial goals. Hearings have been held by several congressional committees including the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Banking Committees.
SWFs pose a complex challenge for policy makers. On one hand, SWFs are long-term investment vehicles looking beyond quarterly results and therefore serve as stable funding sources during financial turbulence. On the other hand, however, there are operational concerns stemming from government control (i.e., lack of transparency and possible non-commercial investment goals). Without transparency, it is difficult to attain a clear picture of SWF investment activity. A lack of SWF transparency can also obscure governance and risk-management problems within SWFs. Many are also concerned that countries will use SWFs to support what one analyst has called "state capitalism," using government-controlled assets to secure stakes around the world in strategic areas such as telecommunications, energy and mineral resources, and financial services, among other sectors.
In response to these concerns, many analysts and policy makers are evaluating the operations of existing SWFs and are looking to the international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to establish guidelines for SWF operations. All of these institutions are currently developing proposals that will be deliberated during 2008. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34063 | crs_RL34063_0 | The bill was signed into law ( P.L. 110-161 , the total amount of funding for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is $37.2 billion; of this amount, $2.6 billion was designated as contingent emergency funding and was available for obligation only after the President submitted a budget request to Congress. Background
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans who meet certain eligibility rules, including disability compensation and pensions, education, training and rehabilitation services, hospital and medical care, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, and death benefits that cover burial expenses. The VHA operates the nation's largest integrated direct health-care delivery system. H.R. The Senate-passed version of H.R. This amount included $25.5 billion for medical services, $3.2 billion for medical administration, $3.6 billion for medical facilities, and $414 million for medical and prosthetic research. FY2008 VHA Budget
On February 5, 2007, the President submitted his FY2008 budget proposal to Congress. The total amount requested by the Administration for the VHA for FY2008 was $34.6 billion, a 1.93% increase in funding compared with the FY2007 enacted amount. The Administration's budget proposal also requested $3.4 billion for medical administration, $3.6 billion for medical facilities, and $411 million for medical and prosthetic research (see Table 5 ). The committee recommendation also included $3.6 billion for medical administration, $193 million above the Administration's request of $3.4 billion; $4.1 billion for medical facilities, a 14% increase over the President's request; and $480 million for medical and prosthetic research, a 17% increase over the President's request of $411 million (see Table 5 ). The committee did not recommend any fee increases as requested by the Administration's budget proposal for the VHA for FY2008. The Military Construction and Veterans Affairs appropriations bill for FY2008 ( H.R. 2642 , H.Rept. On June 15, 2007, the House passed H.R. 2642 . As amended, H.R. 2642 provided $29.0 billion for medical services. 110-85 ). S. 1645 , as reported, provided a total of $37.2 billion for the VHA. Furthermore, the Senate version of the MILCON-VA appropriations bill, as reported, provided $4.1 billion for medical facilities—a 14.0% increase over the FY2008 request and 1.7% less than the FY2007 enacted amount—and $500 million for medical and prosthetic research—a 12% increase over the FY2007 enacted amount, a 22.0% increase over the FY2008 request, and 4.2% above the House-passed amount. The committee did not recommend any fee increases as requested by the Administration's budget proposal for the VHA for FY2008. On September 6, 2007, the Senate passed H.R. With this transfer of funds, $29.1 billion would have been available for medical services—a $3.2 billion (12.3%) increase over the FY2007 enacted amount and $1.9 billion over the FY2008 budget request—and $3.5 billion would have been available for medical administration, $75 million above the FY2008 Administration's request ( Table 5 ). H.R. 110-161 ) on December 26. 2764 included the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008 (MILCON-VA Appropriations Act). 110-186 , and S.Rept. The Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. The MILCON-VA Appropriation Act ( P.L. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility rules. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health-care system.
On February 5, 2007, the President submitted his FY2008 budget proposal to Congress. The total amount requested by the Administration for the VHA for FY2008 was $34.6 billion, a 1.93% increase in funding compared with the FY2007 enacted amount. For FY2008, the Administration was requesting $27.2 billion for medical services, $3.4 billion for medical administration, $3.6 billion for medical facilities, and $411 million for medical and prosthetic research.
On June 15, 2007, the House passed its version of the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations bill (MILCON-VA appropriations bill) for FY2008 (H.R. 2642, H.Rept. 110-186). H.R. 2642 provided $37.1 billion for the VHA for FY2008. This amount included $29.0 billion for medical services, a $1.9 billion (6.9%) increase above the President's request. H.R. 2642 also included $3.5 billion for medical administration, $69 million above the Administration's request of $3.4 billion; $4.1 billion for medical facilities, a 14% increase over the President's request; and $480 million for medical and prosthetic research, a 17% increase over the President's request of $411 million. H.R. 2642 did not include any bill language authorizing fee increases as requested by the Administration's budget proposal for the VHA for FY2008.
On September 6, 2007, the Senate passed MILCON-VA appropriations bill for FY2008 (H.R. 2642, S.Rept. 110-85) with an amendment. H.R. 2642, as passed by the Senate, provided a total of $37.2 billion for the VHA. This amount included $29.1 billion for medical services—a $3.2 billion (12.3%) increase over the FY2007 enacted amount and $1.9 billion over the FY2008 budget request—and $3.5 billion for medical administration, $75 million above the FY2008 Administration's request. Furthermore, H.R. 2642, as passed by the Senate, provided $4.1 billion for medical facilities, and $500 million for medical and prosthetic research. The Senate-passed bill also did not include any bill language authorizing fee increases as requested by the President.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 2764) was signed into law (P.L. 110-161) on December 26, 2007, and included the MILCON-VA Appropriations Act for FY2008. Under P.L. 110-161, the total amount of funding for the VHA is $37.2 billion.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33124 | crs_RL33124_0 | Overview
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita shut down oil and gas production from the Outer ContinentalShelf in the Gulf of Mexico, the source for 25% of U.S. crude oil production and 20% of natural gasoutput. Katrina, which made landfall on August 29, resulted in the shutdown of most crude oil andnatural gas production in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as a great deal of refining capacity in Louisianaand Alabama. Offshore oil and gas production was resuming when Hurricane Rita made landfall onSeptember 24, and an additional 4.8 million barrels per day (mbd) of refining capacity in Texas andnearby Louisiana was closed. Refined product supplies were initially made up from the release of 30 million barrels ofgasoline, middle distillate and other products from the strategic reserves of member nations of theOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) who are International EnergyAgency (IEA) members. Supply appears to havematched demand, as prices fell through late 2005 and early 2006. As of October, nearly 10% of totalnationwide consumption was shut-in because of production problems in the Federal Offshore Gulfof Mexico, or because of damage to critical infrastructure. Another 3% of nationwide supply fromLouisiana state lands is shut-in. Hurricane Effects on Crude Oil Production, Imports, and Transportation
Nearly 1.6 mbd of crude oil -- the equivalent of 7.6% of U.S. oil consumption -- wasproduced on the Gulf of Mexico Federal Offshore before the hurricanes struck. They havea combined capacity of 554,000 bd (3) . (7) On September 2, as part of the 60 million barrel crude and productstock drawdown coordinated by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the United States offered30 million barrels of SPR crude for sale. In effect, this amount reduced the nation's totalcurrent gas supply by about 10%. Natural gas production from Louisiana state lands was also interrupted by the hurricanes. | Hurricanes Katrina and Rita shut down oil and gas production from the Outer ContinentalShelf in the Gulf of Mexico, the source for 25% of U.S. crude oil production and 20% of natural gasoutput. Katrina, which made landfall on August 29, resulted in the shutdown of most crude oil andnatural gas production in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as a great deal of refining capacity in Louisianaand Alabama, 554,000 barrels per day of which was still closed as of late October, 2005. Offshoreoil and gas production was resuming when Hurricane Rita made landfall on September 24, and anadditional 4.8 million barrels per day (mbd) of refining capacity in Texas and nearby Louisiana wasclosed.
Combining the effects of both storms, 1.3 mbd of refining -- about 8% of national capability-- is shut down, reducing the supply of domestically refined fuels commensurately. Much of therefined product shortfall was made up by imports of refined products, some of which were madeavailable by strategic supplies released by International Energy Agency (IEA) member nations onSeptember 2.
As part of the IEA drawdown, 30 million barrels of crude oil were made available from theU.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which holds only crude. Only 11 million barrels was soldfrom the SPR, in part because limited refinery capacity reduced the call on crude.
Natural gas production from Gulf of Mexico and Louisiana state lands has been recoveringsince the storms, but the equivalent of about 3% of U.S. consumption remains shut-in because ofproduction or transport problems. Unlike refined products, which can be imported, there is littleextra available supply. A normal storage situation at the start of the heating season -- coupled witha very warm winter -- saw Spring 2006 arrive with surplus gas in storage and gas prices well belowequivalent oil prices.
This report will be updated to reflect significant restoration of gas and oil production andrelated infrastructure, as well as relevant changes in hydrocarbon supply and demand. |
crs_RL33702 | crs_RL33702_0 | Both the market and government have important roles in helping ensure the availability, affordability, and adequacy of private health insurance. But many think that health insurance and the health care it pays for are different from other goods and services. It does this through public programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, and through policies that affect the market for private insurance. Subsidies make health insurance more affordable for consumers and employers, and regulations help ensure access to insurance and the adequacy of benefits. This report analyzes the roles of the market and government in providing, financing, and regulating private health insurance. The Market
By generating diverse insurance products and by adapting to different and changing conditions, the market for private health insurance provides choices for consumers and employers who have different needs and preferences. Offering Insurance Products with Different Features
Consumers and employers want affordable yet generous coverage. They also want unfettered access to health care providers and services, but generally they must make tradeoffs between cost on the one hand and generous coverage and access on the other. Adapting to Changing Conditions
In addition to providing a variety of products, the market adapts over time to changing circumstances. In addition to providing health benefits for vulnerable populations, the federal government uses tax and regulatory policy to influence the market for private health insurance. Largely because of tax policy, in 2006 about 60% of Americans got health benefits through work. Subsidies for Health Insurance
By far the largest health-related tax benefit is the exclusion for employer-paid insurance. Other Subsidies
Tax benefits also help consumers pay for qualified medical expenses not covered by insurance. Limitations of Tax Policy
Although all of these tax benefits help people pay for health insurance and health care, government—like the market—does not serve everyone equally. Low-income people may be unable to afford coverage or all of the care they desire, even with support. States have primary responsibility for regulating insurance, but the federal government has sought to address selected issues regarding health coverage. This protection is called portability. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) also helps ensure access to health insurance. Federal law includes a few benefit mandates. For example, although HIPAA and COBRA require insurers and employers to offer coverage to certain individuals under certain circumstances, these Acts do not guarantee access to insurance for everyone. In addition, even where regulations require insurers to sell or employers to offer coverage, eligible people may find coverage unaffordable. | Both the market and government have important roles in ensuring the availability, affordability, and adequacy of private health insurance. These roles complement one another, but even together the market and government have limitations.
The market provides a variety of insurance products for consumers and employers with different needs and preferences. These products differ on many dimensions, including the breadth of provider networks, amount of beneficiary cost-sharing, and techniques for managing the use of health care services. Large employers, small employers, and individuals have different health insurance options, but all must make tradeoffs between the cost of coverage and desired features.
A strength of the market is its flexibility to adapt over time to changing circumstances. As economic conditions, consumer preferences, and government policies evolve, the market generates different products with different features. The primary limitation of the market is its failure to provide affordable options for all consumers.
The federal government helps ensure access to health coverage through public programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, and it influences the market for private insurance through tax and regulatory policies. Some tax subsidies help people purchase insurance, and others—including those for Health Savings Accounts—help pay for medical expenses not covered by insurance. By far the largest subsidy is the tax exclusion for employer-provided health benefits. Because of this exclusion, most people get health insurance through work.
Tax subsidies make health insurance and health care seem more affordable for certain taxpayers, but do not provide equivalent support to everyone. In addition, subsides may increase health care spending by reducing the apparent cost of health insurance and health care services.
Regulations affect both access to insurance and the adequacy of benefits. States have primary responsibility for regulating insurance, but the federal government has sought to address selected issues regarding health coverage. For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 include provisions that allow certain people to obtain or continue health coverage under certain circumstances. In addition, several federal laws mandate coverage for specific health benefits.
Although regulations provide some protection for consumers, neither federal nor state rules guarantee access to coverage for everyone. In addition, even where regulations require insurers or employers to offer coverage, consumers may find this coverage unaffordable. This report will be updated. |
crs_R41976 | crs_R41976_0 | Introduction
While Section 271(a) of the Patent Act creates strict liability for someone who directly infringes a patent, Section 271(b) of the Patent Act provides indirect infringement liability for "[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent." On May 31, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled by a vote of 8-1 that induced infringement under Section 271(b) requires actual knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement. Although the "willful blindness" doctrine is widely used by lower federal courts in criminal cases, this is the first time that the Supreme Court has applied it to a civil patent infringement case. It is also the first time that the Court has held that proof of willful blindness can satisfy a statutory requirement of knowing or willful conduct, thus establishing a standard not only for patent infringement cases brought under Section 271(b), but also for all federal criminal cases involving knowledge. Legal Analysis of Global-Tech, Inc. v. SEB S.A. In 1991, SEB S.A. obtained a U.S. patent, No. Pentalpha appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. However, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit's "deliberate indifference" standard for proving intent under Section 271(b) in the absence of proof of actual knowledge of the existence of a patent; instead, the Court adopted a higher standard, borrowing the concept of "willful blindness" from criminal law. Section 271(b) must know that the induced acts constitute patent infringement. Next, the Court ruled that the Federal Circuit was erroneous in holding that a "deliberate indifference to a known risk that a patent exists" would satisfy this knowledge requirement. The defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists. The defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact. | While Section 271(a) of the Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 271(a)) creates liability for someone who directly infringes a patent (by the unauthorized use of a patented invention), Section 271(b) of the act provides indirect infringement liability for someone who "actively induces" another party to engage in infringing activities. "Inducement" is a theory of indirect patent infringement, in which a party causes, encourages, influences, or aids and abets another's direct infringement of a patent. In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., the question was the legal standard for the mental state necessary for a defendant to be liable for actively inducing infringement under Section 271(b). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had ruled that a plaintiff may hold a defendant liable for induced patent infringement by showing that the defendant had a "deliberate indifference of a known risk" that the induced acts may violate an existing patent.
On May 31, 2011, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's "deliberate indifference" standard. By a vote of 8-1, the Court ruled that induced infringement under Section 271(b) requires actual knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement. However, in a somewhat surprising step, the Court declared that this statutory knowledge requirement could be satisfied by proof of the accused inducer's "willful blindness" (that is, the defendant subjectively believes there is a high probability that a patent exists and takes deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact). This is the first time that the Supreme Court has applied "willful blindness," a criminal law doctrine, to a civil patent infringement case. It is also the first time that the Court has held that proof of willful blindness can substitute for actual knowledge, thus establishing a standard not only for patent infringement cases brought under Section 271(b), but also potentially for all federal criminal cases involving knowledge. |
crs_RL33663 | crs_RL33663_0 | Introduction
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported into the United States from designated beneficiary developing countries (BDCs). The United States, the European Union (EU), and other developed countries have implemented similar programs since the 1970s in order to promote economic growth in developing nations. Currently, 121 developing countries and territories are GSP beneficiary developing countries (BDCs). The GSP program provides duty-free entry into the United States for over 3,500 products (based on 8-digit U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule tariff lines) from BDCs, and duty-free status to an additional 1,500 products from 44 GSP beneficiaries additionally designated as least-developed beneficiary developing countries (LDBDCs). In 2017, products valued at about $21.2 billion (imports for consumption) entered the United States duty-free under the program, out of total imports from GSP countries of about $220 billion. Total U.S. imports from all countries amounted to about $2.3 trillion in 2017. This report briefly summarizes recent GSP developments. It provides a brief history, economic rationale, legal background, and comparison of preferential trade programs worldwide and describes the U.S. implementation of the GSP program. 115-141 ). Division M, Title V of the Act extended the GSP program until December 31, 2020. The program was also retroactively renewed for all GSP-eligible entries between December 31, 2017 (the previous expiration date), and April 22, 2018, the effective date of the current GSP renewal reauthorization. United States GSP Implementation
Congress first authorized the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences scheme in Title V of the Trade Act of 1974 ( P.L. The law prohibits (with certain exceptions) the President from extending GSP treatment to certain countries, as follows:
other industrialized countries (Australia, Canada, EU member states, Iceland, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland are specifically excluded); communist countries, unless they are a WTO member, a member of the International Monetary Fund, and receive Normal Trade Relations (NTR) treatment from the United States; must also not be "dominated or controlled by international communism"; countries that collude with other countries to withhold supplies or resources from international trade or raise the price of goods in a way that could cause serious disruption to the world economy; countries that provide preferential treatment to the products of another developed country in a manner likely to have a significant adverse impact on U.S. commerce; countries that have nationalized or expropriated the property of U.S. citizens (including corporations, partnerships, or associations that are 50% or more beneficially owned by U.S. citizens), or otherwise infringe on U.S. citizens' intellectual property rights (IPR), including patents, trademarks, or copyrights; countries that have taken steps to repudiate or nullify existing contracts or agreements of U.S. citizens (or corporations, partnerships, or associations that are 50% or more owned by U.S. citizens) in a way that would nationalize or seize ownership or control of the property, including patents, trademarks, or copyrights; countries that have imposed or enforced taxes or other restrictive conditions or measures on the property of U.S. citizens; unless the President determines that compensation is being made, good faith negotiations are in progress, or a dispute has been handed over to arbitration in the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes or another forum; countries that have failed to act in good faith to recognize as binding or enforce arbitral awards in favor of U.S. citizens (or corporations, partnerships, or associations that are 50% or more owned by U.S. citizens); and countries that grant sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or group that has committed an act of international terrorism, or have not taken steps to support U.S. efforts against terrorism. Second, at least 35% of the appraised value of the product must be the "growth, product, or manufacture" of a beneficiary developing country, as defined by the sum of (1) the cost or value of materials produced in the BDC (or any two or more BDCs that are members of the same association or countries and are treated as one country for purposes of the U.S. law), plus (2) the direct costs of processing in the country. The process will include increased efforts to conclude outstanding country practices reviews, and a triennial assessment of each beneficiary's compliance with the statutory GSP eligibility criteria. On October 15, 2018, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced a hearing of GSP beneficiaries for ongoing reviews of specific country practices. In addition, some products from BDCs under the GSP program may receive more favorable treatment under other trade preference programs, such as AGOA or the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). First, certain products, such as most textile and apparel products, are designated as "import sensitive" and therefore ineligible for duty-free treatment. Allow some import-sensitive products to receive preferential access. Increase flexibility of rules of origin requirements. | The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program provides nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated beneficiary developing countries (BDCs). The United States, the European Union, and other developed countries have implemented similar programs since the 1970s. Congress first authorized the U.S. program in Title V of the Trade Act of 1974, and most recently extended it until December 31, 2020 in Division M, Title V of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141).The GSP program was also retroactively renewed for all GSP-eligible entries between December 31, 2017 (the previous expiration date), and April 22, 2018, the effective date of the current GSP renewal reauthorization.
Currently, 121 developing countries and territories are GSP beneficiary developing countries (BDCs). The GSP program provides duty-free entry into the United States for over 3,500 products (based on 8-digit U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule tariff lines) from BDCs, and duty-free status to an additional 1,500 products from 44 GSP beneficiaries additionally designated as least-developed beneficiary developing countries (LDBDCs). In 2017, products valued at about $21.2 billion (imports for consumption) entered the United States duty-free under the program, out of total imports from GSP countries of about $220 billion. Total U.S. imports from all countries amounted to about $2.3 trillion in 2017.
In recent years, Members of Congress have held a range of views on whether or not to continue to include emerging market developing countries (e.g., India, Brazil) as beneficiaries, or to limit the program to least-developed countries. Duty-free access for products deemed "import sensitive" has caused some controversy, as well as concerns about certain beneficiaries' compliance with GSP eligibility requirements based on alleged violations of worker rights, failure to protect intellectual property, and other practices. In October 2017, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced that it would initiate closer reviews of beneficiaries' compliance with GSP eligibility criteria on a triennial basis, beginning with Asian and Pacific Island countries. Other country practice reviews, as requested by U.S. interested parties, are ongoing.
GSP is one of several trade preference programs through which the United States seeks to help developing countries expand their economies. Other U.S. trade preference programs are regionally focused, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI, includes preference programs for Haiti). U.S. implementation of GSP requires that developing countries meet certain eligibility criteria, such as taking steps to maintain internationally recognized worker rights and protect intellectual property rights, among other things. GSP rules of origin require that at least 35% of the appraised value of the product be the "growth, product, or manufacture" of the BDC. Certain "import sensitive" products (e.g., most textiles and apparel) are specifically excluded, and limits are placed on the quantity or value of any one product imported from any one country under the program (except for products from LDBDCs and AGOA countries). GSP country and product eligibility are also subject to annual review.
This report examines, first, recent legislative developments, along with a brief history, economic rationale, and legal background leading to the establishment of the GSP. Second, the report describes U.S. GSP implementation. Third, the report briefly analyzes the U.S. program's effectiveness and stakeholders' views, and discusses possible options for Congress. |
crs_R45453 | crs_R45453_0 | In particular, delegations from 195 nations, including the United States, adopted the Paris Agreement in 2015, creating an international structure for nations to pledge to abate their GHG emissions, adapt to climate change, and cooperate to achieve these ends, including financial and other support. Pursuant to the Paris Agreement, the United States pledged (in 2015) to reduce GHG emissions by 26%-28% by 2025 compared to 2005 levels. In 2017, President Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Under the provisions of the Paris Agreement, this cannot be completed before November 4, 2020. GHG Emission Sources
GHG emissions are generated throughout the United States from millions of discrete sources: power plants, industrial facilities, vehicles, households, commercial buildings, and agricultural activities (e.g., soils and livestock). As the figure indicates, GHG emissions in the electric power sector have historically accounted for the largest percentage of total U.S. GHG emissions. CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion
Figure 4 illustrates the 2017 U.S. CO 2 emission contributions by sector from the combustion of fossil fuels. CO2 Emission Projections in the Electricity Sector
As the electricity sector contributes a large percentage (35%) of CO 2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, policymakers and stakeholders are paying attention to both recent trends and future projections of CO 2 emissions in the electricity generation sector. Multiple factors will likely impact CO 2 emission levels from the electricity sector. In recent years, several groups, including EPA and EIA, have prepared projections of CO 2 emission levels in the electricity sector. When comparing a reference case to a CPP scenario in the same model, the results generally indicate that the 2015 CPP final rule would have an impact on 2030 CO 2 emission levels from electricity generation. Concluding Observations
International negotiations and domestic policy developments continue to generate congressional interest in current and projected U.S. GHG emission levels. Recent changes in the U.S. electricity generation portfolio between 2005 and 2017 played a key role:
Coal's contribution to total electricity generation decreased from 50% to 30%; Natural gas's contribution to total electricity generation increased from 19% to 32%; and Non-hydro renewable energy (wind and solar) generation increased from 2% to 10%. Accurately forecasting future emission levels is a complex and challenging endeavor. In general, actual emissions have remained well below projections. | International negotiations and domestic policy developments continue to generate congressional interest in current and projected U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels. In December 2015, delegations from 195 nations, including the United States, adopted an agreement in Paris that creates an international structure for nations to pledge to abate their GHG emissions, adapt to climate change, and cooperate to achieve these ends, including financial and other support. Pursuant to that agreement, the United States pledged (in 2015) to reduce GHG emissions by 26-28% by 2025 compared to 2005 levels. In 2017, President Trump announced his intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, but under the provisions of the agreement, this cannot be completed before November 4, 2020.
GHG emissions are generated throughout the United States from millions of discrete sources: vehicles, power plants, industrial facilities, households, commercial buildings, and agricultural activities (e.g., soils and livestock). Of the GHG source categories, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel combustion account for the largest percentage (76%) of total U.S. GHG emissions. Among the sectors, transportation contributes the largest percentage (36%) of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, with electric power second at 35%.
Recent changes in the U.S. electricity generation portfolio played a key role in the CO2 emission decrease. The electricity portfolio affects CO2 emission levels, because different sources of electricity generation produce different rates of CO2 emissions per unit of electricity (zero in the case of some renewables). The figure below illustrates the changes in electricity portfolio between 2005 and 2017. Highlights include:
Coal's contribution to total electricity generation decreased from 50% to 30%; Natural gas's contribution to total electricity generation increased from 19% to 32%; and Non-hydro renewable energy (wind and solar) generation increased from 2% to 10%.
In recent years, several groups have prepared projections of CO2 emission levels in the electricity sector. The results generally indicate that the 2015 Clean Power Plan would have an impact on CO2 emission levels from electricity generation. In addition, reference case scenarios in more recent studies (2018) project lower emissions by 2030 when compared to reference cases from earlier studies.
Multiple factors will likely impact electricity sector CO2 emissions levels, including the electricity generation portfolio, the relative prices of fossil fuels, federal and/or state policy developments, economic impacts, and improvements in demand-side energy efficiency. Accurately forecasting future CO2 emission levels is a complex and challenging endeavor. A comparison of actual CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2017 with selected emission projections illustrates this difficulty. In general, actual emissions have remained well below projections. |
crs_R40764 | crs_R40764_0 | Background
The Department of Defense (DOD) has often relied upon contractors to support military operations. Managing Contractors During Contingency Operations
Lack of sufficient contract management can prevent troops from receiving needed support and lead to wasteful spending. In addition, some analysts believe that lax contractor oversight may lead to contractor abuses, which can undermine U.S. counter-insurgency efforts. DOD is implementing the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT), which is designed to track and monitor contractor personnel within a contingency operation. A number of analysts have raised questions about the reliability of the data gathered by DOD. DOD officials have acknowledged data shortcomings and have stated that they are working to improve the reliability and the type of data gathered. Despite this policy, DOD has trended away from using local nationals as contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq. DOD Contract Obligations
According to the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation (FPDS), DOD obligated approximately $27.2 billion on contracts in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters of operations in FY2010, representing 17% of DOD's total war obligations in the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters of operations. Contractors in Afghanistan
Number of Contractors
As reflected in Table 1 , according to DOD, as of March 2011, there were 90,339 DOD contractor personnel in Afghanistan, compared to approximately 99,800 uniformed personnel. Contractors made up 48% of DOD's workforce in Afghanistan (see Figure 4 ). This compares to December 2008, when contractors represented 69% of DOD's workforce in Afghanistan. DOD Contract Obligations
According to FPDS, DOD obligated approximately $11.8 billion on contracts in the Afghanistan theater of operations in FY2010, representing 15% of total obligations in the Afghanistan in the area. From FY2005-FY2010, DOD obligated approximately $33.9 billion on contracts primarily in the Afghanistan theater, representing 16% of total DOD obligations for operations in that area (see Figure 6 . Contractors in Iraq
Number of Contractors
As reflected in Table 1 (above), according to DOD, as of March 2011, there were approximately 64,000 DOD contractor personnel in Iraq compared to 46,000 uniformed personnel in-country. Contractors made up approximately 58% of DOD's workforce in Iraq. Both contractor and troop levels have decreased every quarter for more than two years (see Figure 7 ). From FY2005 to FY2010, DOD obligated approximately $112.8 billion on contracts primarily in the Iraq theater of operations, representing 19% of total obligations for operations in Iraq. In light of DOD's experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in response to legislation and the findings of numerous studies (including the Gansler Report, GAO reports, and Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reports), DOD has taken a number of steps to try to improve how it manages contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. These efforts have included organizational changes such as setting up the Joint Contracting Command to provide a more centralized contracting support and management system; implementing regulatory and policy changes aimed at improving management; improving training for uniformed personnel on how to manage contractors; and increasing the size of the acquisition workforce in theater. A number of these initiatives have been reflected in or were the result of legislation. | The critical role contractors play in supporting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq necessitates that the Department of Defense (DOD) effectively manage contractors during contingency operations. Lack of sufficient contract management can delay or even prevent troops from receiving needed support and can also result in wasteful spending. Some analysts believe that poor contract management has played a role in permitting abuses and crimes committed by certain contractors against local nationals, which may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
DOD relies extensively upon contractors to support overseas contingency operations. As of March 2011, DOD had more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (155,000) than uniformed personnel (145,000). Contractors made up 52% of DOD's workforce in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since December 2009, the number of DOD contractors in Afghanistan has exceeded the number in Iraq.
According to DOD, in Afghanistan, as of March 2011, there were 90,339 DOD contractor personnel, compared to approximately 99,800 uniformed personnel. Contractors made up 48% of DOD's workforce in Afghanistan at that time. This compares to December 2008, when contractors represented 69% of DOD's workforce in Afghanistan. According to DOD data, the recent surge of uniformed personnel in Afghanistan and the increase in contract obligations did not result in a corresponding increase in contractor personnel.
DOD obligated approximately $11.8 billion on contracts performed primarily in the Afghanistan theater of operations (including surrounding countries) in FY2010, representing 15% of total DOD obligations for the area. From FY2005-FY2010, DOD obligated approximately $33.9 billion on contracts for the Afghanistan theater, representing 16% of total DOD obligations for the area.
According to DOD, in Iraq, as of March 2011, there were 64,253 DOD contractor personnel in Iraq compared to 45,660 uniformed personnel in-country. Contractors made up 58% of DOD's workforce in Iraq. Contractor and troop levels have decreased every quarter for the last nine quarters. DOD obligated approximately $15.4 billion on contracts in the Iraq theater in FY2010, representing 20% of total DOD obligations for the area. From FY2005-FY2010, DOD obligated approximately $112.1 billion on contracts for the Iraq theater of operations, representing 19% of total DOD obligations for the area.
A number of analysts have questioned the reliability of DOD's contractor data. DOD officials have acknowledged data shortcomings and have stated that they are working to improve the reliability and the type of data gathered. DOD is implementing a database to track and monitor contractor personnel during a contingency operation. DOD has also taken a number of steps to try to improve how it manages contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, including efforts to centralize contracting support and management; implement regulatory and policy changes, train uniformed personnel on how to manage contractors; and increase the size of the acquisition workforce in theater. A number of these initiatives have been reflected in or were the result of legislation.
This report provides a detailed analysis of contractor personnel trends and contracting dollars obligated in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Afghanistan, and Iraq. |
crs_RS22327 | crs_RS22327_0 | 109-148 , which was signed into law on December 30, 2005, and which limits liability with respect to pandemic flu and other public health countermeasures. Division C, which is titled the "Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act," (PREP Act) created § 319F-3 of the Public Health Service Act, which provides that, except in one circumstance (discussed below under "New Federal Cause of Action"), a "covered person" would be immune from suit and liability for "all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure if a declaration ... has been issued with respect to such countermeasure." The declaration referred to is a declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) of a public health emergency or the credible risk of such emergency. Immunity from Liability
Division C defines a "covered person" to include the United States and a (i) manufacturer, (ii) distributor, (iii) program planner, (iv) qualified person who prescribed, administered, or dispensed a covered countermeasure, or (v) official, agent, or employee of (i) through (iv). Since then, the Secretary of HHS has issued additional declarations covering various countermeasures against anthrax, botulism, acute radiation syndrome, smallpox, and various strains of influenza. Comparison with Existing Federal Tort Reform Statutes
Congress has enacted other tort reform statutes to limit liability under state law. Division C eliminated tort liability except for willful misconduct, and therefore falls in between these two categories. In addition, Division C would allow injured persons to recover compensation from the Covered Countermeasure Process Fund, if Congress appropriates money for it. | Division C of P.L. 109-148 (2005), 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e, also known as the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act), limits liability with respect to pandemic flu and other public health countermeasures. Specifically, upon a declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services of a public health emergency or the credible risk of such emergency, Division C would, with respect to a "covered countermeasure," eliminate liability, with one exception, for the United States, and for manufacturers, distributors, program planners, persons who prescribe, administer or dispense the countermeasure, and employees of any of the above. The exception to immunity from liability is that a defendant who engaged in willful misconduct would be subject to liability under a new federal cause of action, though not under state tort law, if death or serious injury results. Division C's limitation on liability is a more extensive restriction on victims' ability to recover than exists in most federal tort reform statutes. However, victims could, in lieu of suing, accept payment under a new "Covered Countermeasure Process Fund," if Congress appropriates money for this fund.
The first PREP Act declaration was issued on January 26, 2007, to limit liability for the administration of the H5N1 influenza vaccine. Since then, declarations have been issued covering countermeasures against other strains of influenza (including H1N1), anthrax, botulism, small pox, and acute radiation syndrome. |
crs_RL32438 | crs_RL32438_0 | Perhaps the most notable international agreement prohibiting torture is the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention or CAT), signed by the United States and more than 140 other countries. Definition of "Torture" Under CAT
Whereas a number of prior international agreements and declarations condemned and/or prohibited torture, CAT appears to be the first international agreement to actually attempt to define the term. Constitution." Implementation of the Convention Against Torture in the United States
The United States signed CAT on April 18, 1988, and ratified the Convention on October 21, 1994, subject to certain declarations, reservations, and understandings. However, the United States did add chapter 113C to the United States Criminal Code (Federal Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. In late 2004, the Department of Justice released a memorandum superseding its earlier memo and modifying some of its conclusions. In January 2009, President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order providing that when conducting prospective interrogations, U.S. agents are generally forbidden from relying upon any interpretation of the law governing interrogations issued by the Department of Justice between September 11, 2001, and the final day of the Bush Administration, absent further guidance from the Attorney General. Availability of Civil Redress for Acts of Torture Occurring Outside the United States
Although the United States attached an understanding to its ratification of CAT expressing its view that CAT Article 14 did not require States to recognize a private right of action for victims of torture occurring outside their territorial jurisdiction, the United States nevertheless created in the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) a private right of action for victims of torture committed under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation. Partially in light of this controversy, Congress passed additional guidelines concerning the treatment of detainees via the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which was enacted pursuant to both the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 ( P.L. 109-148 ), and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 ( P.L. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA, P.L. 109-366 ) contained an identical measure and also required the President to establish administrative rules and procedures implementing this standard. These provisions are discussed in greater detail in CRS Report RL33655, Interrogation of Detainees: Requirements of the Detainee Treatment Act , by [author name scrubbed]. Army Field Manual Restrictions on Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment
On September 6, 2006, the Department of Defense implemented the requirements of the McCain Amendment by amending the Army Field Manual to prohibit the "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment" of any person in the custody or control of the U.S. military. Assuming for the purposes of discussion that a U.S. body reviewed certain interrogation methods to assess whether they constituted "torture" for purposes of CAT and domestic implementing legislation, it might consider looking at jurisprudence by non-U.S. bodies for guidance, though such jurisprudence would not be binding upon U.S. courts. | The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) requires signatory parties to take measures to end torture within their territorial jurisdiction and to criminalize all acts of torture. Unlike many other international agreements and declarations prohibiting torture, CAT provides a general definition of the term. CAT generally defines torture as the infliction of severe physical and/or mental suffering committed under the color of law. CAT allows for no circumstances or emergencies where torture could be permitted.
The United States ratified CAT, subject to certain declarations, reservations, and understandings, including that the treaty was not self-executing and required implementing legislation to be enforced by U.S. courts. In order to ensure U.S. compliance with CAT obligations to criminalize all acts of torture, the United States enacted chapter 113C of the United States Criminal Code, which prohibits torture occurring outside the United States (torture occurring inside the United States was already generally prohibited under several federal and state statutes criminalizing acts such as assault, battery, and murder). The applicability and scope of these statutes were the subject of widely-reported memorandums by the Department of Defense and Department of Justice in 2002. The memorandums were criticized by some for taking an overly restrictive view of treatment constituting torture. In late 2004, the Department of Justice released a memorandum superseding its earlier memo and modifying some of its conclusions. In January 2009, President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order providing that when conducting prospective interrogations, U.S. agents are generally forbidden from relying upon any interpretation of the law governing interrogations issued by the Department of Justice between September 11, 2001, and the final day of the Bush Administration, absent further guidance from the Attorney General.
Assuming for the purposes of discussion that a U.S. body had to review a harsh interrogation method to determine whether it constitutes torture under either CAT or applicable U.S. law, it might examine international jurisprudence analyzing whether certain interrogation methods constituted torture. Although these decisions are not binding precedent for the United States, they may inform deliberations here.
Congress has approved additional, CAT-referencing guidelines concerning the treatment of detainees. The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which was enacted pursuant to both the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-148), and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163), contained a provision prohibiting the cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of persons under custody or control of the United States (this provision is commonly referred to as the McCain Amendment). The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA, P.L. 109-366) contained an identical measure and also required the President to establish administrative rules and procedures implementing this standard. These Acts are discussed briefly in this report and in greater detail in CRS Report RL33655, Interrogation of Detainees: Requirements of the Detainee Treatment Act, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43895 | crs_R43895_0 | Introduction
Over the course of 2014, the U.S. government rolled out targeted economic sanctions on Russian individuals and entities in critical commercial sectors in response to that country's annexing of the Crimean region of neighboring Ukraine and its support of separatist militants in Ukraine's east. The United States coordinated its sanctions with other countries, particularly with the European Union (EU). Russia retaliated against sanctions by banning imports of certain agricultural products from countries imposing sanctions, including the United States. U.S. policymakers are debating the use of economic sanctions in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia, including whether sanctions should be kept in place or further tightened. A key question in this debate is the impact of the Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia's economy and U.S. economic interests in Russia. Recent Trends in Russia's Economy
It is difficult to assess whether, and to what extent, the targeted U.S. and EU sanctions in response to the conflict in Ukraine, and Russia's retaliatory measures, have impacted the Russian economy broadly over the past two to three years. In particular, Russia grappled with
economic contraction , with growth slowing to 0.7% in 2014, before contracting sharply by 3.7% in 2015; capital flight , with net private capital outflows from Russia totaling $152 billion in 2014, compared to $61 billion in 2013; rapid depreciation of the ruble , more than 50% against the dollar over the course of 2015; a higher rate of inflation , from 6.8% in 2013 to 15.5% in 2015; budgetary pressures , with the budget deficit widening to 3.2% in 2015, up from 0.9% in 2013; tapping international reserve holdings to offset fiscal challenges, including exclusion from international capital markets, as reserves fell from almost $500 billion at the start of 2014 to $368 billion at the end of 2015; and more widespread poverty , which increased by 3.1 million to 19.2 million in 2015 (13.4% of the population). In 2015, the IMF estimated that U.S. and EU Ukraine-related sanctions and Russia's retaliatory ban on agricultural imports reduced output in Russia over the short term between 1.0% and 1.5%. U.S. Economic Interests
There is debate about the economic impact of the Ukraine-related sanctions for the United States. When the sanctions were announced, U.S. business groups, including the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, raised concerns that U.S. sanctions on Russia could disrupt the operations of U.S. firms in Russia, thereby harming American manufacturers, jeopardizing American jobs, and ceding business opportunities to firms from other countries. They target a small portion of Russian individuals and entities and, in some cases, only restrict specific types of economic transactions. Russia accounts for a small portion of overall U.S. international economic activity. When new U.S. sanctions on Russia were implemented in 2014 in response to the conflict in Ukraine, news reports cited a number of U.S. firms whose operations were disrupted. | In response to Russia's annexation of the Crimean region of neighboring Ukraine and its support of separatist militants in Ukraine's east, the United States imposed a number of targeted economic sanctions on Russian individuals, entities, and sectors. The United States coordinated its sanctions with other countries, particularly the European Union (EU). Russia retaliated against sanctions by banning imports of certain agricultural products from countries imposing sanctions, including the United States.
U.S. policymakers are debating the use of economic sanctions in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia, including whether sanctions should be kept in place or further tightened. A key question in this debate is the impact of the Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia's economy and U.S. economic interests in Russia.
Economic Conditions in Russia
Russia faced a number of economic challenges in 2014 and 2015, including capital flight, rapid depreciation of the ruble, exclusion from international capital markets, inflation, and domestic budgetary pressures. Growth slowed to 0.7% in 2014 before contracting sharply by 3.7% in 2015. The extent to which U.S. and EU sanctions drove the downturn is difficult to disentangle from the impact of a dramatic drop in the price of oil, a major source of export revenue for the Russian government, or economic policy decisions by the Russian government.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated in 2015 that U.S. and EU sanctions in response to the conflict in Ukraine and Russia's countervailing ban on agricultural imports reduced Russian output over the short term by as much as 1.5%. Russia's economy, more recently, is showing some signs of recovery, in part due to higher oil prices, a flexible exchange rate regime, and sizeable foreign exchange reserves, among other factors. The IMF projects Russia's economy will grow by 1.1% in 2017.
U.S. Economic Interests
When the sanctions were announced in 2014, U.S. business groups raised concerns that sanctions harm American manufacturers, jeopardize American jobs, and cede business opportunities to firms from other countries. When the sanctions were rolled out in 2014, news reports cited a number of U.S. firms that were adversely affected by U.S. sanctions on Russia and Russia's retaliatory measures. There are questions about the overall impact of the sanctions on the U.S. economy, however. Russia accounts for a small portion of total U.S. trade and foreign investment. U.S. sanctions also target specific Russian individuals and entities and, in some cases, restrict only specific types of economic transactions. |
crs_RL34750 | crs_RL34750_0 | Introduction
The attacks of September 11, 2001, prompted an increased federal focus on protecting the United States against terrorist nuclear or radiological attack. History and Background
The ASP program is an effort by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop, procure, and deploy a successor to the existing radiation detection portals. Radiation detection portals, also known as radiation portal monitors, are designed to detect the emission of radiation from objects that pass by them. The current portals are generally deployed at the U.S. land and sea borders by DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and operated by DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Current DHS procedures generally include the following steps: When entering the United States, cargo conveyances, such as trucks, pass through a radiation detection portal. (If primary screening detects a potential threat, secondary screening is undertaken to confirm the detection and identify the source.) Congress faces policy issues in several areas: the effectiveness of ASP technology at detecting and identifying threats, the ASP program's costs relative to its benefits, the Secretary's criteria for determining whether ASPs will provide a "significant increase in operational effectiveness," and future actions following secretarial certification. The ASP technology would integrate the tasks into a single step. These recommendations included
that DHS take an iterative approach with modeling and physical testing complementing each other in order to make the testing and evaluation more scientifically rigorous; that DHS employ an iterative process for incremental deployment and continuous improvement, with experience leading to refinements in both technologies and operations over time, including deploying currently unused low-rate initial production ASPs at various sites to assess their capabilities in multiple environments; and that DHS not proceed with further procurement until it has addressed the findings and recommendations of the NAS report and the ASP is shown to be a favored option in a cost-benefit analysis. Based on the cost-benefit analysis performed then, DHS stated that the value of the reduced impact on commerce outweighed the cost of the ASP program and caused deployment of the ASP systems to be a preferred outcome. Additional DNDO cost-benefit analyses are to be used as input to the Secretary's certification decision. Congress is likely to continue to be interested in the scope of the ASP program, its total cost, how ASP systems would be deployed, the calculated benefits of that potential deployment, and the degree to which this next-generation technology increases homeland security. The decision to proceed with full-scale production of the ASP system is no longer coupled to the secretarial certification. Instead, the secretarial certification and the full-scale production decision will be made separately. Congressional committees have held several series of oversight hearings on the ASP program. It would have required the Director of DNDO to analyze and report to Congress on "existing and developmental alternatives to existing radiation portal monitors and advanced spectroscopic portal monitors that would provide the Department with a significant increase in operational effectiveness for primary screening for radioactive materials." | The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with developing and procuring equipment to prevent a terrorist nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. At the forefront of DNDO's efforts are technologies currently deployed and under development whose purpose is to detect smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. These technologies include existing radiation portal monitors and next-generation replacements known as advanced spectroscopic portals (ASPs).
Customs and Border Protection officers use radiation portal monitors to detect radiation emitted from conveyances, such as trucks, entering the United States. When combined with additional equipment to identify the source of the emitted radiation, radiation portal monitors provide a detection and identification capability to locate smuggled nuclear and radiological materials. The ASPs currently under testing integrate these detection and identification steps into a single process. By doing this, DHS aims to reduce the impact of radiation screening on commerce while increasing its ability to detect illicit nuclear material.
The speed of ASP development and deployment, the readiness of ASP technology, and the potential benefits of the ASP program relative to its cost have all been topics of extensive congressional interest. Congress has held oversight hearings on the ASP program since 2006. Additionally, since FY2007, Congress has each year required that the Secretary of Homeland Security certify that ASPs will result in a "significant increase in operational effectiveness" before DHS can obligate appropriated funds for full-scale ASP procurement. Secretarial certification for use in secondary screening is still pending. Certification for use in primary screening is no longer being pursued. The DNDO states that the secretarial certification and the full-scale production decision will be made separately.
Laboratory and field tests of the ASPs, cost-benefit analyses, and other activities are under way to inform the Secretary's certification decision. Among the issues Congress faces are whether to further define the expected performance of the ASP systems through additional legislation; how to assess whether the ASP systems are technologically ready to be deployed; how to weigh the potential economic and security benefits of ASP deployment against its financial cost; and whether the certification process developed by DHS to establish a "significant increase in operational effectiveness" is well founded. |
crs_RS22831 | crs_RS22831_0 | After he announced in April 2005 that he would not change the constitution, a period of political uncertainty set in that lasted until December 10, 2007, when Putin publically endorsed his First Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitriy Medvedev (pronounced dee-MEE-tree mehd-VYED-yehf), as his choice to be the next president. The Campaign
Four candidates were able to register for the March 2, 2008, presidential election. Medvedev's speech was viewed by some observers in Russia as more liberal in tone than Putin's, although both mostly covered similar topics. The monitors raised concerns that an onerous registration process for independent candidates and uneven media coverage contributed to a electoral process that was not free and fair. Implications for U.S. Areas of common U.S.-Russian interest, Bush stated, include non-proliferation and Iranian nuclear issues. | This report discusses the campaign and results of Russia's March 2, 2008, presidential election and implications for Russia and U.S. interests. Popular outgoing President Vladimir Putin endorsed his First Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitriy Medvedev, who easily won an election viewed by some observers as not free and fair. This report will not be updated. Related products include CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS22770, Russia's December 2007 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications, by [author name scrubbed]. For more background and prospects, see CRS Report RL34392, Russia's 2008 Presidential Succession, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31943 | crs_RL31943_0 | Introduction
The Senate pay-as-you-go, or PAYGO, rule generally requires that any legislation projected to increase direct spending or reduce revenues must also include equivalent amounts of direct spending cuts, revenue increases, or a combination of the two so that the legislation does not increase the on-budget deficit in the current fiscal year, the budget year, a six-year period, or an 11-year period (the latter two periods beginning with the current fiscal year). Without such offsetting provisions, the legislation would require the support of at least 60 Senators to waive the rule and allow it to be considered on the Senate floor. The Senate PAYGO rule does not apply to direct spending or revenues generated under existing law; it applies only to legislation considered by the Senate. Consequently, direct spending may increase and revenues may decline in any fiscal year due to factors beyond the control of the PAYGO rule. Current Features of the Senate PAYGO Rule
The current Senate PAYGO rule prohibits the consideration of direct spending or revenue legislation that is projected to increase or cause an on-budget deficit in any of the following four time periods: (1) the current fiscal year; (2) the budget year; (3) the six-year period consisting of the current fiscal year, the budget year, and the 4 ensuing fiscal years; or (4) the 11-year period consisting of the current year, the budget year, and the ensuing nine fiscal years. During the period between 1993, when the rule was established, and the end of the first session of the 115 th Congress, the PAYGO rule was used to prevent the consideration of 44 amendments. The Senate voted to waive the PAYGO rule 14 times, allowing consideration of the matter: five times in relation to a measure, seven times in relation to an amendment (four of these amendments were full-text substitutes to a bill), and twice in relation to the disposition of a House amendment. Legislative History of the Senate PAYGO Rule
The Senate established the PAYGO rule in the FY1994 budget resolution in 1993. It has been modified and extended seven times in subsequent budget resolutions and once in a Senate simple resolution. PAY-AS-YOU-GO POINT OF ORDER IN THE SENATE. | The Senate pay-as-you-go, or PAYGO, rule generally requires that any legislation projected to increase direct spending or reduce revenues must also include equivalent amounts of direct spending cuts, revenue increases, or a combination of the two so that the legislation does not increase the on-budget deficit in the current fiscal year, the budget year, a six-year period, or an 11-year period (the latter two periods beginning with the current fiscal year). Without such offsetting provisions, the legislation would require the support of at least 60 Senators to waive the rule and be considered on the Senate floor.
The Senate PAYGO rule does not apply to direct spending or revenues generated under existing law; it applies only to legislation considered by the Senate. Consequently, direct spending may increase and revenues may decline in any fiscal year due to factors beyond the control of the PAYGO rule.
The Senate first established the PAYGO rule in the FY1994 budget resolution in 1993. As originally established, the rule prohibited the consideration of any direct spending and revenue legislation that was projected to increase the deficit over a 10-year period. The Senate has modified and extended the rule seven times in subsequent budget resolutions and once in a Senate simple resolution. Most recently, in the FY2018 budget resolution, the Senate modified the rule to add two additional periods (the current fiscal year and the budget year) to the existing periods (the six-year and 11-year periods) for which legislation may not increase the projected on-budget deficit.
During the period between 1993, when the Senate PAYGO rule was established, and the end of the first session of the 115 th Congress, the PAYGO rule was used to prevent the consideration of 44 amendments. During the same period, the Senate voted to waive the PAYGO rule 14 times: five times in relation to a measure, seven times in relation to an amendment, and twice in relation to the disposition of a House amendment.
This report was first issued in 2003 and has been updated periodically since then. This update includes the most recent changes to the rule, adds information on points of order raised under the rule since 2015, and replaces the August 4, 2015, version.
This report will continue to be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R44476 | crs_R44476_0 | Overview of the New Standards
On March 25, 2016, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of the Department of Labor (DOL) published in the Federal Register new standards governing exposure to respirable crystalline silica in the workplace. Key features of the new crystalline silica standards include the following requirements for employers:
protect workers when exposure to respirable crystalline silica exceeds the new permissible exposure limit (PEL) of 50 µg/m 3 (micrograms per cubic meter of air), as an 8-hour time-weighted average (TWA), through the use of engineering controls, or if such controls are not effective, the use of respirators; measure workers' exposure to respirable crystalline silica if such exposure may reach or exceed levels of 25 µg/m 3 as an 8-hour TWA; limit workers' access to areas where they may be exposed to respirable crystalline silica; offer medical exams, including chest x-rays and lung function tests, every 3 years to workers exposed to crystalline silica at or above the level of 25 µg/m 3 as an 8-hour TWA for 30 or more days in a year or to construction workers required to wear respirators for 30 or more days in a year; train workers to limit exposure to respirable crystalline silica; and maintain records of workers' exposure to respirable crystalline silica and employer-provided medical exams. These new standards are to be phased in over a five-year period, beginning June 23, 2017, with different implementation dates for construction, general industry, and hydraulic fracturing (fracking). The standards provide employers in the construction industry an exemption from the PEL and requirement to measure employee exposure to crystalline silica if these employers follow the engineering controls and work practices of the new standards, as outlined in Table 1 of the new standards. Projected Costs and Benefits
OSHA projects that the implementation of its new crystalline standards will prevent 642 silica-related deaths per year and produce annual benefits of approximately $8.7 billion through mortality and morbidity reductions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided the case on December 22, 2017, and upheld the new standards. | On March 25, 2016, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of the Department of Labor (DOL) published new standards regulating exposure to crystalline silica in the workplace. Under the new standards, the Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) for crystalline silica is to be reduced to 50 µg/m3 (micrograms per cubic meter of air). Employers are to be required to monitor crystalline silica exposure if workplace levels may exceed 25 µg/m3 for at least 30 days in a year and provide medical monitoring to employees in those workplaces. In the case of construction workers, medical monitoring is required only if the new standards require workers to wear respirators for at least 30 days in a year.
Construction industry employers are exempt from the PEL and exposure monitoring requirements if they comply with the engineering controls and work practices specified in the new standards. The new standards are scheduled to be phased in over the next five years, beginning June 23, 2017, with different implementation dates for construction, general industry, and hydraulic fracturing (fracking).
OSHA projects that the new crystalline silica standards will prevent 642 deaths per year, costing employers just over $1 billion annually. The net monetary benefits of the new standards are projected to be $7.6 billion annually based on reduced mortality and morbidity related to exposure to crystalline silica.
Groups representing employers, manufacturers, and labor filed court challenges to the new standards. On December 22, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the new standards. |
crs_R40676 | crs_R40676_0 | Introduction
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. What a court determines to be "reasonable" depends on the nature of the search and its underlying governmental purpose. This report provides an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2009 decision, Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding , which addressed the strip search of a 13-year-old middle school student. Applying these standards, the Court held that the school's search of Redding's book bag and outer clothing was in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the search of Redding's book bag and outer clothing were conducted in "relative privacy ... and [were] not excessively intrusive.... "
The search became constitutionally unreasonable when it went beyond Redding's outerwear and ultimately led to Redding being required to shake and pull out her bra and underwear. | The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. What a court determines to be "reasonable" depends on the nature of the search and its underlying governmental purpose.
This report provides an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2009 decision, Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, which addressed the constitutionality of a strip search of a 13-year-old middle school student. Based on the facts of the case, the Court held that the school's search of a student's book bag and outer clothing was in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. However, as a result of a number of factual deficiencies, the search became constitutionally unreasonable when it went beyond the student's outerwear and ultimately led to the student being required to shake and pull out her bra and underwear.
For a discussion of drug testing in public schools, see CRS Report RL34624, Governmental Drug Testing Programs: Legal and Constitutional Developments, by [author name scrubbed]. |
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