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crs_RL32371 | crs_RL32371_0 | Introduction
The United States and many of its trading partners use trade remedy laws to lessen the adverse impact of various trade practices on domestic industries, producers, and workers. These laws are deemed consistent with U.S. international obligations provided they conform to the trade remedy provisions agreed to as part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1986-1994) and other trade agreements to which the United States is a party. This report will, first, discuss congressional interest in these laws, and give an overview of recent legislation to amend the laws in Congress. Third, safeguard statutes and investigations are discussed. Finally, an Appendix provides a chart outlining briefly all U.S. trade remedy statutes, major actors, and remedies presented. AD and CVD actions, and (2) U.S. safeguard actions. Second, H.R. S. 1130 (and related bill S. 1267 ), the Strengthening America's Trade Laws Act, seeks to address concerns of some in Congress that the WTO dispute settlement system has "added to the obligations and diminished the rights of WTO members," particularly with regard to the Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements. Countervailing Application to Non-Market Economy (NME) Countries
In the second session, H.R. 4105 seeks to specifically apply countervailing duty laws to non-market economy countries, such as China and Vietnam. An identical measure, S. 2153 , passed the Senate by unanimous consent on March 5, 2012. On December 19, 2011, in a case challenging the imposition of countervailing duties on tires from China (a non-market economy, or NME country), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) ruled that CVD laws cannot be applied to products from NME countries. AD and CVD Laws and Investigations
U.S. The law permits the imposition of antidumping duties if (1) the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA) determines that the foreign subject merchandise is being, or likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value; and (2) the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) determines that an industry in the United States is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of an industry is materially retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise. The statute provides that countervailing duties will be imposed, first, when The ITA determines that the government of a country or any public entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of the subject merchandise that is imported or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation into the United States. U.S. International Obligations
Disciplines regulating the use of antidumping laws appear in Article VI of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the predecessor to the WTO) and in the Antidumping Agreement adopted in the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of multilateral trade negotiations that established the WTO. Safeguard (Escape Clause) Measures
"Safeguard" or "escape clause" trade laws are designed to provide domestic industries with relief from injurious import surges resulting from fairly competitive trade. Statutory Authority
Sections 201-204 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, provide relief for imports from all countries. On this basis, the President may: (1) implement the USITC's recommendations; (2) modify the USITC provisions or provide another form of remedy; or (3) take no action due to U.S. economic or national security interests. On December 19, 2001, the USITC submitted its findings and remedy recommendations to the President. Summary of U.S. Trade Remedy Laws | The United States and many of its trading partners use laws known as trade remedies to mitigate the adverse impact of various trade practices on domestic industries and workers.
U.S. antidumping (AD) laws (19 U.S.C. §1673 et seq.) authorize the imposition of duties if (1) the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce (ITA) determines that foreign merchandise is being, or likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value, and (2) the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) determines that an industry in the United States is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of an industry is materially retarded, due to imports of that merchandise. U.S. countervailing duty laws (19 U.S.C. §1671 et seq.) authorize the imposition of countervailing duties (CVD) if the ITA finds that the government of a country or any public entity has provided a subsidy on the manufacture, production, or export of the merchandise, and the USITC determines injury or threat thereof. U.S. safeguard laws (19 U.S.C. §2251 et seq.) authorize the President to provide temporary import relief from injurious surges of imports resulting from fairly competitive trade from all countries. Other safeguard laws authorize relief for import surges from communist countries (19 U.S.C. §2436) and from China (19 U.S.C. §2451). In each case, the USITC conducts an investigation, forwards recommendations to the President, and the President may act on the USITC's recommendation, modify it, or take no action.
These laws are deemed consistent with U.S. international obligations provided that they conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) and the WTO Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (ADA, Antidumping Agreement) agreed to as part of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations that established the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as other trade agreements to which the United States is a party.
In the first session of the 112th Congress, legislation was introduced seeking to amend trade remedy statutes, including addressing currency misalignment (S. 1619, S. 328, and H.R. 639) in trade remedy investigations. S. 1130 and related bill S. 1267, the Strengthening America's Trade Laws Act, seek, in part, to provide more specific methodology for trade remedy actions in nonmarket economy countries. In the second session, H.R. 4105 seeks to specifically apply countervailing action to nonmarket economy countries in light of a December 19, 2011 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that CVD action may not be applied to the imports of such countries. S. 2153, an identical measure, passed in the Senate by unanimous consent on March 5, 2012.
This report discusses, first, congressional interest in trade remedy laws, and describes legislation seeking to amend the laws in the first session of the 112th Congress. Second, it describes antidumping and countervailing duty laws, procedures, and investigations. Third, U.S. safeguard statutes and investigative procedures are presented. Finally, an Appendix provides a chart outlining briefly all U.S. trade remedy statutes, major actors, and effects of these laws. |
crs_R44342 | crs_R44342_0 | Commentary abounds suggesting the current U.S. income tax code is overly complicated, unfair, a drag on the economy, and in need of reform. Within the current income tax structure, an individual's tax liability is determined as a function of total income. With a consumption tax, however, an individual's tax liability would be determined by total expenditures on goods and services. Consumption taxes can take many different forms—which differ in when the tax is collected, how the tax is calculated, and who is responsible for remitting the tax—but they all share the common tax base of consumption. Common consumption tax designs include a value added tax (VAT), a national sales tax (NST), and a consumed-income tax. Multiple proposals have been introduced in the 114 th Congress to shift revenue collection away from income and toward consumption. 25 and its companion legislation in the Senate, S. 155 , would replace the income tax with a national retail sales tax, often referred to as a "fair tax." H.R. 1040 would offer taxpayers the ability to opt into a consumed-income tax. After an overview of these tax structures, the report will discuss the effects of consumption taxes on economic efficiency, the distribution of the tax burden, and tax administration. H.R. Alternative Tax Bases: Economic Considerations
Taxes allow governments to provide desired goods and services for their citizens; however, taxes also tend to distort individual economic decisionmaking. If a consumption tax proposal were revenue neutral, the income effect produced from switching to a consumption tax is likely to be similar to the income effect under the income tax. As discussed earlier, most taxes tend to distort individual behavior and reduce economic efficiency. In addition, this tax raises revenue without introducing distortions into the economy. Impact on Savings
A key difference between an income tax and a consumption tax is in how individual savings are treated. Transitioning to a consumption tax is expected to increase economic welfare in part due to an increase in private saving. Interactions with State Tax Codes
State tax codes and the federal tax code interact in a number of ways, which could complicate the implementation of a broad consumption tax in the United States. | Commentary abounds suggesting the current U.S. income tax code is overly complicated, unfair, a drag on the economy, and in need of reform. One option for tax reform would fundamentally change how taxes are collected in the United States, and tax consumption instead of income. Multiple proposals have been introduced in the 114th Congress to shift revenue collection away from income and toward consumption. H.R. 25 and its companion legislation in the Senate, S. 155, would replace the income tax with a national retail sales tax, often referred to as a "fair tax." H.R. 1040 would offer taxpayers the ability to opt into a consumed-income tax.
Within the current income tax structure, an individual's tax liability is determined as a function of total income. Under a consumption tax, however, an individual's tax liability would be determined as a function of total expenditures on goods and services. Consumption taxes can take many different forms—which differ in when the tax is collected, how the tax is calculated, and who is responsible for remitting the tax—but they all share the common tax base of consumption. Common consumption tax designs include a value added tax (VAT), a national sales tax (NST), and a consumed-income tax.
Taxes are necessary for the government to raise revenue to provide necessary and desired goods and services. However, taxes also tend to introduce distortions into a market economy and can hinder economic efficiency. Proponents of consumption taxes argue that a broad-based consumption tax could replace the federal income tax, raising requisite revenue while improving economic efficiency, and increasing economic output.
Broadly, taxes tend to distort individual decisions by altering price signals within the economy. Taxes can affect individual behavior in a number of ways, including labor participation decisions, and saving and investment decisions. As discussed in the report, the effects on labor supply from switching to a consumption tax are expected to be small, if any. However, there is evidence that transitioning to a consumption tax may increase individual saving. Increased individual savings could contribute to increased economic output.
Effects on the distribution of the tax burden are also often considered in tax policy debates. When comparing a hypothetical pure consumption tax to a hypothetical pure income tax, consumption taxes place a greater tax burden on lower income individuals. Additionally, in this stylized comparison, consumption taxes place a greater tax burden on younger and older individuals, especially retired individuals drawing down their savings. |
crs_R40715 | crs_R40715_0 | Background
In an Earth Day speech, President Obama linked the importance of winning the technological race to develop clean energy sources with the economic problems associated with U.S. dependence on oil. Many of these proposals represent the elimination of tax expenditures. In some cases, for example, the expensing of intangible drilling expenses, the major oil companies have been excluded from the benefits of the tax provision while the benefit was still in effect for the independent oil producers. These three proposals are likely to increase total taxes on the oil industry: an excise tax on Gulf of Mexico oil and natural gas production, the rescinding of the manufacturing tax deduction for the oil industry, and the repeal of percentage depletion. Repeal of the deduction or less favorable tax treatment of the expenses would be likely to reduce output if the profit margin on oil were low. Repeal Passive Loss Exception for Working Interests in Oil Properties
Repeal of the passive loss exception for working interests in oil and natural gas properties is a relatively small item in terms of revenue contribution—$19 million from 2010 to 2014. The extended amortization period for independent producers is projected by the Administration to contribute almost $1.2 billion in deficit reduction over the period 2010 to 2019. These same proposals, from an alternate point of view, can also be considered to be the elimination of tax preferences that have favored the oil and natural gas industries over other energy sources, and made oil and gas products artificially inexpensive, with consumer costs held below true cost of consumption, when the costs associated with climate change and energy dependence, among other effects, are included. | President Obama, in an Earth Day speech, addressed the linkage between the problems he associated with U.S. reliance on imported oil and the importance of a future based more on alternative energy sources. These problems could be partially addressed by reducing what the Administration sees as favorable treatment of the oil and natural gas industries that were designed to increase production of petroleum products.
The FY2010 budget proposal outlined a set of proposals, framed in terms of deficit reduction, or the elimination of tax expenditures, that would potentially increase the taxes of the oil and natural gas industries, especially the independent producers. These proposals included an excise tax on Gulf of Mexico oil and natural gas production to limit previously granted royalty relief, repeal of the enhanced oil recovery and marginal well tax credits, repeal of the expensing of intangible drilling costs and the deduction for tertiary injectants, repeal of passive loss exceptions for working interests in oil and natural gas properties, and the manufacturing tax deduction for oil and natural gas companies, and the increasing amortization periods for certain expenses and the repeal of the percentage depletion allowance for independent oil and natural gas producers.
It was estimated that these changes would provide $12.7 billion categorized by the Administration as deficit reduction over the period 2010 to 2014. The changes, if enacted, also would reduce the tax advantage enjoyed by independent oil and natural gas producers over the major integrated oil companies. On what will likely be a small scale, the proposals also will make oil and natural gas more expensive for U.S. consumers, with the effect of reducing consumption of those fuels. |
crs_R43893 | crs_R43893_0 | Introduction
The President is responsible for appointing individuals to positions throughout the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted to the President alone. This report identifies, for the 112 th Congress, all nominations submitted to the Senate for full-time positions on 34 regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. This report includes a profile on the leadership structure of each of these 34 boards and commissions as well as a pair of tables presenting information on each body's membership and appointment activity as of the end of the 112 th Congress. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Appointments During the 112th Congress
During the 112 th Congress, President Barack H. Obama submitted nominations to the Senate for 63 of the 149 full-time positions on 34 regulatory and other boards and commissions (most of the remaining positions were not vacant during that time). He submitted a total of 76 nominations for these positions, of which 45 were confirmed, 8 were withdrawn, and 23 were returned to the President. At the end of the Congress, 26 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 20 vacancies among the 149 positions. The chair is also appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Summary of All Nominations and Appointments to Collegial Boards and Commissions
Appendix B. Board and Commission Abbreviations | The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using authorities granted to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are some 149 full-time leadership positions on 34 federal regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions for which the Senate provides advice and consent. This report identifies all nominations submitted to the Senate for full-time positions on these 34 boards and commissions during the 112th Congress.
Information for each board and commission is presented in profiles and tables. The profiles provide information on leadership structures and statutory requirements (such as term limits and party balance requirements). The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, incumbents as of the end of the 112th Congress, incumbents' parties (where balance is required), and appointment action within each executive department. Additional summary information across all 34 boards and commissions appears in the appendix.
During the 112th Congress, the President submitted 76 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions on regulatory boards and commissions (most of the remaining positions on these boards and commissions were not vacant during that time). Of these 76 nominations, 45 were confirmed, 8 were withdrawn, and 23 were returned to the President. The President also made three recess appointments to full-time positions on a regulatory board. At the end of the 112th Congress, 26 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 20 vacancies among the 149 positions.
Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2012 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40994 | crs_R40994_0 | Background
In June 2009, the House passed H.R. 2454 , the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. In November 2009, Chairwoman Boxer of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works completed markup of S. 1733 , the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, by approving a "Manager's Amendment" as a substitute, and ordered S. 1733 reported. Both the House-passed ( H.R. 2454 ) and the Senate-reported ( S. 1733 ) bills would establish a cap-and-trade system to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as well as to address energy efficiency, renewable energy, and other energy topics. Among other provisions, both bills would require major reductions in GHG emissions from entities comprising roughly 85% of current U.S. GHG emissions. Covered sectors would include electricity production, natural gas distribution, petroleum refining, and industrial sectors. These and related bills and issues are currently being debated in Congress. However, if enacted, provisions in these bills could potentially raise farm input costs for fossil fuels, fertilizers, energy, and other production inputs. These higher costs could potentially be alleviated by possible farm revenue increases should farmers participate in carbon offset and renewable energy provisions that are part of these bills. This report also describes some of the carbon energy and biomass provisions pertaining to the domestic agricultural and forestry sectors in the energy titles of these bills. 2454 many in the Senate and in the agriculture community regarded that effort as a "good starting point" that still needed additional work to satisfy those in Congress with major agriculture constituencies. In September 2009, Senator Kerry introduced S. 1733 , which was referred to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (EPW). For example, some in the agricultural community have continued to support the ongoing efforts of Senator Stabenow, who continued to work on a proposal (often referred to as the "Stabenow Amendment") that would expand on the agricultural and forestry carbon offset provisions in these climate bills and also allow for certain other provisions benefitting U.S. farmers and landowners. These provisions were included in a bill, the Clean Energy Partnerships Act of 2009 ( S. 2729 ), introduced by Senator Stabenow shortly after the Senate EPW Committee completed work on S. 1733 . Other in the agricultural community, however, including Chairwoman Lincoln of the Senate Agriculture Committee and the American Farm Bureau Federation, continue to voice concerns about climate legislation and how this legislation could affect national and local farming communities, and U.S. economic competitiveness. Although these bills would not require GHG emission reductions in the agriculture and forestry sectors, if enacted, provisions in these bills could potentially raise farm input costs for energy, fertilizers, and other production inputs. Appendix A compares the carbon offset programs that would be established by the House-passed bill, H.R. The House and Senate bills also differ in their allowable proportions of domestic and international offsets. | In June 2009, the House passed H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. In September 2009, Senator Kerry introduced S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, which was referred to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. The committee completed markup of the bill on November 5, 2009, by approving Senator Boxer's "Manager's Amendment" as a substitute, and ordered S. 1733 reported. Both the House and Senate bills would establish a cap-and-trade system to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as well as address energy efficiency, renewable energy, and other energy topics. Among other provisions, both bills would require major reductions in GHG emissions from entities comprising roughly 85% of current U.S. GHG emissions. Covered sectors would include electricity production, natural gas distribution, petroleum refining, and industrial sectors. These and related bills and issues are currently being debated in Congress.
Although the leading House and Senate climate proposals would not require GHG emission reductions in the agriculture and forestry sectors, provisions in these bills could potentially raise farm input costs for energy, fertilizers, and other production inputs. However, higher production costs could potentially be alleviated by possible farm revenue increases from other provisions that are part of these bills. For example, the cap-and-trade proposals in these bills would distribute tradeable allowances at no cost to certain agricultural industries, such as fertilizer manufacturers. These "free" allowances could also dampen the impact of the cap-and-trade system that would otherwise occur. Higher costs might also be dampened by possible farm revenue increases should farmers participate in carbon offset programs for domestic farm- and land-based carbon storage activities. The renewable energy provisions contained in these bills could potentially expand the market for farm-based biofuels, biomass residues, and dedicated energy crops. Both bills also provide incentives for international forestry and related land-based activities. Other provisions in these bills might also affect the U.S. agriculture sectors. These include provisions that would establish a GHG registry for reporting emissions, which might affect certain larger livestock operations, and provisions to implement certain biomass and bioenergy requirements.
This report describes some of the agriculture and forestry provisions that are included in major energy and climate legislation in the 111th Congress, comparing provisions in the House-passed bill (H.R. 2454) and the Senate-reported bill (S. 1733). Initially, when the House passed H.R. 2454 many in the Senate and in the agriculture community regarded that effort as a "good starting point" that still needed additional work to satisfy those in Congress with major agriculture constituencies. In particular, other ongoing efforts in the Senate, such as a bill introduced by Senator Stabenow (Clean Energy Partnerships Act of 2009, S. 2729), would provide for expanded carbon offset provisions benefitting U.S. farmers and landowners, among other provisions. This Senate bill is supported by many in the agricultural community. However, others (including Chairwoman Lincoln of the Senate Agriculture Committee) continue to question this legislation and cite concerns about how this legislation could affect national and local farming communities. |
crs_R43328 | crs_R43328_0 | Introduction
Medicaid plays a key role in covering long-term services and supports (LTSS) to eligible aged and disabled individuals. As the largest single payer of LTSS in the United States, Medicaid LTSS spending in 2015 (combined federal and state) totaled $149.4 billion and accounted for 42.5% of all LTSS expenditures ($351.8 billion). LTSS are also a substantial portion of spending within the Medicaid program relative to those served. In 2015, Medicaid LTSS accounted for 31% of all Medicaid spending despite the fact that LTSS recipients represent a relatively small share of the total Medicaid population. An estimated 4.1 million Medicaid beneficiaries (or 5.9%) of the 68.5 million total enrolled Medicaid population received LTSS in FY2013. Medicaid funds LTSS for eligible beneficiaries in both institutional settings and home and community-based settings, though the portfolio of services offered differs substantially by state. In more recent decades, federal Medicaid statutory authority has expanded to assist states in increasing and diversifying their Medicaid LTSS coverage to include optional HCBS. As a result, states have a broad range of coverage options to select from when designing their LTSS programs. Moreover, the share of Medicaid LTSS spending for HCBS has nearly tripled over time, from 18% of Medicaid LTSS spending in FY1995 to over half (53%) of total Medicaid LTSS spending in FY2014. 111-148 , as amended) further added to the range of options available to states that want to pursue HCBS coverage expansion. In FY2016 and FY2017, a majority of states reported activities to expand HCBS in 46 and 47 states, respectively. Most states reported using Section 1915(c) HCBS waiver programs or the Section 1915(i) HCBS state plan option to expand their HCBS offerings (42 states in FY2016 and 41 states in FY2017). This report provides a description of the various statutory authorities and other legislative provisions that either require or otherwise allow states to cover LTSS under Medicaid. The report's Appendix A provides a brief legislative history of Medicaid LTSS from Medicaid's enactment and initial coverage requirements for institutional care through the evolution of HCBS options available to states. A discussion of ACA's changes to Medicaid law with respect to Medicaid LTSS coverage options is also provided. The Appendix B tables provide state information about coverage of Medicaid state plan optional benefits and certain grant programs to expand Medicaid HCBS. States are required to offer certain Medicaid institutional services. In general, Medicaid law provides states with two broad authorities, which either cover certain LTSS as a benefit under the Medicaid state plan or cover home and community-based LTSS through a waiver program which permits states to waive certain Medicaid requirements to allow the provision of these services. Over time, states were authorized to cover other types of home and community-based services (HCBS) as optional benefits under the Medicaid state plan. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. | Long-term services and supports (LTSS) refer to a broad range of health and health-related services and supports needed by individuals who lack the capacity for self-care due to a physical, cognitive, or mental disability or condition. Often the individual's disability or condition results in the need for hands-on assistance or supervision over an extended period of time. Medicaid plays a key role in covering LTSS to aged and disabled individuals. As the largest single payer of LTSS in the United States, federal and state Medicaid spending accounted for $149.4 billion or 42.5% of all LTSS expenditures in 2015 ($351.8 billion). LTSS are also a substantial portion of spending within the Medicaid program relative to the population served, accounting for 31% of all Medicaid spending in 2015. Of the 68.5 million total enrolled Medicaid population, an estimated 4.1 million (or 5.9%) received LTSS in FY2013.
Medicaid funds LTSS for eligible beneficiaries in both institutional and home and community-based settings, though the portfolio of services offered differs substantially by state. Moreover, states are required to offer certain Medicaid institutional services to eligible beneficiaries, while the majority of Medicaid home and community-based services (HCBS) are optional for states. In recent decades, federal authority has expanded to assist states in increasing and diversifying their Medicaid LTSS coverage to include HCBS. As a result, the share of Medicaid LTSS spending for HCBS has nearly tripled, accounting for 18% of Medicaid LTSS spending in 1995 to over half (53%) of total Medicaid LTSS spending in FY2014.
States now have a broad range of coverage options to select from when designing their LTSS programs. In general, Medicaid law provides states with two broad authorities, which either cover certain LTSS as a benefit under the Medicaid state plan or cover home and community-based LTSS through a waiver program which permits states to disregard certain Medicaid requirements in the provision of these services, subject to approval. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) established or extended several Medicaid state plan options and grant activities to enhance or expand states' LTSS delivery systems. Given the range of available coverage options, states continue to enhance or expand their LTSS delivery systems to cover additional services or target services to specific populations with a focus on HCBS. In FY2016 and FY2017, most states reported activities to expand HCBS (46 and 47 states, respectively), which include expanding Section 1915(c) HCBS waiver authority programs or the Section 1915(i) HCBS state plan option, among other programmatic changes.
This report provides a description of the various statutory authorities that either require or otherwise allow states to cover LTSS under Medicaid. Appendix A provides a brief legislative history of Medicaid LTSS from Medicaid's enactment and initial coverage requirements for institutional care through the evolution of HCBS options available to states. A discussion of changes to Medicaid made by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) with respect to LTSS coverage options is also provided. The tables in Appendix B provide state information about coverage of Medicaid state plan optional benefits. |
crs_R40217 | crs_R40217_0 | Introduction
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 , H.R. These agencies are the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS), all within the Department of the Interior (DOI). This report includes a comparison of the House and Senate provisions for the land management agencies, as contained in Title VIII of the House-passed version of H.R. Funds are provided in the law for three primary purposes: construction, resource management, and wildland fire management. 1 . 1 . | This report discusses the major federal lands provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, H.R. 1). It focuses on provisions in the law related to four federal agencies: the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service. These provisions relate to construction, resource management, and wildland fire management. A comparison of the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 1 also is provided, which includes a discussion of the Centennial Challenge of the National Park Service. |
crs_R43138 | crs_R43138_0 | The growth in U.S. shale gas production requires the expansion of natural gas pipeline infrastructure at the local level (to extract and gather the gas) and at the national level to transport natural gas from producing regions to consuming markets, typically in other states. Over 300,000 miles of interstate transmission pipeline already transport natural gas across the United States. However, if the growth in U.S. shale gas continues as projected, the requirement for new pipelines could be substantial. This ongoing expansion has increased congressional interest in the role of the federal government in the certification (permitting) of interstate natural gas pipelines. The Natural Gas Pipeline Permitting Reform Act ( H.R. 161 ) seeks to expedite the federal review of certificate applications by imposing deadlines on the agencies involved. FERC Pipeline Certification Process
Under Section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is authorized to issue certificates of "public convenience and necessity" for "the construction or extension of any facilities ... for the transportation in interstate commerce of natural gas" (15 U.S.C. Thus, companies seeking to build interstate natural gas pipelines must first obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity from FERC. 161
There are no statutory time limits within which FERC must complete its own certificate review process, issue an order, or complete a rehearing. However, EPAct authorizes FERC to establish a schedule for all federal authorizations and provides for judicial petition "if a Federal or State administrative agency" fails to comply with that schedule (§313(c)). Congress included these provisions in EPAct to address concerns that some interstate gas pipeline and other energy infrastructure approvals were being unduly delayed by a lack of coordination or insufficient action among agencies involved in the certification process. FERC has promulgated regulations under the EPAct authority requiring certificate-related final decisions from federal agencies or state agencies (acting pursuant to delegated federal authority) no later than 90 days after the commission issues its final environmental document, unless another schedule is established by federal law (18 C.F.R §157.22). 161 ) would strengthen the EPAct provisions by imposing a 12-month deadline on FERC certificate reviews for projects using FERC's pre-filing procedures and by codifying the commission's 90-day regulatory deadline for any certificate-related agency decisions. Any agency decision not meeting the 90-day deadline would be approved by default. 161 addresses continuing concern by some in the gas industry and in Congress that, despite the EPAct provisions, FERC review of gas pipeline certificate applications can still take too long, in large part because other involved agencies have not been complying with FERC's 90-day deadline for agency decisions. Perspectives
In light of their record approving new gas pipelines, FERC commissioners were neutral or modestly supportive toward legislative proposals in the 113 th Congress for stronger certificate review authorities. The optimal time for any deadline that Congress might impose on FERC is unclear. 161 would be approximately the same as the average FERC certificate review time today. However, 12 months could represent a reduction in the review time that might be expected for atypically lengthy or complex pipeline projects, perhaps routed through heavily populated or environmentally sensitive areas. If the 12-month deadline under H.R. 161 were imposed upon FERC, it raises the possibility that the commission might deny certificate applications for some projects solely on the grounds that it lacks sufficient time for an adequate (and legally defensible) review, especially in the case of NEPA compliance. The ability of FERC and any other federal or state agencies it works with to expedite their parts of certificate review may be limited by available resources. The Energy Policy Act of 2003 ( H.R. | Growth in U.S. shale gas production involves the expansion of natural gas pipeline infrastructure to transport natural gas from producing regions to consuming markets, typically in other states. Over 300,000 miles of interstate transmission pipeline already transport natural gas across the United States. However, if the growth in U.S. shale gas continues, the requirement for new pipelines could be substantial. This ongoing expansion has increased congressional interest in the role of the federal government in the certification (permitting) of interstate natural gas pipelines.
Under Section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is authorized to issue certificates of "public convenience and necessity" for "the construction or extension of any facilities ... for the transportation in interstate commerce of natural gas." Thus, companies seeking to build interstate natural gas pipelines must first obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity from FERC. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) designates FERC as the lead agency for coordinating "all applicable Federal authorizations" and for National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance in reviewing pipeline certificate applications.
There are no statutory time limits within which FERC must complete its certificate review process. However, EPAct authorizes FERC to establish a schedule for all related federal authorizations and provides for judicial petition if an agency fails to comply with that schedule. Congress included these provisions in EPAct to address concerns that some interstate gas pipeline and other energy infrastructure approvals were being unduly delayed by a lack of coordination or insufficient action among agencies involved in the certification process. FERC has promulgated regulations requiring certificate-related final decisions from other agencies no later than 90 days after the commission issues its final environmental document.
Notwithstanding the EPAct provisions, there is continuing concern by some in the gas industry and in Congress that FERC review of pipeline certificate applications can still take too long. The Natural Gas Pipeline Permitting Reform Act (H.R. 161) seeks to expedite the federal review of certificate applications by imposing deadlines on the agencies involved. H.R. 161 would impose an explicit 12-month deadline on FERC certificate reviews for projects using FERC's pre-filing procedures and would codify the commission's 90-day regulatory deadline for any certificate-related agency decisions. Any agency decision not meeting the 90-day deadline would be approved by default.
The optimal time for any deadline that Congress might impose on FERC or cooperating agencies is open to debate. The 12-month deadline in H.R. 161 would be approximately the same as the average FERC certificate review time today. However, 12 months could represent a reduction in the review time that might be expected for atypically lengthy or complex pipeline projects. In light of FERC's recent record approving new gas pipelines, FERC commissioners have been neutral or modestly supportive towards legislative proposals for stronger certificate review authorities. However, deadlines imposed on FERC or cooperating agencies could raise the possibility that they might deny permits for some projects solely on the grounds that they lack sufficient time for an adequate review. The ability of FERC and any other federal or state agencies it works with to expedite their parts of certificate review to meet an expedited schedule may be limited by available resources. |
crs_RS22361 | crs_RS22361_0 | Introduction
The Constitution states that those accused of a federal crime shall be tried in the state in which the crime occurred and by a jury selected from the district in which the crime occurred:
The Trial of all Crimes . Courts differ over whether venue can be accurately described as an element of the offense, but agree that the government need only establish venue by a preponderance of the evidence. Crimes Occurring in More Than One District
Other than when the accused seeks a change of venue, venue is only an issue when a crime occurs, or can be said to occur, in more than one district or outside of any district. Section 3237 governs venue for certain multi-district crimes. In later years, the Court concluded that the failure to file required documentation with immigration officials was not a continuous offense and must be prosecuted in the district where the document had to be filed; but that an alien crewman's unlawfully remaining in the United States was a continuous offense and consequently that venue "lies in any district where the crewman willfully remains." In such cases, is venue nevertheless proper wherever an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is committed? The government may try aiders and abettors either where they provided assistance or where the underlying offense may be prosecuted. A defendant commits a crime and may be tried where he commits any of its conduct elements, it explained. (Congress has provided that continuing offenses can be tried 'in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed,' 18 U.S.C. The court may not grant a request that is not timely. Special venue provisions governing prosecution of a few other crimes simply replicate the features of Rule 18, i.e. Section 3238 now reads as follows:
The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or is first brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought into any district, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of the last known residence of the offender or of any one of two or more joint offenders, or if no such residence is known the indictment or information may be filed in the District of Columbia. Venue Transfers
For Prejudice : While the Constitution promises the accused a trial in the district in which the offense was committed, it also promises him a trial by an impartial jury. Pre-trial publicity usually supplies the basis for a change of venue request under Rule 21(a). In a compelling case, the court may order trial to be held elsewhere within the district under Rule 18, which allows the trial court to set the place of trial, and in a rare case may grant a change of venue. The defendant bears the burden of establishing that convenience and the interests of justice compel a transfer. For Plea and Sentencing : A defendant, charged with an indictable offense in another district who wishes to plead guilty, may petition the court in that district for a transfer of venue to the district in which he is located. | The United States Constitution assures those charged with a serious federal crime that they will be prosecuted in the state and district in which the crime occurred. A crime occurs in any district in which any of its "conduct" elements are committed. Some offenses are committed entirely within a single district; there they may be tried. Other crimes have elements that have occurred in more than one district. Still other crimes have been committed overseas and so have occurred outside any district. Statutory provisions, court rules, and judicial interpretations implement the Constitution's requirements and dictate where multi-district crimes or overseas crimes may be tried.
Most litigation involves either a question of whether the government's selection of venue in a multi-district case is proper or whether the court should grant the accused's request for a change of venue. The government bears the burden of establishing venue by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant may waive trial in a proper venue either explicitly or by failing to object to prosecution in an improper venue in a timely manner.
Section 3237 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code supplies three general rules for venue in multi-district cases. Tax cases may be tried where the taxpayer resides. Mail and interstate commerce offenses may be tried in any district traversed during the course of a particular crime. And continuous or overlapping offenses may be tried in any district in which they begin, continue, or are completed. For example, conspiracy, perhaps the most common continuous offense, may be tried where the scheme is joined or where any overt act in its furtherance is committed. These general rules aside, a few crimes, like murder or immigration offenses, have individual venue provisions. In most instances, overseas crimes are tried in the district in which the accused is arrested or into which he is first brought from abroad.
An accused may request a change of venue for reasons of prejudice, convenience, plea, or sentence. Besides his venue rights, an accused is entitled to trial by an impartial jury. Inflammatory pre-trial publicity and other circumstances may hopelessly taint the pool of potential jurors. Nevertheless, before granting a change of venue, the courts will ordinarily exhaust alternative measures such as examination of potential jurors to ensure their impartiality. Beyond prejudice, a court may also grant a change of venue for the convenience of the accused, the government, the victim, or the witnesses. It rarely does. Finally, with the government's concurrence, the court may grant a defendant's request to plea or be sentenced in the district in which they are found.
"Venue" ordinarily refers to both where a crime may be tried and the district from which the trial jury must be drawn, although technically the latter is more properly referred to as vicinage. |
crs_RL31766 | crs_RL31766_0 | Introduction
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 and a permanent (4 year) Iraqi government is now running the day-to-day operations of the country. On January 30, 2005, elections were held in Iraq for a transitional National Assembly and a permanent constitution was adopted on October 15, 2005. On December 15, 2005, elections were held for a permanent (4 year) national assembly, and on May 20, 2006, Prime Minister designate Nouri al-Maliki was named and won approval of a 37-member cabinet. However, even with some relative success recently as a result of additional U.S. forces ("troop surge") to help stabilize Baghdad, coalition forces continue to combat insurgents and are attempting to improve the security situation in Iraq. Also, the current refugee crisis and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq have become another major challenge for the Iraqi government and its neighboring countries. This report provides an annotated list of U.N. agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), key U.S. government agencies, and a sample list of major international and U.S.-based aid organizations that are providing humanitarian assistance to Iraq. Internet addresses of the U.N. agencies as well as links to their websites on Iraq (if available) are provided. The Iraq pages focus on reconstruction and aid programs. This site provides weekly updates of humanitarian and reconstruction in Iraq. | Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 and a permanent (four-year) Iraqi government is now running the day-to-day operations of the country. However, coalition forces continue to combat insurgents and are attempting to improve the security situation in Iraq. According to the Department of Defense, since early 2007 overall violence is down as much as 80%, as a result of the Administration's "troop surge" strategy.
Elections were held in Iraq for a transitional National Assembly on January 30, 2005, and a permanent constitution was adopted on October 15, 2005. On December 15, 2005, elections were held for a permanent (four-year) national assembly, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was named and won approval of a 37-member cabinet on May 20, 2006. According to U.S. officials, the Iraqi government needs to increasingly focus on provision of public services, which is a growing source of public complaint, and on achieving political reconciliation among the relevant parties involved.
This report provides an annotated list of U.N. agencies, key U.S. government agencies, and a sample list of major international and U.S.-based aid organizations that are providing humanitarian assistance to Iraq. Internet links to the U.N. agencies and humanitarian aid organizations are also provided. For detailed discussion on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33936, Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis?, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32105, Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and Reconstruction, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41149 | crs_R41149_0 | On April 15, 2011, the President signed the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 ( P.L. 112-10 , H.R. 1473 ). 112-10 provided funding for the remainder of FY2011 for those agencies typically funded under 11 of the 12 regular appropriations bills, including the Interior, Environment and Related Agencies bills which has provided funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) since FY2006. Title VII of Division B under P.L. The final EPA FY2011 appropriations was $1.61 billion (16%) less than the FY2010 appropriation of $10.29 billion, and $1.34 billion (13%) less than the $10.02 billion included in the President's FY2011 budget request submitted to Congress on February 1, 2010. Beginning October 1, 2010 (the start of FY2011), EPA and other federal departments and agencies were funded under a series of seven interim CRs, generally at or below FY2010 funding levels. Early during the first session of the 112 th Congress, the House passed H.R. 1 , the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, on February 19, 2011. On March 9, 2011, the Senate did not pass the House-passed version of H.R. 1 and did not agree to a subsequent substitute amendment to the bill ( S.Amdt. 149 ) that omitted the House-passed provisions related to EPA regulatory activities. Key Funding Issues
Much of the attention on EPA's appropriations for FY2011 focused on federal financial assistance for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects, environmental cleanup, grants to assist states in implementing air pollution control requirements, and climate change research and related activities. 1 . 112-10 , more than 20 provisions that would have restricted and prohibited the use of appropriated funds to implement various regulatory activities under EPA's jurisdiction were included in House-passed H.R. Title VII of Division B in the Senate substitute amendment ( S.Amdt. Wastewater and Drinking Water Infrastructure30
Most of the overall FY2011 decrease relative to the FY2010 appropriations for EPA resulted from a reduction in EPA's State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) account for grants to aid states to capitalize their Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds (SRFs). The combined total for the Clean Water and the Drinking Water SRFs included in P.L. 112-10 for FY2011 was $2.49 billion, compared to $3.49 billion for FY2010 and the President's request of $3.29 billion. While the FY2011 enacted appropriations (and the President's FY2011 budget request) did not include funds for congressionally designated special projects, funding was included for water infrastructure grants in two geographic-specific areas that reflect Administration priorities were included for FY2011:
$9.98 million for the construction of wastewater and drinking water facilities in Alaska Native Villages, compared to $10.0 million in the FY2011 request, and $13.0 million for FY2010; and $9.98 million for wastewater infrastructure projects along the U.S./Mexico border, compared to $10.0 million in the FY2011 request, and $17.0 million for FY2010. Most of the funding within the Superfund account is allocated to the cleanup of sites that EPA has placed on the National Priorities List (NPL). H.R. Table B -1 presents FY2007-FY2011 enacted appropriations for EPA by each of the eight accounts. | Enacted April 15, 2011, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10, H.R. 1473), provided funding for the remainder of FY2011 for those agencies typically funded under 12 regular appropriations bills. Including applicable rescissions, Title VII of Division B under P.L. 112-10 provided $8.68 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA ) for FY2011. The final EPA FY2011 appropriations were $1.61 billion (16%) less than the FY2010 appropriation of $10.29 billion, and $1.34 billion (13%) less than the $10.02 billion included in the President's FY2011 budget request.
The overall decrease for EPA for FY2011, including rescissions, compared to the FY2010 enacted appropriations and FY2011 President's request was reflected in reductions across the eight EPA regular appropriations accounts. Most of the overall FY2011 decrease resulted from a reduction in EPA's State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) account for grants to aid states to capitalize their Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds (SRFs). The FY2011 combined total for the Clean Water and the Drinking Water SRFs was $2.49 billion, compared to $3.49 billion for FY2010 and the President's FY2011 budget request of $3.29 billion.
None of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2011, including the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies bill that funds EPA, were enacted before the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2010. Initially, a series of temporary continuing resolutions (CRs) was enacted that sequentially extended funding from October 1, 2010, through April 15, 2011 (the last of the FY2011 interim CRs was P.L. 112-8, enacted April 9, 2011). Also during the 112th Congress, Title VII of Division B in H.R. 1, a full-year continuing resolution passed by the House on February 19, 2011, included specified funding levels for certain EPA accounts below the FY2011 requested and FY2010 enacted levels. House-passed H.R. 1 contained more than 20 provisions that would have restricted and prohibited the use of appropriated funds to implement various regulatory activities under EPA's jurisdiction. On March 9, 2011, the Senate did not pass the House version of H.R. 1 and did not agree to a subsequent Senate substitute amendment (S.Amdt. 149) containing different funding levels and omitting the EPA provisions included in the House-passed H.R. 1.
In addition to the Clean Water and the Drinking Water SRFs, other prominent issues that received attention within the context of the EPA FY2011 appropriations debate included the level of funding for greenhouse gas emission regulations, climate change research and related activities, cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the Superfund program, cleanup of less hazardous sites referred to as brownfields, and grants to assist states in implementing certain air pollution control requirements. Funding for the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative established in the FY2010 appropriations, and funding for the protection and restoration of the Chesapeake Bay and other geographic-specific water programs, also received attention. |
crs_RL34394 | crs_RL34394_0 | Introduction
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, or CTBT, would ban all nuclear explosions. It was opened for signature in September 1996; as of February 2008, 178 nations had signed it and 144 of them had ratified. The treaty might be an issue in the presidential campaign. It is organized around three aspects of how the treaty might affect U.S. security that were prominent in the 1999 debate: the CTBT and deterrence; monitoring and verification; and implications for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. At issue, though, is what is needed for deterrence. Can existing weapons be maintained without testing? Can the United States Maintain Existing Warheads Without Testing? Does Deterrence Require New Warheads That Must Be Tested? CTBT opponents see deterrence as dynamic, so that it continues to require new military capabilities that can only be embodied in new weapons that could only be developed with nuclear testing. U.S. conventional forces, the treaty's supporters claim, deter threats from other nations. Since 1999, scientists have made many advances in detection capability that have been widely published. Seismic monitoring entails other arguments. Supporters assert that the treaty would make evasion harder. But clandestine testing offers advantages: an open weapons development program could spur rivals to launch their own program, so a nation wanting to develop nuclear weapons might prefer to keep its intent unknown; a nation that withdrew from the treaty would lose access to IMS data, which could help it evade detection; a nation that withdrew from the treaty to conduct nuclear tests might face the same penalties as one that conducted clandestine tests and was caught cheating; and a nation might prefer to stay in good standing with the international community for as long as possible in order to delay any sanctions. Opponents argue that the treaty would weaken deterrence and that nonproliferation and disarmament are not linked. In this view, the extent of proliferation is about what it would be had the United States ratified the CTBT; this nation has made progress on nuclear nonproliferation despite not having ratified the treaty; the weapons labs have supported 12 annual assessments that nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable despite the lack of testing; and the strategic balance favors this nation whether or not Russia or China has tested clandestinely. The Treaty's Technical Contributions to Nonproliferation
CTBT supporters hold that the treaty would make specific technical contributions to nuclear nonproliferation. To maintain credibility, opponents believe, the U.S. nuclear deterrent must respond to changing conditions. As a result, it is argued, steps toward disarmament are essential for nonproliferation. CTBT opponents, however, see no logical linkage between nonproliferation and disarmament. They note that the United States has taken a great many steps to counter proliferation, many since 1999. Opponents note that even if the United States were to ratify the CTBT, it would still not enter into force, so they see the attempt to gain Senate advice and consent as an exercise in futility, especially given that the Senate rejected the treaty in 1999 by a vote of 48 for, 51 against, and one present—far short of a two-thirds majority. Some supporters hold that U.S. ratification would help secure international cooperation with the United States by symbolizing a U.S. turn toward multilateralism. Appendix A. The resolutions of ratification were also subject to a second declaration:
mindful of the commitment of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and of the commitment which shall be legally binding on the Parties upon ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests [the TTBT] to `continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests,' the United States shares a special responsibility with the Soviet Union to continue the bilateral Nuclear Testing Talks to achieve further limitations on nuclear testing, including the achievement of a verifiable comprehensive test ban. | The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would ban all nuclear explosions. It was opened for signature in 1996. As of March 2008, 178 nations had signed it and 144 had ratified. To enter into force, 44 specified nations must ratify it; 35 have done so. The Senate rejected the treaty in 1999; the Bush Administration opposes it. The United States has observed a nuclear test moratorium since 1992.
There have been many calls worldwide for the United States and others to ratify the treaty. Many claim that it would promote nuclear nonproliferation; some see it as a step toward nuclear disarmament. Several measures have been introduced in Congress regarding the treaty; it might become an issue in the presidential election.
The U.S. debate involves arguments on many issues. To reach a judgment on the treaty, should it come up for a ratification vote in the future, Senators may wish to balance answers to several questions in a net assessment of risks and benefits.
Can the United States maintain deterrence without testing? The treaty's supporters hold that U.S. programs can maintain existing, tested weapons without further testing, pointing to 12 annual assessments that these weapons remain safe and reliable, and claim that these weapons meet any deterrent needs. Opponents maintain that there can be no confidence in existing warheads because many minor modifications will change them from tested versions, so testing is needed to restore and maintain confidence. They see deterrence as dynamic, requiring new weapons to counter new threats, and assert that these weapons must be tested.
Are monitoring and verification capability sufficient? "Monitoring" refers to technical capability; "verification" to its adequacy to maintain security. Supporters hold that advances in monitoring make it hard for an evader to conduct undetected tests. They claim that any such tests would be too small to affect the strategic balance. Opponents see many opportunities for evasion, and believe that clandestine tests by others could put the United States at a serious disadvantage.
How might the treaty affect nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament? Supporters claim that the treaty makes technical contributions to nonproliferation, such as limiting weapons programs; some supporters believe that nonproliferation requires progress toward nuclear disarmament, with the treaty a key step. Opponents believe that a strong nuclear deterrent is essential for nonproliferation, that nonproliferation and disarmament are unrelated, and that this nation has taken many nonproliferation and disarmament actions that the international community ignores.
This report presents a detailed, comprehensive discussion of the treaty's pros and cons from a U.S. perspective. It contains an appendix outlining relevant history. It will be updated periodically with views from protagonists. CRS Report RL33548, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments, by Jonathan Medalia, tracks current developments. |
crs_R42760 | crs_R42760_0 | Introduction
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are stockholder-owned, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), which purchase existing mortgages, guarantee investors that the mortgages will be paid on time, pool the mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), and either keep the MBSs as an investment or sell the MBSs to investors. Congressional charters give the GSEs a special relationship with the federal government, and it is widely believed that the federal government implicitly guarantees their $1.2 trillion in bonds and $3.7 trillion in MBSs. The charters give these GSEs special public policy goals aimed at providing liquidity in the mortgage market and promoting homeownership for underserved groups and locations. In 2008, the GSEs' financial condition had weakened and there were concerns over their ability to meet obligations. On September 7, 2008, the federal government took control of these GSEs from their stockholders and management in a process known as conservatorship. Congressional interest in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has increased in recent years, primarily because the federal government's continuing conservatorship of these GSEs has raised doubts about their future and concerns about the potential cost of supporting them. Since the second quarter of 2012, neither GSE has required Treasury's support. How Do the GSEs Pay Dividends to Treasury? The GSEs are also subject to credit risk . Estimates of the total cost to the federal government of supporting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac use different baselines and vary widely. FHFA has estimated that, by the end of 2015, Treasury is likely to have purchased between $191 billion and $209 billion of senior preferred stock, and the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will pay Treasury $30 billion in dividends between FY2013 and FY2017 and $44 billion between FY2013 and FY2022. The GSEs will guarantee payment of the MBSs. The eventual value of the bonds would depend on the cause of the receivership and the details of the liquidation process. The federal government's financial support extended to the GSEs could, however, make a return to the prior status problematic. As a result of the warrants issued to the Treasury, they could own only 20% of the enterprises. Paying the federal government all profits earned in a quarter might prevent the GSEs from accumulating funds to redeem the senior preferred stock. What Had Congress Done Previously to Improve the Financial Condition of the GSEs? | Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are chartered by Congress as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to provide liquidity in the mortgage market and to promote homeownership for underserved groups and locations. They purchase mortgages, guarantee them, and package them in mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), which they either keep as investments or sell to institutional investors. In addition to the GSEs' guarantees, investors widely believe that MBSs are implicitly guaranteed by the federal government. In 2008, the GSEs' financial condition had weakened and there were concerns over their ability to meet their obligations on $1.2 trillion in bonds and $3.7 trillion in MBSs that they had guaranteed. In response to the financial risks, the federal government took control of these GSEs in a process known as conservatorship as a means to stabilize the mortgage credit market.
Congressional interest in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has increased in recent years, primarily because the federal government's continuing conservatorship of these GSEs. Uncertainty in the housing, mortgage, and financial markets has raised doubts about the future of the enterprises and the potential cost to the Treasury of guaranteeing the enterprises' debt. Since more than 60% of households are homeowners, a large number of citizens could be affected by the future of the GSEs. Congress exercises oversight over the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which is both regulator and conservator of the GSEs, and is considering legislation to shape the future of the GSEs.
Estimates of the eventual total cost to the federal government of supporting the GSEs use different baselines and vary widely. In 2012, FHFA estimated that, by the end of 2015, Treasury is likely to have purchased between $191 billion and $209 billion of senior preferred stock, and the Congressional Budget Office has estimated the GSEs will pay Treasury dividends amounting to $30 billion between FY2013 and FY2017 and $44 billion between FY2013 and FY2022.
Under terms of the federal government's support agreement as amended and effective on August 17, 2012, the enterprises will pay the Treasury all of their quarterly profits (if any). Under the previous agreements, the enterprises paid Treasury dividends of nearly $20 billion annually (10% of the support). Paying the federal government all profits earned in a quarter could prevent the GSEs from accumulating funds to redeem the senior preferred stock. However, it would appear that the GSEs could make quarterly redemptions.
The financial condition of the GSEs continues to improve. In the second quarter of 2013, Fannie Mae paid slightly less than $60 billion in dividends to Treasury and Freddie Mac paid slightly less than $7 billion in dividends. |
crs_RL32221 | crs_RL32221_0 | 114-113 ), which was signed into law on December 18, 2015. Introduction
The Visa Waiver Program allows nationals from certain countries, many of which are in Europe, to enter the United States as temporary visitors for business or pleasure without first obtaining a visa from a U.S. consulate abroad. Temporary visitors for business or pleasure from non-VWP countries must obtain a visa from Department of State (DOS) officers at a consular post abroad before coming to the United States. Proponents of the program say the VWP strengthens U.S. national security because it sets standards for travel documents, requires information sharing between the member countries and the United States on criminal and security concerns, and mandates reporting of lost and stolen travel documents. As of May 2016, there were 38 countries participating in the VWP. As with the prohibition against using the VWP for those who were present in certain countries, the Secretary of DHS has the authority to waive the prohibition on travel under the VWP by certain dual nationals if the Secretary of DHS determines that the waiver would be in the law enforcement or national security interests of the United States. Additionally, with some limited exceptions, aliens entering through VWP are not permitted to adjust their immigration status. VWP Qualifying Criteria
Currently, to qualify for the VWP a country must
offer reciprocal privileges to United States citizens; have had a nonimmigrant refusal rate of less than 3% for the previous year or an average of no more than 2% over the past two fiscal years with neither year going above 2.5%; certify that it has established a program to issue to its nationals machine-readable passports that are tamper-resistant and incorporate a biometric identifier (on April 1, 2016, all passports presented by aliens entering under the VWP were required to be machine-readable and contain a biometric identifier [i.e., e-passports]); certify that it is developing a program to issue tamper-resistant, machine-readable visa documents that incorporate biometric identifiers which are verifiable at the country's port of entry; no later than October 1, 2016, certify that it has in place mechanisms to validate machine-readable passports and e-passports at each port of entry; enter into an agreement with the United States to report or make available through the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) information about the theft or loss of passports no later than 24 hours after a theft or loss is reported to the VWP country; certify, to the maximum extent allowed under the laws of the country, that it is screening each foreign national who is admitted to or departs from that country, using relevant INTERPOL databases and notices, or other means designated by the Secretary of DHS (this requirement goes into effect 270 days after December 18, 2015, and only applies to countries that have an international airport); accept the repatriation of any citizen, former citizen, or national against whom a final order of removal is issued no later than three weeks after the order is issued; enter into and fully implement an agreement with the United States to share information regarding whether a national of that country traveling to the United States represents a threat to U.S. security or welfare; and be determined, by the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, not to compromise the law enforcement or security interests of the United States by its inclusion in the program. The waiver became available in October 2008, and was suspended on July 1, 2009. The system as implemented is known as the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), and became fully operational for all VWP visitors traveling to the United States by airplane or cruise ship on January 12, 2009. In addition, P.L. In FY2014, visitors entering under the VWP constituted 31% of all temporary visitors, the smallest percentage in more than 20 years. (Travelers are checked against these systems through US-VISIT when they enter the United States.) For example, all travelers entering under the VWP must present e-passports, which tend to be more difficult to alter than other types of passports. Legislation in the 114th Congress
The Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act ( H.R. 158 ) was passed by the House on December 8, 2015, and enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 ( P.L. Nonetheless, some provisions of P.L. In addition, there are several other bills that have been introduced in the 114 th Congress that would change some of the VWP requirements to try to augment the security features of the program. Furthermore, bills have also been introduced that propose broad changes to the VWP by, among other things, reinstating the nonimmigrant refusal rate waiver authority, and by allowing DHS to use overstay rates to determine program eligibility. Another legislative proposal would create a new visa waiver program for the U.S. Virgin Islands, and allow the Secretary of DHS to add Poland to the VWP. The act also prohibits people who were present in certain countries since March 1, 2011, from traveling under the VWP. Moreover, P.L. 114-113 . 114-113 prohibiting dual nationals of VWP countries and specified other countries (e.g., Iraq, Syria) from traveling under the VWP are discriminatory and ineffective. Under the bill, the Secretary of DHS could determine that a VWP country has met this requirement if the country signs and implements an agreement to
collect and share biometric information for individuals seeking to travel to the United States through the VWP; compare the collected biometric information against the information in the traveler's passport before the traveler boards a conveyance to the United States; and share the results of the comparison and any other information indicating that the traveler may pose a threat with DHS before the traveler boards a conveyance bound for the United States. H.R. 2686/Quigley, S. 1507/Mikulski)
H.R. 1401 (§3), S. 2091 (§3), H.R. For admission to the VWP, a country who receives a refusal rate waiver also has to
meet all the security requirements of the program; be determined by the Secretary of DHS to have a totality of security risk mitigation measures which provide assurances that the country's participation in the program would not compromise U.S. law enforcement and security interests, or the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws; have had a sustained reduction in visa refusal rates, and have existing conditions for the rates to continue to decline; have cooperated with the United States on counterterrorism initiatives and information sharing before the date of its designation, and be expected to continue such cooperation; and have, during the previous fiscal year, a nonimmigrant visas refusal rate of not more than 10%, or an overstay rate that did not exceed the maximum overstay rate established by the Secretaries of DHS and DOS for countries receiving waivers of the nonimmigrant refusal rate to participate in the VWP the program. | The terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 and in Belgium in March 2016, which were perpetrated mainly by French and Belgian citizens, have increased focus on the potential security risks posed by the visa waiver program (VWP). The VWP allows nationals from certain countries, many of which are in Europe, to enter the United States as temporary visitors (nonimmigrants) for business or pleasure without first obtaining a visa from a U.S. consulate abroad. Temporary visitors for business or pleasure from non-VWP countries must obtain a visa from Department of State (DOS) officers at a consular post abroad before coming to the United States.
Concerns have been raised about the ability of terrorists to enter the United States under the VWP, because those entering under the VWP undergo a biographic rather than a biometric (i.e., fingerprint) security screening, and do not need to interview with a U.S. government official before embarking to the United States. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the VWP strengthens national security because it sets standards for travel documents, requires information sharing between the member countries and the United States on criminal and security concerns, and mandates reporting of lost and stolen travel documents. In addition, VWP travelers have to present e-passports (i.e., passports with a data chip containing biometric information), which tend to be more difficult to alter than other types of passports.
Furthermore, there is interest in the VWP as a mechanism to promote tourism and commerce. The inclusion of countries in the VWP may help foster positive relations between the United States and those countries, and ease consular office workloads abroad. As of July 2016, there were 38 countries participating in the VWP.
In FY2014, more than 21 million visitors entered the United States under this program, constituting 31% of all overseas visitors. To qualify for the VWP, statute specifies that a country must offer reciprocal privileges to U.S. citizens; have had a nonimmigrant refusal rate of less than 3% for the previous year; issue their nationals machine-readable passports that incorporate biometric identifiers; certify that it is developing a program to issue tamper-resistant, machine-readable visa documents that incorporate biometric identifiers which are verifiable at the country's port of entry; report the loss and theft of passports; share specified information regarding nationals of the country who represent a threat to U.S. security; and not compromise the law enforcement or security interests of the United States by its inclusion in the program. Countries can be terminated from the VWP if an emergency occurs that threatens the United States' security or immigration interests.
All aliens entering under the VWP must present passports that contain electronic data chips (e-passports). Under DHS regulations, travelers who seek to enter the United States through the VWP are subject to the biometric requirements of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program. In addition, aliens entering under the VWP must get an approval from the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), a web-based system that checks the alien's information against relevant law enforcement and security databases, before they can board a plane to the United States. ESTA became operational for all VWP countries on January 12, 2009.
Under statute, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the authority to waive the nonimmigrant refusal rate requirement, provided certain conditions are met. The waiver became available in October 2008. In 2008, eight countries were added to the VWP who needed the nonimmigrant refusal rate waiver to be part of the program. However, the waiver authority was suspended on July 1, 2009, because DHS had not implemented an air-exit system that incorporates biometric identifiers. The waiver will not be available until such a system is implemented, and it is unknown when and if a biometric exit system will be implemented. There are countries (e.g., Israel, Poland, Romania) that have expressed interest in being a part of the VWP who would need a waiver of the nonimmigrant refusal rate.
On December 8, 2015, the House passed H.R. 158, the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act. The bill was enacted as part of the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113), which was signed into law on December 18, 2015. The act makes numerous changes to the VWP, including, with some exceptions, prohibiting those who have traveled to Syria, Iraq, and certain other countries since March 2011 from entering the United States under the VWP. In addition, under the act, dual nationals of VWP countries and Syria, Iraq, and certain other countries, with possible exceptions, are also prohibited from traveling to the United States under the VWP. Moreover, P.L. 114-113 changes the information-sharing requirements for countries to participate in the VWP program. Some of the changes to the VWP made by P.L. 114-113 have raised concerns about discrimination based on national origin or family heritage. Two bills introduced after the passage of P.L. 114-113, H.R. 4380 and S. 2449, would remove the new prohibitions on certain dual nationals traveling under the VWP.
Other legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress that would reinstate the nonimmigrant refusal rate waiver authority and make other changes to the VWP, such as allowing DHS to use overstay rates to determine program eligibility (H.R. 1401/H.R. 2686/S. 1507/S. 2091). There are also introduced bills that would change some of the program requirements to augment the security features of the program (e.g., H.R. 4122 and S. 2337). Another proposal (H.R. 2116) would create a new visa waiver program for the U.S. Virgin Islands, and allow Poland to be added to the VWP without meeting the program's requirements. |
crs_R41873 | crs_R41873_0 | Introduction
The child tax credit was created in 1997 by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( P.L. 105-34 ) to help ease the financial burden that families incur when they have children. Like other tax credits, the child tax credit reduces tax liability dollar for dollar of the value of the credit. Initially the child tax credit was a nonrefundable credit for most families. A nonrefundable tax credit can only reduce a taxpayer's income tax liability to zero, while a refundable tax credit can exceed a taxpayer's income tax liability, providing a cash payment primarily to low-income taxpayers who owe little or no income tax. This report provides an overview of the credit under current law and also provides some summary data on these benefits. Current Law
The child tax credit allows taxpayers to reduce their federal income tax liability (the income taxes owed before tax credits are applied) by up to $2,000 per qualifying child. The total amount of their refund is calculated as 15% (the refundability rate) of earnings that exceed $2,500 (the refundability threshold), up to the maximum amount of the refundable portion of the credit ($1,400 per child). The credit phases out for higher-income taxpayers. 115-97 . The legislative changes made to the child tax credit by P.L. The maximum credit a family can receive is equal to the number of qualifying children a taxpayer has, multiplied by $2,000. Maximum Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) per Child, the Refundability Threshold and Refundability Rate
For taxpayers with little or no federal income tax liability, they will be eligible for little if any of the nonrefundable portion of the child tax credit. The amount of the refundable child tax credit is generally calculated using the "earned income formula" up to the maximum ACTC amount of $1,400 per qualifying child. Under the earned income formula, a taxpayer may claim an ACTC equal to 15% of the family's earned income in excess of $2,500, up to the maximum ACTC amount (i.e., up to $1,400 multiplied by the number of qualifying children). Data on the Child Tax Credit
Estimates from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Tax Policy Center highlight several key aspects of the child tax credit:
The total dollar amount of the child tax credit has grown over time: Data from the IRS indicate that the total dollar amount of the child tax credit has increased significantly since enactment. These estimates do not include the impact of recent legislative changes made by P.L. 115-97 , which, all else being equal, will expand the total cost of this tax benefit. In 2018, the majority of the tax benefit will go to taxpayers with income between $75,000 and $500,000 : The Tax Policy Center (TPC) estimates that the majority of child tax credit dollars in 2018 will go to taxpayers with more than $75,000 of income, with nearly one-third of the benefit going to taxpayers with income between $100,000 and $200,000. In comparison, a relatively small share will go to very-low-income or very-high-income taxpayers. About half of the lowest-income taxpayers will receive the credit and no taxpayers with children and income over $1 million will receive the credit. The Tax Policy Center (TPC) estimates that taxpayers with children and income between $100,000 and $200,000 will on average receive a credit of over $3,000 in 2018. 115-97 . As previously discussed, these legislative changes are currently scheduled to be in effect from 2018 through the end of 2025. Total Child Tax Credit Dollars by Income Level
The Tax Policy Center (TPC) estimated the distribution of aggregate child tax credit by income level for 2018 under current law (i.e., including the changes made by P.L. 115-97 ). Taxpayers with income under $20,000 will receive on average a credit of less than $1,000, while the wealthiest taxpayers with children (income over $1 million) will on average receive a credit of $10. | This report provides an overview of the child tax credit under current law, including temporary changes made by the 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97).
When calculating the total amount of federal income taxes owed, eligible taxpayers can reduce their federal income tax liability by the amount of the child tax credit. Currently, eligible families that claim the child tax credit can subtract up to $2,000 per qualifying child from their federal income tax liability. The maximum amount of credit a family can receive is equal to the number of qualifying children in a family multiplied by $2,000. If a family's tax liability is less than the value of their child tax credit, they may be eligible for a refundable credit calculated using the earned income formula. Under this formula, a family is eligible for a refund equal to 15% of their earnings in excess of $2,500, up to the maximum amount of the refundable portion of the credit. The maximum amount of the refundable portion of the credit is $1,400 per qualifying child. The credit phases out for single parents with income over $200,000 and married couples with income over $400,000. Many of these parameters are scheduled to expire at the end of 2025 under P.L. 115-97.
The child tax credit was created in 1997 by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34) to help ease the financial burden that families incur when they have children. Like other tax credits, the child tax credit reduces tax liability dollar for dollar of the value of the credit. Initially the child tax credit was a nonrefundable credit for most families. A nonrefundable tax credit can only reduce a taxpayer's income tax liability to zero, while a refundable tax credit can exceed a taxpayer's income tax liability, providing a cash payment to low-income taxpayers who owe little or no income tax.
Since it was first enacted, the child tax credit has undergone significant changes. Most recently at the end of 2017, Congress expanded the credit, especially for middle- and upper-income taxpayers, by doubling the credit amount and more than tripling the income level at which the credit begins to phase out. Additional, although comparatively more modest, changes were made to the refundable portion of the credit as well, including increasing the refundable credit amount from $1,000 to $1,400 per child and lowering the refundability threshold from $3,000 to $2,500. These changes are scheduled to be in effect from 2018 through the end of 2025.
Estimates from the IRS indicate that the total dollar amount of the child tax credit has increased significantly since enactment from approximately $22 billion to $54 billion. These estimates do not include the impact of recent legislative changes made by P.L. 115-97, which will, all else being equal, expand the total cost of this tax benefit.
The Tax Policy Center (TPC) estimated the distribution of the child tax credit by income level for 2018 under current law (including the changes made by P.L. 115-97) and found that the majority of child tax credit dollars will go to taxpayers with more than $75,000 of income, with nearly one-third of the benefit going to taxpayers with income between $100,000 and $200,000. In comparison, a relatively small share will go to very-low-income or very-high-income taxpayers. TPC also estimated that the vast majority of taxpayers with children will receive the child tax credit. About half of the lowest-income taxpayers will receive the credit and no taxpayers with children and income over $1 million will receive the credit. Finally, TPC estimated that taxpayers with income between $100,000 and $200,000 will on average receive the largest credit of over $3,000. Taxpayers with children and income under $20,000 will receive on average a credit of less than $1,000, while the wealthiest taxpayers with children will receive on average a credit of $10. |
crs_96-809 | crs_96-809_0 | Public charities, social welfare organizations, religious groups, and other non-profit, tax-exempt organizations are not generally prohibited from engaging in all lobbying or public policy advocacy merely because of their federal tax-exempt status. These charitable organizations, which have the advantage of receiving contributions from private parties which are tax-deductible for the contributor under 26 U.S.C. § 170(a), are limited in the amount of lobbying in which they may engage if they wish to preserve this preferred federal tax-exempt status. The general rule for a charitable organization exempt from federal taxation under § 501(c)(3) is that such organization may not engage in lobbying activities which constitute a "substantial part" of its activities. Section 501(c)(4) Civic Organizations
Organizations which are tax exempt under section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code are generally described as "[c]ivic leagues or organizations not operated for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare ...." If a civic league or social welfare organization is tax exempt under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, there is generally no tax consequence for lobbying or advocacy activities (as long as such expenditures are in relation to their exempt function). Section 501(c)(5) Labor Organizations and 501(c)(6) Trade Associations
Labor and agricultural organizations are tax-exempt under section 501(c)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, and business trade associations and chambers of commerce are exempt from federal income taxation under section 501(c)(6). Neither labor or agricultural organizations, nor business trade associations or chambers of commerce, have any specific limitations upon their lobbying activities as a result of their tax-exempt status. This provision, which is commonly called the "Simpson Amendment," prohibits section 501(c)(4) civic leagues and social welfare organizations from engaging in any "lobbying activities," even with their own private funds, if the organization receives any federal grant, loan, or award. Under current federal provisions, no contractor or grantee of the federal government, regardless of tax status, may be reimbursed out of federal contract or grant money for their lobbying activities, or for political activities, unless authorized by Congress. These restrictions generally apply to attempts to influence any federal or state legislation through direct or "grass roots" lobbying campaigns, political campaign contributions or expenditures, but exempt any activity authorized by Congress, or when providing technical and/or factual information related to the performance of a grant or contract when in response to a documented request. In addition to these restrictions of general applicability on the use of federal contract or grant money for lobbying activities, there may be specific statutory limitations and prohibitions on particular federal moneys or on particular federal programs. That provision of law, at 18 U.S.C. Required Disclosures of Lobbying Activities
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as Amended
Organizations which engage in a particular amount of lobbying activities (which must include more than one direct lobbying contact of a covered federal official) through personnel compensated to lobby on the organization's behalf will be required to register and to file disclosure reports under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended. The Lobbying Disclosure Act also exempts from the definition of "lobbying contacts" the activities of lobbying state or local legislators or other state or local governmental bodies or units. | Public charities, religious groups, social welfare organizations and other non-profit organizations which are exempt from federal income taxation are not generally prohibited from engaging in all lobbying or public policy advocacy activities merely because of their tax-exempt status. There may, however, be some lobbying limitations on certain organizations, depending on their tax-exempt status and/or their participation as federal grantees in federal programs. Additionally, organizations (other than churches or their affiliates) which meet specified threshold expenditure requirements on lobbying activities and which engage in direct lobbying of federal officials must register employees who are paid to lobby, and must file reports on lobbying activities, under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended.
As to the different categories of tax-exemption: charitable, religious or educational organizations which are exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, who may receive contributions from private parties that are tax-deductible for the contributor, may not engage in direct or grass roots lobbying activities which constitute a "substantial part" of their activities if they wish to preserve this preferred tax-exempt status. "Civic leagues or organizations not operated for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare ....," tax exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4), on the other hand, have no tax consequence expressed in the statute for lobbying or advocacy activities. (But note restrictions on 501(c)(4)'s receiving federal grants or loans). Labor and agricultural organizations, tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code, and business trade associations and chambers of commerce, exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501(c)(6), also have no specific statutory limitations upon their lobbying activities as a result of their tax-exempt status. Private foundations are generally not allowed to lobby.
A provision of the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act, commonly called the "Simpson Amendment," prohibits section 501(c)(4) civic leagues and social welfare organizations from engaging in any "lobbying activities," even with their own private funds, if the organization receives any federal grant, loan, or award. Because of the definitions under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, however, the "Simpson Amendment" limitations do not appear to apply to any "grass roots" lobbying or advocacy, nor to lobbying of state or local officials, and the amendment also exempts certain other official communications or testimony.
Finally, federal contract or grant money may not be used for any lobbying, unless authorized by Congress. No organization, regardless of tax status, may be reimbursed out of federal contract or grant money for any lobbying activities, or for other advocacy or political activities, unless authorized by Congress. This applies to direct or "grass roots" lobbying campaigns at the state, local or federal level (but exempts providing technical and/or factual information related to the performance of a grant or contract when in response to a documented request). The provision of law at 18 U.S.C. § 1913, as amended, as well as the so-called "Byrd Amendment," would also generally prohibit the reimbursement or payment from federal grants or contracts of the costs for "lobby" activities. |
crs_R42814 | crs_R42814_0 | Although there are many factors that can affect natural gas prices in a particular market for a certain period, such as the nuclear accident in Japan, the growing differential highlights how the U.S. natural gas market has been insulated from external events and the impact of the expanding U.S. natural gas resource base. Additionally, companies are seeking further markets for natural gas and have applied for permits to export natural gas as LNG. As the price for dry gas has dropped because of the increase in supply and other reasons such as the warm winter of 2011, the natural gas industry has turned its attention to producing more wet gas in order to bolster the value they receive. Flaring: A Value Issue
As natural gas production began to increase in 2005, so did the amount of natural gas that was vented (released into the atmosphere) and flared (burned at the production site). Water is a key component of energy production, particularly for shale gas development that requires significant quantities for hydraulic fracturing. Electric power generation makes up the biggest component of U.S. natural gas consumption followed by industrial use. Some of the industrial sector is poised to return to the United States from overseas because of projected low natural gas prices, although in many cases companies are waiting to determine if low U.S. natural gas prices are sustainable. If large parts of the U.S. economy are to shift to natural gas, sufficiently low long-term prices that maintain the advantage of gas over other fuels are likely to be required. The amount of investment that would be required to undertake this change would be enormous, probably in the trillions of dollars, and new technologies and infrastructure would be needed to make the changes economical and practical, particularly in the transportation sector for natural gas vehicles. Less than 1% of U.S. natural gas was consumed in the transportation sector in 2011. Although some of this has occurred, overall natural gas production continues to trend upwards, in part because of cost-reducing efficiency gains, and in part because of contract provisions. Much of the increase in natural gas-fired generation has been from facilities that have been operating below capacity. Coal will, however, retain an important share of the electric power market. Many of these investment plans, if they ultimately come to fruition, will result in new production capacity becoming available over the next five years. Any exports would be an additional source of demand and would likely put upward pressure on prices. Some companies on both the supply and demand side of natural gas have made, or have announced plans for large investments to confirm their positions. Other companies are waiting to see how various dimensions of the debate unfold. The domestic situation may also have an effect on the rest of the world as major U.S. companies with large international portfolios, in particular, continue to buy into shale gas assets. Although oil and gas exploration and production is regulated primarily at the state level, several regulatory developments are occurring at the federal level as well. Price Levels and Volatility: Not a Certainty
The ability of U.S. industry to be positively affected by the evolving position of the United States with respect to natural gas supply depends not only on the low current price, but the expectation that prices will remain low into the future. The market must price natural gas in such a way that consumers are drawn to use more natural gas and that producers are encouraged to produce more natural gas. Industries that use natural gas as an input have seen prices fall. Still other legislation has been introduced that would promote natural gas infrastructure in some areas and other legislation has been introduced to limit the environmental effects of natural gas production. | Due to the growth in natural gas production, primarily from shale gas, the United States is benefitting from some of the lowest prices for natural gas in the world and faces the question of how to best use this resource.
Different segments of the U.S. economy have different perspectives on the role natural gas can play. Suppliers, which have become the victims of their own production success, are facing low prices that are forecast to remain low. Some companies that have traditionally produced only natural gas have even turned their attention to oil in order to improve their financial situation. Smaller companies are having a difficult time continuing operations and larger companies, including international companies, have bought into many shale gas assets. Prices have remained low even as consumption has increased, in part, because producers have raised production to meet the demand and because companies have improved efficiency and extraction techniques. Some companies, many with large production operations, have applied for permits to export natural gas. This has raised concerns from consumers of natural gas that domestic prices will rise. The debate regarding exports is ongoing.
Industries that consume natural gas have seen input costs drop, and some have heralded low natural gas prices as the impetus for a manufacturing revolution in the United States. Some companies have begun to make major investments to take advantage of the low natural gas prices, particularly in petrochemicals. Other companies are waiting to see if prices will remain low long enough to warrant major investments in new facilities. Meanwhile, the electric power sector has already seen a transition from coal-fired generation to natural gas. Low natural gas prices are also putting pressure on renewable sources of power generation. However, increases in demand will put upward pressure on natural gas prices.
The transportation sector, the one part of the economy vulnerable to foreign energy supplies, is beginning to explore ways to use more natural gas. Transportation makes up less than 1% of U.S. natural gas consumption and would require billions of dollars in investment to increase that share significantly.
All of the change that has taken place so far has occurred despite environmental concerns and regulatory developments at the state and federal level that might curtail production. Natural gas is a fossil fuel that produces various pollutants, some more than other fossil fuels and some less. Methane, the major component of natural gas, is also a potent greenhouse gas when released without burning. Other environmental concerns focus on water use and disposal in hydraulic fracturing to extract natural gas from shale formations.
Over the next five years, many of the issues being debated now may be decided. The industry and market are adapting to the newly found supplies and the concerns associated with them, as well as integrating more natural gas into the economy. There are many evolving issues some of which Congress can influence directly because of statutes and some indirectly. On the demand side, legislation has been introduced regarding exports of liquefied natural gas and alternative fuels for vehicles. There has been other legislation related to environmental regulations of natural gas. |
crs_R41470 | crs_R41470_0 | Introduction
Congress has long recognized the need to protect the legal interests of servicemembers whose service to the nation may compromise their ability to meet certain commercial and financial obligations. The purpose of the act is to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense by protecting servicemembers, enabling them to "devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation" by providing for the temporary suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect their legal rights during military service. Prior to the recent legislation expressly creating a private cause of action, most courts that have considered the issue found that a private cause of action exists under the SCRA. An opinion from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company , disagreed with decisions from U.S. district courts in Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon, and Texas, and found that a private cause of action did not exist under the act. Upon reconsideration, the court vacated its earlier opinion and held that a private cause of action did exist under various sections of the SCRA. With the enactment of P.L. The defendant argued that the section did not provide a private cause of action. On October 13, 2010, P.L. 111-275 , the Veterans' Benefits Act of 2010, was enacted. In addition to clarifying protections under the SCRA, including those related to residential and motor vehicle leases, the act explicitly creates a Title VIII addressing civil liability. Servicemembers and their dependents have the right to join an action commenced by the U.S. Attorney General, but they may also commence their own civil action (i.e., a private cause of action) to enforce protections afforded them under the SCRA. Finally, Title VIII provides that neither the U.S. Attorney General's authority or the servicemember's right of a private cause of action preclude or limit any other remedies available under the law, including consequential or punitive damages for violations of the SCRA. The U.S. Attorney General is authorized to commence a civil action in U.S. district court for violations of the SCRA by a person who (1) engages in a pattern or practice of violating the act, or (2) engages in a violation that raises an issue of significant public importance. | Congress has long recognized the need to protect the legal interests of servicemembers whose service to the nation may compromise their ability to meet specified commercial and financial obligations. The purpose of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) is to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense by protecting servicemembers, enabling them to "devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation." The SCRA protects servicemembers by temporarily suspending certain judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect their legal rights during military service.
Prior to enactment of P.L. 111-275, the SCRA did not explicitly provide for a private cause of action. A private cause of action allows an individual, in a personal capacity, to sue in order to enforce a right or to correct a wrong. In the absence of an explicit right of a private cause of action, the right to enforce afforded rights presumably rests with the government. Most courts that have considered the issue found that a private cause of action exists under the SCRA. An opinion from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company, disagreed with decisions from U.S. district courts in Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon, and Texas, and found that a private cause of action did not exist under the act. However, upon reconsideration the court vacated its earlier opinion and held that a private cause of action did exist under various sections of the SCRA.
On October 13, 2010, P.L. 111-275, the Veterans' Benefits Act of 2010, was enacted. In addition to clarifying protections under the SCRA, including those related to residential and motor vehicle leases, the act explicitly creates a Title VIII addressing civil liability. Under Title VIII of the SCRA, the U.S. Attorney General is authorized to commence a civil action against any person who engages in a pattern or practice of violating the act or engages in a violation of the act that raises an issue of significant public importance. Servicemembers and their dependents have the right to join a case commenced by the U.S. Attorney General, but they may also commence their own civil action (i.e., a private cause of action) to enforce protections afforded them under the SCRA. Finally, Title VIII provides that neither the U.S. Attorney General's authority or the servicemember's right of a private cause of action preclude or limit any other remedies available under the law, including consequential or punitive damages for violations of the SCRA. |
crs_RL32595 | crs_RL32595_0 | Threats
It would be difficult for terrorists to attack a U.S. city using a nuclear weapon, but such anattack is plausible and would have catastrophic consequences. (8)
Terrorists or rogue states might acquire nuclear weapons or fissile materials in various ways. (9) It has much fissile material. (11)
A related concern is that Pakistan might be the source of nuclear weapons or materials forterrorists under several scenarios: (1) Islamists in the armed services might provide such assistancecovertly under the current government; (2) if that government were overthrown by fundamentalists,the new government might make weapons available to terrorists; or (3) such weapons might becomeavailable if chaos, rather than a government, followed the overthrow. Securing the Bomb states, "More than 130 research reactors still use HEU as their fuel, in more than 40 countries. Weapon Delivery
The United States has many thousands of miles of land and water borders, as well as severalhundred sea, land, and air ports of entry -- 317 by one count -- giving terrorists many pathways tosmuggle a nuclear bomb into this nation. See also CRS Report RS21729 , U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts, by Marilyn Nelson and [author name scrubbed]. The concern is that if terroristscould place a bomb in a container overseas, they could ship it into the United States and transportit anywhere in the country. The response is often termed "layered defense," reflecting theidea that terrorists would have to proceed through many steps to acquire a nuclear weapon andsmuggle it into the United States, and that attempting to thwart them at each step has a higherlikelihood of success than trying to block one step only. Threat Reduction Programs in the Former SovietUnion. (37)
Efforts To Secure HEU Worldwide. As noted above, much is said to be poorly guarded. (40) On May 26, 2004, responding to such concerns, Secretary ofEnergy Spencer Abraham announced a new Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secureRussian-origin fresh HEU by the end of 2005; to secure spent fuel of Russian/Soviet origin by 2010,and of U.S. origin within a decade; to convert the cores of civilian research reactors using HEU tobe able to use uranium with a concentration of uranium-235 too low to be used in a nuclear weapon,and to try to identify and secure other nuclear and radiological materials that may pose a threat. (43)
Control of Former Soviet and Other Borders. (44)
Container Security Initiative. (50)
U.S. Border Security. Supporting Capabilities. Technology,intelligence, and forensics cut across and support the foregoing steps to keep terrorists or rogue statesfrom acquiring and delivering a nuclear weapon. Technology Development. Improving and organizing intelligence for homeland security have been sharplydebated. (62) In theevent of a terrorist nuclear attack, forensics might be able to identify the nation that originated thefissile material or weapon, and determine whether terrorists had fabricated the weapon on their ownor obtained it from a nation's stockpile. (67)
Role of Congress
Congress funds programs to counter nuclear terrorism through several authorization andappropriations bills. Other bills introduced in the 109th Congress that bear on nuclear terrorism include thefollowing. | It would be difficult for terrorists to mount a nuclear attack on a U.S. city, but such an attackis plausible and would have catastrophic consequences, in one scenario killing over a half-millionpeople and causing damage of over $1 trillion.
Terrorists or rogue states might acquire a nuclear weapon in several ways. The nations ofgreatest concern as potential sources of weapons or fissile materials are widely thought to be Russiaand Pakistan. Russia has many tactical nuclear weapons, which tend to be lower in yield but moredispersed and apparently less secure than strategic weapons. It also has much highly enricheduranium (HEU) and weapons-grade plutonium, some said to have inadequate security. Many expertsbelieve that technically sophisticated terrorists could, without state support, fabricate a nuclear bombfrom HEU; opinion is divided on whether terrorists could make a bomb using plutonium. The fearregarding Pakistan is that some members of the armed forces might covertly give a weapon toterrorists or that, if President Musharraf were overthrown, an Islamic fundamentalist government ora state of chaos in Pakistan might enable terrorists to obtain a weapon. Terrorists might also obtainHEU from the more than 130 research reactors worldwide that use HEU as fuel.
If terrorists acquired a nuclear weapon, they could try many means to bring it into the UnitedStates. This nation has thousands of miles of land and sea borders, as well as several hundred portsof entry. Terrorists might smuggle a weapon across lightly-guarded stretches of borders, ship it inusing a cargo container, place it in a crude oil tanker, or bring it in using a truck, a boat, or a smallairplane.
The architecture of the U.S. response is termed "layered defense." The goal is to try to blockterrorists at various stages in their attempts to obtain a nuclear weapon and smuggle it into the UnitedStates. The underlying concept is that the probability of success is higher if many layers are usedrather than just one or two. Layers include threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union,efforts to secure HEU worldwide, control of former Soviet and other borders, the Container SecurityInitiative and Proliferation Security Initiative, and U.S. border security. Several approaches underliemultiple layers, such as technology, intelligence, and forensics.
Many policy options have been proposed to deal with nuclear terrorism, such as developingnew detection technologies, strengthening U.S. intelligence capability, and improving planning torespond to an attack. Congress funds programs to counter nuclear terrorism and holds hearings andless-formal briefings on the topic. Several bills have been introduced in the 109th Congress relatedto nuclear terrorism.
This report is intended for background, not for tracking current developments. It will beupdated occasionally. It does not cover radiological terrorism; see CRS Report RS21766 , Radiological Dispersal Devices: Select Issues in Consequence Management, and CRS Report RS21528 , Terrorist 'Dirty Bombs': A Brief Primer. |
crs_RL32268 | crs_RL32268_0 | Open Source Software Licenses
It is important to note that the term "open source" implies more than merely distribution of source code along with the object code. For example, the license might require that anyone whoredistributes the software also make the source code of that software publicly available. The relationship between innovation and intellectual property rights remainspoorly understood. As with patents and trade secrets, copyrights may be sold or licensed to others. (62)
Potential Conflicts Between Open Source Software and Intellectual Property
Conflicts potentially arise between open source standards and intellectual property rights. (63) Some observers have expressed concerns that if open source software is incorporated into anotherwise proprietary program, then the terms of the open source license will apply to the entireprogram and defeat intellectual property rights that would otherwise exist. It is also possible that aparty not bound by the terms of an open source license may raise claims of intellectual propertyinfringement based upon the use of software that others believe to be open source. Representatives of proprietary software firms have expressed concerns that "open source is an intellectual-propertydestroyer," (74) and have reportedly referred to opensource software as a "cancer" and"un-American." (75) Others believe that, in orderfor open source software to remain open to thepublic, all programs derived from an open source original should be treated as open source as well. SCO is the current owner of the source code, as well as certainintellectual property rights, associated with a computer program known as UNIX. Validity of Open Source Licenses
No court has yet ruled on the enforceability of open source software licenses. (96) Some observershave suggested that these agreements may be invalid, however. (116)
More far-reaching legal reforms are also possible. The possibility of intellectualproperty rights, and their attendant license fees and royalties, may provide a significant incentive forfirms to innovate and to distribute software. On the other hand, some computer users believe thatthese incentives are unnecessary, and further hope to maintain a non-proprietary environment ofsoftware distribution and development. Striking a balance betweenpromoting innovation, on one hand, and accommodating the demands of software developers andusers, on the other, forms an important component of contemporary software policy. | The term "open source" refers to a computer program that is distributed along with a license, or contract, that requires users of the program to comply with specified conditions. Among thesestipulations are that the source code be distributed along with the software, and that others beallowed to modify the source code as they desire. In contrast, the source code of "closed source"software is proprietary, not publicly distributed and subject to alteration only by the softwaremanufacturer.
Some concerns have arisen concerning the relationship between open source software and intellectual property rights, including copyrights, patents and trade secrets. Although a particularcomputer program may be designated as open source, it remains possible that an owner ofintellectual property may enforce its rights against open source software developers and users. Somecommentators have also expressed concern that open source licenses may overreach, convertingproprietary programs into open source software even if only a portion of that program was derivedfrom an open source original. Others have suggested that open source licenses may not be legallyenforceable, which would allow users to obtain and assert intellectual property rights pertaining tosoftware that was initially distributed as open source.
Striking a balance between promoting innovation, on one hand, and accommodating the demands of software developers and users, on the other, forms an important component ofcontemporary software policy. The possibility of intellectual property rights, and their attendantlicense fees and royalties, may provide a significant incentive for firms to innovate and to distributesoftware. However, some proponents of open source software believe that these incentives areunnecessary, and further hope to maintain a non-proprietary environment of software distributionand development.
Should Congress have an interest in this area, several options present themselves. No action need be taken if the current relationship between open source software and intellectual property isdeemed satisfactory, particularly as software publishers become increasingly aware of intellectualproperty and as judicial precedents may make the legal situation clearer. Congress might also assistindividuals in identifying intellectual property that pertains to software that has been identified asopen source; speak to the enforceability of open source licenses; and, as a possible more far-reachinglegal reform, allow proprietary software publishers a grace period for removing portions of programcode that derived from an open source original. |
crs_R42561 | crs_R42561_0 | Introduction
The American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC) provides financial assistance to taxpayers whose children (or who themselves) are pursuing post-secondary education. This report is organized to first provide an overview of the AOTC, followed by a legislative history that highlights the evolution of education tax credits from proposals in the 1960s through the recent permanent extension of the AOTC at the end of 2015. This report then analyzes the credit by looking at who claims the credit, the effect education tax credits have on increasing attendance at higher education institutions, and administrative issues with the AOTC. Specifically, the AOTC begins to phase out when income exceeds $80,000 ($160,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly) and is completely phased out when income exceeds $90,000 ($180,000 for married taxpayers filing jointly). The AOTC is a refundable credit, meaning taxpayers with little to no tax liability may still be able to benefit from this tax provision. On a per capita basis, the value of the AOTC, as enacted ($2,500) as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. (The AOTC replaced the Hope Credit, but does not affect the Lifetime Learning Credit.) The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act (Division Q of P.L. 114-113 ), made the AOTC permanent, effectively eliminating the Hope Credit. In addition, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) has identified administrative issues with the AOTC and its predecessor, the Hope Credit. When education tax credits were first enacted in 1997, they were expressly intended to provide financial assistance to middle-income taxpayers. Specifically, in 2015, approximately 46.6% of AOTC dollars were claimed by taxpayers with income between $30,000 and $100,000. Notably, these gains were accompanied by the reduction in the share of AOTC dollars (in comparison to the Hope Credit) that went to taxpayers with income between $20,000 and $100,000. One of the primary goals of the AOTC is to increase attendance at post-secondary educational institutions. Because of the limited amount of data available concerning the AOTC, research instead focused more broadly on education tax incentives that lower tuition costs and that have been in effect for several years—namely the Hope Credit, the Lifetime Learning Credit, and the above-the-line tuition and fees deduction (see Appendix A for more information on these tax benefits). More recent research has found that while tax-based aid did have an impact on college attendance, a significant proportion of recipients—93%—would have attended college in the absence of these benefits. Complexity of Benefit: There are a variety of tax benefits that students or their families can claim when they file their taxes, including the AOTC, the Lifetime Learning Credit, and the tuition and fees deduction. While there are a variety of factors that may limit the ability of the AOTC to increase college attendance, research indicates that other forms of student aid including Pell Grants may have a similar impact as the AOTC on college attendance. Policy Options
Congress may also want to consider modifying the AOTC, or consolidating the AOTC with other education tax benefits. Policymakers may choose to either expand or limit certain parameters of the credit, for example, by using a different credit formula, changing the amount of qualifying expenses that can be used to claim the credit, adjusting the portion of the credit (currently 40%) that is refundable, modifying the income level at which the credit phases out, allowing taxpayers to claim the credit for either more or less than four years of post-secondary education, changing the definition of qualifying expenses (for example to include room and board), and providing nondegree-seeking students (such as students in job-training programs) eligibility for the credit. Alternative Policies to Reduce the Cost of Higher Education
The AOTC is one of a variety of policies designed to lower the cost of education to students and their families and hence increase accessibility to higher education. | The American Opportunity Tax Credit (AOTC)—originally enacted on a temporary basis by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) and made permanent by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act (PATH; Division Q of P.L. 114-113)—is a partially refundable tax credit that provides financial assistance to taxpayers (or their children) who are pursuing a higher education. The credit, worth up to $2,500 per student, can be claimed for a student's qualifying expenses incurred during the first four years of post-secondary education. In addition, 40% of the credit (up to $1,000) can be received as a refund by taxpayers with little or no tax liability. The credit phases out for taxpayers with income between $80,000 and $90,000 ($160,000 and $180,000 for married couples filing jointly) and thus is unavailable to taxpayers with income above $90,000 ($180,000 for married couples filing jointly). There are a variety of other eligibility requirements associated with the AOTC, including the type of degree the student is pursuing, the number of courses the student is taking, and the type of expenses which qualify.
Before enactment of the AOTC, there were two permanent education tax credits, the Hope Credit and the Lifetime Learning Credit. The AOTC replaced the Hope Credit (the Lifetime Learning Credit remains unchanged). A comparison of these two credits indicates that the AOTC is both larger—on a per capita and aggregate basis—and more widely available in comparison to the Hope Credit. Data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicate that enactment of the AOTC contributed to an increase in both the aggregate value of education credits claimed by taxpayers and the number of taxpayers claiming these credits.
Education tax credits were intended to provide federal financial assistance to students from middle-income families, who may not benefit from other forms of traditional student aid, like Pell Grants. The enactment of the AOTC reflected a desire to continue to provide substantial financial assistance to students from middle-income families, while also expanding the credit to certain lower- and upper-income students. A distributional analysis of the AOTC highlights that this benefit is targeted to the middle class, with approximately half (46.6%) of the estimated $17 billion of AOTCs in 2015 going to taxpayers with income between $30,000 and $100,000.
One of the primary goals of education tax credits, including the AOTC, is to increase attendance at higher education institutions (for brevity, referred to as "college attendance"). Studies analyzing the impact education tax incentives have had on college attendance are mixed. Recent research that has focused broadly on education tax incentives that lower tuition costs and have been in effect for several years, including the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits, found that while these credits did increase attendance by approximately 7%, 93% of credit recipients would have attended college in their absence. Even though the AOTC differs from the Hope Credit in key ways, there are a variety of factors that suggest this provision may also have a limited impact on increasing college attendance. In addition, a recent report from the Treasury Department's Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) identified several compliance issues with the AOTC.
There are a variety of policy options Congress may consider regarding the AOTC. (The credit was not modified or changed in the recent tax law enacted at the end of 2017, P.L. 115-97.) Alternatively, Congress may want to examine alternative ways to reduce the cost of higher education. This report discusses these issues and concludes with an overview of selected proposals to modify the AOTC. |
crs_R44781 | crs_R44781_0 | With the 1913 ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for popular election of the Senate, the states acquired the option of filling Senate vacancies either by election or by temporary gubernatorial appointment:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. Aside from the death or resignation of individual Senators, vacancies may also occur when a newly elected administration is inaugurated. In 2008-2009, for instance, four vacancies were created following the presidential election: two in connection with the election of Senators Barack H. Obama and Joseph R. Biden as President and Vice President, and two more when Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton was nominated to be Secretary of State and Senator Kenneth L. Salazar of Colorado was nominated to be Secretary of the Interior. On January 20, 2017, the President nominated Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions for the office of Attorney General of the United States. Senator Sessions was confirmed by the Senate on February 8, 2017; he resigned from the Senate the same day and was sworn in the following day, February 9. Senator Jones will serve for the balance of the term, which expires on January 3, 2021. Minnesota
On December 6, 2017, Minnesota Senator Al Franken announced his intention to resign from the Senate. In accordance with Minnesota law, Governor Mark Dayton announced on December 12 that he would appoint Lieutenant Governor Tina Smith to fill the vacancy until a special election could be held. Senator Franken resigned on January 2, 2018, and Senator Smith was sworn in the next day, January 3. On March 21, Governor Phil Bryant announced his appointment of Mississippi Agriculture Secretary Cindy Hyde-Smith to fill the vacancy until a special election. Senator Hyde-Smith, who was sworn in on April 9, 2018, brings the number of women Senators to a historical record of 23. Special elections for Mississippi Senate seats have certain distinctive characteristics: they are nonpartisan; there is no primary—all qualified candidates contest the special general election; and, a majority of votes is required to win. If no candidate wins a majority, the two who gained the most votes would contest a runoff election held three weeks later, on November 27. The most widespread practice is for governors to appoint temporary Senators who hold the seat until the next statewide general election, at which time a special election is held to fill the seat for the balance of the term. The National Conference of State Legislatures identifies two variations within this larger category:
36 states that provide for gubernatorial appointments to fill Senate vacancies, with the appointed Senator serving the balance of the term or until the next statewide general election; and 9 states that provide for gubernatorial appointments, but also require a special election on an accelerated schedule, often within a relatively short period after the vacancy occurs. Filling Vacancies by Appointment through the Next General Election
The 36 states listed below authorize their governors to fill Senate vacancies by appointment, with the temporary Senator serving the balance of the term or until a special election is held concurrently with the next statewide general election. This provision is intended to reduce the length of time an appointed Senator holds office before being replaced by an elected successor. Alabama authorizes the governor to fill a Senate vacancy by appointment. Mississippi authorizes the governor to fill a Senate vacancy by appointment until a special election has been held; if less than one year remains on the prior incumbent's term, the appointee serves the balance of the term. At the time of this writing, April 9, 2018, the Senate's records currently identify 198 appointments to the office of U.S. Proposals to Require that Senate Vacancies Be Filled by Election Only—2009-2011
Following controversies that arose in connection with appointments to fill Senate vacancies in 2008 and 2009, particularly with respect to the Illinois Senate vacancy created by the election of Senator Barack H. Obama as President, proposals to eliminate or curtail gubernatorial power to fill Senate vacancies by appointment were introduced in the 111 th Congress and in a number of state legislatures. 899 would have provided that
when the President of the U.S. Senate issued a certification that a vacancy existed in the Senate, a special election to fill the vacancy would be held not later than 90 days after the certification was issued; the election would be conducted in accordance with existing state laws; and a special election would not be held if the vacancy were certified within 90 days of the regularly scheduled election for the Senate seat in question, or during the period between the regularly scheduled election and the first day of the first session of the next Congress. In addition, as noted earlier in this report, North Carolina in 2013, and Maryland in 2016, enacted legislation that required appointments to fill Senate vacancies be from the same political party as the previous incumbent. | United States Senators serve a term of six years. Vacancies occur when an incumbent Senator leaves office prematurely for any reason; they may be caused by death or resignation of the incumbent, by expulsion or declination (refusal to serve), or by refusal of the Senate to seat a Senator-elect or -designate.
Aside from the death or resignation of individual Senators, Senate vacancies often occur in connection with a change in presidential administrations, if an incumbent Senator is elected to executive office, or if a newly elected or reelected President nominates an incumbent Senator or Senators to serve in some executive branch position. The election of 2008 was noteworthy in that it led to four Senate vacancies as two Senators, Barack H. Obama of Illinois and Joseph R. Biden of Delaware, were elected President and Vice President, and two additional Senators, Hillary R. Clinton of New York and Ken Salazar of Colorado, were nominated for the positions of Secretaries of State and the Interior, respectively. Following the election of 2016, one vacancy was created by the nomination of Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions as Attorney General. Since that time, one additional vacancy has occurred and one has been announced, for a total of three since February 8, 2017.
As noted above, Senator Jeff Sessions resigned from the Senate on February 8, 2017, to take office as Attorney General of the United States. The governor of Alabama appointed Luther Strange III to fill the vacancy until a successor was elected. Doug Jones was elected at the December 12, 2017, special election; he was sworn in on January 3, 2018, and will serve through the balance of the term, which expires in 2021.
Senator Al Franken of Minnesota resigned from the Senate on January 2, 2018. On December 12, 2017, Minnesota Lieutenant Governor Tina Smith was appointed by Governor Mark Dayton to fill the vacancy. Senator Smith was sworn in on January 3, 2018. She will serve until a special election is held on November 6, 2018, to fill the seat for the balance of the term, which expires in 2021.
Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi resigned from the Senate on April 1, 2018. Governor Phil Bryant appointed Cindy Hyde-Smith to fill the vacancy. Senator Hyde-Smith was sworn in on April 9, 2018. She will serve until a nonpartisan special election contested by all qualified candidates is held on November 6. A majority of votes is required to elect. If no candidate wins a majority, the two who gained the most votes will contest a November 27 runoff. The winning candidate will serve for the balance of the term, which expires in 2021. Senator Hyde-Smith brings the number of women Senators to a record total of 23.
The use of temporary appointments to fill Senate vacancies is an original provision of the U.S. Constitution, found in Article I, Section 3, clause 2. The current constitutional authority for temporary appointments to fill Senate vacancies derives from the Seventeenth Amendment, which provides for direct popular election of Senators, replacing election by state legislatures. It specifically directs state governors to "issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, that the legislature of any state may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointment until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct." Since ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, the Senate records currently identify 198 appointments to fill vacancies in the office of U.S. Senator.
During the period since ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, most states have authorized their governors to fill Senate vacancies by temporary appointments. At present, in 35 states, these appointees serve until the next general election, when a permanent successor is elected to serve the balance of the term, or until the end of the term, whichever comes first. Ten states authorize gubernatorial appointment, but require an ad hoc special election to be called to fill the vacancy, which is usually conducted on an accelerated schedule, to minimize the length of time the seat is vacant. The remaining five states do not authorize their governors to fill a Senate vacancy by appointment. In these states, the vacancy must be filled by a special election, here again, usually conducted on an accelerated schedule. In one notable detail concerning the appointment process, six states require their governors to fill Senate vacancies with an appointee who is of the same political party as the prior incumbent.
Following the emergence of controversies in connection with the Senate vacancy created by the resignation of Senator Barack Obama in 2008, several states eliminated or restricted their governors' authority to fill Senate vacancies by appointment, while both legislation and a constitutional amendment that would have required all Senate vacancies to be filled by special election were introduced in the 111th Congress. None of these measures reached the floor of either chamber, however, and no comparable measures have been introduced since that time. |
crs_RL32313 | crs_RL32313_0 | Most Recent Developments
On December 8, 2004, the President signed P.L. 108-447 , a consolidated appropriations actfor FY2005. The act includes a provision amending charter school-related language included in theDistrict of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2005, P.L. 108-335 , which was signed by thePresident on October 18, 2004. 108-335 includes $560 million in special federalpayments and approves the District's $6.3 billion operating budget for FY2005. On October 6, 2004,by unanimous consent the Senate approved the conference committee version of H.R. 108-335
Budget Request
FY2005: The President's Budget Request
On February 2, 2004, the Bush Administration released its FY2005 budgetrecommendations. The Administration's proposed budget includes $560.4 millionin federal payments to the District of Columbia. (1) A majorportion of the President's proposed federal payments and assistance to the Districtinvolves the courts and criminal justice system. These three functions (court operations,defender services, and offender supervision) represent $457.1 million, or 81.6%, ofthe President's proposed $560.4 million in federal payments to the District ofColumbia (see Table 2 ). FY2005: District's Budget Request
On May 14, 2004, the District's city council unanimously approved the city's$8.2 billion budget for FY2005, (2) and forwarded it to the President for review,approval, and transmittal to the Congress. (3) The proposed budget includes a request for $1.03billion in special federal payments. The District has also requested $102million in special federal payments to support emergency preparedness activities,including $80 million for bioterrorism preparedness, $15 million for emergencyplanning and security, and $7 million for the unified communication center forregional emergencies. On July 7, 2004, the House AppropriationsSubcommittee on the District of Columbia conducted a markup of the District ofColumbia Appropriations Act for FY2005 and forwarded the bill to the fullAppropriations Committee for its consideration. On July 14, 2004, the HouseAppropriations Committee ordered reported the unnumbered draft bill, whichincluded $560 million in special federal payments for the District of Columbia. (6)
On July 20, 2004, the House considered and approved the District ofColumbia Appropriations Act for FY2005, H.R. On September 21, 2004, the SenateAppropriations Committee reported S. 2826 , the District of ColumbiaAppropriations Act for FY2005. TheSenate bill, which was accompanied by S.Rept. The $560 million in special federal payments is $19 millionmore than appropriated in FY2004. In addition, the conference version of H.R.4850 would retain several provisions included in the House version of theact and the District's FY2004 appropriations act prohibiting the use of District andfederal funds for lobbying and advocacy activities related to statehood and votingrepresentation in Congress for residents of the District of Columbia with oneexception. The Districtof Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2002, P.L. | On February 2, 2004, the Bush Administration released its FY2005 budget recommendations. The Administration's proposed budget includes $560.4 million in federal payments to the Districtof Columbia. A major portion of the President's proposed federal payments and assistance to theDistrict involves the courts and criminal justice system. This includes funding for the Court Servicesand Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia, Defender Services, and the courts. These three functions (court operations, defender services, and offender supervision) represent$457.1 million, or 81.6%, of the President's proposed $560.4 million in federal payments to theDistrict of Columbia.
On May 14, 2004, the District's city council approved the city's $8.2 billion budget forFY2005. The city's proposed budget includes $2 billion for enterprise funds and $6.2 billion ingeneral fund operating expenses. The proposed budget also included a request for $1.03 billion inspecial federal payments, which is substantially higher than the $560 million proposed by thePresident.
The District budget request also includes $165 million for the Washington Metropolitan AreaTransit Authority's capital fund, a $162 million increase above the amount appropriated in FY2004,and $102 million in special federal payments in support of emergency preparedness activities --including $80 million for bioterrorism preparedness, $15 million for emergency planning andsecurity, and $7 million for a unified communications center for regional emergencies.
On July 7, 2004, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the District of Columbiaconducted a markup of the District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2005 and forwarded theunnumbered draft bill to the House Appropriations Committee. One week later, on July 14, 2004,the House Appropriations Committee completed its markup of the bill, which includes $560 millionin special federal payments for the District of Columbia.
On July 20, 2004, the House considered and passed H.R. 4850 , the District ofColumbia Appropriations Act for FY2005. The measure was accompanied by H.Rept. 108-610 . OnSeptember 21, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 2826 , its version ofthe District of Columbia Appropriations Act for FY2005. The measure was accompanied by S.Rept.108-354 , and includes $560 million in special federal payments to the city. On October 6, 2004, theHouse and Senate passed the conference committee version of H.R. 4850.
On October 18, 2004, the President signed P.L. 108-335 , the District of ColumbiaAppropriations Act for FY2005. The act includes $560 million in special federal payments andapproves the District's $6.3 billion operating budget for FY2005. On December 8, 2004, thePresident signed P. L. 108-447, a consolidated appropriations act for FY2005, which includes aprovision amending charter school-related language included in P.L. 108-335 . This report will beupdated as events warrant. |
crs_RS21353 | crs_RS21353_0 | RS21353 -- New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
Updated April 30, 2003
Background: Objectives, Structure, and Financing
The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), described as a multi-sector sustainable development policy framework, was collectively formulatedand promoted by leading African heads of state. It was endorsed and adopted in mid-2001 by the Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU), founded in 1963 duringthe decolonization era, and later also endorsed by the African Union, which in July 2002 superseded the OAU. NEPAD seeks to spur economic growth and improvesocio-economic development across Africaby increasing capital flows to Africa in the form of private sector investment, development assistance, debt relief,and broadened market access for Africanexports. NEPAD aims at promoting good governance, democratization, and public sectorreforms as primary means of attracting greater foreign investment, political support, and aid flows to Africa. U.S. Policy
Bush Administration. On March 20, 2003,Representative Meeks introduced H.Res. | The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), described by its proponentsas a multi-sector, sustainabledevelopment policy framework, seeks to reduce poverty, increase economic growth, and improve socio-economicdevelopment prospects across Africa. MajorNEPAD aims are to attract greater investment and development aid to Africa, reduce the continent's debt levels, andbroaden global market access for Africanexports. NEPAD emphasizes increased democratization, political accountability, and transparency in governancein African states as primary means ofachieving its goals. NEPAD is a key policy vehicle of the African Union (AU), which succeeded the Organizationof African Unity (OAU) in July 2002; seeCRS Report RS21332, The African Union. H.Res. 155, introduced in March 2003, urges U.S.and international support for NEPAD. This reportwill be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32459 | crs_RL32459_0 | Overview
U.S. commercial ties with France are extensive, mutually profitable, and growing. Each country has an increasingly large stake in the health and openness of the other's economy. In the case of merchandise trade, France is the 8 th largest trading partner for the United States and the United States is France's largest trading partner outside the European Union. In 2008, $42 billion or 57% of bilateral trade occurred in major industries such as aerospace, pharmaceuticals, medical and scientific equipment, electrical machinery, and plastics where both countries export and import similar products (see Table A-3 and Table A-4 in the Appendix ). The United States and France also have a large and growing trade in services such as tourism, education, finance, insurance, and other professional services. These amounts make France the sixth largest market for U.S. exports of services and the seventh largest provider of services to the United States. Investment Ties
While trade in goods and services receives most of the attention in terms of U.S.-France commercial ties, foreign direct investment and the activities of foreign affiliates can be viewed as the backbone of the commercial relationship. Compared to trade flows, the scale of commercial activities of U.S.-owned companies operating in France and French-owned companies operating in the United States outweighs trade flows by a factor of almost five . The combined U.S.-French annual $494.9 billion sales figure translates into over $1.35 billion in commercial transactions taking place every day of the year. In the case of foreign direct investment, France in 2006 was the eleventh largest host country for overall U.S. foreign direct investment and the United States was the number one foreign investor with investments valued at $65.9 billion (historical cost basis). During the same year, French companies had direct investments in the United States totaling $147 billion (valued on a historical cost basis), making France the fifth largest foreign investor in the United States in stock terms (see Table A-6 ). Most U.S. trade and investment with France, dominated by multinational companies and intra-firm trade, is non-controversial. Nevertheless, three prominent issues—agriculture, government intervention in corporate activity, and the war in Iraq—have contributed to increased bilateral tensions from time to time. Specific concerns that divisions over Iraq could spill over into the trade arena arose in early 2003 with reports of U.S. consumer boycotts of French goods and calls from some U.S. lawmakers for trade retaliation against France (and Germany). The spike in bilateral tensions and hard feelings, however, appears not to have had much impact on sales of the products—such as wines, perfumes, handbags, and cheeses—most prone to being boycotted. Effective boycotts would jeopardize thousands of jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. | U.S. commercial ties with France are extensive, mutually profitable, and growing. With over $1.35 billion in commercial transactions taking place between the two countries every day of the year, each country has an increasingly large stake in the health and openness of the other's economy.
France is the eighth largest merchandise trading partner for the United States and the United States is France's largest trading partner outside the European Union. More than half of bilateral trade occurs in major industries such as aerospace, pharmaceuticals, medical and scientific equipment, electrical machinery, and plastics where both countries export and import similar products.
The United States and France also have a large and growing trade in services such as tourism, education, finance, insurance and other professional services. In recent years, France has been the sixth largest market for U.S. exports of services.
Although trade in goods and services receive most of the attention in terms of the commercial relationship, foreign direct investment and the activities of foreign affiliates can be viewed as the backbone of the commercial relationship. The scale of sales of French-owned companies operating in the United States and U.S.-owned companies operating in France outweighs trade transactions by a factor of four and five, respectively.
In 2007, France was the thirteenth largest host country for U.S. foreign direct investment abroad and the United States with investments valued at $68.5 billion was the number one foreign investor in France. During that same year, French companies had direct investments in the United States totaling $169 billion (historical cost basis), making France the sixth largest investor in the United States. French-owned companies employed some 497,000 workers in the United States in 2006 compared to 651,500 employees of U.S. companies invested in France.
Most U.S. trade and investment transactions with France, dominated by multinational companies, are non-controversial. Nevertheless, three prominent issues—agriculture, government intervention in corporate activity, and the war in Iraq—have contributed periodically to increased bilateral tensions. The most pointed perhaps arose in early 2003 with reports of U.S. consumer boycotts of French goods and calls from some Members of Congress for trade retaliation against France (and Germany) due to foreign policy differences over the Iraq War.
The foreign policy dispute, however, appears not to have had much impact on sales of products such as French wines, perfumes and toiletries, travel goods and handbags, and cheeses that are most prone to being boycotted. While some public opinion polls at the time suggested support for economic boycotts as a way of expressing opposition to France's position on Iraq, an economic backlash appears not to have materialized. Effective boycotts would jeopardize thousands of jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. This report will be updated as needed. See also its companion report, CRS Report RL32464, France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42770 | crs_R42770_0 | They provide a range of financial products and services in economically distressed markets, such as mortgage financing for low-income and first-time homebuyers and not-for-profit developers, flexible underwriting and risk capital for needed community facilities, technical assistance, and commercial loans and investments to small start-up or expanding businesses in low-income areas. CDFIs include regulated institutions, such as community development banks and credit unions, and nonregulated institutions, such as loan and venture capital funds. This report begins by describing the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund's (Fund's) history, current appropriations, and each of its programs. The next section of the report analyzes four policy considerations of congressional interest regarding the Fund and the effective use of federal resources to promote economic development. CDEs are eligible for the NMTC. QOFs are eligible for Opportunity Zone (OZ) tax incentives. Certified Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs)
CDFI certification is a designation conferred by the Fund and a requirement for accessing financial award assistance from the Fund through the CDFI program, Native American CDFI Assistance (NACA) programs, and certain benefits under the BEA program to support an organization's established community development financing programs. To carry out this mission, the Fund is composed of several programs that address multiple needs of distressed communities. These programs encourage qualified entities to provide financial and technical assistance to meet the needs of local businesses, potential homebuyers, community developers, and potential investors in low-income and distressed communities. To be eligible for an FA award, a CDFI must be certified by the Fund before it applies for the award. The organizations were headquartered in 46 states and the District of Columbia. FDIC-insured financial institutions that are dedicated to financing and supporting economic development in qualified communities are eligible for the BEA. Opportunity Zone Tax Incentives
The 2017 tax revision ( P.L. First, it analyzes the debate on targeting development assistance toward people versus places. Second, it examines the debate on targeting economic development policies toward labor or capital. Third, it analyzes whether the Fund plays a unique role in promoting economic development or whether it duplicates, complements, or competes with the goals and activities of other federal, state, and local programs. Fourth, it examines assessments of the Fund's management. In addition, some studies indicate that geographically targeted policies may shift activity from a comparative area toward the targeted zone, rather than create new economic activity. Do the Fund's Programs Duplicate Other Government Efforts? Although certain CDFIs may be eligible for similar forms of assistance from other federal programs (e.g., guaranteed loans from SBA), the Fund's limitations to activities in distressed communities allows CDFIs to compete with other entities that face similar economic, environmental, and geographic challenges. Third, some argue that the Fund's programs complement, not compete with, the goals and programs of other federal initiatives. Concerns over the Fund's management primarily involve questions over the transparency and consistency of the Fund's award evaluation processes. Some maintained that TARP's temporary funds were not intended to target regional banks and that the program functionally resulted in a bypass of the typical appropriations process for the Fund. | As communities face a variety of economic challenges, some are looking to local banks and financial institutions for solutions that address the specific development needs of low-income and distressed communities. Community development financial institutions (CDFIs) provide financial products and services, such as mortgage financing for homebuyers and not-for-profit developers; underwriting and risk capital for community facilities; technical assistance; and commercial loans and investments to small, start-up, or expanding businesses. CDFIs include regulated institutions, such as community development banks and credit unions, and nonregulated institutions, such as loan and venture capital funds.
The Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (Fund), an agency within the Department of the Treasury, administers several programs that encourage the role of CDFIs and similar organizations in community development. Nearly 1,000 financial institutions located throughout all 50 states and the District of Columbia are eligible for the Fund's programs to provide financial and technical assistance to meet the needs of businesses, homebuyers, community developers, and investors in distressed communities. In addition, the Fund certifies entities and designates areas that are eligible for the New Markets Tax Credit and Opportunity Zone (OZ) tax incentives, which were recently enacted by the 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97).
This report begins by describing the Fund's history, current appropriations, and each of its programs. A description of the Fund's process of certifying certain financial institutions to be eligible for the Fund's program awards follows. The next section provides an overview of each program's purpose, use of award proceeds, eligibility criteria, and relevant issues for Congress.
The final section analyzes four policy considerations of congressional interest regarding the Fund and the effective use of federal resources to promote economic development. First, it analyzes the debate on targeting development assistance toward particular geographic areas or low-income individuals generally. Prior research indicates that geographically targeted assistance, like the Fund's programs, may increase economic activity in the targeted place or area. However, this increase may be due to a shift in activity from an area not eligible for assistance.
Second, it analyzes the debate over targeting economic development policies toward labor or capital. The Fund's programs primarily rely on the latter, such as encouraging lending to small businesses rather than targeting labor, such as wage subsidies. Research indicates the benefits of policies that reduce capital costs in a targeted place may not be passed on to local laborers in the form of higher wages or increased employment.
Third, it examines whether the Fund plays a unique role in promoting economic development and if it duplicates, complements, or competes with the goals and activities of other federal, state, and local programs. Although CDFIs are eligible for other federal assistance programs and other agencies have a similar mission as the Fund, the Fund's programs have a particular emphasis on encouraging private investment and building the capacity of private financial entities to enhance local economic development
Fourth, it examines assessments of the Fund's management. Some argue that the Fund's programs are not managed in an effective manner and are not held to appropriate performance measures. Others contend that the Fund is fulfilling its mission and achieving its performance measures. |
crs_RS22839 | crs_RS22839_0 | Background
The decision in School District of the City of Pontiac v. Secretary of the United States Department of Education arose in response to litigation surrounding § 9527(a) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision. However, the case was subsequently reheard, and the en banc Sixth Circuit divided evenly, meaning that the judgment of the district court to dismiss the case was affirmed. In reaching its decision, the two-justice majority emphasized its view that the Spending Clause requires "clear notice" of a state's financial obligations. | In 2008, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a decision in School District of the City of Pontiac v. Secretary of the United States Department of Education. In its decision, the court held that the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act failed to provide the required "clear notice" to states and school districts regarding the requirements they must fulfill as a condition of receiving federal funding. The case was subsequently reheard, but the en banc Sixth Circuit divided evenly, meaning that the judgment of the district court to dismiss the case was affirmed. This report discusses some of the practical and legal implications of the Sixth Circuit decisions. |
crs_RL34043 | crs_RL34043_0 | Introduction
This report provides updated information on interstate shipment of municipal solid waste (MSW). Since the late 1980s, Congress has considered, but not enacted, numerous bills that would grant such authority. Over this period, there has been a continuing interest in knowing how much waste is being shipped across state lines for disposal, and what states might be affected by proposed legislation. This report provides data useful in addressing these questions. Total Shipments
The data show that total interstate waste shipments continue to rise: imports in the current survey totaled 42.2 million tons, 17% of the 245.7 million tons of municipal solid waste generated in the United States. Of this amount, 25.3% crossed state lines for disposal. Between CRS's year 2004 report (reporting largely 2003 data) and the current survey (reporting generally 2005 data), imports increased 3.2 million tons, or 8%. Waste Import Highlights
Thirty states had increased imports of municipal waste since 2003, with the largest increases occurring in Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Disposal facilities in the state received 7.9 million tons of MSW and 1.7 million tons of other nonhazardous waste from out of state in 2005. The amounts represented 39% of all solid waste disposed in the state and 19% of the national total for interstate MSW shipments. Despite the state's continued predominance on the list of waste importers, Pennsylvania's MSW imports actually declined for the fourth year in a row in 2005—a cumulative decrease of more than 2.7 million tons. First, beginning in 2002, Pennsylvania imposed a new state fee of $4.00 per ton on waste disposal. Michigan, the third-largest waste importer for the past several years, has also seen substantial growth in imports. Besides the three big increases discussed above (Indiana, Virginia, and Michigan), states that reported major increases in imports compared to CRS's previous survey were Wisconsin, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Tennessee, and Kansas, each of which reported an increase of at least 100,000 tons. New Jersey remains on the list of major importers, with 1.7 million tons of MSW imports in 2005. Ten other states reported declines in waste imports. Major Exporters
As shown in Table 2 , eleven states (New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Missouri, Maryland, Massachusetts, Washington, Minnesota, North Carolina, Indiana, and Florida) and the District of Columbia each exported more than 1 million tons of waste to facilities in other states in the latest reporting period, and 21 other states exported more than 100,000 tons. As noted above, the Canadian province of Ontario also exported a substantial amount of municipal waste (nearly 4 million tons), most of it to Michigan. In addition to Illinois and Ontario, Minnesota and Florida showed the largest increases. As noted earlier, the movement of waste also represents the regionalization and consolidation of the waste industry. | This report, which replaces a 2004 report on the same subject (CRS Report RL32570, Interstate Shipment of Municipal Solid Waste: 2004 Update (pdf)), provides updated information on interstate shipment of municipal solid waste (MSW). Since the late 1980s, Congress has considered, but not enacted, numerous bills that would allow states to impose restrictions on interstate waste shipments, a step the Constitution prohibits in the absence of congressional authorization. Over this period, there has been a continuing interest in knowing how much waste is being shipped across state lines for disposal, and what states might be affected by proposed legislation. This report provides data useful in addressing these questions. It generally presents data as of 2005.
Total interstate waste shipments continue to rise due to the closure of older local landfills and the consolidation of the waste management industry. More than 42 million tons of municipal solid waste crossed state lines for disposal in 2005, an increase of 8% over 2003. Waste imports have grown significantly since CRS began tracking them in the early 1990s, and now represent 25.3% of the municipal solid waste disposed at landfills and waste combustion facilities. In the last 10 years, reported imports have increased 147%.
Pennsylvania remains the largest waste importer. The state received more than 7.9 million tons of MSW and 1.7 million tons of other non-hazardous waste from out of state in 2005. Most of this waste came from New Jersey and New York. Pennsylvania's waste imports represented 19% of the national total. Virginia and Michigan, the second and third largest importers, received 5.7 million tons and 5.4 million tons from out of state respectively in 2005, each of them about 30% less than the amount received by Pennsylvania.
With the exception of Pennsylvania, each of the 15 largest importers showed an increase in waste imports, compared to our last survey, which provided data as of 2003. Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin showed particularly large increases, with Ohio, New York, Oregon, and Georgia also increasing substantially. In each of these states, waste imports increased by 300,000 tons or more, in some cases substantially more. In all, 30 states had increased imports in the current report, and 11 states reported imports that exceeded 1 million tons.
While waste imports increased overall, Pennsylvania, the leading importer, reported a sharp decline in imports. Pennsylvania's imports fell for the fourth year in a row: about 2.7 million fewer tons of out-of-state MSW were received at Pennsylvania landfills in 2005 than in 2001. Factors causing this decline included the imposition of an additional $4.00 per ton state fee on waste disposal and the absence of rail service at Pennsylvania landfills.
New York remains the largest exporter of waste, with New Jersey in second place. Nine other states (Illinois, Missouri, Maryland, Massachusetts, Washington, Minnesota, North Carolina, Indiana, and Florida), the District of Columbia, and the Canadian province of Ontario also exported more than 1 million tons each. |
crs_R42698 | crs_R42698_0 | In June 2012, the Supreme Court largely affirmed the constitutionality of ACA. With respect to the individual mandate, Chief Justice Roberts wrote the controlling opinion and found that while the Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with the authority to enact the individual mandate, the mandate could be upheld as an appropriate exercise of the taxing power. It should be noted that the Supreme Court also rendered a decision on the constitutionality of the ACA's expansion of the Medicaid program, which required that states provide coverage to adults under the age of 65 with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision on the Medicaid expansion, see CRS Report R42367, Medicaid and Federal Grant Conditions After NFIB v. Sebelius: Constitutional Issues and Analysis , by [author name scrubbed]. While the Chief Justice acknowledged that Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce is quite broad, he also pointed out that Congress had never attempted to use this power to make individuals buy an undesired product. The Chief Justice further noted that the language of the Clause (i.e., the power to regulate interstate commerce) reflects the idea that there must be something to regulate in the first place (i.e., some type of "activity"). The problem with the individual mandate, as indicated by the Chief Justice, is that it "does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce." Another argument made against the constitutionality of the individual mandate was the lack of a limiting principle—the idea that if Congress could require the purchase of health insurance, it could require Americans to purchase anything. The Chief Justice disagreed with the Administration, noting that if the Court followed its reasoning, a mandatory purchase could be permitted to solve almost any problem. Possible Implications
While no other Justice joined the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts with respect to the Commerce Clause analysis, four Justices (Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito) issued a dissenting opinion that reached the same conclusion based on somewhat similar reasoning. The Chief Justice's opinion answered affirmatively, upholding the provision as a valid exercise of Congress's authority. For this portion of the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Is the Individual Mandate a Tax or Penalty? Rather than looking at labels, the Court used a functional approach under which it looked at the provision's "substance and application." The Court began by finding that the mandate provision "looks like a tax in many respects." Second, the mandate provision clearly included no scienter requirement. Applied here, the Court found that Section 5000A, while clearly intended to encourage the purchasing of health insurance, did not have to be read as making the failure to do so unlawful. Once the Court determined that the individual mandate was a tax for constitutional purposes, it turned to look at whether the mandate violates the Constitution's limitations on Congress's taxing powers. If so, it would be unconstitutional since it is not apportioned among the states based on population, unless it were a "tax on income." On the other hand, the Court has, on occasion, found that a tax was functionally a regulatory penalty and therefore not supported by the taxing power. | In one of the most highly anticipated decisions in recent years, the Supreme Court released its ruling regarding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in June 2012. In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Court largely affirmed the constitutionality of ACA, including its individual mandate provision. In a move that was unexpected to many, the Court upheld the mandate as a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power, but not its Commerce Clause power.
First, Chief Justice Roberts, in a controlling opinion, found that the Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with the authority to enact the individual mandate. While the Chief Justice acknowledged that Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce is quite broad, he also pointed out that Congress had never attempted to use this power to make individuals buy an undesired product. The Chief Justice further noted that the language of the Clause (i.e., the power to regulate interstate commerce) reflects the idea that there must be something to regulate in the first place (i.e., some type of "activity"). The problem with the individual mandate, as indicated by the Chief Justice, is that it "does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce." The Chief Justice also noted that if the mandate were permissible under the Commerce Clause, a mandatory purchase could be permitted to solve almost any problem, thus agreeing with those who had raised concerns about a lack of a limiting principle—the idea that if Congress could require the purchase of health insurance, it could require Americans to purchase anything. While no other Justice joined the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts with respect to the Commerce Clause analysis, four Justices issued a dissenting opinion that reached the same conclusion based on somewhat similar reasoning.
The Chief Justice then found the mandate provision to be a valid exercise of Congress's taxing power. For this portion of the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The key question here was whether the mandate provision was a tax or penalty. The Court used a functional approach to find the provision was in fact a tax, looking at its substance and application, rather than any statutory labels (which used the term "penalty"). The Court rejected the argument that the provision was actually a regulatory penalty, and therefore outside the scope of the taxing power, because it was not prohibitory, had no scienter requirement, and would be collected just like any other tax by the IRS. The provision's obvious regulatory purpose was not a significant factor, with the Court noting that it is common for taxes to be intended to influence behavior. Further, the Court found the provision did not have to be read as making the failure to buy health insurance unlawful. Finally, the Court found the mandate provision, while a tax, was not a "direct tax" and therefore was not subject to the Constitution's requirement that direct taxes be apportioned among the states based on population.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court also rendered a decision on the constitutionality of the ACA's expansion of the Medicaid program. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision on the Medicaid expansion, see CRS Report R42367, Medicaid and Federal Grant Conditions After NFIB v. Sebelius: Constitutional Issues and Analysis, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41289 | crs_R41289_0 | Introduction
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) replaces a portion of earnings for an eligible worker whose illness or injury—while not necessarily caused by a work-related incident—results in an inability to work. As an insurance program, workers (including active-duty military) and employers in covered occupations, as well as self-employed individuals, contribute to the program through the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) payroll tax and the Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) tax. Conversely, Veterans Disability Compensation (VDC) provides payments to veterans for illnesses and injuries that are caused or aggravated by military service. VDC is a compensation program funded through a mandatory appropriation as part of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) annual budget. VDC is not insurance and therefore, neither veterans nor active military personnel contribute directly toward the funding of the program. SSDI and VDC—administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the VA, respectively—are two of the largest federal disability programs. Although SSDI and VDC both serve the goal of providing income security for individuals with disabilities, these programs fundamentally differ in how they define "disability" and determine eligibility for benefits. For example, an individual must be unable to work to be eligible for SSDI benefits, yet employability is not a factor in VDC disability determinations. This report concludes with a discussion of the challenges facing the administration of both programs, including processing delays for pending claims and appeals. These issues will be of particular interest to Congress due to the high numbers of SSDI claims resulting from a combination of the recent economic decline, an increase in the number of baby-boomers approaching retirement age and their most disability-prone years. SSDI Benefits
To ensure that a condition is long-term, a worker only becomes eligible to apply for SSDI five months after the onset of a disability, and the worker is further evaluated to determine if the disability will last longer than 12 months or result in death. Second, claimants must demonstrate that injuries, diseases, or other medical conditions are related to military service. Distinctions Between SSDI and VDC Programs
There are clear differences in the general goals of SSA and VA disability compensation programs that have likely evolved from the SSDI focus on administering benefits primarily for a civilian work population, which contrasts with the VDC focus on compensating individuals for the adverse health conditions connected to military service. Both programs tend to serve populations approaching retirement age as the typical VDC and SSDI recipients are all over the age of 55. In contrast, VDC—aimed at compensating veterans that have sustained injuries or illnesses as a result of military service—determines payment amounts based on the severity of veterans' service-connected condition(s), without regard for the employability of the veterans. Certain veterans who are unemployable, and have a rating of less than 100%, may be granted additional compensation through IU provisions. SSA and the VA have also been criticized for their processes of adjudicating applications, and the high levels of claims and appeals pending. These were two of several government-wide findings that led the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to designate federal disability programs as "high-risk." | Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Veterans Disability Compensation (VDC)—administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) respectively—are two of the largest federal disability programs, but strongly differ along several dimensions, including the populations served, how each program defines a "disability," as well as varying eligibility requirements.
First, SSDI is an insurance program that replaces a portion of earnings for an eligible worker whose illness or injury—while not necessarily caused by a work-related incident—results in an inability to work. SSDI is one of several federal programs funded through the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) payroll tax and the Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) tax to which all workers and employers in covered occupations (including military personnel) and self-employed individuals make contributions. On the other hand, VDC is not insurance, but is a compensation program in that payments are made to veterans who develop medical conditions that are related to their service in the military. VDC is non-contributory and neither veterans nor active military personnel pay into the program, which is funded through a mandatory appropriation as part of the VA annual budget.
Second, while the purpose of both SSDI and VDC is to provide income security, SSDI provides a financial "safety-net" to eligible civilian and military workers due to their inability to work as a result of long-term or terminal injury or illness. Conversely, VDC provides veterans with tax-free, cash benefits specifically for service-connected illnesses or injuries. The ability to work is not factored into VDC disability determinations, although additional compensation is available for veterans who are unemployable as the result of a service-connected condition(s).
Third, SSDI only compensates workers who are fully disabled, whereas VDC compensates veterans for both partial and fully disabling injuries and illnesses. The VA is further guided by a principle that views disability compensation as an obligation, owed to veterans, for injuries affecting employment that were incurred or aggravated by their service to the country. SSDI benefits are granted solely on medical and economic grounds and other noneconomic factors are not considered. Eligibility requirements generally tend to be more stringent for SSDI than VDC, and most veterans, even if qualified for VDC, will not likely meet the criteria for both programs.
Both SSA and the VA have faced challenges in the administration of benefits and have been criticized for a lack of interagency coordination, processes that are "out-of-sync" with modern conceptions of disability, and extensive processing delays for claims and appeals. These issues led, in part, to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation and determination of federal disability programs as "high risk." Both agencies have made efforts to address issues surrounding pending claims and appeals, but differ in their responses to other recommendations.
This report provides a description and comparative analysis of the SSDI and VDC programs. These issues will be of particular interest to Congress because of the expected increase in the numbers of SSDI and VDC claims. The recent economic decline and aging baby-boomers have continued to place a strain on SSA's resources. The aging of the veteran population and expansion of presumptive conditions policies have contributed to the increase in VDC claims. |
crs_R42727 | crs_R42727_0 | Legal protections for employees who report illegal misconduct by their employers have increased dramatically since the late 1970s when such protections were first adopted for federal employees in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Since that time, with the enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, as amended, Congress has expanded such protections for federal employees. Congress has also established whistleblower protections for individuals in certain private-sector employment through the adoption of whistleblower provisions in at least 18 other industry-specific federal statutes. This report provides an overview of whistleblower provisions in 19 selected federal statutes. While state law may also provide whistleblower protections for employees, this report focuses on relevant federal statutory provisions. The petition for review must be filed within 60 days from the issuance of the Secretary's order, and the commencement of proceedings shall not, unless ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Secretary's order. If she finds no violation, the Secretary will issue an order denying the application. An order issued by the Secretary is subject to judicial review. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)
The Dodd-Frank Act established several new whistleblower protections for individuals employed in the financial services industry. Section 1057 of the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits employers engaged in providing consumer financial products or services, and employers that provide a material service in connection with the provision of such products or services, from terminating or in any other way discriminating against a covered employee because the employee has (1) provided, caused to be provided, or is about to provide or cause to be provided, information relating to a violation of Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act or any other provision of law that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau) to the employer, the Bureau, or a state, local, or federal government authority or law enforcement agency; (2) testified or will testify in any proceeding resulting from the administration or enforcement of Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act or any other provision of law that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau; (3) filed, instituted, or caused to be filed or instituted any proceeding under any federal consumer financial law; or (4) objected to or refused to participate in any activity that the employee reasonably believed to be in violation of any law subject to the jurisdiction of, or enforceable by, the Bureau. Employees and applicants who believe that they have been discharged, interfered with, or otherwise discriminated against in violation of this prohibition may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor within 60 days after the alleged violation. | Legal protections for employees who report illegal misconduct by their employers have increased dramatically since the late 1970s when such protections were first adopted for federal employees in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Since that time, with the enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Congress has expanded such protections for federal employees. Congress has also established whistleblower protections for individuals in certain private-sector employment through the adoption of whistleblower provisions in at least 18 federal statutes. Among these statutes are the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).
In general, claims for relief under the 18 federal statutes follow a similar pattern. Complaints are typically filed with the Secretary of Labor, and an investigation is conducted. Following the investigation, an order is issued by the Secretary, and a party aggrieved by the order is generally permitted to appeal the Secretary's order to a federal court. However, because 18 different statutes are involved in prescribing whistleblower protections, some notable differences exist. For example, under the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1987, individuals employed by defense contractors who engage in whistleblowing activities file complaints with the Inspector General rather than the Secretary of Labor. Under some of the statutes, including the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the Dodd-Frank Act, the Secretary's preliminary order will become a final order if no objections are filed within a prescribed time period.
This report provides an overview of key aspects of the 18 selected federal statutes applicable to individuals in certain private-sector industries. It focuses on the protections provided to employees who believe they have been subject to retaliation, rather than on how or where alleged misconduct should be disclosed. In addition, the report also includes an overview of the Whistleblower Protection Act. While state law may also provide whistleblower protections for employees, this report focuses only on the aforementioned federal statutory provisions. |
crs_R42499 | crs_R42499_0 | Background and History of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was originally passed by Congress as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-322 ). 113-4 ) that reauthorized most of the programs under VAWA, among other things. The VAWA reauthorization also amended and authorized appropriations for the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, enhanced measures to combat trafficking in persons, and amended VAWA grant purpose areas to include sex trafficking. 113-4 gave Indian tribes authority to enforce domestic violence laws and related crimes against non-Indian individuals, and established a nondiscrimination provision for VAWA grant programs. The reauthorization also included new provisions to address the rape kit backlog in states. This reauthorization and others are discussed in this report. Office on Violence Against Women
In 1995, the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) was administratively created within the Department of Justice (DOJ) to administer the grants authorized under VAWA. Since its creation through FY2014, the OVW has awarded more than $6 billion in grants and cooperative agreements to state, tribal, and local governments, nonprofit organizations, and universities. While the OVW administers the majority of VAWA authorized grants, other federal agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), also manage VAWA funds. Under VAWA, domestic violence is generally interpreted as intimate partner violence. Reauthorizations of VAWA
Since it was enacted in 1994, Congress has reauthorized VAWA three times. In 2000, Congress reauthorized VAWA through the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act ( P.L. The legislation added protections for battered and/or trafficked nonimmigrants; enhanced penalties for repeat stalking offenders; and added programs for American Indian victims and sexual assault victims and programs designed to improve the public health response to domestic violence. In 2013, the 113 th Congress reauthorized VAWA through the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA 2013; P.L. Three previously unfunded programs, (1) Interdisciplinary Training and Education on Domestic Violence and Other Types of Violence and Abuse, (2) Research on Effective Interventions in the Health Care Setting, and (3) Grants to Foster Public Health Responses to Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, Sexual Assault, and Stalking, were eliminated and their purpose areas were included in the authorization of a new program called Grants to Strengthen the Healthcare System's Response to Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, Sexual Assault, and Stalking. Table A-1 provides descriptions of VAWA programs. | The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) has been of ongoing interest to Congress since its enactment in 1994 (P.L. 103-322). The original act was intended to change attitudes toward domestic violence, foster awareness of domestic violence, improve services and provisions for victims, and revise the manner in which the criminal justice system responds to domestic violence and sex crimes. The legislation created new programs within the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Health and Human Services (HHS) that aimed to reduce domestic violence and improve response to and recovery from domestic violence incidents. VAWA primarily addresses certain types of violent crime through grant programs to state, tribal, and local governments; nonprofit organizations; and universities. VAWA programs target the crimes of intimate partner violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking.
In 1995, the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) was created administratively within DOJ to administer federal grants authorized under VAWA. In 2002, Congress codified the OVW as a separate office within DOJ. Since its creation, the OVW has awarded more than $6 billion in grants. While the OVW administers the majority of VAWA authorized grants, other federal agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (in HHS) and the Office of Justice Programs (in DOJ), also manage VAWA grants.
Since its passage in 1994, VAWA has been modified and reauthorized several times. In 2000, Congress reauthorized the programs under VAWA, enhanced federal domestic violence and stalking penalties, added protections for abused foreign nationals, and created programs for elderly and disabled women. In 2005, Congress again reauthorized VAWA. In addition to reauthorizing the programs under VAWA, the legislation enhanced penalties for repeat stalking offenders; added additional protections for battered and/or trafficked foreign nationals; created programs for sexual assault victims and American Indian victims of domestic violence and related crimes; and created programs designed to improve the public health response to domestic violence.
In February 2013, Congress passed legislation (Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013; P.L. 113-4) that reauthorized most of the programs under VAWA, among other things. The VAWA reauthorization also amended and authorized appropriations for the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, enhanced measures to combat trafficking in persons, and amended some VAWA grant purpose areas to include sex trafficking. Moreover, VAWA 2013 gave Indian tribes authority to enforce domestic violence laws and related crimes against non-Indian individuals, and established a nondiscrimination provision for VAWA grant programs. The reauthorization also included new provisions to address the rape kit backlog in states. A description of the reauthorization is provided in this report. |
crs_R41497 | crs_R41497_0 | The Appointment Process for Advice and Consent Positions
The President and the Senate share the power to appoint the principal officers of the United States. Three distinct stages mark the appointment process: selection, clearance, and nomination by the President; consideration by the Senate; and appointment by the President. There are a number of steps in this stage of the process for most Senate-confirmed positions. Appointment
In the final stage, the confirmed nominee is given a commission bearing the Great Seal of the United States signed by the President and is sworn into office. President George W. Bush submitted to the Senate 172 nominations to executive department full-time positions. Of these 172 nominations, 125 were confirmed; 13 were withdrawn; and 34 were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate rules. President Bush did not make any recess appointments to the departments during this period. This report provides, for each executive department nomination that was confirmed in the 110 th Congress, the number of days between nomination and confirmation ("days to confirm"). For confirmed nominations, an average (mean) of 104 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 92. The methodology used in this report to count the length of time between nomination and confirmation differs from that which was used in previous similar CRS reports. The statistics presented here include the days during which the Senate was adjourned for its summer recesses and between sessions of Congress. The methodological change reduces the direct comparability of statistics in this report with those of the earlier research. Reasons for the change include the conversion of long recesses into a series of short recesses punctuated by pro forma sessions during the 110 th Congress; the fact that although committees may not be taking direct action on nominations in the form of hearings or votes, they are likely still considering and processing nominations during recesses; and a desire to be consistent with the methodology used by a majority of political scientists as well as CRS research on judicial nominations. In addition, an argument could be made that the decision to extend Senate consideration of nominees over the course of a recess is intentional, and the choice to extend this length of time is better represented by including all days, including long recesses. The second table presented, the list of nomination action within each department, relies primarily upon the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS). | The appointment process for advice and consent positions consists of three main stages. The first stage is selection, clearance, and nomination by the President. This step includes preliminary vetting, background checks, and ethics checks of potential nominees. At this stage, the president may also consult with Senators who are from the same party if the position is located in a state. The second stage of the process is consideration of the nomination in the Senate, most of which takes place in committee. Finally, if a nomination is approved by the full Senate, the nominee is given a commission signed by the President, which makes the nomination official.
During the 110th Congress, the President submitted to the Senate 172 nominations to executive department full-time positions. Of these 172 nominations, 125 were confirmed; 13 were withdrawn; and 34 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, an average of 104 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 92.
The methodology used in this report to count the length of time between nomination and confirmation differs from that which was used in previous similar CRS reports. The statistics presented here include the days during which the Senate was adjourned for its summer recesses and between sessions of Congress. The methodological change, which may reduce the comparability of statistics in this report with those of the earlier research, is discussed in the text of this report as well as in an appendix. Reasons for the change include the conversion of long recesses into a series of short recesses punctuated by pro forma sessions during the 110th Congress; the fact that although committees may not be taking direct action on nominations in the form of hearings or votes, they are likely still considering and processing nominations during recesses; and a desire to be consistent with the methodology used by many political scientists as well as CRS research on judicial nominations. In addition, an argument could be made that the decision to extend Senate consideration of nominees over the course of a recess is intentional, and the choice to extend this length of time is better represented by including all days, including long recesses.
President George W. Bush did not make any recess appointments to executive department full-time positions during the 110th Congress.
Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2008 "Plum Book" (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_98-327 | crs_98-327_0 | This is an outline of two federal statutes: the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA authorizes the collection of information about the activities of foreign powers and their agents, whether those activities are criminal or not. Section 2702 comes with its own set of exceptions which permit disclosure of the contents of a communication: (1) to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient; (2) as otherwise authorized in section 2517 [relating to disclosures permitted under Title III], 2511(2)(a)[relating to provider disclosures permitted under Title III for protection of provider property or incidental to service], or 2703 [relating to required provider disclosures pursuant to governmental authority] of this title; (3) with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or the subscriber in the case of remote computing service; (4) to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used to forward such communication to its destination; (5) as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service; (6) to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in connection with a report submitted thereto under section 227 of the Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990; (7) to a law enforcement agency—(A) if the contents—(i) were inadvertently obtained by the service provider; and (ii) appear to pertain to the commission of a crime; or (8) to a federal, state, or local government entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of communications relating to the emergency. Government Access : The circumstances and procedural requirements for law enforcement access to stored wire or electronic communications and transactional records are less demanding than those under Title III. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) authorizes special court orders for several purposes: electronic surveillance, physical searches, installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices, and orders to disclose tangible items. As in the case of law enforcement wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, there is authority for interception and physical searches prior to approval in emergency situations. The second of these is replete with reporting requirements to Congress and the FISA court. Those who assist are immune from civil liability, but victims of the unlawful use of information derived from a FISA pen register or trap and trace device order have a cause of action against the United States. Overseas FISA Targets (Expires December 31, 2017)
The 2008 FISA Amendments Act established a temporary set of three procedures which authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information by targeting an individual or entity thought to be overseas. The Second Circuit disagreed. FISA Reporting Requirements
Every six months, the Attorney General must report on the use of FISA authority. | This report provides an overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). ECPA consists of three parts. The first, often referred to as Title III, outlaws wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, except as otherwise provided. The second, the Stored Communications Act, governs the privacy of, and government access to, the content of electronic communications and to related records. The third outlaws the use and installation of pen registers and of trap and trace devices, unless judicially approved for law enforcement or intelligence gathering purposes.
FISA consists of seven parts. The first, reminiscent of Title III, authorizes electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence investigations. The second authorizes physical searches in foreign intelligence cases. The third permits the use and installation of pen registers and trap and trace devices in the context of a foreign intelligence investigation. The fourth affords intelligence officials access to business records and other tangible items. The fifth directs the Attorney General to report to Congress on the specifics of the exercise of FISA authority. The sixth, scheduled to expire on December 31, 2017, permits the acquisition of the communications of targeted overseas individuals and entities. The seventh creates a safe harbor from civil liability for those who assist or have assisted in the collection of information relating to the activities of foreign powers and their agents.
This report is an abridged version of CRS Report 98-326, Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], without the footnotes, attributions to authority, the text of ECPA or FISA, or appendices found there. The ECPA sections of the longer report are available separately as CRS Report R41733, Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, by [author name scrubbed], which in turn is available in abridged form, CRS Report R41734, Privacy: An Abridged Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, by [author name scrubbed]. Related CRS reports include CRS Report R42725, Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Extended Until June 1, 2015, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44426 | crs_R44426_0 | Introduction
Eligible veterans are entitled to receive certain military honors at their funerals. There is no cost to the family of a veteran for military honors. 105-261 ; and amended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, P.L. 106-65 . In addition, federal law provides that veterans who served on active duty and former members of the Selected Reserve may be eligible for military funeral honors. Ineligibility Based on Involvement in a Capital Crime
A person is ineligible for military funeral honors if he or she is
convicted of a federal capital crime, the conviction is final, and the sentence has not been commuted by the President; convicted of a state capital crime, the conviction is final, and the sentence has not been commuted by a governor of a state; found by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs or, in the case of a burial or inurnment at Arlington National Cemetery, the Secretary of the Army by clear and convincing evidence and after the opportunity for a hearing, to have committed a federal or state capital crime but has not been convicted of this crime due to death or flight to avoid prosecution. History of the Capital Crime Provisions
The denial of eligibility for military funeral honors for persons involved in capital crimes began in 1997 with the enactment of P.L. Although P.L. 109-461 , enacted in 2006, ordered the Secretary of the Army to remove Wagner's cremated remains from Arlington National Cemetery and return them to his family. These include a funeral honors detail of at least two non-retired uniformed members of the Armed Forces, the folding and presentation of a U.S. flag to the family of the deceased, and the playing of Taps. Pursuant to legislation enacted on May 20, 2016 ( P.L. 95-202 ) to have performed active duty military service and been granted veterans status, such as Women's Air Force Service Pilots, are eligible for inurnment in the Columbarium or Niche Wall at Arlington Cemetery but not ground burial. Pursuant to Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor , declaring Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional, same-sex spouses are eligible for interment or inurnment at Arlington National Cemetery and any VA national cemetery effective June 26, 2013. | Eligible veterans are entitled to receive military honors at their funerals. Federal law, enacted in 1999 (P.L. 105-261) and amended in 2000 (P.L. 106-65) provides that each eligible veteran shall be provided, at minimum,
a two-person funeral honors detail, the playing of taps, and the folding and presentation of a U.S. flag to the family.
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) issues these honors at no cost to the veteran's family. These honors can be augmented to include color guards, pallbearers, and firing parties provided either by the military or civilians in approved veterans or other organizations. Funeral honors at Arlington National Cemetery include additional elements according to the rank of the deceased.
Persons involved in capital crimes are ineligible for military funeral honors. In 1997, Congress began prohibiting interment and inurnment in national cemeteries and military funeral honors for persons involved in federal or state capital crimes. In 2006, Congress passed a law (P.L. 109-461) ordering the cremated remains of a veteran who had been convicted of two counts of murder be removed from Arlington National Cemetery.
In 2013, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor, same-sex spouses of eligible veterans became eligible for interment and inurnment in national cemeteries.
Legislation enacted in 2016 (P.L. 114-158) permits civilians granted veterans status under federal law, such as Women's Air Force Service Pilots (WASPs), to be inurned in the Columbarium or Niche Wall at Arlington National Cemetery. |
crs_R44203 | crs_R44203_0 | Introduction
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) was enacted "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." It prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, physical and mental handicap, and familial status. Subject to certain exemptions, the FHA applies to all sorts of housing, public and private, including single family homes, apartments, condominiums, and mobile homes. It also applies to "residential real estate-related transactions," which include both the "making [and] purchasing of loans ... secured by residential real estate [and] the selling, brokering, or appraising of residential real property." In June 2015, the Supreme Court, in Texas Department of Housing Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project , confirmed the long-held interpretation that, in addition to outlawing intentional discrimination, the FHA also prohibits certain housing-related decisions that have a discriminatory effect on a protected class. The Supreme Court's holding in Inclusive Communities that "disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the [FHA]" mirrors previous interpretations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and all 11 federal courts of appeals that had ruled on the issue. In addition, the Court outlined a number of limiting factors that lower courts and HUD should apply when assessing disparate impact claims. While plaintiffs historically have faced fairly steep odds of getting their disparate impact claims past the preliminary stages of litigation, much less succeeding on the merits of those claims, it is possible that the "cautionary standards" stressed by the Inclusive Communities majority might result in even fewer successful disparate impact claims and swifter disposal of claims that are raised. HUD explained in the preamble of the Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard Final Rule (the Rule or the Disparate Impact Rule) that "[t]his regulation is needed to formalize HUD's long-held interpretation of the availability of 'discriminatory effects' liability under the Fair Housing Act and to provide nationwide consistency in the application of that form of liability." Further, the Court seemed to indicate that such business decisions—or in cases where the defendant is a governmental entity, decisions made in the public interest—should stand unless the "plaintiff has shown that there is an available alternative practice that has less disparate impact and serves the entity's legitimate needs." First, the Court appears to have adopted a three-step burden-shifting test for assessing disparate impact liability under the FHA. At step one, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing evidence that a housing decision or policy caused a disparate impact on a protected class. At step two, defendants can counter the plaintiff's prima facie showing by establishing that the challenged policy or decision is "necessary to achieve a valid interest." As a result, circuits, such as the Fourth (in cases with public defendants) and Seventh, that historically have used a balancing test likely will begin using a burden-shifting test. The Supreme Court stressed that lower courts and HUD should rigorously evaluate plaintiffs' claims to ensure that evidence has been provided to support not only a statistical disparity, but also causality. Additionally, the Court emphasized that claims should be disposed of swiftly in the preliminary stages of litigation if plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. | The Fair Housing Act (FHA) was enacted "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." It prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, physical and mental handicap, and familial status. Subject to certain exemptions, the FHA applies to all sorts of housing, public and private, including single family homes, apartments, condominiums, and mobile homes. It also applies to "residential real estate-related transactions," which include both the "making [and] purchasing of loans ... secured by residential real estate [and] the selling, brokering, or appraising of residential real property." There has been controversy over whether, in addition to outlawing intentional discrimination, the FHA also prohibits certain housing-related decisions that have a discriminatory effect on a protected class. That controversy was settled when, in June 2015, a divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.
Key Takeaways of This Report
In February 2013, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for the first time issued regulations "formaliz[ing] HUD's long-held interpretation of the availability of 'discriminatory effects' liability under the Fair Housing Act and to provide nationwide consistency in the application of that form of liability." In June 2015, the Supreme Court held in Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA—a view previously espoused by HUD and the 11 U.S. Courts of Appeals to render opinions on the issue. The Court also outlined certain limiting factors that should apply when assessing disparate impact claims. The Supreme Court appears to have adopted a three-step burden-shifting test for assessing disparate impact liability under the FHA. The test outlined by the Court, which is similar though not identical to the one adopted by HUD, places the initial burden on the plaintiffs to establish evidence that a housing decision or policy caused a disparate impact on a protected class. Defendants can counter the plaintiff's prima facie showing by establishing that the challenged policy or decision is "necessary to achieve a valid interest." The defendant's "valid interest" will stand unless the "plaintiff has shown that there is an available alternative practice that has less disparate impact and serves the entity's legitimate needs." Going forward, the minority of federal circuits that historically have used a different type of test likely will begin using a burden-shifting scheme consistent with the test outlined in Inclusive Communities. The Supreme Court stressed that lower courts and HUD should rigorously evaluate plaintiffs' disparate impact claims to ensure that evidence has been provided to support, not only a statistical disparity, but also causality (i.e., that a particular policy implemented by the defendant caused the disparate impact). The Court also emphasized that claims should be disposed of swiftly in the preliminary stages of litigation when plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient evidence of causality. Although plaintiffs historically have faced fairly steep odds of getting their disparate impact claims past the preliminary stages of litigation, much less succeeding on the merits, the "cautionary standards" stressed by the Supreme Court might result in even fewer successful disparate impact claims being raised in the courts and/or swifter disposal of claims that are raised. |
crs_RL33110 | crs_RL33110_0 | Introduction
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Armed Forces, under guidance from the Department of Defense (DOD), have conducted the following military operations:
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and other small Global War on Terror (GWOT) operations like the Philippines and Djibouti that began immediately after the 9/11 attacks and continue; Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that began in the fall of 2002 with the buildup of troops for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and continued with counter-insurgency and stability operations until 2010; Operation New Dawn (OND), a successor to OIF that began on September 1, 2010, when U.S. troops adopted an advisory and assistance role and concluded in December 2011 when all U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq (though some 13,000 combat-ready troops remain in Kuwait); Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) providing enhanced security for U.S. military bases and other homeland security that was launched in response to the attacks and continues at a modest level; and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), authorized by the President on August 7, 2014, beginning with DOD air strikes in Iraq and Syria to "degrade and ultimately defeat" the Islamic State (IS) without deploying U.S. ground troops. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Veterans Administration (VA( Medical requests, the total FY2015 war request—including the new November 2014 request for OIR—totals $79.0 billion. The FY2015 Continuing Resolution ( H.J.Res. 113-164 ) sets war spending levels for this fiscal year at $95.5 billion, reflecting the FY2014 enacted level. That total is $16.5 billion above the $79.0 billion amended request that includes OIR. The CR expires on December 11, 2014, and Congress is expected to pass another CR or an Omnibus Appropriations act to set final FY2015 spending levels. At that time, Congress may consider the following war budget issues:
the amount, purposes, and appropriateness of the FY2015 Department of Defense (DOD) war cost request reflecting the troop drawdown to 9,800 troops in December 2014; the utility of an Administration proposal for $5 billion for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTFP), a broadly-flexible new account intended to respond to "evolving threats" primarily through "Train and Equip" programs; whether to rely on OCO-designated funding for all DOD expenses, including paying for an "enduring presence" of some 60,000 U.S. troops in the region, and financing Afghan security forces rather than transferring some of these costs to DOD's base budget; and responding to the new November funding request of $5.5 billion for Operation Inherent Resolve, including whether to set restrictions on the use of U.S. ground forces. 124 / P.L. The tables below do not reflect the $5.5 billion budget amendment to combat the Islamic State, considered to be a new operation by the Department of Defense. Cumulative War Funding and the FY2015 Request
Based on funding enacted from the 9/11 attacks through FY2014, CRS estimates a total of $1.6 trillion has been provided to the Department of Defense, the State Department and the Department of Veterans Administration for war operations, diplomatic operations and foreign aid, and medical care for Iraq and Afghan war veterans over the past 13 years of war. By Operation
Allocated by operation, this $1.6 trillion total is made up of:
$686 billion for Afghanistan and other counter-terror operations (OEF);
$815 billion for Iraq (OIF); $27 billion for enhanced security (Operation Noble Eagle); and $81 billion in other spending designated as war funding but tangentiallyrelated to the Afghan and Iraq war ( Table 3 ). As would be expected, the majority of the FY2015 request is for the war in Afghanistan with
$58.1 billion for Afghanistan/OEF; $5.0 billion for Iraq/OIF/OND; $100 million for enhanced security; and $10.4 billion for other war-designated costs that are not directly part of war operations or aid to Afghanistan or Iraq. On July 22, 2011, President Obama announced the surge would be reversed and the U.S. role would transition from a combat role to a train and assist role in Afghanistan, stating that by "2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security." In February 2013, President Obama announced that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would halve from 65,000 to 33,000 within a year. For example, in H.R. On May 27, 2014, President Obama announced further reductions in the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan during the transition to an "advise and assist" role with decreases from
33,000 in February 2014 to 9,800 by January 1, 2015; by another halving to about 4,900 by the January 1, 2016; and the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would be an "embassy presence," of about 1,000 according to press reports by January 1, 2017. Some ways to evaluate DOD's FY2015 request for war funding which Congress may consider as part of the appropriations and authorization process may include:
reviewing whether DOD has spent all the war funds appropriated over the past several years; comparing operational and troop costs experienced during the Iraq drawdown with the proposed FY2015 costs of the Afghanistan drawdown; and comparing the Administration's new CTPF proposal to expand funding for "Train and Equip" counterterrorism training programs with previous similar programs. There are other indications that war obligations in FY2014 may be more than needed. Flexible Funding and the New Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF)
One of the more controversial issues in the FY2015 request is the Administration's proposal to set up the new Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) intended to allow DOD and other agencies "to respond more nimbly to evolving terrorist threats from South Asia to the Sahel" by building "partnership capacity." 124 / P.L. NDAA Draft FY2015 Conference Version
The CR anticipated that Congress may revise this Train-and-Equip authority in the National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. The New Request to Counter the Islamic State
On November 10, 2014, the Administration submitted a FY2015 budget amendment of $5.5 billion in OCO funds—$5 billion for DOD and $520 million for the Department of State—to support efforts to combat the Islamic State (IS) after its takeover of territory in Iraq and Syria. 124 / P.L. Questions That Could Be Raised
There are several questions that Congress may wish to raise about future war costs. There is no war funding shown for the rest of the decade. Helping to pay for Afghan security forces could be another long-term cost. 4870 stated that none of the funds in Act "may be used to provide weapons in Syria" (defeated 167-244, June 19, 2014). | With enactment of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act on January 1, 2014 (H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-73), Congress has approved appropriations for the past 13 years of war that total $1.6 trillion for military operations, base support, weapons maintenance, training of Afghan and Iraq security forces, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans' health care for the war operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks.
Of this $1.6 trillion total, CRS estimates that the total is distributed as follows:
$686 billion (43%) for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and other counterterror operations received; $815 billion (51%) for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation New Dawn (OND); $27 billion (2%) for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and
$81 billion (5%) for war-designated funding not considered directly related to the Afghanistan or Iraq wars.
About 92% of the funds are for Department of Defense (DOD), 6% for State Department foreign aid programs and diplomatic operations, 1% for Department of Veterans Administration's medical care for veterans. In addition, 5% of the funds (across agencies) are for programs and activities tangentially-related to war operations.
The FY2015 war request for DOD, State/USAID, and Veterans Administration Medical totals $73.5 billion including $58.1 billion for Afghanistan, $5.0 billion for Iraq, $ 100 million for enhanced security, and $10.4 billion for other war-designated funding. These totals do not reflect the new FY2015 request submitted in November 2014 to cover expenses for Operations Inherent Resolve (OIR) that began with airstrikes launched in late August 2014, to aid Syrian insurgents and the Iraq government to counter the takeover of territory by the Islamic State (IS). The Administration submitted a $5.5 billion FY2015 budget amendment for this operation that Congress is considering. Including the new request, the FY2015 war funding now totals $79.0 billion.
In late May 2014, the President announced that troop levels in Afghanistan would fall from 33,000 to 9,800 by January 1, 2015 with the U.S. role focusing on advising Afghan security forces and conducting counter-terror operations. A year later, by January 1, 2016, the President stated that the number of troops in Afghanistan would halve to about 4,900 and then by the beginning of 2017, settle at an embassy presence of about 1,000.
Overall U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq began to decline with the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq by December 2011. The troop decline continued with President Obama's announcement in February 2013 that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would halve from 67,000 to 34,000 by February 2014. Annual war costs also decreased from a peak of $195 billion in FY2008 to $95 billion enacted in FY2014. After the reversal of the 2009 Afghanistan surge, the President promised in the 2013 State of the Union address that "our troops will continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead [and] our mission will change from combat to support." He also stated that by "2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security."
The FY2015 Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res. 124/P.L. 113-164) sets war funding at the FY2014 enacted level of $95.5 billion, which exceeds the FY2015 amended request (with OIR) by about $16.5 billion. The CR expires on December 11, 2014, and Congress is expected to enact another CR or an Omnibus appropriations act for the rest of the fiscal year.
Congress may face several budgetary issues about how to respond to the FY2015 war request and longer-term war cost issues including:
assessing the amount, purposes, and level of funding to support U.S. troops during the post-2014 drawdown; evaluating the Administration proposal for a new flexible funding account that would provide $5 billion for a Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTFP) to respond to unspecified "evolving threats from South Asia to the Sahel" by "building partnership capacity" through Train & Equip programs; defining what is an appropriate war-related cost as opposed to what is in the base, non-war budget, a choice made more difficult in part by the potential squeeze on agencies' base budgets that are subject to Budget Control Act spending limits (P.L. 112-25); estimating the potential long-term cost of the war, including repairing and replacing war-worn equipment and maintaining an "enduring presence" that could entail a substantial footprint in the region; and responding to the November 2014 request for $5.5 billion for Operation Inherent Resolve, the new operation to counter the Islamic State.
There are some indications that the FY2015 DOD war funding request may be more than is needed in light of FY2014 experience when expenses for returning troops and equipment have proven to be lower and the pace faster than anticipated. If expenses are lower and withdrawal is faster than anticipated, the FY2015 request may also include excess funds that could be used to pay for part or all of the new $5.5 billion request to counter the Islamic State. Savings in FY2015 could be partly offset by the recent announcement by Secretary Hagel that up to 1,000 U.S. troops could be kept in Afghanistan until the spring of 2015 to substitute for a delay in NATO troops being available to provide needed support.
Members have raised various concerns about the broad authorities requested for the new CTPF, which exceed current authorities for other Train & Equip programs. The conference version of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 3797, reduces the funding and rejects most of the new authorities requested. Other concerns include the lack of evidence of success in previous similar programs, particularly in situations like the complex political-military environment in Syria and Iraq.
Congress may wish to consider ways to restrict war-funding to exclude activities marginally related to war operations and support, and to limit the use of ground troops in Operation Inherent Resolve. |
crs_R43221 | crs_R43221_0 | Whether and when persons who are present in the United States, but not U.S. citizens or nationals, may receive particular types of government assistance can be difficult to ascertain because of the various federal, state, and local laws governing their eligibility for such assistance. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) was enacted to establish "national policy with respect to welfare and immigration." With certain exceptions, PRWORA bars aliens who are not "qualified aliens" from receiving federal, state, or local "public benefits," and precludes qualified aliens from receiving federal "means-tested public benefits" for 5 or more years after they enter the United States in a qualified status. However, there are also a number of other federal, state, and local measures adopted prior to, or after, the enactment of PRWORA, some of which make different provisions for noncitizens' eligibility for particular benefits. The applications of these measures can raise complicated issues of constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and administrative law. Specifically, PRWORA permits (but does not require) states to
determine, with certain exceptions and subject to certain restrictions, the eligibility of qualified aliens for TANF, social services block grants, and Medicaid, and for state public benefits; limit aliens' eligibility for "programs of general cash public assistance" furnished by states or localities, provided that any such limitations are not more restrictive than the limitations imposed under comparable federal programs; attribute the income and resources of the alien's sponsor(s) to the alien when determining aliens' eligibility for state public benefits; and provide state and local benefits to unauthorized aliens by enacting a measure subsequent to PRWORA's enactment that provides for such eligibility. Noncitizens' Rights to Equal Protection
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection applies to all "persons" within the United States, including aliens (regardless of their immigration status). Thus, measures governing eligibility for public benefits could potentially be subject to legal challenges if they treat aliens differently than citizens. Application to Federal Restrictions on Public Benefits
Because Congress's plenary power over immigration permits it to enact measures as to aliens that would be unconstitutional if applied to citizens, federal restrictions on noncitizens' eligibility for public benefits are subject to rational basis review, and have generally been upheld. Whether PRWORA Provides a Uniform Rule for States and Localities
Courts have reached differing conclusions about whether PRWORA provides a uniform rule regarding noncitizens' eligibility for public benefits, like that contemplated in Plyler . In other cases, the court has suggested that rational basis review is appropriate so long as the measure only distinguishes between classes of aliens, and does not distinguish between aliens and citizens. This means that state or local measures that purport to regulate immigration—by determining which aliens may enter or remain in the United States, or the terms of their continued presence—are, per se , preempted, regardless of whether Congress has legislated on the matter. Preemption by the INA or PRWORA
Measures that are not per se preempted as regulations of immigration can also be challenged on the grounds that they are expressly or impliedly preempted by federal statute. However, it also refers to "other similar benefit[s]," raising questions about whether particular types of assistance constitute federal, state, or local public benefits for purposes of PRWORA. More recently, similar questions have arisen as to what it means for professional licenses to be provided by a government agency or with appropriated funds. As noted previously, PRWORA does not affirmatively define federal means-tested public benefits . Conclusion
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, noncitizen eligibility for public benefits can raise complicated legal issues in part because of the various federal, state, and local statutes regarding such eligibility, and in part because the construction and application of these statutes can raise questions of constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and administrative law. | Whether and when noncitizens may receive particular types of government assistance can be difficult to ascertain because of the various federal, state, and local laws governing their eligibility for such assistance. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 was enacted to establish "national policy with respect to welfare and immigration." With certain exceptions, PRWORA bars aliens who are not "qualified aliens" from receiving federal, state, or local "public benefits," and also precludes qualified aliens from receiving "federal means-tested public benefits" for five or more years after they enter the United States in a qualified status. However, there are also a number of federal, state, and local measures adopted prior to, or after, PRWORA, some of which make different provisions for noncitizens' eligibility for particular benefits. The application of these measures can raise complicated issues of constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and administrative law.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection applies to all "persons" within the United States, including aliens. Thus, measures governing eligibility for public benefits could be subject to legal challenge if they treat aliens differently than citizens. Because of Congress's plenary power over immigration, federal measures that distinguish between aliens and citizens will generally be upheld so long as they are rationally related to a legitimate government interest. State and local measures, in contrast, are generally subject to some type of heightened scrutiny, the degree of which can vary depending upon the benefit involved and the aliens' status. However, state and local measures that follow a "uniform rule" established by Congress could potentially receive the same deferential review afforded to federal measures. Courts have reached differing conclusions as to whether PRWORA establishes such a uniform rule. Courts have also disagreed as to whether measures that treat lawful nonimmigrant aliens differently from citizens are subject to the same level of scrutiny as those that distinguish between lawful immigrant aliens and citizens.
Questions can also arise as to whether particular state and local measures are preempted by federal law. Some states and localities, concerned about the presence of unauthorized aliens within their jurisdiction, have recently enacted measures which would define benefits or related terms more broadly than PRWORA does, and further restrict aliens' eligibility for them. Such measures could potentially be challenged on preemption grounds because the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate immigration. State and local measures that purport to determine the conditions upon which aliens may enter or remain in the United States are, per se, preempted. Federal statutes can also preempt state and local measures by expressly prohibiting them, containing conflicting requirements, or occupying the field.
Moreover, in the application of particular measures, there have been questions about whether particular government programs, services, or types of assistance are benefits. For example, although PRWORA includes certain types of assistance within its definitions of public benefit, it also refers to "any other similar benefit." Parties have litigated whether particular assistance constitutes a benefit "similar" to those governed by PRWORA. They have also litigated whether PRWORA bars aliens from receiving benefits whose provision entails the expenditure of appropriated funds, even if the aliens themselves must pay a fee for the benefit; as well as what it means for a state to "affirmatively provide" for eligibility. Similarly, because PRWORA does not affirmatively define "federal means-tested public benefits," there has been debate about the degree of deference to be accorded to agency interpretations of this term as encompassing only five mandatory spending programs (e.g., Medicaid), and no discretionary spending programs. |
crs_RL33648 | crs_RL33648_0 | Introduction
The Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been developing and maintaining a National Asset Database. The Database contains information on a wide range of individual assets, from dams, hazardous materials sites, and nuclear power plants to local festivals, petting zoos, and sporting good stores. The presence of a large number of entries of the latter type (i.e., assets generally perceived as having more local importance than national importance) has attracted much criticism from the press and from Members of Congress. Many critics of the Database have assumed that it is (or should be) DHS's list of the nation's most critical assets and are concerned that, in its current form, it is being used inappropriately as the basis upon which federal resources, including infrastructure protection grants, are allocated. According to DHS, both of those assumptions are wrong. This report relies primarily on a DHS Office of the Inspector General (DHS IG) report, released on July 11, 2006, but makes reference to other government documents as well. The DHS gets information for the Database from a variety of sources. Judging from the criticism leveled at it, many believe the National Asset Database is (or should be) DHS's list of assets critical to the nation. However, in his written response to the IG report, then-Undersecretary for Preparedness, George Foresman, to whom the Office of Infrastructure Protection reported, stated that the National Asset Database is "not a list of critical assets...[but rather] a national asset inventory...[providing] the 'universe' from which various lists of critical assets are produced." What Are Its Intended Uses? The National Infrastructure Protection Plan establishes DHS's risk management process. According to the NIPP, identifying the assets that comprise the nation's 17 critical infrastructure sectors and key resources within the National Asset Database represents the first step in its process. Also, if the National Asset Database is meant to be a comprehensive list of the nation's infrastructure assets, regardless of criticality, it is incomplete. However, according to the Assistant Secretary, the National Asset Database does not drive DHS's funding decisions. Issues
Assuming that the Undersecretary is not changing the definition of critical infrastructure, and accepting DHS's argument that the National Asset Database is not a prioritized list of critical assets, and that it is not the basis for determining grant allocations, two issues remain: the quality of the information contained in the Database; and, whether the value of keeping low criticality assets in the Database warrant the costs associated with maintaining them in the Database. The quality of the information gathered early in the development of the Database has been questioned. Currently, DHS considers only about 2,500 assets as being the most critical, indicating that less than critical sites could actually dominate the cost of maintaining the Database. A Potential Change in Status for the Database
Currently the presence of a particular asset in the Database carries with it no specific obligations on the part of the owner/operator. However, if ever having an asset on the National Asset Database carries with it some legal or regulatory requirements, then what is in and not in the Database, or adding or removing assets from it, might result in much greater consequences for both the owners/operators and DHS. | The Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been developing and maintaining a National Asset Database. The Database contains information on over 77,000 individual assets, ranging from dams, hazardous materials sites, and nuclear power plants to local festivals, petting zoos, and sporting good stores. The presence of a large number of entries of the latter type (i.e., assets generally perceived as having more local importance than national importance) has attracted much criticism from the press and from Members of Congress. Many critics of the Database have assumed that it is (or should be) DHS's list of the nation's most critical assets and are concerned that, in its current form, it is being used inappropriately as the basis upon which federal resources, including infrastructure protection grants, are allocated.
According to DHS, both of those assumptions are wrong. DHS characterizes the National Asset Database not as a list of critical assets, but rather as a national asset inventory providing the 'universe' from which various lists of critical assets are produced. As such, the Department maintains that it represents just the first step in DHS's risk management process outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. DHS has developed, apparently in parallel with the National Asset Database, a list of about 2,200 assets that it has determined are critical to the nation. Also, while the National Asset Database has been used to support federal grant-making decisions, according to a DHS official, it does not drive those decisions.
In July 2006 the DHS Office of the Inspector General released a report on the National Asset Database. Its primary conclusion was that the Database contained too many unusual and out-of-place assets and recommended that those judged to be of little national significance be removed from the Database. In his written response to the DHS IG report, the then-Undersecretary for Preparedness did not concur with this recommendation, asserting that keeping these less than nationally significant assets in the Database gave it a situational awareness that can assist in preparing and responding to a variety of incidents.
Accepting the DHS descriptions of the National Asset Database, questions and issues remain. For example, the National Asset Database seems to have evolved away from its origins as a list of critical infrastructures, perhaps causing the differences in perspective on what the Database is or should be. As an inventory of the nation's assets, the National Asset Database is incomplete, limiting its value in preparing and responding to a wide variety of incidents. Assuring the quality of the information in the Database is important and a never-ending task. If DHS not only keeps the less than nationally significant assets in the Database but adds more of them to make the inventory complete, assuring the quality of the data on these assets may dominate the cost of maintaining the Database, while providing uncertain value. Finally, the information currently contained in the Database carries with it no legal obligations on the owner/operators of the asset. If, however, the Database becomes the basis for regulatory action in the future, what appears in the Database takes on more immediate consequences for both DHS and the owner/operators. |
crs_R41746 | crs_R41746_0 | Concerns about the U.S. highway system's seismic risk stem from interest in protecting public safety, facilitating response and recovery efforts, and minimizing economic loss and social disruption. This report addresses frequently asked questions about the risk from earthquakes to highway systems, including bridges, tunnels, pavements, and other highway components. What Are the Components of Seismic Risk? Seismic risk to a highway system is determined by three factors:
likelihood of seismic events of varying magnitudes, and related physical events, often referred to as the hazard; vulnerability of highway structures to damage from such events; and potential consequences of that vulnerability (e.g., lives lost, economic disruption). Seismic hazards are greatest in the western United States, particularly in California, Washington, Oregon, and Alaska and Hawaii. Other events that can occur in response to an earthquake, including soil liquefaction, landslides, tsunamis, flooding, and fires, also contribute to the hazard exposure of a highway. No national database exists on the seismic design and retrofit status of highway system components; thus, a perspective on vulnerability at the national level is unavailable. The performance of highway bridges is a critical determinant of the seismic performance of a highway system. National seismic bridge design standards have been in place since 1992, based on guidelines developed in the 1970s and 1980s. Many of the most vulnerable older bridges, particularly in West Coast states, have been retrofitted to improve seismic resilience. In contrast, many older bridges in the New Madrid seismic zone have not been retrofitted. Existing highway structures vulnerable to earthquake hazards can be replaced, retrofitted, abandoned, or simply left alone. The decision with respect to each structure generally is up to state governments and other infrastructure owners; most importantly, state governments determine whether to pursue retrofitting or replacement as they set priorities for using federal and state highway funds. Because no national data exist on the status of retrofitting existing highway bridges or other infrastructure, no national estimates exist of what it might cost to retrofit the most vulnerable structures. Seismic retrofitting of highway infrastructure is an eligible expense for federal highway funds apportioned to states (i.e., distributed by formula), via the Surface Transportation Block Grant Program and the National Highway Performance Program, and as preventive maintenance under other federal-aid highway programs. State and local governments and other highway and bridge owners also may use their own funds for seismic retrofitting. What Is the U.S. Department of Transportation's Role in Enhancing Seismic Resiliency? Apart from its role in administering federal-aid highway funds that may be used for seismic retrofitting, DOT and its FHWA also fund seismic hazard research and training and coordinate with other federal agencies working on enhancing resilience. Four federal agencies responsible for long-term earthquake risk reduction coordinate their activities under NEHRP: the USGS, NSF, FEMA, and NIST. | Earthquakes and related events, such as soil liquefaction, landslides, tsunamis, flooding, and fires, pose risks to highway infrastructure. Concerns about the U.S. highway system's seismic vulnerability stem from interest in protecting public safety, facilitating response and recovery efforts, and minimizing economic loss and social disruption. This report addresses a number of frequently asked questions about earthquake risk and highway system components, especially bridges.
The three components of seismic risk to the highway system are the likelihood of an earthquake of varying magnitudes, the vulnerability of highway structures to damage, and the potential consequences of that vulnerability. Seismic hazards are greatest in the West Coast states, California, Washington, and Oregon, as well as Alaska and Hawaii. Although disputed by some geologists, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) identifies high hazard in portions of several southern and midwestern states associated with the seismic zone near New Madrid, MO. There is also growing concern about earthquakes induced by activities associated with oil and natural gas production.
Existing highway structures vulnerable to earthquake hazards can be replaced, retrofitted, abandoned, or simply left alone. The decision of how to manage each structure's seismic risk generally is up to state governments and other infrastructure owners. There is no national database of seismic design and retrofit status of highways. Many states at greatest risk have assessed their highway infrastructure's seismic risk and directed funding to mitigate these risks.
Bridges are a major determinant of the seismic performance of a highway system. National seismic bridge design standards have been in place since 1992. Many of the most vulnerable older bridges, particularly in West Coast states, have been retrofitted to improve seismic resilience. In contrast, many older bridges in the New Madrid seismic zone have not been retrofitted.
Because no national database exists on the status of retrofitting existing highway bridges or other infrastructure, no national estimates are available for what it might cost to retrofit the most vulnerable structures. Seismic retrofitting of highway infrastructure is an eligible expense for federal highway funds distributed by formula to states. However, when states choose to invest their federal funds in seismic risk reduction, less is available for other purposes. State and local governments and other highway and bridge owners also may use their own funds for seismic retrofitting.
In addition to its role in administering federal-aid highway funds that may be used for seismic retrofitting, the Department of Transportation (DOT) supports seismic hazard research and training and coordinates with other federal agencies working on enhancing resilience. Other federal agencies that contribute to improving the highway system's seismic resiliency include the USGS, the National Science Foundation (NFS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). |
crs_R41101 | crs_R41101_0 | This administrative policy was codified into law in amendments to the Stafford Act contained in P.L. The cost-shares are reflective of the Stafford Act's fundamental insistence on state participation and that the State "will comply with all applicable cost-sharing requirements of this Act." Section 406 is the repair or replacement of public infrastructure. An adjustment of the cost-share from 25% state and local share of a project to 10%, as proscribed in regulation, can greatly reduce the costs of the disaster for state and local governments while increasing federal expenditures. Some have questioned whether the per capita amount employed by FEMA is reasonable based on average per capita amounts of damages for major disaster declarations. Timing and Frequency of Cost-Share Adjustments
In some catastrophic events, such as Hurricane Katrina, the estimated eligible damage amounts crested the cost-share threshold early in the disaster recovery period (in the case of Katrina, two months following the event) and the cost-share was adjusted. These are the waivers intended to be made through FEMA's cost-share adjustment process as defined in regulation using a per capita threshold amount of damage. While the majority of cost-share waivers have met this threshold, others have been included for various reasons that will be detailed throughout this report. Cost Shares for U.S. Cost-Share Waivers By Program Area
Public Assistance Cost-Share Waivers
Sections 403, 406, and 407 are those Stafford provisions that reimburse emergency work, permanent infrastructure repair and debris removal. Unlike the flexibility noted above for the programs with a floor of "not less than 75 percent," the Stafford Act states that "the Federal share shall be 75 percent," necessitating legislation to adjust that amount for the ONA program. Cost-share reduction legislation for the Gulf Coast (including the declarations for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma) did not address the HMGP section; as a result, the cost-share for hazard mitigation costs remains at 75 % federal and 25% state and local. Under P.L. Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew and a Different Cost-Share
During the disaster-quiescent 1980's the question of cost-share was not a prominent part of the discussion for either Congress or the state and local governments affected by disaster declarations. This second threshold was used to qualify the nine Midwestern states most impacted by the flooding for a reduced cost-share. Also, the decision to grant cost-share waivers to Florida and Texas may have been in recognition of the amount of help both states had provided to Mississippi and Louisiana, respectively, in both emergency management resources and in hosting large numbers of evacuees in the wake of the storms of 2005. There have been several instances when Congress chose to adjust a state's cost-share by legislation. That for states in which the President declared a major disaster (as that term is defined in Section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 USC 5122) on September 24, 2005, as a result of Hurricane Rita, each county or parish eligible for individual and public assistance under such declaration in such states will be treated equally for purposes of cost-share adjustments under such Act, to account for the impact in those counties and parishes of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina. 111-32 , reduced cost-shares for damages from Hurricane Ike. However, the per capita damage amounts in both states were far below the per capita qualifying criteria. However, the major disaster declarations for the affected states did contain a cost-share adjustment for the Direct Federal Assistance provided for power and transportation help. In that event, the Bush Administration established the federal nature of the contribution early in the process. Certainly the broader authority to judge what is or is not a disaster under the Stafford Act has provided president's since 1988 with more latitude to approve unusual or "marginal" events as disasters or emergencies. But regulatory cost-share waivers, if applied broadly and without the compelling support of recent congressional legislative waivers, could chip away at that commitment and complicate, rather than strengthen, the federal-state partnership
Conclusion
The cost-shares for the funding of Stafford Act programs speak to the cooperative working relationship reflected in that legislation between the two levels of government in addressing disaster response and recovery work. Recent congressional actions demonstrate a recognition of the financial burdens caused by disaster damage, while also demonstrating a willingness to adjust cost-share amounts for events that are not of the scope and size associated with previous cost-share adjustments. The resulting additional assistance provided to states and localities, through more generous cost-shares, increases the overall disaster costs to the federal government. Within this new reality, the cost-share adjustments, and their increase of the federal share, could begin to impinge on the annual budget choices faced by the Obama Administration and Congress. | The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (The Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288) includes the Public Assistance (PA) program, Sections 406 and 407 of the act. These sections provide assistance to states, local governments and non-profit organizations for debris removal and rebuilding of the public and non-profit infrastructure. The Stafford Act is a partnership between the federal and state governments and part of the partnership is the notion that state and local governments should have some "skin in the game." That is, they should contribute toward some of the costs incurred by the disaster response and recovery programs. The division of costs between federal and state governments is known as a "cost-share." The language of the Stafford Act defining cost-shares for the repair, restoration, and replacement of damaged facilities provides that the federal share "shall be not less than 75 percent." These provisions have been in effect for over 20 years. The Stafford Act also gives the President the authority to adjust some of the cost-shares. While this authority is long standing, the history of FEMA's administrative adjustments and Congress' legislative actions in this area, are of a more recent vintage.
In all, there have been 245 cost-share adjustments of varying sizes and lengths of time dating back to 1986. In 1998 FEMA promulgated regulations that provide a more consistent and open approach to cost-share adjustments. The overwhelming majority of these cost-share adjustments have been based on that regulatory authority and carried out by the executive branch through administrative actions. However, since 1997, and particularly in the wake of the difficult issues caused by the Gulf Coast storms of 2005, Congress has begun to exercise its authority to adjust cost-shares. The recent trend toward legislative cost-share waivers suggests that Congress may have an interest in continuing to influence the federal/state relationship in providing resources to respond to disaster situations.
The cost-share regulation establishes eligible per capita disaster damage amounts that could qualify a state for cost-share reductions. The per capita amounts are updated on an annual basis. With the adjustment process formalized in regulation, and with larger disasters more frequent in succeeding years, the cost-share waivers have also become more common. Certainly the interest in achieving such a reduction for the state and local share has grown with the awareness of the cost-share adjustments during large disaster events such as Hurricane Katrina. Beyond actions by the executive branch, Congress has adjusted cost-shares through legislation when a state or states may not, or have yet to meet, the per capita threshold. FEMA and the Clinton administration adjusted the cost-shares for some states affected by the 1993 Mississippi River flooding that had not met the per capita policy amount.
In 2007, Congress adjusted the cost-shares following the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005 for states that did not meet the identified threshold and also waived cost-shares for programs other than the PA program. Most recently, in P.L. 111-32, Congress again adjusted the state cost-shares for the two states most impacted by Hurricane Ike in 2008. The legislation also waived the cost-share for two other states, separate from the hurricane area, with major disaster declarations that did not meet the qualifying threshold. There have been multiple cost-share adjustments for the Hurricane Sandy major disaster declarations. Broader administrative cost-share adjustments for the major disaster declarations for Hurricane Sandy will depend on whether the eligible per capita disaster damage totals mandated by regulation are reached. While the expenditures for Sandy are large, so too are the populations in the affected states.
Under the Insular Areas Act, a different threshold is implemented for U.S. territories that provides a more generous cost-share for smaller disaster events in several of the territories. Cost-share waivers have also been frequently applied.
Cost-share waivers can be a great help to a state and its communities seeking to recover from a disaster event and reeling from the economic problems caused by the disaster. But such waivers also reduce the supplemental nature of Stafford Act funding through the increase of the federal share. How such cost-share waivers are administered is an issue that FEMA has addressed through regulation and Congress has addressed through legislation. This report will be revised as warranted by events. |
crs_RL33960 | crs_RL33960_0 | Introduction
The primary source of federal aid to K-12 education is the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), particularly its Title I, Part A program of Education for the Disadvantaged. The ESEA was initially enacted in 1965 (P.L. 89-10), and was most recently amended and reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110 ). The NCLB authorized virtually all ESEA programs through FY2008. It is widely expected that the 113 th Congress will consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA. The NCLB initiated a major expansion of federal influence on several aspects of public K-12 education, primarily with the aim of increasing the accountability of public school systems and individual public schools for improving achievement outcomes of all students, especially the disadvantaged. The results of these assessments are used to make complex annual adequate yearly progress (AYP) determinations for each public school and local educational agency (LEA). A series of increasingly substantial consequences must be applied to schools and LEAs that fail to meet the AYP standards for two consecutive years or more. Accountability requirements also extend to virtually all public school teachers and aides with respect to their qualifications. Beyond Title I-A, other major ESEA programs provide grants to support the education of migrant students; recruitment of and professional development for teachers; language instruction for limited English proficient (LEP) students; drug abuse prevention programs; after-school instruction and care; expansion of charter schools and other forms of public school choice; education services for Native American, Native Hawaiian, and Alaska Native students; Impact Aid to compensate local educational agencies for taxes forgone due to certain federal activities; and a wide variety of innovative educational approaches or instruction to meet particular student needs. The waivers exempt states from various academic accountability requirements, teacher qualification-related requirements, and funding flexibility requirements that were enacted through NCLB. However, in order to receive the waivers, SEAs must agree to meet four principles established by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) for "improving student academic achievement and increasing the quality of instruction." The four principles, as stated by ED, are as follows: (1) college- and career-ready expectations for all students; (2) state-developed differentiated recognition, accountability, and support; (3) supporting effective instruction and leadership; and (4) reducing duplication and unnecessary burden. Taken collectively, the waivers and principles included in the ESEA flexibility package amount to a fundamental redesign by the Administration of many of the accountability and teacher-related requirements included in current law. As of May 2013, ED had approved ESEA flexibility package applications for 37 states and the District of Columbia and was reviewing applications from several other states. If Congress continues to work on ESEA reauthorization during the 113 th Congress, it is possible that provisions included in any final bill may be similar to or override the waivers and principles established by the Administration. The remainder of this report focuses only on current law and does not discuss the details of the ESEA flexibility package or how it modifies current law. For more information about the ESEA flexibility package, see CRS Report R42328, Educational Accountability and Secretarial Waiver Authority Under Section 9401 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act . The timeline must incorporate concrete movement toward meeting an ultimate goal of all students reaching a proficient or higher level of achievement by the end of the 2013-2014 school year. | The primary source of federal aid to K-12 education is the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), particularly its Title I, Part A program of Education for the Disadvantaged. The ESEA was initially enacted in 1965 (P.L. 89-10), and was most recently amended and reauthorized by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, P.L. 107-110). The NCLB authorized virtually all ESEA programs through FY2008. It is widely expected that the 113th Congress will consider whether to amend and extend the ESEA.
The NCLB initiated a major expansion of federal influence upon several aspects of public K-12 education, primarily with the aim of increasing the accountability of public school systems and individual public schools for improving achievement outcomes of all students, especially the disadvantaged. States must implement in all public schools and school districts a variety of standards-based assessments in reading, math and science; make complex annual adequate yearly progress (AYP) determinations for each public school and district; and require virtually all public school teachers and aides to meet a variety of qualification requirements. State AYP policies must incorporate an ultimate goal of all public school students reaching a proficient or higher level of achievement by the end of the 2013-2014 school year. Further, participating states must enforce a series of increasingly substantial consequences for most of their schools and almost all school districts that fail to meet the AYP standards for two consecutive years or more. All of these requirements are associated with state participation in the ESEA Title I-A program.
Other major ESEA programs provide grants to support the education of migrant students; recruitment of and professional development for teachers; language instruction for limited English proficient students; drug abuse prevention programs; after-school instruction and care; expansion of charter schools and other forms of public school choice; education services for Native American, Native Hawaiian, and Alaska Native students; Impact Aid to compensate local educational agencies for taxes foregone due to certain federal activities; and a wide variety of innovative educational approaches or instruction to meet particular student needs.
While Congress has not enacted legislation to reauthorize the ESEA, the Administration has made available an ESEA flexibility package that waives various academic accountability requirements, teacher qualification-related requirements, and funding flexibility requirements that were enacted through NCLB. In exchange for these waivers, states must agree to meet four principles established by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) for "improving student academic achievement and increasing the quality of instruction." The four principles, as stated by ED, are as follows: (1) college- and career-ready expectations for all students; (2) state-developed differentiated recognition, accountability, and support; (3) supporting effective instruction and leadership; and (4) reducing duplication and unnecessary burden.
Taken collectively, the waivers and principles included in the ESEA flexibility package amount to a fundamental redesign by the Administration of many of the accountability and teacher-related requirements included in current law. As of May 2013, ED had approved ESEA flexibility package applications for 37 states and the District of Columbia and was reviewing applications from several other states. If Congress considers ESEA reauthorization during the 113th Congress, it is possible that provisions included in any final bill may be similar to or override the waivers and principles established by the Administration.
This report focuses only on current law and does not discuss the details of the ESEA flexibility package or how it modifies current law. For more information about the ESEA flexibility package, see CRS Report R42328, Educational Accountability and Secretarial Waiver Authority Under Section 9401 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. |
crs_R41658 | crs_R41658_0 | Introduction
Since Congress approved an equestrian statue to George Washington in 1783, more than 100 other memorials have been authorized in the District of Columbia. In 1986, Congress debated and passed the Commemorative Works Act to guide the memorial creation process in the District of Columbia. This report does not address memorials outside the District of Columbia. Congress created the act in an effort
(1) to preserve the integrity of the comprehensive design of the L'Enfant and McMillan plans for the Nation's Capital; (2) to ensure the continued public use and enjoyment of open space in the District of Columbia and its environs, and to encourage the location of commemorative works within the urban fabric of the District of Columbia; (3) to preserve, protect, and maintain the limited amount of open space available to residents of, and visitors to, the Nation's Capital; and (4) to ensure that future commemorative works in areas administered by the National Park Service and the Administrator of General Services in the District of Columbia and its environs are…appropriately designed, constructed, and located; and…reflect a consensus of lasting national significance of the subjects involved. 108-126 , a reserve area and building moratorium were established on the National Mall. As a result, the definitions proscribed for memorial placement in Area I, where new commemorative works must be of preeminent historical and lasting significance to the United States, and Area II, which is reserved for subjects of lasting historical significance to the American people, became more important when deciding where a commemorative work should be placed. The NPS outline guides initiation, legislation, site election and approval, design approval, fundraising, construction, and dedication of commemorative works. Extension of Statutory Authority
In some instances, Congress has chosen to extend the legislative authority for a commemorative work. All authorized commemorative works are provided a seven-year period to complete the work unless the group has a construction permit issued by the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) or the Administrator of the General Services Administration (Administrator). 3922), authorizes the Vietnam Women's Memorial Project, Incorporated, to establish a memorial on Federal land in the District of Columbia or its environs to honor women who served in the Armed Forces of the United States in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era;
Whereas section 3 of the said Act of November 15, 1988, states the sense of the Congress that it would be most fitting and appropriate to place the memorial within the two and two-tenths acre site of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in the District of Columbia which is within area I; and
Whereas the Secretary of the Interior has notified the Congress of his determination that the memorial authorized by the said Act of November 15, 1988, should be located in area I: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States Of America in Congress assembled, That the location of a commemorative work to honor women who served in the Armed Forces of the United States in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era, authorized by the Act approved November 15, 1988 (102 Stat. Once the memorial sponsor has chosen a designer and selected a concept design plan, those plans are presented to the NPS or General Services Administration, the Commission of Fine Arts, and the NCPC. Fundraising
As discussed above in " Payment of Expenses ," authorizing legislation often contains a statement that the commemorative work is to be created pursuant to the CWA and that the use of federal funds is not generally authorized or appropriated for the creation of commemorative works. In some instances, Congress has appropriated federal funds to assist with the creation of the commemorative work. 24. Appendix C. District of Columbia Map with Area Designations
Appendix D. Entities Responsible for Memorials in the District of Columbia
The process established by the Commemorative Works Act (CWA) to create a commemorative work in the District of Columbia involves the National Capital Memorial Advisory Commission, the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, the National Capital Planning Commission, the District of Columbia Historic Preservation Office, and sometimes the American Battle Monuments Commission. | In 1783, the Continental Congress authorized the first memorial in American history, an equestrian statue to honor George Washington that was to be constructed by the "best artist" in Europe. Since that time, Congress has authorized more than 100 commemorative works in the District of Columbia. Even with multiple authorized works, however, no specific process existed for the creation of commemorative works for almost two centuries. While Congress has long been responsible for authorizing memorials on federal land, the process for approving site locations, memorial design plans, and funding was historically haphazard. At times, Congress was involved in the entire design and building process. In other instances, that authority was delegated to executive branch officials, federal commissions were created, or Congress directly authorized a sponsor group to establish a memorial.
In 1986, in an effort to create a statutory process for the creation, design, and construction of commemorative works in the District of Columbia, Congress debated and passed the Commemorative Works Act (CWA). The CWA codified congressional procedure for authorizing commemorative works when federal land is administered by the National Park Service or the General Services Administration. The act delegated responsibility for overseeing design, construction, and maintenance to the Secretary of the Interior or the Administrator of the General Services Administration, and several other federal entities, including the National Capital Planning Commission, the Commission of Fine Arts, and the National Capital Memorial Advisory Commission. Additionally, the CWA restricts placement of commemorative works to certain areas of the District of Columbia based on the subject's historic importance. These areas include the Reserve (i.e., the National Mall), where no new commemorative works are permitted; Area I, where new commemorative works must be of preeminent historical and lasting significance to the United States; and Area II, which is reserved for subjects of lasting historical significance to the American people. The act further stipulates that the Secretary of the Interior or the Administrator of the General Services Administration provide recommendations to Congress on the placement of works within Area I.
Pursuant to the CWA, the National Park Service and the National Capital Planning Commission outlined a 24-step process to guide the creation of a commemorative work in the District of Columbia. The guidelines include initiation of a memorial, authorizing legislation, site selection and approval, fundraising, design approval, construction, and memorial dedication.
Once a commemorative work is authorized, Congress may continue its involvement in the process in two ways. First, because the CWA provides a seven-year authorization for all commemorative works (with an administrative extension available), Congress is sometimes asked to extend a memorial sponsor group's authority beyond the initial period. Second, in some circumstances, Congress is asked to provide appropriations to assist a sponsor group's fundraising. In the past, appropriations for commemorative works have been in the form of both direct appropriations and matching funds.
This report does not address memorials outside the District of Columbia. |
crs_R42842 | crs_R42842_0 | The declaration also noted the completion of a model chapter on transparency, adding to the list of model chapters developed by APEC for use by its members when negotiating bilateral or multilateral trade agreements. In addition, the declaration committed the APEC members to develop non-discriminatory, market-driven innovation policies that promote greater involvement of small, medium, and micro-sized enterprises (SMMEs) and women in the field of technological innovation. Key Issues for U.S. Policy
Although as the host for this year's meetings, Russia set the overall agenda for the Leaders' Meeting and the resulting Leaders' Declaration, the United States delegation had its own priorities to pursue in Vladivostok. Below is a summary (in alphabetical order) of the five key issues addressed at the APEC meetings in Vladivostok, according to officials with the U.S. State Department and U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR's) office. Agreement on Environmental Goods Tariff Reductions
The leading outcome for the United States, according to U.S. officials, was the agreement to lower tariffs on 54 categories of "environmental goods" to 5% or less by 2015. At the 19 th Leaders' Meeting held in Honolulu in November 2011, the APEC members agreed to lower tariffs to 5% by 2015 on a then-undesignated list of environmental goods. The leaders' efforts on food security and sustainable agriculture built on two previous APEC declarations. According to U.S. officials, the APEC leaders agreed that in preparation for next year's Leaders' Meetings, the members would conduct comprehensive supply chain performance assessments. The study reports that the ease of doing business in APEC economies, as measured by several commercial factors, had improved by an average of 8.2% between 2009 and 2011. The results exceeded APEC's target of a 5% improvement during the same time period, and were nearly a third of APEC's goal of a 25% improvement by 2015. APEC and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
During President Obama's first term, there seemed to be a subtle shift in the role of APEC in U.S. trade policy and its interaction with the ongoing TPP negotiations. Following the 2010 Leaders' Meeting held in Yokohama, Japan, the Leaders' Declaration was more explicit about the role of the FTAAP and its relationship to APEC:
We will take concrete steps toward realization of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), which is a major instrument to further APEC's regional economic integration agenda. Despite having helped organize the first APEC Leaders' Meeting in 1993, former Australia Prime Minister Paul Keating subsequently referred to APEC as a "talk shop of debatable output." As an APEC member, the United States contributes to the support of the APEC secretariat in Singapore, as well as various APEC programs. | Russia hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) week-long series of senior-level meetings in Vladivostok on September 2-9, 2012. The 20 th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, the main event for the week, was held September 8-9, 2012. It was the first time that Russia had hosted the APEC meetings, as well as the first APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting at which all the members were also members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
U.S. expectations for the 20 th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting were relatively low for a number of reasons. First, several of the members' leaders either did not attend (e.g., President Obama), were effectively lame ducks (e.g., President Hu Jintao of China), or were facing political uncertainty at home (e.g., Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of Japan), making it difficult for the members to consider major commitments. Second, in the eyes of U.S. officials involved in the preparations for the meetings, Russia's lack of experience and past lack of commitment to APEC weakened the pre-meeting preparations for the Leaders' Meeting. Third, by holding the Leaders' Meeting in September (rather than in November, as in previous years), Russia foreshortened the time to work on various initiatives. Fourth, recent events and initiatives, including the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement negotiations, have raised questions within the Obama Administration about APEC's role on the promotion of greater economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.
Despite the low U.S. expectations, U.S. officials indicate that they think the week-long event in Vladivostok was relatively productive. Below is a summary of the main results of these meetings, according to senior officials in the Obama Administration:
The 21 APEC members agreed to lower their tariffs on 54 categories of environmental goods to no more than 5% by 2015. The APEC members endorsed a model chapter on transparency for reference when negotiating multilateral or bilateral trade agreements. The APEC members agreed to cooperate in developing policies and technology to promote sustainable agriculture, including encouraging the harmonizing of domestic regulations on food safety. An APEC report concluded that its members had improved the ease of doing business by an average of 8.2% between 2009 and 2011, fulfilling nearly a third of APEC's goal to obtain a 25% improvement by 2015. The APEC members agreed to continue to promote technological innovation by developing non-discriminatory, market-driven innovation policies and fostering greater communication between academia, businesses, and governments.
U.S. officials are apprehensive, however, about APEC's prospects for the next two years when first Indonesia and then China will be the host members.
This report also examines the role of Congress with respect to APEC, including appropriations necessary to finance APEC's secretariat and U.S. support of APEC activities. |
crs_R43868 | crs_R43868_0 | T he National Trails System Act (16 U.S.C. §§1241-1251) of 1968 established the Appalachian and Pacific Crest National Scenic Trails, and authorized a national system of trails to provide outdoor recreational opportunities and to promote access to the nation's outdoor areas and historic resources. They provide for a variety of outdoor recreation uses. Connecting or Side Trails provide public access to the other types of nationally designated trails or connections between such trails. Congress plays an ongoing role in shaping the National Trails System through legislation and oversight. Congress establishes new trails within the system; directs the Administration to study potential new trails; determines the level of agency funding for trail management; and considers whether new trail categories (such as "national discovery trails") should be included in the system, among other roles. For individual trails, Congress has made specific provisions concerning land acquisition, trail use, and other matters. Ongoing issues for Congress include whether to designate additional trails, how to balance trail designation with other potential land uses, whether trail designation should be accompanied by federal land acquisition, what activities should be permitted on trails, and how to appropriately balance federal and nonfederal funding for trails, among other issues. Additionally, the system contains more than 1,200 NRTs and 6 connecting or side trails, including trails in every state, Washington, DC, and Puerto Rico. Designation and Land Acquisition
NSTs and NHTs are designated by acts of Congress. Prior to establishing a trail, Congress typically directs the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture to study the route for potential inclusion in the system. In contrast to national scenic and historic trails, national recreation trails may be designated by the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture with the consent of the federal agency, state, or political subdivision with jurisdiction over the lands involved. The Secretaries also have authority to designate connecting and side trails. Organization and Management
The 30 national scenic and historic trails are administered by either the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture, acting through the land management agencies. In contrast to the NSTs and NHTs, NRTs are typically administered by states, localities, and private organizations, with federal agencies participating when the trails cross federal lands. The National Park Service is responsible for the overall coordination of the national recreation trails, including nonfederal trails. Such uses may include but are not limited to bicycling, cross-country skiing, day hiking, equestrian activities, jogging or similar fitness activities, overnight and long-distance backpacking, snowmobiling, and surface water and underwater activities. Funding
Each agency with management authority over national trails has its own funding for carrying out activities related to trail administration and management. Legislation
In the 114 th Congress, H.R. 1865 and S. 1423 would designate a new Condor National Recreation Trail in California. H.R. Another proposal ( H.R. 2661 ) would add a new type of trail—"national discovery trails"—to the system. Many comparable bills had also been introduced in previous Congresses. | The National Trails System was created in 1968 by the National Trails System Act (16 U.S.C. §§1241-1251). The system includes four types of trails: (1) national scenic trails (NSTs), which display significant physical characteristics of U.S. regions; (2) national historic trails (NHTs), which follow travel routes of national historical significance; (3) national recreation trails (NRTs), which provide outdoor recreation accessible to urban areas; and (4) connecting or side trails, which provide access to the other types of trails. As defined in the act, NSTs and NHTs are long-distance trails designated by acts of Congress. NRTs and connecting and side trails may be designated by the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture with the consent of the federal agency, state, or political subdivision with jurisdiction over the lands involved.
Congress plays an ongoing role in shaping the National Trails System through legislation and oversight. Broad issues for Congress include, among others:
whether and where to establish new trails in the system, whether to establish new categories of trails (such as "national discovery trails"), and how much funding to provide to agencies for trail management.
When designating individual trails, Congress has considered issues such as:
how to balance trail designation with other potential land uses, how to address federal land acquisition, and whether to make specific provisions for trail use that may differ from those in the overall act.
Congress has established 11 NSTs and 19 NHTs, as well as several NRTs (although recreation trails are more typically designated administratively). In addition, the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture have designated more than 1,200 NRTs and 6 connecting or side trails. The scenic, historic, and connecting trails are federally administered by either the National Park Service (NPS) and/or the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior, or the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture, with cooperation from states and other entities to operate nonfederal trail segments. The roughly 1,200 national recreation trails are typically managed by states, localities, and private organizations, except where they cross federal lands. The act limits federal land acquisition for the trails system, with specific provisions for different trail types.
Each federal agency with management authority over national trails has its own budget for trail administration and management. Trails have also received funding from federal transportation programs, private donations, permits and fees, and local excise taxes, among other sources.
Uses of the national trails may include, but are not limited to, bicycling, cross-country skiing, day hiking, equestrian activities, jogging or similar fitness activities, overnight and long-distance backpacking, snowmobiling, and surface water and underwater activities. Provisions for motorized vehicle use vary among the different types of trails.
Legislation in the 114th Congress would designate a new national recreation trail (H.R. 1865 and S. 1423), direct a study of one trail route for potential addition to the system as a national historic trail (H.R. 984 and S. 479), and make other changes. As in earlier Congresses, a bill (H.R. 2661) has also been introduced to add a new type of trail—national discovery trails—to the system. |
crs_R43586 | crs_R43586_0 | In the second, the Court extended this doctrine to hold that people are not entitled to Fourth Amendment safeguards for records given to a third-party or data generated as part of a person's business transactions with a third-party. In two of the most prominent third-party cases, Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller , the Court held that government access to telephone calling records and bank records, respectively, were not Fourth Amendment searches for which warrants were required. Both Smith and Miller , decided in the mid- to late-1970s, came before the mass digital revolution experienced over the last several decades. Since these decisions, there has been a wave of advancement in data generation, collection, automation, and processing. Two major events in the past few years typify this ongoing debate. The second is the litigation surrounding the National Security Agency's telephone metadata program. With these shifts in technology and legal thinking in mind, this report explores the history and legal foundations of the third-party doctrine. It will then analyze the Court's third-party doctrine cases and provide doctrinal and practical arguments for and against its application. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and the Secrecy Model of Privacy
In 1967, the Court decided Katz v. United States , which abandoned the literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment—one that protected only persons, houses, papers, and effects—to one that also protected intangible interests such as privacy. This would have significant consequences for government access to records and other information held by third parties. The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and upheld the surreptitious surveillance. With White , the Court combined several ideas in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: first, that it is unreasonable for people to expect privacy in information they share with another, and second, that they assume the risk that that information can be handed over to the government. Looking to both this assumption of the risk theory and the secrecy model, the Court then included the following sentence which would come to encapsulate the third-party doctrine:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. In the 1877 case Ex p arte Jackson , the Supreme Court held that the content of a mailed letter was protected under the Fourth Amendment, while the information exposed to the public, such as the address written on the outside, was not. Further emphasizing this distinction, while Smith covered the telephone numbers a person dials to make a call, government access to the numbers dialed after a call has been placed, known as "post-cut through dialed digits," is considered a Fourth Amendment search. Criticism of the Third-Party Doctrine
While the third-party doctrine appears to fit reasonably well with the rest of Fourth Amendment case law, and has other weighty arguments in its favor, it has also had its share of vocal critics both on and off the Court. Implications of United States v. Jones on the Third-Party Doctrine
In addition to the doctrinal and practical arguments made against the third-party doctrine, several concurring opinions in the recent GPS tracking case United States v. Jones prompt additional questions about its continued application. As Justice Scalia's opinion relied upon a trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment, it will likely not have major repercussions for the third-party doctrine, unless one accepts that the government trespasses on an individual's "papers" or "effects" when it accesses records from third-party companies. However, two concurring opinions in Jones by Justices Sotomayor and Alito might signal the willingness of five Justices to reevaluate future applications of the third-party doctrine, at least with respect to pervasive government monitoring. She directly called into question "the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties." Other congressional measures would alter the third-party doctrine in a more targeted way. | In the 1970s, the Supreme Court handed down Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller, two of the most important Fourth Amendment decisions of the 20th century. In these cases, the Court held that people are not entitled to an expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily provide to third parties. This legal proposition, known as the third-party doctrine, permits the government access to, as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, a vast amount of information about individuals, such as the websites they visit; who they have emailed; the phone numbers they dial; and their utility, banking, and education records, just to name a few. Questions have been raised whether this doctrine is still viable in light of the major technological and social changes over the past several decades.
Before there were emails, instant messaging, and other forms of electronic communication, it was much easier for the courts to determine if a government investigation constituted a Fourth Amendment "search." If the police intruded on your person, house, papers, or effects—tangible property interests listed in the text of the Fourth Amendment—that act was considered a search, which had to be "reasonable" under the circumstances. However, with the advent of intangible forms of communication, like the telephone or the Internet, it became much more difficult for judges to determine when certain surveillance practices intruded upon Fourth Amendment rights. With Katz v. United States, the Court supposedly remedied this by declaring that the Fourth Amendment protects not only a person's tangible things, but additionally, his right to privacy. Katz, however, left unprotected anything a person knowingly exposes to the public. This idea would form the basis of Smith and Miller. In those cases, the Court held that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dials (Smith) and in checks and deposit slips he gives to his bank (Miller), as he has exposed them to another and assumed the risk they could be handed over to the government.
While the third-party doctrine has been criticized by Members of Congress, various commentators, and others as overly constrictive of Americans' privacy rights, it appears to fit relatively well with other Fourth Amendment case law. That being said, advancements in data collection, automation, and use have some questioning the continued application of this doctrine in a digital society. Several events have precipitated renewed debates over its continued existence. First was the Supreme Court's decision in the GPS tracking case, United States v. Jones, where two concurring opinions comprising five Justices of the Court called into question various existing Fourth Amendment theories, including the third-party doctrine, at least with respect to long-term government monitoring and advanced surveillance technology. Second was the Edward Snowden leaks relating to the National Security Agency's telephone metadata program, which has been primarily justified by Smith and the third-party doctrine. Various Members of Congress have joined the debate, with some introducing legislation that would require a warrant for access to records held by third-parties, and others introducing more targeted measures that would limit access to information such as geolocation data from third-party companies.
With these legal, social, and technological trends in mind, this report explores the third party-doctrine, including its historical background, its legal and practical underpinnings, and its present and potential future applications. It explores the major third-party doctrine cases and fits them within the larger Fourth Amendment framework. It surveys the various doctrinal and practical arguments for and against its continued application. Lastly, this report describes congressional efforts to supplement legal protection for access to third-party records, as well as suggesting possible future directions in the law. |
crs_RL34184 | crs_RL34184_0 | The brownfields tax incentive in section 198 of the Internal Revenue Code expires on December 31, 2007. It was first enacted in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( P.L. The 110 th Congress may consider another short-term (or long-term) extension, making the tax extension permanent, or allowing it to expire. Another possibility is to repeal the recapture provision. First enacted as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( P.L. 105-34 ), the incentive allows a taxpayer to fully deduct the costs of environmental cleanups in the year the costs were incurred (called "expensing"), rather than spreading the costs over a period of years ("capitalizing"). To take advantage of the brownfields tax incentive, the developer of a property has to obtain a statement from the state environmental agency that the parcel is a "qualified contaminated site" as defined in the law. Since FY2003, the Administration's budget proposals have proposed making the tax incentive permanent. This extension through 2007, which was enacted on December 20, 2006, was made retroactive to December 31, 2005, when the previous extension expired. In 2004 the IRS introduced a new form, Schedule M-3, which provides information, for the first time, on the use of the section 198 brownfields tax incentive. Use of the schedule was phased in, and in the first year of use, tax year 2004 (for returns submitted in 2005), only some corporations and no partnerships were required to file it. The results for 2004 only recently became available, and show section 198 remediation costs of $294,970,000, reported by 110 corporations out of a population of 5,557,965 corporate returns. This information is obviously limited, since the response for 2004 excluded more than half the corporations and all the partnerships, response on the brownfields tax incentive was at the corporations' discretion, and it was limited to those companies with assets of $10 million or more. Partnerships with assets over $10 million were required to use Schedule M-3 beginning with tax year 2006, and those results will be available in February 2009. CRS Survey Findings
CRS surveyed the appropriate environmental agency in each state in 2003, and again in 2007, to determine the number of brownfield certifications they had issued. In 2003, 27 states reported that since the enactment of the provision in August 1997 until the time of the survey in April-June 2003 they had received a total of 161 requests for certification, of which 147 were approved, and 14 were denied. In 1999, as Congress was considering making the tax incentive permanent, Treasury estimated it would be used to clean up 18,000 brownfields over the next 10 years (1,800 per year); the department anticipated that the loss in revenue resulting from the tax incentive would be $600 million for 5 years ($120 million per year), and that it would induce an additional $7 billion in private investment. CRS also contacted four private developers and the editor of a brownfields trade publication to solicit their viewpoints on the subject, as well. Nineteen states reported in both the 2003 and 2007 surveys that they had received no applications for certification. That information will be available in February 2009. | What was regarded as a key brownfields tax incentive in the Internal Revenue Code expires on December 31, 2007. Originally enacted in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34), the provision allows a taxpayer to fully deduct the costs of environmental cleanup in the year the costs were incurred (called "expensing"), rather than spreading the costs over a period of years ("capitalizing"). The provision was adopted to stimulate the cleanup and development of less seriously contaminated sites by providing a benefit to taxpaying developers of brownfield properties. It also contains a "recapture" provision, which diminishes its benefits. In each of its budget proposals since FY2003, the administration has proposed that Congress make the incentive permanent. The 109th Congress renewed the provision (for the fourth time) through 2007 (P.L. 109-432) and made it effective retroactively to December 31, 2005, when the previous extension expired. The law also made sites contaminated by petroleum products eligible for the tax incentive. The 110th Congress may consider a variety of options, including granting another extension, making the incentive permanent, allowing it to expire, or repealing the recapture requirement.
Until recently, information on the extent of use of the brownfields tax incentive could not be determined from federal income tax returns. Use of a new tax form, Schedule M-3, for corporations and partnerships with assets over $10 million began being phased in with tax year 2004. The first of those data, covering the 2004 tax year, became available in February 2007. They showed that section 198 environmental remediation costs of $295 million were reported by 110 corporations, out of a population of 5,557,965 corporate returns. This information is understated because it excluded more than half of all corporations, and all partnerships.
To take advantage of the tax break, a developer has to obtain a certification from the state environmental agency that the site qualifies as a brownfield. CRS surveyed the agencies of all states in 2003, and again in 2007, to ask how many certification applications they had received and approved. In 2003, 27 states reported that they had received a total of 161 applications since enactment in 1997, of which 147 were approved. In 2007, 29 states reported that they had received 175 applications over the previous four years, of which 170 were approved. The results were somewhat surprising; before enactment in 1997 the Treasury Department and the Environmental Protection Agency had expected it to be used as many as 10,000 times per year.
Accordingly, CRS also asked the state agencies, four private developers, and the editor of a trade publication for their views on why the tax incentive was so little used. There was divided opinion on the utility of the tax incentive, and criticism of its stop-and-go nature due to its expiration and renewal every one or two years. The Schedule M-3 data for firms with more than $10 million in assets confirm the CRS survey findings of modest use of the section 198 brownfields tax incentive. The tax form was fully phased in with tax year 2006, and full information will be available in February 2009. However, as discussed in this report, it appears that the section 198 tax break is a useful tool in some brownfield situations. |
crs_R44315 | crs_R44315_0 | Human trafficking in the United States is broadly conceptualized in two categories: sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA; Division A of P.L. Notably, the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (JVTA; P.L. 114-22 ) was signed into law on May 29, 2015. This report discusses domestic human trafficking issues addressed by the JVTA. The report supplements CRS Report R43917, Domestic Human Trafficking Legislation in the 114th Congress , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. A major aspect of U.S. anti-trafficking efforts is victim assistance—providing immediate services when victims are identified and helping them recover from the victimization. The JVTA seeks to improve services to victims. These changes include
clarifying that victims' services and legal assistance under VAWA include services and assistance to victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking who are also victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons ; amending the purpose for grants to tribal governments to combat violence against women to include sex trafficking and creating a new purpose area to provide services to address the needs of youth who are victims of several crimes, including sex trafficking; creating a new tribal coalition grant program (administered by DOJ) that, among other purposes, seeks to enhance access to essential services for Indian women victimized by domestic and sexual violence, including sex trafficking; and to assist Indian tribes in developing and promoting state, local, and tribal laws and policies that enhance best practices for responding to violent crimes against Indian women, including sex trafficking; and amending the authorization for grants for state and local law enforcement's anti-trafficking programs focusing on U.S. citizen victims so that these grants can be used for noncitizen victims as well. The JVTA also makes changes to increase financial penalties for traffickers and heighten the federal response to trafficking offenses. These monies are to be deposited into a Domestic Trafficking Victims' Fund (established by the act). Money from the fund may be used from FY2016 through FY2019 to support certain existing grant programs authorized by the TVPA or to enhance programming for victims of child pornography served under the Victims of Child Abuse Act. However, the act prohibits the use of monies from the fund for medical items or health care or services. The JVTA addresses sex trafficking of children through changes to a few policy areas, including missing and exploited children, runaway youth, the child welfare system, and juvenile justice. Generally, the grants may be used to (1) establish or enhance specialized training programs on the prevention of child trafficking for law enforcement, first responders, health care officials, child welfare officials, juvenile justice personnel, prosecutors, and judicial personnel; (2) establish law enforcement and prosecution units and task forces dedicated to fighting trafficking of children; (3) establish or enhance court programs to assist child trafficking victims; and (4) fund activities of law enforcement agencies to find homeless and runaway youth, including the salaries and associated expenses for retired federal law enforcement officers assisting the law enforcement agencies in finding these youth. Other Issues
Inter-agency Coordination/Efficiency
There have been concerns about possible duplication of efforts and a lack of coordination among the agencies that conduct anti-trafficking activities, and whether the fact that so many agencies are involved with anti-trafficking policy leads to duplication or funds not being used in the most efficient manner. The JVTA directs the President's Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking to conduct a review of human trafficking prevention within the United States. The report is to include (1) a catalog of the U.S. government's efforts to prevent individuals from committing trafficking offenses and prevent children from becoming victims; (2) a survey of the literature related to deterring individuals from trafficking and preventing children from becoming victims; (3) identification of best practices related to preventing human trafficking of children; and (4) identification of gaps in research and data that would be helpful in formulating strategies to prevent child trafficking. The report is to be submitted to the House and the Senate Judiciary Committees within 180 days of the law's enactment. | The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA, S. 178/P.L. 114-22), an omnibus bill that primarily includes anti-human trafficking provisions, was signed into law on May 29, 2015. The bill received broad congressional support, passing the Senate unanimously on April 22, 2015, and the House nearly unanimously (420-3) on May 19, 2015. Through amendments in the House and the Senate, the law incorporates the same or similar provisions from 10 of the 12 bills on trafficking that passed the House in the first few weeks of the 114th Congress: H.R. 159, H.R. 181, H.R. 246, H.R. 285, H.R. 350, H.R. 357, H.R. 398, H.R. 460, H.R. 468, and H.R. 469.
The JVTA amends the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), the major federal law that addresses human trafficking, as well as multiple other federal statutes. It expands the federal response to trafficking in four broad areas: (1) victims' services and benefits, (2) criminal justice, (3) domestic sex trafficking of children, and (4) inter-agency coordination and training, and related areas.
A major aspect of U.S. anti-trafficking efforts is victim assistance: providing immediate services when victims are identified and helping them recover from the victimization. The JVTA seeks to improve services to victims. For example, it directs the Department of Justice, which administers anti-trafficking programs, to provide a database for trafficking victim stakeholders on counseling and other victim supports.
The JVTA also seeks to heighten the federal response to crimes perpetrated by traffickers. A major component of the law is the establishment of new financial penalty assessments for traffickers. These monies are to be deposited into a Domestic Trafficking Victims' Fund established under the act. Money from the fund may be used to award certain existing grants authorized by the TVPA or enhance programming for victims of child pornography served under the Victims of Child Abuse Act, among other purposes. The law prohibits the use of monies from the fund for medical items or health care or services under certain circumstances, though it allows such services to be funded from other sources.
The JVTA responds to domestic sex trafficking of children through changes to a few policy areas, including missing and exploited children, runaway youth, the child welfare system, and juvenile justice. Notably, it requires law enforcement agencies to report additional information to a federal data system on missing children. It also creates a new child human trafficking deterrence program to aid child victims of both sex and labor trafficking while also supporting investigations and prosecutions of trafficking offenses.
The JVTA addresses other issues related to trafficking, particularly concerns about possible duplication of efforts and a lack of coordination among the agencies that conduct anti-trafficking activities. It directs the President's Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking to conduct a review of human trafficking prevention within the United States, including cataloging the U.S. government's efforts to prevent individuals from committing trafficking offenses and to prevent children from becoming victims. The law also requires a Government Accountability Office report to Congress that would include information on federal and state law enforcement agencies' efforts to combat human trafficking as well as information on federal anti-trafficking grant programs.
This report supplements CRS Report R43917, Domestic Human Trafficking Legislation in the 114th Congress. For further information about trafficking, see CRS Report RL34317, Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress; and CRS Report R41878, Sex Trafficking of Children in the United States: Overview and Issues for Congress. |
crs_R44886 | crs_R44886_0 | Introduction
The Antiquities Act of 1906 (54 U.S.C. §§320301-320303) authorizes the President to proclaim national monuments on federal lands that contain "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest." The President is to reserve "the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected." From 1906 to date, Presidents have established 157 monuments and have enlarged, diminished, or otherwise modified previously proclaimed monuments. Presidential establishment of monuments sometimes has been contentious, based on the size of the areas and types of resources protected; the effects of monument designation on land uses; and the lack of requirements for public participation, congressional and state approval, and environmental review, among other issues. Executive Review of Monuments
On April 26, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order requiring the Secretary of the Interior to review national monuments established or expanded by Presidents since 1996. The review is to determine if the establishment or expansion of post-1996 monuments conforms to the policy in the executive order and to develop any recommendation for presidential actions, legislative proposals, or other actions to carry out the policy. In a May 5, 2017, press release, the Department of the Interior (DOI) identified 27 national monuments that would be reviewed under the President's executive order. One of the 27 monuments, Katahdin Woods and Waters National Monument, is under review based on the adequacy of public outreach and coordination with stakeholders in establishing the monument. The other 26 monuments are under review because the size at establishment or after expansion exceeded 100,000 acres. A final report on the secretarial review of monuments is due within 120 days of the issuance of the executive order—August 24, 2017. Overview of Land-Based Monument Proclamations
This report provides a compilation and summary of provisions of monument proclamations that could facilitate congressional decisionmaking on monuments and oversight of presidential monument authority. This report focuses on provisions of proclamations related to six topics that have been important in the debate on national monuments: energy, livestock grazing, use of motorized and non-motorized mechanized vehicles, timber, hunting and fishing, and tribes. The major provisions on each of these topics are summarized to provide an overview of their emphasis and variation. For this purpose, the verbatim text of the pertinent provisions for the 21 monuments is provided in six separate tables. An analysis of the monument proclamations in the context of other authorities would be necessary to determine the extent to which activities are authorized on particular lands and the role of the public, states, and tribes in decisionmaking by the four agencies. Topical Summary of Provisions of Land-Based Monument Proclamations
Energy
The proclamations for the national monuments generally bar new mineral and geothermal leases, mining claims, and prospecting or exploration activities, subject to valid existing rights. Most of the proclamations prohibit the use of motorized and non-motorized mechanized vehicles off-road except for emergency or administrative purposes. Proclamations for 20 of the monuments specify that they do not enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of the relevant state with regard to fish and wildlife management, whereas the proclamation for Grand Staircase-Escalante references only "diminish." For all but one of the 21 monuments—Sand to Snow—the proclamations address livestock grazing. They typically express that legal authorities governing livestock grazing on agency lands also apply to lands within the monument. Only four of the monument proclamations address timber on monument lands, directly or possibly as part of language on vegetative management. The proclamations appear to recognize the primary authority of states to manage fish and wildlife. The proclamations for 14 of the 21 national monuments state that they do not enlarge or diminish the rights of any Indian tribe. | The Antiquities Act of 1906 (54 U.S.C. §§320301-320303) authorizes the President to proclaim national monuments on federal lands that contain "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest." The President is to reserve "the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected." From 1906 to date, Presidents have established 157 monuments and have enlarged, diminished, or otherwise modified previously proclaimed monuments. Presidential establishment of monuments has sometimes been contentious, based on the size of the areas and types of resources protected; the effects of monument designation on land uses; and the lack of requirements for public participation, congressional and state approval, and environmental review, among other issues.
On April 26, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order requiring the Secretary of the Interior to review national monuments established or expanded by presidential proclamation since 1996 that meet certain criteria. The review arises in the context of current controversy over the President's monument authority and is to determine conformance of monument designation with a policy set out in the executive order. On May 5, 2017, the Department of the Interior (DOI) identified 27 national monuments that would be reviewed. One of the 27 monuments, Katahdin Woods and Waters National Monument, is under review based on the adequacy of public outreach and coordination with stakeholders in establishing the monument. The other 26 monuments are under review because the size at establishment or after expansion exceeded 100,000 acres. Of these 26 monuments, 5 are marine based and 21 are land based. The Secretary is to issue a final report on the review of monuments within 120 days of the issuance of the executive order—August 24, 2017. In his final report, the Secretary is to include recommendations for presidential actions, legislative proposals, or other actions. Congress has authority to alter the President's authority to proclaim monuments and to establish, abolish, or amend monuments (including regulating uses of monument lands).
To facilitate congressional decisionmaking and oversight of national monuments, including consideration of uses of monument lands, this report provides a compilation and summary of provisions of proclamations for the 21 land-based monuments with sizes exceeding 100,000 acres. It focuses on provisions related to six topics important in the debate on national monuments: energy, livestock grazing, use of motorized and non-motorized mechanized vehicles, timber, hunting and fishing, and tribes. These provisions are summarized to provide an overview of their emphasis and variation, and the verbatim text of the pertinent provisions is provided in six separate tables. An analysis of monument proclamations in the context of other authorities would be necessary to determine the extent to which activities are authorized on particular lands and the effect (if any) on changes in land management on the ground.
The proclamations for the 21 national monuments generally bar new mineral and geothermal leases, mining claims, and prospecting or exploration activities, subject to valid existing rights. For all but one of the 21 monuments—Sand to Snow—the proclamations address livestock grazing. They typically express that legal authorities governing livestock grazing on agency lands also apply to lands within the monument. Most of the proclamations prohibit the use of motorized and non-motorized mechanized vehicles off-road except for emergency or administrative purposes. Only four of the monument proclamations address timber on monument lands, directly or possibly as part of language on vegetative management. The proclamations appear to recognize the primary authority of states to manage fish and wildlife, by generally specifying that the proclamations do not enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of the relevant state with regard to fish and wildlife management. The proclamations for 14 of the 21 national monuments expressly state that they do not enlarge or diminish the rights of any Indian tribe. |
crs_RL32594 | crs_RL32594_0 | Facilitating interoperability has been a policy concern of public safety officials for a number of years. Acting on recommendations made by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), Congress included several sections regarding improvements in communications capacity—including clarifications to the Homeland Security Act—in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ). Despite indications of progress, much remains to be done. The federal government is an important component, however, of any network that might be put in place to provide interoperable communications. H.R. 5252 as amended in committee by the Senate ( S. 2686 ) includes detailed language on the dispersal of funds designated for interoperable communications and 911. Emergency Communications: Recent Legislation
Congress responded to recommendations for improvements in programs to support communications and foster interoperability with language in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that raises the bar for performance and accountability, as well as easing some of the obstacles to performance. New Legislation for Emergency Communications
The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for 2007 ( H.R. 5441 , Representative Rogers) included provisions from S. 3595 (Senator Collins) that were accepted by the Senate as S.Amdt. Many of the provisions incorporated in S.Amdt. 4560 are based on provisions in H.R. 5351 (Representative Reichert). The House passed H.R. 5351 , the National Emergency Reform and Enhancement Act, on July 25, 2006. The appropriations bill was agreed in conference and signed by the President on October 4, 2006 ( P.L. 109-295 ). The sections that deal with emergency communications (Title VI, Subtitle D) add substantive language for improving emergency communications to the Homeland Security Act, building on provisions included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ( P.L. Specific provisions are included covering urban and other high risk communications capabilities. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. The Advanced Telecommunications And Opportunity Reform Act, ( H.R. Interoperability of communications among first responders and public safety agencies. MSRC has been active in evaluating the effectiveness of the Emergency Alert System. Subsequently, the program was assigned to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), following FEMA when it moved to the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). | Since September 11, 2001, the effectiveness of America's communications capabilities in support of the information needs of first responders and other public safety workers has been a matter of concern to Congress. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) included sections that responded to recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, in its report of July 2004, and by others in recent years, regarding public safety communications. Most public safety advocates consider that the communications failures following the onslaught of Hurricane Katrina demonstrate that there is much still to be done to provide the United States with adequate communications capabilities in emergencies.
Senator Susan M. Collins introduced a bill (S. 3595), to reinforce the authority of the Federal Emergency Management Agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including planning and organizational responsibilities for emergency communications. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for 2007 (H.R. 5441, Representative Rogers) incorporated provisions from S. 3595 that were accepted by the Senate as S.Amdt. 4560. Many of the provisions in the agreed version of S.Amdt. 4560 were based on provisions in H.R. 5351 (Representative Reichert). The House passed H.R. 5351, the National Emergency Reform and Enhancement Act, on July 25, 2006. The appropriations bill was agreed in conference and signed by the President on October 4, 2006 (P.L. 109-295). The sections that deal with emergency communications (Title VI, Subtitle D) add substantive language for improving emergency communications to the Homeland Security Act, building on provisions included in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
Many of the proposed bills introduced in the 109th Congress that would have aided public safety and emergency communications were written to strengthen the federal government's capabilities in responding to emergencies. Bills introduced include S. 3721 (Senator Collins); H.R. 5852 (Representative Reichert ); S. 3172 (Senator Clinton); H.R. 5759 (Representative Harris); S. 1725 (Senator Lieberman) and S. 1703 (Senator Kerry).
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171) includes provisions for up to $1 billion for interoperable communications, as well as for improvements in 911 and emergency alert systems. H.R. 5252 as amended in committee by the Senate, re-titled the Advanced Telecommunications and Opportunities Reform Act, includes detailed language on the dispersal of funds designated for interoperable communications, including 911.
This report has been updated to cover key events through December 31, 2006. It is a reference document, only. |
crs_RS22369 | crs_RS22369_0 | These changes require most states to engage more of their caseloads in activities and/or reduce cash assistance caseloads from FY2005 levels. The DRA required HHS to issue regulations to "ensure consistent measurement of work participation rates" by further defining TANF work activities beyond the current statutory list; requiring uniform methods for reporting hours of work; and determining the circumstances in which parents must be included in the work participation rate calculation. The HHS regulations were issued in interim, final form on June 29, 2006. Mandatory Child Care Funding
From FY2002 through FY2005, mandatory child care funding for the Child Care and Development Block Grant has been set at $2.717 billion per year. The DRA increases mandatory child care funding to $2.917 billion per year for FY2006 through FY2010, an increase from current levels of $200 million per year or $1 billion over five years. Healthy Marriage Promotion
The healthy marriage promotion initiative is funded at approximately $100 million per year, to be spent through grants awarded by the Secretary of HHS to support research and demonstration projects by public or private entities; and technical assistance provided to states, Indian tribes and tribal organizations, and other entities. Responsible Fatherhood Initiatives
Additionally, the DRA makes available up to $50 million per year for responsible fatherhood initiatives. (See CRS Report RL31025, Fatherhood Initiatives: Connecting Fathers to Their Children , by [author name scrubbed] for more on these initiatives.) | The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171 ) includes a scaled-back version of welfare reauthorization. More extensive versions were considered during the preceding four-year debate. (See CRS Report RL33418, Welfare Reauthorization in the 109 th Congress: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed] for details.) The DRA extends funding at current levels for basic state grants under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant through Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. It requires most states to either raise participation in work activities among families receiving cash welfare from TANF or further reduce the cash assistance rolls. DRA also required the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to issue regulations to define activities countable toward work participation standards and set rules for state enforcement and verification of participation in activities. These regulation were published on June 29, 2006. The DRA also extends Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) mandatory funding through FY2010, increasing mandatory child care funding by $200 million per year from previous levels (a total increase of $1 billion over five years). The DRA further establishes $100 million per year in TANF research and technical assistance funds for "healthy marriage promotion" initiatives and $50 million per year for "responsible fatherhood initiatives." This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44878 | crs_R44878_0 | Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), which is managed by the Department of State (DOS), resettles refugees from around the world in the United States. Once a refugee case is approved for U.S. resettlement, the USRAP determines where in the country the refugee(s) will be resettled. This determination is made through DOS's Reception and Placement Program (R&P), which provides initial resettlement services to arriving refugees. Each year, DOS's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) requests proposals from public and private nonprofit organizations that are interested in providing services and assistance to refugees under the R&P Program; PRM enters into a cooperative agreement with each successful applicant. The organizations, sometimes referred to as voluntary agencies, maintain nationwide networks of local affiliates to provide services to refugees. The services include pre-arrival services (e.g., placement); reception upon arrival in the United States; basic needs support (e.g., housing, furnishings, food, and clothing) for at least 30 days; and help accessing health, employment, education, and other services, as needed. Placement of Refugees
Decisions about which R&P agencies will resettle particular approved refugee cases are made at weekly meetings in which resettlement agency representatives review biographic and other information about incoming refugees. As part of the "sponsorship assurance" process, an agency agrees to assume responsibility for a refugee case and provide required R&P services. As of May 31, 2017, in FY2017, refugee arrivals have been placed in the District of Columbia and every state except Wyoming. In FY2016, the only states with no refugee placements were Delaware and Hawaii. Related Requirements
The INA provisions on refugee resettlement assistance set requirements for the R&P Program's placement process. To the extent practicable, these policies are to
insure that an arriving refugee is not placed in an area that is highly impacted by refugees unless the new arrival has close family in the area; provide for local affiliates of resettlement agencies to meet at least quarterly with state and local governments to plan and coordinate the appropriate placement of arriving refugees in the states and localities; and consider the proportion of refugees in the local population; the availability of employment, affordable housing, and other resources for refugees in the area; the likelihood of refugees becoming self-sufficient; and the likely secondary migration of refugees to and from the area. In addition, the agency administering the R&P Program is directed to consider the recommendations of a state in determining where to place refugees within that state. Funding
The resettlement agencies participating in the R&P Program provide initial resettlement services using a combination of R&P Program funds and contributions from other sources. | The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), which is managed by the Department of State (DOS), resettles refugees from around the world in the United States. Once a refugee case is approved for U.S. resettlement, the USRAP determines where in the country the refugee(s) will be resettled. This determination is made through DOS's Reception and Placement Program (R&P), which provides initial resettlement services to arriving refugees. R&P initial resettlement assistance is separate from longer-term resettlement assistance provided through the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).
Each year, DOS's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) requests proposals from public and private nonprofit organizations that are interested in providing services and assistance to refugees under the R&P Program. It then enters into a cooperative agreement with each successful applicant. The organizations, sometimes referred to as voluntary agencies, maintain nationwide networks of local affiliates to provide services to refugees. The services include pre-arrival services (e.g., placement); reception on arrival in the United States; basic needs support (e.g., housing, furnishings, food, and clothing) for at least 30 days; and help accessing health, employment, education, and other services, as needed. Funding comes from the R&P Program and contributions from other sources.
Decisions about which R&P agencies will resettle particular approved refugee cases are made at weekly meetings in which representatives of the resettlement agencies review biographic and other information about incoming refugees. As part of the "sponsorship assurance" process, an agency agrees to assume responsibility for a refugee case and provide required R&P services. Once refugees are in the United States, however, they do not have to remain in their initial placement area. They can relocate at any time.
The R&P Program is subject to a set of statutory requirements. Regarding the placement process, the ORR director and the agency administering the R&P Program are required to consult regularly with state and local governments and resettlement agencies about the intended distribution of refugees among the states and localities. The agency administering the R&P Program is further required to consider the recommendations of the state in determining where to place refugees within a state.
As of May 31, 2017, in FY2017, refugee arrivals have been placed in the District of Columbia and every state except Wyoming. In FY2016, the only states with no refugee placements were Delaware and Hawaii. |
crs_R41674 | crs_R41674_0 | Background
This report describes the ways that international terrorists and insurgents use the Internet, strategically and tactically, in pursuit of their political agendas. Why and How International Terrorists Use the Internet
The Internet is used as a prime recruiting tool for insurgents. There may be some evidence that terrorist organizations seek the ability to use the Internet itself as a weapon in an attack against critical infrastructures. The Internet can also be used to transmit information and material support for planned acts of terrorism. Federal Government Efforts to Address Cyberterrorism
A number of U.S. government organizations appear to monitor terrorist websites and conduct a variety of activities aimed at countering them. Different agencies may weigh each option differently, creating a need to achieve interagency consensus prior to action. Counterpropaganda: Strategic Communications, Public Diplomacy, and Information Operations
In common parlance and in media reporting, the terms "strategic communications," "public diplomacy," "global engagement," "information operations," and "propaganda" are often used interchangeably. There is no overarching definition of strategic communications for the federal government. Although some reports warn of social media's potential misuse by terrorists, government policies are evolving to embrace the use of tools such as Facebook and Twitter as a means of strategic communications and public diplomacy. Yet DOD has been working with DHS and the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center through Cyberstorm and other exercises to map out a National Cyber Incident Response Plan, which gives a structure for how the federal government might respond in the event of a major cyberattack. Laws may be interpreted by some agencies to prohibit certain activities, and in some cases agencies may have competing equities at stake. Institutional Constraints
Some argue that the effectiveness of the U.S. government's strategic communications, information operations, and global engagement programs is still hampered by the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. § 1461), also known as the Smith-Mundt Act. Some say that these policies have created an unnecessary "firewall" between domestic and foreign audiences, limiting what information the United States produces and distributes to counter extremists in cyberspace for fear of "blow-back" to its own citizens. Intelligence Gain/Loss Calculus
Tensions between a website's purported intelligence value and operational threat level can determine the particular capabilities used to thwart the site. 5729 , the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2010. This bill, which may be reintroduced in some form in the current Congress, has generated much discussion over what some describe as the "Internet Kill Switch." | The Internet is used by international insurgents, jihadists, and terrorist organizations as a tool for radicalization and recruitment, a method of propaganda distribution, a means of communication, and ground for training. Although there are no known reported incidents of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure as acts of terror, this could potentially become a tactic in the future.
There are several methods for countering terrorist and insurgent information operations on the Internet. The federal government has organizations that conduct strategic communications, counterpropaganda, and public diplomacy activities. The National Framework for Strategic Communication guides how interagency components are to integrate their activities. However, these organizations may be stovepiped within agencies, and competing agendas may be at stake. This report does not discuss technical and Internet architecture design solutions.
Some may interpret the law to prevent federal agencies from conducting "propaganda" activities that may potentially reach domestic audiences. Others may wish to dismantle all websites that are seen to have malicious content or to facilitate acts of terror, while some may have a competing interest in keeping a site running and monitoring it for intelligence value.
Key issues for Congress:
Although the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative addresses a federal cybersecurity strategy and departmental roles and responsibilities, overclassification, competing equities, and poor information sharing between agencies hinder implementation of a national cybersecurity strategy. (See "Federal Government Efforts to Address Cyberterrorism.") Federal agencies have interpreted the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (22 U.S.C. § 1461), also known as the Smith-Mundt Act, as creating a "firewall" between foreign and domestic audiences, limiting U.S. government counterpropaganda activities on the Internet. (See "Institutional Constraints.") Some agencies favor monitoring and surveillance of potentially harmful websites, while others would shut them down entirely. (See "Intelligence Gain/Loss Calculus.") Different agency approaches to combating terrorists' use of the Internet and different definitions and strategies for activities such as information operations (IO) and strategic communications (SC) create an oversight challenge for Congress. (See "Counterpropaganda: Strategic Communications, Public Diplomacy, and Information Operations.")
Cybersecurity proposals from the 111th Congress such as S. 3480, which contained controversial provisions labeled by the media as the Internet "Kill Switch," are likely to be reintroduced in some form in the 112th Congress. (See "Congressional Activity.") With growing interest in strategic communications and public diplomacy, there may also be an effort to revise the Smith-Mundt Act. |
crs_RL33118 | crs_RL33118_0 | This report provides information on the pace of all Supreme Court nominations and confirmations since 1900, focusing on the actual amounts of time that Presidents and the Senate have taken to act (as opposed to the elapsed time between official points in the process). On May 10, 2010, President Obama announced that he had selected Solicitor General Elena Kagan as his nominee to replace Justice Stevens. Both time spans (49 and 48 days respectively for the Kagan and Sotomayor nominations) are close to or at the median 49 days that elapsed between the nomination announcement and the start of hearings for all Supreme Court nominees between 1981 and 2010. The entire Kagan appointment process, starting with when President Obama first learned that Justice Stevens would leave the Court, until Senate confirmation on August 5, lasted 118 days. In a few relatively recent instances, however, the full Senate has taken much longer to act on a reported Court nomination than it did with the Kagan nomination. The most important of these action dates include those on which (1) an outgoing Justice officially informs the President of the intention to step down from the Court (or, alternatively, the date on which a Court seat is vacated due to the death of a Justice), (2) a President formally nominates someone to the Court, the Senate receives the President's nomination, and the nomination is referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee (almost always all on the same date), (3) the Senate Judiciary Committee holds hearings on the nomination, (4) the committee votes on the nomination, and (5) the Senate votes on whether to confirm, or chooses to take no action. For example, rather than starting the nomination clock with the official notification of the President of a forthcoming vacancy (e.g., the receipt of a formal retirement letter), this analysis focuses on when the President first learned of the vacancy (e.g., a private conversation with the outgoing Justice). Likewise, rather than starting the confirmation clock with the transmission the official nomination to the Senate, this analysis focuses on when the Senate became aware of the President's selection ( e.g., by a public announcement by the President). Table 2 presents the number of days elapsed for six related time intervals: (1) from when the President apparently learned of the actual or prospective vacancy to the his announcement of a new nominee, (2) from the nomination announcement to the first Judiciary Committee hearing, (3) from the first hearing to the committee's final action, (4) from the committee's final action to the Senate's final action, (5) from nomination announcement to final Senate action (duration of total Senate action), and (6) from the vacancy starting date (when the President apparently first became aware of the opportunity to make a nomination) to final Senate action. The entire process, from actual or prospective vacancy to final Senate action, lasted a median of 79 days from 1900-2010. As shown in Figure 1 (and Table 3 ), from 1900-1980, Presidents took a median of 34 days to announce their nominees after apparently learning of vacancies, compared with only 19.5 days from 1981-2010. As shown in Figure 1 (and Table 3 ), this period almost quadrupled—from 12.5 days during the 1900-1980 period to 49 days from 1981-2010. Finally, the entire nomination-and-confirmation process took substantially longer after 1980 than during the previous 80 years. This report indicates that, from 1900-1980, the President's portion of the process took longer than the Senate's. Since 1981, the nomination-and-confirmation process has lasted a median of 113 days—almost twice as long as the 59-day median from 1900-1980. Some early 20 th century appointments to the Supreme Court were confirmed within days of a vacancy occurring. | The speed with which appointments to the Supreme Court move through various stages in the nomination-and-confirmation process is often of great interest not only to all parties directly involved, but, as well, to the nation as a whole. This report provides information on the amount of time taken to act on all Supreme Court nominations occurring between 1900 and the present. It focuses on the actual amounts of time that Presidents and the Senate have taken to act (as opposed to the elapsed time between official points in the process). For example, rather than starting the nomination clock with the official notification of the President of a forthcoming vacancy, this report focuses on when the President first learned of a Justice's intention to leave the Court (e.g., via a private conversation with the outgoing Justice), or received word that a sitting Justice had died. Likewise, rather than starting the confirmation clock with the transmission of the official nomination to the Senate, this report focuses on when the Senate became aware of the President's selection (e.g., via a public announcement by the President).
The data indicate that the entire nomination-and-confirmation process (from when the President first learned of a vacancy to final Senate action) has generally taken almost twice as long for nominees after 1980 than for nominees in the previous 80 years. From 1900 to 1980, the entire process took a median of 59 days; from 1981 through 2010, the process took a median of 113 days. Although Presidents after 1980 have moved more quickly than their predecessors in announcing nominees after learning of vacancies (a median of 19.5 days compared with 34 days before 1980), the Senate portion of the process (i.e., from the nomination announcement to final Senate action) appears to take much longer than before (a median of 84 days from 1981 through 2009, compared with 17 days from 1900 through 1980). Notably, the amount of time between the nomination announcement and first Judiciary Committee hearing has almost quadrupled—from a median of 12.5 days (1900-1980) to 49 days (1981-2010).
President Obama learned of another prospective vacancy on April 9, 2010. On May 10, 2010, President Obama announced he would nominate Solicitor General Elena Kagan to succeed Justice John Paul Stevens. From June 30 to July 1, 2010, the Senate Judiciary Committee held four days of hearings on the nomination, and on July 20, voted 13-6 to report the nomination to the Senate. On August 3, 2010, the Senate began its consideration of the nomination. The Senate confirmed Kagan as the nation's 112th Supreme Court Justice on August 5 by a 63-37 vote. The overall time for the Kagan appointment process was slightly longer than for other recent nominations. The entire period for presidential selection and Senate consideration and action on the 2009 Sonia Sotomayor nomination, for example, lasted 97 days, compared with 118 days for the Kagan nomination. Nonetheless, although the Kagan nomination took longer to move through the process than did the Sotomayor nomination, the total Kagan timetable was similar to those of other nominations since 1981. In fact, including the Kagan timetable data raised the median number of days for the entire process by only a day and a half—to 113 days, compared with 111.5 days for all Supreme Court nominations between 1981 and 2009.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41802 | crs_R41802_0 | Introduction
Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), tuberculosis (TB), and malaria are three of the world's leading causes of morbidity and mortality. In FY2012, of the $8.8 billion the United States spent on global health programs under the Global Health Initiative (GHI)—the Obama Administration's effort to coordinate and improve U.S. global health programming—approximately 84% was on bilateral and multilateral HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria combined, with bilateral HIV/AIDS programs accounting for 58% of all funding. The United States is currently the single largest donor for global HIV/AIDS and has played a key role in generating a robust international response to TB and malaria. This report highlights some of the current challenges posed by HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, as well as several cross-cutting policy issues that the 112 th Congress may consider as it determines U.S. global health funding for these three diseases, including
health systems strengthening, country ownership, research and development, monitoring and evaluation, and engagement with multilateral organizations. U.S. Policy Background
U.S. efforts to address HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria have grown significantly over the last few decades, as successive Administrations and Congresses have increasingly recognized the severity and impact of these diseases. Bush Administration
The George W. Bush Administration greatly elevated the fight against HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria in the U.S. foreign policy agenda. In 2003, the Bush Administration announced the establishment of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), pledging $15 billion over the course of five years to combat HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. Trends in Funding for HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria: FY2001-FY2012
Over the past decade, Congress has demonstrated significant support for U.S. programs targeting global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. FY2012 funding for HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs together was slightly lower than in FY2011, and included a decrease in funding for global HIV/AIDS programs, slight increases in funding for global TB and malaria programs, and a larger increase in funding for the U.S. contribution to the Global Fund. Some health experts have expressed concern over the leveling of global health funding, particularly for HIV/AIDS, over the past few years. These experts argue that divestment in U.S. global HIV/AIDS and TB programs could imperil lives, reverse recent progress, undermine significant scientific findings, and lead to decreasing levels of support from other donors. Progress in global TB control is also challenged by HIV/TB co-infection and new forms of drug resistant TB. Despite these common factors, each disease presents unique challenges, which Congress may consider as it debates the U.S. response to each disease. For more information on the particular characteristics of and U.S. response to each of the diseases, see the following CRS reports by Alexandra Kendall: CRS Report R41645, U.S. Response to the Global Threat of HIV/AIDS: Basic Facts ; CRS Report R41643, U.S. Response to the Global Threat of Tuberculosis: Basic Facts ; and CRS Report R41644, U.S. Response to the Global Threat of Malaria: Basic Facts . Treatment has been a central component of PEPFAR programs. Despite this commitment, many health experts call for increased U.S. support of HIV/AIDS prevention efforts in general, and efforts targeting high-risk groups in particular. Key Cross-Cutting Issues
Along with the challenges specific to HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, a number of issues extend to all three diseases. Looking Forward
The second session of the 112 th Congress will likely exercise oversight of and debate the appropriate funding amounts for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs and priority areas within these programs. U.S. Malaria Strategy Targets
GHI goals and projected targets for U.S. malaria programs are:
to achieve Africa-wide impact, by halving the burden of malaria (morbidity and mortality) in 70% of at-risk populations in sub-Saharan Africa (approximately 450 million people), thereby removing malaria as a major public health problem and promoting economic growth and development throughout the region; to limit the spread of anti-malaria multi-drug resistance in Southeast Asia and the Americas; to increase emphasis on strategic integration of malaria prevention and treatment activities with maternal and child health, HIV/AIDS, neglected tropical diseases, and tuberculosis programs, and on multilateral collaboration to achieve internationally accepted goals; to intensify present efforts to strengthen health systems and strengthen the capacity of host-country workforces to ensure sustainability; to assist host countries to revise and update their National Malaria Control Strategies and Plans to reflect the declining burden of malaria, and link programming of U.S. malaria control resources to those host country strategies; and to ensure a woman-centered approach for malaria prevention and treatment activities at both the community and health facility levels, since women are the primary caretakers of young children in most families and are in the best position to help promote health behaviors related to malaria. | The spread of human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), tuberculosis (TB), and malaria across the world poses a major global health challenge. The international community has progressively recognized the humanitarian impact of these diseases, along with the threat they represent to economic development and international security. The United States has historically been a leader in the fight against HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria; it is currently the largest single donor for global HIV/AIDS and has been central to the global response to TB and malaria. In its second session, the 112th Congress will likely consider HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs during debate on and review of U.S.-supported global health programs, U.S. foreign assistance spending levels, and foreign relations authorization bills.
Over the past decade, Congress has demonstrated bipartisan support for addressing HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria worldwide, authorizing approximately $54 billion for U.S. global efforts to combat the diseases from FY2001 through FY2012. During this time, Congress supported initiatives proposed by President George W. Bush, including the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), both of which have demonstrated robust U.S. engagement in global health. Through the Global Health Initiative (GHI), President Barack Obama has led efforts to coordinate U.S. global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs and create an efficient, long-term, and sustainable approach to combating these diseases.
Despite ongoing progress in fighting HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria, these diseases remain leading global causes of morbidity and mortality. Many health experts urge Congress to capitalize on recent gains and bolster U.S. leadership and funding to combat these diseases. In contrast, some Members of Congress have proposed cuts to these programs as part of deficit reduction efforts.
This report reviews the U.S. response to HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria and discusses several issues Congress may consider as it debates spending levels and priority areas for related programs. The report includes analysis of:
Funding Trends: Combined funding for the three diseases has increased significantly over the past decade, from approximately $911 million in FY2001 to $7.4 billion in FY2012. The bulk of the increase over time has been targeted toward HIV/AIDS, although in recent years funding for global HIV/AIDS has begun to level off. When compared to FY2011, funding in FY2012 included decreases for global HIV/AIDS, and slight increases for global TB and malaria programs. Some health experts applaud what they see as a shift toward less expensive efforts that maximize health impact. Other experts warn that divestment from HIV/AIDS could significantly endanger the lives of those reliant on U.S. assistance and could reverse fragile gains made against the epidemic and other diseases. Disease-Specific Issues: HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria each present unique challenges. Rising numbers of people in need of life-long HIV/AIDS treatment combined with reduced global HIV/AIDS funding have heightened concerns over the sustainability of treatment programs and incited debate over the appropriate balance of funding between antiretroviral treatment (ART) and other HIV/AIDS interventions. Growing rates of HIV/TB co-infection and drug-resistant TB strains have increased calls for escalating TB control efforts. Finally, growing resistance to anti-malaria drugs and insecticides threatens malaria control efforts, leading to calls for more attention to reducing resistance and developing new anti-malaria commodities. Cross-Cutting Issues: Several cross-cutting issues are currently being debated, particularly in relation to increased efficiency and sustainability of HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs under the GHI. These include Health Systems Strengthening, Country Ownership in Recipient Countries, Research and Development, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Engagement with Multilateral Organizations.
For details on particular characteristics of the HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria epidemics and the U.S. response, see the following CRS reports, by [author name scrubbed].
CRS Report R41645, U.S. Response to the Global Threat of HIV/AIDS: Basic Facts CRS Report R41643, U.S. Response to the Global Threat of Tuberculosis: Basic Facts CRS Report R41644, U.S. Response to the Global Threat of Malaria: Basic Facts |
crs_R44977 | crs_R44977_0 | Introduction
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P.L. When a major disaster overwhelms a state or tribal nation's response capacity, the state's governor or the tribal nation's chief executive may submit a request for a major disaster declaration. To help evaluate a state or tribal nation's need for assistance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) uses a Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) as a mechanism "to determine the impact and magnitude of damage and the resulting unmet needs of individuals, businesses, the public sector, and the community as a whole." Although not explicitly mentioned in the Stafford Act, PDAs play a crucial role in the declaration process. State and tribal governments use information from a PDA to determine whether to request a major disaster declaration and, if so, the basis for that major disaster request. FEMA relies in part on the PDA to provide a recommendation to the President concerning whether a major disaster declaration is warranted and, if so, which types of federal supplemental assistance should be made available. Despite the importance of PDAs in the declaration process, PDA information has only recently been made available to the public. In 2008, FEMA, at the direction of Congress via general provisions in appropriations legislation, began to post PDA reports on its website. In spite of their limitations, PDA reports contain a great deal of information concerning (1) damage estimates; (2) demographic information of the affected area, including percentages of elderly populations and low-income households; and (3) insurance coverage in the area. CRS constructed a dataset using information from PDA reports and coupled that dataset with data on declarations and obligations from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), through which FEMA funds PA and IA, to analyze the possible use of PDAs in the disaster declaration process. Determinations by the Assistant Administrator for the Disaster Assistance Directorate of the types and extent of FEMA disaster assistance to be provided are based upon findings whether the damage involved and its effects are of such severity and magnitude as to be beyond the response capabilities of the state, the affected local governments, and other potential recipients of supplementary federal assistance. Where possible, the following sections also analyze the extent to which each factor seems to influence PA and IA determinations using data from FEMA's publicly available PDA reports. Depending on the nature of the incident, one or more categories of work may be provided through PA.
FEMA considers six factors when assessing whether a governor's or chief executive's request warrants PA:
estimated cost of the assistance; localized impacts; insurance coverage; hazard mitigation; recent multiple disasters; and programs of other federal assistance. FEMA generally relies on two thresholds to evaluate whether to recommend PA. The PDA reports do not provide information about other recent incidents. In the discussions of factors considered for IA in this report, these results will be used for comparison. PDA reports include information on the percentage of low-income and elderly households in the affected community. The type of disaster event may also impact the PDA timeline. Some may argue that using per capita thresholds as a consideration when determining whether an incident warrants PA is consistent with the Stafford Act. If Congress is concerned that the per capita threshold is a poor measurement of state capacity, it could require FEMA to replace or supplement the per capita threshold with another form of measurement. PDA Timelines and Accuracy
PDA reports provide information regarding the length of time between a major disaster request and its ultimate declaration or denial by the President. As discussed in " Preliminary Damage Assessment Timeline ," of the requests for major disaster declarations that were neither expedited nor appealed, 89.8% were decided within a month after requested, 63.7% were decided within two weeks after requested, and 18.5% were decided within the week they were requested. | When a major disaster overwhelms a state or tribal nation's response capacity, the state's governor or tribal nation's chief executive may request a major disaster declaration from the federal government. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act authorizes the President to issue major disaster declarations in response to such requests.
To evaluate a state or tribal nation's need for federal assistance, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) uses a Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) as a mechanism to determine the impact and magnitude of damage caused by the incident. Although not explicitly mentioned in the Stafford Act, PDAs play a crucial role in the declaration process. State and tribal governments use PDA information as part of the basis for their major disaster request, and FEMA relies on the PDA findings to provide a recommendation to the President concerning whether a major disaster declaration is warranted and what types of federal supplemental assistance should be made available.
More specifically, the PDA provides information about various "factors" which FEMA evaluates to determine whether Public Assistance (PA) is warranted after an incident. For PA, these factors include estimated costs of assistance, localized impacts, insurance coverage, hazard mitigation, recent multiple disasters, and the availability of other federal resources. Similarly, FEMA uses information from the PDA to assess factors that determine whether an incident warrants Individual Assistance (IA) and, if so, which types of IA.
Despite their importance in the declaration process, PDA information has only recently been publicly available. In 2008, FEMA, at the direction of Congress, began to post PDA reports on its website. PDA reports contain information concerning (1) damage estimates, (2) demographic information of the affected area (including percentages of elderly populations and low-income households), and (3) insurance coverage in the area.
This report analyzes a dataset built from 587 PDA documents. It also compares that constructed dataset to a previously constructed dataset of disaster declarations and other data from FEMA regarding obligations from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), the account from which FEMA provides PA and IA.
In recent years, congressional interest in emergency management has focused on funding, program administration, and program coordination—both among federal agencies and state emergency management agencies. The data from PDA reports informs debates about these policy issues. For example, PDA reports provide insight as to whether FEMA recommendations are applied uniformly to all major disaster requests. Similarly, PDA reports can be analyzed to address congressional concerns over whether PA and IA determinations are systematic and appropriate. More broadly, PDA information can inform the debate over whether federal disaster assistance is being provided for incidents that could be handled at the state, local, or tribal level.
Some of the key findings in this report include
major disaster declarations that authorize PA generally conform with the PA thresholds outlined in regulation; higher percentages of low-income households in a disaster-impacted area seem to influence the decision to authorize IA; of requests that were neither expedited nor appealed, 18.5% were decided within one week, 63.7% were decided within two weeks, and 89.8% were decided within one month; the time between a major disaster request and decision varies based on the amount of PA and IA damage as well as the type of event; and the magnitude of PDA estimates for both PA and IA that under-estimate ultimate obligations is greater than the magnitude of estimates that over-estimate ultimate obligations.
This report concludes with policy observations and considerations for Congress. These considerations include
replacing the per capita threshold used by FEMA to make major disaster recommendations with another form of measurement; requiring PDA reports to include additional information about the incident; taking measures to increase PDA accuracy; and amending Section 320 of the Stafford Act.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41171 | crs_R41171_0 | Introduction
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides the freedom to individuals to exercise their religious beliefs without governmental interference, and simultaneously prohibits government actions that benefit followers of one faith over another. At times, when government actions would otherwise burden individuals' religious exercise, the government makes efforts to accommodate the religious practice. However, accommodation of religion to prevent violations of the Free Exercise Clause must be carefully considered in order to prevent violation of the Establishment Clause. The tension between the clauses has been illustrated in a number of military scenarios in recent years. For example, the U.S. Army recently allowed the first Sikh in more than 25 years to graduate from the officer basic training program without sacrificing the articles of his faith. In another example, the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act was enacted in December 2010 and created a process to repeal the military's current policy regarding homosexual servicemembers once certain conditions are met. The repeal has raised several questions about the impact a new policy would have on chaplains whose religious background does not support homosexuality. This report provides an overview of the requirements of the First Amendment related to military personnel's religious exercise. It analyzes current constitutional and statutory requirements regarding religious exercise, and provides a framework for how Congress and the courts might consider future issues that arise related to servicemembers' religious exercise. Specifically, the report examines the limitations placed on servicemembers in uniform to exercise their religious beliefs. It also examines the role of military chaplains and the legal challenges associated with public funding for religious personnel. The report analyzes efforts by Congress and the Department of Defense to address the constitutional concerns that are raised by these issues. | The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides the freedom to individuals to exercise their religious beliefs without governmental interference, and simultaneously prohibits government actions that benefit followers of one faith over another. At times, when government actions would otherwise burden individuals' religious exercise, the government makes efforts to accommodate the religious practice. However, accommodation of religion to prevent violations of the Free Exercise Clause must be carefully considered in order to prevent violation of the Establishment Clause.
The tension between the clauses has been illustrated in a number of military scenarios in recent years. For example, the U.S. Army recently allowed the first Sikh in more than 25 years to graduate from the officer basic training program without sacrificing the articles of his faith, allowing the officer to maintain his unshorn hair and beard and to wear a turban. In another example, legislation enacted in December 2010 that has provided a process for the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding homosexual servicemembers to be repealed has raised several questions about the impact a new policy would have on chaplains whose religious background does not support homosexuality.
This report provides an overview of the requirements of the First Amendment related to military personnel's religious exercise. It analyzes current constitutional and statutory requirements regarding religious exercise, and provides a framework for how Congress and the courts might consider future issues that arise related to servicemembers' religious exercise. Specifically, the report examines the limitations placed on servicemembers in uniform in the exercise of their religious beliefs. It also examines the role of military chaplains and the legal challenges associated with publicly funding religious personnel. The report analyzes efforts by Congress and the Department of Defense to address the constitutional concerns that are raised by these issues. |
crs_RL30938 | crs_RL30938_0 | Introduction
The United States faces a wide range of national security threats, from intercontinentalballistic missiles to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (1) by terrorists. The debate overthe seriousness of the various threats has intensified recently. Various studies and commissions haverecommended far reaching changes in the approach to domestic preparedness and response to threatsto the homeland. (2)
This paper (3) outlines current legislation and policies that govern the military's role when supporting lawenforcement in a domestic terrorism crisis. It also highlights some of the issues confronting the U.S.government. Many expertssay the probable long term affects of such an attack on the population, environment, and theeconomy make it imperative that the U.S. be fully prepared to either deter or interdict an attemptedattack by force if necessary. The Lead Federal Agency for combating terrorismoverseas is the Department of State (DOS) and the agency designated to respond to terrorist attackson U.S. soil is the Department of Justice (DoJ) through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Crisis Management of Domestic Terrorism Events
To understand fully the military's role in domestic crisis response it is necessary to explorethe national-level structures and response options prior to the involvement of military forces. Crisis management is predominatelya law enforcement function that manages the resources necessary to prevent or resolve a terroristincident including intelligence gathering, surveillance, tactical operations, negotiations, forensics,and follow-on investigations. The National Security Council. The Military's Role in Domestic Crisis Management
PDD 39 and assorted legislation permits DoD to develop and maintain plans and capabilitiesto respond to threats or acts of terrorism, including use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In a domestic crisis involving WMD, DoD may be called upon to assist in several different waysranging from actual interdiction of the terrorists to the loaning of specialized equipment for use bylaw enforcement agencies in the crisis. The Department of Defense has published directivesestablishing policy and assigning responsibility for providing military assistance to civil authoritiesincluding specific policy for assistance to civil law enforcement officials in emergencies involvingterrorism and WMD. 10 U.S.C. Section 382, may extend technical advice and assessment to law enforcement personnelincluding:
1) Providing expert advice on all matters pertaining tothe search, location, identification, seizure, render safe/disarm/disable procedures, handling and /ortransport of a suspected WMD;
2) Check an area, such as a room, when trained lawenforcement personnel are unavailable and there is reason to suspect that the area contains bobbytraps or improvised explosive devices and render such devices safe by monitoring, containing,disabling, or disposing of them or their components or elements before a law enforcement searchof the area is conducted;
3) Undertake appropriate rendering-safe and disposalactions, including monitoring, containing, disabling and/or disposing of or otherwise rendering safea suspected biological, chemical, or nuclear material or device that is notweaponized;
4) Upon approval of the National CommandAuthority, (41) undertakeappropriate rendering-safe and disposal actions, including the monitoring, containing, disabling and/or disposing of or otherwise rendering safe a suspected WMD, to include its components orelements;
5) Participate in the questioning of suspects by lawenforcement personnel, only when necessary to determine the characteristics of the suspected WMDdevice, its components or elements for the purpose of rendering itsafe;
6) Provide and operate specialized equipment orvehicles;
7) Provide other assistance as requested by the AttorneyGeneral or lawfully delegated representative and approved by the Secretary of Defense. There are many critical issues concerning U.S. terrorism policy overall and domesticterrorism specifically. Most experts believe that acomprehensive national strategy coherently linking national policy with the capabilities of the manyagencies charged with domestic terrorism responsibilities is a critical step in defeating the threat. Many experts also contend that the United States would be better served by employing the full rangeof DoD's capabilities during domestic crisis response operations. (51) Lastly, newly proposed congressional oversight roles are seenby many as an important factor in a more effective response to domestic terrorism. | The United States faces a number of significant national security threats, ranging in scopefrom intercontinental ballistic missiles to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) byterrorists. The debate over the seriousness of the various threats intensified recently, even before theevents of September 11, 2001. Various studies and commissions recommended far reaching changesin the U.S. approach to domestic preparedness and response to threats to the homeland, many nowbeing implemented. Many experts believe the probable long term effects of a WMD attack byterrorists on the population, environment, and the economy make it imperative that the U.S. be fullyprepared to either deter or interdict an attempted terrorist attack.
This paper reviews the current legislation and policies that govern the military's role whensupporting law enforcement in a domestic terrorism crisis and highlights some of the issuesconfronting the U.S. government. To fully understand the military's role in domestic crisis responseit is necessary to explore existing national-level structures and response options prior to theinvolvement of military forces. Crisis management is predominately a law enforcement function thatmanages the resources necessary to prevent or resolve a terrorist incident, including one involvingWMD. Current U.S. government terrorism response policy is contained in presidential directives. Among other matters, these directives address National Security Council structure and federalagency crisis response roles when responding to a domestic terrorism incident. The creation of theDepartment of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command has not yet changed the basic rolesand relationships described herein.
Many federal agencies are available to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indealing with a terrorist threat or in the resolution of an actual terrorist incident. The Department ofDefense (DoD), as a supporting agency in domestic law enforcement operations, has developed andmaintains plans and capabilities to respond to threats or acts of terrorism, including those involvingthe use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. In a domestic crisis, DoD may be called uponto assist in several different ways ranging from actual interdiction of the terrorists to the loaning ofspecialized equipment for use by law enforcement agencies. DoD has published specific policy forassistance to civil law enforcement officials in emergencies involving terrorism and WMD. U.S.terrorism policy is an issue of growing policy debate. Most experts believe that a comprehensivenational strategy for domestic terrorism is a critical step in defeating the threat. Some say moreeffectively employing DoD's capabilities during domestic crisis response operations, or newrelationships based on the recent creation of the Department of Homeland Security are the bestmethods to ensure success against domestic terrorism. Lastly, newly proposed congressionaloversight roles are seen by many as an important factor in a more effective response to domesticterrorism. This report will be updated should major changes occur to the relationships described. |
crs_RL34582 | crs_RL34582_0 | The weakening of the dollar raises concern in Congress and among the public that the dollar's decline is a symptom of broader economic problems, such as a weak economic recovery, rising public debt, and a diminished standing in the global economy. How might failure by the 112 th Congress to raise the federal debt ceiling or address the country's long-term government debt problem affect the exchange rate? Economic theory suggests that the dollar's path can be influenced by a variety of factors that could confer to the United States both benefits and costs, and in some circumstances a depreciating currency can be, on balance, beneficial. This report examines the several factors that are likely to influence the dollar's medium-term path; why further depreciation could occur; what effects a depreciating dollar could have on the economy, including the pace of economic recovery; and how alternative policy measures might influence the dollar's path. Broad Economic Forces That Affect the Dollar
Since the break-up of the Bretton Woods international monetary system in 1973, the exchange rate of the dollar has been largely determined by the market—the supply and demand for dollars in global foreign exchange markets. Dollars are demanded by foreigners to buy dollar denominated goods and assets. (Assets include bank accounts, stocks, bonds, and real property.) In most circumstances, however, there is a strong expectation that asset-market transactions will tend to be dominant and ultimately dictate the exchange rate's direction of movement. Determinants of the Size and Direction of Cross-Border Asset Flows
Economic theory suggests that several economic factors could influence the direction of cross-border asset flows. The Dollar is the Principal Global "Reserve Currency"
A reserve currency is a currency held in sizable quantities by foreign governments and central banks as part of their holdings of foreign exchange. One factor governing whether dollar depreciation is an orderly or disorderly adjustment is investor expectations about future dollar depreciation. The exchange rate, while usually not the primary target, can be affected by macroeconomic policies, such as quantitative easing, fiscal stimulus, and debt reduction. Policies to Influence the Demand for U.S. Assets
Given the importance of international asset markets in determining the dollar's exchange rate, policies aimed at directly or indirectly influencing the demand and supply of dollar assets would potentially have the greatest direct impact on the dollar. This would exert upward pressure on the dollar. To achieve an orderly correction of these imbalances that assures more stable exchange rates and leaves all the involved economies on sounder macroeconomic footing, mainstream economic thinking suggests that the needed rebalancing can be most efficiently achieved by a coordinated international policy response, the salient elements of which are
in the United States, raising the national saving rate via substantial increases in the saving rates of households and government and through that reducing the U.S. trade deficit to a "sustainable" size; in Japan and Europe, generating faster economic growth primarily propelled by domestic spending rather than net exports; in Asia (excluding Japan and China), fostering a recovery of domestic investment and reducing the outflow of domestic saving; and in China (and other surplus economies that fix their exchange rates to the dollar), allowing their currencies to appreciate and channel more of their domestic savings into domestic spending. | Depreciation of the dollar since 2002 raises concern among some in Congress and the public that the dollar's decline is a symptom of broader economic problems, such as a weak economic recovery, rising public debt, and a diminished standing in the global economy. However, a falling currency is not always a problem, but possibly an element of economic adjustments that are, on balance, beneficial to the economy.
A depreciating currency could affect several aspects of U.S. economic performance. Possible effects include increased net exports, decreased international purchasing power, rising commodity prices, and upward pressure on interest rates; if the trend is sustained, the United states may also experience a reduction of external debt, possible undermining of the dollar's reserve currency status, and an elevated risk of a dollar crisis.
The exchange rate is not a variable that is easily addressed by changes in legislative policy. Nevertheless, although usually not the primary target, the dollar's international value can be affected by decisions made on policy issues facing the 112th Congress, including decisions related to generating jobs, raising the debt limit, reducing the budget deficit, and stabilizing the growth of the federal government's long-term debt. Also, monetary policy actions by the Federal Reserve, over which Congress has oversight responsibilities, can affect the dollar.
The exchange rate of the dollar is largely determined by the market—the supply and demand for dollars in global foreign exchange markets associated with the buying and selling of dollar denominated goods, services, and assets (e.g., stocks, bonds, real property) on global markets. In most circumstances international asset-market transactions will tend to be dominant, with the size and strength of inflows and outflows of capital ultimately determining whether the exchange rate appreciates or depreciates.
A variety of factors can influence the size and direction of cross-border asset flows. Of principal importance are the likely rate of return on the asset, investor expectations about a currency's future path, the size and liquidity of the country's asset markets, the need for currency diversification in international investors' portfolios, changes in the official holdings of foreign exchange reserves by central banks, and the need for and location of investment safe havens. All of these factors could themselves be influenced by economic policy choices.
To give Congress the economic context in which to view the dollar's recent and prospective movement, this report analyzes the evolution of the exchange rate since its peak in 2002. It examines several factors that are likely to influence the dollar's medium-term path; what effects a depreciating dollar could have on the economy; and how alternative policy measures that could be taken by the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the 112th Congress might influence the dollar's path. |
crs_RL33535 | crs_RL33535_0 | Background
On May 18, 2005, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the first national standards for mercury emissions from coal-fired electric power plants. In the United States, coal-fired power plants are the largest emission source, accounting for 42% of total mercury emissions according to EPA. EPA's 2005 regulations, referred to as the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), establish a cap-and-trade program for power plant mercury that will take effect in 2010. CAMR will have little impact on emissions before 2018, however. At that time, the regulations call for a 69% reduction in emissions as compared to the 1999 level. In setting the limit so far in the future, EPA stated, in part, that mercury control technologies are not commercially available, and will not be generally available until after 2010. Many observers disagree with that conclusion, including a growing number of states. Which States Are Setting Standards
As of February 2007, 18 states have established more stringent emission limits that will take effect sooner than will EPA's, and four other states are developing regulations that would do so. The states with regulations already promulgated (or laws enacted) represent a broad cross-section of states, including Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. What the Standards Will Require
Rates, Dates, Compliance, and Trading
As shown in Appendi x es A and B , the specifics of the state standards vary in stringency, in effective dates, and in numerous other details. First, at least 15 of the state programs will require reductions of 80% to 90% in mercury emissions when fully implemented. Second, the effective dates range from 2007 at the earliest to 2015, with a majority of the programs imposing at least a first phase reduction by 2010. Fourth, unlike the CAMR program, a key feature of which is the trading of emission allowances, the state programs generally prohibit interstate trading of mercury credits; many prohibit in-state trading, as well. These prohibitions address the concern that mercury hot spots might persist if individual plants could avoid installing controls by buying credits. Thus, it can be difficult to compare the stringency of various state requirements. | In March 2005, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the first national emission standards for mercury emissions from electric power plants. EPA studies conclude that about 6% of American women of child-bearing age have blood mercury levels sufficient to increase the risk of adverse health effects (especially lower IQs) in children they might bear. Power plants account for 42% of total U.S. mercury emissions, according to EPA. Thus, there has been great interest in the agency's power plant regulations.
The regulations established a cap-and-trade program to address power plant emissions, but the program would have little impact on emissions before 2018. At that time, the regulations call for a 69% reduction in emissions as compared to the 1999 level.
In setting the limit so far in the future, EPA stated, in part, that mercury control technologies were not commercially available, and would not be generally available until after 2010. Many observers disagreed with that conclusion, including a growing number of states. As of February 2007, 18 states (Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) have established more stringent emission limits, which take effect sooner than will EPA's, and four other states are developing regulations that would do so.
The state standards vary in stringency, in effective dates, and in numerous other details, but a number of generalizations can be made:
Most of the state programs will require reductions of 80% to 90% in mercury emissions when fully implemented; by comparison, the federal program requires a 22% reduction in its first phase and 69% when fully implemented. The effective dates of the state programs range from 2007 at the earliest to 2015; the federal requirements will not be fully implemented until at least 2025. The state programs generally prohibit interstate trading of mercury credits, and many also prohibit in-state trading. The trading prohibitions address the concern that "hot spots" with high concentrations of mercury might persist if individual plants could avoid installing controls by buying credits.
This report reviews the state standards for mercury emissions from power plants and discusses issues raised by the promulgation of such standards. Among these are whether states can prevent the sale of credits generated by compliance with state regulations in EPA's national credit trading program, and the potential impact of state programs on court challenges to EPA's national regulations. |
crs_R42323 | crs_R42323_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Constitution establishes two methods by which Presidents may appoint officers of the United States: either with the advice and consent of the Senate, or unilaterally "during the Recess of the Senate." These two constitutional provisions have long served as sources of political tension between Presidents and Congresses, and the same has held true since President Obama took office. This tension is illuminated by President Obama's difficulty in obtaining Senate confirmation of nominations for the Directorship of the newly-established Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or Bureau) and Members of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board). On December 17, 2011, the Senate adopted a unanimous consent agreement that scheduled a series of pro forma sessions to occur from December 20, 2011, until January 23, 2012, with brief recesses in between. The unanimous consent agreement established that "no business" would be conducted during the pro forma sessions and that the second session would begin at 12:00 p.m., January 3, 2012. On January 4, 2012, despite the periodic pro forma sessions of the Senate, the President, asserting his authority under the Recess Appointments Clause, announced his intent to appoint Cordray to serve as the first CFPB Director and Block, Griffin Jr., and Terrence F. Flynn, to be members of the NLRB. This report analyzes the legal issues associated with the President's exercise of his Recess Appointments Clause power on January 4, 2012. To set the framework of our discussion, the report begins with a general legal overview of the Recess Appointments Clause. This is followed by an analysis of two legal principles, standing and the political question doctrine, which may impede a reviewing court from reaching the merits of a potential legal challenge to the appointments. The examination of these justiciability issues is followed by an analysis of the constitutional validity of the appointments; potential statutory restrictions on a recess appointee's authority to exercise the powers of the CFPB; and how actions taken by the recess appointees may be impacted by a court ruling that the appointments are unlawful. Conclusions
The unique facts underlying the President's January 4, 2012, recess appointments raise a number of unresolved constitutional questions regarding the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause. However, the Clause itself contains ambiguities, and with a lack of judicial precedent that may otherwise elucidate the provision, it is difficult to predict how a reviewing court would define the contours of the President's recess appointment authority. If the President's recess appointments are challenged, it appears the most likely plaintiffs to satisfy the court's standing requirements would be a private individual or association who, following the appointments, has suffered an injury as a result of some discrete action taken by the CFPB or NLRB. Were the court to proceed to the merits of the challenge, the primary question presented would likely be whether the President made the January 4 recess appointments "during a recess of the Senate." Aspects of both of these determinations, which appear to involve questions of separation of powers and the internal proceedings of the Senate, may potentially be deemed to involve political questions inappropriate for judicial review and better resolved by the President and Congress. Finally, even if the recess appointments are considered constitutionally valid, it appears likely that questions may be raised as to Director Cordray's authority. | The U.S. Constitution establishes two methods by which Presidents may appoint officers of the United States: either with the advice and consent of the Senate, or unilaterally "during the Recess of the Senate." These two constitutional provisions have long served as sources of political tension between Presidents and Congresses, and the same has held true since President Obama took office.
At the end of the first session of the 112th Congress, the Senate had not acted upon the nominations of the Director to the recently established Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or Bureau) or of members to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). On December 17, 2011, the Senate adopted a unanimous consent agreement that established a series of "pro forma" sessions to occur from December 20, 2011, until January 23, 2012, with brief recesses in between. The unanimous consent agreement established that "no business" would be conducted during the pro forma sessions and that the second session would begin at 12:00 p.m., January 3, 2012.
On January 4, 2012, despite the periodic pro forma sessions of the Senate, the President, asserting his Recess Appointments Clause powers, announced his intent to appoint Richard Cordray to be Director of the CFPB and Terrence F. Flynn, Sharon Block, and Richard F. Griffin Jr. to be Members of the NLRB. The unique facts underlying the President's January 4, 2012, recess appointments raise a number of unresolved constitutional questions regarding the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause. However, the Clause itself contains ambiguities, and with a lack of judicial precedent that may otherwise elucidate the provision, it is difficult to predict how a reviewing court would define the contours of the President's recess appointment authority.
If the President's recess appointments are challenged, it appears the most likely plaintiffs to satisfy the court's standing requirements would be a private individual or association who, following the appointments, has suffered an injury as a result of some discrete action taken by the CFPB or NLRB. Were the court to proceed to the merits of the challenge, the primary question presented would likely be whether the President made the January 4 recess appointments "during a recess of the Senate." This issue, however, appears to involve questions of separation of powers and the internal proceedings of the Senate, and may potentially be deemed to involve political questions inappropriate for judicial review and better resolved by the President and Congress. Finally, even if the recess appointments are considered constitutionally valid, it appears likely that other questions may be raised as to Director Cordray's authority.
This report analyzes the legal issues associated with the President's asserted exercise of his Recess Appointments Clause power on January 4, 2012. The report begins with a general legal overview of the Recess Appointments Clause. This is followed by an analysis of two legal principles, standing and the political question doctrine, which may impede a reviewing court from reaching the merits of a potential legal challenge to the appointments. The examination of these justiciability issues is followed by an analysis of the constitutional validity of the appointments; potential statutory restrictions on a recess appointee's authority to exercise the powers of the CFPB; and how actions taken by the recess appointees could be impacted by a court ruling that the appointments are unlawful. |
crs_R45137 | crs_R45137_0 | The Bankruptcy Code generally attempts to balance two competing policy concerns. At the same time, however, the bankruptcy system also attempts to maximize total creditor return by distributing a subset of the debtor's assets or income to creditors in an orderly, equitable, and efficient fashion. Thus, "Congress and the judiciary are constantly striving to achieve a wise balance between" offering "a fresh start for debtors" and ensuring "fairness to creditors." This report accordingly provides a primer for Members and their staffs on the basics of U.S. bankruptcy law. In so doing, the report provides a broad overview of the most essential concepts necessary for an informed understanding of the U.S. bankruptcy system, including
the competing policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code; the sources of bankruptcy law; the organization of the Bankruptcy Code; the key players in a bankruptcy proceeding; the initiation of a bankruptcy case; the "automatic stay" of creditor actions against the debtor; the various types of proceedings established by different "Chapters" of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as the differences between those proceedings; and the discharge of debt. The Bankruptcy Code and Other Sources of Bankruptcy Law
As noted above, the Bankruptcy Code is the primary source of bankruptcy law in the United States. As explained in greater detail below, each of these types of proceedings has different eligibility requirements, is governed by different procedures, and results in different forms of relief. Chapter 11 Reorganization
Whereas the purpose of a Chapter 7 proceeding is to liquidate the debtor, most Chapter 11 proceedings aim to reorganize the debtor's debt structure so that the debtor may continue to operate. "With certain exceptions . | U.S. bankruptcy law has two central aims. First, bankruptcy law seeks to relieve debtors of certain obligations they are unable to repay by providing them with a "fresh start" from financial difficulties. At the same time, bankruptcy law attempts to preserve the countervailing interests of creditors and other stakeholders by maximizing total creditor return in an orderly and efficient fashion. Congress and the courts have established a complex system of statutes, procedural rules, and judicial precedents intended to balance these competing interests.
Various types of debtors—from individual consumers with modest incomes to the largest multinational corporations—may potentially encounter difficulty repaying their debts. To accommodate the differing needs of such debtors, the Bankruptcy Code—which is the primary source of bankruptcy law in the United States—contains a variety of "Chapters" which create several different forms of bankruptcy proceedings. Although the end goal of each of those proceedings is to balance the conflicting interests of debtors, creditors, and other stakeholders, each Chapter has its own procedures, eligibility requirements, and forms of relief. Whereas some Chapters aim to liquidate the debtor, others attempt to reorganize the debtor so that it may continue to operate as a going concern, while still others adjust the debtor's debts.
This report serves as a primer for Members and their staffs on the basics of U.S. bankruptcy law. The report provides a brief overview of the most essential concepts necessary for an informed understanding of the U.S. bankruptcy system, including
the competing policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code; the sources of bankruptcy law; the organization of the Bankruptcy Code; the key players in a bankruptcy proceeding; the initiation of a bankruptcy case; the "automatic stay" of creditor actions against the debtor; the various types of proceedings established by different Chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as the differences between those proceedings; and the "discharge" of debt. |
crs_R40509 | crs_R40509_0 | Rules Changes Affecting House Floor Procedure
On the first day of the 111 th Congress, the House agreed to H.Res. 5 , which made several changes to House rules affecting floor proceedings. Adjustment to Calendar Wednesday Procedure
Calendar Wednesday is a rarely-utilized procedure that allows committee-reported legislation, not otherwise privileged for floor consideration, to be called up by the committee of jurisdiction on Wednesdays. 5 amended clause 6 of Rule XV to require that the Calendar Wednesday procedure only occur at the request of a committee. 5 added a paragraph to clause 1 of Rule XIX to grant the presiding officer the authority to postpone consideration of legislation. Under the new paragraph, if legislation is being considered under the terms of a typical special rule, the presiding officer can postpone further consideration to a time designated by the Speaker. In the past, the House agreed to special rules that granted the Speaker the authority to postpone consideration when it anticipated that such authority might be useful. For example, it is no longer in order to offer a motion to recommit instructing the committee to report back a measure "promptly" with an amendment. The primary procedural effect of any motion to recommit with instructions other than to report back "forthwith" was the same as that of a motion to recommit without any instructions: the measure would be returned to committee with no requirement for further action. Instructions in a Motion to Recommit Must Direct Committee to Report "Forthwith"
Prior to the rules change at the start of the 111 th Congress, a motion to recommit with instructions could have omitted the term "forthwith" (referred to as a motion to recommit with non-forthwith instructions). In previous Congresses, a straight motion to recommit was not debatable. 5 amended House Rule XIX, clause 2(b), to allow 10 minutes of debate on any motion to recommit in order under this rule. 5 removed from House Rule XX, clause 2(a), a provision aimed at prohibiting the presiding officer from holding a vote open "for the sole purpose of reversing the outcome of such vote." The provision had been added at the start of the 110 th Congress, but due in part to issues concerning its enforceability, its deletion was recommended by the Select Committee to Investigate the Voting Irregularities of August 2, 2007. The first concerned the closing of votes taken by electronic device and the second addressed the use of the House floor. The announcement did not change the long-standing practices for ending a vote. The 2009 modification of the Speaker's announced policy establishes that the best practice is "for presiding officers is to await the Clerk's certification that a vote tally is complete and accurate." Use of the House Floor
Pursuant to authority granted to the Speaker over "general control of the Hall of the House" in House Rule I, clause 3, the Speaker also announced that the chamber of the House should not be used for "mock proceedings on the floor" or "political rallies." | On the first day of the 111th Congress, the House agreed to H.Res. 5, which made several changes to House rules affecting floor proceedings. First, the House amended clause 6 of Rule XV to require that Calendar Wednesday only occur at the request of a committee. Calendar Wednesday is a rarely-utilized procedure that allows reported legislation, not otherwise privileged for floor consideration, to be called up by the committee of jurisdiction on Wednesdays. Prior to this rules change, unanimous consent was routinely granted to waive the Calendar Wednesday procedure.
The House also added a paragraph to clause 1 of Rule XIX to grant the presiding officer the authority to postpone consideration of legislation. Under the new paragraph, if legislation is being considered under the typical terms of a special rule, the presiding officer can postpone further consideration to a time designated by the Speaker. During the 110th Congress, special rules usually included a provision granting the presiding officer this authority, and the addition of this paragraph to the standing rules makes such provisions unnecessary. The authority allows the presiding officer to postpone consideration even after the motion to recommit has been offered.
In addition, the House amended House Rule XIX, clause 2(b), to allow 10 minutes of debate on any motion to recommit in order under this rule. Prior to this rules change, a straight motion to recommit, which proposes to send the measure back to committee without instructions, was not debatable. The rule was further amended to require that any instructions in a motion to recommit be to report back an amendment "forthwith." It was previously in order to offer motions to recommit with instructions that did not propose that the committee report back "forthwith." For example, Members could propose instructions that the committee hold hearings, or report back a measure "promptly" with an amendment. The primary procedural effect of a motion to recommit with any instructions other than to report back "forthwith" was the same as a straight motion to recommit: the measure would be returned to committee with no requirement for further action.
Finally, the House removed from House Rule XX, clause 2(a), a provision that aimed to prohibit the presiding officer from holding a vote open "for the sole purpose of reversing the outcome of such vote." The provision had been added at the start of the 110th Congress, but due in part to issues concerning its enforceability, its deletion was recommended by the Select Committee to Investigate the Voting Irregularities of August 2, 2007.
At the start of the 111th Congress, the Speaker made customary announcements concerning House operations and the legislative process, with two modifications related to floor proceedings. First, the Speaker announced her endorsement of the existing process for closing a vote by electronic device. This announcement does not change long-standing practices for closing votes, but it states that the best practice is for presiding officers to rely on certification from the clerks that a vote tally is complete and accurate. Second, pursuant to authority granted to the Speaker over "general control of the Hall of the House" in House Rule I, clause 3, the Speaker announced that the chamber of the House should not be used for "mock proceedings on the floor" or "political rallies." |
crs_R41290 | crs_R41290_0 | Introduction
President Obama has nominated his Solicitor General, Elena Kagan, to be the next Supreme Court Justice. If confirmed, she would fill the seat being vacated by Justice John Paul Stevens upon his retirement at the end of the 2009/2010 term. Prior to her term as Solicitor General, Ms. Kagan, in her capacity as an academic and scholar, wrote influential pieces analyzing free speech jurisprudence. "Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment Doctrine"
The most comprehensive article (over 100 pages) Ms. Kagan has written on the First Amendment is "Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine." It is also important to note that the article was published in 1996. To explain why Ms. Kagan thinks her government motive theory is necessary to understand First Amendment doctrine, she begins with an example of a case that, in her opinion, could only make sense in the context of First Amendment doctrine if the Court is primarily concerned with improper government motive. Ms. Kagan hypothesizes that this outcome can be best understood when viewed as an attempt by the Court to guard against laws that have a greater likelihood of being motivated by an improper purpose. She acknowledges room for disagreement with her theory, but appears to believe, nonetheless, that she has devised the best explanation for then-current First Amendment jurisprudence possible. These two theories are compared with Ms. Kagan's "government motive-based" theory, which claims that "what is essential is not the consequences of a regulation but the reasons that underlie it" and that where a law leaves too much room for impermissible underlying motivations, the court will be more likely to strike it down as a result of that suspicion. Ms. Kagan argues that all free speech cases dealing with restrictions on the speech of private persons (she leaves the discussion of government speech for another day) can be explained, at least in part, by the Court's indirect inquiry into whether the law was motivated by the above impermissible reasons. She acknowledges that in United States v. O'Brien , the Supreme Court said that the purpose of Congress (or any governmental body) "is not a basis for declaring legislation unconstitutional." A law that banned all billboards would probably be constitutional, under current doctrine. Content-neutral laws do carry risk of improper motive, in Ms. Kagan's view, because they restrict speech, and it is possible that lawmakers may be so averse to a particular idea that they are willing to suppress more speech than necessary to restrict that idea's expression. This seems to run counter to the Court's decisions to create categories of speech with a lower value under the First Amendment. She uses as an example laws that would prohibit flag burning. Ms. Kagan wonders, however, why it is improper for the government to restrict objectively contemptible ideas, independent of the harm they might cause. "Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After R.A.V." Three years prior to publishing her article described above, Ms. Kagan wrote a piece in the University of Chicago Law Review on the implications of the Court's decision in R.A.V. Instead, she appears to take the position that assuming her understanding of the Court's doctrine is correct, statutes may be designed to comport with that doctrine and restrict some hate speech and pornography, though certainly not all. Fighting words are unprotected expression. Ms. Kagan further states that she believes this approach to be the most harmonious with free speech principles. Kagan does not argue that these will certainly work, nor does she argue that these are the only paths. She argues, therefore, that with the proper "fit" a law designed in this way might withstand scrutiny. | President Obama has nominated his Solicitor General, Elena Kagan, to be the next Supreme Court Justice. If confirmed, she would fill the seat being vacated by Justice John Paul Stevens upon his retirement at the end of the 2009/2010 term. Prior to her term as Solicitor General, Ms. Kagan, in her capacity as an academic and scholar, wrote influential pieces analyzing free speech jurisprudence.
In particular, Ms. Kagan wrote a law review article entitled "Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment Doctrine." This article is best described as an attempt to understand the underlying issues free speech doctrine addresses. Ms. Kagan argues, basically, that the Supreme Court scrutinizes most closely speech restrictions that carry the most risk of having been enacted to serve improper government motives (e.g., to benefit certain ideas, to suppress particular ideas, or to serve legislative self-interest). Ms. Kagan opens the article by noting that the Supreme Court claims that the purpose of Congress (or any governmental body) "is not a basis for declaring legislation unconstitutional." Ms. Kagan posits, nonetheless, that free speech jurisprudence is an indirect (even unconscious) attempt by the Court to ferret out improper government motives where speech restrictions are at issue. In this way, she explains seeming inconsistencies in First Amendment law. For example, she uses her improper motive theory to explain why it is permissible for the government to ban all fighting words, but impermissible for the government to ban only fighting words motivated by racial or ethnic discrimination. Under Ms. Kagan's theory, it is more likely that the latter restriction was enacted pursuant to the improper governmental motive of suppressing ideas with which legislators disagree than the former, making the latter restriction unconstitutional, while the former withstands scrutiny.
Ms. Kagan does not appear to argue that the theory she describes is the best possible way to establish a freedom of speech doctrine, nor does she argue that her theory is the only way to understand free speech jurisprudence. She states, instead, that she has engaged in this analysis, because "only when we know why the doctrine has emerged and what purposes it serves will we know whether and how to modify it." Thus, to the extent that she evaluates particular cases within this article, it seems that her assertions of whether particular decisions are "correct" or "incorrect" may refer to whether the reasoning of the decisions fits with the theory of jurisprudence she is explicating rather than her beliefs regarding the proper outcomes of the cases.
Ms. Kagan took a somewhat different, though consistent, perspective in her earlier article entitled "Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After R.A.V." The focus of this article, rather than being motivated by an attempt to understand the Court's underlying aims, seemed to be more on crafting statutes that would comport with the Court's existing case law, which takes into account what Ms. Kagan would argue are the Court's underlying aims. Ms. Kagan suggests various ways for crafting statutes that would restrict pornography and hate speech that she believes could be constitutional under the Court's then-current doctrine.
This report will explain these articles in further detail, as well as an additional, shorter piece, discussing the First Amendment implications of codes of conduct at public universities. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43081 | crs_R43081_0 | Introduction
On January 10, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) released a final rule implementing the Ability-to-Repay (ATR) requirement of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. The final rule is effective January 10, 2014, one year after it was issued. Description of Final Rule10
Prior to offering a borrower a mortgage that is subject to the rule, the ATR rule will require a lender to determine, based on documented and verified information, that the borrower has the ability to repay the loan. Failure to comply could result in a lender having to pay damages to a borrower who brings a lawsuit and claims that the lender did not follow the ATR rule. With regard to product-feature restrictions, a QM cannot have
A lender that originates a QM is entitled to a "presumption of compliance" with the ATR requirement, but the type of presumption of compliance and the amount of legal protection the lender receives depends on the mortgage interest rate. In addition, if the mortgage is otherwise a QM (meets the other underwriting and product feature requirements), the subprime borrower could win his case if the court finds that "the creditor did not make a reasonable and good faith determination of the consumer's repayment ability at the time of consummation." Temporary Agency/GSE QM Option
The CFPB is concerned that lenders may initially only originate mortgages that meet the QM standards because "of the fragile state of the mortgage market as a result of the recent mortgage crisis." The CFPB final rule, therefore, establishes a Temporary Agency/GSE QM Option for loans eligible to be purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or to be insured by the government through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), or the Rural Housing Service (RHS). In addition, the loan must
meet the QM requirement that a lender verify a borrower's income, assets, and debt obligations; have a term of between 5 years and 30 years; have a fixed interest rate; satisfy the QM requirement that the lender determine that the borrower can afford all scheduled payments besides the balloon payment given the borrower's income and assets; not be subject to a forward commitment (an agreement to sell the loan) at the time the loan is consummated; and not have negative amortization. Higher-priced mortgages afford a rebuttable presumption and non-higher-priced mortgages provide the lender with a safe harbor. As part of its analysis of the final rule, the CFPB estimated the fraction of the mortgage market at various points in time that would satisfy the ATR rule and receive the different types of QM status. The CFPB also analyzed the mortgage market as of 2011. An additional 22% would have satisfied the ATR rule through the general ATR option (though not receive QM status) and the final 8% would not have complied with the final rule. Using data from 2011, the CFPB estimated that "76 percent of mortgages would have been qualified mortgages inside the safe harbor, 2 percent of mortgages would have been qualified mortgages with a rebuttable presumption, and 22 percent of mortgages would have been subject to the ability-to-repay requirements." Jumbo loans may be most affected in the short term by the QM rule. Additional Selected Issues
In addition to affecting who may receive a mortgage, the ATR rule may have other effects on the mortgage market. Relationship to Other Rules
The Ability-to-Repay rule is one of several mortgage market rules required by the Dodd-Frank Act that were released by the CFPB in January 2013. | On January 10, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) released a final rule implementing the Ability-to-Repay (ATR) requirement of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). The rule is effective January 10, 2014. The ATR rule will require a lender to determine based on documented and verified information that at the time a mortgage loan is made, the borrower has the ability to repay the loan. Failure to make such a determination could result in a lender having to pay damages to a borrower who brings a lawsuit claiming that the lender did not follow the ATR rule.
The final rule provides multiple ways for a lender to comply, one of which is by originating a Qualified Mortgage (QM). To receive QM status, a loan must meet certain underwriting and product-feature requirements. For example, in most cases a QM cannot have a balloon payment (a large payment that is typically due at the end of the loan). If a loan is a QM, then the lender receives a presumption of compliance for legal purposes.
The type of presumption of compliance that a QM receives depends on the rate of the loan. If the loan is a higher-priced mortgage (the mortgage's rate exceeds the average rate for a prime mortgage by more than 1.5 percentage points for a purchase), then the lender receives a rebuttable presumption of compliance. It is presumed that the lender complied, but the borrower could win his case if, for example, the court finds that the lender should have known that the borrower did not have sufficient residual income after paying his mortgage and other obligations to afford his living expenses. If the QM is not a higher-priced mortgage, then the lender receives a safe harbor. So long as the mortgage meets the QM standards, the lender is considered to have complied with the ATR rule.
Some are concerned that, at least in the short term, only mortgages meeting the QM standards will be originated because of the legal protections they afford, even though there are other means of complying with the ATR rule. The definition of QM, therefore, could determine who would receive a mortgage in the future. To increase access to credit, the CFPB also included a temporary QM option for loans eligible to be purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or to be insured by the government through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), or the Rural Housing Service (RHS). According to the final rule, the temporary option would last for, at most, seven years from when the rule goes into effect in January 2014.
The CFPB's analysis of the mortgage market as of the end of 2011 concluded that, excluding the temporary option, approximately 76% of mortgages would have received safe harbor QM status. An additional 2% would have been qualified mortgages with a rebuttable presumption, and 22% would have satisfied the ATR rule through other compliance options. Including the temporary option, the CFPB estimates that more than 95% of the mortgage market as of the end of 2011 would have received QM status. Underwriting standards and access to credit are considered to have been tighter in 2011 than before the housing crisis, however.
In addition to concerns about credit availability, experts have raised other potential issues with the final rule. Some ask how the temporary QM option might affect the government's role in the housing market, while others raise concerns about the final rule's impact on rural and community banks. The ATR rule is one of several mortgage market rules released by regulators; some worry about how the rules, in aggregate, will affect the mortgage market. |
crs_RL34540 | crs_RL34540_0 | As Table 1 shows, Congress appropriated $60.538 billion for CJS departments and agencies in this act. This amount was $4.578 billion more than the FY2008 enacted level (an 8.2% increase) and $3.488 billion more than the amended FY2009 request (a 6.1% increase). For Justice, the Omnibus included $26.120 billion. Economic Stimulus
On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ). In this act, Congress appropriated $15.922 billion for CJS departments and agencies. For Commerce, the act provided $7.916 billion, including the following amounts:
$150.0 million of the EDA, $1.000 billion for the Census Bureau, $5.350 billion for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), $580.0 million for the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), $830.0 million for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), and $6.0 million for the DOC Office of Inspector General (OIG). For science agencies, the act provided $4.004 billion, including $1.002 billion for NASA and $3.004 billion for the National Science Foundation (NSF). 2638 ) on September 30, 2008. This law included a CR that funded most CJS and related agencies at their FY2008 levels through March 6, 2009. On March 6, 2009, President Obama extended this CR through March 11, 2009, by signing a another resolution into law ( P.L. 111-6 ; H.J.Res. For several accounts, however, the CR included funding at levels above those appropriated for FY2008. For example, the CR funded the Census Bureau through March 6, 2009 (then March 11, 2009), at a rate that would have equaled a full-year FY2009 appropriation of $3.109 billion. FY2008 Supplemental
On June 20, 2008, then-President Bush signed into law the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 2642 ). The House-reported bill would have provided CJS departments and agencies with $59.657 billion, including $8.707 billion for Commerce, $25.439 billion for Justice, $24.628 billion for science agencies, and $883 million for related agencies. The Senate-reported bill would have provided CJS departments and agencies with $60.724 billion, including $9.402 billon for Commerce, $25.779 billion for Justice, $24.673 billion for science agencies, and $869 million for related agencies. Those issues included the following:
continuing oversight of the FBI's transformation and the redirection of a larger share of the its resources towards combating domestic and international terrorism, and away from traditional crime; rising crime rates in medium-size and smaller cities (in 2006 as compared to 2005, cities with populations of 100,000 to 249,999 reported a 2.3% increase in the reported number of violent crime; and cities with populations of 50,000 to 99,999, 25,000 to 49,999, and 10,000 to 24,999 reported violent crime increases of 3.5%, 3.8%, and 2.8%, respectively); proposed consolidation of the existing 38 federal law enforcement assistance programs into four "competitive" grant programs and a reduction in such assistance to $589.0 million for FY2009 ($1.422 billion less than the amount appropriated by Congress for FY2008, or a 70.7% decrease); proposed consolidation of Office on Violence Against Women programs into a single "competitive" grant program, and a reduction in that Office's budget to $280.0 million for FY2009 (30% decrease as compared to the FY2008 appropriation); proposed $100.0 million Southwest Border Enforcement Initiative that would increase resources to bolster DOJ's efforts to combat illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and firearms smuggling across the Southwest border between the United States and Mexico in the Administration's FY2009 budget request; FY2008 budget shortfall for the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in light of projections that its facilities could have been 39% over capacity in 2008 and could be 42% over capacity in 2009; and proposed elimination of a prisoner reentry initiative under the Administration's FY2009 grant consolidation plan, when an estimated 650,000 offenders are being released from prison annually. On March 11, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-8 ), which appropriated $9.268 billion for the Department of Commerce. This amount was 12.8% greater than President Bush's original FY2009 request of $8.217 billion. On June 9, 2008, the Administration submitted an FY2009 budget amendment requesting almost $546.0 million more for the 2010 Census, to be offset by reducing, canceling, or shifting funds for other Census Bureau activities, elsewhere in the Commerce Department, and in other entities. The House Appropriations Committee reported bill ( H.R. For FY2009, the Omnibus ( P.L. The act provided $4.004 billion for the CJS science agencies, including $1.002 billion for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and $3.002 billion for NSF (see Table 10 ). The FY2009 request was to provide $276.0 million for IA. 110-252 ) provided, among other things, $62.5 million in emergency supplemental funding for the NSF. 110-329 ; H.R. | This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress to provide FY2009 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS). On March 11, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8). In the Omnibus, Congress appropriated $60.538 billion for CJS agencies. This amount was $4.578 billion more than the FY2008 enacted level (an 8.2% increase) and $3.488 billion more than the amended FY2009 request (a 6.1% increase). The Omnibus included $9.268 billion for the Department of Commerce, $26.120 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.278 billion for science agencies, and $872 million for related agencies.
On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5). In the ARRA, Congress appropriated $15.922 billion for CJS agencies. Among other amounts, the act provided $1.000 billion for the Census Bureau, $5.350 billion for the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, $580 million for the National Institute of Standards and Technology, $830 million for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, $4.002 billion for state and local law enforcement assistance, $1.002 billion for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and $3.004 billion for the National Science Foundation (NSF).
On September 30, 2008, then-President Bush signed a continuing resolution (CR) (P.L. 110-329) that funded most CJS agencies at their FY2008 levels through March 6, 2009. Under this act, several CJS agencies were funded at rates above their FY2008 levels. For example, the Census Bureau was funded at a rate that would have equaled a full-year FY2009 appropriation of $3.109 billion—more than double the amount provided for FY2008. This act also included FY2008 supplemental funding for several CJS accounts. On March 6, 2009, President Obama extended this CR through March 11, 2009, signing another resolution into law (P.L. 111-6; H.J.Res. 38).
On June 20, 2008, then-President Bush signed into law the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252; H.R. 2642). In this act, Congress appropriated $210.0 million for the Census Bureau, $449.0 million for Justice, and $62.5 million for NASA, and $62.5 million for the NSF.
While the House and Senate Appropriations Committee reported FY2009 CJS appropriations bills (H.R. 7322 and S. 3182), the 110th Congress did not considered these bills further. Nevertheless, the House bill would have provided $59.657 billion for CJS departments and agencies, the Senate bill, $60.724 billion. For FY2009, the Administration initially requested $56.563 billion for CJS agencies, but later amended its request several times, increasing it to $57.050 billion. For Commerce, the FY2009 request initially included $8.217 billion, but the amended request included almost $546.0 million more for the 2010 Census that was to be offset by reducing, canceling, or shifting other amounts for Commerce and certain other entities. The amended FY2009 request included $8.664 billion for Commerce, $23.128 billion for Justice, $24.474 billion for science, and $784 million for related agencies. The amended FY2009 request was nearly was 1.9% less than the amount ($55.960 billion) appropriated by Congress for CJS departments and agencies for FY2008. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43703 | crs_R43703_0 | Abused, neglected, or abandoned children who also lack authorization under immigration law to reside in the United States (i.e., unauthorized aliens) raise complex immigration and child welfare concerns. In 1990, Congress created an avenue for unauthorized children who become dependents of the state juvenile court to remain in the United States legally and permanently as lawful permanent residents (LPR) under the Immigrant and Nationality Act (INA). If an LPR meets the naturalization requirements set in the INA, he or she can become a U.S. citizen. In that year, Congress enacted provisions in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 that altered the eligibility criteria for SIJ status as part of a package of amendments pertaining to unaccompanied alien children. Now, the recent increase in unaccompanied alien children arriving in the United States has cast a spotlight on SIJ status because these unaccompanied children may apply for, and some may obtain, LPR status through this provision. This report provides a brief explanation of the statutory basis of SIJ status and how it has evolved. It also presents statistics on the number of children who have applied for and received SIJ status since FY2005. The report concludes with a discussion of the applicability of SIJ status for unaccompanied alien children. The provision enabled unauthorized alien children who become dependents of the state juvenile courts to remain in the United States legally and permanently. In terms of the number of I-360 petitions approved, the numbers have increased from 73 in FY2005 to 3,432 in FY2013. While the data presented in Figure 1 do not differentiate among those unauthorized children who arrived unaccompanied by their parents and those who were removed from their parents because of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, many observers point to the similarity in the spiking trends of both categories. | Abused, neglected, or abandoned children who also lack authorization under immigration law to reside in the United States (i.e., unauthorized aliens) raise complex immigration and child welfare concerns. In 1990, Congress created an avenue for unauthorized alien children who become dependents of the state juvenile courts to remain in the United States legally and permanently. Any child or youth under the age of 21 who was born in a foreign country; lives without legal authorization in the United States; has experienced abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and meets other specified eligibility criteria may be eligible for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status. Otherwise, unauthorized residents who are minors are subject to removal proceedings and deportation, as are all other unauthorized foreign nationals.
The SIJ classification enables unauthorized juveniles who become dependents of the state juvenile court to become lawful permanent residents (LPR) under the Immigrant and Nationality Act (INA). If an LPR meets the naturalization requirements set in the INA, he or she can become a U.S. citizen.
When Congress enacted provisions in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, it altered the eligibility criteria for SIJ status as part of a package of amendments pertaining to unaccompanied alien children. Now, the recent increase in unaccompanied alien children arriving in the United States has cast a spotlight on SIJ status because these unaccompanied children may apply for, and some may obtain, LPR status through this provision.
There has been a tenfold increase in the number of children requesting SIJ status between FY2005 and FY2013. In terms of approvals, the numbers have gone from 73 in FY2005 to 3,432 in FY2013. While the data do not differentiate among those unauthorized children who arrived unaccompanied by their parents and those who were removed from their parents because of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, many observers point to the similarity in the spiking trends of both categories.
This report provides a brief explanation of the statutory basis of SIJ status and how it has evolved. It also presents statistics on the number of children who have applied for and received SIJ status since FY2005. The report concludes with a discussion of the applicability of SIJ status for unaccompanied alien children. |
crs_RL34574 | crs_RL34574_0 | Since the development of nuclear weapons, federal agencies have been involved in securing U.S. nuclear assets against diversion, theft, and attack. Federal Efforts
The federal government has implemented a series of programs focused on detecting the illicit shipment of nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and securing nuclear weapons and material. These programs largely reside within the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; agencies that became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) upon its creation in 2002; and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established by President Bush on April 15, 2005. Intended to centralize coordination of the federal response to an unconventional nuclear threat, DNDO is located within the Department of Homeland Security. The SAFE Port Act ( P.L. 109-347 ) gave the office statutory authority and specific responsibilities to protect the United States against radiological and nuclear attack. Among these responsibilities is to
develop, with the approval of the Secretary and in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy, an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture with implementation under which (A) the Office will be responsible for the implementation of the domestic portion of the global architecture; (B) the Secretary of Defense will retain responsibility for implementation of Department of Defense requirements within and outside the United States; and (C) the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy will maintain their respective responsibilities for policy guidance and implementation of the portion of the global architecture outside the United States, which will be implemented consistent with applicable law and relevant international arrangements. Because federal efforts to protect against nuclear attack are spread among multiple agencies, determining the full range of existing efforts, coordinating the outcomes of these efforts, identifying any overlaps and gaps between them, and developing an architecture integrating current and future efforts are likely to be evolving, ongoing tasks. The DNDO has organized these programs into a global nuclear detection architecture framework, a combined system of systems, which relies heavily on its technological component. According to the DNDO, the analysis methodology underpinning the global nuclear detection architecture continues to undergo revision and refinement:
In order to maximize the effectiveness of the FY 2008 edition of the [global nuclear detection architecture], DNDO will leverage the independent observation of a full peer review to ensure that the requirements called forth in the [global nuclear detection architecture] continue to reduce the risk from nuclear terrorism. Investment in the interior layer of the architecture has arisen mainly through existing programs designed to protect and safeguard national nuclear facilities and laboratories. Successes in developing and deploying these detector types may lead to significant advances in DNDO's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack. The success of DNDO's activities in establishing this architecture will likely require ongoing evaluation and oversight into the future. The DNDO is aware of the need to retain institutional knowledge. Additional coordination occurs between agencies participating in the global nuclear detection architecture as well. | The U.S. government has implemented a series of programs to protect the nation against terrorist nuclear attack. Some of these programs predate September 11, 2001, while others were established since then. Most programs are within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; and agencies that became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) upon its creation, and they are focused on detecting the illicit acquisition and shipment of nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and securing nuclear weapons. These disparate programs have historically been viewed as lacking coordination and centralized oversight.
In 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal response to an unconventional nuclear threat. The office was codified in 2006 through the passage of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) and given specific statutory responsibilities to protect the United States against radiological and nuclear attack, including the responsibility to develop a "global nuclear detection architecture." Determining the range of existing federal efforts protecting against nuclear attack, coordinating the outcomes of these efforts, identifying overlaps and gaps between them, and integrating the results into a single architecture are likely to be evolving, ongoing tasks.
The global nuclear detection architecture is a multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack. Among its components are existing programs in nuclear detection operated by other federal agencies and new programs put into place by DNDO. The global nuclear detection architecture is developed by DNDO in coordination with other federal agencies implementing nuclear detection efforts and this coordination is essential to the success of the architecture.
This architecture is a complicated system of systems. Measuring the success of the architecture relative to its individual components and the effectiveness of additional investments are challenges. The DNDO is developing risk and cost methodologies to be applied to the architecture in order to understand and prioritize the various nuclear detection programs and activities in multiple federal agencies.
Congress, in its oversight capacity, has shown interest in the development and implementation of the global nuclear detection architecture and in the decision-making process attendant to investments in it. Other issues that may be foci of congressional attention include the balance between investment in near-term and long-term solutions for architecture gaps, the degree and efficacy of federal agency coordination, the mechanism for setting agency investment priorities in the architecture, and the efforts DNDO has undertaken to retain institutional knowledge regarding this sustained architecture effort. |
crs_R43033 | crs_R43033_0 | United States v. Lopez and Progeny
However, in 1995, the Supreme Court revisited the scope of the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez . Conclusion
Congress has broad authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause to enact laws in areas that may overlap with traditional state jurisdiction. As such, Congress has passed complex statutory provisions that regulate the possession, receipt, transfer, and manufacture of firearms and ammunition. As explored in this report, courts have been confronted with the question of whether federal laws can be applied to intrastate possession and intrastate transfers of firearms, or whether such application exceeds the authority of Congress under its commerce power. Generally, the courts have upheld such laws under these as-applied challenges. | Congress has broad authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause to enact laws in areas that may overlap with traditional state jurisdiction. As such, Congress has passed complex statutory provisions that regulate the possession, receipt, transfer, and manufacture of firearms and ammunition. Generally, courts have upheld the validity of firearms laws pursuant to Congress's commerce power. However, courts have been confronted with the question of whether federal laws can be applied to intrastate possession and intrastate transfers of firearms, or whether such application exceeds the authority of Congress. This report explores these cases and how courts have analyzed these as-applied challenges under the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence primarily set forth in United States v. Lopez. |
crs_R41597 | crs_R41597_0 | Introduction
In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced he intended to significantly restructure the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program. The FCS was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program that had been underway since 2000 and was at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. As part of this restructuring, the Army was directed to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations and would incorporate combat lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Initial GCV Request for Proposal (RFP)10
On February 25, 2010, the Army released the RFP for the GCV as described in the following DOD press release:
Army Ground Combat Vehicle Request for Proposal Released
The Army released last Thursday a RFP for the technology development phase of the Infantry Fighting Vehicle being developed under the GCV effort. The Army reportedly planned to reissue the RFP within 60 days of the cancellation. Revised GCV RFP Issued
On November 30, 2010, the Army issued a revised GCV RFP. The first contract for $439.7 million went to the General Dynamics-led team and the second contract for $449.9 million went to the BAE Systems-Northrop Grumman team. Program Activities
DOD Initiates Major GCV Program Changes34
On January 16, 2013, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) Frank Kendall issued an Acquisition Decision Memorandum and an accompanying information memorandum detailing major changes to the GCV program to "enable a more affordable and executable program." The Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) plan is to award both EMD and production options to a single vendor. DOD Announces the Termination of the GCV Program37
On February 24, 2014, during a news conference outlining his recommendations to the President for DOD's FY2015 budget, Secretary of Defense Hagel stated:
I have also accepted the Army's recommendation to terminate the current Ground Combat Vehicle program and re-direct the funds toward developing a next-generation platform. Discussions with Army officials suggest, however, while the GCV program will not move forward, unspecified funding will be provided by DOD to continue certain GCV-related engineering efforts. FY2014 Budget Activity
FY2014 Budget Request41
The FY2014 budget request for the GCV was $592.2 million for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E). 113-66)42
The FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act recommended fully funding the Administration's budget request. Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 (P.L. 113-76 appropriated $100.2 million for the GCV program for FY2014—a $492 million cut to the President's FY2014 budget request. Potential Issues for Congress
What Are the Army's Plans for a Bradley Replacement? As the Army will essentially be "going back to the drawing board" to develop a new fighting vehicle, it might also be a potential consideration to reexamine foreign-developed infantry fighting vehicles that were evaluated during the GCV's Analysis of Alternative phase. What Is the True Status of the GCV Program?45
Despite Secretary of Defense Hagel's statement that the GCV program is to be "terminated," reports suggest that the GCV program will continue on as part of still to be defined science and technology effort. This situation could raise a number of issues for Congress. | In April 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Gates announced he intended to significantly restructure the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program. The FCS was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program that had been underway since 2000 and was at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. In lieu of the cancelled FCS manned ground vehicle (MGV), the Army was directed to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations and would incorporate combat lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Army reissued a request for proposal (RFP) for the GCV on November 30, 2010, and planned to begin fielding the GCV by 2015-2017. On August 17, 2011, the GCV program was approved to enter the Technology Development Phase of the acquisition process and, a day later, the Army awarded two technology development contracts: $439.7 million to the General Dynamics-led team and a second contract for $449.9 million to the BAE Systems-Northrop Grumman team.
Starting in May and running through June 2012, the Army tested a number of foreign candidates during a Network Integration Exercise. This test informed the Army's Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), which is a requirement before the GCV program can progress to the next developmental phase. The AoA reportedly found no suitable existing, less expensive combat vehicles that could meet the Army's GCV requirements. On January 16, 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated a series of major GCV program changes which, while slipping the program schedule to the right and going to a single competitor during Engineering and Manufacturing Development, could save over $4 billion from FY2014 to FY2019.
The Administration's January 26, 2012, Major Budget Decision Briefing not only introduced a new Asia-Pacific strategic focus, but also delayed the GCV program for a year due to the SAIC-Boeing protest.
On February 24, 2014, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced the termination of the GCV program. Army officials contend that this decision was strictly a budgetary one as the GCV program was not experiencing any developmental problems at the time of termination. The Army also notes that some funding might be provided to continue unspecified GCV engineering-related efforts.
The Administration's FY2014 GCV Budget Request was $592.2 million in RDT&E funding. The FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66) recommended fully funding the GCV budget request. The FY2014 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76) appropriated $100.2 million for the GCV program for FY2014—a $492 million cut to the President's FY2014 budget request. Because DOD concluded the GCV program, there was no FY2015 GCV Budget Request.
Potential issues for Congress include the Army's plans for a Bradley replacement vehicle and whether a previously evaluated foreign vehicle could be a suitable replacement. Another potential issue is the precise program status of the GCV, as DOD pronounced the program was "terminated" but reports suggest the Army will fund and continue selected unidentified GCV science and technology activities in FY2015. |
crs_R44181 | crs_R44181_0 | Ballast water has been identified as a major pathway for introduction of AIS. Today stakeholders broadly agree on the need for strong measures to control vessel discharges, especially ballast water discharges, but there are differing views on how to do that. Vessel discharge requirements in the United States are a result of U.S. Coast Guard regulations; a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) permit; and individual state rules, limitations, and requirements. This report discusses the combination of regulations and standards, which is at issue today and is addressed in legislation in the 114 th Congress, the Vessel Incidental Discharge Act ( S. 373 , H.R. 980 , and titles included in S. 1611 , S. 2829 , and H.R. 4909 , which the House passed on May 18). Overlapping Federal Requirements
For some time, the maritime industry has argued for harmonization of what it views as duplicative federal rules for vessel discharges, especially for ballast water discharges, through a single set of requirements. Shipping and other industry groups have raised concerns that EPA's permit overlaps with mandates in the Coast Guard rule, making implementation costly and confusing for vessel owners. State Role and Federal Preemption
Shipping and other industry groups have also objected to the conditions that states attach to EPA's permit, which they argue create a patchwork of inconsistent requirements that are economically inefficient and cumbersome to implement. At the same time, some states and environmental advocacy groups continue to favor more stringent numeric standards in order to eliminate invasions of aquatic invasive species. The current legislation would establish a single federal ballast water management standard, specifying the Coast Guard's 2012 numeric standards as the baseline. Under the legislation, these standards would supersede existing state standards or permits and also would supersede EPA's ballast water management requirements under the CWA. The Coast Guard would be directed to adopt more stringent ballast water standards within eight years, unless a feasibility review determines that the specified more stringent standards are not attainable. The Coast Guard could establish lower or higher revised performance standards with respect to classes of vessels, if appropriate. Upon enactment of the bill, manufacturers of ballast water treatment technology could only sell, deliver, or import technology that has been certified by the Coast Guard as meeting criteria in the legislation. Subject to the findings of the feasibility review, the Coast Guard is directed to revise the ballast water performance standards—by adopting the revised standards specified in the Vessel Incidental Discharge Act, by adopting lower performance standards if the Coast Guard determines that no ballast water treatment technology can meet the revised standards in the bill, or by adopting higher performance standards if treatment technology exists that exceeds the revised standards. However, it modifies this general prohibition by authorizing a state or political subdivision to adopt or enforce a ballast water law or rule that is more stringent than the standards under the Vessel Incidental Discharge Act if the Coast Guard makes a determination that compliance with the standard can be achieved and detected; that technology is commercially available; and determines that the law or rule is consistent with international treaties or agreements to which the United States is a party. Finally, Section 11 states that upon enactment, the legislation shall be the exclusive statutory authority for federal regulation of vessel discharges. Conclusion
Legislation intended to strengthen regulation and management of ballast water discharges that can be a source of non-native aquatic invasive species in U.S. waters has been introduced in Congress for more than a decade, including proposals to require vessels to achieve specific ballast water treatment performance standards. | Today stakeholders broadly agree on the need for strong measures to control vessel discharges, especially ballast water discharges, which can introduce a wide range of contaminants into U.S. and international waters. Ballast water has been identified as a major pathway for introduction of aquatic nuisance, or invasive, species that can harm aquatic ecosystems. Vessel discharge requirements in the United States are a result of U.S. Coast Guard regulations; a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) permit; and individual state requirements that apply in nearly one-half of the states. Vessels also are subject to a number of international agreements, treaties, and Conventions. This report discusses the combination of regulations and standards, which is at issue today and is addressed in legislation in the 114th Congress, the Vessel Incidental Discharge Act (S. 373, H.R. 980, and titles included in S. 1611, S. 2829, and H.R. 4909, which the House passed on May 18, 2016).
The existing regulatory system presents several issues. First, for some time, the maritime industry has argued for harmonization of what it views as duplicative federal rules for vessel discharges, especially for ballast water discharges, through a single set of requirements. Shipping and other industry groups have raised concerns that EPA's permit overlaps with mandates in Coast Guard rules, making implementation costly and confusing for vessel owners. Others, especially some environmental groups, favor centralizing regulation with the EPA. Second, shipping and other industry groups also have objected to conditions that states attach to EPA's permit, which they argue create a patchwork of inconsistent requirements that are hard to implement. However, most states oppose proposals to preempt state action in this area. Third, although the current Coast Guard and EPA requirements for ballast water call for identical treatment standards, some states and environmental groups favor more stringent standards in order to eliminate invasions of aquatic invasive species. EPA and the Coast Guard believe that technology to meet more stringent standards is not technically or economically achievable at this time.
Legislation intended to strengthen regulation and management of vessel discharges, especially discharges that can be a source of non-native aquatic nuisance species in U.S. waters, has been introduced in Congress for more than a decade. The legislation in the 114th Congress addresses many of the concerns with the current regulatory system, especially issues of concern to the maritime and shipping industry.
The Vessel Incidental Discharge Act would establish a single federal ballast water management standard, specifying standards issued by the Coast Guard in 2012 as the baseline. Under the legislation, these standards would supersede existing state standards or permits and also would supersede EPA's ballast water management requirements under the Clean Water Act. Upon enactment, the legislation would be the exclusive statutory authority for federal regulation of vessel discharges. The Coast Guard would be directed to adopt more stringent ballast water standards within eight years, unless a feasibility review determines that the specified more stringent standards are not attainable. The Coast Guard could establish lower or higher revised performance standards with respect to classes of vessels, if appropriate. Following enactment of the bill, manufacturers of ballast water treatment technology could only sell, deliver, or import technology that has been certified by the Coast Guard as meeting criteria in the legislation. Finally, a state could adopt or enforce a more stringent ballast water performance standard if the Coast Guard determines that compliance with the state standard is achievable and is consistent with obligations under relevant international treaties or agreements. |
crs_RL31517 | crs_RL31517_0 | Introduction
On January 22, 2002, the Congressional Research Service sponsored a seminar on the possiblelessons for U.S. policy from the experiences of other countries in handling their own terrorismchallenges. Although this seminar was held over two and a half years ago, several of the topics of discussion and speakers' points of view are relevant to the recommendations made by the report ofthe 9/11 Commission issued in July 2004. The remainder ofthe text is unchanged from the original publication of July 24, 2002. One of the most controversial topics of discussion at the CRS seminar was the utility ofsuch reforms. Other speakers and discussants raised several considerations as towhy this finding may have been true: (1) terrorists may have intensified their activities as they foundreforms counterproductive to their objectives; (2) if negotiations were going on they might haveintensified activities to produce more concessions; (3) the government was unable to deliver thedegree of reform needed or had undertaken reforms too late; (4) other government actions, such asstopping people on the streets, may have undermined the positive effects of reform; or simply (5)that the time frame covered by the study (four to eleven years, depending on the case) may have notbeen long enough to demonstrate the true results of reforms. CRS speakers pointed to international cooperation ashelpful in controlling sources of support for terrorist acts, in particular financing and arms. Participants and Topics
There were three speakers. Several speakers warned, in various contexts, that policymakers needed to think several steps ahead in formulatinganti-terrorism policies, in order to avoid unintended consequences that could make a bad situationworse. Issues in Dealing with Terrorist Organizations
Attrition: Targeting Members and Leaders
In his review of his five country comparative study, Hewitt stated that the only policy tool that significantly reduced levels of terrorist violence was what he called a "model of attrition," i.e., thearrest, internment or killing of terrorists. "Arrests and the rule of law do seem to be the most effective long-term way,"according to Probst. Weighing an Assassination Policy. Responding to a question on the issue of targeting leaders of terrorist organizations for assassination, Crenshawlisted common perceptions of the pros and cons of such a policy. An advantage, she said, was thatassassinations could be an efficient means to cripple an organization by removing the leadership orthe people with key skills, and relatively more humane than using a massive military response inwhich many innocent people might be killed. First, Crenshaw argued that it would be hard to avoid mistakes. Third, she raised the possibility that the targets would not be as critical to the organization as believed, and that their elimination might not end the threat. (3)
The Difficulties of Negotiations
A discussion on the utility of negotiations underscored the extreme difficulties of bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion. Two suggestions were made for improving the possibilities of successfully concluding negotiations. Simultaneous anti-corruption, education, and cultural measuresshould be undertaken to guarantees that a process "is moving towards co-existence." Utility of Reforms
Hewitt's most contentious findings were that reforms and accommodation did not lead to the cessation of terrorism. He also found that "improving economic conditions doesn't have any effect on the levelof terrorism." Potential for Long-term Change. Crenshaw thought that one lesson to be learned from the experiences of European liberal democracies with domestic terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s was that despite policies "that clampeddown pretty severely on terrorism...civil liberties did survive." One theme that reoccurred throughout the seminar was the degree to which the United States can control the factors that promote international terrorism, particularly in the current situation indealing with the multi-pronged threat of Islamist terrorism. Gopin argued for a joint, multidisciplinary effort between policy analysts and the academic field of anti-terrorism. | Participants in a CRS seminar on the possible lessons to be learned from other countries' experiences in dealing with terrorism, generally agreed on three things. First, terrorism is a used bya wide variety of groups for a wide variety of ends. Second, the current threat that the United Statesfaces from Islamist terrorism is most likely long-term. And third, policymakers must think throughanti-terrorist actions in order to avoid consequences that may be worse than the original problem. Much of the seminar discussion focused on matters that two and a half years later became thesubject of 9/11 Commission recommendations. A revised introduction highlights the discussionsummarized in this report that is relevant to Commission recommendations. The remainder of thereport has not been changed.
Discussions during the three hour seminar, held on January 22, 2002, centered on the relative utility of three main policy tools: (1) targeting members and leaders for arrest and assassination, oras speaker Christopher Hewitt labeled it, the "model of attrition," (2) negotiations, and (3) reforms. Hewitt, who has studied the effectiveness of anti-terrorism policies in five countries said that theonly one that showed clear results was a "model of attrition," i.e., that arrest, internment, or killingof terrorists is the most effective means to significantly reduce levels of terrorist violence. SpeakerMartha Crenshaw weighed the pros and cons of targeted assassinations, noting that for her thedisadvantages -- principally the difficulty of avoiding mistakes and the possibility thatassassinations would just encourage others to take the place of those killed -- outweighed theadvantages -- principally that it was relatively more humane than a massive military response.
The most controversial subject was the utility of political and economic reforms in countries that harbor terrorists. Many questions were raised about Hewitt's finding that improving economicconditions did not have any effect on levels of terrorism, and that fairly extensive political reformsmight decrease, but did not end terrorism. Some raised the possibility that long-term educationalreforms, and other methods of changing perceptions, might have more success.
The difficulties of achieving negotiated settlements to end terrorism were examined. Participants suggested ways to increase the chances for successful outcomes. These includedinternational support for legitimate core issues in order to increase support for negotiations,international participation in the negotiations; and the adoption of measures that would isolateterrorists, including steps to increase the rule of law, and anti-corruption, educational, and culturalprograms.
The utility of controlling supporting structures for terrorism and restricting civil liberties were also discussed. Speakers noted that international cooperation is necessary to control arms and fundsthat usually flow from abroad.
(This seminar was made possible in part by a grant from the Charles H. Revson Foundation.) |
crs_RL33707 | crs_RL33707_0 | 102-575 , the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Studies and Facilities Act; 43 U.S.C. At the same time, Administration support for the program has changed from full support prior to enactment in 1992, to the Administration's current position of generally not supporting projects proposed for authorization by project sponsors (primarily municipal water agencies) that have not gone through Reclamation's feasibility process. Responsibility for undertaking the new program—commonly referred to as the Title XVI program—was assigned to Reclamation in the Department of the Interior (DOI). The result of several years' effort in addressing this conflict was the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992 ( P.L. Status of the Title XVI Program and Projects
Authorizations
Congress has authorized 33 Title XVI projects (see the Appendix for additional information). These supporting documents state that the program helps Reclamation "meet its mission to manage and develop water and related resources in an economically and environmentally sound manner" (and specifically notes the program's role in assisting Southern California reduce its reliance on Colorado River water); however, the summary of the PART review declares that the water reclamation and reuse activity is "not one of Reclamation's core functions." Because Title XVI projects are municipal water development project and the most recent articulated congressional policy on these types of projects is nearly half a century old, there remains confusion over how to manage the differences of opinion over the appropriate federal role in water reuse projects that are raised between Congress and the Administration, and within Congress. Unlike other areas of water resources management in which the federal role is more prominent (e.g., irrigation water supply, flood damage reduction, and navigation; or supporting wastewater and drinking water treatment investments through revolving loan programs), the federal role in water supply development for M&I uses largely has been secondary to the primary role of state and local governments. Implementation Issues
On the implementation front, what is at issue for Congress is whether the Title XVI program's current implementation inhibits the achievement of congressional interest in water reuse projects. Recent questions and concerns about the implementation of the Title XVI program appear to have increased in part because of the nature of project evaluation and authorization processes and the lack of a clear program funding process that is typical of federal water quality programs; this is demonstrated by OMB's PART review and the Administration's current positions on authorizing new projects and its budget requests. Project Evaluation and Authorization
Under the evaluation process established in Title XVI of P.L. Second, some sponsors have engaged Reclamation in a feasibility study, but have found agency support lacking in recent years. The Administration's request of $10.1 million for Title XVI for FY2007 is 40% less than the FY2006 enacted appropriation of $25.6 million. 5768 and S. 3639 , would replace the existing appraisal and feasibility evaluation process with a more limited technical and financial viability and review process. These priorities range from assisting communities with drought resilience to focusing on projects with innovative and new technologies. For example, it appears from recent testimony that projects sponsors are generally interested in a more streamlined project development process and expanded program appropriations, while the Administration supports a more limited program with long-term objectives focused on federal interests. The challenge for Congress will be how to proceed in the face of divergent positions. | Congress authorized the Department of the Interior (DOI) to undertake a program to provide limited federal financing for water reuse (i.e., planned beneficial use of treated wastewater and impaired surface and groundwaters) in Title XVI of P.L. 102-575—the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater Studies Feasibility Act of 1992. Title XVI's implementation by DOI's Bureau of Reclamation has been contentious; many Members of Congress, particularly from water-scarce western states, support both the program and specific projects, but are frustrated by growing backlogs of projects seeking authorization or awaiting appropriations.
The Bush Administration has generally opposed authorizing additional projects, citing the backlogs and noting that the projects proposed for authorization generally do not meet Reclamation's requirements for a feasibility study. At the same time, the Administration's requests for appropriations for Title XVI have been relatively consistent for several years, with the FY2007 request at $10.1 million, albeit nearly half of what Congress has appropriated in recent years. The resulting inertia in implementation has raised congressional interest in possible changes to the program. Options discussed range from clarifying the program's criteria (e.g., focus on areas of most need), to changing the way projects are evaluated (e.g., replacing the requirement for a Reclamation feasibility study with an evaluation of technical and financial viability), to expanding and prioritizing Title XVI appropriations.
Views on how to proceed vary based on perspectives of the proper role of the federal government in water supply, the appropriate priority for the program in the current fiscal environment, the history and mission of the program, and the urgency and need for investment and promotion of water reuse technologies. Title XVI's genesis includes helping Southern California reduce its reliance on Colorado River water. As authorizations for projects in other areas and with other purposes were added, the justification for federal involvement in these projects, which expand municipal water supply, and the long-term goals and planning for the program came under increasing scrutiny, particularly by the Administration. At the same time, the program was increasingly pursued by project sponsors as a route for federal assistance, which was then leveraged for additional support and financing. Several project sponsors have directly pursued congressional authorization outside the Title XVI feasibility study process. It is not clear if this is due to the Administration's resistance to pursue Title XVI projects, or due to a combination of other factors.
In the face of decreasing support from the Administration and mounting dissatisfaction of project sponsors, the 109th Congress has engaged in oversight of the program and authorized only a limited set of additional Title XVI projects. The issue for Congress is whether and how to change the program. The challenge for Congress is that stakeholders' perspectives on how to improve the program are fundamentally different. Project sponsors generally prefer a more streamlined project development process and expanded program appropriations, while the Administration supports a smaller, more focused program with long-term objectives tied to federal interests. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL34059 | crs_RL34059_0 | Introduction
Congress is considering several legislative strategies that would reduce U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases—primarily carbon dioxide (CO 2 )—and/or increase uptake and storage of CO 2 from the atmosphere. Others point out that the human contribution of carbon to the atmosphere is a small fraction of the total quantity of carbon that cycles naturally back and forth each year between the atmosphere and two huge carbon reservoirs: the global oceans and the planet's land surface. A key question is how CO 2 emissions from human activities are changing the global carbon cycle—the exchange, or flux, of carbon between the atmosphere, oceans, and land surface—and how the changes affect the rate of CO 2 buildup in the atmosphere. Most climate scientists agree that human perturbations to the carbon cycle are a main factor driving climate change over the past 50 years. Carbon Storage, Sources, and Sinks
The atmosphere, oceans, vegetation, and soils on the land surface all store carbon. In contrast to the oceans, soils, and vegetation, the pool of fossil carbon is only a source, not a sink, except over geologic time scales. If the human contribution of CO 2 is subtracted from the global carbon cycle, then the average net flux —the amount of CO 2 released to the atmosphere versus the amount taken up by the oceans, soils, and vegetation—is close to zero. If CO 2 emissions continue or grow, however, atmospheric concentrations of CO 2 will likely also continue to rise, increasing radiative forcing —the degree to which the atmosphere traps incoming radiation from the sun. The "Missing Sink"
What used to be known as "the missing sink" component in the global carbon cycle is now understood to be that part of the terrestrial ecosystem responsible for the net uptake of carbon from the atmosphere to the land surface (especially high-latitude, or boreal, forests). Like the land surface, the oceans today accumulate more carbon than they emit to the atmosphere each year, acting as a net sink for about 1.7 GtC per year. Ultimately, the oceans could store more than 90% of all the carbon released to the atmosphere by human activities, but the process takes thousands of years. Of possible concern is how the ocean and land surface sinks will behave over the coming decades and longer, and whether they will continue to take up more carbon than they release. Very little carbon is sequestered by deliberate action. Most of the North American terrestrial carbon sink, such as the forest regrowth component, is sometimes referred to as the unmanaged , or background, carbon cycle. Policy makers may also need to evaluate and quantify how management practices, such as afforestation, conservation tillage, and other techniques, would increase the net flux of carbon from the atmosphere to the land surface. For example, some land management practices may be eligible to receive carbon offsets in cap-and-trade legislation that is under consideration. A cap-and-trade system designed to include carbon offsets would likely need an accurate and precise accounting for the tons of carbon sequestered deliberately by land management practices. Some techniques proposed for increasing ocean sequestration of carbon, such as iron fertilization and deep ocean injection of CO 2 , are in an experimental phase and have unknown long-term environmental consequences. The uncertainty in the future behavior of carbon sinks implies that accurately calculating the concentration of atmospheric CO 2 in the future is also uncertain, even if the amount of CO 2 emitted to the atmosphere could be controlled precisely. | Huge quantities of carbon are actively exchanged between the atmosphere and other storage pools, including the oceans, vegetation, and soils on the land surface. The exchange, or flux, of carbon among the atmosphere, oceans, and land surface is called the global carbon cycle. Comparatively, human activities contribute a relatively small amount of carbon, primarily as carbon dioxide (CO2), to the global carbon cycle. Despite the addition of a relatively small amount of carbon to the atmosphere, compared to natural fluxes from the oceans and land surface, the human perturbation to the carbon cycle is increasingly recognized as a main factor driving climate change over the past 50 years.
If humans add only a small amount of CO2 to the atmosphere each year, why is that contribution important to global climate change? The answer is that the oceans, vegetation, and soils do not take up carbon released from human activities quickly enough to prevent CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere from increasing. Humans tap the huge pool of fossil carbon for energy, and affect the global carbon cycle by transferring fossil carbon—which took millions of years to accumulate underground—into the atmosphere over a relatively short time span. As a result, the atmosphere contains approximately 35% more CO2 today than prior to the beginning of the industrial revolution. As the CO2 concentration grows it increases the degree to which the atmosphere traps incoming radiation from the sun, which further warms the planet.
The increase in atmospheric CO2 concentration is mitigated to some extent by two huge reservoirs for carbon—the global oceans and the land surface—which currently take up more carbon than they release. They are net sinks for carbon. Currently, most of the total global carbon sink is referred to as the unmanaged, or background, carbon cycle. Very little carbon is removed from the atmosphere and stored, or sequestered, by deliberate action. If the oceans, vegetation, and soils did not act as sinks, then the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere would increase even more rapidly.
Congress is considering legislative strategies to reduce U.S. emissions of CO2 and/or increase the uptake of CO2 from the atmosphere. Congress may also opt to consider how land management practices, such as afforestation, conservation tillage, and other techniques, might increase the net flux of carbon from the atmosphere to the land surface. Some land management practices may be eligible to receive carbon offsets in cap-and-trade legislation that is under consideration. A cap-and-trade system designed to include carbon offsets would likely need an accurate and precise accounting for the tons of carbon sequestered deliberately by land management practices. How the ocean sink could be managed to store more carbon is unclear. Iron fertilization and deep ocean injection of CO2 are in an experimental stage, and their promise for long-term enhancement of carbon uptake by the oceans is not well understood.
Of additional concern is how the ocean and land surface sinks will behave over the coming decades and longer, and whether they will continue to take up more carbon than they release. The uncertainty in the future behavior of carbon sinks implies that accurately predicting the concentration of atmospheric CO2 in the future is also uncertain, even if the amount of CO2 emitted to the atmosphere could be controlled precisely. |
crs_RS21712 | crs_RS21712_0 | RS21712 -- The African Cotton Initiative and WTO Agriculture Negotiations
January 16, 2004
The African Cotton Initiative
Four cotton producing African countries -- Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali -- have proposed in WTO agriculture negotiationsthe complete elimination of trade-distorting domestic support and export subsidies for cotton. The World Bank reports that over 2 million farmers in the region produce cotton. Implications for U.S. Cotton Programs
Adoption of a stand-alone sectoral initiative, as proposed by the African countries, could mean that cotton producers would, after fouryears, no longer be receiving payments under 2002 farm bill programs that are linked to production, namelymarketing loan assistanceand loan deficiency payments. (18) Direct payments in FY2003 are estimated to be $428 million. (19)
Adoption of the U.S. proposal to reduce cotton subsidies as part of a comprehensive approach to reducing trade-distorting domesticsupport, also could have substantial, if less drastic, consequences for cotton. The United States, on the other hand, continues to insiston including cottonsubsidies in a broader negotiating approach. | In World Trade Organization (WTO) Negotiations on agriculture, a group of Africancountries have proposed that all subsidies for cotton be eliminated by the end of four years. The proposal alsoadvocatescompensating African cotton producing countries for revenues estimated to be lost due to cotton subsidies. TheUnited States, whichprovides substantial production-related subsidies to cotton producers, agrees that cotton subsidies distort trade, butmaintains that theissue should be negotiated in a comprehensive manner. Disagreement over the African cotton initiative has blockedprogress on anagreement on agriculture in the current round of multilateral trade negotiations known as the Doha DevelopmentAgenda (DDA). How to tackle the question of cotton subsidies -- either as a stand-alone initiative or as part of a broader agreementto reducetrade-distorting farm subsidies -- will be on the agenda as DDA negotiations continue in 2004. If the initiative wereagreed to asproposed, U.S. cotton producers would no longer be receiving 2002 farm bill marketing loan, loan deficiency, orcounter-cyclicalpayments after four years. Under a U.S. alternative proposal for reduction in trade distorting subsidies, cottonproducers could stillreceive payments under those programs but in reduced amounts. This report will be updated. |
crs_RL33962 | crs_RL33962_0 | In the absence of a federal program requiring GHG reductions, a growing number of U.S. states are taking action in this arena. Although a majority of states have addressed climate change to some degree (e.g., by creating GHG inventories or state action plans ), the most aggressive actions have come from a smaller group of states, including California and a coalition of states from the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions. The first section of this report discusses the activity in California. The second section focuses on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a cooperative effort of 10 states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. The report's final section considers these state-led actions from a federal policymaking perspective, examining the potential effects, limitations, and legal challenges of state-led climate change actions. California has enacted several significant pieces of climate change legislation, each addressing GHG emissions in different ways. This section discusses the actions California has taken to decrease its GHG emissions. For example, the law does not specifically require the use of a market-based system, such as a cap-and-trade program, to reduce GHG emissions. are used to generate electricity for consumers. The new performance standards will affect not only California, but also other states in the West. The LCFS aims to reduce the carbon intensity of California's transportation fuels by 10% by 2020. Starting in January 2009, RGGI states have agreed to implement a cap of 188 million short tons of carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. The cap is intended to stabilize emissions through the end of 2014. In 2015 and each subsequent year, the emissions cap would be lowered incrementally, so that by 2018, the cap would be 10% below the initial level. Some observers consider RGGI to be a model for a possible federal cap-and-trade program, and thus several of RGGI's design elements are generating interest and debate. Issues for Congress
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the climate change developments in California raise several issues that may be of interest to Congress. Patchwork of Regulations
One concern shared by many observers, particularly industry stakeholders, is that state climate change programs (in the absence of a federal program) will create a patchwork of regulations nationwide. There are already several lawsuits against state actions that seek to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles. | In the absence of a federal program requiring greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions, a growing group of U.S. states are taking action in this arena. Significant actions have been undertaken in California and by a coalition of states from the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions.
California has undertaken several initiatives that seek to reduce GHG emissions. In 2004, the state issued regulations to reduce GHG emissions from motor vehicles. At least 14 other states have indicated that they plan to implement California's new vehicle requirements. In 2006, California passed two climate change statutes. The first establishes a statewide cap on GHG emissions. The second, once it becomes applicable, effectively limits the use of coal-generated electricity in California. The state has also taken action to reduce the carbon intensity in its transportation fuels.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a partnership of10 Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states, sets up a cap-and-trade system aimed at limiting carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. The cap is scheduled to take effect in January 2009 and cap carbon dioxide emissions at 188 million short tons through the end of 2014. In 2015, the cap would begin to decrease, so that by 2018, emissions would be capped at 10% below the initial level. Because some observers see RGGI as a possible model for a federal cap-and-trade program, several of RGGI's design elements are generating interest and debate.
Predicting the precise consequences of these state-led climate change actions is difficult. The actions may affect energy markets to some degree by encouraging the use of fewer carbon-intensive fuels. Many observers suggest that the range of state actions will catalyze federal activity. Industry stakeholders are especially concerned that the states will create a patchwork of climate change regulations across the nation. This prospect is causing some industry leaders to call for a federal climate change program. If Congress seeks to establish a federal program, the experiences and lessons learned in the states may be instructive.
The RGGI and climate change activities in California are aggressive, but the resulting emission reductions may be offset by increased emissions in states without such requirements. This is a primary limitation of state climate change programs. Legal challenges to the state actions, particularly those that may affect interstate commerce, represent another obstacle. |
crs_RS20557 | crs_RS20557_0 | Examples of Navy NCW Programs
CEC And NIFC-CA
The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system links Navy ships and aircraft operating in a particular area into a single, integrated air-defense network in which radar data collected by each platform is transmitted on a real-time (i.e., instantaneous) basis to the other units in the network. NMCI
A significant program related to NCW is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), which is a corporate-style intranet linking more than 300 Navy and Marine Corps shore installations. Congress has closely followed the program for several years. Without satisfied customers, the Navy will be challenged in meeting program goals. | Programs for implementing network-centric warfare (NCW) in the Navy include the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) systems, the IT-21 program, and FORCEnet. A related program is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). Congress has expressed concern for some of these programs, particularly NMCI. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32862 | crs_RL32862_0 | Introduction
Congress has played a key role in fostering the development of civilian capacity and capabilities to deal with conflicts overseas. "First generation" efforts were the establishment in 2004 of the former Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). In November 2011, the Obama Administration announced its establishment of this bureau, which integrated S/CRS. CSO is intended to provide the institutional focus for policy and "operational solutions" to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises. This report provides background on the origins and development of S/CRS and related capabilities. It also discusses four issues raised during the S/CRS years that may still be relevant for the CSO Bureau: perceptions of S/CRS's effectiveness, the appropriate size for Civilian Response Corps (CRC), flexible funding for stabilization operations, and funding for a reserve component. It does not cover events or perceptions since the formation of the CSO Bureau and will not be updated. For current information on CSO, see CRS Report R42775, In Brief: State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) , by [author name scrubbed]. The George W. Bush Administration launched several initiatives to do just that. With the passage in September 2008 of Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 ( S. 3001 / P.L. 110-417 , known as the Lugar-Biden bill after its sponsors), signed into law October 14, 2008, Congress established S/CRS as part of permanent law. 108-447 , S/CRS's functions were (1) to catalogue and monitor the non-military resources and capabilities of executive branch agencies, state and local governments, and private and non-profit organizations "that are available to address crises in countries or regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife"; (2) to determine the appropriate non-military U.S. response to those crises, "including but not limited to demobilization, policy, human rights monitoring, and public information efforts"; (3) to plan that response; (4) to coordinate the development of interagency contingency plans for that response; (5) to coordinate the training of civilian personnel to perform stabilization and reconstruction activities in response to crises in such countries or regions"; and (6) to monitor political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for U.S. and international assistance. Codifying Civilian Reconstruction and Stabilization Assistance and State Department Capabilities: Title XVI, P.L. These authorities are permanent. S/CRS grew slowly from a few dozen to somewhat under 200. Establishing the Civilian Response Corps Active Response Component (CRC-A)
As originally planned by the Bush Administration, and contemplated by early plans of the Obama Administration, the total number of personnel for the CRC-A was 250. The State Department broke down the uses of the requested $323 million as follows:
$136.9 million to build and support an active component of 250 members and a standby component of 2,000 members, to fund up to 1,000 members of the active and standby component to deploy to S&R missions in FY2010; $63.6 million to establish a trained and equipped 2,000 member reserve component that will draw other public and private sector experts into U.S. S&R responses; $12.5 million to fund the deployment of other experts during the first three months of an operation, "ensuring that critical staff such as police trainers and advisors can be deployed when ... most needed"; $51.3 million to sustain deployed personnel and provide logistics for up to 130 responders for three months, including $7.1 million to operate and maintain a civilian deployment center; $34.3 million to provide security for up to 130 civilian responders (in up to three deployed field teams) in a semi-permissive environment for three months; and $24.7 million to augment Washington-area leadership, including 10 new positions for S/CRS operations and staff. In addition, Congress established a new USAID Complex Crisis Fund with $50 million to "support programs and activities to respond to emerging or unforeseen complex crises overseas." QDDR Proposal to Reorganize State Department for Conflict and Stabilization Operations
The Obama Administration first announced the creation of the CSO Bureau in the December 2010 QDDR. Under the plan set out in the QDDR, S/CRS would be subsumed under the new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), which would "build upon but go beyond the mandate and capabilities of S/CRS," serving "as the institutional locus for policy and operational solutions for crisis, conflict, and instability." Establishing a Reserve Capability? Nevertheless, Congress did not provide funds to establish a civilian reserve. | In November 2011, the Obama Administration announced the creation of a new State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) to provide the institutional focus for policy and "operational solutions" to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority states. This bureau represents a "second generation" effort to develop civilian capacity to deal with conflict, integrating the "first generation" Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).
Congress established S/CRS by law in the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act, 2008, as Title XVI of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S. 3001, P.L. 110-417, signed into law October 14, 2008). This "Lugar-Biden" legislation codified the existence and functions of S/CRS and authorized new operational capabilities within the State Department, a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) of government employees with an active and a standby component, and a reserve component. Earlier, in 2004, the George W. Bush Administration had stood up S/CRS to address long-standing concerns, both within Congress and the broader foreign policy community, over the perceived lack of the appropriate capabilities and processes to deal with transitions from conflict to stability. These capabilities and procedures include adequate planning mechanisms for stabilization and reconstruction operations, efficient interagency coordination structures and procedures in carrying out such tasks, and appropriate civilian personnel for many of the non-military tasks required.
From July 2004, S/CRS worked to establish the basic concepts, mechanisms, and capabilities necessary to carry out such operations. With a staff that slowly grew from a few dozen to well over 100 individuals, S/CRS took steps to monitor and plan for potential conflicts, to develop a rapid-response crisis management "surge" capability, to improve interagency and international coordination, to develop interagency training exercises, and to help State Department regional bureaus develop concepts and proposals for preventive action.
Not until four years later, in 2008, did Congress provide the first funding to establish civilian response capabilities, as well as the first line-item funding for S/CRS. The Bush Administration plans at that point contemplated a CRC force of 4,250, including a sizable reserve component of private citizens similar in concept to the U.S. military reserve. The Obama Administration proceeded with plans and funding requests to develop S/CRS and its operational arm, the CRC. The 111th Congress provided funding to expand the active and standby units, but not to establish the civilian reserve. The 111th Congress also established a new USAID Complex Crises Fund (CCF) to support programs and activities responding to emerging or unforeseen complex crises abroad. The 112th Congress continued to fund S/CRS and its successor, the CSO Bureau, as well as the CCF, although at reduced levels.
As background for the 113th Congress's possible consideration of civilian capabilities, this report covers their development through the formation of the CSO Bureau. This report will not be updated. For information on the CSO Bureau, see CRS Report R42775, In Brief: State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42376 | crs_R42376_0 | The Military Construction Appropriations Account
The military construction appropriations account includes a number of appropriations subaccounts:
Military Construction accounts provide funds for new construction, construction improvements, and facility planning and design in support of active and reserve military forces and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies. Appropriation Legislation
On February 14, 2012, President Barack Obama submitted to Congress his request for military construction appropriations to support federal government operations during the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 2012 (FY2013). Military construction projects are funded through Title I and Title IV of the broader Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. The House Committee on Appropriations introduced its Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 2013 ( H.R. 112-491 ) on May 23, 2012. 5854 was received in the Senate on June 5, 2012, read twice, and placed on the Legislative Calendar under General Orders (Calendar No. The Senate Committee on Appropriations introduced its own draft of the bill (S. 3215, S. Rept. 112-168) on May 22. The House Committee on Armed Services reported its amendment of the bill on May 11 ( H.Rept. The House began debate of the bill on May 16 and passed it by recorded vote, 219-10 (Roll no. Key Issues
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
Completing the 2005 BRAC Round
The Department of Defense has completed implementation of the recommendations made by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (also known as the BRAC Commission) and approved by President George W. Bush. Requesting New BRAC Rounds
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced on January 26, 2012, that the President would request congressional authorization to carry out two new BRAC rounds, in 2013 and 2015. This new bill was enacted as P.L. Following agreements between South Korea and the United States, the headquarters of U.S. Extension of Authority to Use Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Funds for Military Construction
Both of the Committees on Armed Services reported versions of the NDAA for 2013 that include a provision (Section 2803) that extends for a year the Secretary of Defense's authority to use up to $200 million in O&M funds from the defense appropriation for the construction of facilities in the geographic areas of responsibility of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and those areas on the continent of Africa formerly under CENTCOM responsibility. | The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill provides funding for the planning, design, construction, alteration, and improvement of facilities used by active and reserve military components worldwide. Title I of the bill capitalizes military family housing and the U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program and finances the implementation of installation closures and realignments. Other titles within the legislation fund veterans benefit and health care programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), provide for the creation and maintenance of U.S. cemeteries and battlefield monuments within the United States and abroad, and support the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Armed Forces Retirement Homes, and Arlington National Cemetery. The bill also funds advance appropriations for veterans' medical services.
President Barack Obama submitted his request to Congress for FY2013 appropriations on February 13, 2013. For the appropriations accounts included in this bill, his request totaled $145.2 billion in new budget authority, divided into three major categories: Title I (military construction and family housing) at $11.2 billion; Title II (veterans affairs) at $135.6 billion; and Title III (related agencies) at $219.5 million. Of the total, $74.4 billion (49.9%) would be discretionary appropriations, with the remainder considered mandatory.
Military construction funding amounts requested by the President and enacted by Congress have fallen off as the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) round has reached completion, although Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has requested statutory authority to carry out two new BRAC rounds in 2013 and 2015. Funding support for military family housing construction has also declined as the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) continue their efforts to privatize formerly government-owned accommodations.
The House Committee on Appropriations reported its FY2013 bill (H.R. 5854) on May 16, 2012 (H.Rept. 112-491) and passed the bill on May 31. It was received in the Senate on June 5. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its bill (S. 3215) on May 22 (S.Rept. 112-168), and the bill was placed on the Legislative Calendar under General Orders. |
crs_RS21091 | crs_RS21091_0 | Three laws provide the answer as to whether a particular court has jurisdiction: the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act [PKPA], the Uniform Child Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act [UCJEA] and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act [UCCJA], which has been enacted in some form in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Parents, although they are subject to the PKPA, remain exempt from criminal sanctions under the general federal kidnapping statute. In the absence of a formal custody order, custodial rights are determined by state law. The 1986 Bradley amendment to the federal child support laws effectively bars retroactive modification that would wipe out past-due support obligations. | Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has little direct authority to legislate in the field of domestic relations. Generally, state policy guides these decisions. Despite the lack of direct authority to legislate domestic relations issues, Congress continues to enact federal laws that indirectly affect family law questions concerning child custody and support. This report answers questions frequently asked regarding the interplay between federal and state laws governing these areas. |
crs_RL34317 | crs_RL34317_0 | Overview
Trafficking in persons (TIP), or human trafficking, is both an international and a domestic crime that is often also associated with violations of labor, public health, and human rights standards. Anti-TIP efforts have accelerated in the United States since the enactment of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), and internationally since the passage of the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (hereinafter, U.N. Protocol), adopted in 2000. This report focuses on international and domestic human trafficking and U.S. policy responses, with particular emphasis on the TVPA and its subsequent reauthorizations. Using a revised methodology, the ILO issued a new estimate in June 2012 on the number of victims of forced labor worldwide, concluding that some 20.9 million individuals were likely subjected to forced labor, including labor and sex trafficking as well as state-imposed forms of forced labor. However, trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation has historically been the most commonly reported—and prosecuted—form of human trafficking globally. Ongoing demand for cheap, labor-intensive and low-skilled work, including for commercial sex, may also drive the markets for both domestic and international human trafficking. For further analysis of the various foreign policy responses, see CRS Report R42497, Trafficking in Persons: International Dimensions and Foreign Policy Issues for Congress , by Liana Rosen. According to the most recent U.S. government estimates, in 2004 as many as 17,500 people were trafficked into the United States annually. Aid Available to Victims of Trafficking in the United States
Under the TVPA, the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Labor (DOL) have programs or administer grants to other entities to provide services to trafficking victims. There is confusion over whether U.S. citizens, as well as noncitizens, are eligible for services under all the anti-trafficking grant programs in TVPA, and whether Congress has provided funding for programs that target U.S. citizen and LPR victims. Under the law, to receive these benefits and services, victims of severe forms of trafficking who are at least 18 years of age must be certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, after consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, as willing to assist in every reasonable way in the investigation and prosecution of severe forms of trafficking, having made a bona fide application for a T-visa that has not been denied, and being granted continued presence in the United States by the Secretary of Homeland Security to effectuate the prosecution of traffickers in persons. ORR also provides grants to organizations that render assistance specific to the needs of victims of trafficking, such as temporary housing, independent living skills, cultural orientation, transportation needs, access to appropriate educational programs, and legal assistance and referrals. Domestic Investigations of Trafficking Offenses
In addition to providing victims services, and educational outreach, U.S. domestic anti-TIP efforts include the investigation and prosecution of trafficking offenses by law enforcement. For a more in depth analysis of the issues surround the sex trafficking of children in the United States, see CRS Report R41878, Sex Trafficking of Children in the United States: Overview and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. How to Measure the Effectiveness of Global Anti-TIP Programs
It is often difficult to evaluate the impact of U.S. anti-trafficking efforts on curbing TIP. So far, few reliable indicators have been identified. Some have estimated that the number of minor sex trafficking victims could be in the hundreds of thousands. Enacted Legislation in the 113th Congress: The TVPA Reauthorization
On February 28, 2013, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 ( P.L. Title XII of P.L. P.L. 113-4 requires training on the identification of trafficking victims for appropriate personnel at the Department of Labor. 113-4 amends the grant program for state and local law enforcement's anti-trafficking programs that focus on U.S. citizen victims, so that the grants can be used for anti-trafficking programs for noncitizen victims. 113-4 reauthorizes appropriations for the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 for FY2014 through FY2017, decreasing some authorization levels and increasing others. 106-386 ). The act's key provisions on human trafficking:
Directed the Secretary of State to provide an annual report by June 1, listing countries that do and do not comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, and to provide information on the nature and extent of severe forms of trafficking in persons (TIP) in each country and an assessment of the efforts by each government to combat trafficking in the State Department's annual human rights report; Called for establishing an Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking, chaired by the Secretary of State, and authorized the Secretary to establish within the Department of State an Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking to assist the Task Force; Called for measures to enhance economic opportunity for potential victims of trafficking as a method to deter trafficking, to increase public awareness, particularly among potential victims, of the dangers of trafficking and the protections that are available for victims, and for the government to work with NGOs to combat trafficking; Established programs and initiatives in foreign countries to assist in the safe integration, reintegration, or resettlement of victims of trafficking and their children, as well as programs to provide assistance to victims of severe forms of TIP within the United States, without regard to such victims' immigration status and to make such victims eligible for any benefits that are otherwise available under the Crime Victims Fund; Provided protection and assistance for victims of severe forms of trafficking while in the United States; Amended the Federal Criminal code to make funds derived from the sale of assets seized from and forfeited by traffickers available for victims assistance programs under this act; Amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to allow the Attorney General to grant up to 5,000 nonimmigrant visas (T visas) per year to certain victims of severe forms of trafficking who are in the United States and who would face unusual and severe harm if they were removed from the United States. In addition, P.L. The total for domestic obligations does not include the costs of administering TIP operations or TIP-related law enforcement investigations. The bulk of U.S. anti-trafficking assistance programs abroad are administered by the U.S. Department of State, USAID, and DOL. DHS and the DOJ's International Criminal Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) also provide some anti-TIP training to law enforcement and judicial officials overseas. Some U.S. funding supports the anti-TIP efforts of the United Nations and other international organizations. | Trafficking in persons (TIP) for the purposes of exploitation is believed to be one of the most prolific areas of contemporary international criminal activity and is of significant interest to the United States and the international community as a serious human rights concern. TIP is both an international and a domestic crime that involves violations of labor, public health, and human rights standards, and criminal law.
In general, the trafficking business feeds on conditions of vulnerability, such as youth, gender, poverty, ignorance, social exclusion, political instability, and ongoing demand for cheap labor and sex workers. Actors engaged in human trafficking range from amateur family-run organizations to sophisticated transnational organized crime syndicates. Trafficking victims are often subjected to mental and physical abuse in order to control them, including debt bondage, social isolation, removal of identification cards and travel documents, violence, and fear of reprisals against them or their families. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), in June 2012, some 20.9 million individuals were estimated to be victims of forced labor, including TIP. The most recent estimate from the U.S. government noted that as many as 17,500 people were believed to be trafficked into the United States each year, and some have estimated that 100,000 U.S. citizen (USC) children were victims of trafficking within the United States during the course of each year.
Human trafficking is of great concern to the United States and the international community. Anti-TIP efforts have accelerated in the United States since the enactment of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, Division A of P.L. 106-386) and internationally since the passage of the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, adopted in 2000. Through the TVPA and its reauthorizations (TVPRAs), Congress has aimed to eliminate human trafficking by creating international and domestic grant programs for both victims and law enforcement, creating new criminal laws, and conducting oversight on the effectiveness and implications of U.S. anti-TIP policy. In March 2013, the TVPA was reauthorized through FY2017 in the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (Title XII, P.L. 113-4).
The United States engages in anti-TIP efforts internationally and domestically. The bulk of U.S. anti-trafficking programs abroad is administered by the State Department, United States Agency for International Development, and Department of Labor (DOL). In keeping with U.S. anti-trafficking policy, these programs have emphasized prevention, protection, and prosecution (the three "Ps"). Prevention programs have combined public awareness and education campaigns with education and employment opportunities for those at risk of trafficking, particularly women and girls. Protection programs have involved direct support for shelters, as well as training of local service providers, public officials, and religious groups. Programs to improve the prosecution rates of traffickers have helped countries draft or amend existing anti-TIP laws, as well as provided training for law enforcement and judiciaries to enforce those laws. However, it is difficult to evaluate the impact of international U.S. anti-trafficking efforts since few reliable measures of TIP have been identified.
Domestically, anti-TIP efforts also include protection for victims, education of the public, and the investigation and prosecution of trafficking offenses. The Departments of Justice (DOJ), Health and Human Services (HHS), and DOL have programs or administer grants to other entities to provide assistance specific to the needs of victims of trafficking. These needs include temporary housing, independent living skills, cultural orientation, transportation needs, job training, mental health counseling, and legal assistance. Both HHS and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) administer public awareness campaigns on recognizing human trafficking victims. In addition, within the United States at the federal level, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in DOJ and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Department of Homeland Security both have primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting traffickers.
Some of the issues surrounding U.S. policy to combat human trafficking include whether there is equal treatment of all victims—both foreign nationals and U.S. citizens, as well as victims of labor and sex trafficking; whether current law and services are adequate to deal with the emerging issue of minor sex trafficking in the United States (i.e., the prostitution of children in the United States); and whether U.S. efforts to stem human trafficking internationally are efficacious.
In addition, the current budget situation has heightened interest in Congress on the funding and oversight of current efforts to fight TIP, to make sure that the grant programs authorized under the TVPA as amended do not duplicate efforts and that funding is being used in the most efficacious manner. Obligations for global and domestic anti-TIP programs, not including operations and law enforcement investigations, totaled approximately $82.5 million in FY2011. The TVPRA of 2013 authorized $127.75 million in global and domestic anti-TIP programs for FY2014.
The 113th Congress has made TIP a priority. In February 2013, Congress passed S. 47 (P.L. 113-4), which amended and reauthorized the TVPA. Among other things, P.L. 113-4 modified some of the grant programs, expanded reporting requirements, created new criminal penalties for trafficking offenses, and reauthorized appropriations from FY2014 through FY2017. It is expected that Congress will consider other TIP legislation during the 113th session dealing with the child welfare system's response to minor sex trafficking, trying to limit demand for prostitution, and addressing the issue of online advertisements for the commercial sexual exploitation of minor trafficking victims.
See also CRS Report R41878, Sex Trafficking of Children in the United States: Overview and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R42497, Trafficking in Persons: International Dimensions and Foreign Policy Issues for Congress, by Liana Rosen. |
crs_R45207 | crs_R45207_0 | Status of Legislation
On April 27, 2018, the House of Representatives passed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 ( H.R. 4 ), a measure to reauthorize federal civil aviation programs, including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for a six-year period. H.R. 4 does not include a controversial proposal to privatize air traffic control (ATC) laid out in an earlier bill, H.R. 2997 . On May 9, 2018, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported a four-year FAA reauthorization bill ( S. 1405 , S.Rept. 115-243 ) that does not address ATC privatization. Despite many similarities, there are a number of differences in the two bills, including the length of authorization, funding amounts, and other provisions. If either bill is enacted, it would be the first long-term FAA reauthorization act since the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-95 ) expired at the end of FY2015. Changes to grant allocations for airport improvements remain in both H.R. 4 or S. 1405 . H.R. It would create a new supplemental funding authorization for AIP discretionary funds from the general fund appropriations, starting in FY2019 with $1.02 billion and rising to $1.11 billion in FY2023. Large hub airports would not be eligible for these funds. 4 seeks to establish a pilot program to provide air traffic services on a preferential basis to aircraft equipped with upgraded NextGen avionics. S. 1405 , on the other hand, would require FAA to identify any barriers to complying with the 2020 ADS-B mandate and develop a plan to address them. H.R. S. 1405 does not address community noise in the context of NextGen procedures, but does include language clarifying the use of AIP funds for certain noise mitigation programs and requirements for updating airport noise exposure maps. Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
P.L. H.R. Both bills would direct FAA to issue regulations within one year of enactment establishing a certification process for drone package delivery operations, including commercial fleet operations with highly automated UAS. S. 1405 includes a provision that would allow nonacademic structured and disciplined ground training courses to count toward the 1,500-hour requirement. 4 or S. 1405 . While H.R. H.R. 4 would require FAA to issue regulations establishing minimum dimensions for passenger seats. 4 would make involuntary bumping of passengers after boarding an unfair and deceptive practice. It would also allow an air carrier to advertise base airfare rather than the final cost to the passenger, as long as it discloses additional taxes and fees via a link on its website. This practice is currently deemed "unfair and deceptive" by a DOT consumer protection rule, which requires that airline and travel websites give most prominent display to the total cost of a flight, including taxes and fees. | On April 27, 2018, the House of Representatives passed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (H.R. 4), a six-year Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization measure that does not include a controversial proposal to privatize air traffic control laid (ATC) out in an earlier bill, H.R. 2997. On May 9, 2018, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation reported a four-year FAA reauthorization bill (S. 1405, S.Rept. 115-243) that does not address ATC privatization. The enactment of either bill would be the first long-term FAA reauthorization act since the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95) expired at the end of FY2015.
Despite many similarities, there are a number of differences in the two bills, including the length of authorization, funding amounts, and other provisions. Key differences include the following:
S. 1405 would authorize funding to aviation programs from FY2018 through FY2021, while funding authorization in H.R. 4 would cover two additional years, through FY2023. H.R. 4 would provide higher annual funding. H.R. 4 would establish a pilot program to provide air traffic services on a preferential basis to aircraft equipped with upgraded avionics compatible with FAA's NextGen ATC system, while S. 1405 would require FAA to identify barriers to complying with the current 2020 equipage deadline. H.R. 4 proposes a number of actions to address noise complaints attributed to NextGen procedures, while S. 1405 addresses noise concerns by clarifying the availability of certain airport grant funds for noise mitigation programs. While both bills would establish a process for certifying drone package delivery operations, S. 1405 addresses the privacy policies of unmanned aircraft operators and would require FAA to establish a public database of unmanned aircraft to aid with compliance and enforcement of airspace restrictions and applicable regulations. Whereas S. 1405 would allow FAA to revise airline pilot qualification standards to allow certain ground instruction to count toward the 1,500 flight-hour minimum, H.R. 4 does not propose any changes to the current requirements. H.R. 4 would create a new supplemental funding authorization for Airport Improvement Program (AIP) discretionary funds from the general fund appropriations, exceeding $1 billion each year. Large hub airports would not be eligible for these funds. H.R. 4 would make involuntary bumping of passengers after boarding an unfair and deceptive practice. It would also allow an air carrier to advertise base airfare rather than the final cost to the passenger, as long as it discloses additional taxes and fees via a link on its website. Such practice is currently deemed "unfair and deceptive" by a Department of Transportation (DOT) consumer protection rule. |
crs_R41608 | crs_R41608_0 | Endangered and threatened species—and the law that protects them, the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA, P.L. 93-205 , as amended; 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543)—are controversial, in part, because dwindling species are often harbingers of resource scarcity. The most common cause of species' decline is habitat loss or alteration. Congressional efforts in the 110 th , 111 th , and 112 th Congresses focused on addressing specific controversial features of ESA and on oversight of concerns such as the science used for making decisions and designating critical habitat, but little legislation related to ESA was enacted. Under ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) may be listed as either endangered or threatened according to assessments of the risk of their extinction. Once a species is listed, legal tools, including penalties and citizen suits, are available to aid species recovery and protect habitat. A more detailed discussion of the major provisions of ESA is provided in CRS Report RL31654, The Endangered Species Act: A Primer , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. Issues in the 112th Congress
ESA reauthorization has been on the legislative agenda since the funding authorization expired in 1992, and bills have been introduced in each subsequent Congress to address various aspects of endangered species protection. The issue for the 112 th Congress was whether to attempt to delist any wolf population legislatively, to modify the effects of wolf recovery efforts, or to leave the issue to management of FWS (as affected by likely further court rulings). The species was listed as threatened under ESA in 1993 and, in recent years, its abundance has declined to the lowest ever observed. However, the prohibition language was not included in P.L. No such bills were enacted. P.L. 112-270 amended P.L. 106-392 to maintain annual base funding for the Upper Colorado and San Juan fish recovery programs through FY2019. 2055 ), providing slightly more than $237 million for FWS endangered species and related programs; FY2012 funding for FWS core ESA programs was 0.5% more than the FY2011 enacted amount and 3.5% less than the FY2012 Administration request. In the absence of final action on this bill, a continuing resolution, P.L. | The Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1543) was enacted to increase protection for, and provide for the recovery of, vanishing wildlife and vegetation. Under ESA, species of plants and animals (both vertebrate and invertebrate) can be listed as endangered or threatened according to assessments of their risk of extinction. Habitat loss is the primary cause for listing species. Once a species is listed, powerful legal tools are available to aid its recovery and protect its habitat. Accordingly, when certain resources are associated with listed species—such as water in arid regions like California, old growth timber in national forests, or free-flowing rivers—ESA is seen as an obstacle to continued or greater human use of these resources. ESA may also be controversial because dwindling species are usually harbingers of broader ecosystem decline or conflicts. As a result, ESA is considered a primary driver of large-scale ecosystem restoration issues.
Major issues concerning ESA in recent years have included the role of science in decision making, critical habitat (CH) designation, incentives for property owners, and appropriate protection for listed species, among others.
Although many bills were introduced, little legislation related to ESA was enacted by the 112th Congress. Committees conducted oversight of the implementation of various federal programs and laws that address threatened and endangered species. P.L. 112-10 (final appropriations for FY2011) included a legislative delisting of a portion of the reintroduced Rocky Mountain gray wolf population. P.L. 112-74 provided slightly more than $237 million for FWS endangered species and related programs; this FY2012 funding for FWS core ESA programs was 0.5% more than the FY2011 enacted amount and 3.5% less than the FY2012 Administration request. P.L. 112-270 amended P.L. 106-392 to maintain annual base funding for the Upper Colorado and San Juan fish recovery programs through FY2019.
The authorization for spending under ESA expired on October 1, 1992. The prohibitions and requirements of ESA remain in force, even in the absence of an authorization, and funds have been appropriated to implement the administrative provisions of ESA in each subsequent fiscal year. Proposals to reauthorize and extensively amend ESA were last considered in the 109th Congress, but none were enacted. No legislative proposals were introduced in the 110th, 111th , or 112th Congresses to reauthorize ESA.
This report discusses oversight issues and legislation that was introduced in the 112th Congress to address ESA implementation and management of endangered and threatened species. |
crs_R40416 | crs_R40416_0 | 111-5 ) provides funding for various education programs. Among these programs, ARRA includes the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund, which provides federal funding to states to support elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education. It will also analyze the constitutionality of the distribution of federal money to religious schools in the context of common questions raised by these provisions. P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
As passed by the House and Senate, ARRA includes a prohibition on the use of funds provided under Title XIV, the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF). ARRA limits the use of money received under the SFSF to comport with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In addition to making the funds available only to public elementary and secondary schools, the SFSF provides that money provided by the Fund to institutions of higher education may not be used for:
modernization, renovation, or repair of facilities –
(A) used for sectarian instruction or religious worship; or
(B) in which a substantial portion of the functions of the facilities are subsumed in a religious mission. Religious institutions of higher education are eligible to receive funds provided under the SFSF. | The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) provides funding for various educational programs, including a State Fiscal Stabilization Fund. The State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF) provides federal funding to states to support elementary, secondary, and postsecondary education. Although federal money provided by the SFSF is available only to public elementary and secondary schools, public and private institutions of higher education are eligible to receive federal money from the SFSF. Because the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment limits the extent to which the government may provide funds to religious organizations, the SFSF also includes a provision that prohibits funds from being used for facilities with religious uses or purposes.
This report will provide a brief overview of the prohibition on the use of funds by institutions of higher education, including proposals considered by the House and Senate before ARRA was enacted. It will also analyze the constitutionality of the distribution of federal money to religious schools in the context of common questions raised by these provisions. |
crs_R40077 | crs_R40077_0 | A bill passed by the House in May 2010, the Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act of 2010 ( H.R. 4614 ), would provide grant funding incentives to states that collected DNA samples from persons who are at least 18 years old who are arrested for specified types of crimes. However, prior cases involved the collection of DNA samples from people who had been convicted of a crime. Typically, a law enforcement agency's phlebotomist collects a blood sample pursuant to state or federal law. In addition, the federal government and some states now authorize compulsory collection from people whom the government has arrested or detained but not convicted. The U.S. Department of Justice implemented the authorization in a final rule that took effect January 9, 2009. The Court's Fourth Amendment analysis falls into three general categories. Courts have relied on different legal tests in these cases. Reasonableness as Applied to Arrestees
As mentioned, to date, only a handful of state and federal judicial decisions address compulsory collection of DNA from persons awaiting a criminal trial. Two federal district courts have issued rulings in cases challenging the federal authorities for pre-conviction DNA collection. In United States v. Pool , the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California upheld such collection. In United States v. Mitchell , the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reached the opposite result. Both courts applied the general balancing test to determine whether such collection was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In contrast, because it viewed DNA collection as presenting a far greater privacy intrusion than fingerprinting, the Mitchell court held that although the government has a legitimate interest in identifying suspects, that interest is one "that can be satisfied with a fingerprint and photograph" rather than with the more intrusive DNA sample. Storage of DNA Profiles after Punishment Ends
A final issue that might arise in future DNA cases is the constitutionality of storing convicts' DNA profiles after their sentences have ended. Conclusion
Although nearly all courts that have addressed the issue have upheld the compulsory collection of DNA from persons who have been convicted, no judicial consensus has yet emerged regarding the constitutionality of such collection from persons who have been arrested or are facing charges prior to a criminal trial. The two U.S. district court cases addressing pre-conviction DNA collection pursuant to the federal law illustrate that outcomes in future cases involving arrestees may depend on courts' resolution of at least two key issues, namely: (1) what, if any, distinction exists between the reasonable expectation of privacy of an arrestee and a convict; and (2) the degree of privacy intrusion perceived as a result of a DNA sample. The latter question may turn on courts' framing of the role of DNA collection—that is, whether it is analogous to the long-upheld practice of fingerprinting or whether it represents a greater privacy intrusion. | Relying on different legal standards, courts have historically upheld laws authorizing law enforcement's compulsory collection of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, prior cases reviewed the extraction of DNA samples from people who had been convicted on criminal charges. New state and federal laws authorize the collection of such samples from people who have been arrested or detained but not convicted. On the federal level, the U.S. Department of Justice implemented this expanded authority with a final rule that took effect January 9, 2009. The Katie Sepich Enhanced DNA Collection Act of 2010 (H.R. 4614), a bill passed by the House, would provide grant funding bonuses to states that authorized the collection of DNA from persons arrested for specified types of crimes.
To date, only a few courts have reviewed the constitutionality of pre-conviction DNA collection pursuant to the new federal rule. The two federal district courts to have considered the issue applied the same Fourth Amendment test—the "general balancing" or "general reasonableness" test—but reached opposite conclusions. In United States v. Pool, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California held that the government's interest in collecting a DNA sample from a person facing charges outweighed any intrusion of privacy. In United States v. Mitchell, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reached the opposite conclusion.
Points of disagreement between the two district court opinions are likely to reemerge as themes in future decisions addressing pre-conviction DNA collection. One difference is whether the defendant's status as a person facing criminal charges was viewed as impacting the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. Another is the extent to which the government was seen as having a legitimate interest in obtaining a DNA sample in particular, rather than a fingerprint or another identifier. Finally, the courts disagreed regarding the degree of the privacy intrusion caused by collecting a DNA sample. The latter questions are framed by a larger debate about the nature and role of DNA in law enforcement. For example, is a DNA sample merely a means by which to identify a person, like a fingerprint? Or does it present a greater privacy intrusion?
A few additional factors might complicate courts' analyses of DNA collection in future cases. For example, emerging scientific research suggests that the type of DNA used in forensic analysis might implicate a greater privacy intrusion than courts had previously assumed. In addition, most courts have yet to review the constitutionality of storing convicts' DNA profiles beyond the time of sentence completion. |
crs_RL33172 | crs_RL33172_0 | (2)
As a general rule, the Supreme Court adheres to precedent, citing the doctrine of stare decisis ("to stand by a decision"). (3) The general ruleof stare decisis is not an absolute rule, however; the Court recognizes the need on occasion to correctwhat are perceived as erroneous decisions or to adapt to changed circumstances. In deciding whetherto overrule precedent the Court takes a variety of approaches and applies a number of differentstandards, many of them quite general and flexible in application. As a result, the law of staredecisis in constitutional decision making has been called amorphous and manipulable, and has beencriticized as incoherent. Butbecause the Court does not appear to have developed a "coherent or stable conception of theappropriate role of precedent in constitutional adjudication," (82) it is difficult to predictwhen the Court will rely on stare decisis and when it will depart from it. | As a general rule, the Supreme Court adheres to precedent, citing the doctrine of stare decisis ("to stand by a decision"). The general rule of stare decisis is not an absolute rule, however, and theCourt recognizes the need on occasion to correct what are perceived as erroneous decisions or toadapt decisions to changed circumstances. In deciding whether to overrule precedent the Court takesa variety of approaches and applies a number of different standards, many of them quite general andflexible in application. As a result, the law of stare decisis in constitutional decision making can beconsidered amorphous and manipulable, and it is difficult to predict when the Court will rely on stare decisis and when it will depart from it. This report cites instances in which the Court hasoverruled precedent as well as instances in which it has declined to do so, and sets forth therationales that the Court has employed. |
crs_R41745 | crs_R41745_0 | Introduction
Because Congress did not provide funding for FY2014, the new fiscal year beginning October 1, 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD), like other agencies, is now subject to a lapse in appropriations. In that event, agencies are generally required to shut down, although the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has identified a number of exceptions to that rule, including a blanket exception for activities that "provide for the national security." Under this scenario, DOD benefit programs for military retirement and concurrent receipt could be delayed if the debt ceiling is not raised, which is not the case during the current government shutdown, where payments to military retirees are protected, as are salaries of troops, and DOD civilians after enactment of H.R. On October 10, 2013, the President signed H.J.Res. 91 , which provides for the payment of death gratuities and other funeral expenses for military personnel. Known as the "Honoring the Families of Fallen Soldiers Act," this act was passed in response to considerable controversy in Congress and the press about the Secretary of Defense's determination that these expenses were not covered under the Pay Our Military Act (POMA), passed on September 30, 2012. During a House Armed Services hearing on October 10, 2013, on implementation of POMA, several Members raised concerns about the Department's interpretation. CBO estimates that H.J.Res. DOD Revises Its Guidance on Furloughing Certain Civilians
On October 5, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that after consultation with the Department of Justice, it was decided that the new law, H.R. 3210 , would permit DOD to recall most, but not all, DOD civilians from furlough rather than the fewer number "excepted" from furlough under DOD's original September 25, 2013, Contingency Plan. The Administration interpreted H.R. 3210 as also permitting the recall of those DOD civilians " whose responsibilities contribute to the morale, well-being, capabilities and readiness of service members [italics added]" . This revision of DOD's Contingency Plan would increase the number of DOD civilians returning to work from roughly 50% to about 95%, according to DOD Comptroller Robert Hale. As the services and DOD components implement this decision, civilians will return to work starting this week and will become eligible to be paid on time under H.R. 3210 . DOD is continuing to review whether the number of contractor personnel, also covered under H.R. 3210 , will be increased. The Issue of Retroactive Pay for Civilians
Those defense civilian or contractor personnel who were or remain furloughed would only receive pay for that period if Congress passes legislation to pay furloughed personnel. On October 5, 2013, the House unanimously passed H.R. 3223 , which would provide retroactive pay for all federal employees, as occurred during the 1995 to 1996 shutdown. The President has announced his support. The Senate has not taken up the bill at this time. 3210 .) This bill is part of a package of five "mini" CRs that would provide funding, generally at the FY2013-enacted level including the effects of sequestration, for the District of Columbia, the National Institutes of Health, various museums, Veterans Administration funding, and pay for guard and reservists. DOD's Contingency Plan for a Shutdown
In a September 30, 2013, press conference, DOD Comptroller Robert Hale suggested that while all military personnel would continue to report for duty, only those reservists, DOD civilians, and contractor personnel providing support for the Afghanistan war and other unspecified military operations would continue to work. This delay appears to reflect some debate about how to interpret the language in the new law, which provides appropriations to cover the pay and allowances of those DOD employees who are currently "excepted" from furlough, hence paying those personnel on time, and gives the Secretary of Defense authority to bring previously furloughed civilians and contractor personnel back to work, provided he determines that they are providing support to members of the armed forces performing active service. Some personnel would be "excepted" from furloughs, including all uniformed military personnel on active duty, while others would be subject to furlough. "Excepted" military, reservists, and civilian personnel who would continue to work during a lapse in appropriations would be paid on time because of the passage of H.R. Among the questions addressed are
the effects of a shutdown on pay for uniformed military personnel and DOD civilians; how reservists and military technicians may be affected; types of activities to protect persons and property that are "excepted;" potential effects on contracting; whether DOD Dependent Schools or childcare centers would continue to operate during a shutdown; how long operations of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service could continue; and whether the "Feed and Forage Act," 41 U.S.C. The 2013 guidance also concludes that child care "essential to readiness" may continue as well as emergency family support. Issuance of some contracts would continue during a shutdown, but other contracting activity, perhaps done by the same people, would not. 3210 , funds for all active-duty military, activated reservists, and those DOD civilian and contractor personnel whose support is necessary for military operations, for other DOD "excepted" activities, and to support active service personnel will be paid on time despite the lapse in other appropriations. DOD is continuing to review the status of many contractor personnel under H.R. While contracts for activities necessary to support military operations could be signed, reimbursements could not be provided and it is not clear that all vendors would be willing to provide goods or services under these circumstances, particularly if a shutdown appears likely to continue for an extended period. 1341 and 1342. The following discussion (1) briefly reviews the legal basis for the Department of Defense to continue operations during a funding lapse and the attendant legal constraints on the scope of activities and the financial mechanisms that are permitted; (2) provides a brief overview of the possible impact of a lapse in funding on military and civilian personnel, on current military operations including operations in Afghanistan, and on day-to-day business operations of the Department of Defense; and (3) provides selected excerpts from DOD guidance on activities that may continue during a funding lapse and those that may not. The Antideficiency Act
The Antideficiency Act, now codified at 31 U.S.C. Administration of benefit payments provided through funds that remain available in the absence of new appropriations: The Attorney General found that departments are "authorized to incur obligations in advance of appropriations for the administration of benefit payments under entitlement programs when the funds for the payments themselves are not subject to a one-year appropriation." This wording might be read to imply that the authority of agencies to continue operations related to national security is independent of the authority to continue activities related to the safety of life or the protection of property. Those employees of the Department who do not fall within the scope of the Act (unless they have been determined to be "excepted" and unless engaged in activities that support service members) include:
i) CIO functions;
ii) DCMO functions, at the OSD and Component level;
iii) Legislative Affairs and Public Affairs functions not previously excepted or required
in support of internal communications to members ofthe Armed Forces in active service;
iv) Auditor and related functions, not previously excepted, and DF AS functions that otherwise would not be determined to be "excepted" upon exhaustion of its working capital fund budgetary resources, and not required to process payrolls;
v) Work done in support of non-DoD activities and Agencies (except the U.S. Coast Guard); and
vi) Civil works functions of the Department of Army. | Because Congress did not provide any FY2014 funding for the Department of Defense (DOD) by October 1, 2013, the beginning of the new fiscal year, DOD, like other agencies, is now subject to a lapse in appropriations during which agencies are generally required to shut down. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), however, has identified a number of exceptions to the requirement that agencies cease operations, including a blanket exception for activities that "provide for the national security."
With the approach of the Treasury Department's estimate of an October 17, 2013, deadline for raising the debt ceiling, concerns have grown about the potential effect on government programs and workers. If the Treasury Department were to continue the current practice of paying bills as they come due, DOD programs ranging from payments to military retirees to contractor bills could be delayed or reduced, a situation that differs from the current government shutdown. It is difficult to predict effects because of the uncertainty about Treasury actions, but payment delays could affect all programs and personnel. Negotiations are currently underway to deal with the upcoming deadline.
Concerns about DOD's implementation of the government shutdown continue. On September 25, 2013, DOD issued guidance and a contingency plan that limited the types of "excepted" activities that would continue to be carried out during a shutdown to military operations, unspecified other operations and national security activities, and those necessary to protect the safety of persons and property. As a result, during the lapse in appropriations, some DOD personnel would be "excepted" from furloughs, including all uniformed military personnel, while others would be furloughed and, thus, not be permitted to work. Those civilian personnel who support "excepted" activities—roughly half of DOD's 750,000 civilians—would continue to report for work while the remainder would be furloughed and not paid. Normally, such "excepted" military and civilian personnel would continue to work but would not be paid until after appropriations are subsequently provided.
With enactment of H.R. 3210, the Pay Our Military Act (POMA), on September 30, 2013, however, many defense personnel will be paid on time, including all active-duty personnel, most civilians, and some contractor personnel. On October 5, 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the language in H.R. 3210 would allow DOD to recall most but not all of its civilian employees to work. In addition to those DOD civilians already designated as "excepted," the Administration interpreted H.R. 3210 as permitting the Secretary to recall (and start to pay) those DOD civilians "whose responsibilities contribute to the morale, well-being, capabilities and readiness of service members." This revision of DOD's Contingency Plan would increase the number of DOD civilians returning to work from roughly 50% to about 95%, according to DOD Comptroller Robert Hale. As the services and DOD components implement this decision, civilians will return to work starting this week, and be paid on time under H.R. 3210.
DOD is continuing to review whether the number of contractor personnel, also covered under H.R. 3210, will be increased. Those defense civilian or contractor personnel who were or remain furloughed would only receive pay for that period if Congress passes legislation to pay furloughed personnel. On October 5, 2013, the House unanimously passed H.R. 3223, which would provide retroactive pay for all federal employees, as occurred during the 1995 to 1996 shutdown. The President has announced his support of the bill. The Senate has not yet taken it up.
On October 10, 2013, in reaction to considerable controversy in Congress, the President signed H.J.Res. 91, Honoring the Families of Fallen Soldiers Act, to provide for payment of death gratuities and other funeral expenses. Both houses had passed the bill unanimously. Previously, the Secretary of Defense had determined that such expenses were not covered under POMA. CBO estimates that the new law would cost about $150 million over the course of a year.
On October 2 and October 3, 2013, the House passed five "mini" Continuing Resolutions (CRs) providing funding for the District of Columbia, NIH, various museums, Veterans Administration disability programs, and pay for non-activated reservists, generally at FY2013 levels including the sequester now in effect. That package includes H.R. 3230, which would expand the number of reservists who would be paid on time from activated reservists (such as those deployed for the Afghan war) who are already covered by H.R. 3210, to non-activated duty reservists who are performing weekend drills. Based on press reports of reactions from the Senate leadership, however, the Senate is not likely to take up the bill.
The authority to continue some activities during a lapse in appropriations is governed by the Antideficiency Act, codified at 31 U.S.C. 1341 and 1342, as interpreted by Department of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions and reflected in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance to executive agencies. Subject to review by OMB, each agency is responsible for making specific determinations on which activities may continue during a shutdown and which may not.
Legally, according to DOJ and OMB guidance, activities that may continue during a lapse in appropriations include (1) activities "necessary to bring about the orderly termination of an agency's functions"; (2) administration of benefit payments provided through funds that remain available in the absence of new appropriations, including, in the case of DOD, military retirement benefits; (3) activities and purchases financed with prior year funds and ongoing activities for which funding has already been obligated; (4) activities undertaken on the basis of constitutional authorities of the President; and (5) activities related to "emergencies involving the safety of human life or the protection of property." The Defense Department attributes its authority to carry on national security-related operations mainly to Section 1342 of the Antideficiency Act, which permits the continuation of activities to protect human life and property.
In addition to military operations, other activities that would continue under a shutdown by virtue of the Anti-Deficiency Act include operation of DOD Dependent Schools, child care centers, and DOD medical activities, including TRICARE services for dependents, but not non-essential services, such as elective surgery in military medical facilities. Passage of POMA considerably broadened the types of support activities, primarily performed by civilians, that would continue during the shutdown. A CBO estimate suggests that POMA appropriated $200 billion, or about one-third or of DOD's $614 billion FY2014 request.
The roughly 5% of DOD's civilians who would continue to be furloughed continue to face a pay gap, potentially imposing hardships on many families, unless legislation providing retroactive pay is enacted. Contracting activities that supported military activities and payments to vendors derived from prior multiyear appropriations could also continue. The status of many contractor personnel remains unclear. While some new contract obligations to support "excepted" activities could be signed, monies could not be disbursed while other new contracts would be delayed. This could create some confusion and, potentially, disruptions to supplies of some material and services, particularly if full funding for DOD is not restored soon. |
crs_R42995 | crs_R42995_0 | Introduction
One critical housing decision that households make is whether to rent or to own. Multiple factors influence the decision, such as a household's financial status and expectations about the future. Few homebuyers have sufficient financial resources to make the purchase without borrowing money. Most need to take out a loan known as a mortgage. As described in more detail in the " Lender Protection " section, the government provides explicit support to certain homeowners through government agencies such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and implicit support to others, such as through the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The housing finance system has two major components: a primary market and a secondary market . Many different types of lenders, including banks, credit unions, and finance companies (institutions that lend money but do not necessarily accept deposits) make home loans. A loan that uses real estate as collateral is typically referred to as a mortgage . When a borrower applies for a mortgage, the lender will underwrite, or evaluate, the borrower. If the borrower is unable or unwilling to pay, the lender can seize the house and sell it to recoup what is owed. To increase the probability that the sale of the house will be sufficient to recover the amount of the mortgage outstanding (and to reduce the advantage to the homeowner of defaulting), the lender will generally require a down payment . Mortgage insurance, an insurance policy purchased by either the borrower or the lender (though usually by the borrower), compensates the lender in the event that the borrower defaults. Borrowers typically purchase mortgage insurance from private businesses ( private mortgage insurance or PMI) or the federal government. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) . U.S. Department of Agriculture ( USDA ) . Mortgage Servicing
After a loan is made, the borrower is responsible for making the required payments. Other types of mortgages may have their own requirements for considering loss mitigation options prior to a foreclosure. Nonconforming loans can be broken down into three additional categories depending on the reason they are not conforming. Credit risk refers to the risk that the lender bears if a borrower does not repay the mortgage on time. The market for buying and selling mortgages is called the secondary market, which is described below. When a mortgage is sold, the mortgage servicer may change. Securitization
When a lender sells a mortgage in the secondary market, the new mortgage holder can hold the mortgage as a whole loan . When held as a whole loan, the mortgage is in the portfolio of the new mortgage holder, and the new mortgage holder bears the risks associated with the mortgage. Mortgage securitization comes in many different forms, but generally speaking, the process involves a financial institution acquiring and combining (pooling together) many different mortgages and then issuing a mortgage-backed security (MBS). A servicer collects the payments of all the borrowers whose mortgages are part of the security and remits the payments to the investors. The underlying loans that comprise the MBS are related to the mortgage classifications described in " The Primary Market " section of this report: generally, conforming mortgages are included in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac MBS, government-insured mortgages in Ginnie Mae MBS, and nonconforming mortgages in private-label MBS, although there are exceptions. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not originate mortgages, a process that occurs in the primary market. Ginnie Mae guarantees MBS made up exclusively of mortgages insured or guaranteed by the federal government, namely FHA, VA, USDA, or HUD's Office of Public and Indian Housing. The relative illiquidity of specified-pool markets compared with the TBA market may be due to the structure of the market, the absence of a large forward market for non-agency MBS, or the type of securities being traded (i.e., securities that do not have a perceived or explicit government guarantee). | When making a decision about housing, a household must choose between renting and owning. Multiple factors, such as a household's financial status and expectations about the future, influence the decision. Few people who decide to purchase a home have the necessary savings or available financial resources to make the purchase on their own. Most need to take out a loan. A loan that uses real estate as collateral is typically referred to as a mortgage.
A potential borrower applies for a loan from a lender in what is called the primary market. The lender underwrites, or evaluates, the borrower and decides whether and under what terms to extend a loan. Different types of lenders, including banks, credit unions, and finance companies (institutions that lend money but do not accept deposits), make home loans. The lender requires some additional assurance that, in the event that the borrower does not repay the mortgage as promised, it will be able to sell the home for enough to recoup the amount it is owed. Typically, lenders receive such assurance through a down payment, mortgage insurance, or a combination of the two. Mortgage insurance can be provided privately or through a government guarantee. After a mortgage is made, the borrower sends the required payments to an entity known as a mortgage servicer, which then remits the payments to the mortgage holder (the mortgage holder can be the original lender or, if the mortgage is sold, an investor). If the borrower does not repay the mortgage as promised, the lender can repossess the property through a process known as foreclosure.
The secondary market is the market for buying and selling mortgages. If a mortgage originator sells the mortgage in the secondary market, the purchaser of the mortgage can choose to hold the mortgage itself or to securitize it. When a mortgage is securitized, it is pooled into a security with other mortgages, and the payment streams associated with the mortgages are sold to investors. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitize mortgages that conform to their standards, known as conforming mortgages. Mortgages that do not conform to all of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's standards are referred to as nonconforming mortgages. Ginnie Mae guarantees mortgage-backed securities (MBS) made up exclusively of mortgages insured or guaranteed by the federal government. Other financial institutions also issue MBS, known as private-label securities (PLS). The characteristics of the borrower and of the mortgage determine the classification of the loan. What happens to a mortgage in the secondary market is partially determined by whether the mortgage is government-insured, conforming, or nonconforming. Depending on the type of MBS or mortgage purchased, investors will face different types of risks.
Congress is interested in the condition of the housing finance system for multiple reasons. The mortgage market is very large and can impact the wider U.S. economy. The federal government supports homeownership both directly (through the Federal Housing Administration [FHA], Department of Veterans Affairs [VA], and U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA]) and indirectly (through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). This support by the federal government means that the government is potentially liable for financial losses. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and FHA experienced financial difficulty in the years following the housing and mortgage market turmoil that began around 2007, although they are more financially stable of late. Congress has shown an ongoing interest in exercising oversight and considering legislation to potentially reduce the government's risk in the mortgage market and reform the broader housing finance system.
For an abbreviated version of this report, see CRS In Focus IF10126, Introduction to Financial Services: The Housing Finance System, by Katie Jones and N. Eric Weiss. |
crs_R44739 | crs_R44739_0 | Introduction
Program eligibility requirements and payment limits are central to how various U.S. farm programs operate. Congress first added payment limits as part of farm commodity programs in the 1970 farm bill (P.L. With each succeeding farm bill, Congress has addressed anew who is eligible for farm payments and how much an individual recipient should be permitted to receive in a single year. In recent years, congressional debate has focused on
attributing payments directly to individual recipients; ensuring that payments go to persons or entities currently engaged in farming; capping the amount of payments that a qualifying recipient may receive in any one year; and excluding farmers or farming entities with incomes above a certain level as measured by their adjusted gross income (AGI) from payment eligibility. Discussed below are cross-cutting eligibility requirements that affect multiple programs, including participant identification, foreign ownership, nature and extent of participation (i.e., actively engaged in farming criteria), means tests, and conservation requirements. Actively Engaged In Farming (AEF) Requirement
To be eligible for certain Title I commodity program benefits, participants—individuals as well as other types of legal entities—must meet specific requirements concerning their "active participation" in the farming operation. Foreign Person or Legal Entity
Generally, if a foreign person or legal entity meets a particular farm program's eligibility requirements, then they are eligible to participate. One exception is the four permanent disaster assistance programs—Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honeybees, and Farm-Raised Fish Program (ELAP); Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP); Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP); and Tree Assistance Program (TAP)—and the noninsured crop disaster assistance program (NAP), which explicitly prohibit payments to foreign entities, other than resident aliens. Direct Attribution of Payments
The process of tracking payments to an individual through various levels of ownership in single and multi-person legal entities is referred to as "direct attribution." It is this accumulation of an individual's payments—tracked through four levels of ownership in multi-person legal entities—that is subject to the annual payment limit. Several major farm support programs—as defined by specific titles of the 2014 farm bill—are currently subject to annual payment limits. Economically, they contend that large payments facilitate consolidation of farms into larger units, raise the price of land, and put smaller, family-sized farming operations and beginning farmers at a disadvantage. Politically, they believe that large payments undermine public support for farm subsidies and are costly. Critics of payment limits (and thus supporters of higher limits or no limits) counter that all farms are in need of support, especially when market prices decline, and that larger farms should not be penalized for the economies of size and efficiencies they have achieved. They say that farm payments help U.S. agriculture compete in global markets, and that income testing is at odds with federal farm policies directed toward improving U.S. agriculture and its competitiveness. For example, new eligibility requirements or tighter payment limits may result in
a reorganization of the farm operation to increase the number of eligible persons, or to lower the income that counts against a new AGI limit or the farm program payments that count against a smaller payment limit; a change in the crop and program choices or marketing practices, for example, to take advantage of the absence of a payment limit on MAL certificate exchange gains and forfeitures benefits; or a change in land use, such as, instead of farming the same acreage, renting out or selling some land to farmers that have not hit their payment limits. | Current U.S. farm program participants—whether individuals or multi-person legal entities—must meet specific eligibility requirements to receive benefits under certain farm programs. Some requirements are common across most programs while others are specific to individual programs. In addition, program participants are subject to annual payment limits that vary across different combinations of farm programs. Federal farm support programs, along with their current eligibility requirements and payment limits, are listed in Table 1.
Since 1970, Congress has used varying policies to address the issue of who should be eligible for farm payments and how much should an individual recipient be permitted to receive in a single year. In recent years, congressional policy has focused on tracking payments through multi-person entities to individual recipients (referred to as direct attribution); ensuring that payments go to persons or entities actively engaged in farming; capping the amount of payments that a qualifying recipient may receive in any one year; and excluding farmers or farming entities with large average incomes from payment eligibility.
Current eligibility requirements that affect multiple programs include identification of every participating person or legal entity—both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens; the nature and extent of an individual's participation (i.e., actively engaged in farming criteria) including ownership interests in multi-person entities and personal time commitments (whether as labor or management); means testing—persons with combined farm and nonfarm adjusted gross income (AGI) in excess of $900,000 are ineligible for most program benefits; and conservation compliance requirements.
In general, if a foreign person or legal entity meets a program's eligibility requirements, then they are eligible to participate. One exception is the four permanent disaster assistance programs created under the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) and the noninsured crop disaster assistance program (NAP) whereby non-resident aliens are excluded.
The process of tracking payments to an individual through various levels of ownership in single or multi-person legal entities is critical for assessing an individual's cumulative payments against their annual payment limit. Current law requires direct attribution through four levels of ownership in multi-person legal entities. Current payment limits include a cumulative limit of $125,000 for all covered commodities under major Title I revenue support programs, with the exception of peanuts, which has its own $125,000 limit. The permanent disaster assistance programs also have a $125,000 per crop year limit, with some exceptions.
Supporters of payment limits contend that large payments facilitate consolidation of farms into larger units, raise the price of land, and put smaller, family-sized farming operations and beginning farmers at a disadvantage. In addition, they argue that large payments undermine public support for farm subsidies and are costly. Critics of payment limits counter that all farms need support, especially when market prices decline, and that larger farms should not be penalized for the economies of size and efficiencies they have achieved. Further, critics argue that farm payments help U.S. agriculture compete in global markets, and that income testing is at odds with federal farm policies directed toward improving U.S. agriculture and its competitiveness.
As part of the next farm bill debate, Congress may again address these concerns, as well as the following questions: How does policy design of payment limits relate to their distributional impact on crops, regions, and farm size? Is there an optimal aggregation of payment limits across commodities or programs? Do unlimited benefits under the marketing assistance loan program's forfeiture or commodity certificate exchanges reduce the effectiveness of overall payment limits? |
crs_R42826 | crs_R42826_0 | Introduction
The federal government is the largest buyer of goods and services in the world, and executive branch agencies—particularly the Department of Defense—make most of these purchases. Many (although not all) acquisitions by executive branch agencies are subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which can make the FAR a topic of interest to Members and committees of Congress and their staff. In particular, Members, committees, and staff may find themselves
considering or drafting legislation that would prompt amendment of the FAR to save money, promote transparency, or further other public policies; conducting oversight of executive agencies' performance in procuring goods and services, including their compliance with the FAR; and responding to questions from constituents regarding executive branch procurement activities. The FAR is a regulation, codified in Parts 1 through 53 of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). "), executive branch agencies are generally subject to the FAR when making certain purchases. In addition, while much of the FAR is arguably process oriented (e.g., specifying how agencies may obtain full and open competition), the opening sections of the FAR articulate "guiding principles" for the federal acquisition system that arguably inform all other sections of the FAR and federal procurement generally (e.g., satisfying the customer, minimizing administrative operating costs). Depending upon the topic, the FAR may provide contracting officers with the government's basic policy, any requirements that agencies must meet, and any exceptions to these requirements. Parts 52 and 53
Parts 52 and 53 differ from the other parts of the FAR in that they provide agencies with standard provisions and clauses to be included, or incorporated by reference, in the solicitation or contract, as well as forms for use during the acquisition process. In brief, the four performance standards are:
(a) [s]atisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered product or service ...;
(b) [m]inimize administrative operating costs;
(c) [c]onduct business with integrity, fairness, and openness; and
(d) [f]ulfill public policy objectives. Promulgation of the FAR
The questions and answers in this section address the promulgation of the FAR, including the origins of the FAR; the process by which the FAR is amended; who typically promulgates regulations amending the FAR; the roles of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in revising and implementing the FAR; and how long it generally takes to amend the FAR. 93-400 ) to authorize the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to "issue policy directives … for the purpose of promoting the development and implementation of the uniform procurement system." The FAR was published initially on September 19, 1983, and took effect on October 1, 1984. The Secretary of Defense, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) are the other members of the FAR Council. In addition to the FAR, there are a number of statutes that, directly or indirectly, address the acquisition of goods and services by executive branch agencies. "), are intended to guide executive agencies in acquiring goods and services, they may not be the only regulations to address particular procurement-related topics. In some cases, however, Congress may also enact legislation that effectively or expressly forecloses certain amendments to the FAR. Thus, it is the provisions in the contract, not those in the FAR, that bind the contractor, although contract terms required by the FAR may be read into contracts which lack them in certain circumstances (see " What Happens If Required Contract Clauses Are Not Included in a Particular Contract? Agencies are authorized to deviate from the FAR under certain circumstances. Could an Agency or Transaction Not Subject to the FAR Be Subject to Requirements Like Those in the FAR? | The federal government is the largest buyer of goods and services in the world, and executive branch agencies—particularly the Department of Defense—make most of these purchases. Many (although not all) acquisitions by executive branch agencies are subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which can make the FAR a topic of interest to Members and committees of Congress and their staff. In particular, Members, committees, and staff may find themselves (1) considering or drafting legislation that would amend the FAR to save money, promote transparency, or further other public policies; (2) conducting oversight of executive agencies' performance in procuring goods and services; and (3) responding to questions from constituents regarding executive branch procurement activities. In addition, certain commentators have recently suggested that some or all FAR provisions should be withdrawn.
The FAR is a regulation, codified in Parts 1 through 53 of Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which generally governs acquisitions of goods and services by executive branch agencies. It addresses various aspects of the acquisition process, from acquisition planning to contract formation, to contract management. Depending upon the topic, the FAR may provide contracting officers with (1) the government's basic policy (e.g., small businesses are to be given the "maximum practicable opportunity" to participate in acquisitions); (2) any requirements agencies must meet (e.g., obtain full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures); (3) any exceptions to the requirements (e.g., when and how agencies may waive a contractor's exclusion); and (4) any required or optional clauses to be included, or incorporated by reference, in the solicitation or contract (e.g., termination for convenience). The FAR also articulates the guiding principles for the federal acquisition system, which include satisfying the customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered goods and services; minimizing operating costs; conducting business with integrity, fairness, and openness; and fulfilling public policy objectives. In addition, the FAR identifies members and roles of the "acquisition team."
The FAR is the result of a 1979 statute directing the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to "issue polic[ies] … for the purpose of promoting the development and implementation of [a] uniform procurement system." Partly in response to this directive, the FAR was issued in 1983, and took effect in 1984. It has been revised frequently since then, in response to legislation, executive orders, litigation, and policy considerations. These revisions are generally made by the Administrator of General Services, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator of National Aeronautics and Space, acting on behalf of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council. However, the Administrator of OFPP also has the authority to amend the FAR in certain circumstances. FAR amendments generally apply only to contracts awarded after the effective date of the amendment.
While the FAR contains the principal rules of the federal acquisition system, it is not the only authority governing acquisitions of goods and services by executive branch agencies. Statutes, agency FAR supplements, other agency regulations, and guidance documents may also apply. In some cases, these sources cover topics not covered in the FAR, and sometimes the FAR addresses topics not expressly addressed in statute or elsewhere. In addition, it is the contract (not the FAR) that binds the contractor, although judicial and other tribunals may read terms required by the FAR into contracts which lack them.
Agencies subject to the FAR may deviate from it in certain circumstances, and agencies or transactions not subject to the FAR may be subject to similar requirements under other authority. |
crs_R40910 | crs_R40910_0 | Overview
The United States and almost 200 other countries are negotiating under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to address climate change cooperatively beyond the year 2012. Parties agreed to complete those negotiations by the 15 th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP-15), held December 7-18, 2009, in Copenhagen. Rather than a new treaty containing quantitative, legally binding GHG obligations, many predict the outcome will be a political mandate for pursuit of a later, more inclusive and enforceable agreement. As the Copenhagen meeting opened, the United States had formally offered neither a GHG target nor specific amounts of financial assistance, although on the eve of the conference, the White House announced that President Obama intends to offer a "provisional" GHG target for the United States of 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, ultimately to be brought "in line" with energy and climate legislation, if passed. Congress will decide whether the United States becomes a Party to any agreement. Its objective is " stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system ." Most Parties conclude the objective requires avoiding a 2 o Celsius increase of global mean temperature from pre-industrial values and reducing GHG emissions by 50% by 2050 from 1990 levels. Many argue that the industrialized countries' share should be an 80-95% reduction by 2050 from 1990 levels. The UNFCCC principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" among Parties permeates debate about obligations of different forms, levels of effort, and verifiability. Despite these facts, most countries argue that the Annex I countries have not fully met their UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol obligations to reduce GHG emissions and assist developing countries (with the United States especially criticized). The wealthier countries (including the United States) also committed to provide financial and technical assistance to underpin developing countries' efforts to meet their obligations. Deep divisions exist among Parties over four proposals now in the negotiating text:
one or more funds established under the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP), managed by one or more Trustees, with funds generated through levies on international maritime transport and aviation; a share of proceeds from accessing international emissions trading; assessed contributions from Parties; and voluntary contributions from Parties and other donors; OR assessed contributions from Annex I Parties as a percent of Gross National Product; a World Climate Change Fund or Green Fund under the authority and guidance of the UNFCCC COP, administered by an existing financial institution, with funding from assessed contributions from all Parties except the Least Developed Countries (LDCs); a Global Fund for Climate (U.S. proposal) as an operating entity of the (existing) financial mechanism (the World Bank's Global Environment Facility), funded by multiyear, voluntary contributions of all Parties except LDCs; and use of existing financial institutions, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), multilateral development banks, etc., with a Facilitative Platform under the authority and Guidance of the COP to register and link needs to support, and to monitor and evaluate the information in the registry. The European Council has concluded that 100 billion euros annually by 2020 will be necessary to help developing countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Annex I nations, however, underscore the importance of private sector finance through GHG trading mechanisms and other investments, with public funds as smaller and more targeted shares. The United States participates in the financing deliberations with impaired credibility, being almost $170 million in arrears for its assessed contribution to the Global Environment Facility (the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC and other treaties). The U.S. delegation indicates this would increase availability, capacity, and information exchange related to technology. | The United States and almost 200 other countries are negotiating under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to address climate change cooperatively beyond the year 2012. Parties agreed to complete the negotiations by the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP-15) from December 7-18, 2009, in Copenhagen. However, some nations' leaders have indicated that the Copenhagen outcome is likely to be a political agreement providing a mandate for a later legally binding, comprehensive agreement.
The negotiations are intended to decide the next steps toward meeting the objective of the UNFCCC, to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Most Parties conclude the objective requires avoiding a 2oCelsius increase of global mean temperature from pre-industrial values and reducing global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 50% by 2050 from 1990 levels, with industrialized countries' share to be an 80-95% reduction. The UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities among Parties permeates debate about obligations of different forms, levels of effort, and verifiability. Key disagreements remain among Parties:
GHG mitigation: Some countries, including the United States, seek GHG actions by all Parties; many developing countries argue that differentiation should exclude them from quantified and verifiable GHG limitations. Many vulnerable countries are alarmed that GHG targets proposed by wealthy countries are inadequate to avoid 2oC of temperature increase and associated serious risks. Adaptation to climate change: Many countries, including the United States, wish to use bilateral and existing international institutions, with incremental financial assistance, targeted at the most vulnerable populations; many developing countries seek a fully financed, systemic, and country-determined effort to avoid damages of climate change, to which they have contributed little. Financial assistance to developing countries: Many wealthy countries, including the United States, propose private sector mechanisms, such as GHG trading, along with investment-friendly economies, as the main sources of financing, with a minor share from public funds; many developing countries argue for predictable flows of unconditioned public monies, with direct access to an international fund under the authority of the Conference of the Parties. Technology: Many countries, including the United States, maintain that private sector mechanisms are most effective at developing and deploying the needed advanced technologies, enabled by balanced trade and intellectual property protection; some countries seek new institutional arrangements and creative mechanisms to share technologies to facilitate more effective technology transfer.
Negotiators face a complex array of proposals. Many delegations, including the United States, approach Copenhagen with unresolved climate agendas at home. President Obama has announced an intention to offer a "provisional" GHG target for the United States in the range of 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, ultimately to be brought "in line" with energy and climate legislation. The U.S. delegation negotiates without clear signals as to what the Congress would support. U.S. influence in the negotiations may also be impaired by having signed but not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and by being almost $170 million in arrears in contributions to the multilateral Global Environment Facility. |
crs_R44945 | crs_R44945_0 | Human Resources Management (HRM) Flexibilities for Emergency Situations
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has issued guidance for federal executive branch departments and agencies on various flexibilities available to facilitate HRM for emergency situations involving severe weather, natural disaster, and other circumstances multiple times since 2001. Notably, these issuances occurred following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which occurred back-to-back in the Gulf Coast region of the United States in late summer 2005; and as part of fulfilling OPM's responsibilities under the President's national strategy on pandemic influenza in 2006. Table 1 , below, provides information on selected flexibilities related to staffing, compensation, leave transfer, and telework in Title 5 of the United States Code and Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations . | Federal executive branch departments and agencies have available to them various human resources management flexibilities for emergency situations involving severe weather, natural disaster, and other circumstances. At various times, the Office of Personnel Management issued guidance on these flexibilities, which supplements the basic policies governing staffing, compensation, leave sharing, and telework in Title 5 of the United States Code and Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Some examples of when issuances have occurred include following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005; in response to pandemic influenza in 2006; and in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey in 2017. |
crs_RL34555 | crs_RL34555_0 | The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which regulates speculative trading in energy commodities, has found no evidence that prices are not being set by the economic fundamentals of supply and demand. Others, however, believe that changes in the fundamentals do not justify recent increases in energy prices, and seek the cause for soaring prices in the futures and derivatives markets, which are used by financial speculators as well as producers and commercial users of energy commodities. Hedgers—producers or commercial users of commodities—trade in futures to offset price risk. They can use the markets to lock in today's price for transactions that will occur in the future, shielding their businesses from unfavorable price changes. Most trading, however, is done by speculators seeking to profit by forecasting price trends. Together, the trading decisions of hedgers and speculators determine commodity prices: there is no better mechanism available for determining prices that will clear markets and ensure efficient allocation of resources than a competitive market where hedgers and speculators pool information and trade on their expectations of future prices. In other words, there is no reason why speculation in and of itself should cause prices to be artificially high. Theory says increased speculation should produce more efficient pricing. In practice, however, some observers, including oil company CEOs, OPEC ministers, and investment bank analysts, now speak of a "speculative premium" in the price of oil. How could the price discovery function of the energy derivatives market have broken? Several explanations are possible. First, the market could be manipulated. Eventually, prices return to fundamental levels, often with a sudden plunge. However, there is no sure method for determining what the true price is; the only observable price is the one the market generates. Other bills, including H.R. The question of whether current prices are justified by fundamental factors of supply and demand, or whether irrational exuberance has created a bubble in energy prices (similar to what was observed in dot-com stocks in the late 1990s), is beyond the scope of this report. However, testimony presented to Congress has identified a recent trend in financial markets that some argue may be putting upward pressure on prices: decisions by institutional investors, such as pension funds, foundations, or endowments, to allocate a part of their portfolio to commodities. While the decision of an individual pension fund to put 3%-4% of its portfolio in commodities may appear entirely rational, some observers argue that the aggregate impact of institutional index trading has been to overwhelm the commodity markets, because of the disproportion between the amount of money held by pension funds, foundations, and other institutions and the amounts that have traditionally been traded in the energy futures market. Hedgers, those who use the futures markets to offset price risk arising from their dealings in the underlying commodity, are generally exempt from position limits. 6604 and S. 3268 , two bills that were brought to the floor in their respective chambers in July 2008 but failed on procedural votes. | While most observers recognize that the fundamentals of supply and demand have contributed to record energy prices in 2008, many also believe that the price of oil and other commodities includes a "speculative premium." In other words, speculators who seek to profit by forecasting price trends are blamed for driving prices higher than is justified by fundamentals.
In theory, this should not happen. Speculation is not a new phenomenon in futures markets—the futures exchanges are essentially associations of professional speculators. There are two benefits that arise from speculation and distinguish it from mere gambling: first, speculators create a market where hedgers—producers or commercial users of commodities—can offset price risk. Hedgers can use the markets to lock in today's price for transactions that will occur in the future, shielding their businesses from unfavorable price changes. Second, a competitive market where hedgers and speculators pool their information and trade on their expectations of future prices is the best available mechanism to determine prices that will clear markets and ensure efficient allocation of resources.
If one assumes that current prices are too high, that means that the market is not performing its price discovery function well. There are several possible explanations for why this might happen. First, there could be manipulation: are there traders in the market—oil companies or hedge funds, perhaps—with so much market power that they can dictate prices? The federal regulator, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), monitors markets and has not found evidence that anyone is manipulating prices. The CFTC has announced that investigations are in progress, but generally manipulations in commodities markets cause short-lived price spikes, not the kind of multi-year bull market that has been observed in oil prices since 2002.
Absent manipulation, the futures markets could set prices too high if a speculative bubble were underway, similar to what happened during the dot-com stock episode. If traders believe that the current price is too low, and take positions accordingly, the price will rise. Eventually, however, prices should return to fundamental values, perhaps with a sharp correction.
One area of concern is the increased participation in commodity markets of institutional investors, such as pension funds, foundations, and endowments. Many institutions have chosen to allocate a small part of their portfolio to commodities, often in the form of an investment or contract that tracks a published commodity price index, hoping to increase their returns and diversify portfolio risk. While these decisions may be rational from each individual institution's perspective, the collective result is said to be an inflow of money out of proportion to the amounts traditionally traded in commodities, with the effect of driving prices artificially high.
This report summarizes the numerous legislative proposals for controlling excessive speculation, including H.R. 6604 and S. 3268, which received floor action in their respective chambers in July 2008. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41727 | crs_R41727_0 | Introduction
For many individuals, the amount being withheld for federal taxes from their paychecks or pension payments in 2011 is larger than it was in 2010. This report is intended to help Members of the 112 th Congress and their staff respond to taxpayer inquiries by examining the reasons for the changes in withholding. It begins with a brief description of the current system for federal withholding from wage and pension income and then assesses the effects of two federal economic stimulus measures on withholding amounts: the Making Work Pay tax credit (MWPTC) that was available in 2009 and 2010 and the Social Security tax reduction for employees and the self-employed in 2011 that replaced the credit. The assessment includes a comparison of their average benefits by income level and their cost-effectiveness in promoting growth in national income and employment. Not all income payments are subject to withholding. Employers also have the option of combining the amounts to be withheld for the income tax and the employee's share of the Social Security and Medicare hospital insurance taxes. Making Work Pay Tax Credit and Federal Tax Withholding in 2009 and 2010
A key element of the first economic stimulus bill (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 or ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) passed by the 111 th Congress in February 2009 was a temporary refundable tax credit (IRC Section 36A) designed to benefit low- and middle-income households. Known as the Making Work Pay Tax Credit (MWPTC), it was equal to the lesser of 6.2% of a taxpayer's earned (or wage) income or $400 for single filers and $800 for married couples filing jointly (even if only one spouse has earned income) in both 2009 and 2010. The credit was subject to two significant limitations. First, it was reduced by the amount of any economic recovery payment or refundable credit received by an eligible taxpayer as a result of ARRA. Second, the MWPTC was reduced by an amount equal to 2% of a recipient's modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) in excess of $75,000 (or $150,000 in the case of a joint return). After the credit became available, nothing was withheld from the biweekly paychecks of the same individuals, increasing their take-home pay by about $15 for single filers and $19 for married individuals filing jointly. Congress allowed the MWPTC to expire at the end of 2010. In its place, it established a temporary payroll tax cut for employees and self-employed persons, as part of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Compensation Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (TRUCJCA, P.L. 111-312 ). As with the MWPTC, the temporary Social Security tax reduction is intended to boost spending by low-to-middle-income households. Unlike the credit, however, the payroll tax holiday has immediate benefits for workers at the bottom of the wage scale, since the first dollar of annual wages is subject to the payroll tax but exempt from the income tax. The payroll tax holiday also raises the take-home pay of some of the workers whose wage income was too high to benefit from the MWPTC. Changes in Federal Tax Withholding in 2011
As a result of ARRA and TRUCJCA, many taxpayers have experienced a change in the amount withheld for federal taxes from their paychecks or pension payments in 2011. The expiration of the MWPTC, combined with the implementation of the Social Security tax reduction for employees, has altered the formulas used to determine how much to withhold. | Over the first few weeks of 2011, many employed, self-employed, and retired individuals from the public and private sectors discovered that the amount withheld from their paychecks and pension payments for federal income and employment taxes was larger or smaller than the amount that was withheld in 2010.
This report is intended to help Members of the 112th Congress and their staff respond to questions from constituents about the reasons for the withholding changes. It examines the two main reasons for the changes: the Making Work Pay tax credit (MWPTC) that was available in 2009 and 2010 and the Social Security tax reduction for employees and the self-employed that is available in 2011. The report also compares the average benefits of each stimulus measure by income level and assesses their cost-effectiveness as tools for promoting growth in national income and employment.
The MWPTC was included in the first economic stimulus bill passed by the 111th Congress (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 or ARRA, P.L. 111-5). It was intended to boost the after-tax income of low- and middle-income households. The credit was refundable and equal to the lesser of 6.2% of a taxpayer's wage income or $400 for single filers and $800 for married couples filing jointly in 2009 and 2010. It was subject to two limitations: (1) the credit was reduced by the amount of any economic recovery payment or refundable credit received by an individual under ARRA, and (2) it was reduced by an amount equal to 2% of a recipient's modified adjusted gross income in excess of $75,000 for single filers and $150,000 for joint filers. Congress designed the credit to be disbursed in small increments through reduced withholding. As a result, take-home pay for eligible single and joint filers was somewhat larger each payroll period in 2009 and 2010 than it otherwise would have been.
The MWPTC expired at the end of 2010 and has not been extended. In its place, through the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (TRUCJCA, P.L. 111-312), Congress established a reduction in the employee's share of the Social Security tax from 6.2% to 4.2% for 2011 only. The reduction also applies to Social Security tax paid by self-employed individuals. Like the MWPTC, the payroll tax holiday is intended to raise spending by low- to middle-income households by increasing their take-home pay each payroll period. Unlike the credit, however, the payroll tax holiday grants immediate benefits on workers at the bottom of the wage scale and raises the take-home pay of some of the workers and self-employed persons whose earned income was too high to benefit from the credit.
Because of ARRA and TRUCJCA, many taxpayers are experiencing a change in the amount withheld for federal taxes from their paychecks or pension payments in 2011. The expiration of the MWPTC, coupled with the implementation of the temporary payroll tax holiday for employees and the self-employed, has altered the formulas used to determine withholding. Consequently, employees and self-employed individuals with gross earned incomes below $20,000 will be worse off in 2011, whereas those with incomes above $20,000 will be better off. At the same time, many retired persons living off pension benefits alone are likely to experience a rise in federal withholding amounts, since their pension payments are subject to the same federal withholding tables as earned income. |
crs_R42827 | crs_R42827_0 | The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the basis of many aid policy initiatives, called for the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to plan foreign aid budgets and programs "based not on dollars spent, but on outcomes achieved," and for USAID to become "the world leader in monitoring and evaluation." The 2015 QDDR continued the emphasis on evaluation, emphasizing the strategic use of data and the need to build agency evaluation capacity. The current emphasis on evaluation is not new. The importance, purpose and methodologies of foreign aid evaluation have varied over the decades since USAID was established in 1961, responding to political and fiscal circumstances, as well as evolving development theories. In most cases, clear evidence of the success or failure of U.S. assistance programs is lacking, both at the program level and in aggregate. Another reason is that historically, most foreign assistance programs are never evaluated for the purpose of determining their impact, either at the time of implementation or retrospectively. In recent years, however, aid-implementing agencies have taken steps to improve both the quantity and quality of aid evaluations, and to make better use of the information gleaned from those efforts. A 2016 USAID review identified notable improvements in evaluation practices at USAID since implementation of a new evaluation policy in 2011. Performance evaluations have typically been carried out sporadically, to address questions of efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability, among other things. Aid evaluation practices and policies have variously focused on different evaluation objectives, including meeting program management needs, institutional learning, accountability for resources, informing policymakers, and building local oversight and project design capacity. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, established in 2004, has been regarded by many as a leader in aid evaluation, largely as a result of its demanding evaluation policy. Some of these challenges are discussed below. Funding and Personnel C onstraints . Compressed Timelines . Country Ownership and Donor Coordination . Security . Evaluations are rarely designed or used to inform policy. 2139 in the 111 th Congress, introduced by Representative Howard Berman), which called for "a process for applying the lessons learned and results from evaluation activities, including the use and results of impact evaluation research, into future budgeting, planning, programming, design and implementation of such United States foreign assistance programs." The Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act of 2009 ( S. 1524 in the 111 th Congress, introduced by then Senator Kerry) called for the creation of a Council on Research and Evaluation of Foreign Policy to do cross-agency evaluation of aid programs. The State Department followed suit in February 2012 with a new evaluation policy that was similar in many respects to the USAID policy, and MCC updated its policy in May 2012. Issues for Congress
While some momentum on foreign aid evaluation reform has originated within the Administration, Congress may have significant influence on this process. Not only can Congress mandate or promote a certain approach to evaluation directly through legislation, as has been proposed, it can modulate Administration policies by controlling the appropriations necessary to implement the policies. Congress may also influence how, or if, the information resulting from evaluations will impact foreign assistance policy priorities. The Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act ( H.R. It was enacted and signed into law in July 2016 as P.L. Appendix. | In most cases, the success or failure of U.S. foreign aid programs is not entirely clear, in part because historically, most aid programs have not been evaluated for the purpose of determining their actual impact. Many programs are not even evaluated on basic performance. The purpose and methodologies of foreign aid evaluation have varied over the decades, responding to political and fiscal circumstances. Aid evaluation practices and policies have variously focused on meeting program management needs, building institutional learning, accounting for resources, informing policymakers, and building local oversight and project design capacity. Challenges to meaningful aid evaluation have varied as well, but several are recurring. Persistent challenges to effective evaluation include unclear aid objectives, funding and personnel constraints, emphasis on accountability for funds, methodological challenges, compressed timelines, country ownership and donor coordination commitments, security, and agency and personnel incentives. As a result of these challenges, aid agencies do not undertake evaluation of all foreign aid activities, and evaluations, when carried out, may differ considerably in quality.
The Obama Administration has taken several steps to enhance foreign assistance evaluation.
2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) resulted in, among other things, a stated commitment to plan foreign aid budgets "based not on dollars spent, but on outcomes achieved." USAID introduced a new evaluation policy in January 2011. The State Department, which began to manage a growing portion of foreign assistance in the 21st century, introduced a new evaluation policy in February 2012, which was updated in January 2015. The Millennium Challenge Corporation revised its evaluation policy in 2012, and soon after began releasing its first evaluation reports.
The agency evaluation policies differ in several respects, including their support for impact evaluation, but reflect a common emphasis on evaluation planning as a part of initial program design, transparency and accessibility of evaluation findings, and the application of data to inform future project design and policy decisions. Aspects of the three evaluation policies are compared in the Appendix.
Recent reports and policy reviews suggest that aid evaluation frequency and quality have improved in recent years, though progress has been uneven. Attention to this issue remains strong, both within the Administration and among Members of Congress. The 2015 QDDR reemphasizes the role of evaluation, calling for more evaluation training, more strategic use of data, and more timely analysis of lessons learned, among other things. Though recent evaluation reform efforts have been agency-driven, Congress has considerable influence over their impact. Legislators may mandate a particular approach to evaluation directly through legislation (e.g., the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act, P.L. 114-191, enacted in July 2016), or may support or fail to support Administration policies by controlling the appropriations necessary to implement the policies. Furthermore, Congress will largely determine how, or if, any actionable information resulting from the new approach to evaluations will influence the nation's foreign assistance policy priorities. |
crs_R42575 | crs_R42575_0 | The primary federal legislation that regulates private sector collective bargaining is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), enacted in 1935. In addition to establishing workers' rights to organize and establishing union election procedures, the NLRA also permits collective bargaining contracts between employers and labor organizations that require all workers covered by the contract to pay dues to the negotiating organization. These contract provisions are known as union security agreements . Since the NLRA was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, individual states have had the option of enacting laws that prohibit union security agreements. These state laws supersede the union security provisions of the NLRA and are known as right to work (RTW) laws. As of this writing, 24 states have enacted RTW laws. Supporters of expanding RTW laws claim that they will increase personal freedom and employer flexibility. These provisions stated that individual states may pass laws prohibiting union security agreements in labor contracts and that these state laws would supersede the NLRA provisions authorizing union security agreements. Most national RTW proposals are relatively narrow in scope and only prohibit union security agreements. They typically do not address union election procedures or any other issues associated with collective bargaining. These National Right to Work proposals often have a substantial number of cosponsors. These proposals typically forbid state RTW laws by striking the provisions of the NLRA that permit such laws. State Activities
As noted previously, Indiana and Michigan each enacted an RTW law in 2012. Empirical Evidence Relating to RTW
There has been a great deal of debate and research on the economic effects of RTW laws on states that adopt them. It is possible to compare data from states with RTW laws to states without such laws, but since it is not possible to observe the counterfactual—what would have happened in each state if it had a differing union security policy—there is no simple way to tell what contribution an RTW law (or lack thereof) made to other outcomes in the state. For example, a researcher could compare employment growth in Arizona (an RTW state) and neighboring New Mexico (a union security state), but it would be impossible to identify what portion of the differences between the states was attributable to their respective union security laws and what portions were attributable to differences in labor force characteristics, industry makeup, local taxation policies, and countless other state-specific characteristics. Right to Work and Economic Outcomes
Given the complexity of establishing the relationship between RTW and lower-order outcomes like unionization rates, it comes as little surprise that the literature related to the laws' effects on higher-order outcomes such as employment and wages is inconclusive. Under this view, RTW laws are a relatively insignificant factor in the location of a business. Opponents of RTW laws, however, argue that aggregate data are misleading and mask substantial variation among both RTW and union security states. Conversely, studies that considered other outcomes suggested benefits to RTW laws. As such, the ongoing debate on RTW may be driven by factors other than rigorous empirical evidence related to economic outcomes. | The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) establishes most private-sector workers' rights to unionize and collectively bargain over wages, benefits, and working conditions. Enacted in 1935, the NLRA also permits collective bargaining contracts between employers and labor organizations that require every individual covered by the collective bargaining contract to pay dues to the negotiating labor organization. These contract provisions are known as union security agreements. Since the NLRA was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, individual states have been permitted to supersede the union security provisions of the NLRA by enacting laws that prohibit union security agreements. These state laws are known as right to work (RTW) laws.
Currently, 24 states have RTW laws. Of these, 12 states passed RTW laws prior to 1950 and another six passed them prior to 1960. The two most recent states to adopt RTW laws are Indiana and Michigan, both of which enacted legislation in 2012. Several other state legislatures are debating RTW laws.
Recent legislative proposals, with substantial numbers of cosponsors, would expand RTW policies nationwide. Advocates of national RTW laws claim that they would enhance personal freedom and employer flexibility. Opponents argue that such laws would weaken workers' abilities to collectively bargain for more favorable compensation and working conditions. Proposals aiming to expand RTW policies typically strike the provisions of the NLRA that permit union security agreements.
National RTW proposals are often discussed in the context of the economic performance of states that have adopted them. However, research that compares outcomes in RTW and union security states is inconclusive. The recent data trends between RTW and union security states are relatively distinct, but, since it is difficult to determine the effect of a single variable on broader economic outcomes, the influence of RTW laws in these trends (if any) is unclear.
Unionization rates in RTW states are less than half of what they are in union security states. It is ambiguous what portion of this difference is attributable to RTW laws, what portion is due to diverse preferences among states' populations regarding unionization, and what portion is due to other factors. In the past decade, aggregate employment in RTW states has increased modestly while employment in union security states has declined. It is unclear if this growth is attributable to RTW, other pro-business policies (which tend to be concentrated in RTW states), or other factors. Wages are lower in RTW states than union security states. Historical research has suggested that RTW laws have little influence on these differences. More contemporary scholarship has come to diverse conclusions, depending on the researchers' methodology.
Difficulties associated with rigorously studying the relationships between RTW laws and various outcomes are likely to continue to make it difficult to generate definitive findings about these relationships. As such, the ongoing debate on RTW may be driven by factors other than rigorous empirical evidence related to economic outcomes. |
crs_R44709 | crs_R44709_0 | Overview
From 1953 to 1975, initiatives to reform Senate Rule XXII at the start of a new Congress were biennial rituals. They were instigated mainly by Senators in each party frustrated by the chamber's inability to enact certain legislation, such as civil rights measures, due to filibusters. The biennial focus on amending Rule XXII at the beginning of a Congress declined somewhat with the revisions made to Rule XXII in 1975—cloture was lowered from two-thirds of the Senators present and voting to three-fifths of the Senators chosen and sworn—and the changes made in 1979 and 1986 involving the length of post-cloture debate. However, senatorial interest in changing Rule XXII at the start of a new Congress—called the "constitutional option" by some—reemerged in the 2000s. At the beginning of the 112 th , 113 th , and 114 th Congresses—in 2011, 2013, and 2015, respectively—a number of reform-minded Senators unsuccessfully urged the Senate to adopt its rules on "opening day" by majority vote (as the House does on its first day) without having to mobilize a supermajority vote. Rule XXII mandates that prolonged debate on amendments to Senate rules can be brought to an end by a two-thirds vote of the Senators present and voting. Reform Senators have generally viewed the opening of a new Congress as a special constitutional time that permits the Senate to change its procedures by majority vote unencumbered by chamber rules adopted by a previous Congress. They cite the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 5) as their authority: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings," which implicitly means by majority vote, state the reformers. They point out that the Senate has adopted rules, and the Constitution says nothing about the vote required to adopt those rules. They also emphasize that the Senate is a continuing body with continuing rules (the "continuing body" doctrine ). If an effort is made at the start of the 115 th Congress (2017-2018) to amend Senate rules by majority vote—the so-called constitutional option—what key concerns might Senators on either side of the issue bear in mind? They are the support of the presiding officer, which could be the President of the Senate; the assistance of the majority leader; the mobilization of a determined and united majority; skillful use of procedural moves and countermoves; the length of "opening day"; the continuing body doctrine; and procedures to be followed pending approval of new rules. | From 1953 to 1975, proposals to reform Rule XXII at the start of a new Congress were biennial rituals. They were instigated by Senators in each party frustrated by the chamber's inability to enact social and civil rights legislation because of the opposition of other Members. The biennial focus declined somewhat when the Senate in 1975 amended Rule XXII to reduce the number of Senators required to invoke cloture from two-thirds of the Senators present and voting to three-fifths of the Senators chosen and sworn (60 of 100). In 1979 and 1986, the Senate also amended Rule XXII by reducing the length of time for post-cloture debate. However, senatorial interest in revising Rule XXII on "opening day" reemerged in the 2000s.
At the start of three recent Congresses—in 2011, 2013, and 2015—a number of reform-minded Senators unsuccessfully urged the Senate (as the House does on its first day) to adopt its rules by majority vote without having to muster a supermajority vote. Rule XXII mandates that prolonged debate on amendments to Senate rules can be brought to an end by a two-thirds vote of the Senators present and voting—67 of 100 Members if all Senators vote, a likely outcome on an issue that affects the institution's long-standing deliberative character.
Reform-minded Senators have generally viewed the opening of a new Congress as a special constitutional time that permits the Senate to amend its procedures by majority vote unencumbered by chamber rules adopted by a previous Congress. They cite the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 5) as their authority: "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings," which implicitly means by majority vote, state the reformers. Opponents reject this assertion and point out that the Senate has adopted rules, and the Constitution says nothing about the vote required to adopt those rules. Moreover, the Senate is a continuing body with continuing rules.
This report's prime purpose is to discuss seven considerations that Senators on either side of the issue might bear in mind if an effort is made at the start of the 115th Congress (2017-2018) to amend Senate rules by majority vote. Seven specific considerations are discussed: the role of the presiding officer, who could be the President of the Senate; the assistance of the majority leader; the mobilization of a determined and united majority; skillful use of procedural moves and countermoves; the length of "opening day"; the continuing body doctrine; and procedures to be followed pending approval of new rules. The report concludes with several observations about legislating in the Senate. |
crs_RL33087 | crs_RL33087_0 | The Economies of the United States and Canada
The economies of the United States and Canada are highly integrated, a process that has been accelerated by the bilateral U.S.-Canada free trade agreement (FTA) of 1989 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994. Both are affluent industrialized economies, with similar (though not identical) standards of living. However, the economies of the two countries diverge in numerous ways. The persistent per capita income gap has proven worrisome to Canadian policymakers as it raises questions about Canadian productivity and competitiveness. Agriculture makes up the remaining 1.9% of the Canadian economy and 1.2% of the U.S. economy. The Trade and Investment Relationship
Canada is the largest single nation trading partner of the United States. In 2010, total merchandise trade with Canada was $481.5 billion (a 12.1% increase from 2009), consisting of $275.5 billion in imports and $206.0 billion in exports resulting in a trade deficit of $69.5 billion. While Canada is an important trading partner for the United States, the United States is the dominant trade partner for Canada. Trade is a dominant feature of the Canadian economy. In 2009, Canada's merchandise trade balance fell into deficit for the first time since 1975 and this deficit persisted in 2010. This integration has been assisted by trade liberalization over the past 40 years, beginning with the Automotive Agreement of 1965 (which eliminated tariffs on shipments of autos and auto parts between the two countries), through the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1989 (FTA), and NAFTA. Canada is also highly dependent on FDI. Both are signatories to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and are bound together by the North American Free Trade Agreement. Intellectual Property Rights
In 2011, the U.S. Trade Representative again listed Canada on its Special 301 report on intellectual property rights protections to the priority watch list for intellectual property rights protections. Security and Trade
The aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, has increased scrutiny of the Canadian border as a possible point of entry for terrorists or for weapons of mass destruction. While concerns in the United States over the U.S.-Canada border are focused primarily on border security and immigration issues, the debate in Canada has become much broader, encompassing such issues as the nature of sovereignty, the desirability and feasibility of further economic integration with the United States, and even the adoption of the U.S. dollar. In addition, since the 2001 terror attacks there has been a perception by some in Canada and Mexico that continued economic access to the U.S. market is dependent on greater security cooperation with the United States. | The United States and Canada conduct the world's largest bilateral trade relationship, with total merchandise trade (exports and imports) exceeding $429.7 billion in 2009. The U.S.-Canadian relationship revolves around the themes of integration and asymmetry: integration from successive trade liberalization from the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact of 1965 leading to North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and asymmetry resulting from Canadian dependence on the U.S. market and from the disparate size of the two economies.
The economies of the United States and Canada are highly integrated, a process that has been accelerated by the bilateral U.S.-Canada free trade agreement (FTA) of 1988 and the NAFTA of 1994. Both are affluent industrialized economies, with similar standards of living and industrial structure. However, the two economies diverge in size, per capita income, productivity and net savings.
Canada is the largest single-country trading partner of the United States. In 2009, total merchandise trade with Canada consisted of $224.9 billion in imports and $204.7 billion in exports. In 2007, China displaced Canada as the largest source for U.S. imports for the first time, a trend that has continued since then. While Canada is an important trading partner for the United States, the United States is the dominant trade partner for Canada, and trade is a dominant feature of the Canadian economy. Automobiles and auto parts, a sector which has become highly integrated due to free trade, make up the largest sector of traded products. Canada is also the largest exporter of energy to the United States. Like the United States, the Canadian economy is affected by the transformation of China into an economic superpower. The United States and Canada also have significant stakes in each other's economy through foreign direct investment.
Both countries are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and both are partners with Mexico in the NAFTA. While most trade is conducted smoothly, several disputes remain contentious. Disputes concerning the 2006 softwood lumber agreement are under arbitration, and Canada has sought WTO consultations over country-of-origin-labeling requirements. In addition, the United States has placed Canada on its Special 301 priority watch list over intellectual property rights enforcement issues. Canada has also vigorously protested the implementation of the "Buy American" provisions of the economic stimulus package.
The terrorist attacks of 2001 focused attention on the U.S.-Canadian border. Several bilateral initiatives have been undertaken to minimize disruption to commerce from added border security. The focus on the border has renewed interest in some quarters in greater economic integration, either through incremental measures such as greater regulatory cooperation or potentially larger goals such as a customs or monetary union. Congressional interest has focused mostly on trade disputes, and also on the ability of the two nations to continue their traditional volume of trade with heightened security on the border. |
crs_RL30011 | crs_RL30011_0 | Introduction
The Congressional Research Service receives numerous requests for lists of recipients of the Medal of Honor (MOH), the nation's highest award for military bravery. Since its first presentation in 1863, there have been nearly 3,500 recipients of the Medals of Honor. In 1973 and 1979, the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee issued Committee Print 8, Vietnam Era Medal of Honor Recipients: 1964-1972 , and Committee Print 3, Medal of Honor Recipients: 1863-1978 . Each print lists recipients and provides the full text of the citations describing the actions that resulted in the awarding of the MOH. This report covers additions and changes to the list of recipients of the medal since the release of the above-mentioned committee prints. As the citation is processed through the chain of command, it is edited. For historical information and a more detailed account of congressional and other efforts to award the MOH, see CRS Report 95-519, Medal of Honor: History and Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. Medals of Honor by Action
An asterisk (*) indicates those individuals who were awarded their medals posthumously. Citation . Place of birth: unknown. Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs. | The Medal of Honor (MOH) is the nation's highest award for military valor. It is presented by the President in the name of Congress and is often called the Congressional Medal of Honor. Since its first presentation in 1863, nearly 3,500 MOHs have been awarded. In 1973, the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs issued a committee print, Vietnam Era Medal of Honor Recipients 1964-72, followed by the committee print, Medal of Honor Recipients: 1863-1978, in 1979. Both committee prints list recipients and provide the full text of the citation, which describes the actions that resulted in the awarding of the medal.
This report covers additions and changes to the list of recipients of the medal since the release of the committee print. For further information, see CRS Report 95-519, Medal of Honor: History and Issues, by [author name scrubbed].
The official citations are not always consistent in wording for all recipients. Some of the citations do not contain information such as company, division, date of birth, or place of birth. An asterisk (*) indicates those individuals who were awarded their medal posthumously. |
crs_R43131 | crs_R43131_0 | Stormwater is in part a water quantity problem, and for decades the focus of local governments and public works officials was on how to engineer solutions to move rainwater rapidly away from urban areas to avoid the economic damages of flooding. Green infrastructure systems and practices use or mimic natural processes to infiltrate, evapotranspire, and/or harvest stormwater on or near the site where it is generated in order to reduce flows to municipal sewers. Further, the increased amount of runoff also increases pollutant loads that are harmful to aquatic life and public health into streams, rivers, and lakes. Nationally, about 750 cities operate combined sewer systems. As a result, technologies or practices called green infrastructure are receiving increased attention. The growing interest in green infrastructure practices is driven to a great extent by arguments that it is a cost-effective way to manage urban stormwater problems, particularly compared with costs of gray infrastructure. Other Non-Water Benefits. Many observers believe that the biggest barriers are lack of information on performance and cost-effectiveness, and uncertainty whether green infrastructure will contribute to achieving water quality improvements. At the federal level, there are more than two dozen funding programs in seven departments and agencies that could potentially be applicable, but there is no single source of dedicated federal funding to design and implement green infrastructure solutions. Without federal or state assistance, communities take several approaches to financing public capital projects. Local ratepayers fund most wastewater treatment needs, including stormwater projects. The number of stormwater utilities that charge fees as a dedicated funding source for projects has grown in recent years. Many municipalities try to encourage homeowners and developers to incorporate green infrastructure practices by offering incentives for both existing and planned developments. The four most common types of local incentive mechanisms are fee discounts or credits, development incentives, best management practice installation subsidies, and award and recognition programs. Some municipalities offer rebates or financing for installation of specific practices . Since 2012, the agency has awarded grants ranging from $400,000 to $950,000 to 37 communities in 23 states for projects such as developing tools and guidance to identify green infrastructure opportunities and reviewing local codes and ordinances to identify barriers to green infrastructure. EPA also has supported research evaluating green infrastructure BMPs. Congressional Interest
Congressional interest in these issues is reflected in legislation and oversight hearings in recent Congresses. Legislation titled the Innovative Stormwater Infrastructure Act of 2015 has been introduced in the 114 th Congress to support research and implementation of green/innovative stormwater infrastructure ( H.R. 1775 / S. 896 ; and Title II, Subtitle C, of H.R. 2893 / S. 1837 ). Two other bills in the 114 th Congress, S. 2768 and S. 2848 , include provisions calling for EPA to promote green infrastructure. David C. Rouse and Ignacio F. Bunster-Ossa, Green Infrastructure: A Landscape Approach , American Planning Association, Report Number 571, January 2013, 160 p.
American Rivers, Water Environment Federation, American Society of Landscape Architects, and ECONorthwest, Banking on Green: A Look at How Green Infrastructure Can Save Municipalities Money and Provide Economic Benefits Community-Wide , April 2012, 41 p.
The Nature Conservancy, Greening Vacant Lots: Planning and Implementation Strategies , December 2012, 129 p.
Christopher Kloss and Crystal Calarusse, Rooftops to Rivers, Green Strategies for Controlling Stormwater and Combined Sewer Overflows , Natural Resources Defense Council, June 2006, 54 p.
Noah Garrison and Karen Hobbs, Rooftops to Rivers II, Green Strategies for Controlling Stormwater and Combined Sewer Overflows , Natural Resources Defense Council, 2011, 134 p.
Alisa Valderrama, Lawrence Levine, Eron Bloomgarden, Ricardo Bayon, Kelly Wachowicz, and Charlotte Kaiser, Creating Clean Water Cash Flows, Developing Private Markets for Green Stormwater Infrastructure in Philadelphia , Natural Resources Defense Council, EKO Asset Management Partners, and The Nature Conservancy, Report R:13-01-A, January 2013, 87 p.
Jeffrey Odefey, Permitting Green Infrastructure: A Guide to Improving Municipal Stormwater Permits and Protecting Water Quality , report of American Rivers, January 2013, 40 p.
Noah Garrison, Robert C. Wilkinson, and Richard Horner, A Clear Blue Future, How Greening California Cities Can Address Water Resources and Climate Challenges in the 21 st Century , Natural Resources Defense Council, NRDC Technical Report, August 2009, 53 p.
Clean Water America Alliance, Barriers and Gateways to Green Infrastructure , September 2011, 38 p.
Center for Neighborhood Technology and American Rivers, The Value of Green Infrastructure: A Guide to Recognizing Its Economic, Environment and Social Benefits , 2010, 80 p.
Charles T. Driscoll, Caitlin G. Eger, David G. Chandler, et al, Green Infrastructure: Lessons from Science and Practice , a publication of the Science Policy Exchange, June 2015, 32 p.
Environmental Finance Center Network, Green Infrastructure Resource Directory , June 2012, 11 p.
Nell Green Nylen and Michael Kiparsky, Accelerating Cost-Effective Green Stormwater Infrastructure: Learning from Local Implementation , UC-Berkeley School of Law Center for Law, Energy & the Environment, February 2015, 51 p.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Low Impact Development (LID) "Barrier Busters" Fact Sheet Series , a seven-part series of fact sheets for state and local decisionmakers, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/green/bbfs.cfm . | For decades, stormwater, or runoff, was considered largely a problem of excess rainwater or snowmelt impacting communities. Prevailing engineering practices were to move stormwater away from cities as rapidly as possible to avoid potential damages from flooding. More recently, these practices have evolved and come to recognize stormwater as a resource that, managed properly within communities, has multiple benefits.
Stormwater problems occur because rainwater that once soaked into the ground now runs off hard surfaces like rooftops, parking lots, and streets in excessive amounts. It flows into storm drains and ultimately into lakes and streams, carrying pollutants that are harmful to aquatic life and public health. Traditional approaches to managing urban stormwater have utilized so-called "gray infrastructure," including pipes, gutters, ditches, and storm sewers. More recently, interest has grown in "green infrastructure" technologies and practices in place of or in combination with gray infrastructure. Green infrastructure systems use or mimic natural processes to infiltrate, evapotranspire, or reuse stormwater runoff on the site where it is generated. These practices keep rainwater out of the sewer system, thus preventing sewer overflows and also reducing the amount of untreated runoff discharged to surface waters.
Cities' adoption of green technologies and practices has increased, motivated by several factors. One motivation is environmental and resource benefits. Advocates, including environmental groups, landscape architects, and urban planners, have drawn attention to these practices. But an equally important motivation is cost-saving opportunities for cities that face enormous costs of stormwater infrastructure projects to meet requirements of the Clean Water Act. Other potential benefits include reduced flood damages, improved air quality, and improved urban aesthetics. However, barriers to implementing green infrastructure include lack of information on performance and cost-effectiveness and uncertainty whether the practices will contribute to achieving water quality improvements.
Another key barrier is lack of funding. At the federal level, there is no single source of dedicated federal funding to design and implement green infrastructure solutions. Without assistance, communities take several approaches to financing wastewater and stormwater projects; the most frequently used tool is issuance of municipal bonds. As a dedicated funding source for projects, the number of local stormwater utilities that charge fees has grown in recent years. Many municipalities try to encourage homeowners and developers to incorporate green infrastructure practices by offering incentives. The most common types of local incentive mechanisms are stormwater fee discounts or credits, development incentives, rebates or financing for installation of specific practices, and award and recognition programs.
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) support for green infrastructure has grown since the 1990s. The agency has provided technical assistance and information and developed policies to facilitate and encourage green infrastructure solutions and incorporate green infrastructure practices in Clean Water Act permits. EPA also has awarded grants to communities in 23 states for projects to identify green infrastructure opportunities and steps needed to overcome implementation barriers.
Congress has shown some interest in these issues. In the 114th Congress, legislation has been introduced to support research and implementation of green/innovative stormwater infrastructure (H.R. 1775/S. 896 and in provisions in H.R. 2893 and S. 1837). Two other bills, S. 2768 and S. 2848, include provisions calling for EPA to promote green infrastructure. Overall, many in Congress remain concerned about how municipalities will pay for needed investments in water infrastructure projects generally—not limited to green infrastructure—and what role the federal government can and should play in those efforts. |
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