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crs_R41889 | crs_R41889_0 | The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is an international financial institution connected to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The GCF was proposed by Parties to the UNFCCC during the 2009 Conference of Parties (COP) in Copenhagen, Denmark, and its design was agreed to during the 2011 COP in Durban, South Africa. The fund aims to assist developing countries in their efforts to combat climate change through the provision of grants and other concessional financing for mitigation and adaptation projects, programs, policies, and activities. The GCF is capitalized by contributions from donor countries and other sources, potentially including innovative mechanisms and the private sector. The GCF currently complements many of the existing multilateral climate change funds (e.g., the Global Environment Facility, the Climate Investment Funds, and the Adaptation Fund); however, as the official financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, some Parties believe that it may eventually replace or subsume the other funds. The GCF was made operational in the summer of 2014. The Obama Administration announced a pledge of $3 billion over four years during the G-20 meetings in Australia on November 15, 2014. Notwithstanding these financial pledges, details remain to be worked out. They include
what role the GCF would play in providing sustained finance at adequate levels; how it would fit into the existing development assistance and climate financing architecture; whether sources beyond public funding would successfully contribute to it; and how it would allocate and deliver assistance efficiently and effectively to developing countries. The U.S. Congress—through its role in authorizations, appropriations, and oversight—would have significant input on U.S. participation in the fund, including
whether and when to participate in the fund; whether and how much to contribute to the fund, and with what source or sources of finance; whether fund contributions would carry specific guidance in distribution and use; how contributions to the fund would relate to other U.S. bilateral, multilateral, and private sector climate change assistance; and whether and when to consent to negotiated treaty obligations, if submitted. The agreement adopted the guidelines for the general operation of the fund. Recent Developments
The GCF was made operational in the summer of 2014, commencing its initial resources mobilization process. The Administration's FY2016 budget requested $500 million for the fund. Climate Finance Commitments
The relationship of the GCF to other climate finance commitments by the United States can be outlined as follows:
UNFCCC 2020 Pledges. The Cancun negotiating text makes clear that "funds provided to developing country Parties may come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources" (1/CP.16§99). As Congress considers potential authorization and/or appropriations for the GCF, it may raise concerns regarding the cost, purpose, direction, efficiency, and effectiveness of the UNFCCC and existing international financial institutions. Congress may then be required to determine the allocation of funds between bilateral and multilateral climate change assistance as well as among the variety of multilateral mechanisms. Potential authorizations and appropriations for the GCF would rest with several committees, including the U.S. House of Representatives Committees on Foreign Affairs (various subcommittees); Financial Services (Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade); and Appropriations (Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs); and the U.S. Senate Committees on Foreign Relations (Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection); and Appropriations (Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs). | Over the past several decades, the United States has delivered financial and technical assistance for climate change activities in the developing world through a variety of bilateral and multilateral programs. The United States and other industrialized countries committed to such assistance through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, Treaty Number: 102-38, 1992), the Copenhagen Accord (2009), and the UNFCCC Cancun Agreements (2010), wherein the higher-income countries pledged jointly up to $30 billion in "fast start" climate financing for lower-income countries for the period 2010-2012, and a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion annually by 2020. The Cancun Agreements also proposed that the pledged funds are to be new, additional to previous flows, adequate, predictable, and sustained, and are to come from a wide variety of sources, both public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.
One potential mechanism for mobilizing a share of the proposed international climate financing is the UNFCCC Green Climate Fund (GCF), proposed during the 2009 Conference of Parties (COP) in Copenhagen, Denmark, accepted by Parties during the 2011 COP in Durban, South Africa, and made operational in the summer of 2014. The fund aims to assist developing countries in their efforts to combat climate change through the provision of grants and other concessional financing for mitigation and adaptation projects, programs, policies, and activities. The GCF is capitalized by contributions from donor countries and other sources, potentially including innovative mechanisms and the private sector. The GCF currently complements many of the existing multilateral climate change funds (e.g., the Global Environment Facility, the Climate Investment Funds, and the Adaptation Fund); however, as the official financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, some Parties believe that it may eventually replace or subsume the other funds.
The GCF was made operational in the summer of 2014. Parties have pledged approximately $10 billion for the initial capitalization of the fund. The Obama Administration announced a pledge of $3 billion over four years during the G-20 meetings in Australia on November 15, 2014. The Administration's FY2016 budget requested $500 million for the fund. Notwithstanding these financial pledges, some operational details remain to be clarified. They include what role the GCF would play in providing sustained finance at scale, how it would fit into the existing development assistance and climate financing architecture, whether sources beyond public funding would successfully contribute to it, and how it would allocate and deliver assistance efficiently and effectively to developing countries.
The U.S. Congress—through its role in authorizations, appropriations, and oversight—would have significant input on U.S. participation in the GCF. Congress regularly determines and gives guidance to the allocation of foreign aid between bilateral and multilateral assistance as well as among the variety of multilateral mechanisms. In the past, Congress has raised concerns regarding the cost, purpose, direction, efficiency, and effectiveness of the UNFCCC and existing international institutions of climate financing. Potential authorizations and appropriations for the GCF may rest with several committees, including the U.S. House of Representatives Committees on Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, and Appropriations, and the U.S. Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations. Appropriations for foreign aid are generally provided through the U.S. Administration's State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 150 account. |
crs_R42843 | crs_R42843_0 | Only the Senate confirms presidential nominations and approves treaties. In general, House rules and practices allow a numerical majority to process legislation relatively quickly. Congressional action is typically planned and coordinated by party leaders in each chamber, who have been chosen by Members of their own caucus or conference—that is, the group of Members in a chamber who share a party affiliation. Majority party leaders in the House have important powers and prerogatives to effectively set the policy agenda and decide which proposals will receive floor consideration. In the Senate, the leader of the majority party is generally expected to propose items for consideration, but formal tools that allow a numerical majority to take action are few. In both chambers, much of the policy expertise resides in the standing committees—panels of Members from both parties that typically take the lead in developing and assessing legislation. The process by which a bill becomes law is rarely predictable and can vary significantly from bill to bill. In fact, for many bills, the process will not follow the sequence of congressional stages that are often understood to make up the legislative process. This report presents a look at each of the common stages through which a bill may move, but complications and variations abound in practice. In the Senate, bills are typically referred to committee in a similar process, though in almost all cases, the bill is referred to only the committee with jurisdiction over the issue that predominates in the bill. In a limited number of cases, a bill might not be referred to committee, but instead be placed directly on the Senate Calendar of Business through a series of procedural steps on the floor. Hearings11
The first formal committee action on a bill or issue might be a hearing, which provides a forum at which committee Members and the public can hear about the strengths and weaknesses of a proposal from selected parties—like key executive branch agencies, relevant industries, and groups representing interested citizens. A markup concludes when the committee agrees, by majority vote, to report the bill to the chamber. The committee may vote to report a referred bill, with recommended changes that reflect any amendments adopted during the markup. Floor Scheduling
Once a committee has reported a bill, it is placed on one of the respective chambers' calendars. Many will never be brought up on the floor during the course of a two-year Congress. Alternatively, leadership may ask the Rules Committee to start the process of bringing a specific bill to the floor for more lengthy consideration and possible amendments. Most bills are considered under "suspension of the rules" procedures, which limits debate to 40 minutes and does not allow amendments to be offered by Members on the floor. However, for the House to pass a bill under suspension of the rules requires two-thirds of Members voting to agree. called a special rule. Special rules are reported by the House Rules Committee. After debate, the House votes on adopting the special rule; only after its adoption will the House then proceed to consider the bill itself, under the terms specified by the special rule. After the amendment process is complete, the Committee of the Whole reports to the full House any recommended amendments, which are then usually approved by the House by voice vote. Just prior to voting on final passage, Members will typically briefly debate and then vote on a motion to recommit, which allows the minority party to effectively propose its own amendment. Senate Floor Consideration33
To consider a bill on the floor, the Senate first must agree to bring it up—typically by agreeing to a unanimous consent request or by voting to adopt a motion to proceed to the bill, as discussed earlier. Only once the Senate has agreed to consider a bill may Senators propose amendments to it. Perhaps the modern Senate's defining feature is the potential difficulty of reaching a final vote on a matter. Most questions that the Senate considers—from a motion to proceed to a bill, to each amendment, to the bill itself—are not subject to any debate limit. Senate rules provide no way for a simple numerical majority to cut off or otherwise impose a debate limit and move to a final vote. As a result, Senators can wage (or threaten to wage) a filibuster on most amendments, bills, or other motions—in effect, insisting on extended debate or taking other actions intended to delay or prevent a final vote. Overall, these rules and practices governing floor debate and amending in the Senate provide significant leverage to each individual Senator. Rather than relying on the formal rules like cloture, however, frequently the Senate can more effectively act using unanimous consent agreements. Executive Business in the Senate
In addition to full legislative authority, the U.S. Constitution provides the Senate with two unique responsibilities: first, the power to confirm certain presidential nominees to the federal judiciary and certain executive branch positions; and second, the power to approve treaties. In the legislative process, treaties are treated very much like bills: they are referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, where they may be considered and reported. However, the Constitution requires that two-thirds of voting Senators agree for a treaty to be ratified. Resolving Differences Between the Chambers44
A bill must be agreed to by both chambers in the same form before it can be presented to the President. Therefore, at some point in the legislative process, either the House must act on a Senate bill or the Senate must act on a House bill. In this case, when one chamber receives the bill passed by the other, it may act on (and possibly amend) that bill, or alternatively, it may consider (and possibly amend) its own bill first—eventually substituting its language into the other chamber's bill for the purposes of resolving differences between the two proposals. This back-and-forth trading of proposals by the House and Senate is called amendments between the houses (or amendment exchange, or sometimes simply ping-pong). Through a combination of informal negotiations and formal meetings, the conferees try to hammer out a compromise, drawing on elements of the competing proposals that were adopted by each chamber. Reaching a vote on a conference report in the Senate may require a cloture process, and in the House, conference reports are typically considered under a special rule. Beginning at midnight on the closing of the day of presentment, the President has 10 days, excluding Sundays, to sign or veto the bill. If the President vetoes the bill, it is returned to the congressional chamber in which it originated; that chamber may attempt to override the President's veto, though a successful override vote requires the support of two-thirds of those voting. Only if both chambers vote to override does the bill become law notwithstanding the President's veto; successful overrides of a veto are rare. | This report introduces the main steps through which a bill (or other item of business) may travel in the legislative process—from introduction to committee and floor consideration to possible presidential consideration. However, the process by which a bill can become law is rarely predictable and can vary significantly from bill to bill. In fact, for many bills, the process will not follow the sequence of congressional stages that are often understood to make up the legislative process. This report presents a look at each of the common stages through which a bill may move, but complications and variations abound in practice.
Throughout, the report provides references to a variety of other CRS reports that focus on specific elements of congressional procedure. CRS also has many other reports not cited herein that address some procedural issues in additional detail (including congressional budget and appropriations processes). These reports are organized by subissue at http://www.crs.gov/iap/congressional-process-administration-and-elections.
Congressional action on bills typically is planned and coordinated by party leaders in each chamber, though as described in this report, majority party leaders in the House have more tools with which to set the floor agenda than do majority party leaders in the Senate. In both chambers, much of the policy expertise resides in the standing committees, panels of Members who typically take the lead in developing and assessing proposed legislation within specified policy jurisdictions.
Introduction and Referral of Legislation. Once a Member of the House or Senate introduces a bill, it is typically referred to the committee (or committees) in that chamber with jurisdiction over its elements. Committees do not formally consider each of these referred bills. The committee chair has the primary agenda-setting authority for each committee and identifies which bills will receive formal committee attention during the course of the two-year Congress. (Committees are not limited, however, to consideration of measures referred to them and may initiate legislative action on their own.)
Committee Consideration. A committee may conduct hearings on a bill to provide committee members and the public an opportunity to hear from selected parties (e.g., a federal agency or organized interest) about the bill's strengths and weaknesses. If the committee wants to formally recommend that the bill receive consideration from its parent chamber, it will hold a markup on the bill, at which committee members vote on any proposed amendments. The markup concludes when the committee agrees, by majority vote, to report the bill (with any recommended changes adopted in the markup) to its chamber.
Floor Scheduling. In the House, majority party leaders generally decide which bills will receive floor consideration; typically, they schedule a bill for a type of streamlined floor consideration, or instead ask the Rules Committee to propose a set of tailored parameters for floor consideration. In the Senate, bills are brought to the floor only after the Senate agrees to a motion (typically offered by the majority leader) to proceed to a specific bill or, alternatively, if no Senator objects to a unanimous consent request to bring it up.
House Floor Consideration. In the House, most bills that receive consideration do so under a procedure called "suspension of the rules," which limits debate to 40 minutes and prohibits floor amendments, but requires two-thirds of Members voting to agree. Most other bills are considered under tailored debate and amending parameters set by the terms of a special rule reported by the House Rules Committee (which effectively operates as an arm of the majority party leadership). The House first votes to adopt the special rule, and then can proceed to debate and potentially amend the bill (typically accomplished in a setting called Committee of the Whole). After any debate and amending process is complete, the House then typically votes on a minority party alternative (through a vote on a motion to recommit) before proceeding to a final vote on passage.
Senate Floor Consideration. In the Senate, once the chamber has agreed to bring up a bill, it can be considered under rules and practices that allow for a wide-ranging debate and amendment process. A defining feature of Senate floor consideration is that no rule permits a numerical majority to end debate and proceed to a final vote on most questions (e.g., a bill or amendment). Thus, Senators may wage a filibuster, effectively threatening extended debate or other actions that would delay or prevent a final vote. The Senate's cloture rule provides a process, however, by which a supermajority of the Senate (usually three-fifths) can, over a series of days, place a limit on debate (as well as limits on amendments) and eventually reach a final vote. These rules and practices provide extraordinary leverage to individual Senators, but frequently the Senate decides it can more effectively act by putting aside the formal rules and instead agreeing—by unanimous consent—to tailored parameters on debate and amending.
Executive Business in the Senate. The Senate has the unique responsibility to confirm certain presidential nominations and to approve treaties. Nominations and treaties are treated very much like bills: they are referred to committees, where they may be considered and reported to the chamber. On the floor, a ratification of a treaty requires the support of two-thirds of voting Senators. Nominations considered on the floor may be confirmed by a numerical majority, but they are subject to debate, such that reaching a final vote may require a successful cloture process.
Resolving Differences between the Chambers. At some point in the legislative process, either the House must act on a Senate bill, or the Senate must act on a House bill since only one can be presented to the President. One chamber frequently agrees to a bill—without changes—that was sent to it by the other, but sometimes each chamber proposes changes to a bill sent to it by the other. The chambers resolve their differences on the competing proposals either through a back-and-forth trading of alternative proposals (called amendments between the houses), or by convening an ad hoc conference committee in which House and Senate Members from the relevant committees are appointed to hammer out a compromise called a conference report. After both chambers have agreed to identical text (either by agreeing to the other chamber's proposal during amendments between the houses or by agreeing to the conference report), the bill can be presented to the President.
Presidential Action. The President has 10 days, excluding Sundays, to sign or veto a bill. If it is vetoed, it can only become law if Congress agrees—by two-thirds in each chamber, separately—to override the veto. Successful overrides of presidential vetoes are rare, so Congress typically must accommodate the President's position earlier in the process. |
crs_RS22483 | crs_RS22483_0 | In 1973, Congress enacted the Veteran Health Care Expansion Act of 1973 ( P.L. 93-82 ), which, among other things, established effective September 1, 1973, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs (CHAMPVA) as a means of providing health care services to dependents and survivors of certain veterans. CHAMPVA is fundamentally a health insurance program where certain eligible dependents and survivors of veterans (veterans rated permanently and totally disabled from a service-connected condition) obtain medical care from private health care providers. Beneficiaries usually pay 25% of the cost of medical care up to an annual catastrophic cap of $3,000 plus an annual outpatient deductible of $50 per individual or $100 per family. CHAMPVA pays the remaining 75% of the cost of the beneficiaries' medical care. The program is administered by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), Office of Community Care, located in Denver, CO. The enactment of the Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010 ( P.L. Eligibility for CHAMPVA requires inclusion in one of the following categories:
the individual is the spouse or child of a veteran who has been rated permanently and totally disabled for a service-connected disability; or the individual is the surviving spouse or child of a veteran who died from a VA-rated service-connected disability; or the individual is the surviving spouse or child of a veteran who was at the time of death rated permanently and totally disabled from a service-connected disability; or the individual is the surviving spouse or child of a military member who died on active duty, not due to misconduct (in most cases, these family members are eligible under TRICARE, not CHAMPVA); or the individual is designated as a "primary family caregiver" of a seriously injured veteran who qualifies under the Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers (PCAFC), and does not have any other form of health insurance. A child's eligibility, excluding that of a helpless child, for CHAMPVA is terminated under the following conditions:
if the child is not enrolled in an accredited school as a full-time student, the child loses eligibility at age 18; or if the child is enrolled in an accredited school as a full-time student, the child loses eligibility at age 23 or upon losing full-time student status; or if the child marries; or if the child is a stepchild, the stepchild loses eligibility upon no longer living in the household of the sponsor; or if the child is a full-time student at an educational institution, between the ages of 18 and 23, and incurred a disabling injury or illness, the child loses eligibility either (1) six months from the removal date of the disability, (2) two years from the onset of the disability or illness, or (3) on the child's 23 rd birthday, whichever occurs first. The CHAMPVA program covers most health care services and supplies that are determined to be medically necessary, including inpatient and outpatient care, prescription drugs, mental health services, and skilled nursing care. Certain types of care require advance approval, commonly known as preauthorization. Currently, preauthorization is required for
durable medical equipment, hospice services, mental health/substance abuse services, organ and bone marrow transplants, and dental procedures that are directly related to covered medical conditions. By law, CHAMPVA is generally the secondary payer for beneficiaries having any other form of health insurance. | The Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Department of Veterans Affairs (CHAMPVA) was established by the Veterans Health Care Expansion Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-82). CHAMPVA is primarily a health insurance program where certain eligible dependents and survivors of veterans receive care from private sector health care providers. The program is administered by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), Office of Community Care, located in Denver, CO.
Eligibility
To be eligible for CHAMPVA benefits, the beneficiary must be the spouse or child of a veteran who has a total and permanent service-connected disability, or the widowed spouse or child of a veteran who (1) died as a result of a service-connected disability; or (2) had a total, permanent disability resulting from a service-connected condition at the time of death; or (3) died while on active duty status and in the line of duty; and does not qualify for health care under the Department of Defense (DOD) TRICARE program. The Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-163) expanded CHAMPVA benefits for primary caregivers of certain seriously injured veterans if they do not have any other form of health insurance. Under current law, a child (other than a helpless child) loses eligibility when (1) the child turns 18, unless enrolled in an accredited school as a full-time student; or (2) the child, who has been a full-time student, turns 23 or loses full-time student status; or (3) the child marries. Nevertheless, a child between the ages of 18 and 23 may remain eligible for CHAMPVA benefits if the child incurs a disabling illness or injury—while enrolled as full-time student—and is unable to continue studying at his or her educational institution. The child's eligibility will end either (1) six months from the removal date of the disability, (2) two years from the onset of the disability, or (3) on the child's 23rd birthday.
Benefits
The CHAMPVA program covers most health care services and supplies that are determined to be medically necessary, including inpatient and outpatient care, prescription drugs, mental health services, and skilled nursing care. Certain types of care require advance approval, commonly known as preauthorization. Currently, preauthorization is required for durable medical equipment, hospice services, mental health/substance abuse services, organ and bone marrow transplants, and dental procedures that are directly related to covered medical conditions.
Payments
CHAMPVA beneficiaries usually pay 25% of the cost of medical care up to an annual catastrophic cap of $3,000 plus an annual outpatient deductible of $50 per individual or $100 per family. CHAMPVA pays the remaining 75% of the cost of the beneficiaries' medical care. CHAMPVA is generally a secondary payer to other health insurance coverage and Medicare. CHAMPVA is the primary payer for Medicaid, Indian Health Service, and State Victims of Crime Compensation Programs. |
crs_R44645 | crs_R44645_0 | The Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, commonly known as Social Security, is the most well-known of these programs. SSA is also responsible for carrying out two cash assistance programs for certain groups of low-income individuals: (1) Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled and (2) Special Benefits for Certain World War II Veterans. Administrative costs as a share of benefit payments are projected to be 1.3% in FY2017. FY2017 Budget Request and Appropriations for SSA
Although benefit payments for SSA's programs are considered mandatory spending and thus are not controlled by the annual appropriations process, the agency requires annual discretionary appropriations to carry out its programs and to support the administration of non-SSA programs, such as Medicare, and other priorities. SSA's accounts are traditionally funded through the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. Mandatory Funding Provided Through the Annual Appropriations Process
For FY2017, the President's budget request included $11.4 million in payments to the Social Security trust funds that are provided through the annual appropriations process. In addition to funding benefit payments, the SSI appropriation provides for the program's administrative expenses, beneficiary services, and research and demonstration project-related costs. Limitation on Administrative Expenses
The appropriation for the LAE account funds SSA's administrative costs associated with OASI, SSDI, SSI, and Special Benefits for Certain World War II Veterans as well as costs incurred by the agency to support Medicare and other non-SSA programs. The FY2017 President's budget request for SSA's LAE account was $13.067 billion, which is $905 million (or 7.4%) more than the amount enacted for FY2016. Program Integrity Activities
The FY2017 President's budget request included $1.819 billion for costs associated with SSA's program integrity activities, which include continuing disability reviews (CDRs) and SSI redeterminations. FY2017 Continuing Resolutions
On September 29, 2016, President Barack Obama signed into law the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act ( H.R. 5325 ; P.L. 114-223 ), which contained the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017 (Division C). The first FY2017 continuing resolution (CR) provided continuing appropriations for 11 of the 12 annual appropriations bills (including the LHHS appropriations bill) through December 9, 2016. However, funding dedicated to SSA's program integrity work was exempt from the ATB rescission. On December 10, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 ( H.R. 2028 ; P.L. 114-254 ). The second FY2017 CR provided continuing appropriations for 11 of the 12 annual appropriations bills (including the LHHS appropriations bill) through April 28, 2017. On April 28, 2017, President Trump signed into law a third FY2017 CR ( H.J.Res. 99 ; P.L. 115-30 ). The short-term CR continued funding under the terms of the previous CR through May 5, 2017. FY2017 Omnibus
On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( H.R. 244 ; P.L. 115-31 ). $1.819 billion of the LAE appropriation is for program integrity activities, which is composed of $273 million in base funding and $1.546 billion in cap adjustment funding. General LAE funding refers to LAE funding not dedicated to program integrity work, that is, the base LAE appropriation and funding from user fees paid to SSA for certain administrative activities. According to SSA and others, the declining real value of the general LAE appropriation has contributed to agency delays in processing other workloads. One of the most publicized issues for SSA over the past several years has been the growing number of pending disability cases at the hearing level of the administrative appeals process. | The Social Security Administration (SSA) is responsible for administering a number of federal entitlement programs that provide income support (cash benefits) to qualified individuals. These programs are
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), commonly known as Social Security; Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled; and Special Benefits for Certain World War II Veterans.
In FY2017, SSA's programs are projected to pay a combined $1 trillion in federal benefits to an estimated 68.4 million individuals. The cost to administer these programs is projected to be about 1.3% of benefit outlays.
Although benefit payments for SSA's programs are considered mandatory spending and thus are not controlled by the annual appropriations process, the agency requires annual discretionary appropriations to carry out its programs and to support the administration of non-SSA programs, such as Medicare, as well as various other priorities. The annual appropriation for SSA's limitation on administrative expenses (LAE) account provides nearly all of the agency's administrative funding. The LAE account is composed of funds from the Social Security and Medicare trust funds for their share of administrative expenses, the general fund of the U.S. Treasury for SSI's share of administrative expenses, and user fees paid to SSA for certain administrative activities. Additional appropriations from Congress provide funding for SSI program costs, research and demonstration projects, SSA's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and certain payments to the Social Security trust funds. SSA's accounts are traditionally funded through the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill.
The Obama Administration's FY2017 request for SSA's LAE account was $13.067 billion, which included $1.819 billion for program integrity activities such as continuing disability reviews (CDRs) and SSI nonmedical redeterminations. By comparison, the FY2016 appropriation for SSA's LAE account was $12.162 billion, with $1.426 billion dedicated to program integrity work.
On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act (H.R. 5325; P.L. 114-223), which contains the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017 (Division C). The first FY2017 continuing resolution (CR) provided continuing appropriations for 11 of the 12 annual appropriations bills (including the LHHS appropriations bill) through December 9, 2016.
On December 10, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 2028; P.L. 114-254). The second FY2017 CR provided continuing appropriations for 11 of the 12 annual appropriations bills (including the LHHS appropriations bill) through April 28, 2017. On April 28, 2017, President Trump signed into law a third FY2017 CR (H.J.Res. 99; P.L. 115-30). The short-term CR continued funding under the terms of the previous CR through May 5, 2017.
On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 244; P.L. 115-31), which provides continued funding through the end of FY2017. The annualized funding level for the LAE account under the FY2017 omnibus is $12.482 billion, with $1.819 billion dedicated to program integrity work.
Over the past several years, Congress has increased the amount of funding provided to SSA for program integrity work. This increase has allowed the agency to process more CDRs and SSI redeterminations, resulting in additional net savings to the federal government. However, funding for non-program integrity work during this period has essentially remained flat in nominal (unadjusted) terms. According to SSA and others, recently enacted funding levels for non-program integrity work have contributed to agency delays in processing other workloads, such as pending disability cases at the hearing level of the administrative appeals process. |
crs_RL34734 | crs_RL34734_0 | Political and Economic Conditions
Argentina's democratic political system experienced considerable stress in 2001-2002 when the country experienced a severe economic crisis and related social unrest. Despite some difficulties, Kirchner made popular policy moves in the areas of human rights, institutional reform, and economic policy that helped restore Argentines' faith in democracy. These included an energy crisis early in the year and a series of farmers strikes beginning in March 2008 that led to the congressional defeat of the President's increase on taxes for soybean and sunflower seed exports. Looking ahead, President Fernández faces the challenge of dealing with the effects of the global financial crisis on Argentina's economy. Global Financial Crisis
Initially, President Fernández maintained that the financial crisis in the United States would not have an effect on the region. Argentina's growth in recent years has been fueled by its exports of primary commodities, but the rapid decline in the price of important export commodities for Argentina such as soybean products and corn will have an impact on economic growth and the government's fiscal situation. 1117 (Hinchey) to the FY2009 Intelligence Authorization Act, H.R. The House approved H.R. Argentine-U.S. Relations
Overview
U.S.-Argentine relations generally have been strong since the country's return to democracy in 1983 and were especially close during the Menem presidency (1989-1999). With Cristina Fernández's presidential victory, there was considerable expectation that the tenor of relations with the United States would improve, compared to relations under the previous Kirchner administration. Just two days after her December 10, 2007 inauguration, however, an unexpected challenge to U.S.-Argentina relations occurred when U.S. federal prosecutors in Miami charged five foreign nationals in the so-called "suitcase scandal" involving the attempted delivery of funds to benefit Fernández's presidential campaign (see discussion below for details). In July 2007, the House approved H.Con.Res. On July 15, 2008, the House approved H.Con.Res. The provision was not included in the FY2009 continuing resolution. Legislative Initiatives in the 110th Congress
H.Res. Among its provisions, the resolution supports the counterterrorism efforts of the "3 + 1" mechanism, emphasizes the importance of eliminating Hezbollah's financial network in the tri-border area of South America, expresses concern over the emerging national security implications of Iran's efforts to expand its influence in Latin America, and recommends that the President create more mechanisms for joint counterterrorism operations and intraregional information sharing among supportive countries in the Western Hemisphere, especially in light of Iran's increased involvement in the region. The provision calls for a report (in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex) within 270 days by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that includes a description of any information in possession of the intelligence community with respect to the accession to power of the Argentine military in 1976, violations of human rights committed by officers or agents of the Argentine military and security forces, and Operation Condor and the fate of Argentine people targeted, abducted, or killed during such Operation, including children born in captivity whose status remains unknown. Judgment Evading Foreign States Accountability Act of 2008. S. 3289 (Kohl). As reported, Section 736 of the bill would prohibit any funds appropriated by the act to pay the salaries and expenses of any individual to conduct any activities that would allow the importation into the United States of any ruminant or swine, or any fresh (including chilled or frozen) meat or product of any ruminant or swine, that is born, raised, or slaughtered in Argentina until the Secretary of Agriculture certifies to Congress that every region of Argentina is free of foot and mouth disease without vaccination. Also see related bills, S. 3238 / H.R. | A South American nation with a population of around 40 million, Argentina returned to elected civilian democracy in 1983 after seven years of harsh military rule. In 2001-2002, the democratic political system experienced considerable stress as the country experienced a severe economic crisis, but ultimately weathered the storm. Current President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, elected in October 2007, succeeded her husband President Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), who had made popular policy moves regarding human rights, institutional reform, and economic policy that helped restore Argentines' faith in democracy. In her first year in office, President Fernández has faced several major challenges, including an energy crisis in early 2008 followed by a series of farmers strikes that led to the defeat of her proposed agricultural export tax increase. More recently, the government has faced the challenge of dealing with the effects of the global financial crisis. The rapid decline in prices for several of Argentina's key exports will have an impact on economic growth and government revenue.
U.S.-Argentine relations generally have been strong since the country's return to democracy in 1983 and were especially close during the Menem presidency (1989-1999). There was some friction in relations when the United States did not support Argentina during its 2001-2002 financial crisis, and under the Kirchner presidency when Argentina moved toward closer relations with Venezuela. There was expectation that the tenor of relations with the United States would improve under President Fernández. This was thwarted, however, by the so-called suitcase scandal involving the arrest of four foreign nationals from Venezuela and Uruguay in Miami for the attempted delivery of funds to benefit Fernández's presidential campaign. Nevertheless, the United States and Argentina continue to cooperate on many areas of mutual interest, including anti-drug and anti-terrorism efforts.
In the 110th Congress, several initiatives regarding Argentina were adopted or introduced. The House adopted two resolutions for the anniversary of the 1994 Argentine-Israel Mutual Association bombing: H.Con.Res. 188 approved in July 2007, and H.Con.Res. 385, approved in July 2008. The House also adopted H.Res. 435 in November 2007 that emphasized the importance of eliminating Hezbollah's financial network in the tri-border area of South America. The House version of the FY2009 Intelligence Authorization Act, H.R. 5959, included a provision requiring a Central Intelligence Agency report on human rights violations committed by Argentine military and security forces during the military dictatorship (1976-1983). In September 2008, a bill was introduced, H.R. 7205, that would bar access to U.S. capital markets to foreign states that fail to satisfy U.S. court judgments, and specifically cited Argentina as an egregious example. The Senate version of the FY2009 agriculture appropriations bill, S. 3289, contained a provision prohibiting funds from being used for the importation of fresh meat from Argentina until the Secretary of Agriculture certifies to Congress that every region of Argentina is free of foot and mouth disease; the provision was not included in the FY2009 continuing appropriations resolution. Separate bills, S. 3238 and H.R. 6522, were also introduced on the issue. This report, which may be updated, summarizes political and economic conditions in Argentina and issues in Argentine-U.S. relations. |
crs_RS21349 | crs_RS21349_0 | Current Context
The devastation caused by the January 12, 2010, earthquake in Haiti focused world attention on the humanitarian crisis and prompted U.S. leaders to reconsider policies on Haitian migration. Some members of Congress have long criticized the interdiction and mandatory detention of Haitians who attempted to enter the United States without proper immigration documents as too harsh given country conditions. P.L. Temporary Protected Status29
The issue of Haitian TPS has arisen several times in the past few years, most notably after the U.S. The scale of the current humanitarian crisis—estimated thousands of Haitians dead and reported total collapse of the infrastructure in the capital city of Port au Prince—led DHS to announce on January 13, 2010, that it is temporarily halting the deportation of Haitians. Secretary Napolitano extended and re-designated TPS for Haitians on May 17, 2011. The extension becomes effective July 23, 2011, and enables eligible individuals who arrived up to one year after the earthquake in Haiti to receive TPS. Federal Assistance to Haitian Migrants
Those Haitians who are deemed Cuban-Haitian Entrants are among the subset of foreign nationals who are eligible for federal benefits and cash assistance. Those Haitians who are newly arriving LPRs, however, are barred from the major federal benefits and cash assistance for the first five years after entry. According to the DOS, there were 54,716 Haitians who had approved petitions to immigrate to the United States at the time of the earthquake and who were waiting for visas to become available. Advocates for Haitians asked Secretary Napolitano to give humanitarian parole to those Haitians with approved petitions for visas. Proponents of expediting the admission of Haitians with family in the United States maintained that it would relieve at least some of the humanitarian burden in Haiti. Other supporters assert that it would increase the remittances sent back to Haiti to provide critical help as the nation tries to rebuild. Those opposed to expediting the admission of Haitians asserted that it would not be in the national interest, nor would it be fair to other foreign nationals waiting to reunite with their families. Adoption of Haitian Orphans
Haitian children who were legally confirmed as orphans eligible for intercountry adoption by the government of Haiti and who were in the process of being adopted by U.S. residents prior to the earthquake have been given humanitarian parole to come to the United States. 5283 ), which would authorize the DHS Secretary to adjust to LPR status those aliens who were granted parole into the United States pursuant to the humanitarian parole policy for certain Haitian orphans from January 18, 2010, through April 15, 2010. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 ( H.R. 4899 , P.L. Possible Mass Migration
There are concerns that the ongoing crisis in Haiti may result in mass migration from the country. At least five federal agencies now handle Haitian migrants: DHS's Coast Guard (interdiction); Customs and Border Protection (apprehensions and inspections); Immigration and Customs Enforcement (detention); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (credible fear determination); and DOJ's EOIR (asylum and removal hearings). The balancing of DHS's border security and immigration control responsibilities during an ongoing humanitarian crisis poses a unique challenge. | The environmental, social, and political conditions in Haiti have long prompted congressional interest in U.S. policy on Haitian migrants, particularly those attempting to reach the United States by boat. While some observers assert that such arrivals by Haitians are a breach in border security, others maintain that these Haitians are asylum seekers following a decades old practice of Haitians coming by boat without legal immigration documents. Migrant interdiction and mandatory detention are key components of U.S. policy toward Haitian migrants, but human rights advocates express concern that Haitians are not afforded the same treatment as other asylum seekers.
The devastation caused last year by the January 12, 2010, earthquake in Haiti led Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano to grant Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Haitians in the United States at the time of the earthquake. The scale of humanitarian crisis—estimated thousands of Haitians dead and collapse of the infrastructure in the capital city of Port au Prince—resulted in this TPS announcement. On May 17, 2011, Secretary Napolitano re-designated TPS for Haitians through January 22, 2013. The extension also enables eligible individuals who arrived up to one year after the earthquake in Haiti to receive TPS.
Secretary Napolitano gave humanitarian parole to Haitian children who were legally confirmed as orphans eligible for intercountry adoption by the government of Haiti and who were in the process of being adopted by U.S. residents prior to the earthquake. P.L. 111-293, the Help HAITI Act of 2010, authorizes the DHS Secretary to adjust to legal permanent residence (LPR) status those Haitian orphans who were granted parole from January 18, 2010, through April 15, 2010.
Those Haitians who are deemed Cuban-Haitian Entrants are among the subset of foreign nationals who are eligible for federal benefits and cash assistance. Those Haitians who are newly arriving legal permanent residents, however, are barred from the major federal benefits and cash assistance for the first five years after entry. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 4899, P.L. 111-212), includes funding to cover additional costs for federal benefits and cash assistance resulting from Haitian evacuees.
According to the U.S. Department of State (DOS), there were 54,716 Haitians who had approved petitions to immigrate to the United States at the time of the earthquake and who were waiting for visas to become available. Advocates for Haitians continue to request that Secretary Napolitano give humanitarian parole to those Haitians with approved petitions for visas. Proponents of expediting the admission of Haitians with family in the United States maintain that it would relieve at least some of the humanitarian burden in Haiti and would increase the remittances sent back to Haiti to provide critical help as the nation tries to rebuild. Those opposed to expediting the admission of Haitians assert that it would not be in the national interest, nor would it be fair to other foreign nationals waiting to reunite with their families.
More broadly, there are concerns that the crisis conditions in Haiti—notably, the outbreak of cholera and the return of deposed dictator Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier—may trigger mass migration from the island. DHS agencies that would address a potential mass migration include the U.S. Coast Guard (interdiction); Customs and Border Protection (apprehensions and inspections); Immigration and Customs Enforcement (detention and removal); and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (credible fear determinations). The balancing of DHS's border security responsibilities during a humanitarian crisis poses a challenge. |
crs_RS22701 | crs_RS22701_0 | Background
The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) was a trilateral initiative, launched in March 2005, that was intended to increase cooperation and information sharing in an effort to increase and enhance prosperity in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The SPP was a government initiative that was endorsed by the leaders of the three countries from 2005 to 2008, but it is was not a signed agreement or treaty and, therefore, contained no legally binding commitments or obligations. It could, at best, be characterized as an endeavor by the three countries to facilitate communication and cooperation across several key policy areas of mutual interest. Although the SPP built upon the existing trade and economic relationship of the three countries, it was not a trade agreement and distinct from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Some key issues for Congress regarding the SPP concerned possible implications related to private sector priorities, national sovereignty, transportation corridors, cargo security, and border security. The security working groups were chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the prosperity working groups were chaired by the Secretary of Commerce. It is unclear what course of action will be taken regarding the former SPP initiatives under President Barack Obama's Administration. In August 2009, President Obama met with Mexican President Calderón and Canadian Prime Minister Harper at the North American Leaders' Summit in Guadalajara, Mexico. The leaders discussed key issues that affect the three countries and agreed to continue cooperation in these areas, but there was no mention of continuing the SPP. The U.S. government website on the SPP states that it has been archived and will not be updated. Working Group Proposals and Priorities
In 2005 and 2006, the SPP working groups provided annual reports to the three leaders of North America on the work and key accomplishments of the working groups. The 2005 report provided the initial proposals on how to accomplish the goals of the SPP. The priorities focused on increasing collaborative efforts to improve certain sectors of the economy; developing higher standards of safety and health; and addressing environmental concerns. In addition, the North American leaders agreed upon the following five priority areas for the SPP working groups: (1) Enhancement of the Global Competitiveness of North America, (2) Safe Food and Products, (3) Sustainable Energy and the Environment, (4) Smart and Secure Borders, and (5) Emergency Management and Preparedness. In February 2008, ministers from the United States, Canada, and Mexico met in Baja California, Mexico to review the progress of the working groups during the previous year and to discuss cooperative approaches for meeting challenges and opportunities in the five SPP priority areas. NACC Recommendations
The NACC report listed the following priorities to enhance North American competitiveness:
Facilitating entry for cargo and reducing border congestion along the borders with Canada and Mexico; Establishing competitive supply chains across North America by developing efficient transportation networks, especially along the northern and southern borders of the United States; Working towards comprehensive integration of the North American automotive industry through more efficient border inspections and greater regulatory cooperation by aligning vehicle safety standards and regulations among the three countries; Implementing a trilateral Intellectual Property Action Strategy for more rigorous protection of intellectual property rights; Enhancing secure alternatives to a passport before the June 2009 date for full implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative; Strengthening trilateral communication and cooperation to prevent the entry of unsafe food and products into North America and working to make regulatory and inspection regimes for food and product safety more compatible; Encouraging development of sustainable energy technologies and protection of the environment through private sector cooperation; Ensuring emergency management planning through increased cooperation on emergency protocols, particularly those related to border traffic and prioritization of cross-border shipments during emergencies; and Enhancing cooperation in financial regulation in order to provide more efficient access to capital, to improve the availability and affordability of insurance coverage for cross-border carriers, and to find new ways for cross-border collaboration on investment. | The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) was a trilateral initiative that was launched in March 2005 by Canada, Mexico, and the United States to increase cooperation and information sharing for the purpose of increasing and enhancing security and prosperity in North America. President Obama met with Mexican President Calderón and Canadian Prime Minister Harper at the North American Leaders' Summit in Guadalajara, Mexico in August 2009. The three leaders discussed key issues that affect the three countries and agreed to continue cooperation in these areas, but there was no mention of continuing the SPP. It is unclear what course of action will be taken under President Barack Obama's Administration with regard to the former SPP initiatives. The U.S. government website on the SPP states that it has been archived and will not be updated.
The SPP was a government initiative that was endorsed by the Canada, Mexico, and the United States between 2005 and 2008, but it was not a signed agreement or treaty and, therefore, contained no legally binding commitments or obligations. It could, at best, be characterized as an endeavor by the three countries to facilitate communication and cooperation across several key policy areas of mutual interest. Although the SPP built upon the existing trade and economic relationship of the three countries, it was not a trade agreement and distinct from the existing North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Some key issues for Congress regarding the SPP concerned possible implications related to private sector priorities, national sovereignty, transportation corridors, cargo security, and border security.
The SPP established a number of working groups related to both the security and prosperity components of the initiative. The security working groups were chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the prosperity working groups were chaired by the Secretary of Commerce. In 2005 and 2006, the SPP working groups provided annual reports to the three North American leaders on their work and key accomplishments. The 2005 report provided the initial proposals on how to accomplish the goals of the SPP. The priorities focused on increasing collaborative efforts to improve certain sectors of the economy; developing higher standards of safety and health; and addressing environmental concerns.
At the 2007 North American Leaders' Summit in Montebello, Canada, the leaders announced the following priorities for the SPP: (1) Enhancement of the Global Competitiveness of North America, (2) Safe Food and Products, (3) Sustainable Energy and the Environment, (4) Smart and Secure Borders, and (5) Emergency Management and Preparedness. In February 2008, ministers from the United States, Canada, and Mexico met in Baja California, Mexico to review the progress of the working groups during the previous year and to discuss cooperative approaches for meeting challenges and opportunities in the five SPP priority areas. In April 2008, the North American leaders held a summit to discuss how they might further advance the goals of the SPP. The three leaders decided that their respective ministers should continue to renew and focus their work in the five SPP priority areas. |
crs_RS22896 | crs_RS22896_0 | Background of the Case
United States v. Santos involved a challenge to the conviction of the operator of an illegal lottery and one of his collectors for violating a provision of 18 U.S.C. For a conviction under this particular subsection of the statute, which covers a form of money laundering, referred to as "promotional money laundering," the prosecution must prove: (1) that the defendant engaged in a financial transaction involving the "proceeds" of an unlawful activity; (2) that the unlawful activity had been designated by the statute as a "specified unlawful activity"; (3) that defendant knew that the property involved in the transaction "represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity"; and (4) the defendant had the "intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity." Supreme Court Decision
The issue presented to the Court was a straightforward question of statutory interpretation: as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1956, does "proceeds" mean "profits" or "gross receipts?" 1956, including operating an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens essentially limits the reach of the plurality opinion. Legislation
S. 386 , the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, has been passed by both the House and Senate and, as of May 19, 2009, awaits the signature of the President. It was introduced on February 5, 2009, by Senator Leahy to enhance federal enforcement capabilities to counteract mortgage fraud, securities fraud, and fraud with respect to federal financial assistance. In addition to provisions which provide funding for investigation and prosecution of this type of fraud; substantive provisions extending the reach of specific criminal statutes addressing financial fraud; and (in the version passed by the House) the creation of a legislative branch Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the bill includes an amendment to the definition of "proceeds" in the anti-money laundering laws to cover "gross receipts" of the underlying criminal activity. The House-passed version also includes a provision addressing the merger problem. §§ 1956 and 1957, should not be undertaken in combination with the prosecution of any other offense, without prior approval of specified Department of Justice Officials or the relevant United States Attorney if the underlying predicate offense for the money laundering prosecution "is so closely connected with the conduct to be charged as the other offense that there is no clear delineation between the two offenses." § 1956(c)(8) to specify that "proceeds" includes "gross receipts," and H.R. | On June 2, 2008, the U. S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Santos (No. 06-1005), vacated convictions of the operator of an illegal lottery and one of his runners who had been charged with conducting financial transactions involving the "proceeds" of an illegal gaming business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The ruling is that "proceeds," as used in this money laundering statute, means "profits" rather than "gross receipts" of the underlying unlawful activity. The decision combines a plurality opinion interpreting the word "proceeds" in the statute to mean "profits" and a concurring opinion, necessary for a majority ruling, that leaves room for interpreting "proceeds" as "gross receipts" in other circumstances. A strong dissenting opinion emphasized the constraints the ruling will place on prosecutors. The interpretation rests on two principles of statutory construction: the rule of lenity and the merger doctrine. Under the rule of lenity, ambiguities in criminal statutes are construed in favor of the defendant. Application of the merger doctrine avoids the prospect that a defendant would receive two punishments under different statutes for what is essentially a single offense. On February 5, 2009, Senator Leahy introduced S. 386, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, which was reported favorably by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on March 23, 2009, S.Rept. 111-10. On April 28, the bill, as amended, was passed by the Senate. On May 7, an amended version of the bill was passed by the House. It was returned to the Senate, amended, and passed; thereafter, on May 18, it was passed by the House for presentation to the President. The bill includes provisions amending the definition of "proceeds" under the anti-money laundering criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(8) and 1957(c), to specify that the term includes the "gross receipts" of the underlying criminal activity. As passed by the House, the bill also includes a provision addressing the possibility of a merger problem in money laundering prosecutions for predicate offenses closely connected with the elements of the money laundering offense. Other legislation with provisions to cover "gross receipts" includes S. 378 and H.R. 1793. This report will be updated on the basis of major legislative activity. |
crs_R41859 | crs_R41859_0 | Introduction
Many states have enacted changes to their Unemployment Compensation (UC) programs in recent years. This report first provides a brief overview of the unemployment compensation programs and benefits that may be available to eligible, unemployed individuals. Next, the two categories of UC state law issues are discussed:
1. changes in the duration of state UC unemployment benefits and 2. changes in the maximum UC weekly benefit amount. Until its expiration the week ending on or before January 1, 2014 (i.e., December 28, 2013; or December 29, 2013, in New York State), the temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program also provided up to four tiers of additional weeks of unemployment benefits to certain workers who had exhausted their rights to UC benefits in states with high unemployment. Extended Benefit Program
The Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, P.L. (This temporary 100% federal funding for EB is now expired.) There are two types of payable periods for EB benefits. Because states administer all unemployment benefits, including EB and EUC08 benefits (when authorized), through their state UC programs, states were facing increased administrative pressure regarding program integrity. State Law Changes to UC Benefit Duration
In response to similar state UC financial stress following prior recessions, states have typically reduced the amount of UC benefits paid to individuals through reductions in the maximum benefit amount or through changes in the underlying benefit calculations. Effective October 1, 2015, Arkansas further reduced its UC maximum duration to up to 20 weeks. In an opinion issued July 26, 2016, however, the Missouri Supreme Court found this 2015 law unconstitutional. North Carolina decreased the maximum UC duration from 26 weeks to a variable maximum duration, depending on the state unemployment rate and ranging from 12 weeks up to 20 weeks. In addition, one state enacted a law with that decreased maximum UC duration only for a particular calendar year:
Illinois enacted a law that decreased UC maximum duration in the state from 26 weeks to 25 weeks, effective only for calendar year 2012. Examples of adjusted EUC08 benefit durations—based on a weekly benefit amount of $300 and a new maximum UC duration of 20 weeks—are also provided:
Tier I of EUC08 (prior to expiration) Duration formula: 54% of the duration of an individual's total regular UC benefits in benefit year Illustration of adjusted duration (formerly, the unreduced EUC08 tier I duration would have been up to 20 weeks—based on up to 26 weeks of unreduced state UC benefits—at a weekly benefit amount of $300) 54% of 20 weeks of UC = 10.8 weeks; up to 10 weeks at weekly benefit amount of $300 and the last week prorated at $240 ($300/0.8 = $240) Tier II of EUC08 (prior to expiration) Duration formula: 54% of the duration of an individual's total regular UC benefits in benefit year Illustration of adjusted duration (formerly, up to 14 weeks at $300) 54% of 20 weeks of UC = 10.8 weeks; up to 10 weeks at weekly benefit amount of $300 and the last week prorated at $240 ($300/0.8 = $240) Tier III of EUC08 (prior to expiration) Duration formula: 35% of the duration of an individual's total regular UC benefits in benefit year Illustration of adjusted duration (formerly, up to 13 weeks at $300) 35% of 20 weeks of UC = 7 weeks; up to 7 weeks at weekly benefit amount of $300 Tier IV of EUC08 (prior to expiration) Duration formula: 39% of the duration of an individual's total regular UC benefits in benefit year Illustration of adjusted duration (formerly, up to 6 weeks at $300) 39% of 20 weeks of UC = 7.8 weeks; up to 7 weeks at weekly benefit amount of $300 and the last week prorated at $240 ($300/0.8 = $240)
EUC08 tier duration calculations (prior to program expiration) for each state that enacted a reduction in regular UC benefit duration are provided in Table 2 . 110-252 , as amended, included a "nonreduction" rule that made the availability of federally financed EUC08 benefits (when authorized) contingent on not actively changing the state's method of calculation for UC benefits, if the method would have decreased weekly benefit amounts. 111-5 . Any reduction to the UC weekly benefit amount also translates into reduced EUC08 (when authorized) and EB weekly benefit amounts. Therefore, if the average weekly wage declines in these states, they may experience automatic reductions in UC average weekly benefit amount, which are permitted under the "nonreduction" rule. P.L. 112-96 provided a specific exception to this UC "nonreduction" rule in the case of state legislation that was enacted before March 1, 2012. In February 2013, North Carolina enacted legislation that included a provision to actively reduce UC weekly benefit amounts in the state. All tiers of EUC08 ended in North Carolina as of June 29, 2013. With the expiration of the EUC08 program as of the week ending on or before January 1, 2014 (i.e., December 28, 2013; or December 29, 2013, in New York State), the "nonreduction" rule is no longer effective. | This report analyzes recent changes to state Unemployment Compensation (UC) programs. Two categories of UC state law issues are considered: (1) changes in the duration of state UC unemployment benefits, and (2) changes in the UC weekly benefit amount.
In recent years, some states have enacted legislation to decrease the maximum number of weeks of regular state UC benefits. Until 2011, all states paid at least up to 26 weeks of UC benefits to eligible, unemployed individuals. In 2011, however, six states passed legislation to decrease their maximum UC benefit durations: Arkansas, Florida, Illinois (only for calendar year 2012), Michigan, Missouri, and South Carolina. In 2012, Georgia also passed legislation to decrease the maximum UC benefit duration. In 2013, Kansas and North Carolina enacted similar legislation. Subsequently, in 2015, Arkansas and Missouri enacted additional state laws to further reduce their maximum UC durations. In the case of Missouri, however, the Missouri Supreme Court found the 2015 law unconstitutional; therefore, this further UC duration reduction is not in effect. In 2016, Idaho reduced its maximum UC duration. Finally, in 2017, Arkansas passed a third reduction in its maximum UC duration. As a result of these state law changes, depending on state unemployment, the shortest potential UC maximum duration is currently 12 weeks (in Florida and North Carolina), compared with 26 weeks prior to 2011.
Changes in UC benefit duration have consequences for the duration of federal unemployment benefits that may be available to unemployed workers, including Extended Benefits (EB) and benefits from the now-expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program. Because state UC benefit duration is an underlying factor in the calculation of duration for additional federal unemployment benefits, reducing UC maximum duration also reduces the number of weeks available to unemployed workers in the federal extended unemployment programs (including EUC08, which is now expired, and EB).
Prior to the expiration of the EUC08 program on December 28, 2013 (December 29, 2013, in New York), states were temporarily subject to a "nonreduction" rule (under P.L. 111-205, as amended), which made the availability of federally financed EUC08 benefits contingent on not actively changing the state's method of calculation for UC benefits, if it would have decreased weekly benefit amounts. Some states, however, make automatic adjustments to weekly benefit amounts under existing state law. Consequently, when these states experience certain conditions, such as a decrease in the average weekly wage used in the automatic adjustment calculation, their maximum weekly UC benefit amount may have been decreased without having violated the now-expired "nonreduction" rule. P.L. 112-96 provided a specific exception to the "nonreduction" rule in the case of state legislation enacted before March 1, 2012. In February 2013, North Carolina enacted legislation that actively reduced UC weekly benefit amount calculations beginning in July 2013. Due to this violation of the "nonreduction" rule, EUC08 benefits were no longer available in North Carolina, effective June 29, 2013. All EUC08 benefits expired as of the week ending on or before January 1, 2014 (i.e., December 28, 2013; or December 29, 2013, in New York State). Any reduction to the UC weekly benefit amount also translates into reduced EB weekly benefit amounts (and EUC08 benefit amounts when the program was authorized).
Overall, the two types of changes to state UC laws and programs have consequences for the duration and amount of unemployment benefits. This report describes these changes and analyzes their consequences for UC, EUC08 (when it was authorized), and EB benefits. It will be updated, as needed, to reflect additional state UC changes. |
crs_RL32217 | crs_RL32217_0 | The first pillar of the Administration argument for ousting Saddam Hussein—its continued active development of WMD—has been researched extensively. The second pillar of the Administration argument—that Saddam Hussein's regime had links to Al Qaeda—is relevant not only to assess justification for the invasion decision but also because an Al Qaeda affiliate (Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I) became a key component of the post-Saddam insurgency among Sunni Arabs in Iraq. The Administration argument for an Iraq-Al Qaeda linkage had a few major themes: (1) that there were contacts between Iraqi intelligence and Al Qaeda in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan dating from the early 1990s, including Iraq's assistance to Al Qaeda in deployment of chemical weapons; (2) that an Islamist faction called Ansar al-Islam (The Partisans of Islam) in northern Iraq, had ties to Iraq's regime; and (3) that Iraq might have been involved in the September 11, 2001 plot itself. Some CIA experts reportedly asserted that the ideological differences between Iraq and Al Qaeda were too large to be bridged permanently. However, some accounts question the extent of links, if any, between Baghdad and Ansar al-Islam. Al Qaeda and the Iraq Insurgency
Whether or not Al Qaeda leaders and Saddam Hussein had a relationship, a major issue facing the United States is the degree to which Al Qaeda elements are threatening the U.S. effort to stabilize post-Saddam Iraq. The U.S. troop surge was intended to try to take advantage of a growing rift within the broad insurgency that was being observed by U.S. commanders in Iraq as early as mid-2005. In August 2006, U.S. commanders began to receive overtures from Iraqi Sunni tribal and other community leaders in Anbar Province to cooperate with U.S. efforts to expel AQ-I and secure the cities and towns of the province. This became known as the "Awakening" (As Sahawa). In Baghdad, the U.S. military established supported this trend in the course of the Baghdad Security Plan ("troop surge") by establishing about 100 combat outposts, including 33 "Joint Security Stations" in partnership with the ISF, to clear neighborhoods of AQ-I and to encourage the population to come forward with information about AQ-I hideouts. In late July 2008, a reputed AQ-I leader in Anbar told the Washington Post that AQ-I leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri had left Iraq to go to Afghanistan, or to the border areas of Pakistan where Al Qaeda leaders are believed to be hiding. He testified that AQ-I is "still capable of lethal attacks" and that the United States must "maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside Iraq that support it, and on the resource flows that sustain it." This estimate is somewhat higher than what many experts might expect in light of the official U.S. command assessments of the weakening of AQ-I by U.S. operations and strategy. Linkages to Al Qaeda Central Leadership
If the reports of significant AQ-I relocations to the Pakistan tribal areas bordering Afghanistan are correct, this would suggest that the links are tightening between AQ-I and Al Qaeda's central leadership as represented by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. | In explaining the decision to invade Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein from power, the Administration asserted, among other justifications, that the regime of Saddam Hussein had a working relationship with the Al Qaeda organization. The Administration assessed that the relationship dated to the early 1990s, and was based on a common interest in confronting the United States. The Administration assertions were derived from U.S. intelligence showing a pattern of contacts with Al Qaeda when its key founder, Osama bin Laden, was based in Sudan in the early to mid-1990s and continuing after he relocated to Afghanistan in 1996.
Critics maintain that subsequent research demonstrates that the relationship, if it existed, was not "operational," and that no hard data has come to light indicating the two entities conducted any joint terrorist attacks. Some major hallmarks of an operational relationship were absent, and several experts outside and within the U.S. government believe that contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda were sporadic, unclear, or subject to alternate explanations.
Another pillar of the Administration argument, which has applications for the current U.S. effort to stabilize Iraq, rested on reports of contacts between Baghdad and an Islamist Al Qaeda affiliate group, called Ansar al-Islam, based in northern Iraq in the late 1990s. Although the connections between Ansar al-Islam and Saddam Hussein's regime were subject to debate, the organization evolved into what is now known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I). AQ-I has been a numerically small but operationally major component of the Sunni Arab-led insurgency that frustrated U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. Since mid-2007, in part facilitated by combat conducted by additional U.S. forces sent to Iraq as part of a "troop surge," the U.S. military has exploited differences between AQ-I and Iraqi Sunni political, tribal, and insurgent leaders to virtually expel AQ-I from many of its sanctuaries particularly in Baghdad and in Anbar Province. U.S. officials assess AQ-I to be weakened almost to the point of outright defeat in Iraq, although they say it remains lethal and has the potential to revive in Iraq. Attacks continue, primarily in north-central Iraq, that bear the hallmarks of AQ-I tactics, and U.S. and Iraqi forces continue to conduct offensives targeting suspected AQ-I leaders and hideouts.
As of mid-2008, there are indications that AQ-I leaders are relocating from Iraq to join Al Qaeda leaders believed to be in remote areas of Pakistan, near the Afghanistan border. That perception, if accurate, could suggest that AQ-I now perceives Afghanistan as more fertile ground than is Iraq to attack U.S. forces. The relocation of AQ-I leaders to Pakistan could also accelerate the perceived strengthening of the central Al Qaeda organization.
This report will be updated as warranted by developments. See also: CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL30211 | crs_RL30211_0 | 2606 ) because it cut $1.92 billion from his request. 3422 provides $13.5 billion for regular foreign aid programs, plus$1.8 billion over three years for the Wye River/Middle East peace accord, for a totalpackage of $15.3 billion. 3425 , also enacted by reference in P.L.106-113 ) for the U.S. to support the IMF off-market sale of gold. Introduction
The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislativevehicle through which Congress reviews and votes on the U.S. foreign assistancebudget and influences executive branch foreign policy making generally. The FY2000 budget resolution that cleared Congress on April 15 ( H.Con.Res. 68 set a $17.7 billiontarget for total international affairs budget, a figure 15% below the request. President Clinton, in his initial February 1999 request,asked Congress to appropriate $14.1 billion for Foreign Operations programs inFY2000, plus $1.9 billion in support of the Wye River/Middle East peace accord inFY1999-2001. Compared withthe $15.4 billion total FY1999 Foreign Operations spending -- the "base" plussupplementals -- the FY2000 request, without the Wye River funds, was about $1.35billion, or 9% less than FY1999 amounts. In separate actions during the summer, the House and Senate approved bills spending roughlythe same amount of money overall -- $12.624 billion and $12.691 billion,respectively -- but at levels less than appropriated in FY1999 and well below thePresident's request. Confereesapproved $12.693 billion, nearly identical to the Senate's level, but still belowamounts for FY1999 and the President's request. Other Members voted against the bill because the conference agreementremoved House-passed abortion restrictions related to international family planningprograms and included funding for the U.N. Population Fund which maintainsactivities in China. Keeping to an earlier pledge, President Clinton vetoed H.R. 2606 and several weeks of negotiations, congressionalleaders and White House officials agreed to a compromise package which thePresident says he supports. H.R. Major Policy and Spending Issues in the Foreign Operations Debate
In addition to funding decisions made by Congress in the Foreign Operations appropriation bill, the annual spending measure also includes a wide range of policyprovisions that frequently raise contentious foreign policy disagreements between thePresident and Congress. Among the most significant funding and policy issues raised during congressional debate this year on the Foreign Operations appropriation measureconcern conflicting executive-legislative branch development assistance strategypriorities, restrictions on international family planning programs, regional aidallocations, competing initiatives to reduce debt burdens of the poorest developingcountries, and the terms and conditions under which the United States provides heavyfuel oil to North Korea. Policy Priorities of U.S. Development Aid. The White House said the President would veto any bill that includedthe Smith language. Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and U.S. North Korea Policy. H.R. H.R. | The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. foreign aid budget and influences executive branch foreign policymaking generally. It contains the largest share -- over two-thirds -- of total U.S. internationalaffairs spending.
For FY2000, President Clinton requested $14.1 billion (later amended upward to $14.4 billion), plus $1.9 billion over three years for the Wye River/Middle East peace accord. The President'sproposal, excluding the Wye River funds, was about $1.35 billion, or 9% less than FY1999 amounts.
Congressional action on the FY2000 budget resolution resulted in preliminary funding allocations for Foreign Operations programs well below the requested amount. H.Con.Res. 68 , which cleared Congress on April 15, cut the $20.9 billion overallforeign policy discretionary budget request to $17.7 billion, 15% less than the President seeks. Because Foreign Operations funds represent over two-thirds of the foreign policy budget, a reductionof this order would substantially limit amounts available for Foreign Operations programs.
In addition to total funding levels, five issues were among those that received the most attention during the FY2000 debate, and in some cases, resulted in the sharpest split between House andSenate, and Congress-Executive branch positions: 1) U.S. development aid policy and spendingpriorities; 2) population aid and international family planning policy; 3) regional aid allocations; 4)U.S. funding for North Korea's heavy fuel oil and broad U.S.-North Korean policy; and 5)competing initiatives to reduce debt owed to the United States and other creditors by the world'spoorest and most highly indebted nations.
During the summer, the Senate ( S. 1234 ) and House ( H.R. 2606 ) approved FY2000 Foreign Operations spending measures providing $12.69 billion and $12.62billion, respectively. Because of the reduced funding levels and a House-passed abortion restriction,the White House said the President would veto either bill. A House-Senate conference committee,after deleting the House abortion restriction, agreed to $12.69 billion for Foreign Operations. President Clinton vetoed the bill, however, due to cuts totaling $1.92 billion to his budget request. Following weeks of negotiations, Congress and the White House agreed to a revised ForeignOperations bill ( H.R. 3422 , enacted by reference in H.R. 3194 , P.L.106-113 ) that totals $15.3 billion, including $1.8 billion for the Wye River/Middle East peaceaccord. The compromise package further funds $799 million of White House spending prioritiesthat Congress had rejected in the vetoed H.R. 2606 .
Key Policy Staff
CRS Division abbreviation: "FDT" = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. |
crs_RL32508 | crs_RL32508_0 | Somesystems are used only by military units; others are national systems operated by Washington-leveldefense agencies. Understanding the procedures for acquiring ISR systems is, however, complicated by the factthat different ISR systems are acquired in entirely different ways, by different intelligence agenciesor military services, and are designed for different users. Congressional Concerns with ISR: Lack of Coordination
Although procedures for coordinating the budgeting of ISR programs have long been inplace, some Members of Congress have concluded that the procedures have not been whollyeffective. The council would be charged with developing a comprehensiveroadmap "to guide the development and integration" of DOD ISR capabilities for 15 years. (26) The provision was not,however, included in the version of the bill that was enacted as P.L. (28)
The publication of the 9/11 Commission's report in July 2004 provided the impetus forcongressional action in an election year. (42) For example, there has been for a number of years a program,known as Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP), which is designed to facilitatethe use of satellite imagery and other NIP products by military commanders. The same types of coordinativemechanisms that have long existed will undoubtedly continue to be required. The National Security Act assigns to theSecretary of Defense the responsibility to ensure, in consultation with the DCI, that:
(1) the budgets of the elements of the intelligencecommunity within the Department of Defense are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needsof the Department of Defense, including the needs of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andthe commanders of the unified and specified commands and, wherever such elements are performinggovernment-wide functions, the needs of other departments andagencies;
(2) ensure appropriate implementation of the policiesand resource decisions of the Director of Central Intelligence by elements of the Department ofDefense within the National Foreign Intelligence Program;
(3) ensure that the tactical intelligence activities of theDepartment of Defense complement and are compatible with intelligence activities under theNational Foreign Intelligence Program.... (47)
Executive Order (EO) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities , required that the DCI,together with the Secretary of Defense, "ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap between nationalforeign intelligence programs and Department of Defense intelligence programs...." (48) There have been, inaddition, a number of inter-agency agreements within the executive branch that govern thecoordination of intelligence programs and budget processes. In addition, U.S. post-cold war defense planning continues to evolveinto new, and uncertain, approaches to a wide variety of possible conflict situations. In regard to ISR systems, the act provides the DNI with an opportunity and a staff (theCommunity Management Staff is to be transferred to the Office of the DNI) to assess whethergovernment-wide ISR requirements are being effectively addressed. Appendix A: A Case Study in ISR Acquisition: The Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) and Global Hawk UAVs
Efforts to procure a new generation of reconnaissance satellites and high altitude unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs) serve as a case study that illustrates the dilemmas involved in the acquisitionsof intelligence platforms and systems. (68) Some observers have,accordingly, suggested that many of the capabilities of reconnaissance satellites could be realizedby relying on less expensive, high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles such as Global Hawk, whichhas recently become available for operational missions and has been used during Operation IraqFreedom. | Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions are principal elements of U.S.defense capabilities, and include a wide variety of systems for acquiring and processing informationneeded by national security decisionmakers and military commanders. ISR systems range in sizefrom hand-held devices to orbiting satellites. Some collect basic information for a wide range ofanalytical products; others are designed to acquire data for specific weapons systems. Some are"national" systems intended primarily to collect information of interest to Washington-area agencies;others are "tactical" systems intended to support military commanders on the battlefield. Collectively, they account for a major portion of U.S. intelligence spending that, according to mediaestimates, amounts to some $40 billion annually.
For some time Congress has expressed concern about the costs and management of ISRprograms. With minor exceptions, ISR acquisition has been coordinated by the Defense Departmentand the Intelligence Community. Although there are long-existing staff mechanisms for reviewingand coordinating ISR programs in the context of the annual budget submissions, many in Congressbelieve that existing procedures have not avoided duplication of effort, excessive costs, and gaps incoverage. Examples that some observers cite are separate efforts to acquire a new generation ofreconnaissance satellites and a high altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) known as Global Hawk. Both systems acquire some of the same sorts of information and serve similar customers, but theyare acquired in distinctly different ways; moreover, in both cases procurement efforts have beenbeset by increasing costs and schedule delays.
Recently enacted statutes mandate better integration of ISR capabilities and require that theDefense Department prepare a roadmap to guide the development and integration of ISR capabilitiesover the next fifteen years. An effective roadmap, if developed, could potentially ensure morecomprehensive coverage of targets and save considerable sums of money. To establish responsibilityfor an Intelligence Community-wide effort, the 9/11 Commission recommended that a new positionof Director of National Intelligence be established to manage the national intelligence program (butnot joint military and tactical intelligence programs, which would continue to be managed by theDefense Department). This position was included, after extended debate, in the Intelligence Reformand Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) that was approved by the President onDecember 17, 2004. The implications of this legislation for ISR programs are as yet uncertain, butCongress may seek to assess the effectiveness of the statute in addressing long-existing concernswith ISR programs. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_RL31623 | crs_RL31623_0 | It begins with a review of the international security environment, highlighting the threats that the United States has sought to deter or respond to with its nuclear forces. In each of these areas, the report summarizes U.S. nuclear policy during the Cold War, identifies changes implemented in the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and details how the Bush Administration proposes to bring continuity and change to U.S. nuclear weapons, policy, and infrastructure. These include the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy, how to make the U.S. nuclear deterrent "credible," the relationship between U.S. nuclear posture and the goal of discouraging nuclear proliferation, plans for strategic nuclear weapons, and the future of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Other nations, such as those in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, were included in the U.S. nuclear war plans, but their presence reflected their relationship with the Soviet Union more than any independent threat they might pose to the United States or allies. Consequently, the United States would not rule out the possible first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict. In its presentation outlining the results of the Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration argued that nuclear weapons, along with missile defenses and other elements of the U.S. military establishment, not only deter adversaries by promising an unacceptable amount of damage in response to an adversary's attack, they can also assure allies and friends of the U.S. commitment to their security by providing an extended deterrent, dissuade potential adversaries from challenging the United States with nuclear weapons or other "asymmetrical threats" by convincing them that they can never negate the U.S. nuclear deterrent; and defeat enemies by holding at risk those targets that could not be destroyed with other types of weapons. The key difference between the past and the future may be rhetorical—during the Cold War, the United States emphasized the role that nuclear weapons could play in deterring the Soviet Union before mentioning other possible objectives for U.S. nuclear policy; in the future, with the greatly reduced risk of global nuclear war, the other objectives may become more prominent in discussions of U.S. national security strategy. The Bush Administration has stated that the United States would develop and deploy those nuclear capabilities that it would need to defeat the capabilities of any potential adversary whether or not it possessed nuclear weapons. The focus will be "on how we will fight, not who we will fight." The third leg of the new triad is a "responsive infrastructure" that would allow the United States to maintain and, if necessary, expand its nuclear arsenal in response to emerging threats. The Bush Administration has indicated that it will no longer maintain the capability to exercise this option. In 2006, DOE announced a plan to consolidate and reduce the size of its nuclear weapons complex. This debate surfaced frequently during the Cold War, when the United States sought to develop a mixture of strategy, doctrine, and force posture that would deter not only a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States but also a conventional attack by the Soviet Union or its allies against U.S. allies. Strategic Nuclear Weapons
As was noted above, the Bush Administration's plans for the U.S. arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons contain a number of key components:
Reductions in the number of "operationally deployed" strategic nuclear warheads to between 2,200 and 1,700 warheads; Retention of most deployed delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers), with reductions in the number of warheads carried by and counted on these vehicles; Storage of many warheads removed from deployment; The ability to restore stored warheads to deployed delivery vehicles in days, weeks, or months—a capability known as the "responsive force." First, they question why, if Russia and the United States are no longer enemies, does the United States need to maintain 2,200 warheads in its deployed forces. | The Bush Administration conducted a review of U.S. nuclear weapons force posture during its first year in office. The review sought to adjust U.S. nuclear posture to address changes in the international security environment at the start of the new century. Although it continued many long-standing policies and programs, it also introduced new elements into both U.S. policy and U.S. nuclear weapons programs. This report, which will be updated as needed, provides an overview of the U.S. nuclear posture to highlight areas of change and areas of continuity.
During the Cold War, the United States sought to deter the Soviet Union and its allies from attacking the United States and its allies by convincing the Soviet Union that any level of conflict could escalate into a nuclear exchange and, in that exchange, the United States would plan to destroy the full range of valued targets in the Soviet Union. Other nations were included in U.S. nuclear war plans due to their alliances with the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the United States maintained a substantial nuclear arsenal to deter potential threats from Russia. It would not forswear the first use of nuclear weapons in conflicts with other nations, such as those armed with chemical or biological weapons, and formed contingency plans for such conflicts. The Bush Administration has emphasized that the United States and Russia are no longer enemies and that the United States will no longer plan or size its nuclear force to deter a "Russian threat." Instead, the United States will maintain a nuclear arsenal with the capabilities needed to counter capabilities of any potential adversary, focusing on "how we will fight" rather than "who we will fight." Furthermore, U.S. nuclear weapons will combine with missile defenses, conventional weapons, and a responsive infrastructure in seeking to assure U.S. allies, dissuade U.S. adversaries, deter conflict, and defeat adversaries if conflict should occur.
During the Cold War the United States maintained a "triad" of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers in a strategic nuclear arsenal of more than 10,000 warheads. During the 1990s, the United States reduced the size of this arsenal to around 7,000 warheads , but maintained all three legs of the triad. The Bush Administration has announced that the United States will further reduce its arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 "operationally deployed" warheads, but that it will not eliminate many delivery vehicles while reducing its force and it will retain many nondeployed warheads in storage as a "responsive force" that could be added to the deployed forces if conditions warranted. The Bush Administration has also announced that it will resize and modernize the infrastructure that supports U.S. nuclear weapons, so that the United States could respond to unexpected changes in the status of its arsenal or the international security environment.
Analysts and observers have identified several issues raised by the Administration's Nuclear Posture Review. These include the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy, how to make the U.S. nuclear deterrent "credible," the relationship between the U.S. nuclear posture and the goal of discouraging nuclear proliferation, plans for strategic nuclear weapons, and the future of non-strategic nuclear weapons. |
crs_RL33106 | crs_RL33106_0 | Introduction
Border security has emerged as an area of concern for many, particularly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Although recent concerns pertaining to border security may be attributed to the threat of potential terrorists coming into the country, past concerns that centered around drug and human smuggling and the illegal entry of migrants are still important issues. Differences Between the Southwest and Northern Borders
The U.S. border with Mexico is approximately 2,000 miles long and is comprised of six Mexican and four U.S. states. The southern neighbor is linked with the United States through trade and investment, migration and tourism, environment and health concerns, and family and cultural relationships. Mexico is the second most important trading partner of the United States, and this trade is critical to many U.S. industries and border communities. DHS' Directorate of Border and Transportation Security includes the U.S. Coast Guard, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), among other agencies. People-Related Inspections
There are 25 land POE along the southwest border, with over 800,000 people arriving from Mexico daily. The majority of travelers seeking entry into the United States at a southwest land POE are Mexican nationals who possess a Mexican border crossing card (also known as Laser Visa). The agreement was accompanied by a 22-point action plan that included several immigration-related border security items under the heading "Securing the Flow of People." In FY2003, there were over 4 million commercial crossings at the southwest border. However, security concerns have been raised with respect to the Administration's decision to exclude travelers who have a border crossing card from the requirements of the program (see discussion below). Consequently, several issues that are unique to the border patrol have gained prominence. Of concern is the potential for terrorists to exploit the porous southwest border. In conclusion, as the number of illegal aliens that are present in the United States continues to grow, attention will likely continue to be directed at the border and the enforcement of immigration laws within the interior of the country. DHS has launched several initiatives aimed at apprehending illegal aliens and dismantling human and drug smuggling organizations. Despite these efforts, the flow of illegal migration continues. Issues such as enforcement of immigration laws and organizational issues such as inter- and intra-agency cooperation, coordination and information sharing continue to be debated. In the view of some, a more comprehensive approach that addresses the "push factors" of the sending countries and the "pull factors" of the United States, coupled with more effective enforcement of current laws in the interior of the country may once again merit examination. | Border security has emerged as an area of public concern, particularly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Although recent public concerns pertaining to border security may be attributed to the threat of potential terrorists coming into the country, past concerns that centered around drug and human smuggling and the illegal entry of migrants remain important issues. As Congress passes legislation to enhance border security (e.g., P.L. 109-13) and the Administration puts into place procedures to tighten border enforcement, concerns over terrorists exploiting the porous southwest border continue to grow.
The U.S. border with Mexico is some 2,000 miles long, with more than 800,000 people arriving from Mexico daily and more than 4 million commercial crossings annually. The United States and Mexico are linked together in various ways, including through trade, investment, migration, tourism, environment, and familial relationships. Mexico is the second most important trading partner of the United States and this trade is critical to many U.S. industries and border communities. In an effort to facilitate the legitimate flow of travel and trade, the governments of the United States and Mexico signed the U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership agreement. The agreement was accompanied by a 22-point action plan that included several immigration and customs-related border security items.
While the northern and southwest borders share common issues, the southwest border has issues that are unique. For example, the US-VISIT program was reportedly implemented at selected southwest land ports of entry. Concerns about Mexican nationals who have Mexican border crossing cards being excluded from the requirements of the program have been raised. Additional issues such as the system used to verify Mexican border crossing cards (Biometric Verification System) and the consolidation of immigration and customs inspectors have also raised concerns. Arguably, the most pressing concern at the southwest border is the number of undocumented aliens who still manage to cross the border every day, the majority of which are Mexican nationals.
As the number of illegal aliens that are present in the United States continues to grow, attention is directed at the border patrol and the enforcement of immigration laws within the interior of the country. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) units have launched several initiatives aimed at apprehending illegal aliens and dismantling human and drug smuggling organizations. Despite these efforts, the flow of illegal migration continues. Issues such as enforcement of immigration laws and organizational issues such as inter- and intra-agency cooperation, coordination and information sharing continue to be debated. In the view of some, a more comprehensive approach that addresses the "push factors" of the sending countries and the "pull factors" of the United States, coupled with more effective enforcement of current laws in the interior of the country may once again merit examination. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33874 | crs_RL33874_0 | The actual number of unauthorized aliens in the United States is unknown. As expected after the passage of IRCA, the estimate for 1988 dropped to 1.9 million. The estimated number of unauthorized alien residents peaked in 2007, when Passel estimated that there were 12.4 million unauthorized alien residents in the United States ( Figure 1 ). Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan C. Baker of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) published their 2007 estimates of the unauthorized resident alien population from the American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau and yielded results consistent with Passel's estimates. The OIS reported an estimated 11.6 million unauthorized alien residents as of January 2008. Thus, the true size of the illegal population could be 11.5 million. Asia's share of the unauthorized alien residents appeared to have grown over this period (from 6% to 11%), and the estimated numbers of unauthorized resident aliens from Asia rose from 0.2 million in 1986 to 1.3 million in 2010. Migrants from Mexico continued to dominate the unauthorized alien population in the ACS, as Figure 5 illustrates, and as they had in the CPS data shown in Figure 2 The OIS demographers estimated that the unauthorized resident alien population from Mexico increased from 4.7 million in 2000 to 6.8 million in 2011, an estimate larger than Passel and Cohn's estimate of 6.1 million unauthorized resident alien population from Mexico in 2011. These data further suggest that the rate of unauthorized migration slowed in recent years. Historically, unauthorized migration is generally attributed to the "push-pull" of prosperity-fueled job opportunities in the United States in contrast to limited or nonexistent job opportunities in the sending countries. Accordingly, the economic recession that began in December 2007 may have curbed the migration of unauthorized aliens, particularly because sectors that traditionally rely on unauthorized aliens, such as construction, services, and hospitality, have been especially hard hit. This interpretation, generally referred to as a caging effect, argues that IIRIRA's increased penalties for illegal entry, coupled with increased resources for border enforcement particularly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, stymied what had been a rather fluid movement of migratory workers along the southern border; this in turn raised the stakes in crossing the border illegally and created an incentive for those who succeed in entering the United States to stay. More recently, some maintain that strengthened border security measures, such as "enforcement with consequences" and coordinated efforts with Mexico to reduce illegal migrant recidivism may be having an impact. While the empirical evidence to support a causal link between strengthened border enforcement policies and reduced illegal migration has not been demonstrated, some researchers credit it as part of a constellation of factors holding down the flow. The current system of legal immigration is frequently cited as another factor that contributed to the growth in unauthorized alien residents. There are statutory ceilings that limit the type and number of immigrant visas issued each year, which lead to wait-times for visas to become available to legally come to the United States. The increase in the number of aliens deported from the United States annually from 189,026 in 2001 to 387,242 in 2010 might also have had a chilling effect on family members weighing illegal presence. Some observers point to more elusive factors—such as pronounced shifts in immigration enforcement priorities away from illegal entry to identifying and removing suspected terrorists and criminal aliens, or well-publicized legislative debates of possible "amnesty" legislation—as having magnet effects when they assess the increase in unauthorized resident aliens over the past 25 years. | Estimates derived from the March Supplement of the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) indicate that the unauthorized resident alien population (commonly referred to as illegal aliens) rose from 3.2 million in 1986 to 12.4 million in 2007, before leveling off at 11.7 million in 2012. The estimated number of unauthorized aliens had dropped to 1.9 million in 1988 following passage of a 1986 law that legalized several million unauthorized aliens. Jeffrey Passel, a demographer with the Pew Research Center, has been involved in making these estimations since he worked at the U.S. Bureau of the Census in the 1980s.
Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) reported an estimated 11.5 million unauthorized alien residents as of January 2011, up from 8.5 million in January 2000. The OIS estimated that the unauthorized resident alien population in the United States increased by 37% over the period 2000 to 2008, before leveling off since 2009. The OIS estimated that 6.8 million of the unauthorized alien residents in 2011 were from Mexico. About 33% of unauthorized residents in 2011 were estimated to have entered the United States since 2000, but the rate of illegal entry appears to be slowing. The OIS based its estimates on data from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey.
Although increased border security, a record number of alien removals, and high unemployment, among other factors, have depressed the levels of illegal migration in recent years, the number of unauthorized aliens residing in the United States remains sizeable. Research suggests that various factors have contributed to the ebb and flow of unauthorized resident aliens, and that the increase is often attributed to the "push-pull" of prosperity-fueled job opportunities in the United States in contrast to limited job opportunities in the sending countries. Accordingly, the economic recession that began in December 2007 may have curbed the migration of unauthorized aliens, particularly because sectors that traditionally rely on unauthorized aliens, such as construction, services, and hospitality, have been especially hard hit.
Some researchers also suggest that the increased size of the unauthorized resident population during the late 1990s and early 2000s is an inadvertent consequence of border enforcement and immigration control policies. They posit that strengthened border security curbed the fluid movement of seasonal workers. This interpretation, generally referred to as a caging effect, argues that these policies raised the stakes in crossing the border illegally and created an incentive for those who succeed in entering the United States to stay. More recently, some maintain that strengthened border security measures, such as "enforcement with consequences," coordinated efforts with Mexico to reduce illegal migrant recidivism, and increased border patrol agents, may be part of a constellation of factors holding down the flow.
The current system of legal immigration is cited as another factor contributing to unauthorized migration. The statutory ceilings that limit the type and number of immigrant visas issued each year create long waits for visas. According to this interpretation, many foreign nationals who have family in the United States resort to illegal avenues in frustration over the delays. Some researchers speculate that record number of alien removals (e.g., reaching almost 400,000 annually since FY2009) caused a chilling effect on family members weighing unauthorized residence. Some observers point to more elusive factors when assessing the ebb and flow of unauthorized resident aliens—such as shifts in immigration enforcement priorities away from illegal entry to removing suspected terrorists and criminal aliens, or well-publicized discussions of possible "amnesty" legislation. |
crs_RL34398 | crs_RL34398_0 | Introduction
On February 24, 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced the Boeing Company as the winner of a competition to build 179 new KC-46A aerial refueling tankers for the Air Force, a contract valued at roughly $35 billion. The KC-46A acquisition program is a subject of intense interest because of the dollar value of the contract, the number of jobs it may create, the importance of tanker aircraft to U.S. military operations, and because previous attempts by DOD to move ahead with a KC-X acquisition program over the last several years have led to controversy and ultimately failed. The explanatory statement accompanying the conference report on H.R. 933 put funding at $1,738.5 million, a reduction of $77.1 million from the Administration request. The KC-10 is a much larger aircraft than the KC-135 or the KC-46A. 4310/S. Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report accompanying S. 3254 , recommended funding the Next Generation Aerial Refueling Aircraft program at $1,728.5 million, $87.1 million below the requested level, with the following explanation:
Next generation aerial refueling aircraft
The budget request included $1,815.6 million to continue development of the KC–46A, the next-generation aerial refueling aircraft. 5856 , recommended funding the Next Generation Aerial Refueling Aircraft program at $1,738.5 million, $77.1 million below the requested level, for "Air Force identified forward financing." 933 put funding at $1,738.5 million. 1253)
House
As passed by the House, H.R. Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee report ( S.Rept. FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill ( H.R. 5136 , recommends approving the Administration's request for $863.9 million in research and development funding for the KC-X program. 2. 2647 , recommends approving the Administration's request for $439.6 million in research and development funding for the KC-X program. FY2010 DOD Appropriations Bill ( H.R. House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report ( H.Rept. | On February 24, 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced the Boeing Company as the winner of a competition to build 179 new KC-46A aerial refueling tankers for the Air Force, a contract valued at roughly $35 billion. Prior to the announcement, the program had been known as KC-X.
The KC-46A acquisition program is a subject of intense interest because of the dollar value of the contract, the number of jobs it would create, the importance of tanker aircraft to U.S. military operations, and because DOD's previous attempts to acquire a new tanker since 2001 had ultimately failed.
DOD's KC-46A acquisition strategy poses potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following: What are the effects of budget cuts on executability of the KC-46A program? What if any effect will the announced closure of Boeing's Wichita, KS, plant have on the KC-46 program? What alternatives does the Air Force have to extend KC-135 service life if the KC-46 is delayed?
FY2013 defense authorization bill: H.R. 4310, as passed by the House, recommended approving the Administration's request for $1,815.6 million in research and development funding for the Next Generation Aerial Refueling Aircraft program. S. 3254, as passed by the Senate, recommended $1,728.5 million, $87.1 million less than the Administration's requested funding level for KC-X. The FY2013 conference report set funding at $1,738.5 million, $77.1 million less than the Administration's request, citing excess prior-year funds.
FY2013 DOD appropriations bill: The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 112-493 of May 25, 2012), recommended approving the Administration's request for $1,815.6 million in research and development funding for the Next Generation Aerial Refueling Aircraft program. The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 112-196 of August 2, 2012), recommended $1,738.5 million for the Next Generation Aerial Refueling Aircraft, a reduction of $77.1 million from the Administration request. The explanatory statement accompanying the conference report on H.R. 933 put funding at $1,738.5 million. |
crs_RL31337 | crs_RL31337_0 | Congressional Support for An "Asian" Missile Defense Capability
Since the mid-1990s, Congress has supported the development of a missile defense capability to protect forward-deployed U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific area, regional allies, and Taiwan fromshort- and medium-range missiles, a goal that requires some level of Japanese support--if onlyhosting U.S. missile defense forces. First, the relevanttechnologies are applicable across the whole range of BMD threats. Another concept is to deploy a sea-basedsystem in the Sea of Japan with a capability to intercept North Korean intercontinental missiles intheir assent, or "boost" phase, when they are most vulnerable. This report discusses and analyses the Administration's approach to missile defense and itsimplications for U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense, but the report's point of departure is thetraditional delineation of types of anti-missile systems based on the characteristics of the specificballistic missile threats that they seek to counter. Even though some of the technology being developed in the NTW program would berelevant to the defense against strategic missiles, the design characteristics for Standard SM-3interceptor missile being developed for the NTW are deficient in speed and range for the task ofintercepting an ICBM. Both were intended to defend against short- and medium-range ballisticmissiles, but at different points in their flight path. Less than a year later, in August 1999, the U.S. and Japanese governments signed amemorandum of understanding (MOU) covering a five-year program of joint research anddevelopment on the then U.S. Navy Theater Wide (NTW) ballistic missile defense program, butJapan has made no decision about acquisition of a missile defense capability and currentconstitutional interpretations appear to rule out the integration of any such Japanese capability withthat of the U.S. Navy. Approach to Missile Defense on U.S.-Japan Cooperation
The decision of the Bush Administration in the Summer of 2001 to eliminate the distinctionbetween national missile defense and other BMD programs, and to redesignate the NTW project asthe sea-based "mid-course" defense element of a seamless BMD capability, has created additionaluncertainty in Japan about the benefits and constitutionality of participating in joint missile defensetechnology research. Japanese Participation in NTW/Sea-Based Midcourse Interceptor Missile
Possible U.S. Request for Expanded Cooperation. Japanese Perspectives on TMD
Because of the implications for Japan's relations with the United States and the People'sRepublic of China, which opposes many aspects of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, the issues ofwhether Japan will acquire a missile defense capability and the extent to which such capabilitywould be integrated with that of the U.S. Navy, have assumed major national policy significance forTokyo. ABM Treaty. Japan was not a party to the treaty but has regarded the agreement as a fundamental pillar ofnuclear stability. Ban on Collective Defense. From this perspective, Article 9 is viewed as a kindof Talisman protecting Japan from the revival of militarism. Because a BMD system deployed in Japan could help protect U.S. troopsstationed in Japan, as well as Japanese lives and assets, many in the Congress and the ExecutiveBranch, and among the U.S. public, tend to see Japan's participation in BMD as a fully warrantedexercise in alliance burden-sharing. These could be critical issues in the case of an integrated U.S.-JapaneseBMD capability. Several of these foreign policy issues are trilateral rather than bilateral. For different reasons, neitherof these alternatives to the political status quo has been enthusiastic about missile defensecooperation with the United States. | The issue of missile defense cooperation with Japan intersects with several issues of directconcern to Congress, ranging from support for developing a capability to protect U.S. regionalforces, Asia-Pacific allies, and Taiwan, from Chinese short- and medium-range missiles, tocountering a possible future threat to U.S. territory from long-range missiles developed by NorthKorea. Japan's current participation in the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program dates fromAugust 1999, when the Japanese government agreed to conduct cooperative research on fourcomponents of the interceptor missile being developed for the then U.S. Navy Theater-Wide (NTW)anti-missile system--a sea-based "upper tier" (exo-atmospheric) capability against short- andmedium-range missiles up to 3,500 kilometers.
In the spring of 2001, the Administration changed the context of the cooperative researcheffort when it reorganized and redirected the U.S. missile defense program to emphasize theemployment of specific technologies across the entire spectrum of missile defense challenges, butespecially to gain a limited, near-term capability to defeat missile attacks on U.S. territory by "rogue"states. The Pentagon redesignated the NTW program as the Sea-Based Midcourse System, with agoal of developing a capability for attacking missiles of all ranges in the initial or middle phases oftheir flight path. This change added to an already complex list of Japanese policy concerns, byputting Japan in the position of possibly cooperating in the development of technology that couldbecome part of an American national missile defense capability -- a step that many Japanese see astransgressing a constitutional ban on "collective defense."
Thus far, the Administration's program change has not deterred Japan from cooperativeresearch on missile defense, but the policy shift has unsettled Japanese leaders and created additionalpolitical obstacles to bilateral BMD cooperation. The new U.S. approach has been criticized in theJapanese press and the Diet (parliament), both because of the potential violation of the implied banon "collective defense" contained in Article 9 of Japan's U.S.-imposed "Peace Constitution," and alsobecause the Bush initiative requires the United States to withdraw from the U.S.-RussianAnti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which Tokyo has long regarded as an important element ofstrategic stability. An integrated U.S.-Japan BMD capability aimed at protecting third countrieswould raise the same constitutional issues.
Japan has not made a decision regarding the acquisition of a missile defense capability. Japanese policymakers and defense firms generally are enthusiastic about missile defensecooperation, but the political parties, the media, and the general public are split over the issue. Proponents view BMD cooperation as a means to counter a perceived North Korean missile threat,and perhaps a Chinese threat as well. Other Japanese are fearful of aggravating relations with Chinaor triggering an Asian missile race. Even groups in Japan favoring BMD cooperation are concernedabout the large costs associated with the still-unproven technology. The popular Koizumiadministration seems inclined to finesse the constitutional issue, if possible. Japan's future stancewill likely depend on regional developments and how the issue plays out in the currently unstablepolitical environment. |
crs_R43200 | crs_R43200_0 | W ater and energy are critical resources that are reciprocally and mutually linked. Meeting energy needs depends upon the availability of water, often in large quantities, for mineral extraction and mining, fuel production, hydropower, and thermoelectric power plant cooling. Likewise, energy is required for the pumping, conveyance, treatment and conditioning, and distribution of water and for collection, treatment, and discharge of wastewater. This interdependence, which is often described as the water-energy nexus, or energy-water nexus, is illustrated in the following graphic from a U.S. Department of Energy report. This report first discusses water-related energy use broadly and then energy for facilities that treat and deliver water to end users and also dispose of and discharge wastewater. There is growing recognition that "saving energy saves water," and the report describes options and impediments for energy efficiency by these facilities. Energy use for water is a function of many variables, including water source (surface water pumping typically requires less energy than groundwater pumping), treatment (high ambient quality raw water requires less treatment than brackish or seawater), intended end-use, distribution (water pumped long distances requires more energy), amount of water loss in the system through leakage and evaporation, and level of wastewater treatment (stringency of water quality regulations to meet discharge standards). Likewise, the intensity of energy use of water varies depending on characteristics such as topography (affecting groundwater recharge), climate, seasonal temperature, and rainfall. National data can obscure differences in water-related energy use that are regional or state-specific, as reflected in a 2005 study by the California Energy Commission, which found that "water-related energy use [in California] consumes 19 percent of the state's electricity, 30 percent of its natural gas, and 88 billion gallons of diesel fuel every year—and this demand is growing." Energy efficiency initiatives offer opportunities for delivering significant water savings, and likewise, water efficiency initiatives offer opportunities for delivering significant energy savings. Thus, saving water saves energy and also reduces carbon emissions. Nearly all of the energy consumed is electricity, about 80% of which is used by motors for pumping. Wastewater aeration, pumping, and solids processing account for most of the electricity used in wastewater treatment. These data are important, because energy is the second-highest budget item for municipal drinking water and wastewater facilities, after labor costs, with utilities spending about $4 billion a year. Energy consumption by drinking water and wastewater utilities can comprise 30%-40% of a municipality's total energy bill. Moreover, as electricity rates increase, energy conservation and efficiency are issues of increasing importance to many utilities. Nevertheless, opportunities for efficiency exist in several categories. Improved energy management . Some water utilities are generating energy on-site to offset purchased electricity. Several barriers to improved energy efficiency by water and wastewater utilities are apparent. Cost. Municipalities that own and operate water utilities generally are risk-averse, reluctant to change practices, and hesitant to implement new technologies. Ideally, consistent data collection methodology is needed to gather and track water and energy data across all sectors and within sectors, such as at the utility level, and to aid benchmarking. Analysis is needed of incentives, disincentives, and lack of incentives to investing in cost-effective energy or water efficiency measures. | Water and energy are resources that are reciprocally and mutually linked, because meeting energy needs requires water, often in large quantities, for mining, fuel production, hydropower, and power plant cooling, and energy is needed for pumping, treatment, and distribution of water and for collection, treatment, and discharge of wastewater. This interrelationship is often referred to as the energy-water nexus, or the water-energy nexus. There is growing recognition that "saving water saves energy." Energy efficiency initiatives offer opportunities for delivering significant water savings, and likewise, water efficiency initiatives offer opportunities for delivering significant energy savings. In addition, saving water also reduces carbon emissions by saving energy otherwise generated to move and treat water.
This report provides background on energy for facilities that treat and deliver water to end users and also dispose of and discharge wastewater. Energy use for water is a function of many variables, including water source (surface water pumping typically requires less energy than groundwater pumping), treatment (high ambient quality raw water requires less treatment than brackish or seawater), intended end-use, distribution (water pumped long distances requires more energy), amount of water loss in the system through leakage and evaporation, and level of wastewater treatment (stringency of water quality regulations to meet discharge standards). Likewise, the intensity of energy use of water, which is the relative amount of energy needed for a task such as pumping water, varies depending on characteristics such as topography (affecting groundwater recharge), climate, seasonal temperature, and rainfall. Most of the energy used for water-related purposes is in the form of electricity. Water-related energy is estimated to account for about 4% of the nation's electricity generation, but many data gaps exist. Also, regional differences can be significant. In California, for example, as much as 19% of the state's electricity consumption is for pumping, treating, collecting, and discharging water and wastewater.
Energy consumption by public drinking water and wastewater utilities, which are primarily owned and operated by local governments, can represent 30%-40% of a municipality's energy bill. At drinking water plants, the largest energy use (about 80%) is to operate motors for pumping. At wastewater treatment plants, aeration, pumping, and solids processing account for most of the electricity that is used. Energy is the second-highest budget item for these utilities, after labor costs, so energy conservation and efficiency are issues of increasing importance to many of them. Opportunities for efficiency exist in several categories, such as upgrading to more efficient equipment, improving energy management, and generating energy on-site to offset purchased electricity. However, barriers to improved energy efficiency by water and wastewater utilities exist, including capital costs and reluctance by utility officials to change practices or implement new technologies.
Topics for research to better understand water-related energy use include studies of energy demands for water at local, regional, and national scales; development of consistent data collection methodology to track water and energy data across all sectors; development and implementation of advanced technologies that save energy and water; and analysis of incentives, disincentives, and lack of incentives to investing in cost-effective energy or water efficiency measures. |
crs_R41944 | crs_R41944_0 | The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health care system. Veterans generally must enroll in the VA health care system to receive medical care. Eligibility for enrollment is based primarily on previous military service, disability, and income. The VA provides free inpatient and outpatient medical care to veterans for service-connected conditions and to low-income veterans for nonservice-connected conditions. This report focuses on appropriations for VHA. 112-74 ; H.Rept. House Action
On July 28, 2010, the House passed its version of the FY2011 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2011, H.R. The House-passed bill provided a total of $48.8 billion for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) for FY2011, which included $48.1 billion authorized in the FY2010 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act ( P.L. FY2012 VHA Budget
President's Request
The President submitted his FY2012 budget request to Congress on February 14, 2011. The Administration's FY2012 budget request for VHA (medical services, medical support and compliance, medical facilities, and medical and prosthetic research) is $51.4 billion. The President's budget is also proposing to set up a $953 million contingency fund that would provide additional funds up to $953 million to become available for obligation if the Administration determines that additional funds are required due to changes in economic conditions in 2012. Furthermore, the President's budget is requesting $52.5 billion in advance appropriations for FY2013 for the three medical care accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities). This resolution also provides for up to $52.5 billion in advance appropriations consistent with the Veterans Health Care Budget and Reform Transparency Act of 2009. On June 14, the House passed the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2012 ( H.R. 2055 ; H.Rept. 112-94 ). 2055 ; S.Rept. 112-29 ). The Senate-passed version of the MILCON-VA appropriations bill for FY2012 provides a total of approximately $128.1 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a whole. The Senate–passed version of H.R. 2055 provides a total of $51.2 billion for VHA. Similar to the House-passed version, the Senate-passed version of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill, FY2012, provides $52.5 billion in advance appropriations for FY2013 for the three relevant accounts, the same as the Administration's request. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012
Congress did not pass the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2012 before the fiscal year began on October 1, 2011, and funded most of the VA through a series of short-term continuing resolutions (CRs)— P.L. On December 15, 2011, House and Senate conferees of H.R. 2055 reported a conference agreement ( H.Rept. 112-331 ), which was titled the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, and included nine appropriations bills. Division H of this measure contained the MILCON-VA Appropriations Act, 2012. 112-74 ; H.Rept. 112-331 ), was enacted into law on December 23, 2011. 112-331 ), provides a total of $51.2 billion for VHA for FY2012. P.L. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. 112-74 ), did not approve the President's proposal to set up a $953 million contingency fund. | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. Benefits to veterans range from disability compensation and pensions to hospital and medical care. The VA provides these benefits through three major operating units: the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA).
This report focuses on the VHA. The VHA is primarily a direct service provider of primary care, specialized care, and related medical and social support services to veterans through the nation's largest integrated health care system. Veterans generally must enroll in the VA health care system to receive medical care. Eligibility for enrollment is based primarily on previous military service, disability, and income. VA provides free inpatient and outpatient medical care to veterans for service-connected conditions and to low-income veterans for nonservice-connected conditions.
The President submitted his FY2012 budget request to Congress on February 14, 2011. The Administration's FY2012 budget request for VHA (medical services, medical support and compliance, medical facilities, and medical and prosthetic research) was $51.4 billion. The President's budget proposed to set up a $953 million contingency fund that would have provided additional funds up to $953 million to become available for obligation if the Administration determined that additional funds were required due to changes in economic conditions in 2012. Furthermore, as required by the Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-81), the President's budget requested $52.5 billion in advance appropriations for the three medical care accounts (medical services, medical support and compliance, and medical facilities) for FY2013.
On June 14, the House passed the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill (MILCON-VA Appropriations bill) for FY2012 (H.R. 2055; H.Rept. 112-94). The House-passed measure provided $51.1 billion for VHA for FY2012. The Senate passed its version of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2012 (H.R. 2055; S.Rept. 112-29) on July 20. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 2055 provided a total of $51.2 billion for VHA. The House and Senate-passed versions of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2012 provided $52.5 billion in advance appropriations for FY2013. Furthermore, both the House and Senate versions of the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2012 (H.Rept. 112-94; S.Rept. 112-29) did not approve the President's proposal to set up a $953 million contingency fund.
Congress did not pass the MILCON-VA Appropriations bill for FY2012 before the fiscal year began on October 1, 2011, and funded most of the VA through a series of short-term continuing resolutions (CRs). On December 15, 2011, House and Senate conferees of H.R. 2055 reported a conference agreement (H.Rept. 112-331), which was titled the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, and included nine appropriations bills. Division H of this measure contained the MILCON-VA Appropriations Act, 2012. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74; H.Rept. 112-331) was enacted into law on December 23, 2011. P.L. 112-74 provides a total of $51.2 billion for VHA for FY2012 and $52.5 billion in advance appropriations for FY2013. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), did not approve the President's proposal to set up a $953 million contingency fund. |
crs_RS22643 | crs_RS22643_0 | The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides a comprehensive federal scheme for the regulation of private-sector employee benefit plans. However, these health plans must also meet additional requirements under ERISA. However, beginning in 1986, Congress added to ERISA a number of requirements on the nature and content of health plans, including rules governing health care continuation coverage, limitations on exclusions from coverage based on preexisting conditions, parity between medical/surgical benefits and mental health benefits, and minimum hospital stay requirements for mothers following the birth of a child. Under the MHPA, health plans are not required to offer mental health benefits. | The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) sets certain federal standards for the provision of health benefits under private-sector, employment-based health plans. These standards regulate the nature and content of health plans and include rules on health care continuation coverage as provided under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), guarantees on the availability and renewability of health care coverage for certain employees and individuals, limitations on exclusions from health care coverage based on preexisting conditions, and parity between medical/surgical benefits and mental health benefits. This report discusses these health benefit requirements under ERISA. |
crs_RS22822 | crs_RS22822_0 | Given rising attention to energy prices, energy insecurity, and climate change, Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (hereafter referred to as the "Energy Independence Act") to address, among other things, the efficiency of current incandescent light bulbs. By one projection, the new standards will cumulatively save more than $40 billion on electricity costs and offset about 750 million metric tons of carbon emissions by the year 2030. New Energy Efficiency Requirements for Light Bulbs
The Energy Independence Act sets new performance requirements for certain common light bulbs. The Tier I requirements, set to take effect in 2012-2014, require these bulbs to be 25% to 30% more efficient than today's products (see Table 1 ). Incandescent bulbs are not banned or prohibited by the new law. Other new incandescent products will likely be introduced by the effective dates of the law. Non-incandescent products, including compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) and light emitting diode (LED) bulbs, can already meet Tier I standards. Manufacturers are developing new types of LED bulbs for general lighting and expect rapid cost reductions. But LEDs are not widely available in general illumination markets. Legislation
On March 13, 2008, the Light Bulb Freedom of Choice Act ( H.R. 5616 ) was introduced to repeal the new lighting performance standards unless the Government Accountability Office finds that (1) consumers would obtain a net financial savings by switching to the more efficient bulbs, (2) no health risks would be introduced by the switch, and (3) total U.S. CO 2 emissions would decline by 20% by 2025 as a result of the switch. | The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) sets new performance standards for many common light bulbs. Tier I standards require a 25%-30% increase in the energy efficiency of typical light bulbs beginning in 2012, and still greater improvements through Tier II standards starting in 2020. Supporters expect these new measures to save consumers billions of dollars in electricity costs, offset the need to build dozens of new power plants, and cut millions of tons of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.
Efficient lighting products such as compact fluorescent lights and light emitting diodes have advanced rapidly in recent years. Light quality has improved, costs have declined, and consumer choice has expanded. Still, many consumers prefer traditional incandescent lighting products. Incandescent bulbs are not banned or outlawed by the new law, but they will need to meet the new efficiency standards to remain on the market. Some new incandescent products already available can meet Tier I requirements, and at least one manufacturer claims that it will have advanced incandescent products available in time to meet the Tier II requirements.
The Light Bulb Freedom of Choice Act (H.R. 5616) was introduced on March 13, 2008, to repeal the new standards unless special provisions are met. |
crs_R40521 | crs_R40521_0 | Introduction
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is the major federal statute for the education of children with disabilities. IDEA both authorizes federal funding for special education and related services and, for states that accept these funds, sets out principles under which special education and related services are to be provided. The major principles include the following requirements:
States and school districts make available a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to all children with disabilities, generally between the ages of 3 and 21. IDEA has been the subject of numerous reauthorizations; the most recent reauthorization was P.L. 108-446 in 2004. Congress is currently beginning the process of identifying potential issues for the next reauthorization. This report examines the Supreme Court decisions, and selected lower court decisions since July 1, 2005, the effective date of P.L. 108-446 . Definition of Disability
A key component of IDEA is the definition of a child with a disability. IDEA contains detailed requirements for the IEP. Several courts have examined the question of whether all settlement agreements are enforceable in federal court or whether judicial enforcement is limited to agreements reached through dispute resolution or mediation. IDEA, as amended, states in part,
(ii) REIMBURSEMENT FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL PLACEMENT.—If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of the enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment. Some courts have found that the child is entitled to compensatory education for the same amount of time that appropriate services were withheld. The Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson was controversial. The parents in Arlington Central School District v. Murphy argued that the language on costs encompassed the payment of expert witness fees. | The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is the major federal statute for the education of children with disabilities. IDEA both authorizes federal funding for special education and related services and, for states that accept these funds, sets out principles under which special education and related services are to be provided. The cornerstone of IDEA is the principle that states and school districts make available a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to all children with disabilities. IDEA has been the subject of numerous reauthorizations; the most recent reauthorization was P.L. 108-446 in 2004. Congress is currently beginning the process of identifying potential issues for the next reauthorization. Some of the issues raised by judicial decisions include the following:
What amount of educational progress is required to meet FAPE standards? What educational benefits are required to be put in an individualized education program (IEP)? What use of seclusion and restraints is allowed (if any) under IDEA? Are all settlement agreements enforceable in federal court or only those reached through dispute resolution or mediation? Is information disclosed in a resolution session confidential? What are the specific rights of a parent of a child with a disability? What are the rights of a noncustodial parent of a child with a disability? Does the Supreme Court's decision in Schaffer v. Weast correctly allocate the burden of proof in IDEA cases? Are compensatory educational services required for the same amount of time that the appropriate services were withheld? Does the Supreme Court's decision in Arlington Central School District v. Murphy correctly deny reimbursement for expert witness fees? Does there need to be more detailed guidance on systemic compliance complaints?
This report examines the Supreme Court decisions, and selected lower court decisions since July 1, 2005, the effective date of P.L. 108-446. |
crs_R44188 | crs_R44188_0 | Introduction
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides grants to states, territories, and Indian tribes for benefits and services to help ameliorate, or address the root causes of, childhood economic disadvantage. TANF Funding and History
The 1996 welfare reform law that created TANF based the bulk of its funding on historical expenditures in its predecessor programs. Financing the Pre-TANF Programs
Before the 1996 welfare reform law, federal grants helped states fund the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programs of cash assistance for needy families with children; Emergency Assistance (EA) for families with children; and the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills (JOBS) training program, which provided employment services and education to AFDC recipients. The amount of federal funding in the predecessor programs for a state depended on the expenditures in the state. It is not adjusted for changes in conditions either nationally or in each state, such as changes in prices (inflation), the cash assistance caseload, or the population (e.g., poor children). However, having the TANF block grant based on historical expenditures had a number of additional implications. In the earlier years, funding in addition to the basic block grant came from welfare-to-work grants, supplemental grants, and bonus funds. TANF requires states to maintain spending from their own funds on TANF or TANF-related activities. The $10.4 billion, called the maintenance-of-effort level, represents 75% of what was spent from state funds in FY1994 in TANF's predecessor programs of cash, emergency assistance, job training, and welfare-related child care spending. How States May Use TANF Funds
TANF is a broad-purpose block grant that gives states the flexibility to use its funds to address both the effects of, and the root causes of, childhood economic disadvantage. Figure 5 shows both the level and composition of spending in FY1995 under the pre-TANF programs and in FY2000 and FY2014 under TANF. In FY2014, cash assistance accounted for 26% of all TANF and MOE dollars. Other work supports represented $4.5 billion in FY2014, or 14.3% of total TANF and MOE dollars. Selected TANF Financing Issues
The TANF funding level, both nationally and for each state, is rooted in what states spent in the early to mid-1990s in the pre-TANF programs that were focused on cash assistance for needy families with children. These rules would require legislation to increase spending for TANF to be offset by corresponding decreases in other mandatory spending programs or through increases in revenue. However, these rules differ from those of mandatory programs that provide direct benefits for individuals. The relevant population depends on opinions about whether TANF should be focused on providing benefits and services to the cash assistance population; whether the current size of the cash assistance caseload is indicative of meeting the needs of the population eligible for TANF cash assistance; or whether TANF should be viewed as a block grant to address child poverty more broadly. The Allocation of Federal TANF Funds among the States
In addition to the total basic block grant being based on the early to mid-1990s levels, each state's funding is also based on what it received in federal grants in TANF's predecessor programs during this period. As shown in the figure, the contingency fund often has not behaved as a countercyclical source of extra TANF funds. There are some implications of the potential lack of a counter-cyclical funding source for TANF. Table A-2 provides the amount of federal funding through the TANF basic block grant by state as well as state MOE levels at 75% and 80% rates of FY1994 predecessor program state expenditures. | The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant provides grants to states, Indian tribes, and territories to help them fund a wide range of benefits and services for needy families with children. It was created in the 1996 welfare reform law, which rewrote the rules for cash assistance programs for these families. The 1996 law also created TANF as a broad-purpose block grant with state flexibility to design programs to address both the effects of and root causes of childhood economic disadvantage.
TANF funding is based on the amount of federal and state expenditures in its predecessor programs (Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and related programs) in the early to mid-1990s. The bulk of federal TANF funds is in a basic block grant. Both the national total of the basic block grant, $16.5 billion per year, and each state's grant are based on federal funding in the predecessor programs during this period. States must also expend a minimum amount of their own funds on TANF or TANF-related programs under the maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement. That minimum totals $10.4 billion per year. The MOE is based on state expenditures in the predecessor programs in FY1994. Over time, states have received some extra TANF funding: welfare-to-work grants, contingency funds, supplemental grants, and bonus funds. However, these grants were small relative to the basic block grant and MOE funding.
The cash assistance caseload declined substantially in the late 1990s from its 1994 peak, resulting in a decline in spending on TANF basic assistance. In FY1995, under TANF's predecessor programs, AFDC cash assistance represented 70% of total expenditures in the programs consolidated into TANF. By FY2000 cash assistance had declined to 40% of total TANF and MOE funds; in FY2014 cash assistance represented 26% of all TANF and MOE funds. TANF also provides funds for state-subsidized child care programs ($5.1 billion or 16% of total FY2014 TANF and MOE funds) as well as a wide range of services, including those addressing child abuse and neglect and pre-kindergarten programs.
Most of TANF's financing issues relate to its fixed level of funding, based on programs and conditions that existed in the early and mid-1990s. Neither the national total funding level nor each state's level of funding has been adjusted for changes since then, such as inflation, the size of the cash assistance caseload, or changes in the poverty population. From FY1997 through FY2014, the TANF block grant lost 32% of its value due to inflation alone. The TANF allocation "locked in" historical differences among the states that resulted in a wide range of funding levels relative to the number of poor children. Further, TANF potentially lacks a source of sufficient additional funding in case of a future economic downturn. Should Congress seek to address these issues, it would do so in the context of budget rules that apply to TANF as a mandatory program with fixed funding. Current budget rules would require legislation to increase TANF funding to contain corresponding offsets by reducing other mandatory funds and/or increasing revenues. |
crs_R43734 | crs_R43734_0 | Introduction
The sheer number of children coming to the United States who are not accompanied by parents or legal guardians has raised considerable concern. Overwhelmingly, the children are coming from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. This report focuses on the demographics of unaccompanied alien children while they are in removal proceedings. The median age fell to 16 years old in FY2013 and has remained there in the first seven months of FY2014. Similarly, the percentage of females among unaccompanied children has grown. The median age of females has dropped from 17 years in FY2011—the year that was the median age across all groups of children—to 15 years in the first seven months of FY2014. | The number of children coming to the United States who are not accompanied by parents or legal guardians and who lack proper immigration documents has raised complex and competing sets of humanitarian concerns and immigration control issues. This report focuses on the demographics of unaccompanied alien children while they are in removal proceedings. Overwhelmingly, the children are coming from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The median age of unaccompanied children has decreased from 17 years in FY2011 to 16 years during the first seven months of FY2014. A greater share of males than females are represented among this population. However, females have steadily increased in total numbers and as a percentage of the flow since FY2011. The median age of females has dropped from 17 years in FY2011—the year that was the median age across all groups of children—to 15 years in the first seven months of FY2014. |
crs_R41947 | crs_R41947_0 | and other federal environmental laws and regulations are major causes of delay in moving highway and transit projects from conception to completion. What the evidence appears to show is that while major highway and transit facilities do take a long time to plan and build, typically on the order of 10 to 15 years, much of the delay is unrelated to federally mandated environmental review. Developing a community consensus on what to do, securing the funding, and dealing with affected residents and businesses, including utility companies and railroads, all appear to be significant causes of delay. The report begins with an overview of the project delivery process for highway and transit projects. Highways
There may be as many as 200 steps in a major highway project, but these are typically grouped into five major phases: planning; preliminary design and environmental review; final design; right-of-way acquisition and utility relocation; and construction. The new process, mandatory for all projects requiring an EIS,
requires project sponsors to initiate the environmental review process by notifying DOT of the type of work, termini, length, general location of the proposed project, and a statement of any anticipated federal approvals; establishes a new entity required to participate in the NEPA process, referred to as a "participating agency," which includes any federal, state, tribal, regional, and local government agencies that may have an interest in the project; requires the lead agency to establish a schedule for coordinating public and agency participation in the environmental review process; establishes a 180-day statute of limitation on judicial claims on final agency actions related to environmental requirements (the previous limit had been six years, under provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act); and authorizes the use of federal transportation funds to help agencies required to expedite the environmental review process (similar to provisions in TEA-21). Another broad option would be the creation of an office within the Department of Transportation responsible for accelerating project delivery. This might involve establishing in law a requirement for a partnering plan, funding an awards program for outstanding collaboration, or creation of a special research and technical training center devoted to transportation project delivery. Such a step might make permanent SAFETEA's Pilot Program (§6005) and expand it to allow delegation of NEPA authority to any state that consents to accept that authority (see, for example, H.R. One option in reauthorization for overcoming this problem is to create an Integrated Planning Pilot Project, under the Special Experiment Program authority that currently exists for FHWA. Consequently, there have been suggestions to allow states to use their own procedures, provided that FHWA has certified that a state's procedures properly protects property owners and tenants. Another option is for Congress to provide FTA with the ability to "fast-track" projects that are low-risk, because the project sponsor is experienced and other reasons, or that involve a relatively low share of federal funds. STAA would also have done away with alternatives analysis required under the New Starts program, which is often seen as a duplication of the alternatives analysis required under the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA). | Major highway and transit facilities can take somewhere on the order of 10 to 15 years to plan and build. The environmental review process required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other federal environmental laws and regulations is often cited as the main culprit for long delivery times. Available data and research, however, show that environmental review is typically not the greatest source of delay in surface transportation projects. Developing a community consensus on what to do, securing the funding, and dealing with affected residents and businesses, including utilities and railroads, also contribute to the long timelines required to complete certain projects.
Project delay can occur during any of the five main phases in delivering major highway and transit projects: planning; preliminary design and environmental review; final design; right-of-way acquisition and utility relocation; and construction. If it wishes to address project delay in the pending reauthorization of surface transportation projects, Congress has several options that might broadly affect all phases of project delivery in both highway and transit projects. Other possible options are targeted to specific issues that affect just one or two phases of a highway or transit project.
Broad options that Congress might consider for accelerating project delivery are
devolving federal surface transportation funding and the associated federal requirements back to the states; creating an office within the Department of Transportation responsible for expediting project delivery; new initiatives for encouraging and rewarding collaboration between federal, state, and local agencies, such as a requirement in law for partnering plans, funding an awards program for outstanding collaboration, or creation of a special research and technical training center devoted to transportation project delivery.
More narrowly tailored options for specific phases or modes include
certifying states to use their own procedures to protect dislocated property owners and tenants; reducing the number of steps in the public transit New Starts program and the elimination of the alternatives analysis that is often seen as a duplication of the requirements in NEPA; providing the Federal Transit Administration with the ability to "fast-track" New Starts projects that are low-risk; creation of an Integrated Planning Pilot Project, under the Special Experiment Program authority that currently exists for the Federal Highway Administration; making permanent the Surface Transportation Project Delivery Pilot Program and expanding it to allow delegation of NEPA authority for highway projects to any state. |
crs_R41757 | crs_R41757_0 | 110-325 , was enacted in 2008 to amend the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On March 25, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued final regulations implementing the ADA Amendments Act. P.L. The final regulations track the statutory language of the ADA but also provide several clarifying interpretations. Several of the major regulatory interpretations are as follows:
including the operation of major bodily functions in the definition of major life activities; adding rules of construction for when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, and providing examples of impairments that will most often be found to substantially limit a major life activity; interpreting the coverage of transitory impairments; interpreting the use of mitigating measures; and interpreting the "regarded as" prong of the definition. | The ADA Amendment Act (ADAAA), P.L. 110-325, was enacted in 2008 to amend the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) definition of disability. On March 25, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued final regulations implementing the ADAAA. The final regulations track the statutory language of the ADA but also provide several clarifying interpretations. Several of the major regulatory interpretations are, including the operation of major bodily functions in the definition of major life activities; adding rules of construction for when an impairment substantially limits a major life activity and providing examples of impairments that will most often be found to substantially limit a major life activity; interpreting the coverage of transitory impairments; interpreting the use of mitigating measures; and interpreting the "regarded as" prong of the definition. |
crs_RS20376 | crs_RS20376_0 | A Closer Look at the Elements
RICO outlaws the collection of an unlawful debt, or the patterned commission of two or more crimes from a series of designated state and federal crimes ("racketeering activities" often referred to as predicate offenses), in order to acquire, invest in, or conduct the activities of an enterprise whose activities occur in, or affect, interstate or foreign commerce. It makes it unlawful for
(1) any person
(2) to acquire or maintain an interest in or control of
(3) a commercial enterprise
(4) through
(a) the collection of an unlawful debt or
(b) a pattern of predicate offenses. Subsection 1962(c) makes it unlawful for
(1) any person,
(2) employed by or associated with,
(3) a commercial enterprise
(4) to conduct or participate in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs
(5) through
(a) the collection of an unlawful debt or
(b) a pattern of predicate offenses. , at 2346. However, more is required where the enterprise is not engaged in economic activity. Conspiracy
Conspiracy under subsection 1962(d) is
(1) the agreement of
(2) two or more
(3) to invest in, acquire, or conduct the affairs of
(4) a commercial enterprise
(5) in a manner which violates 18 U.S.C. RICO violations are punishable by fine or by imprisonment for life in cases where the predicate offense carries a life sentence, or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years in all other cases. Civil Liability . RICO violations may result in civil as well as criminal liability. "Any person injured in his business or property by reason" of a RICO violation has a cause of action for treble damages and attorneys' fees. Although the United States is apparently not a "person" that may sue for damages under RICO, the term does include local governments, state agencies, and foreign governments. This authority has been invoked relatively infrequently, primarily to rid various unions of organized crime and other forms of corruption. | Congress enacted the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) provisions as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968. In spite of its name and origin, RICO is not limited to "mobsters" or members of "organized crime" as those terms are popularly understood. Rather, it covers those activities which Congress felt characterized the conduct of organized crime, no matter who actually engages in them. RICO proscribes no conduct that is not otherwise prohibited. Instead it enlarges the civil and criminal consequences, under some circumstances, of a list of state and federal crimes.
RICO condemns: (1) any person, (2) who (a) invests in, or (b) acquires or maintains an interest in, or (c) conducts or participates in the affairs of, or (d) conspires to invest in, acquire, or conduct the affairs of (3) an enterprise (4) which (a) engages in, or (b) whose activities affect, interstate or foreign commerce (5) through (a) the collection of an unlawful debt, or (b) the patterned commission of various state and federal crimes ("racketeering activities" sometimes referred to as "predicate offenses"). Violations are punishable by fines, forfeiture, and imprisonment for not more than 20 years or life if one of the predicate offenses carries such a penalty.
Civil RICO permits anyone injured in their business or property by a RICO violation to recover treble damages, costs and attorneys' fees. In exceptional cases, at least at the behest of the government, the courts will enjoin further RICO violations, order divestiture, dissolution or reorganization, or restrict an offender's future professional or investment activities. RICO comes with tailored provisions for venue and service of process, expedited judicial action in civil cases brought by the United States, in camera proceedings, and for the use of civil investigative demands.
This is an abridgement of a report, which with full citations, footnotes, and various appendixes, appears as CRS Report 96-950, RICO: A Brief Sketch, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33170 | crs_RL33170_0 | Various federal officials have spoken in favor of extending the Federal Communication Commission's indecency restriction, which currently applies to broadcast television and radio, to cable and satellite television. This report examines whether such an extension would violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Introduction
The FCC's indecency restriction was enacted pursuant to a federal statute that, insofar as it was found constitutional, requires the FCC to promulgate regulations to prohibit the broadcast of indecent programming from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. The FCC has found that, for material to be "indecent," it "must describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or activities," and "must be patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium." . . television. This is because, as the Supreme Court wrote when it struck down the ban on "indecent" material on the Internet, "the Government may not 'reduc[e] the adult population . . . to . In Playboy , where the Court did apply strict scrutiny to a speech restriction on cable television, it held the speech restriction unconstitutional, in part because, as quoted above, "for two-thirds of the day no household in those service areas could receive the programming, whether or not the household or the viewer wanted to do so." Summary and Conclusion
In 1978, in Pacifica , the Supreme Court held that, because broadcast radio and television have a "uniquely pervasive presence" and are "uniquely accessible to children," the government may, during certain times of day, prohibit "[p]atently offensive, indecent material" on these media. In 1996, however, in Denver Area Consortium, a Supreme Court plurality held that, with respect to "how pervasive and intrusive [television] programming is . . . cable and broadcast television differ little, if at all." The Court, however, continues to cite Pacifica with approval, but, in Playboy , it held that governmental restrictions on cable television are, unlike those on broadcast media, entitled to strict scrutiny. Thus, whereas, in Pacifica , the Court upheld a restriction on "indecent" material on broadcast media without applying strict scrutiny, the Court apparently would not uphold a comparable restriction on "indecent" material on cable television unless the restriction served a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means. It seems uncertain whether the Court would find that denying minors access to "indecent" material on cable television would constitute a compelling governmental interest. It appears that a strong case may be made that applying the FCC's indecency restriction to cable television would be "unreasonable" under this formulation. . . to . . . only what is fit for children.'" | Various federal officials have spoken in favor of extending the Federal Communication Commission's indecency restriction, which currently applies to broadcast television and radio, to cable and satellite television. This report examines whether such an extension would violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
The FCC's indecency restriction was enacted pursuant to a federal statute that, insofar as it was found constitutional, requires the FCC to promulgate regulations to prohibit the broadcast of indecent programming from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. The FCC has found that, for material to be "indecent," it "must describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or activities," and "must be patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium."
In 1978, in Pacifica, the Supreme Court held that, because broadcast radio and television have a "uniquely pervasive presence" and are "uniquely accessible to children," the government may, during certain times of day, prohibit "[p]atently offensive, indecent material" on these media. In 1996, however, a Supreme Court plurality held that, with respect to "how pervasive and intrusive [television] programming is . . . cable and broadcast television differ little, if at all."
Then, in 2000, the Court held that governmental restrictions on speech on cable television are, unlike those on broadcast media, entitled to strict scrutiny. Thus, whereas, in Pacifica, the Court upheld a restriction on "indecent" material on broadcast media without applying strict scrutiny, the Court apparently would not uphold a comparable restriction on "indecent" material on cable television unless the restriction served a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means.
It seems uncertain whether the Court would find that denying minors access to "indecent" material on cable television would constitute a compelling governmental interest. Assuming that it would, then, whether or not there is a less restrictive means than a 6 a.m.-to-10 p.m. ban by which to deny minors access to "indecent" material on cable television, it appears that a strong case may be made that applying the FCC's indecency restrictions to cable television would violate the First Amendment. This is because, as the Supreme Court wrote when it struck down the ban on "indecent" material on the Internet, "the Government may not 'reduc[e] the adult population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.'" In addition, the Court, in the 2000 case mentioned above, struck down a speech restriction on cable television, in part because "for two-thirds of the day no household in those service areas could receive the programming, whether or not the household or the viewer wanted to do so." |
crs_R44227 | crs_R44227_0 | They may also include embedded devices in roadways and in other components of infrastructure such as electric grids, manufacturing plants and other buildings, farms, and virtually any other object, element, or system for which remote communications, control, or data collection and processing might be useful. In other words, the IoT potentially includes huge numbers and kinds of interconnected objects. The IoT is often considered the next major stage in the evolution of cyberspace. Internet connectivity allows a smart object to communicate with computers and with other smart objects. To enable precise communications, each IoT object must be uniquely identifiable. Smart objects can form systems that communicate information and commands among themselves, usually in concert with computers they connect to. Smart systems allow for automated and remote control of many processes. These integrated systems can potentially have substantial effects on homes and communities, factories and cities, and every sector of the economy, both domestically and globally. The IoT may significantly affect many aspects of the economy and society, although the full extent and nature of its eventual impacts remains uncertain. Among those commonly mentioned are agriculture, energy, health care, manufacturing, and transportation. Economic Growth
Several economic analyses have predicted that the IoT will contribute significantly to economic growth over the next decade, but the predictions vary substantially in magnitude. Infrastructure and Smart Cities
The capabilities of the smart grid, smart buildings, and ITS combined with IoT components in other public utilities—such as roadways, sewage and water transport and treatment, public transportation, and waste removal—can contribute to more integrated and functional infrastructure, especially in cities. In such a world, cyberspace and human space would seem to effectively merge into a single environment, with unpredictable but potentially substantial societal and cultural impacts. There is no single federal agency that has overall responsibility for the IoT, just as there is no one agency with overall responsibility for cyberspace. Federal agencies may find the IoT useful in helping them fulfill their missions through a variety of applications such as those discussed in this report and elsewhere. Each agency is responsible under various laws and regulations for the functioning and security of its own IoT, although some technologies, such as drones, may also fall under some aspects of the jurisdiction of other agencies. Various agencies have regulatory, sector-specific, and other mission-related responsibilities that involve aspects of IoT. What Issues Might Affect the Development and Implementation of the IoT? The Internet of Things is often lauded for its potentially revolutionary applications. Technical Issues
Prominent technical limitations that may affect the growth and use of the IoT include a lack of new Internet addresses under the most widely used protocol, the availability of high-speed and wireless communications, and lack of consensus on technical standards. IoT objects need energy for sensing, processing, and communicating information. As the number of connected objects in the IoT grows, so will the potential risk of successful intrusions and increases in costs from those incidents. Consequently, new approaches to security may be needed for the IoT. Privacy
Cyberattacks may also compromise privacy, resulting in access to and exfiltration of identifying or other sensitive information about an individual. In addition to the question of whether security measures are adequate to prevent such intrusions, privacy concerns also include questions about the ownership, processing, and use of such data. Some interagency initiatives have been established with respect to specific aspects of the IoT. Legislation
Bills
No bills have been introduced in the last two Congresses relating specifically to the IoT. 195 /Lance, introduced April 13, 2015) and one in the Senate ( S.Res. Both call for
a U.S. strategy for development of the IoT to improve social well-being while allowing for innovation and protecting against misuse, recognition of the importance of a consensus-based approach and the role of businesses in that development, federal government commitment to use the IoT, and a U.S. commitment to use the IoT for developing new technologies to address challenging societal issues. Hearings
Both the House and the Senate have held hearings on the IoT in 2015. Caucuses
There are several congressional caucuses that may consider issues associated with the IoT. | "Internet of Things" (IoT) refers to networks of objects that communicate with other objects and with computers through the Internet. "Things" may include virtually any object for which remote communication, data collection, or control might be useful, such as vehicles, appliances, medical devices, electric grids, transportation infrastructure, manufacturing equipment, or building systems.
In other words, the IoT potentially includes huge numbers and kinds of interconnected objects. It is often considered the next major stage in the evolution of cyberspace. Some observers believe it might even lead to a world where cyberspace and human space would seem to effectively merge, with unpredictable but potentially momentous societal and cultural impacts.
Two features make objects part of the IoT—a unique identifier and Internet connectivity. Such "smart" objects each have a unique Internet Protocol (IP) address to identify the object sending and receiving information. Smart objects can form systems that communicate among themselves, usually in concert with computers, allowing automated and remote control of many independent processes and potentially transforming them into integrated systems.
Those systems can potentially impact homes and communities, factories and cities, and every sector of the economy, both domestically and globally. Although the full extent and nature of the IoT's impacts remain uncertain, economic analyses predict that it will contribute trillions of dollars to economic growth over the next decade. Sectors that may be particularly affected include agriculture, energy, government, health care, manufacturing, and transportation.
The IoT can contribute to more integrated and functional infrastructure, especially in "smart cities," with projected improvements in transportation, utilities, and other municipal services. The Obama Administration announced a smart-cities initiative in September 2015.
There is no single federal agency that has overall responsibility for the IoT. Agencies may find IoT applications useful in helping them fulfill their missions. Each is responsible for the functioning and security of its own IoT, although some technologies, such as drones, may fall under the jurisdiction of other agencies as well. Various agencies also have relevant regulatory, sector-specific, and other mission-related responsibilities, such as the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Transportation, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission.
Security and privacy are often cited as major issues for the IoT, given the perceived difficulties of providing adequate cybersecurity for it, the increasing role of smart objects in controlling components of infrastructure, and the enormous increase in potential points of attack posed by the proliferation of such objects. The IoT may also pose increased risks to privacy, with cyberattacks potentially resulting in exfiltration of identifying or other sensitive information about an individual. With an increasing number of IoT objects in use, privacy concerns also include questions about the ownership, processing, and use of the data they generate.
Several other issues might affect the continued development and implementation of the IoT. Among them are
the lack of consensus standards for the IoT, especially with respect to connectivity; the transition to a new Internet Protocol (IPv6) that can handle the exponential increase in the number of IP addresses that the IoT will require; methods for updating the software used by IoT objects in response to security and other needs; energy management for IoT objects, especially those not connected to the electric grid; and the role of the federal government, including investment, regulation of applications, access to wireless communications, and the impact of federal rules regarding "net neutrality."
No bills specifically on the IoT have been introduced in the 114th Congress, although S.Res. 110 was agreed to in March 2015, and H.Res. 195 was introduced in April. Both call for a U.S. IoT strategy, a focus on a consensus-based approach to IoT development, commitment to federal use of the IoT, and its application in addressing challenging societal issues. House and Senate hearings have been held on the IoT, and several congressional caucuses may consider associated issues. Moreover, bills affecting privacy, cybersecurity, and other aspects of communication could affect IoT applications. |
crs_R42156 | crs_R42156_0 | A nonbank is an institution that provides financial services or products but does not have a bank, thrift, or credit union charter. The Nonbank Supervision Program will subject some nonbanks to the same consumer protection standards as currently applied to banks. This report will describe the Nonbank Supervision Program, the structure and powers of the CFPB, and other early CFPB initiatives. This report does not address arguments that have been made against the validity of the recess appointment itself, nor does it address related questions that have been raised regarding the scope of Cordray's authority as the director of the CFPB while serving pursuant to a recess appointment. Overview of the Bureau
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was established by Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act ( P.L. 111-203 , the Dodd-Frank Act). The creation of the CFPB consolidates many consumer financial protection responsibilities into one agency. The Dodd-Frank Act states that the purpose of the CFPB is to implement and enforce federal consumer financial law while ensuring that consumers can access financial products and services. The CFPB is also instructed to ensure that the markets for consumer financial services and products are fair, transparent, and competitive. To fulfill its mandate, the CFPB can issue rules, examine certain institutions, and enforce consumer protection laws and regulations. Early Agenda of the New Director: Nonbank Supervision Program
On January 4, 2012, President Obama installed Richard Cordray as the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau via recess appointment. As stated in CRS Report R41839, Limitations on the Secretary of the Treasury's Authority to Exercise the Powers of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection , by [author name scrubbed],
Until a CFPB Director is appointed, the CFP Act provides the Secretary (of the Treasury) the authority to exercise some, but not all of the Bureau's authorities. Using its "newly established" powers after Cordray's appointment, the CFPB announced its Nonbank Supervision Program. Under the Program, the CFPB has authority to supervise three groups of nonbanks. First, the CFPB can regulate nonbanks in three specific markets—mortgage companies, payday lenders, and private education lenders. Second, the CFPB can regulate the "larger participants" in other financial markets. Third, the CFPB may supervise a nonbank that is performing actions that may pose a risk to consumers with regard to consumer financial products or services. | The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was established by Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act (P.L. 111-203, the Dodd-Frank Act). The creation of the CFPB consolidates many existing consumer financial protection responsibilities into one agency. The Dodd-Frank Act states that the purpose of the CFPB is to implement and enforce federal consumer financial law while ensuring that consumers can access financial products and services. The CFPB is also instructed to ensure that the markets for consumer financial services and products are fair, transparent, and competitive. To fulfill its mandate, the CFPB can issue rules, examine certain institutions, and enforce consumer protection laws and regulations.
On January 4, 2012, President Obama installed Richard Cordray as the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau via recess appointment. As explained in CRS Report R41839, Limitations on the Secretary of the Treasury's Authority to Exercise the Powers of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, by [author name scrubbed], the Dodd-Frank Act transferred some powers to the CFPB and established new powers. The CFPB could not exercise its new powers until a director was appointed. Included in the newly established powers is the authority to regulate certain nonbanks for consumer protection. Under the new authority conferred by the appointment of Cordray, the CFPB announced the Nonbank Supervision Program. A nonbank is an institution that provides financial services but does not have a bank, thrift, or credit union charter. The Nonbank Supervision Program will subject some nonbanks to the same consumer protection standards as currently applied to banks. Under the program, the CFPB will supervise three groups of nonbanks. First, the CFPB can regulate nonbanks in three specific markets—mortgage companies, payday lenders, and private education lenders. Second, the CFPB can regulate the "larger participants" in other financial markets. Third, the CFPB may supervise a nonbank that is performing actions that may pose a risk to consumers with regard to consumer financial products or services. This report describes the Nonbank Supervision Program as well as other initiatives that the CFPB has started since its creation.
This report does not address arguments that have been made against the validity of the recess appointment itself, nor does it address related questions that have been raised regarding the scope of Cordray's authority as the director of the CFPB while serving pursuant to a recess appointment. |
crs_RS22363 | crs_RS22363_0 | The VVSG are a set of technical standards for voting systems that use computers to assist in recording or counting votes. It went into effect in December 2007. The Relationship Between the VVSG and the Federal Voting Systems Standards (VSS)
The VVSG replaced the federal voluntary VSS originally developed under the auspices of the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The act is largely silent on the relationship between the VVSG and those requirements, which stipulate that voting systems must provide for auditability, accessibility, and ballot verification and error correction by voters, that states must set standards for what constitutes a vote on a given system, and that machine error rates of voting systems must conform to the standards set in the guidelines. They include the following:
The functional capabilities a voting system is expected to have. Requirements for voter-verified paper trails (VVPAT) used in conjunction with DREs (this is new in the VVSG ). Major Policy Issues about the VVSG
Several issues have been raised about the VVSG that may require congressional attention. Among them are the following:
The degree to which the guidelines are voluntary. The 2005 version did not address the second criticism, but the 2007 draft would require more realistic testing. The 2005 version of the guidelines partially revised the VSS, and some observers believe that the revisions should have been more comprehensive to address perceived shortcomings of the VSS. | The federal Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) are a set of technical standards for voting systems that use computers to assist in recording or counting votes. The first version went into effect in December 2007, and a draft second version has been developed. The VVSG replaced the federal voluntary Voting Systems Standards (VSS). The 2005 VVSG are a partial revision of the VSS, with revision focused mainly on accessibility, usability, and security. The 2007 draft is a complete rewrite. Several issues have been raised about the VVSG that may require congressional attention. Among them is the question of timing. Some vendors claim that there needs to be more time for technology development before the new guidelines become effective; some activists argue that problems with voting systems, and federal requirements, demand more rapid implementation of the VVSG. The new guidelines did not have much direct impact on voting systems used in 2006. One exception was provisions relating to paper-ballot audit trails, which several states now require to be used in conjunction with electronic voting machines such as touchscreen systems. Like the VSS, the VVSG are voluntary, but some observers believe that a regulatory approach would be more appropriate given the importance of elections to the democratic process. However, since many states require that voting systems be certified, vendors are expected to treat the VVSG in the same way they have treated the VSS—as effectively mandatory. |
crs_R45275 | crs_R45275_0 | Across these decades, the breadth of policy areas addressed through such farm bills has expanded beyond providing support for a limited number of agricultural commodities to include establishing programs and policies that address a broad spectrum of related areas, such as agricultural conservation, credit, rural development, domestic nutrition assistance, trade and international food aid, organic agriculture, forestry, and support for beginning and veteran farmers and ranchers, among others. On June 21, 2018, the House voted 213-211 to approve H.R. 2 , the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018, an omnibus farm bill that would establish farm and food policy for the next five years, covering FY2019-FY2023. The Senate passed its version of H.R. 2, the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, on June 28, 2018, on a vote of 86-11. The disparity in the number of titles between the two bills reflects the provision of a separate title for energy programs in the Senate bill, whereas the House bill would eliminate what had been a separate energy title in the 2014 farm bill and place these agricultural energy programs within the title on rural infrastructure and economic development. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued its scores of H.R. CBO projected that spending on mandatory programs in the Senate bill would total $867 billion over the 10-year period FY2019-FY2028 and $865 billion in the House bill. These totals compare with CBO's estimate of the cost of extending the current 2014 farm bill for 10 years of $867 billion. 113-79 , many of which are to expire in 2018 unless Congress acts to reauthorize or extend them. In the Senate bill, while none of the titles' cumulative increases and decreases are as large in magnitude as the changes to nutrition and conservation programs in the House bill, the section-by-section scores of the Senate bill nonetheless show both increases and decreases from the baseline. Major field-crop programs include the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) programs and the Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) program (see Table 5 ). Under both bills, the sugar program is extended but is otherwise unchanged. With respect to payment limits and the AGI limit, the Senate farm bill would leave payment limits unchanged but tighten the AGI limit to $700,000 (down from $900,000 under current law). In contrast, the House farm bill proposes to expand the list of producer exemptions from payment and income limits under certain conditions. Both bills would also expand coverage choices for milk producers. margin would be lowered slightly. The House and the Senate bills reauthorize all current conservation programs with the exception of the largest—the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP)—which the House bill would repeal. The two largest working lands programs—Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and CSP—account for more than half of all conservation program funding. Nutrition15
The Nutrition titles of House- and Senate-passed farm bills differ in their approach to eligibility and benefit calculation rules but include some similar policies in other topic areas (see Both bills would reauthorize SNAP and related programs for five years through the end of FY2023. Both bills propose policies intended to improve detection of errors and fraud. The House bill repeals funding for performance bonuses, while the Senate bill reduces funding and limits them to application timeliness. Both bills would expand SNAP bonus incentives for fruit and vegetable purchases and authorize the addition of milk for certain incentive pilot programs (one with mandatory funding in the House bill, one with discretionary funding in the Senate bill). Food Distribution Programs. Both bills would make changes to the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations. Other Nutrition Programs and Policies. 2. For direct loans, the Senate bill would increase the farm ownership loan limit to $600,000 and the farm operating loan limit to $400,000, both from $300,000 currently. The bill establishes priorities for awarding loans and grants for broadband projects in rural communities. The Senate bill would also authorize a new Urban, Indoor, and Emerging Agricultural Production, Research, Education, and Extension Initiative. The Senate bill would raise the authorized level, while the House bill would modify the terms of the program. The House bill would also direct the Secretary of Agriculture to exempt unprocessed dead and dying trees on NFS lands in California from the export prohibition for 10 years and would amend provisions of the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000, a program that authorizes payments to counties containing NFS lands and certain BLM lands, among other provisions. Both bills extend most of the energy title programs through FY2023. The House bill addresses energy programs in three key ways—it reauthorizes many of the programs, it changes the placement of the programs within the farm bill, and it modifies the type of funding available for the programs. In contrast, the House bill provides discretionary funding, but not mandatory funding, for the energy title programs. The Senate bill includes a number of provisions regarding industrial hemp within the bill's Horticulture title but also includes hemp-specific provision in the Research, Crop Insurance, and Miscellaneous titles of the bill. The House bill does not include comparable hemp provisions, but it would amend certain regulatory requirements under some federal statutes that are not contained in the Senate bill. 5485 ) that are intended to facilitate the possible commercial cultivation of hemp in the United States. Both bills would establish an animal disease preparedness program and a vaccine bank that prioritizes the acquisition of foot-and-mouth disease vaccine. Both the House-passed and Senate-passed bills amend parts of current law to account for USDA reorganizational changes that created the Under Secretary for Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs, the Under Secretary for Farm Production and Conservation, and the Assistant to the Secretary for Rural Development. | Congress sets national food and agriculture policy through periodic omnibus farm bills that address a broad range of farm and food programs and policies. The 115th Congress has the opportunity to establish the future direction of farm and food policy, because many of the provisions in the current farm bill (the Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) expire in 2018.
On June 21, 2018, the House voted 213-211 to approve H.R. 2, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018, an omnibus farm bill that would authorize farm and food policy for FY2019-FY2023. The Senate passed its version of H.R. 2, the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, also a five-year bill, on June 28, 2018, on a vote of 86-11.
In terms of cost, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) score of July 24, 2018, of the programs in both bills with mandatory spending—such as nutrition programs, commodity support programs, major conservation programs, and crop insurance—over a 10-year budget window (FY2019-FY2028) amounts to $867 billion in the Senate-passed bill and $865 billion in the House-passed bill. These cost projections compare with CBO's baseline scenario of an extension of existing 2014 farm bill programs with no changes of $867 billion. In both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 2, most existing programs would be extended through FY2023. Overall, the bills provide a relatively large measure of continuity with the existing framework of farm and food programs even as they would modify numerous programs, alter the amount and type of program funding that certain programs receive, and exercise discretion not to reauthorize some others.
Both bills would extend commodity support programs largely along existing lines while modifying them in different ways. For instance, the House bill could raise the effective reference price for crops enrolled in the Price Loss Coverage program (PLC) under certain market conditions. It would also amend payment limits and the adjusted gross income (AGI) limit for eligibility for farm program payments and increase the number of producer exemptions from payment and income limits. In contrast, the Senate bill would leave payment limits unchanged while lowering the AGI limit for payment eligibility. The Senate would also leave PLC unchanged while adopting changes to the Agricultural Risk Coverage program (ARC) that could enhance its appeal as a program option. Both bills would amend disaster assistance programs but under different approaches. Both bills would also rename the dairy program and expand coverage choices for milk producers, and both bills extend the sugar program with no changes.
The House and Senate bills would reauthorize the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) for five years, and both bills include polices intended to improve error and fraud detection. Among their differences, the House bill includes multiple changes to who is eligible for SNAP and the calculation of benefits, which are not included in the Senate bill. The House bill includes major changes to work requirements, while the Senate bill would make changes that are minor by comparison.
Within the conservation title, the two bills would raise the acreage limit on enrollment in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), with the House bill setting a higher limit than the Senate does. Among other differences, the House bill would repeal the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), whereas the Senate bill would extend CSP but lower the limit on acreage enrollment. The House bill also increases funding for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), while the Senate bill reduces funding for EQIP. Within the credit title, both bills increase the maximum loan amounts for the U.S. Department of Agriculture's guaranteed farm ownership loans and guaranteed farm operating loans. The Senate bill would also raise the limits for direct farm ownership loans and direct farm operating loans, whereas the House bill would not. The miscellaneous title of both bills establishes an animal disease preparedness program and a vaccine bank, although they diverge over funding.
The Senate bill includes a number of provisions that are intended to facilitate the possible commercial cultivation of industrial hemp, while the House bill would amend certain regulatory requirements that apply to industrial hemp. For rural communities, the House bill would authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to reprioritize certain loan and grant programs and take other actions to respond to specific health emergencies, and it would require the Secretary to promulgate minimum acceptable standards for broadband service. The Senate bill would establish priorities for awarding loans and grains for rural broadband projects and add a new program on substance abuse education and prevention. Both bills extend most bioenergy programs, but the House bill places them within the title on rural development and infrastructure, while the Senate bill maintains a separate energy title. Moreover, while the House bill would provide discretionary funding for these programs but no mandatory funding, the Senate bill would provide both mandatory and discretionary funding. |
crs_RL33526 | crs_RL33526_0 | Academia, industry, and government can play complementary roles in technology development. While opponents argue that cooperative ventures stifle competition, proponents assert that they are designed to accommodate the strengths and responsibilities of these sectors. They allow for shared costs, shared risks, shared facilities, and shared expertise. The lexicon of current cooperative activity covers various different institutional and legal arrangements. Cooperative activities with the federal government might include projects that use federal facilities and researchers, federal funding for industry-industry or industry-university efforts, or financial support for centers of excellence at universities to which the private sector has access. Collaboration permits work to be done which is too expensive for one company to fund and also allows for R&D that crosses traditional boundaries of expertise and experience. A joint venture makes use of existing, and supports development of new resources, facilities, knowledge, and skills. In addition, technological advancement contributes to the economic growth vital to the health and security of the nation. While acknowledging that the commercialization of technology is the responsibility of the business community, in the past several years the government has attempted to stimulate innovation and technological advancement in industry. 103 - 42 , the National Cooperative Production Amendments Act of 1993. Firms were also permitted a larger tax deduction for charitable contributions of equipment used in scientific research at academic institutions. Many cooperative industry-industry or industry-university programs are supported and/or organized by the federal departments and agencies. 101 - 189 ), provided, in part, a legislative mandate for technology transfer from the federal government to the private sector, established a series of offices in the agencies and/or laboratories to administer transfer efforts, provided incentives for federal laboratory personnel to actively engage in technology transfer, and created new contractual means for industry to work with the laboratories including cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs). To further promote cooperative research and development among universities, government, and the private sector, changes in the patent laws were made by P.L. Thus, questions may be raised as to whether programs and policies encouraging increased cooperative research, without concomitant efforts to facilitate the development and commercialization of technologies and techniques, can be effective mechanisms to increase the competitiveness of American industry. Are there more effective types of joint ventures? | In response to the foreign challenge in the global marketplace, the United States Congress has explored ways to stimulate technological advancement in the private sector. The government has supported various efforts to promote cooperative research and development activities among industry, universities, and the federal R&D establishment designed to increase the competitiveness of American industry and to encourage the generation of new products, processes, and services.
Collaborative ventures are intended to accommodate the strengths and responsibilities of all sectors involved in innovation and technology development. Academia, industry, and government often have complementary functions. Joint projects allow for the sharing of costs, risks, facilities, and expertise.
Cooperative activity covers various institutional and legal arrangements including industry-industry, industry-university, and industry-government efforts. Proponents of joint ventures argue that they permit work to be done that is too expensive for one company to support and allow for R&D that crosses traditional boundaries of expertise and experience. Such arrangements make use of existing, and support the development of new, resources, facilities, knowledge, and skills. Opponents argue that these endeavors dampen competition necessary for innovation.
Federal efforts to encourage cooperative activities include the National Cooperative Research Act; the National Cooperative Production Act; tax changes permitting credits for industry payments to universities for R&D and deductions for contributions of equipment used in academic research; and amendments to the patent laws vesting title to inventions made under federal funding in universities. Technology transfer from the government to the private sector is facilitated by several laws. In addition, there are various ongoing cooperative programs supported by multiple federal departments and agencies.
Given the increased popularity of cooperative programs, questions might be raised as to whether they are meeting expectations. Among the issues before Congress are whether joint ventures contribute to industrial competitiveness and what role, if any, the government has in facilitating such arrangements. |
crs_R43358 | crs_R43358_0 | Background
Food fraud, or the act of defrauding buyers of food and food ingredients for economic gain—whether they be consumers or food manufacturers, retailers, and importers—has vexed the food industry throughout history. Some of the earliest reported cases of food fraud, dating back thousands of years, involved olive oil, wine, spices, and tea. These same products continue to be associated with fraud, along with a range of other products. It is not known conclusively how widespread food fraud is in the United States or worldwide. In part, this is because those who commit fraud do not intend to cause physical harm and want to avoid detection. Most incidents go undetected since they usually do not result in a food safety risk and consumers often do not notice a quality problem. Although the vast majority of food fraud incidents do not pose a public health risk, there have been fraud cases that have resulted in actual or potential public health risks. Perhaps the most widely cited, high-profile cases have involved the addition of melamine to high-protein feed and milk-based products to artificially inflate protein values in products that may have been diluted. For example, in 2007, evidence emerged that adulterated pet food ingredients from China had caused the deaths of a large number of dogs and cats in the United States. This was followed by reports that melamine-contaminated baby formula had sickened an estimated 300,000 Chinese children, killing a reported 6 infants. Reports also indicate fish and seafood fraud may be widespread in some markets, consisting mostly of the mislabeling or substitution of a higher-valued species with something different from and inferior to the expected species, possibly with a fish species which could be associated with some types of food poisoning or exposure to certain allergens. The Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) estimates that fraud may cost the global food industry between $10 billion and $15 billion per year, affecting approximately 10% of all commercially sold food products. Fraud resulting in a food safety or public health risk event, however, could have significant financial or public relations consequences for a food industry or company. For the purposes of the workshop, FDA defined "economically motivated adulteration" as the:
fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a substance in a product for the purpose of increasing the apparent value of the product or reducing the cost of its production, i.e., for economic gain. The Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) provides the following definitions of "economic adulteration" as part of its report on consumer product fraud in the food, beverage, and consumer product industry:
Economic adulteration is defined as the intentional fraudulent modification of a finished product or ingredient for economic gain through the following methods: unapproved enhancements, dilution with a lesser-value ingredient, concealment of damage or contamination, mislabeling of a product or ingredient, substitution of a lesser-value ingredient or failing to disclose required product information. Available Data and Information Repositories
Review of Available Database Information
Efforts are ongoing to compile and capture current and historical data on food fraud and EMA incidents through the creation of databases and repositories. Federal Activities Involving Food Fraud
In the United States, no single federal agency and no single U.S. law or statute directly addresses food fraud or "economically motivated adulteration" of food and food ingredients. Instead, food fraud and intentional adulteration of food is broadly addressed through food safety authorities and border protection and import authorities and activities. Accordingly, FDA and USDA are the principle federal agencies that are working to protect the food supply from food safety risks, including both unintentionally and intentionally introduced contamination, in conjunction with enforcement of FDA and USDA laws by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as part of its border inspections. Other agencies also have played a role in food fraud prevention. Congressional Actions Involving Food Fraud
Congress has introduced a number of bills intended to address concerns about food fraud, mostly with respect to concerns about a particular food or food ingredient, but has not introduced legislation that would specifically address fraud in a comprehensive manner. | Food fraud, or the act of defrauding buyers of food or ingredients for economic gain—whether they be consumers or food manufacturers, retailers, and importers—has vexed the food industry throughout history. Some of the earliest reported cases of food fraud, dating back thousands of years, involved olive oil, tea, wine, and spices. These products continue to be associated with fraud, along with some other foods. Although the vast majority of fraud incidents do not pose a public health risk, some cases have resulted in actual or potential public health risks. Perhaps the most high-profile case has involved the addition of melamine to high-protein feed and milk-based products to artificially inflate protein values in products that may have been diluted. In 2007, pet food adulterated with melamine reportedly killed a large number of dogs and cats in the United States, followed by reports that melamine-contaminated baby formula had sickened thousands of Chinese children. Fraud was also a motive behind Peanut Corporation of America's actions in connection with the Salmonella outbreak in 2009, which killed 9 people and sickened 700. Reports also indicate that fish and seafood fraud is widespread, consisting mostly of a lower-valued species, which may be associated with some types of food poisoning or allergens, mislabeled as a higher-value species. Other types of foods associated with fraud include honey, meat and grain-based foods, fruit juices, organic foods, coffee, and some highly processed foods.
It is not known conclusively how widespread food fraud is in the United States or worldwide. In part, this is because those who commit food fraud want to avoid detection and do not necessarily intend to cause physical harm. Most incidents go undetected since they usually do not result in a food safety risk and consumers often do not notice a quality problem. Although the full scale of food fraud is not known, the number of documented incidents may be a small fraction of the true number of incidents. The Grocery Manufacturers Association estimates that fraud may cost the global food industry between $10 billion and $15 billion per year, affecting approximately 10% of all commercially sold food products. Fraud resulting in a food safety or public health risk event could have significant financial or public relations consequences for a food industry or company.
There is no statutory definition of food fraud or "economically motivated adulteration" (EMA) of foods or food ingredients in the United States. However, as part of a 2009 public meeting, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) adopted a working definition, defining EMA as the "fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a substance in a product for the purpose of increasing the apparent value of the product or reducing the cost of its production, i.e., for economic gain." Efforts are ongoing to compile and capture current and historical data on food fraud and EMA incidents through the creation of databases and repositories.
Over the years, Congress has introduced a number of bills intended to address concerns about food fraud for a particular food or food ingredient. Such legislation has not addressed food fraud in a comprehensive manner. However, although no single federal agency or U.S. law directly addresses food fraud, a number of existing laws and statutes already provide the authority for various federal agencies to address fraud. Currently, food fraud is broadly addressed through various food safety, food defense, and food quality authorities as well as border protection and import authorities across a number of federal agencies. FDA and the U.S. Department of Agriculture are the principle agencies that are working to protect the food supply from food safety risks—both unintentionally and intentionally introduced contamination—in conjunction with border protection and enforcement activities by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Other agencies also play a role. |
crs_R44638 | crs_R44638_0 | Introduction
In January 2016, Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, announced plans for a tax reform that would explore corporate integration. Corporate integration involves the elimination or reduction of additional taxes on corporate equity investment that arise because corporate income is taxed twice. This system of taxation produces differential tax burdens, potentially discouraging the realization of gains on the sale of corporate stock and favoring noncorporate equity investment over corporate investment, debt finance over equity finance, and retained earnings over dividends. These firms' choices with respect to the location of investment and profits are affected by firm-level rather than shareholder-level taxes. A second change is that the fraction of shareholders who are not subject to U.S. shareholder taxes has increased, so that currently only about a quarter of corporate stock of U.S. firms is estimated to be owned by shareholders subject to U.S. individual taxes on dividends and capital gains (compared to about half at the time of the study). If all profits were taxed at the statutory rate, distributed as a dividend, and then taxed at ordinary rates to a shareholder in the 35% bracket, the total tax on a corporate investment would be 58% (a 35% corporate tax and an additional 35% on the remaining 65% of profit) compared with a tax rate of 35% on noncorporate investment, for a 23 percentage point difference. Tax-Exempt Shareholders
A large share of corporate income (estimated at 50% of the total) is not taxed at the shareholder level because it is held in tax-exempt, or largely tax-exempt, form, such as pensions, individual retirement accounts, annuities, and life insurance. Effective Tax Rates for Investments Financed with Both Debt and Equity
As the preceding analysis indicates, corporations are more heavily taxed on equity investment than are firms in the noncorporate sector, but are more favored in the case of debt finance. Overall tax rates in the corporate sector are lower than in the noncorporate sector because of tax preferences for intangible investments. Full Integration
Full integration would eliminate one of the levels of taxation and apply both to dividends and retained earnings. Taxing at the Shareholder Level: Mark to Market
Another approach to integration is to repeal the corporate tax entirely, tax dividends and capital gains at ordinary rates, and mark the value of stock to market, that is, tax capital gains on the stock regardless of whether it was sold and increase the basis of the stock for the future. Imputation Credit or Deduction with Withholding Tax and Credit
Some of these issues with the dividend deduction can be addressed by adopting the same type of system using the corporation to withhold taxes as in the modified partnership treatment. It excluded interest from, and disallowed interest deductions for both corporate and noncorporate businesses. Revenue Concerns
Revenue impacts are an important consideration in any tax reform proposal. Table 1 focused on domestic investment by U.S. firms. If the shareholder allocation prototype allowed for refundable credits for the corporate tax, then the effective tax rates would be the individual rates (times their shares) for each type of shareholder multiplied by the ratio of the firm's effective tax rate to the statutory rate (to measure the difference between the economic base and the taxable base) minus the foreign tax credit. The mark-to-market approach is uncertain in its impact. The full integration proposals, imposing only the corporate tax, or a mark-to-market approach achieve neutrality between retained earnings and capital gains. Thus having only a modest reduction (as in the shareholder allocation or dividend deduction with nonrefundable credits) would be most likely to achieve efficiency gains (or not make losses larger). The refundable allocation and dividend proposals have significant revenue losses. Conclusion
The proposals for integration in this report were examined in the light of revenue adequacy, administrative feasibility, and economic efficiency gains in reducing distortions. It also would address issues such as profit shifting and inversions. The mark-to-market proposal, because it taxes global economic income, eliminates a number of distortions both domestic and foreign. | In January 2016, Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, announced plans for a tax reform that would explore corporate integration. Corporate integration involves the elimination or reduction of additional taxes on corporate equity investment that arise because corporate income is taxed twice, once at the corporate level and once at the individual level. Traditional concerns are that this system of taxation is inefficient because it (1) favors noncorporate equity investment over corporate investment, (2) favors debt finance over equity finance, (3) favors retained earnings over dividends, and (4) discourages the realization of gains on the sale of corporate stock. Increasingly, international concerns such as allocation of investment across countries, repatriation of profits earned abroad, shifting profits out of the United States and into tax havens, and inversions (U.S. firms using mergers to shift headquarters to a foreign country) have become issues in any tax reform, corporate integration included.
This report first examines the four traditional efficiency issues by comparing effective tax rates. These estimates suggest that there is little overall difference between corporate and noncorporate investment or even favorable treatment of corporations, for several reasons. A larger share of corporate assets benefits from tax preferences. Moreover, only a quarter of shares in U.S. firms is held by taxable individuals; the remainder is held by tax-exempt and largely tax-exempt pension and retirement accounts, nonprofits, and foreigners. Additionally, tax rates on individual dividends and capital gains are lower than ordinary rates.
However, effective tax rates across assets differ markedly, with intangible assets most favored and structures least favored. Debt is treated favorably in both the corporate and noncorporate sectors, but more so in the corporate sector, so that the total stock of assets in the corporate sector is taxed less heavily than in the noncorporate sector when both debt and equity are considered. The distortion between debt and equity finance is large in each sector, with negative tax rates for debt finance in many cases, while differences in taxes affecting dividend payout choices or realization of capital gains on stock appear to be small because of low tax rates.
The report outlines several approaches to integration. Full integration would address both dividends and retained earnings. One approach would tax on a partnership basis by allocating income to shareholders and using the firm to withhold taxes. Credits for withheld taxes would be provided to shareholders, and credits could be made nonrefundable for tax-exempt and foreign shareholders. A different full integration approach would eliminate shareholder taxes and tax only at the firm level. A third would tax at the shareholder level and not the firm by imposing ordinary rates and taxing not only dividends and realized capital gains but also unrealized gains by marking shares to market prices (i.e., mark-to-market). Partial integration focuses on dividends and could provide either a dividend deduction by the firm (with a withholding tax and credits) or a dividend exclusion to the shareholder. Disallowing interest deductions in full or in part could be combined with most proposals.
The report compares these proposals with respect to impact on revenue, administrative feasibility, and effects on both traditional and international tax choices. Shareholder allocation or deductions with refundable credits produce relatively large revenue losses, as does mark-to-market. Nonrefundability and making modifications in mark-to-market can substantially reduce these revenue losses. Most proposals would have modest efficiency gains, and some would modestly increase efficiency losses. Mark-to-market would tax economic income and potentially produce a number of efficiency gains but may not be feasible on administrative grounds. Disallowing or restricting deductions for interest would lead to efficiency gains on a number of margins and provide revenue to help achieve revenue-neutral reforms. |
crs_R44297 | crs_R44297_0 | Introduction
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was last comprehensively amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110 ). Appropriations for most programs authorized by the ESEA were authorized through FY2007. As Congress has not reauthorized the ESEA, appropriations for ESEA programs are currently not explicitly authorized. However, because the programs continue to receive annual appropriations, appropriations are considered implicitly authorized. During the 114 th Congress, the House Education and the Workforce Committee reported the Student Success Act ( H.R. Both chambers agreed to a conference to resolve their differences. On November 19, 2015, the conference committee agreed to file the conference report of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) by a vote of 39-1. On December 2, 2015, the House agreed to the conference report based on a bipartisan vote of 359-64. This report highlights key provisions included in the ESSA and provides some context regarding the treatment of similar provisions in current law, where applicable. Table 2 depicts the proposed structure of the ESEA under the ESSA and includes all authorizations of appropriations for FY2017 through FY2020. Table 3 provides examples of programs authorized under current law that would not be retained by the ESSA. The report does not aim to provide a comprehensive summary of ESSA or of technical changes that would be made by the bill. The major areas considered include the following:
overall structural and funding issues; Title I-A accountability; Title I-A formulas; teachers, principals, and school leaders; flexibility and choice; and general provisions. | The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was last comprehensively amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110). Appropriations for most programs authorized by the ESEA were authorized through FY2007. As Congress has not reauthorized the ESEA, appropriations for ESEA programs are currently not explicitly authorized. However, because the programs continue to receive annual appropriations, appropriations are considered implicitly authorized.
Congress has actively considered reauthorization of the ESEA during the 114th Congress, passing comprehensive ESEA reauthorization bills in both the House (Student Success Act; H.R. 5) and the Senate (Every Child Achieves Act of 2015; S. 1177). Both chambers agreed to a conference to resolve their differences. On November 19, 2015, the conference committee agreed to file the conference report of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) by a vote of 39-1. On December 2, 2015, the House agreed to the conference report based on a bipartisan vote of 359-64.
Table 1 in this report highlights key provisions included in the ESSA and provides some context regarding the treatment of similar provisions in current law, where applicable. The major areas considered in this examination include the following:
overall structural and funding issues; Title I-A accountability; Title I-A formulas; teachers, principals, and school leaders; flexibility and choice; and general provisions.
Table 2 depicts the proposed structure of the ESEA under the ESSA and includes all authorizations of appropriations for FY2017 through FY2020. Table 3 provides examples of programs authorized under current law that would not be retained by the ESSA.
The report does not aim to provide a comprehensive summary of ESSA or of technical changes that would be made by the bill. |
crs_R41744 | crs_R41744_0 | Rare earth elements (also referred to as REEs and by the shorthand term "rare earths") include the lanthanide series of 15 elements on the periodic table, beginning with atomic number 57 (lanthanum) and extending through element number 71 (lutetium). These 17 elements are referred to as "rare" because while they are relatively abundant in quantity, they appear in low concentrations in the earth's crust and economic extraction and processing is both difficult and costly. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the United States was the leader in global production of rare earths. Since that time, processing and manufacturing of the world's supply of rare earths and downstream value-added forms such as metals, alloys, and magnets have shifted almost entirely to China, in part due to lower labor costs and lower environmental standards. A series of events and ensuing press reports have highlighted the rare earth "crisis," as some refer to it. DOD's report was released in March 2012. (3) Yttrium Oxide. Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to submit a report to the congressional defense committees by February 1, 2014, on the Department's risk mitigation strategy for rare earth elements, which should include, at a minimum, the following elements:
(1) A list and description of the programs initiated or planned to reclaim rare earth elements by the Department, along with a description of the materials reclaimed or expected to be reclaimed from such programs;
(2) An assessment of the cost of materials produced by these reclamation efforts compared to the cost of newly-mined materials;
(3) An assessment of availability of reliable suppliers in the National Defense Industrial Base for the reclamation and reprocessing of rare earth elements;
(4) A list of alternative sources of supply, such as mine tailings, recycled components, and consumer waste, that the Department has investigated or plans to investigate;
(5) A physical description of alternative sources of supply with corresponding geologic characteristics, such as grade, resource size, and the amenability of that feedstock to metallurgical processing;
(6) A description of the materials that the Department plans to obtain via the Defense Priorities and Allocations System; and
(7) Other diversification of supply activities deemed relevant by the Under Secretary. 2013 Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress
In October 2013, DOD released its Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress. Overall demand for rare earth materials has decreased considerably from the previous year. As a result, prices for most rare earth oxides and metals have declined approximately 60 percent from their peaks in the summer of 2011. How and Where Are Rare Earths Produced?22
In April 2010, GAO reported on the world's production of rare earths and stated that China produced
97% of rare earth ore, 97% of rare earth oxides, 89% of rare earth alloys, 75% of neodymium iron boron magnets (NeFeB), and 60% of samarium cobalt magnets (SmCo). Recent supply chain developments by Molycorp include the acquisition of Neo Materials Technology, Inc.—a Toronto-based firm (renamed Molycorp Canada) with rare earth processing and permanent magnet powder facilities in China. Molycorp plans to ship some of its production capacity to its Neo Materials facility in China. Some rare earth observers are concerned that Molycorp's purchase of Neo Materials Technologies could potentially make it more difficult for Molycorp to supply U.S. defense needs for rare earths, given China's domination and the increased broadening of restrictions on exporting rare earth minerals. 76-117, 50 U.S.C. Policy Issues for Congress
Dependence on Foreign Sources for Rare Earth Materials
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern with the nearly total U.S. dependence on foreign sources for rare earth elements. Some have raised questions about China's near dominance of the rare earth industry and the implications for U.S. national security. Yet the "crisis" for many policymakers is not the fact that China has cut its rare earth exports and appears to be restricting the world's access to rare earths, but the fact that the United States has lost its domestic capacity to produce strategic and critical materials, and that the manufacturing supply chain for rare earths has largely migrated to outside the United States. 111-383 ) and S.Rept. 111-201 (accompanying S. 3454 , the proposed Senate National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011) required the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of rare earth supply chain issues and develop a plan to address any vulnerabilities. The assessment would identify whether any rare earth materials would be:
(1) Critical to the production, sustainment, or operation of significant United States military equipment; or
(2) Subject to interruption of supply, based on actions or events outside the control of the Government of the United States. The bill would require the Secretary of the Interior to (1) conduct an assessment of the United States' capability to meet current and future demands for the minerals critical to domestic manufacturing competitiveness, economic, and national security in a time of expanding resource nationalism; (2) conduct an assessment of the current mineral potential of federal lands, and an evaluation of mineral requirements to meet current and emerging needs for economic and national security, and U.S. industrial manufacturing needs (such an assessment would address the implications of any potential mineral shortages or supply disruptions, as well as the potential impact of U.S. dependence on foreign sources for any minerals); and (3) conduct an inventory of rare earth elements and other minerals deemed critical based on the potential for supply disruptions, including an analysis of the supply chain for each mineral. Section 843 of P.L. | Some Members of Congress have expressed concern over U.S. acquisition of rare earth materials composed of rare earth elements (REE) used in various components of defense weapon systems. Rare earth elements consist of 17 elements on the periodic table, including 15 elements beginning with atomic number 57 (lanthanum) and extending through number 71 (lutetium), as well as two other elements having similar properties (yttrium and scandium). These are referred to as "rare" because although relatively abundant in total quantity, they appear in low concentrations in the earth's crust and extraction and processing is both difficult and costly.
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the United States was the leader in global rare earth production. Since then, production has shifted almost entirely to China, in part due to lower labor costs and lower environmental standards. Some estimates are that China now produces about 90- 95% of the world's rare earth oxides and is the majority producer of the world's two strongest magnets, samarium cobalt (SmCo) and neodymium iron boron (NeFeB) permanent, rare earth magnets. In the United States, Molycorp, a Mountain Pass, CA mining company, recently announced the purchase of Neo Material Technologies. Neo Material Technologies makes specialty materials from rare earths at factories based in China and Thailand. Molycorp also announced the start of its new heavy rare earth production facilities, Project Phoenix, which will process rare earth oxides from ore mined from the Mountain Pass facilities.
In 2010, a series of events and press reports highlighted what some referred to as the rare earth "crisis." Some policymakers were concerned that China had cut its rare earth exports and appeared to be restricting the world's access to rare earths, with a nearly total U.S. dependence on China for rare earth elements, including oxides, phosphors, metals, alloys, and magnets. Additionally, some policymakers had expressed growing concern that the United States had lost its domestic capacity to produce strategic and critical materials, and its implications for U.S. national security.
Pursuant to Section 843, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (P.L. 111-383) and S.Rept. 111-201 (accompanying S. 3454), Congress had mandated that the Secretary of Defense conduct an assessment of rare earth supply chain issues and develop a plan to address any vulnerabilities. DOD was required to assess which rare earths met the following criteria: (1) the rare earth material was critical to the production, sustainment, or operation of significant U.S. military equipment; and (2) the rare earth material was subject to interruption of supply, based on actions or events outside the control of the U.S. government. The seven-page report was issued in March 2012.
In October 2013, DOD released its Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress in accordance with Section 2504 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.). The report states that, due to global market forces, the overall demand for rare earth materials has decreased, as prices for most rare earth oxides and metals have declined since 2011.
Given DOD's assessment of the supply and demand for rare earths for defense purposes, coupled with the recent announcement of Molycorp's proposed acquisition of Neo Material Technologies, Congress may choose to use its oversight role to seek more complete answers to the following important questions:
Given Molycorp's purchase of Neo Material Technologies and the potential for the possible migration of domestic rare earth minerals to Molycorp's processing facilities in China, how may this move affect the domestic supply of rare earth minerals for the production of U.S. defense weapon systems? Given that DOD's assessment of future supply and demand was based on previous estimates using 2010 data, could there be new concern for a possible rare earth material supply shortage or vulnerability that could affect national security? Are there substitutes for rare earth materials that are economic, efficient, and available? Does dependence on foreign sources alone for rare earths pose a national security threat?
Congress may encourage DOD to develop a collaborative, long-term strategy designed to identify any material weaknesses and vulnerabilities associated with rare earths and to protect long-term U.S. national security interests. |
crs_RL30505 | crs_RL30505_0 | Most Recent Developments
On December 15, both the House and the Senate approved a conference agreement on theLabor-HHS-Education appropriations bill, H.R. 4425 ( P.L. Five other appropriations bills alsoprovide funds for national defense activities of DOD and other agencies including:
the military construction appropriations bill, which finances construction of military facilities and construction and operation of military family housing, all administered byDOD;
the energy and water development appropriations bill, which funds atomicenergy defense activities administered by the Department of Energy;
the VA-HUD-independent agencies appropriations bill, which finances civil defense activities administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, activities of theSelective Service System, and support for National Science Foundation Antarctic research;
the Commerce-Justice-State appropriations bill, which funds national security-related activities of the FBI, the Department of Justice, and some other agencies; and
the transportation appropriations bill, which funds some defense-related activities of the Coast Guard. The Administration's FY2001 budget includes $305.4 billion for the national defense budget function, of which $284.3 billion is requested in the defense appropriations bill. On June 29, the House, and on June 30, the Senate,approved a conference agreement on the FY2001 military construction appropriations bills, H.R. 106-246 ) on July 13. 4205 . House and Senate conferees announced anagreement on the measure on October 6, and the House approved the conference report by a vote of382-31 on October 11, and the Senate approved it on October 12 by a vote of 90-3. 106-398 ). 106-754 ), the House approved the agreement on July 19,the Senate approved it on July 27, and the President signed the bill into law on August 9 ( P.L.106-259 ). The President signed the bill into law ( P.L. Last year, in action on FY2000 bills, appropriatorstook several steps to provide additional funds for defense and non-defenseprograms, including (1) providing $1.8 billion in funding for FY2000 pay raisesas emergency appropriations in an FY1999 supplemental appropriations bill; (2)moving the last pay day of the fiscal year for military personnel into FY2001;and (3) designating $7.2 billion in the FY2000 defense appropriations bill asemergency funding. The conference agreement on the supplemental (which is included in H.R. Later, however, Congress made an across-the-board cut of 0.22% in all FY2001 discretionary appropriations, including defense, in H.R. In all, the defense reductionamounts to $521 million according to CBO estimates. 4577 also provided some additional FY2001 funds for defense programs. The majordefense additions are $150 million to repair bomb damage to the USS Cole,$100 million for classified programs in funded through the OverseasContingency Operations Transfer Fund, and $43.5 million for militaryconstruction programs. (8) The Senate-passed version of the annualdefense authorization billincluded a guarantee that the Defense Department will provide health care for life tomilitary retirees. Thiswas a key issue in the authorization conference. In floor action on June 7, the Senate approved an amendment to the authorization bill by Senator Warner that would eliminate a provision in currentlaw that makes military retirees eligible for Medicare - i.e., all those over age64 - ineligible for military medical care. Theauthorization conference also follows SASC, however, in requiring the Armyto carry out a test program to compare currently deployed armored vehicles withnew wheeled vehicles that the Army wants to buy before a third medium weightbrigade can be outfitted. The authorization conference agreement does not include the House-passedmeasure that would require troop withdrawals from Kosovo, though it doesinclude extensive reporting requirements concerning allied burdensharing. Two years ago, gender integrated training was a major issue. | House and the Senate action on annual FY2001 defense funding was completed in December when Congress approved the FY2001 omnibus appropriations bill. In all, Congress provided about$310.0 billion for national defense, including $287.8 billion in the Department of DefenseAppropriations bill. The national defense total is about $4.7 billion above the Administration'srequest.
The conference agreement on the FY2001 Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations/Omnibus appropriations bill, H.R. 4577 , approved in the House and Senate on December 15,provides some additional FY2001 funds for the Department of Defense, including $150 million torepair the USS Cole, $100 million for classified programs related to operations overseas, and $43.5million for military construction. Section 1403 of the bill also makes an across-the-board cut of0.22% in all FY2001 discretionary funds, including defense, though military personnel funding isexempted from the reduction. In all, this will reduce FY2001 defense funding by $520 million.
On October 11, the House approved an a conference agreement on the FY2001 defense authorization bill, H.R. 4205 , by a vote of 382-31. The Senate approved the agreementon October 12 by a vote of 90-3. The President signed the bill into law on October 30 ( P.L.106-398 ). A conference agreement on the defense appropriations bill, H.R. 4576 , wasapproved in the House on July 19 and in the Senate on July 27, and the President signed the bill onAugust 9 ( P.L. 106-259 ). Earlier the House and the Senate approved a conference agreement on theFY2001 military construction appropriations bill, H.R. 4425 , and the President signedthe measure into law on July 13 ( P.L. 106-246 ). This bill includes supplemental appropriations forFY2000 military operations in Kosovo and Colombia, for increased fuel and medical care costs, andfor some other defense programs.
In action on key issues, authorization conferees agreed to (1) provide a permanent guarantee of health care for Medicare-eligible military retirees that was included in the Senate bill, but thatexpired after two years; (2) provide compensation for workers made ill by exposure to toxicmaterials in the nation's nuclear weapons program; (3) drop a House-passed provision mandatingtroop withdrawals from Kosovo if allies do not meet burdensharing commitments (though the billincludes extensive reporting requirements); and (4) drop anti-hate crimes legislation that wasattached to the Senate-passed bill. The retiree health care measure will make all military retireeseligible for health care through the military health care system. Conferees also agreed to acomprehensive retail and mail-order pharmacy benefit. According to preliminary CBO estimates,the bill's retiree health care provisions will cost $40 billion more over the next 10-years than benefitsDOD currently provides.
Several major weapons programs also received attention in this year's defense debate. The authorization and appropriations conference agreements reduced funding for the Joint Strike Fighterbecause of program delays. The authorization and appropriations bills also approved additionalfunding for the Army's "transformation" plan, including funds to equip a second medium-weightbrigade in FY2001. The authorization conference, however, included a requirement that the Armycarry out additional comparative testing of armored vehicles before outfitting a third brigade.
Key Policy Staff
Abbreviations:
FDT = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
G&F = Government and Finance Division
RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry Division |
crs_95-387 | crs_95-387_0 | Issue
Language in the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 that would expand coverage of government-funded abortions provided via military health care to cases of rape and incest was included in the conference report and signed into law. This memorandum directed a change in policy so that abortions could be performed at military medical facilities provided that the procedure was "privately funded." Although the President's interpretation of the language was arguably consistent with the letter of the law, critics contend that it countermanded the spirit of the statute and is overly broad. On December 1, 1995, P.L. 104-61 was enacted. On February 10, 1996, P.L. 104-106 was enacted. As noted above, language has been included in the Senate version of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act that would expand the availability of government-funded abortion to cases where the pregnancy was the result of an act of rape or incest. These abortions were privately paid for. In 1980, the language included in the FY1981 DOD appropriations act was again modified as follows:
None of the funds appropriated by this Act shall be used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victim of rape or incest, when such rape has within seventy-two hours been reported to a law enforcement agency or public health service; nor are payments prohibited for drugs or devices to prevent implantation of the fertilized ovum, or for medical procedures necessary for the termination of an ectopic pregnancy: Provided, however, That the several States are and shall remain free not to fund abortions to the extent that they in their sole discretion deem appropriate. A number of reasons have been advanced to explain this general unwillingness by health care personnel in uniform to perform these procedures. DOD respects host nation laws regarding abortion." None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to administer any policy that permits the performance of abortions at medical treatment or other facilities of the Department of Defense, except when it is made known to the federal official having authority to obligate or expend such funds that the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term: Provided, That the provisions of this section shall enter into force if specifically authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996. 104-406]." In 1998, the House National Security Committee rejected another attempt to allow for privately funded abortions at these facilities. H.R. This amendment would have limited the restriction on the use of DOD facilities for performing abortions at those facilities "in the United States." Neither S.Amdt. Availability of Abortion Services at Military Facilities Overseas
According to Department of Defense and individual command officials (as reported to the Army Times , September 5, 1994: 18; source: Defense Department and individual command officials), the availability of abortion services (prior to the restrictions enacted on December 1, 1995) at military facilities overseas could vary depending on location. Local U.S. military policy: Under German law, abortions are illegal except in cases of rape or medical necessity. The military does not allow abortions at its facilities. ITALY
National policy: Abortions are permitted. Abortions are not performed at military hospitals. | In 1993, President Clinton modified the military policy on providing abortions at military medical facilities. Under the change directed by the President, military medical facilities were allowed to perform abortions if paid for entirely with non-Department of Defense (DOD) funds (i.e., privately funded). Although arguably consistent with statutory language barring the use of Defense Department funds, the President's policy overturned a former interpretation of existing law barring the availability of these services. On December 1, 1995, H.R. 2126, the FY1996 DOD appropriations act, became law (P.L. 104-61). Included in this law was language barring the use of funds to administer any policy that permits the performance of abortions at any DOD facility except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term or where the pregnancy resulted from an act of rape or incest. Language was also included in the FY1996 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 104-106, February 10, 1996) prohibiting the use of DOD facilities in the performance of abortions. These served to reverse the President's 1993 policy change.
Over the last three decades, the availability of abortion services at military medical facilities has been subjected to numerous changes and interpretations. Within the last 15 years, Congress has considered numerous amendments to effectuate such changes.
Abortions are generally not performed at military medical facilities in the continental United States. In addition, few have been performed at these facilities abroad for a number of reasons. First, the U.S. military follows the prevailing laws and rules of foreign countries regarding abortion. Second, the military has had a difficult time finding health care professionals in uniform willing to perform the procedure.
With the enactment of P.L. 104-61 and P.L. 104-106, these questions became moot, because then, neither DOD funds nor facilities could be used to administer any policy that provides for abortions at any DOD facility, except where the life of the mother may be endangered if the fetus were carried to term. Privately funded abortions at military facilities are permitted when the pregnancy was the result of an act of rape or incest.
In 2011, attempts to expand coverage for cases of rape and incest and allow for privately funded abortion were blocked in the Senate.
Language in the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 that would expand coverage of government-funded abortions for cases of rape and incest was included in the conference report and signed into law. |
crs_R40527 | crs_R40527_0 | Introduction
In August 2008, the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA) was enacted in response to consumer alarm about the safety of toys and children's products and concern about the effectiveness of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and of the statutory and regulatory framework for consumer product safety. In addition to strengthening the regulatory and enforcement authority of the CPSC, the new law established new safety standards, such as those for lead content and phthalates, and testing and certification requirements, focusing particularly on children's products. A range of implementation issues have arisen. New safety standards and testing and certification requirements have caused confusion and concern about possible exemptions to and appropriate compliance with new standards, compliance with testing and certification requirements, and disputes about CPSC interpretation of new standards. | This report will present an overview of issues regarding the implementation of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA). In addition to strengthening the regulatory and enforcement authority of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the new law established new safety standards, such as those for lead content and phthalates, and testing and certification requirements, focusing particularly on children's products. A range of implementation issues have arisen, including uncertainty about possible exemptions to and appropriate compliance with new standards, compliance with testing and certification requirements, disputes about Commission interpretation of new standards, and the particular concerns of small businesses and of non-profit resellers.
For a summary of the provisions in the CPSIA, including those not described in this report, see CRS Report RL34684, Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008: P.L. 110-314, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43248 | crs_R43248_0 | Overview
The statutory framework for the communications sector largely was enacted prior to the commercial deployment of digital technology. The expert agencies charged with implementing the relevant statutes—the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Copyright Office—have had to determine if and how to apply the law to technologies and circumstances that were not considered by Congress. Frequently, their decisions have led to litigation, requiring the courts to rule with limited guidance from the statutes. This has led to long delays in the rule implementation and increased market uncertainty. These new technologies have driven changes in market structure throughout the communications sector that were not contemplated by the 1996 Act. Technological spillovers have allowed for the convergence of previously service-specific networks, creating new competitive entry opportunities. But they also have created certain incentives for market consolidation. Firms also have used new technologies to attempt to "invent around" statutory obligations or prohibitions, such as retransmission consent and copyright requirements. In addition, firms have developed new technologies that allow consumers to avoid paying for programming or to skip the commercials that accompany video programming, challenging traditional business models. Members on both sides of the aisle as well as industry stakeholders have suggested that many existing provisions in the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and in the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, need to be updated to address current technological and market circumstances. There is no consensus about the changes needed. Three broad, interrelated policy issues are likely to be prominent in any policy debate over how to update the statutory framework:
how to accommodate technological change that already has taken place and, more dynamically, how to make the framework flexible enough to accommodate future technological change; given that underlying scale economies allow for only a very small number of efficient facilities-based network competitors, how to give those few network providers the incentive to invest and innovate while also constraining their ability to impede downstream competition from independent service providers who must use their networks; and given that spectrum is an essential communications input, how to implement a framework that fosters efficient spectrum use and management. | The statutory framework for the communications sector largely was enacted prior to the commercial development and deployment of digital technology, Internet Protocol (IP), broadband networks, and online voice, data, and video services. These new technologies have driven changes in market structure throughout the communications sector. Technological spillovers have allowed for the convergence of previously service-specific networks, creating new competitive entry opportunities. But they also have created certain incentives for market consolidation. Firms also have used new technologies to attempt to "invent around" statutory obligations or prohibitions, such as retransmission consent and copyright requirements. In addition, firms have developed new technologies that are attractive to consumers because they allow them to avoid paying for programming or allow them to skip the commercials that accompany video programming, but present a challenge to the traditional business model.
The expert agencies charged with implementing the relevant statutes—the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Copyright Office—have had to determine if and how to apply the law to technologies and circumstances that were not considered when the statutes were developed. Frequently, this has led parties unhappy with those interpretations to file court suits, which has delayed rule implementation and increased market uncertainty. The courts, too, have had to reach decisions with limited guidance from the statutes.
Members on both sides of the aisle as well as industry stakeholders have suggested that many existing provisions in the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and in the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, need to be updated to address current technological and market circumstances, though there is no consensus about the changes needed. Three broad, interrelated policy issues are likely to be prominent in any policy debate over how to update the statutory framework:
how to accommodate technological change that already has taken place and, more dynamically, how to make the framework flexible enough to accommodate future technological change; given that underlying scale economies allow for only a very small number of efficient facilities-based network competitors, how to give those few network providers the incentive to invest and innovate while also constraining their ability to impede downstream competition from independent service providers that must use their networks; and given that spectrum is an essential communications input, how to implement a framework that fosters efficient spectrum use and management. |
crs_R41238 | crs_R41238_0 | As a result of subsequent military action, particularly in Afghanistan, the United States captured numerous persons whom it suspected of ties to Al Qaeda or the Taliban—groups alleged to have perpetrated the 9/11 attacks or to have aided the perpetrators. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. What legal frameworks limit the Executive's authority to detain and try persons captured in a military conflict as it sees fit? In what circumstances may Congress limit the federal courts' jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus? Justice Stevens has been a key player in the Supreme Court's resolution of such questions. He authored majority opinions in two significant cases, Rasul v. Bush and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld . This view of the habeas writ's historical role appeared to inform Justice Stevens's approach in post-9/11 cases. The dissenting opinion articulated the most restrictive view of executive power among the various opinions. Rasul v. Bush
After 9/11, numerous Guantanamo detainees submitted habeas petitions in federal courts to challenge their detentions. In several cases predating the habeas statute, the Court upheld federal courts' jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus challenging wartime detentions. He challenged the planned military commission proceeding, arguing that (1) the Executive lacked the authority under existing statutes and the laws of war to use a military commission as the forum for a trial for the crime of conspiracy; and (2) the military commission procedures violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (i.e., Chapter 47 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code) and the Geneva Convention, under which he was entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito wrote dissenting opinions. | Justice John Paul Stevens played a pivotal role in determining the scope of executive-branch power in a post-9/11 world. After 9/11, Congress quickly authorized the Executive to respond to the terrorist attacks using military force. Difficult legal questions emerged from the consequences of the ensuing military actions, particularly as suspected members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban were captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere and transferred to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Key questions included: What legal authorities restrict the Executive's ability to detain and try such persons as it sees fit? To what extent do detainees outside of the United States have the right to challenge their detentions in federal courts? When may Congress remove federal courts' jurisdiction over habeas cases?
Justice Stevens authored majority opinions in two leading cases, Rasul v. Bush and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which the Court allowed detainees' habeas petitions to proceed and invalidated the early incarnation of military commissions, thereby rejecting the broader views of executive power articulated shortly after the 9/11 attacks. In the cases, his view prevailed over strongly articulated dissenting opinions authored by Justice Scalia and other justices.
For a more in-depth examination of the Supreme Court's post-9/11 decisions regarding habeas corpus, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33836 | crs_RL33836_0 | This report discusses legislation and activity in the 109 th Congress aimed at amending the nation's campaign finance laws, primarily under Titles 2 and 26 of the U.S. Code, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)—the main body of law governing federal campaign finance. Highlights of 109th Congress Legislative Activity
During the 109 th Congress, 51 bills were introduced (43 in the House and 8 in the Senate) to change federal campaign finance law. Legislation relating to 527 organizations received the most prominent legislative and media attention during the 109 th Congress. 527 Issue
The 109 th Congress followed the 2004 elections, during which an estimated $435 million was spent by political organizations operating under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, but outside federal election law regulation. On March 8, 2005, the Senate Rules and Administration Committee held a hearing on S. 271 (McCain-Feingold-Lott), the 527 Reform Act of 2005, to require that 527s involved in federal elections comply fully with federal election law. On May 17, the bill was reported as an original bill— S. 1053 —and placed on the Senate's legislative calendar. The Senate took no further action on the measure. It focused on two measures: H.R. 1316 sought to address the 527 issue indirectly, by loosening restrictions on funding sources within FECA. 513 and H.R. Almost a year later, on April 5, 2006, the House passed H.R. 513 was also incorporated into the House Republican leadership's lobbying and ethics reform bill— H.R. 513 as reported by the House Administration Committee. 4975 , the House substituted it for the text of S. 2349 , the Senate-passed version of the bill, to enable a conference with the Senate. The Senate-passed bill did not contain the 527 provisions, and disagreement between the two chambers on the 527 issue reportedly contributed to the 109 th Congress enacting neither lobby reform nor 527 regulation legislation. 4975 , the lobby reform bill. Major Reforms Proposed, by Category
As explained previously, campaign finance bills introduced in the 109 th Congress covered a wide range of topics. The 13 th contains proposals to change the presidential public funding system. The 14 th —" Miscellaneous"—contains all other proposals. Those few bills that addressed it in the 109 th Congress generally sought to adjust existing restrictions. 4759 (Doolittle)—regarding impact of regulation of campaign financing
H.R. These headings are the same categories used throughout this report. May 3, passed House (217-213). S. 2511 (McCain)—527 Reform Act of 2005
Soft Money: Non-Party
Would have included in definition of "political committee" any 527 organization, unless it: (1) had annual gross receipts of less than $25,000; (2) was a political committee of a state or local party or candidate; (3) existed solely to pay certain administrative expenses or expenses of a qualified newsletter; (4) was composed solely of state or local officeholders or candidates whose voter drive activities referred only to state/local candidates and parties; or (5) was exclusively devoted to elections where no federal candidate was on ballot, to non-federal elections, ballot issues, or to selection of non-elected officials; Would have made last exemption (above) inapplicable if the 527 organization spent more than $1,000 for: (1) public communications that promoted, supported, attacked, or opposed a clearly identified federal candidate within one year of the general election in which that candidate was seeking office; or (2) for any voter drive effort conducted by a group in a calendar year, unless: (a) sponsor confined activity solely to one state; (b) non-federal candidates were referred to in all voter drive activities and no federal candidate or party was referred to in any substantive way; (c) no federal candidate or officeholder or national party official/agent was involved in organization's direction, funding, or spending; AND (d) no contributions were made by the group to federal candidates; Would have required political committees (but not candidate or party committees) that made disbursements for voter mobilization activities or public communications that affected both federal and non-federal elections to use generally at least 50% hard money from federal accounts to finance such activities (but would have required that 100% of public communications and voter drive activities that referred to only federal candidates be financed with hard money from a federal account, regardless of whether the communication referred to a political party); in effect, this would have codified the 2005 FEC regulations on this topic and made them applicable to 527s not affected by current rules; Would have allowed contributions to non-federal accounts making allocations (above) only by individuals and subject to limit of $25,000 per year; would have prohibited fundraising for such accounts by national parties and officials and federal candidates and officeholders; Stated that this act was to have no bearing on FEC regulations, on any definitions of political organizations in Internal Revenue Code, or on any determination of whether a 501(c) tax-exempt organization might be a political committee under FECA; Would have provided special expedited judicial review procedures, similar to BCRA's, for a challenge on constitutional grounds, and would have allowed any Member to bring or intervene in any such case; Declared that if any provision were deemed unconstitutional, the rest of the act would not be affected. | During the 109th Congress, 51 bills were introduced to change the nation's campaign finance laws (primarily under Titles 2 and 26 of the U.S. Code). These bills—43 in the House and 8 in the Senate—sought to change the current system, including tightening perceived loopholes. Two of those bills passed the House, but no bill passed both chambers. Therefore, no statutory changes occurred in federal campaign finance law during the 109th Congress.
Although the 109th Congress chose not to enact campaign finance legislation, Congress nonetheless considered dozens of bills addressing a wide variety of topics. In summarizing that legislation, this report identifies 14 major topics (categories) addressed in the bills. These categories are diverse, ranging from changing individual contribution limits to regulating independent expenditures. Although some bills called for increased regulation, others proposed less regulation. Hence, legislative activity during the 109th Congress reflected a long-standing debate in campaign finance policy over extending regulation of campaign finance practices versus limiting the reach of such regulation.
The most prominent legislation introduced during the 109th Congress—and that which advanced farthest through the legislative process—focused on political organizations operating under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, but outside federal election law. Sponsors of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) offered bills to require that "527s" (as these organizations are popularly known) involved in federal elections comply fully with federal election law. The Senate Rules and Administration Committee reported such a measure—S. 1053—in May 2005, but no further action occurred in the Senate. The House Administration Committee reported two 527 bills with starkly different approaches: H.R. 513—the 527 Reform Act of 2005, the counterpart to S. 1053—and H.R. 1316, which sought to address the 527 issue indirectly by loosening restrictions on funding sources permitted under federal campaign finance law. In April 2006, the House passed H.R. 513, as amended, but the Senate took no action on the bill.
Legislation proposing 527 reform later became a component of the 109th Congress debate over lobbying reform. The text of H.R. 513 was eventually incorporated into the House Republican leadership's lobbying and ethics reform bill—H.R. 4975, which passed the House in May 2006. The Senate-passed lobbying bill did not contain the 527 provisions. Disagreement between the two chambers on the 527 issue reportedly contributed to neither lobbying reform nor 527 regulation legislation being enacted during the 109th Congress.
This report will not be updated, because it reflects the complete record of 109th Congress proposals and activity in this area. It may be used to provide a basis for legislation that could be offered in the 110th Congress. |
crs_R43963 | crs_R43963_0 | The Department of Energy's Office of Science conducts basic research in six overarching program areas: advanced scientific computing research, basic energy sciences, biological and environmental research, fusion energy sciences, high-energy physics, and nuclear physics. Through primarily these programs, the Department of Energy was the third-largest federal funder of basic research and the largest federal funder of research in the physical sciences in FY2014. This budget and appropriations tracking report describes selected major items from the Administration's FY2016 budget request for the Science account, which funds the Office of Science, and tracks legislative action on FY2016 appropriations. It also provides selected historical funding data. These tables will be updated to include Senate-passed (if available) and final enacted FY2016 appropriations. FY2016 Science Budget Request and Appropriations
The Obama Administration has requested $5.340 billion for Science in FY2016, a $272 million (5%) increase over the FY2015 enacted level of $5.068 billion. By dollar amount, the largest increase in the FY2016 Science budget request is for Basic Energy Sciences (BES), which would gain $116 million (7%). The largest decrease is for Fusion Energy Sciences (FES), which would decline by $48 million (-10%). By percentage, the largest increase among Science's research programs would go to Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR), which would receive $80 million (15%) more in FY2016. The House-passed Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 ( H.R. 2028 ) would provide $5.100 billion for Science in FY2016. This amount is $29 million (1%) more than the FY2015 enacted funding level and $240 million (-4%) less than the Administration's request. By dollar amount, the largest increase (over FY2015) in the House recommendation is for Basic Energy Sciences ($37 million). The largest percentage increase in the House recommendation is for Nuclear Physics (3%). Biological and Environmental Research would be reduced the most, measured by both amount and percentage change (-$54 million or -9%). The White House Office of Management and Budget issued a "Statement of Administration Policy" opposing H.R. As amended and reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, H.R. 2028 would provide $5.144 billion for the Science account in FY2016. This amount is $73 million (1%) more than the FY2015 enacted funding level, $196 million (-4%) less than the FY2016 Administration request, and $44 million (1%) more than the House-passed funding level. By dollar amount, the largest increase (over FY2015) in the Senate recommendation is for Basic Energy Sciences ($111 million); by percentage, the largest increase is for Advanced Scientific Computing Research (15%). The largest decrease—by both amount and percentage—would go to Fusion Energy Sciences ($197 million, -42%). The Senate Appropriations Committee recommends U.S. withdrawal from the international fusion energy project known as ITER. | The Department of Energy's Office of Science conducts basic research in six overarching program areas: advanced scientific computing research, basic energy sciences, biological and environmental research, fusion energy sciences, high-energy physics, and nuclear physics. Through primarily these programs, the Department of Energy was the third-largest federal funder of basic research and the largest federal funder of research in the physical sciences in FY2014.
This budget and appropriations tracking report describes selected major items from the Administration's FY2016 budget request for the Office of Science and tracks legislative action on FY2016 appropriations for the office. It also provides selected historical funding data. This report has been updated to include House-passed and Senate-proposed amounts for FY2016. It will be updated to include Senate-passed (if available) and final enacted FY2016 appropriations.
Overall, the Obama Administration requests $5.340 billion for Science in FY2016, a $272 million (5%) increase over the FY2015 enacted level of $5.068 billion. By dollar amount, the largest increase is for Basic Energy Sciences (BES), which would gain $116 million (7%). The largest decrease is for Fusion Energy Sciences (FES), which would be reduced by $48 million (-10%). By percentage, the largest increase among Science's research programs would go to Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR), which would receive $80 million (15%) more in FY2016.
The House-passed Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2028) would provide $5.100 billion for the Science account in FY2016. This amount is $29 million (1%) more than the FY2015 enacted funding level and $240 million (-4%) less than the Administration's request. By dollar amount, the largest increase (over FY2015) in the House recommendation is for Basic Energy Sciences ($37 million). The largest percentage increase in the House recommendation is for Nuclear Physics (3%). Biological and Environmental Research would be reduced the most, measured by both amount and percentage change (-$54 million or -9%). The White House Office of Management and Budget issued a "Statement of Administration Policy" opposing H.R. 2028, in part due to Office of Science funding levels.
As amended and reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, H.R. 2028 would provide $5.144 billion for the Science account in FY2016. This amount is $73 million (1%) more than the FY2015 enacted funding level, $196 million (-4%) less than the FY2016 Administration request, and $44 million (1%) more than the House-passed funding level. By dollar amount, the largest increase (over FY2015) in the Senate Appropriations Committee recommendation is for Basic Energy Sciences ($111 million); by percentage, the largest increase is for Advanced Scientific Computing Research (15%). The largest decrease—by both amount and percentage—is for Fusion Energy Sciences ($197 million, -42%). The Senate Appropriations Committee recommends U.S. withdrawal from the international fusion energy project known as ITER. |
crs_RL33466 | crs_RL33466_0 | On May 18 the House passed H.R. 5386 in June. 5386 and most other FY2007 appropriations bills for domestic agencies and departments did not occur before Congress adjourned sine die in December, thus delaying this legislative activity to the beginning of the 110 th Congress. Programs are administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), while state and local governments have the principal day-to-day responsibility for implementing the law. The last major amendments to the law were contained in the Water Quality Act of 1987 ( P.L. Among its many provisions, the 1987 legislation (1) established a comprehensive program for controlling toxic pollutant discharges, beyond that already provided in the act, to respond to so-called "toxic hot spots"; (2) added a program requiring states to develop and implement programs to control nonpoint sources of pollution, or rainfall runoff from farm and urban areas, plus construction, forestry, and mining sites; (3) authorized a total of $18 billion for wastewater treatment assistance under a combination of the act's traditional construction grants program and a new program of grants to capitalize state revolving funds; (4) authorized or modified a number of programs to address water pollution problems in diverse geographic areas such as coastal estuaries, the Great Lakes, and the Chesapeake Bay; and (5) revised many of the act's regulatory, permit, and enforcement programs. 100-4 . Three sets of issues have been the focus of attention regarding the pace and effectiveness of implementation: the toxic pollutant control provisions, nonpoint pollution management provisions, and the state revolving fund provisions to transfer wastewater treatment funding responsibility to the states after 1994. Congressional oversight of the act's implementation during this time has been wide-ranging, extending from review of the state and needs of the nation's wastewater infrastructure, to CWA enforcement, implementation of wetlands protection and regulatory efforts, and examination of various EPA policies and programs. Yet, as industrial and municipal sources have abated pollution, uncontrolled nonpoint sources have become a relatively larger portion of remaining water quality problems—perhaps contributing as much as 50% of the nation's water pollution. At issue today is what progress is being made to manage nonpoint source pollution and what additional efforts may be needed involving Section 319 or other public and private activities. Program Changes
In the mid-1990s, EPA and states negotiated changes intended to give the 319 program a new framework by giving states more flexibility. Thus, for many years there was little implementation of the provision that Congress enacted in 1972. EPA and state officials have been concerned about diverting resources from other high-priority water quality activities in order to meet the courts' orders. Other Issues
A number of other issues affecting efforts to achieve the goals and objectives of the Clean Water Act continue to receive attention, as well. Advocates of the SRF program (especially state and local government officials) contended that the cuts would impair their ability to carry out needed municipal wastewater treatment plant improvement projects. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved the same funding level for clean water SRF grants when it reported H.R. The amount included in both bills for these clean water grants is significant because, if enacted at that level in a final FY2007 measure, it would be first time since FY1997 that Congress has not appropriated more than was requested in the President's budget. The final measure included $900 million for these grants—$170 million more than requested by the President for 2006. | Congress enacted the last major amendments to the Clean Water Act in 1987 (P.L. 100-4). Since then, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), states, and others have been working to implement the many program changes and additions mandated in the law. At issue today—more than 30 years after enactment of the core law—is what progress is being made to achieve its goals. In general, states and environmental groups fault EPA for delays in issuing guidance and providing assistance to carry out the law. EPA and others are critical of states, in turn, for not reaching beyond conventional knowledge and approaches to address their water quality problems. Environmental advocates have been criticized for insufficient recognition of EPA's and states' need for flexibility to implement the act. Finally, Congress has been criticized for not providing adequate resources to meet EPA and state needs. Appropriations for clean water programs, especially water infrastructure, are a continuing issue.
Three issues have predominated recently in connection with implementation of the law. The first involves funding to construct municipal wastewater treatment plants under the state revolving fund (SRF) provisions of the 1987 amendments. Budgetary constraints on federal aid for wastewater treatment and large remaining funding needs are long-standing concerns. The President's FY2007 budget requested $688 million for these SRF grants, 22% less than FY2006 funding, and in May 2006 the House passed legislation providing the level requested by the President (H.R. 5386). The Senate Appropriations Committee approved the same level in June. Final action did not occur before the 109th Congress adjourned in December, thus carrying over this legislative activity to the beginning of the 110th Congress.
The second issue involves progress in implementing the nonpoint pollution management provisions added in 1987. States have developed management programs describing methods that will be used to reduce nonpoint pollution, which may be responsible for as much as 50% of the nation's remaining water quality problems. Most observers agree that implementation of nonpoint source control measures is significantly hindered by limited resources. EPA has adopted program guidance intended to give states more flexibility and to speed up progress in nonpoint source control. The third issue is impacts of requirements under current law for states to develop total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) in order to address uncontrolled sources of impairment in waters that have not yet achieved water quality standards. In addition, other issues exist that are important to implementation and attaining the goals and objectives of the act. They include efforts to manage overflows of untreated wastewater from municipal sewer systems, and questions about the effectiveness and costs of the nation's wetlands protection efforts, particularly in relation to the wetlands permit program in Section 404 of the act. Congressional oversight of these issues in the 110th Congress is anticipated. |
crs_R42794 | crs_R42794_0 | Introduction
Under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, states, territories, and tribes are entitled to claim partial federal reimbursement for the cost of providing foster care, adoption assistance, and kinship guardianship assistance to children who meet federal eligibility criteria. The Title IV-E program, as it is commonly called, provides support for monthly payments on behalf of eligible children, as well as funds for related case management activities, training, data collection, and other costs of program administration. For FY2013, states spent $12.3 billion under the Title IV-E program and expected to receive federal reimbursement of $6.7 billion, or 54% of that spending. To be eligible to claim federal support under the Title IV-E program, a state, territory, or tribe must have a Title IV-E plan that is approved by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF). Spending related to meeting these requirements is included as part of the foster care case planning and pre-placement activities; licensing, recruitment, and background check category shown in Figure 1 . Overview of Requirements Related to Children's Safety, Permanence, and Well-Being
Apart from providing assistance to eligible children, the state, territorial, or tribal agency operating a Title IV-E program must have an approved Title IV-E plan that provides for policies and procedures to accomplish the following nine purposes:
Enable children to be reunited with their families or prevent their entry to foster care (e.g., by making "reasonable efforts"—in nearly all cases—to prevent children's entry into foster care or to reunite children with their families, including by developing a plan for each child that describes services and activities necessary to permit reunification). For an overview of case review components, including case planning and permanency planning requirements, see Figure 2 at the end of this report. Further, the law changes the language of current policy to indicate these services (as well as those previously provided for in the law) are intended to ensure a youth may make a successful transition from foster care to adulthood. Children and Youth to Whom the Procedures Apply
The procedures to identify, document in agency records, and determine services for victims of, or those at risk of, sex trafficking must apply to all children in the care, placement, or supervision of the state child welfare agency, including
c hildren who are in foster care and under age 18 (or up to any age under 21, if the state has elected to serve such older youth with Title IV-E foster care assistance); children (under age 18) who are not in foster care but for whom the agency has an open case file; youth (up to age 21, or 23 in limited circumstances) who are receiving services under the Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP); and children who run away from foster care, provided they have not reached the age at which the state ends Title IV-E assistance (or have not been formally discharged from care). The population of children and youth who run away or are missing from care is varied. | Under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, states, territories, and tribes are entitled to claim partial federal reimbursement for the cost of providing foster care, adoption assistance, and kinship guardianship assistance to children who meet federal eligibility criteria. The Title IV-E program, as it is commonly called, provides support for monthly payments on behalf of eligible children, as well as funds for related case management activities, training, data collection, and other costs of program administration. For FY2013, states spent $12.3 billion under the Title IV-E program (both federal and state dollars); at least 25% of this spending (some $3.1 billion) was expended for the types of "administrative" program costs described in this report, including case planning and pre-placement activities related to children in or entering foster care, as well as licensing, recruitment, and background checks and other costs related to foster care providers.
As a condition of receiving this funding, states, territories, and tribes must have a Title IV-E plan that is approved by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families. That plan must ensure direct financial assistance is made available to eligible children under the Title IV-E program. Further, it must ensure that the state, territory, or tribe will adhere to federal plan requirements primarily intended to ensure children's safety, permanence, and well-being.
The focus of this report is Title IV-E plan requirements other than those related to provision of direct financial assistance to eligible children. Those requirements are intended to (1) enable children to be reunited with their families or prevent their entry to foster care; (2) promote children's placement with relatives and maintain sibling connections; (3) ensure children's living arrangements are safe and appropriate and permit "normalcy"; (4) provide for regular oversight and review of each child's status in foster care and timely development and implementation of a permanency plan; (5) ensure timely efforts to find a permanent home for children or youth who cannot be reunited with their families; (6) ensure the health care and education needs of children in foster care are addressed; (7) help youth make a successful transition from foster care to adulthood; (8) identify, document, and determine services necessary for child welfare-involved children or youth who are victims (or at risk of) of sex trafficking and locate and respond to children or youth who run away or are missing from foster care; and (9) ensure program coordination and collaboration and meet certain administrative standards. |
crs_RS22979 | crs_RS22979_0 | From enactment of the PTA in 1964 through the presidential transition of 2008-2009, most PTA-authorized support was provided after the election of the incoming President and Vice President. The Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010 amended the PTA and included several other provisions to provide additional support to eligible candidates for pre-election transition planning. These provisions had effect for the first time during the 2012 presidential election. The Edward "Ted" Kaufman and Michael Leavitt Presidential Transitions Improvements Act of 2015 (PTIA)—enacted on March 18, 2016—incorporated some provisions of the 2010 law, with modifications, into the PTA. It also further amended the PTA with provisions for pre-election transition support for presidential candidates. A general provision of the PTA authorizes the General Services Administration (GSA) Administrator (Administrator) to spend PTA-authorized funds for the provision of most of the specified "services and facilities ... in connection with ... obligations incurred by the President-elect or Vice-President-elect" between the day following the general election and 180 days after the inauguration. Funding for 2016-2017
The President's FY2016 budget request for GSA included $13.278 million in funding for activities authorized by the Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010 in anticipation of the 2016-2017 presidential transition. These recommendations were endorsed by Congress and included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, which was enacted on December 18, 2015. The President's FY2017 budget request for GSA included $9.5 million for PTA-related activities. The budget request for the Office of Administration in the Executive Office of the President included $7.582 million for PTA-related activities "and similar expenses." Each of these two requests was funded at the proposed level in the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017. It directs the President and the incumbent Administration to establish a specified transition-related organizational infrastructure, with some features ongoing and others operational during a presidential election year only. The PTA also authorizes the incumbent Administration to provide certain pre-election transition support for eligible candidates (as defined below). In addition, the PTA authorizes eligible candidates to fund pre-election transition activities through their campaigns. The statute also establishes a process for designating and preparing career officials who will likely act as agency leaders during the transition process. It further provides for the negotiation, before the election, of memoranda of understanding between the incumbent President and eligible candidates concerning post-election transition matters. A second provision of the 2004 act pertains to expedited security clearances for transition team members. Post-election Support
Once the President-elect and Vice President-elect have been ascertained by the Administrator, the PTA authorizes the Administrator to provide—to the President-elect and Vice President-elect—certain facilities, funds, and services to prepare for future duties, including the following:
Suitable office space appropriately equipped with furniture, furnishings, office machines and equipment, and office supplies; Payment of the compensation of members of office staffs designated by the President-elect or Vice President-elect; Payment of expenses for the procurement of services of experts or consultants or organizations thereof for the President-elect or Vice President-elect; Payment of travel expenses and subsistence allowances, including rental of Government or hired motor vehicles; When requested by [one of the incoming officers or a designee], and approved by the President, Government aircraft ... for transition purposes on a reimbursable basis; [W]hen requested by [one of the incoming officers or a designee], aircraft ... chartered for transition purposes; Communications services; and Payment of expenses for printing and binding. As noted earlier, the PTA also sets limitations on transition-related donations as a condition for receiving services and funds under the act. | The Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (PTA) authorizes funding for the General Services Administration (GSA) to provide suitable office space, staff compensation, and other services associated with the presidential transition process (3 U.S.C. §102 note). The act has been amended a number of times since 1963 in response to evolving understandings of the proper role of the government in the transition process. Since the 2008-2009 transition, the PTA has been amended twice. The Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-283) did so by authorizing additional support to eligible candidates for pre-election transition planning. The 2010 act also included related provisions that were not included as part of the PTA at that time. The Edward "Ted" Kaufman and Michael Leavitt Presidential Transitions Improvements Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-136), enacted on March 18, 2016, incorporated some provisions of the 2010 law, with modifications, into the PTA. It also further amended the PTA with additional provisions for pre-election transition support for eligible presidential candidates.
As amended, the PTA directs the President and the incumbent Administration to establish a specified transition-related infrastructure, with some features ongoing and others during a presidential election year only. It also authorizes the provision by the incumbent Administration of certain pre-election transition support for eligible candidates. In addition, the PTA authorizes eligible candidates to fund pre-election transition activities through their campaigns. The statute also establishes a process for designating and preparing career officials who will act as agency leaders during the transition process. It further provides for the negotiation, before the election, of memoranda of understanding between the incumbent President and eligible candidates concerning post-election transition matters. Once the President-elect and Vice President-elect have been ascertained by the GSA Administrator, the PTA authorizes the Administrator to provide, to each President-elect and Vice President-elect, certain facilities, funds, and services, such as office space and payment for office staffs and travel expenses.
In order to receive services and funds under the act, eligible candidates, Presidents-elect, and Vice Presidents-elect are required to adhere to certain transition-related contribution limits and disclosure requirements.
Other provisions of the PTA provide for expedited security clearance processes for transition team members and the incoming President's top appointees.
In general, presidential transition activities under these statutes are coordinated by the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
The President's FY2016 budget proposal for GSA included a request for $13.278 million in funding for activities authorized by the Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010 in anticipation of the 2016-2017 presidential transition. These requests were endorsed by Congress and included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, which was enacted on December 18, 2015 (P.L. 114-113). The President's FY2017 budget proposal for GSA included a request for $9.5 million for PTA-related activities. The budget request for the Executive Office of the President included $7.582 million for PTA-related activities "and similar expenses." Each of these two requests was funded at the proposed level in the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017.
From enactment of the PTA in 1964 (P.L. 88-277) through the presidential transition of 2008-2009, much of the PTA-authorized and -funded support was provided after the election of the incoming President and Vice President. The pre-election-related provisions enacted in 2010 had effect for the first time during the 2012 presidential election cycle, and those provisions enacted in 2016 will come into effect during the 2016-2017 presidential transition. |
crs_RL31242 | crs_RL31242_0 | These funds are distributed based on the amount of eligible foster care or adoption assistance claims submitted by states (under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act), or via statutory formula for child welfare-related activities, including screening and investigation of child abuse and neglect reports; family support, preservation, and reunification services; adoption promotion and support services; and independent living services and other support for current and former foster care youths. Viewed together, these statutory program requirements comprise federal child welfare policy, and are the fundamental basis on which state compliance with federal child welfare requirements rests. Changes Enacted by the 109th Congress
The 109 th Congress enacted six bills that amended federal child welfare policies included in Title IV-B or Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. Safe and Timely Interstate Placement Act of 2006
This bill ( H.R. 5403 , P.L. 109-239 ) amended Title IV-B and Title IV-E to encourage the expedited placement of foster children into safe and permanent homes across state lines. 4472 , P.L. However, prior law allowed states to "opt out" of the federal criminal records check procedures, and P.L. 109-248 requires all states to check any child abuse and neglect registry they maintain for information about a prospective foster or adoptive parent (and any adult living in their household). The check must be made before approving placement of a foster child in the home (and without regard to whether the state plans to claim Title IV-E support for the child). Further the new law requires states to report on their actual use of funds under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act, increases the funding set-aside from the Safe and Stable Families program for tribal child and family services, and allows access to these funds for more tribes. Additionally states are required to have procedures to respond to and maintain child welfare services in the wake of a disaster and must also describe in their state plan how they consult with medical professionals to assess the health of and provide medical treatment to children in foster care. P.L. 6111 , P.L. P.L. 109-432 also amended Title IV-E to require states to have in effect procedures for verifying the citizenship or immigration status of each child in foster care (whether or not the state claims Title IV-E support for the child). 109-432 also amended Section 1123A of the Social Security Act to specifically require that state compliance with this new federal requirement be checked as part of periodic conformity reviews (e.g. Federal funds for child welfare programs under the Social Security Act and for CAPTA's Basic State Grants and Community-Based Grants for the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect are administered by the Children's Bureau within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Requirements are believed to be current through changes made by the 109 th Congress. Funding is authorized on a discretionary basis. 109-288 ) five broad purposes: (1) to protect and promote the welfare of all children; (2) to prevent the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children; (3) to support at-risk families through services which allow children, where appropriate to remain safely with their families or return to their families in a timely manner; (4) to promote safety, permanence, and well-being of children in foster care and adoptive families; and (5) to provide training, professional development and support to ensure a well-qualified child welfare workforce. The federal government provides funds under these programs on a matching basis (80% federal share). | States have primary responsibility for administering child welfare funds. However, the federal government provides substantial child welfare funding that is contingent on states meeting certain program requirements. The greatest part of federal assistance dedicated to child welfare is included in Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. Programs authorized under these parts of the law provide funds for a range of child welfare services, from family support and preservation to foster care, adoption support and independent living. State compliance with the plan requirements of Title IV-E and Title IV-B is determined primarily via the Child and Family Services Review, (which is authorized by Section 1123A of the Social Security Act). Separately, under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), states receive funds to improve their child protective service systems; to develop and support community-based programs that support and strengthen families to prevent child abuse and neglect; and to improve the handling, investigation, and prosecution of child maltreatment cases.
The 109 th Congress saw the enactment of six bills that amended federal child welfare policies in Title IV-B or Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. S. 1894 ( P.L. 109-113 ) and S. 1932 ( P.L. 109-171 ) changed program eligibility rules for the federal Title IV-E foster care and adoption assistance programs. Each of the remaining bills added to or otherwise amended the Title IV-B or Title IV-E state plan requirements. Under the Title IV-B programs, states are now required (or will be on a specified effective date) to (1) develop standards for the frequency and content of caseworker visits to children in foster care; (2) limit total funds spent for administrative purposes to no more than 10% of the program spending; (3) describe how they consult with medical professionals to assess the health and well-being of foster children and determine their appropriate treatment; (4) have procedures in place to respond to a disaster and to maintain child welfare services at such a time; and (5) to report on the actual use of federal funds received under Title IV-B ( S. 3525 , P.L. 109-288 ). Changes made to the Title IV-E Foster Care and Adoption Assistance programs require all states to (1) establish procedures for the "orderly and timely interstate placement of children," including compliance with specific time frames for conducting home studies requested prior to an interstate placement and for making a decision about the placement ( H.R. 5403 , P.L. 109-239 ); (2) comply with expanded federal procedures to check the criminal records of prospective foster or adoptive parents (as well as primarily civil child abuse and neglect registries) before approving placement of any foster child in a home ( H.R. 4472 , P.L. 109-248 ); and (3) have procedures for verifying the citizenship or immigration status of all children in foster care ( H.R. 6111 , P.L. 109-432 ).
This report summarizes changes made in the 109 th Congress and then categorizes and describes state program requirements (and related definitions) linked to dedicated federal child welfare funds. As a whole, these program requirements constitute federal child welfare policy, and are the fundamental basis on which state conformity with federal law is based. This report will be updated as significant program requirement changes are enacted. |
crs_R44538 | crs_R44538_0 | The bill would authorize states to receive federal support under the Title IV-E foster care and permanency program for services and programs provided to children and their families that are intended to prevent the need for children to enter foster care, by allowing them to remain safely at home with parents, or with kin. At the same time, the bill would restrict the ability of states to claim support for children in foster care who are placed in group settings rather than in foster family homes. Additionally, the bill would extend funding authority for the child and family services programs authorized in Title IV-B of the Social Security Act and it would revise the purposes of, including eligibility for, the Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP) to make them more consistent with the goal of helping all youth who experience foster care at an older age make a successful transition to adulthood. Programs authorized in Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act are administered by the Children's Bureau, which is an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF), Administration on Children, Youth, and Families (ACYF). On June 15, 2016, the House Ways and Means Committee agreed, by unanimous voice vote, to report the bill (Chairman Brady's Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute) favorably to the full House. On June 16, 2016, Senator Hatch, with Senators Wyden, Grassley, and Bennet, introduced the Senate companion ( S. 3065 ) to the Family First Prevention Services Act, as ordered reported by the House Ways and Means Committee. On June 21, 2016, the full House considered and passed H.R. The bill has been widely praised by a diverse group of more than 50 national, state, and local organizations and agencies, including child welfare advocacy groups and agencies representing public child welfare administrators; substance abuse treatment and prevention administrators and providers; pediatricians; social workers; biological parents, kin caregivers, and foster and adoptive parents; and courts and judges, among others. CBO Cost Estimate
CBO estimates that H.R. 5456 would reduce federal direct spending by $66 million over the next 10 fiscal years, FY2017-FY2026. Although certain changes in the bill are expected to increase direct spending, especially related to expanding uses of Title IV-E program funding, CBO estimates those costs would be more than fully offset by other changes that would reduce spending under that same program. 5456 / S. 3065 . Definition of "Qualified Residential Treatment Program"
For purposes of the Title IV-E program, a qualified residential treatment program means a program that meets all of the following requirements:
has a trauma-informed treatment model designed to address the clinical or other needs of children with serious emotional or behavioral disorders or disturbances; is able to implement the specific treatment identified as necessary for a child placed there; has registered or licensed nursing and other licensed clinical staff who are onsite during business hours, available 24/7, and provide care within the scope of their practice (as defined by state law); facilitates outreach to the child's family members (including siblings) and appropriate participation and integration of family members in the child's treatment program; provides post-discharge planning and family-based supports for at least six months after a child's discharge from the treatment center; documents each of these outreach and treatment program activities, including how sibling connections are maintained, and maintains contact information of any known biological family and fictive kin of the child; and is licensed (in accordance with state standards for child care institutions that provide foster care) and accredited by one of three independent and not-for-profit accrediting organizations specified in the bill (or any other independent, not-for-profit accrediting organization approved by the HHS Secretary). | The Family First Prevention Services Act of 2016 (H.R. 5456 and S. 3065) would amend the child welfare programs authorized in the Social Security Act to allow states to receive open-ended federal support under Title IV-E for time-limited services and programs that are intended to prevent the need for children to enter foster care by allowing children to remain safely at home with parents, or with kin. This change would respond to long-standing concern by state administrators, child welfare advocates, and some policymakers that federal child welfare support is largely available only after a child is placed in foster care and that little resources are provided to strengthen and stabilize families to prevent children's removal to foster care.
At the same time, the bill would restrict the ability of states to claim support for children in foster care who are placed in group settings rather than in foster family homes. With limited exceptions, this change would restrict Title IV-E foster care maintenance payment support for children in foster care to those otherwise eligible children placed in foster family homes or those placed in a "qualified residential treatment program" that offers a "treatment model" designed to address the clinical or other needs of children with emotional or behavioral disorders. In its 2015 report on use of "congregate care" in child welfare, the federal Children's Bureau concluded that while there is an "appropriate role for congregate care placements in the continuum of foster care settings" a child's placement in such a setting "should be based on the specialized behavioral and mental health needs or clinical disabilities of children."
Additionally, the bill would extend funding authority for the child and family services programs authorized in Title IV-B of the Social Security Act and it would revise the purposes of, and eligibility for, the Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (CFCIP) to make them more consistent with the goal of helping all youth who experience foster care at an older age make a successful transition to adulthood.
H.R. 5456 was introduced on June 13, 2016, and was ordered reported by the House Ways and Means Committee (unanimous voice vote) on June 15, 2016 (with amendment). A companion to the bill was introduced in the Senate (S. 3065) on June 16, 2016. On June 21, 2016, the full House passed H.R. 5456 (by voice vote), as it had been reported by the House Ways and Means Committee. The bill has been widely praised by a diverse group of national, state, and local organizations and stakeholders, including child welfare advocacy groups and agencies representing public child welfare administrators; substance abuse treatment and prevention administrators and providers; pediatricians; social workers; biological parents, kin caregivers, and foster and adoptive parents; and courts and judges, among others.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the bill will decrease direct federal spending by $66 million across the next 10 fiscal years, FY2017-FY2026. Although certain changes in the bill are expected to increase direct spending, especially related to expanding uses of Title IV-E program funding for prevention services and programs, CBO estimates those costs would be more than fully offset by other changes that would reduce spending under that same program.
Programs authorized in Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act are administered by the Children's Bureau, which is an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF), Administration on Children, Youth, and Families (ACYF). |
crs_RL33492 | crs_RL33492_0 | The Administration had requested $1.502 billion for Amtrak; Amtrak itself requested $1.840 billion. The legislation also provided $2.5 billion for grants for high-speed rail and intercity passenger rail projects and rail network congestion mitigation projects, funding for which Amtrak is among the eligible recipients. 111-8 ), which provided $1.490 billion for Amtrak for FY2009, $165 million more than in FY2008. In February 2009 Congress appropriated $1.3 billion for capital grants to Amtrak, and $8 billion for intercity passenger rail infrastructure grants (for which Amtrak is among the eligible recipients) in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. In October 2008, the 110 th Congress passed an Amtrak reauthorization bill, the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (Division B of P.L. This bill authorizes nearly $10 billion over the five-year life of the bill (FY2009-FY2013) specifically for Amtrak, including $5.3 billion in capital grants, nearly $3 billion in operating grants, and $1.4 billion for debt service. In addition, Congress authorized a total of $1.9 billion over these five fiscal years in intercity passenger rail capital grants to the states on an 80-20 federal/state matching basis. Congress also authorized $1.5 billion in capital grants to states and/or Amtrak for the development of 11 authorized high-speed rail corridors, and $325 million in rail network congestion mitigation grants. The act established a procedure for interested public or private entities to submit proposals for the financing, design, construction, and operation of high-speed rail in the 11 authorized corridors. However, putting a proposal into action would require further legislation from Congress. Amtrak was created by Congress in 1970 to maintain a minimum level of intercity passenger rail service, while relieving the railroad companies of the financial burden of providing that money-losing service. The company operates approximately 44 routes over 21,000 miles of track. Some of Amtrak's corridor routes are supported in part by assistance from the states they serve. According to the Department of Transportation Inspector General (DOT IG), Amtrak needs about $2 billion a year to restore the system to a state-of-good-repair and develop corridor service, or $1.4 billion simply to keep the system from falling into further disrepair. More fundamentally, the DOT IG has stated that a new federal intercity passenger rail strategy is needed:
The current model for providing intercity passenger service continues to produce financial instability and poor service quality. 110-432 ). Finances
Amtrak runs a deficit of over a billion dollars each year. Congress provided $1.490 billion for Amtrak (in Division I of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 111-5 ). Amtrak Reauthorization
Amtrak's previous authorization expired in December 2002. It required that Amtrak operate without federal operating assistance after 2002; this was not accomplished. Funding for Amtrak's Inspector General: $108 million. The act also authorizes three new federal intercity passenger rail grant programs for which Amtrak is eligible:
Intercity Passenger Rail Service Corridor Capital Assistance Program (§301) : authorizes DOT to make grants to states, public agencies, or Amtrak (in cooperation with a state) for the capital costs of facilities, infrastructure, and equipment to provide or improve intercity passenger rail transportation; federal share not to exceed 80%; total authorized funding $1.9 billion over FY2009-FY2013. | Amtrak was created by Congress in 1970 to provide intercity passenger railroad service. It operates approximately 44 routes over 22,000 miles of track, 97% of which is owned by freight rail companies. It runs a deficit each year, and requires federal assistance to cover operating losses and capital investment. Without a yearly federal grant to cover operating losses, Amtrak would not survive as presently configured. The crux of the public policy issue facing Congress has been succinctly stated by the Department of Transportation Inspector General (DOT IG): "To create a new model for intercity passenger rail, a comprehensive reauthorization that provides new direction and adequate funding is needed. The problem with the current model extends beyond funding—there are inadequate incentives for Amtrak to provide cost-effective service; state-of-good-repair needs are not being adequately addressed; and states have insufficient leverage in determining service quality options, in part because Amtrak receives Federal rail funds, not the states."
Amtrak was reauthorized in 2008. Its previous authorization had lapsed in 2002 because of a policy stalemate involving the Bush Administration and Congress. The Bush Administration advocated significant changes to federal passenger rail policy, involving a reduction of Amtrak's role. Those changes were supported by some in Congress, while others supported increased funding for Amtrak, in line with Amtrak's strategy of maintaining its full current network while restoring its infrastructure to a state of good repair. Interest in alternatives to, and complements to, auto and air transportation, spurred by concerns over gasoline supplies and global warming, as well as the Obama Administration's interest in high-speed rail, suggest that Amtrak policy may receive additional attention in the 111th Congress.
Appropriations. For FY2010, the Obama Administration requested $1.502 billion for Amtrak, which is $600 million more than the previous Administration requested for FY2009. Amtrak itself requested $1.840 billion, which is $350 million more than Congress appropriated last year. Congress provided $1.584 billion for Amtrak FY2010. Congress also appropriated $2.5 billion for intercity and high speed rail grants, for which Amtrak is among the eligible recipients.
Congress provided $1.490 billion for Amtrak in the FY2009 transportation appropriations act (Division I of P.L. 111-8), $165 million more than the $1.325 billion provided in FY2008. In addition, Congress appropriated $1.3 billion for capital grants to Amtrak, and appropriated another $8 billion for intercity rail infrastructure projects (for which Amtrak is among the eligible recipients) in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5).
Reauthorization. Amtrak's previous authorization expired in December 2002. In October 2008, the 110th Congress passed an Amtrak reauthorization bill, the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (Division B of P.L. 110-432). This bill authorized nearly $10 billion over the five-year life of the bill (FY2009-FY2013) specifically for Amtrak, including $5.3 billion in capital grants, nearly $3 billion in operating grants, and $1.4 billion for debt service. In addition, Congress authorized a total of $1.9 billion over these five fiscal years in intercity passenger rail capital grants to the states on an 80-20 federal/state matching basis. Congress also authorized $1.5 billion in capital grants to states and/or Amtrak for the development of 11 authorized high-speed rail corridors. The act established a procedure for interested public or private entities to submit proposals for the financing, design, construction, and operation of high-speed rail on these 11 corridors. However, putting a proposal into action would require further legislation from Congress. |
crs_RL32374 | crs_RL32374_0 | It compares, on a side-by-side basis, the international financial institutions'(IFIs') procedures and policies for preventing and punishing corruption in their operations. (1)
The anti-corruption measures at the MDBs are new, and in some cases (notably in the African Development Bank) are still being implemented. Congress specified thatthey shall use the voice and vote of the United States in each MDB to ensure that by June 30, 2005,each institution (1) posts an annual report on its website containing statistical summaries and casestudies of the fraud and corruption cases pursued by its investigations unit; (2) establishes a plan forconducting regular independent audits of internal management controls including fraud preventionand making reports publicly available; and (3) establishes an effective procedure for the receipt,retention, and treatment of complaints received by the bank regarding fraud and other matters ofinternal control. Experts say measures for countering corruption at the MDBs must be implemented on many levels to be effective. These include bank lending and operations; procurement of goods andservices; staff conduct; independent internal reporting mechanisms to address allegations ofmisconduct; oversight and management of bank operations; and educating staff on policies andprocedures. Each of the IFIs consider similarsanctions for misbehavior, such as demotions and dismissals of staff members, blacklisting firms,and the cancellation of loans for borrowers. In the most airtight organization, it may still be possiblefor corruption to occur. Anti-Corruption Measures in the MDBs
The World Bank
The World Bank's Internal Audit Department (IAD) began working in anti-corruption issues in 1997. The bank also as an independent Inspection Panel, which also reports directly to the executive board. The International Monetary Fund
The IMF is different from the MDBs in that it does not fund projects. IFAD is different than the other IFIs in that it is a specializedagency of the U.N., and it conducts investigations in a manner consistent with the rules of the UnitedNations. Asian Development Bank
At the Asian Development Bank (ADB), an Anti-corruption Unit (OAGA) within the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) is responsible for implementing the ADB's anti-corruption policies,with oversight from the Oversight Committee on Corruption. Comparison of the IFIs' Anti-Corruption Mechanisms | The international financial institutions (IFIs) all have procedures to prevent, identify, and punish corruption within their organizations. The World Bank appears to have the most extensive anddetailed process for addressing corruption issues, but the other multilateral development banks(MDBs) have or are establishing similar procedures. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) doesnot make loans for specific projects; all its loans go directly to the central bank or finance ministryof the borrower country. Nevertheless, it also has procedures for preventing, investigating, andpunishing unethical or corrupt practices.
Organizations may achieve more effective anti-corruption programs by implementing complementary measures to counter corruption at many levels. These include scrutiny of the IFIs'lending procedures, their systems for the procurement of goods and services, staff conduct, oversightand management of their operations, and the education of staff on policies and procedures. Majorprocedures for controlling corruption include the establishment of an independent corruption unit,an oversight committee, mandatory staff financial disclosure procedures, and a corruption reportinghotline. The World Bank is the only IFI that has adopted procedures in all four areas. Most of theothers, excepting the African Development Bank (AFDB) and the International Fund for AgriculturalDevelopment (IFAD), have procedures in three of these areas. The AFDB requires mandatory stafffinancial disclosure and is considering possible action in the other areas. IFAD's anti-corruption unitis organized differently than the other IFIs in that anti-corruption responsibilities are carried out byits Office of Internal Audit, but it functions similarly to anti-corruption units at the other IFIs. Also,IFAD is still in the process of implementing mandatory staff financial disclosure.
This report provides, on a side-by-side basis, comparisons of the anti-corruption procedures in the MDBs and the IMF. It also provides a detailed description of the institutional arrangements eachIFI has adopted to address corruption issues. This report will be updated if significant changes aremade in the systems and procedures it describes. |
crs_RL32963 | crs_RL32963_0 | Introduction(1)
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Base Closure Act), as amended,generally governs the military base realignment and closure (BRAC) process. (4) However, this report focuseson the effect a failure to comply would have if Members of Congress or other parties sued based onan alleged failure to comply with the Act's provisions. (7)
Administrative Procedure Act Claims
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides for judicial review of "final agencyaction," (8) unless either oftwo exceptions applies: (1) when a statute precludes judicial review or (2) when "agency action iscommitted to agency discretion by law." (21) The foundation for this argument is that under the APA, judicialreview is not available if statutes preclude judicial review. (24)
Souter cited a variety of evidence to support the contention that Congress generally intendedto preclude judicial review under the Base Closure Act: (25)
statutorily-mandated strict time deadlines for making and implementing BRACdecisions
"the all-or-nothing base-closing requirement at the core of theAct"
congressional frustration resulting from previous attempts to close militarybases
"nonjudicial opportunities to assess any procedural (or other) irregularities,"(i.e., the opportunities for the Commission and the Comptroller General to review the Secretary'srecommendations, the President's opportunity to consider procedural flaws, and Congress'sopportunity to disapprove the recommendations)
"the temporary nature of the Commission"
the fact that the Act expressly provides for judicial review regarding objectionsto base closure implementation plans under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)that are brought "within a narrow time frame," but the Act does not explicitly provide for any otherjudicial review
Importantly, whether the Supreme Court applies the rationale of the Dalton majority orJustice Souter's Dalton concurrence, the Court would likely decide not to review the BRAC actionsof the Secretary or the Commission under the APA in the 2005 round. (26) Even if the actions of the Secretary or the Commission were heldto be final agency action (which would be unlikely, given the Dalton decision), courts might considerthose agency actions to be committed to agency discretion by law -- thus making them judiciallyunreviewable. (43) According to the Court, the Base Closure Act did not limit the President's discretion in anyway. (45) Therefore, the issue of how the President chose to exercise his discretion under the Base Closure Actwas held to be judicially unreviewable. (53) However, the BaseClosure Act has not yet been held unconstitutional by any federal appellate courts. | The 2005 round of military base realignments and closures (BRAC) is now underway. TheDefense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Base Closure Act), as amended, establishesmandatory procedures to be followed throughout the BRAC process and identifies criteria to be usedin formulating BRAC recommendations. However, judicial review is unlikely to be available toremedy alleged failures to comply with the Base Closure Act's provisions. A synopsis of the relevantlaw regarding the availability of judicial review in this context is included below:
The actions of the Secretary of Defense (Secretary) and the independent BRACCommission (Commission) are not considered to be "final agency action," and thus cannot bejudicially reviewed pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Even if a court determined that the actions of the Secretary and the Commission were "final agency action," the court would likely consider the case to fall under oneof two APA exceptions to judicial review: (1) when statutes preclude judicial review or (2) whenagency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
The President's actions cannot be judicially reviewed under the APA, becausethe President is not an "agency" covered by the statute.
A claim that the President exceeded his statutory authority under the BaseClosure Act has been held to be judicially unreviewable, because the Base Closure Act gives thePresident broad discretion in approving or disapproving BRACrecommendations.
Thus, courts would likely allow the BRAC process to proceed even if the Department ofDefense, the Commission, or the President did not comply with the Base Closure Act's requirements.
This report was prepared by [author name scrubbed], Law Clerk, under the general supervision of[author name scrubbed], Legislative Attorney. It will be updated as case developments warrant. |
crs_R43290 | crs_R43290_0 | On September 25, 2013, the leadership of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce announced an agreement on a bill to cover both topics. The House passed H.R. 3204 , the Drug Quality and Security Act, which now awaits Senate action. Title II is the proposed Drug Supply Chain Security Act. Compounding Quality Act
Under current law, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA, 21 USC 301 et seq. ), the federal government regulates drug manufacturing and sales within the United States. Title I of H.R. The act would, among other things:
maintain FDA authority to regulate drug compounding that goes beyond the scope of state-regulated practice of pharmacy; establish a new category of compounding entity, termed "outsourcing facility," which would apply to entities that compound sterile drugs, volunteer to register with FDA, and follow practice and reporting requirements; require that the label of a drug from an outsourcing facility state "This is a compounded drug"; dictate user fees to fund outsourcing facility registration and reporting; advisory committee activities; annual reports; the issuing of regulations; and a study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO); and direct enhanced communication among state boards of pharmacy and between those boards and the FDA. 3204 would amend that section by removing the provision in current law that restricts a compounder from advertising or promoting a compounded drug. It involves compounding by a licensed pharmacist or physician in response to a prescription for an individual patient. A drug that is compounded in a registered outsourcing facility would have to meet the following conditions:
may not be made from bulk drug substances unless they comply with limitations specified in this bill on use of bulk drug substances and other ingredients; may not be a drug that has been withdrawn or removed from the market because it was found to be unsafe or not effective; may not be "essentially a copy of one or more approved drugs"; may not be on the Secretary's list of "drugs that present demonstrable difficulties for compounding that are reasonably likely to lead to an adverse effect on the safety or effectiveness of the drug or category of drugs, taking into account the risks and benefits to patients" unless compounding is done "in accordance with all applicable conditions identified on the list ... as conditions that are necessary to prevent" such difficulties; if it is subject to a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy (REMS), the outsourcing facility must demonstrate a plan to use "controls comparable to the controls applicable under the relevant" REMS; may be sold or transferred only by the outsourcing facility that compounded it; must be compounded in an outsourcing facility that has paid fees (as would be established in this Act); must have a label that includes the statement "This is a compounded drug." It also would direct the Secretary to promulgate implementing regulations. The Secretary would be required to consult with the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy in implementing the submission requirement and to immediately notify state boards of pharmacy when receiving submissions or when the Secretary determines that a pharmacy is acting contrary to FFDCA Section 503A. Title II, the proposed Drug Supply Chain Security Act, would, among other things, require
the creation and continuation of transaction information , transaction history , and transaction statements (beginning no later than January 2, 2015 for manufacturers, wholesale distributors, and repackagers; beginning July 1, 2015 for dispensers); a product identifier on each package and homogeneous case of a product, to include a standardized numerical identifier (SNI), lot number, and product expiration date (beginning no later than four years after enactment of this bill); required verification of the product identifier at the package level (with staggered starting dates: manufacturers four years after enactment of this bill, repackagers five years after enactment, wholesale distributors six years after enactment, and dispensers seven years after enactment); registration of wholesale distributors and third-party logistics providers in the states from which they distribute or by the Secretary if the state does not offer such licensure; that the Secretary develop standards for that registration; specific activities, following a specified timeline, to implement an interoperative unit-level traceability system ten years after enactment; and the development and maintenance of a uniform national policy for the tracing of drug products through the supply chain. These include the exchange of transaction histories among supply chain entities that would be required by proposed FFDCA Section 582. H.R. | The proposed Drug Quality and Security Act, H.R. 3204, is the current focus of congressional efforts to protect the public from unsafe, ineffective, or otherwise subquality compounded drugs and from the risks of counterfeit and subquality drugs entering the supply chain between the manufacturer and the dispenser. Majority and minority leadership of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions announced an agreement on September 25, 2013, following years of bicameral and bipartisan efforts. On September 27, 2013, Representative Fred Upton, the chair of the House committee, introduced the text, which would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), as H.R. 3204. The House passed it by voice vote on September 28, 2013, sending it to the Senate on September 30, 2013. The bill now awaits Senate action.
Title I, the Compounding Quality Act, would create the term outsourcing facility to apply to an entity that compounds sterile drugs in circumstances that go beyond activities that the FFDCA allows pharmacies to do under state regulation. As such, the proposed category could be conceptualized somewhere between a state-regulated pharmacy and a federally regulated drug manufacturer. The bill would direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to consult with the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy regarding submissions from states that concern a compounding pharmacy that may be acting outside what the FFDCA allows. The bill would also maintain the FFDCA section that addresses what is referred to as traditional compounding—wherein a pharmacist or physician compounds a drug to fill a prescription written for an individual patient. It would remove the provision, which has been challenged in court, that forbids a compounder from advertising or promoting a compounded drug.
An entity that compounds sterile drugs and that may not obtain prescriptions for identified individual patients would be able to voluntarily register as an outsourcing facility. If it also complies with a set of listed requirements, an outsourcing facility would be exempt from certain FFDCA requirements on drug manufacturers: adequate directions for use labeling, sale only after FDA approval of a new drug application, and compliance with supply chain activities (that would be added by Title II of H.R. 3204). An outsourcing facility would have to label the product to include the statement "This is a compounded drug," list active and inactive ingredients, report annually to the HHS Secretary on drugs compounded, be subject to inspection, submit adverse event reports, and pay annual fees (that would be established by this bill) to cover the cost of overseeing outsourcing facilities.
Title II, the Drug Supply Chain Security Act, would add FFDCA requirements to be implemented over the next few years. These include that manufacturers and repackagers put a product identifier, including a standardized numerical identifier, on each package or homogenous case. With certain exceptions, exchange of transaction information, histories, and statements would be required when a manufacturer, wholesale distributor, dispenser, or repackager transfers or accepts a drug. Also required would be a system of verification and notification when the Secretary or a trading partner within the supply chain suspects that a product may be illegitimate. The bill would require national standards for the licensing of wholesale distributors and third-party logistics providers. Requirements for the Secretary would include guidance documents, regulations, public meetings, and pilot projects.
The act also would include a timetable and tasks involving the development of an interoperable, electronic, package-level tracking system to begin 10 years after enactment. |
crs_R41953 | crs_R41953_0 | The remaining U.S. primary energy production is attributable to nuclear electric and renewable energy resources. ,
Energy Tax Incentives
The tax code supports the energy sector by providing a number of targeted tax incentives, or tax incentives only available for the energy industry. In 2013, the tax code provided an estimated $23.3 billion in support for the energy sector. The expiration of a number of energy-related tax incentives means that, under current law, a substantial shift in balance of energy tax incentives across different types of energy resources is projected to occur (see the section " Energy Tax Incentive Trends " below). Of the federal tax support targeted to energy in 2013, an estimated 20.4% of the value of tax incentives went towards supporting fossil fuels. During 2013, an estimated 11.4% of U.S. primary source energy was produced using renewable resources. The tax credits for alcohol fuels (including ethanol) expired at the end of 2011, while the tax credits for biodiesel and renewable diesel expired at the end of 2014. Thus, after 2014, under current law, there are no projected costs associated with tax incentives for renewable fuels. Expired tax incentives may be extended, however, as part of the "tax extenders." The Section 1603 grant option is not available for projects that began construction after December 31, 2011. Extension of expired tax incentives for energy efficiency would increase the cost of energy efficiency-related tax incentives. In the case of the Section 1603 grant program, since outlays occur when property is placed in service, costs for this program will continue to be incurred long past its 2011 expiration date. Accounting for expired provisions has additional implications for trends in tax-related support for different types of energy resources. Between 2013 and 2018, the cost of tax-related provisions that support renewable energy (both renewables and renewable fuels) is projected to decline from $13.4 billion to $5.0 billion (see Figure 3 ). This cost is projected to be $4.8 billion in 2018. The increase in the share of federal financial support for renewables is largely due to the Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credits program. The majority of energy produced comes from fossil fuels. However, since the primary tax provisions supporting renewables have expired, tax-related support for renewables has fallen in recent years, and is projected to continue to decline. For example, tax incentives designed to reduce reliance on imported petroleum may be consistent with energy security goals. Tax incentives that promote renewable energy resources may be consistent with certain environmental objectives. While subsidy per unit of production or subsidy relative to production level calculations may provide a starting point for evaluating energy tax policy, a complete policy analysis might consider why the level of federal financial support might differ across various energy technologies. Comparing Energy Production to Energy Tax Incentives: 2009 and 2010
While the proportion of primary energy production attributable to certain energy resources changes slowly over time, there are often substantial changes in the estimated value of energy-related tax incentives for certain types of energy resources from year to year. | The U.S. tax code supports the energy sector by providing a number of targeted tax incentives, or tax incentives only available for the energy industry. As Congress evaluates the tax code and contemplates tax reform, there has been interest in understanding how energy tax benefits are distributed across different domestic energy resources. For example, what percentage of energy-related tax benefits support fossil fuels (or support renewables)? How much domestic energy is produced using fossil fuels (or produced using renewables)? And how do these figures compare?
In 2013, the value of federal tax-related support for the energy sector was estimated to be $23.3 billion. Of this, $4.8 billion (20.4%) can be attributed to tax incentives supporting fossil fuels. Tax-related support for renewables was an estimated $13.4 billion in 2013 (or 57.4% of total tax-related support for energy).
While the cost of tax incentives for renewables has exceeded the cost of incentives for fossil fuels in recent years, the majority of energy produced in the United States continues to be derived from fossil fuels. In 2013, fossil fuels accounted for 78.5% of U.S. primary energy production. The remaining primary energy production is attributable to nuclear electric and renewable energy resources, with shares of 10.1% and 11.4%, respectively.
The balance of energy-related tax incentives has changed over time, and it is projected to continue to change, under current law, in coming years. Factors that have contributed to recent changes in the balance of energy-related tax incentives include
The expiration of tax-related support for renewables fuels. Tax-related support for renewable fuels declined substantially after the tax credits for alcohol fuels was allowed to expire at the end of 2011. Other fuels-related incentives also expired at the end of 2014 (although these may be extended as part of the "tax extenders"). The Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credits program. A major source of tax-related support for renewables in recent years has been the Section 1603 grant program. This program is not available for projects beginning construction after the end of 2011. While outlays for this program increased through 2013, as qualified property was placed in service, outlays for Section 1603 grants have begun to decline. Expired tax incentives for renewables and energy efficiency. Several other incentives for renewables and energy efficiency have expired (again, these may be extended as part of the tax extenders). Since tax-related support for fossil fuels is expected to remain roughly constant under current law, the expiration of renewables- and efficiency-related incentives means the share of tax incentives for these sectors is expected to decline in future years, under current law.
While subsidy per unit of production or subsidy relative to production level calculations may be one starting point for evaluating energy tax policy, a complete policy analysis might consider why the level of federal financial support differs across various energy technologies. Tax incentives for energy may support various environmental or economic objectives. For example, tax incentives designed to reduce reliance on imported petroleum may be consistent with energy security goals. Tax incentives that promote renewable energy resources may be consistent with certain environmental objectives. |
crs_RL33503 | crs_RL33503_0 | The U.S. military has been involved in Afghanistan since the fall of 2001 when Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) toppled the Taliban regime and attacked the Al Qaeda terrorist network hosted by the Taliban. A significant U.S. military presence in the country could continue for a number of years as U.S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Coalition, and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces attempt to stabilize the country by defeating the insurgency, facilitating reconstruction, and combating Afghanistan's illegal drug trade. Coalition Forces in Afghanistan
Non-U.S. Insurgent Tactics and Operations
Insurgent tactics and operations against Coalition forces continue to evolve, and some maintain that they are becoming increasingly like the tactics employed in Iraq. Part of ISAF's mission is "supporting and helping to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to a standard that will enable them in time to assume full responsibility for the internal and external security of the country." A 50,000 Soldier Afghan National Army?47
One report suggests that the Administration now supports the creation of a 50,000 soldier ANA as opposed to the 70,000 soldier force that the United States and other countries agreed to at the Bonn II Conference in December 2002 and later reaffirmed at the London Conference on Afghan Reconstruction. A 150,000 Afghan National Army Needed? If these systems have been developed within Afghan government institutions to protect and perpetuate the illegal Afghan drug trade, NATO and U.S. military actions designed to combat the Afghan opium trade and disrupt its financial ties to Taliban insurgents may prove to be ineffective. Some question if more direct NATO involvement in Afghan counternarcotics efforts could achieve better results but additional troops would likely be required for a more direct role in counternarcotics operations. Because of what some call a lack of commitment by many NATO members, the United States and Great Britain were compelled to provide the majority of reinforcements needed to meet the growing security threat posed by the Taliban insurgents and narcotics traffickers. The nature of insurgent operations suggests that the Taliban insurgency continues to evolve. Inadequate Equipment for the Afghan National Army
With numerous reports from U.S. officials citing the poor state of the Afghan National Army in terms of equipment, it is possible that Congress might examine how the United States and NATO and Coalition countries plan to improve the equipment posture of the Afghan National Army. | The U.S. military has been involved in Afghanistan since the fall of 2001 when Operation Enduring Freedom toppled the Taliban regime and attacked the Al Qaeda terrorist network hosted by the Taliban. A significant U.S. military presence in the country could continue for many years as U.S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Coalition, and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces attempt to stabilize the country by defeating the insurgency, facilitating reconstruction, and combating Afghanistan's illegal drug trade. Despite NATO's assumption of command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the United States will remain the largest troop contributing nation and will continue Operation Enduring Freedom, intended to locate and destroy insurgents and terrorists operating in Afghanistan. Acting on a 2006 request by NATO senior leaders for additional troops, the United States, Great Britain, and possibly Poland will together send approximately 6,000 additional troop to help combat insurgents. Insurgent activity continues to evolve, with some of the tactics and techniques being used by Afghan insurgents reportedly similar to those employed in Iraq. Reports suggest that instead of building a 70,000 soldier Afghan National Army as agreed to in the 2002 Bonn Conference, the Administration intends to support a 50,000 soldier force, while some Afghan officials suggest that a 150,000 man Afghan National Army will be needed to insure both internal and external security. Senior U.S. officials have also stated that the Afghan National Army needs to be significantly better equipped if it is to become an effective security force.
Despite the efforts of the Coalition and Afghan government, poppy production in 2006 significantly surpassed last year's crop and reported cooperation between drug lords and insurgents has added a new dimension and possible complications to efforts to combat the insurgents and the growing drug trade. The possible involvement of Afghan government and police officials in protecting drug traffickers, in concert with NATO's and the United States' indirect involvement in counternarcotics efforts, calls into question the Coalition's ability to stem the illegal opium trade that helps to finance insurgent operations.
The 110 th Congress, in its oversight role, may choose to examine the sufficiency of U.S. and NATO forces, the impact of an evolving insurgency, NATO's operations against insurgents, the size, proficiency, and equipping of the Afghan National Army, and the effectiveness of counternarcotics operations. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41088 | crs_R41088_0 | Take, for example, the term "president": in the EU today, there is a President of the European Council, a President of the European Commission, a President of the European Parliament, and a rotating country presidency of the EU that has a corresponding national president or prime minister. This episode reflected a wider lack of clarity in the United States about the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on EU leadership, and in particular on the status of the EU's "rotating presidency," the role of the EU's new "permanent president," and the role of other EU actors involved in representing the European Union on the world stage. Changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have a significant impact on the leadership of the European Council, the Council of Ministers, and the EU's rotating presidency system. The Rotating Presidency
Every six months—on January 1 and July 1 of each year—the "EU Presidency" rotates among the member states. The President is elected by the member states for a term of two-and-a-half years, renewable once. Changes and Continuities Regarding the Council of Ministers
The Lisbon Treaty also creates another important new position to boost the EU's international visibility: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which some observers have labeled "EU foreign minister." Role and Responsibilities of the Rotating Presidency Country
Many of the day-to-day duties of the presidency country continue as before the Lisbon Treaty. It is expected to continue preparing, arranging, and chairing the meetings of the Council of Ministers, other than in the Foreign Affairs configuration. This responsibility includes working in the Council of Ministers to forge agreement on legislative proposals. The presidency country is also expected to continue setting out a few broad policy priorities for its tenure. This process of "intergovernmental" decision-making takes place in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Thus, it is in political matters and CFSP that the new President of the European Council and the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are expected, as described above, to play the most prominent role (possibly with an occasional assist, as requested, from the leader or foreign minister of the rotating presidency country). Second, in many areas of policy-making, the member countries of the EU have agreed to pool their sovereignty. The President of the European Commission will therefore continue to play an important role in representing the EU externally on issues that are managed by the Commission, including, as mentioned above, many economic, trade, and environmental issues. Many of the issues in which the European Parliament acts as a "co-legislator" bear on external affairs in some way. Although it has no formal role in the CFSP, some observers suggest that the Parliament has become an increasingly important forum for debating international issues. Because the language of the Lisbon Treaty is fairly vague as to the exact duties of the newly created positions, analysts assert that the roles of the key positions in EU external affairs—the President of the European Council and the High Representative, as well as the President of the Commission, the rotating country presidency, and the European Parliament—will be worked out and defined in practice as the new arrangements are implemented. | Changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union's (EU's) reform treaty that took effect on December 1, 2009, have a significant impact on EU governance. The EU is an important partner or interlocutor of the United States in a large number of issues, but the complicated institutional dynamics of the EU can be difficult to navigate.
The Lisbon Treaty makes substantial modifications in the leadership of the EU, especially with regard to the European Council, the Council of Ministers, and the EU's rotating presidency. Every six months, the "EU Presidency" rotates among the 27 member states. Under the treaty, however, the leader of the presidency country no longer serves as the temporary chair and spokesman of the European Council, the grouping of the EU's 27 national leaders. This duty now belongs to the newly created President of the European Council, who serves a once-renewable two-and-a-half-year term.
In addition, the foreign minister of the presidency country no longer chairs the meetings of EU foreign ministers in the Council of the EU (commonly known as the Council of Ministers). This duty is now performed by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, another newly created position whose holder serves a five-year term and is both an agent of the Council of Ministers and a Vice President of the European Commission. Many of the day-to-day duties of the rotating presidency country, however, will continue under the Lisbon Treaty.
Ministers of the presidency country will still chair all of the meetings of the Council of Ministers other than in the area of foreign policy. The presidency country is expected to continue preparing and arranging these activities, and playing a leading role in the Council of Ministers to forge agreement on legislative proposals. The presidency country is also expected to help formulate a few broad policy priorities for its tenure. The EU remains in an extended phase of institutional transition as the new arrangements of the Lisbon Treaty are implemented, and the rotating presidency country is expected to support the development of the new institutions and positions. Hungary holds the rotating presidency for the first half of 2011, and Poland will hold it for the second half of the year. Spain and Belgium held the rotating presidency in 2010.
EU foreign policy decisions of a political or security-related nature require unanimous intergovernmental agreement among the 27 member states. In many other issues which may relate to external affairs, however, EU members have agreed to pool their decision-making sovereignty. A number of additional EU actors often have particular relevance in these matters. The President of the European Commission represents the EU externally on issues that are managed by the Commission, including many economic, trade, and environmental issues. Many of the issues in which the European Parliament acts as a "co-legislator," such as trade and data protection, relate to external affairs. Some observers also suggest that the Parliament has become an increasingly important forum for debating international issues.
Changes in the structure of EU governance may be of interest to the 112th Congress. For more information, also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report RS21618, The European Union's Reform Process: The Lisbon Treaty, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42650 | crs_R42650_0 | The practice is unquestionably unethical when it is done illegally; its status is more uncertain when it is done legally. A majority of the jurisdictions on record have rejected the proposition that secret recording of a conversation is per se unethical even when not illegal. A number endorse a contrary view, however, and an even greater number have yet to announce their position. Reaction to the Opinion 337 was mixed. Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee Ethics Opinion No. "... [T]he Committee is of the opinion that the findings and assumptions of the American Bar Association Committee expressed in ABA Formal Opinion 337 remain valid today: that a failure to give notice of the recording of a conversation to all parties is the equivalent of a representation that the conversation is not being recorded, and is thus deceitful in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). A lawyer may secretly record a conversation in order to protect against perjury. Although it is not illegal in the state of Indiana to tape record another person without that person's knowledge, it is unethical for an attorney to do this to another attorney in the context of a pending legal matter without informing him first." The Code proscribes an attorney surreptitiously recording conversations directly or indirectly without the consent of all parties. No.... "Model Rule 8.4(c) prohibits 'conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' 422 (2001). The committee is further of the opinion that it is not improper for a lawyer engaged in such an investigation to participate in, or to advise another person to participate in, a communication with a third party which is electronically recorded with the full knowledge and consent of one party to the conversation, but without the knowledge or consent of the other party, as long as the recording is otherwise lawful. | In some jurisdictions, it is unethical for an attorney to secretly record a conversation even though it is not illegal to do so. A few states require the consent of all parties to a conversation before it may be recorded. Recording without mutual consent is both illegal and unethical in those jurisdictions. Elsewhere the matter is more uncertain.
In 1974, the American Bar Association (ABA) opined that surreptitiously recording a conversation without the knowledge or consent of all of the participants violated the ethical prohibition against engaging in conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." The ABA conceded, however, that law enforcement recording, conducted under judicial supervision, might breach no ethical standard. Reaction among the authorities responsible for regulation of the practice of law in the various states was mixed. In 2001, the ABA reversed its earlier opinion and announced that it no longer considered one-party consent recording per se unethical when it is otherwise lawful.
Today, this is the view of a majority of the jurisdictions on record. A substantial number, however, disagree. An even greater number have yet announce to an opinion.
A sampling of the views of various bar associations in the question is attached. An earlier version of this report once appeared under the same title as CRS Report 98-250. An abridged version of this report is available without footnotes or attachment as CRS Report R42649, Wiretapping, Tape Recorders, and Legal Ethics: An Abridged Overview of Questions Posed by Attorney Involvement in Secretly Recording Conversation. |
crs_RS22005 | crs_RS22005_0 | Background
Congress and state legislatures have authorized the use of forfeiture for over two hundred years. Forfeiture law has always been somewhat unique. Civil Forfeiture
Forfeiture follows one of two procedural routes: criminal or civil. Although crime triggers all forfeitures, they are classified as civil forfeitures or criminal forfeitures according to the nature of the judicial procedure which ends in confiscation. Criminal forfeitures are part of the criminal proceedings against the property owner, and confiscation is only possible upon the conviction of the owner of the property and only to the extent of defendant's interest in the property. Within the confines of due process and the language of the applicable statutes, the guilt or innocence of the property owner is irrelevant; it is enough that the property was involved in a crime to which forfeiture attaches in the manner in which statute demands. As a general rule, since the proceedings are in rem, actual or constructive possession of the property by the court is a necessary first step in any confiscation proceeding. Because realty cannot ordinarily be seized until after the property owner has been given an opportunity for a hearing, the procedure differs slightly in the case of real property. Administrative Forfeitures
In the interests of expediency and judicial economy, Congress has sometimes authorized the use of administrative forfeiture as the first step after seizure in "uncontested" cases. Disposition of Forfeited Assets
Disposal of forfeited property is ordinarily a matter of statute. Intergovernmental transfers and the use of special funds, however, are the hallmarks of the more prominent federal forfeiture statutes. The Treasury and Justice Departments insist that state and local law enforcement agencies indicate the law enforcement purposes to which the transferred property is to be devoted and that the transfer will increase and not supplant law enforcement resources. Forfeitures that Congress has designated as remedial civil sanctions do not implicate double jeopardy concerns unless "the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate Congress' intention to establish a civil remedial mechanism." In other challenges, the lower federal courts have found that due process permits: the procedure of shifting the burden of proof to a forfeiture claimant after the government has shown probable cause and allows use of a probable cause standard in civil forfeitures; postponement of the determination of third-party interests in criminal forfeiture cases until after trial in the main; an 11-year delay between issuance of a criminal forfeiture order and amendment of the original order to reach overseas assets; and fugitive disentitlement under 28 U.S.C. | Forfeiture has long been an effective law enforcement tool. Congress and state legislatures have authorized its use for over 200 years. Every year, it redirects property worth billions of dollars from criminal to lawful uses. Forfeiture law has always been somewhat unique. Legislative bodies, commentators, and the courts, however, had begun to examine its eccentricities in greater detail because under some circumstances it could be not only harsh but unfair. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), P.L. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000), was a product of that reexamination.
Modern forfeiture follows one of two procedural routes. Although crime triggers all forfeitures, they are classified as civil forfeitures or criminal forfeitures according to the nature of the procedure that ends in confiscation. Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding. The property is the defendant in the case. Unless the statute provides otherwise, the innocence of the owner is irrelevant—it is enough that the property was involved in a violation to which forfeiture attaches. As a matter of expedience and judicial economy, Congress often allows administrative forfeiture in uncontested civil confiscation cases. Criminal forfeiture is an in personam proceeding, and confiscation is only possible upon the conviction of the owner of the property.
The Supreme Court has held that authorities may seize moveable property without prior notice or an opportunity for a hearing but that real property owners are entitled as a matter of due process to preseizure notice and a hearing. As a matter of due process, innocence may be irrelevant in the case of an individual who entrusts his or her property to someone who uses the property for criminal purposes. Although some civil forfeitures may be considered punitive for purposes of the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause, civil forfeitures do not implicate the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause unless they are so utterly punitive as to belie remedial classification.
The statutes governing the disposal of forfeited property may authorize its destruction, its transfer for governmental purposes, or deposit of the property or of the proceeds from its sale in a special fund. Intergovernmental transfers and the use of special funds are hallmarks of federal forfeiture. Every year federal agencies transfer hundreds of millions of dollars and property to state, local, and foreign law enforcement officials as compensation for their contribution to joint enforcement efforts.
This is an abridged version of CRS Report 97-139, Crime and Forfeiture, by [author name scrubbed], a longer report from which citations, footnotes, and attachments have been stripped. |
crs_RS22727 | crs_RS22727_0 | Election Results
Center-left presidential candidate Alvaro Colom of the National Union for Hope (UNE) defeated General Otto Pérez Molina of the right-wing Patriot Party (PP) in the November 4, 2007 run-off elections, which were considered free and fair. President-elect Colom will take office on January 14, 2008. In the period leading up to the September 9 general election there were 119 violent acts resulting in 51 deaths, including the murders of candidate's relatives and party activists. Violence appeared to lessen in the period between the first and second round of voting. U.S. interest in Guatemala lies in consolidating democracy, securing human rights, establishing security, and promoting trade. U.S. immigration policy has been a point of tension. | Alvaro Colom, of the center-left Nation Union of Hope (UNE) party, defeated right-wing candidate Otto Pérez Molina of the Patriot Party, in November 4, 2007 run-off elections. President-elect Colom will take office on January 14, 2008. No single presidential candidate won a majority of votes in the first round held on September 9, 2007, in which congressional and mayoral races were also held. The dominant issue in the campaign was security, and the 2007 election campaigns were the most violent since the return to democracy in 1985, with 56 candidates, activists, and family members killed. Since no party won a majority in Congress, the next president will have to build coalitions to achieve his legislative agenda. U.S. interests in Guatemala include consolidating democracy, securing human rights, establishing security and promoting trade, though U.S. immigration policy has been a point of tension in bilateral relations. |
crs_RL33025 | crs_RL33025_0 | In the 109 th Congress, tax reform was a major legislative issue. In January 2005, President Bush appointed a nine-member bipartisan panel to study the federal tax code and to propose options to reform the code. In a pure consumption tax system, income tax credits and deductions, like the mortgage interest deduction, would be eliminated. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-432 ) temporarily allowed, for tax year 2007, mortgage insurance premiums paid for a personal residence to be tax deductible as mortgage interest. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 ( H.R. 3648 ; P.L. 110-142 ) extended that temporary provision through the end of 2010. Fundamental Tax Reform and Legislative Developments in the 109th Congress
Several tax reform proposals were introduced, most of which proposed to enact fundamental tax reform by changing the tax base from income to consumption. The nine-member panel appointed by President Bush produced a report in the fall of 2005 that included a proposal to change the mortgage interest deduction. The remainder of this report describes the deduction for home mortgage interest and explores rationales for subsidizing homeowners. The report then provides an economic analysis of the value and performance of the deduction and concludes with a discussion and analysis of the possible changes to the mortgage interest deduction that could occur under different tax reform scenarios. One study found that the deduction for mortgage interest subsidizes housing consumption, but its impact on homeownership rates was minimal. Alternatively, Congress may choose not to alter the mortgage interest deduction. 1040 and S. 1099 ) would have eliminated the mortgage interest deduction. Other Options
There are many possibilities that Congress could choose to modify the mortgage interest deduction. If the deduction were eliminated as a result of fundamental tax reform, the resulting effects would depend on a variety of variables. These variables include the nature of tax reform, the resulting changes in the tax base and tax rates, changes in interest rates, and other economic variables. If the deduction were eliminated without other tax policy changes, federal income tax revenues could increase, the tax base could be broadened, and the federal budget deficit could be reduced. Modifications to the mortgage interest deduction could also have several effects. Congress could choose to allow the deduction for only one residence, rather than two, or reduce the allowable principal debt from $1 million to some lower amount, perhaps $500,000. These changes would reduce the amount of tax revenue loss associated with the provision without adding complexity to the tax code. Congress could also choose to improve the equitable nature of the provision by allowing more low income households to claim mortgage interest, either as an above-the-line deduction or as a tax credit. Finally, the mortgage interest deduction could remain unaltered. | The mortgage interest deduction, which is one of the largest sources of federal tax revenue loss with an estimated annual cost of $72 billion, is intended to encourage homeownership. Empirical studies suggest that the mortgage interest deduction subsidizes mortgage lending, which has more impact on housing consumption than homeownership rates. Other homeownership subsidies, like down-payment assistance programs, are proven to be more effective at increasing homeownership among lower-income families and are less expensive than the mortgage interest deduction.
A recent enhancement to the mortgage interest deduction was enacted in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-432),which temporarily allowed, for tax year 2007, mortgage insurance premiums paid for a personal residence to be tax deductible as mortgage interest. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 (H.R. 3648; P.L. 110-142) extended that provision through the end of 2010.
Early in the 109th Congress, tax reform was a major legislative issue. President Bush appointed a bipartisan panel to study the federal tax code and to propose options to reform the code. The panel produced a report in the fall of 2005 that included a proposal to change the mortgage interest deduction. Legislation for fundamental tax reform was introduced, and some bills proposed to change the tax base such that income tax credits and deductions, like the mortgage interest deduction, would have been eliminated. Late in the first session of the 110th Congress, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rangel indicated that fundamental tax reform might still be considered in the 110th Congress.
There are many possible options to alter the mortgage interest deduction. If the deduction were eliminated as a result of fundamental tax reform, the resulting effects would depend on a variety of variables, including the nature of tax reform, the resulting changes in the tax base and tax rates, changes in interest rates, and other economic variables. If the deduction were eliminated without other tax policy changes, federal income tax revenues would increase, the tax base could be broadened, and the federal budget deficit could be reduced.
Modifications to the mortgage interest deduction could take any one of several approaches. Congress could choose to allow the deduction for only one residence and/or to reduce the allowable principal debt, which is currently $1 million. These changes would reduce the amount of tax revenue loss associated with the provision. Congress could choose to improve equity by allowing more low-income households to claim mortgage interest, either as an above-the-line deduction or as a tax credit. Finally, the mortgage interest deduction could remain unaltered.
This report, which will be updated to reflect legislative developments, describes the deduction for home mortgage interest, provides economic analysis, and concludes with possible changes to the mortgage interest deduction and the potential impacts of those changes. |
crs_R44043 | crs_R44043_0 | Introduction
The President is responsible for appointing individuals to certain positions in the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted to the President alone. This report identifies, for the 113 th Congress, all nominations submitted to the Senate for full-time positions on 34 regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. This report includes information on the leadership structure of each of these 34 boards and commissions as well as a pair of tables presenting information on each body's membership and appointment activity as of the end of the 113 th Congress. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Appointments During the 113th Congress
During the 113 th Congress, President Barack H. Obama submitted nominations to the Senate for 86 of the 149 full-time positions on 34 regulatory and other boards and commissions (most of the remaining positions were not vacant during that time). He submitted a total of 114 nominations for these positions, of which 77 were confirmed, 7 were withdrawn, 30 were returned to the President, and no recess appointments were made. At the end of the Congress, 24 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 22 vacancies among the 149 positions. Only the chair, who is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, serves full time. Summary of All Nominations and Appointments to Collegial Boards and Commissions
Appendix B. Board and Commission Abbreviations | The President makes appointments to certain positions within the federal government, either using authorities granted to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are some 149 full-time leadership positions on 34 federal regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions for which the Senate provides advice and consent. This report identifies all nominations submitted to the Senate for full-time positions on these 34 boards and commissions during the 113th Congress.
Information for each board and commission is presented in profiles and tables. The profiles provide information on leadership structures and statutory requirements (such as term limits and party balance requirements). The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, incumbents as of the end of the 113th Congress, incumbents' parties (where balance is required), and appointment action within each board or commission. Additional summary information across all 34 boards and commissions appears in the appendix.
During the 113th Congress, the President submitted 114 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions on these boards and commissions (most of the remaining positions on these boards and commissions were not vacant during that time). Of these 114 nominations, 77 were confirmed, 7 were withdrawn, and 30 were returned to the President. At the end of the 113th Congress, 24 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 22 vacancies among the 149 positions.
Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2012 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41373 | crs_R41373_0 | As an alternative, "expedited rescission," instead of allowing Congress to ignore presidential recommendations for rescissions, facilitates congressional consideration of the rescission messages and an up-or-down vote by at least one house on the President's proposals. If either house disapproves the request, the other house need take no action because approval by both houses is necessary to make the rescission permanent. Expedited Rescission Proposals in the 112th Congress
On January 25, 2011, Senator McCain, along with Senator Carper and 21 other original cosponsors, introduced S. 102 , the Reduce Unnecessary Spending Act of 2011, which incorporates the Administration's expedited rescission proposal from 2010 and is virtually identical to S. 3474 from the 111 th Congress. On March 11, 2011, Congressman Van Hollen introduced a companion bill (by request) as H.R. 1043 , with the same title, but which has two slight differences from the Senate bills and is virtually identical to H.R. These measures would amend the ICA of 1974 to provide an expedited process for consideration of certain rescission requests from the President. Within 45 days after signing a bill into law, the President would be able to submit a package of rescissions for reducing or eliminating discretionary appropriations or non-entitlement non-appropriated funding contained in the bill as enacted. Such proposed rescissions from the President would be considered as a group and would be subject to expedited procedures in Congress, designed to make an up-or-down vote on the package more likely. Later in this report, some possible issues for Congress relating to expedited rescission authority for the President are identified and examined under the two rubrics of budgetary savings and respective prerogatives of the President and Congress. On May 24, 2010, President Obama transmitted an Administration draft bill providing for expedited rescission procedures to Congress, called the Reduce Unnecessary Spending Act of 2010. 5454 and S. 3474 . As described above, under the framework established by the ICA, the President may propose to rescind funding provided in an appropriations act by transmitting a special message to Congress and obtaining the support of both houses within 45 days of continuous session. If denied congressional approval during this time period, either by Congress ignoring the presidential rescission request or by one or both houses rejecting the proposed rescission, the President must make the funding available to executive agencies for obligation and expenditure. On the other hand, H.R. A variety of issues may be placed under the rubric of two general topics. Supporters of expedited rescission bills acknowledge that the device would not be a cure-all for deficit reduction. Governors "believe that it is a very important tool for fiscal discipline. Breadth of Coverage
The potential savings from expedited rescission also would depend upon the breadth of coverage granted to the President. In the three hearings on expedited rescission held in the 111 th Congress, witnesses generally agreed that the expedited rescission measures under consideration would have avoided the constitutional issues found in the LIVA. It would, however, relinquish some of Congress's power of the purse to the President, which was a serious matter. Priorities of Federal Spending
Aside from modest savings, some suggest that the impact of granting special rescission authority to the President with expedited procedures may well be felt in giving preference to the President's spending priorities over those enacted by Congress. Hearings were held in both chambers, but no further action occurred. | Under the framework established by the Impoundment Control Act (ICA) of 1974 (P.L. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297), the President may propose to rescind funding provided in an appropriations act by transmitting a special message to Congress and obtaining the support of both houses within 45 days of continuous session. If denied congressional approval during this time period, either by Congress ignoring the presidential rescission request or because one or both houses rejected the proposed rescission, the President must make the funding available to executive agencies for obligation and expenditure.
Instead of allowing Congress to ignore presidential recommendations for rescissions, "expedited rescission" attempts to require congressional consideration of the rescission and a vote by at least one house on the proposals. If either house disapproves the request, the other house need take no action because approval by both houses is necessary to make the rescission permanent. This approach has attracted support over the years, including several bills introduced in the 111th Congress. On May 24, 2010, President Obama sent to Congress the Reduce Unnecessary Spending Act of 2010, a draft bill providing for expedited rescission procedures, which was introduced in the 111th Congress as H.R. 5454 and S. 3474. Hearings on expedited rescission proposals were held in both chambers during the 111th Congress.
On January 25, 2011, Senator McCain, along with Senator Carper and 21 other original cosponsors, introduced S. 102, the Reduce Unnecessary Spending Act of 2011, which is virtually identical to S. 3474 from the 111th Congress, and a related hearing by a Senate subcommittee was held on March 15, 2011. On March 11, 2011, Congressman Van Hollen with 26 cosponsors introduced H.R. 1043, which is virtually identical to H.R. 5454 from the 111th Congress and very similar to S. 102. The two measures pending in the 112th Congress would amend the ICA of 1974 to provide an expedited process for consideration of certain rescission requests from the President. Within 45 days after signing a bill into law, the President would be able to submit a package of rescissions for reducing or eliminating discretionary appropriations or non-entitlement non-appropriated funding contained in the bill as enacted. Such proposed rescissions from the President would be considered as a group and would be subject to expedited procedures in Congress, designed to make an up-or-down vote on the package more likely.
A variety of issues related to expedited rescission measures that may prove of possible interest to Congress are noted in the report. Under the rubric of budgetary savings, some existing data suggest that enactment of expedited rescission authority for the President would have a relatively small impact on federal spending. Supporters acknowledge that expedited rescission would not be a panacea for deficit reduction, but that it would provide another useful tool for promoting fiscal discipline. The potential deterrent effect of the instrument has also been noted. The possible savings to be realized from expedited rescission depends on the breadth of coverage. In a rescission package subject to expedited congressional consideration, would the President be able to include any item of discretionary spending, and what about new items of direct (mandatory) spending? Would limited tax benefits be subject to cancellation under expedited rescission procedures? Other issues come under the subject of prerogatives of the legislative and the executive branches. Would the expedited procedures result in a President's spending priorities getting preference over those enacted by Congress? What about implications for relations between the President and Congress, with particular concern about the power of the purse?
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS20672 | crs_RS20672_0 | The previous drinking water standard for arsenic, 50 ppb, was set by the U.S. Public Health Service in 1942. EPA adopted that level and issued an interim drinking water regulation for arsenic in 1975. In 1986, Congress amended the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), converted all interim standards to National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, and included arsenic on a list of 83 contaminants for which EPA was required to issue new standards by 1989. In the final rule, published on January 22, 2001 (66 FR 6976), EPA set the standard at 10 ppb and applied it to non-transient, non-community water systems, as well as community water systems. Congress took issue with EPA's assessment that small system variance technologies were not merited for the arsenic standard, and in 2002, directed EPA to review the criteria it uses to determine whether a compliance treatment technology is affordable for small systems. Arsenic Rule Review
EPA issued the final rule on January 22, 2001. In March 2001, the Administrator delayed the rule for 60 days, citing concerns about the science supporting the rule and its estimated cost to communities. On May 22, 2001, EPA delayed the rule's effective date until February 22, 2002, but did not change the 2006 compliance date for water systems (66 FR 28342). In October 2001, EPA affirmed that 10 ppb was the appropriate standard and announced plans to provide $20 million for research on affordable treatment technologies to help small systems comply. The conferees expressed concern that the new requirements could pose a "huge financial hardship" for many rural communities. Various bills were offered to promote small system compliance by providing technical assistance, financial assistance, and/or compliance flexibility. None of these bills was enacted. Arsenic-specific legislation has again been offered in the 111 th Congress, although broader infrastructure bills have received wider attention. | The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 (P.L. 104-182) directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to update the standard for arsenic in drinking water. In 2001, EPA issued a new arsenic rule that set the legal limit for arsenic in tap water at 10 parts per billion (ppb), replacing a 50 ppb standard set in 1975, before arsenic was classified as a carcinogen. The arsenic rule was to enter into effect on March 23, 2001, and water systems were given until January 2006 to comply. EPA concluded that the rule would provide health benefits, but projected that compliance would be costly for some small systems. Many water utilities and communities expressed concern that EPA had underestimated the rule's costs significantly. Consequently, EPA postponed the rule's effective date to February 22, 2002, to review the science and cost and benefit analyses supporting the rule. After completing the review in October 2001, EPA affirmed the 10 ppb standard. The new standard became enforceable for water systems in January 2006.
Since the rule was completed, Congress and EPA have focused on how to help communities comply with the new standard. In the past several Congresses, numerous bills have been offered to provide more financial and technical assistance and/or compliance flexibility to small systems; however, none of the bills has been enacted. Similar legislation again has been offered in the 111th Congress, while broader infrastructure financing bills have received greater congressional attention. |
crs_RS21729 | crs_RS21729_0 | The figures for Alaska reflect a 1961 remeasurement. §1451) come to 88,612 miles (not including the Great Lakes). Table 3 provides figures for the areas of the U.S. coastline bordering international waters. CRS Reports on Border Security Issues
CRS Report RS22026, Border Security: The San Diego Fence , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Selected Internet Sources
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) United States and Mexico http://www.ibwc.state.gov
This website has historical information on the two treaties—the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty of February 2,1848, and the Treaty of December 30, 1853—between the United States and Mexico that set the international boundary between the two countries. Information on U.S.-Canadian border history and boundary markings along open vistas is also included. | This report, originally authored by CRS Information Specialist Barbara Torreon, provides information on the international boundaries that the United States shares with Canada and Mexico. Included are data on land and water boundaries for the northern Canadian border and the southern Mexican border, as well as the international boundaries for the U.S. states that border these countries. Coastline figures for the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, the Great Lakes, and extraterritorial areas are also included. This report does not cover border security issues; however, a listing of relevant CRS reports is at the end of this report. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL30502 | crs_RL30502_0 | 4475 ), the Transportation appropriations bill, Title V of which partially funds a selectgroup of accounts from the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government primary funding measure. 4985 (Vetoed October 30)
Transportation Appropriations or P.L. 5658 , Treasury and GeneralGovernment)
Introduction
The bulk of the accounts within the Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of the President, and GeneralGovernment FY2001 are funded through P.L.106-554 ( H.R. On February 7, 2000, the budget for FY2001 was submitted. Status and Legislative History
In addition to the 21 FY2001 continuing funding resolutions, (9) there were four legislative measures designed to provide appropriations for all the Treasury andGeneral Government accounts and one to provide partial funding for selected accounts. 4985 was included as a section in Division B of the Legislative Branch appropriations( H.R. 4516 . On September 14, 2000, the House agreed to the conference report for H.R. (25) Those accounts which are new for FY2001 had no funding during the period October 1 through December 21,2000. On October 5, the conference committee for the Transportation FY2001appropriation, H.R. Treasury and General Government Appropriations, 2001 (Public Law 106-554)
Budget and Key Policy Issues
Department of the Treasury
The Department of the Treasury has both financial and law enforcement functions. Combined with the funding in P.L. Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The Senate-reported version would have funded it at $4.3 million. The FY2001 continuing funding resolution ( P.L. 106-275 , as amended by P.L. National Science and Technology Council. At the time P.L.106-346 was signed, H.R. 106-346
During the debates in both the House and Senate on the Legislative Branch Appropriations conference report,several Members indicated that they supportedhigher levels of funding for some of the accounts under discussion. 106-346 on October 23, 2000. The House had passed H.R. 4516 . 4871 . The Senate's bill ( S. 2900 ), as approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 20, 2000, included language identical to H.R. 4871 , the conference version ( H.R. Major Funding Trends
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees have approved the allocations to the various appropriations. The House, on May 9, 2000, approveddiscretionary budget authority at $14.088 billion, with outlays at $14.563 billion. 106-761 ) of $14.402 billion in budget authority and $14.751 in outlays. The Senate, on May 4, 2000, allocated $14.3 billion for budget authority and$14.566 billion for outlays. While the congressional numbers are in disagreement with one another, they areconsistently lower than the requested funding. Themandatory accounts are funded at $14.68billion and the discretionary accounts at $15.63 billion. CBO calculates that total at $31.2 billion. Appropriations for the Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of the President, and General Government, FY1996to FY2000 (in billions of current dollars) a
Source for FY2000: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, as of July 26 2000.
a These figures, in current dollars, include CBO adjustments for permanent budget authorities, rescissions, and supplementals, as well as other elements factoredinto the CBO scorekeeping process. Table 4. Department of the Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of the President, and General GovernmentAppropriations (in thousands of dollars)
Sources:
Conference Report on H.R. Scorekeeping. | FY2001 Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of the president, and General Government funding was enacted through P.L. 106-554 , the ConsolidatedAppropriations Act for FY2001, December 21, 2001. Partial funding for a select few of the accounts and somegeneral provisions of the Treasury, Postal Service,Executive Office of the President, and General Government FY2001 Appropriations are included in the Departmentof Transportation FY2001 Appropriation( P.L. 106-346 , Title V, October 23, 2000) and the continuing funding resolution ( P.L. 106-275 , as amended). Twenty-one continuing resolutions providedstopgap funding during the period October 1 through December 21, 2000. There were four appropriations billswhich would have funded all or some of theaccounts usually funded through the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government FY2001 appropriations acts. The House had passed, on July 20, H.R. 4871 . The Senate had reported, on July 20, S. 2900 and, on July 26, had voted to invoke clotureto proceed with debate on H.R. 4871 . The third version, H.R. 4985 , was introduced on July 26 as a new bill and reported fromthe Legislative Branch( H.R. 4516 ) appropriations conference committee as section 1001, Division B of that conference. This billwas vetoed October 30, 2000.The Houseagreed to the conference report on H.R. 4516 September 14. On October 6, the House and Senate approvedand sent to the President, a conferenceagreement for Department of Transportation appropriations ( H.R. 4475 ). Title V partially funds ($348.4million) several of the accounts.
P.L. 106-554 funds the accounts at $30.4 billion ($14.7 in mandatory funding and $15.6 in discretionary accounts). The FY2001 budget, submitted to Congresson February 7, 2000, requested $31.2 billion. The FY2000 funding totals $28.3 billion, including mandatoryfunding (reflecting scorekeeping by theCongressional Budget Office (CBO)). Incorporating the CBO scorekeeping for FY2001, the budget would havemandatory accounts funded at $14.7 billion anddiscretionary funding set at $16.5 billion. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees approved allocationsto the various appropriations:House--discretionary budget authority at $14.402 billion with outlays at $14.751 billion; and Senate--$14.3 billionfor budget authority and $14.566 billion foroutlays. While the congressional allocations were in disagreement with one another, they were consistently lowerthan the requested funding. P.L. 106-346 ( H.R. 4475 ) adds $348 million.
The Budget and Key Policy Issues section of the report discusses both the funding provisions and policy initiatives in the funding statutes. The funding provisionsin Title V of the Department of Transportation appropriations act were critical to the success of passage of the mainfunding provisions in that compromises werereached on the main bill based on commitments to funding for the Department of the Treasury, principally theInternal Revenue Service's (IRS) STABLE programand for IRS information technology. Table 4 details the funding, in the various versions of the FY2001appropriations proposals, by account.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: G&F = Government and Finance; DSP = Domestic Social Policy; RSI=Resources, Science, and Industry. |
crs_RS22848 | crs_RS22848_0 | In May of 2007, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a regulation tightening the administrative procedures and clarifying the vague definitions that allow these types of financing mechanisms to operate. Sources of State Share and Documentation of Certified Public Expenditures
Prior regulations, in defining the types of public funds that may be available to fund the state share of Medicaid costs, establish that funds "transferred from other public agencies" to the state or local agency and under the state's administrative control can be used to fund the state share of Medicaid. The rule would require that providers receive and retain the full amount of the Medicaid payments provided to them for Medicaid services. On March 11, 2008, a lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by a coalition of provider groups led by the National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems, the American Hospital Association, and the Association of American Medical Colleges. . The lawsuit asked the court to reject the rule on three grounds: that CMS has overstepped its authority in limiting intergovernmental transfers, that Congress has barred the agency from imposing a cost limit on Medicaid payments to governmental providers, and that CMS improperly issued the rule. The rule was vacated and the matter returned to the agency. In May of 2007, Congress enacted a one-year moratorium on the implementation of the rule. That moratorium was extended until April 1, 2009, as part of H.R. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ) includes a Sense of the Congress that the Secretary of HHS should not promulgate a final rule on cost limits on public providers (nor on two other rules regarding graduate medical education and rehabilitative services). | On May 29, 2007, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a rule intended to establish control over the use and misuse of intergovernmental transfers in financing the states' shares of Medicaid costs. The rule clarifies the types of intergovernmental transfers of funds allowable for financing a portion of Medicaid costs, imposes a limit on Medicaid reimbursements for government-owned hospitals and other institutional providers, and requires certain providers to retain all of their Medicaid reimbursements. In addition, the rule would establish documentation requirements to substantiate that a governmental entity is making a certified public expenditure (CPE) when contributing to the state share of Medicaid. The rule has raised considerable concern among states and health care providers that its impact on Medicaid services, providers, and beneficiaries could be severe. In response, Congress placed a moratorium on the implementation of its provisions. The moratorium was recently extended until April 1, 2009. Further, in May of 2008, a federal judge ruled, in a lawsuit brought by a coalition of provider groups, that the rule was "improperly promulgated" and vacated the rule, and remanded the matter back to the agency. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) includes a Sense of the Congress that the Secretary of Health and Human Services should not promulgate a final rule on cost limits on public providers. |
crs_R44969 | crs_R44969_0 | Introduction
In precedent stretching back to the Chinese Exclusion Case of 1889, the Supreme Court has held that Congress possesses "plenary power" to regulate immigration. The Court has determined that the executive branch, by extension, possesses unusually broad authority to enforce laws pertaining to alien entry, and to do so under a level of judicial review much more limited than that which would apply outside of the exclusion context. The scope of the federal government's power to exclude aliens is at the forefront of litigation concerning two successive executive orders (the second revising and replacing the first) issued by President Donald Trump that, in their revised form, seek to deny entry temporarily to foreign nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries and to all refugees, subject to limited waiver. The litigation has threshold issues, however, such as questions of mootness and standing, that may well prevent the Court from reaching the merits, particularly following the issuance of a presidential proclamation superseding and somewhat modifying some of the entry restrictions at issue in the case. Second, the report analyzes the extent to which the constitutional and statutory rights of U.S. citizens limit the exclusion power under the "facially legitimate and bona fide" test of Kleindienst v. Mandel . The report applies the principles of the Supreme Court's immigration jurisprudence to the two primary claims that U.S. persons and entities have pressed against the President's revised executive order in the "Travel Ban" litigation: (1) that the revised order violates the Establishment Clause; and (2) that the revised order violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The Supreme Court has since relied upon these cases for the proposition that excluded nonresident aliens cannot state legal claims with respect to entry. The question about the extent to which U.S. citizens can challenge an alien's exclusion, on the other hand, has occupied the Court in three important cases since 1972: Kleindienst v. Mandel , Fiallo v. Bell , and the splintered Kerry v. Din . Under the rule that these cases establish, the government need only articulate a "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for excluding a nonresident alien or class of aliens in order to prevail against an American citizen's claim that his or her constitutional rights have been violated by the exclusion. The case produced the test that continues to govern claims that the exclusion of an alien violates an American citizen's constitutional rights:
[P]lenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established.... We hold that when the Executive exercises [a delegation of this power] negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason , the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant. Despite the relatively clear picture of the scope of the Executive's exclusion power drawn from Mandel , Fiallo , and Din , three unresolved issues warrant discussion: (1) whether the Executive possesses inherent exclusion power, as opposed to solely statutory-based power; (2) the extent to which U.S. citizens or entities may challenge an alien's exclusion on statutory grounds; and (3) the extent to which the Constitution limits the Executive's application of broad delegations of congressional power to make exclusion determinations. At least one pre- Mandel Supreme Court decision states that the Executive does possess inherent authority to exclude aliens. Supreme Court precedent offers limited guidance as to whether such statutory claims are cognizable and, if so, what standard of review should govern them. The Supreme Court also limited the lower court injunctions to allow the government to apply EO-2's entry restrictions against aliens who do not have a "bona fide relationship" to a person or entity within the United States. The Supreme Court likely will not address the underlying question about the outer limits of the executive power. The Court could dismiss the government's appeals in the Travel Ban cases as moot or reject the plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing rather than decide them on the merits; or, maybe most in line with its approach in prior exclusion cases, the Court could decide the merits of the plaintiffs' claims in a way that does not require it to define the boundaries of the Executive's power, such as by rejecting the claims under domestic Establishment Clause jurisprudence. | The Supreme Court has determined that inherent principles of sovereignty give Congress "plenary power" to regulate immigration. The core of this power—the part that has proven most impervious to judicial review—is the authority to determine which aliens may enter the country and under what conditions. The Court has determined that the executive branch, by extension, has broad authority to enforce laws concerning alien entry mostly free from judicial oversight. Two principles frame the scope of the political branches' power to exclude aliens. First, nonresident aliens abroad cannot challenge exclusion decisions because they do not have constitutional or statutory rights with respect to entry. Second, even when the exclusion of a nonresident alien burdens the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen, the government need only articulate a "facially legitimate and bona fide" justification to prevail against the citizen's constitutional challenge.
The first principle is the foundation of the Supreme Court's immigration jurisprudence, so well established that the Court has not had occasion to apply it directly in recent decades. The second principle, in contrast, has given rise to the Court's modern exclusion jurisprudence. In three important cases since 1972—Kleindienst v. Mandel, Fiallo v. Bell, and the splintered Kerry v. Din—the Court applied the "facially legitimate and bona fide" test to deny relief to U.S. citizens who claimed that the exclusion of certain aliens violated the citizens' constitutional rights. In each case, the Court accepted the government's stated reasons for excluding the aliens without scrutinizing the underlying facts. This deferential standard of review effectively foreclosed the U.S. citizens' constitutional challenges. Nonetheless, the Court refrained in all three cases from deciding whether the power to exclude aliens has any limitations. Particularly with regard to the executive branch, the Court left an unexplored margin at the outer edges of the power.
In March 2017, President Trump issued an executive order temporarily barring many nationals of six Muslim-majority countries and all refugees from entering the United States, subject to limited waivers and exemptions. This order replaced an earlier executive order that a federal appellate court had enjoined as likely unconstitutional. Upon challenges brought by U.S. citizens and entities, two federal appellate courts determined that the revised order is likely unlawful, one under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the other under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The Supreme Court agreed to review those cases and, for the meantime, has ruled that the Executive may not apply the revised order to exclude aliens who have a "bona fide relationship" with a U.S. person or entity. In reaching this interim solution, the Supreme Court considered only equitable factors and carefully avoided any discussion of the merits of the constitutional and statutory challenges against the revised order. Even so, the Court's temporary restriction of the executive power to exclude nonresident aliens abroad is remarkable when compared with the Court's earlier immigration jurisprudence.
The merits of these so-called "Travel Ban" cases raise significant questions about the extent to which the rights of U.S. citizens limit the executive power to exclude aliens. It seems relatively clear that, under existing jurisprudence, the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard should govern the Establishment Clause claims against the revised executive order. However, Supreme Court precedent does not clarify whether that standard contains an exception that might permit courts to test the government's proffered justification for an exclusion by examining the underlying facts in particular circumstances. Nor does Supreme Court precedent resolve whether the standard governs U.S. citizens' statutory claims against executive exercise of the exclusion power, or even whether such statutory claims are cognizable. The outcome of the Travel Ban cases would likely turn upon these issues, if the Supreme Court were to decide the cases on the merits rather than on a threshold question such as mootness (a key issue in light of a presidential proclamation modifying the entry restrictions at issue in the cases). |
crs_RL31302 | crs_RL31302_0 | With the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 ( P.L. 108-7 , Division J), the accounts covered by the Treasury and General Government appropriations legislation arefunded through the end of FY2003. The FY2003 budget was submittedto Congress on February 4, 2002. The bill, as passed, would fund the discretionary accounts at $18.5 billion, for a total of $35.1 billion. S.Rept.107-212 shows that the bill, as reported, would fund the discretionary accounts at $18.5 billion, fora total of $34.8 billion. TheBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms will be renamed the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,Firearms, and Explosives and will be transferred to the Department of Justice. Status of FY2003 Appropriations for the Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of the President, and General Government (See Table 5 for breakdown of accounts within bills)
Treasury and General Government Appropriations, FY2003
Budget and Key Policy Issues
Department of the Treasury
In recent decades, the Department of the Treasury has performed four basic functions: (1) formulating, recommending, and implementing economic, financial, tax, and fiscal policies; (2)serving as the financial agent for the federal government; (3) enforcing federal financial, tax,tobacco, alcoholic beverage, and gun laws; and (4) producing all postage stamps, currency, andcoinage. Under P.L. Of this amount, $10.418 billion (or about 60%) was go to the IRS, $2.869billion (or 17%) to the U.S. Customs Service, and $1.0 billion (or 6%) to the U.S. Secret Service.According to budget documents released by the administration, requested funding for the Departmentreflected two priorities: (1) an increase in the resources available for strengthening "security at homeand abroad, as an outgrowth of the events of September 11, 2001; and (2) an increase in funding forefforts to modernize the Customs Service and the business information systems at the IRS. (24)
The Administration's FY2003 budget request includes $883,775,000 for ATF, a 3% increase over the agency's FY2002 appropriation. 107-67 , the IRS received $9.437 billion in funding in FY2002, or $548 million more than it received in FY2001. U. S. Secret Service. Under P.L. In addition, USPS receiveda total of $675,000,000 to compensate it for extraordinary expenses arising from the terrorist attacks.The President allocated $175,000,000 from the Emergency Response Fund authorized by P.L.107-38 , the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery From and Response toTerrorist Attacks on the United States, FY2001. 107-117 . 108-7 retained the funding for the accounts as separate accounts within the Executive Office of the President, as had been reported by the House Committee on Appropriations and passedby the House through H.R. General Services Administration (GSA). Homeland Security
Prior to the terrorist attacks of last fall, the Office of Management and Budgethad identified several accounts under this appropriation (Department of the Treasury,Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. SecretService, and the General Services Administration) as being funded for functionsrelated to countering terrorism. Emergency Counterterrorism Funding
Subsequent to the attacks, certain accounts have been allocated funds from the Emergency Response Fund established through P.L. 107-38 . The 108th Congress enacted P.L. Alternativetables are also provided. 5120 and S. 2740 ). During the interim period, the accounts were fundedat the FY2002 enacted levels. (97) The conferencereport does not provide a breakdown of mandatory and discretionary funding. Continuing Resolution. Scorekeeping. | The Treasury and General Government accounts are funded for FY2003 through the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 ( P.L. 108-7 ; Division J). Because the accounts in thisappropriation were not funded, other than under continuing resolution, as the 107th Congressadjourned, legislation was required for that purpose early in the 108th Congress. During the interim,the accounts were funded at FY2002 enacted levels. P.L. 108-7 also requires a rescission across alldiscretionary funding within the Act.
On February 4, 2002, President George W. Bush submitted his FY2003 budget to Congress. The budget documents show, for accounts funded through the Treasury, Postal Service, and GeneralGovernment appropriations bill, a proposed FY2003 discretionary budget authority of $18.7 billion,an increase over FY2002 estimates by just under $1 billion. Many of the FY2002 estimates offeredearlier in the year are no longer current because they have been affected by supplementalappropriations, largely in response to the September 11 attacks.
H.R. 5120 , as passed by the House July 24, 2002, would have provided $18.5 billion in discretionary funding. The total for the bill would have been $35.1 billion. This wouldrepresent a 3.1% increase over FY2002, including supplemental and emergency funding. Afterscorekeeping adjustments, including $745 million associated with the Administration's accrualfunding proposal, the committee's mark was $147.6 million above FY2002 appropriations and$207.8 million below the Administration request. S. 2740 , as reported by the SenateCommittee on Appropriations, would have provided a total of $34.8 billion to fund the accounts. Discretionary funding under the reported measure would be $18.5 billion. The FY2002appropriation, P.L. 107-67 , totaled $32.4 billion. Congressional Budget Office scorekeeping put thetotals at $32.8 billion ($15.7 billion mandatory and $17.1 billion discretionary). Several of theaccounts were also receiving funding through the Emergency Response Fund under P.L. 107-38 and P.L. 107-117 .
Accounts in the Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Secret Service, and the General Services Administration usually receivefunding for functions related to countering terrorism. Emergency Response Fund allocations, asprovided by P.L. 107-38 , the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from andResponse to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, FY2001, have gone to accounts in theDepartment of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President, and the General ServicesAdministration. Three major entities covered by the Treasury and General Governmentappropriation are being transferred to the newly created Department of Homeland Security. Thoseare the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Customs Service, and the Federal Protective Service of theGeneral Services Administration. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms will be renamedand transferred to the Department of Justice.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: DSP = Domestic Social Policy; G&F = Government and Finance. |
crs_R41037 | crs_R41037_0 | Status of Legislation
This report summarizes key provisions applicable to Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in H.R. 3590 , the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), as passed by the Senate on December 24, 2009. The eligibility issue area may include the bill's most dramatic health reforms applicable to Medicaid, namely a coverage expansion for nonelderly, non-pregnant individuals with income up to 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL). Mandatory benefit additions would include premium assistance for employer-sponsored health insurance, coverage of free standing birth clinics, and tobacco cessation services for pregnant woman. Cost control reforms include proposed reductions in Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments, reduced expenditures for prescription drugs and payment reforms to reduce inappropriate hospital expenditures for health-care acquired conditions. The bill would give states and other stakeholders new program integrity enforcement and monitoring tools as well as impose new data reporting and oversight requirements on states and providers. Additional Medicaid and CHIP program integrity provisions would include requirements for states to implement initiatives used by the Medicare program, such as a national correct coding initiative and a recovery audit contract program. The bill includes a number of demonstrations, pilot programs, and grants. Among the provisions that would impact eligibility, the bill would add two new mandatory eligibility groups, and several new optional eligibility groups. Optional Eligibility Expansions
Non-elderly, Non-pregnant Individuals with Family Income Above 133% of the FPL (§2001, §10201)
Beginning on January 1, 2014 the bill would create a new optional Medicaid eligibility category for all non-elderly, non-pregnant individuals (e.g., childless adults, and certain parents) who are otherwise ineligible for Medicaid, or enrolled in an existing Medicaid eligibility group. Enrollment Simplification and Coordination with State Health Insurance Exchanges (§2202)
As a condition of the Medicaid state plan and receipt of any federal financial assistance after January 1, 2014, the bill would require states to meet the following requirements:
(1) States would be required to establish procedures for:
enabling individuals to apply for, or renew enrollment in, Medicaid or CHIP through an internet website allowing electronic signatures; enrolling individuals who are identified by an Exchange as being eligible for Medicaid or CHIP, without any further determination by the state; ensuring that individuals who apply for Medicaid and/or CHIP but are determined ineligible for either program are screened for enrollment eligibility in qualified plans offered through the Exchange, and if applicable, obtain premium assistance for such coverage without having to submit an additional or separate application; ensuring that the state Medicaid agency, CHIP agency, and the Exchange utilize a secure electronic interface that allows for eligibility determinations and enrollment in Medicaid, CHIP or premium assistance for a qualified plan as appropriate; ensuring that Medicaid and/or CHIP enrollees who are also enrolled in qualified health benefits plan through the Exchange are provided Medicaid medical assistance and/or CHIP child health assistance that is coordinated with the Exchange coverage, including services related to Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSDT); and conduct outreach and enrollment of vulnerable populations such as unaccompanied homeless youth, racial and ethnic minorities, and individuals with HIV/AIDS;
(2) The state Medicaid and CHIP agencies may enter into an agreement with the Exchange under which each agency may determine whether a state resident is eligible for premium assistance for the purchase of a qualified health benefits plan under the Exchange, so long as the agreement meets specified requirements to reduce administrative costs, eligibility errors, and disruptions in coverage;
(3) The Medicaid and CHIP agency would be required to comply with the requirements for the system established under Section 1413 (relating to streamlined procedures for enrollment through an Exchange, Medicaid and CHIP); and
(4) The bill would require states to establish a website (not later than January 1, 2014) that links Medicaid to the state Exchange. The bill would make a number of changes to the federal statute that established MACPAC. The Innovation Center would test innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP program expenditures, while preserving or enhancing the quality of care furnished to beneficiaries. | This report summarizes key provisions applicable to Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as passed by the Senate on December 24, 2009. In general, the bill would expand health insurance coverage to many Americans who currently are uninsured, while attempting to reduce expenditures and offering mechanisms to increase care coordination, encourage more use of health prevention, and improve quality of care. The bill would reform the private health insurance market, impose a mandate for most legal U.S. residents to obtain health insurance, establish health insurance "Exchanges" that would subsidize health insurance coverage for eligible individuals; expand Medicaid eligibility; create programs to improve quality of care and encourage more use of preventive services; address healthcare workforce issues; and propose a number of other Medicaid and Medicare program and federal tax code changes.
Among the proposed Medicaid reforms, the bill would modify eligibility standards and methodologies, add several new mandatory and optional Medicaid benefits, expand Medicaid benefits, and increase CHIP funding. Beginning in 2014, or sooner at state option, nonelderly, non-pregnant individuals with income below 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) would become eligible for Medicaid. New optional eligibility groups also would be added, such as non-elderly, non-pregnant individuals (childless adults) with income above 133% of poverty. The bill also would require states to maintain current coverage levels for individuals under Medicaid and CHIP. In addition, the bill would add several new mandatory Medicaid benefits including coverage of services in free standing birth clinics, and coverage of tobacco cessation services for pregnant women.
The bill would make a number of Medicaid and CHIP financing changes, such as reducing Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments, increasing prescription drug rebates and increasing certain pharmacy reimbursement, increasing federal spending for the Territories, providing special enhanced disaster recovery Medicaid funding, and requiring payment system reforms.
The bill includes provisions that would give states and other stakeholders new program integrity (PI)—waste, fraud and abuse—enforcement and monitoring tools as well as impose some new data reporting and oversight requirements on states and providers. Additional PI provisions affecting Medicaid and CHIP include requirements for states to implement a national correct coding initiative similar to the Medicare program, a broad new nursing home accountability initiative, and other new requirements to enhance PI that increase the uniformity of Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP requirements.
The bill also offers opportunities for states and other stakeholders to use new demonstrations and grants to modify payment systems, introduce care delivery models, and improve care quality, which include a medical global payment system demonstration and school-based health center grants. |
crs_R44922 | crs_R44922_0 | The U.S. Coal Industry
Introduction
The Trump Administration has taken several actions intended to help revive the U.S. coal industry. Within its first two months, the Administration rolled back or began reversing several coal-related regulations finalized under the Obama Administration. This effort was undertaken as three of the largest coal producers continued recovery from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and occurred in the context of higher coal prices (making coal production possibly more profitable), lower inventories, and higher natural gas prices—factors that could lead to coal being more competitive as a fuel source for electricity generation. Coal will likely remain an essential component of the U.S. energy supply, but how big of a role will it play? Trends and Recent Developments in the U.S. Coal Industry
Coal Production
U.S. coal production had been strong since the 1990s (above or near 1 Bst per year until 2014), and reached its highest level of production in 2008 (1.17 Bst) before it declined precipitously in 2015 (see Table 1 and Figure 2 ) and 2016. EIA current data and short-term projections show coal production remaining under 800 million tons in 2017 and 2018 (see Table A-1 ). Long-term EIA projections show that coal production would fall below 600 million short tons (mst) per year under the reference case that includes the implementation of the Obama Administration's Clean Power Plan (CPP). Without CPP, coal production would remain relatively flat, at between 800 million and 900 million short tons per year through 2050. Coal Mining Employment and the Number of Mines
The trend in coal mining has been to improve labor productivity, or to make production more efficient, with the use of technology. There were sharp increases in labor productivity (more coal per man-hour) in the 1980s and 1990s, as labor productivity more than doubled from 2.74 average production per employee hour in 1985 to 7.02 in 2000, particularly at coal mines in the West (see Table 2 ). There is no indication that the coal industry will see a reversal of these production trends, even if there are some short-term gains in employment. In either case (declining or flat demand), coal consumption would continue to be a smaller share of the total U.S. energy pie. Electric power generation is the primary market for coal, accounting for about 93% of total consumption. With the retirement of many coal-fired power plants and the building of new gas-fired plants, accompanied by relatively flat electricity demand, there has been a structural shift in demand for U.S. coal—one that will likely result in reduced capacity for coal-fired electricity generation over the long run. In 2016, natural gas overtook coal as the primary fuel for power generation. In short, coal would likely account for a smaller portion of total U.S. energy consumption for years to come, replaced by natural gas and renewable energy, particularly for power generation. Structure of the U.S. Coal Industry
Background on the Industry
The coal industry is highly concentrated in the United States, with just a handful of major producers, operating primarily in four states (Wyoming, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Illinois). In 2015, the top five coal mining companies were responsible for about 57% of U.S. coal production, led by Peabody Energy Corp. with 19.6% and Arch Coal Inc. with 14.6% (see Table 5 and Figure 7 ). The major coal producers made numerous acquisitions in 2011 in anticipation of stronger global demand, although it was during a period of slowing domestic coal demand, weak coal prices, and more competitive natural gas supplies. The huge debt load and coal overproduction during this period was not sustainable and led to the bankruptcy of many coal firms. Three of the top five coal producers have filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection (see Table 5 ) since August 2015 (ANR in August 2015, Arch Coal in February 2016, and Peabody Energy in April 2016). Other major producers such as Patriot Coal, Walter Energy, and James River Coal have filed as well. All told, over 50 coal producers have filed for bankruptcy in the past two years, with a total of $19.3 billion in debt being reorganized. | The Trump Administration has taken several actions intended to help revive the U.S. coal industry. Within its first two months, the Administration rolled back or began reversing several coal-related regulations finalized under the Obama Administration. This effort was undertaken as three of the largest coal producers continued recovery from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and occurred in the context of higher coal prices (making coal production possibly more profitable), lower inventories, and higher natural gas prices—factors that could lead to coal being more competitive as a fuel source for electricity generation. Coal will likely remain an essential component of the U.S. energy supply, but how big will its footprint be?
U.S. coal production had been strong since the 1990s (above or near 1 billion short tons per year until 2014), and reached its highest level of production in 2008 (1.17 billion short tons). But it declined precipitously in 2015 and 2016. The Energy Information Administration's (EIA's) current data and short-term projections show coal production remaining under 800 million short tons in 2017 and 2018. Long-term EIA projections show that coal production is likely to fall below 600 million short tons per year, assuming implementation of the Obama Administration's Clean Power Plan (CPP). Without CPP, coal production is expected to remain relatively flat, at around 800-900 million short tons per year through 2050.
As a result of societal concerns, among them the desire for cleaner air, coal consumption may have peaked. But in either case (declining or flat demand), coal is a smaller share of the total U.S. energy pie. Power generation is the primary market for coal, accounting for about 93% of total consumption. With the retirement of many coal-fired power plants and the building of new gas-fired plants, accompanied by lower electricity demand, there has been a structural shift in demand for U.S. coal—one that may lead to reduced capacity over the long term for coal-fired electricity generation. In 2016, natural gas overtook coal as the top energy source for power generation. Also, the strength of renewables for electricity generation should not be discounted, as EIA projects annual growth at a rate of 2.6% through 2050. Thus, coal would very likely remain a smaller portion of total U.S. energy consumption for years to come, particularly as energy used for power generation.
The trend in coal mining has been to improve labor productivity, or to make production more efficient, with the use of technology. There were sharp increases in labor productivity (more coal per man-hour) in the 1980s and 1990s, as labor productivity more than doubled from 1985 to 2000, particularly at coal mines in the West. There is no indication that the coal industry will see a reversal of these production trends, even if there are some short-term gains in employment.
The coal industry is highly concentrated in the United States, with just a handful of major producers, operating primarily in four states (Wyoming, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Illinois). In 2015, the top five coal mining companies were responsible for about 57% of U.S. coal production, led by Peabody Energy Corp. with 19.6% and Arch Coal Inc. with 14.6%. The coal majors made numerous acquisitions in 2011 during a period of increasing global demand but of slowing domestic demand, weak coal prices, and more competitive natural gas supplies. The debt load and coal overproduction during this period was not sustainable and led to the bankruptcy of many coal firms.
Three of the top five coal producers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection beginning in August 2015 (Alpha in August 2015, Arch Coal in February 2016, and Peabody in April 2016). Other major producers such as Patriot Coal, Walter Energy, and James River Coal have filed for bankruptcy as well. All told, over 50 coal producers have filed for bankruptcy in the past two years, with a total of $19.3 billion in debt being reorganized. |
crs_RL33881 | crs_RL33881_0 | Background
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program, Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, was enacted in January 1975 ( P.L. 93-647 ). The CSE program is administered by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and is funded by general revenues. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and nine tribal nations operate CSE programs and are entitled to federal matching funds. In FY2005, the CSE program collected $23 billion in child support on behalf of more than 17 million children, of which $21 billion went to families and $2 billion was retained by the states and federal government as recovered welfare costs. The CSE program is intended to help strengthen families by securing financial support for children from their noncustodial parent on a consistent and continuing basis and by helping some families to remain self-sufficient and off public assistance by providing the requisite CSE services. 109-171 included significant changes to the CSE program, it did not include many of the child support provisions discussed and considered within the four-year welfare reauthorization debate. This report provides a brief discussion of 12 child support provisions that were considered during 2002-2005 within the context of welfare reauthorization but not enacted in P.L. The Administration has included several of the provisions in its FY2008 Budget. (See Table A-1 .) Identification and Seizure of Assets Held by Multi-State Financial Institutions
P.L. The proposed provision would have given the federal government the authority to act on behalf of states to seize financial assets for the purpose of paying child support. The main reason that Congress (as part of the 1996 welfare reform law) required states, as a condition of receiving CSE funding, to adopt the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) was to reduce the problems associated with the establishment and enforcement of child support in interstate cases. The rest of this report discusses an array of unrelated provisions that proponents argued would make the CSE program more efficient and effective. The provisions would have (1) required the HHS Secretary to submit a report to Congress on the procedures states use to locate custodial parents for whom child support has been collected but not yet distributed; (2) designated Indian tribes and tribal organizations as persons authorized to have access to information in the Federal Parent Locator Service; (3) changed the language of current law to require the Secretary of Education to reimburse the HHS Secretary for any costs incurred by the HHS Secretary in providing requested information on new hires (from the National Directory of New Hires which is part of the FPLS) to help the Education Secretary locate persons who had defaulted on student loans; (4) increased federal funding for the CSE access and visitation program; (5) prohibited states from collecting child support from noncustodial fathers to repay Medicaid costs associated with the birth of a child; and (6) required the health care plan administrator to notify the state CSE agency when a child lost health care coverage. Child Support Provisions in Welfare Measures | The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program, Part D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, was enacted in January 1975 (P.L. 93-647) and most recently amended by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171). The CSE program is administered by the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and is funded by general revenues. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and nine tribal nations operate CSE programs and are entitled to federal matching funds. In FY2005, the CSE program collected $23 billion in child support on behalf of more than 17 million children. The CSE program is intended to help strengthen families by securing financial support for children from their noncustodial parent on a consistent and continuing basis.
Although the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (enacted February 8, 2006) included significant changes to the CSE program, it did not include many of the child support provisions that had been considered during the preceding four-year debate within the context of welfare reauthorization. This report discusses 12 such provisions that were passed by either the House or the Senate Finance Committee (or both). The Administration has included several of these provisions in its FY2008 budget. Of the 12 provisions, five aimed at enhancing CSE collection tools would have (1) eased the collection of child support from veterans' disability compensation benefits; (2) facilitated the collection of child support from Social Security benefits; (3) allowed the HHS Secretary to act on behalf of states to seize financial assets (held by a multi-state financial institution) of noncustodial parents who owed child support; (4) facilitated the collection of child support from longshore and harbor workers' compensation; and (5) required states to adopt a later version of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) so as to facilitate the collection of child support payments in interstate cases.
Other provisions included an array of measures aimed at making the CSE program more efficient and effective. The provisions would have (1) required the HHS Secretary to submit a report to Congress on the problems of undistributed child support collections; (2) designated Indian tribes and tribal organizations as persons authorized to have access to information in the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS); (3) changed the language of current law to require the Secretary of Education to reimburse the HHS Secretary for any costs incurred by the HHS Secretary in providing requested information on new hires (from the National Directory of New Hires, which is part of the FPLS) to help the Education Secretary locate persons who had defaulted on student loans; (4) increased federal funding for the CSE access and visitation program; (5) prohibited states from collecting child support from noncustodial fathers to repay Medicaid costs associated with the birth of a child; and (6) required each health care plan administrator to notify the state CSE agency when a child has lost health care coverage. The final provision discussed in this report would have gradually reduced the federal matching rate for CSE expenditures, from 66% to 50%. Table A-1 shows the welfare reauthorization legislation in which these 12 child support provisions appeared. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R42701 | crs_R42701_0 | Introduction
The prospect of drone use in domestic surveillance operations has engendered considerable debate among Americans of various political ideologies. Background, Uses, and Drone Technology
Drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are aircraft that do not carry a human operator and are capable of flight under remote control or autonomous programming. An unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is the entire system, including the aircraft, digital network, and personnel on the ground. Drones can range from the size of an insect—sometimes called nano drones or micro UAVs—to the size of a traditional jet. Drones are perhaps most commonly recognized from their missions abroad, including to target and kill suspected members of Al Qaeda and related groups, but they might be used for a variety of other purposes, including for both commercial and law enforcement activities within the United States. In fact, the FAA predicted that 30,000 unmanned aircraft could be flying in U.S. skies in less than 20 years. Most recently, as part of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Congress mandated that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) "develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system." And how does technology affect society's expectation of privacy? When analyzing domestic drone use under the Fourth Amendment, a reviewing court may be informed by cases surrounding privacy in the home, privacy in public spaces, location tracking, manned aerial surveillance, those involving the national border, and warrantless searches under the special needs doctrine. The Fourth Amendment protects this zone of privacy by ensuring that "the right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... against unreasonable search and seizure, shall not be violated[.]" Again, the touchstone in every Fourth Amendment case is whether the search is reasonable . Whether a targeted individual is at home, in his backyard, in the public square, or near a national border will play a large role in determining whether he is entitled to privacy. Equally important is the sophistication of the technology used by law enforcement and the duration of the surveillance. As surveillance technology advances and becomes ever-present in Americans' lives, people's conception of privacy may tend to oscillate. Drones are smaller, can fly longer, and can be built more cheaply than traditional aircraft. Drones are not hindered by similar limitations. Several measures have been introduced in the 113 th Congress that would restrict the domestic use of drones, and establish arguably greater constraints on their usage than the Fourth Amendment requires. This statement would require the following items:
A list of individuals who would have the authority to operate the drone The location in which the drone will be used The maximum period it will be used Whether the drone would be collecting information about individuals
If the drone will be used to collect personal information, the statement must include the following:
The circumstances in which such information will be used The kinds of information collected and the conclusions drawn from it The type of data minimization procedures to be employed Whether the information will be sold, and if so, under what circumstances How long the information would be stored Procedures for destroying irrelevant data. This statement must include policies adopted by the agency that
minimize the collection of information and data unrelated to the investigation of a crime under a warrant, require the destruction of data that is no longer relevant to the investigation of a crime, establish procedures for the method of such destruction, and establish oversight and audit procedures to ensure the agency operates a UAS in accordance with the data collection statement filed with the FAA. | The prospect of drone use inside the United States raises far-reaching issues concerning the extent of government surveillance authority, the value of privacy in the digital age, and the role of Congress in reconciling these issues.
Drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are aircraft that can fly without an onboard human operator. An unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is the entire system, including the aircraft, digital network, and personnel on the ground. Drones can fly either by remote control or on a predetermined flight path; can be as small as an insect and as large as a traditional jet; can be produced more cheaply than traditional aircraft; and can keep operators out of harm's way. These unmanned aircraft are most commonly known for their operations overseas in tracking down and killing suspected members of Al Qaeda and related organizations. In addition to these missions abroad, drones are being considered for use in domestic surveillance operations to protect the homeland, assist in crime fighting, disaster relief, immigration control, and environmental monitoring.
Although relatively few drones are currently flown over U.S. soil, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts that 30,000 drones will fill the nation's skies in less than 20 years. Congress has played a large role in this expansion. In February 2012, Congress enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform Act (P.L. 112-95), which calls for the FAA to accelerate the integration of unmanned aircraft into the national airspace system by 2015. However, some Members of Congress and the public fear there are insufficient safeguards in place to ensure that drones are not used to spy on American citizens and unduly infringe upon their fundamental privacy. These observers caution that the FAA is primarily charged with ensuring air traffic safety, and is not adequately prepared to handle the issues of privacy and civil liberties raised by drone use.
This report assesses the use of drones under the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. A reviewing court's determination of the reasonableness of a drone search would likely be informed by location of the search, the sophistication of the technology used, and society's conception of privacy in an age of rapid technological advancement. While individuals can expect substantial protections against warrantless government intrusions into their homes, the Fourth Amendment offers less robust restrictions upon government surveillance occurring in public places including areas immediately outside the home, such as in driveways or backyards. Concomitantly, as technology advances, the contours of what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment may adjust as people's expectations of privacy evolve.
In the 113th Congress, several measures have been introduced that would restrict the use of drones at home. Several of the bills would require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before using drones for domestic surveillance, subject to several exceptions. Others would establish a regime under which the drone user must file a data collection statement stating when, where, how the drone will be used and how the user will minimize the collection of information protected by the legislation. |
crs_RL34647 | crs_RL34647_0 | An interchange fee is paid by the merchant's bank to the cardholder's bank (that issued the card) after the cardholder purchases goods or services with a payment (credit or debit) card. At issue are increases in interchange fees set by the credit card associations like Visa and MasterCard and card-issuing banks or companies like Discover Card and American Express to enable merchants to gain access to the associations' and issuers' electronic payment network. Interchange fees have been rising since the 1990s, despite diminishing fraud losses and technological advances in communications that lowered the costs of accessing the electronic payment system. Merchants argue that the card associations have not negotiated these fees with them but instead present them as take it or leave it offers. Economists who have studied the payment card market attribute the higher interchange fees to the nature and structure of the market, which is not the traditional market but a two-sided market. The conditions are where the payment card issuers have market power and merchants have an inelastic demand for accepting payment cards. The report begins with a discussion of the nontraditional structure of the payment card market. The second section is an analysis of the problem of the optimum level of payment cards to achieve the highest social welfare benefit for cardholders and merchants. The last section discusses the implications of the analysis. In both the newspaper and the payment card cases, revenue transfers are necessary to maximize overall social welfare. In that regard, the economic assessment of the issue may contribute to the judicial and legislative determination of whether the Visa and MasterCard associations are monopolies and whether the domination of these associations warrants granting limited antitrust immunity to providers and merchants to negotiate interchange fees. 2695)
The Durbin Amendment
Even though interchange fees were not considered a contributing cause of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 ( S. 3217 ), which addresses the regulatory failures that caused of the crisis, also contains provisions concerning interchange fees. Senator Durbin's Amendment on interchange fees that was adopted as part of S. 3217 as amended by the full Senate and incorporated into the Senate-passed version of H.R. 4173 mandates specific regulatory actions. Its purpose is to ensure that small businesses and other entities that accept debit cards pay a reasonable and proportional price for the use of the payment card networks and prohibits the payment card network from imposing anti-competitive restrictions, such as prohibiting discounts to customers who pay with cash, on small businesses and other entities that accept payment cards. The effect of the Durbin Amendment would be to lower the cost to merchants for using the payment card network to process debit card transactions, but does not guarantee the cost to consumers will be lowered. The representative from Visa suggested that there is no evidence that merchants have lowered their profits by passing on the lower cost of interchange fees to their customers. The result could be that the social benefit of the electronic payment card system is lowered, because the government's action would lower revenues to the card-issuing banks, causing them to issue fewer than the optimal number of cards to cardholders. | Interchange fees in the processing of credit and debit cards have become controversial. An interchange fee is paid by the merchant's bank to a cardholder's bank (that issued the card) after the cardholder purchases goods or services with a payment (credit or debit) card. Merchants and cardholders assert that they must accept excessive and increasing interchange fees set by the card associations such as Visa and MasterCard and member card-issuing banks. Interchange fees have been rising since the 1990s, despite diminishing fraud losses and technological advances in communications that lower the costs of accessing the electronic payment system. Merchants argue that the card associations have not negotiated these fees with them but instead present the fees as "take it or leave it" offers.
Economists who have studied the payment card markets attribute the higher interchange fees to the nature and structure of the market. This is not the traditional market, they point out, but a two-sided market where suppliers compete for two types of customers with different demand responses, like a newspaper that must attract both readers and advertisers. In the payment card market, banks must attract cardholders and merchants, and a transfer of revenues is usually necessary to provide card-issuing banks an incentive to issue more cards, which provide more payment card users to merchants. This is similar to newspapers, where the lower the subscription rates, the higher the readership and the higher the advertiser revenues. For a payment card system that needs more cardholders to achieve the optimal benefits to cardholders and merchants, more revenue transfers may be needed to offset the cost of issuing more cards to cardholders. There could be cases, however, where the revenue transfers are excessive, which would mean that the interchange fees are providing excess profits to issuer banks.
Even though interchange fees were not considered a contributing cause of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, S. 3217 as amended by the full Senate and incorporated into the Senate-passed version of H.R. 4173, which addresses the regulatory causes of the crisis, also contains provisions on interchange fees. The Durbin Amendment (S.Amdt. 3989) on interchange fees was adopted. The amendment mandated specific regulations to applied debit cards to ensure that small businesses and other entities that accept debit cards pay a reasonable and proportional price for the use of the payment card network, and limit the payment card network from imposing anti-competitive restrictions on small businesses and other entities that accept payment cards. The amendment does not address what some believe to be a critical part of the interchange fee issue that relates to legal or regulatory caps on the fees. Specifically, presently there is not a mechanism that could be used to ensure that merchants lower their prices to pass the excess revenues back to the cardholders. In countries where interchange fees are capped, the governments have been relying on merchants to voluntarily lower prices. Yet, there is no evidence that merchants have done so.
This report examines the Visa and MasterCard card associations' systems. The report begins with a discussion of the nontraditional structure of the payment card market. The next section is an analysis of the problem of the optimum level of payment cards to achieve the highest social welfare benefit for cardholders and merchants. The third section discusses the provisions in Senator Durbin's amendment and other legislation in the House that was not acted upon by the full House of Representatives that would grant the payment card stakeholders limited antitrust immunity for negotiating access fees and terms for using electronic payment card system. The last section is a discussion of some implications of the analysis. This report will be updated as financial and legislative developments warrant. |
crs_R44060 | crs_R44060_0 | Overview
Cash flow financing (CFF) is a statutory provision in the Arms Export Control Act that enables presidentially authorized recipients of U.S. foreign military aid to pay for U.S. defense equipment in partial installments over time rather than all at once. However, at times some lawmakers and observers have criticized the use of CFF, arguing that as a policy tool, it effectively commits Congress to future appropriations in order to pay for previously purchased, high-priced defense systems. Current Changes Proposed by the Obama Administration
As U.S. military assistance to Egypt has continued fairly steadily for over three decades, successive administrations have continued the practice of authorizing CFF for Egypt—until earlier this year. On March 31, 2015, after a phone call between President Obama and Egyptian President Abdelfattah al Sisi, the White House announced that, though the Administration was releasing the deliveries of select weapons system to Egypt that had been on hold since October 2013 (and pledged to continue seeking $1.3 billion in aid from Congress), "Beginning in fiscal year 2018, the President noted that we will channel U.S. security assistance for Egypt to four categories—counterterrorism, border security, Sinai security, and maritime security—and for sustainment of weapons systems already in Egypt's arsenal." This announcement had come after the Administration's lengthy review of U.S. foreign assistance policy toward Egypt, a process that began immediately following the Egyptian military's ouster of former president Mohammed Morsi, a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood. To date, there has been relatively muted public discussion of the President's proposed policy changes. | On March 31, 2015, after a phone call between President Obama and Egyptian President Abdelfattah al Sisi, the White House announced that beginning in FY2018, the United States would stop providing cash flow financing (CFF) to Egypt. Cash flow financing is the financial mechanism that enables foreign governments to pay for U.S. defense equipment in partial installments over time rather than all at once; successive Administrations have authorized CFF for Egypt since 1979.
In recent years, as public scrutiny of U.S. military aid to Egypt has increased, some observers have criticized the provision of CFF to Egypt. Critics argue that the financing of expensive conventional weapons systems is based on an assumption of future appropriations from Congress. Others argue that as the Egyptian military combats terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere, now may not be the optimal time to alter U.S. military aid to Egypt.
The Administration's proposed policy change comes after its lengthy review of U.S. foreign assistance policy toward Egypt, a process that began immediately following the Egyptian military's ouster of former president Mohammed Morsi, a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood.
The House draft FY2016 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill specifies that the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committees on Appropriations on any plans to restructure military assistance for Egypt.
This report analyzes this proposed change in U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt; it provides background on the history of CFF and reviews various issues for Congress. For more on U.S. policy toward Egypt, please see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31016 | crs_RL31016_0 | President Bush's Andean Regional Initiative Request for FY2002
In April 2001 budget submissions, President Bush requested $882.29 million in FY2002economic and counter-narcotics assistance for Colombia and regional neighbors in an initiativecalled the "Andean Regional Initiative," with $731 million of the counter-narcotics assistance calledthe "Andean Counterdrug Initiative." (6)
Critics of the Andean Regional Initiative argue that it is a continuation of what they regard as the misguided approach of Plan Colombia approved in 2000, with an overemphasis on military andcounter-drug assistance, and with inadequate support for human rights and the peace process inColombia. Supporters argue that the Andean RegionalInitiative continues needed assistance to Colombia when Plan Colombia assistance is just beginningto take effect, while providing more support for endangered regional neighbors and more assistancefor social and economic programs. Under final allocations for FY2002, Peru received $194.87 million, with $119.87million in economic and social programs, and $75 million in counter-narcotics aid. As passed bythe House, the bill provides $826 million for the ARI, of which $675 million is for the ACI, areduction of $56 million from the President's request. The Senate Appropriations Committee marked up its version of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill on July 26, andreported out H.R. The Senate passed H.R. As passed by the Senate, the bill provides $698 for the ARI, of which $547 is for the ACI,a reduction of $184 million from the President's request, and includes conditions on the safety ofaerial fumigation and the implementation of alternative development programs..
Committee Action. 107-345 ) was passed by the House on December 19, and by theSenate on December 20, 2002. Itincludes $625 million for the "Andean Counterdrug Initiative" (ACI) portion of the Andean RegionalInitiative. The conference version of H.R. These include the following. Limitations on Personnel in Colombia. Foreign Relations Authorization, FY2002-FY2003
House Action. 1646 on May 4, 2001, with four reporting requirementson Colombia and a prohibition on the issuance of visas to illegal armed groups in Colombia. Reporting Requirement on the "Colombianization" of U.S. The Committee on Foreign Relations reported out S. 1401 on September 4, 2001, with a provision in section 606,similar to a provision in the House version of the bill, requiring the Secretary of State to submit toappropriate congressional committees within 60 days after enactment a report that outlines acomprehensive strategy to eradicate all opium at its source in Colombia. National Defense Authorization Act, FY2002
House Action. 2586 on August 1, 2001, and reported out the bill ( H.Rept.107-194 ) on September 4, 2001, with a provision containing a cap on U.S. military personnel inColombia, and this was retained when the House approved the bill on September 25, 2001. This House provision was not retained in theconference version of S. 1438 ( H.Rept. 107-333 ), which passed by both chambers onDecember 13, 2001. Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)
House Action. On November 16, 2001, the House passed H.R. 3009 , the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, whichwould offer expanded trade benefits to the Andean region through December 31, 2006. On November 29, 2001, the Senate Committee on Finance reported out an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. February 2002. | In April and May 2001, the Bush Administration proposed $882.29 million in FY2002 economic and counter-narcotics assistance, as well as extension of trade preferences and othermeasures, for Colombia and regional neighbors in an initiative called the "Andean RegionalInitiative" (ARI).
Critics of the Andean Regional Initiative argue that it is a continuation of what they regard as the misguided approach of Plan Colombia assistance approved in 2000, with an overemphasis onmilitary and counter-drug assistance, and with inadequate support for human rights and the peaceprocess in Colombia. Supporters argue that it continues needed assistance to Colombia, whileproviding more support for regional neighbors and social and economic programs.
In action on the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill ( H.R. 2506 ), the House passed the bill on July 24, 2001, with $826 million for the ARI, of which $675 million is forthe counter-narcotics "Andean Counterdrug Initiative" (ACI) portion, a reduction of $56 millionfrom the President's ACI request. The Senate passed the bill on October 24, 2001, with $698 millionfor the ARI, of which $547 million is for the ACI, a reduction of $184 million from the President'sACI request. The conference version of H.R. 2506 , as approved by the House onDecember 19, and the Senate on December 20, includes $625 million for the ACI, $106 million lessthan the President's ACI request, with $215 million earmarked for AID programs and a variety ofconditions, including an alteration of the cap on military and civilian contractors serving inColombia. In February 2002 budget submissions, the Bush Administration allocated $645 millionto the ACI account for FY2002, including $20 million transferred from the general InternationalNarcotics Control account.
In action on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, the House passed H.R. 1646 on May 16, 2001, with four reporting requirements on activities in Colombiaand a prohibition on the issuance of visas to illegal armed groups in Colombia. The Senate ForeignRelations Committee reported out S. 1401 on September 4, 2001, with a requirementfor a report that outlines a comprehensive strategy to eradicate all opium cultivation at its source inColombia. No further action occurred on either of these bills in the first session of the 107thCongress.
In action on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002, the House passed H.R. 2586 on September 25, 2001, with a cap of 500 on the number of U.S. militarypersonnel in Colombia, with some exceptions. This provision was not retained in the conferenceversion of S. 1438 which was passed by both chambers on December 13, 2001.
In action on the Andean Trade Preference Act, on November 16, 2001, the House passed H.R. 3009 , the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, which wouldextend and expand the ATPA through December 31, 2006. The Senate Finance Committee reporteda more limited version, S. 525 , on November 29, 2001, in the context of otherlegislation. |
crs_RL31801 | crs_RL31801_0 | Division A of P.L. The full House approved the conference agreement on December 8, 2003. The President signed the measure into law( P.L. 108-199 ) on January 23, 2004. The enacted consolidated appropriations measure contains $80.63 billion for USDA and related agencies for FY2004 (excluding the effects of a 0.59%across-the-board rescission in all discretionary, non-defense accounts, as required inthe final law). As originally reported by their respective committees, H.R. 2673 and S. 1427 contained nearly identicalappropriations of $77.49 billion. However, the Senate added $2.2 billion to themandatory food stamp account to reflect more recent projections of programparticipation, and conferees added $1 billion to the food stamp reserve account. Justover three-fourths ($63.7 billion) of the spending in the agriculture portion (DivisionA) of P.L. 108-199 is classified as mandatory spending, including food stamps, childnutrition programs, crop insurance, and the various farm support programs fundedthrough USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation. The balance of spending ($16.9 billion) in Division A is for discretionaryprograms, which is $198 million below the Administration's request and $61 millionbelow both the House- and Senate-passed levels. Discretionary spending in DivisionA of the measure is $963 million below the FY2003 enacted level includingsupplementals. Agriculture appropriators were allocated nearly $1 billion less forFY2004 discretionary accounts than the FY2003 level including supplementals. Tohelp achieve this goal, the conference agreement includes an FY2004 appropriationfor foreign food aid that is $572 million below the FY2003 level (which wasbolstered by supplemental spending). Also, the conference agreement containsprovisions that limit or prohibit spending on certain mandatory conservation, ruraldevelopment, and research programs, which in total reduced spending in theseaccounts by approximately $650 million from authorized levels. The measure did not include a Senate provision that would have relaxed the licensing requirement for travel to Cuba for the sale of agricultural and medicalproducts. Congressional Action on FY2004 Appropriations for the U.S. Department of Agriculture and RelatedAgencies
** = Pending
(1) Before Senate floor action on the FY2004 appropriations measure, the Senatesubstituted the text of S. 1427 for the text of the House-passed bill( H.R. 108-199 , H.Rept. Division H of P.L.108-199 also includes conservation provisions that are not part of the regular annual funding for conservation programs. For P.L. 108-199 delays most implementation for 2 years. Conferees rejected a House-passed provision that would have blocked FDA from preventing individuals, wholesalers, and pharmacists from importing cheaperFDA-approved prescription drugs from foreign suppliers. (1) FY2003 enacted levels include amounts appropriated for USDA and related agencies in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2003 ( P.L. | On January 23, 2004, the President signed into law an FY2004 consolidated appropriations measure ( P.L. 108-199 , H.R. 2673 ) that includes annual funding for the U.S.Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies. The full House approved the conference agreementof the measure on December 8, 2003. Senate floor action on the conference agreement was delayedfor several weeks until a cloture motion was approved and the conference agreement was adoptedon January 22, 2004. Part of the reason for the delay in Senate consideration of the measure wasopposition to a conference-adopted provision that postpones implementation of country-of-originlabeling (COOL) for fresh fruits and vegetables, and red meats, for two years, until September 30,2006. Until enactment of P.L. 108-199 , FY2004 spending for USDA and related agencies had beengoverned by several continuing resolutions (most recently P.L. 108-135 , H.J.Res. 79 ),which allowed FY2004 spending to continue at the FY2003 level.
The FY2004 consolidated appropriations act contains $80.63 billion for USDA and related agencies for FY2004 (excluding the effects of a 0.59% across-the-board rescission in alldiscretionary, non-defense accounts, as required by the final law). As originally reported by theirrespective committees, H.R. 2673 and S. 1427 contained nearly identicalappropriations of $77.49 billion. However, the Senate added $2.2 billion to the mandatory foodstamp account to reflect more recent projections of program participation, and conferees added $1billion to the food stamp reserve account. Just over three-fourths ($63.7 billion) of the spending inthe agriculture portion (Division A) of P.L. 108-199 is classified as mandatory spending, includingfood stamps, child nutrition programs, crop insurance, and the various farm support programs fundedthrough USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation.
The balance of spending ($16.9 billion) in Division A is for discretionary programs, which is$198 million below the Administration's request and $61 million below both the House- andSenate-passed levels. Discretionary spending in Division A of the measure is $963 million belowthe FY2003 enacted level including supplementals. Agriculture appropriators were allocated nearly$1 billion less for FY2004 discretionary accounts than the FY2003 level including supplementals.To help achieve this goal, P.L. 108-199 includes an FY2004 appropriation for foreign food aid thatis $572 million below the FY2003 level (which was bolstered by supplemental spending). Also, P.L.108-199 contains provisions that limit or prohibit spending on certain mandatory conservation, ruraldevelopment, and research programs, which in total reduced spending in these accounts byapproximately $650 million from authorized levels.
The measure did not include a Senate provision that would have relaxed the licensing requirement for travel to Cuba for the sale of agricultural and medical products. Conferees alsorejected a House provision that would have blocked FDA from preventing individuals fromimporting cheaper FDA-approved prescription drugs from foreign suppliers.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science and Industry; DSP = Domestic Social Policy;
G&F = Government and Finance |
crs_R44744 | crs_R44744_0 | Introduction
Congressional actions on air quality issues have been dominated since 2011 by efforts—particularly in the House—to change the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) authority to promulgate or implement new emission control requirements. Often under court order, the Obama Administration's EPA used authorities Congress gave EPA in the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970, 1977, and 1990 to address long-standing issues posed by emissions from various sources. EPA finalized GHG standards for power plants in August 2015; set GHG emission standards for oil and gas industry sources in June 2016; finalized a second round of GHG standards for trucks in August 2016; and completed a Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) of the already promulgated 2022-2025 GHG standards for light-duty vehicles (cars and light trucks) in January 2017. Most of these rules are under review at EPA. The agency asked the D.C. On October 27, 2017, the D.C. The Clean Power Plan (CPP), which is the rule for existing units, would set state-specific goals for CO 2 emissions and emission rates from existing fossil-fueled power plants. President Obama vetoed both of the joint resolutions. 2042 , which would have delayed the compliance date of GHG emission standards for existing EGUs (including the date by which states must submit implementation plans) until after the completion of judicial review of any aspect of the rule, and would have allowed a state to opt out of compliance if the governor determined that the rule would have significant adverse effects on rate-payers or on the reliability of the state's electricity system. Legislation was also considered in the 113 th and 112 th Congresses: the House passed bills to restrict EPA's authority to implement GHG emission requirements for power plants on five separate occasions. Implementation of the CPP was stayed by the Supreme Court in February 2016, pending the completion of judicial review. Challenges to the rule were filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit by more than 100 parties, including 27 states. Circuit heard oral argument in the case in September 2016; as of this writing, the court has not issued a decision. On March 28, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13783, to require the review of regulations and policies that burden the development or use of domestically produced energy. directed EPA to review the Clean Power Plan, the NSPS, and other regulations for consistency with policies that the E.O. enumerates, and as soon as practicable, to "suspend, revise, or rescind the guidance, or publish for notice and comment proposed rules suspending, revising, or rescinding those rules." The EPA and judicial processes could be short-circuited by Congress, through legislation overturning or modifying the CPP or NSPS. The threat of a filibuster, requiring 60 votes to proceed, might prevent Senate action, however. The Administration stated that the rule was a key component under President Obama's "Climate Action Plan," and that the plan's Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions was needed to set the Administration on track to achieve its goal to cut methane emissions from the oil and gas sector by 40%-45% from 2012 levels by 2025, and to reduce all domestic greenhouse gas emissions by 26%-28% from 2005 levels by 2025. directed EPA to review the rule for consistency with policies that the E.O. EPA has begun a review of the rule and has proposed a two-year stay of the rule during the review process. 2015 Revision of the Ozone NAAQS
Since 2008, review of the NAAQS for ozone has sparked recurrent controversy. These are not the data EPA is using to designate nonattainment areas under the standard: EPA's final designation decisions, announced May 1 and July 17, 2018, are generally using data for 2014-2016, and have identified 201 counties or partial counties and 2 tribal areas in 22 states and the District of Columbia as nonattainment. In the 115 th Congress, H.R. 806 and S. 263 would, among other provisions, delay designation of nonattainment areas under the 2015 ozone standard until 2025 and submission of State Implementation Plans until 2026, require future NAAQS reviews every 10 years instead of every 5, and allow consideration of technological feasibility in the setting of some primary (health-based) standards. 806 on July 18, 2017. In addition, the House passed H.R. 1119 , the SENSE Act, which would ease emission limits for electric generating units powered by coal refuse; and H.R. | Review of regulations issued under the Obama Administration, with the possibility of their modification or repeal, has been the main focus of interest on Clean Air Act issues in the 115th Congress and in the executive and judicial branches in 2017 and 2018. Of particular interest are the ambient air quality standards for ozone promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in October 2015; EPA rules to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from power plants, cars and trucks, and the oil and gas sector; and emission standards for three groups of sources: brick kilns, wood stoves and heaters, and power plants that burn waste coal.
Reducing GHG emissions to address climate change was a major goal of President Obama, but, for a variety of reasons, many in Congress have been opposed to it. In the absence of congressional action, President Obama directed EPA to promulgate GHG emission standards using existing Clean Air Act authority. This authority has been upheld on three occasions by the Supreme Court, but the specifics remain controversial and subject to debate in Congress, the Trump Administration, and the courts.
The Clean Power Plan (CPP), which would limit GHG emissions from existing fossil-fueled power plants, has been a frequent subject of debate. Implementation of the CPP has been stayed by the Supreme Court since February 2016, pending the completion of judicial review. Prior to the stay, challenges to the rule had been filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit by more than 100 parties, including 27 states. The D.C. Circuit heard oral argument in the case in September 2016; as of this writing, the court has not issued a decision. The Trump Administration's EPA has proposed to repeal the CPP and has asked for public input on what should replace it. The D.C. Circuit has stayed the litigation during EPA's review of the CPP.
More broadly, on March 28, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13783, to require the review of regulations and policies that burden the development or use of domestically produced energy. The E.O. directed EPA to review the Clean Power Plan and several other regulations for consistency with policies that the E.O. enumerates, and as soon as practicable, to "suspend, revise, or rescind the guidance, or publish for notice and comment proposed rules suspending, revising, or rescinding those rules." GHG rules for cars and trucks and for methane emissions from the oil and gas industry, in addition to the CPP, are subject to the executive order and are under review at EPA, as well as being challenged in the courts.
Congress could, of course, short-circuit the EPA and judicial processes, through legislation overturning or modifying any of these regulations. The threat of a filibuster, requiring 60 votes to proceed, might prevent Senate action, however.
An EPA rule that has been the subject of action in the 115th Congress is the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for ozone, which EPA revised in October 2015. Under the revised NAAQS, EPA was to have designated areas that have not attained the standard in October 2017, setting in motion tighter emission requirements for a multitude of industrial, commercial, and mobile sources of pollution. On May 1 and July 17, 2018, the agency took action, identifying 52 areas in 22 states and the District of Columbia as being in nonattainment of the revised standard.
On July 18, 2017, the House passed H.R. 806, which would have delayed designation of the nonattainment areas until 2025 and would require future reviews of the NAAQS every 10 years instead of every 5, among other provisions. The House has also passed legislation to delay emission standards for brick kilns and wood heaters (both in H.R. 1917) and to exempt coal-refuse-fired electric generating units (EGUs) from certain emission standards that apply to other coal-fired EGUs (H.R. 1119). All of the House-passed bills await action in the Senate. |
crs_RL32171 | crs_RL32171_0 | Background
The authority of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction, procedures and remedies available infederal courts is principally found in Article III of the United States Constitution. Federal district courts and courts of appeal (the inferior federal courts) are authorized to consider most questions of federal statutory and constitutional law, with appeal to the SupremeCourt. In general, most modern "court-stripping" proposals appear to be intended to increase statecourt involvement in constitutional cases by decreasing federal court involvement. There are at leastthree possible variations to these proposals. (15) Second, there are proposals to vest theexclusive jurisdiction to hear such constitutional cases in the state courts without appeal to theSupreme Court. (17) To the extent that theseremedy limitations actually prevent the vindication of established constitutional injury, they wouldappear to fall under the same category as proposals that limit the jurisdiction of particular courts.Thus, for instance, the amendment noted above which would prohibit the use of funds forenforcement of a particular district court decision, (18) would seem likely to be analyzed similarly toan amendment limiting lower court jurisdiction over constitutional cases. The Congress does not have theauthority to establish the jurisdiction of state courts, and consequently those "court stripping"proposals that relate to the inferior federal courts do not generally specify that state courts willbecome the primary courts for vindication of specified constitutional rights. Limiting Consideration of Specific Constitutional Issues to State Courts with No Supreme Court Review
This scenario requires evaluation of two aspects of Article III: the power of Congress to allocate federal judicial power and the power of Congress to create exceptions to the Supreme Court'sappellate jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause. This limit arises from the previously notedfact that some types of federal "judicial power" are extended by the text of the Constitution to "all"such cases, i.e., cases arising under either the Constitution, federal law, treaty, admiralty or maritimejurisdiction, or cases affecting an Ambassador or other public Ministers or Consuls. Under this textual analysis, the power to consider cases concerning the Constitution must be vested in some federal court. Various such proposals have been made,such as the previously noted amendment limiting funds available to the courts for enforcement ofa particular court decision. (53)
Constitutional considerations other than separation of powers could also be at issue if proposed legislation was intended to significantly burden a particular group or to impair a fundamental right.It is generally agreed that a law that limited a federal court's power for an illegitimate constitutionalpurpose could run afoul of provisions of the Constitution apart from Article III. Conclusion
Congress's authority to limit the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts appears relatively broad, so that limiting the jurisdiction of these courts to consider particular constitutional cases is arguablywithin its Article III authority. Finally, elimination ofreview of constitutional issues by any court, state or federal, seems the least likely to surviveconstitutional scrutiny. It should be noted, however, that various commentators have suggested that any limitation of jurisdiction for a particular class of constitutional cases raises questions regarding both the separationof powers doctrine and the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, a resolution of these broader questions would depend on further judicial developmentsin this area. | Over the years, various proposals have been made to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases regarding particular areas of constitutional law such as busing, abortion, prayer in school,and most recently, reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. Several such proposals passed the House in the108th Congress, including an amendment to H.R. 2799 to limit the use of funds toenforce a federal court decision regarding the Pledge of Allegiance; H.R. 2028 , to limitthe jurisdiction of federal courts to hear cases regarding the Pledge of Allegiance; and H.R. 3313 , to limit federal court jurisdiction over questions regarding the Defense ofMarriage Act. Generally, proponents of these proposals are critical of specific decisions made bythe federal courts in that particular substantive area, and the proposals are usually intended to expressdisagreement with cases in those areas and/or to influence the results or applications of such cases. Proposals of this type are often referred to as "court-stripping" legislation. The label arises from thefact that many of these proposals invoke the Congress's power to regulate federal court jurisdiction,i.e., the courts' power to consider cases of a particular class and in a particular procedural posture.It should be noted, however, that some proposals characterized as "court-stripping," rather thanfocusing on jurisdiction, address what remedies are available to litigants or what procedures mustbe followed to bring constitutional cases. Although the United States Congress has broad authorityto regulate in all three of these areas of judicial power -- jurisdiction, procedure and remedies --this authority is generally used to address broader issues of court efficiency and resource allocation.This report, however, is limited to proposals to allocate judicial power in a way that affects orinfluences the result in cases concerning specific constitutional issues.
There are at least three different types of "court-stripping" proposals: (1) limiting the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, (2) limiting the jurisdiction of all federal courts, and (3)limiting the jurisdiction of both state and federal courts together. While the Congress has broadauthority under Article III of the Constitution to regulate the jurisdiction, procedures and remediesavailable in state and federal courts, this power is generally not used as a means to affect substantivelaw. Consequently, the federal courts have only rarely faced the question of what happens when theCongress acts under Article III to limit substantive litigation, and the Supreme Court has not squarelyfaced a modern law limiting jurisdiction to affect or influence litigation of constitutional questions.Thus, an analysis of these proposals relies to some extent on textual analysis and scholarlydiscussion. Congress's authority to limit the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts appears relativelybroad, so that laws limiting the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts would appear to raise fewerconstitutional issues. Significant constitutional questions arise, however, with regard to whetherCongress could eliminate both inferior federal court and Supreme Court review of constitutionalmatters. Further, elimination of review of constitutional issues by any court -- state or federal court-- seems the least likely to survive constitutional scrutiny. Various commentators, however, havesuggested that limiting jurisdiction for any court for a particular class of cases raises questionsregarding both the separation of powers doctrine and the Equal Protection Clause. |
crs_R45018 | crs_R45018_0 | T he North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994, establishing a free trade area as part of a comprehensive economic and trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Currently, the United States is renegotiating the agreement. However, repeated threats from President Trump to abandon NAFTA and other actions by the Administration as part of ongoing efforts to "modernize" NAFTA have raised concerns that the United States could withdraw from the agreement altogether. Although some U.S. agricultural industries support NAFTA renegotiation and efforts to address certain outstanding trade disputes—especially regarding milk, potatoes, some fruits and vegetables, cheese, and wine—many continue to express strong support for NAFTA and oppose outright withdrawal. Possible disruptions in U.S. export markets and general uncertainty in U.S. trade policy also continue to be a concern for U.S. food and agricultural producers. Similar concerns have been raised by some in Congress who have oversight authority on industry and trade activities and who continue to monitor the ongoing NAFTA renegotiations. This report examines some of the potential consequences to U.S. agricultural markets of a U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA, focusing on the possibility that higher tariffs could be imposed on U.S. imports and exports. In particular, under a NAFTA withdrawal, it is likely that most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs would be imposed on agricultural products traded among the NAFTA countries instead of the current zero tariff (i.e., duty-free trade) for most agricultural products. In general , MFN tariffs on U.S. agricultural imports would likely raise prices both to U.S. consumers and other end users, such as manufacturers of value-added food products. Similarly, if higher MFN tariffs were applied to U.S. goods exported to Canada and Mexico, this could make some U.S. agricultural products more costly to buyers in those markets, which could lower U.S. exports—such as meat products, grains and feed, and processed foods. Comprehensive analysis of a possible U.S. NAFTA withdrawal focused exclusively on agricultural markets is also not available. Trends in Agricultural Trade Under NAFTA
Trade under NAFTA underpins an important market for U.S. food and agricultural producers. Canada and Mexico are the United States' two largest trading partners, accounting for 28% of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports and 39% of its imports in 2016. Over the past 25 years under NAFTA, the value of U.S. agricultural trade with Canada and Mexico has increased sharply. Exports rose from $8.7 billion in 1992 to $38.1 billion in 2016 ( Figure 1 ), while imports rose from $6.5 billion to $44.5 billion over the same period ( Figure 2 ). Adjusted for inflation, the value of agricultural exports and imports between the United States and its NAFTA partners has increased roughly threefold since 1990, growing at an average rate of about 5%-6% annually. MFN rates generally reflect the highest (most restrictive) rates that World Trade Organization (WTO) members can charge each other on imported goods and services. Imposition of MFN Tariffs
Following is a discussion of possible tariff changes to both U.S. agricultural imports and exports in the event of a possible U.S. NAFTA withdrawal. As noted previously, in general, the imposition of higher MFN tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports would likely make U.S. products in those markets less price-competitive and more costly to foreign buyers, which could result in reduced quantities sold. Reduction in U.S. Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate the importance of Canada and Mexico to U.S. agricultural trade for selected agricultural commodity groupings, as defined by USDA. These market share data—together with MFN tariff information—further suggest that these products may become more costly and less competitive in these markets as higher tariffs, mostly duty-free access, and other types of trade preferences are removed under a possible U.S. NAFTA withdrawal. | The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994, establishing a free trade area as part of a comprehensive economic and trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Currently, the United States is renegotiating the agreement. However, repeated threats by President Trump to abandon NAFTA and other actions by the Administration as part of ongoing efforts to "modernize" NAFTA have raised concerns that the United States could withdraw from NAFTA. Although some U.S. agricultural sectors support NAFTA renegotiation and efforts to address certain outstanding trade disputes—regarding milk and dairy products, potatoes, some fruits and vegetables, and wine—many continue to express strong support for NAFTA and oppose outright withdrawal. Possible disruptions in U.S. export markets and general uncertainty in U.S. trade policy also continue to be a concern for U.S. food and agricultural producers. Similar concerns have been raised by some in Congress who have oversight authority on industry and trade activities and who continue to monitor and conduct hearings on the ongoing NAFTA renegotiations.
Trade under NAFTA provides an important market for U.S. agricultural producers and a broader choice of food products for U.S. food processors and consumers. Canada and Mexico are the two largest U.S. agricultural trading partners (combining imports and exports), accounting for 28% of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports and 39% of U.S. imports in 2016. Under NAFTA, U.S. agricultural trade with Canada and Mexico has increased significantly. Agricultural exports rose from $8.7 billion in 1992 to $38.1 billion in 2016, while imports rose from $6.5 billion to $44.5 billion over the same period. Adjusted for inflation, growth in the value of total U.S. agricultural exports and imports with its NAFTA partners has increased roughly threefold, growing at an average rate of 5%-6% annually.
To date, comprehensive quantitative analysis of a possible U.S. NAFTA withdrawal focused exclusively on agricultural markets is not yet available. This report looks at the potential economic effects to agricultural markets of a possible U.S. NAFTA withdrawal assuming the application of most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs on traded agricultural products instead of the current zero tariff (i.e., duty-free trade) for selected agricultural products. MFN rates generally reflect the highest (most restrictive) rates that World Trade Organization (WTO) members can charge each other on imported goods and services.
In general, the application of MFN tariffs on U.S. agricultural imports would likely raise prices both to U.S. consumers and other end users, such as manufacturers of value-added food products. MFN tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports would, in turn, likely make U.S. products in those markets less price-competitive and more costly to foreign buyers, which could result in reduced quantities sold. Given that certain agricultural products dominate U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico—such as meat products, grains and feed, and processed foods—these products could become more costly and less competitive as MFN tariffs are imposed and other trade preferences are removed under a NAFTA withdrawal. This could result in reduced market share for U.S. products in these markets. This report looks at a subset of MFN tariffs for certain products that could impact U.S. agricultural markets in the event of a possible U.S. NAFTA withdrawal.
Other potential trade impacts under a U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA could include (but are not limited to) higher prices for imported products from Canada and Mexico, reductions in agricultural imports that compete with U.S. products, disruption of integrated supply chains, general market disruption and uncertainty, economic impacts to some agricultural-producing states (both positive and negative), and a decrease of future negotiating leverage of the United States (e.g., to review and resolve disputes regarding a range of non-tariff barriers to trade). |
crs_R41028 | crs_R41028_0 | The cover-over provisions for rum extend as far back as 1917 for PR and 1954 for the USVI. Annual cover-over revenues in FY2011 were $449.0 million for PR and $133.5 million for the USVI. The congressional debate on this legislation could also lead to debate on the broader issue of the cover-over program more generally. In the 112 th Congress, legislation has been introduced to expand federal control over the use of covered-over revenue. Passage of H.R. 1883 (or similar legislation, S. 986 ) would result in limits on Puerto Rico's and the USVI's ability to use covered-over revenue to subsidize the rum industry in the islands. The legislation is likely in response to the recent economic development initiatives in the USVI financed in part by rum cover-over revenue. The President's FY2013 budget proposal includes an extension of the $13.25 cover-over, as does S. 3521 . Cover-Over Revenue
In FY2011, PR received $449.1 million in covered-over revenue from domestic production and other country imports into the United States, combined. The Use of Cover-Over Revenue
Puerto Rico uses cover-over revenue to finance marketing and promotional activities for the rum industries. Departments of the Treasury and the Interior to the USVI and PR to directly and indirectly support the rum industry. 4578 , to require the Unite States to pay to the Virgin Islands the full amount of excise taxes imposed on rum produced in the Virgin Islands. | Under current law, the excise tax on rum is $13.50 per proof gallon and is collected on rum produced in or imported into the United States. Through 2011, $13.25 per proof gallon of imported rum is transferred or "covered over" to the Treasuries of Puerto Rico (PR) and the United States Virgin Islands (USVI). In FY2011, PR received over $449.0 million in revenue and the USVI received over $133.5 million. The law does not impose any restrictions on how PR and USVI can use the transferred revenues. Both territories use some portion of the revenue to promote and assist the rum industry.
The cover-over provisions for rum extend as far back as 1917 for PR and 1954 for USVI. Recently, the United States Virgin Islands has dedicated a larger share of current and future covered-over revenue to help finance public and private infrastructure that would directly benefit the rum industry.
In the 112th Congress, legislation has been introduced to expand federal control over the use of covered-over revenue. Passage of H.R. 1883 (or similar legislation, S. 986) would result in limits on Puerto Rico's and the USVI's ability to use covered-over revenue to subsidize the rum industry in the islands. The legislation is likely in response to the recent economic development initiatives in the USVI financed in part by rum cover-over revenue. The President's FY2013 budget proposal includes an extension of the $13.25 cover-over, as does S. 3521.
This report provides a history and analysis of the rum cover-over program and current legislative efforts to modify the program. The congressional debate on this legislation could also lead to debate on the broader issue of the cover-over program more generally. This report will be updated as legislative events warrant. |
crs_RL30763 | crs_RL30763_0 | Although the vast majority of telemarketers are legitimate business people, there are other individuals and companies who violate existing laws and rules and bilk unsuspecting customers of $40 billion a year according to some estimates. Federal Laws
In recent years, several federal laws that deal directly with telemarketing issues have been enacted. Because both the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are responsible for different aspects of telemarketing, both agencies were directed to promulgate regulations. Since the Federal Trade Commission had previously announced the establishment of a national do-not-call registry, the FCC will implement its rules in conjunction with the FTC. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act
P.L. Telemarketers calling consumers must promptly identify the seller of the product or service, that the purpose of the call is to sell something, the nature of the goods or services being offered, and, in the case of a prize promotion, that no purchase or payment is required to participate or win. Results of the review will be reported to Congress. Individual state laws and regulations cover telemarketing practices within a state. Be Informed
Consumers can go to a local library and ask for help in finding information on telemarketing and telemarketing scams. The library's Internet connection (if available) will provide access to the websites listed in this report. | In recent years, Congress has enacted several federal laws addressing telemarketing fraud and practices. As a result, both the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have established regulations covering the $720 billion telemarketing industry in the United States. It is estimated that consumers lose over $40 billion a year to fraudulent telemarketers. Although the vast majority of telemarketers are legitimate business people attempting to sell a particular product or service, there are unscrupulous individuals and companies violating telemarketing rules and promoting various fraudulent schemes aimed at parting consumers from their money.
The FCC, FTC, and several consumer groups and government/business partnerships identified in this report provide extensive information on telemarketing. This report provides summaries of the federal laws and regulations particular to telemarketing, the establishment of a national do-not-call registry, and on the options that are available to consumers to attempt to limit the calls that they receive from telemarketers and to report questionable telemarketing practices to local or federal authorities. The report also lists sources of additional information with addresses, phone numbers, and Internet sites (if available) and will be updated as legislation or news events warrant. |
crs_R43936 | crs_R43936_0 | From the earliest days of commercial radio, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and its predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission, have encouraged diversity in broadcasting. This concern has repeatedly been supported by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has affirmed that "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public," and that "assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment." The FCC's policies seek to encourage four distinct types of diversity in local broadcast media:
diversity of viewpoints, as reflected in the availability of media content reflecting a variety of perspectives; diversity of programming, as indicated by a variety of formats and content, including programming aimed at various minority and ethnic groups; outlet diversity, to ensure the presence of multiple independently owned media outlets within a geographic market; and minority and female ownership of broadcast media outlets. In addition to promoting diversity, the FCC aims, with its broadcast media ownership rules, to promote localism and competition by restricting the number of media outlets that a single entity may own or control within a geographic market. Authority and Legal Directives
Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to review its media ownership rules every four years to determine whether they are "necessary in the public interest as a result of competition," and "repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest." The new media ownership rules became effective December 1, 2016. News Consumption Trends
The debate over media ownership rules is occurring against the background of sweeping changes in news consumption patterns. Based on surveys conducted by Pew Research Center, the percentage of adults citing local broadcast television as a news source declined from 65% in 1996 to 46% in 2016. Nevertheless, local television still outranks other local news sources. In contrast, those citing printed newspapers as a source they "read yesterday" or use regularly declined from 50% in 1996 to 20% in 2016. These trends raise questions as to whether common ownership of multiple media outlets in the same market might limit diversity of viewpoints as much today as two decades ago. Broadcast Signals and Markets
Two characteristics of broadcast television and broadcast radio stations determine whether or not the media ownership rules described in later sections of this report are triggered: (1) the geographic range (or contours ) of their signals, and (2) the limits of their media markets as determined by the Nielsen Company, a market research firm. Radio/Television Cross-Ownership Rules
The radio/television cross-ownership rules limit ownership of broadcast radio and television stations serving the same geographic area. The FCC first adopted NBCO rules in 1975. Ownership Diversity
In 2004, 2011, and 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, directed the FCC to review its broadcast ownership diversity policies in conjunction with the media ownership rules. 2. The FCC stated that it did not believe that either Section 257 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act or Section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 requires it to adopt race- or gender- conscious measures in order to promote ownership diversity. Measures Specific to Small Businesses
In 2016 the FCC also reinstated the six measures from its 2008 Diversity Order to enable eligible entities to abide by less restrictive media ownership and attribution rules, and more flexible licensing policies, than their counterparts. | From the earliest days of commercial radio, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and its predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission, have encouraged diversity in broadcasting. This concern has repeatedly been supported by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has affirmed that "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public," and that "assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment."
The FCC's policies seek to encourage four distinct types of diversity: (1) diversity of viewpoints, as reflected in the availability of media content reflecting a variety of perspectives; (2) diversity of programming, as indicated by a variety of formats and content; (3) outlet diversity, to ensure the presence of multiple independently owned media outlets within a geographic market; and (4) minority and female ownership of broadcast media outlets.
In addition to promoting diversity, the FCC aims, with its broadcast media ownership rules, to promote localism and competition by restricting the number of media outlets that a single entity may own or control within a local geographic market. Two characteristics of broadcast television and broadcast radio stations determine whether or not media ownership rules are triggered: (1) the geographic range of their signals, and (2) the boundaries of their media markets as determined by the Nielsen Company, a market research firm.
After first adopting rules limiting common ownership of multiple local radio stations, multiple local television stations, and multiple national broadcast networks in the 1940s, the FCC continued to expand and modify media ownership rules. It began to limit cross-ownership of radio and television stations in 1970, and cross-ownership of newspapers and television stations in 1975. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires the FCC to review these rules every four years and repeal or modify those it no longer deems to be in the public interest.
Following its most recent review, the FCC retained its media ownership rules in 2016, and readopted rules counting broadcast stations that jointly sell advertising time as commonly owned. Pending approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the FCC will require independently owned broadcast television stations to include resource-sharing agreements in their online public inspection files. In addition, as directed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, the FCC reviewed its broadcast ownership diversity policies. It concluded that it did not believe the 1996 Telecommunications Act nor the Communications Act of 1934 requires it to adopt race- or gender-conscious measures in order to promote ownership diversity. In order to increase broadcast ownership diversity, FCC also reinstated rules enabling certain small businesses to abide by less restrictive media ownership and attribution rules, and more flexible licensing policies, than their counterparts. The newly approved media ownership and diversity rules took effect on December 1, 2016.
The FCC's 2016 review occurred against the background of sweeping changes in news consumption patterns. Surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center show 20% of respondents citing printed newspapers as a source they "read yesterday" or used regularly in 2016, down from 50% in 1996. While the percentage of adults citing local broadcast television as a news source declined from 65% in 1996 to 46% in 2016, it still outranked other local news sources. These trends, along with increased consumption of news online, are contributing to debate in Congress as to whether common ownership of multiple media outlets in the same market might limit diversity of viewpoints as much today as 20 or 40 years ago. |
crs_R44916 | crs_R44916_0 | Introduction to the PHS Agencies
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has designated 8 of its 11 operating divisions (agencies) as components of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS). The PHS agencies are (1) the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), (2) the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), (3) the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), (4) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), (5) the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), (6) the Indian Health Service (IHS), (7) the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and (8) the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). NIH conducts and supports basic, clinical, and translational medical research. AHRQ conducts and supports research on the quality and effectiveness of health care services and systems. IHS supports a health care delivery system for American Indians and Alaska Natives. SAMHSA funds community-based mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services. ATSDR, which is headed by the CDC director and included in the CDC section of this report, is tasked with identifying potential public health effects from exposure to hazardous substances. In FY2013, for example, NIH was the primary source of transfers both to CMS for ACA implementation and to CDC and SAMHSA to help offset a loss of funding for those two agencies from the ACA's Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF, discussed below). Mandatory Funding, User Fees, and Collections
Although the bulk of PHS agency funding is provided through annual discretionary appropriations, agencies also receive mandatory funding, user fees, and third-party collections. Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF) . A table showing the allocation of annual PPHF funding by agency since FY2010 is provided in Appendix C . Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF) . FDA's user fee programs now support the agency's regulation of prescription drugs, animal drugs, medical devices, tobacco products, and some foods, among other activities. In FY2017, user fees account for 41% of the agency's funding. Almost all of the CDC accounts, for example, are funded with discretionary appropriations plus amounts from other sources (see Table 5 ). From FY2003 through FY2014, AHRQ did not receive its own annual discretionary appropriation. In FY2015, AHRQ received its own discretionary appropriation for the first time in more than a decade in lieu of any set-aside funding. This trend continued in FY2016 and FY2017, with the agency receiving its own discretionary appropriation and no set-aside funds. Most of CDC's spending is extramural. In FDA's annual appropriation, Congress sets both the total amount of appropriated funds and the amount of user fees that the agency is authorized to collect and obligate for that fiscal year. Recent Trends in Agency Funding
HRSA funding increased from $8.1 billion in FY2010 to $10.7 billion in FY2017; this increase occurred despite a reduction in the agency's discretionary appropriation during that time (see Table 7 ). Recent Trends in Agency Funding
IHS's funding, which includes discretionary appropriations and collections from third-party payers of health care, increased between FY2010 and FY2017 from $5.1 billion to $6.3 billion (see Table 8 ). National Institutes of Health (NIH)75
Agency Overview
NIH is the primary agency of the federal government charged with performing and supporting biomedical and behavioral research. 244 ; P.L. Recent Trends in Agency Funding
SAMHSA's program-level funding increased by 13% from FY2016 ($3.8 billion) to FY2017 ($4.3 billion). As discussed earlier in this report, the FY2016 CHCF funding was not subject to sequestration. | Within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), eight agencies are designated components of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS). The PHS agencies are funded primarily with annual discretionary appropriations. They also receive significant amounts of funding from other sources, including mandatory funds from the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended), user fees, and third-party reimbursements (collections).
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) funds research on improving the quality and delivery of health care. For more than a decade prior to FY2015, AHRQ did not receive its own annual appropriation. Instead, it relied on redistributed ("set-aside") discretionary funds from other PHS agencies for most of its funding, with supplemental amounts from the ACA's mandatory Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF). Since FY2015, AHRQ has received an annual appropriation in lieu of any set-aside funds. The agency's FY2017 funding level of $417 million was $11 million less than the FY2016 level of $428 million. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is the federal government's lead public health agency. CDC obtains its funding from multiple sources besides discretionary appropriations. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) investigates the public health impact of exposure to hazardous substances. ATSDR is headed by the CDC director and included in the discussion of CDC in this report. The CDC/ATSDR funding level decreased from $12.2 billion in FY2016 to $12.1 billion in FY2017. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates drugs, medical devices, food, and tobacco products, among other consumer products. The agency is funded with annual discretionary appropriations and industry user fees. The agency's funding levels for FY2016 and FY2017 remained constant at about $4.7 billion, with user fees accounting for 41% of FDA's total FY2017 funding. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) funds programs and systems that provide health care services to the uninsured and medically underserved. HRSA, like CDC, relies on funding from several different sources. The agency's funding decreased from $10.8 billion in FY2016 to $10.7 billion in FY2017. The Indian Health Service (IHS) supports a health care delivery system for Native Americans. IHS's funding, which includes discretionary appropriations and collections from third-party payers of health care, increased between FY2016 and FY2017 from $6.2 billion to $6.4 billion. Appropriations increased during that period, while collections stayed the same in both fiscal years. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) funds basic, clinical, and translational biomedical and behavioral research. NIH gets more than 99% of its funding from discretionary appropriations. Recent increases in NIH's annual appropriations have boosted its funding level to a new high of $34.1 billion in FY2017, compared with $32.3 billion in FY2016. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) funds mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services. SAMHSA's funding, about 95% of which comes from discretionary appropriations, was approximately $3.8 billion in FY2016 and $4.3 billion in FY2017.
This report supersedes two earlier products, both of which remain available: CRS Report R43304, Public Health Service Agencies: Overview and Funding (FY2010-FY2016), and CRS Report R44505, Public Health Service Agencies: Overview and Funding (FY2015-FY2017). |
crs_RL31491 | crs_RL31491_0 | Introduction
In 1987, Congress amended the Clean Water Act (CWA) to provide for establishment of a program of state revolving loan funds (SRFs) through which to finance local water pollution abatement projects ( P.L. Although no additional authorizing legislation was adopted after 1987, Clean Water Act appropriations, contrary to stated expectations , continued. In 1995, EPA ruled that Davis-Bacon no longer applied to CWA/SRF projects. In the spring of 2000, EPA reversed itself and, entering into a settlement agreement with the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO, affirmed that the act would be applied to such projects effective July 1, 2001. Other amendments followed. 87-88.) Through the next few years, Congress variously modified the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). It was clear that the SRFs would serve federally specified purposes and in a federally specified manner. The end. The relevant part of the new Section 513 was to have read:
The Administrator shall take such action as may be necessary to ensure that each laborer or mechanic employed by a contractor or subcontractor of a project that is financed in whole or in part by a grant, loan, loan guarantee, refinancing, or any other form of financial assistance provided under this Act ( including assistance provided by a State from a water pollution revolving loan fund established by a State pursuant to Title VI) shall be paid wages at rates that are not less than the prevailing rates for projects of a similar character in the locality of the project that is financed under this Act, as determined by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the Act of March 3, 1931 (commonly known as the "Davis-Bacon Act") (40 U.S.C. Congress continued to appropriate funds for CWA projects and for SRFs. 961 would have deleted the phrase "before fiscal year 1995" and would have removed "administrative requirements previously imposed on Title II grant recipients and currently extended to applicants who receive SRF capitalization grant loans." Davis-Bacon is not self-enforcing. Did DBA provisions continue to be written into CWA/SRF contracts? Finally, EPA's Federal Register explanation noted: "... as a matter of policy , the Agency has determined that prevailing wage rate requirements applicable to federally-assisted construction projects should continue to apply to federally-assisted treatment works construction in the CWSRF program." The BCTD stated its understanding that "EPA would prospectively apply Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements to construction of treatment works projects assisted by State Water Pollution Control Revolving Funds with funds made directly available by capitalization grants under Title VI of the Clean Water Act...." The BCTD explained: "... in order to receive a capitalization grant" for its SRF, the states had been required to "enter into a capitalization grant agreement with the EPA that imposes an assortment of conditions"—one of which was the Section 602(b)(6) DBA requirement. But, EPA subsequently moved the effective date back to September 1, 2001. What happened after 1994 when SRF authorizations expired remains in question. But absent further authorizations, Congress continued to fund the SRF program through the appropriations process. The act itself requires an agreement to pay not less than the locally prevailing wage rate be included in every construction contract "in excess of $2,000, to which the United States or the District of Columbia is a party ...." (Italics added.) If the EPA were correct (in either stance), upon what legal foundation does its judgment rest? If so, on what ground? Report from the Subcommittee: H.Rept. "By establishing the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirement for the construction of treatment works, the Committee continues its long-standing practice of ensuring the application of Davis-Bacon where Federal funds are provided for construction...." It added: "For the Clean Water SRFs, the most significant source of revenue in the state revolving funds is the Federal capitalization grant. | The Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) requires, among other things, that not less than the locally prevailing wage be paid to workers employed, under contract, on federal construction work "to which the United States or the District of Columbia is a party." Congress has added DBA prevailing wage provisions to more than 50 separate program statutes.
In 1961, a DBA prevailing wage requirement was added to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (P.L. 87-88), now known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), which assists in construction of municipal wastewater treatment works. In 1987, Congress moved from a program of federal grants for municipal pollution abatement facilities to a state revolving loan fund (SRF) arrangement in which states would be expected to contribute an amount equal to at least 20% of SRF capitalization funding. The SRFs were expected to remain as a continuing and stable source of funds for construction of treatment facilities. And, Congress specified that certain administrative and policy requirements (including Davis-Bacon) were to be annexed from the core statute and would apply to treatment works "constructed in whole or in part before fiscal year 1995" with SRF assistance. By October 1994, under the 1987 amendments, it was expected that federal appropriations for SRFs would end.
After 1987, Congress variously reconsidered the CWA and the SRF program but made no further authorizations. It did, however, contrary to expectation when the 1987 legislation was adopted, continue to appropriate funds for SRF pollution abatement projects. Thus, a conflict arose. Did the administrative and policy requirements associated with federal funding (inter alia, the prevailing wage requirement) continue to apply? If so (or if not), upon what legal foundation? In 1995, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ruled that prevailing wage rates (Davis-Bacon) would no longer be required on SRF projects. The Building and Construction Trades Department (BCTD), AFL-CIO, protested.
What happened after 1994 is not entirely clear: that is, whether prevailing rates were actually paid. In the spring of 2000, EPA reversed its position and came to conclude that Davis-Bacon did indeed apply. Following notice in the Federal Register (and review of submissions from interested parties), EPA entered into a "settlement agreement" with the BCTD. It would enforce DBA rates on CWA projects effective July 1, 2001. But then EPA moved the effective date back, to late summer—and, then, to October. Thereafter, it seems, EPA was silent.
During recent years, Congress has increasingly considered funding mechanisms other than direct appropriations for public construction: e.g., joint federal and state revolving funds, loan guarantees, tax credits, etc. This report is a case study of the application of DBA requirements to one such mechanism, the CWA/SRFs. The question of DBA application to the SRFs continues in the 110th Congress. |
crs_R41618 | crs_R41618_0 | Development of three recently discovered natural gas fields—Tamar, Dalit, and Leviathan (see Figure 1 )—is projected to begin at the end of 2012 and be completed by the end of the decade. The estimated supplies from these fields (see Table 1 ) would enable Israel to decrease its natural gas and coal imports and possibly its oil imports. Israel's trade balance would likely improve and its carbon dioxide emissions would likely decline as a result. Regionally, Israel's success thus far has sparked interest from its neighbors to explore their boundaries for energy resources and has raised concerns from Lebanon about sovereignty over the discoveries. Noble Energy's other natural gas discoveries (Tamar and Dalit) coupled with the success of other companies puts Israel in a position to be self sufficient in natural gas and possibly become a natural gas exporter, thus improving the country's energy and economic security. If only half the natural gas from the new discoveries is produced at today's production levels, Israel would have well over a 100-year supply of natural gas. Electricity Generation Sector Likely to be Transformed
Israel's electricity generation sector will most likely undergo the greatest change because of the development of Israel's natural gas resources. Currently, natural gas fuels about 26% of Israel's electric generation. | Israel has been dependent on energy imports since it became a nation in 1948, but the recent offshore natural gas discoveries could change that and possibly make Israel an exporter of natural gas. Development of the recently discovered natural gas fields—Tamar, Dalit, and Leviathan—likely will decrease Israel's needs for imported natural gas, imported coal, and possibly imported oil. A switch to natural gas would most likely affect electric generation, but could also improve Israel's trade balance and lessen carbon dioxide emissions. Regionally, Israel's success thus far has sparked interest from its neighbors to explore their boundaries for energy resources and has raised concerns from Lebanon about sovereignty over the discoveries. Development of these new resources, and possibly other discoveries, would enhance Israel's economic and energy security. Israel is in the early stages of formulating the regulatory framework to oversee the development of these resources and may seek assistance from the United States or other natural gas producing countries in weighing its options.
Key Points:
The new discoveries—depending upon the actual production—could represent over 200 years' worth of Israel's current natural gas consumption. Israel's electrical generation sector will likely be the beneficiary of the new natural gas resources. Additional natural gas and possibly oil resources may exist. |
crs_RL34279 | crs_RL34279_0 | 110-182 . The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3773 , the Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007, or the RESTORE Act of 2007, on November 15, 2007, while S. 2248 was reported out of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on October 26, 2007, and an amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 2248 , the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 2007, or the FISA Amendments Act of 2007, was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on November 16, 2007. After striking all but the enacting clause of H.R. 3773 and inserting the text of S. 2248 as amended, the Senate then passed H.R. On March 14, 2008, the House passed an amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3773 . After intensive negotiations, a compromise bill, H.R. 6304 , was introduced in the House on June 19, 2008. The measure passed the House the following day. A cloture motion on the measure was presented in the Senate on June 26, 2008. Further activity on H.R. 6304 is anticipated after the Senate returns from the July 4 th recess. The current legislative and oversight activity with respect to electronic surveillance under FISA has drawn national attention to several overarching issues. This report briefly outlines three such issues and touches upon some of the perspectives reflected in the ongoing debate. These issues include the inherent and often dynamic tension between national security and civil liberties, particularly rights of privacy and free speech; the need identified by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Admiral Mike McConnell, for the intelligence community to be able to efficiently and effectively collect foreign intelligence information from the communications of foreign persons located outside the United States in a changing, fast-paced, and technologically sophisticated international environment, and the differing approaches suggested to meet this need; and limitations of liability for those electronic communication service providers who furnish aid to the federal government in its foreign intelligence collection. This report briefly examines these issues and sets them in context. Tension Between National Security and Civil Liberties
Two constitutional provisions, in particular, are implicated in this debate—the Fourth and First Amendments. Legislative Response: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Foreign Persons Abroad
On August 5, 2007, the Protect America Act of 2007 was enacted into law, P.L. P.L. 110-55 expired on February 16, 2008, after passage of a 15-day extension to its original sunset date. | The current legislative and oversight activity with respect to electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has drawn national attention to several overarching issues. This report briefly outlines three such issues and touches upon some of the perspectives reflected in the ongoing debate. These issues include the inherent and often dynamic tension between national security and civil liberties, particularly rights of privacy and free speech; the need for the intelligence community to be able to efficiently and effectively collect foreign intelligence information from the communications of foreign persons located outside the United States in a changing, fast-paced, and technologically sophisticated international environment or from United States persons abroad, and the differing approaches suggested to meet this need; and limitations of liability for those electronic communication service providers who furnish aid to the federal government in its foreign intelligence collection. Two constitutional provisions, in particular, are implicated in this debate—the Fourth and First Amendments. This report briefly examines these issues and sets them in context.
The 110th Congress has been very active in developing and considering measures to amend FISA to address these issues. On August 5, 2007, the Protect America Act, P.L. 110-55, was enacted into law. It expired on February 16, 2008, after passage of a 15-day extension to its original sunset date, P.L. 110-182. On November 15, 2007, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007. On February 12, 2008, the Senate passed S. 2248, as amended, then struck all but the enacting clause of H.R. 3773, and inserted the text of S. 2248, as amended, in its stead. On March 14, 2008, the House passed an amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3773. After months of intensive negotiations, on June 19, 2008, a compromise bill, H.R. 6304, was introduced in the House. It was passed by the House the following day. On June 26, 2008, a cloture motion on the measure was presented in the Senate. Further activity on H.R. 6304 is anticipated after the Senate returns from the July 4th recess. Each of these bills differs somewhat in content and approach from one another. This report also briefly explores legislative responses to the issues addressed. It will be updated as needed. |
crs_R44447 | crs_R44447_0 | A llegations of political corruption often involve questions regarding a public official or candidate's use of campaign funds or the relationship between campaign contributors and the candidate or official. A common concern is that a particular individual, private organization, company, or other entity "bought"—through large campaign contributions widely distributed—particular official favors, official acts, or official forbearance from officers or employees of the federal government. These issues have been highlighted in several high-profile cases over recent years. In 2016, the Supreme Court clarified the boundaries of federal political corruption statutes in McDonnell v. United States , in which it examined which actions taken by public officials could be considered official acts. Overview of Campaign Finance Regulation2
Contributions to Candidates
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) regulates campaign contributions in federal elections. Generally, FECA regulates contributions in three ways, by establishing limits, source restrictions, and disclosure requirements. Ban on Corporate and Labor Union Contributions
FECA prohibits contributions by corporations and labor unions from their own funds or "general treasuries." Prohibition on Conversion of Campaign Funds for Personal Use
In addition to the provisions relating to campaign contributions, FECA also prohibits the converting of campaign funds for personal use. Specifically, the law considers a contribution to be converted to personal use if it is used to fulfill any commitment, obligation, or expense that would exist "irrespective" of the candidate's campaign or duties as a federal officeholder. Criminal Penalties
While FECA also sets forth civil penalties, this report addresses the law's criminal penalties. Campaign Contributions and Official Government Acts
In addition to the campaign finance laws discussed above, a number of federal political corruption provisions impose restrictions on the use of campaign contributions to influence official acts by elected officials, including bribery; illegal gratuities; extortion; and honest services fraud. Bribery is perhaps the best known of the political corruption crimes, barring an official from accepting a thing of value in exchange for being influenced in the performance of an official act. The scope of prohibition on honest services fraud has been limited to apply only to situations that involve bribery or kickbacks that result in public officials engaging in schemes that could be seen as depriving the public of honest services expected from government officials. While the bribery and illegal gratuity provisions prohibit public officials from seeking or accepting contributions related to official acts, extortion prohibits public officials from using their position to demand contributions. In a similar vein as the bribery provision, the making of campaign contributions, either on one's own initiative or in response to a request from an official or the official's campaign, with the mere hope or expectation that one might be treated favorably in the future because of one's generosity and support in making such campaign contributions, does not provide the necessary quid pro quo or corrupt character for an extortion charge:
... [T]he explicitness requirement serves to distinguish between contributions that are given or received with the "anticipation" of official action and contributions that are given or received in exchange for a "promise" of official action. | Allegations of political corruption often involve questions regarding a public official or candidate's use of campaign funds or the relationship between campaign contributors and the candidate or official. A common concern is that a particular individual, private organization, company, or other entity "bought"—through large campaign contributions widely distributed—particular official favors, official acts, or official forbearance from officers or employees of the federal government. These issues have been highlighted in several high-profile cases over recent years. In 2016, the Supreme Court clarified the boundaries of federal political corruption statutes in McDonnell v. United States, in which it examined which actions taken by public officials could be considered "official acts."
In an effort to curb corruption in the political process, Congress has enacted laws that regulate campaign contributions made to federal office candidates. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) regulates contributions in three general ways, by establishing limits, source restrictions, and disclosure requirements. Source restrictions include prohibitions on contributions from government contractors, foreign nationals, and the general treasuries of corporations and labor unions (corporate and labor union political action committee (PAC) contributions are permitted). Further, the law prohibits the converting of campaign funds for personal use; that is, it bans contributions from being used to fulfill any expense that would exist "irrespective" of the candidate's campaign or federal officeholder duties. Courts have generally upheld these regulations in order to maintain the integrity of the democratic process by protecting against quid pro quo corruption and its appearance. In addition to civil penalties, it is notable that FECA sets forth a range of criminal penalties.
In addition to the direct federal regulation of campaign contributions, a number of federal political corruption provisions prohibit federal officials from receiving personal benefits that are related, in certain ways, to their official acts. Among some of the most common concerns raised in political corruption cases are bribery, illegal gratuities, and extortion. Laws criminalizing these activities bear upon the relationship of official acts to otherwise lawful contributions: The prohibition on bribery precludes officials from accepting contributions in exchange for performance of an official act. The prohibition on illegal gratuities does not require that the contribution be made in exchange for the official act, but instead precludes officials from accepting contributions made because of the official act. The prohibition on extortion precludes officials from using their position to demand contributions in exchange for official action. Additionally, a number of political corruption cases involve charges of so-called "honest services" fraud, alleged when public officials engage in schemes that deprive the public of honest services of government officials.
This report provides an overview of federal campaign finance and public corruption laws that may be relevant to the political campaigns of elected officials, including discussion of provisions that could be implicated in cases involving the misuse of campaign funds or malintent of campaign contributions. |
crs_RS21435 | crs_RS21435_0 | population were college graduates and by 2000 this had increased to 24%. Theproportionwho, upon graduation, would be the first in their family to get a college degree declined from 65% in 1987 to 62%in 2000. Thus, it appears thathighschool graduates from low-income families and those that lack a parent with a college degree are less likely thanothergraduates to move on to college. College Enrollment in the Fall of 2000 Among Spring 2000 High School Graduates by Parent's Educational Attainment and Family Income Status
Source: Current Population Survey. These results have particularly important implications for the TRIO programs since the legislation stipulates that not lessthan two-thirds of program participants be both low-income and first generation students. | The Higher Education Act (HEA) supports several programs that provideservices and incentives to disadvantaged students to help increase their educational attainment. Foremost amongtheseprograms are the federal TRIO programs and the Gaining Early Awareness and Readiness for UndergraduateProgram(Gear Up). These programs are primarily intended for individuals who are from low-income families and wouldbe thefirst in their family to attain a college degree. This report reviews available data on these populations and attemptstomeasure the extent to which high school graduates from these groups go on to college. This report is intended asasupplement to CRS Report RL31622, TRIO and Gear Up Programs: Status and Issues, and will notbe updated. |
crs_RS22479 | crs_RS22479_0 | Analysis of Supreme Court Ruling
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry was a consolidation of four appeals before the U.S. Supreme Court. Constitutionality of Partisan Gerrymandering
While not ruling out the possibility of a claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering being within the scope of judicial review, the Court in LULAC v. Perry was unable to find a sufficient standard for making such a determination. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that District 23 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it diluted the voting power of Latinos. Selected Legislation in the 111th Congress
In the 111 th Congress, H.R. 3025 , the "Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2009," (Representative Tanner) and S. 1332 , the "Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2009," (Senator Johnson) are pending. These bills would, among other things, prohibit states from carrying out more than one congressional redistricting after a decennial census and apportionment, unless a court required the state to conduct subsequent redistricting to comply with the Constitution or to enforce the Voting Rights Act; require states to conduct redistricting through the use of independent commissions; and impose standards of compactness, contiguity, and geographical continuity. | In a splintered, complex decision, the U.S. Supreme Court in League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry largely upheld a Texas congressional redistricting plan that was drawn mid-decade against claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. The Court invalidated one Texas congressional district, District 23, finding that it diluted the voting power of Latinos in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. While not ruling out the possibility of a claim of partisan gerrymandering being within the scope of judicial review, a majority of the Court in this case was unable to find a "reliable" standard for making such a determination.
In the 111 th Congress, H.R. 3025 , the "Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2009," (Representative Tanner) and S. 1332 , the "Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2009," (Senator Johnson) are pending. These bills would, among other things, prohibit states from carrying out more than one congressional redistricting after a decennial census and apportionment, unless a court required the state to conduct subsequent redistricting to comply with the Constitution or to enforce the Voting Rights Act; require states to conduct redistricting through the use of independent commissions; and impose standards of compactness, contiguity, and geographical continuity. |
crs_RL33436 | crs_RL33436_0 | In September 2018, Abe's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) held an internal party leadership vote in which Abe defeated former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, securing a three-year term as party president. With the LDP and its coalition partner, the much smaller Komeito party, firmly in control of Japan's legislature, Abe's victory in the LDP leadership contest means that he will continue serving as premier. (For background on Japanese politics, see the " Japanese Politics " section.) Trump's shift on North Korea—including his decision to suspend U.S.-South Korean military exercises to obtain greater concessions from Pyongyang—and his statements critical of the value of alliances generally and Japan specifically have increased questions among Japanese policymakers about the depth and durability of the U.S. commitment to Japan's security. China and Japan Look to Stabilize Relations
Despite an ongoing territorial dispute in the East China Sea, Japan and China appear to be seeking stability in their bilateral relationship, a trend that has accelerated in the past several months. The emphasis on economic issues has emerged as the two sides have sought to manage tensions in the security realm. Japan's Uneasy Relations with South Korea
Japan's relations with South Korea remain precarious despite a rapprochement in 2016. Japan's Foreign Policy and U.S.-Japan Relations
U.S.-Japan Relations in the Trump Presidency
Although candidate Donald Trump made statements critical of Japan during his campaign, relations have remained strong on the surface throughout several visits and leaders' meetings. Some analysts have expressed concern about the differences in approach to global issues between the Trump Administration and Tokyo. Japan is a firm supporter of the United Nations as a forum for dealing with international disputes and concerns. To cite one example, several Japanese cabinet members expressed disappointment in the Trump Administration's decision to withdraw from the Paris climate accord. Abe's Leadership
If Abe remains in office through November 2019, as expected, he will become the longest-serving prime minister in post-war Japan. However, it also has been U.S. policy since 1972 that the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty covers the Senkakus, because Article 5 of the treaty stipulates that the United States is bound to protect "the territories under the Administration of Japan," and Japan administers the Senkakus. Japan is directly threatened by North Korea given the demonstrated capability of Pyongyang's medium-range missiles; in 2017, North Korea twice tested missiles that flew over Japanese territory. In addition, U.S. bases in Japan could be targeted by the North Koreans in any military contingency. Shortly after returning to office in 2012, Abe released an article outlining his foreign and security policy strategy titled "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond," which described how the democracies of Japan, Australia, India, and the United States could cooperate to deter Chinese aggression on its maritime periphery. The bilateral defense guidelines also seek to improve alliance coordination. Realignment of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa
Due to the legacy of the U.S. occupation and the island's key strategic location, Okinawa hosts a disproportionate share of the U.S. military presence in Japan. U.S. trade with Japan has largely risen over the same time period. A number of factors may have contributed to this trend:
Japan's slow economic growth—beginning with the burst of the asset bubble in the 1990s—has changed the general U.S. perception of Japan from one as an economic competitor to one as a "humbled" economic power; significant Japanese investment in the United States including in automotive manufacturing facilities has linked production of some Japanese branded products with U.S. employment; the successful conclusion of the multilateral Uruguay Round agreements in 1994 led to further market openings in Japan, and established the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its enhanced dispute settlement mechanism, which has provided a forum used by both Japan and the United States to resolve trade disputes; the rise of China as an economic power and trade partner has caused U.S. policymakers to shift attention from Japan to China as a primary source of concern; and the growth in the complexity and number of countries involved in global supply chains has likely diffused or shifted concerns over import competition as many Japanese products are now imported into the United States as components in finished products from other countries, thereby reducing the bilateral trade deficit. U.S. Tariffs Under the Trump Administration
The Trump Administration has imposed tariffs on several significant U.S. imports from Japan. In March 2018, President Trump announced tariffs of 25% and 10% on certain U.S. steel and aluminum imports, respectively. U.S.-Japan Bilateral Trade Agreement Negotiations89
On September 26, President Trump and Prime Minister Abe announced their intent to start formal bilateral trade agreement negotiations. Japan had been hesitant to engage in formal bilateral trade talks as it remains committed to the regional Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and through which it had already agreed to politically sensitive concessions, particularly in agriculture, to the United States, who withdrew from the agreement in 2017. | Japan is a significant partner of the United States in a number of foreign policy areas, particularly in security concerns, which range from hedging against Chinese military modernization to countering threats from North Korea. The U.S.-Japan military alliance, formed in 1952, grants the U.S. military the right to base U.S. troops—currently around 50,000 strong—and other military assets on Japanese territory, undergirding the "forward deployment" of U.S. troops in East Asia. In return, the United States pledges to protect Japan's security.
Although candidate Donald Trump made statements critical of Japan during his campaign, relations have remained strong, at least on the surface, throughout several visits and leaders' meetings. Bilateral tensions have arisen in 2018, however. On North Korea policy, Tokyo has conveyed some anxiety about the Trump Administration's change from confrontation to engagement, concerned that Japan's priorities will be marginalized as the United States pursues negotiations with North Korea. More broadly, Japan is worried about the U.S. commitment to its security given Trump's skepticism about U.S. alliances overseas. Contentious trade issues have also resurfaced as the two governments look to negotiate a bilateral accord. In addition, Japan has expressed disappointment about the Trump Administration's decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Paris Agreement on addressing climate change.
Japan is the United States' fourth-largest overall trading partner, Japanese firms are the second largest source of foreign direct investment in the United States, and Japanese investors are the second largest foreign holders of U.S. treasuries. Tensions in the trade relationship have increased under the Trump Administration. The U.S.-Japan announcement on September 26, 2018, of their intent to begin formal bilateral trade agreement negotiations has eased concerns over potential U.S. import restrictions on motor vehicle and parts trade, but certain U.S. steel and aluminum imports from Japan remain subject to increased U.S. tariffs. The trade talks could prove challenging given the Trump Administration's focus on the bilateral U.S. trade deficit, particularly in autos—Japan's largest export to the United States in 2017. Japan had been hesitant to pursue bilateral negotiations as it remains committed to the TPP.
After years of turmoil, Japanese politics has been relatively stable since the December 2012 election victory of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and further consolidated in the LDP's subsequent parliamentary gains. With the major opposition parties in disarray, the LDP's dominance does not appear to be threatened. Abe could become Japan's longest serving post-war leader if he remains in office throughout this term. However, Abe may struggle to pursue the more controversial initiatives of his agenda, such as increasing the Japanese military's capabilities and flexibility, because of his reliance on a coalition with a smaller party.
With his political standing secured, Abe continues his diplomatic outreach, possibly hedging against an over-reliance on the U.S alliance. Since 2016, Abe has sought to stabilize relations with China, despite an ongoing territorial dispute and Japanese concerns about China's increasing assertiveness in its maritime periphery. Relations with South Korea, while stable, remain fraught with sensitive historical issues and differences in how to approach North Korea. Elsewhere, Abe has pursued stronger relations with Australia, India, Russia, and several Southeast Asian nations.
In the past decade, U.S.-Japan defense cooperation has improved and evolved in response to security challenges, such as the North Korean missile threat and the confrontation between Japan and China over disputed islands. Abe accelerated the trend by passing controversial security legislation in 2015. Much of the implementation of the laws, as well as of U.S.-Japan defense guidelines updated the same year, lies ahead, and full realization of the goals to transform alliance coordination could require additional political capital and effort. Additional concerns remain about the implementation of an agreement to relocate the controversial Futenma base on Okinawa, particularly after the September gubernatorial election of a politician opposed to the relocation. |
crs_RL34388 | crs_RL34388_0 | Child welfare agencies seek to ensure the well-being of children and their families, including protecting children from abuse or neglect and ensuring that they have a safe and permanent home. Federal-State Framework for Child Welfare Policy
As the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted, states have the primary obligation to ensure child welfare. In FY2008, Congress appropriated just under $7.9 billion for child welfare purposes. This represents a modest decline from the estimated 511,000 children in care on the last day of FY2005, but is well below the recorded high of 567,000 children in care on the last day of FY1999 (when there were about 8.0 children in foster care per 1,000 in the population). These services and activities may take a variety of forms and include the following:
efforts to educate the public about child abuse or neglect and how to report suspected maltreatment; efforts to prevent child abuse and neglect and improve child and family well-being generally (such as provision of community-based family support services like parenting education classes); procedures to identify children who have been abused or neglected (such as operating a hotline to receive and screen referrals and investigating abuse or neglect allegations); procedures and services to protect children from unsafe home situations by providing services to prevent the need for their removal (such as parenting education, respite care, counseling, or mental health, substance abuse or other treatment services); or, when necessary, finding a temporary foster home for children and supporting their stay in foster care; services and activities to enable children removed to foster care to be returned to their families (e.g. Legislation that would respond to a number of the concerns raised in the child welfare hearings held during 2007, including proposals to change the federal child welfare financing structure, has been introduced in the 110 th Congress. Other legislative proposals would authorize or require new services and protections for children in (or about to enter) foster care; seek to improve services for youth who are aging out of care (including those who have already exited due to age); encourage greater access to a range of services for kinship caregivers and further encourage their involvement as decision-makers and use as caregivers for children who cannot remain safely with their parents; aim to improve foster and adoptive parent recruitment efforts of state child welfare agencies; permit direct access to federal Title IV-E funds for tribal governments; and make other related changes intended to enhance the safety, permanence, and well-being of children. Proposals to Expand Title IV-E Eligible Populations
A number of bills would expand the population of children who are eligible for federal assistance under Title IV-E of the Social Security by de-linking the program (or parts of it) from the eligibility rules of the former federal cash welfare program (repealed in 1996 by P.L. 5466 , H.R. S. 1462 and H.R. 2188 , H.R. 5466 , S. 3038 and H.R. 2188 , H.R. 2188 , H.R. 5466 , and H.R. S. 661 , S. 3038 , and H.R. 3409 ), would each permit youth who remain in foster care until their 21 st birthday to remain eligible for federal foster care support. S. 1512 and H.R. Funding for Services to Children and Families
A common criticism of federal child welfare financing is that most federal support is for children after they have been removed from their homes (i.e., funds provided for foster care or adoption assistance) and that relatively little federal funding is provided to encourage states to provide services that would prevent placement of a child in foster care or to help children who are placed in foster care be successfully reunited with their parents. 5466 , H.R. 5466 and H.R. 4208 , S. 2560 , and H.R. 4208 , S. 2560 , and H.R. Funding Authorization and Youth Served
H.R. Additionally, H.R. H.R. S. 382 and H.R. On the last day of FY2006, only about 125,000 children were in formal (court-ordered) foster care and were living with a relative. 5466 , S. 661 , H.R. Licensing Standards
H.R. 2188 , S. 661 , H.R. 4688 and H.R. Plan Requirements
With certain exceptions, S. 1956 , H.R. (However, H.R. Improving the Child Welfare Workforce
H.R. 5466 and H.R. 273 , H.R. 471 , H.R. Increased Adoption Tax Benefits
H.R. | As the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted, states have the primary obligation to ensure child welfare. However, Congress provides significant federal funds to help states exercise this responsibility ($7.9 billion appropriated in FY2008). Most of this support is provided for children who are in foster care and who meet specific federal eligibility criteria. This report discusses the federal framework for child welfare policy; reviews the scope of activities, and children and families served, by state child welfare agencies; summarizes several child welfare-related hearings that were held in 2007; describes child welfare and related legislative proposals that have been introduced in the 110th Congress; and reviews child welfare programs for which funding authorization has expired or is set to expire on the last day of FY2008.
Child welfare agencies seek to ensure the well-being of children and their families, including protecting children from abuse or neglect and ensuring that they have a safe and permanent home. In FY2006 child protection agencies found 905,000 children to be victims of abuse or neglect. Some of these children were removed to foster care, some remained in their homes and received services, while others received no further follow-up from the agency. After reaching a recorded high of 567,000 on the last day of FY1999, the number of children in foster care has declined by about 10%, and on the last day of FY2006, an estimated 510,000 children were in foster care. Less than half of these children are eligible for federal foster care support under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act.
Legislation that would respond to a number of the concerns raised in 2007 child welfare hearings has been introduced in the 110th Congress. These proposals would expand the eligible populations served with Title IV-E funds to include (potentially) all children in foster care or adopted (with special needs) from foster care (H.R. 5466, H.R. 4207, S. 2900, S. 1462, H.R. 4091, and S. 3038), as well as children leaving foster care for legal guardianship with a relative (S. 661, H.R. 2188, H.R. 5466, and S. 3038), and youth who choose to remain in foster care until their 21st birthday (S. 1512, H.R. 4208, S. 2560, and H.R. 5466). Other introduced proposals would authorize additional support for child and family services (H.R. 5466 and S. 2237); authorize or require new services or protections for children in, or about to enter, foster care (H.R. 3283, S. 379, S. 382, H.R. 687, and H.R. 5466); seek to improve services for youth who have, or are expected to, age out of care (S. 2341, H.R. 2188, H.R. 4208/S. 2560, and H.R. 3409); help support or permit access to services for kinship caregivers and further encourage their use as caregivers (S. 661, H.R. 2188, H.R. 5645, and H.R. 5466); provide new support for training or other related efforts to improve the child welfare workforce (H.R. 5466, H.R. 2314 and S. 2944); aim to improve foster and adoptive parent recruitment efforts (S. 2395 and H.R. 4198); permit direct access to federal Title IV-E funds for tribal governments (S. 1956, H.R. 4688, and H.R. 5466); and make other related changes intended to enhance the welfare of children, including requiring states to have licensing standards for certain residential programs for youth with emotional or behavioral issues (H.R. 5876), and expanding or making permanent the current Adoption Tax Credit rules (H.R. 273, H.R. 471, S. 561, H.R. 1074, H.R. 3192, and H.R. 4313). This report will be updated as legislative activity occurs. |
crs_R44970 | crs_R44970_0 | Introduction
The National Health Service Corps (NHSC) is a clinician recruitment and retention program that aims to reduce health workforce shortages in underserved areas. Under each of these programs, health providers receive either scholarships or loan repayments in exchange for a service commitment at an NHSC-approved facility located in a federally designated health professional shortage area (HPSA, see text box). The three NHSC programs are managed by the Bureau of Health Workforce (BHW) in the Health Resources and Service Administration (HRSA), an agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The NHSC was created by the Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970 to provide an adequate supply of trained health providers in federally designated HPSAs. Since the program's inception, Congress has reauthorized and revised the program several times, with the most recent reauthorization included in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 , ACA). Historically, the NHSC had been exclusively funded as part of HRSA's discretionary appropriation. The ACA created the CHCF and provided mandatory funding for it over a five-year period (FY2011-FY2015). The fund was intended to supplement the NHSC budget; however, from FY2012 to FY2017, it made up the entirety of the program's funding. The CHCF was initially set to expire at the end of FY2015; however, it was extended for two years (FY2016 and FY2017) as part of the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA, P.L. 115-96 ) ultimately provided mandatory funding for the first two quarters of FY2018, and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. Although the program had not received discretionary appropriations from FY2012 through FY2017, it received $105 million in FY2018 in P.L. 115-141 , with funds directed toward supporting health care providers who provide opioid and other substance use disorder treatment in HPSAs. Recruitment
From FY2011 through FY2017, the most recent year of final data available, the NHSC offered more than 39,000 loan repayment agreements and scholarship awards to individuals who have agreed to serve for a minimum of two years in a HPSA. Field Strength
The number of awards the NHSC makes at any point in time is only one component of program size, as not all awardees are currently serving as NHSC providers. Specifically, NHSC scholars and S2S program participants are still completing their training. As such, the NHSC also measures its field strength, which is the number of NHSC providers who are fulfilling a service obligation in a HPSA in a given year. In FY2017, the most recent year in which data are available, total NHSC field strength was 10,179. Legislative Proposals to Expand NHSC Provider Eligibility
Some individuals and professional groups have advocated for making additional provider types eligible for the NHSC. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. NHSC providers are located at HPSAs throughout the United States and its territories (see Figure 4 ). | The National Health Service Corps (NHSC) provides scholarships and loan repayments to health care providers in exchange for a period of service in a health professional shortage area (HPSA). The program places clinicians at facilities—generally not-for-profit or government-operated—that might otherwise have difficulties recruiting and retaining providers.
The NHSC is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Congress created the NHSC in the Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-623), and its programs have been reauthorized and amended several times since then.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA; P.L. 111-148) permanently reauthorized the NHSC. Prior to the ACA, the NHSC had been funded with discretionary appropriations. The ACA created a new mandatory funding source for the NHSC—the Community Health Center Fund (CHCF), which was intended to supplement the program's annual appropriation. However, between FY2012 and FY2017, the CHCF entirely replaced the NHSC's discretionary appropriation. For FY2018, the NHSC received $105 million from discretionary appropriations in P.L. 115-141 to support awards to expand and improve access to opioid and other substance use disorder treatment providers. The law also reserves $30 million from the $105 million for the new Rural Communities Opioid Response initiative administered by the Federal Office of Rural Health Policy within HRSA. For FY2018, CHCF funding represents 75% of the program's appropriation.
The CHCF is time-limited. Initially an appropriation from FY2011 through FY2015, the CHCF was subsequently extended in the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA, P.L. 114-10) through FY2017 and then extended for an additional two years (i.e., through FY2019) in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. 115-123).
From FY2011 through FY2017, the most recent year of final data available, the NHSC offered more than 39,000 loan repayment agreements and scholarship awards to individuals who have agreed to serve for a minimum of two years in a HPSA. In FY2017, the NHSC made 5,711 awards. The number of awards the NHSC makes is only one component of program size, because not all awardees are currently serving as NHSC providers; some are still completing their training (e.g., scholarship award recipients). As such, the NHSC also measures its field strength: the number of NHSC providers who are fulfilling a service obligation in a HPSA in a given year. In FY2017, total NHSC field strength was 10,179. NHSC providers are currently serving in a variety of settings throughout the entire United States and its territories. The majority of NHSC providers serve in outpatient settings, most commonly at federally qualified health centers. |
crs_R41768 | crs_R41768_0 | Access to mental health and substance use disorder services is determined in part by the insurance coverage of these services and by the terms under which the services are covered. Federal parity law and the health reform law affect both the coverage of mental health and substance use disorder services, as well as the terms under which they are covered. Federal law requires parity in annual and aggregate lifetime limits, treatment limitations, financial requirements, and in- and out-of-network covered benefits. However, federal parity law does not mandate the coverage of mental health and substance use disorder services. The health reform law builds on federal parity law and also contains provisions that mandate coverage of mental health and substance use disorder services. The health reform law (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 [ P.L. These include (1) Qualified Health Plans (QHPs), the plans that will be offered through the Exchanges; (2) plans offered through the individual market; and (3) Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans (that are not managed care plans). This approach, where the coverage of mental health and substance use disorder services is not required, but where parity with medical and surgical services is required if mental health and substance use disorder services are covered, is termed a mandated offering parity approach. The ACA does not require that specific mental health and substance use disorder services be included as part of the EHB. Are All Plans Required to Cover the EHB or the EHBP? It specifically requires four types of plans to offer either the EHB or EHBP: (1) new plans offered through the individual market; (2) new plans offered through the small group market; (3) QHPs; and (4) Medicaid benchmark and benchmark equivalent plans. Mental Health Parity and Mandated Coverage of Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Services Provisions in the ACA | Two important components of access to mental health and substance use disorder services are their insurance coverage and the terms under which they are covered. Federal mental health parity law addresses the terms under which mental health and substance use disorder services are covered in comparison with medical and surgical services in those plans that choose to offer coverage of these services. Federal law requires parity in annual and aggregate lifetime limits, treatment limitations, financial requirements, and in- and out-of-network covered benefits. However, federal parity law does not mandate the coverage of mental health and substance use disorder services.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148), as amended, contains provisions that address both the coverage of mental health and substance use disorder services and the terms under which these services are covered. Specifically, the ACA includes provisions that require (1) compliance with federal parity law by certain plans and (2) the coverage of mental health and substance use disorder services by certain plans.
The ACA does not change the federal mental health requirements at all. However, it extends applicability of these requirements to three new plan types: (1) Qualified Health Plans (QHPs, offered through the state Exchanges); (2) plans offered through the individual market; and (3) Medicaid benchmark and benchmark equivalent plans that are not managed care plans.
The ACA also requires certain plans to offer coverage of mental health and substance use disorder services, by requiring these plan types to cover the Essential Health Benefits (EHB), which are defined to include mental health and substance use disorder services. The ACA requires coverage of the EHB, and therefore at least some mental health and substance use disorder services, by the following plan types: (1) QHPs; (2) new plans offered through the individual or small group market; and (3) Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans. |
crs_RL33561 | crs_RL33561_0 | Overview
In July 2005, President Bush announced his intention to conclude a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with India. The Administration proposed legislation (introduced as H.R. 4974 / S. 2429 ) in March 2006 that, in addition to providing waivers of relevant provisions of the AEA (Sections 123 a. On July 26, 2006, the House passed H.R. 5682 by a vote of 359 to 68. On November 16, 2006, the Senate passed H.R. 5682 by a vote of 85 to12, substituting the text of S. 3709 as an engrossed amendment; the Senate insisted on its amendment, necessitating a conference to resolve differences between the bills. On December 7, conferees filed a conference report, and on December 8, the House approved the conference report by a vote of 330 to 59; the Senate approved the conference report by unanimous consent in the early hours of December 9. His signing statement is discussed in more detail below. 5682 in the House
Committee Actions
The House International Relations Committee met on June 27, 2006 to consider H.R. Representative Schiff offered an amendment with three components: to add a provision to U.S. policy with respect to South Asia (Section 3 (b)(7)) encouraging India not to increase its production of fissile material at military facilities pending a multilateral moratorium on production of such material for nuclear weapons; to add a reporting requirement for the Presidential submission to implement the waivers (Section 4 (c) (2) (I)) on steps taken to ensure the U.S. transfers will not be replicated by India or used in its military facilities and that U.S. nuclear fuel supply does not facilitate military production of high-enriched uranium or plutonium; and to add a reporting requirement for an annual report on the same (Section 4 (o) (2) (C)). 5682 in the Senate
Committee Actions
On June 29, 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered original legislation, S. 3709 , to create an exception for India from relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (See S.Rept. On November 15, 2006, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to consider S. 3709 , at a time to be determined by the Majority Leader, in consultation with the Democratic Leader. 5682 Conference Report
On December 7, 2006, conferees on H.R. 5682 filed Conference Report H.Rept. 109-721 . The bill essentially combines many of the provisions of both the House and Senate versions. Specific differences are highlighted in Table 1 , below. Of note, the Senate provisions to ban enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production cooperation with India (now Section 104. (d) (5)) prevailed in the conference bill, as did Title II, which includes the implementing legislation of the U.S. Additional Protocol. The so-called Harkin amendment, which added a determination that India was fully and actively supporting U.S. and international efforts to contain, dissuade, and sanction Iran for its nuclear weapons program, did not remain as a determination, but became two reporting requirements: first, as a one-time report when the Section 123 agreement is submitted to Congress (now Section 104. 109-401 Signing Statement
On December 18, 2006, President Bush signed the "Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006" into law ( P.L. The President's signing statement also noted that the executive branch would construe "provisions of the Act that mandate, regulate, or prohibit submission of information to the Congress, an international organization, or the public, such as sections 104, 109, 261, 271, 272, 273, 274, and 275, in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional authority to protect and control information that could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties." | In March 2006, the Bush Administration proposed legislation to create an exception for India from certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act to facilitate a future nuclear cooperation agreement. After hearings in April and May, the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered bills in late June 2006 to provide an exception for India to certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act related to a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. On July 26, 2006, the House passed its version of the legislation, H.R. 5682, by a vote of 359 to 68. On November 16, 2006, the Senate incorporated the text of S. 3709, as amended, into H.R. 5682 and passed that bill by a vote of 85 to 12. The Senate insisted on its amendment, and a conference committee produced a conference report on December 7, 2006. The House agreed to the conference report (H.Rept. 109-721) on December 8 in a 330-59 vote; the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to the conference report on December 9. The President signed the bill into law (P.L. 109-401) on December 18, 2006.
The Senate and House versions of the India bill contained similar provisions, with four differences. The Senate version contained an additional requirement for the President to execute his waiver authority, an amendment introduced by Senator Harkin and adopted by unanimous consent that the President determine that India is "fully and actively participating in U.S. and international efforts to dissuade, sanction and contain Iran for its nuclear program." This provision was watered down into a reporting requirement in the conference report. The Senate version also had two unique sections related to the cooperation agreement, Sections 106 and 107, both of which appear in the conference report. Section 106 (now Section 104 (d) (4)) prohibits exports of equipment, material or technology related for uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing or heavy water production unless conducted in a multinational facility participating in a project approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or in a facility participating in a bilateral or multilateral project to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle. Section 107 (now Section 104 (d) (5)) would establish a program to monitor that U.S. technology is being used appropriately by Indian recipients. Finally, the Senate version also contained the implementing legislation for the U.S. Additional Protocol in Title II, which was retained in the conference bill. Minor differences in reporting requirements and statements of policy are compared in Table I of this report.
This report provides a thematic side-by-side comparison of the provisions of the conference report with H.R. 5682 as passed by the House and by the Senate, and compares them with the Administration's initially proposed legislation, H.R. 4974/S. 2429, and the conference report. The report concludes with a list of CRS resources that provide further discussion and more detailed analysis of the issues addressed by the legislation summarized in the table. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44978 | crs_R44978_0 | None of the FY2018 regular appropriations bills was enacted prior to the enactment of H.R. 601 , a temporary CR. The measure also included separate divisions that establish a program to provide foreign assistance concerning basic education (Division A—Reinforcing Education Accountability in Development Act), supplemental appropriations for disaster relief requirements for FY2017 (Division B), and a temporary suspension of the public debt limit (Division C). On September 8, 2017, the President signed H.R. 601 into law ( P.L. 115-56 ). This report provides an analysis of the continuing appropriations provisions in H.R. 601 . For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2016, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Coverage
Division D covers all 12 of the regular annual appropriations bills by providing continuing budget authority for projects and activities funded in FY2017 by that fiscal year's regular appropriations acts—as specified in Section 101 of P.L. The CR includes both budget authority that is subject to those limits and also budget authority that is effectively exempt from those limits—including that designated or otherwise provided as "Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism" (OCO/GWOT), "continuing disability reviews and redeterminations," "disaster relief," and "emergency requirements." Duration
Section 106 provides that funding in the CR is effective October 1, 2017, through December 8, 2017—about the first 10 weeks of the fiscal year. Most projects and activities funded in the CR are subject to an across-the-board decrease in Section 101(b) that would reduce the rate by 0.6791% below the level of FY2017 funding. The CR and the Statutory Discretionary Spending Limits
Background
Appropriations for FY2018 are subject to statutory discretionary spending limits on categories of spending designated as "defense" and "nondefense" spending pursuant to the BCA. When spending effectively not subject to those limits—because it was designated or otherwise provided as OCO/GWOT, disaster relief, emergency requirement, or a program integrity adjustment—is included, CBO estimates total annualized budget authority in the CR of $1,183.058 billion. Agency, Account, and Program-Specific Provisions
In addition to the general provisions that establish the coverage, duration, and rate, CRs typically include provisions that are specific to certain agencies, accounts, or programs. First, certain provisions designate exceptions to the formula and purpose for which any referenced funding is extended. These are often referred to as "anomalies." Second, certain provisions may have the effect of creating new law or changing existing law. Most typically, these provisions are used to renew expiring provisions of law or extend the scope of certain existing statutory requirements to the funds provided in the CR. Table 1. Selected CRS Appropriations Experts | This report provides an analysis of the continuing appropriations provisions for FY2018 in Division D of H.R. 601. The measure also included separate divisions that establish a program to provide foreign assistance concerning basic education (Division A—Reinforcing Education Accountability in Development Act), supplemental appropriations for disaster relief requirements for FY2017 (Division B), and a temporary suspension of the public debt limit (Division C). On September 8, 2017, the President signed H.R. 601 into law (P.L. 115-56).
Division D of H.R. 601 was termed a "continuing resolution" (CR) because it provided temporary authority for federal agencies and programs to continue spending in FY2018 in the same manner as a separately enacted CR. It provides temporary funding for the programs and activities covered by all 12 of the regular appropriations bills, since none of them had been enacted previously. These provisions provide continuing budget authority for projects and activities funded in FY2017 by that fiscal year's regular appropriations acts, with some exceptions. It includes both budget authority that is subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits on defense and nondefense spending and also budget authority that is effectively exempt from those limits, such as that designated as for "Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism."
Funding under the terms of the CR is effective October 1, 2017, through December 8, 2017—roughly the first 10 weeks of the fiscal year.
The CR generally provides budget authority for FY2018 for projects and activities at the rate at which they were funded during FY2017. Most projects and activities funded in the CR, however, are also subject to an across-the-board decrease of 0.6791% (pursuant to Section 101(b) of Division D).
According to the cost estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the annualized discretionary budget authority provided in the FY2018 CR, as enacted, and subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits is approximately $1,070 billion. When spending that is effectively not subject to those limits (Overseas Contingency Operations, disaster relief, emergency requirements, and program integrity adjustments) is also included, the CBO estimate is $1,183 billion.
CRs usually include provisions that are specific to certain agencies, accounts, or programs. These include provisions that designate exceptions to the formula and purpose for which any referenced funding is extended (referred to as "anomalies") as well as provisions that have the effect of creating new law or changing existing law (often used to renew expiring provisions of law). The CR includes a number of such provisions, each of which is briefly summarized in this report. CRS appropriations process experts for each of these provisions are listed in Table 1.
For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2016, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32284 | crs_RL32284_0 | Introduction
The rental assistance programs authorized under Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. The rising cost of providing rental assistance is due, in varying degrees, to expansions in the program, the cost of renewing expiring long-term contracts, and rising costs in housing markets across the country. The most rapid cost increases have been seen in the voucher program. In order to understand why the program has become so expensive and why reforms are being considered, it is first important to understand the mechanics of the program and its history. This paper will provide an overview of the Section 8 programs and their history. For more information, see CRS Report RL33929, The Section 8 Voucher Renewal Funding Formula: Changes in Appropriations Acts ; CRS Report RL34002, Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program: Issues and Reform Proposals ; and CRS Report R41182, Preservation of HUD-Assisted Housing , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. The Section 23 program assisted low-income families residing in leased housing by permitting a public housing authority (PHA) to lease existing housing units in the private market and sublease them to low-income and very low-income families at below-market rents. Over 1.2 million units of housing with Section 8 contracts that originated under the new construction and substantial rehabilitation program still receive payments today. However, under the voucher program, families can pay more of their incomes toward rent and lease apartments with rents higher than FMR. Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance
The first program under Section 8 can be characterized as Section 8 project-based rental assistance. Project-based Section 8 contracts are managed by contract administrators. Section 8 Tenant-Based Housing Choice Vouchers
When QHWRA merged the voucher and certificate programs in 1998, it renamed the voucher component of the Section 8 program the Housing Choice Voucher program. Project-based vouchers are portable; after one year, a family with a project-based voucher can convert to a tenant-based voucher and then move, as long as a tenant-based voucher is available. | The Section 8 low-income housing program is really two programs authorized under Section 8 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937, as amended: the Housing Choice Voucher program and the project-based rental assistance program. Vouchers are portable subsidies that low-income families can use to lower their rents in the private market. Vouchers are administered at the local level by quasi-governmental public housing authorities (PHAs). Project-based rental assistance is a form of rental subsidy that is attached to a unit of privately owned housing. Low-income families who move into the housing pay a reduced rent, on the basis of their incomes.
The Section 8 program began in 1974, primarily as a project-based rental assistance program. However, by the mid-1980s, project-based assistance came under criticism for seeming too costly and concentrating poor families in high-poverty areas. Congress stopped funding new project-based Section 8 rental assistance contracts in 1983. In their place, Congress created vouchers as a new form of assistance. Today, vouchers—numbering more than 2 million—are the primary form of assistance provided under Section 8, although over 1 million units still receive project-based assistance under their original contracts or renewals of those contracts.
Congressional interest in the Section 8 programs—both the voucher program and the project-based rental assistance program—has increased in recent years, particularly as the program costs have rapidly grown, led by cost increases in the voucher program. In order to understand why costs are rising so quickly, it is important to first understand how the program works and its history. This report presents a brief overview of that history and introduces the reader to the program. For more information, see CRS Report RL34002, Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program: Issues and Reform Proposals; and CRS Report R41182, Preservation of HUD-Assisted Housing, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44003 | crs_R44003_0 | U.S. officials and analysts contend that the potential foreign fighter threat underscores the importance of close law enforcement ties with key European allies and existing U.S.-EU information-sharing arrangements, including those related to tracking terrorist financing and sharing airline passenger data. Some U.S. policymakers, including several Members of Congress, have expressed particular worries about European fighters in Syria and Iraq because of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Hearings in the 113 th and 114 th Congresses have addressed the potential foreign fighter threat, and several pieces of legislation have been introduced on the VWP. As noted previously, U.S. authorities judge that more than 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the Syria-Iraq region since the start of the conflict in Syria in 2011; of this figure, at least 3,400 are believed to be Westerners, including roughly 150 Americans. U.S. officials estimate that a handful of Americans have died fighting in the Syrian conflict since 2012. They also assert that military operations against the Islamic State group since August 2014 have killed thousands of fighters, including an unknown number of foreigners. Countering violent extremism . European Assessments and Responses33
European Fighters: Increasing Numbers and Growing Concerns
Like the United States, European governments and the 28-member European Union (EU) have become increasingly alarmed by recent events in Syria and Iraq, especially the threat posed by the Islamic State organization to both regional stability and domestic security. Worries also exist about "lone wolf" attacks from those who may not have traveled abroad but have been inspired by Islamist extremist propaganda. Despite these efforts, finding ways to stem the flow of European fighters to the Syria-Iraq region and keep track of those who go and return remains challenging. European governments face budgetary and personnel resource constraints in seeking to identify and monitor a growing number of potential assailants. Prosecuting individuals preemptively is difficult in many European countries because most existing laws require a high level of proof that a suspect has actually engaged in terrorism abroad or has returned to commit a terrorist act. These include the following:
enhancing information-sharing among member states and with EU bodies such as Europol (the EU agency that handles criminal intelligence) and Eurojust (the EU agency responsible for prosecutorial coordination in cross-border crimes); finalizing an EU-wide system for the collection of airline Passenger Name Record data to help counter terrorist threats and improve information exchanges among EU member states; strengthening external EU border controls by making full use of existing security tools provided in the framework that governs the Schengen area of free movement; preventing radicalization by detecting and removing Internet content that promotes terrorism or extremism, developing communication strategies to foster tolerance and counter terrorist ideologies, and addressing societal factors and situations in prisons that may contribute to radicalization; implementing strengthened EU rules to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing; increasing cooperation to curb the illicit trafficking of firearms given that the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen appear to have been carried out with military-grade weapons that are illegal in most European countries; and improving cooperation with international partners, especially in the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel, and the Western Balkans. EU leaders have also agreed to "systematic" checks against relevant law enforcement databases of EU citizens flagged as possible terrorist suspects or returning fighters at the external borders. To combat the potential foreign fighter threat, Belgium has employed a mix of security measures and prevention efforts. The proposed new surveillance authorities could be particularly controversial given long-standing German concerns about privacy rights. The majority of these individuals came from Ceuta. Some U.S. policymakers, including several Members of Congress, have expressed particular worries about European fighters in Syria and Iraq because the U.S. Visa Waiver Program permits short-term visa-free travel for citizens of most European countries (see "Issues for Congress" for more information). Some proposed measures largely aimed to enhance the security of the VWP further (see H.R. U.S. officials point out that ESTA's introduction has greatly strengthened the VWP's security controls over the last few years and that the program's information-sharing provisions with participating countries help to enhance U.S. intelligence about known and suspected terrorists and other criminals. | The rising number of U.S. and European citizens traveling to fight with rebel and terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq has emerged as a growing concern for U.S. and European leaders, including Members of Congress. Several deadly terrorist attacks in Europe over the past year—including the killing of 17 people in Paris in January 2015—have heightened the perception that these individuals could pose a serious security threat. Increasingly, terrorist suspects in Europe appear to have spent time with groups fighting in the Middle East, especially with the Islamic State organization (also known as ISIL or ISIS). Others, like the gunman who murdered two individuals in Copenhagen in February 2015, seem to have been inspired by Islamist extremist propaganda.
U.S. intelligence suggests that more than 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the Syria-Iraq region, including at least 3,400 Westerners, since 2011. The vast majority of Western fighters are thought to be from Europe, although roughly 150 Americans have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria. U.S. authorities estimate that a handful of Americans have died in the conflict; they also assert that military operations against the Islamic State group since August 2014 have killed thousands of fighters, including an unknown number of foreigners.
European governments have employed a mix of security measures and prevention efforts to address the potential foreign fighter threat. These have included
increasing surveillance; prohibiting travel; countering terrorist recruitment and incitement to terrorism via the Internet and social media; and strengthening counter-radicalization programs.
Steps are also being taken by the 28-member European Union (EU) to better combat the possible threat given the bloc's largely open internal borders (which permit individuals to travel without passport checks among most European countries). EU leaders have emphasized the need to enhance information-sharing among national and EU authorities, strengthen external border controls, and improve existing counter-radicalization efforts, particularly online.
Nevertheless, European countries and the EU face a range of challenges in stemming the flow of fighters to Syria and Iraq and keeping track of those who go and return. Prosecuting such individuals is difficult in many European countries because most existing laws require a high level of proof that a suspect has actually engaged in terrorism abroad or has returned to commit a terrorist act. Due to ongoing resource constraints, even those governments with far-reaching legal authority to detain terrorist suspects have found it difficult to identify and monitor a growing number of potential assailants. Furthermore, implementation of several EU-wide measures under discussion could be slowed by national sovereignty concerns, long-standing law enforcement barriers to sharing sensitive information, and strong EU data privacy and protection rights.
U.S. officials and analysts contend that the potential foreign fighter threat underscores the importance of close law enforcement ties with key European allies and existing U.S.-EU information-sharing arrangements, including those related to tracking terrorist financing and sharing airline passenger data. Some U.S. policymakers, including several Members of Congress, have expressed particular worries about European fighters in Syria and Iraq because the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) permits short-term visa-free travel to the United States for citizens of most European countries. At the same time, many point out that the VWP's existing security controls require VWP travelers to provide advanced biographic information to U.S. authorities and may help limit travel by known violent extremists. In the 113th Congress, several pieces of legislation were introduced on the VWP, ranging from proposals to limit or suspend the program to those that sought to strengthen the security of the VWP further. In the 114th Congress, two proposals—H.R. 158 and S. 542—largely aim to enhance the VWP's security components to better guard against potential terrorist threats. For additional information, see CRS Report RS22030, U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33186 | crs_RL33186_0 | Introduction
America's current account (CA) (exports less imports plus net income payments and net unilateral transfers) has been in deficit every year but one since 1982. After a year in surplus in 1991, it steadily rose as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) to a record high of 6.1% of GDP in 2005 and 2006. Some observers have questioned whether the CA deficit is sustainable. Those expressing concern about the CA deficit typically define unsustainability to mean that the United States would have difficulty financing the CA deficit at some point in the near future, and the resulting adjustment process would harm the U.S. economy. But if the desirability of U.S. assets were to change rapidly (due to a loss in confidence in the U.S. economy, for example), foreign capital inflows and the value of the dollar could decline quickly; at a minimum, foreigners would require significantly higher interest rates than they do at present for inflows to continue. If both lender and borrower are rational, many economists believe that the CA deficit can be mutually beneficial—it allows the lender to enjoy a higher rate of return than could be enjoyed at home and allows the borrower to operate with a larger capital stock than could be financed from domestic saving. Some economists, however, doubt this interpretation and are concerned that the large CA deficit is symptomatic of wider economic imbalance. On the other hand, if the U.S. economy grows faster than the rest of the world in the future, then (small) CA deficits would be needed for foreigners to maintain U.S. asset holdings equal to the U.S. share of world GDP. But, all else equal, foreigners will only be induced to buy more exports if the dollar depreciates. In 2008, the United States had a net foreign debt of $3.5 trillion, but received net investment income of $126 billion from the rest of the world. That is because U.S. holdings of foreign assets have earned a higher rate of return than U.S. debt owed to foreigners. It should be emphasized that economic theory suggests that a slow decline in the CA deficit and dollar would not be troublesome for the overall economy. The initial effect could be a sudden and large depreciation in the value of the dollar, as the supply of dollars on the foreign exchange market increased, and a sudden and large increase in U.S. interest rates, as an important funding source for investment and the budget deficit was withdrawn from the financial markets. (Empirical evidence suggests that the full effects of a change in the exchange rate on traded goods takes time, so the dollar may have to "overshoot" its eventual depreciation level in order to achieve a significant adjustment in trade flows in the short run.) The financial crisis, beginning in August 2007 with the illiquidity of the U.S. subprime mortgage market and deepening in September 2008, would seem to be a good test case for how a large change in investor sentiment would affect the CA deficit. The crisis led to a large decline in private capital flows in 2008—both foreign purchases of U.S. assets and U.S. purchases of foreign assets that had countervailing effects on the CA balance. This trend was not new—the steady financing of the CA deficit has depended heavily on official capital inflows since 2002. First, the United States has a flexible exchange rate regime. However, not all cases of large CA deficits end in a reversal. Under his optimistic scenario, in which he assumes that the U.S. net debt will rise to 60% of GDP by 2010 and then remain constant, the CA deficit would peak at 7.3% of GDP in four years, before eventually declining to 3.2% of GDP (with most of the decline occurring in the first four years after the peak). This scenario (and the first scenario) is not sustainable in the long run because the net foreign debt would grow continuously. From 2002 to 2006, the dollar depreciated by 16% in inflation-adjusted terms. The CA deficit began declining in 2007, along with the continued decline in the dollar through 2008. While a sudden reduction in foreign capital inflows cannot be ruled out—it has happened to foreign countries—it seems highly unlikely. | America's current account (CA) deficit (the trade deficit plus net income payments and net unilateral transfers) rose as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) from 1991 to a record high of about 6% of GDP in 2006. It began falling in 2007, and reached 3% of GDP in 2009. The CA deficit is financed by foreign capital inflows. Many observers have questioned whether such large inflows are sustainable. Even at 3% of GDP, the deficit is probably still too large to be permanently sustained, and many economists fear that the decline is temporary and caused by the recession. Further, a large share of the capital inflows have come from foreign central banks in recent years, and some are concerned about the economic and political implications of this reliance. Some fear that a rapid decline in capital inflows would trigger a sharp drop in the value of the dollar and an increase in interest rates that could lower asset values and disrupt economic activity. However, economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that the most plausible scenario is a slow decline in the CA deficit, which would not greatly disrupt economic activity because production in the traded goods sector would be stimulated.
The financial crisis that worsened in September 2008 would seem to be a good test case of the type of event that could lead to the feared "sudden stop" in foreigners' willingness to finance the CA deficit. While the recession deepened following the crisis, it has not been via a sudden decline in the dollar or a sudden broad spike in U.S. interest rates. On the contrary, the dollar appreciated in value in the months after the crisis and foreign demand for U.S. Treasury bonds has risen since the crisis worsened. On the other hand, there was a large decline in private foreign capital inflows beginning in 2008; had it not been for foreign government purchases of U.S. securities, the CA would have been in surplus in 2009, all else equal.
One long-term consequence of large and chronic CA deficits has been the growing foreign ownership of the U.S. capital stock. A large CA deficit is not sustainable in the long run because it increases U.S. net debt owed to foreigners, which cannot rise without limit. A larger debt can be serviced only through more borrowing or higher net exports. For net exports to rise, all else equal, the value of the dollar must fall. This explains why many economists believe that both the dollar and the CA deficit will fall further at some point in the future. To date, debt service has not been burdensome. Because U.S. holdings of foreign assets have earned a higher rate of return than U.S. debt owed to foreigners, U.S. net investment income has remained positive, even though the United States is a net debtor nation.
Since 1980, most episodes of a declining CA deficit in industrialized countries have been associated with slow economic growth. Only two episodes were associated with a severe disruption in economic activity. Because most of the episodes involved small countries, these cases may differ in important ways from any corresponding episode in the United States. Historically, a few other countries have had a higher net foreign debt-to-GDP ratio than the United States has at present; however, if CA deficits continue at current levels, the U.S. net foreign debt could eventually be the highest ever recorded.
This report also reviews studies on the CA deficit's sustainability. Some of the studies suggest that a large dollar depreciation could eventually be required to restore sustainability. But the inflation-adjusted 25% depreciation of the dollar from 2002-2008 had little effect on the CA deficit, which kept growing until 2007. The CA deficit did not decline rapidly until after the financial crisis of September 2008—a period with little trend movement in the dollar. |
crs_R41347 | crs_R41347_0 | Introduction
The concentration of rare earth elements (REEs) production in China raises the important issue of supply vulnerability. REEs are used for many commercial applications including new energy technologies, electronic devices, automobiles, and national security applications. Is the United States vulnerable to supply disruptions? Are these elements essential to U.S. national security and economic well-being? There are 17 rare earth elements (REEs), 15 within the chemical group called lanthanides, plus yttrium and scandium. The lanthanides consist of the following: lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium. Rare earths are moderately abundant in the earth's crust, some even more abundant than copper, lead, gold, and platinum. While some are more abundant than many other minerals, most REEs are not concentrated enough to make them easily exploitable economically. The United States was once self-reliant in domestically produced REEs, but over the past 15 years has become 100% reliant on imports, primarily from China, because of lower-cost operations. Major End Uses and Applications
Currently, the dominant end uses for rare earth elements in the United States are for automobile catalysts and petroleum refining catalysts, use in phosphors in color television and flat panel displays (cell phones, portable DVDs, and laptops), permanent magnets and rechargeable batteries for hybrid and electric vehicles, and numerous medical devices (see Table 1 ). There are important defense applications such as jet fighter engines, missile guidance systems, antimissile defense, and satellite and communication systems. World demand for REEs was estimated at 136,100 tons in 2010, with global production around 133,600 tons annually. The difference was covered by above-ground stocks or inventories. The Industrial Minerals Company of Australia (IMCOA) estimates somewhat lower world demand at 160,000 metric tons in 2016. Most new (greenfield) mining projects that are underway could easily take as long as 5-10 years for development. In the long run, however, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) expects that global reserves and undiscovered resources are large enough to meet global demand. As world demand continues to climb, U.S. demand for rare earth elements is also projected to rise, according to the USGS. U.S.-based Molycorp operates a mine and separation plant at Mountain Pass, CA, and sells the rare earth concentrates and refined products from previously mined above-ground stocks and recent new mine production. Recent supply chain developments by Molycorp include the acquisition of Neo Materials Technology, Inc.—a Toronto-based firm (renamed Molycorp Canada) with rare earth processing and permanent magnet powder facilities in China. Weld mine in Australia, which began production in 2012. A feasibility study of the project is underway. A final decision is expected to be announced in early 2014. On September 18, 2013, the House passed H.R. Rare Earth-Related Legislation in the 113th Congress
H.R. 761 , the National Strategic and Critical Minerals Production Act of 2013
Introduced by Mark E. Amodei on February 15, 2013, and referred to House Committees on Natural Resources and the Judiciary. | The concentration of production of rare earth elements (REEs) outside the United States raises the important issue of supply vulnerability. REEs are used for new energy technologies and national security applications. Two key questions of interest to Congress are: (1) Is the United States vulnerable to supply disruptions of REEs? (2) Are these elements essential to U.S. national security and economic well-being?
There are 17 rare earth elements (REEs), 15 within the chemical group called lanthanides, plus yttrium and scandium. The lanthanides consist of the following: lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium. Rare earths are moderately abundant in the earth's crust, some even more abundant than copper, lead, gold, and platinum. While more abundant than many other minerals, REEs are not concentrated enough to make them easily exploitable economically. The United States was once self-reliant in domestically produced REEs, but over the past 15 years has become 100% reliant on imports, primarily from China, because of lower-cost operations.
U.S.-based Molycorp has begun production at its Mountain Pass mine and anticipates production at full capacity (19,050 metric tons) in 2014. Molycorp also operates a separation plant at Mountain Pass, CA, and sells rare earth concentrates and refined products from newly mined and previously mined above-ground stocks. Molycorp announced its purchase of Neo Materials Technology (renamed Moly Canada), a rare earth processor and producer of permanent magnet powders which has facilities in China.
Some of the major end uses for rare earth elements include use in automotive catalytic converters, fluid cracking catalysts in petroleum refining, phosphors in color television and flat panel displays (cell phones, portable DVDs, and laptops), permanent magnets and rechargeable batteries for hybrid and electric vehicles, generators for wind turbines, and numerous medical devices. There are important defense applications, such as jet fighter engines, missile guidance systems, antimissile defense, space-based satellites, and communication systems.
World demand for rare earth elements was estimated at 136,000 tons per year, with global production around 133,600 tons in 2010. The difference was covered by previously mined above-ground stocks. World demand is projected to rise to at least 160,000 tons annually by 2016 according to the Industrial Minerals Company of Australia. Some mine capacity at Mt. Weld Australia has come on-stream in 2012, but far below the projected 11,000 metric tons of capacity. Other new mining projects could easily take as long as 5-10 years to reach production. In the long run, however, the U.S. Geological Survey expects that global reserves and undiscovered resources are large enough to meet demand.
In March 2012, the Obama Administration announced the filing of a World Trade Organization case against China, citing unfair trade practices in rare earths. A final decision is expected to be announced in early 2014. Several legislative proposals have been introduced in the 113th Congress in the House and Senate to address the potential of U.S. supply vulnerability and to support domestic production of REEs and other critical minerals because of their applications for national security/defense systems and clean energy technologies. On September 18, 2013, the House passed H.R. 761, The National Strategic and Critical Minerals Production Act of 2013. |
crs_R41836 | crs_R41836_0 | Introduction
A number of states and local governments have taken actions to address greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. One of the most significant climate change developments at the state level is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI, pronounced "Reggie"), which is based on an agreement signed by RGGI governors in 2005. RGGI currently involves nine states—Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The results of the RGGI program may be informative to policymakers, because RGGI may serve as a possible test case for a federal cap-and-trade program, providing insights into implementation complexities, the mechanics of various design elements, and lessons of potential design pitfalls. Several of RGGI's design elements generated considerable interest during the development and debate of federal proposals to address GHG emissions. RGGI Overview
RGGI is a sector-specific cap-and-trade system that applies to CO 2 emissions from electric power plants with capacities to generate 25 megawatts or more —164 facilities in the nine RGGI states. Emission allowance auctions . Emissions Cap
Although RGGI is one of the more aggressive state programs addressing GHG emissions, the program's first emission cap exceeded actual emissions since its inception in 2009. The first cap never compelled regulated entities to make internal emission reductions or purchase emission credits (or offsets). This change took effect in January 2014. The figure depicts a substantial decline in carbon-intensive electricity generation, particularly coal, over that time frame. In 2005, RGGI states generated 33% of their electricity from coal and petroleum, sources of energy with relatively high carbon intensity. In 2016, these sources generated 7% of RGGI's electricity. Impacts of the Original Emissions Cap
Although RGGI's original emission cap did not directly require emission reductions (due to unexpected emission levels, discussed above), the cap, and the overall RGGI program, still had impacts. First, the cap's existence attached a price to the regulated entities' CO 2 emissions. Second, the cap's emission allowances were a new form of currency. The emission allowance value can be used to support various policy objectives, including (as is the case with RGGI) energy efficiency and renewable energy investments. Several RGGI studies indicate that supporting energy efficiency provides multiple benefits: emission reduction, consumer savings via lower electricity bills, and regional job creation. The revised cap took effect in January 2014. During this period, the reserve price ($1.86-$1.93 per ton) acted like an emissions fee or carbon tax. The RGGI states (as a group) have more than doubled this commitment. As mentioned above, RGGI auction revenues have accounted for the vast majority (approximately 91%) of the emission allowance value created by the emissions cap. The RGGI states significantly altered their emissions cap in 2014, and this new cap may have different effects than the original emissions cap. It is uncertain how this new development may impact electricity use and prices in the RGGI region and, in turn, the perception and support for the program. As a group, the nine RGGI states account for approximately 7% of U.S. CO 2 emissions from energy consumption and 16% of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Table 2 indicates that RGGI's aggregate CO 2 emissions from energy consumption rank in the top 20 among nations. But from a practical standpoint, the RGGI program's contribution to directly reducing the global accumulation of GHG emissions in the atmosphere is arguably negligible. | The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was the nation's first mandatory cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. RGGI involves nine states—Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The RGGI cap-and-trade system applies only to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from electric power plants with capacities to generate 25 megawatts or more—approximately 168 facilities. The RGGI emissions cap took effect January 1, 2009, based on an agreement signed by RGGI governors in 2005.
The results of the RGGI program may be instructive to policymakers. Several of RGGI's design elements generated considerable interest during the development and debate of federal proposals to address GHG emissions. In particular, the program's emissions cap has received particular attention. When the original cap took effect in 2009, it did not compel regulated entities to make internal emission reductions or purchase emission credits from other sources. Several factors led to this outcome: RGGI's cap design, an economic downturn, and a substantial shift to less carbon-intensive fuels. For instance, in 2005, RGGI states generated 33% of their electricity from coal and petroleum, sources of energy with relatively high carbon intensity. In 2016, these sources generated 7% of RGGI's electricity.
To address the disparity between the cap and actual emissions, RGGI states agreed (in 2013) to reduce the existing cap (by 45%) so that the cap level would match actual emissions. The revised cap took effect in January 2014. RGGI's revised cap may have vastly different effects than its predecessor. It is uncertain how this new development may impact electricity use and prices in the RGGI region and, in turn, the perception and support for the program.
Although actual emissions were ultimately well below the original emissions cap, the cap's existence attached a price to the regulated entities' CO2 emissions. Because the cap level was above actual emissions, the allowance price acted like an emissions fee or carbon tax. Although the cap likely had limited direct impact on the region's power plant emissions, the revenues generated from the emission allowance sales likely had some impact on emission levels in the region.
Through 2016, RGGI states, as a group, have sold 91% of their emission allowances through quarterly auctions. The auction proceeds—over $2.7 billion to date—have provided a new source of revenue, which has been used to support various policy objectives. RGGI states (as a group) have distributed the vast majority of the emission allowance value to support energy efficiency, renewable energy, other climate-related efforts, or electricity consumer assistance. Several RGGI studies indicate that supporting energy efficiency provides multiple benefits: emission reduction, consumer savings via lower electricity bills, and job creation.
As a group, the total CO2 emissions from the nine RGGI states account for approximately 7% of U.S. CO2 emissions (and 16% of U.S. gross domestic product). RGGI's aggregate emissions rank in the top 20 among all nations. But from a practical standpoint, the RGGI program's contribution to directly reducing the global accumulation of GHG emissions in the atmosphere is arguably negligible. However, RGGI's activities may stimulate action in other states or at the federal level: Compared to a patchwork of state/regional requirements, industry stakeholders may prefer a singular national policy. For a number of reasons, experiences in RGGI may be instructive for policymakers seeking to craft a national program. |
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