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crs_RL32238 | crs_RL32238_0 | Introduction
Issue For Congress
The Bush Administration identified transformation as a major goal for the Department of Defense (DOD) soon after taking office, and initially justified many of its proposals for DOD on the grounds that they are needed for defense transformation. Although defense transformation is still discussed in administration defense-policy documents and budget-justification materials, the concept is now less prominent in discussions of U.S. defense policy and programs than it was during the earlier years of the Bush Administration. Overall Vision
In general, the Administration's vision for defense transformation calls for placing increased emphasis in U.S. defense planning on the following: irregular warfare (including terrorism, insurgencies, and civil war), potential catastrophic security threats (such as the possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and rogue states), and potential disruptive events (such as the emergence of new technologies that could undermine current U.S. military advantages). The Administration's vision for defense transformation calls for shifting the U.S. military away from a reliance on massed forces, sheer quantity of firepower, military services operating in isolation from one another, and attrition-style warfare, and toward a greater reliance on joint (i.e., integrated multi-service) operations, NCW, effects-based operations (EBO), speed and agility, and precision application of firepower. How Might It Affect the Defense Industrial Base? Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
Transformation Under DOD's New Leadership
One potential oversight issue for Congress relating to defense transformation is how much DOD will continue to emphasize transformation, and how DOD's overall vision for transformation might change, as a result of Robert Gates succeeding Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in December 2006. Other observers were concerned that the Administration invoked the term transformation as an all-purpose rhetorical tool for justifying its various proposals for DOD, whether they relate to transformation or not, and for encouraging minimal debate on those proposals by tying the concept of transformation to the urgent need to fight the war on terrorism. | The Bush Administration identified transformation as a major goal for the Department of Defense (DOD) soon after taking office, and initially justified many of its proposals for DOD on the grounds that they were needed for defense transformation. Although defense transformation is still discussed in administration defense-policy documents and budget-justification materials, the concept is now less prominent in discussions of U.S. defense policy and programs than it was during the earlier years of the Bush Administration.
The Administration's vision for defense transformation calls for placing increased emphasis in U.S. defense planning on the following: irregular warfare, including terrorism, insurgencies, and civil war; potential catastrophic security threats, such as the possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and rogue states; and potential disruptive events, such as the emergence of new technologies that could undermine current U.S. military advantages. The Administration's vision for defense transformation calls for shifting U.S. military forces toward a greater reliance on joint operations, network-centric warfare, effects-based operations, speed and agility, and precision application of firepower. Transformation could affect the defense industrial base by transferring funding from "legacy" systems to transformational systems, and from traditional DOD contractors to firms that previously have not done much defense work.
Potential oversight issues for Congress regarding defense transformation include the potential for DOD transformation plans to change as a result of Robert Gates succeeding Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense; the merits of certain elements of DOD's transformation plan; overall leadership and management of transformation; experiments and exercises conducted in support of transformation; measures for creating a culture of innovation viewed as necessary to support transformation; the adequacy of information provided to Congress regarding transformation-related initiatives; and whether the Administration has invoked the term transformation as an all-purpose rhetorical tool for justifying its various proposals for DOD. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42525 | crs_R42525_0 | The bill also provides funds for agencies in two other departments—the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture, and the Indian Health Service (IHS) in the Department of Health and Human Services—as well as funds for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 113-6
No regular FY2013 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill was enacted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year on October 1, 2012. Accordingly, Congress first included funds for these agencies in a continuing appropriations resolution (CR, P.L. 112-175 ) through March 27, 2013. This part-year CR was superseded by the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( P.L. Enacted on March 26, 2013, the law provided full-year continuing appropriations for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies through September 30, 2013. The Congressional Budget Office had estimated that, excluding the effects of sequestration, P.L. 113-6 contained $29.83 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. However, appropriations in the law were reduced under the sequester order of the President, issued on March 1, 2013. That order implemented an across-the-board cut for (non-exempt, nondefense) discretionary funding, which was calculated based on a reduction of each account of about 5.0%; the accompanying report indicated a dollar amount of budget authority to be canceled from each account pursuant to that across-the-board cut. 113-6 were reduced by an across-the-board rescission of 0.2% under P.L. 113-6 .The effect of these reductions on budgetary resources of agencies, accounts, and programs within Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies initially was unclear, pending guidance from OMB as to how they would be applied. For information on final appropriations for agencies for FY2013, reflecting the sequester and the across-the-board rescission, see CRS Report R43142, Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies: FY2013 and FY2014 Appropriations . 113-6 affected particular authorities and activities of agencies in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. 112-175 , accounts in the Interior bill were generally funded at a level that was 0.612% higher than the FY2012 level. 6091 ( H.Rept. 112-589 ) contained $27.66 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies for FY2013. This would have been a decrease of $1.57 billion (5.4%) from the FY2012 level of $29.23 billion. The committee-reported bill would have been a decrease of $2.07 billion (6.9%) from the Administration's FY2013 request of $29.72 billion. While no bill to appropriate funds for FY2013 was marked up and reported by the Senate committee, on September 25, 2012, the bipartisan leadership of the subcommittee released a draft FY2013 bill and a draft detailed funding table. The draft contained $29.72 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies, $5.3 million (<0.1%) lower than the President's request but $489.8 million (1.7%) higher than the FY2012 appropriation and $2.06 billion (7.4%) higher than the House committee-reported level in H.R. H.R. 6091 , which was not enacted, contained regular appropriations for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. | The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Interior (DOI), except for the Bureau of Reclamation, and for agencies within other departments—including the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also includes funding for arts and cultural agencies, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and numerous other entities.
Neither the House nor the Senate passed a regular appropriations bill for FY2013 for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. On July 10, 2012, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 6091 (H.Rept. 112-589) with $27.66 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. If enacted, this level would have been a decrease of $1.57 billion from the FY2012 level of $29.23 billion and a decrease of $2.07 billion from the Administration's FY2013 request of $29.72 billion. While no regular appropriations bill was marked up or reported in the Senate, the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Interior Subcommittee released a draft bill, together with a draft detailed funding table, on September 25, 2012. The draft would have provided $29.72 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies, $5.3 million lower than the President's request but $489.8 million higher than the FY2012 appropriation and $2.06 billion higher than the House committee-reported level in H.R. 6091.
Because no regular FY2013 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill was enacted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, Congress first included funds for these agencies in a continuing appropriations resolution (CR, P.L. 112-175) through March 27, 2013. For accounts in the Interior bill, the CR generally continued funding at a level that was 0.612% higher than the FY2012 level.
P.L. 112-175 was superseded by a second law, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6). Enacted on March 26, 2013, the law provided full-year continuing appropriations for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies through September 30, 2013. The Congressional Budget Office had estimated that, excluding the effects of sequestration, the law contained $29.83 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. However, appropriations in the law were reduced under the sequester order of the President, issued on March 1, 2013. That order implemented an across-the-board cut for (non-exempt, nondefense) discretionary funding, which was calculated based on a reduction of each account of about 5.0%; the accompanying report indicated a dollar amount of budget authority to be canceled from each account pursuant to that across-the-board cut. Appropriations in the law also were reduced by an across-the-board rescission of 0.2% under P.L. 113-6. The effect of these reductions on budgetary resources of agencies, accounts, and programs within Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies initially was unclear, but was subsequently determined. For final FY2013 appropriations for agencies, reflecting the sequester and across-the-board rescission, see CRS Report R43142, Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies: FY2013 and FY2014 Appropriations. |
crs_R41915 | crs_R41915_0 | Section 36 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides for a credit for many taxpayers who bought a principal residence in 2008, 2009, or 2010. The amounts of the credit vary depending upon whether the property was purchased in 2008 or was purchased later and, for purchases made after 2008, whether the purchaser qualified for the "long-time resident" exception. Those for subsequent years' purchases generally are not subject to repayment. For credits based on purchases after 2008, acceleration of repayment means that the entire credit must be repaid if taxpayers cease using the purchased properties as their principal residences within the 36 months following the purchase. For credits based on a 2008 purchase, acceleration of repayment means that the outstanding balance of the credit becomes due. In each case, the repayment is calculated and included as tax on the tax return for the tax year in which the property ceased to be the taxpayer's principal residence. There are several exceptions to these repayment provisions. This report addresses the exception for involuntary conversions of the property, as well as the limitation on repayment based on gain (if any) realized on the disposition of the property as it applies to involuntary conversions. Repayment of the Homebuyer Tax Credit After an Involuntary Conversion
Generally, an involuntary conversion will not trigger acceleration of repayment in the tax year in which the involuntary conversion occurs. Under the exception for involuntary conversions, taxpayers who have received the homebuyer tax credit have two years from the date of the involuntary conversion to replace the property and, thereby, avoid acceleration of repayment. For those who purchased their homes in 2008, the involuntary conversion will not suspend their existing duty to repay the credit over a 15-year period. Those who purchased property in 2008 and received the maximum $7,500 credit were required to begin repayment of the credit at $500 per year beginning with their 2010 tax returns. Although the acceleration provision is not triggered in the year of the involuntary conversion, the involuntary conversion must nonetheless be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on the tax return for the year in which the involuntary conversion occurs. In some of these cases, repayment may not be necessary due to the limitation based on gain. In this case, the taxpayer who does not replace the principal residence within the two years allowed must determine whether there was a gain or loss realized on the property. When there is a gain, that gain would be compared to the outstanding balance of the homebuyer credit. The smaller of the two would be the amount that is added to tax as accelerated repayment of the credit in the year in which the two-year replacement period expires. Appendix. • If you do not replace the residence within this two-year period, your credit will be accelerated, but will be reported on the tax return for the tax year in which the two-year period expires. No. No. • You will need to continue paying your scheduled repayment amount ($500 if the credit was $7,500) in 2011 and 2012. • If there was no gain, you would not have to repay any more of the credit. • If the gain was less than the outstanding balance on the credit, your repayment would be the amount of the gain. | Taxpayers who purchased a principal residence in 2008-2010 (and in some cases, 2011) may have qualified for a tax credit under Section 36 of the Internal Revenue Code—the first-time homebuyer credit. This credit was amended several times with changes being made to the amount of the credit, the requirements for qualifying for the credit, and the requirements for repaying the credit. These details are available in CRS Report RL34664, The First-Time Homebuyer Tax Credit, by [author name scrubbed].
Generally, taxpayers claiming the credit based on a 2008 credit are required to repay the credit over a 15-year period beginning with the 2010 tax return. Taxpayers who purchased after 2008 generally are not required to repay the credit.
However, repayment of the credit may be accelerated when the taxpayer no longer uses the property as the principal residence. For those who purchased property in 2008, acceleration means that any outstanding credit balance must be repaid with the tax return for the year in which the taxpayer ceased using the property as the principal residence. For those who purchased after 2008, the credit must be repaid in full if the taxpayer ceased using the property as the principal residence within the 36 months immediately following the date of purchase.
There are several exceptions to the repayment requirements. This report focuses on the exception due to involuntary conversion and the limitation based on gain.
The term "involuntary conversion" includes either the partial or complete destruction of the property due to a casualty such as a fire, flood, or tornado. Alternatively, the term may mean the loss of some or all of the property by theft or condemnation, which would include a sale under threat of condemnation. Generally, an involuntary conversion will not trigger acceleration of repayment in the tax year in which the involuntary conversion occurs.
Under the exception for involuntary conversions, taxpayers who have received the homebuyer tax credit have two years from the date of the involuntary conversion to replace the property and, thereby, avoid acceleration of repayment. However, those who purchased in 2008 will need to continue repaying one-fifteenth of their credit annually in the interim. If a taxpayer does not replace the residence within the allowed two-year period, the outstanding credit balance generally would be included in the tax liability for the tax return for the year in which the two-year period expires. However, repayment of the credit could be limited by the gain realized on the involuntary conversion.
If the taxpayer realized a loss on the involuntary conversion, there would be no obligation to repay the outstanding credit balance. If the taxpayer realized a gain, but the gain was less than the outstanding credit balance, the credit repayment would be limited to the amount of gain. That lower amount would be added to the taxpayer's tax liability for the year in which the two-year period expired. In either case, the taxpayer would have no obligation to repay any remaining credit balance in future years.
This report includes an Appendix with questions that are representative of questions being raised by constituents in areas that have been affected recently by flooding and are applicable to other sorts of involuntary conversions. |
crs_R42823 | crs_R42823_0 | Overview
This report provides an overview of current U.S.-India security engagement, a topic of interest to the U.S. Congress, where there is widely held and generally bipartisan support for a deepened U.S. partnership with the world's largest democracy, not least on issues of shared security interests. It begins with a brief discussion of the most important U.S. security interests related to India, then moves to a more detailed review of current U.S.-India security engagement in the realm of military-to-military contacts, counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation, and defense trade. Beginning under President George W. Bush, and continuing with President Barack Obama, the U.S. and Indian governments have been seeking to sustain and deepen a substantive "strategic partnership," even as bilateral commercial and people-to-people contacts flourish of their own accord. We expect India's importance to U.S. interests to grow in the long-run as India, a major regional and emerging global power, increasingly assumes roles commensurate with its position as a stakeholder and a leader in the international system. With this bilateral partnership based on shared values such as democracy, pluralism, and rule of law, numerous economic, security, and global initiatives are underway, among them unprecedented plans for civilian nuclear cooperation. In mid-2012, the co-chairs of the Senate India Caucus penned a letter to the Deputy Secretary of Defense strongly urging him to press the Indian government to continue its efforts to improve its defense procurement procedures, as well as to "aggressively pursue co-development or co-production opportunities," which they contend "would prove mutually beneficial not just to the U.S. and Indian defense industries, but also to the long-term relationship of our two militaries." India is today described as being a defense cooperation "linchpin" in the Obama Administration's strategy of "rebalancing" toward Asia, a strategy that includes "expanding military partnerships" in South Asia. U.S. officials thus find national security interests several relevant in areas beyond traditional military security. The Current Status of U.S.-India Security Engagement
Since September 2001, and despite a concurrent U.S. rapprochement with Pakistan, U.S.-India security cooperation has flourished. The United States remains willing to discuss potential sales to India of missile defense systems. CT cooperation is today described by the Obama Administration as a pillar of the bilateral relationship. Despite these constraints, some analysts suggest that U.S.-India CT cooperation is among the most resilient components of security cooperation between the two countries, one that is (barring any major unforeseen shifts) bound to grow steadily through diverse mechanisms and contexts for collaboration. For example, during 2011 testimony before a House panel, one U.S. expert listed what he sees as five key challenges to future U.S.-India CT cooperation: (1) Suboptimal alignment of U.S. and Indian bureaucracies , resulting in poor interagency communication and coordination in both countries, and a lack of clarity about issue-area responsibilities; (2) India's limited bureaucratic capacity and its highly centralized and often opaque decision making processes; (3) primary law enforcement role of Indian states ; (4) sometimes divergent views of the terrorist threat itself, related primarily to differing perceptions on the role played by Pakistan; and (5) Indian doubts about the U.S. commitment to CT cooperation due to perceptions that Washington's conduct is not always fully transparent. Still, many Indians continue to be wary of closer defense ties with the United States and are concerned that these could lead to future strings, such as conditionality and/or cutoffs, and perhaps constrain New Delhi's foreign policy freedom in times of conflict. However, Indian defense purchases from the United States represent only a small percentage of the country's overall purchases over the past decade. Defense trade in the United States and India appears guided by certain distinct considerations in each country. Washington and New Delhi are taking steps to reduce the mistrust between them. The enthusiasm with which the Pentagon and State Department are pursuing such ties with India has in large part to do with India's growing importance in the context of the U.S. "pivot" toward the Asia-Pacific, or what is sometimes called the "Indo-Pacific." New Delhi's leaders are mindful of the precariousness of their region's stability, and they arguably appreciate the value of leveraging an American presence in pursuing their strategic goals. | U.S.-India engagement on shared security interests is a topic of interest to the U.S. Congress, where there is considerable support for a deepened U.S. partnership with the world's largest democracy. Congressional advocacy of closer relations with India is generally bipartisan and widespread; House and Senate caucuses on India and Indian-Americans are the largest of their kind. Caucus leaders have encouraged the Obama Administration to work toward improving the compatibility of the U.S. and Indian defense acquisitions systems, as well as to seek potential opportunities for co-development or co-production of military weapons systems with India. In the 112th Congress, the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 112-26) opined that a deepened partnership with India is critical to the promotion of core mutual national interests.
The United States and India have since 2004 been pursuing a "strategic partnership" that incorporates numerous economic, security, and global initiatives. Defense cooperation between the two countries remains in relatively early stages of development. However, over the past decade—and despite a concurrent U.S. engagement with Indian rival Pakistan and a Cold War history of bilateral estrangement—U.S.-India security cooperation has flourished. American diplomats now rate military links and defense trade among the most important aspects of transformed bilateral relations in the 21st century. The United States views security cooperation with India in the context of common principles and shared national interests such as defeating terrorism, preventing weapons proliferation, and maintaining regional stability. After initial uncertainty, under President Barack Obama, senior Pentagon officials assured New Delhi that the United States is fully committed to strengthening ties through the enhancement of the defense relationship made newly substantive under President George W. Bush.
Many analysts view increased U.S.-India security ties as providing a perceived "hedge" against or "counterbalance" to growing Chinese influence in Asia, although both Washington and New Delhi repeatedly downplay such motives. While a complete congruence of U.S. and Indian national security objectives is unlikely in the foreseeable future, meaningful convergences are identified in areas such as the emergence of a new balance-of-power arrangement in the region. Still, indications remain that the perceptions and expectations of top U.S. and Indian strategic planners are divergent on several key issues, perhaps especially on the role of Pakistan, as well as on India's relations with Iran. Moreover, given a national foreign policy tradition of "nonalignment," Indian leaders are averse to forming any "alliance" with the United States and are clear in their intention to maintain India's "strategic autonomy." Questions remain about the ability of the Indian economy to grow at rates sufficient to improve its security capabilities at the pace sought in both Washington and New Delhi. Despite these factors, U.S. leaders only expect India's importance to U.S. interests to grow steadily, and they foresee India taking on new security roles commensurate with its status as a major power and stakeholder in the international system. This expectation is a key aspect of the Obama Administration's policy of "rebalancing" toward the Asia-Pacific, which is conceived as including the Indian Ocean region.
This report reviews the major facets of U.S.-India security relations with a focus on military-to-military contacts, counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation, and defense trade, while also discussing some of the many obstacles to deeper cooperation in each of these areas. The strategic aspects of the bilateral security relationship are in the companion CRS Report R42948, U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. U.S.-India relations are discussed more broadly in CRS Report RL33529, India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44859 | crs_R44859_0 | Introduction
Malawi is a small, poor southeastern African country of just over 18 million people that in the early 1990s underwent a democratic transition from one-party rule. The country has long relied on foreign assistance, and U.S. aid is the main focus of U.S.-Malawian relations. Congressional interest centers mostly on such assistance, in particular health aid, as well as on concerns over governance trends, notably under the presidency of the late President Bingu wa Mutharika, the brother of incumbent President Peter Mutharika. In recent years, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) bilateral assistance to Malawi has ranged between $196 million (FY2014) and $261 million (FY2016), supplemented in FY2016 with an additional $102.6 million in disaster response funding, primarily made up of food aid (see Table 1 ). The Obama Administration requested $195.6 million for FY2017. 115-31 ) congressional appropriators mandated that at least $56 million in Development Assistance account funds be allocated to Malawi, and that up to $10 million of this funding be made available for higher education programs. The Trump Administration requested $161.3 million for Malawi in FY2018. Roughly 6.7 million Malawians were experiencing acute food insecurity in early 2017. These developments prompted various international donors to withhold aid. A key point of electoral controversy was an unsuccessful attempt by Banda to annul the election. Mutharika Administration
Mutharika took office in June 2014. GDP per capita—which is among the world's lowest—fell substantially, from $354 in 2015 to $294 last year. Malawi is landlocked, and its agriculturally-centered and undiversified economy is import-dependent for many products, such as fuel and manufactured goods. In 2014, Malawi was the fifth most aid-dependent country or territory globally; the amount of official development assistance (ODA) it received was equivalent to 75% of the value of government expenditures, and the percentage has been even higher in the past (reaching a peak of 113% in 2012). Most members of CABS, along with the United States, currently provide project-based or otherwise targeted development aid, rather than direct budget support, notably for social services, humanitarian needs, and infrastructure and public institutional development. U.S. Relations
U.S.-Malawi relations warmed following Malawi's democratic transition in 1994, but became strained during President Wa Mutharika's second term (see " Political Background ," above), before improving under Banda. Malawi is eligible for trade benefits, including apparel benefits, under the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, Title I, P.L. A significant portion of U.S. assistance for Malawi has been allocated toward health programs, including through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), and the presidential Global Health Initiative (GHI). Malawi has also been a Feed the Future (FTF) participant country. MCC
Malawi was awarded a $21 million Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold program in 2005 that focused on enhancing good governance and fighting corruption. The MCC approved a $350 million, 5-year MCC compact for Malawi in January 2011, but little progress was initially made due to concern over the Wa Mutharika administration's policies, and the compact was suspended in March 2012. The Compact was reinstated in June 2012, after the inauguration of President Banda. It entered into force in September 2013 and is slated to be completed in September 2018. | Malawi is a poor, landlocked country in southeastern Africa. A former British colony, Malawi transitioned from one-party rule to a democratic system in the early 1990s. It has since held a series of multi-party elections—though the most recent polls, held in 2014, featured some logistical shortcomings, limited violence, and a number of controversies, including a failed attempt by then-incumbent President Joyce Banda to annul the election. The race was ultimately won by Peter Mutharika, whose brother, Bingu wa Mutharika, served as president from 2004 until his death in 2012, when he was succeeded by Banda. Peter Mutharika took office in June 2014 after besting Banda in presidential elections that year.
Malawi's economy is agriculturally centered, undiversified, and import-dependent for many inputs. Its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita ranks among the lowest in the world. A regional drought in 2015-2016 hit the domestic agricultural economy hard and left an estimated 6.7 million Malawians acutely food insecure as of early 2017. Malawi is heavily reliant on donor aid; in 2014, it ranked as the world's fifth most aid-dependent country or territory with respect to the amount of development assistance received relative to government expenditures. A major corruption scandal emerged during the Banda administration in 2013 and remains an ongoing political concern and an object of continuing policy and judicial action. It prompted many European and multilateral agency donors to withhold direct budget support to Malawi, and such holds continue. Nevertheless, many donors, including the United States, provide targeted development aid, including for social services, humanitarian needs, and infrastructure and public institutional development.
U.S.-Malawi ties warmed following Malawi's democratic transition but faced strains during the 2004-2012 tenure of President Bingu wa Mutharika, whose administration was marred by semi-authoritarian leadership and human rights concerns. Relations improved markedly under Joyce Banda and have remained positive under President Peter Mutharika. U.S. development assistance has long been the main focus of U.S.-Malawian relations. Congressional interest has traditionally centered on such assistance, notably in the health sector, and on governance concerns.
In recent years, State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) bilateral assistance to Malawi has ranged between $196 million (FY2014) and $261 million (FY2016). This was supplemented in FY2016 with an additional $102.6 million in disaster response funding, primarily for emergency food aid. The Obama Administration requested $195.6 million for FY2017, and Congress mandated that at least $56 million be allocated to Malawi, and that up to $10 million of this funding be made available for higher education programs. The Trump Administration requested $161.3 million for Malawi in FY2018, centered almost exclusively on health system aid.
In recent years, a large portion of U.S. assistance to Malawi has been provided through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and other health programs, including the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) and the presidential Global Health Initiative (GHI). The United States has also provided assistance through the Feed the Future (FTF) initiative. Malawi has received some U.S. security assistance focused on military professionalization and peacekeeping capacity building. Malawi is eligible for trade benefits under the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The country was also awarded a five-year, $350 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact focused on electric power in January 2011, but the compact was temporarily suspended due to concerns over anti-democratic trends. It was reinstated in 2012 and is slated to be completed in September 2018. |
crs_RL33747 | crs_RL33747_0 | Since September 11, 2001, successive Congresses have passed legislation regarding technology, funding, spectrum access and other areas critical to emergency communications. Congress first addressed interoperability in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 ). 108-458 ) that expanded its requirements for action in improving interoperability and public safety communications. Also in response to a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission, Congress set a firm deadline for the release of radio frequency spectrum needed for public safety radios as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ). These laws provide the base from which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can develop a national public safety communications capability as required by the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 ( P.L. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
Acting on recommendations made by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), Congress included several sections regarding improvements in communications capacity—including clarifications to the Homeland Security Act—in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ( P.L. 108-458 ). The Secretary of Homeland Security, with the FCC and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), was required to prepare a study on strategies to meet public safety and homeland security needs for first responders and all other emergency response providers. Provisions in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 planned for the release of spectrum by February 18, 2009 and created a fund to receive spectrum auction proceeds and disburse designated sums to the Treasury and for other purposes. The funding program has been modified slightly to conform to provisions established in P.L. 110-53 . 109-295 ). 7303 (a) (1) [6 U.S.C. Actions in the 110th Congress
The passage of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 ( P.L. Title XXII revised provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act regarding the nature of programs eligible for grants from the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund, making funds generally available for planning, system designing, and purchasing decisions related to achieving interoperability. National Emergency Communications Plan
Title III of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act established new guidelines for funding, tightened requirements for meeting state and national planning goals, and set a deadline by which interoperable communications must be achieved as part of the National Emergency Communications Plan required by Title VI Subtitle D of P.L. 109-295 . The bill also contains a requirement for the immediate release of the 24 MHz of spectrum for public safety use, now scheduled for 2009, discussed above. Also in the Senate, Senator Charles E. Schumer introduced a bill to ensure adequate funding for high-threat areas ( S. 74 ). The Reliable, Effective, and Sustained Procurement of New Devices for Emergency Responders (RESPONDER) Act of 2008 ( S. 3465 , Wicker) would create a First Responders Interoperable Device Availability Trust Fund to provide grants to purchase interoperable radios for the new public safety network proposed for some of the channels being released in the transition to digital TV. In the House, H.R. Among its provisions, H.R. 130 would create an Advisory Council on First Responders and would also require the Under Secretary of Science and Technology within DHS to conduct a study evaluating the need to assign additional spectrum for use by public safety. 3116 , Representative Stupak) would establish a separate fund within the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund that would be used for public safety communications grants. | Since September 11, 2001, several bills introduced in the U.S. Congress have included provisions to assist emergency communications. Key provisions from a number of these bills have become law.
Legislation addressing communications among first responders focused first on interoperability—the capability of different systems to connect—with provisions in the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296). The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) provided more comprehensive language that included requirements for developing a national approach to achieving interoperability. Some of the legislative requirements were based on recommendations made by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission). Also in response to a 9/11 Commission recommendation regarding the availability of spectrum for radio operations, Congress set a date to release needed radio frequency spectrum by early 2009, as part of the Deficit Reduction Act (P.L. 109-171). The act also provided funding for public safety and for the improvement of 911 systems through a Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund. In a section of the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-295, Title VI, Subtitle D), Congress revisited the needs of an effective communications capacity for first responders and other emergency personnel and expanded the provisions of P.L. 108-458. The 109th Congress also passed provisions to improve emergency alerts, incorporated in the Port Security Improvement Act (P.L. 109-347).
In the 110th Congress, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) was passed in the 1st Session. Sections in the act modified and expanded provisions for emergency communications passed in P.L. 109-171 and P.L. 109-295. Among introduced bills that would fund public safety are: S. 74 (Senator Schumer), to ensure adequate funding for high-threat areas; S. 345 (Senator Biden), that would provide funding and includes a requirement for the immediate release of spectrum for public safety use, now scheduled for 2009; S. 3465 (Senator Wicker), to create a First Responders Interoperable Device Availability Trust Fund that would provide grants to purchase interoperable radios for the new public safety network proposed for some of the spectrum made available by the transition to digital TV; H.R. 3116 (Representative Stupak), creating a Public Safety Communications Trust Fund to receive, among other sources of funding, the uncommitted balance remaining in the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund; and H.R. 130, a funding bill for first responders (Representative Frelinghuysen), with a provision that would require the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a study evaluating the need to assign additional spectrum for use by public safety. The bills that carry provisions regarding spectrum are referring, for the most part, to licenses at 700 MHz that were auctioned in January-March 2008; some of the licenses have been assigned to public safety. The proceeds from the auction are to be deposited in the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund, from which mandated disbursements will be made by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The auction grossed approximately $19.6 billion. |
crs_R43680 | crs_R43680_0 | Two policy changes since September 2008 have permanently reduced the deficit—the Budget Control Act (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) as amended since 2012 and the winding down of overseas contingency operations (OCO) beginning in 2009. The major changes involve the extension of expiring tax provisions and temporary extensions of the "doc fix." Overall, the effect of legislative changes on the deficit was more than twice as large as economic and technical changes combined from 2009 to 2014, and would have been larger if assistance to the GSEs was classified as a legislative change. The budget has proven to be disproportionately affected by past recessions, however. In other words, were a recession to occur in the next 10 years, it would likely increase cumulative budget deficits over the course of the budget window by more than the baseline projection of steady growth, even after accounting for higher than projected growth in expansion years. The budget is not projected to be on a sustainable path under current policy in the long term because the debt held by the public would continuously grow more quickly than GDP. Economists view this as unsustainable because it would imply that an ever-growing portion of national income would be needed to meet interest payments. Because deficits are projected to continue to grow in the long run, growing reductions in spending or increases in taxes would be required over time to maintain sustainability. CBO projects that spending would need to be cut or revenues increased by 1.8% of GDP immediately and permanently to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio over the next 75 years, or 7.4% of GDP under the alternative fiscal scenario. The deficit is a long-term issue in that any negative economic consequences from running large deficits have been minor to date, but there is the risk that the deficit's effect on the economy could become negative at any time. Although economic theory suggests that larger deficits provided a stimulative boost to the economy during the recent recession by partially offsetting the contraction of private spending, continued deficits would be expected to eventually have a negative effect on the economy. If that is the case, the decline in the trade deficit may reverse. To that end, deficit reduction proposals can start with the observation that Social Security, Medicare, net interest (which cannot be changed), and defense discretionary make up almost two-thirds of total spending. In 2009, spending reached its highest share of GDP since 1945 and revenues reached their lowest share of GDP since 1950. Spending rises under the baseline projection despite discretionary spending falling to its lowest share of GDP since data were first collected because mandatory spending and net interest on the federal debt are projected to grow relative to GDP. Discretionary Spending
Discretionary spending has fallen from 12.3% of GDP in 1962 to a projected 6.8% of GDP in 2014. The baseline, based on current law, assumes that discretionary spending will adhere to the levels set in the Budget Control Act (BCA) through 2021 and discretionary spending not subject to the caps (notably, OCO) will rise at the rate of inflation. In part, the link between entitlement spending and deficits is driven by the assumptions that go into these projections—other spending is assumed to gradually fall relative to GDP in the long run, revenues are projected to gradually rise relative to GDP because of bracket creep, while health spending per capita is projected to continue to grow faster than GDP per capita. However, CBO's projections already assume the decline will continue, and it still results in an unsustainably large budget deficit. Revenues
In 2009 and 2010, revenues were at historically low shares of GDP across all major categories—individual income taxes were at their lowest share of GDP since 1950, corporate income taxes were at their lowest share of GDP since the 1930s, social insurance receipts were at their lowest share of GDP since the 1970s, and excise taxes were at their lowest share of GDP since 1934, the first year for which data are available. In 2013, revenue as a share of GDP returned closer to historically average levels because of the economic recovery and because of the expiration of the payroll tax cut and certain provisions from the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. Bracket creep does not lead to a significant increase in revenues relative to GDP over a 10-year projection, but it does over a 75-year projection. | The federal budget deficit was the largest it has been since World War II as a percentage of GDP from 2009 to 2012, peaking at 10.1% of GDP. This occurred because spending reached its highest share of GDP since 1945 and revenues reached their lowest share of GDP since 1950. Since then, the deficit has declined to a projected 2.8% of GDP in 2014, which is still above the 1946 to 2008 average. Over the next 25 years, deficits are projected to become very large again under current law.
The recent decline in the deficit is partly due to improvements in the economy, the expiration of temporary measures taken in response to the recession, and spending cuts (mainly to discretionary spending). Spending was cut by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) and the reduction in overseas contingency operations (OCO), primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since September 2008, legislative changes to spending have added a cumulative $1.12 trillion to deficits and legislative changes to revenues, mainly the extension of expiring tax provisions, have added $1.75 trillion to deficits, excluding resulting interest costs.
Looking forward, several uncertainties are inherent in the baseline that may lead to different outcomes than projected. There have been large errors to budget projections historically, in part because economic forecasting is subject to large errors. The budget has also proven to be highly sensitive to recessions, and CBO does not project a recession in its 10-year projection. Budget projections also do not assume any significant changes in spending on future wars or disasters. The baseline projection follows current law, assuming that the "doc fix" and tax "extenders" will expire as scheduled. If Congress temporarily extends either, as it has done regularly in the past, the deficit will be larger than projected.
In the long run, legislative changes will be needed to reduce spending or increase taxes to keep the debt on a sustainable path. Postponing action requires larger changes to be made in the long run, and limits the ability to phase in changes gradually. Economists view the debt as currently unsustainable because it is projected to grow faster than gross domestic product (GDP) indefinitely under current policy, causing an ever growing share of national income to be devoted to servicing the debt. The main source of long-term fiscal unsustainability is the growth in elderly entitlement spending. In particular, spending on major health programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, is assumed to continue to grow faster than GDP, as it has historically. Overall, mandatory spending has grown as a share of GDP, rising from 4.7% of GDP, when data were first compiled in 1962, to a projected 12.3% of GDP in 2014, and is projected to continue rising. By contrast, discretionary spending has fallen from 12.3% of GDP in 1962 to a projected 6.8% of GDP in 2014, and under the baseline it is projected to decline to its lowest share of GDP ever, primarily because of the BCA's statutory caps. Revenues are projected to stay near their historical average over the next 10 years.
Economic theory predicts that deficits have a stimulative effect on the economy during recessions, but harm economic growth by resulting in an increase in interest rates or the trade deficit during economic booms. Thus, the state of the economy is a consideration for the timing of deficit reduction.
Options for deficit reduction on the spending side are constrained by the fact that Social Security, Medicare, net interest, and defense discretionary spending make up almost two-thirds of total spending. On the revenue side, 80% of revenue is raised by income and payroll taxes. |
crs_RL34500 | crs_RL34500_0 | The degree to which unauthorized resident aliens should be accorded certain rights and privileges as a result of their residence in the United States, along with the duties owed by such aliens given their presence, remains the subject of debate in Congress. This report focuses on the policy and legislative debate surrounding unauthorized aliens' access to federal benefits. Unauthorized Population in the United States
Researchers at Pew Research Center estimate that there were 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States in March 2014. Mixed-Immigration-Status Families
A noteworthy portion of the households headed by unauthorized aliens is likely to have U.S. citizen children, as well as spouses who may be legal permanent residents. As Figure 2 illustrates, the number of citizen children (i.e., under 18 years of age) in households headed by an unauthorized alien has grown from 2.7 million in 2003 to 4.5 million in 2010. Benefit Eligibility Rules
As mentioned before, most persons lacking legal authority to reside in the United States are not eligible for federally provided assistance. The law defines a federal public benefit as
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States; and (B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States. The U.S. Receipt of Benefits
There is a widely held perception that many unauthorized migrants obtain federal benefits—despite the restrictions and verification procedures. Selected Issues
Although the law appears straightforward, the policy on unauthorized aliens' access to federal benefits is peppered with ongoing controversies and debates. Some center on demographics issues, such as how to treat mixed-immigration-status families. Others explore unintended consequences, most notably when tightening up the identification requirements results in denying benefits to U.S. citizens. Still others are debates about how broadly the clause "federal public benefit" should be implemented. | Federal law bars aliens residing without authorization in the United States from most federal benefits; however, there is a widely held perception that many unauthorized aliens obtain such benefits. The degree to which unauthorized resident aliens should be accorded certain rights and privileges as a result of their residence in the United States, along with the duties owed by such aliens given their presence, remains the subject of debate in Congress. This report focuses on the policy and legislative debate surrounding unauthorized aliens' access to federal public benefits.
Except for a narrow set of specified emergency services and programs, unauthorized aliens are not eligible for federal public benefits. The law (§401(c) of P.L. 104-193) defines federal public benefit as
any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States; and any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States.
The actual number of unauthorized aliens in the United States is unknown. Researchers at Pew Research Center estimate that there were 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States in March 2014. A noteworthy portion of the households headed by unauthorized aliens are likely to have U.S. citizen children, as well as spouses who may be legal permanent residents (LPRs), and are referred to as "mixed status" families. The number of U.S. citizen children in "mixed status" families has grown from 2.7 million in 2003 to 4.5 million in 2010. (This is the latest figure available as of the date of the report.)
Although the law appears straightforward, the policy on unauthorized aliens' access to federal public benefits is peppered with ongoing controversies and debates. Some center on demographic issues, such as how to treat mixed-immigration-status families. Others explore unintended consequences, most notably when tightening up the identification requirements results in denying benefits to U.S. citizens. Still others are debates about how broadly the clause "federal public benefit" should be implemented, particularly regarding tax credits and refunds. |
crs_RS22871 | crs_RS22871_0 | The "Section 1207" authority used for this funding expired at the end of FY2010. Congress first provided DOD with "Section 1207" authority in 2005. 109-163 , provided authority for DOD to transfer to the State Department up to $100 million in defense articles, services, training or other support in FY2006 and again in FY2007 to use for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries. FY2010 Section 1207 funding totaled $92.2 million. In a March 20, 2008, letter, DOD requested that Congress double Section 1207 authorized funding to $200 million per year, extend the authority for five fiscal years, and broaden the authority to permit DOD to provide that services or transfer defense articles and funds to the head of any U.S. government department or agency, not just the Department of State. Section 1207 of the conference version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 ( P.L. As noted above, the Administration requested $100 million for the CCF in the FY2011 budget, stating that this would replace funding previously provided under Section 1207 authority. Pointing to the Secretary of Defense's April 15, 2008, testimony at a HASC hearing that Section 1207 authority "is primarily for bringing civilian expertise to operate alongside or in place of our armed forces," SASC stated that the legislative intent of Section 1207 authority was broader, and was meant "to enable the Secretary of Defense to support the provision by the Secretary of State of reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country." In action on the FY2010 defense authorization and appropriations acts, and the FY2010 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related appropriations act, armed services authorizers, defense appropriators, and foreign operations appropriators expressed the sense that the State Department should have responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction funding. | Now expired, Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163) provided authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to transfer to the State Department up to $100 million per fiscal year in defense articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries. From FY2006 through FY2010, Section 1207 funded $445.2 million in projects in 23 countries on a bilateral basis and in five countries on a multilateral basis (including one also funded bilaterally). Section 1207 authority expired on September 30, 2010, at the end of FY2010.
Under Section 1207, the Secretary of Defense was authorized to "provide services to, and transfer defense articles and funds to, the Secretary of State for the purpose of facilitating the provision by the Secretary of State of reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country." Congress capped the value of these services, articles, and funds at $100 million.
Congress never intended Section 1207 to be a permanent authority. Congressional authorizers and appropriators expressed in several documents that Section 1207 authority was temporary, and indicated that such funding is better provided under the State Department budget.
This report provides background and data on Section 1207 authority and funding that may be useful for possible debate in the 112th Congress regarding the appropriate roles and funding mechanisms for DOD, the State Department, and other U.S. agencies in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and in stabilization and reconstruction operations. It also may serve as background for possible consideration of the Obama Administration proposal for a joint State-DOD Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), as some of the GSCF's proposed uses overlap with Section 1207 purposes.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44918 | crs_R44918_0 | For example, in response to the financial turmoil beginning in 2007, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. It then provides a brief overview of each federal financial regulatory agency. Finally, the report discusses other entities that play a role in financial regulation—interagency bodies, state regulators, and international standards. Resolution. Goals of Regulation
Financial regulation is primarily intended to achieve the following underlying policy outcomes:
Market Efficiency and Integrity . Capital Formation and Access to Credit . Illicit Activity Prevent ion . Taxpayer Protection. Financial regulation is to maintain financial stability through preventative and palliative measures that mitigate systemic risk. As a result, when taking any action, regulators balance the tradeoffs between their various goals. Types of Regulation
The types of regulation applied to market participants are diverse and vary by regulator, but can be clustered in a few categories for analytical ease:
Prudential . Disclosure is used to achieve the goals of consumer and investor protection, as well as market efficiency and integrity. Competition . The primary federal regulator for
national banks and thrifts (also known as savings and loans) is the OCC, their chartering authority; state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System is the Federal Reserve; state-chartered thrifts and banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System is the FDIC; foreign banks operating in the United States is the Fed or OCC, depending on the type; credit unions—if federally chartered or federally insured—is the National Credit Union Administration, which administers a deposit insurance fund separate from the FDIC's. Although these agencies are the banks' institution-based regulators, banks are also subject to CFPB regulation for consumer protection, and to the extent that banks are participants in securities or derivatives markets, those activities are also subject to regulation by the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the CFTC). Regulatory jurisdiction over various aspects of the Treasury market is fragmented across multiple regulators. 110-289 , 122 Stat. Following another farming crisis, it was made an "arm's length" regulator with increased rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement powers by the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985 ( P.L. For example, the FCA regulates these institutions for safety and soundness, through capital requirements. Registration is another area where states play a role. Given the size and significance of the U.S. financial system, U.S. policymakers are generally viewed as playing a substantial role in setting these standards. There is significant overlap between the FSB's regulatory reform agenda and the Dodd-Frank Act. Changes to Regulatory Structure Since 2008
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 created four new federal entities related to financial regulation—the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), Office of Financial Research (OFR), Federal Insurance Office (FIO), and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and eliminated the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB). | The financial regulatory system has been described as fragmented, with multiple overlapping regulators and a dual state-federal regulatory system. The system evolved piecemeal, punctuated by major changes in response to various historical financial crises. The most recent financial crisis also resulted in changes to the regulatory system through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA; P.L. 110-289). To address the fragmented nature of the system, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a council of regulators and experts chaired by the Treasury Secretary.
At the federal level, regulators can be clustered in the following areas:
Depository regulators—Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Reserve for banks; and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) for credit unions; Securities markets regulators—Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); Government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) regulators—Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), created by HERA, and Farm Credit Administration (FCA); and Consumer protection regulator—Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), created by the Dodd-Frank Act.
These regulators regulate financial institutions, markets, and products using licensing, registration, rulemaking, supervisory, enforcement, and resolution powers.
Other entities that play a role in financial regulation are interagency bodies, state regulators, and international regulatory fora. Notably, federal regulators generally play a secondary role in insurance markets.
Financial regulation aims to achieve diverse goals, which vary from regulator to regulator:
market efficiency and integrity, consumer and investor protections, capital formation or access to credit, taxpayer protection, illicit activity prevention, and financial stability.
Policy debate revolves around the tradeoffs between these various goals. Different types of regulation—prudential (safety and soundness), disclosure, standard setting, competition, and price and rate regulations—are used to achieve these goals.
Many observers believe that the structure of the regulatory system influences regulatory outcomes. For that reason, there is ongoing congressional debate about the best way to structure the regulatory system. As background for that debate, this report provides an overview of the U.S. financial regulatory framework. It briefly describes each of the federal financial regulators and the types of institutions they supervise. It also discusses the other entities that play a role in financial regulation. |
crs_R41098 | crs_R41098_0 | Overview
The 111 th Congress took continuing interest in the health of the U.S. research and development (R&D) enterprise and in providing sustained support for federal R&D activities. 112-10 ) by the 112 th Congress on April 15, 2011. On February 1, 2010, President Obama requested $147.696 billion for R&D in FY2011, a 0.2% increase over the enacted FY2010 R&D funding level of $147.353 billion. 110-69 ) and President Bush's American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI). President Obama sought to achieve this objective largely through a 6.6% increase in aggregate funding for the Department of Energy Office of Science, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and Technology's core laboratory research. 110-329 and P.L. 111-8 . Under President Obama's FY2011 budget request, six federal agencies would have received 94.8% of total federal R&D funding: the Department of Defense (DOD), 52.5%; the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (primarily the National Institutes of Health (NIH)), 21.8%; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 7.4%; the Department of Energy (DOE), 7.6%; the National Science Foundation (NSF), 3.8%; and the Department of Agriculture (USDA), 1.7%. In 2007, Congress authorized substantial R&D increases for these agencies under the America COMPETES Act ( P.L. Under President Obama's FY2011 budget request, DOD R&D funding would have been reduced by $3.542 billion, USDA R&D funding would have been cut by $143 million, and DHS R&D would have fallen by $104 million. Three years later, with enacted funding levels for FY2008-FY2010 below those authorized in P.L. FY2011 Appropriations Status
As of the end of the 111 th Congress, no regular appropriations bill had been enacted. Two of the 12 regular appropriations bills had passed the House (the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2011, and the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2011); none had passed the Senate. To provide for continuity of government operations into FY2011, the 111 th and 112 th Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions that provided funding for all agencies until enactment of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 ( P.L. Division A of the act provides FY2011 appropriations for the Department of Defense; Division B provides full-year continuing funding for FY2011 for all other agencies at their FY2010 levels unless other provisions in the act specify otherwise. In the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. FY2010 funding was provided in Division D of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ). The 4.4% increase requested for FY2011 was less than the 7.2% annual growth rate required to achieve a doubling in 10 years. The enacted FY2011 appropriation provided less than the request for each of the six major research programs of the Office of Science. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 112-10 ), which included the Department of the Interior and its agencies. The act provided a total of $802.1 million in R&D funding for DOI, $4.1 million (0.5%) more than in FY2010, and $27.1 million (-3.3%) less than the amount requested by the President. President Obama proposed $679.2 million for USGS R&D in FY2011, an increase of $18.6 million (2.8%) above the estimated FY2010 level. 111-188 specified how much of these funds were to be used to fund R&D. | President Obama requested $147.696 billion for research and development (R&D) in FY2011, a $343 million (0.2%) increase from the estimated FY2010 R&D funding level of $147.353 billion. Congress plays a central role in defining the nation's R&D priorities, especially with respect to two overarching issues: the extent to which the federal R&D investment can grow in the context of increased pressure on discretionary spending and how available funding will be prioritized and allocated. Low or negative growth in the overall R&D investment may require movement of resources across disciplines, programs, or agencies to address priorities.
As of the end of the 111th Congress, no regular appropriations bill had been enacted by Congress. Two of the 12 regular appropriations bills had passed the House (the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2011, and the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2011); none had passed the Senate. To provide for continuity of government operations into FY2011, the 111th and 112th Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions that provided funding for all agencies until enactment of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10) on April 15, 2011. Division A of the act provides FY2011 appropriations for the Department of Defense; Division B provides full-year continuing funding for FY2011 for all other agencies at their FY2010 levels unless other provisions in the act specify otherwise
Under the President's request, six federal agencies would have received 94.8% of total federal R&D spending: the Department of Defense (DOD, 52.5%), Department of Health and Human Services (largely the National Institutes of Health) (21.8%), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (7.4%), Department of Energy (7.6%), National Science Foundation (3.8%), and Department of Agriculture (1.7%). NASA would have received the largest dollar increase for R&D of any agency, $1.700 billion (18.3%) above its FY2010 funding level; DOD would have received the largest reduction in R&D funding, $3.542 billion (4.4%) below its FY2010 level.
President Obama requested increases in the R&D budgets of the three agencies that were targeted for doubling in the America COMPETES Act and its reauthorization, and by President Bush under his American Competitiveness Initiative using FY2006 R&D funding as the baseline. The Department of Energy's Office of Science would have received an increase of $226 million (4.6%), the National Science Foundation an increase of $551 million (8.0%), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology's core research and facilities an increase of $48 million (7.3%). P.L. 112-10 provided less than the FY2010 level and less than the President's request for each of these accounts. In aggregate, funding for these accounts under P.L. 112-10 is less than in FY2010 and less than the President's request.
For the past five years, federal R&D funding and execution has been affected by mechanisms used to complete the annual appropriations process—the year-long continuing resolution for FY2007 (P.L. 110-5) and the combining of multiple regular appropriations bills into the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161), the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117), and P.L. 112-10. Completion of appropriations after the beginning of each fiscal year may cause agencies to delay or cancel some planned R&D and equipment acquisition. |
crs_RL34165 | crs_RL34165_0 | Introduction
After June 12, 2009, households with over-the-air analog-only televisions will no longer be able to receive full-power television service unless they either (1) buy a digital-to-analog converter box to hook up to their analog television set; (2) acquire a digital television or an analog television equipped with a digital tuner; or (3) subscribe to cable, satellite, or telephone company television services, which are expected to provide for the conversion of digital signals to their analog customers. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ), as amended by the DTV Delay Act, directed that on June 12, 2009, over-the-air full-power television broadcasts—which are currently provided by television stations in both analog and digital formats—will become digital only. The preeminent issue for Congress is ensuring that American households are prepared for the transition, thereby minimizing a scenario whereby television sets across the nation "go dark" on June 12, 2009. In total, 971 full-power stations terminated their analog signal on June 12. Although the FCC and many reports in the press indicate that, in general, the digital transition appears to be proceeding relatively smoothly, digital signal reception problems persist for some viewers, particularly in areas where individual stations switched on June 12 from UHF to VHF channels. Digital television technology allows a broadcaster to offer a single program stream of high definition television (HDTV) or, alternatively, multiple video program streams ("multicasts") of standard or enhanced definition television, which provide a lesser quality picture than HDTV, but a generally better picture than analog television. The 109 th Congress acted to establish a digital-to-analog converter box program that will partially subsidize consumer purchases of converter boxes. 109-171 ) directed the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce to provide up to two forty-dollar coupons to requesting U.S. households. According to the statute, as amended by the DTV Delay Act, the coupons are to be issued between January 1, 2008, and July 31, 2009, and must be used within three months after issuance towards the purchase of a stand-alone device used solely for digital-to-analog conversion. 111-5 ) allows expired coupons to be replaced. And finally, will anticipated consumer problems with converter box set-up, antennas, and digital signal reception be adequately addressed? The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 established two grant programs administered by the NTIA designed to assist low-power television stations with the digital transition. | The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171), as amended by the DTV Delay Act, directed that on June 12, 2009, all over-the-air full-power television broadcasts—which were previously provided by television stations in both analog and digital formats—would become digital only. Digital television (DTV) technology allows a broadcaster to offer a single program stream of high definition television (HDTV), or alternatively, multiple video program streams (multicasts). Households with over-the-air analog-only televisions will no longer be able to receive full-power television service unless they either (1) buy a digital-to-analog converter box to hook up to their analog television set; (2) acquire a digital television or an analog television equipped with a digital tuner; or (3) subscribe to cable, satellite, or telephone company television services, which will provide for the conversion of digital signals to their analog customers.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 established a digital-to-analog converter box program—administered by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce—that partially subsidizes consumer purchases of converter boxes. NTIA provides up to two forty-dollar coupons to requesting U.S. households. The coupons are being issued between January 1, 2008, and July 31, 2009, and must be used within 90 days after issuance towards the purchase of a stand-alone device used solely for digital-to-analog conversion. The DTV Delay Act allows expired coupons to be replaced.
The preeminent goal for Congress is ensuring that American households are prepared for the DTV transition deadline, thereby minimizing a scenario where television sets across the nation "go dark." At issue is whether the federal government's current programs and reliance on private sector stakeholders will lead to a successful digital transition with a minimum amount of disruption to American TV households. Specific issues have included whether consumer DTV education and outreach efforts are sufficient, the extent to which digital signal reception and antenna issues could still be a problem for some viewers, and whether the supply of converter boxes will be adequate.
On June 12, 2009, 971 full power television stations terminated their regular analog programming. All other full power stations (about 790 stations) had already voluntarily terminated their analog signal before June 12. Although the FCC and many reports in the press indicate that, in general, the digital transition appears to be proceeding relatively smoothly, digital signal reception problems persist for some viewers, particularly in areas where individual stations switched on June 12 from UHF to VHF channels. |
crs_R40582 | crs_R40582_0 | Drug Trafficking in Mexico
Today Mexico is a major producer and supplier to the U.S. market of heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana and the major transit country for cocaine sold in the United States. A small number of Mexican DTOs control the most significant drug distribution operations along the Southwest border. More than 5,600 people died in drug trafficking violence in Mexico in 2008, more than double the prior year. He called the increased drug violence a threat to the Mexican state and sent thousands of soldiers and federal police to combat cartels in drug trafficking "hot spots." In 2008, the government's crackdown, and rivalries and turf wars among Mexico's DTOs, fueled an escalation in violence throughout the country, including in northern Mexico near the U.S.-Mexico border. Since coming into office in December 2006, President Calderón has deployed some 45,000 troops and 5,000 federal police along the U.S.-Mexico border and throughout the country's interior. The seven major cartels that once controlled Mexico have reconfigured. It has become independent of the Sinaloa federation and has grown to be one of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, still controlling large areas of the country. The Mexican State v. The DTOs
The growth and dramatic character of the violence, the targeting of civil and law enforcement officials, and the direct battle with police and military units, have led some observers to question the strength of the Mexican government, even characterizing it as potentially a "failing" state. Ciudad Juárez is a strategic location for both drugs and weapons trafficking and it has emerged as a key battleground. President Calderón has demonstrated an unmatched willingness to collaborate with the United States on joint counterdrug measures. He has mobilized tens of thousands of military troops to confront the DTOs in drug trafficking "hotspots." Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano noted in March 2009 congressional testimony that the United States has a significant security stake in helping Mexico in its efforts against the drug cartels and organized crime, with three major roles to play: providing assistance to Mexico to defeat the cartels and suppress the flare-up of violence in Mexico; taking action on the U.S. side of the border to cripple smuggling enterprises; and guarding against and preparing for the possible spillover of violence into the United States. The Mérida Initiative79
The United States and Mexico issued a joint statement on October 22, 2007, announcing a multi-year plan for $1.4 billion in U.S. assistance to combat drug trafficking and other criminal organizations in Mexico and Central America. To date Congress has appropriated a total of $700 million for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative: with $352 million in FY2008 supplemental assistance and $48 million in FY2009 bridge funds, both funded by P.L. Implementation of Mérida
The growth and dramatic character of the violence in Mexico and the potential threat for spillover north of the border has focused concern on the pace of the implementation of Mérida aid in both countries. Later in December, the governments of Mexico and the United States met to coordinate implementation of the Mérida Initiative through a cabinet-level High Level group reflecting the urgency on both sides of the border to address the growing violence in Mexico. Hearings on Increased Drug Violence in the 111th Congress
This compilation of selected hearings, prepared by [author name scrubbed], Information Research Specialist with the Knowledge Services Group of CRS, focuses on increasing violence in Mexico as well as U.S. foreign assistance and border security programs. House
U.S. Congress. Merida Initiative . Law Enforcement Responses to Mexican Drug Cartels . | Drug-related violence in Mexico has spiked in recent years as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have competed for control of smuggling routes into the United States. Drug trafficking issues are prominent in Mexico because the country has for at least four decades been among the most important producers and suppliers of heroin, marijuana and (later) methamphetamine to the U.S. market. Today it is the leading source of all three drugs and is now the leading transit country for cocaine coming from South America to the United States. Although previous Mexican governments had accommodated some drug trafficking in the country, when President Felipe Calderón came into office in December 2006 he made battling the Mexican drug trafficking organizations a top priority. He has raised spending on security and sent thousands of troops and federal police to combat the DTOs in states along the U.S.-Mexico border and throughout the country. In response to the government's crackdown, the DTOs have responded with escalating violence.
In recent years, drug trafficking violence in Mexico has claimed thousands of lives and reached a level of intensity and ferocity that has exceeded previous periods of drug-related violence. The government's intensified campaign against the DTOs resulted in changes in the structure of these criminal organizations. The seven major DTOs in Mexico have reconfigured. The fracturing of some of the most powerful drug trafficking syndicates and the reemergence of once powerful DTOs have led to bloody conflict within and among the DTOs. Today a small number of DTOs control the lucrative drug trafficking corridors through which drugs flow north from Mexico into the United States and high-powered firearms and cash flow south fueling the narcotics trade.
President Calderón has demonstrated what has been characterized as an unprecedented willingness to cooperate with the United States on counterdrug measures. In October 2007, both countries announced the Mérida Initiative to combat drug trafficking, gangs and organized crime in Mexico and Central America. To date, the U.S. Congress has appropriated a total of $700 million for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative. The program, which combines counternarcotics equipment and training with rule of law and justice reform efforts, is still in its initial stages of implementation.
The scope of the drug violence and its location—much of it in northern Mexico near the U.S.-Mexico border—has been the subject of intense interest in Congress. The 111th Congress has held more than a dozen hearings dealing with the increased violence in Mexico as well as U.S. foreign assistance and border security efforts. This report examines the causes for the escalation of the violence in Mexico. It provides a brief overview of Mexico's counterdrug efforts, a description of the major DTOs, the causes and trends in the violence, the Calderón government's efforts to crackdown on the DTOs, and the objectives and implementation of the Mérida Initiative as a response to the violence in Mexico. For related information about Mexico and the Mérida Initiative, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, and CRS Report R40135, Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues. For more information on international drug policy, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug Control Policy. |
crs_RL32713 | crs_RL32713_0 | Introduction
Persons of African descent, commonly referred to as "Afro-Latinos," along with women and indigenous populations, are among the poorest and most marginalized groups in Latin America. The term "Afro-Latinos," as used within the international development community and the U.S. government, generally refers to Afro-descendant populations in the Spanish-and Portuguese-speaking nations of Latin America. Improvement in the status of Afro-Latinos could be difficult and internally contentious, however, depending on the size and circumstances of the Afro-descendant populations in each country. Those proponents disagree, however, as to whether U.S. foreign aid should be specifically targeted towards Afro-Latinos (as it has been in the case of some indigenous peoples), or whether it should continue to be distributed broadly through programs aimed at helping all marginalized populations. U.S. Foreign Assistance and Afro-Latinos
Assisting Afro-Latinos has never been a primary U.S. foreign policy objective. Prior Legislative Activity
Congress has expressed some concern in recent years about the status of Afro-Latinos in Latin America. Some Members of Congress also expressed specific concerns about the situation of Afro-Colombians affected by the conflict in Colombia. Legislation in the 110th Congress
In the 110 th Congress, there have been several bills with provisions related to Afro-Latinos. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2008 ( H.R. 2764 / P.L. 110 - 161 ) required the State Department to certify that the Colombian military is not violating the land and property rights of Afro-Colombians or the indigenous. It also prohibited the use of Andean Counterdrug funds for investment in oil palm development if it causes displacement or environmental damage (as it has in many Afro-Colombian communities). In the explanatory statement to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, the conferees stipulate that up to $15 million in alternative development assistance to Colombia may be provided to Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities. On July 11, 2007, the House passed H.Res. 426 (McGovern), recognizing 2007 as the year of the rights of internally displaced persons (including Afro-Colombians) in Colombia and offering U.S. support to programs that seek to assist and protect them. On September 9, 2008, the House passed (Engel), supporting the values and goals of the "Joint Action Plan Between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the United States of America to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality," which was signed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Brazilian Minister of Racial Integration Edson Santos in March 2008. In addition to considering legislation with provisions related to Afro-Latinos, the 110 th Congress discussed the situation of Afro-Colombians during its consideration of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. | The 110th Congress maintained an interest in the situation of Afro-Latinos in Latin America, particularly the plight of Afro-Colombians affected by the armed conflict in Colombia. In recent years, people of African descent in the Spanish-and Portuguese-speaking nations of Latin America—also known as "Afro-Latinos"—have been pushing for increased rights and representation. Afro-Latinos comprise some 150 million of the region's 540 million total population, and, along with women and indigenous populations, are among the poorest, most marginalized groups in the region. Afro-Latinos have formed groups that, with the help of international organizations, are seeking political representation, human rights protection, land rights, and greater social and economic opportunities. Improvement in the status of Afro-Latinos could be difficult and contentious, however, depending on the circumstances of the Afro-descendant populations in each country.
Assisting Afro-Latinos has never been a primary U.S. foreign policy objective, although a number of U.S. aid programs benefit Afro-Latinos. While some foreign aid is specifically targeted towards Afro-Latinos, most is distributed broadly through programs aimed at helping all marginalized populations. Some Members support increasing U.S. assistance to Afro-Latinos, while others resist, particularly given the limited amount of development assistance available for Latin America.
There was legislative action on several bills in the 110th Congress with provisions related to Afro-Latinos. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2008 (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) required the State Department to certify that the Colombian military is not violating the land and property rights of Afro-Colombians or the indigenous. It also prohibited the use of Andean Counterdrug funds for investment in oil palm development if it causes displacement or environmental damage (as it has in many Afro-Colombian communities). In the explanatory statement to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, the conferees stipulated that up to $15 million in alternative development assistance to Colombia may be provided to Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities. On July 11, 2007, the House passed H.Res. 426 (McGovern), recognizing 2007 as the year of the rights of internally displaced persons (including Afro-Colombians) in Colombia and offering U.S. support to programs that assist and protect them. On September 9, 2008, the House passed (Engel), supporting the values and goals of the "Joint Action Plan Between the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the United States of America to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality," which was signed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Brazilian Minister of Racial Integration Edson Santos in March 2008.
In addition, the 110th Congress discussed the situation of Afro-Colombians during its consideration of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. As in the past, the 111th Congress is likely to continue to consider legislative provisions relevant to the circumstances of Afro-Latinos. |
crs_RS21324 | crs_RS21324_0 | 318 Commended the President for his actions taken against Iraq and called for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the freezing of Iraqi assets, the cessation of all armsshipments to Iraq, and the imposition of sanctions against Iraq. Passed in the Senate: August 2, 1990
Public Laws
P.L. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution . Urged thePresident to take "appropriate action in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, tobring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations." For a complete list of 108th legislation related to Iraq that has been proposed in either the House or the Senate, please see Iraq - U.S. | This report is a compilation of legislation on Iraq from 1990 to the present. The list is composed of resolutions and public laws relating to military action ordiplomatic pressure to be taken against Iraq. (1) Thelist does not include foreign aid appropriations bills passed since FY1994 that deny U.S. funds to any nation inviolation of the United Nations sanctionsregime against Iraq. (2)
Also, measures that were not passed only in either the House or the Senate are not included (with the exceptionof the proposals in the 108th Congress and several relevant concurrentand joint resolutions from previous Congresses ). For a more in-depth analysis of U.S. action against Iraq, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq, Compliance, Sanctions and U.S. Policy. This report will beupdated periodically. |
crs_RS21477 | crs_RS21477_0 | The Earned Income Tax Credit1
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible workers earning relatively low wages. An EITC-eligible family may also receive a portion of the credit in the form of advanced payments. Approximately 83% of the tax returns had a reduction or disallowance of the EITC as a result of the manual review. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. The American Recovery and Relief Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. While the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240 ) made the EGTRRA provisions for marriage penalty relief permanent, the increase in marriage penalty relief to $5,000 (indexed for inflation) made by ARRA was extended for only five years (the expansion will sunset on December 31, 2017). 107-16 ) made several changes to the EITC that were scheduled to expire on December 31,2010. Changes to the EITC that were scheduled to expire include
changing the definition of earned income for the EITC so that it does not include nontaxable employee compensation; eliminating the reduction in the EITC for the alternative minimum tax (AMT); and simplifying the calculation of the credit through use of AGI rather than modified AGI. The ARRA created the category for families with three or more children, with a credit rate of 45%, for tax years 2009 and 2010 only. The ARRA also increased the phase-in amount for married couples filing joint tax returns so that it is $5,000 higher than for unmarried taxpayers in tax year 2009, and indexed for inflation beginning in tax year 2010. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-312 ) extended the ARRA provisions for two years (through 2012). 112-240 ) extended the ARRA provisions for five years (through tax year 2017). | The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC or EIC) began in 1975 as a temporary program to return a portion of the Social Security taxes paid by lower-income taxpayers, and was made permanent in 1978. In the 1990s, the program was transformed into a major component of federal efforts to reduce poverty, and is now the largest anti-poverty entitlement program. Tax year 2009 data show a total EITC amount of $59.7 billion for 27.2 million tax returns, yielding an average tax credit of $2,195. Most of the EITC (87.1%) was received as a refund (EITC exceeded tax liability) by low-income workers.
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-116) made several changes to the credit, including simplifying the definition of earned income to reflect only compensation included in gross income; basing the phase-out of the credit on adjusted gross income (AGI) instead of expanded (or modified) gross income; and eliminating the reduction in the EITC for the alternative minimum tax (AMT).
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) created the category for families with three or more children, with a credit rate of 45%, for tax years 2009 and 2010 only. The ARRA also increased the phase-in amount for married couples filing joint tax returns so that it is $5,000 higher than for unmarried taxpayers in tax year 2009, and $5,010 in tax year 2010.
The changes to the credit made by EGTRRA and ARRA were set to expire on December 31, 2010. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) extended the EGTRRA and ARRA provisions for two years (through 2012).
The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) permanently extended the EGTRAA provisions, but extended the ARRA provisions for only five years. The expiration of the ARRA provisions for the EITC is one of the legislative issues for Congress.
This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants. |
crs_R45129 | crs_R45129_0 | When deriving meaning from the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has relied on certain "methods" or "modes" of interpretation—that is, ways of figuring out a particular meaning of a provision within the Constitution. This report broadly describes the most common modes of constitutional interpretation; discusses examples of Supreme Court decisions that demonstrate the application of these methods; and provides a general overview of the various arguments in support of, and in opposition to, the use of such methods by the Court. Textualism
Textualism is a mode of legal interpretation that focuses on the plain meaning of the text of a legal document. Textualism usually emphasizes how the terms in the Constitution would be understood by people at the time they were ratified, as well as the context in which those terms appear. Textualists usually believe there is an objective meaning of the text, and they do not typically inquire into questions regarding the intent of the drafters, adopters, or ratifiers of the Constitution and its amendments when deriving meaning from the text. Original Meaning
Whereas textualist approaches to constitutional interpretation focus solely on the text of the document, originalist approaches consider the meaning of the Constitution as understood by at least some segment of the populace at the time of the Founding. Originalists, however, generally agree that the Constitution's text had an "objectively identifiable" or public meaning at the time of the Founding that has not changed over time, and the task of judges and Justices (and other responsible interpreters) is to construct this original meaning. Judicial Precedent
The most commonly cited source of constitutional meaning is the Supreme Court's prior decisions on questions of constitutional law. For most, if not all Justices, judicial precedent provides possible principles, rules, or standards to govern judicial decisions in future cases with arguably similar facts. That is, pragmatist approaches often involve the Court weighing or balancing the probable practical consequences of one interpretation of the Constitution against other interpretations. One flavor of pragmatism weighs the future costs and benefits of an interpretation to society or the political branches, selecting the interpretation that may lead to the perceived best outcome. Using another type of pragmatist approach, a court might consider the extent to which the judiciary could play a constructive role in deciding a question of constitutional law. . . without due process of law." National Identity or "National Ethos"
Another approach to interpretation that is closely related to but conceptually distinct from moral reasoning is judicial reasoning that relies on the concept of a "national ethos." Structuralism
One of the most common modes of constitutional interpretation is based on the structure of the Constitution. Indeed, drawing inferences from the design of the Constitution gives rise to some of the most important relationships that everyone agrees the Constitution establishes—the relationships among the three branches of the federal government (commonly called separation of powers or checks and balances); the relationship between the federal and state governments (known as federalism); and the relationship between the government and the people. Prior decisions of the political branches, particularly their long-established, historical practices, are an important source of constitutional meaning to many judges, academics, and lawyers. Indeed, courts have viewed historical practices as a source of the Constitution's meaning in cases involving questions about the separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights, particularly when the text provides no clear answer. | When exercising its power to review the constitutionality of governmental action, the Supreme Court has relied on certain "methods" or "modes" of interpretation—that is, ways of figuring out a particular meaning of a provision within the Constitution. This report broadly describes the most common modes of constitutional interpretation; discusses examples of Supreme Court decisions that demonstrate the application of these methods; and provides a general overview of the various arguments in support of, and in opposition to, the use of such methods of constitutional interpretation.
Textualism. Textualism is a mode of interpretation that focuses on the plain meaning of the text of a legal document. Textualism usually emphasizes how the terms in the Constitution would be understood by people at the time they were ratified, as well as the context in which those terms appear. Textualists usually believe there is an objective meaning of the text, and they do not typically inquire into questions regarding the intent of the drafters, adopters, or ratifiers of the Constitution and its amendments when deriving meaning from the text.
Original Meaning. Whereas textualist approaches to constitutional interpretation focus solely on the text of the document, originalist approaches consider the meaning of the Constitution as understood by at least some segment of the populace at the time of the Founding. Originalists generally agree that the Constitution's text had an "objectively identifiable" or public meaning at the time of the Founding that has not changed over time, and the task of judges and Justices (and other responsible interpreters) is to construct this original meaning.
Judicial Precedent. The most commonly cited source of constitutional meaning is the Supreme Court's prior decisions on questions of constitutional law. For most, if not all Justices, judicial precedent provides possible principles, rules, or standards to govern judicial decisions in future cases with arguably similar facts.
Pragmatism. Pragmatist approaches often involve the Court weighing or balancing the probable practical consequences of one interpretation of the Constitution against other interpretations. One flavor of pragmatism weighs the future costs and benefits of an interpretation to society or the political branches, selecting the interpretation that may lead to the perceived best outcome. Under another type of pragmatist approach, a court might consider the extent to which the judiciary could play a constructive role in deciding a question of constitutional law.
Moral Reasoning. This approach argues that certain moral concepts or ideals underlie some terms in the text of the Constitution (e.g., "equal protection" or "due process of law"), and that these concepts should inform judges' interpretations of the Constitution.
National Identity (or "Ethos"). Judicial reasoning occasionally relies on the concept of a "national ethos," which draws upon the distinct character and values of the American national identity and the nation's institutions in order to elaborate on the Constitution's meaning.
Structuralism. Another mode of constitutional interpretation draws inferences from the design of the Constitution: the relationships among the three branches of the federal government (commonly called separation of powers); the relationship between the federal and state governments (known as federalism); and the relationship between the government and the people.
Historical Practices. Prior decisions of the political branches, particularly their long-established, historical practices, are an important source of constitutional meaning. Courts have viewed historical practices as a source of the Constitution's meaning in cases involving questions about the separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights, particularly when the text provides no clear answer. |
crs_RS22521 | crs_RS22521_0 | Introduction
On April 12, 2006, U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman and Peruvian Minister of Foreign Trade and Tourism Alfredo Ferrero Diez Canseco signed the proposed U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA). 110 - 138 on December 14, 2007. It went into effect February 1, 2009. Incorporation of New Trade Policy for America into PTPA Labor Provisions
On May 10, 2007, after much negotiation, Congress and the Administration announced a "New Trade Policy for America." The Administration released the "final text" of the Peru FTA incorporating these concepts on June 25, 2007. Weaknesses of the Peru TPA Labor Provisions
Despite Recent Progress, Peru's Labor Laws and Enforcement Have Been Weak
Critics argue that, with enforceable ILO core labor standards in the language of the agreement, the main issues at this point are Peru's adoption of new labor laws and enforceability. ILO Core Labor Standard Language and U.S. Laws
Before the new PTPA language was released, some observers noted that the United States has ratified only two ILO conventions, while Peru has ratified all eight. The House passed the Peru TPA implementing legislation, H.R. 3688 , on November 8, 2007, by a vote of 285 to 132; the Senate passed it on December 4 by a vote of 77 to 18; and President Bush signed it into law as P.L. | On April 12, 2006, the United States and Peru signed the proposed U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA). On June 25, 2007, the Administration released a revised text with new labor, environment, and other provisions. This "final text" language reflected a Congress-Administration "New Trade Policy for America" announced on May 10 that incorporated key Democratic priorities. Supporters of the agreement argue that Peru has ratified all eight International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards and that the PTPA would reinforce Peru's labor reform measures of recent years. Critics are concerned about the potential for enforcement of the standards. Peru PTA implementing legislation (H.R. 3688) passed the House on November 8, 2007, by a vote of 285 to 132; passed the Senate on December 4 by a vote of 77 to 18; and was signed by President Bush on December 14 (P.L. 110-138). It went into effect on February 1, 2009. See also CRS Report RL34108, U.S.-Peru Economic Relations and the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33864, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Renewal: Core Labor Standards Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34758 | crs_RL34758_0 | Pursuant to statutory requirements and presidential directives, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an agency located within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued such a plan in March 2008 with publication of the National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF is the end product of a long history. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the structure for responding to emergencies and disasters resided in at least 5 separate plans. This report does not offer an exhaustive overview of these authorities. In December 2004, through the primary guidance and authorization of the Stafford Act, the Homeland Security Act, and HSPD-5, DHS issued a successor to the Federal Response Plan , which was entitled the National Response Plan (NRP). The problems that arose from Hurricane Katrina prompted numerous studies. In response to the Post-Katrina legislation and perceived problems with the implementation of the NRP, DHS revised the plan and issued the NRF. The section that follows discusses how some of the changes in the NRF have addressed these criticisms. The NRF is also shorter. National Versus Federal Focus
Despite efforts to make the NRP a nationwide response plan, the NRP was widely seen as not sufficiently national in its focus because it emphasized federal preparedness and response. Concluding Observations
In response to directives from Congress and the President, the Bush Administration issued the NRF to establish a new approach to coordinate federal and nonfederal entities in times of emergencies and major disasters. | In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and President Bush moved to consolidate numerous federal emergency plans into a single, unified national response plan. The end product of these efforts was the National Response Plan (NRP), which established broad lines of authority for agencies responding to emergencies and major disasters.
Perceived problems with the implementation of the NRP during Hurricane Katrina led Congress to enact the Post-Katrina Management Reform Act (P.L. 109-295) to integrate preparedness and response authorities. The legislation directed DHS to issue a successor plan to the NRP entitled the National Response Framework (NRF). Implemented in March 2008, the NRF establishes a new approach to coordinating federal and nonfederal resources and entities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) maintains that the NRF is an improvement over the NRP. Some, however, assert that the NRF is not an improvement because it does not fully address the problems and challenges associated with the NRP.
This report discusses how national response planning documents have evolved over time and describes the authorities that shape the NRF. Several issue areas that might be examined for potential lawmaking and oversight concerning the NRF are also highlighted.
This report will be updated as significant legislative or administrative changes occur. |
crs_RS20837 | crs_RS20837_0 | The rules governing howchild supportcollections are distributed among families, the state, and the federal government have changed substantially. In contrast,under P.L.104-193 , payments to families who leave TANF are more generous. If a custodial parent assigned her orhis child support rights to the state before October 1, 1997, the parent had to assign all support rights for supportpayments (bothcurrent and past-due) that accrued to the family during the period of AFDC receipt, as well as payments that hadaccrued before theirapplication for AFDC benefits. These distribution rules do not apply to child support collections obtained by intercepting federal income tax refunds. To reiterate, effective October 1, 2000, the state must treat any support arrearages collected on behalf of a former welfare family,except for those collected through the federal income tax offset program, as accruing in the following order: (1)to the period after thefamily stopped receiving cash assistance, (2) to the period before the family received cash assistance, and (3) to theperiod while thefamily was receiving cash assistance. The result of these child support distribution changes is that states are nowrequired to pay ahigher fraction of child support collections on arrearages to families that have left welfare by making these paymentsto families first(before the state and federal government). In the 108th Congress, H.R. 4737 as passed by the House in the107th Congress. | P.L. 104-193, the 1996 welfare reform law, substantively changed the rules governinghow child support collections are distributed among families, states, and the federal government. The general rulesin effect as ofOctober 1, 2000 are that child support collected during the time a family receives cash welfare belongs to the state;current childsupport and arrearages (past-due payments) that are owed to a family that is no longer receiving welfare belongsto the family; andchild support owed to a family that never received welfare belongs to the family. This is referred to as the "familiesfirst" childsupport distribution policy. (These "families first" distribution rules do not apply to child support collections madeby interceptingfederal income tax refunds.) Many policymakers contend that Congress should simplify the child supportdistribution system whichcurrently requires the tracking of six categories of arrearage payments to properly pay custodial parents. Legislationthat includedprovisions to simplify child support distribution procedures and provide more of the child support collected tocustodial parents(rather than the government) was passed by the House in the 106th and 107th Congresses, but not by the Senate. Similar legislation hasbeen reintroduced as part of the welfare reauthorization measure in the 108th Congress. This reportwill be updated as needed toreflect legislative activity. |
crs_RL34278 | crs_RL34278_0 | Most Recent Developments
During the first session of the 110 th Congress, the Administration requested $196.5 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, including $189.3 billion for military operations, $6.9 billion for international affairs, and $325 million for other purposes. Through the end of December, 2007, Congress had approved $86.8 billion of the total requested for defense and about $1.5 billion of the amount requested for international affairs. Congress began to consider FY2008 supplemental appropriations in earnest in the fall of 2007. Review of Congressional Action on FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Through December 2007
Administration Request
The Administration submitted requests for FY2008 emergency supplemental appropriations in three blocks. The bill provided $99.5 billion for the Department of Defense, $6.1 billion for international affairs, and $14.5 billion for domestic programs (for a full discussion, see CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], updated July 2, 2007). At the end of September, Congress included $5.2 billion in emergency funding for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles (most of the mount requested in July) in a provision attached to the first FY2008 continuing resolution, H.J.Res. 52 , P.L. 110-92 , that the President signed on September 29, 2007. On November 8, 2007, the House and Senate approved a conference agreement on the FY2008 defense appropriations bill, H.R. 110-116 , on November 13. The bill also provided an additional $11.6 billion in emergency funding for MRAP vehicles. 2340 , a substitute offered by Senator McConnell, to provide $70 billion for the Defense Department without requiring withdrawal from Iraq. 110-161 , on December 26, 2007. These amounts were in addition to $27.4 billion for the Army and $4.8 billion for the Marine Corps in the regular FY2008 Defense Appropriations Act ( P.L. Supplemental Funding for International Affairs in the Final Consolidated Appropriations Bill
The FY2008 state department, foreign operations appropriations bill is one of 11 regular FY2008 appropriations bills that were incorporated into the consolidated appropriations act, H.R. 2764 , P.L. This leaves $5.4 billion of the request still to be considered. Iraq Policy Provisions in the House-Passed Bridge Fund, H.R. 4156 –
Stated the sense of Congress that the war in Iraq should end as quickly and safely as possible and troops brought home; Extended prohibitions on the use of torture by Defense Department personnel to other government agencies; Prohibited the use of funds in the bill to deploy any unit abroad unless the President certifies 15 days in advance that the unit is "fully mission capable;" Required the President within 30 days to begin an immediate and orderly redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq; Stated that the withdrawal from Iraq should be accompanied by a comprehensive strategy to work with neighbors and the international community to bring stability to Iraq; Set December 15, 2008, as a goal for completing the transition of U.S. armed forces to a limited presence, though the date is not a firm deadline; Restricted missions after the transition to protecting U.S. facilities, armed forces, and civilians; providing limited training and related assistance to Iraqi security forces; and engaging in targeted counter-terrorism operations against al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq; Required quarterly reports beginning February 1, 2008, on plans to achieve the transition of the U.S. mission in Iraq; Said that congressional consideration of additional funding shall not begin until the first quarterly report on the transition of U.S. forces is submitted; Required by February 15, 2008, a comprehensive regional stability plan for the Middle East; Required additional quarterly reports, beginning on January 15, 2008 and continuing through the remainder of the fiscal year, that would establish performance measures for military and political stability in Iraq and specify a timetable for achieving the goals. By a voter of 24-71, with 60 votes required, the Senate refused to approve the measure, and it was then withdrawn. The request included $141.7 billion for military operations abroad, $3.3 billion in emergency funds for international affairs programs, and $325 million in emergency funding for other agencies, including the Department of Energy for counter-proliferation programs, the Coast Guard, and the Department of Justice. 3222 , P.L. | During the 1st session of the 110th Congress, in calendar year 2007, the Administration requested emergency FY2008 supplemental appropriations of $196.5 billion to cover costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, for war-related and other international affairs programs, and for some other activities. The request included $189.3 billion for the Department of Defense, $6.9 billion for international affairs, and $325 million for other agencies.
Through the end of December 2007, Congress provided $86.8 billion in emergency funds for the Defense Department and $2.4 billion for international affairs, though only $1.5 billion of that is now being counted against the Administration request. These amounts were included in threebills –
The first FY2008 continuing resolution, H.J.Res. 52, P.L. 110-92, enacted on September 29, 2007, included $5.2 billion in emergency funding for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles; The regular FY2008 defense appropriations act, H.R. 3222, P.L. 110-116, enacted on November 13, 2007, provided $11.6 billion more in emergency funding for MRAPs; The FY2008 consolidated appropriations act, H.R. 2764, P.L. 110-161, enacted on December 26, 2007, included $70 billion in emergency funding for defense and $2.4 billion for international affairs, of which $1.5 billion is allocated to requested programs.
Approval of these measures left unresolved the status of $102.5 billion in FY2008 emergency funding for the Department of Defense, $5.4 billion for international affairs, and somewhat under $300 million for other programs. Congress is expected to consider these amounts in a second FY2008 supplemental appropriations bill in the spring of 2008. For congressional action on that measure, see CRS Report RL34451, FY2008 Spring Supplemental Appropriations and FY2009 Bridge Appropriations for Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes (P.L. 110-252), by [author name scrubbed] et al.
Through the fall of 2007, congressional action on supplemental FY2008 funding was embroiled in the ongoing debate over Iraq policy. Initially, in mid-November, the House approved a bill, H.R. 4156, providing $50 billion for military operations, but the bill required that troop withdrawals from Iraq begin within sixty days and that the President prepare a plan for withdrawing most troops by December 2008. That bill failed when the Senate refused to close debate. In mid-December, the initial House-passed consolidated appropriations bill included $31 billion for military operations, but prohibited use those funds in Iraq except for force protection. The Senate took up that bill and substituted a measure providing $70 billion without conditions. The House then approved the Senate bill, which became law.
This CRS report reviews congressional action on FY2008 supplemental appropriations through December 2007. It will not be updated. |
crs_RL33386 | crs_RL33386_0 | Introduction
Under federal law, an array of civil rights statutes is available to protect individuals from discrimination. This report provides a brief overview of selected federal civil rights statutes, as well as information about other CRS products that discuss these laws. Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974
The Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA) prohibits discrimination in educational opportunities on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin. Specifically, with regard to civil rights laws, the act applies Title VII of the CRA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Rehabilitation Act to the legislative branch. | Under federal law, an array of civil rights statutes is available to protect individuals from discrimination. This report provides a brief summary of selected federal civil rights statutes, including the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Fair Housing Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Rehabilitation Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, the Age Discrimination Act, the Civil Service Reform Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, the Congressional Accountability Act, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, and the Reconstruction Statutes. |
crs_R41612 | crs_R41612_0 | In 2009, due to the global food price crisis of 2007-2008, and the ongoing global economic recession, global hunger hit a historic high level. In June 2009, the Obama Administration pledged to provide $3.5 billion over three years (FY2010 to FY2012) for a new global hunger and food security initiative, and in May 2010, it launched the Feed the Future initiative. Congress plays a central role in funding and oversight of agricultural development programs, which are administered by several U.S. agencies and international organizations, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank. The vast majority of the world's undernourished live in developing countries. In July 2009 at the G8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy, President Obama pledged to provide at least $3.5 billion over three years (FY2010 to FY2012) to promote global agricultural development, improved nutrition and food security. The G8 summit also committed the G8 and other participants at the summit to five principles for a food security initiative:
supporting comprehensive strategies, investment through country-owned plans, improving stronger coordination among donors, leveraging effective multilateral institutions, and delivering on sustained and accountable commitments. The Obama Administration's Feed the Future Initiative
On September 28, 2009, the U.S. State Department, which has been the lead coordinating agency of the Administration's global hunger and food security initiative, issued a Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative (GHFSI) Consultation Document outlining the priorities and strategy for the Administration's global food security initiative. According to the FtF Guide, the initiative builds on the five principles for sustainable food security first articulated at L'Aquila and endorsed at the 2009 World Summit on Food Security in Rome. Feed the Future Focus Countries
Currently the FtF initiative is focusing on 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean ( Table 1 ). FtF investments will take place in two phases, depending on the extent that country investment plans (CIPs) have been developed in a given host country. Funding for Food Security
The Administration's FY2011 budget request includes $1.64 billion for FtF activities, which is about 3% of the total international affairs (Function 150) budget request. The FY2011 request for the FtF is about 40% greater than the estimated FY2010 allocation, with the increase largely the result of $408 million requested in FY2011 for contribution to a newly created multilateral trust fund for global food security established at the World Bank. The Administration's FY2011 budget request for FtF represents only a portion of foreign assistance requested for food and agriculture activities. Separately, for FY2011, the Administration is also requesting an additional $4.2 billion for humanitarian and emergency assistance, which includes $1.690 billion for Food for Peace Title II emergency and non-emergency food aid; $1.605 billion for Migration and Refugee Assistance; $861 million for International Disaster Assistance; and $45 million for Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance. A significant portion of these programs include activities related to food security and agricultural development. The primary objective of the QDDR was to develop a whole-of-government approach to U.S. development policy. Selected Issues for Congress
The 112 th Congress may be faced with several issues and policy options regarding agricultural development, global food security, food aid, and U.S. foreign aid reform. The current fiscal situation and the shift in congressional leadership in the House, may result in additional debate and discussion about the Administration's priorities and funding requests related to food security and agricultural development. This has resulted in a weaker institutional capacity of partner institutions in developing countries. | The global food price crisis of 2007-2008 and the global economic crisis resulted in an increase in the proportion and absolute number of hungry people worldwide to historic levels, over one billion in 2009. In 2010, the estimate of hungry people in the world declined to 925 million, a decrease of about 9.6%. The vast majority of the world's undernourished live in developing countries; South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa account for 63% and 26% of the total, respectively.
In June 2009, at the G8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy, President Obama pledged $3.5 billion over three years (FY2010 to FY2012) to a global hunger and food security initiative to address hunger and poverty worldwide. The U.S. commitment is part of a global pledge, by the G20 countries and others, of more than $20 billion. In May 2010, the Department of State officially launched the Administration's global hunger and food security initiative, called Feed the Future (FtF). The Department of State was the lead agency initially in developing the Feed the Future strategy, while the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the primary agency responsible for coordinating its implementation. Feed the Future builds on the five principles for sustainable food security first articulated at L'Aquila and endorsed at the 2009 World Summit on Food Security in Rome: supporting comprehensive strategies, investment through country-owned plans, improving stronger coordination among donors, leveraging effective multilateral institutions, and delivering on sustained and accountable commitments. The two primary objectives of Feed the Future are (1) to accelerate inclusive agricultural sector growth, and (2) to improve the nutritional status in developing countries, particularly of women and children. Currently, Feed the Future is focusing activities in 20 developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Investments will take place in two phases, depending on the extent that country investment plans (CIPs) have been developed in a given host country.
The Administration's FY2011 budget request includes $1.64 billion for FtF activities, which is about 3% of the total international affairs budget request, and is about 40% greater than the estimated FY2010 allocation to similar activities. The increase is largely due to a new request in FY2011 of $408 million for contribution to a newly created multilateral trust fund for global food security established at the World Bank. The Administration's FY2011 budget request for Feed the Future represents only a portion of foreign assistance requested for food and agriculture activities. Separately, for FY2011, the Administration is also requesting an additional $4.2 billion for humanitarian and emergency assistance, which includes $1.690 billion for Food for Peace Title II emergency and non-emergency food aid; $1.605 billion for Migration and Refugee Assistance; and $861 million for International Disaster Assistance. A significant portion of these programs include activities related to food security and agricultural development.
The 112th Congress may be faced with several issues and policy options regarding agricultural development, global food security, food aid, and U.S. foreign aid reform. Congress plays a central role in funding foreign assistance programs, and will continue consideration of appropriations for agriculture development and food security-related activities for FY2011 and FY2012. Congress continues to consider leadership, technical capacity, and accountability issues related to the implementation of the initiative at USAID, in coordination with other U.S. development agencies in a so-called "whole of government" approach, and in partnership with other governments and institutions abroad. The current fiscal situation and the shift in congressional leadership in the House may result in additional debate and discussion about the Administration's priorities and funding requests related to food security and agricultural development. |
crs_RS22689 | crs_RS22689_0 | Buyout funds acquire ownership stakes in businesses of all sizes. In short, private equity and hedge funds, once marginal players, now exert what could be characterized as significant influence in the markets where they operate. Fund Structure and Compensation
While private equity firms and hedge funds may differ in their investment strategies, their structures are similar. There are two kinds of partners. The fund managers, who guide the investment strategy, are general partners. The general partners often invest their own capital in the funds, but this is usually a small share of the total managed by the fund. Small public investors are generally not able to invest in hedge funds, because they lack either the assets or income. The 20% performance fee is sometimes paid in cash, and sometimes credited to the manager's account. Tax Issues and Proposals
Congressional proposals have evolved since the 110 th Congress from the full taxation of carried interest as ordinary income to more nuanced approaches that account for "enterprise value" and tax carried interest at some blend of the capital gains and ordinary income tax rates. In the 113 th Congress, S. 268 and the President's FY2014 Budget Proposal take a nuanced approach that treats carried interest as a mix of capital gains and ordinary income. The Tax Reform Act of 2014 would exempt carried interests derived from real estate but tax a portion of the remainder as ordinary income. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the provision in the Tax Reform Act of 2014 would raise $3.1 billion in revenue in the FY2014-FY2023 budget window, while the provision in the President's FY2014 Budget Proposal would raise $17.4 billion in revenue in the FY2014-FY2023 budget window. Tax Treatment of Publicly Traded Partnerships
Instead of changing the tax treatment of fund managers' income, another approach would change the tax treatment of some hedge funds that are organized as publicly traded partnerships. | Private equity and hedge funds are investment pools generally available only to institutions and individuals able to make investments in excess of $200,000. Private equity funds acquire ownership stakes in other companies and seek to profit by improving operating results or through financial restructuring. Hedge funds follow many strategies, investing in any market where managers see profit opportunities. The two kinds of funds are generally structured as partnerships: the fund managers act as general partners, while the outside investors are limited partners. Fund managers are compensated in two ways. First, to the extent that they invest their own capital in the funds, they share in the appreciation of fund assets. Second, they charge the outside investors two kinds of annual fees: a percentage of total fund assets, and a percentage of the fund's earnings. The latter performance fee is called "carried interest" and is treated as capital gains under current tax rules.
Since the 110th Congress, concerns have been raised that the current tax rules are inequitable and inconsistent with some tax policy principles. Proposals that address this concern have focused on taxing some portion (or all in some cases) of carried interest as ordinary income. In the 113th Congress, the Tax Reform Act of 2014 would tax carried interest, exempting income earned from real estate, as ordinary income. S. 268 and the President's FY2014 Budget Proposal would tax carried interest as ordinary income, while taxing another form of compensation, known as enterprise value, as capital gains income. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the provision in the Tax Reform Act of 2014 would raise $3.1 billion in revenue in the FY2014-FY2023 budget window, while the provision in the President's FY2014 Budget Proposal would raise $17.4 billion in revenue in the FY2014-FY2023 budget window.
This report discusses the major issues surrounding the tax treatment of hedge fund and private equity managers and will be updated as legislative developments warrant. |
crs_RL33884 | crs_RL33884_0 | The bill as passed, Public Law 110-177 ( P.L. 110-177 ), consists of four components: adjustments to applicable provisions of criminal law, reenforcement of the authority and oversight features of the law that governs federal judicial security, grant programs to facilitate increased security for the judiciary of the states, and miscellaneous provisions whose relation to judicial security might initially appear remote. 110-177 enhances sanctions of Section 1112 the increases the penalties for manslaughter in violation of both Sections 1112 and 1114, but also manslaughter committed:
against a Member of Congress, a senior executive branch official, or, a Supreme Court Justice; in connection with a federal offense that involves the use or possession of armor piercing ammunition during and furtherance of the offense; in connection with the possession of a firearm or dangerous weapon in a federal facility; against protected diplomatic officials; against an American by an American overseas; in the course of an obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. 110-177 makes it a federal crime to make publicly available certain identifying information such as home addresses, telephone numbers, and social security numbers of federal officials, employees, witnesses, and jurors (grand and petite) either (1) with the intent to threaten, intimidate, or incite a crime of violence against such individuals or members of their immediate families, or (2) with the intent and knowledge that the information will be used for such purpose, 18 U.S.C. Security for Tax Court Activities
The Marshals Service is authorized to provide security and service of process for the federal District Courts, Courts of Appeal and the Court of International Trade. Redacted Financial Disclosure Statements
The Ethics in Government Act requires federal judges, Members of Congress, and senior officials in the legislative, executive and judicial branches to file publicly available financial disclosure reports. 13861-13868, authorizes community-based grants for state, territorial, and tribal prosecutors. 110-177 amends Part H to include state witness protection programs and authorizes appropriations for Part H of $20 million for each fiscal year through 2012. Life Insurance Costs
Judges of the United States Courts of Appeal and United States District Courts serve during good behavior, which ordinarily means for life. Federal statutes describe the appointment authority for several positions in the judicial branch. It would presumably override the circuit court en banc limitations as well. | The proposals of the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-177 , H.R. 660 and S. 378 ), fall within one of four categories. One consists of amendments to existing federal criminal law. The bill increases the penalties for manslaughter committed during the course of an obstruction of justice and for witness intimidation and retaliation. It creates new federal crimes proscribing (1) the use of nuisance liens and encumbrances to harass federal officials; (2) the public disclosure of personal, identifying information concerning federal officials in order to intimidate them or incite crimes of violence against them; and (3) the possession of dangerous weapons in federal courthouses.
A second category seeks to improve implementation of judicial security measures through increased appropriations, enhanced security for the Tax Court, explicit provisions for consultation between the Department of Justice and the Judicial Conference relating to court security, a report on concerns for the safety of federal prosecutors, and a revival of authority to redact information from certain publicly available judicial financial disclosure statements.
A third authorizes grants for state witness protection programs; for increased security of state, territorial and tribal courts; and for acquisition of armored vests for state court officials. The fourth category consists of proposals whose relation to security may appear more tangential: procurement authority for the United States Sentencing Commission; life insurance costs for bankruptcy, magistrate, and territorial judges; the appointment and en banc participation for senior judges; and judgeships in the Ninth Circuit and District of Columbia Courts of Appeal.
This report is available in an abridged version â stripped of its footnotes, and most of its citations to authority â as CRS Report RS22607, Court Security Improvement Act of 2007: Public Law 110-177 (H.R. 660 and S. 378) in Brief , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44527 | crs_R44527_0 | UC Financing
The financing arrangement for UC is specified within the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) of 1939. Revenue for the program is provided through payroll taxes levied by both the federal government and the states on a portion of wages paid by covered employers. Total UC expenditures include benefit payments and administrative costs. Federal unemployment taxes are deposited with the U.S. Treasury and credited to the federal accounts within the UTF. Federal unemployment taxes pay for state administrative costs, half the cost of Extended Benefits (EB), and loans to insolvent state UC programs. Likewise, state unemployment taxes are deposited into the UTF and credited to the corresponding state account. The funds within state UTF accounts are limited to paying each state's regular UC benefits and the state's half of EB costs. As shown in Table 1 , federal unemployment tax revenue for FY2016 is projected to be $5.8 billion of the $46.7 billion in all unemployment taxes collected (approximately 12%). UC Benefits Are Mandatory Entitlements
In budgetary terms, UC benefits are mandatory spending because the underlying law authorizes the Treasury to transfer funds to the states for UC benefit payments without the need for further appropriation. Calculating the Federal Unemployment Tax
FUTA imposes a 6.0% gross federal unemployment tax rate on the first $7,000 of each worker's yearly earnings. 2. Because most employees earn more than the $7,000 taxable wage ceiling in a year, the federal unemployment tax typically is $42 per worker per year. Since 1940, Congress has increased the FUTA wage base three times: from $3,000 to $4,200 in 1972; from $4,200 to $6,000 in 1978; and from $6,000 to $7,000 in 1983. These increases did not keep pace with inflation or wage growth, and the divergence between taxable and total wages continues to grow as shown in Figure 1 . Since 1939, Congress has permanently increased the net FUTA tax rate three times: from 0.3% to 0.4% in 1965, 0.5% in 1970, and 0.6% in 1983. In addition to these three permanent tax increases, there have been three temporary ( surtax ) increases of short duration. In addition to these short-term changes, a temporary 0.2% surtax began in 1977 and was continually reauthorized (nine times) until finally lapsing at the end of June 2011—a span of over 34 years. In addition, it provides information on the effective tax rate (i.e., the total federal revenue as a proportion of total wages in covered employment). As an incentive to comply with the framework, FUTA provides a lower net federal unemployment tax if state UC programs meet certain guidelines on what types of employment must be covered by the state UC programs and meet the state unemployment tax requirements set out under FUTA. There remains significant state independence within these broad parameters. States generally determine individual qualification requirements, disqualification provisions, eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, potential weeks of benefits, and the state tax structure used to finance all of the regular state UC benefits and half of the EB. The state unemployment tax rate of an employer is based on the amount of UC paid to its former employees. | The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) of 1939 specifies the financing arrangement for the Unemployment Compensation (UC) program. Revenue for the program is provided through payroll taxes levied by both the federal government and the states on a portion of wages paid by covered employers. Total UC expenditures include benefit payments and administrative costs.
Federal unemployment taxes are deposited with the U.S. Treasury and credited to the federal accounts within the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF). Federal unemployment taxes pay for state administrative costs, half the cost of Extended Benefits (EB), and loans to insolvent state UC programs. State unemployment taxes are deposited into the UTF and credited to the corresponding state account. State unemployment tax revenue is limited to paying each state's regular UC benefits and the state's half of EB costs. In budgetary terms, UC benefits are mandatory spending because the underlying law authorizes the Treasury to transfer funds to the states for UC benefit payments without the need for further appropriation.
FUTA imposes a gross federal payroll tax on employers of 6.0% on the first $7,000 paid annually to each employee. As an incentive to comply with the framework, FUTA lowers the net federal unemployment tax to 0.6% if the state UC program follows the federal requirements. States must follow FUTA guidelines on what types of employment must be covered by UC; and state unemployment taxes on employers must meet FUTA's parameters. All states comply with these guidelines. Because most employees earn more than the $7,000 taxable wage ceiling in a year, the federal unemployment tax paid by an employer is typically no more than $42 per worker per year.
Federal unemployment tax revenue for FY2016 is projected to be $5.8 billion, whereas state unemployment tax revenue is projected to be $40.9 billion. The federal unemployment tax financed expenditures are projected to be approximately $4.2 billion—approximately 12% of all UC expenditures. In comparison, state financed UC expenditures are projected to be $32.3 billion—approximately 88% of all UC expenditures.
There remains significant state independence within the broad parameters set by FUTA. States generally determine individual qualification requirements, disqualification provisions, eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, potential weeks of benefits, and the state tax structure used to finance all of the regular state UC benefits and half of the EB.
Since 1940, Congress has increased the FUTA wage base three times: from $3,000 to $4,200 in 1972; from $4,200 to $6,000 in 1978; and from $6,000 to $7,000 in 1983. Congress has permanently increased the net FUTA tax rate three times: from 0.3% to 0.4% in 1965, 0.5% in 1970, and 0.6% in 1983. There also have been three temporary (surtax) tax rate increases of short duration (from 0.4% to 0.8% in 1962, from 0.4% to 0.65%; in 1963, and from 0.5% to 0.58% in 1973). In addition to these short-term changes, a temporary 0.2% surtax began in 1977 and was continually reauthorized (nine times) until finally lapsing at the end of June 2011—a span of over 34 years.
The combination of increases in the wage base and the doubling of the tax rate has not kept pace with inflation or wage growth, and the proportion of total revenue to total covered wages continues to decline. By 2015, the net federal unemployment tax revenue was equivalent to an effective tax rate of 0.1% on the total wages in covered employment. |
crs_R42713 | crs_R42713_0 | The Fair Labor Standards Act2
The FLSA provides for a federal minimum wage, overtime pay, and child labor protections. The FLSA covers most, but not all, private and public sector employees. The FLSA exempts certain employers and employees from the minimum wage, overtime, or child labor standards of the act. Certain employees in computer-related occupations are also exempt from both the minimum wage and overtime if they meet an hourly wage or weekly salary test and a job duties test. The Basic Minimum Wage
The basic minimum wage is raised periodically by Congress. As of January 1, 2014, 21 states and the District of Columbia have minimum wage rates that are higher than the federal minimum wage. Most employees are paid more than the basic minimum wage. Tipped Workers
Tipped employees may be paid less than the basic minimum wage, but their cash wage plus tips must equal at least the basic minimum wage. Under the FLSA, an employer may pay a tipped worker a minimum cash wage of $2.13 if the employee receives at least $5.12 an hour in tips (for a total hourly wage of $7.25). Workers with Disabilities
Under Section 14(c) of the FLSA, employers may pay special minimum wages (SMWs) to workers with disabilities. The purpose of the SMWs is to provide persons with disabilities the opportunity to work. American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) were not covered by the FLSA of 1938. In 2007, Congress passed the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 ( P.L. The act delayed the increases in the minimum wages in American Samoa for 2012, 2013, and 2014. The next minimum wage increases in American Samoa are scheduled for September 30, 2015. On September 30, 2012, the minimum wage in CNMI increased by $0.50 an hour to $5.55. The minimum wage in CNMI is currently scheduled to rise by $0.50 an hour, to $6.05, on September 30, 2014. Comp Time in Lieu of Overtime Pay
The FLSA, under Section 7(o), allows covered, nonexempt state and local government employees to receive compensatory time off ("comp time") for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. Comp time is time off with pay in lieu of overtime pay. Section 7 of the FLSA requires employers to pay at least time-and-a-half to employees who work overtime. Section 7(r) requires covered employers to provide break time for nursing mothers. Section 13(a)(17) applies specifically to employees in computer-related occupations. Under the 2004 regulations, computer professionals are exempt from the minimum wage and overtime standards of the FLSA if they meet the job duties test provided in regulations and, if they are paid an hourly wage, are paid at least $27.63 an hour or, if they are paid a salary, are paid at least $455 a week. Under Section 13(a)(15) of the FLSA, domestic service workers who provide companionship services in private homes are exempt from both the minimum wage and overtime standards of the act. On October 1, 2013, DOL published in the Federal Register new regulations that changed the definition of companionship services and limited the minimum wage and overtime exemptions for domestic service workers employed in private home to those workers who are employed directly by an individual or family. The new regulations also extend minimum wage and overtime coverage to companions employed by a third party employer, and extend overtime coverage to live-in domestic workers employed by a third party. 110-28 ). Title VIII of the act, "Fair Minimum Wage and Tax Relief," increased the basic federal minimum wage from $5.15 to $5.85 an hour effective July 2007, from $5.85 to $6.55 an hour effective July 2008, and from $6.55 to $7.25 an hour effective July 2009. | The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides workers with minimum wage, overtime pay, and child labor protections. The FLSA covers most, but not all, private and public sector employees. In addition, certain employers and employees are exempt from coverage.
Provisions of the FLSA that are of current interest to Congress include the basic minimum wage, subminimum wage rates, exemptions from overtime and the minimum wage for certain persons who provide companionship services, the exemption for certain employees in computer-related occupations, compensatory time ("comp time") in lieu of overtime pay, and break time for nursing mothers.
Basic Minimum Wage
The FLSA requires employers to pay covered, nonexempt employees at least the minimum wage. In 2007, the basic minimum wage was raised, in steps, from $5.15 to $7.25 an hour. The basic minimum wage was raised to $7.25 an hour effective July 24, 2009. As of January 1, 2014, 21 states and the District of Columbia have minimum wage rates that are higher than the federal minimum wage. Basic minimum wage rates in American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) are lower than in the continental United States. In 2007, Congress passed the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-28), which mandated annual increases of $0.50 an hour in the minimum wages of American Samoa and CNMI. In 2010, Congress temporarily suspended these increases. The minimum wage in CNMI increased by $0.50 an hour to $5.55 on September 30, 2012, and is scheduled to rise to $6.05 an hour on September 30, 2014. In July 2012, Congress delayed the wage increases in American Samoa. The next minimum wage increases in American Samoa are scheduled for September 30, 2015.
Subminimum Wage Rates
Tipped employees may be paid less than the basic minimum wage, but their cash wage plus tips must equal at least the basic minimum wage of $7.25. Employers may pay tipped workers $2.13 an hour in cash wages, provided the employees receive at least $5.12 an hour in tips. The latter amount is called a "tip credit." Employers may pay special minimum wages (SMWs) to workers with disabilities. The purpose of the SMWs is to provide persons with disabilities the opportunity to work.
Overtime
The FLSA requires employers to pay at least time-and-a-half to covered, nonexempt employees who work more than 40 hours in a week at a given job. The FLSA allows covered, nonexempt state and local government employees to receive compensatory time off (comp time) for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. Comp time is time off with pay in lieu of overtime pay.
Exemptions
The FLSA exempts certain employers and employees from the minimum wage, overtime pay, or child labor standards of the act. Certain employees in computer-related occupations are exempt from both the minimum wage and overtime standards of the FLSA if they meet an hourly wage or weekly salary test and a job duties test. Domestic service workers who provide companionship services in private homes are exempt from both the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA if they are employed directly by an individual or family.
Under new regulations published in the Federal Register on October 1, 2013, minimum wage and overtime coverage now applies to companions who work in private households if they are employed by a third party. Overtime pay now applies to live-in domestic service workers who are employed by a third party. |
crs_RS22299 | crs_RS22299_0 | The Senate may, however, use provisions of Senate Rule XIV or unanimous consent to bypass referral of a bill or joint resolution to a committee. The Senate might also hold a measure in abeyance at the desk (of the presiding officer), at least temporarily not referring it to committee or proceeding on it. This report does not examine the use of the amendment process as a way to bypass Senate committees. This report examines alternative procedures and actions that the Senate uses to bypass committee consideration of bills and joint resolutions. It also provides examples of how the Senate uses these alternative procedures and actions to facilitate consideration and passage of some bills and joint resolutions. In the remainder of this report, bill or bills and measure or measures will be used to refer to bills and joint resolutions. Using Rule XIV to Bypass a Senate Committee
Senate Rule XIV, paragraph 4, states: "... every bill and joint resolution introduced on leave, and every bill and joint resolution of the House of Representatives which shall have received a first and second reading without being referred to a committee, shall, if objection be made to further proceeding thereon, be placed on the Calendar ." Therefore, through objection, a bill after two readings is prevented from being referred to committee and is placed directly on the Senate's Calendar of Business. Although placing a bill directly on the calendar does not guarantee that the full Senate will ever consider it, the measure is available for floor consideration and certain procedural steps, like committee reporting or discharging a committee from a bill's consideration, and procedural requirements, like the two-day availability of a committee report, may be obviated. The Senate might choose this option when—
a related Senate measure is already on the calendar; a Senate committee is in the process of completing consideration of Senate companion legislation; an amendment to the House measure is already in discussion among interested Senators and the House-passed measure will be the Senate's legislative vehicle; Senators of the committee of jurisdiction support for the House-passed measure is stronger in the full Senate than in the committee to which it would be referred; the House-passed measure includes tax or appropriations provisions, which must originate in the House, requiring the use of a House-passed legislative vehicle; or for another reason. Measures Placed on the Senate Calendar by Unanimous Consent
By unanimous consent, bills may also be read the first and second times and placed directly on the calendar. Even major legislation might be placed directly on the calendar by unanimous consent. On many pieces of noncontroversial legislation, Senate leaders might use one of two informal processes called clearance and hotlining to determine the feasibility of expeditious or immediate consideration of a measure. If successful in negotiating unanimous consent to proceed to the consideration of a measure, or perhaps to discharge a committee from further proceedings on a measure and then to proceed to its consideration, the majority leader propounds a unanimous consent request on the Senate floor to proceed to the consideration of the specified measure. On September 1, anticipating House action, Senator Thad Cochran, chair of the Appropriations Committee, made this unanimous consent request, which was agreed to:
Mr. President, at this point, I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding the recess or adjournment of the Senate, the Senate may receive from the House an emergency supplemental appropriations bill for relief of the victims of Hurricane Katrina, the text of which is at the desk, and that the measure be considered read three times and passed and a motion to reconsider laid on the table; provided that the text of the House bill is identical to that which is at the desk. | Most bills and joint resolutions introduced in the Senate, and many House-numbered bills and joint resolutions received by the Senate after House passage, are referred to committee. Some bills and joint resolutions, however, are not referred to committee. This report examines the alternative procedures and actions that the Senate uses to bypass committee consideration of bills and joint resolutions. It also provides examples of how the Senate uses these alternative procedures and actions to facilitate consideration and passage of some bills and joint resolutions.
Provisions of Senate Rule XIV and the practice of unanimous consent allow the Senate to bypass a measure's referral to committee, whether that measure might be major or noncontroversial. Rule XIV requires measures to be read twice before referral to committee. By objecting after the second reading of a measure to any further proceeding on it, a Senator, normally the majority leader, acting on his own initiative or at the request of any Senator, prevents a bill or joint resolution's referral to committee. The measure is placed directly on the Senate Calendar of Business. Alternately, unanimous consent is also used to bypass referral and place measures directly on the calendar.
Although placing a measure directly on the calendar may facilitate calling it up later for consideration on the Senate floor, placement on the calendar does not guarantee floor consideration.
A bill or joint resolution, in addition, might be neither referred to committee nor placed on the calendar: a measure might be held at the desk (of the presiding officer)—either simply being at the desk in the absence of any proceeding on it or after being ordered by unanimous consent to be held at the desk. This status has been applied to both major and noncontroversial measures.
Unanimous consent may be used to truncate a committee's consideration of a measure referred to it: a measure might be referred to a committee but then the committee by unanimous consent of the Senate is discharged from further consideration of the measure.
The Senate regularly uses unanimous consent to consider and pass noncontroversial legislation that was placed directly on the calendar, that is at the desk (neither placed on the calendar nor referred to committee), or that has been discharged from committee.
One purpose of using any of the means of bypassing committee referral or truncating committee consideration of a measure is to facilitate a measure's Senate consideration. The Senate leadership might use one of two informal processes, called clearance and hotlining, to determine if any Senator would object to a specific bill or joint resolution being considered and possibly passed by unanimous consent.
This report does not examine procedures applicable to concurrent and simple resolutions, treaties, or nominations. Nor does it examine the use of a germane, relevant, or nongermane amendment instead of a bill or joint resolution. This report will not be updated again in the 115th Congress unless Senate procedures change. |
crs_RS21761 | crs_RS21761_0 | Updated April 20, 2004
Introduction
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA, P.L. 108-173 ) added a voluntary prescription drug benefit to Medicare and made manychanges to the Medicare+Choice (M+C) program, now called Medicare Advantage (MA). Changes to MA include(1) increased payment rates, (2) a competition program in2006, (3) the addition of regional plans beginning in 2006, and (4) a six-year comparative cost adjustment programin 2010 that enhances competition between MA plans andrequires traditional Medicare to compete with MA plans. Although plan participation is likely to increase due tothe increased payments, long-term plan participation isunknown. Starting in 2006, plans will beencouraged (but not required) to serve entire regions designated by the Secretary as part of a new regional program. The CCA program isdesigned to enhance competition between local private plans in the Medicare program and to compare the overallefficiency of these plans with respect to traditional Medicare. | The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (P.L.108-173) added a voluntary prescription drugbenefit to Medicare and established the Medicare Advantage program to replace the Medicare+Choice program. Theact increases payments to private plans beginning in March2004, creates a new competitive program in 2006, adds a regional program also in 2006, and creates a temporaryprogram that requires traditional Medicare to compete withprivate plans in 2010. These changes were designed to increase private plan participation and to increasecompetition in Medicare. Although plan participation is likely toincrease in the short-term, long-term participation is unknown. This paper outlines major changes to the managedcare program and indicates how these changes may affectparticipation. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RS20479 | crs_RS20479_0 | Under the Social Security Act, disabled individuals qualify for benefits only if they are determined to be unable to engage in "substantial gainful activity" (SGA). In 2014, this amount is $1,070 a month. However, the same section of the law specifies that a different definition of SGA applies to individuals disabled by blindness. These individuals are considered to be engaging in SGA if their earnings exceed 1,800 a month (this amount is also adjusted annually to reflect growth in average wages). 106 - 182 permanently continued the severance between the earnings test and the SGA level of the blind enacted in P.L. Appendix. | In the Social Security disability program, the level of earnings that constitute "substantial gainful activity" (SGA), and therefore disqualifies a person from receiving benefits, is set by regulation at $1,070 a month for 2014. However, the law provides a different SGA level for the blind at $1,800 a month for 2014, which is adjusted annually to reflect growth in average wages. This report discusses the reasons for these differing amounts and proposals to change them. The appendix section of the report charts the difference between the two amounts from 1975 to 2014. |
crs_RS21396 | crs_RS21396_0 | Map Sources
Links to basic static maps (non-interactive, printable image files) of Iraq and the Middle East region are provided below. It also provides some historical maps as well as links to Iraq maps on other websites. Maps of Iraq located on this website, dated 2001 through 2010, include "Return to Iraq: 2009-2010" (a map of individuals returning to Iraq after displacement) and "Projects of Japan ODA [Official Development Assistance] Loans in Iraq (as of 31 Mar 2010)." | This report identifies online sources for maps of Iraq, including government, library, and organizational websites. These sources have been selected on the basis of their authoritativeness and the range, quality, and uniqueness of the maps they provide. Some sources provide up-to-the-minute maps; others have been selected for their collection of historical maps. Maps of Iraq, the Middle East, significant security incidents in Iraq, and refugees returning to Iraq have been provided. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL33518 | crs_RL33518_0 | Since it currently takes 10 years to "grow" or promote to the rank of major (from lieutenant to promotion to major) and 14 years if a major is an academy or ROTC graduate, this is not a problem that can be quickly nor easily solved as the Army continues to transform its force structure and, simultaneously, fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The Army currently projects an officer shortage of approximately 3,000 "line" officers in FY2007, a situation that worsens to 3,700 officers in FY2008 and continues to average more than 3,000 annually through FY2013. While a number of potential causes are reviewed, this report will focus on two: reduced officer accessions (the number of new lieutenants brought to active duty annually) during and after the drawdown of the early to mid-1990s, and the significant increase in officer requirements as the Army transforms to a "brigade-centric" force, a key element in the Army's Modular Force Initiative. This report assesses the extent of the Army officer shortfall, examines perceived causes, reviews recent retention initiatives, identifies other possible retention incentives, and concludes with a review of possible options for Congress. As a result, 82.6% of all requirements for the rank of major are projected to be filled, and the Army defines a personnel fill rate of 85% or less as a "critical" shortage. Officer shortages in excess of 3,000 annually are projected to persist through at least 2013. These shortages have been exacerbated by the growth of officer requirements as the Army has transformed its force structure. However, this does not appear to be the case. Deployment Tempo
With ongoing military operations in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), some would assume that this deployment tempo has negatively impacted officer retention. In summary, reduced accessions during and immediately following the drawdown in the 1990s and the increased officer requirements of the Modular Force Initiative appear to be the primary contributors to the current and projected shortage of captains and majors. Can Reserve Component Officers Be Used to Address the Shortage? The challenge for the Army would be in defining "critical skills" in terms of rank, branch, years of service, year group or some other criteria and then linking the appropriate bonus level to the number of years that the bonus will be paid. | The Army's enlisted recruiting shortfall in 2005 generated significant congressional and media interest, and served as the impetus for several legislative initiatives. However, until very recently, there has been little mention or visibility of potential shortages in the Army's officer corps. This problem is currently unique to the Army. While specific skill shortages and imbalances have been reported by the other services, only the Army is reflecting service-wide active component shortages.
The Army currently projects an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in FY2007, with the most acute shortfalls in "senior" captains and majors with 11 to 17 years of experience. For example, the Army considers any personnel "fill rate" (the number of officers available to fill requirements) of less than 85% a "critical" shortage, and projects a fill rate of 82.6% for majors in FY2007.
The Army further projects an increased shortage of more than 3,700 officers the following year, and estimates that annual shortages in excess of 3,000 officers will persist through FY2013 unless accessions (the number of new lieutenants brought to active duty annually) can be increased and retention can be improved. It presently takes 10 years to "grow" a major (from lieutenant to promotion to major), and 14 years if that major is an academy or ROTC graduate. Therefore, the projected shortage appears to be a significant long-term challenge especially as the Army continues to transform and maintain a significant role in fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT).
This report analyzes a number of potential factors contributing to the shortfall, especially the impact of reduced officer accessions during and after the Army personnel drawdown of the early 1990s, and the significant increase in Army officer requirements caused by the Army force structure transformation to a modular, brigade-centric force through its Modular Force Initiative. At this time, the high deployment tempo associated with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) does not appear to be associated with these shortfalls.
Although the Army has already introduced several new programs to enhance officer retention, other possible options exist that could help address the Army's officer shortages. They include the possibility of officer retention bonuses. The Army does not pay any officer continuation or retention bonuses, with the exception of Aviation Career Incentive Pay.
This report will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R41438 | crs_R41438_0 | United States law has been applied to North Korea in the following ways in response to the North Korean government's objectionable activities:
North Korea poses a threat to U.S. national security because of "the current existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula," as declared by President George W. Bush on June 26, 2008, under the terms of the National Emergencies Act (NEA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA); North Korea is cited by the United Nations Security Council for its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles pursuits, withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and contribution to regional tensions; the United States meets the requirements as a member state of the United Nations pursuant to the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to implement sanctions adopted by the U.N. Security Council; North Korea committed an unprovoked attack that resulted in the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan ; announced a new nuclear test and missile launches in 2009; and engaged in money laundering, counterfeiting of goods and currency, bulk cash smuggling, and narcotics trafficking, all in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, leading President Barack Obama to expand the national emergency in 2010, 2011, 2015, and 2016. U.S. Economic Sanctions Currently in Place
United States economic sanctions imposed on North Korea, as a result both of requirements in U.S. law and decisions made in the executive branch to exercise discretionary authorities, have the following impact:
Trade is limited to food, medicine, and other humanitarian-related goods, all of which require a license. Imports from North Korea are prohibited as of June 2011; exports to North Korea of most U.S.-origin goods, services, or technology are prohibited as of March 2016. Trade in luxury goods is banned. The Department of Commerce denies export licenses for reasons of nuclear proliferation, missile technology, U.N. Security Council requirements, and international terrorism. Arms sales and arms transfers are fully denied. Financial transactions are prohibited . U.S. persons are prohibited from providing financial services for the purpose of evading sanctions, or from providing financial services to a person or entity designated for sanctions. The President, in September 2017, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to designate for sanctions any foreign financial institution that conducts or facilitates "any significant transaction on behalf of any [designated] person," or "in connection with trade with North Korea." North Korea is designated as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern by the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), effective December 9, 2016. U.S. new investment is prohibited , and investment in North Korea's transportation, mining, energy, or financial sectors is prohibited. North Korea is also ineligible to participate in any U.S. government program that makes credit, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees available. U.S. f oreign aid is minimal and mostly limited to refugees fleeing North Korea; broadcasting into the country; nongovernmental organization programs dedicated to democracy promotion, human rights, and governance; and emergency food aid. In past years, aid related to disabling and dismantling the country's nuclear weapons program has been made available. By law, U.S. representatives in the international financial institutions (IFI) are required to vote against any support for North Korea due to its nuclear weapons ambitions and international terrorism. Human rights and environmental activities would also likely result in U.S. objections to North Korea's participation in the IFI. U.S.-based assets are blocked for North Korean individuals, entities, and vessels designated by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). U.S. persons are prohibited from entering into trade and transaction with these designees and, most recently, foreign financial institutions could become subject to U.S. sanctions for facilitating transactions for designated persons. Kim Jong-un, the Korean Workers' Party, and others —banks, shipping companies, seagoing vessels, state agencies, and other individuals affiliated with the state's security regime—are identified as being among those engaged in illicit and punishable activities, possibly including nuclear or ballistic missile programs, undermining cybersecurity, censorship, and sanctions evasion. As a result, effective March 15, 2016, any of their assets under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S. persons and entities are prohibited from entering into trade and transactions with the designees. U.S. travel requires a special validation passport issued by the State Department. Such passports are reserved only for travel in the U.S. national interest and are intended for professional reporters, officials with the American Red Cross or International Committee of the Red Cross, or those who have a "compelling humanitarian" justification. The order requires the access to property and interests in property be blocked for any individual or entity identified by the Secretary of the Treasury to have, directly or indirectly
imported, exported, or reexported to, into, or from North Korea any arms or related materiel; provided training, advice, or other services or assistance, or engaged in financial transactions, related to the manufacture, maintenance, or use of any arms or related materiel to be imported, exported, or reexported to, into, or from North Korea, or following their importation, exportation, or reexportation to, into, or from North Korea; imported, exported, or reexported luxury goods to or into North Korea; engaged in money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods or currency, bulk cash smuggling, narcotics trafficking, or other illicit economic activity that involves or supports the Government of North Korea or any senior official thereof; materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, prohibited activities or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked; or be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked. | U.S. economic sanctions imposed on North Korea are instigated by that country's activities related to weapons proliferation, especially its tests since 2006 of nuclear weapons and missile technology; regional disruptions; terrorism; narcotics trafficking; undemocratic governance; and illicit activities in international markets, including money laundering, counterfeiting of goods and currency, and bulk cash smuggling. The sanctions have the following consequences for U.S.-North Korea relations:
Trade is limited to food, medicine, and other humanitarian-related goods, all of which require a license. Imports from North Korea are prohibited as of June 2011; exports to North Korea of most U.S.-origin goods, services, or technology are prohibited as of March 2016. Trade in luxury goods is banned. The Department of Commerce denies export licenses for reasons of nuclear proliferation, missile technology, U.N. Security Council requirements, and international terrorism. Arms sales and arms transfers are fully denied. Financial transactions are prohibited. U.S. persons are prohibited from providing financial services for the purpose of evading sanctions, or from providing financial services to a person or entity designated for sanctions. The President, in September 2017, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to designate for sanctions any foreign financial institution that conducts or facilitates "any significant transaction on behalf of any [designated] person," or "in connection with trade with North Korea." North Korea is designated as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern by the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), effective December 9, 2016. U.S. new investment is prohibited, and investment in North Korea's transportation, mining, energy, or financial sectors is prohibited. North Korea is also ineligible to participate in any U.S. government program that makes credit, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees available. U.S. foreign aid is minimal and mostly limited to refugees fleeing North Korea; broadcasting into the country; nongovernmental organization programs dedicated to democracy promotion, human rights, and governance; and emergency food aid. In past years, aid related to disabling and dismantling the country's nuclear weapons program has been made available. By law, U.S. representatives in the international financial institutions (IFI) are required to vote against any support for North Korea due to its nuclear weapons ambitions and international terrorism. Human rights and environmental activities would also likely result in U.S. objections to North Korea's participation in the IFI. U.S.-based assets are blocked for North Korean individuals, entities, and vessels designated by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). U.S. persons are prohibited from entering into trade and transaction with these designees and, most recently, foreign financial institutions could become subject to U.S. sanctions for facilitating transactions for designated persons. Kim Jong-un, the Korean Workers' Party, and others—banks, shipping companies, seagoing vessels, state agencies, and other individuals affiliated with the state's security regime—are identified as being among those engaged in illicit and punishable activities, possibly including nuclear or ballistic missile programs, undermining cybersecurity, censorship, and sanctions evasion. As a result, effective March 15, 2016, any of their assets under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S. persons and entities are prohibited from entering into trade and transactions with the designees. U.S. travel requires a special validation passport issued by the State Department. Such passports are reserved only for travel in the U.S. national interest and are intended for professional reporters, officials with the American Red Cross or International Committee of the Red Cross, or those who have a "compelling humanitarian" justification.
From the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States had imposed fairly comprehensive economic, diplomatic, and political restrictions on North Korea. In 1999, however, President Clinton announced the United States would lift many restrictions on U.S. exports to and imports from North Korea in areas other than those controlled for national security concerns; the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Transportation issued new regulations a year later that implemented the new policy. On June 26, 2008, President George W. Bush delisted North Korea as a state sponsor of international terrorism, and removed restrictions based on authorities in the Trading With the Enemy Act and the terrorism designation, replacing them with more circumscribed economic restrictions related to proliferation concerns.
The U.S. sanctions are a result of requirements incorporated into U.S. law by Congress, decisions made in the executive branch to exercise discretionary authorities, and obligations placed on member states of the United Nations by the U.N. Security Council. Though the President, in accordance with the Constitution, leads the way in conducting foreign policy, Congress holds substantial power to shape foreign policy by authorizing and funding programs, advising on appointments, and specifically defining the terms of engagement in accordance with U.S. political and strategic interests. This report presents the legislative basis for U.S. sanctions policy toward North Korea. These sanctions are a critical tenet of the larger bilateral relationship, and this report highlights Congress's role and responsibility in determining the nature of U.S.-North Korea relations. |
crs_RL32445 | crs_RL32445_0 | Introduction
This report analyzes the potential for liquefied natural gas (LNG) to become a flexible, dependable, source of natural gas supply for the U.S. market, while also setting a cap on natural gas prices. While adding the physical capacity to receive more LNG is important, significant changes in the structure and practices of the LNG market are also likely to be required before LNG might assume its projected economic role in U.S. energy supply. The evolution of LNG supply will contribute to the debate over the relative importance of the proposed Alaskan natural gas pipeline, expanded use of lands now off limits to exploration and production, and investments in technology to expand additional unconventional gas supplies. In 2005, over 85% of natural gas imported to the United States came from Canada via pipeline. Virtually all of the remaining projected natural gas imports are expected to be in the form of LNG. Whether LNG can provide a cap on U.S. natural gas market prices, or a floor below which prices are unlikely to fall, depends on the way the price formation process develops in the LNG market as well as the fundamental demand and supply balance. Price risk is managed through a price escalation clause in the SPA. However, if an SPA is not in place, as the size of production capacity increases, the risk associated with marketing ever larger quantities of LNG grows. Spot, as well as futures and derivative markets, allow market participants to manage risk, but in the traditional LNG market, quantities are set in the SPA and the producer's need to operate at full capacity to cover financing costs and generate a profit dictates contract terms. Supporting the supply chain would be the availability of financial capital to develop new projects, fund new tankers, and build new receiving terminals without the necessary collateral of an SPA. As a result of these origins, LNG prices have been derived from, and determined contractually by, the price of oil. Contract Provisions
The LNG market is showing signs of undergoing a transition. Since the traditional LNG market structure, largely intact today, is based on long-term contracts designed to ensure business stability, a number of changes would need to occur if a more competitive market structure is to evolve. Because increasing LNG supplies is only one of a number of ways to close the projected gap between U.S. natural gas demand and supply over the coming years, any decisions to encourage or discourage this particular source may have implications for other potential sources. Optimists point to the large quantities of stranded natural gas around the world and the plans to develop dozens of receiving terminals in the United States and might conclude that this source alone might close the demand and supply gap. | Natural gas consumption in the United States is expected to increase substantially over the coming decades primarily because of its usefulness in generating relatively clean electricity. Domestic supplies are projected to be unable to meet increasing demand because existing fields are yielding less production and new drilling efforts are not replicating past success rates. Pipeline imports from Canada are also projected to decline. Various alternatives exist that might close the demand and supply gap, with imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) being touted as one of the most promising.
As a result of projected supply increases, much of the LNG debate and analysis has focused on the availability of the physical facilities needed to bring larger quantities of LNG into the United States. However, other changes in LNG market structure and practices are also likely to be needed before expanded quantities of LNG can be supplied at competitive market prices.
The traditional LNG market, which developed in the 1970s can be characterized as capital intensive and long term, with restrictive contractual provisions. Risk is managed through the sales contract, and the whole production chain is committed in advance to ensure economic viability of the project. Many of the characteristics of this market are inconsistent with a more competitive market environment.
The LNG market is only in the early stages of a transition which incorporates a viable short term spot market, price discovery through gas-to-gas competition, financial instruments to manage risk, competitive capital acquisition, open access of various links in the supply chain to insure efficient resource allocation, and an expanded set of producers and buyers. Full realization of the potential of LNG to provide a stable source of supply to U.S. markets, as well as providing a price cap to U.S. natural gas prices, awaits changes in market structure, investment in receiving terminals, as well as additional sources of supply.
The extent to which the LNG market develops market-based characteristics may determine the extent to which other sources of natural gas supply are needed. An Alaskan natural gas pipeline, development of restricted prospective resources, and developing advanced technologies to extract natural gas from unconventional sources may be considered as substitutes in closing the projected demand and supply gap. |
crs_R42554 | crs_R42554_0 | Some Members suggested that the State Department may have been too trusting of Beijing's initial commitments to ensure Chen's safety in China. With Chen and his immediate family now in the United States, issues of concern for Congress moving forward include the Chinese government's treatment of both Chen's extended family and supporters in China as well as the status of the official investigation that Beijing promised to undertake regarding local government abuses of Chen prior to his escape from Shandong province. A long-term consideration for Congress is what place human rights should occupy in the overall U.S.-China relationship. While the case was still unfolding, critics suggested that the Obama Administration may have judged the many issues to be discussed at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) to be more important than the fate of a blind legal advocate, and thus rushed to conclude the negotiations over Chen before the opening of the S&ED, risking Chen's safety. Yet Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's unorthodox decision to authorize U.S. diplomats to bring Chen into the U.S. Embassy in the first place sent another signal: that the United States was willing to put those matters at risk for the sake of a human rights issue centered on one person. After one of Chen's associates contacted the U.S. Embassy in Beijing on April 25, 2012, asking for help for Chen, who had broken bones in his foot in his escape from extra-legal house arrest in his home province of Shandong, the U.S. government faced several choices about how to respond. Beijing may have decided that a prolonged face-off with the United States over a provincial legal advocate was not in its interests. If the security apparatus has been weakened, however, it is still possible that it will regain its strength, perhaps even by playing up charges that moderate elements of the leadership compromised China's sovereignty by agreeing to negotiate with the United States over the fate of a citizen in China. For the United States, at least two outstanding issues remain. Chen Guangfu's son, Chen Kegui, faces a charge of attempted murder for injuring security personnel with a cleaver when they stormed his home after Chen Guangcheng's escape. They were:
Reunification with his wife and children, whom he had left behind in Shandong Province when he escaped to Beijing, Relocation to "a safe environment" in China outside of Shandong Province, "An honest investigation, starting at the central government level," of his allegations of mistreatment at the hands of local officials in Shandong Province, An opportunity to study law at a Chinese university, and No official retribution for those who helped him escape. The First Set of Understandings
The Chinese government has not publicly confirmed any of the details of the initial set of understandings reached between the two governments, but as reported by U.S. officials, the first set of understandings, all made verbally, encompassed the following elements:
Chen's reunification with wife and children, Relocation of Chen and his family to "a safe environment," The opportunity for Chen to study at one of seven universities, of Chen's choosing, with the Chinese government paying for tuition and for the family's room and board, The opportunity for Chen to transfer to another university, either in China or overseas, after two years, A Chinese government commitment to "listen to [Chen's] complaints of abuse and conduct a full investigation," starting as soon as Chen left the Embassy for hospital treatment, and An assurance that Chen had "no remaining legal issues directed at" him and would "be treated like any other student in China." The Subsequent Understanding
Within hours of leaving the U.S. Embassy for Chaoyang Hospital on May 2, 2012, Chen had a change of heart about staying in China. Further Policy Considerations
In the longer term, Congressional considerations related to the Chen Guangcheng case include: how to promote human rights in China in light of recent events surrounding Chen, as well as in light of trends in the bilateral relationship and political and social developments in the PRC; and how or whether to formulate a policy toward China that combines human rights and other bilateral issues, such as economic, security, and environmental matters. After a late-night meeting at the State Department in Washington, Secretary of State Clinton authorizes bringing him into the Embassy. After talking to his wife, friends, and associates, Chen changes his mind about staying in China and requests to travel to the United States. May 4, 2012
Second day of the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue in Beijing. May 19, 2012
Chen, his wife, and their two children arrive in Newark, NJ, on United Airlines Flight 88 from Beijing. They take up residence at New York University, where Chen plans to study law. | The case of blind Chinese legal advocate Chen Guangcheng, who escaped from illegal house arrest in China's Shandong Province on April 20, 2012, and made his way to Beijing, the United States Embassy, and, ultimately, the United States, has generated strong congressional interest. While Chen was still in China, some Members questioned whether the U.S. State Department had done enough to ensure Chen's safety, with criticism focused on the State Department's decision to escort Chen from the Embassy to a Beijing hospital on May 2, 2012, and its willingness to accept verbal assurances from the Chinese government that it would ensure a "safe environment" for Chen in China. With Chen now in the United States, remaining issues for the Administration and Congress include the fate of the family members, supporters, and friends back in China who helped him escape. The situation of Chen's nephew, Chen Kegui, may be of particular concern. He faces attempted murder charges for injuring security personnel with a kitchen knife when they burst into his father's house late at night after Chen's escape, and he has been denied access to lawyers retained by his family on his behalf. The United States is also watching to see if China follows through on its promise to investigate Chen's treatment at the hands of local officials in Shandong over the past seven years. In the longer term, congressional considerations include how the United States should respond to other human rights cases in China, and what place promotion of human rights should have in the overall U.S.-China relationship.
Chen's saga tested the bilateral relationship and showed it to have a resilience that surprised some observers. When an associate of Chen's contacted the U.S. Embassy in Beijing on April 25, 2012, to request help for him, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton reportedly personally authorized a mission to rescue Chen from the streets of Beijing and bring him into the U.S. Embassy compound for assessment by U.S. medical personnel. That move plunged the United States and China into three weeks of high-stakes diplomacy over Chen's fate. With the two countries' premier bilateral dialogue, the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, scheduled for May 3 and 4, 2012, in Beijing, diplomats for the two sides engaged in tense negotiations. Moving at a rapid pace, they produced a detailed and highly unusual set of understandings under which the Chinese government committed to relocate Chen to a "safe environment" away from his home province and offer him the opportunity to study law at one of seven universities, with the Chinese government paying for Chen's tuition and room and board for him and his family. Chen accepted these verbal understandings—the terms of which China never publicly confirmed—and left the Embassy after six days for a local hospital. Hours later, Chen changed his mind about staying in China, occasioning another round of negotiations. Those negotiations produced a subsequent understanding, under which the Chinese government said publicly that Chen was free to apply for documents to study abroad. Chen, his wife Yuan Weijing, and their two children arrived in the United States on May 19, 2012. Chen plans to study law at New York University.
This report begins by examining implications of the Chen case for the place of human rights in U.S.-China relations. It then discusses why Beijing may have been willing to negotiate with the United States at all over the fate of a Chinese citizen inside China. The report highlights the remaining issues in the case, details the understandings reached between the two governments, and then provides background on Chen Guangcheng and a list of his family and other associates in China who may be at risk. The report includes a map showing Chen's home district and Beijing, the city to which he escaped. It also includes a timeline of developments in the case from April 20, 2012, until May 19, 2012, based upon information available at the time of publication. |
crs_R43073 | crs_R43073_0 | Introduction
Federal law requires the President to submit an annual budget to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. The budget informs Congress of the President's overall federal fiscal policy based on proposed spending levels, revenues, and deficit (or surplus) levels. The budget request lays out the President's relative priorities for federal programs, such as how much should be spent on defense, education, health, and other federal programs. The President's budget may also include legislative proposals for spending and tax policy changes. While the President is not required to propose legislative changes for those parts of the budget that are governed by permanent law (i.e., mandatory spending), such changes are generally included in the budget. President Obama submitted his FY2014 budget to Congress on April 10, 2013. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the division of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that is responsible for administering Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). In January 2011, CMS became responsible for much of the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. CMS is the largest purchaser of health care in the United States with Medicare and federal Medicaid expenditures accounting for 29.7% of the total national health expenditures in 2011. In 2010, CMS provided health insurance to 114 million individuals through Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP, which is roughly one in three Americans. This report summarizes the President's budget estimates for each section of the CMS budget. Then, for each legislative proposal included in the President's budget, this report provides a description of current law and the President's proposal. The explanations of the President's legislative proposals are grouped by the following program areas: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, private health insurance, and program management. Budget Summary
The CMS budget includes a mixture of both mandatory and discretionary spending. However, a vast majority of the CMS budget is mandatory spending, such as Medicare benefits and grants to states for Medicaid. With the Medicare physician payment adjustment, the estimated impact of the legislative proposals, and the estimated savings net of the program integrity and Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) investments ($0.4 billion), the President's budget estimates CMS's net outlays will be $854.3 billion in FY2014, which is an increase of $60.2 billion, or 7.6%, over the net outlays for FY2013. For budgetary purposes, CMS is divided into the following sections: Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, program integrity, state grants and demonstrations, private health insurance, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI), and program management. Legislative Proposals
The President's FY2014 budget contains a number of proposals that would impact the CMS budget. Some are program expansions, and others are designed to reduce federal spending. At the end of each of these sections, there is a table summarizing the costs or savings for each legislative proposal, and the tables classify each proposal as new, modified from the President's FY2013 budget, or repeated from the President's FY2013 budget. | Federal law requires the President to submit an annual budget to Congress no later than the first Monday in February. The budget informs Congress of the President's overall federal fiscal policy based on proposed spending levels, revenues, and deficit (or surplus) levels. The budget request lays out the President's relative priorities for federal programs, such as how much should be spent on defense, education, health, and other federal programs. The President's budget may also include legislative proposals for spending and tax policy changes. While the President is not required to propose legislative changes for those parts of the budget that are governed by permanent law (i.e., mandatory spending), such changes are generally included in the budget. President Obama submitted his FY2014 budget to Congress on April 10, 2013.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the division of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that is responsible for administering Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), among other activities. CMS is the largest purchaser of health care in the United States, with expenditures from CMS programs accounting for roughly one-third of the nation's health expenditures. In FY2014, it is estimated that one-in-three Americans will be provided coverage through Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP. CMS is also responsible for implementing many of the private health insurance provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148).
The CMS budget includes a mixture of both mandatory and discretionary spending. However, the vast majority of the CMS budget is mandatory spending, such as Medicare benefits and grants to states for Medicaid.
For budgetary purposes, CMS is divided into the following sections: Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, program integrity, state grants and demonstrations, private health insurance protections and programs, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, and program management. The President's FY2014 budget contains a number of legislative proposals that would affect the CMS budget. Some are program expansions, and others are designed to reduce federal spending.
The President's proposed budget for CMS would be $854.3 billion in net mandatory and discretionary outlays for FY2014. This would be an increase of $60.2 billion, or 7.6%, over the net outlays for FY2013. This estimate includes the cost of the Medicare physician payment adjustment ($15.4 billion), the estimated savings of the legislative proposals (-$5.8 billion), and the estimated savings from program integrity investments (-$0.1 billion).
This report summarizes the President's budget estimates for each section of the CMS budget. Then, for each legislative proposal included in the President's budget, this report provides a description of current law and the President's proposal. The explanations of the President's legislative proposals are grouped by the following program areas: Medicare, Medicaid, program integrity, private health insurance, and program management. A table summarizing the estimated costs or savings for each legislative proposal is at the end of each of these sections. |
crs_R45201 | crs_R45201_0 | IHS Overview
The Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead federal agency charged with improving the health of American Indians and Alaska Natives. IHS provides health care for approximately 2.2 million eligible American Indians/Alaska Natives through a system of programs and facilities located on or near Indian reservations, and through contractors in certain urban areas. IHS provides services to members of 573 federally recognized tribes. It provides services either directly or through facilities and programs operated by Indian tribes or tribal organizations through self-determination contracts and self-governance compacts authorized in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA). Finally, the Public Health Service Act provides funds for the Special Diabetes Program for Indians grants administered by IHS. Funding Sources
The IHS has three major sources of funding, described here in order of magnitude: (1) discretionary appropriations, (2) collections, and (3) mandatory appropriations. Unlike most agencies within HHS, which receive their appropriations through the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education appropriations act, the IHS receives its discretionary appropriations through the Interior/Environment appropriations act. IHS's discretionary appropriations are divided into three accounts: (1) Indian Health Services, (2) Contract Support Costs, and (3) Indian Health Facilities. IHS has the authority to receive payments from other federal programs such as Medicaid, Medicare, CHIP, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. IHS also receives payments from state programs (such as workers compensation) and from private insurance. In addition to these collections, IHS collects rent from facilities it owns. This mandatory funding was extended through FY2019 in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. 115-123 ). The President's budget request proposes to shift the FY2019 appropriation to discretionary funding. IHS Third-Party Collections
IHS facilities collect payments from third-party payors for services provided to IHS beneficiaries who are also enrolled in other programs. | The Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead federal agency charged with improving the health of American Indians and Alaska Natives. IHS provides health care for approximately 2.2 million eligible American Indians/Alaska Natives through a system of programs and facilities located on or near Indian reservations, and through contractors in certain urban areas. IHS provides services to members of 573 federally recognized tribes. It provides services either directly or through facilities and programs operated by Indian tribes or tribal organizations through self-determination contracts and self-governance compacts authorized in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA).
The IHS has three major sources of funding: (1) discretionary appropriations, (2) collections, and (3) mandatory appropriations.
Unlike most agencies within HHS, which receive their appropriations through the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education appropriations act, IHS receives its discretionary appropriations through the Interior/Environment appropriations act. IHS's discretionary appropriations are divided into three accounts: (1) Indian Health Services, (2) Contract Support Costs, and (3) Indian Health Facilities.
IHS collects payments for the health services it provides. IHS, unlike other federal agencies, has the authority to receive payments from other federal programs such as Medicaid, Medicare, and the Department of Veterans Affairs for the health services it provides to IHS beneficiaries who are also enrolled in those programs. IHS also receives payments from state programs (such as workers' compensation) and from private insurance. In addition to these payments, IHS collects rent from facilities it owns.
Since FY1998, IHS has received a mandatory appropriation each fiscal year to support the Special Diabetes Program for Indians. This funding source was most recently extended in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which provided mandatory appropriations for FY2018 and FY2019. The President's budget requests that these funds be moved to discretionary appropriations in FY2019.
This fact sheet focuses on the funding that IHS has received between FY2014 and FY2019 (proposed). |
crs_RL33583 | crs_RL33583_0 | Introduction
On May 31, 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced FY2006 allocations of federal homeland security assistance to states and urban areas. That assistance was made available through the following three programs:
the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), which is designed to fund state homeland security strategy activities to build first responder and emergency management capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism and catastrophic events; the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), which focuses on law enforcement and public safety activities to prevent terrorist attacks through such activities as intelligence gathering, information sharing, and target hardening; and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), which is designed to fund designated high-threat, high-risk urban-area activities to prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks and catastrophic events. The programs provided funds to address planning, operations, equipment, training, and exercise needs of states and high-threat, high-density urban areas. The purpose of the set of programs was to help recipients build and sustain first responder and emergency management capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and catastrophic events. The USA PATRIOT Act guarantees each state an amount of 0.75% of total SHSGP and LETPP appropriations. The remaining appropriation and the appropriation for UASI grants were allocated at the discretion of the Department of Homeland Security. This CRS report explains the FY2003 through FY2006 administrative guidance that governed the three homeland security assistance programs, discusses the changes to DHS requirements for grant applications and subsequent reporting by recipients, describes the DHS grant allocation methods, and identifies pertinent oversight questions that may be of interest to Congress. | On May 31, 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced FY2006 allocations of federal homeland security assistance to states and urban areas. That assistance is made available through the following three programs:
the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), which is designed to fund state homeland security strategy activities to build first responder and emergency management capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism and catastrophic events; the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), which focuses on law enforcement and public safety activities to prevent terrorist attacks through such activities as intelligence gathering, information sharing, and target hardening; and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), which is designed to fund designated high-threat, high-risk urban-area activities to prevent, protect against, and respond to terrorist attacks and catastrophic events.
The programs provide funds to address planning, operations, equipment, training, and exercise needs of states and high-threat, high-density urban areas. The purpose of the set of programs is to help recipients build and sustain first responder and emergency management capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and catastrophic events. The USA PATRIOT Act guarantees each state an amount of 0.75% of total SHSGP and LETPP appropriations. The remaining appropriation and the appropriation for UASI grants are allocated at the discretion of the Department of Homeland Security.
This CRS report explains the FY2003 through FY2006 administrative guidance that governed the three homeland security assistance programs, discusses the changes in DHS requirements for grant applications and subsequent reporting by recipients, describes the DHS grant allocation methods, and identifies pertinent oversight questions that may be of interest to Congress. For information on FY2007 homeland security grant guidance, see CRS Report RL33859, Fiscal Year 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program, H.R. 1, and S. 4: Description and Analysis , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R45187 | crs_R45187_0 | With DB plans, participants receive regular monthly benefit payments in retirement (which some refer to as a "traditional" pension). The plans that are the subject of this report are DB plans. Multiemployer pension plans are sponsored by more than one employer (often, though not required to be, in the same industry) and maintained as part of a collective bargaining agreement. When a multiemployer pension plan becomes insolvent, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) provides financial assistance to the plan so the plan can continue to pay benefits up to the PBGC guaranteed amount. This suggests that a larger percentage of participants in plans that receive PBGC financial assistance in the future are likely to see benefit reductions as a result of the PBGC maximum guarantee level. PBGC estimates that in the future it will not have sufficient resources from which to provide financial assistance for insolvent plans to pay benefits at the PBGC guarantee level. Multiemployer Pension Plan Data
CRS analyzed public-use Form 5500 data from the Department of Labor (DOL) for the 2015 plan year, the most recent year for which complete data are available. Most private-sector pension plans are required to annually report to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), DOL, and PBGC information about the plan, such as the number of participants, financial information, and the companies that provide services to the plan. For example, most multiemployer DB plans are required to file Schedule MB, which contains information specific to multiemployer DB plans, such as the zone status of the plan (described below). Not all multiemployer DB pension plans file Schedule MB. 109-280 ) required that multiemployer plans that meet specified financial criteria must report to the IRS their financial condition as being in one of several categories. Multiemployer Plan Insolvencies by Year
As noted above, data from Schedule MB of Form 5500 for the 2015 plan year showed that 83 plans indicated that they were in critical and declining status and expected to become insolvent. The 25 Largest Multiemployer Plans
Plans with 75,000 or more participants, which were the 25 largest multiemployer DB pension plans (by the number of participants) in the 2015 plan year, are listed in Table 4 . For each plan, the table contains the number of participants, the zone status in 2015, the funded percentage, the amount of underfunding in the plan, and the amount of expected payments in the 2015 plan year. In total, these plans have 4.7 million participants, which is 44.4% of participants in multiemployer plans that filed Schedule MB in 2015. Schedule R, Part V, Line 13 of Form 5500 requires multiemployer DB plans to list employers that contribute more than 5% of that plan's total contributions (referred to in this report as "5% contributors"). Note that an employer's total contributions to all of the multiemployer plans to which it contributed could have been larger than the amount listed in Table 5 if the employer contributed to additional plans, but whose contributions to those other plans were less than 5% of a plan's total contributions. 5% Contributors in the Largest Critical and Declining Multiemployer DB Plans
Table 6 lists the 5% contributors in the 12 largest multiemployer DB plans that are in critical and declining status (ranked by the amount of total contributions to the plan for the 2015 plan year) and the number of plans in which each employer is a 5% contributor. | Multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plans are pensions sponsored by more than one employer and maintained as part of a collective bargaining agreement. With DB pensions, participants receive a monthly benefit in retirement that is based on a formula. With multiemployer DB pensions, the formula typically multiplies a dollar amount by the number of years of service the employee has worked for employers that participate in the DB plan.
Some DB pension plans have sufficient resources from which to pay their promised benefits. But, as a result of a variety of factors—such as changes in the unionized workforce and the 2007 to 2009 recession—many multiemployer DB plans are likely to become insolvent over the next 20 years and run out of funds from which to pay benefits owed to participants.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a U.S. government agency that insures the benefits of participants in private-sector DB pension plans. Although PBGC is projected to have sufficient resources to provide financial assistance through 2025 to smaller multiemployer DB plans, the projected insolvency of large multiemployer DB pension plans would likely result in a substantial strain on PBGC's multiemployer insurance program. In a report released in June 2017, PBGC indicated that the multiemployer insurance program is highly likely to become insolvent by 2025. In the absence of increased financial resources for PBGC, participants in insolvent multiemployer DB pension plans would likely see sharp reductions in their pension benefits.
This report's data are from the public use file of the Form 5500 annual disclosure for the 2015 plan year (the most recent year for which complete information is available). Nearly all private-sector pension plans (including multiemployer DB plans) are required to file Form 5500 with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Department of Labor (DOL), and PBGC. The Form 5500 information includes breakdowns on the number of plan participants, financial information about the plan, and details of companies providing services to the plan. Multiemployer DB plans specifically are required to report their financial condition as being in one of several categories (referred to as the plan's "zone status").
The insolvencies of these plans could affect the employers that contribute to multiemployer plans. For example, an employer in a plan that becomes insolvent plan might have to recognize the total amount of its future obligations to the plan, which could affect the employer's access to credit and, potentially, its participation in other multiemployer plans.
This report provides data on multiemployer DB plans categorized in several ways. First, the report categorizes the data based on plans' zone status in 2015. Next, it provides a year-by-year breakdown of the number of plans that are expected to become insolvent and the number of participants in those plans. It then provides information on the 25 largest multiemployer DB plans in 2015 (each plan has at least 75,000 participants). Finally, the report provides data on those employers whose plans indicate they contributed more than 5% of the plans' total contributions (referred to in this report as "5% contributors") in the 2015 plan year. It lists (1) the 5% contributors whose total contributions to multiemployer plans were at least $25 million and (2) the 5% contributors in the 12 largest multiemployer plans (as ranked by total contributions to the plan) that are in critical and declining status. |
crs_RL32747 | crs_RL32747_0 | Following the financial crisis, the budget deficit reached 10% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 and 9% of GDP in 2010, a level that cannot be sustained in the long run. Concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability depend on the projected future path of the budget, absent future policy changes. While the recent growth in the budget deficit was due to short-term developments unrelated to entitlement spending on the elderly, the projected path of the budget in the long run primarily depends on the future path of entitlement spending. Thus, the increases in spending are not projected to subside after the baby boomers have passed away. Projected spending increases from 4.8% of GDP in 2010 to 6.1% of GDP in 2035, whereas revenues are projected to stay fairly constant as a proportion of GDP. In CBO's projection, federal health spending increases from 5.6% in 2011 to as much as 10.3% in 2035. If the government financed its rising budget deficit by increasing the money supply, the rate of inflation would also increase significantly along with interest rates. The deficits projected under current policy would exceed private saving and cause national saving to become negative. Once a pay-as-you-go system is up and running and suffers an adverse demographic shift, there is no reform that can avoid placing a burden on some participants in the system by making some present or future generation receive less than past generations. Trust Funds Cannot Finance Future Benefits From a Government-Wide Perspective
According to law, when benefit costs of Social Security and Medicare Part A exceed income, their trust funds can be drawn down to finance benefits. Any policy change that reduced the current budget deficit would reduce the government's future fiscal gap; likewise, current budget deficits increase that fiscal gap. But making the transition to a prefunded system makes current generations worse off, because the prefunding must be financed either through higher taxes or lower benefits. Consequences of such an approach are that some medical spending would cease and some would be shifted to private spending and private insurance. If Social Security is maintained on a pay-as-you-go basis, tax increases rising to 1.4% of GDP are projected to be needed by 2035 (assuming, because of the overall budget shortfall, that general revenues are unavailable). If taxes were raised today and the proceeds not saved, then the tax increases required in the future would not be reduced. The retirement of the baby boomers, increased life expectancy, and the rising cost of health care are projected to increase spending without any commensurate increase in revenues. To keep the overall budget on a sustainable path over the next 50 years, either the projected rise in Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid spending will have to be contained, or tax revenues will have to be increased, or both. Grappling with the fiscal solvency issue is also complicated by the inability to bind future Congresses to a long-term spending path—even if policy changes that reduce spending or raise revenue are initially used to reduce the budget deficit, there is the risk that the fiscal improvement will be undone by future Congresses. What has already contributed to the fiscal imbalance is today's budget deficits, and the simplest and most concrete step that can be taken to reduce the fiscal gap is to reduce the current budget deficit. Debt-financed individual accounts, by themselves, are projected to worsen the fiscal outlook over the next 75 years and would not increase GDP or national saving. Medicare and Medicaid face much larger and more intractable financial problems than Social Security. | Following the financial crisis, the budget deficit reached 10% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 and 9% of GDP in 2010, a level that cannot be sustained in the long run. Concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability depend on the projected future path of the budget, absent future policy changes. While entitlement spending made little contribution to current budget deficits, the retirement of the baby boomers, rising life expectancy, and the rising cost of medical care result in projections of large and growing budget deficits over the next several decades. Social Security outlays are projected to rise from 4.8% of GDP today to 6.1% of GDP in 2035, and federal health outlays (mainly on Medicare and Medicaid) are projected to rise from 5.6% today to as much as 10.3% of GDP in 2035. These increases in spending are not expected to subside after the baby boomers have passed away. Without any corresponding rise in revenues, this spending path would maintain unsustainably large and persistent budget deficits, which would push up interest rates and the trade deficit, crowd out private investment spending, and ultimately cause fiscal crisis.
To avoid this outcome, taxes would need to be raised or expenditures would need to be reduced. Altering taxes and benefits ahead of time would reduce the size of adjustments required in the future, if the proceeds were used to increase national saving. (Making changes ahead of time would also allow individuals time to adjust their private saving behavior.) National saving can be increased by reducing the budget deficit. But if the budget savings is subsequently offset by new spending or tax cuts, the government's ability to finance future benefits will not have improved. Individual accounts financed by increasing the budget deficit would not increase national saving or reduce the government's fiscal imbalance, and could exacerbate that imbalance over the 75-year projection.
Relatively small tax increases or benefit reductions could return Social Security to long-run solvency. Restraining the growth in Medicare and Medicaid spending is more uncertain and difficult, however. The projected increase in spending is driven more by medical spending outpacing general spending increases than by demographic change. But it is uncertain how to restrain cost growth because much of it is the result of technological innovation that makes new and expensive treatments available. If future medical spending grows more slowly than projected, then the long-term budget outlook improves dramatically. From a government-wide perspective, Social Security or Medicare trust fund assets cannot help finance future benefits because they are redeemed with general revenues at a time when the overall budget is in deficit.
The reason revenues are not projected to rise along with outlays is that these programs are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis: current workers finance the benefits of current retirees. In the future, there will be fewer workers per retiree. Once a pay-as-you-go system is up and running and faced with an adverse demographic shift, there is no reform that can avoid making some present or future generation receive less than past generations. Under current policy, future generations will be made worse off by higher taxes or lower benefits. Under a reform that increases national saving, some of that burden would be shifted to current generations. Overall, current budget deficits negate the system's limited existing prefunding, exacerbating the future fiscal shortfall. While entitlement spending on the elderly is the major driver behind future deficits, it played little part in the growth of the current budget deficit to unsustainable levels. Reducing the current deficit is the most straightforward and concrete step that can be taken today to reduce the future shortfall. |
crs_R44673 | crs_R44673_0 | Introduction
Security cooperation provisions in the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) have escalated ongoing debates over U.S. security sector assistance to foreign countries and raised questions regarding whether existing authorities are able to meet current and evolving requirements. Since World War II, the U.S. Department of State has served as the lead agency in guiding U.S. security assistance to foreign countries, with long-standing authorities codified in Title 22 (Foreign Relations) of the U.S. Code and funded through congressional appropriations to the State Department. Over time, however, and particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has granted DOD new authorities in annual NDAAs and in Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code to engage in "security cooperation" with foreign militaries and other security forces—now considered by DOD to be an "important tool" for executing its national security responsibilities and "an integral element of the DOD mission." The incremental nature of Congress's adjustments to DOD's Title 10 authorities, however, has resulted in some 80 or more provisions that are described as an unwieldy "patchwork," which complicates the management, application, and oversight of such engagements. Congress enacted many of these DOD authorities to respond to emerging threats, but also imposed limits on their scope, application, and duration, sometimes based on country- or region-specific conditions and concerns. Provisions in the FY2017 NDAA, particularly those in the Senate-passed version of the bill ( S. 2943 ), could also alter the way in which DOD conducts security cooperation programming, the relationship between DOD and the State Department on security cooperation and security sector assistance matters, and Congress's oversight of related funding and programming. Security Cooperation "Reform" Proposals in the FY2017 NDAA
In April 2016, following a review of its security cooperation authorities, DOD formally submitted 10 proposals for the FY2017 NDAA to Congress that would consolidate several authorities already located in Title 10 of the U.S. Code and codify other temporary authorities and reporting requirements into a new chapter within Title 10, entitled "Security Cooperation." The House-passed version of the FY2017 NDAA, H.R. In addition, S. 2943 offered provisions that would centralize all DOD security cooperation programs under a new funding mechanism; create a professionalized security cooperation workforce; support budgeting transparency; and require assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of security cooperation programs and activities. Proposals would also variously alter the statutorily required role of the State Department in overseeing security cooperation programs by changing existing requirements that the Secretary of State approve or jointly formulate certain existing DOD programs and activities. In July 2016, the FY2017 NDAA went to conference to resolve differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions, and the lame duck session beginning in November is expected to address the NDAA conference report. Key Proposed Changes
As part of the proposed enactment of a new chapter in Title 10 of the U.S. Code devoted specifically to security cooperation, nearly 60 existing provisions in Title 10 or public law may variously be transferred, codified, modified, consolidated, repealed, or otherwise affected. 2282 on "Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Security Forces" with a new permanent authority that is much broader. 10 U.S.C. 4909 . Changes to Broaden the Scope of Existing DOD Authorities
In addition to proposed changes to DOD's "global train and equip" authority, other proposals, particularly those envisioned by DOD and S. 2943 , would substantively expand the scope of DOD's existing authorities to conduct security cooperation program and activities in several respects. Examples of such changes include the following:
Expanding the purposes for which security cooperation is authorized . Expanding authorized activities. Increasing the types of foreign personnel that can b enefit from DOD engagement . Changing funding limits and related provisions. In particular, despite broad recognition that several of the Senate-proposed provisions could improve the execution and administration of security cooperation programs and activities, some indicate that the next Administration may require longer timeframes for (1) DOD and the State Department to develop regulations for the coordination of security cooperation and security assistance programs and activities, (2) DSCA to administer the changes envisioned by the security cooperation proposals, and (3) DOD to establish and use a central funding mechanism for building foreign security forces capacity through the SCEF. Others have emerged as flashpoints in a broader debate over DOD's role in security cooperation. While the conference report is not yet released, it is expected to be brought before the House and Senate during the lame duck session. Many anticipate that security cooperation policy questions will continue to challenge policymakers in the next Administration and the 115 th Congress. | During the lame duck session, the 114th Congress is expected to consider various provisions in the annual defense authorization bill that address U.S. security sector cooperation. If enacted, the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) could significantly alter the way in which the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) engages and partners with foreign security forces.
Policy Debate in Context
Successive U.S. Administrations have emphasized the importance of strengthening foreign military partnerships to achieve shared security goals. Over time, the legal authorities underpinning some of these efforts have moved beyond the "traditional" suite of foreign assistance programs authorized in Title 22 (Foreign Relations) of the U.S. Code, which are overseen by the U.S. Department of State and often implemented by DOD. In support of such a shift, Congress has incrementally provided DOD with some 80 or more authorities, apart from those in Title 22, to interact with foreign security forces and defense ministries and respond to emerging threats.
These authorities, enacted through NDAAs and amendments to Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code, have enabled DOD to pursue a wider range of direct engagements with foreign partners—collectively described by DOD as "security cooperation." These authorities, however, vary in scope, application, duration, and reporting requirements. Congress has also imposed limits based on country- or region-specific conditions and concerns.
Proposals in the FY2017 NDAA
In April 2016, DOD submitted 10 proposals to Congress, seeking to address what it describes as an unwieldy "patchwork" of security cooperation authorities. Responding to DOD's proposals, both the House and Senate versions of the FY2017 NDAA (H.R. 4909 and S. 2943, respectively) contain provisions intended to bring greater coherence to DOD's security cooperation enterprise.
Central to these proposals is a new chapter in Title 10 on "Security Cooperation." As part of the proposed changes, nearly 60 existing provisions in Title 10 or public law would be affected or modified. Proposals would also variously alter the statutorily required role of the State Department in overseeing and approving security cooperation programs. Some proposals would substantively change the scope of DOD's existing authorities by
expanding the purposes for which security cooperation is authorized; expanding authorized activities; broadening the geographical scope of security cooperation; increasing the types of foreign personnel that can benefit from DOD engagement; and changing funding limits and related provisions.
S. 2943 contains some of the most far-reaching changes, particularly in its replacement of 10 U.S.C. 2282 ("Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Security Forces") with a broader authority. S. 2943 would additionally offer new provisions, including several that aim to enable DOD to better manage security cooperation through
a new funding mechanism called the "Security Cooperation Enhancement Fund"; improved workforce training through a "Security Cooperation Workforce Development Program"; enhanced budgeting transparency and reporting requirements to Congress; and required assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.
Outlook
Some of the proposed provisions in the FY2017 NDAA have broad appeal, while others have emerged as flashpoints in a larger debate over DOD's role in security sector assistance. The FY2017 NDAA also raises questions over whether security cooperation policy architecture is adequately structured to meet current and evolving requirements and whether the mechanisms of congressional oversight are adequately tailored to current levels of activity.
The FY2017 NDAA went to conference on July 8, 2016. The conference report, while not yet public, is expected to be brought before both the House and Senate when the 114th Congress returns from recess in November 2016. Beyond the FY2017 NDAA, many analysts anticipate that security cooperation issues will continue to feature on the policymaking agenda in the next Administration and the 115th Congress.
For further reading on broader security sector assistance debates, see CRS Report R44444, Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense; CRS Report R44602, DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues; and CRS Report R44313, What Is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress. |
crs_RS21643 | crs_RS21643_0 | Notwithstanding changes which have occurred over time (1) , the Select Committee on HomelandSecurity has been charged with conducting a review of House rules, including Rule X, as they apply to homelandsecurity matters,and recommending changes to the Rules Committee no later than September 30, 2004. Jurisdictions Parallel Between House and Senate. 190 , to study the need for joint rules and procedures). | On January 7, 2003, the House created a Select Committee on Homeland Security withlegislative and oversight jurisdiction over the newly created Department of Homeland Security. The selectcommittee is alsomandated to study House rules, including Rule X, as they apply to homeland security matters, and to recommendchanges to theHouse Rules Committee no later than September 30, 2004. This report briefly addresses jurisdiction and referralreform options. Itwill be updated if events warrant. |
crs_RL34239 | crs_RL34239_0 | The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct, P.L. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 farm bill, P.L. Key Elements of EISA and the 2008 Farm Bill
The following table provides a side-by-side comparison of biofuels-related provisions in EISA with the enacted farm bill—the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008. Both bills cover a wide range of energy and agricultural topics in addition to biofuels. Key biofuels-related provisions of EISA and the 2008 farm bill include:
a major expansion of the renewable fuel standard (RFS) established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ) [EISA]; expansion and/or modification of tax credits for ethanol [farm bill]; grants and loan guarantees for biofuels (especially cellulosic) research, development, deployment, and production [EISA, farm bill]; studies of the potential for ethanol pipeline transportation, expanded biofuel use, market and environmental impacts of increased biofuel use, and the effects of biodiesel on engines [EISA, farm bill]; expansion of biofuel feedstock availability [farm bill]; reauthorization of biofuels research and development at the U.S. Department of Energy [EISA] and the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Environmental Protection Agency [farm bill]; and reduction of the blender tax credit for corn-based ethanol, a new production tax credit for cellulosic ethanol, and continuation of the import duty on ethanol [farm bill]. | The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140), also known as the 2007 energy bill, significantly expands existing programs to promote biofuels. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246), also known as the 2008 farm bill, contains a distinct energy title (Title IX) that covers a wide range of energy and agricultural topics with extensive attention to biofuels, including corn-starch based ethanol, cellulosic ethanol, and biodiesel. Research provisions relating to renewable energy are found in Title VII and tax provisions are found in Title XV of the farm bill.
Key biofuels-related provisions of EISA and the 2008 farm bill include:
a major expansion of the renewable fuel standard (RFS) established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) [EISA]; expansion and/or modification of tax credits for ethanol [farm bill]; grants and loan guarantees for biofuels (especially cellulosic) research, development, deployment, and production [EISA, farm bill]; studies of the potential for ethanol pipeline transportation, expanded biofuel use, market and environmental impacts of increased biofuel use, and the effects of biodiesel on engines [EISA, farm bill]; expansion of biofuel feedstock availability [farm bill]; reauthorization of biofuels research and development at the U.S. Department of Energy [EISA] and the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Environmental Protection Agency [farm bill]; and reduction of the blender tax credit for corn-based ethanol, a new production tax credit for cellulosic ethanol, and continuation of the import duty on ethanol [farm bill].
This report includes information from CRS Report RL34130, Renewable Energy Policy in the 2008 Farm Bill, by Tom Capehart, and CRS Report RL34136, Biofuels Provisions in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140), H.R. 3221, and H.R. 6: A Side-by-Side Comparison, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41314 | crs_R41314_0 | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. This report provides a brief overview of GINA, an overview of relevant ACA and GINA provisions relating to the provision of health insurance through the private market, an overview of relevant ACA and GINA provisions relating to the implementation of employer wellness programs, and statutory analysis of the potential interactions between the related provisions in both laws. Conclusion
As noted above, both GINA and the ACA contain provisions affecting certain elements of health insurance, as well as wellness programs. GINA is a civil rights statute and has as its purpose the prohibition of discrimination against individuals on the basis of genetic information. In order to effectuate this prohibition, GINA not only contains certain requirements for health insurance and a general prohibition of employment discrimination provisions, but also has strong privacy protections. On the other hand, the ACA is comprehensive health care legislation that is intended to, among other things, enhance consumer protections in the private health insurance market and expand health coverage. The ACA, the more recent statute, does not specifically amend GINA and also does not reference GINA's requirements. | Upon the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), as amended, certain questions have been raised about how the ACA might affect existing law. One such existing law, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), is a civil rights statute and has as its purpose the prohibition of discrimination against individuals on the basis of genetic information. In order to effectuate this prohibition, GINA not only contains certain requirements for health insurance and a general prohibition of employment discrimination provisions, but also has strong privacy protections. On the other hand, the ACA is comprehensive health care legislation that is intended to, among other things, enhance consumer protections in the private health insurance market. Both GINA and the ACA contain provisions affecting certain elements of health insurance, as well as employment-based wellness programs. The ACA, the more recent statute, does not specifically amend GINA and also does not reference GINA's requirements. The two laws serve different but complementary purposes, and there is no explicit conflict or contradiction in their terms. Still, the interaction of these two acts may be analyzed.
This report provides a brief overview of GINA; an overview of relevant ACA and GINA provisions relating to the provision of health insurance through the private market and the implementation of employer wellness programs; and statutory analysis of the potential interactions between the related provisions in both laws. |
crs_R44093 | crs_R44093_0 | Much attention has been focused on the use of water to grow certain agricultural crops in California, given current drought conditions in the state and mandatory cutbacks for non-agricultural water users. Most media attention has focused on certain orchard crops, such as tree nuts and vineyard crops, as well as some grain and pasture crops used to support California's meat and dairy industries. These reports frequently conflict with primary data sources, resulting in confusion over the state of agricultural production and irrigated water use in the California. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) indicates that roughly 60% is used for the state's agricultural sectors; the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) indicates roughly 40%. Congressional interest in California agricultural water use centers largely on the operation of the Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project, which supplies water to numerous agricultural and municipal contractors, some or much of it at a low cost, as well as on U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) support for individual crops and farmers. Congress may also be interested in broader implications of decreased agricultural production and/or lack of water availability throughout the state under certain water supply scenarios. In 2012, California's farm-level sales totaled nearly $45 billion and accounted for nearly 11% of total U.S. farm-level sales ( Figure 2 ). USDA ranks five counties—Tulare, Kern, Fresno, Monterey, and Merced—as among the leading agricultural counties in the United States, with a reported $28.7 billion in farm sales. Four of these counties receive water from the federal Central Valley Project (CVP), which has reduced deliveries in recent years due to drought and environmental factors. Among individual crops, there has been a continued shift toward growing more permanent orchard crops in some parts of California. Orchard crops cannot be fallowed in dry years without loss of investment. In contrast, most vegetables and other row crops are annual crops that are both sown and harvested during the same production year, sometimes more than once. From 2004 to 2013, overall harvested acres increased for almonds, walnuts, pistachios, raisins, grapes, berries, cherries, pomegranates, and olives, but also for certain grain and feed crops ( Table 3 ). During the same period, overall harvested acreage decreased for some field crops (cotton, alfalfa, rice, wheat) but also for certain orchard crops (wine grapes and some citrus and tree fruits). The shift to growing more permanent orchard crops appears to be largely market-driven. Estimates of total water use in California and the amount and share of water used for irrigation agriculture vary depending on the data source and methodology used. Water use for agricultural irrigation is estimated at 33 MAF, or about 41% of total use in a normal water year ( Figure 6 ). This estimate is also based on available data for 2010. These estimates differ from other widely cited estimates that 80% of California's available water supplies are for agricultural use as reported in media and news reports. Differences among the various estimates of water supply and use are largely based on different survey methods and assumptions, including the baseline amount of water estimated for use (e.g., what constitutes "available" supplies). USDA's 2013 Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey reports that, nationally, California has the largest number of irrigated farmed acres compared to other states and accounts for about one-fourth of total applied acre-feet of irrigated water in the United States. These data indicate that of total irrigated acres harvested in California about 31% of irrigated acres were land in orchards and 18% were land in vegetables. Another 46% of irrigated acres harvested were land in alfalfa, hay, pastureland, and grain crops (including rice, corn, and cotton). | California ranks as the leading agricultural state in the United States in terms of farm-level sales. In 2012, California's farm-level sales totaled nearly $45 billion and accounted for 11% of total U.S. agricultural sales. Five counties—Tulare, Kern, Fresno, Monterey, and Merced—rank among the leading agricultural counties in the nation.
Given current drought conditions in California, however, there has been much attention on the use of water to grow agricultural crops in the state. Depending on the data source, irrigated agriculture accounts for roughly 40% to 80% of total water supplies. Such discrepancies are largely based on different survey methods and assumptions, including the baseline amount of water estimated for use (e.g., what constitutes "available" supplies). Two primary data sources are the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the California Department of Water Resources (DWR). USGS estimates water use for agricultural irrigation in California at 25.8 million acre-feet (MAF), accounting for 61% of USGS's estimates of total withdrawals. DWR estimates water use withdrawals for agricultural irrigation at 33 MAF, or about 41% of total use. Both of these estimates are based on available data for 2010. These estimates differ from other widely cited estimates indicating that agricultural use accounts for 80% of California's available water supplies, as reported in media and news reports.
Attention has also focused on trends in California toward growing more permanent orchard crops, such as fruit and nut trees and vineyard crops, as well as production of grain and pasture crops, much of which is used to support the state's meat and dairy industries. Orchard crops refer to tree or vineyard crops that are planted once, require continuous watering to reach maturation, and cannot be fallowed during dry years without loss of investment. In contrast, most vegetables and other row crops (including grain and pasture crops) are annual crops that are sown and harvested during the same production year, sometimes more than once, and may be fallowed in dry years. Between 2004 and 2013, overall harvested acres in California increased for almonds, walnuts, pistachios, raisins, grapes, berries, cherries, pomegranates, and olives, but also for corn. During the same period, overall harvested acreage decreased for some field crops (cotton, alfalfa, rice, wheat), but also for certain orchard crops (wine grapes and some citrus and tree fruits). This shift to growing more permanent crops, especially tree nuts, appears to be largely market-driven.
The availability of irrigation water has been a major factor in the development of California's agricultural production. California has the largest number of irrigated farmed acres compared to other states and accounts for about one-fourth of total applied acre-feet of irrigated water in the United States. Water use per acre in California is also high compared to other states. Available data for 2013 indicate that, of total irrigated acres harvested in California, about 31% of irrigated acres were land in orchards and 18% were land in vegetables. Another 46% of irrigated acres harvested were land in alfalfa, hay, pastureland, rice, corn, and cotton.
Congressional interest in California agriculture and water use centers largely on the Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project (CVP), which supplies water to numerous agricultural and municipal contractors. In recent years, the CVP has cut back water deliveries due to drought and environmental factors. Congress also authorizes and oversees U.S. Department of Agriculture support for individual crops and farmers, and some Members have expressed concern over the broader implications of decreased agricultural production and/or lack of water availability throughout the state. |
crs_RL33824 | crs_RL33824_0 | Proposed Legislation and Rule Change
A variety of proposals were made in the 110 th Congress regarding granting the Delegate of the District of Columbia voting rights in the House. 78 , which proposed House Rule changes allowing the District of Columbia delegate (in addition to the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico and the delegates from American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands) to vote in the Committee of the Whole, subject to a revote in the full House if such votes proved decisive. H.Res. 78 was approved by the House on January 24, 2007. Then, on April 19, 2007, Congress passed a bill introduced by Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton, H.R. 1905 , the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007, which would have granted the District a voting representative in the full House. A similar bill, S. 1257 , was considered by the Senate on September 18 of that year, but a motion to invoke cloture failed by a vote of 57-42. Similar bills to give the Delegate a vote in the Full House— H.R. 157 and S. 160 —have been introduced in the 111 th Congress. S. 160 was approved by the Senate on February 26, 2009, by a vote of 61-37. 78 are similar to amendments to the House Rules that were in effect during the 103 rd Congress. H.R. It was soon challenged, but it was upheld at both the District Court and the Court of Appeals level. It would appear, however, that the proposal was upheld primarily because of the provision calling for a revote when the vote of the delegates or residents was decisive in the Committee of the Whole. The opinions of the Justices in Tidewater Transfer Co. appear to be no different. Arguably, granting the Delegate a vote in the House involves an extension of a fundamental right. Assuming that the Delegate for the District of Columbia could not cast a vote in the full House, a separate question arises as to whether, as provided for by the House Rules amended by H.Res. Conclusion
In sum, it is difficult to identify either constitutional text or existing case law which would directly support the allocation by Congress of the power to vote in the full House on the District of Columbia Delegate. Further, that case law which does exist would seem to indicate that not only is the District of Columbia not a "state" for purposes of representation, but that congressional power over the District of Columbia does not represent a sufficient power to grant congressional representation. In particular, at least six of the Justices who participated in what appears to be the most relevant Supreme Court case, National Mutual Insurance Co. of the District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Co. , authored opinions rejecting the proposition that Congress's power under the District Clause was sufficient to effectuate structural changes to the political structures of the federal government. Further, the remaining three Justices, who found that Congress could grant diversity jurisdiction to District of Columbia citizens despite the lack of such jurisdiction under Article III, specifically limited their opinion to instances where there was no extension of any fundamental right nor substantial disturbance of the existing federalism structure. To the extent that providing District residents with House representation could be so characterized, then one could argue that all nine Justices would have found the instant proposal to be unconstitutional. Although not beyond question, it would appear likely that Congress does not have authority to grant voting representation in the House of Representatives to the District of Columbia as contemplated by H.R. On the other hand, because the provisions of H.Res. 78 allowing Delegates a vote in the Committee of the Whole would be largely symbolic, these amendments to the House Rules are likely to pass constitutional muster. | A variety of proposals were made in the 110th Congress regarding granting the Delegate of the District of Columbia voting rights in the House. On January 24, 2007, the House approved H.Res. 78, which changed the House Rules to allow the D.C. delegate (in addition to the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico and the delegates from American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands) to vote in the Committee of the Whole, subject to a revote in the full House if such votes proved decisive. A bill introduced by Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton, H.R. 1905, the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007, would have given the District of Columbia Delegate a vote in the Full House. On April 19, 2007, H.R. 1905 passed the House by a vote of 241 to 177. A related bill, S. 1257, was considered by the Senate on September 18 of that year, but a motion to invoke cloture failed by a vote of 57-42. Similar bills to give the Delegate a vote in the Full House—H.R. 157 and S. 160—have been introduced in the 111th Congress. S. 160 was approved by the Senate on February 26, 2009, by a vote of 61-37.
These two approaches appeared to raise separate, but related, constitutional issues. As to granting the Delegate a vote in the full House, it is difficult to identify either constitutional text or existing case law that would directly support the allocation by statute of the power to vote in the full House to the District of Columbia Delegate. Further, that case law that does exist would seem to indicate that not only is the District of Columbia not a "state" for purposes of representation, but that congressional power over the District of Columbia does not represent a sufficient power to grant congressional representation. In particular, at least six of the Justices who participated in what appears to be the most relevant Supreme Court case on this issue, National Mutual Insurance Co. of the District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Co., authored opinions rejecting the proposition that Congress's power under the District Clause was sufficient to effectuate structural changes to the federal government. Further, the remaining three Justices, who found that Congress could grant diversity jurisdiction to District of Columbia citizens despite the lack of such jurisdiction in Article III, specifically limited their opinion to instances where the legislation in question did not involve the extension of fundamental rights or substantially disturb the political balance between the federal government and the states. To the extent that granting the Delegate a vote in the house would be found to meet these distinguishing criteria, all nine Justices in Tidewater Transfer Co. would arguably have found the instant proposal to be unconstitutional.
H.Res. 78, on the other hand, is similar to amendments to the House Rules that were adopted during the 103rd Congress and survived judicial scrutiny at both the District Court and the Court of Appeals level. It would appear, however, that these amendments were upheld primarily because of the provision calling for a revote by the full House when the vote of the delegates was decisive in the Committee of the Whole. In conclusion, although not beyond question, it would appear likely that Congress does not have authority to grant voting representation in the House of Representatives to the Delegate from the District of Columbia as contemplated under H.R. 1905. As the revote provisions provided for in H.Res. 78 would render the Delegate's vote in the Committee of the Whole largely symbolic, however, the amendments to the House Rules would be likely to pass constitutional muster. |
crs_RS20968 | crs_RS20968_0 | It became law as P.L. 107-43 onSeptember28, 2001. During the Senate debate, Senator Phil Gramm warned that he will oppose any effort to turn theU.S.-JordanFTA into a model for how future trade agreements should deal with worker rights (and environmental protectionissues). The Larger Debate About Including Worker Rights Provisions in Trade Agreements
The labor provisions of the U.S.-Jordan FTA and reaction to them can also be viewed in the context of the larger ongoingdebate in Congress about the linkage of worker rights and trade. Underthat authority, NAFTA was negotiated with its labor side agreement. Stakeholders in favor of including labor provisions in the body of trade agreements argue in favor of using the U.S.-JordanFTA labor provisions as a model for other trade agreements. Comparison of Key Provisions of U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA | The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA), implemented as P.L. 107-43, which went into effect December 17, 2001, breaks new ground by including multiple worker rights provisions inthe bodyof a U.S. trade agreement, rather than as a side agreement, for the first time. For this reason, it adds somecontroversy to thecongressional debate over whether worker rights provisions should be included in future trade agreements. Someobserverseye this configuration of worker rights protections as a model for future trade agreements; others view it as aone-timeoccurrence justified only because Jordan has a strong tradition of labor protections; still others oppose the inclusionof laborprovisions in trade agreements under any circumstances. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32898 | crs_RL32898_0 | For FY2006, the Bush Administration asked Congress to provide $11.649 billion inappropriated funds for Treasury operations -- or 3.8% more than the amount enacted for FY2005 (see Table 1 ). Once again, the vast share of this requested amount was to go to the IRS, whose budgetwould have totaled $10.679 billion. The other departmental offices and bureaus would havereceived the following amounts: departmental offices, $195 million; departmental systems andcapital investments, $24 million; Office of Inspector General, $17 million; TIGTA, $133 million;Air Transportation Stabilization program, $3 million; CDFI, $8 million; Treasury building and annexrepair and restoration, $10 million; FinCEN, $74 million; Financial Management Service, $236million; Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, $62 million; and Bureau of the Public Debt,$177 million. All accounts -- except those for departmental systems and capital investments andTreasury building and annex repair and restoration -- would have been funded at higher levels thanin FY2005. 3058 ) to provide funding for Treasury and a handful of other federal agencies inFY2006. Under the conference agreement on H.R. This section examines some of the key policy issuesraised by the Administration's budget request for Treasury operations except the IRS. Administration of the Community Development FinancialInstitutions Fund. To bring its proposed budget into closer alignment with IRS's major programs and most recentstrategic plan, the Administration proposed that the agency's budget be restructured beginningin FY2006. Under the proposal, the number of appropriations accounts in the IRS budgetwould be reduced from six to three: tax administration and operations (TAO), BSM, andadministration of the health insurance tax credit. For FY2006, the Administration sought $10.460 billion in appropriated funds forTAO -- or about 5% more than was spent for this purpose in FY2005; $199 million for BSM-- or 2% less than the amount enacted for FY2005; and $20 million for administration of thehealth insurance tax credit -- or 43% less than the amount enacted for FY2005. Comparedto the FY2005 budget, the Administration sought $500 million more for enforcement but $38million less for taxpayer service and $4 million less for BSM. As a result, it was difficult to make meaningful comparisons between theAdministration's budget request and the funding for IRS operations included in theHouse-passed version of H.R. 3058, the IRSwould have received $4.137 billion for processing, assistance, and management (or $80million more than the amount enacted for FY2005 but $45 million less than the amountapproved by the House); $4.726 billion for tax law enforcement (or $362 million more thanthe amount enacted for FY2005 and $145 million more than the amount approved by theHouse); $1.598 billion for information systems (or $20 million more than the amount enactedfor FY2005 and $23 million more than the amount approved by the House); $199 million forthe BSM program (or $4 million less than the amount enacted for FY2005 but the sameamount requested by the Administration and approved by the House); and $20 million foradministering the health insurance tax credit (or $15 million less than the amount enacted forFY2005 but the same amount requested by the Administration and approved by the House). On November 18, it released a conference report ( H.Rept. President Bush signed the measure on November30. Issues for Congress
The Administration's budget request for the IRS in FY2006 raised several policyissues. | The Treasury Department performs a host of critical functions as a federal agency. Foremostamong them are protecting the nation's financial system from a variety of financial crimes,administering the tax code and collecting tax revenue, managing and accounting for the public debt,administering the government's finances, and regulating and supervising financial institutions.
This report examines the President's budget request for Treasury and the Internal RevenueService (IRS) in FY2006, some of the key policy issues it raised, and congressional action on therequest. It will not be updated again.
For FY2006, the Bush Administration asked Congress to provide $11.648 billion inappropriated funds for Treasury, or 3.8% more than the amount enacted for FY2005. As usual, thevast share of the proposed budget was to go to the IRS, which would have received $10.679 billion. The remaining departmental offices and bureaus would have received the following amounts:departmental offices, $195 million; departmental systems and capital investments, $24 million;Office of Inspector General, $17 million; Inspector General for Tax Administration, $133 million;Air Transportation Stabilization program, $3 million; Community Development FinancialInstitutions Fund, $8 million; Treasury building and annex repair and restoration, $8 million;Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, $74 million; Financial Management service, $236 million;Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, $91 million; and the Bureau of the Public Debt, $177million.
The Administration budget request for IRS operations ($10.679 billion) in FY2006 was 4.3%more than the amount enacted for FY2005. To better align the request with the IRS's currentfive-year strategic plan, the Administration sought to revise the agency's budget beginning inFY2006. Under its proposal, the number of accounts would be reduced from six to three: taxadministration and operations (TAO), business systems modernization (BSM), and administrationof the health insurance tax credit. For FY2006, the Administration asked that $10.460 billion bespent on TAO, or 4.6% more than was spent for this purpose in FY2005; $199 million on BSM, or2.3% less than the amount enacted for FY2005; and $20 million on administration of the health caretax credit, or 41.5% less than the amount enacted for the current fiscal year. Compared to theamounts enacted for FY2005, the Administration sought $500 million more for enforcement but $39million less for taxpayer service and $4 million less for BSM.
The House and Senate approved somewhat differing versions of an FY2006 appropriationsbill ( H.R. 3058 ) that included Treasury and the IRS. As a result, the differences hadto be resolved in a conference committee. Under the conference agreement passed by the House andSenate on November 18, 2005, and signed by President Bush on November 30, Treasury is receiving$11.689 billion in funding (or about $40 million more than the amount requested by theAdministration); nearly 91% of that amount, or $10.671 billion, is set aside for the IRS. |
crs_R41605 | crs_R41605_0 | The variety as well as consistency in committee rules is analyzed as these rules relate to legislative activities, principally hearings, oversight, and markups. Administrative provisions in House and committee rules are not analyzed in this report. Provisions of committee rules applicable to legislative activities are clustered by topic, rather than by House rule number. Rule XI, clause 2(a)(1) directs each standing committee to adopt "written rules governing its procedure." This paragraph continues: "Such rules … (B) may not be inconsistent with the Rules of the House or with those provisions of law having the force and effect of Rules of the House…." Rule XI, clause 1(a)(1)(A) in addition states: "The Rules of the House are the rules of its committees and subcommittees so far as applicable." Finally, Rule XI, clause 1(a)(1)(B) subordinates subcommittees to the committee of which they are a part: "Each subcommittee is a part of its committee and is subject to the authority and direction of that committee and to its rules, so far as applicable." Rule X contains the legislative and oversight jurisdiction of each standing committee, several clauses on committee procedures and operations, and a clause specifically addressing the jurisdiction and operation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Rule XII concerns the referral of legislation and other matters. Rule XIII addresses the filing and content of committee reports, and addresses privileged reports, with individual provisions applicable to privileged reports of the Committee on Rules. Among the aspects of committee rules that a committee member or staff member might examine to understand a committee's procedures are the following:
the role and authority of the committee's chair in scheduling meetings, referring legislation to and discharging it from subcommittees, issuing subpoenas, and taking other actions; the role and authority of the ranking minority member, for example, whether the chair may take specific actions without any involvement of the ranking minority member, after "notice" to that member, after "consultation" with that member, or with the "concurrence" of that member; the role and authority of the committee vis-à-vis the chair—whether specific actions by the committee may be taken only "by majority vote"; the role and authority of the minority party, for example, whether the presence of one or more members of the minority party will be required for a quorum for specific business; and the implementation of changes to House rules affecting committees, such as the change in the 112 th Congress (2011-2013), which required committee chairs to make available to committee members and the public at least 24 hours in advance of the markup the text of legislation to be marked up. Within the parameters of House rules, committees in their own rules may grant authority to or withhold it from their subcommittees. (See, below, " Scheduling Subcommittee Hearings and Meetings ," under " Scheduling Committees' Meetings and Hearings .") Committee Referral of Measures or Matters to Subcommittee, House Committee Rules, 114th Congress
Table 1 compares committee rules in the 114 th Congress across the 21 standing House committees on referring measures or matters to subcommittees. See also, below, " Reports "
Motions
Three motions specific to committees are authorized in Rule XI. There is not a specific House rule applicable to obtaining a vote in committee. | Rule XI, clause 2(a)(1) directs each standing committee to adopt "written rules governing its procedure." This paragraph continues: "Such rules … (B) may not be inconsistent with the Rules of the House or with those provisions of law having the force and effect of Rules of the House…." Rule XI, clause 1(a)(1)(A) in addition states: "The Rules of the House are the rules of its committees and subcommittees so far as applicable." Finally, Rule XI, clause 1(a)(1)(B) subordinates subcommittees to the committee of which they are a part: "Each subcommittee is a part of its committee and is subject to the authority and direction of that committee and to its rules, so far as applicable."
Many provisions of House rules applicable to committee procedures appear in Rule XI, which also includes procedures specifically applicable to the Committee on Ethics. Rule X contains the legislative and oversight jurisdiction of standing committees, several clauses on committee operations, and a clause specifically addressing the jurisdiction and operation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Rule XII concerns the referral of legislation and related matters. In addition to calendars, Rule XIII addresses the filing and content of committee reports.
Each House standing committee implements these rules, and select provisions of other House rules, in adopting its rules. Variety as well as consistency in committee rules is analyzed in this report as the rules relate to legislative activities, principally hearings, oversight, and markups. Administrative provisions in House and committee rules are not analyzed. Provisions of committee rules on legislative activities are clustered by topic, rather than by House rule number.
In adopting their rules for the 113th Congress, committees in some instances adopted House rules unchanged, and in other instances adapted House rules to their own needs where they had discretion to do so. Committee rules change incrementally from one Congress to the next, with a committee typically making several amendments to its rules from the preceding Congress. Variations in key committee rules are highlighted in five tables:
referring measures or matters to subcommittees—whether the chair may or must refer legislation to a subcommittee, the time frame within which a decision must be made, and where authority to discharge a subcommittee resides; scheduling hearings and meetings—committees' regular meeting day and time, authority to schedule additional meetings, and authority to cancel meetings; hearings—quorum requirements, extending witness questioning time, and order of questioning witnesses; subpoenas—committee authority, chair authority, ranking minority member authority, and notification to committee members of issuance of a subpoena; and record votes—obtaining a record vote, and postponing further proceedings when a record vote is requested.
See CRS Report RS20794, The Committee System in the U.S. Congress, by [author name scrubbed], for an explanation of the types of committees. See also CRS Report R40233, House Ad Hoc Select Committees with Legislative Authority: An Analysis, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report 96-708, Conference Committee and Related Procedures: An Introduction, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42746 | crs_R42746_0 | The newly elected Legco and Chief Executive will have the opportunity to consider further political reforms that could result in the election of the Chief Executive and the Legco members by universal suffrage in 2017 and 2020, respectively. The 2012 election results may have raised the risk of a political stalemate for democratic reforms in Hong Kong. The outcome of Hong Kong's 2012 elections matters to Congress for three key reasons. Second, Hong Kong's Basic Law, a quasi-constitution for the city passed by China's National People's Congress in April 1990, stipulates that the "ultimate aim" is the election of the Chief Executive and "all the members of the Legislative Council" by universal suffrage. The conduct of the 2012 elections and the possibility of additional political reforms are indicators of the Chinese government's commitment to the Basic Law and its support for the democratic reforms within a territory over which it exercises sovereignty. Third, some scholars speculate that Hong Kong may serve as a testing ground for possible democratic reforms in Mainland China, either as part of an officially recognized process or as the result of a populist movement such as occurred in 1989. For the Legislative Council, Section III of Annex II states:
With regard to the method for forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and its procedures for voting on bills and motions after 2007, if there is a need to amend the provisions of this Annex, such amendments must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record (emphasis added). Implications for Congress
The Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 states that it is U.S. policy to support democracy in Hong Kong. Congress has appropriated funds in the past to foster the development of civil society and democratic practices in Hong Kong. The 2012 Hong Kong election results and the upcoming discussion of future election reforms—including the involvement of the Chinese government—are factors that Congress may consider when deciding whether to allocate more assistance for the democratic practices in Hong Kong. In addition, Congress may conduct hearings or organize other events to examine and bring attention to the prospects for democracy in Hong Kong. | Hong Kong selected a new Chief Executive and Legislative Council (Legco) in March and September of 2012, respectively. Both elections delivered surprising results for different reasons. The eventual selection of Leung Chu-ying (CY Leung) as Chief Executive came after presumed front-runner Henry Tang Ying-yen ran into a series of personal scandals. The Legco election results surprised many as several of the traditional parties fared poorly while several new parties emerged victorious.
The 2012 elections in Hong Kong are important for the city's future prospect for democratic reforms because, under the territory's Basic Law, any changes in the election process for Chief Executive and Legco must be approved by two-thirds of the Legco members and receive the consent of the Chief Executive. Under the provision of a decision by China's Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued in December 2007, the soonest that the Chief Executive and all the Legco members can be elected by universal suffrage are the elections of 2017 and 2020, respectively. As such, the newly elected Legco and CY Leung will have the opportunity to propose and adopt election reforms that fulfill the "ultimate aim" of the election of Hong Kong's leaders by universal suffrage.
The outcome of Hong Kong's 2012 elections matters to Congress for three key reasons. First, the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 states that it is U.S. policy to support democracy in Hong Kong. Second, the conduct of the 2012 elections and the possibility of additional political reforms may be indicators of the Chinese government's commitment to the Basic Law and its support for the democratic reforms in areas where it exercises sovereignty. Third, some scholars speculate that Hong Kong may serve as a testing ground for possible democratic reforms in Mainland China.
Congress has appropriated funds in the past to foster the development of civil society and democratic practices in Hong Kong. The 2012 election results and the upcoming discussion of future election reforms—including the involvement of the Chinese government—are factors that Congress may consider when deciding whether to allocate more assistance for the democratic practices in Hong Kong. In addition, Congress may conduct hearings or organize other events to examine and bring attention to the prospects for democracy in Hong Kong. |
crs_RS22924 | crs_RS22924_0 | The experience of prior Congresses has shown that bills incorporating provisions that would reduce regulatory requirements on banks, thrifts, and credit unions tend to receive stronger support or less opposition than legislative proposals that address the industries separately. H.R. The legislation, like P.L. 109-351 , provides some, but not all, of the changes sought separately by advocates for the banking/thrift and the credit union industries. 6312 is enacted the industries' interests in regulatory relief are likely to continue. 6312
The Credit Union, Bank and Thrift Regulatory Relief Act of 2008 ( H.R. 6312 ) was introduced on June 19, 2008, by Representative Kanjorski, and was cosponsored by 3 members. The legislation passed the House on June 24, 2008 and on June 25, 2008 was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The following is an overview of the legislation. Savings Association Credit Card Banks. The proposal includes the requirement for a biennial report to Congress. 6312
The proposed Credit Union, Bank and Thrift Regulatory Relief Act of 2008 is viewed by many as a compromise between the positions taken by credit union and the banking industries. | Credit unions, banks and thrifts (savings associations) are subject to numerous safety, soundness, and consumer protection laws and regulations. Since 2001, both the banking/thrift and the credit union industries have worked with Congress to develop legislative proposals that would reduce existing regulatory requirements and what are seen as the burdens compliance enforcement places on depository financial institutions. During the 109th Congress, legislation was enacted (P.L. 109-351; 120 Stat. 1966) that provided some of the changes sought by the industries. The statute reduced regulatory requirements for all types of depository financial institutions. Both the banking/thrift and credit union industries remain interested in the regulatory relief provisions excluded from the law. Current legislation, the Credit Union, Bank, and Thrift Regulatory Relief Act of 2008 (H.R. 6312), would provide additional steps towards obtaining the package of regulatory relief originally sought. The legislation moved quickly through the House. H.R. 6312 was introduced on June 19, 2008, and on June 24, 2008, the bill was considered under suspension of the rules and passed by the House. On June 25, 2008, the legislation was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R40183 | crs_R40183_0 | The campaign activities of 501(c)(4) groups continue to receive significant scrutiny. These groups are among the entities operating with less restriction due to the Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United v. FEC . In that case, the Court invalidated the prohibitions in FECA on corporations using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures and electioneering communications. While 501(c)(4) organizations are operating with less restriction under FECA after Citizens United , there still remain important restrictions and requirements on these groups to engage in campaign activity under both FECA and the IRC. That is, FECA prohibits corporations from using their treasury funds to make contributions to candidates and parties, requiring them to establish a Political Action Committee (PAC) in order to do so; the IRC sets forth certain requirements related to maintaining tax-exempt status; and FECA requires a group whose major purpose is to elect federal candidates to register as a political committee, which means that it must raise and spend campaign funds subject to FECA's contribution limits, source restrictions, and disclosure requirements. Additionally, 501(c)(4) groups are subject to IRC and FECA reporting requirements. Second, the IRS has ruled that a group which primarily benefits partisan interests could jeopardize its 501(c)(4) status. While no statute expressly addresses the ability of 501(c)(4) groups to engage in campaign activity, this limitation is implicit in the statutory requirement in Section 501(c)(4) that organizations be "operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare." Applying the standard that campaign activity (along with any other non-exempt purpose activity) cannot be the organization's primary activity raises three basic questions: what does "primary" mean; what is considered campaign activity; and how are the organization's activities to be measured. A key source for the information is the Form 990, which groups must file annually with the IRS. Reporting Requirements
Internal Revenue Code
Under the IRC, 501(c)(4) organizations must generally file an annual information return (Form 990) with the IRS. However, any identifying information of the contributors listed on Schedule B is not subject to public disclosure. Additionally, the organization is required to disclose its donors who contributed at least $1,000. If an organization establishes a separate bank account, consisting only of donations from U.S. citizens and legal resident aliens made directly to the account for electioneering communications, then it is required to disclose only those donors who contributed at least $1,000 to the account. A Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulation provides an exception to the donor disclosure requirement for electioneering communications. The regulation permits corporations—including incorporated 501(c) organizations—and labor unions making disbursements for electioneering communications to disclose only the identity of each person who made a donation of at least $1,000 specifically "for the purpose of furthering" an electioneering communication. This regulation has been the topic of ongoing litigation. Independent Expenditures
FECA requires Section 501(c) organizations making "independent expenditures" that aggregate more than $250 in a calendar year to disclose whether an independent expenditure supports or opposes a candidate, whether it was made independently of a campaign, and the identity of each person who contributed more than $200 to the organization specifically "for the purpose of furthering" an independent expenditure. | The campaign activities of tax-exempt 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations continue to receive considerable attention. These groups operate with less restriction after the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC, which invalidated long-standing prohibitions in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) on corporations and labor unions using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures and electioneering communications. However, even after Citizens United, 501(c)(4) groups are still subject to regulation under FECA and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).
Under FECA, incorporated groups are prohibited from making political contributions and are still required to establish a political action committee (PAC) in order to do so. (In contrast to independent expenditures and electioneering communications, contributions are given to a candidate or political committee). Additionally, the claim is sometimes made that 501(c)(4) groups should be required to register as political committees under FECA. This is important because political committees must raise and spend funds subject to FECA contribution limits, source restrictions, and disclosure requirements.
Under the IRC, a Treasury regulation requires that 501(c)(4) organizations have the promotion of social welfare as their primary purpose. This means two things: (1) campaign activity (along with any other non-exempt purpose activity) cannot be the organization's primary activity and (2) a group that primarily benefits private partisan interests may jeopardize its 501(c)(4) status. Questions abound about these two restrictions and how they are applied (e.g., how is campaign activity measured?), and the IRS has been criticized for failing to issue guidance in this area.
501(c)(4) organizations are required to report information to the IRS and FEC. They are generally required to file an annual information return (Form 990) with the IRS. Information about campaign activity is reported on the form's Schedule C, which is subject to public disclosure. While large donors are reported on the form, no identifying information is required to be publicly disclosed. Additionally, groups making independent expenditures and electioneering communications must file reports with the FEC. Only those donors giving more than $200 specifically "for the purpose of furthering" an independent expenditure are disclosed. For electioneering communications, FECA requires the disclosure of donors who contributed at least $1,000; however, if the group establishes a separate bank account, consisting only of donations from U.S. citizens and legal resident aliens made directly to the account, then only those donors who contributed at least $1,000 to the account are disclosed. A Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulation provides an exception to the donor disclosure requirement for electioneering communications. The regulation permits corporations—including incorporated 501(c)(4) groups—and labor unions making disbursements for electioneering communications to disclose only the identity of each person who made a donation of at least $1,000 specifically "for the purpose of furthering" an electioneering communication. This regulation has been the topic of ongoing litigation, Center for Individual Freedom v. Van Hollen, which is currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. |
crs_RS22246 | crs_RS22246_0 | TANF Cash Welfare Benefit Programs
TANF is the major federal-state program providing cash assistance to needy families with children. Other Benefits and Services
In addition to ongoing cash welfare and emergency aid, TANF can fund a wide range of other social services for low-income families with children, such as child care, transportation aid, family preservation and support services, and similar types of services. Legislation to Respond to the Impact of Hurricane Katrina
Welfare programs are not usually associated with responses to natural disasters. However, the scope of Hurricane Katrina's displacement of families, the strain placed on human service agencies responding to this displacement, plus the flexibility allowed states to design programs under TANF, made the block grant a potential source of help to the victims of this disaster. P.L. | The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides grants to states to help them fund a wide variety of benefits and services to low-income families with children. TANF is best known for funding cash welfare benefits for families with children, but the block grant may also fund other benefits and services such as emergency payments, child care, transportation assistance, and other social services. Welfare programs are not usually associated with responses to natural disasters. However, the scope of Hurricane Katrina's displacement of families, the strain placed on responding human service agencies, plus the flexibility allowed states to design programs under TANF, made the block grant a potential source of help to the victims of this disaster. P.L. 109-68 provided some additional TANF funds and waived certain program requirements for states affected by Katrina. Under that act, all states were provided capped funding to aid evacuees from hurricane-damaged states. This report will be not be updated. |
crs_RS20555 | crs_RS20555_0 | Current Tax Law
Federal income tax laws provide certain allowances for the blind, the most important of which is the additional standard deduction amount allowed to legally blind taxpayers. Initially, in introducing the provision as a deduction in the Revenue Act of 1943, the House Ways and Means Committee stated "the committee has provided for a special deduction of $500 from the gross income of every blind person in order to cover the expenses resulting directly from blindness, such as the cost of readers and guides. The tax provision for the blind in the Revenue Act of 1948 was incorporated in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 , substantially unchanged. A comprehensive revision of the income tax code was made with enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986—designed to lead to a fairer, more efficient and simpler tax system. Both the standard deduction and additional standard deduction amount for blind and/or elderly taxpayers were indexed for inflation in future years. Thus, Congress in the 1986 tax act effectively targeted the tax benefits to lower and moderate income elderly and blind taxpayers by substituting an additional standard deduction amount for the additional personal exemption permitted under prior law. Thus, the extra standard deduction amount can be seen as an attempt to compensate the blind for these added living and business expenses. However, as discussed below, it may also be said that the additional standard deduction accorded the blind does not meet horizontal equity principles in that all taxpayers with equal net incomes are not treated equally. Many blind individuals have low incomes. | In the Revenue Act of 1943, a special $500 income tax deduction was first permitted the blind for expenses directly associated with readers and guides. This deduction for expenses evolved to a $600 personal exemption in the Revenue Act of 1948 so that the blind did not forfeit use of the standard deduction and so that the tax benefit could be reflected directly in the withholding tables. Congress attempted to target the tax benefit to low- and moderate-income blind individuals by replacing the tax exemption with an additional standard deduction amount with passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
The extra standard deduction amount provides tax relief that recognizes the increased costs of living and associated costs of employment for blind taxpayers. Since many blind taxpayers have low incomes, they are able to use the additional standard deduction amount provided under current tax law. However, this extra amount arguably does not meet the tax tests of horizontal equity and effectiveness. The provision has not been extended to other taxpayers with handicapping conditions because of administrative difficulties and the loss of additional federal tax revenues. This report will be updated in future years to reflect changes in law or in the additional standard deduction amount that is adjusted for inflation. |
crs_RL32971 | crs_RL32971_0 | Introduction
The Constitution establishes that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and counsels, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for and which shall be established by law." As a corollary to this general maxim, the Constitution provides further that "[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session." It is generally accepted that the clause was designed to enable the President to ensure the unfettered operation of the government during periods when the Senate was not in session and therefore unable to perform its advice and consent function. In addition to fostering administrative continuity, Presidents have exercised authority under the Recess Appointments Clause for political purposes, appointing officials who might have difficulty securing Senate conformation. While the President's exercise of the recess appointment power in any context may give rise to controversy, the use of the Recess Appointments Clause to appoint judges to temporary positions on Article III courts has emerged as a particularly contentious political issue. Article III Issues
Presidents have made over 300 recess appointments to the federal judiciary, including twelve to the Supreme Court, since the first Administration of George Washington. The practice of making such appointments lessened considerably after the Eisenhower Administration, with only four judicial recess appointments having occurred since 1960. Despite the controversy attendant to judicial recess appointments, the President's authority to make such appointments has been challenged only in a handful of cases, and the Supreme Court has consistently declined the opportunity to hear the issue. The court began its analysis by analyzing the structure of the Recess Appointments Clause, determining that "[t]he text of the United States Constitution authorizes recess appointments of judges to Article III courts." | Article II of the Constitution provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and counsels, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for and which shall be established by law." As a supplement to this authority, the Constitution further provides that "[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session." The Recess Appointments Clause was designed to enable the President to ensure the unfettered operation of the government during periods when the Senate was not in session and therefore unable to perform its advice and consent function. In addition to fostering administrative continuity, Presidents have exercised authority under the Recess Appointments Clause for political purposes, appointing officials who might be viewed unfavorably by the Senate.
While the President's exercise of the recess appointment power in any context may give rise to controversy, the use of the Recess Appointments Clause to appoint judges to temporary positions on Article III courts can be particularly politically contentious. Presidents have made over 300 recess appointments to the federal judiciary, including twelve to the Supreme Court, since the first Administration of George Washington. The practice of making such appointments lessened considerably after the Eisenhower Administration, with only four judicial recess appointments having occurred since 1960. Despite the controversy attendant to judicial recess appointments, the President's authority to make such appointments has been challenged only in a handful of instances, with the most recent litigation arising from President George W. Bush's recess appointment of William H. Pryor to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on February 20, 2004. This report provides an overview of the legal and constitutional issues pertaining to the recess appointment of judges to Article III courts, with a particular focus on the proceedings involving the appointment of Judge Pryor. |
crs_RL30234 | crs_RL30234_0 | Introduction
On June 30, 1999, U.S. and Canadian officials signed a new comprehensive agreement to resolve long-standing disputes and to ensure implementation of the conservation and harvest-sharing principles of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST). The provisions in this agreement's Annex IV outline, in detail, the fishery regimes to be followed by Canada and the United States in cooperatively managing the five species of Pacific salmon. Most chapters of Annex IV expired at the end of 2008, and discussions began in 2005 on its renegotiation. This report provides historical background about the PST, discusses issues that created difficulties in the regime, summarizes the 1999 salmon accord, and outlines issues relevant to the renegotiation of Annex IV. The 1999 Agreement (1) established abundance-based fishing regimes for the Pacific salmon fisheries under the jurisdiction of the PST; (2) created two bilaterally managed regional restoration and enhancement endowment funds to promote cooperation, improve fishery management, and aid stock and habitat enhancement efforts; and (3) included provisions to enhance bilateral cooperation, improve the scientific basis for salmon management, and apply institutional changes to the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC). On June 30, 1999, the United States and Canada formally signed the 1999 Agreement on Pacific Salmon. Decision-Making
The 1999 Agreement was reached within the framework of the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985 ( P.L. 7; 16 U.S.C. These regimes, which allow fishery harvest to vary from year to year, are designed to implement the conservation and harvest-sharing principles of the PST. Additionally under the agreement, two bilaterally managed regional restoration and enhancement endowment funds were established. Congressional appropriation of $140 million for the two Endowment Funds . Critics of U.S. Endangered Species Act. U.S. Concerns
Several complex issues challenged the PSC and the parties. The combined implementation of the 1985 PST and the 1999 Agreement continued to pose challenges. Several of these were considered in the renegotiation of the expiring Annex IV fisheries regimes. Most participants believed that the most difficult issue associated with the renegotiation concerned the fishery regime for Chinook salmon found in Chapter 3 of Annex IV. The problems arising from the status (e.g., U.S. endangered and threatened species listing) of certain runs of Chinook salmon in Washington, Oregon, Idaho and perhaps British Columbia posed particular challenges for the negotiators. An additional issue of concern to Canada was the increasing bycatch of Yukon River Chinook salmon by the U.S. pollock fishery in the Bering Sea concurrent with declining numbers of Chinook salmon migrating into Canada to spawn in Upper Yukon River tributaries. | The Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST) of 1985 requires the United States and Canada to develop periodic bilateral agreements to implement the PST's conservation and harvest-sharing principles. Beginning in 1993, long-standing disputes prevented such an agreement from being concluded. On June 30, 1999, after many years of heated diplomatic struggles, U.S. and Canadian officials reached a new comprehensive agreement. The 1999 Agreement (1) established abundance-based fishing regimes for the Pacific salmon fisheries under the jurisdiction of the PST; (2) created two bilaterally managed regional restoration and enhancement endowment funds to promote cooperation, improve fishery management, and aid stock and habitat enhancement efforts; and (3) included provisions to enhance bilateral cooperation, improve the scientific basis for salmon management, and apply institutional changes to the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC). Annex IV to the 1999 Agreement outlines, in detail, the fishery regimes to be followed by Canada and the United States in cooperatively managing the six species of anadromous Pacific salmon and trout. Before it expired at the end of 2008, the terms of Annex IV were renegotiated.
The 1999 conservation and harvest-sharing agreement was of interest to Congress for several reasons. Most notably, a congressional appropriation of $140 million was required to establish the agreement's two regional restoration and enhancement endowment funds. Provisions of the 1999 Agreement were implemented thorough additional authorizing language and amendment of the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. §§3631, et seq.). The 1999 Agreement under the PST regime has been implemented in accordance with existing U.S. laws pertaining to salmon conservation (e.g., Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act; Endangered Species Act). In addition, the agreement's implementation determines the quantity of fish available for commercial, recreational, and subsistence fisheries as well as Indian treaty allocations.
Many complex issues continue to challenge the PSC and the parties; several of these were addressed in the 2008 renegotiation of the Annex IV fisheries regimes. Some of the issues associated with the renegotiation included the fishery regime for Chinook salmon found in Chapter 3 of Annex IV. The problems arising from the status (e.g., U.S. endangered and threatened species listing) of certain runs of Chinook salmon in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and perhaps British Columbia posed particular challenges for the negotiators. Additional concerns arose from Canada over increasing bycatch of Chinook salmon by the U.S. pollock fishery in the Bering Sea, as many of these fish are bound for the Yukon River, including Canadian tributaries.
This report provides historical background about the PST, discusses issues that created difficulties in the regime, summarizes the 1999 accord, and analyzes issues considered during the renegotiation of Annex IV. The 111th Congress may conduct oversight of the renegotiated Agreement and its implications for U.S. salmon management. |
crs_RS22758 | crs_RS22758_0 | At the same time, however, there has been considerable public disagreement over precisely what kinds of ballistic missile systems Iran has or is developing itself or in cooperation with others. A brief overview of Iran's medium and short-range ballistic missile programs then follows. In February 2008, Iran reportedly launched a low-orbit research rocket in preparation for a later satellite launch. Some have reported that perhaps several dozen or more of these missile types may be deployed and operational. In mid-July 2008, Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles and rockets of varying ranges during military exercises. Various major international media retracted initial images of the missile launches because they were reportedly digitally altered. Bush Administration officials said Iran did not test new technologies or capabilities, but said the missile launches were evidence of the need for its proposed missile defense system in Europe. At the time, a Pentagon spokesman said he could not confirm the launch occurred, but that this was consistent with the fact that Iran continues to develop a ballistic missile program that poses a threat to Iran's neighbors in the region and beyond. | Iran has an active interest in developing, acquiring, and deploying a broad range of ballistic missiles, as well as developing a space launch capability. This was spotlighted several times since 2008. In mid-July 2008, Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles during military exercises, reportedly including the medium-range Shahab-3. At the time, a Pentagon spokesman said Iran was "not testing new technologies or capabilities, but rather firing off old equipment in an attempt to intimidate their neighbors and escalate tension in the region." Subsequent analysis of the July 2008 missile launches shows Iran apparently digitally altered images of those launches. Iran announced other missile and space launch tests in August and November 2008. In February 2009, Iran announced it launched a satellite into orbit and "officially achieved a presence in space." This short report seeks to provide an overview of the reported or suspected variety of Iranian ballistic missile programs. Because there remains widespread public divergence over particulars, however, this report does not provide specificity to what Iran may or may not have, or is in the process of developing. This report may be updated. |
crs_R43431 | crs_R43431_0 | These include programs to support management of nonfederal forests, forestry research, and management of federal forests. It then presents information on forestry in the 2014 farm bill, the Agricultural Act of 2014. In addition, the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 (HFRA) was referred to and reported by the agriculture committees. The 2014 Farm Bill Forestry Title
For nearly three years, Congress considered an omnibus farm bill—which included a forestry title—to establish the direction of agriculture and food policy for the next several years. A conference agreement was reached in late January 2014; it was approved by both chambers within eight days and was signed into law ( P.L. 113-79 ) by the President on February 7, 2014. Several of these provisions were included in both the House and Senate bills. 2642 provisions to establish national critical areas within the National Forest System. Some provisions in the farm bill may also apply to federal land managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior (DOI), such as the stewardship contracting and good neighbor authorities. Administrative Appeals
Section 8006 of the 2014 farm bill modifies two administrative appeals requirements for land and resource management planning in the National Forest System. Good Neighbor Authority
Section 8206 permanently reauthorizes the Forest Service's and BLM's Good Neighbor Authority and extends the authority nationwide. The Secretary of Agriculture may implement priority projects to reduce the risk of or increase the resilience to insect or disease infestations in the designated areas. Miscellaneous National Forest Management Provisions
The 2014 farm bill also included several miscellaneous provisions related to national forest management:
Section 8301 requires the Forest Service to revise the strategic plan for the forest inventory and analysis program for public and private forests and their resources, established by Forest and Rangelands Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974. In addition, several of the forestry issues that were debated but ultimately not included in the enacted 2014 farm bill could be debated again in future farm bills or legislation. The House-passed version of the farm bill proposed to eliminate the permanent authority of the Forest Legacy Program and the Community Forest and Open Space Conservation Program to receive annual appropriations, and instead would have authorized the programs through FY2018. Brief History of Forestry Provisions in Previous Farm Bills
Past farm bills also have included forestry provisions, primarily addressing the forestry assistance programs. The Forestry title:
established national priorities for private forest management and assistance; required statewide forest assessments and strategies for assistance; provided for competitive funding for certain programs; created new programs for open space conservation and for emergency reforestation; established a FS tribal relations program for cultural and heritage cooperation and a competitive grants program for Hispanic-serving institutions; reauthorized four existing programs, but did not reauthorize several other programs, including the Forest Land Enhancement Program; amended the Lacey Act Amendments to prohibit imports of illegally logged wood products; and modified three national forest boundaries and certain timber contract provisions. | The Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79, the 2014 farm bill) was signed into law by President Obama on February 7, 2014, after both the House and Senate voted to approve a conference agreement. The 2014 farm bill establishes agricultural and food policy for the next several years, and also addresses several aspects of federal forestry policy.
Forestry provisions were included in the Forestry title (Title VIII) of the 2014 farm bill as well as in some of the other titles. The 2014 farm bill generally repeals, reauthorizes, and modifies existing forestry assistance programs and provisions under two main authorities: the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act (CFAA; P.L. 95-313; 16 U.S.C. §§2101-2114), as amended, and the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 (HFRA; P.L. 108-148; 16 U.S.C. §§6501-6591), as amended. Several forestry assistance programs were reauthorized through FY2018. However, many federal forestry assistance programs are permanently authorized, and thus do not require reauthorization in the farm bill. The farm bill also repeals programs that had expired or had never received appropriations.
The 2014 farm bill includes provisions addressing the management of the National Forest System. For example, it permanently reauthorizes stewardship contracting and extends the good neighbor authority nationwide, both tools the Forest Service uses to conduct restoration and other forest management projects. The farm bill also authorizes the designation of treatment areas within the National Forest System due to insect or disease infestation, and allows for expedited project planning within those designated areas. In addition, the farm bill includes provisions to modify the existing public notice, comment, and appeals process for land and resource management plans.
Congress considered other forestry provisions which were not included in the final law, but which might be debated in other legislation. Protecting communities from wildfire continues to be a priority for some, while controlling invasive species is a priority for others. How to address these issues was debated in terms of both federal assistance programs to nonfederal forest owners and management of the National Forest System. In addition, some wanted to change the funding mechanisms and amounts for several forestry assistance programs. Issues from this and previous farm bills may also become of interest again in the future, such as assisting forest-dependent communities in diversifying their economies or providing payments for ecosystem services—forest values that have not traditionally been sold in the marketplace. |
crs_RS22867 | crs_RS22867_0 | The administrative responsibilities associated with these new rules vary by chamber. Legislation Subject to the Rule
Senate earmark disclosure rules apply to any congressional earmark included in either the text of the bill or the committee report accompanying the bill, as well as the conference report and joint explanatory statement. The disclosure requirements apply to items in authorizing legislation, appropriations legislation, and tax measures. Furthermore, they apply not only to measures reported by committees but also to unreported measures, amendments, House bills, and conference reports. Requirements for Senators Submitting Earmark Requests
Under Senate Rule XLIV, paragraph 6, a Senator requesting that a congressional earmark be included in a measure is required to provide a written statement to the chair and ranking minority member of the committee of jurisdiction that includes
the Senator's name; the name and address of the intended earmark recipient (if there is no specific recipient, the location of the intended activity should be included); in the case of a limited tax or tariff benefit, identification of the individual or entities reasonably anticipated to benefit to the extent known to the Senator; the purpose of the earmark; and a certification that neither the Senator nor the Senator's immediate family has a financial interest in such an earmark. | Earmark disclosure rules in both the House and the Senate establish certain administrative responsibilities that vary by chamber. Under Senate rules, a Senator requesting that an earmark be included in legislation is responsible for providing specific written information, such as the purpose and recipient of the earmark, to the committee of jurisdiction. Further, Senate committees are responsible for compiling and presenting such information in accord with Senate rules. In the Senate, disclosure rules apply to any congressional earmark, limited tax benefit, or limited tariff benefit included in either the text of a bill or any report accompanying the measure, including a conference report and joint explanatory statement. The disclosure requirements apply to earmarks in appropriations legislation, authorizing legislation, and tax measures. Furthermore, they apply not only to measures reported by committees but also to measures not reported by committees, floor amendments, and conference reports. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL32677 | crs_RL32677_0 | Introduction
Agriculture, as a production-oriented sector, requires energy as an important input to production. U.S. farm production—whether for crop or animal products—has become increasingly mechanized and requires timely energy supplies at particular stages of the production cycle to achieve optimum yields. Several key points that emerge from this report are:
agriculture is reliant on the timely availability of energy, but has been reducing its overall rate of energy consumption; U.S. agriculture consumes energy both directly as fuel or electricity to power farm activities, and indirectly in the fertilizers and chemicals produced off farm; energy's share of agricultural production expenses varies widely by activity, production practice, and locality; at the farm level, direct energy costs are a significant, albeit relatively small component of total production expenses in most activities and production processes; when combined with indirect energy expenses, total energy costs can play a much larger role in farm net revenues, particularly for major field crop production; and energy price changes have implications for agricultural choices of crop and activity mix, and cultivation methods, as well as irrigation and post-harvest strategies. This report provides background on the relationship between energy and agriculture in the United States. Agriculture as a Share of U.S. Energy Use
Direct Energy Use
In 2002, the U.S. agricultural sector (encompassing both crops and livestock production) used an estimated 1.1 quadrillion Btu of total direct energy. Agriculture Sector Energy Use by Source
Of the estimated 1.7 quadrillion Btu of total energy used by the U.S. agricultural sector in 2002, 65% (1.1 quadrillion Btu) was consumed as direct energy (electricity, gasoline, diesel, LP gas, and natural gas), compared with 35% (0.6 quadrillion Btu) consumed as indirect energy (fertilizers and pesticides). Efficiency Gains in Farm Energy Use
The large declines in agricultural sector use of direct and indirect energy sources since the late 1970s has not come at the expense of lower output. Agriculture appears to have made dramatic efficiency gains in energy use. The tightening U.S. supply situation, and increasing dependence on imports, has contributed to higher natural gas prices, with immediate implications for farm fuel and fertilizer costs, as well as for U.S. fertilizer production. In recent years, high domestic natural gas prices have resulted in the idling and/or closing of a significant share of U.S. nitrogen production capacity. Farm Income and Energy Prices
In February 2004, USDA projected U.S. net cash farm income at $55.9 billion. | Agriculture requires energy as an important input to production. Agriculture uses energy directly as fuel or electricity to operate machinery and equipment, to heat or cool buildings, and for lighting on the farm, and indirectly in the fertilizers and chemicals produced off the farm. In 2002, the U.S. agricultural sector used an estimated 1.7 quadrillion Btu of energy from both direct (1.1 quadrillion Btu) and indirect (0.6 quadrillion Btu) sources. However, agriculture's total use of energy is low relative to other U.S. producing sectors. In 2002, agriculture's share of total U.S. direct energy consumption was about 1%. Agriculture's shares of nitrogen and pesticide use—two of the major indirect agricultural uses identified by the U.S. Dept of Agriculture (USDA)—are significantly higher at about 56% and 67%, respectively.
U.S. farm production—whether for crop or animal products—has become increasingly mechanized and requires timely energy supplies at particular stages of the production cycle to achieve optimum yields. Energy's share of agricultural production expenses varies widely by activity, production practice, and locality. Since the late 1970s, total agricultural use of energy has fallen by about 28%, as a result of efficiency gains related to improved machinery, equipment, and production practices. Despite these efficiency gains, total energy costs of $28.8 billion in 2003 represented 14.4% (5.2% direct and 9.3% indirect) of annual production expenses of $198.9 billion. As a result, unexpected changes in energy prices or availability can substantially alter farm net revenues, particularly for major field crop production.
High fuel and fertilizer prices in 2004, and increasing energy import dependence for petroleum fuels and nitrogen fertilizers has led to concerns about the impact this would have on agriculture. High natural gas prices have already contributed to a substantial reduction in U.S. nitrogen fertilizer production capacity—over a 23% decline from 1998 through 2003. In the short run, price- or supply-related disruptions to agriculture's energy supplies could result in unanticipated shifts in the production of major crop and livestock products, with subsequent effects on farm incomes and rural economies. In the long run, a sustained rise in energy prices may have serious consequences on energy-intensive industries like agriculture by reducing profitability and driving resources away from the sector.
This report provides information relevant to the U.S. agricultural sector on energy use, emerging issues, and related legislation. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40781 | crs_R40781_0 | Introduction
The Housing Trust Fund (HTF), administered by the Department of Hous ing and Urban Development (HUD ) , provides formula funds to states to use for certain affordable housing activities. The HTF was established by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA, P.L. A majority of funds must be used to benefit extremely low-income households (households with incomes at or below 30% of area median income), and all funds must be used for extremely low- or very low-income households (households with incomes at or below 50% of area median income). Rather than being funded through appropriations, the Housing Trust Fund (along with the Capital Magnet Fund, another new affordable housing fund established by HERA) is funded through contributions from two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. After its creation in 2008, the HTF did not receive any funding for several years. In September 2008, there were concerns about Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's finances. In November 2008 FHFA suspended Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's contributions to the affordable housing funds before any had been made. Background
Many states and localities across the nation have created housing trust funds, which provide dedicated sources of state or local funding for affordable housing activities. 110-289 ) was enacted. However, because these contributions were suspended for several years, the Housing Trust Fund received its first funding in 2016. To date, no other source of funding has been provided to the HTF. By statute, the formula for allocating funds to states is based on the following factors:
the ratio of the shortage of standard rental units affordable and available to extremely low-income renter households in a given state to the aggregate shortage of such rental units in all states (this factor is given "priority emphasis"); the ratio of the shortage of standard rental units affordable and available to very low-income renter households in a given state to the aggregate shortage of such rental units in all states; the ratio of extremely low-income renter households living with incomplete kitchen or plumbing facilities, more than one person per room, or spending more than 50% of income on housing costs in a given state to the aggregate number of such households in all states; and the ratio of very low-income renter households spending more than 50% of income on rent in a given state to the aggregate number of such households in all states. By law, at least 80% of HTF funds must be used for rental housing activities. ELI households are defined as households with incomes that do not exceed 30% of area median income, and VLI households are defined as having incomes no higher than 50% of area median income. The total amount transferred to the HTF was $174 million. Current Issues
This section discusses current issues related to the Housing Trust Fund, namely, arguments that are commonly made for and against the Housing Trust Fund; the current status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and its potential implications for the Housing Trust Fund; legislative proposals that would provide additional funding to the Housing Trust Fund; and legislative proposals that would limit funding for the Housing Trust Fund or eliminate the program entirely. Arguments Made For and Against a National Housing Trust Fund
The idea of a national affordable housing trust fund has been controversial. Supporters have advocated for such a fund for years, arguing that it is needed to address a shortage of affordable housing for extremely low-income households. Finally, since it was announced that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be beginning their contributions to the Housing Trust Fund and the Capital Magnet Fund, some have criticized the decision to require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to make contributions to the housing funds while they remain in conservatorship and subject to agreements with Treasury. Efforts to Eliminate or Limit Funding for the HTF
As noted earlier, some in Congress criticize the Housing Trust Fund as being duplicative of other programs or express concerns that it is funded outside the appropriations process or could be vulnerable to misuse. | The Housing Trust Fund (HTF) was established by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA, P.L. 110-289) to provide funds to states to use for affordable housing activities, with a focus on producing rental housing for extremely low-income households. It is administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and funded through contributions from two government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, rather than through appropriations. Due to concerns about Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's financial position, their contributions to the HTF were suspended for several years before the program had ever received any funding. More recently, however, their contributions to the HTF have begun. The first funding was transferred to the HTF in early 2016.
In general, affordable housing trust funds provide dedicated, permanent sources of funding for affordable housing that do not require annual appropriations. Many states and localities across the United States have their own affordable housing trust funds, and for years affordable housing advocates had worked to get such a fund created on a national level. Opponents of a national affordable housing trust fund argued, among other things, that it would be duplicative of other affordable housing programs.
The Housing Trust Fund created by HERA provides funding for formula-based grants to states to use for affordable housing activities. By statute, most of the funding must be used for rental housing; states can use up to 10% of their grants for certain homeownership activities. Furthermore, all of the funds must benefit very low- or extremely low-income households, with at least 75% of the funding for rental housing being used exclusively for the benefit of extremely low-income households (defined as households with incomes that do not exceed 30% of area median income) or households with incomes no greater than the federal poverty line.
In the years since the HTF was established, supporters of the Housing Trust Fund have searched for additional sources of funding for the program, and have argued for the beginning of Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's contributions to the Housing Trust Fund as those entities returned to profitability. (The contributions began in 2015, with the first funds transferred to the HTF in 2016.) At the same time, policymakers who oppose the Housing Trust Fund have made efforts to repeal it or to prevent Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from contributing to it while they remain in conservatorship. In recent Congresses, legislation has been introduced to fund the HTF through alternate sources, as well as to eliminate it entirely. The HTF has also been debated in the context of broader housing finance reform efforts, which are largely concerned with proposals for how to reform, eliminate, or replace Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. However, no legislation to either fund the HTF through a different source or to eliminate it entirely has been enacted to date. |
crs_RL33074 | crs_RL33074_0 | Overview
Mandatory spending is composed of budget outlays controlled by laws other than appropriation acts, including federal spending on entitlement programs. Entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare make up the bulk of mandatory spending. Other mandatory spending programs include Supplemental Security Income (SSI), unemployment insurance, certain veterans' benefits, federal employee retirement and disability, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and various tax credits. Mandatory spending composed nearly 60% of all federal spending in FY2014. Social Security, Medicare, and the federal share of Medicaid alone composed nearly 50% of all federal spending. Mandatory spending is controlled by laws other than appropriations acts. In contrast, discretionary spending is provided and controlled through the annual appropriations process. Net interest payments, the final category of federal spending, are automatically authorized and are the government's interest payments on debt held by the public offset by interest income that the government receives. Such entitlement spending is referred to as appropriated entitlements. In FY1962, three years before the creation of Medicare and Medicaid, less than 30% of all federal spending was mandatory. At that time, Social Security accounted for about 13% of total federal spending or about half of all mandatory spending. In FY2014, mandatory spending accounted for nearly 60% of total spending and 12.2% of GDP (or just under 14% of GDP before offsetting receipts). Changes in Mandatory Spending
The composition of mandatory spending has changed dramatically over the past 40 years and, according to CBO baseline projections, will continue to change over the decade. Mandatory spending levels have and will continue to be affected by the automatic spending reduction process enacted as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ). Though the majority of the spending reductions affect the discretionary side of the budget, mandatory spending was reduced (sequestered) by $17 billion in FY2013, $18 billion in FY2014, and $18 billion in FY2015. However, as discussed above, increases in mandatory spending primarily related to rising health care costs are projected to result in a continued upward trend despite these reductions. Trends in Spending Over the Next Decade
While the share of mandatory spending has increased as a portion of total federal spending, discretionary spending has fallen. Mandatory spending now counts for the majority of total federal spending. Discretionary spending is projected to continue to fall further to 5.1% of GDP, its lowest level ever. By FY2022 discretionary spending's share of the economy is projected to be equal to or less than spending in each of the two largest categories of mandatory programs, Social Security and Major Health Programs. In that year, discretionary spending is projected to total 5.4% of GDP, Social Security spending is projected to total 5.4% of GDP and spending on major health programs is projected to total 6.7% of GDP. According to CBO extended baseline projections, federal mandatory spending on health care, in large part due to rising costs, is projected to reach 13.4% of GDP by FY2085. In 1962, before Medicare and Medicaid were created, Social Security accounted for just over half of all mandatory spending. Today, Social Security accounts for roughly 40% of mandatory spending. | Federal spending is divided into three broad categories: discretionary spending, mandatory spending, and net interest. Mandatory spending is composed of budget outlays controlled by laws other than appropriation acts, including federal spending on entitlement programs. Entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare make up the bulk of mandatory spending. Other mandatory spending programs include Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), unemployment insurance, some veterans' benefits, federal employee retirement and disability, and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). In contrast to mandatory spending, discretionary spending is provided and controlled through appropriations acts. Net interest spending is the government's interest payments on debt held by the public, offset by interest income that the government receives.
In FY2014, mandatory spending accounted for nearly 60% of total federal spending and over 12% of GDP. Social Security alone accounted for 24% of federal spending. Medicare and the federal share of Medicaid, the fastest growing components of mandatory spending, together accounted for 26% of federal spending. Therefore, spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid made up nearly 50% of total federal spending. The composition of mandatory spending has changed significantly over the past 40 years. In 1962, before the creation of Medicare and Medicaid, mandatory spending was less than 30% of all federal spending. At that time, Social Security accounted for about 13% of total federal spending or about half of all mandatory spending.
Mandatory spending levels have and will continue to be affected by the automatic spending reduction process enacted as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), as amended. Though the majority of the spending reductions affect the discretionary side of the budget, mandatory spending was reduced by $17 billion in FY2013, $18 billion in FY2014, and $18 billion in FY2015. Under current law, reductions to mandatory spending will continue through FY2024. However, increases in mandatory spending primarily related to rising health care costs are projected to result in a continued upward trend despite these reductions.
Over the next decade, mandatory spending is projected to reach 14% of GDP. Discretionary spending is projected to continue to fall further to 5% of GDP, its lowest level ever. By FY2022 discretionary spending's share of the economy is projected to be equal to or less than spending in each of the two largest categories of mandatory programs, Social Security and Major Health Programs.
Over the long term, projections suggest that if current policies remain unchanged, the United States could face a major fiscal imbalance, largely due to rising health care costs and impending baby boomer retirements. Federal mandatory spending on health care is projected to expand from 5% of GDP in FY2014 to 14% in FY2089 according to CBO's extended baseline projection. Social Security is projected to grow from 5% of GDP in FY2014 to 7% of GDP by FY2089. The share of mandatory spending continues to increase as a portion of total federal spending.
Because discretionary spending is a smaller proportion of total federal outlays compared to mandatory spending, some budget experts contend that any significant reductions in federal spending must include cuts in entitlement spending. Other budget and social policy experts contend that cuts in entitlement spending could compromise their goals: the economic security of the elderly and the poor. This report will be updated annually. |
crs_R42600 | crs_R42600_0 | Description of Report's Following Sections
Senators, recent debate has shown, have differed on how many U.S. circuit and district court nominations the Senate should confirm in 2012 and how late in the year it should continue to confirm them. They have disagreed as to what guidance, if any, previous presidential election years provide to the Senate regarding these questions. Further, they have differed specifically on whether slowing down, or stopping, the processing of judicial nominations at a certain point during this session of Congress, or after a certain number of nominees have been confirmed, would be in keeping with the Senate's experience in past presidential election years. This report seeks to help inform the above debate, by analyzing the number and timing of circuit court and district court nominations confirmed by the Senate in presidential election years dating back to 1980. The report compares the processing of judicial nominations during these years, using various quantitative measures, while relating its findings to the Senate's processing of judicial nominations in 2012 through the month of June. In successive sections, the report analyzes the following, for presidential election years from 1980 to 2008:
the number and percentage of circuit and district court nominees confirmed by the Senate in each election year; the percentage of confirmed lower court nominees who were approved by the Senate during each month across the eight election years; the extent to which Senate confirmations of judicial nominees tended to drop off in the second half of election years; the last dates on which the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate considered or acted on judicial nominations in each election year; the average cumulative number of judicial nominees confirmed by the Senate at the end of nine successive months (February through October); and the extent to which judgeship vacancy rates in the circuit and district courts have risen or fallen in each election year. Number and Percentage of Nominees Confirmed in Presidential Election Years
As shown by Table 1 , the number of circuit and district court nominees confirmed during presidential election years varied during the 1980 to 2008 period, ranging from 2 to 11 and 18 to 55, respectively. In 2012, as of June 30, 24 of 52 pending election-year district court nominees, or 46.2%, have been confirmed. Specifically, of the 57 circuit court nominees confirmed during presidential election years from 1980 to 2008, most were confirmed in February (14.0%), May (15.8%), June (21.1%), and October (14.0%). Of the 280 district court nominees confirmed during the same eight presidential election years, most were confirmed in February (11.8%), May (15.7%), June (20.0%), September (11.4%), and October (10.0%). In contrast, from 1996 to 2008, nearly all confirmed circuit court nominees (18 of 19, or 94.7%) were approved during the first six months of the year. During the more recent presidential election years (1996 to 2008), a greater percentage of district court nominees were confirmed in the second half of the year (45.7%) than were approved post-June during the 1980 to 1992 presidential election years (35.4%). In the four most recent completed presidential election years, however, the Senate has not confirmed circuit court nominees after July. During the 1980 to 2008 presidential election years, the last confirmation dates of district court nominees—occurring in September or later in seven of the eight years—are in contrast to the last dates of circuit court confirmations during the four most recent election years (1996 to 2008). The figure shows, for example, that the average number of circuit court nominees confirmed by the end of June during the presidential election years of 1980 to 2008 was five, the same number of circuit nominees that the Senate in 2012 confirmed by the end of June. During certain presidential election years in the 1980 to 2008 period, Senate confirmation rates appeared related to the rise or fall in judicial vacancy rates over the course of the year. | In 2012, a presidential election year, an ongoing subject of debate in the Senate has been how many U.S. circuit and district court nominations should be confirmed by year's end, and how late in the year the Senate should continue to confirm them. Senators have disagreed as to what guidance, if any, previous presidential election years provide to the Senate regarding these questions. They have differed specifically on whether slowing down, or stopping, the processing of judicial nominations at a certain point during this session of Congress, or after a certain number of nominees have been confirmed, would be in keeping with the Senate's experience in past presidential election years.
This report seeks to help inform the debate, by analyzing the number and timing of circuit court and district court nominations confirmed by the Senate in presidential election years from 1980 to 2008. The report compares the processing of judicial nominations during these years, using various quantitative measures, while relating its findings to the Senate's processing of judicial nominations in 2012, as of June 30.
Findings in the report include the following:
The greatest and smallest numbers of circuit court nominees confirmed during a presidential election year in the 1980 to 2008 period were 11 and 2, compared with 5 confirmed thus far in 2012. Annual percentages of nominees confirmed ranged from 71.4% to 18.2%, compared with 41.7% confirmed in 2012, as of June 30. The greatest and smallest numbers of district court nominees confirmed in the 1980 to 2008 election years were 55 and 18, compared with 24 confirmed in 2012, as of June 30. Annual percentages of nominees confirmed ranged from 77.9% to 46.2%—the latter identical to 46.2% confirmed in 2012, as of June 30. Of 57 circuit court nominees confirmed during presidential election years from 1980 to 2008, most were confirmed in February (14.0% ), May (15.8%), June (21.1%), and October (14.0%). Of 280 district court nominees confirmed during presidential election years from 1980 to 2008, most were confirmed in February (11.8%), May (15.7%), June (20.0%), and September (11.4%). In the four most recent presidential election years, 1996 to 2008, Senate confirmation of circuit court nominees almost completely stopped after June 30, with 18 of 19 (94.7%) confirmed in the first six months of the year. In contrast, during presidential election years from 1980 to 1992, approximately 42% of circuit court nominees were confirmed post-June. In contrast, in the four most recent presidential election years,1996 to 2008, a greater percentage of district court nominees were confirmed in the second half of the year (45.7%) than were confirmed after June 30 in the four previous election years of 1980 to 1992 (35.4%). During the presidential election years from 1980 to 1992, the Senate confirmed circuit court nominees as late as October (in three of the years) and December (in the fourth year). By contrast, in the four more recent election years, 1996 to 2008, the Senate did not confirm a circuit nominee after July. In seven of the eight election years, the last district court nominee was confirmed in September or later. During the 1980 to 2008 presidential election years, the Senate annually confirmed an average of five circuit court nominees by the end of June, the same number as confirmed by the Senate in 2012, as of June 30. The Senate confirmed an average of 21 district court nominees by the end of June during the 1980 to 2008 presidential election years, compared with 24 confirmed by the Senate in 2012, as of June 30. Circuit court judgeship vacancy rates declined between January 1 and December 31 in six of eight presidential election years from 1980 to 2008. District judgeship vacancy rates declined in four of the election years. During certain election years, Senate confirmation rates appeared related to the rise or fall in judicial vacancy rates. |
crs_RL31859 | crs_RL31859_0 | � 1332; (3) (2) a provision regarding removal; (4) and (3) aconsumer class action "bill of rights." Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights and ImprovedProcedures for Interstate Class Actions. In particular, section 3 would add the following:
Section 1711-Judicial scrutiny of coupon and other noncash settlements (Section 1712 in S. 274/S. Section 1713-Protection against discrimination based on geographic location (Section 1714 in S. 274/S. 1115-Enactment ofJudicial Conference Recommendations)
This provision provides that class notices should present information in "plain English." (10)
In the exercise of their discretion, the federal courts must consider: (11)
-- "Whether the claims asserted involve matters of national interstate interest"
-- "Whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws other than those of the State in which the action was originally filed"
-- "In the case of a class action originally filed in a State court, whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction"
-- "Whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number of citizensfrom any other State, and the citizenship of the other members of the proposed class isdispersed among a substantial number of States"
-- "Whether 1 or more class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other persons have been or may be filed." This section contains a similar class action definition as section 3, defining a class action as (A) any civil action filed pursuant to rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a similar statestatute or rule. Appeals of Class Action Certification Orders (H.R.1115 only). An amendment adoptedby the House Judiciary Committee in reporting H.R. 1115 and S. 2062). Effective Date (H.R. (18)
On October 21, 2003, Senator John Breaux introduced S. 1769 , "National Class Action Act of 2003," as an alternative bill which is considered to be much broader than S. 1751 . On December 15, 2003, Senator Dodd proposed Senate Amendment 2232 to S. 274 which was introduced in the Senate on January 20, 2004, (21) by Senator Grassley. Similarlanguage to that contained in Senate Amendment 2232 is also reflected in S. 2062 (theClass Action Fairness Act of 2004) which was introduced in the Senate on February 10, 2004 (22) andplaced on the Senate Calendar on February 11, 2004. (24)
On July 8, 2004, the proponents of S. 2062 again failed to get 60 votes needed to proceed for further consideration of the bill. (26) This latest action willprobablyaid the demise of the legislation for this legislative year. | The House has passed H.R. 1115 and the Senate Judiciary Committee has reported out S. 274 (both styled the Class Action Fairness Act of 2003). Each (1) creates aconsumer class action bill of rights, and (2) allows the federal courts to try a greater number of largeclass action law suits (100 plaintiffs or more) arising out of state law where the parties come fromdiverse states. Current law requires that each plaintiff have suffered $75,000 in damages and thatthere be complete diversity before a state lawsuit may be filed in or removed to federal court, thatis to say all of the plaintiffs must be citizens residing in different states than all of the defendants. The bills ease the complete diversity requirement and eliminate the requirement of individualdamages of $75,000 as long as the damages suffered by the class as a whole is $5 million or more.
The consumer class action bill of rights in each proposal contains safeguards which provide for judicial scrutiny of coupon and other noncash settlements, protection against a proposed settlementthat would result in a net loss to a class member, protection against discrimination based upongeographic location, and prohibition on a class representative receiving a greater share of the award.
S. 274 / S. 1751 alone includes within its bill of rights explicit provisions for "plain English" settlement notices and settlement notifications for state and federalauthorities. H.R. 1115 instead defers to the notice reforms recommended in theamendments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure forwarded to Congress by theSupreme Court on March 27, 2003. H.R. 1115 alone permits pre-trial review of a lowerfederal court's grant or denial of class certification and makes its provisions retroactively applicableto suits filed before the date of enactment (but prior to class certification).
On October 21, 2003, Senator John Breaux introduced S. 1769 as an alternative bill which is considered to be much broader than S. 1751 .
On December 15, 2003, Senator Dodd proposed Senate Amendment 2232 to S. 274 , introduced in the Senate on January 20, 2004, by Senator Grassley. Most of these amendmentsare also incorporated into S. 2062 (the Class Action Fairness Act of 2004) which wasintroduced by Senator Grassley in the Senate on February 10, 2004.
On July 8, 2004, S. 2062 failed to get the 60 votes needed to proceed for further consideration which probably will aid the demise of the legislation for this legislative year. |
crs_R42517 | crs_R42517_0 | Introduction to HUD
Most of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts enacted by Congress. 117 (112 th Congress), to fund government agencies—including HUD—at their FY2012 levels, increased by 0.612%, through the earlier enactment of final FY2013 appropriations legislation on March 27, 2012. The CR does not extend emergency funding that was provided in FY2012; HUD received $100 million in emergency funding in FY2012. The bill was approved by the Senate on September 22, 2012, and signed by the President on September 28, 2012 ( P.L. The 112 th Congress adjourned without enactment of final FY2013 appropriations legislation. On March 6, 2013, the House approved a bill to provide full-year government-wide appropriations for FY2013 ( H.R. It contained a continuing resolution that would have continued funding for most federal agencies, including HUD, at FY2012 levels, reduced by an across-the-board rescission of 0.098%. It proposed to maintain the funding reductions imposed by the sequester that was ordered on March 1, 2013. The bill provided a number of anomalies, including two for accounts within the HUD budget; one modified the maximum set-aside for the Emergency Solutions Grants within the homeless assistance grants account and the other increased the authority and funding for Indian Housing Loan Guarantees. On March 12, 2013, the Senate Committee on Appropriations released a substitute amendment to H.R. 933 , which included several individual appropriations bills and a continuing resolution to fund the remaining federal agencies, including HUD, through the end of FY2013. The CR continued funding for most programs and activities at FY2012 levels. Like the House-passed bill, it proposed to maintain the funding reductions imposed by the March 1, 2013, sequester. The Senate substitute amendment included more anomalies and increased overall funding for HUD compared to the House-passed version of H.R. 113-6
On March 20, 2013, the Senate amended and approved H.R. The President signed H.R. 933 into law on March 26, 2013 ( P.L. 113-6 , HUD programs and activities received $42.632 billion in new appropriations in FY2013 under the terms of the year-long CR. That amount is $1.6 billion less (-4%) than the FY2012 level of $44.241 billion. House Action, 112th Congress
The Transportation, HUD and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee approved a draft FY2013 funding bill on June 7, 2012; the full Appropriations Committee approved the draft bill on June 19, 2012, with only technical changes to the HUD portion ( H.R. As shown in Table 2 , the bill included $33.6 billion for HUD, which is about $30 million more than requested by the President, but nearly $1.4 billion less than is included in the Senate version ( S. 2322 ). The most significant difference between the House and Senate versions is that the House bill included the President's request to reduce funding for the Section 8 project-based rental assistance program (discussed later in this report). 112-157 ) proposed total net budget authority for HUD at just under $35 billion, a decrease of about 7% compared to FY2012, but an increase of about 4% over the President's requested level. S. 2322 proposed to increase funding for the Section 8 project-based rental assistance program by more than $1 billion above the President's request. President's Budget Request
On February 13, 2012, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2013 budget request, including just under $34 billion in net budget authority for HUD. However, the decrease in net budget authority requested is largely attributable to an estimated increase in offsetting receipts from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). As shown in Table 2 , not accounting for offsets, the President's budget requested an increase of more than $500 million in new appropriations for HUD programs and activities. The largest increases in funding were proposed for the accounts that fund the public housing program and the homeless assistance programs. 113-6 , the final FY2013 year-long continuing resolution, after accounting for the sequestration reduction and the across-the-board rescission, resulted in $17.964 billion being made available for the voucher program in FY2013, which is 2% less than the amount available (post-rescission) in FY2012 and 6% less than the amount requested by the President. The President's budget requested about $600 million less for the project-based rental assistance account than was provided in FY2012. In terms of total funding for the public housing program—both the capital fund and operating fund—the President's FY2013 budget requested a 13% increase compared to FY2012. The House Appropriations Committee-passed version of the FY2013 HUD appropriations bill proposed no funding for Choice Neighborhoods ( H.R. 112-25 ). This was 13% more than the $2.948 billion appropriated in FY2012 for formula grants and 8% more than recommended in the Senate bill, S. 2322 . During floor consideration of the bill, the House approved, by voice vote, an amendment ( H.Amdt. H.R. FY2013 Appropriations, P.L. The act contains $16 billion in funding for HUD, all of which was provided to the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. However, prior to that date, Congress enacted the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA, P.L. According to a report accompanying the order, funding for HUD's programs and activities for FY2013 was to be reduced by about $3 billion as a result of the sequester. As noted earlier, in January 2013, the ATRA ( P.L. | The President's FY2013 budget requested nearly $34 billion in net new budget authority for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in FY2013. This is about $4 billion less than was provided in FY2012. However, in terms of new appropriations for HUD's programs and activities, the President's budget actually requested an increase of more than $512 million compared to FY2012. The difference—a decrease in net budget authority versus an increase in new appropriations—is attributable to an estimated increase in the amount of excess receipts available from the FHA insurance fund, which are used to offset the cost of the HUD budget. The President's budget requested increases in funding for public housing and homelessness assistance grants. The President's budget requested decreases in funding for the project-based Section 8 rental assistance program and several community development-related programs.
S. 2322, the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies FY2013 appropriations bill reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations in the 112th Congress, included about $35 billion in net new budget authority for HUD. That is about $1 billion more than the President's request and more than $2 billion less than was provided in FY2012. In terms of new appropriations for HUD's programs and activities (not accounting for offsets), S. 2322 proposed about $1 billion more than the President's request and $2 billion more than FY2012. The largest increase was provided for the project-based Section 8 rental assistance account.
The House Appropriations Committee, in the 112th Congress, passed its version of the FY2013 Transportation-HUD appropriations bill on June 19, 2012 (H.R. 5972). It included $33.6 billion for HUD, which is less than the Senate but more than the President requested. The bill included increased funding for the Community Development Block Grant program, but no new funding for the HOPE VI/Choice Neighborhoods program. H.R. 5972 was considered by the House the week of June 25, 2012, and was approved, as amended, on June 29, 2012. An amendment added during floor consideration would have prohibited the transfer and use of other department funds to carry out the activities of the Sustainable Communities Initiative (SCI) grant program. On June 21, 2012, the Obama Administration released a Statement of Administration Policy on the bill expressing opposition to certain program funding levels in the House bill and objecting to the House's overall discretionary funding level for FY2013. For these reasons, the statement said that the President's advisors would recommend that he veto H.R. 5972.
In September 2012, Congress enacted and the President signed a continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 117) to fund government agencies—including HUD—at their FY2012 levels, increased by 0.612%, through the earlier of enactment of final FY2013 appropriations legislation or March 27, 2012. The CR did not extend emergency funding that was provided in FY2012 (HUD received $100 million in emergency funding in FY2012). The 112th Congress adjourned without enacting final FY2013 appropriations.
In January 2013, the new 113th Congress enacted a supplemental funding bill in response to Hurricane Sandy (P.L. 113-2). The bill provided $16 billion for the Community Development Block Grant program, to be used for recovery from Hurricane Sandy, and other disasters.
On March 1, 2013, under the terms of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240), President Obama ordered a sequestration. The result is an across-the-board cut of 5% for most of HUD's programs and activities for FY2013, a total reduction of about $3 billion.
On March 6, 2013, the House approved a bill to provide full-year government-wide appropriations for FY2013 (H.R. 933). It proposed to continue funding for HUD programs at FY2012 levels, reduced by an across-the-board rescission of .098%. It proposed to maintain the reductions imposed by the sequester. The bill included a number of anomalies, including two that affected HUD. One involved the homeless assistance programs and one involved Indian Housing Loan Guarantees.
On March 12, 2013, the Senate Committee on Appropriations released a substitute amendment to H.R. 933, which included several individual appropriations bills and a continuing resolution to fund the remaining federal agencies, including DOT and HUD, through the end of FY2013. The CR continued funding for most programs and activities at FY2012 levels. Like the House-passed version of the bill, it also proposed to maintain the funding reductions imposed by the March 1, 2013, sequester. The Senate substitute amendment included more anomalies and increased funding for HUD, compared to the House-passed version of H.R. 933. The Senate substitute amendment included funding increases above FY2012 levels for homeless assistance programs, Indian Housing Loan Guarantees, Section 8 tenant-based rental assistance, and the Public Housing Operating Fund. The Senate approved H.R. 933, as amended by the substitute amendment and other floor amendments (none of which involved HUD), on March 20, 2013. The next day, the House agreed to the Senate amendments. The President signed H.R. 933 into law on March 26, 2013 (P.L. 113-6).
In total, P.L. 113-6 provided $1.6 billion less in new appropriations for HUD programs and activities than was provided in FY2012 (-4%), after accounting for the sequester reduction and the 0.2% across-the-board rescission ordered by OMB as required by the law. |
crs_R42697 | crs_R42697_0 | Bailey v. United States concerned the question of whether "the detention of an individual who has just left premises to be searched under warrant is permissible when the individual is detained out of view of the house as soon as possible." Florida v. Jardines
Is a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics-detection dog a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause? This term, the Court declared that a search occurs when the police obtain information on the basis of the performance of a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a private house. Place sought to suppress evidence found in the bag. Florida Supreme Court
The Florida Supreme Court held that the use of a drug-sniffing dog on Jardines's front porch constituted a search and that such a search required probable cause before it could be conducted. Beyond Place , Edmond , and Caballes , they mention the Court's observation in Kyllo to the effect that "'a Fourth Amendment search does not occur—even when the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned—unless the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search and society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.'" Florida v. Harris
Has the Florida Supreme Court decided an important question in a way that conflicts with established Fourth Amendment precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court by holding that an alert by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog certified to detect illegal contraband is insufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle? It refused to accept a trained drug-detection dog's positive reaction as per se probable cause in Harris . And probable cause permits police to search a car or truck without a warrant. Probable cause exists when "there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Better instead, it held, to rely upon a "totality of the circumstances" standard that permits a common sense assessment of the individual facts presented in a particular case. Florida Supreme Court
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that in Harris the state had failed to show that, taking all the circumstances into account, the alert of a trained dog to the door of a truck entitled an officer to believe that there was a fair probability that the truck contained illicit drugs. It held that
[T]o meet its burden of establishing that the officer had a reasonable basis for believing the dog to be reliable in order to establish probable cause, the State must present the training and certification records, an explanation of the meaning of the particular training and certification of that dog, field performance records, and evidence concerning the experience and training of the officer handling the dog, as well as any other objective evidence known to the officer about the dog's reliability in being able to detect the presence of illegal substances within the vehicle. The smell of drugs was there. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. One such instance occurs when officers seek to execute a search warrant. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bailey to consider the question, and held that under the Summers rule the occupants must be taken into custody in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. The Supreme Court disagreed. Missouri v. McNeely
Whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases. The Fourth Amendment insists that in most instances officials secure a search warrant before they search a person's house, papers, effects, or person. There are exceptions. | The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
This term, the Supreme Court decided that (1) deploying a drug-detecting dog at the front door of a house qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search (Florida v. Jardines); (2) the positive reaction of a trained, drug-detecting dog constitutes probable cause per se (Florida v. Harris); (3) the rationale which permits the warrantless, suspicionless detention of individuals found in a place covered by a search warrant also permits the warrantless, suspicionless off-site apprehension and return of individuals who have recently left a place covered by a search warrant (Bailey v. United States); and (4) the body's capacity to absorb blood alcohol, without more, does not constitute a "destruction of evidence" exigency justifying a per se exception to the warrant requirement (Missouri v. McNeely).
The Supreme Court has said in the past that walking a drug-detecting dog around a car pulled over on the highway or around luggage in an airport is not a Fourth Amendment search. Nevertheless, the Court in Jardines noted that those cases were decided under the "expectation of privacy" rationale. Under the alternative "property intrusion" rationale, a Fourth Amendment search occurred when police used a trained dog to test for the smell of marijuana on Jardines's porch.
Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. The Supreme Court has held that informers' tips, used to establish probable cause, need not be subjected to uniform, rigid reliability standards. The Florida Supreme Court in Harris held that the prosecution had not established the existence of probable cause because it had failed to satisfy court-mandated standards for the reliability of drug-detecting dogs and their handlers. The U.S. Supreme Court declared in Harris that the Florida court was in error for failure to apply the traditional common sense, totality-of-the-circumstances standard.
In order to minimize the risk of harm to the officers, the destruction of evidence, or the flight of suspects, officers executing a search warrant for contraband may detain individuals found on the premises to be searched. They may do so though they have no probable cause to arrest the individuals. The Supreme Court in Bailey held that this exception to the Fourth Amendment's usual requirements does not permit officers to allow individuals to leave the premises to be searched before apprehending them off-site and returning them to the place being searched.
Exigent circumstances will sometimes excuse strict compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements. One such instance arises when the evidence sought will likely be lost by the time officers secure a search warrant. The Supreme Court in McNeely held destruction of the evidence exceptions are judged using a totality of the circumstances standard. The natural dissipation of alcohol from the blood, by itself, does not permit warrantless blood tests in drunk driving cases. |
crs_RL33420 | crs_RL33420_0 | Most Recent Developments
On February 14, 2007, Congress completed work on the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill and the Science, State, Justice, and Commerce Appropriations bill as part of the FY2007 Continuing Resolution ( H.J.Res. 109-289 as amended by P.L. 110-5 ). For the 2 nd session of the 109 th Congress, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees are maintaining the same jurisdiction structure as last year—House Foreign Operations and Senate State/Foreign Operations. Foreign Operations Overview
Foreign Operations, the larger of the two components with a request of $23.69 billion for FY2007, is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews and votes on the U.S. foreign assistance budget and influences major aspects of executive branch foreign policy-making generally. State Department/Broadcasting Overview
Budgets for the Department of State, including embassy construction, embassy security, and public diplomacy, were within the State Department and related programs title of the Science, State, Justice, and Commerce (SSJC) appropriations in the House and the State, Foreign Operations measure in the Senate. Substantial supplementals of $7.5 billion, $21.2 billion, and $2.5 billion, respectively, for assistance to the front line states in the war on terrorism and Afghanistan and Iraq reconstruction, pushed spending upward. And, as noted above, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, several emergency supplemental appropriations raised State Department funding levels to an all-time high by FY2004. Nevertheless, the size of the reduction compared with the executive request approved in House and Senate budget resolutions creates a challenging budget picture for appropriation subcommittees with jurisdiction over Foreign Operations and State Department/Broadcasting programs. Foreign Operations Request Overview
The 14.3% increase over regular FY2006 appropriations proposed for Foreign Operations was one of the largest additions in the President's request for discretionary spending in FY2007. The bill provided $32.6 billion in international affairs spending, of which $9.56 billion was for State Department Operations, diplomacy and broadcasting, and $23.0 billion for foreign assistance programs. The final legislation ( P.L. | The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill in the House, and the State, Foreign Operations measure in the Senate are the primary legislative vehicles through which Congress reviews the U.S. international affairs budgets and influences executive branch foreign policy making generally. They contain the largest shares—the House bill, about two-thirds; the Senate bill, about 97%—of total U.S. international affairs spending.
Due to subcommittee structural differences between the House and Senate in the 109th Congress, the House Appropriations Committee considered the Foreign Operations request separate from the State Department budget, with the latter falling under the jurisdiction of the Science, State, Justice, and Commerce (SSJC) Subcommittee. The Senate Appropriations Committee, however, combined Foreign Operations and State Department funding requests.
Funding for Foreign Operations and State Department/Broadcasting programs has been rising for six consecutive years, and amounts approved in FY2004 reached an unprecedented level compared with the past 40 years. Emergency supplementals enacted since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to assist the front line states in the war on terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq reconstruction, and for State Department operations and security upgrades have pushed spending upward.
Major issues confronting the 110th Congress in considering the Foreign Operations and State Department/Broadcasting appropriations request for FY2007 included:
The overall size of the Foreign Operations request—a 14.4% increase over regular FY2006 Foreign Operations funds; Proposed cuts in spending on core bilateral development assistance and programs in Latin America; A 71% increase in appropriations for the Millennium Challenge Account; and Secretary Rice's Transformational Diplomacy initiative for the State Department.
On February 14, 2007, Congress completed work on the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill and the Science, State, Justice, and Commerce Appropriations bill as part of the FY2007 Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res. 20/ P.L. 109-289 as amended by P.L. 110-5). The bill provided $32.6 billion in international affairs spending, of which $9.56 billion was for State Department Operations, diplomacy and broadcasting, and $23.0 billion for foreign assistance programs. This is the final update of this report. |
crs_RL34589 | crs_RL34589_0 | Introduction
On July 11, 2008, in North Carolina v. EPA , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. CAIR, promulgated by EPA under the Clean Air Act (CAA) in May 2005, established a regional cap-and-trade program for sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from electric generating units (EGUs) in 28 eastern states and the District of Columbia. Subsequently, on December 23, 2008, the court modified its decision to allow CAIR to remain in effect while EPA fashions a replacement rule. Importance of the CAIR Decision
From a policy standpoint, the court's decision seriously undermined EPA's approach to clean air under the Bush Administration. CAIR was the lynchpin that held together EPA's strategy for attainment of the ozone and fine particulate National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), for achieving reductions in mercury emissions from coal-fired powerplants, for addressing regional haze impacts from powerplants, and for responding to state petitions to control upwind sources of ozone and fine particulate pollution under Section 126 of the Clean Air Act. As discussed in this report, the potential impact of vacating CAIR on communities attempting to achieve NAAQS and the impact on mercury emissions would be substantial, and prompted some (including EPA, state environmental agencies, electric utilities, and environmental organizations) to appeal the decision. On July 11, 2008, the D.C. The agency has, since then, begun development of a Clean Air Transport Rule to replace CAIR. The replacement rule was proposed in July 2010, and EPA has indicated that it will finalize the rule by summer 2011. Circuit's ruling. As of May 2011, similar legislation has not been introduced in the 112 th Congress. That decision strongly suggests that there is no simple "fix" that would make CAIR acceptable to the court. This left EPA with three clear options: (1) starting over with a new strategy to mitigate transported air pollutants based on the decision; (2) allowing the states to sort out the issue through Section 126 petitions; or (3) seeking new legislation providing EPA with the statutory authority to either implement CAIR in some form, or an alternative. EPA is proceeding with the first of these options and expects to propose a new Clean Air Transport Rule in April 2010. For Congress, the decision raises several issues:
Should Congress consider providing EPA with the authority to implement CAIR or other cost-based, market-oriented approaches to address NAAQS? Should Congress consider multi-pollutant legislation as a supplement or substitute for the current regulatory regime, at least for electric generating units? Should Congress consider a more comprehensive revision to the Clean Air Act to address not only ozone and PM 2.5 NAAQS non-attainment, but also mercury emissions from coal-fired powerplants, and emerging environmental issues such as climate change? | On August 2, 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed a new Clean Air Transport Rule to control powerplant emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). When finalized, this rule will replace the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR); CAIR, which was promulgated in May 2005, established a regional cap-and-trade program for SO2 and NOx emissions from electric generating units (EGUs) in 28 eastern states and the District of Columbia. On July 11, 2008, in North Carolina v. EPA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated CAIR, saying that it had "more than several fatal flaws." The court subsequently modified its decision on December 23, 2008, however, reversing itself by allowing CAIR to remain in effect until a new rule is promulgated by EPA.
From a policy standpoint, the court's July 2008 decision seriously undermined EPA's approach to clean air over the previous eight years. CAIR was the lynchpin that held together the Bush Administration's strategy for attainment of the ozone and fine particulate National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), for achieving reductions in mercury emissions from coal-fired powerplants, for addressing regional haze impacts from powerplants, and for responding to state petitions to control upwind sources of ozone and fine particulates under Section 126 of the Clean Air Act. As discussed in this report, the potential impact on communities attempting to achieve NAAQS and the impact on mercury emissions without CAIR or a similar rule would be substantial; this has prompted some to call for congressional action to address the issue. On February 4, 2010, Senator Carper and 11 bipartisan cosponsors introduced S. 2995, a multipollutant bill that would have replaced the CAIR requirements, and required standards for powerplant emissions of mercury. The bill was not acted on. As of May 2011, legislation addressing CAIR replacement has not been introduced in the 112th Congress.
The D.C. Circuit's July 2008 decision strongly suggested that there is no simple "fix" that will make CAIR acceptable to the court. This left EPA with three clear long-term options: (1) starting anew with a new strategy with respect to mitigating transported air pollution based on the decision; (2) allowing the states to sort out the issue through Section 126 petitions; and (3) seeking new legislation providing EPA with the statutory authority to implement either CAIR in some form, or an alternative. The agency is proceeding with the first of these options with its proposed transport rule, but has indicated that it views congressional efforts to address the issue as "mutually reinforcing."
For Congress, the court decision raises several issues:
Should Congress consider providing EPA with the authority to implement CAIR or other cost-based, market-oriented approaches to address NAAQS? Should Congress consider multi-pollutant legislation as a supplement or substitute for the current regulatory regime, at least for electric generating units? Should Congress consider a more comprehensive revision to the Clean Air Act to address the full scope of ozone and PM2.5 NAAQS non-attainment and related issues, as well as mercury emissions from coal-fired powerplants, and emerging environmental issues such as climate change? |
crs_R42587 | crs_R42587_0 | The public, private, and tribal forests of the United States are crisscrossed by thousands of miles of logging roads. When it rains or snow melts, the runoff from those roads can be environmentally harmful, depositing large amounts of sediment and other pollutants into streams and rivers. How, under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), should logging road runoff be addressed? On March 20, 2013, the Supreme Court answered a key aspect of that question. In Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center , the Court held that EPA had permissibly construed a prior version of its Industrial Stormwater Rule to exempt stormwater runoff from logging roads that is channeled—that is, collected in ditches, culverts, or other channels—from the discharge permit scheme in the Clean Water Act (CWA). The Ninth Circuit decision had prompted immediate reaction in Congress, which enacted legislation barring EPA from requiring discharge permits for logging road runoff until September 30, 2013, and now has enacted permanent legislation to that effect (the 2013 farm bill, H.R. 2642 , P.L. EPA's Silvicultural Rule . As a nonpoint source, such runoff required no NPDES permit. Before the Court was the version of EPA's Industrial Stormwater Rule addressed by the decisions below—that is, before the agency amended it on November 30, 2012, three days prior to oral argument. On the merits, recall that the CWA requires timber companies to have NPDES permits for channeled logging road runoff only if the discharges are, in the words of the CWA, "associated with industrial activity"—as that phrase is defined in EPA's Industrial Stormwater Rule. EPA had long interpreted this rule definition not to reach logging road runoff, and the Supreme Court concluded 7-1 in Decker that EPA's interpretation of its rule was a permissible one. The rule's references suggested to the Court that its natural reading was confined to traditional industrial buildings, and so did not extend to logging operations. Moreover, EPA had espoused this reading for a long time; it had not been adopted recently in response to this litigation. In light of these factors, the Court viewed the precept that courts owe deference to agency interpretations of their own rules as applying in full force. Finally, the state of Oregon had invested much effort in developing best management practices for stormwater runoff from logging roads, so EPA, as the Court saw it, could reasonably have concluded that further federal regulation would be unnecessary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In any event, the rule as amended in November 2012 clarifies that stormwater discharges from logging roads do not constitute stormwater discharges "associated with industrial activity" and, accordingly, that a NPDES permit is not required. As expected, the rule is intended to get around the Ninth Circuit ruling by specifying that logging roads do not need CWA pollution discharge permits for stormwater runoff. Second, EPA said that the agency is considering designating a subset of stormwater discharges from forest roads under CWA Section 402(p)(6), the authority for the Phase II stormwater program. 112-74 ), with a provision that barred EPA from requiring a permit for stormwater runoff associated with silvicultural activities until September 30, 2012. 113-79 ), includes a provision similar but not identical to the House-passed language. | U.S. forests are crisscrossed by thousands of miles of logging roads. When it rains or snow melts, runoff from these roads can be environmentally harmful, so how to address this runoff under the Clean Water Act (CWA) has long been an issue.
On March 20, 2013, the Supreme Court in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center addressed one aspect of this issue: logging road runoff that is discharged into CWA-covered waters from ditches, culverts, or other channels. Such conveyances arguably make the runoff a "point source" under the CWA, which normally means that a permit under the act's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) is required. Special CWA provisions, however, exempt stormwater runoff, unless, as relevant here, it is "associated with industrial activity." In Decker, the Supreme Court upheld 7-1 EPA's long-standing reading of its Industrial Stormwater Rule that logging road runoff, even if channeled, is not "associated with industrial activity" and so does not require a NPDES permit. This reversed the Ninth Circuit and affirmed EPA's view that logging road runoff is subject only to a requirement of best management practices.
In upholding EPA's reading of its rule as exempting logging road runoff from the NPDES program, the Court observed that references in the Industrial Stormwater Rule suggest that its natural reading should be confined to traditional industrial buildings, and so does not extend to logging operations. Moreover, EPA had espoused this reading for a long time; it had not been adopted recently in response to this litigation. In light of these factors, the Court viewed the precept that courts owe deference to agency interpretations of their own rules as applying in full force. Finally, the state of Oregon had invested much effort in developing best management practices for stormwater runoff from logging roads, so EPA, as the Court saw it, could reasonably have concluded that further federal regulation would be unnecessary.
EPA's response to the Ninth Circuit ruling was to amend the Industrial Stormwater Rule. The amended rule, issued in November 2012 three days prior to the oral argument before the Supreme Court, makes explicit the agency's long-standing position that logging roads do not need CWA discharge permits for stormwater runoff. The Supreme Court opinion actually deals with EPA's reading of the prior, less explicit version of the Industrial Stormwater Rule. The amended rule may or may not be resurrected on remand to the district court. For the moment, however, the status quo is unchanged: NPDES permits have never been required for logging road runoff, and they are not required as of now. EPA also is considering designating a subset of stormwater discharges from forest roads for regulation under flexible mechanisms available in the CWA, including non-permitting approaches, but the agency has not issued a proposal or announced a timetable for further action.
Congressional interest in responding to the Ninth Circuit ruling has been strong. Congress enacted temporary measures that barred EPA until September 30, 2013, from requiring a permit for stormwater runoff associated with silviculture activities. The 2013 farm bill reauthorization (H.R. 2642, P.L. 113-79) includes a provision stating that discharges resulting from specified silviculture activities shall not require CWA discharge permits. |
crs_R43723 | crs_R43723_0 | The Federal Trade Commission's Regulation of Data Security Under Its Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices (UDAP) Authority
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) in 1914. The protection of consumers from anticompetitive, deceptive, or unfair business practices is at the core of the FTC's mission. As part of that mission, the FTC has been at the forefront of the federal government's efforts to protect sensitive consumer information from data breaches, and to regulate cybersecurity. As the number of data breaches continues to soar, so too do the number of FTC investigations into lax data security. In FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. , a federal district court judge denied a motion to dismiss, thereby effectively lending support to the FTC's position that it possesses jurisdiction to regulate data security under its unfair or deceptive practices authority. In another data security case, In the Matter of LabMD , the commission rejected a motion to dismiss in an administrative enforcement action brought against a medical diagnostics laboratory. Both decisions are currently being appealed. Separately, LabMD has asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Eleventh Circuit) for the third time to dismiss the administrative action. Both cases are the subject of a great deal of interest from Congress, businesses, trade groups, corporate law firms, and legal scholars. This report will discuss the FTC's legal authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act in relation to data security, and the two aforementioned cases. Background
The FTC first became involved with consumer privacy issues in 1995. Initially, the FTC promoted industry self-regulation as the preferred approach to protecting consumer privacy. After assessing its effectiveness, however, the FTC reported to Congress that self-regulation was not working. Thereupon, the FTC began taking legal action against entities that violated their own privacy policies, asserting that such actions constituted "deceptive trade practices" under Section 5(a) of the FTC Act which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Rather, the FTC has broad authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.... " Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, an act or practice is unfair if the act or practice (1) "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers," (2) "which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves," and (3) "not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." According to recent testimony by FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, using the deceptive prong of its statute, the FTC has settled more than 30 matters challenging companies' express and implied claims about the security they provide for consumers' personal data, and the FTC has also settled more than 20 cases alleging that a company's failure to reasonably safeguard consumer data was an unfair practice. Because most of the FTC's privacy and data security cases, and almost all of its COPPA and GLBA cases, were resolved with settlements or abandoned, there are few judicial decisions addressing the FTC's authority to regulate the data security practices of companies which have suffered a data breach. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp . is widely viewed as an important case to test the authority of the FTC to respond to data breaches, and it could have far-reaching implications for the liability of companies whose computer systems suffer a data breach. Proposed Legislation
As part of efforts to enact cyber and data security legislation , several bills before Congress include provisions that would provide the FTC with enhanced enforcement authority by, for example, explicitly authorizing the FTC to promulgate rules to implement data security standards and to assess civil penalties. In recent FTC testimony before Congress, the agency has called for federal legislation that would (1) strengthen its existing authority governing data security standards on companies and (2) require companies to provide notification to consumers where there is a data security breach. | The Federal Trade Commission Act established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) in 1914. The protection of consumers from anticompetitive, deceptive, or unfair business practices is at the core of the FTC's mission. As part of that mission, the FTC has been at the forefront of the federal government's efforts to protect sensitive consumer information from data breaches and regulate cybersecurity. As the number of data breaches has soared, so too have FTC investigations into lax data security practices. The FTC has not been delegated specific authority to regulate data security. Rather, the FTC has broad authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) to prohibit unfair and deceptive acts or practices.
In 1995, the FTC first became involved with consumer privacy issues. Initially, the FTC promoted industry self-regulation as the preferred approach to combatting threats to consumer privacy. After assessing its effectiveness, however, the FTC reported to Congress that self-regulation was not working. Thereupon, the FTC began taking legal action under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Since 2002, the FTC has pursued numerous investigations under Section 5 of the FTC Act against companies for failures to abide by stated privacy policies or engage in reasonable data security practices. It has monitored compliance with consent orders issued to companies for such failures. Using the deception prong of its statute, the FTC has settled more than 30 matters challenging companies' claims about the security they provide for consumers' personal data and more than 20 cases alleging that a company's failure to reasonably safeguard consumer data was an unfair practice. Because most of the FTC's privacy and data security cases were resolved with settlements or abandoned, there have been few judicial decisions. Against this backdrop, there are now two pending cases testing the FTC's unfairness authority under Section 5 of FTC Act as a means to respond to data breaches. These cases could have far-reaching implications for the liability of companies whose computer systems suffer a data breach. Both cases are the subject of a great deal of interest from Congress, businesses, trade groups, corporate law firms, and legal scholars.
In April 2014, in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., a federal district court denied a motion to dismiss, thereby effectively lending support to the FTC's position that it possesses jurisdiction to regulate data security practices under its authority to bring enforcement actions against unfair or deceptive practices. In another case, In the Matter of LabMD—an administrative enforcement action brought against a medical diagnostics laboratory—the commission rejected a motion to dismiss that challenged the FTC's authority to impose sanctions under the FTC Act. Both decisions are currently being appealed. Wyndham is on appeal to the Third Circuit, and LabMD has asked the Eleventh Circuit for the third time to intervene. The FTC's administrative action against LabMD was stayed this summer pending a related congressional hearing.
Several cyber and data security bills before Congress include provisions that would explicitly authorize the FTC to issue rules to implement data security standards and assess civil penalties. The FTC has called for federal legislation that would strengthen its existing authority governing data security standards and require companies to provide breach notification to consumers. This report provides background on the FTC and its legal authorities in the context of data security, and discusses the two aforementioned cases. |
crs_R42782 | crs_R42782_0 | 113-6 on March 26, 2013, which contained the text of five regular appropriations acts and provided continuing appropriations that covered the remaining seven regular appropriations bills through the remainder of the fiscal year. This report provides analysis of the components of the two FY2013 continuing resolutions and congressional action on those CRs. For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2012, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices , by [author name scrubbed]. Congressional Action on FY2013 Appropriations
Prior to the beginning of FY2013, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees each reported 11 of the 12 regular appropriations bills. Seven regular appropriations bills were passed by the House; no regular appropriations bills were passed by the Senate. None of the regular appropriations bills were enacted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. The first CR for FY2013 was signed into law on September 28, 2012 ( H.J.Res. 117 ; P.L. 5855 ), the Legislative Branch ( H.R. 933 . P.L. 112-175
The part-year CR for FY2013 covered all 12 regular appropriations bills by providing budget authority for projects and activities funded in FY2012 by the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012 ( P.L. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; 2 U.S.C. 113-6
The full-year CR covers seven regular appropriations bills by providing budget authority for projects and activities funded in FY2012 by Division C of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ); 4. 112-74 ); 7. Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (Division C, P.L. 112-55 ). P.L. 112-175
Funding in the part-year CR for FY2013 was effective October 1, 2012, through March 27, 2013—nearly the first six months of the fiscal year. 113-6
The funding provided by the second CR (Division F) is effective for a full fiscal year—October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2013—replacing the funding rate and directions provided in the part-year CR with amounts for the entire fiscal year both by reference and through anomalies. Many projects and activities funded in the CR were subject to an across-the-board increase of less than 1% (0.612%). The CR modified the formula under which some of the funds designated for the purposes of Section 251(b) of the BBEDCA were extended. Projects and activities in the referenced FY2012 appropriations acts are funded in the same amount for FY2013. P.L. 112-175
According to CBO, the total amount of annualized budget authority for regular appropriations in the part-year CR, including projects and activities funded at the rate for operations, the across-the-board increase, and anomalies, was $1.047 trillion. When spending was included in the calculation that was designated under Section 251(b) of the BBEDCA for OCO/GWOT, continuing disability reviews and redeterminations, health care fraud abuse control, or disaster relief, the total CBO-estimated amount of annualized budget authority in the CR was $1.154 trillion. 113-2 ), is $1.043 trillion. 113-2 is $1.196 trillion. Additional Reporting Requirements
P.L. 112-175
The first continuing resolution included two new reporting requirements for certain departments and agencies as well as for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 112-175 , with some technical changes. | This report provides analysis of the components of the two FY2013 continuing resolutions (CR) and congressional action on those CRs.
Prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees each reported 11 out of 12 regular appropriations bills. Seven regular appropriations bills were passed by the House; no regular appropriations bills were passed by the Senate. None of the regular appropriations bills were enacted into law. The first CR for FY2013 was signed into law on September 28, 2012 (H.J.Res. 117; P.L. 112-175). On March 26, 2013, H.R. 933 (P.L. 113-6) was signed into law, which contained the texts of five regular appropriations acts and provided continuing appropriations through the remainder of the fiscal year for the other seven bills.
The first, part-year CR for FY2013 covered all 12 regular appropriations bills by providing budget authority for projects and activities that had been funded in FY2012 by P.L. 112-55, P.L. 112-74, and P.L. 112-77, with specified exceptions. Funding in the CR was effective October 1, 2012, through March 27, 2013, a duration of nearly the first six months of the fiscal year. Budget authority for projects and activities was provided at the rate they were funded in FY2012. Most of these projects and activities were also subject to an across-the-board increase of less than 1% (0.612%). The CR included several "anomalies"—provisions that provide exceptions to the general formula and purpose for which FY2012 funding is continued. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the total annualized level of budget authority for regular appropriations was $1.047 trillion, with a total annualized spending rate of $1.154 trillion once budget authority designated as provided by Section 251(b) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA), is included. The CR included two new reporting requirements for specified departments and agencies as well as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
The subsequent full-year CR for FY2013 extends the FY2012 funding in P.L. 112-55 and P.L. 112-74 for a total of 7 regular appropriations bills: (1) Energy and Water Development, (2) Financial Services, (3) Interior, (4) Labor/Health and Human Services/Education, (5) Legislative Branch, (6) State/Foreign Operations, (7) Transportation/Housing and Urban Development Appropriations bills. Most of the additional FY2012 funding provided by the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-77) is continued for FY2013. Generally, funding in the CR is effective for the full fiscal year—October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2013. Projects and activities in the referenced FY2012 appropriations acts are funded in the same amount for FY2013. Like the part-year CR it replaced, the full-year CR also includes a number of anomalies that provide exceptions to the purpose and amount of the FY2012 funding that is continued. The total CBO estimated level of budget authority for appropriations in FY2013 is $1.043 trillion, with total spending of $1.196 trillion once budget authority designated as provided by Section 251(b) of the BBEDCA is included. The CR maintains the two new reporting requirements initially provided by the part-year CR, with some technical changes.
For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2012, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42075 | crs_R42075_0 | Issue
Laws prohibiting women from serving in air and naval combat units were repealed in the early 1990s. Howeve r, until recently, it has been Department of Defense (DOD) policy to restrict women from certain combat-related units and military occupations, especially ground combat units. On January 24, 2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta rescinded the rule that restricted women from serving in combat units and directed the military departments to review their occupational standards and assignment policies for implementation no later than January 1, 2016. On December 3, 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ordered the military to open all combat jobs to women with no exceptions. This most recent policy change followed extensive studies that were completed by the military departments and by the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) on issues such as unit cohesion, women's health, equipment, facilities modifications, propensity to serve, and international experiences with women in combat. 103-160 ), Congress enacted language that
repealed the remaining prohibitions on women serving on combatant vessels and aircraft, required the Secretary of Defense to ensure occupational performance standards were gender-neutral, and required the Secretary of Defense to notify the House and Senate Armed Services Committees 90 days before any policy changes were to be made concerning the assignment of women to ground combat roles, and, required the Secretary of Defense to notify these committees 30 days prior to the opening of any "combatant unit, class of combatant vessel, or type of combat platform" to women. Women on Submarines
While women have been allowed by law to serve on surface combatants in the Navy since the early 1990s, women have been barred by policy from assignments on submarines until just recently. As part of this announcement, the Secretary of Defense directed the military departments to conduct a "women in the service review" (WISR) of service-level policies and standards between 2013 and the end of 2015, and to expeditiously move forward in the integration of women into previously closed positions. On March 10, 2016, Secretary Carter approved the final implementation plans. These studies included discussion of the methodology for validating occupational standards and recommendations for maintaining, modifying, or developing new occupational standards. Career Management for Women in Combat Occupations
One of the arguments for opening combat roles to women was that without the ability to serve in combat occupations, women would not have equal career leadership opportunities. As the new policy is implemented, Congress may continue to monitor the impact of change on recruitment, retention, assignments, and force readiness. | Over the past two decades of conflict, women have served with valor and continue to serve on combat aircraft, naval vessels, and in support of ground combat operations. The expansion of roles for women in the Armed Forces has evolved since the early days of the military when women were restricted by law and policy from serving in certain occupations and units. Women have not been precluded by law from serving in any military unit or occupational specialty since 1993 when Congress repealed the remaining prohibitions on women serving on combatant aircraft and vessels. However, Department of Defense (DOD) policies have prevented women from being assigned to units below brigade level where the unit's primary mission was to engage directly in ground combat. This policy barred women from serving in infantry, artillery, armor, combat engineers, and special operations units of battalion size or smaller. On January 24, 2013, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta rescinded the rule that restricted women from serving in combat units and directed the military departments and services to review their occupational standards and assignment policies and to make recommendations for opening all combat roles to women no later than January 1, 2016.
On December 3, 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ordered the military to open all combat jobs to women with no exceptions. This most recent policy change followed extensive studies that were completed by the military departments and by the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) on issues such as unit cohesion, women's health, equipment, facilities modifications, propensity to serve, and international experiences with women in combat. These studies also included a review and validation of gender-neutral occupational standards for combat roles where such standards existed.
On March 10, 2016, Secretary Carter announced that the Services' and SOCOM's implementation plans for the integration of women into direct ground combat roles were approved. Some concerns about the implementation of the new policy remain, including the recruitment, assignment, and career management of women into the new roles, and the impact of integration on unit readiness. Congress has oversight authority in these matters, and may also consider issues such as equal opportunity, equal responsibility (such as selective service registration), and the overall manpower needs of the military. |
crs_R43259 | crs_R43259_0 | The reported bill contained five major provisions:
Title I would have encouraged state and local governments to adopt model building energy codes for residential and commercial buildings; Title II would have authorized credit support (loan guarantees) for debt financing of energy efficiency measures in commercial, multifamily residential, industrial, municipal, governmental, and institutional (college, school, and hospital) facilities; Title III would have created grants for an industry revolving loan program to reduce energy intensity and improve industrial competitiveness, grants for supply chain energy efficiency, and rebates for energy efficient electric motors and transformers; Title IV would have directed DOE to issue guidance for federal agency use of advanced computer tools, and act on other measures, to achieve energy efficiency improvements; and Title V would have reduced the authorization for the zero net energy commercial buildings initiative, as an offset for the costs of S. 1000 . The bill was reported ( S.Rept. S. 1392 Introduced
On July 30, 2013, S. 1392 was introduced to replace S. 761 . The bill is based on voluntary provisions and was designed to be deficit-neutral. The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (SENR) reported the new bill by a vote of 19-3 on July 31, 2013. Two Provisions of S. 761 Dropped
S. 1392 was introduced as a trimmed-down version of S. 761 . The bill contains provisions for building energy codes, industrial energy efficiency, federal agencies, and budget offsets. Floor Action Overview
Motion to Proceed
On September 11, 2013, the Senate voted by unanimous consent to proceed to consideration of S. 1392 . This objection effectively blocked voting action on all other amendments. By September 19, 2013, a total of 125 amendments had been proposed. Other Energy and Carbon Emissions Amendments
As of September 19, 2013, a total of 27 amendments had been filed that involved other energy aspects and climate concerns. Floor Debates on Amendments
So far, only two amendments have been the subject of major floor debate: S.Amdt. 1866 , on the Affordable Care Act, and S.Amdt. 1908 , on the Keystone XL Pipeline. 1866)
Of the 23 non-energy amendments, seven would amend the Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended). The amendment would amend Section 1312(d)(3)(D) of ACA and would affect how Members of Congress, congressional staff, the President, the Vice President, and many executive branch political appointees can obtain health insurance coverage through their federal employment. On September 12, 2013, the amendment sponsor introduced S. 1497 as a stand-alone bill with content similar to that of S.Amdt 1866. 1866 be considered immediately and "locked down for a vote," objecting to further consideration of other amendments. In other words, the sponsor sought a guarantee that the amendment's provisions would be brought for a vote on any active legislative vehicle , such as a continuing appropriations resolution (CR) for FY2014. Keystone XL Pipeline (S.Amdt. In particular, they claimed that the United States would be able to reduce dependence on oil imports from Venezuela. In fact, they argued that most of the oil would be exported to other countries. One proponent contended that the pipeline would be safer and more efficient than using trains and trucks, and another proponent stated that there would be an "environmental advantage" to using the high-tech refineries located on the Gulf Coast. Three notable examples have been selected for discussion here: fossil fuel use in new federal buildings, carbon emissions regulation, and regional haze regulation. Several other non-energy amendments address other environmental laws and EPA regulations. Suspension of Floor Action
No Agreement to Limit Amendments
In order to get an agreement to limit the time available for debate, amending, and voting on amendments, the floor managers secured leadership approval to take a vote on S.Amdt. Efforts to Restart Floor Action
Floor managers indicated that—once the CR, shutdown, health care, and debt limit issues are resolved—they hope to resume action on S. 1392 . 1908 —and possibly on S.Amdt. | S. 1392—the Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act of 2013—was introduced on July 30, 2013. Often referred to as the Shaheen-Portman bill, it is a trimmed-down version of S. 761. It contains provisions for building energy codes, industrial energy efficiency, federal agencies, and budget offsets. The bill contains voluntary provisions and was designed to be deficit-neutral. To date, virtually all debate related to the bill has been focused on floor amendments.
The bill was reported by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (SENR) on a 19-3 vote. On August 1, 2013, a motion to proceed was introduced and amendments began to be filed. On September 11, 2013, a unanimous consent agreement on the motion launched floor action. By September 19, 2013, 125 amendments had been proposed. Of that total, 75 directly address energy efficiency policy, 23 address "other" energy and carbon emissions policy areas, and 27 address non-energy policy areas.
Amendments subject to controversy address five policy areas: fossil fuel use by federal buildings, carbon emissions regulation, regional haze regulation, Keystone XL Pipeline, and the Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 as amended). Only the Keystone XL Pipeline and one ACA amendment have been the subject of major floor debate on S. 1392.
S.Amdt. 1908 on the Keystone XL Pipeline calls for a Sense of Congress resolution that encourages the President to issue a permit needed to begin construction. In floor debate, proponents argued that the project would create thousands of jobs; generate tax revenues for federal, state, and local governments; reduce dependence on oil imports from Venezuela; and gain an "environmental advantage" from using high-tech refineries on the Gulf Coast. Opponents contend that there would be less than 100 permanent jobs, most of the oil would be exported, and there is a "tangible risk" of a spill that could have severe environmental impacts.
S.Amdt. 1866 would amend Section 1312(d)(3)(D) of ACA and would affect how Members of Congress, congressional staff, the President, the Vice President, and many executive branch political appointees can obtain health insurance coverage through their federal employment.
The sponsor of S.Amdt. 1866 requested a vote on this amendment and objected to further consideration of other amendments, which blocked voting on all other amendments. Shortly after floor debate began, the sponsor introduced a stand-alone bill (S. 1497) with similar content and expressed a willingness to drop the objection, if a vote could be "locked down" for S.Amdt. 1866—or if a vote on the proposal (S. 1497) could be guaranteed for any other active legislation.
Despite a tentative agreement to take votes on S.Amdt. 1908 and S.Amdt. 1866, supporters of non-energy amendments increased their requests to include four additional non-energy amendments. The resulting impasse led to a suspension of action on September 18, 2013, with no fixed date to resume action. The Senate then focused attention on passing a continuing appropriations resolution (CR) and addressing the federal debt ceiling. Floor managers have indicated that—once the CR, shutdown, health care, and debt limit issues are resolved—they hope to resume action on S. 1392. |
crs_R41932 | crs_R41932_0 | Although U.S. Treasury securities, which represent nearly all federal debt, have long been considered risk-free assets, the magnitude of federal deficits and the projected imbalance between federal revenues and outlays has raised concerns among some. The size of federal deficits and the projected imbalance between federal revenues and outlays have raised concerns among some, including the rating agency Standard & Poor's (S&P), which downgraded the U.S. sovereign credit rating from AAA to AA+ on August 5, 2011. Continued concerns about rising federal debt and the ability of policymakers to reach solutions to fiscal challenges could raise borrowing costs and negatively affect capital markets. Although CDS prices may indicate market assessments of default probabilities, the market for U.S. CDSs is small and thinly traded, which reduces its reliability as a measure of the federal government's fiscal condition. What is a Credit Default Swap? In the case of a CDS on U.S. sovereign debt, the U.S. government is the reference entity. A typical CDS contract on sovereign debt specifies that a buyer, in exchange for an annual fee set by the market and paid quarterly, obtains from a seller specified protection against default and broadly similar events affecting securities issued by a country (i.e., the reference entity). In a typical sovereign CDS, such as for the United States, credit events include failure to pay, repudiation or moratorium on debt, and certain debt restructurings. Also, under standard CDS contracts for sovereign U.S. debt, a credit rating agency's downgrade of the U.S. credit rating does not constitute a "credit event." An investor holding a CDS while not owning or borrowing the underlying bond is often said to possess a "naked CDS." Public interests, in some cases, may be promoted by restricting the creation or publication of certain types of information. How Does the U.S. Sovereign CDS Market Work? Some financial market and federal budget analysts view price trends of U.S. CDSs as an indicator of the risks of a sovereign default by the federal government. Committees organized by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) determine when a credit event has occurred. S&P not only expressed concerns about the federal government's fiscal outlook, but also cited "political brinksmanship" in debt ceiling negotiations, which raised the issue of a hypothetical federal default, as a factor in its decision. CDSs, however, probably provide a more useful indicator of sovereign default risks for countries whose sovereign CDSs are more actively traded. Thus, pricing and volume trends for sovereign CDSs on countries facing more immediate fiscal challenges, such as Greece and Portugal, where default risks appear more salient due to higher levels of fiscal stress, may be more informative indicators. The Debt Limit and Long Term Fiscal Challenges
President Obama signed the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( S. 365 ; P.L. 112-25 ) on August 2, 2011, which included provisions to raise the debt limit and reduce deficits. While U.S. CDS prices rose to a record high of about 82 bps before passage of the act. After the Budget Control Act was enacted, U.S. CDSs fell to previous levels, trading at about 55 bps in mid August 2011. U.S. CDSs have been trading in the same price range as Germany's, but far below CDS prices for Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. For example, in mid August 2011, Greek CDSs traded around 1700 bps, Portuguese CDSs around 800 bps, and Irish CDSs around 700 bps. Prices for Treasuries suggest that financial markets continue to consider federal debt instruments a safe haven despite the S&P downgrade. CDS Price Trends for Selected Countries | Paying the public debt is a central constitutional responsibility of Congress (Article I, Section 8). U.S. Treasury securities, which represent nearly all federal debt, have long been considered risk-free assets. The size of federal deficits and the projected imbalance between federal revenues and outlays, however, have raised concerns among some, including the rating agency Standard & Poor's (S&P), which downgraded the U.S. sovereign credit rating from AAA to AA+ on August 5, 2011. S&P also cited "political brinksmanship" in debt ceiling negotiations as a factor, which raised the issue of a hypothetical federal default. Prices for Treasuries suggest that financial markets continue to consider federal debt instruments a safe haven despite the S&P downgrade. Continued concerns about rising federal debt and the ability of policymakers to reach solutions to fiscal challenges could raise borrowing costs and negatively affect capital markets.
A credit default swap (CDS) contract is a way to hedge or speculate on credit risk, including sovereign credit risk. A CDS protection buyer, in exchange for an annual fee set by the market and paid quarterly, can trade an asset issued by a "reference entity" (or a cash equivalent) for its face value if a "credit event" occurs. A CDS buyer need not own or borrow an asset issued by the reference entity, thus may hold a "naked CDS." A committee of the derivatives trade organization, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), determines whether a credit event has occurred, according to their interpretation of applicable guidelines. In general, failure to make a timely payment usually constitutes a credit event, as does a repudiation of debts, and in some cases, debt restructuring.
Some view CDS price trends for U.S. debt as an indicator of the market's perception of the federal government's creditworthiness. The cost of buying CDS protection on federal debt for a one-year duration has roughly doubled since the start of 2011. In mid-August 2011, U.S. CDSs traded at about 55 basis points (bps; one-hundredths of 1%), after having risen to about 63 bps after the S&P downgrade. U.S. CDS trading volume rose and prices hit a record high of about 82 bps in the week before President Obama signed the Budget Control Act of 2011 (S. 365; P.L. 112-25) on August 2, 2011. The act included provisions to raise the debt limit and reduce deficits.
U.S. CDSs have traded in the same price range as Germany, which is far below sovereign CDS prices for Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. For example, in mid-August 2011, Greek CDSs traded around 1700 bps, Portuguese CDSs around 800 bps, and Irish CDSs around 700 bps. While the federal government faces fiscal challenges, especially in the long term, markets seem to regard fiscal stresses confronting some European governments as far more severe and immediate.
The U.S. CDS market is small and thinly traded, which may limit its reliability as a measure of the federal government's fiscal condition. CDSs may more usefully indicate sovereign default risks for countries with more immediate fiscal challenges, such as Greece and Portugal, where sovereign default risks may be more salient due to higher levels of fiscal stress, or for larger European economies, such as Italy and Spain, which have recently come under increased fiscal stress. Four Eurozone countries imposed certain restrictions on types of sovereign CDS trading in August 2011. This report explains how the sovereign CDS market works and how such CDS price trends may illuminate fiscal stresses facing sovereign governments. Although CDS prices may be imperfect measures of the federal government's fiscal condition, some investors may try to glean information from those price trends, which could potentially affect U.S. debt markets in the future. European calls for reform in sovereign CDS trading may also be of interest to U.S. lawmakers. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42662 | crs_R42662_0 | The current law, codified at 5 U.S.C. §7353(a), prohibits any federal officer or employee from soliciting or receiving any gift of any amount from a prohibited source, that is, from someone who is seeking action from, doing business with, or is regulated by one's agency, or whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of one's official duties. Under these regulations, the President is expressly exempt from the broad restrictions on receiving or accepting gifts from prohibited sources or gifts given because of his official position, and thus may accept gifts from the general public, even from "prohibited sources," or gifts given because of his official position, as long as the President does not "solicit or coerce" the offering of gifts from such sources, nor accept a gift in return for an official act. §2635.202(c)(2). Gifts coming to the White House that are not intended for the President or First Lady personally, however, but rather are given with the intent to be made for the "White House," or otherwise made to the government of the United States, and personal gifts not retained by the President or First Lady, are catalogued, distributed, or disposed of by the United States. Gifts From Foreign Governments
The President and all federal officials are restricted by the Constitution, at Article I, Section 9, clause 8, from receiving any "presents" from foreign governments, kings, or princes, without the consent of the Congress. Bribery, Illegal Gratuities
The President and all federal officials are subject to the restrictions of the bribery law at 18 U.S.C. Financial Disclosure
In addition to restrictions on the receipt of gifts, the President is required to publicly disclose personal financial information, including personal gifts over minimal amounts ($350 as of this writing) which have been received by him and his immediate family. | This report addresses provisions of federal law and regulation restricting the acceptance of personal gifts by the President of the United States.
Although the President, like all other federal officers and employees, is prohibited from receiving personal gifts from foreign governments and foreign officials without the consent of Congress (U.S. Const., art. I, §9, cl. 8), the President is generally free to accept unsolicited personal gifts from the American public. Most of the restrictions on federal officials accepting gifts from "prohibited sources" (those doing business with, seeking action from, or regulated by one's agency) are not applicable to the President of the United States (5 C.F.R. §2635.204(j)), although the President may not solicit gifts from such sources. The President, in a similar manner as other federal officials, may also receive unrestricted gifts from relatives and gifts that are given on the basis of personal friendship. When personal gifts accepted by the President or his immediate family exceed a certain amount, those gifts are required to be publicly disclosed in financial disclosure reports filed annually by the President. 5 U.S.C. app., §§101(f)(1), 102(a)(2). The President remains subject to the bribery and illegal gratuities law which prohibits the receipt of a gift or of anything of value when that receipt, or the agreement to receive such thing of value, is connected in some way to the performance (or nonperformance) of an official act. |
crs_R43919 | crs_R43919_0 | The major federal response continues to be through research, education, outreach, and voluntary technical and financial incentives to producers. Nutrients: A Primer
Nutrients are elements essential to plant growth. As crops grow and are harvested, they gradually remove the existing nutrients from the soil. Over time, most soils will require additional nutrients to maintain or increase crop yield. When nutrients are added in excess of the plants' ability to utilize them, there is an increased risk that the nutrients will enter the surrounding environment (water or air) and create problems such as algal blooms (discussed below). In agricultural production, the focus generally rests on the three primary macronutrients––nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), and potassium (K)—because of their relative abundance in plants. The nutrients of primary environmental concern in agriculture are nitrogen and phosphorus. Environmental Effects
One of the better-known environmental responses to high levels of nutrients is eutrophication––the enrichment of water bodies, which can promote the growth of algae. However, high levels of nutrients and ideal growing conditions can overfeed algae, creating algal blooms that deplete the oxygen content of water, block sunlight to other organisms, and potentially produce toxins. These harmful algal blooms (HABs) can contaminate surface and drinking water supplies, potentially harming animal and human health. Over time, through research and technological advancements, nutrient management has become increasingly sophisticated. An advanced understanding of how crops utilize nutrients and how nutrients move in the environment has led to the development of a number of best management practices (BMPs) for nutrient use. Primarily, nutrient BMPs focus on preventing or reducing the ways in which excess nutrients can enter the environment––erosion, runoff, leaching, volatilization, denitrification, and nitrification. Crop Production
Crop production BMPs for nutrient management generally focus on the "4Rs"––applying the right amount of nutrients, from the right source, in the right place, at the right time. Animal Agriculture
Best management practices for livestock operations are typically prescribed for concentrated animal feeding operations where animals are raised or bred in close quarters, thus creating a concentrated source of nutrients. Federal Response to Agricultural Nutrients
Currently, few federal regulations govern the environmental impacts from agriculture. Some environmental laws specifically exempt agriculture from regulatory requirements, and others are structured so that agriculture is not addressed by most, if not all, of the regulatory impact. In terms of environmental impacts, the primary regulatory focus has been on protecting water resources and is governed by the Clean Water Act (CWA). For those waters, states must establish a total maximum daily load (TMDL) to ensure that water quality standards can be attained. A number of USDA agencies provide support through education, outreach, and research, while federal funds are provided through conservation programs to adopt BMPs for nutrient reduction. Who should bear the cost of nutrient loading? | Nutrients are elements essential to plant and animal growth. In agricultural production, the focus generally rests on the three primary macronutrients––nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), and potassium (K)—because of their relative abundance in plants. As crops grow and are harvested, they gradually remove the existing nutrients from the soil and over time will require additional nutrients to maintain or increase crop yield. When nutrients are added in excess of the plants' ability to utilize them, there is an increased risk that the nutrients will enter the surrounding environment (water or air) and create environmental problems. The nutrients of primary environmental concern in agriculture are nitrogen and phosphorus.
One of the better-known environmental responses to high levels of nutrients is eutrophication––the enrichment of water bodies, which can promote the growth of algae. Under certain conditions, algal blooms can occur that can deplete the oxygen content of water, block sunlight to other organisms, and potentially produce toxins. These harmful algal blooms can contaminate surface and drinking water supplies, potentially harming animal and human health.
Over time, through research and technological advancements, an understanding of how crops utilize nutrients and how nutrients move in the environment have led to the development of a number of best management practices (BMPs) for nutrient management. Primarily, nutrient BMPs focus on preventing or reducing the ways in which excess nutrients can enter the environment. Crop production BMPs for nutrient management generally focus on applying the right amount of nutrients, from the right source, in the right place, at the right time. BMPs for livestock operations are typically prescribed for concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs), where animals are raised or bred in close quarters, thus creating a concentrated source of nutrients.
Currently, few federal regulations govern the environmental impacts from agriculture. Some environmental laws specifically exempt agriculture from regulatory requirements, and others are structured so that agriculture is not addressed by most, if not all, of the regulatory impact. The primary regulatory authority protecting water resources is the Clean Water Act (CWA). Regulatory requirements for agricultural nutrients under the CWA are limited to permitting requirements for large CAFOs and the establishment of total maximum daily loads, which are pollution limits for state-identified impaired waters.
The major federal response to nutrient pollution from agriculture continues to be through research, education, outreach, and voluntary technical and financial incentives. A number of U.S. Department of Agriculture agencies provide support through education, outreach, and research, while federal funds are provided through conservation programs to help agricultural producers adopt BMPs for nutrient reduction.
As the 114th Congress reviews nutrient pollution in U.S. waterways, among the issues being discussed is how to address nutrients from agricultural sources. Whether the current balance between regulatory action and voluntary response is enough to meet environmental goals, who should bear the cost of preventing and correcting nutrient loading, and whether the tools for correction are adequate are among the issues being discussed. How these issues are resolved will have important implications for agriculture, which has taken a keen interest in water quality policy and legislation. |
crs_R44323 | crs_R44323_0 | Introduction
The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in Member offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 12 staff position titles that are typically used in House Members' offices. The positions include the following:
Caseworker Chief of Staff District Director Executive Assistant Field Representative Legislative Assistant Legislative Correspondent Legislative Director Office Manager Press Secretary Scheduler Staff Assistant
House Member staff pay data for the years 2001-2015 were developed based on a random sampling of staff for each position in each year. Pay data for staff working in Senators' offices are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014 . Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in House and Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014 , and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014 , respectively. Table 3 - Table 14 provide tabular pay data for each House Member office staff position. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following:
a line graph showing change in pay, 2001-2015, in nominal (current) and constant 2016 dollars; a comparison, at 5-, 10-, and 15- year intervals from 2015, of the cumulative percentage change in median pay for that position to changes in pay, in constant 2016 dollars, of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of 2015 pay in 2016 dollars, in $10,000 increments. Between 2011 and 2015, the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, increased for one position, office manager, by 0.22%, and decreased for 11 staff positions, ranging from a -3.53% decrease for field representatives to a -25.83% decrease for executive assistants. This may be compared to changes over the same period to Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%. | The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in Member offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems.
This report provides pay data for 12 staff position titles that are typically used in House Members' offices. The positions include the following: Caseworker, Chief of Staff, District Director, Executive Assistant, Field Representative, Legislative Assistant, Legislative Correspondent, Legislative Director, Office Manager, Press Secretary, Scheduler, and Staff Assistant.
Tables provide tabular pay data for each House Member office staff position. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following:
a line graph showing change in pay, 2001-2015; a comparison, at 5-, 10-, and 15-year intervals from 2015, of the cumulative percentage change in pay of that position to changes in pay of Members of Congress and salaried federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of 2015 pay in $10,000 increments.
In the past five years (2011-2015), the change in median pay, in constant 2016 dollars, increased for one position, office manager, by 0.22%, and decreased for 11 staff positions, ranging from a -3.53% decrease for field representatives to a -25.83% decrease for executive assistants. This may be compared to changes over the same period to Members of Congress, -5.10%, and General Schedule, DC, -3.19%.
Pay data for staff working in Senators' offices are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014. Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in House and Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014, and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014, respectively.
Information about the duration of staff employment is available in CRS Report R44683, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44685, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senate Committees, 2006-2016, CRS Report R44682, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2006-2016, and CRS Report R44684, Staff Tenure in Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, 2006-2016. |
crs_R41928 | crs_R41928_0 | Introduction
The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill, which began its consideration as H.R. 2584 and ended as Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 112-74 ), funds agencies and programs in parts of three federal departments (Interior, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services), as well as numerous related agencies and bureaus, including the Environmental Protection Agency. Among the more controversial agencies represented in the bill is the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior (DOI). Congress approved $1.48 billion for the agency for FY2012. Most accounts and subaccounts were reduced relative to FY2011 levels. This report analyzes FY2012 appropriations in a policy context, with reference to past appropriations. 112-74 contained some limits on listing; see discussion " Endangered Species Funding .") Hot Topics
In the FY2012 FWS appropriations cycle several issues emerged:
elimination of funding for the adding of new species to the list of those protected under the Endangered Species Act; elimination of funding for critical habitat designation; cuts in funding for fish hatcheries; restoration to near FY2011 levels for the National Wildlife Refuge Fund, a fund that provides payments in lieu of taxes to local governments for the presence of non-taxable refuge land—a program for which the President proposed no appropriation; elimination of annual funding for most land acquisition for the National Wildlife Refuge System; and response to the FY2011 legislative delisting of certain populations of gray wolves. The limitations on listing foreign species or responding to petitions were not found in the previous appropriations bill; limitations on critical habitat designation have been a feature of appropriations bills for over 15 years. FWS had argued that the best available science supported delisting. The consolidated bill contained $62.1 million for the Law Enforcement program, down 1.2% from the FY2011 level of $62.9 million. Nine hatcheries met or exceeded the Administration's 40% mitigation threshold: more than 40% of the benefit of the hatchery was attributed to mitigation of the effects of a water project. FWS argued that some or all of the hatchery costs should be borne by the responsible water project agencies. One of the programs, the Multinational Species Conservation Fund, generates considerable constituent interest despite the small size of the program. | The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriation funds agencies and programs in three federal departments, as well as numerous related agencies and bureaus. Among the agencies represented is the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior. Many of its programs are among the more controversial of those funded in the bill. For FY2012, the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-74, Division E, H.Rept. 112-331) provided $1.48 billion for FWS, down 2% from the FY2011 level of $1.50 billion. (This measure also provided appropriations for most federal government operations for the remainder of FY2012.) For FWS, most accounts were reduced to some degree relative to the FY2011 level.
This report analyzes the FWS funding levels contained in the FY2012 appropriations bill. Emphasis is on FWS funding for programs that have generated congressional debate or particular constituent interest, now or in recent years. Several controversies arose during the appropriations cycle over funding levels or restrictions on funding:
The Administration proposed limitations on funds that could be used to respond to petitions to list new species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), arguing that petitions diverted the agency from listing species with higher conservation priority; others argued that without petitions FWS would list fewer species. The Administration also proposed to limit spending on listing foreign species. Both limits were accepted. The House bill proposed to limit judicial review of FWS decisions concerning the delisting of gray wolves under ESA. This provision was eliminated from the final bill. The Administration proposed cutbacks in funding for certain fish hatcheries involved in mitigation of the effects of federal water projects. FWS argued that the mitigation burden belonged on the shoulders of the agencies responsible for the projects. Congress did cut some of the program, but also specified a transfer of funds to FWS to support hatchery mitigation. The Administration proposed elimination of annual appropriations for payments to counties for lost revenues due to the presence of non-taxable FWS lands. Congress continued the appropriation, with small reductions from previous appropriations. The House bill proposed to eliminate nearly all funding for FWS land acquisition. Congress reduced but did not eliminate the program.
All of these issues are discussed in more detail below, along with funding levels for other programs. |
crs_RS22256 | crs_RS22256_0 | Since the early 1960s, minority participation goals have also been integral to executive branch enforcement of minority hiring and employment standards on federally financed construction projects and in connection with other large federal contracts. Affirmative Action in Public Education
The Regents of the University of California v. Bakke ruling in 1978 launched the contemporary constitutional debate over state-sponsored affirmative action. At issue in Fisher was the constitutionality of the undergraduate admissions plan at the University of Texas (UT) at Austin, which, in a stated effort to increase diversity, considers race as one factor among many when evaluating applicants to the school. As a result, the courts should generally defer to a university's determination that racial diversity is essential to its educational goals. | Affirmative action remains a subject of public debate as the result of legal and political developments at the federal, state, and local levels. Over the years, federal courts have reviewed minority admissions programs to state universities; scrutinized the constitutional status of racial diversity policies in public elementary and secondary schools; ruled on minority preferences in public and private employment as a remedy for violation of civil and constitutional rights; and considered federal, state, and local efforts to increase minority participation as contractors and subcontractors on publicly financed construction projects. This report provides a brief history of federal affirmative action law. |
crs_R44231 | crs_R44231_0 | The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) significantly expanded the CFTC's jurisdiction to include over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, also called swaps. The CFTC Reauthorization Process
The CEA, the statute governing futures and swaps markets in which the CFTC administers, contains a sunset provision. This means Congress must periodically reauthorize appropriations to carry out the CEA. However, if an explicit authorization of appropriations for a program or activity is present—as in the CEA—and it expires, the underlying authority in the statute to administer such a program or engage in such an activity does not. In other words, the CFTC continues functioning and administering the CEA even if its authorization has expired—which has been the case since the last CFTC reauthorization expired on September 30, 2013. It has not been uncommon for Congress to pass CFTC reauthorization bills several years after the prior authorization had expired. Historically, the reauthorization process has often been one of the principal vehicles for modifying the CFTC's regulatory authority and evaluating the efficacy of its regulatory programs. The current CFTC reauthorization process is the first since the Dodd-Frank Act's passage brought the more than $400 trillion U.S. swaps market under regulatory oversight. 2289 , the Commodity End-User Relief Act, on June 9, 2015, by a vote of 246 to 171. Among other changes to the CEA, H.R. The Obama Administration threatened to veto H.R. 2289 , stating that the bill "undermines the efficient functioning of the CFTC by imposing a number of organizational and procedural changes and would undercut efforts taken by the CFTC over the last year to address end-user concerns." On April 14, 2016, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry marked up and ordered to be reported a CFTC reauthorization bill, S. 2917 . In addition, Section 202 adds a requirement that the CFTC conduct quantitative as well as qualitative assessments of costs and benefits. The requirement for quantitative cost-benefit analysis appears to mark a change from previous practice. 2289 , taken together, would expand the exception from certain Dodd-Frank swaps trading and clearing requirements granted to nonfinancial companies. H.R. (H.R. 2289 as passed by the House would modify the definition of a financial entity, potentially enabling a wider range of companies to claim the end-user exception to the clearing requirement in the Dodd-Frank Act. H.R. S. 2917 takes a different approach to modifying the definition of a financial entity. Instead, S. 2917 adds a requirement at the end of Section 2(h)(7)(C) directing the CFTC to issue a new rule defining the term predominantly engaged in financial activities. Changes to Definition of Bona Fide Hedging (H.R. 2289, S. 2917)
Section 313 of H.R. Language in the two bills on this topic is substantially the same. This change could potentially broaden the bona fide hedging definition so as to allow anticipated, as well as current, risks. H.R. H.R. 1256 , the current bill mandates that, starting 18 months from its enactment, the swaps regulatory requirements of the eight largest foreign swaps markets must be considered comparable to those of the United States—unless the CFTC issues a rule or order finding that any of those foreign jurisdictions' requirements are not comparable to or as comprehensive as those of the United States. 2289 would overturn it. 2289 would remove a requirement added in the Dodd-Frank Act's Title VII that foreign regulators indemnify a U.S.-based swap data repository (SDR) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for any expenses arising from litigation related to a request for market data. Indemnification generally refers to compensating someone for harm or loss. The provision in H.R. 2289 in Section 104, would essentially codify the deadline for FCMs to deposit any capital to cover residual interest as no earlier than 6:00 p.m. on the following business day. | The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), created in 1974, regulates futures, most options, and swaps markets. The CFTC administers the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA; P.L. 74-765, 7 U.S.C. §1 et seq) enacted in 1936 to monitor trading in certain derivatives markets. The CEA contains a sunset provision, meaning Congress periodically reauthorizes appropriations to carry out the CEA. If an explicit authorization of appropriations for a program or activity is present—as in the CEA—and it expires, the underlying authority in the statute to administer such a program does not, however. Thus, the CFTC continues functioning and administering the CEA even if its authorization has expired—which has been the case since the last CFTC reauthorization expired on September 30, 2013. It has not been uncommon for Congress to pass CFTC reauthorization bills several years after the prior authorization had expired.
The current CFTC reauthorization process is the first since the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank; P.L. 111-203) brought the roughly $400 trillion U.S. swaps market under regulatory oversight. Historically, the reauthorization process has often been one of the principal vehicles for modifying the CFTC's regulatory authority and evaluating the efficacy of its regulatory programs. The House passed a CFTC reauthorization bill, H.R. 2289, the Commodity End-User Relief Act, on June 9, 2015, by a 246 to 171 vote. The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry marked up and ordered to be reported an identically titled bill, S. 2917, which would also reauthorize such appropriations, as well as making other changes to the CEA. The Obama Administration threatened to veto H.R. 2289, stating that the bill " ... undermines the efficient functioning of the CFTC by imposing a number of organizational and procedural changes and would undercut efforts taken by the CFTC over the last year to address end-user concerns." A number of the provisions in H.R. 2289 discussed in this report do not appear in S. 2917. This report examines the following selected major provisions of H.R. 2289, and S. 2917, which have generally garnered the most attention:
H.R. 2289 expands the current 5 cost-benefit analysis provisions in the CEA to 12. It adds a requirement that the CFTC conduct quantitative as well as qualitative assessments, which appears to mark a change from previous practice. H.R. 2289 includes a provision that would extend an exemption from certain Dodd-Frank swaps trading and clearing requirements granted to nonfinancial companies so as to also include certain of their affiliates. H.R. 2289 would modify the definition of a "financial entity," potentially enabling a wider range of companies to claim certain exemptions from the Dodd-Frank derivatives requirements. S. 2917 takes a different approach to modifying this definition. It directs the CFTC to issue a new rule defining the term predominantly engaged in financial activities to exclude hedging transactions. H.R. 2289 and S. 2917 would potentially broaden the bona fide hedging definition to allow anticipated, as well as current, risks to be hedged, which might increase the number of swaps that qualify as hedges. Bona fide hedging is often used to determine which swaps count toward registration requirements, position limits, large trader reporting, and other regulatory requirements. Language in the two bills on this topic is substantially the same. H.R. 2289 mandates that, starting 18 months from enactment, the swaps regulatory requirements of the eight largest foreign swaps markets must be considered comparable to those of the United States—unless the CFTC issued a rule finding that any of those foreign jurisdictions' requirements were not comparable to U.S. requirements. S. 2917 and H.R. 2289 would essentially codify the deadline for a futures commission merchant (FCM) to deposit any capital to cover residual interest as no earlier than 6:00 p.m. on the following business day. H.R. 2289 would remove a requirement in Dodd-Frank that foreign regulators indemnify a U.S.-based swap data repository for any expenses arising from litigation related to a request for market data. Indemnification generally refers to compensating someone for harm or loss. |
crs_R43948 | crs_R43948_0 | The program is operated by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE that Congress established in the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. NNSA also manages two other programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors. Stockpile stewardship consists of all activities in NNSA's Weapons Activities account. It consists of four programs with funding of over $1 billion each and several smaller programs, all of which are discussed in detail below. According to a White House document of May 2010, the President provided Congress with a classified report (the "1251 report") required by the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1251, "on the comprehensive plan to: (1) maintain delivery platforms [that is, bombers, missiles, and submarines that deliver nuclear weapons]; (2) sustain a safe, secure, and reliable U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; and (3) modernize the nuclear weapons complex." The panel's recommendations included strengthening presidential guidance and oversight of the nuclear enterprise; establishing new congressional mechanisms for leadership and oversight of the enterprise; replacing NNSA with a new Office of Nuclear Security within DOE, renamed to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Security, with the Secretary responsible for the mission; and building a culture of performance, accountability, and credibility. Similarly, in its FY2016 report on energy and water development appropriations, S.Rept. The FY2016 request was $3,187.3 million; the enacted amount, on a comparable basis, for FY2015 was $2,797.2 million. The House Appropriations Committee recommended $3,354.3 million for FY2016. The House passed H.R. 2028 , Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016, by a vote of 240-177, without amendments to the Weapons Activities section of the bill as reported from committee. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $3,039.5 million for FY2016. H.R. 2028 , as passed by the House, provided the requested amounts; the Senate Appropriations Committee likewise recommended providing the requested amounts. 113-235 , the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, had also provided full funding for the B61 LEP, the W76 LEP, the W88 Alt 370, and the cruise missile warhead life extension study. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $52.0 million, and the omnibus appropriations bill provided this amount. The FY2015-enacted amount for Stockpile Services comparable to the FY2016 budget structure (i.e., minus programs transferred to Nuclear Material Commodities) was $762.4 million. For FY2016, H.R. For FY2016, the House Appropriations Committee recommended $589.2 million and stated, "The recommendation further expands the request to specify funds for the management of nuclear materials to other materials of strategic significance by including funding requested for Material Recycling and Recovery, Storage, Nuclear Materials Integration, and other planning efforts within Strategic Materials Sustainment." Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Programs
RDT&E includes five programs. The FY2016 request was $1,776.5 million. 2028 , as passed by the House, provided $1,774.2 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $1,766.3 million. The omnibus appropriations bill provides $1,818.5 million. The FY2016 request was $389.6 million; the House Appropriations Committee recommended $412.9 million, which would, among other things, provide funds "to better understand the properties of plutonium and to advance concepts for pit reuse" and "to enhance U.S. capabilities to assess foreign state weapons activities." H.R. H.R. Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF)
This program used to fund infrastructure and operations at nuclear weapons complex sites. However, beginning in FY2016, its main funding elements were material recycle and recovery, recapitalization of facilities, and construction of facilities. The FY2016 request was $1,054.5 million. The House Appropriations Committee recommended consolidating funding for RTBF, Infrastructure and Safety, and Site Stewardship into a new category, Infrastructure and Operations (I&O), for which it recommended $2,228.2 million. 2028 , as passed by the House, provided the amount recommended by the House Appropriations Committee and did not amend the committee's recommendation on consolidation. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $1,021.1 billion for RTBF. Infrastructure and Safety
Infrastructure and Safety (I&S), a new program in the FY2016 budget request, included parts of RTBF and another program, Site Stewardship, described below. The FY2016 request was $1,466.1 million; the comparable FY2015-enacted funding was $1,386.7 million. As noted in the previous paragraph, the committee recommended consolidating I&S into I&O. The omnibus appropriations bill followed the House lead and appropriated $2,279.1 million for Infrastructure and Operations. Among other things, the bill provided $25.0 million for certain emergency response-related R&D that had been traditionally funded in Weapons Activities; the Administration requested no funds in the Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response Program for this R&D. The FY2016 request for the remaining Site Stewardship program was $36.6 million; the comparable amount for FY2015 was $27.8 million. H.R. The omnibus appropriations bill followed the House budget structure and funded this program under the I&O account. The omnibus appropriations bill provides $682.9 million for Defense Nuclear Security and directed that $30 million should be used for the Security Improvements Program that will address the backlog of security projects, as directed in the House report. For Weapons Activities, the FY2016 request was $283.9 million; the comparable enacted amount for FY2015 was $307.1 million. (NNSA requested an additional amount for Legacy Contractor Pensions under Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.) | The annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and several independent agencies.
The DOE budget includes funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE. NNSA operates three programs: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, which secures nuclear materials worldwide, conducts R&D into nonproliferation and verification, and operates the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program; Naval Reactors, which "is responsible for all U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion work"; and Weapons Activities.
The latter is the subject of this report. It operates the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which maintains the U.S. nuclear gravity bombs and missile warheads and has science and infrastructure programs that support that mission. (The Department of Defense [DOD] operates the bombers and missiles that would deliver nuclear weapons; it is funded in the Department of Defense appropriations bill.) The Armed Services Committees authorize funds for DOD and NNSA programs. The FY2016 request proposed moving counterterrorism programs from Weapons Activities to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. On a basis comparable to the FY2016 budget structure, the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 83/P.L. 113-235) provided $8,007.7 million for Weapons Activities. The FY2016 request was $8,846.9 million, a 10.5% increase over FY2015. The House Appropriations Committee recommended providing $8,713.0 million for FY2016. The House passed H.R. 2028, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016, by a vote of 240-177 on May 1. The bill as passed by the House made no changes to the Weapons Activities section of the committee bill. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported the bill on May 21. It recommended providing $8,882.4 million. Congress provided 8,846.9 million for Weapons Activities in the omnibus appropriations bill for FY2016 (H.R. 2029).
Weapons Activities has four main programs, each with a request of over $1 billion for FY2016, as follows. FY2015-enacted amounts included below are comparable to the FY2016 budget structure.
Directed Stockpile Work works directly on nuclear weapons. It includes life extension programs, maintenance, and others. The FY2015-enacted amount was $2,797.2 million; the FY2016 request was $3,187.3 million, a 13.9% increase. H.R. 2028, as passed by the House, provided $3,354.3 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $3,039.5 million. The omnibus appropriations bill provided $3,387.8 million. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Programs, which advances the science, engineering, computation, and manufacturing that support Directed Stockpile Work. The FY2015-enacted amount was $1,766.2 million; the FY2016 request was $1,776.6 million, a 0.6% increase. H.R. 2028, as passed by the House, provided $1,774.2 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $1,766.3 million. The omnibus appropriations bill provided $1,818.5 million. Infrastructure and Safety (I&S), a budget category that NNSA proposed in its FY2016 request, includes operations of facilities, recapitalization, maintenance, safety operations, and other programs. The FY2015-enacted comparable amount was $1,386.7 million; the FY2016 request was $1,466.1 million, a 5.7% increase. The House Appropriations Committee recommended consolidating I&S into Infrastructure and Operations. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $1,466.1 million for I&S. The omnibus appropriations bill accepted the House budget structure and consolidated I&S into Infrastructure and Operations, as described next. Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) funds material recycle and recovery, recapitalization of facilities, and construction of facilities. Prior to FY2016, it also funded operations of the nuclear weapons complex. The FY2015-enacted amount was $2,033.4 million; the FY2016 request was $1,054.5 million, with the decrease due to transferring funds to I&S. The FY2015 comparable request for RTBF was $688.0 million, so on a comparable basis FY2016 RTBF increased by 53.3%. The House Appropriations Committee recommended consolidating funding for RTBF, Infrastructure and Safety, and Site Stewardship into a new category, Infrastructure and Operations (I&O), for which it recommended $2,228.2 million. H.R. 2028, as passed by the House, accepted this budget structure. The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended keeping I&S and Site Stewardship as separately funded categories, and providing $1,021.1 million for I&O and $36.6 million for Site Stewardship. The omnibus appropriations bill accepted the consolidated funding structure, and provided $2,279.1 million for Infrastructure and Operations (I&O).
Weapons Activities also includes several smaller programs, all of which are described in this report: Secure Transportation Asset, Site Stewardship, Defense Nuclear Security, Information Technology and Cybersecurity, and Legacy Contractor Pensions. |
crs_R43745 | crs_R43745_0 | This report provides legislative analyses of the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act ( S. 744 ), as passed by the Senate, and the Supplying Knowledge-based Immigrants and Lifting Levels of STEM Visas Act (SKILLS Visa Act, H.R. 2131 ), as ordered reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary. These visa categories are commonly referred to by the letter and numeral that denote their subsection in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Overarching Policy Options
The admission of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers raises a series of policy options as the United States competes internationally for the most talented workers in the world without putting downward pressures on the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers and U.S. students entering the labor market. Adding to the complexity of the debate is the variety of temporary visa categories that enable employment-based temporary admissions for highly skilled foreign workers. They perform work that ranges from skilled labor to management and professional positions as well as jobs requiring extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics. Congress has considered several overarching legislative options to reform the system of admitting highly skilled foreign workers, which include the following:
streamlining procedures that govern the admission of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers so that the rules are less time consuming and burdensome for employers; increasing the number of temporary professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers admitted each year; requiring employers of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to meet labor markets tests, such as making efforts to recruit U.S. workers and offering wages and benefits that are comparable to similarly employed U.S. workers; extending labor protections and worker rights to professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to prevent abuse or exploitation of the worker; enabling professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to have "visa portability" so they can change jobs; and permitting professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to have "dual intent"; that is, to apply for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status while seeking or renewing temporary visas. In addition to these issues that cross-cut the various temporary employment-based visas, Congress has focused in particular on two visa categories: H-1B visas for professional specialty workers, and L visas for intra-company transferees. These two nonimmigrant visas epitomize the tensions between the global competition for talent and potential adverse effects on the U.S. workforce. Legislation in the 113th Congress
The 113 th Congress has considered legislation that would make extensive revisions to nonimmigrant categories for professional specialty workers (H-1B visas), intra-company transferees (L visas), and other skilled temporary workers; and two bills have received action. Both bills would substantially revise these visa categories, with provisions largely aimed at streamlining procedures, strengthening enforcement, and expanding admissions. Proposed Reforms of the H-1B Visa
The major nonimmigrant category for temporary professional workers is the H-1B visa. | The admission of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers raises a complex set of policy issues as the United States competes internationally for the most talented workers in the world, without adversely effecting U.S. workers and U.S. students entering the labor market. Legislative proposals that Congress has considered include streamlining procedures that govern the admission of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers; increasing the number of temporary professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers admitted each year; requiring employers of professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to make efforts to recruit U.S. workers and offer wages and benefits that are comparable to similarly employed U.S. workers; extending labor protections and worker rights to professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to prevent abuse or exploitation of the worker; enabling professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to have "visa portability" so they can change jobs; and allowing professional, managerial, and skilled foreign workers to have "dual intent"; that is, to apply for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status while seeking or renewing temporary visas.
Adding to the complexity of the debate is the variety of temporary visa categories that enable employment-based temporary admissions for highly skilled foreign workers. They perform work that ranges from skilled labor to management and professional positions to jobs requiring extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics. These visa categories are commonly referred to by the letter and numeral that denote their subsection in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Congress has focused on two visa categories in particular: H-1B visas for professional specialty workers, and L visas for intra-company transferees. These two nonimmigrant visas epitomize the tensions between the global competition for talent and potential adverse effects on the U.S. workforce. The United States struggles to support the recruitment of highly skilled professionals on H-1B visas and L visas without displacing U.S. workers or putting downward pressures on the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers and U.S. students entering the labor market. Achieving this end through a process that both meets the expeditious needs of U.S. business and preserves employment opportunities for U.S. workers is a challenge, and there are critics of the current H-1B and L policies on each side of the issue. Congress is also weighing reforms of other professional and outstanding worker visas as well as treaty-specific visas.
The 113th Congress has acted on legislation that would make extensive revisions to nonimmigrant categories for professional specialty workers (H-1B visas), intra-company transferees (L visas), and other skilled temporary workers. The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744), as passed by the Senate, and the Supplying Knowledge-based Immigrants and Lifting Levels of STEM Visas Act (SKILLS Visa Act, H.R. 2131), as ordered reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary, would substantially revise these visa categories. Both bills have provisions aimed at streamlining procedures, strengthening enforcement, and expanding admissions. |
crs_R44489 | crs_R44489_0 | Introduction
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) among the United States and 11 Asia-Pacific countries. The TPP would be eligible to receive expedited legislative consideration under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), P.L. 114-26 , unless Congress determines the Administration has failed to advance TPA negotiating objectives, or has not met various notification and consultation requirements. U.S. trade policymakers took notice of the P-4's relative ambition as a possible template for a wider Asia-Pacific free trade agreement. Obama Administration officials and other TPP proponents argue that these implications would be positive and felt in several ways, both geo-economic and geo-political. While debate continues, both in the United States and abroad, over the appropriate scope of various TPP provisions and the degree to which they differ from other regional pacts, some policymakers argue that the TPP would provide the United States with leverage to help shape regional and, perhaps, broader multilateral economic norms. Some opponents of the agreement argue that focusing on the strategic elements of the TPP distracts the debate from what they view should be its main criteria: the agreement's potential impact on the U.S. economy. Among the U.S. negotiating partners in the TPP, Japan is the largest economy and largest trading partner without an existing U.S. FTA (and hence, with greater scope for trade liberalization with the United States). Malaysia and Vietnam also stand out among the TPP countries without existing U.S. FTAs, both in terms of their current trade and investment with the United States and their potential for future growth. The breadth and depth of trade liberalization resulting from two potential agreements is likely to differ. Stakeholders' views on the TPP agreement vary. Tariffs36
Background
Like previous U.S. FTAs, TPP would eventually eliminate all industrial goods tariffs and most agriculture tariffs and quotas. Key Provisions with Non-U.S. FTA Countries
Given the existing U.S. FTAs with Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore, which include comprehensive tariff coverage, this section focuses only on TPP tariff commitments between the United States and the five TPP countries without an existing U.S. FTA (Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Vietnam). Concerns include the following:
Currency M anipulation . The May 2016 study estimates that both services sector output and employment would see increases above a 2032 baseline as a result of the TPP. The International Trade Advisory Committee for services and finance industries (ITAC 10) reported that the agreement satisfies TPA negotiating objectives and "on balance promotes the economic interest of the United States." Biologics. Patent Linkage. Enforcement. TPP includes provisions on trademark protection and enforcement. Exceptions. Minimum Standard of Treatment (MST) . In contrast, KORUS limited the affirmation of a government's right to regulate due to "environmental concerns." Financial Services . Exceptions . TPP includes certain limits (exceptions) on the ratchet mechanism for Vietnam for the first three years after TPP's entry into force under specified conditions. Reaction to the SOE provisions in TPP is mixed. Nondiscriminatory Treatment/Commercial Considerations . Exceptions. Transparency and Reporting . It would:
provide opportunities for partner countries to comment on proposed standards and regulations and the implementation of regulations; require nondiscriminatory treatment for conformity assessment bodies, including nongovernmental bodies; extend transparency obligations to include placing new TBT proposals and rules on a single website, broadening the range of TBT measures notified to the WTO; allow interested stakeholders from others parties to participate in the development of technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures by central government bodies, and adopt U.S. style notice and comment periods; mandate a "reasonable interval"—generally defined as no less than 6 months—between adoption and implementation of new standards, as well as business compliance with new standards; establish a Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade to promote and monitor the implementation and administration of the agreement and strengthen cooperation. The goal of this new chapter, according to the USTR, is to ensure a regulatory environment throughout the Asia-Pacific that includes hallmarks of the U.S. regulatory system, such as transparency, impartiality, due process, and coordination across government, while affirming the rights of TPP countries to regulate their economies to promote legitimate public policy objectives. Penalties . In TPP, these issues are addressed in a separate and more extensive chapter (see " State-Owned Enterprises "). A similar clause is not found in TPP. Congress may consider the agreement from several perspectives if it considers implementing legislation. On one hand, the TPP would incorporate provisions on new trade barriers, such as digital trade and additional intellectual property rights. At the same time, increased trade can lead to job loss and economic dislocation in importing-competing sectors. The TPP is ambitious in at least four ways: (1) its size—it would be the largest U.S. FTA by trade flows and could expand in a region that represents over half of all U.S. trade; (2) the scope and scale of its liberalization—the parties, while not always at the desired level of ambition, have agreed to reduce barriers to goods, services, and agricultural trade and to establish rules and disciplines on a wide range of topics, including new policy issues that neither the WTO nor existing FTAs yet cover; (3) its potential evolution as a "living agreement"—it may continue to be expanded in terms of its membership and its rules and disciplines, and a number of countries officially have expressed an interest in joining TPP if it goes into effect; and (4) its geo-political significance—it has become, for some observers in the United States and Asia, a symbol of U.S. commitment to and influence in the Asia-Pacific, a region of growing economic and military importance where U.S. leadership increasingly is being challenged. | The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) among 12 Asia-Pacific countries, with both economic and strategic significance for the United States. The proposed agreement is perhaps the most ambitious FTA undertaken by the United States in terms of its size, the breadth and depth of its commitments, its potential evolution, and its geo-political significance. Signed on February 4, 2016, after several years of negotiations, if implemented, TPP would be the largest FTA in which the United States participates, and would eliminate trade barriers and establish new trade rules and disciplines on a range of issues among TPP partners not found in previous U.S. FTAs or the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, the TPP is designed to better integrate the United States into the growing Asia-Pacific region and has become the economic centerpiece of the Administration's "rebalance" to the region. Congress would need to enact implementing legislation for the agreement to enter into force for the United States. Such legislation would be considered under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) procedures, unless Congress determines the Administration has not met TPA requirements.
TPP Members
Currently, the TPP includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam, which together comprise 40% of the world's GDP. TPP is envisioned as a "living agreement," potentially addressing new issues and open to future members, including as a possible vehicle to advance a wider Asia-Pacific free trade area. The United States currently has FTAs with six TPP partner countries. Japan is the largest economy and trading partner without an existing U.S. FTA. Malaysia and Vietnam also stand out among TPP countries without existing U.S. FTAs, given the rapid growth in U.S. trade with the two nations over the past three decades and their generally higher level of trade restrictions.
Potential Outcomes of TPP
The TPP would provide several principal trade liberalization and rules-based outcomes for the United States. These include the following:
lower tariff and nontariff barriers on U.S. goods through eventual elimination of all tariffs on industrial products and most tariffs and quotas on agricultural products; greater service sector liberalization with enhanced disciplines, such as nondiscriminatory and minimum standard of treatment, along with certain exceptions; additional intellectual property rights protections in patent, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets; first specific data protection provisions for biologic drugs and new criminal penalties for cybertheft of trade secrets; investment protections that guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment, minimum standard of treatment and other provisions to protect foreign investment, balanced by provisions to protect a state's right to regulate in the public interest; enforceable provisions designed to provide minimum standards of labor and environmental protection in TPP countries; commitments, without an enforcement mechanism, to avoid currency manipulation, provide transparency and reporting concerning monetary policy, and engage in regulatory dialogue among TPP parties; digital trade commitments to promote the free flow of data and to prevent data localization, except for data localization in financial services, alongside commitments on privacy and exceptions for legitimate public policy purposes; enhanced regulatory transparency and due process provisions in standards-setting; and the most expansive disciplines on state-owned enterprises ever in a U.S. FTA or the WTO, albeit with exceptions, to advance fair competition with private firms based on commercial considerations.
The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) has estimated that the TPP would bring modest overall benefits to the U.S. economy once implemented, slightly increasing both output (0.15%) and employment (0.07%) above a baseline scenario without the agreement. According to the USITC study, most agriculture and services sectors would see expansions, while some manufacturing and natural resources sectors would be expected to contract relative to baseline projections as resources shifted within the U.S. economy.
TPP Debate
Views on the likely effects of the agreement vary. Proponents argue that the TPP is in the national interest and has the potential to boost economic growth and jobs through expanded trade and investment opportunities in what many see as the world's most economically vibrant region. Opponents of TPP voice concerns over possible job loss and competition in import-sensitive industries. Other concerns include how a TPP agreement might limit the government's ability to regulate in areas such as health, food safety, and the environment. The Obama Administration and others have argued that the strategic value of a TPP agreement parallels its economic value, while others argue that past trade pacts have had a limited impact on broad foreign policy dynamics. In analyzing the agreement and its implementing legislation, Congress may consider the agreement from several of these perspectives, as well as how the TPP promotes progress on U.S. trade negotiating objectives. |
crs_R44288 | crs_R44288_0 | N ational delegations from more than 190 countries and the European Union will gather in Paris, France, on November 29, 2015, to try to negotiate an agreement to address climate change. A climate change deal in Paris is not assured. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has drawn on the draft texts of an agreement and a decision under negotiation, and publicly available reports and views to provide a current sense of what may be likely outcomes. These are not predictions. While many stakeholders are optimistic that an agreement will be reached, the nature of the expected agreement and the provisions within it are far from certain. Existing Obligations under the UNFCCC
All Parties to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including the United States, have a host of common obligations under the treaty. In addition, more than 174 Parties to the UNFCCC—almost 90%—voluntarily submitted Intended Nationally Determine d Contributions (INDCs) prior to the Paris conference, with almost all containing pledges to limit or reduce their GHG emissions. What Is Likely in an Expected Agreement and Decision
If the Paris negotiations succeed in resolving the major disputes, they are likely to yield at least two agreements: an Agreement (hereinafter capitalized)—which many expect to be legally binding; and a Decision (hereinafter capitalized) by the COP that would adopt the Agreement under the UNFCCC and include provisions intended to "give effect to the Agreement." The Decision would lay out follow-up processes for the Parties, tasks for the Secretariat, and possibly include related provisions that could be legally binding under the Convention. For example, the UNFCCC already contains many legally binding obligations for all Parties; however, the United States delegation may oppose an Agreement that would establish new substantive obligations on the United States, such as making the GHG emission reduction in the U.S. INDC legally binding. Very broad participation has already been achieved by the negotiating process. For example, while only a few Annex I Parties of the 1992 UNFCCC took on specific obligations to produce national plans to mitigate their GHG emissions (e.g., under the Kyoto Protocol), already a large majority of Parties to the UNFCCC have submitted INDCs in preparation for the COP21. Calls for guidelines for (transparent) reporting and review of financing and other means to assist Parties to meet their obligations could make it into a final Agreement. Placeholders to define "developed country Parties" and "developing country Parties" appear in the Definitions article of the draft as well; whether quantified pledges for GHG emission mitigation and/or financing are legally binding for all Parties, only developed country Parties, or no Parties; whether to further characterize, in the Agreement, the UNFCCC's objective as avoidance of a temperature goal (2 o C, 1.5 o C, or well below either), or to "decarbonize" economies, and whether the responsibilities to achieve any long-term goal might be allocated to Parties individually; whether financing heretofore pledged collectively by most of the highest-income Parties, to aim to mobilize $100 billion annually by 2020, should be included in the Agreement, quantified, required to continually increase over time, be prescribed by formula, or be limited to "developed country Parties" rather than all Parties "in a position to do so." Parties that perceive themselves as vulnerable to climate change seek provisions to provide them with funds for "loss and damage" that they may suffer even with adaptation efforts. There remains a placeholder in the draft regarding whether a Party may place reservations on its accession to the Agreement. The Role of Congress in Approving a New Climate Agreement23
The UNFCCC is legally binding on the United States—the United States ratified the agreement and it entered into force in 1994. | The Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) convenes for the 21st time (COP21) in Paris, France, from November 29 to December 11, 2015. The United States ratified the UNFCCC in 1992. Accordingly, the United States and the other 195 UNFCCC Parties already have legally binding but qualitative obligations under the treaty. COP21 intends to finalize an agreement under the UNFCCC to address climate change from 2020 on. A major focus is to lay out a path toward stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere to avoid a 2o Celsius (3.6oF) increase in global temperature. The expected agreement would replace the Kyoto Protocol, to which the United States is not a Party. The Kyoto Protocol contains obligations for a limited set of the highest income countries to the year 2020.
This report identifies critical issues regarding (1) the expected Paris Agreement and (2) a Decision that would give effect to the Agreement. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) draws on the draft negotiating texts, publicly available reports, and commentaries to suggest likely outcomes. These are not predictions. While many stakeholders are optimistic that agreement will be reached, the conclusions are far from certain.
There are many issues under negotiation. The main issues include (with key terms italicized) the following:
Which provisions will be legally binding, and on which Parties? Will responsibilities be differentiated among Parties with different circumstances and capacities? Will all Parties agree to modify the existing bifurcation into Annex I and developing country Parties? Is resolution possible if the Agreement does not ensure differentiated but efficacious participation of all Parties? Will a durable Agreement, intended to provide a multi-decade framework, include binding processes for all Parties to ensure progression toward the long-term UNFCCC objective? Might greater priority be given to adaptation to climate change, particularly with regard to financing and capacity-building? Will Parties find common ground on Means of Implementation (MOI), including assistance in financing, capacity building, and access to technologies? Will all Parties accept a common transparency framework with international reviews of national performance and consultations to address noncompliance? Would Parties with historically high contributions to current GHG concentrations agree to address loss and damage from climate change, or would Parties that feel most vulnerable to climate change accept an agreement without it? Will an agreement set long-term goals to avoid future temperature increases of 2o Celsius (3.6oF) or lower, or to impose deadlines to achieve decarbonization of economies?
Legal form and force: A new agreement could be internationally legally binding but not add legally binding obligations for the United States. If it does not, a new agreement may constitute an executive agreement that may not require the advice and consent of the Senate under the Constitution. Some in Congress, however, suggest that an executive agreement could be an "end run" or violate the treaty clause of the Constitution.
Financing: Financing beyond 2020 remains a crucial issue for the Paris deal. Some Parties seek to make financing pledges legally binding; scale up amounts on a timetable; restrict contributors to public funds from developed country Parties, and pay for loss and damage in developing countries. The United States and many current donor countries oppose proposals to pay for loss and damage.
Worldwide Participation: Very broad participation has already been achieved by the negotiating process. While only a few Annex I Parties of the 1992 UNFCCC took on specific obligations to produce national plans to mitigate their GHG emissions, 174 Parties to the UNFCCC—almost 90%—voluntarily submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) prior to the Paris conference, almost all containing pledges to limit or reduce their GHG emissions. |
crs_RS22644 | crs_RS22644_0 | Federal campaign finance law provides political parties with three major options for providing financial support to House, Senate, and presidential candidates: (1) direct contributions, (2) coordinated expenditures, and (3) independent expenditures. Coordinated expenditures allow parties (notwithstanding other provisions in the law regulating contributions to campaigns) to buy goods or services on behalf of a campaign, and to discuss those expenditures with the campaign. Because parties are the spending agents, they (not candidates) report their coordinated expenditures to the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Parties may also make coordinated expenditures on behalf of presidential candidates. FECA defines an "independent expenditure" to include spending for a communication that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, and is not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of a candidate or a political party. Independent Party Spending Limits Found Unconstitutional and Coordinated Party Expenditure Limits Upheld: Colorado I and II
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission (FEC) (Colorado I ( 1996 ) ) , the Supreme Court found that political parties have a constitutional right to make unlimited independent expenditures. In Colorado II, the Supreme Court ruled that a political party's coordinated expenditures—unlike genuine independent expenditures—may be constitutionally limited in order to minimize circumvention of FECA contribution limits. As the Court explained, coordinated party expenditures have no "significant functional difference" from direct party candidate contributions. Recent Legislative Activity
Reconsidering coordinated party expenditure limits is a consistent part of the debate over the role of political parties compared with other political committees and "outside groups." Perhaps most notably, H.R. 6286 (Cole) during the 111 th Congress, and S. 1091 (Corker) and H.R. H.R. As Table 1 below shows, public financing and appropriations legislation considered during the 114 th Congress would increase or eliminate limits on coordinated party expenditures in some cases. On their own, these data do not suggest particular outcomes if caps on party coordinated expenditures were lifted, but they do indicate that one party might not necessarily have a major total financial advantage over the other if the caps are lifted in the near future. Proponents of limits on party coordinated expenditures contend that the caps reduce the amount of money in politics. | A provision of federal campaign finance law, codified at 52 U.S.C. §30116(d) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §441a(d)), allows political party committees to make expenditures on behalf of their general election candidates for federal office and specifies limits on such spending. These "coordinated party expenditures" are important not only because they provide financial support to campaigns, but also because parties and campaigns may explicitly discuss how the money is spent. Although they have long been the major source of direct party financial support for campaigns, coordinated expenditures have recently been overshadowed by independent expenditures.
In a 1996 ruling, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission (FEC) (Colorado I), the U.S. Supreme Court found that political parties have a constitutional right to make unlimited independent expenditures. Federal campaign finance law defines an independent expenditure to include spending for a communication that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, and is not made in cooperation or consultation with a candidate or a political party. In a subsequent case, Colorado II, however, the Court ruled that a political party's coordinated expenditures—that is, expenditures made in cooperation or consultation with a candidate—may be constitutionally limited in order to minimize circumvention of contribution limits. According to the Court, in contrast to independent expenditures, coordinated party expenditures have no "significant functional difference" from direct party candidate contributions.
Despite limited legislative activity on the topic in recent Congresses, coordinated party expenditures remain a component of the debate over the strength of modern political parties. In recent Congresses, provisions in some appropriations bills would have increased or abolished coordinated party expenditure limits, as would some public financing bills (H.R. 20; H.R. 424; H.R. 2143; S. 1176; S. 1910; S. 2132; and S. 3250 in the 114th Congress; and H.R. 20, H.R. 268, H.R. 269, H.R. 270, and S. 2023 in the 113th Congress).
Those who support existing limits on coordinated party expenditures argue that the caps reduce potential corruption and the amount of money in politics. Opponents maintain that the limits are antiquated, particularly because political parties may make unlimited independent expenditures supporting their candidates. If the caps were lifted and fundraising patterns remained consistent with those discussed here, it appears that neither party would have a substantial resource advantage over the other. It is important to note, however, that individual circumstances would determine particular fundraising and spending decisions.
This report will be updated occasionally as events warrant. |
crs_R43719 | crs_R43719_0 | Introduction
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." This provision limits the government's power to restrict speech. In 1976, the Supreme Court issued its landmark campaign finance ruling in Buckley v. Vale o. In Buckley , the Court found that limits on campaign contributions, which involve giving money to an entity, and expenditures, which involve spending money directly for electoral advocacy, implicate rights of political expression and association under the First Amendment. From these general principles, the Court concluded that contributions and expenditures facilitate an interchange of ideas, and cannot be regulated as mere conduct unrelated to their underlying act of communication. The Court in Buckley , however, afforded different degrees of First Amendment protection to contributions and expenditures. Contribution limits are subject to more lenient review, the Court found, because they impose only a marginal restriction on speech and will be upheld if the government can demonstrate that they are a "closely drawn" means of achieving a "sufficiently important" governmental interest. On the other hand, expenditure limits are subject to strict scrutiny because they impose a substantial restraint on speech. That is, limits on expenditures must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Therefore, in Buckley and its progeny, the Court has generally upheld limits on contributions, finding that they serve the governmental interest of protecting elections from corruption, while invalidating limits on independent expenditures, finding that they do not pose a risk of corruption. Importantly, the Court's recent case law has announced that only quid pro quo corruption or its appearance constitute a sufficiently important governmental interest to justify limits on contributions and expenditures. Although the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence has shifted over the years, the basic Buckley framework has generally been applied when determining whether a campaign finance limit violates the First Amendment. This report discusses current Supreme Court and other case law evaluating the constitutionality of limits on contributions and expenditures in various contexts. The Court has determined that limits on expenditures are subject to strict scrutiny review, and accordingly, has found them to be unconstitutional. Candidates Whose Opponents Self-Finance
The Supreme Court has ruled that a statute establishing a series of staggered increases in contribution limits for candidates whose opponents significantly self-finance their campaigns violates the First Amendment. Super PACs
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that limits on contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures are unconstitutional. In McConnell v. FEC , the Court held that Section 213 of BCRA, which required political parties to choose between coordinated and independent expenditures after nominating a candidate, burdened the First Amendment right of parties to make unlimited independent expenditures. Corporations and Labor Unions
The Supreme Court has held that limits on corporate, and it appears labor union, expenditures that are made independently of any candidate or political party are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Such expenditures are protected speech, regardless of whether the speaker is a corporation. As a result, in 2014, the Court overturned limits on aggregate contributions. | The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." This provision limits the government's power to restrict speech. In 1976, the Supreme Court issued its landmark campaign finance ruling in Buckley v. Valeo. In Buckley, the Court determined that limits on campaign contributions, which involve giving money to an entity, and expenditures, which involve spending money directly for electoral advocacy, implicate rights of political expression and association under the First Amendment. In view of the fact that contributions and expenditures facilitate speech, the Court concluded, they cannot be regulated as mere conduct.
The Court in Buckley, however, afforded different degrees of First Amendment protection to contributions and expenditures. Contribution limits are subject to more lenient review because they impose only a marginal restriction on speech, and will be upheld if the government can demonstrate that they are a "closely drawn" means of achieving a "sufficiently important" governmental interest. On the other hand, expenditure limits are subject to strict scrutiny because they impose a substantial restraint on speech. That is, limits on expenditures must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Therefore, in Buckley and its progeny, the Court has generally upheld limits on contributions, finding that they serve the governmental interest of protecting elections from corruption, while invalidating limits on independent expenditures, finding that they do not pose a risk of corruption. Importantly, the Court's recent case law has announced that only quid pro quo corruption or its appearance constitute a sufficiently important governmental interest to justify limits on contributions and expenditures. Although the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence has shifted over the years, the basic Buckley framework has generally been applied when determining whether a campaign finance limit violates the First Amendment.
This report discusses current Supreme Court and other case law evaluating the constitutionality of limits on contributions and expenditures. For example, while the Court has generally upheld reasonable limits on contributions, it has invalidated them when it found that they were too low, prohibited minors age 17 or under from contributing, and after determining that aggregate contribution limits serve as a complete ban once the aggregate amount has been reached. The Court has also ruled that a series of staggered increases in contribution limits for candidates whose opponents significantly self-finance their campaigns are unconstitutional. An appellate court has held that limits on contributions to groups making only independent expenditures are unconstitutional, which resulted in the creation of super PACs. Cases including McConnell, Davis, SpeechNow.org, McCutcheon, and Williams-Yulee are examined.
The Supreme Court has overturned limits on candidate expenditures, including limits on candidates using personal wealth to finance campaigns, as well as on independent expenditures by political parties. Further, the Court has held that requiring parties to choose between coordinated and independent expenditures after nominating a candidate is unconstitutional because it burdens the right of parties to make unlimited independent expenditures. On the other hand, the Court has upheld limits on party coordinated expenditures because they are functionally similar to contributions. The Court has also invalidated a long-standing prohibition on corporations, and it appears labor unions, using treasury funds for independent expenditures, finding that regardless of the speaker being a corporation, such expenditures are protected speech. Cases including Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, Randall, Wisconsin Right to Life, and Citizens United are discussed. |
crs_R44486 | crs_R44486_0 | Title I-A is the largest program in the ESEA, funded at $14.9 billion for FY2016. Title I-A is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The ESEA was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95 ) on December 10, 2015. This report provides final FY2016 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest total Title I-A grant amount ($1.8 billion) and, as a result, the largest percentage share (11.98%) of Title I-A grants. Wyoming received the smallest total Title I-A grant amount ($34.8 million) and, as a result, the smallest percentage share (0.24%) of Title I-A grants. | The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95) on December 10, 2015. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and was funded at $14.9 billion for FY2016. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families.
Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others.
This report provides final FY2016 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest FY2016 Title I-A grant amount ($1.8 billion or 11.98% of total Title I-A grants). Wyoming received the smallest FY2016 Title I-A grant amount ($34.8 million or 0.24% of total Title I-A grants). |
crs_R40941 | crs_R40941_0 | Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) Overview
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) has become known as a "signature wound" of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF). Relevant VA Programs and Services
Although the early stages of TBI treatment may occur within the military health care system if the initial injury occurs during military service, a description of the military health care system is beyond the scope of this report, which focuses on the VA health care system. In FY2015, VA spending for TBI is estimated to be $234 million (including $61 million for OEF/OIF veterans). The VA projects the 10-year (FY2016–FY2025) costs of TBI to be $2.2 billion (including $0.5 billion for OEF/OIF veterans). Most cases of mild TBI, however, resolve without medical attention. In the case of servicemembers, treatment begins at the site of the event and continues at a military treatment facility. Once stabilized, servicemembers may remain at a military treatment facility or be sent to VA medical facilities for continuing treatment, rehabilitation, and transitional care. Three VA and joint VA/DOD programs seek to address the transition from DOD to VA health care facilities: (1) the VA Liaison Program, (2) OEF/OIF Care Management, and (3) the Federal Recovery Coordinator Program. These programs are available to veterans with TBI as well as other qualified veterans and servicemembers. Screening and Evaluation
Moderate or severe TBI is likely to be recognized immediately at the time of the initial injury; however, mild TBI may go unnoticed if an individual walks away from an injury seemingly unharmed. Despite repeated assessments of servicemembers by the DOD, veterans may enter the VA health care system with undiagnosed TBI. Since 2007, VA policy has required that all OEF/OIF veterans receiving medical care in the VA health care system be screened for possible TBI (to identify cases of TBI that might otherwise go untreated). Those who screen positive must be offered further evaluation and specialized treatment. Acute and Post-Acute Care: VA Polytrauma/TBI System of Care
Veterans with moderate or severe TBI may receive care through the VA Polytrauma/TBI System of Care (PSC), which is also available to veterans with other traumatic injuries. Like the larger VISN structure, the PSC is geographically dispersed, thereby making the specialized treatment more accessible to veterans, regardless of where they live. The PSC operates as a "hub and spoke" model with four components: (1) Polytrauma Rehabilitation Centers, (2) Polytrauma Network Sites, (3) Polytrauma Support Clinic Teams, and (4) Polytrauma Points of Contact. Long-term services and supports have historically been provided in institutional settings (e.g., nursing homes); however, if a veteran is able to live in the community and receive home or community-based treatment, this arrangement is generally preferable to institutional care. The VA has an ongoing pilot program providing assisted living services to veterans with TBI. In addition to institutional and noninstitutional services for veterans, the VA offers services for some caregivers. The VA is collaborating with the Department of Education's National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research (NIDRR) to develop the Traumatic Brain Injury Veterans Health Registry, which is intended to facilitate future research by providing longitudinal data on the demographics, military service, injury, and treatment of all OEF/OIF veterans with TBI. The VA is also working with the NIDRR to establish a database similar to the institute's existing TBI Model System National Database (established in 1989), which is intended to facilitate research collaboration and program evaluation. | In recent years, Congress, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have increased attention to traumatic brain injury (TBI), which is known as a "signature wound" of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF). Although the early stages of TBI treatment may occur within the military health care system (if the injury occurs during military service), this report focuses on the VA health care system. In FY2015, VA spending for TBI is estimated to be $234 million. The VA projects the 10-year (FY2016–FY2025) costs of TBI to be $2.2 billion (including $0.5 billion for OEF/OIF veterans).
The type of treatment needed depends on the severity of the injury. Most cases of mild TBI—representing the majority of injuries—resolve without medical attention. Moderate or severe TBI requires immediate treatment. In the case of servicemembers, treatment begins at the site of the event and continues at a military treatment facility. Once stabilized, servicemembers may remain at a military treatment facility or be sent to VA medical facilities.
When servicemembers transfer from DOD to VA facilities, coordination between the two systems is necessary. Three VA and joint VA/DOD programs seek to address the transition from DOD to VA health care facilities: (1) OEF/OIF Care Management, (2) the VA Liaison Program, and (3) the Federal Recovery Coordinator Program. These programs are available to veterans with TBI as well as other qualified veterans and servicemembers.
Mild TBI may go unnoticed if an individual walks away from an injury seemingly unharmed. Despite repeated assessments of servicemembers by the DOD, veterans may enter the VA health care system with undiagnosed TBI. Thus, VA policy requires that all OEF/OIF veterans receiving medical care in the VA health care system be screened for possible TBI and that those who screen positive be offered further evaluation and specialized treatment.
Veterans with moderate or severe TBI may receive care through the VA Polytrauma/TBI System of Care (PSC), which is also available to veterans with other traumatic injuries. The PSC is geographically dispersed, thereby making specialized treatment more accessible to veterans, regardless of where they live. The PSC operates as a "hub and spoke" model with four components: (1) Polytrauma Rehabilitation Centers, (2) Polytrauma Network Sites, (3) Polytrauma Support Clinic Teams, and (4) Polytrauma Points of Contact.
The VA provides a range of long-term services and supports, most of which are available to veterans who have TBI as well as other qualified veterans. Long-term services and supports have historically been provided in institutional settings (e.g., nursing homes); however, if a veteran is able to live in the community and receive home- or community-based treatment, this arrangement is generally preferable to institutional care. The VA has an ongoing pilot program providing assisted living services to veterans with TBI and has requested authority to pay for care in Medical Foster Homes. The VA also offers services for some caregivers for veterans with TBI.
The VA conducts and collaborates on TBI research. For example, the VA is collaborating with the Department of Education's National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research to develop the Traumatic Brain Injury Veterans Health Registry, and to establish a database similar to the institute's existing TBI Model System National Database. |
crs_RL31358 | crs_RL31358_0 | In May 2005 this same group announced they had achieved major advances in the efficiency of creating human cloned embryos using SCNT and in isolating human stem cells from the cloned embryos. Cloning Attempts in the United Kingdom and United States
Scientists in the United Kingdom, at the University of Newcastle and the University of Edinburgh, and scientists in the United States, at Harvard University, Advanced Cell Technology and the University of California in San Francisco, are working on deriving patient-matched stem cells from cloned human embryos. Scientists at the Harvard Stem Cell Institute intend to produce cloned human embryos for research studies on juvenile diabetes, Parkinson's disease, and several other diseases. The NIH Guidelines on Stem Cell Research , published by the Clinton Administration in August 2000, would not have funded research in which: human stem cells are used for reproductive cloning of a human; human stem cells are derived using SCNT; or, human stem cells that were derived using SCNT are utilized in a research project. Actions During the Current Bush Administration
On August 9, 2001, President Bush announced that for the first time federal funds would be used to support research on human embryonic stem cells, but funding would be limited to "existing stem cell lines." On January 18, 2002, the National Academies released its report, entitled Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human Reproductive Cloning . The panel recommended that the U.S. ban human reproductive cloning. The ban should be legally enforceable, rather than voluntary, and carry substantial penalties. However, the panel concluded that research using SCNT to produce stem cells should be permitted because of the considerable potential for developing new therapies and advancing biomedical knowledge. 810 (Castle), the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act, passed the House on May 24, 2005, on a vote of 238-194. It would amend the Public Health Service Act and direct the Secretary of HHS to conduct and support research that utilizes human embryonic stem cells regardless of the date on which the stem cells were derived from a human embryo. On July 18, 2006, the Senate passed H.R. 810 , the first veto of his six years in office. An attempt in the House on July 19 to override the veto of H.R. 1357 amends Title 18 of the United States Code and would ban the process of human cloning as well as the importation of any product derived from an embryo created via cloning. 1357 is essentially identical to the measure which passed the House in the 107 th Congress ( H.R. 2505 ) and the 108 th Congress ( H.R. Both bills would ban human reproductive cloning but allow cloning for medical research purposes, including stem cell research. Critics of the ban on human cloning argue that SCNT creates a "clump of cells" rather than an embryo, and that the ban would curtail medical research and prevent Americans from receiving life-saving treatments created overseas. In July 2004, Dr. Paul McHugh, a member of the President's Council who objects to the destruction of human embryos and who had voted with the Council majority for a moratorium on cloning-for-biomedical research, argued in a medical journal article that SCNT "resembles a tissue culture," and that the products of SCNT should be available for research once regulations are in place to ensure that SCNT is conducted ethically. The National Academies also recommended a ban on reproductive cloning, and did not call it temporary but did add that it should be reconsidered every five years. One related issue, that of the use of federal funding for therapeutic cloning, has also been discussed. | In December 2005, an investigation by Seoul National University, South Korea, found that scientist Hwang Woo Suk had fabricated results on deriving patient-matched stem cells from cloned embryosâa major setback for the field. In May 2005 Hwang had announced a significant advance in creating human embryos using cloning methods and in isolating human stem cells from cloned embryos. These developments have contributed to the debate in the 109 th Congress on the moral and ethical implications of human cloning. Scientists in other labs, including Harvard University and the University of California at San Francisco, intend to produce cloned human embryos in order to derive stem cells for medical research on diabetes, Parkinson's disease, and other diseases.
President Bush announced in August 2001 that for the first time federal funds would be used to support research on human embryonic stem cells, but funding would be limited to "existing stem cell lines." Federal funds can not be used for the cloning of human embryos for any purpose, including stem cell research. In July 2002 the President's Council on Bioethics released its report on human cloning which unanimously recommended a ban on reproductive cloning and, by a vote of 10 to 7, a four-year moratorium on cloning for medical research purposes. The ethical issues surrounding reproductive cloning (commodification, safety, identity ), and therapeutic cloning (embryos' moral status, relief of suffering), impact various proposals for regulation, restrictions, bans, and uses of federal funding. In January 2002, the National Academies released Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human Reproductive Cloning . It recommended that the U.S. ban human reproductive cloning aimed at creating a child. It suggested the ban be enforceable and carry substantial penalties. The panel noted that the ban should be reconsidered within five years. However, the panel concluded that cloning to produce stem cells should be permitted because of the potential for developing new therapies and advancing biomedical knowledge.
On May 24, 2005, the House passed H.R. 810 (Castle), which would allow federal support of research that uses human embryonic stem cells regardless of the date on which the stem cells were derived from a human embryo, thus negating the Bush stem cell policy limitation on "existing stem cell lines." In July of 2006, the Senate passed H.R. 810 and President Bush vetoed it, the first veto of his presidency. An attempt in the House to override the veto was unsuccessful. Action on the Weldon bill (which passed the House in the 108 th Congress and stalled in the Senate) is also possible; it was reintroduced in the 109 th Congress as H.R. 1357 and S. 658 (Brownback). The bill bans the process of cloning as well as the importation of any product derived from an embryo created via cloning. It bans not only reproductive applications, but also research on therapeutic uses, which has implications for stem cell research. Advocates of the legislative ban say that allowing any form of human cloning research to proceed raises serious ethical issues and will inevitably lead to the birth of a baby that is a human clone. Critics of the ban argue that the measure would curtail medical research and prevent Americans from receiving life-saving treatments created overseas. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R40097 | crs_R40097_0 | Overview
Severe thunderstorms and tornadoes affect communities across the United States every year, causing fatalities, destroying property and crops, and disrupting businesses. According to the National Science and Technology Council: "Due to changes in population demographics and more complex weather-sensitive infrastructure, Americans today are more vulnerable than ever to severe weather events caused by tornadoes, hurricanes, severe storms, heat waves, and winter weather." However, on May 20, 2013, the town of Moore, Oklahoma, was struck by a large and extremely destructive tornado (ranked EF-5, the most destructive on a scale of 0-5; EF rankings, or intensity scale, for tornadoes are discussed in Appendix ). 1786 ). Congress attempted to clarify the federal role in mitigating damages from windstorms (including tornadoes and thunderstorms) by passing the National Windstorm Impact Reduction Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-360 ). It is not clear whether the program made progress toward its objective: achievement of major measurable reductions in the losses of life and property from windstorms. In addition, the four agencies responsible for implementing the program—the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NOAA, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—have not identified a line item for the program in their annual budget justifications. The bill states that the purpose of the program is
to achieve major measurable reductions in the losses of life and property from windstorms through a coordinated Federal effort, in cooperation with other levels of government, academia, and the private sector, aimed at improving the understanding of windstorms and their impacts and developing and encouraging the implementation of cost-effective mitigation measures to reduce those impacts. In the 111 th Congress, the House passed similar legislation, H.R. As of May 22, 2013, similar legislation has not been introduced in the House or Senate. However, the evidence is unclear as to whether the frequency and intensity of severe thunderstorms and tornadoes has increased or will increase in the future due to climate change. The 2011 Tornados: A Link to Climate Change? Forecasting and Warning: The Role of the National Weather Service
The NWS, at the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce, has statutory authority for weather forecasting and for issuing storm warnings (15 U.S.C. Thus it is not clear whether long-term efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas-induced global warming—such as by reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases—could also mitigate damage to property and reduce injuries and losses of life from severe thunderstorms and tornadoes. The role of the federal government in weather and climate research, thunderstorm and tornado forecasting, and issuing warnings is substantial. They are the destructive products of severe thunderstorms, and second only to flash flooding as the cause for convective storm related fatalities. Risks from Tornadoes
Damages from violent tornadoes seem to be increasing, similar to the trend for other natural hazards. According to some insurance industry analysts, losses of $1 billion or more from single tornado events are becoming more frequent. The results would suggest that there are limits to the number of potential lives saved by improvements in forecasting ability and warning systems, and that social, behavioral, and demographic factors may play an increasingly important role in tornado-related fatalities. | Severe thunderstorms and tornadoes affect communities across the United States every year, causing fatalities, destroying property and crops, and disrupting businesses. Tornadoes are the most destructive products of severe thunderstorms, and second only to flash flooding as the cause for most thunderstorm-related fatalities. Damages from violent tornadoes seem to be increasing, similar to the trend for other natural hazards—in part due to changing population, demographics, and more weather-sensitive infrastructure—and some analysts indicate that losses of $1 billion or more from single tornado events are becoming more frequent.
Policies that could reduce U.S. vulnerability to severe thunderstorms and tornadoes include improvements in the capability to accurately detect storms and to effectively warn those in harm's way. The National Weather Service (NWS) has the statutory authority to forecast weather and issue warnings. Some researchers suggest that there are limits to the effectiveness of improvements in forecasting ability and warning systems for reducing losses and saving lives from severe weather. The research suggests that, for example, social, behavioral, and demographic factors now play an increasingly important role in tornado-related fatalities.
One issue for Congress is its role in mitigating damages, injuries, and fatalities from severe thunderstorms and tornadoes. The National Science and Technology Council has recommended the implementation of hazard mitigation strategies and technologies, including some—such as conducting weather-related research and development and disseminating results—that Congress has supported through annual appropriations for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Science Foundation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other federal agencies. Other recommended strategies include land use and zoning changes, which are typically not in the purview of Congress.
Congress attempted to clarify the federal role in mitigating damages from windstorms (including tornadoes and thunderstorms) by passing the National Windstorm Impact Reduction Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-360). It is not evident whether the program made progress toward its objective: achievement of major measurable reductions in the losses of life and property from windstorms. Authorization for the program expired at the end of FY2008. In the 113th Congress, legislation introduced in the House (H.R. 1786) would reauthorize the wind hazards program through FY2016. Similar legislation was introduced in the House and Senate in the 112th Congress, but no action was taken.
It is not clear whether changes to climate over the past half-century have increased the frequency or intensity of thunderstorms and tornadoes, or whether climate changes were responsible for the intense and destructive tornado activity in 2011, or for the extremely destructive EF-5 tornado that struck Moore, Oklahoma, on May 20, 2013. An issue for Congress is whether future climate change linked to increases in greenhouse gas emissions will lead to more frequent and more intense thunderstorms and tornadoes, and whether efforts by Congress to mitigate long-term climate change will reduce potential future losses from thunderstorms and tornadoes. |
crs_R44510 | crs_R44510_0 | Background
In recent years, Members of both chambers have introduced legislation that would reauthorize, amend, add, or eliminate programs and activities undertaken by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). This report briefly summarizes SAMHSA's major programs and activities and describes the agency's organizational structure. Block Grants
SAMHSA's two biggest programs are block grants—one supports mental health services and the other supports substance abuse prevention and treatment services. SAMHSA distributes SABG funds to states (including the District of Columbia and specified territories) and one tribal entity according to a formula. Programs of Regional and National Significance (PRNS)
SAMHSA's Programs of Regional and National Significance (PRNS) encompass numerous grants and activities within each of three areas: (1) mental health, (2) substance abuse treatment, and (3) substance abuse prevention. Three of the programs (GLS—Youth Suicide Prevention—States, GLS—Youth Suicide Prevention—Campus, and GLS—Suicide Prevention Resource Center) are separately authorized under PHSA sections amended or added by the Garrett Lee Smith (GLS) Memorial Act ( P.L. 108-355 ). Example: Pregnant and Postpartum Women
The Pregnant and Postpartum Women program supports residential substance use disorder treatment services for pregnant and postpartum women. Example: Drug-Free Workplace and National Laboratory Certification
As an example of substance abuse prevention PRNS, SAMHSA provides oversight of the Federal Drug-Free Workplace Program and the related National Laboratory Certification Program. Other Grant Programs
In addition to its block grants and numerous discretionary grants under the PRNS authorities, SAMHSA has three other grant programs: Children's Mental Health Services, Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness (PATH), and Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness (PAIMI). The states, in turn, make grants to local governments and private non-profit organizations to support mental health and substance abuse treatment, case management, and other services. SAMHSA's Organizational Structure
SAMHSA is organized in four centers supported by headquarters offices, regional administrators, and advisory councils and committees. SAMHSA estimates that it will support 665 full-time employee equivalents in FY2016 and FY2017. Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality (CBHSQ)
The Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality (CBHSQ) has primary responsibility for collecting and analyzing behavioral health statistics. | In recent years, Members of both chambers have introduced legislation that would reauthorize, amend, add, or eliminate programs and activities undertaken by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). This report briefly summarizes SAMHSA's major programs and activities and describes the agency's organizational structure. The Appendix provides an overview of SAMHSA's budget.
SAMHSA's two biggest programs are the Community Mental Health Services Block Grant (MHBG, $533 million in FY2016) and the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant (SABG, $1.9 billion in FY2016). Both block grant programs distribute funds to states (including the District of Columbia and territories) according to a formula. The states, in turn, may distribute funds to local government entities and non-profit organizations. The SABG also distributes funds to one tribal entity.
SAMHSA's Programs of Regional and National Significance (PRNS) encompass numerous grants and activities within each of three areas:
Mental health ($407 million in FY2016): for example, suicide prevention activities, some of which are separately authorized under the Garrett Lee Smith (GLS) Memorial Act (P.L. 108-355). Substance abuse treatment ($334 million in FY2016): for example, the Pregnant and Postpartum Women program, which supports residential substance use disorder treatment services for pregnant and postpartum women. Substance abuse prevention ($211 million in FY2016): for example, SAMHSA's oversight of the Federal Drug-Free Workplace Program and the related National Laboratory Certification Program.
SAMHSA has three other grant programs: Children's Mental Health Services ($119 million in FY2016), Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness (PATH, $65 million in FY2016), and Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness (PAIMI, $36 million in FY2016).
In addition, SAMHSA conducts surveillance and data collection, statistical and analytic support, performance and quality information systems activities, and agency-wide initiatives.
SAMHSA is organized in four centers: (1) the Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS, $1.2 billion in FY2016); (2) the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT, $2.2 billion in FY2016); (3) the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP, $211 million in FY2016); and (4) the Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality (CBHSQ, $120 million in FY2016). The work of the four centers is supported by headquarters offices, regional administrators, and advisory councils and committees. SAMHSA estimates that it will support 665 full-time employee equivalents in FY2016 and FY2017. |
crs_R43349 | crs_R43349_0 | Postal Service (USPS) and mandated that it operate as a self-supporting, wholly governmental entity. Previously, the federal government provided postal services via the U.S. Post Office Department (USPOD), a federal agency that was financially dependent upon annual appropriations from Congress. The PRA designed USPS to be a marketized government agency, that is, an agency that would cover its operating costs with revenues generated through the sales of postage and related products and services. Although USPS does receive an annual appropriation, the agency does not rely on appropriations. Its appropriation is approximately $90 million per year, about 0.1% of USPS's $65 billion operating budget. USPS employees are covered by, and may be eligible for, benefits under the same two pension plans that cover nearly all civilian federal workers: the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) for employees first hired before 1984 and the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) for employees first hired in 1984 or later. In addition, by law, USPS retirees (and employees) may participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). USPS's recent deficits—$40 billion since FY2007—have prompted much discussion over possible reforms to the agency and its operations. USPS's retiree health benefits and pension funding policies have been part of this discussion, in part because they represent significant costs to the agency. In FY2013, prefunding USPS's retiree health benefits cost the agency $5.6 billion and funding its pensions cost $5.7 billion. This amounted to 15.7% of USPS's $72.1 billion operating expenses. Recent USPS Retiree Health Benefits Funding Issues10
Since FY2007, USPS has been required to prefund its current employees' future retirement benefits. In short, although the law states USPS must pay more than $5 billion per year through FY2017, the agency has not had sufficient cash to make all these payments. Between FY2007 and FY2012, USPS's financial condition eroded considerably. Recent Proposals for Changing the Prefunding Policy
In the 113 th Congress, bills were introduced to change the current RHBF policy. These bills included
The Postal Service Protection Act of 2013 ( H.R. 630 ) and ( S. 316 ), which would have abolished the RHBF prefunding policy and RHBF payment schedule. H.R. H.R. S. 1486 also would have attempted to reduce USPS's long-term retiree health benefits costs by moving some USPS retirees onto Medicare and authorizing USPS to opt its employees (and future retirees) out of the FEHBP and into a new health insurance program. Finally, the bill aimed to further reduce USPS's prefunding costs by requiring USPS to fund 80% of its total liability (as opposed to the current 100% funding requirement). Absent a reduction in the cost of financing CSRS pensions, a reduction in the proportion of CSRS pension costs allocated to USPS—as under the USPSOIG and PRC reports—would increase the current unfunded liability of the Civil Service Retirement and the Disability Fund (CSRDF), the federal trust fund that finances CSRS and FERS benefits. H.R. The Postal Reform Act of 2013 ( H.R. The Postal Reform Act of 2013 ( H.R. | Congress designed the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to be a self-supporting government agency. Since 1971, the agency has not relied upon annual appropriations to cover its operating costs. Rather, USPS has funded its operations mostly through the sales of postage and postal products and services.
Since FY2007, however, the agency has run more than $40 billion in deficits and has reached its statutory borrowing limit ($15 billion). The agency does receive an annual appropriation of approximately $90 million per year, which amounts to about 0.1% of USPS's $65 billion operating budget.
USPS's troubled financial condition has raised concerns about the viability of the agency. Many postal reform bills were introduced in the 113th and 112th Congresses. These bills proposed altering many aspects of postal operations, from raising mailing rates to reducing delivery days and closing USPS post offices and mail sorting facilities.
Postal reform bills also have proposed altering funding policies for USPS's retiree healthcare and pensions. Alterations to these policies could significantly affect USPS's financial condition. In FY2013, prefunding USPS's retiree health benefits cost the agency $5.6 billion and funding its pensions cost $5.7 billion. These costs constituted 15.7% of the agency's operating expenses.
USPS employees are covered by the same retirement plans as most other civilian federal employees: the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS). In addition, USPS retirees (and employees) participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). Since FY2007, USPS has been required by law to prefund its current employees' future retirement health benefits at a cost of more than $5 billion per year. USPS has lacked sufficient cash to make all of these payments.
A number of bills were introduced in the 113th Congress to improve USPS's financial condition by altering current pension and retiree health benefits funding policies. Bills carrying provisions to alter the funding of USPS retiree health benefits included H.R. 630, H.R. 2690, H.R. 2748, and S. 1486. USPS pension funding legislation included H.R. 630, H.R. 961, H.R. 2690, H.R. 2748, S. 316, and S. 1486.
The aforementioned USPS retiree health benefits bills would have reduced the Postal Service's annual operating expenses by abolishing or reworking the current statutory prefunding schedule; moving some USPS retirees on to Medicare; or lowering the target for prefunding from the current 100% funding requirement to 80% of the estimated total liability.
USPS pension-related bills aimed to aid the Postal Service's financial condition by either changing the costs allocation between the Postal Service and the federal government in the funding of USPS's CSRS benefits or recalculating USPS's FERS costs. In both instances, the legislation would have refunded sums from the federal government to USPS. |
crs_R40000 | crs_R40000_0 | Most Recent Developments
An FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-8 , was enacted on March 11, 2009, more than five months after the beginning of the fiscal year. A continuing resolution had funded operations from October 1, 2008, until the omnibus was enacted. In addition, two supplemental appropriations bills for FY2009 have been enacted during the 111 th Congress: P.L. 111-5 in February 2009 (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, ARRA) and P.L. 111-32 in June 2009 (the Supplemental Appropriations Act). The regular Agriculture and Related Agencies appropriation in the FY2009 omnibus totals $108.3 billion, up 19% from FY2008. This total is composed of $87.8 billion in mandatory appropriations (up 21%, mostly because of rising food stamp demand), and $20.4 billion of discretionary appropriations (up 14% from FY2008). The ARRA supplemental provided $26.5 billion (about 25% of the amount in a regular appropriation although outlays may occur over a multi-year period), mostly for domestic food assistance. The second supplemental provided $771 million for international food aid and domestic farm loans. Scope of the Agriculture Appropriations Bill
The Agriculture appropriations bill—formally known as the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act—covers funding for the following agencies and departments:
all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (except the Forest Service, which is funded by the Interior appropriations bill), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services, and in the House, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); in the Senate, CFTC appropriations are handled by the Financial Services appropriations subcommittee. Action on FY2009 Appropriations
The FY2009 Agriculture appropriations bill was marked up in the House subcommittee in June 2008 and reported by the Senate full committee in July 2008 ( Table 2 ). Senate Action
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the Agriculture appropriations bill ( S. 3289 , S.Rept. Exceptions for Agriculture and Related Agencies programs in the continuing resolution included:
allowing a higher base allocation for FDA under the continuing resolution by including in FY2009 funding the $150 million of supplemental emergency funding that was provided in FY2008 in addition to the regular FY2008 appropriation; allowing mandatory spending increases for programs in the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 to maintain program levels (an unspecified increase, likely in the billions of dollars); increasing the discretionary funding for the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) nutrition program to an annual rate of $6.658 billion (up from $6.02 billion in FY2008); increasing funding for the Food and Nutrition Service's Commodity Assistance Program to $234 million (up from $210 million in FY2008); and increasing the rural housing rental assistance program to $997 million (up from $479 million in FY2008 and equivalent to the Administration's request). However, the 2008 farm bill (P.L. | The Agriculture appropriations bill includes all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except the Forest Service, plus the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) appropriation also has been enacted with the Agriculture appropriations bill, even though jurisdiction in the Senate for CFTC funding moved to the Financial Services appropriations subcommittee in FY2008.
An FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-8, was enacted on March 11, 2009, more than five months after the beginning of the fiscal year. A continuing resolution had funded operations from October 1, 2008, until the omnibus was enacted. In addition, two supplemental appropriations bills for FY2009 have been enacted during the 111th Congress: P.L. 111-5 in February 2009 (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, ARRA) and P.L. 111-32 in June 2009 (the Supplemental Appropriations Act).
The regular Agriculture and Related Agencies appropriation in the FY2009 omnibus totals $108.3 billion, up 19% from FY2008. This total is composed of $87.8 billion in mandatory appropriations (up 21%, mostly because of rising food stamp demand) and $20.4 billion of discretionary appropriations (up 14% from FY2008). Discretionary programs with the most notable increases include rural housing, domestic nutrition assistance, and the Food and Drug Administration. The omnibus reduces three mandatory programs in the 2008 farm bill by $484 million, including two conservation program and one specialty crops program. The omnibus contains 521 congressionally designated earmarks for agriculture and related programs totaling $380 million. These earmarks are 16% fewer in number and 6% fewer in dollars than FY2008, the first year that such disclosure was required.
The ARRA supplemental provided $26.5 billion (about 25% of the amount in a regular appropriation, although outlays may occur over a multi-year period), mostly for domestic food assistance. The second supplemental provided $771 million for international food aid and domestic farm loans.
During the regular appropriations cycle, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the Agriculture appropriations bill on July 17, 2008 (S. 3289, S.Rept. 110-426). The bill would have provided $97.2 billion in total funding, including $20.4 billion in discretionary appropriations. The Senate bill contained provisions to reduce mandatory spending by $641 million for 18 conservation, bioenergy, specialty crop, research, and rural development programs below the levels authorized in the 2008 farm bill.
The House Appropriations Committee did not report an FY2009 Agriculture appropriations bill. The subcommittee approved a bill on June 19, 2008, but the full committee stopped regular action on FY2009 appropriations bills over procedural difficulties. Thus, no information is publicly available on the contents of the House subcommittee markup. |
crs_R42505 | crs_R42505_0 | Introduction
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly called the Food Stamp Program, is designed primarily to increase the food purchasing power of eligible low-income households to a point where they can buy a nutritionally adequate low-cost diet. This report describes the rules related to eligibility for SNAP benefits and the rules related to the issuance and use of benefits. SNAP is authorized by the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008. This law, formerly the Food Stamp Act of 1977, has since 1973 been reauthorized by the "farm bill," omnibus legislation that also typically includes the reauthorization of other federal agricultural policies and programs. SNAP was most recently authorized by the 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014; P.L. 113-79 ). See CRS Report R43332, SNAP and Related Nutrition Provisions of the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) administers SNAP. In general, the maximum SNAP benefit is based upon the level of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's lowest cost food plan (the Thrifty Food Plan or TFP) and varies by household size. Net income is the gross income with certain specified deductions subtracted. However, it is close to those used by some other programs such as the National School Lunch Program; the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); and the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). If a household includes an elderly or disabled member, the household is entitled to different SNAP deduction rules as well as some different financial eligibility rules (discussed in the next section). The basis of categorical eligibility is a rule that makes households composed entirely of recipients of benefits funded from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, Supplemental Security Income cash assistance, or state General Assistance (GA) automatically eligible for SNAP. Eligible households' gross income must be at or below gross income standards and their counted income must meet net income eligibility thresholds. Income and SNAP Deductions
Gross monthly income includes all of a household's cash income except the following "exclusions" (disregards): (1) most payments made to third parties (rather than directly to the household); (2) unanticipated, irregular, or infrequent income, up to $30 a quarter; (3) loans (student loans are treated as student aid, see (10)); (4) income received for the care of someone outside the household; (5) nonrecurring lump sum payments such as income tax refunds, retroactive lump sum Social Security payments, and certain charitable donations (in many cases, these may instead be counted as liquid assets); (6) federal energy assistance (e.g., LIHEAP); (7) reimbursement for expenses; (8) income earned by schoolchildren 17 or younger; (9) the cost of producing self-employment income; (10) federal post-secondary student aid (e.g., Pell grants, student loans); (11) "on the job" training earnings of dependent children under 19 in the Workforce Investment and Opportunity Act (WIOA) programs, as well as monthly "allowances" under these programs; (12) income set aside by disabled SSI recipients under an approved "plan for achieving self support"; (13) combat-related military pay; and (14) payments required to be disregarded by provisions of federal law outside the Food and Nutrition Act (e.g., various payments under laws relating to Indians, payments under Older Americans Act employment programs for the elderly). Under the traditional path to SNAP eligibility, households must have net monthly income that does not exceed the inflation-adjusted federal poverty guidelines (100% FPL). Categorical Eligibility
SNAP also conveys eligibility to households that already participate in specific means-tested programs. In addition to the nationwide and state-specific work eligibility rules, SNAP law creates a time limit for able-bodied adults without dependents ("ABAWDs") who are not working a minimum of 20 hours per week. States have the option, but are not required, to offer ABAWDs a slot in an employment and training program or a workfare program. Benefit Amounts (Allotments)
The eligibility rules of SNAP, discussed above, create a framework by which individuals (constituting a household) are eligible or ineligible for benefits, but once eligible, the participant is also subject to a benefit calculation process, which determines the household's monthly benefit amount or allotment. Benefits are provided through electronic benefit transfer (EBT) systems under which recipients are issued a debit-like card that they use to make food purchases. SNAP-Authorized Retailers
SNAP benefits may be redeemed only at authorized retailers. | The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly called the Food Stamp Program, is designed primarily to increase the food purchasing power of eligible low-income households to help them buy a nutritionally adequate low-cost diet. This report describes the rules related to eligibility for SNAP benefits as well as the rules for benefits and their redemption. SNAP is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS). SNAP is authorized by the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008. This law, formerly the Food Stamp Act of 1977, has since 1973 been reauthorized by the "farm bill," omnibus legislation that also typically includes the authorization of other federal agricultural policies and programs. The program was most recently reauthorized by the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79, enacted February 7, 2014). Many farm bill provisions expire in 2018, and the 115th Congress may undertake the next reauthorization of SNAP.
SNAP eligibility and benefits are calculated on a household basis. Financial eligibility is determined through a traditional or a categorical eligibility path. Under traditional eligibility, applicant households must meet gross income, net income, and asset tests. Specifically, household gross monthly income (all income as defined by SNAP law) must be at or below 130% of the federal poverty level, and household net (SNAP-specified deductions are subtracted) monthly income must be at 100% of the federal poverty level. The traditional asset rules are set at $2,000 per household (inflation adjusted). (Households that contain an elderly or disabled member have a higher asset limit and also do not have to meet the gross income test.) Under categorical eligibility, SNAP eligibility is automatically conveyed based upon the applicant's participation in other means-tested programs, namely Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), or General Assistance (GA). Because TANF is a broad-purpose block grant, the state option to extend SNAP eligibility to applicants that receive a TANF-funded benefit allows states to offer program eligibility under rules that vary from those discussed in this paragraph, including an elimination of the asset test. Applicants are also subject to non-financial rules, which include work-related requirements such as a time limit for Able-bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs).
If eligible for SNAP, an applicant household also undergoes a calculation of its monthly benefit amount (or allotment). This calculation utilizes the household's net income as well as the maximum allotment, a figure that equals the current value of the "Thrifty Food Plan" (TFP). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act had temporarily increased this value; this increase ended after October 31, 2013.
Benefits are issued on an EBT card, which operates with a declining balance like a debit card. Benefits are not cash, may not be accessed at an automatic teller machine, and are redeemable only for foods. Benefits may be redeemed for foods at licensed retailers, which may include a wide variety of retailers so long as retailers meet licensing requirements.
This report focuses on SNAP eligibility and the form and function of benefits. For an overview of SNAP along with the other USDA-FNS programs, such as the Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), and National School Lunch Program (NSLP), see CRS Report R42353, Domestic Food Assistance: Summary of Programs. For issues related to SNAP and the 2014 farm bill, see CRS Report R43332, SNAP and Related Nutrition Provisions of the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79). For a brief overview of the farm bill's nutrition programs, see CRS In Focus IF10663, Farm Bill Primer: SNAP and Other Nutrition Title Programs. |
crs_R41535 | crs_R41535_0 | Introduction
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has the responsibility for creating policies, priorities, and objectives for the federal Drug Control Program. This national program is aimed at reducing the use, manufacturing, and trafficking of illicit drugs and the reduction of drug-related crime and violence and of drug-related health consequences. ONDCP is located in the Executive Office of the President. Authorization for ONDCP expired at the end of FY2010, but it has continued to receive appropriations. Congress, while continuously charged with ONDCP's oversight, is now faced with its possible reauthorization. The director of ONDCP, often referred to as the "Drug Czar," has numerous responsibilities, of which the primary three are
developing a comprehensive National Drug Control Strategy to direct the nation's anti-drug efforts; developing and overseeing a National Drug Control Budget to implement the National Drug Control Strategy, including determining the adequacy of the drug control budgets submitted by contributing Drug Control Program agencies (listed below); and coordinating, overseeing, and evaluating the effectiveness of federal anti-drug policies and the National Drug Control Strategy implementation by the various agencies contributing to the Drug Control Program. Further, Congress may exercise oversight over ONDCP's means of evaluating the nation's federal drug control programs. Given the current public debate over the legal status of marijuana, Congress may also choose to address ONDCP's ability to support or oppose marijuana legalization. In each Strategy since 2010, ONDCP has outlined seven specific objectives—to be accomplished by 2015—aimed at reducing both illicit drug use and its consequences. National Drug Control Budget
In creating the National Drug Control Strategy, ONDCP consults with the various federal Drug Control Program agencies; ONDCP then reviews their respective drug budgets and incorporates them into the National Drug Control Budget (Budget), which is submitted to Congress as part of the annual appropriations process. This review yielded an addition of 19 federal programs or agencies to the Budget. Marshals Service—Federal Prisoner Detention Department of Labor** Employment and Training Administration** Office of National Drug Control Policy High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program Other Federal Drug Control Programs Salaries and Expenses Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs U.S. Agency for International Development Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration* National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service Department of Veterans Affairs Veterans Health Administration
In the FY2015 Budget, there are five priorities for which resources are requested across agencies: substance abuse prevention, substance abuse treatment, drug interdiction, domestic law enforcement, and international partnerships. In September 2014, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 ( P.L. 113-164 ) continued funding the federal government at FY2014 spending levels through December 11, 2014. In May 2009, ONDCP Director Kerlikowske called for an end to use of the term. Over the past several years, Director Kerlikowske has repeatedly stated that while drug use was previously considered a law enforcement or criminal justice problem, it transitioned to being viewed as a combination of criminal justice, social policy, and public health problems. Details of FY2015 federal drug control spending, including the proportion focused on supply-reduction versus demand-reduction activities, remain unclear. In the FY2015 request, the Administration proposes to use approximately 57% of the funds ($14.436 billion) for supply-side functions and 43% of the funds ($10.927 billion) for demand-side functions. Former Director Kerlikowske has indicated that the most cost-effective elements of the Strategy and Budget are in prevention and treatment —the two components of demand reduction. In considering ONDCP's reauthorization, policy makers may deliberate on whether to authorize specific supply-reduction or demand-reduction programs. Congress may also exercise oversight regarding ONDCP's implementation of evidenced-based activities. Current law also requires the Director of National Drug Control Policy to (1) ensure that no federal funds appropriated to ONDCP are expended for any study or contract relating to the legalization of a substance listed in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act and (2) oppose any attempt to legalize the use of any such substance that the Food and Drug Administration has not approved for use for medical purposes. Considering the Role of ONDCP
Should Congress choose to reauthorize ONDCP, it may wish to consider the role of ONDCP and the director. ONDCP has distanced itself from the seemingly outdated term "war on drugs," but the office is arguably a product of the war on drugs. | The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is located in the Executive Office of the President and has the responsibility for creating policies, priorities, and objectives for the federal Drug Control Program. This national program is aimed at reducing the use, manufacturing, and trafficking of illicit drugs and the reduction of drug-related crime and violence and of drug-related health consequences. The director of ONDCP has primary responsibilities of developing a comprehensive National Drug Control Strategy (Strategy) to direct the nation's anti-drug efforts; developing a National Drug Control Budget (Budget) to implement the National Drug Control Strategy, including determining the adequacy of the drug control budgets submitted by contributing federal Drug Control Program agencies; and evaluating the effectiveness of the National Drug Control Strategy implementation by the various agencies contributing to the Drug Control Program. Authorization for ONDCP expired at the end of FY2010, but it has continued to receive appropriations. Congress, while continuously charged with ONDCP's oversight, is now faced with its possible reauthorization.
In May 2009, then-Director R. Gil Kerlikowske called for an end to use of the term "war on drugs." This is in part because while drug use was previously considered a law enforcement or criminal justice problem, it has transitioned to being viewed more as a public health problem. Indeed, the Obama Administration has indicated that a comprehensive strategy should include a range of prevention, treatment, and law enforcement elements. The 2014 National Drug Control Strategy outlines seven core areas—ranging from strengthening international partnerships to focusing on intervention and treatment efforts in health care—aimed at reducing both illicit drug use and its consequences. The overall goal is to achieve a 15% reduction in the rate of drug use and its consequences over a five-year period (2010-2015).
In creating the National Drug Control Strategy, ONDCP consults with the various federal Drug Control Program agencies. ONDCP then reviews their respective drug budgets and incorporates them into the National Drug Control Budget (Budget), which is submitted to Congress as part of the annual appropriations process. As requested by Congress in the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-469), the Budget was restructured in FY2012, incorporating the activities and budgets of 19 additional federal agencies/programs, to reflect a more complete range of federal drug control spending. The FY2013 Budget incorporated four additional federal agencies/programs, and the FY2014 Budget incorporated one additional federal program. In the proposed FY2015 Budget, there are five priorities for which resources are requested across agencies: substance abuse prevention and substance abuse treatment (both of which are considered demand-reduction areas), and drug interdiction, domestic law enforcement, and international partnerships (the three of which are considered supply-reduction areas). The FY2015 Budget proposes to use 57% of the funds ($14.436 billion) for supply-side functions and 43% of the funds ($10.927 billion) for demand-side functions. Federal drug control activities were funded at $25.212 billion for FY2014. In September 2014, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015 (P.L. 113-164) continued funding the federal government at FY2014 spending levels through December 11, 2014. Details of FY2015 federal drug control spending, however, remain unclear.
In considering ONDCP's reauthorization, there are several issues on which policy makers may deliberate. Congress may consider whether to authorize specific supply-reduction or demand-reduction programs. Congress may also exercise oversight regarding ONDCP's implementation of evidenced-based activities. Another issue that might be debated is whether the revised Budget structure captures the full scope of the nation's anti-drug activities. Further, ONDCP has created a new Performance Reporting System (PRS) to evaluate annual progress toward each of the Drug Control Program's strategic goals. Congress may exercise oversight regarding the new PRS.
Given the current public debate over the legal status of marijuana, Congress may also choose to address ONDCP's ability to support or oppose marijuana legalization. Current law requires the Director of National Drug Control Policy to (1) ensure that no federal funds appropriated to ONDCP are expended for any study or contract relating to the legalization of a substance listed in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act and (2) oppose any attempt to legalize the use of any such substance that the Food and Drug Administration has not approved for use for medical purposes.
Finally, should Congress choose to reauthorize ONDCP, it may wish to reconsider the role of ONDCP and the director. ONDCP has distanced itself from the seemingly outdated term "war on drugs," but the office is arguably a product of the war on drugs. |
crs_R42942 | crs_R42942_0 | Introduction
In the wake of the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig on April 20, 2010, federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and responsible parties faced an unprecedented challenge. This report provides a summary update of selected issues related to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill:
Oil spill response, Fate of the oil, Gulf Coast restoration, Economic claims and other payments, Civil and criminal settlements, Department of the Interior regulatory developments, Dispersant regulations, Congressional activity, and Investigations and reports. In February 2015, a Coast Guard memorandum announced that in March 2015, the Gulf Coast Incident Management Team would "transition from Phase III (Operations) ... and reconstitute as a Phase IV Documentation Team." As part of that transition, Coast Guard field unit commanders would respond to reports of oil spills in their respective areas of responsibility. As of April 2015, 30 response personnel, including federal officials and civilians, are working on activities related to the Deepwater Horizon incident. The Deepwater Horizon NRDA process is in the restoration planning phase. In 2011, BP agreed to provide $1 billion toward early restoration projects in the Gulf of Mexico to address injuries to natural resources caused by the spill. In May 2013, the trustees proposed additional projects under a third phase. The plan for these projects, finalized in June 2014, proposes funding an additional 44 early restoration projects at a cost of approximately $627 million. Gulf Restoration and the RESTORE Act20
In addition to natural resource damages that were a direct result of the spill, the Deepwater Horizon incident generated interest in natural resource issues in the region that were present before the spill occurred. Eighty percent of any administrative and civil Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 311 penalties paid by responsible parties in connection with the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill will provide the revenues for the trust fund. Potential CWA civil penalties against BP, which could be considerable, are discussed below. BP has appealed this ruling. As of December 2014, BP has spent over $14 billion in cleanup operations. Settlements from various parties, to date, total almost $6 billion. The $4 billion would be distributed as follows:
$2.394 billion to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) to support restoration efforts in the Gulf states, $1.15 billion to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, $350 million to the National Academy of Sciences for oil spill prevention and response research, $100 million to the North American Wetlands Conservation Fund, and $6 million to the General Treasury. In the civil settlement, Transocean agreed to pay $1 billion, of which 80% ($800 million) will go into the newly created Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund (pursuant to the RESTORE Act in P.L. DOI Safety Reforms and Regulatory Developments
The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill generated considerable interest in offshore drilling safety and related issues. On October 1, 2011, DOI divided BOEMRE into three separate entities: the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue. April 13, 2015: proposed rule that would alter the requirements for blowout preventers and specific drilling practices/procedures. EPA Dispersant Regulations
EPA issued a proposed rule on January 22, 2015, that would amend the existing dispersant regulations (40 CFR Part 300, Subpart J). Dispersants received considerable attention during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response. EPA's January 2015 proposed rule would, among other provisions:
revise and expand the testing requirements that must be performed to determine eligibility for EPA's product schedule; establish minimum criteria for toxicity and revise the minimum criteria for efficacy for a dispersant to be listed on the product schedule; amend and clarify the process for pre-authorization of dispersant use; and require monitoring of various environmental parameters when dispersants are used in specific situations (e.g., subsurface application or extended surface application). As time progressed, oil-spill-related legislative activity decreased and, in general, addressed topics not directly related to the Deepwater Horizon incident. Provisions in the first two laws generally concerned short-term matters that will not have a lasting impact on oil spill governance. | In the wake of the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and responsible parties faced an unprecedented challenge. An oil discharge continued for 87 days, resulting in the largest ever oil spill in U.S. waters.
Led by the U.S. Coast Guard, response activities were extensive for several years but have diminished substantially:
At the height of operations (summer of 2010), response personnel numbered over 47,000. As of April 2015, 30 response personnel, including federal officials and civilians, are working on activities related to the Deepwater Horizon incident. In February 2015, a Coast Guard memorandum announced that in March 2015, the Gulf Coast Incident Management Team (GCIMT) would "transition from Phase III (Operations) ... and reconstitute as a Phase IV Documentation Team." As part of that transition, Coast Guard field unit commanders would respond to reports of oil spills in their respective areas of responsibility.
As one of the responsible parties, BP has spent over $14 billion in cleanup operations. In addition, BP has paid over $15 billion to the federal government, state and local governments, and private parties for economic claims and other expenses, including reimbursements for response costs related to the oil spill. BP and other responsible parties have agreed to civil and/or criminal settlements with the Department of Justice (DOJ). Settlements from various parties, to date, total almost $6 billion. BP's potential civil penalties under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which could be considerable, are not yet determined.
The natural resources damage assessment (NRDA) process, conducted by federal, state, and other trustees, is ongoing and is now in its restoration planning phase. BP agreed to pay $1 billion to support early restoration projects. Ten such projects have been funded to date, with aggregate estimated costs of approximately $71 million. In December 2013, the trustees proposed an additional $627 million to fund 44 restoration projects. The trustees prepared a final plan for these projects in June 2014.
In addition, the RESTORE Act, enacted in 2012, directs 80% of any administrative and civil CWA penalty revenue into a newly created trust fund, which supports environmental and economic restoration projects in the Gulf states. Approximately $800 million is expected to be available from a civil CWA settlement with Transocean—one of the responsible parties—but projects have yet to receive funding.
The Deepwater Horizon incident generated considerable interest in offshore drilling safety and related issues. In 2011, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (DOI) redefined the responsibilities previously performed by the Minerals Management Service (MMS) and reassigned the functions of the offshore energy program among three separate organizations: the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR).
These agencies have promulgated several rulemaking changes, some of which are based on issues raised by the Deepwater Horizon spill. For example, on April 13, 2015, BSEE released a proposed rule (prior to Federal Register publication) that would alter the requirements for blowout preventers and specific drilling practices/procedures.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed a rule on January 22, 2015, that would amend dispersant regulations in 40 CFR Part 300, Subpart J. Dispersants received considerable attention during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response. EPA's January 2015 proposed rule would, among other provisions, establish a threshold for toxicity and revise the minimum criteria for dispersant effectiveness.
During and soon after the spill response, congressional interest was high, but it has since decreased. Although previous Congresses (111th-113th) enacted several oil-spill-related bills, the provisions in these laws (other than the RESTORE Act) generally concern short-term matters that did not have a lasting impact on oil spill governance. In general, oil-spill-related bills in recent years have addressed issues not directly related to the Deepwater Horizon incident. |
crs_R40147 | crs_R40147_0 | There are many different kinds of buildings—residential, commercial, government, and those with special uses such as schools and hospitals—and they form a large and core component of the nation's infrastructure. The construction, characteristics, operation, and demolition of buildings are now recognized as a major source of environmental impact, including direct effects on the humans who use them. Topics covered include how green building is defined, what it consists of, the major areas of environmental impact it seeks to address, an overview of the tools available for ensuring that a building conforms to green criteria, outstanding issues in the implementation of green building, an overview of the major statutory and executive authorities that address it, and programs in federal agencies that involve one or more elements related to it. What some call green building is barely distinguishable from standard building practices. In general, green building might best be characterized as an integrated approach to building design, construction, and operations that significantly reduces the environmental footprint of buildings in comparison to standard practices. Elements of Green Building
Descriptions of green building generally focus on specified elements, which in various documents may also be referred to by other terms such as attributes, life-cycle parameters, performance areas, or impact categories. Commonly cited elements are energy, water, materials, waste, and health. Materials
The materials used in a building, during both construction and operations, can contribute substantially to the building's environmental footprint. Integration
One of the most salient features of green building is integration. Many systems, such as the well-known Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), combine both rating and certification into a single system. Legislative and Policy Framework
Several federal laws, executive orders, and other policy instruments have provisions relating to green building. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. EISA and other policy instruments require all federal agencies to implement green building practices for buildings they control. However, several agencies have programs and activities that have a broader focus than reducing the environmental impacts of the facilities of that agency. EISA (Sections 433 and 436) directed the Director of the Office of Federal High-Performance Green Buildings to provide recommendations to the Secretary of Energy on rating and certification systems that can be used by agencies for meeting federal green building requirements, based on the results of a study to be conducted by the office every five years (42 U.S.C. Department of Energy
Most of the external green building activities of the Department of Energy (DOE) relate to the energy element (see " Elements of Green Building "), through the Building Technologies Office (BTO), the Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP), and the Weatherization and Intergovernmental Programs Office (WIP) of the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE). Developing metrics and tools for measuring building sustainability is a priority of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Issues for Congress
Four of the questions Congress may expect to face with respect to green building are
How well are current federal green building programs working? How effective are current methods for coordinating the green building activities of different agencies? To what extent and by what means should Congress extend federal efforts to facilitate and support adoption and implementation of green building measures throughout the United States? What priorities should Congress give to the different elements of green building, especially those such as siting that have received less attention in the past? What actions should Congress take to facilitate the growth of scientific and technical knowledge relating to green building? | Buildings, whether residential, commercial, government, or special-use, are core components of the nation's infrastructure. Their construction, operation, and demolition are increasingly recognized as major sources of environmental impact. Without significant transformation of building construction and operations, that impact is expected to increase with population growth and changes in other demographic and economic factors. One strategy for achieving that transformation is most widely known by the term green building. However, the term is used differently by various proponents and practitioners, denoting a continuum of practices, from those differing minimally from standard practices, to those aimed at providing buildings with a minimum of environmental impact.
In general, green building can be characterized as integrated building practices that significantly reduce the environmental footprint of a building in comparison to standard practices. Descriptions of green building generally focus on a number of common elements, especially siting, energy, water, materials, waste, and health. Serviceability or utility is also an explicit design element for a class of green buildings known as high-performance buildings.
One of the most salient features of green building is integration of the various elements. Although individual elements can be addressed separately, the green building approach is more comprehensive, focusing on the environmental footprint of a building over its life cycle, from initial design and construction to operations during the building's useful life, through eventual demolition and its aftermath.
The desire to integrate the various elements of green building has led to the development of rating and certification systems to assess how well a building project meets a specified set of green criteria. The best-known system is Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED). Developed by the U.S. Green Building Council, it focuses on site, water, energy, materials, and indoor environment. Recently, green building practices have found their way into building model codes and technical standards.
Green building has received substantial attention from government, industry, and public interest groups. Several federal laws and executive orders have provisions relating to green building. Among these are the energy policy acts (EPACTs) of 1992 and 2005 (P.L. 102-486 and P.L. 109-58), the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140), and Executive Order 13693. EISA and other policy instruments require all federal agencies to implement green building practices. However, several agencies have programs and activities that have a focus that goes beyond reducing the environmental impacts of the facilities used by that agency—for example, by performing research or facilitating the green-building activities of nonfederal entities. Among those agencies are the General Services Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Office of Federal Sustainability, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Housing and Urban Development.
Green building raises issues relating to performance, cost, market penetration, and the approach itself. Among the questions Congress may face with respect to such issues are the following: How well are current green building programs working? How effective are current methods for coordinating the green building activities of different agencies? To what extent and by what means should Congress extend its efforts to facilitate and support the adoption and effective implementation of green building measures? What priorities should Congress give to the different elements of green building? What actions should Congress do to facilitate the growth of the scientific and technical knowledge base relating to green building? |
crs_RS22685 | crs_RS22685_0 | The 111 th Congress did not pass legislation that would have amended Chapter 13 of the Copyright Act to extend design protection to fashion design, the Design Piracy Prohibition Act ( H.R. The 112 th Congress may consider similar legislation. The U.S. Both the patent and trademark law regimes provide limited means for protecting fashion design. 2196 ) and the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act ( S. 3728 ) would have amended the Copyright Act to provide a three-year term of copyright protection for fashion designs. Both H.R. The definition of "apparel" is broad, encompassing articles of men's, women's, and children's clothing, including undergarments, and outerwear, gloves, footwear, and headgear. Additionally, the term covers handbags, purses, wallets, duffel bags, suitcases, tote bags, belts, and eyeglass frames, rendering these items eligible for protection. However, the bills defined "fashion design" differently; S. 3728 mirrored H.R. The original elements of the article of apparel or the original arrangement or placement of original or non-original elements must
be the result of a designer's own creative endeavor; and provide a unique, distinguishable, non-trivial and non-utilitarian variation over prior designs for similar types of articles. 2196 . In addition, unique to H.R. Instead, protection arises under S. 3728 upon the design's creation. Searchable Database for Fashion Designs
H.R. 2196 would have required the Register of Copyrights to establish and maintain a computerized database containing information regarding protected fashion designs. Finally, the legislation required that such database be made available to the public without a fee or other access charge. S. 3728 contained no similar provision. Designs Not Subject to Protection
Section 1302 of the Copyright Act denies protection for a design that is
(1) not original;
(2) staple or commonplace, such as a standard geometric figure, a familiar symbol, an emblem, or a motif, or another shape, pattern, or configuration which has become standard, common, prevalent, or ordinary;
(3) different from a design excluded by paragraph (2) only in insignificant details or in elements which are variants commonly used in the relevant trades;
(4) dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it; or
(5) embodied in a useful article that was made public by the designer or owner in the United States or a foreign country more than 2 years before the date of the application for registration. In contrast, S. 3728 would have made protection unavailable for a fashion design that was made public before the enactment of the bill or more than three years before the date upon which protection of the design is asserted. H.R. Additionally, both bills added protection for images of fashion designs as well as for the designs themselves, stipulating that an article is infringing if its design was copied, without the consent of the design owner, from a protected design itself "or from an image thereof." However, the bills expressly excluded from this definition an illustration or picture of a protected design in an advertisement, book, periodical, newspaper, photograph, broadcast, motion picture, or similar medium. H.R. 2196 provided several limitations on infringement liability:
if the allegedly infringing article is original and not closely and substantially similar in overall visual appearance to the protected design; if the allegedly infringing article reflects a trend (defined by the bill as a newly popular concept or idea expressed in a wide variety of designs of apparel that are in immediate demand); or if the allegedly infringing article is the result of independent creation. S. 3728 would have established slightly different limitations on liability: (1) if the allegedly infringing article is not "substantially identical" in overall visual appearance to the original elements of a protected design (that is, the article would not likely be mistaken for the protected design because the article contains only differences in construction or design that are merely trivial); (2) if the article is the result of independent creation; or (3) if a person produces a single copy of a protected design for non-commercial personal use or for the use of an immediate family member (the "home sewing exception"). 2196 would leave unchanged the current statutory prerequisite of registering the design prior to filing an infringement suit. | Fashion design does not currently receive explicit protection under U.S. copyright law. Limited avenues for protection of certain types of apparel designs can be found through trademark and patent law, though proponents of copyright protection for fashion design argue that these limited means are insufficient. The 111th Congress did not pass legislation that would have provided a three-year term of copyright protection for fashion designs, the Design Piracy Prohibition Act (H.R. 2196) and the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act (S. 3728). This report analyzes these two legislative proposals. The 112th Congress may consider similar legislation regarding fashion design protection.
The bills resembled each other although contained differences. For example, for a fashion design to receive protection under H.R. 2196, the designer must register the design with the U.S. Copyright Office; S. 3728 contained no such registration requirement. Instead, protection arises under S. 3728 upon the design's creation, although the design must be a sufficiently "unique, distinguishable, non-trivial and non-utilitarian variation over prior designs for similar types of articles." This is a more restrictive definition of "fashion design" compared to H.R. 2196.
Both bills offered copyright protection for the appearance of an article of apparel as well as its ornamentation. They broadly defined the term "apparel" to mean the following: clothing (including undergarments, outerwear, gloves, footwear, and headgear), handbags, purses, wallets, tote bags, belts, and eyeglass frames. H.R. 2196 would have denied protection to fashion design that had been embodied in a useful article that was made public by the designer in the United States or a foreign country more than six months before the date of the application for registration. In contrast, S. 3728 would have denied protection if the design was made public prior to the enactment of the bill or more than three years before the date upon which protection of the design is asserted. H.R. 2196 would have required the Register of Copyrights to establish and maintain an electronically searchable database of protected fashion designs; such database must be made available to the public without a fee or other access charge. S. 3728 contained no similar provision.
Both bills would have prohibited the creation, importation, sale, or distribution of any article whose design has been copied from a protected fashion design (or from an image of it), without the consent of the registered design owner. Such activity would have been considered an infringement of the fashion design owner's rights, and the adjudged infringer would have been subject to damages of the greater of: $250,000 or $5 per copy (under H.R. 2196) or $50,000 or $1 per copy (under S. 3728). H.R. 2196 provided several limitations on infringement liability: (1) if the allegedly infringing article is original and not closely and substantially similar in overall visual appearance to the protected design; (2) if the allegedly infringing article reflects a "trend" (defined by the bill as a newly popular concept or idea expressed in a wide variety of designs of apparel that are in immediate demand); or (3) if the allegedly infringing article is the result of independent creation. S. 3728's limitations on liability were slightly different: (1) if the allegedly infringing article is not "substantially identical" in overall visual appearance to the original elements of a protected design (that is, the article would not likely be mistaken for the protected design because the article contains non-trivial differences in construction or design); (2) if the article is the result of independent creation; or (3) if a person produces a single copy of a protected design for non-commercial personal use. In addition, both bills expressly stated that an infringing article is not an illustration or picture of a protected design in an advertisement, book, periodical, newspaper, photograph, broadcast, motion picture, or similar medium. |
crs_RL32135 | crs_RL32135_0 | The reader should recognize that efforts to improve the establishment and enforcement of medical child support need to be viewed in the current context of high health care costs, a declinein employer-provided health insurance coverage (which is the foundation of the current medical childsupport system), an increase in the share of health insurance costs borne by employees, and a largenumber of children who are uninsured. This report provides alegislative history of medical support provisions in the CSE program, describes current policy withrespect to medical child support, examines data on medical child support, and discusses some of theissues related to medical child support. Medical support is the legal provision of payment of medical, dental,prescription, and other health care expenses for dependent children by the noncustodial parent. Itcan include provisions to cover health insurance costs as well as cash payments for unreimbursedmedical expenses. The requirement for medical child support is a part of the child support order,and it only pertains to the parent's dependent children. Activitiesundertaken by the state CSE agencies to establish and enforce medical support are eligible for federalreimbursement at the general CSE matching rate of 66%. (4)
According to federal regulations (45 CFR 303.31), for both families who have assigned their medical support rights to the state and families who have applied for CSE services, the CSE agencymust:
(1) Petition the court or administrative authority to include in the child support order health insurance that is available to the noncustodial parent at reasonable cost in new or modified childsupport orders, unless the child has satisfactory health insurance other than Medicaid;
(2) Petition the court or administrative authority to include medical support whether or not --(a) health insurance at reasonable cost is actually available to the noncustodial parent at the timethe order is entered; or (b) modification of current coverage to include the child(ren) in questionis immediately possible;
(3) Establish written criteria to identify cases not included under the previous two provisionswhere there is a high potential for obtaining medical support based on -- (a) evidence thathealth insurance may be available to the noncustodial parent at a reasonable cost, and (b) facts,as defined by state law, regulation, procedure, or other directive, which are sufficient to warrantmodification of the existing support order to include health insurance coverage for a dependentchild(ren);
(4) Petition the court or administrative authority to modify child support orders for cases thatare likely to have access to health insurance to include medical support in the form of healthinsurance coverage;
(5) Provide the custodial parent with information pertaining to the health insurance policywhich has been secured for the dependent child(ren);
(6) Inform the Medicaid agency when a new or modified court or administrative order for childsupport includes medical support and provide specific information to the Medicaid agencywhen the information is available;
(7) If health insurance is available to the noncustodial parent at reasonable cost and has notbeen obtained at the time the order is entered, take steps to enforce the health insurancecoverage required by the support order and provide the Medicaid agency with the necessaryinformation;
(8) Periodically communicate with the Medicaid agency to determine if there have been lapsesin health insurance coverage for Medicaid applicants and recipients; and
(9) Request employers and other groups offering health insurance coverage that is beingenforced by the CSE agency to notify the CSE agency of lapses in coverage. (8)
The medical child support process requires that a state CSE agency issue a notice to the employer of a noncustodial parent, who is subject to a child support order issued by a court oradministrative agency, informing the employer of the parent's obligation to provide health carecoverage for the child(ren). If thedependent child(ren) is eligible for coverage under a plan, the plan administrator is required to enrollthe dependent child(ren) in an appropriate plan. The plan administrator also must notify thenoncustodial parent's employer of the premium amount to be withheld from the employee'spaycheck. Most policymakers agree that health care coverage must beavailable, accessible, affordable, and stable. 105-200 stipulated that a medical child support incentive payment system be developed -- thathas not yet happened. Further, although the National Medical Support Notice was promulgatedDecember 27, 2000 and became effective on March 27, 2001, as discussed below, only half of thestates are using it. 104-193 ), which required inclusionof health care coverage in all child support orders established or enforced by CSE agencies, it isgenerally agreed that the establishment and enforcement of medical support has remainedinadequate. | Medical child support is the legal provision of payment of medical, dental, prescription, and other health care expenses of dependent children. It can include provisions to cover health insurancecosts as well as cash payments for unreimbursed medical expenses. According to 2001 ChildSupport Enforcement (CSE) data, 93% of medical child support is provided in the form of healthinsurance coverage. The requirement for medical child support is apart of all child support orders(administered by CSE agencies), and it only pertains to the parent's dependent children. Activitiesundertaken by CSE agencies to establish and enforce medical child support are eligible for federalreimbursement at the CSE matching rate of 66%.
The medical child support process requires that a state CSE agency notify the employer of a noncustodial parent who owes child support, that the parent is obligated to provide health carecoverage for his or her dependent children. CSE agencies notify employers of a medical childsupport order via a standardized federal form called the National Medical Support Notice. The planadministrator must then determine whether family health care coverage is available for which thedependent children may be eligible. If eligible, the plan administrator is required to enroll thedependent child in an appropriate plan, and notify the noncustodial parent's employer of thepremium amount to be withheld from the employee's paycheck.
Although establishment of a medical support order is a prerequisite to enforcing the order, inclusion of a health insurance order does not necessarily mean that health insurance coverage isactually provided. According to CSE program data, in 2001, only 49% of child support ordersincluded health insurance coverage, and the health insurance order was complied with in only 18%of the cases. Most policymakers agree that health care coverage for dependent children must beavailable, accessible, affordable, and stable. Since 1977 and sporadically through 1998, Congresshas passed legislation to help states effectively establish and enforce medical child support. TheNational Medical Support Notice, mandated by 1998 law and promulgated in March 2001, wasviewed as a means to significantly improve enforcement of medical child support -- to date onlyabout half the states are using the Notice. The 1998 law also called for an advisory body to designa medical child support incentive which would become part of the CSE performance-based incentivepayment system -- a recommendation was made to Congress in 2001 to indefinitely delaydevelopment of a medical child support incentive mainly because it was argued that the appropriatedata was not yet available upon which to base such an incentive.
Improving the establishment and enforcement of medical child support has been hampered to some extent by factors such as high health care costs, a decline in employer-provided healthinsurance coverage, an increase in the share of health insurance costs borne by employees, and thelarge number of uninsured children. This report provides a legislative history of medical supportprovisions in the CSE program, describes current policy with respect to medical child support,examines available data, and discusses some of the issues related to medical child support. Thisreport will not be updated. |
crs_R41212 | crs_R41212_0 | In August 2015, EPA promulgated emission standards for new and existing fossil-fueled electric generating units (EGUs) under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act. This report discusses elements of this controversy, providing background on stationary sources of greenhouse gas pollution and identifying options Congress has if it chooses to address the issue. The report discusses four sets of options: (1) resolutions of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act; (2) freestanding legislation directing, delaying, or prohibiting EPA action; (3) the use of appropriations bills as a vehicle to influence EPA activity; and (4) amendments to the Clean Air Act, including legislation to establish a new GHG control regime. The report considers each of these in turn, but first provides additional detail regarding the sources of GHG emissions, the requirements of the Clean Air Act, and a brief description of the two rules that would limit power plant GHG emissions. Because power plants and other stationary sources are the largest sources of GHG emissions, EPA has begun the process of regulating their emissions through the two authorities. The potential advantage of the Congressional Review Act lies primarily in the procedures under which a resolution of disapproval is to be considered in the Senate. In December 2015, Congress passed and sent to the President two resolutions of disapproval under the CRA: S.J.Res. 23 , which would disapprove the New Source Performance Standards for power plants promulgated by EPA on August 3, 2015, and S.J.Res. The President vetoed both resolutions on December 18. 2042 and Other Bills in the 114th Congress
On June 24, 2015, the House passed Representative Whitfield's H.R. It would also allow a state to opt out of compliance if the governor determines that the rule would have an adverse effect on rate-payers or have a significant adverse effect on the reliability of the state's electricity system. It addressed the New Source Performance Standards proposed by EPA, rather than the standards for existing power plants. 910 / S. 482 , was introduced by Chairman Upton of the House Energy and Commerce Committee and Senator Inhofe, then-ranking Member of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. House appropriations riders considered during this time would have
prohibited EPA (during the one-year period following enactment) from proposing or promulgating New Source Performance Standards for GHG emissions from electric generating units and refineries; declared any statutory or regulatory GHG permit requirement to be of no legal effect; prohibited common law or civil tort actions related to greenhouse gases or climate change, including nuisance claims, from being brought or maintained; prohibited the preparation, proposal, promulgation, finalization, implementation, or enforcement of regulations governing GHG emissions from motor vehicles manufactured after model year 2016, or the granting of a waiver to California so that it might implement such standards; and prohibited EPA from requiring the issuance of permits for GHG emissions from livestock and prohibited requiring the reporting of GHG emissions from manure management systems. | In August 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated standards to limit emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from both new and existing fossil-fueled electric power plants. Because of the importance of electric power to the economy and its significance as a source of GHG emissions, the EPA standards have generated substantial interest. The economy and the health, safety, and well-being of the nation are affected by the availability of a reliable and affordable power supply. Many contend that that supply would be adversely impacted by controls on GHG emissions. At the same time, an overwhelming scientific consensus has formed around the need to slow long-term global climate change. The United States is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases, behind only China, and power plants are the source of about 30% of the nation's anthropogenic GHG emissions. If the United States is to reduce its total GHG emissions, as the President has committed to do, it will be important to reduce emissions from these sources.
Leaders of both the House and Senate in the 114th Congress have stated their opposition to GHG emission standards, so Congress has considered several bills to prevent EPA from implementing the promulgated rules. Such legislation could take one of several forms:
1. a resolution (or resolutions) of disapproval under the Congressional Review Act; 2. freestanding legislation; 3. the use of appropriations bills as a vehicle to influence EPA activity; or 4. amendments to the Clean Air Act.
Following promulgation of the power plant GHG standards, Congress passed and sent to the President S.J.Res. 23 and S.J.Res. 24, joint resolutions disapproving the standards for both new and existing power plants under the Congressional Review Act. The President vetoed both resolutions on December 18, 2015.
Earlier, the House passed H.R. 2042, which would delay the compliance date of GHG emission standards for electric generating units and would allow a state to opt out of compliance if the governor determines that the rule would have an adverse effect on rate-payers or have a significant adverse effect on the reliability of the state's electricity system. The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee has reported a bill with similar (and additional) provisions, S. 1324, but as of this writing the full Senate has not acted on it.
This report discusses elements of the GHG controversy, providing background on stationary sources of GHG emissions and providing information regarding the options Congress has at its disposal to address GHG issues. |
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