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crs_R41291 | crs_R41291_0 | Section 125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ( P.L. 103-465 ), which is the law that approved and implemented the agreements reached during the Uruguay Round, provided that the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) must submit to the Congress every five years a report that analyzes the costs and benefits of continued U.S. participation in the WTO. Once Congress receives this comprehensive report, any Member of Congress may introduce a privileged joint resolution withdrawing congressional approval of the WTO Agreement within 90 days. The USTR submitted the report to Congress on March 1, 2010. To date no withdrawal resolution has been introduced in the 111 th Congress in either chamber. Most observers maintain that U.S. withdrawal from the WTO is at best highly unlikely for both substantive and procedural reasons. Substantively, the withdrawal of U.S. participation could undermine a multilateral system of trade rules and practices, formulated and implemented under U.S. leadership, that on balance has contributed to increased economic prosperity and security at home and abroad. Procedurally, a withdrawal resolution would have to pass both the House and Senate and then surmount a likely Presidential veto via an override with a two-thirds majority vote. Yet, this resolution provides an opportunity for members of Congress periodically to debate the U.S. role in an important international institution and the direction of U.S. trade policy, generally. The purpose of this report is to analyze some of the main issues in the debate on U.S. participation in the WTO and to address some of the criticisms leveled at the organization. Background on the GATT/WTO System
Following World War II, nations throughout the world, led by the United States and several other developed countries, sought to establish an open and non-discriminatory trading system with the goal of raising the economic well-being of all countries. Unable to secure approval for such a comprehensive agreement, however, they reached a provisional agreement on tariffs and trade rules, called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). WTO
The World Trade Organization (WTO) succeeded the GATT in 1995. The first deals with administering the rules and principles negotiated and signed by its members. Major decisions at the WTO are made by representatives of the 153 member governments. Member states proffer negotiating positions, build alliances with other nations, file dispute settlement cases, and implement their decisions. So far under the WTO dispute settlement procedure, the United States has had more success as a complainant than as a respondent. There have been complaints that some countries, including the United States, have not fully adhered to the finding of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panels. Criticisms of the WTO from Environmental, Food Safety, Labor, Development, and Financial Regulation Perspectives
In the debate on U.S. participation in the WTO, some advocates for the environment, food safety, labor, development, and financial regulation have been extremely vocal in their criticisms of the WTO. While some of the critics oppose the very existence of the WTO, much of the criticism is based on interpretations of various WTO agreements or rulings. Critics, such as Public Citizen, have argued that the WTO has been a disaster for the environment. Appendix. 2535), beginning with March 1, 2000, and every five years thereafter, such report, transmitted by the President, must "include an analysis of the effects of the WTO Agreement on the interests of the United States, the costs and benefits to the United States of its participation in the WTO, and the value of the continued participation of the United States in the WTO." | Following World War II, the United States led efforts to establish an open and nondiscriminatory trading system with the expressed goal of raising the economic well-being of all countries and bolstering world peace. These efforts culminated in the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948, a provisional agreement on tariffs and trade rules that governed world trade for 47 years. The World Trade Organization (WTO) succeeded the GATT in 1995 and today serves as a permanent body that administers the rules and agreements negotiated and signed by 153 participating parties, as well as a forum for dispute settlement and negotiations.
Section 125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements (P.L. 103-465), which is the law that approved and implemented the agreements reached during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, provided that the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) must submit to Congress every five years a report that analyzes the costs and benefits of continued U.S. participation in the WTO. The USTR submitted its report to Congress on March 1, 2010, triggering a 90 legislative day timetable in which any Member of Congress may introduce a privileged joint resolution withdrawing congressional approval of the WTO Agreement (to date no withdrawal resolution has been introduced in the 111th Congress).
Most observers maintain that U.S. withdrawal from the WTO is at best highly unlikely for both substantive and procedural reasons. Substantively, the withdrawal of U.S. participation could undermine a multilateral system of trade rules and practices, formulated and implemented under U.S. leadership, that on balance has contributed to increased economic prosperity and security at home and abroad. Procedurally, a withdrawal resolution would have to pass both the House and Senate and then surmount a likely Presidential veto via an override with a two-thirds majority vote. Nevertheless, such a resolution provides an opportunity for Members of Congress periodically to debate "whether the WTO is an effective organization" and ways it could better serve U.S. interests.
The purpose of this report is to analyze some of the main issues in any debate on U.S. participation in the WTO and to address some of the criticisms leveled at the organization. Academic studies indicate that the United States benefits from broad reductions in trade barriers worldwide, but some workers and industries might not share in those gains. Decisions in the WTO are made by member governments, which determine their negotiating positions, file dispute challenges, and implement their decisions. However, some argue that smaller countries are left out of decision-making and that governments tend to represent the interests of large corporations disproportionately.
The United States has been a frequent participant in WTO dispute proceedings, both as a complainant and as a respondent. There have been complaints that countries do not adhere to decisions and that U.S. trade remedy laws have not been judged properly. It is also argued that this multilateral dispute settlement process is unique and that the United States has successfully used the process to advance its economic interests.
Certain advocates for the environment, food safety, labor, development, and financial regulation have criticized the WTO. Much of the criticism is based on interpretations of various WTO agreements or rulings that have been controversial. An appendix sets out the legislative procedures for the WTO withdrawal resolution. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33476 | crs_RL33476_0 | Some Members of Congress have occasionally authorized and appropriated funding for programs benefitting Israel at a level exceeding that requested by the executive branch. Other Members have sought greater scrutiny of some of Israel's actions. Israel has sought to influence U.S. policy on Iran, and supported the Trump Administration's May 2018 withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement. As Iran-backed groups have been successful in helping Syria's government regain effective control of the country, Israel has conducted a number of airstrikes targeting these groups. Contentious domestic politics for both Israelis and Palestinians make it difficult for them to make diplomatic concessions, particularly in a climate where questions surround the continued leadership of Prime Minister Netanyahu (see " Corruption Allegations Involving Netanyahu " below) and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas. Possibly complicating the situation further, President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017 and the Administration moved the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May 2018. Since Israel's founding, the average lifespan of an Israeli government has been about 23 months. This electoral result came at a time when debate in Israel was intensifying over settlement in the territories occupied during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The enduring appeal of Netanyahu and right-of-center parties to Israeli voters in recent years may stem from a number of factors, including
Arguments by some that Palestinians have rejected peace and that Israeli military withdrawals from southern Lebanon (in 2000) and the Gaza Strip (in 2005) emboldened Hezbollah and Hamas and contributed to subsequent conflict. The varying interests of the coalition's members and some intra-party rifts contribute to difficulties in building consensus on several issues, including
How to strengthen Israel's security and protect its Jewish character while preserving rule of law and freedom of expression for all citizens. How to promote general economic strength while addressing popular concerns regarding economic inequality and cost of living. Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case to U.S. officials that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. Iranian Nuclear Agreement and the U.S. Withdrawal
Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran's nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). He argued against the JCPOA when it was negotiated in 2015, and welcomed President Trump's May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran's oil and central bank transactions. Iran in Syria: Cross-Border Attacks with Israel45
A "shadow war" has developed between Israel and Iran over Iran's presence in Syria. Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications. Hamas and Gaza
Israel faces a threat from the Gaza Strip (via Hamas and other militant groups). In 2008, Congress enacted legislation requiring that any proposed U.S. arms sale to "any country in the Middle East other than Israel" must include a notification to Congress with a "determination that the sale or export of such would not adversely affect Israel's qualitative military edge over military threats to Israel." Aid
Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. Pending Security Cooperation Legislation
U.S.-Israel Security Assistance Authoriz ation Act of 2018 ( S. 2497 and H.R. 5141 ) . Bilateral Trade
The United States is Israel's largest single-country trading partner, and—according to data from the U.S. International Trade Commission—Israel is the United States's 24 th -largest trading partner. The two countries concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1985, and all customs duties between the two trading partners have since been eliminated. However, the PA continues security coordination with Israel. While these Arab states have criticized the U.S. stance on Jerusalem, there are also signs that the shared goal of countering Iranian influence in the region is leading some of them to interact more overtly with Israeli counterparts and to dissuade the Palestinians from abandoning U.S.-backed diplomacy. When ordered by Israel's court system to dismantle outposts, the government has complied. | Since Israel's founding in 1948, successive U.S. Presidents and many Members of Congress have demonstrated a commitment to Israel's security and to close U.S.-Israel cooperation. Strong bilateral ties influence U.S. policy in the Middle East, and Congress provides active oversight of the executive branch's actions. Israel is a leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid and a frequent purchaser of major U.S. weapons systems. By law, U.S. arms sales cannot adversely affect Israel's "qualitative military edge" over other countries in its region. The two countries signed a free trade agreement in 1985, and the United States is Israel's largest trading partner.
Israel regularly seeks help from the United States to bolster its regional security and defense capabilities. Legislation in Congress frequently includes proposals to strengthen U.S.-Israel cooperation, such as the U.S.-Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2018 (S. 2497 and H.R. 5141).
Concerns about Iran dominate Israel's strategic calculations. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu influenced President Trump's May 2018 decision to withdraw from the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement and to reimpose sanctions on Iran, and Israel has made common cause with several Arab states to counter Iran's regional activities. During 2018, Israel and Iran have clashed over Iran's presence in Syria, fueling speculation about the possibility of broader conflict between the two countries and how Russia's presence in Syria might affect the situation. A serious threat persists from Hezbollah's rocket arsenal in Lebanon, adding to the uncertainty along Israel's northern border.
Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza may present less of an immediate threat to Israeli population centers. Nevertheless, various forms of conflict have taken place around the Gaza-Israel frontier in 2018. Improving difficult living conditions for Palestinians in Gaza while also ensuring Israel's security presents a challenge, given: Hamas' control of Gaza, Israeli and Egyptian control of its access points, and recent reductions in U.S. and Palestinian Authority (PA) funding.
Israel's political impasse with the Palestinians continues. Israel has militarily occupied the West Bank since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, with the PA exercising limited self-rule in some areas since the mid-1990s. The Trump Administration's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017 and its relocation of the U.S. embassy there in May 2018 were greeted warmly by Israel but rejected by Palestinians and many other international actors. The success of an anticipated U.S. diplomatic proposal may depend on a number of factors, including whether Israel embraces it and can persuade Palestinians or Arab state leaders to do so. Approximately 590,000 Israelis live in residential neighborhoods or "settlements" in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. These settlements are of disputed legality under international law.
Israel has a robust economy and an active democracy. Prime Minister Netanyahu's governing coalition includes various right-of-center and religious parties. Domestic debates continue about the government's commitment to rule of law and freedom of expression, and how to balance market-friendly economic policies with individuals' concerns about cost of living. The role and status of Arab citizens presents challenges for the state and society. Netanyahu is facing a number of corruption allegations, and some political commentators anticipate that Netanyahu will call national elections ahead of the attorney general's decision on whether to indict him. |
crs_98-921 | crs_98-921_0 | Background
The Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA, 42 U.S.C. It provides broad nondiscrimination protection in employment, public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications for individuals with disabilities. The ADA Amendments Act, P.L. The Supreme Court has decided 20 ADA cases. | The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides broad nondiscrimination protection in employment, public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications for individuals with disabilities. This report summarizes the major provisions of the ADA and analyzes selected recent issues, including the Supreme Court cases and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. |
crs_R42612 | crs_R42612_0 | D uring the final months of recent presidential administrations, federal agencies have typically issued a larger number of rules relative to comparable time periods earlier in the administration. This phenomenon is often referred to as "midnight rulemaking." Various scholars and public officials have documented evidence of midnight rulemaking by several recent outgoing administrations, especially for those outgoing administrations that will be replaced by an administration of a different party. Overview of Midnight Rulemaking
One possible explanation for the issuance of "midnight rules" is the desire of the outgoing administration to complete its work and achieve certain policy goals before the end of its term of office—what has been termed the "Cinderella effect." Because it may be difficult to change or eliminate rules after they have taken effect, issuing midnight rules can also help ensure a legacy for a President—especially when an incoming administration is of a different party. On the other hand, a 2012 study for the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) concluded that many midnight regulations were "relatively routine matters not implicating new policy initiatives by incumbent administrations," and that the "majority of the rules appear to be the result of finishing tasks that were initiated before the Presidential transition period or the result of deadlines outside the agency's control (such as year-end statutory or court-ordered deadlines)." The study cited some evidence of the strategic use of midnight rules to implement certain desired policies before leaving office, but, in general, the study said that "the perception of midnight rulemaking as an unseemly practice is worse than the reality." Concerns over Midnight Rulemaking
One general concern raised about midnight rulemaking is that an outgoing administration has less political accountability compared to an administration faced with the possibility of re-election. Furthermore, rules that are hurried through at the end of an administration may not have the same opportunity for public input. Agencies may find that in order to issue regulations by the end of an administration, they may not have sufficient time to review and digest public comments taken during the comment period. Another concern is that the quality of the regulations themselves may suffer during the midnight period, since the departing administration may issue rules quickly, and as a result, the rules may not receive adequate review. For example, one study of midnight rulemaking suggested that "an increase in the number of regulations promulgated in a given time period could overwhelm the institutional review process that serves to ensure that new regulations have been carefully considered, are based on sound evidence, and justify their cost." Finally, some have argued that the task of evaluating a previous administration's midnight rules can potentially overwhelm a new administration. At any time, Congress can use its legislative power to overturn or change a regulation that has been issued by an agency. A change in the underlying statutory authority could force an agency to amend a regulation that has been already issued, provide additional instruction to an agency while a rule is under development and before it has been finalized, or outright repeal a rule that had already been issued. In addition, Congress may use the expedited procedures provided in the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to disapprove agency rules, including, in some cases, rules issued in a previous session of Congress. Alternatively, Congress can add provisions to agency appropriations bills to prohibit certain rules from being implemented or enforced. | During the final months of recent presidential administrations, federal agencies have typically issued a larger number of rules relative to comparable time periods earlier in the administration. This phenomenon is often referred to as "midnight rulemaking." Various scholars and public officials have documented evidence of midnight rulemaking by several recent outgoing administrations, especially for those outgoing administrations that will be replaced by an administration of a different party.
The most likely explanation for the issuance of "midnight rules" is the desire of the outgoing administration to complete its work and achieve certain policy goals before the end of its term of office. This tendency has been termed the "Cinderella effect" by some observers. Because it may be difficult to change or eliminate rules after they have taken effect, issuing midnight rules can help ensure a legacy for a President.
Some entities and individuals have raised a number of concerns over the practice of midnight rulemaking. One such concern is that an outgoing administration has less political accountability compared to an administration faced with the possibility of re-election. Furthermore, rules that are hurried through at the end of an administration may not have the same opportunity for public input: agencies may find that to issue regulations by the end of an administration, they may not have sufficient time to read and digest public comments received during the comment period.
Another concern over midnight rulemaking is that the quality of regulations may suffer during the midnight period, since the departing administration may issue rules quickly, and, as a result, the rules may not receive adequate review or analysis. One study suggested that "an increase in the number of regulations promulgated in a given time period could overwhelm the institutional review process that serves to ensure that new regulations have been carefully considered, are based on sound evidence, and can justify their cost." Finally, some have argued that the task of evaluating a previous administration's midnight rules could overwhelm a new administration.
Although some observers have voiced concerns about midnight rulemaking, a 2012 study for the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) concluded that many midnight regulations were "relatively routine matters not implicating new policy initiatives by incumbent administrations," and that the "majority of the rules appear to be the result of finishing tasks that were initiated before the Presidential transition period or the result of deadlines outside the agency's control (such as year-end statutory or court-ordered deadlines)." The study cited some evidence of the strategic use of midnight rules to implement certain desired policies before leaving office, but in general, the study said that "the perception of midnight rulemaking as an unseemly practice is worse than the reality."
Congress has several options pertaining to midnight regulations—even after they have taken effect. First, Congress can use its legislative power to overturn or change a regulation that has already been issued: Congress could amend the statutory authority underlying a regulation, which could force an agency to amend a regulation that has been already issued, or could provide additional instruction to an agency before a rule is finalized.
In addition, Congress may use the expedited procedures provided in the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to disapprove agency rules, including, in some cases, rules issued by the outgoing administration during the previous Congress. Alternatively, Congress can add provisions to agency appropriations bills to prohibit certain rules from being implemented or enforced. Furthermore, in Congresses coinciding with the end of recent administrations, as well as in the current (114th) Congress, some Members have introduced bills that would change or prevent the practice of issuing midnight rules. |
crs_R41662 | crs_R41662_0 | 110-252 ), which created a new temporary unemployment insurance program, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program. The authorization for this program has been extended multiple times and currently is authorized through the week ending on or before January 1, 2014. 8 . 112-25 ). 112-40)
On September 2, 2011, P.L. 112-78)
P.L. 112-78 , the authorization for the EUC08 program was extended through the week ending on or before March 6, 2012; the 100% federal financing of the EB program was extended until March 7, 2012; and the three-year lookback trigger option for the EB program was extended until the week ending on or before February 29, 2012. 112-96 , signed on February 22, 2012) contained provisions that (1) made changes to the structure of the EUC08 program as well as maintained temporary EB provisions; (2) reformed the UC program; (3) provided additional reemployment services for EUC08 claimants; and (4) expanded the Short-Time Compensation and Self-Employment Assistance programs in states. Unemployment Insurance Extensions in P.L. H.R. H.R. 8 also extended the 100% federal financing of EB through December 31, 2013, as well as the option for states to use three-year lookbacks in their EB triggers until the week ending on or before December 31, 2013. H.R. In addition, H.R. Legislative Proposals
Unemployment Insurance Provisions in the President's American Jobs Act of 2011 Proposal (Title III, Subtitle A: Supporting Unemployed Workers Act of 2011)22/S. 12/S. It would not expand the number of weeks of unemployment benefits available to the unemployed beyond what is currently available. 3346/S. H.R. H.R. 3346 and S. 1804 would also extend the temporary extended railroad unemployment benefits (authorized under P.L. H.R. Other Legislative Proposals to Extend Expiring UI Provisions
In addition to the President's American Jobs Act of 2011 proposal, S. 1549 / H.R. 12 / S. 1660 , and H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. President's Budget Proposal for FY2013
The President's Budget Proposal for FY2013 attempts to address some of these concerns. H.R. H.R. 589 and H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. 3427 and S. 1826 . H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. It would be available to businesses with gross receipts in the previous taxable year of no more than $20 million (among other requirements) that hire unemployed individuals who (1) have received unemployment benefits—either regular UC or other federal benefits, including EUC08 and EB—for at least four weeks during the year prior to the hiring date and (2) reside in a "high unemployment zone" (defined as any county with an unemployment rate that exceeds both the national unemployment rate and 4%). | The 112th Congress considered a number of issues related to currently available unemployment insurance programs: Unemployment Compensation (UC), temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08), and Extended Benefits (EB). With the national unemployment rate decreasing but still high, the weekly demand for regular and extended unemployment benefits continued at high levels. Congress deliberated multiple times on whether to extend the authorization for several key temporary unemployment insurance provisions. The EUC08 program, along with temporary provisions surrounding EB, had been set to expire at the end of 2012. The signing of H.R. 8 on January 2, 2013, now means that the EUC08 program is scheduled to expire the week ending on or before January 1, 2014. The 100% federal financing of the EB program will expire on December 31, 2013. In addition, the option for states to use three-year EB trigger lookbacks expires the week ending on or before December 31, 2013.
The 112th Congress faced these expirations as well as likely unemployment insurance policy issues, including unemployment insurance financing. In addition, a temporary 0.2% federal unemployment tax (FUTA) surtax expired at the end of June 2011. Among other items, policy discussions focused on the appropriate length and availability conditions of unemployment benefits.
This report provides a brief overview of the three unemployment insurance programs—UC, EUC08, and EB—that may currently pay benefits to eligible unemployed workers. This report discusses relevant legislation introduced in the 112th Congress: specifically, H.R. 1745, S. 386, H.R. 650, H.R. 589, H.R. 1663, H.R. 235, S. 310, H.R. 569, H.R. 2001, H.R. 2120, H.R. 2137, H.R. 2731, H.R. 2806, H.R. 2868, S. 1743, H.R. 3346, S. 1804, S. 1826, H.R. 3427, S. 1885, S. 1931, S. 1944, H.R. 3598, H.R. 3601, H.R. 3630, H.R. 3615, H.R. 3638, H.R. 3743, H.R. 494, S. 2095, S. 2081, a proposal outlined in the President's Budget Proposal for FY2013, as well as the President's American Jobs Act of 2011 proposal (introduced in Congress as S. 1549, H.R. 12, and S. 1660). This report also discusses the implications for the UI programs with respect to provisions in H.R. 2693, S.Amdt. 581 to S. 1323, P.L. 112-25, P.L. 112-40, P.L. 112-78, P.L. 112-96, and H.R. 8.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33392 | crs_RL33392_0 | Orphan works are copyrighted works whose owners are difficult or impossible to identify and/or locate. In January 2006, it issued its Report on Orphan Works, which includes proposed legislative language to address the problem identified. This report surveys the findings of the Report on Orphan Works ("Report"), considers the Copyright Office's proposed amendment to the Copyright Act to address the issue, and analyzes introduced orphan works legislation in the 109 th and 110 th Congresses. The inaccessibility arises from the risk of liability that a user might incur for copyright infringement if and when a copyright owner subsequently appears:
First, the economic incentive to create may be undermined by the imposition of additional costs on subsequent creators wishing to use material from existing works. A primary goal, however, was to harmonize U.S. copyright law with international treaties and practice, where formalities are not a requirement for copyright protection. The Report on Orphan Works
By conducting stakeholder discussions and reviewing extensive submissions of comments, the U.S. The Report identifies many obstacles to identifying and locating copyright owners and assigns general categories of uses that appear to be most impacted by orphan works, namely, uses by "subsequent creators" who may create a derivative commercial work incorporating the orphan work; "large scale access uses" by institutions such as libraries that make available a wide body of work to the public; "enthusiast" uses by individuals who have an interest in a particular work, subject, or artist; and "private" uses, the most common illustration being someone who wishes to reproduce a family photograph or make a potentially infringing use of obsolete or orphaned computer software. The Copyright Office's Recommendation
The Report concludes that the orphan works problem, though difficult to describe and quantify, is indeed real. One who uses an orphan work would be required to have performed "a good faith, reasonably diligent search" to identify the copyright holder and provide "attribution to the author and copyright owner of the work, if possible and appropriate." When the infringement is made without commercial advantage and the user ceases infringement promptly after receiving notice thereof, no monetary relief would be available. Legislative Proposals
No legislation relating to orphan works has yet been introduced in the 111 th Congress as of the date of this report. 5439, 109th Congress, Second Session, the Orphan Works Act of 2006
The Orphan Works Act of 2006 incorporated many of the recommendations of the Copyright Office and was introduced and reported by the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property in May 2006. This bill was later imbedded in an omnibus copyright bill, appearing as Title II of The Copyright Modernization Act of 2006 ( H.R. The bill provided significantly greater detail than the Copyright Office's proposed language, including setting forth specific standards to establish what is a "reasonably diligent search." 5889, 110th Congress, Second Session, the Orphan Works Act of 2008
The Orphan Works Act of 2008 resembled the 109 th Congress's orphan works legislation although it had substantial differences. This statutory "safe harbor" would have been available if the infringer is a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives, or a public broadcasting entity, and the infringer proved by a preponderance of the evidence that:
The infringement was performed without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage and for a charitable, religious, or educational purpose; and The infringer promptly ceased the infringing use after receiving notice of the claim for infringement and after conducting an expeditious good faith investigation of the claim. Exceptions to the Eligibility for Limitation on Monetary Remedies
H.R. S. 2913 also differed from H.R. However, the House took no action on S. 2913 , and H.R. 5889 did not make it out of the House Judiciary Committee, before the end of the 110 th Congress. | Orphan works are copyrighted works whose owners are difficult or impossible to identify and/or locate. Orphan works are perceived to be inaccessible because of the risk of infringement liability that a user might incur if and when a copyright owner subsequently appears. Consequently, many works that are, in fact, abandoned by owners are withheld from public view and circulation because of uncertainty about the owner and the risk of liability.
In 2006, at the request of Congress, the U.S. Copyright Office issued its Report on Orphan Works ("Report"). The goal of the Report was to elicit public comment and evaluate the extent of real or perceived problems that content users encounter in their efforts to use these works. The Report defines the problems it identified, and concludes that the problem is indeed real and should be addressed legislatively. It analyzes stakeholders' views on the issue and constraints on solutions imposed by the structure of U.S. copyright law and international copyright obligations. The Report sets forth a proposal to amend the Copyright Act by adding a provision that would limit liability for infringing use of orphan works when, prior to use, a user performs a reasonably diligent search for the copyright owner and provides attribution to the author and copyright owner, if possible. In some instances, when copyright infringement is made without commercial advantage and the user ceases infringement promptly after receiving notice thereof, no monetary relief would be available.
Adopting many of the suggestions of the Copyright Office, the Orphan Works Act of 2006 was introduced in the 109th Congress, second session (H.R. 5439). This bill was later incorporated into an omnibus copyright bill, appearing as Title II of The Copyright Modernization Act of 2006 (H.R. 6052). However, the bill was not addressed by the end of that Congress's adjournment. The bill would have implemented a limitation on monetary damage liability for specified infringement of orphan works, but took a more detailed approach than the Report's original proposals in establishing requirements for such liability limitations, such as articulating standards for a "reasonably diligent search." The bill would also have directed the Copyright Office to study and report on the implementation of the new orphan works amendment, and to study and make recommendations for a "small claims" procedure to address copyright infringement.
Legislation addressing the orphan works issue was reintroduced in the 110th Congress: the Orphan Works Act of 2008 (H.R. 5889) and the Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008 (S. 2913). The two bills resembled the Orphan Works Act of 2006, although there were substantial differences from that earlier legislation and even between themselves. These additional or revised provisions were added in part to address concerns raised by photographers, illustrators, and other visual artists, as well as textile and home furnishing manufacturers. While S. 2913 passed the Senate, H.R. 5889 did not make it out of the House Judiciary Committee.
This report surveys the findings and conclusions in the U.S. Copyright Office's Report on Orphan Works and analyzes the orphan works bills that were considered by the 109th and 110th Congresses. No legislation relating to orphan works has yet been introduced in the 111th Congress as of the date of this report. However, the outcome of the Google Book Search class action lawsuit (and its pending settlement) may potentially affect future orphan works legislation. |
crs_RL33762 | crs_RL33762_0 | Background
In recent years, Congress has been increasingly concerned that other countries—China, Japan, Taiwan and Korea in particular—are manipulating the value of their national currencies in ways injurious to the U.S. economy. A spate of legislation was introduced in the 109 th Congress seeking to pressure foreign countries to revalue their currencies or seeking changes in the international financial system—particularly changes in the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—that would help accomplish that end. This is not a new issue. It also directs the Secretary of the Treasury to analyze the foreign exchange rate policies of foreign countries, in consultation with the IMF, to determine whether they are manipulating the exchange rate between their currency and the US dollar for the purpose of preventing effective adjustment or gaining unfair trade advantage. When this is found, the Secretary must undertake negotiations in the IMF or bilaterally for the purpose of eliminating this situation. The IMF charter gives the international agency no effective tools, however, to help it enforce its oversight responsibilities or its judgment whether countries are meeting their Article IV responsibilities. Previously, most of the IMF's surveillance over countries' exchange policies occurred during the Fund's annual bilateral discussions with its member countries about their domestic and international economic policies. These discussions are mandated by Article IV and called "Article IV consultations." A report to the IMF Executive Board is planned for early 2007. At least 15 other bills were introduced in the 109 th Congress which sought to indicate specific ways the United States might pursue that objective. Several would authorize the imposition of countervailing duties or special tariffs on goods imported from countries with undervalued currencies unless those currencies have risen to a level at or near their appropriate fair market rate. Others would change the reporting requirement in the 1988 Exchange Rates Act in ways that would make it more likely that the Treasury Department would find that countries are manipulating their currencies. They sought, in effect, to "level the playing field" by raising the price of those goods sold in the United States by an amount equal to the presumed undervaluation of the country's currency. Many of these initiatives would contravene international trade rules or WTO guidelines. Other legislation also addressed these issues. On the Senate side, S. 377 , introduced by Senator Lieberman, would have required the President to begin multilateral and bilateral negotiations with the countries which engage most egregiously in currency manipulation, to report to Congress on the extent of the problem, and to institute proceedings under the provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 dealing with countervailing duties, dumping and market disruption if those countries do not stop manipulating the value of their currency within 90 days. To make such a determination under the 1988 Act, the Secretary would be required to find that (1) China was manipulating its exchange rate for the purpose of gaining an unfair trade advantage or preventing effective balance of payments adjustment and (2) it had a material global current account surplus and significant bilateral trade surplus with the United States. No specific countries are mentioned and the provisions of the bill would apply to all countries which are found by the IMF to be manipulating the value of their currency to the detriment of the United States and other countries. These consultations should seek ways of remedying, in a transparent manner, situations where countries' interventions in currency markets have results that are contrary to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF and have negative effects on the currencies of other countries and on the world economy. | In recent years, Congress has been increasingly concerned that other countries—China, Japan, Taiwan and Korea in particular—are manipulating the value of their national currencies in ways injurious to the U.S. economy. A spate of legislation was introduced in the 109th Congress seeking to pressure foreign countries to revalue their currencies or seeking changes in the international financial system—particularly changes in the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—that would help accomplish that end. Similar bills are likely to be introduced in the 110th Congress.
Current law on this topic is defined by the Exchange Rates and International Economic Policy Act of 1988. Among other things, it requires the Secretary of the Treasury to analyze the foreign exchange rate policies of other countries, in consultation with the International Monetary Fund, to see if foreign countries are manipulating the value of their currency for the purpose of gaining unfair trade advantage or preventing effective balance of payments adjustment. When this is found, the Secretary is required to seek negotiations with the offending country multilaterally or bilaterally for the purpose of ending that situation. In recent years, many have thought that China is manipulating its currency for these purposes. The Treasury Secretary has not made a finding to this effect, however, on grounds that China does not meet all the criteria specified in the 1988 Act and that Chinese authorities have given assurances that they will raise the value of their currency.
The IMF Articles of Agreement specify, in Article IV, that countries may not manipulate their currency for the purpose of gaining trade advantage or for preventing balance of payments adjustment. The IMF is responsible for exercising "firm surveillance" over countries' exchange rate policies and for assuring their compliance with the Article IV rule. The IMF has no effective tools other than persuasion, however, with which to enforce its oversight responsibility. Previously, most of the IMF's surveillance was done bilaterally through its annual consultations with member countries. In 2006, the Fund instituted a new program of multilateral consultations and it brought together China, Japan, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Euro area representatives to discuss the major financial and trade imbalances currently affecting the world economy. A report and possible recommendations are to be received in early 2007.
Congress has sought in various ways to address trade problems which many believe are exacerbated by undervalued foreign currencies. Several bills were introduced in 2005 and 2006 to establish countervailing duties or special tariffs on goods entering the United States from countries with undervalued currencies. These are intended to raise the domestic price of those goods to levels that would prevail if those currencies were valued at their appropriate level. Many of these initiatives might violate international trade rules, however. Advocates argue that the United States must take action to protect itself regardless. Other legislation has sought to require the Secretary of the Treasury to make a finding that China and other countries are currency manipulators. Another group of bills proposed that the United States should pursue reforms in the IMF that would give that international agency more authority to enforce Article IV and to stop countries from manipulating their currency. Many of the sponsors of the bills discussed in this report are reportedly planning to introduce similar bills in the 110th Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41175 | crs_R41175_0 | Recognizing that the emissions reductions for the Kyoto Protocol were set for a period that would end in 2012, the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference in Bali adopted the "Bali Road Map" as a framework for negotiations over the post-2012 climate regime. In doing so, the parties established two tracks for negotiation: (1) a track by which Kyoto Protocol parties would pursue an amendment to the Protocol for a "second round" of emission targets for Annex I parties, and (2) a track by which UNFCCC parties would seek agreement on GHG mitigation targets or actions for all parties. Non-Annex I parties wishing to associate with the Copenhagen Accord should identify and commit to undertaking "nationally appropriate" GHG "mitigation actions" (NAPAs). Binding and non-binding agreements go by many names, but an agreement is considered binding only if it (1) conveys the intention of its parties to create legally binding relationships under international law and (2) has gone into force. First, the United States must sign the treaty; second, the agreement must be submitted by the Executive to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to treaty ratification and two-thirds of the Senators present must give their approval (sometimes inaccurately referred to as "ratification by the Senate" ); and third, the President must ratify the agreement by following the terms of the agreement for ratification or accession. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
The UNFCCC was the first formal international agreement addressing human-driven climate change. The UNFCCC does not set binding targets for GHG emissions. The Committee notes further that a decision by the executive branch to reinterpret the Convention to apply legally binding targets and timetables for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases to the United States would alter the "shared understanding" of the Convention between the Senate and the executive branch and would therefore require the Senate's advice and consent. The George H.W. Amendments, annexes and protocols are to be adopted at ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties. The Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol was negotiated as a first step towards implementing the UNFCCC, largely by establishing quantitative emission reduction targets for the high income countries listed in its Annex B. The Protocol's goal is to reduce the overall emissions of those parties by at least 5% below 1990 levels by 2012. In 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would not become a party to the Protocol. U.S. law, however, permits some kinds of legally binding international agreements, namely some forms of executive agreements, to avoid taking the form of a treaty. It establishes a process that allows each Annex I party to define its own GHG emissions target level. Consequently, the Accord is not a legally binding international agreement. The United States has submitted a letter to the Executive Secretary indicating its intention to be associated with the Accord, however, because the agreement is not legally binding, this association does not necessarily require U.S. adherence with the Accord's provisions. The Constitution does not appear to require the President to submit the Copenhagen Accord to the Senate for its advice and consent. From the international law perspective then, the Copenhagen Accord is not a treaty. It may be difficult for the United States to achieve its voluntary commitment to reduce its overall greenhouse gas emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 without congressional support. | The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) opened for signature in 1992 and soon thereafter was ratified by the United States. The UNFCCC does not set greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets, and during ratification hearings, the George H.W. Bush Administration represented that any protocol or amendment to the UNFCCC creating binding GHG emissions targets would be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.
The Kyoto Protocol (the Protocol) to the UNFCCC was intended as a first step towards implementing the UNFCCC. To that end, it sets quantitative emission reduction targets for the high income countries listed in its Annex B. The Protocol's goal is to reduce each parties' overall emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels by 2012. Although the United States signed the Protocol in 1998, it did not submit the Protocol to the Senate. The George W. Bush Administration announced in 2001 that it would not pursue U.S. accession to the Protocol. The Obama Administration has followed this policy.
In 2007, the UN Climate Change Conference in Bali adopted a framework for negotiations over the post-2012 climate regime. It established two tracks for negotiation: (1) a track by which Kyoto Protocol parties would pursue an amendment to the Protocol for a "second round" of emission targets for its Annex B parties, and (2) a track by which UNFCCC parties would set GHG mitigation targets or actions for all parties. However, consensus under either track proved difficult to achieve at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties. The outcome, the Copenhagen Accord (the Accord), is consequently considered a non-binding political agreement. The Accord allows each high income party listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC to define its own GHG emissions target level. "Non-Annex I" parties wishing to associate with the Accord must identify and commit to undertaking "nationally appropriate mitigation actions," which may receive international support subject to certain international reporting requirements.
The labels "convention," "protocol," and "accord" are not clear indicators of whether these three climate change agreements are binding internationally and/or domestically. Under international law, an agreement is considered binding only if it conveys the intention of its parties to create legally binding relationships and has entered into force. However, some have suggested that enforceability, rather than intentions, should govern whether an agreement is "legally binding."
Under U.S. law, a legally binding international agreement may take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. In order for the United States to enter a treaty, the agreement must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate and subsequently be ratified by the President. An executive agreement does not require the Senate's advice and consent in order to be legally binding. Historically, executive agreements have arisen in a limited set of circumstances, and certain subjects, including significant global environmental issues, have traditionally been handled as treaties that require the Senate's approval.
Of the three agreements discussed, only the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are considered legally binding agreements under international law, and the United States is bound only by the former. The United States has, however, indicated its intent to associate with the Copenhagen Accord. In doing so, it voluntarily committed to reduce U.S. emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020. The Accord does not implicate the treaty power of Congress, which will likely shape the domestic effect of the Copenhagen Accord through appropriations and lawmaking. The Accord does not appear to empower the Executive to implement it solely by agency actions. |
crs_R43884 | crs_R43884_0 | Introduction
This report provides a brief outline of the FY2015 annual appropriations measure for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its enactment by the 114 th Congress. It serves as a complement to CRS Report R43796, Department of Homeland Security: FY2015 Appropriations . Major Developments in the 114th Congress
Prior to the 114 th Congress, Congress had not enacted an FY2015 annual appropriations bill for DHS. The President signed an interim continuing resolution for FY2015 into law prior to the end of the fiscal year. After enactment of a second and third short-term continuing resolution, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, was signed into law as P.L. 113-235 provided an extension of continuing appropriations for the department through February 27, 2015. The following descriptions reflect only the major actions taken on FY2015 homeland security appropriations in the 114 th Congress. January 14, 2015—House Passes H.R. 240
H.R. 240, an annual appropriations bill which would provide DHS $39.7 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, was introduced by House Appropriations Committee Chairman Rogers on January 9, 2015. The bill was considered under a structured rule on January 13 and 14, 2015. After adopting these five amendments, the bill passed the House on January 14, 2015, by a vote of 236-191. 240 as introduced—without the legislative text added by the five House amendments—by a vote of 66-33, then passed the Senate-amended bill by a vote of 68-31. February 27, 2015—Senate and House Extend Continuing Resolution
On February 27, 2015, a three-week extension of the continuing resolution funding DHS ( H.J.Res. March 3, 2015—House Agrees to the Senate Amendment
On March 3, 2015, the House voted 257-167 to approve the Senate version of H.R. March 4, 2015—FY2015 Homeland Security Appropriations Enacted
On March 4, 2015, H.R. Table 2 includes a summary of funding included in the FY2014 regular DHS appropriations bill, the Administration's FY2015 appropriations request, the House- and Senate-reported FY2015 DHS appropriations bills, and P.L. In Figure 1 , the first column of numbers shows budget authority provided in P.L. | This report provides a brief outline of the FY2015 annual appropriations measure for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its enactment by the 114th Congress. It serves as a complement to CRS Report R43796, Department of Homeland Security: FY2015 Appropriations.
The Administration requested $38.3 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2015. In the 113th Congress, the House Appropriations Committee reported an annual appropriations measure (H.R. 4903) that would have provided $39.2 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, and the Senate Appropriations Committee reported a measure (S. 2534) that would have provided $39.0 billion. Neither bill received floor consideration in the 113th Congress. As no DHS annual appropriation had been enacted by the end of FY2014, the department operated under a continuing resolution for the first several months of FY2015.
Annual appropriations for DHS were not included in P.L. 113-235, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, which extended the continuing resolution—slated to expire December 17, 2014—through February 27, 2015.
With the beginning of the 114th Congress, both House- and Senate-reported FY2015 annual homeland security appropriations bills were no longer available for action. H.R. 240, a new FY2015 annual homeland security appropriations bill, was introduced on January 9, 2015, and considered in the House the following week under a structured rule that allowed five immigration policy-related amendments. After adopting these five amendments, the bill passed the House on January 14, 2015. On February 27, the Senate passed an amended H.R. 240 without the legislative text added by the House amendments.
After the House did not pass a three-week extension of the continuing resolution, the Senate and House passed a one week extension of the continuing resolution to avoid a lapse in annual appropriations for DHS. On March 3, 2015, the House voted to approve the Senate version of H.R. 240. The bill was signed into law on March 4, 2015, as P.L. 114-4.
As enacted, the bill provided $39.7 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL30512 | crs_RL30512_0 | Most Recent Developments
Congress appropriated $2.649 billion for legislative branch operationsin FY2001, a 6.6% increase overthe FY2000 appropriation of $2.486 billion. The FY2001 funding level includes the appropriation in theregular annual legislative branch appropriations bill; a supplemental appropriation of $118 million in amiscellaneous appropriations bill; and a rescission of 0.22%. Regular FY2001 Appropriations . The first regular FY2001 legislative branch appropriations bill( H.R. 4516 ) approved by Congress was vetoed by President Clinton in late October 2000. Seven weeks later, on December 14, a new legislative branch appropriations bill ( H.R. 5657 ),which contained the funding levels as approved in the original bill, was introduced and incorporated byreference in the FY2001 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. 4577 ). The latter act wassigned into law ( P.L. 106-554 ) on December 21, 2000. During initial consideration of the regular legislative branch bill, the House Appropriations Committee,in compliance with budget allocation restrictions, established funding for FY2001 at 5.5% less than the levelappropriated for FY2000. When the Senate took up the bill it approved an overall 3.7 % increase. TheHouse later restored most of the funds cut at the committee level when it adopted a manager's amendmentcontaining an additional $95.7 million in funding during floor consideration of the House bill. Thecompromise bill approved by the conference committee provided for a 2.1% over FY2000. Additional Regular Appropriations and Rescission . A second bill ( H.R. 5666 ), whichcontained an additional $118 million in regular FY2001 legislative branch appropriations funds, and a 0.22%across-the-broad cut in FY2001 appropriations, was also incorporated by reference into P.L. 106-554 ). Major Issues Driving Discussions on the FY2001 Bill
Among the major funding issues considered and resolved were actionsto:
increase funds for the Capitol Police for 100 - 115 additional officersto implement the Capitol Police Board's security plan; temporarily transfer administrationof the Capitol Police to a chief administrative office, under jurisdiction of the GeneralAccounting Office (subsequently changed to jurisdiction of the U.S. CapitolPolice);
merge the Library of Congress police and the Government PrintingOffice police with the Capitol Police (provision deleted in conference); provide adequatefunds for electronic document printing, the digital online program of the Library ofCongress, and enhancements to the legislative information system;
fund the support agencies' staff succession programs to replaceemployees eligible for retirement in the immediate future; and authorize the comptrollergeneral greater authority for flexibility in a reduction-in-force and for voluntary earlyretirement authority and separation payments (provision deleted in conference). General Accounting Office Budget. Print. | Congress appropriated $2.649 billion for legislative branch operations in FY2001, a 6.6% increase over the FY2000 appropriation of $2.486 billion. The FY2001 funding level includes theappropriation in the regular annual legislative branch appropriations bill; a supplementalappropriation of $118 million in a miscellaneous appropriations bill; and a rescission of 0.22%.
Regular FY2001 Appropriations . The first regular FY2001 legislative branch appropriations bill ( H.R. 4516 ) approved by Congress was vetoed by President Clinton in late October2000. Seven weeks later, on December 14, a new legislative branch appropriations bill( H.R. 5657 ), which contained the funding levels as approved in the original bill, wasintroduced and incorporated by reference in the FY2001 Consolidated Appropriations Act( H.R. 4577 ). The latter act was signed into law ( P.L. 106-554 ) on December 21, 2000.
During initial consideration of the regular legislative branch bill, the House Appropriations Committee, in compliance with budget allocation restrictions, established funding for FY2001 at5.5% less than the level appropriated for FY2000. When the Senate took up the bill it approved anoverall 3.7 % increase. The House later restored most of the funds cut at the committee level whenit adopted a manager's amendment containing an additional $95.7 million in funding during floorconsideration of the House bill. The compromise bill approved by the conference committeeprovided for a 2.1% over FY2000.
Among the major funding issues considered were actions to:
increase funds for the Capitol Police to employ 100-115 additional officers toimplement the Capitol Police Board's security plan;
temporarily transfer administration of the Capitol Police to a chiefadministrative officeunder jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office;
merge Library of Congress and Government Printing Office policewith the CapitolPolice;
provide adequate funds for electronic document printing, the digitalonline programof the Library of Congress, and enhancements to the legislative information system;
fund the support agency staff succession programs to replaceemployees eligible forretirement in the immediate future; and
authorize GAO greater flexibility in reductions-in-force and earlyretirements andseparation payments.
Additional Regular Appropriations and Rescission. A second bill ( H.R. 5666 ), whichcontained an additional $118 million in regular FY2001 legislative branch appropriations funds, and a 0.22%across-the-broad cut in FY2001 appropriations, was also incorporated by reference into P.L. 106-554 .
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: GOV/FIN = Government and Finance |
crs_R43722 | crs_R43722_0 | Introduction
Federal inspectors general (IGs) have been granted substantial independence and powers to combat waste, fraud, and abuse within designated federal departments and agencies. To execute their missions, offices of inspector general (OIGs) conduct and publish audits and investigations—among other duties. In some cases, employees within federal offices or inspectors general are vested with law enforcement authority. For the purposes of this report, law enforcement authority is generally defined as having the legal authority to
carry a firearm while engaged in official duties; make an arrest without a warrant while engaged in official duties; and seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of premises, or seizure of evidence. This report provides a list of the statutes and regulations that are used to vest OIGs with law enforcement authority. Other OIGs with Law Enforcement Authority
Statutes That Vest Law Enforcement Authority
As shown in Table 2 , five additional OIGs are provided law enforcement authority through laws outside of the IG Act. | Federal inspectors general (IGs) have been granted substantial independence and powers to combat waste, fraud, and abuse within designated federal departments and agencies. To execute their missions, offices of inspector general (OIGs) conduct and publish audits and investigations—among other duties. Established by public law as permanent, nonpartisan, and independent offices, OIGs exist in more than 70 federal agencies, including all departments and larger agencies, along with numerous boards and commissions and other entities. Many OIGs have been vested with law enforcement authority to assist their investigations.
This report provides background on federal offices of inspectors general and their law enforcement authorities in investigations.
In this report, law enforcement authority is generally defined as having the legal authority to
carry a firearm while engaged in official duties; make an arrest without a warrant while engaged in official duties; and seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of premises, or seizure of evidence.
This report identifies the laws and regulations that vest certain OIGs with law enforcement authority, which permits the use of guns and ammunition. This report also describes some of the requirements and expectations of OIGs that have law enforcement authority, and includes some reasons that OIGs have expressed a need for law enforcement authority. |
crs_RL32621 | crs_RL32621_0 | Introduction
Background
The United States has long held to the principle that it will not return a foreign national to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened. This principle is embodied in several provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), most notably in provisions defining refugees and asylees. Aliens seeking asylum must demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned home, they will be persecuted based upon one of five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Aliens present in the United States may apply for asylum with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security after arrival into the country, or may seek asylum before a Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) immigration judge during removal proceedings. Aliens arriving at a U.S. port who lack proper immigration documents or who engage in fraud or misrepresentation are placed in expedited removal; however, if they express a fear of persecution, they receive a "credible fear" hearing with an USCIS asylum officer and—if found credible—are referred to an EOIR immigration judge for a hearing. Current Concerns
The core concern is the extent an asylum policy forged during the Cold War can adapt to a changing world. Although there are many who would revise U.S. asylum law and policy, those advocating change have divergent perspectives. Some express concern that potential terrorists could use asylum as an avenue for entry into the United States, especially aliens from trouble spots in the Mideast, northern Africa and south Asia. Others argue that—given the religious, ethnic, and political violence in various countries around the world—it is becoming more difficult to differentiate the persecuted from the persecutors . Some assert that asylum has become an alternative pathway for immigration rather than humanitarian protection provided in extraordinary cases. Others maintain that current law does not offer adequate protections for people fleeing human rights violations or gender-based abuses that occur around the world. The regulations also state that an asylum seeker "does not have a well-founded fear of persecution if the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant's country.... "
In evaluating whether the asylum seeker has sustained the burden of proving that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution, the regulations state that the asylum officer or immigration judge shall not require the alien to provide evidence that there is a reasonable possibility he or she would be singled out individually for persecution if:
(A) The applicant establishes that there is a pattern or practice in his or her country of nationality or, if stateless, in his or her country of last habitual residence, of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; and
(B) The applicant establishes his or her own inclusion in, and identification with, such group of persons such that his or her fear of persecution upon return is reasonable. The number of cases USCIS asylum officers approved dropped to 10,101 cases in FY2004. Generally, over two-thirds of all asylum cases that EOIR receives are affirmative cases referred to the immigration judges by the asylum officers. The total number of individuals who received asylum in FY2005 was 25,257, down from a high of 38,641 in FY2001. One bill with substantive revisions to asylum law was enacted: the REAL ID Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-13 , Division B). 108-458 ) were included in H.R. 418 added a provision to the bill to eliminate the annual cap of 10,000 on asylee adjustments to LPR status. 1268 as P.L. | The United States has long held to the principle that it will not return a foreign national to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened. This principle is embodied in several provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), most notably in provisions defining refugees and asylees. Aliens seeking asylum must demonstrate a well-founded fear that if returned home, they will be persecuted based upon one of five characteristics: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Aliens present in the United States may apply for asylum with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after arrival into the country, or they may seek asylum before the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) during removal proceedings. Aliens arriving at a U.S. port who lack proper immigration documents or who engage in fraud or misrepresentation are placed in expedited removal; however, if they express a fear of persecution, they receive a "credible fear" review with an USCIS asylum officer and—if found credible—are referred to an EOIR immigration judge for a hearing.
In FY2004, there were 27,551 claims for asylum filed with USCIS, and 55,067 asylum cases filed with EOIR in FY2004. Generally, over two-thirds of all asylum cases that EOIR received were cases referred to the immigration judges by the asylum officers. The USCIS asylum officers approved 10,101cases in FY2004, a 32% approval. Of asylum cases EOIR decided in FY2004, the approval rate was 34%. The total number of individuals who received asylum in FY2004 was 27,222, down from a high of 38,641 in FY2001. The individuals approved in FY2005 fell to 25,257.
Although there are many who would revise U.S. asylum law, those advocating change have divergent perspectives. Some express concern that potential terrorists could use asylum as an avenue for entry into the United States, especially aliens from trouble spots in the Mideast, northern Africa and south Asia. Others argue that—given the religious, ethnic, and political violence in various countries around the world—it is becoming more difficult to differentiate the persecuted from the persecutors. Some assert that asylum has become an alternative pathway for immigration rather than humanitarian protection provided in extraordinary cases. Others maintain that current law does not offer adequate protections for people fleeing human rights violations or gender-based abuses that occur around the world. At the crux is the extent an asylum policy forged during the Cold War can adapt to a changing world and the war on terrorism.
During the 109th Congress, major asylum provisions that were dropped from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) were included in the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, Division B). This law also eliminated the annual cap of 10,000 on asylee adjustments. The 110th Congress may consider other revisions to asylum, especially in the context of comprehensive immigration reform. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_R44619 | crs_R44619_0 | During the late 1960s the disaster loan program of the Small Business Administration (SBA) was created as well as the Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) program. The amount of the assistance is calibrated to include housing and utility costs in the affected area. Direct Assistance
Direct assistance provides temporary housing units to disaster survivors that are purchased or leased by the federal government. These repairs may also include mitigation measures to make the house less susceptible to future damage. Replacement
In this form of assistance, the IHP makes a contribution toward the replacement of an owner-occupied residence that was lost in a disaster event. Assistance under ONA can include clothing, furniture, funeral expenses, emergency medical help, and other needs. Case Management Services
A companion to the provision of IHP services is the authority for states to request Case Management Services to assist families and individuals in organizing assistance and ensuring that they are accessing the various forms of help that may be available. The NPSCs take in the great majority of all applications. Section 408 of the Stafford Act states that:
The President shall determine appropriate types of housing assistance to be provided under this section to individuals and households described in subsection (a)(1) based on considerations of cost effectiveness, convenience to individuals and households, and such other factors as the President may consider appropriate. Housing Assistance Provided by Category
As noted earlier, the primary types of assistance provided under IHP are repairs, rental assistance and Other Needs Assistance (ONA). With the exception of Hurricane Katrina (which is an outlier), for most disasters, the majority of assistance is provided through grants for home repairs to make a home habitable. That is followed by rental assistance costs and ONA payments. The use of manufactured housing is not common and is a last resort when the other housing options are not available. This presented limited alternatives for temporary housing for disaster survivors. In the case of Hurricane Sandy, and in fact for most disasters, the favored option for homeowners is to repair their homes and remain in them. Potential Issues for Congress
Equity in Disaster Housing Assistance
While FEMA assistance through the IHP program is available for presidentially declared disasters (and SBA disaster loan assistance may be available even for events that are not declared disasters by the President), a select number of disaster events receive an expanded form of federal assistance to meet housing needs. This can create differing tiers of disaster housing assistance for declared disasters depending on what actions Congress takes. CDBG-DR Availability
In some instances that are perceived as catastrophic events, Congress provides additional resources to states and local governments through the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. The language provided CDBG resources
for necessary expenses related to disaster relief, long-term recovery, restoration of infrastructure and housing, and economic revitalization in the most impacted and distressed areas resulting from a major disaster declared pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. FEMA's Policy Guidance notes that a facility may be eligible if
Facility use is not limited to any of the following:
A certain number of individuals;
A defined group of individuals who have a financial interest in the facility, such as a condominium association;
Certain classes of individuals; or
An unreasonably restrictive geographical area, such as a neighborhood within a community;
Since the guidance explicitly sees a condominium association as ineligible if it limits use of its facility to its members, there has been an extended dialogue between FEMA and the representatives of condo and co-op associations. But other assistance, such as home repairs, are 100% federally funded. It would also increase the state's interest in accountability and assuring the quality and timeliness of the repairs as well as the importance of coordinating the applicable programs. But the remaining challenges can be addressed through increased communication by FEMA and its state partners. | Following a major disaster declaration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may provide three principal forms of assistance. These include Public Assistance, which addresses repairs to a community and states' or tribe's infrastructure; Mitigation Assistance which provides funding for projects a state or tribe submits to reduce the threat of future damage; and Individual Assistance (IA) which provides help to individuals and families.
IA can include several programs, depending on whether the governor of the affected state or the tribal leader has requested that specific help. These can include Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) for workers made unemployed by a disaster and not covered by the state's standard unemployment program. IA can also include Crisis Counseling that provides assistance to state and local mental health organizations to assist disaster victims traumatized by an event. IA may also include Case Management services that help a state to organize potential forms of assistance for disaster survivors.
All of those programs can perform important tasks in the post-disaster environment to aid disaster survivors in reorienting their lives and returning to normal. But the principal IA program to offer such assistance is the Individuals and Households Program (IHP), authorized by Section 408 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The IHP provides temporary housing assistance as well as the Other Needs Assistance (ONA) grants that can provide necessary assistance for the replacement of lost items such as furniture and clothing. Funds to assist any household are currently capped at $33,000. This amount is adjusted annually according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Federal disaster housing assistance has a long history that is not always best understood by concentration on the exceptional circumstances presented by Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. In fact, the Hurricane Sandy experience of the last several years may serve as a better guide to explain the form FEMA housing assistance takes in most disaster recovery operations.
While the Katrina experience suggested a general reliance on motel rooms, travel trailers, mobile homes, and even docked cruise ships, the great majority of disaster housing help comes in the form of repairs to a home to make it habitable and financial assistance to cover the cost of temporary rental units, such as available apartments in the disaster area. The use of mobile homes and travel trailers, what FEMA terms "direct assistance," is rare and generally considered a last resort to be employed only when other housing options are not available in the immediate disaster area. But improvements have been made in this form of assistance and are reviewed here.
This report explains the traditional approach for temporary housing through the IHP program following a disaster, how it is implemented, and considers if the current policy choices are equitable for disaster victims. As a part of this examination, the report looks at other forms of housing repair assistance such as the Small Business Administration (SBA) Disaster Loan Program for homeowners as well as assistance that is provided, in some instances, through the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Community Development Block Grant (CDBG-DR) program.
In recent years FEMA has catalogued its use of various forms of housing and the associated costs of each. This report will review those expenditures and provide information on the relative costs, and applications of, several categories of assistance. |
crs_RL33194 | crs_RL33194_0 | In the post-9/11 context, this pastoral image of GA has been tarnished to a degree by knowledge that the 9/11 hijackers trained in small general aviation aircraft in the United States, and amid lingering concerns that GA aircraft could be used to carry out a future terrorist attack. While some recent high-profile breaches of GA security have pointed to persisting vulnerabilities, and limited intelligence information may suggest a possible terrorist "fixation" on using aircraft to attack U.S. interests, GA aircraft vary considerably with regard to the risks they pose. Policymakers have received mixed signals about the relative risk posed by general aviation. Based on this analysis, possible approaches and ongoing initiatives to enhance GA security are discussed. In a sense, general aviation (GA) is a catch-all phrase that encompasses about 54% of all civil aviation activity within the United States, measured in terms of overall airport flight operations. 107-71 ) originally called on the Department of Justice to implement a program to conduct background checks of all alien applicants seeking flight training in the United States in aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds and mandated security training for flight school employees. While the threat posed by light GA aircraft carrying conventional explosives is limited by the size and speed of these aircraft, some experts argue that small aircraft may pose a significant threat if used as a platform to launch a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attack over a densely populated area. Because the various sectors of GA appear to pose distinct threats, risk mitigation strategies arguably should be tailored to some degree to address the specific security threats posed by different sectors of the GA industry as well as the specific nature of potential security vulnerabilities that also vary across different types of aircraft and flight operations. Possible Options to Mitigate the Security Risks of General Aviation
A variety of options exist for mitigating security risks posed by GA aircraft and flight operations, many of which have been implemented or are currently under development or consideration. The FY2006 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-90 ) required the DHS to examine the vulnerability of high-risk areas and facilities to possible attack from GA aircraft. 110-53 ) has included a requirement for the TSA to develop and implement a standardized threat and vulnerability assessment program for general aviation airports, and implement that assessment program "on a risk-managed basis" at GA airports. If deemed feasible, the bill authorizes the implementation of such a grant program. Due to the diversity of GA airports and the kinds of operations that they accommodate, the risk picture is likely to vary widely. Surveillance and Monitoring
Surveillance and monitoring of GA operations are a challenge. However, biometrics may play a more significant role at the GA operator level of security where they could be implemented to control access to operator facilities such as aircraft storage and maintenance hangars. Background Checks and Vetting
Because GA airports must maintain a level of reasonable accessibility to facilitate the freedom of movement by air and air commerce, surveillance, access controls, and physical security measures to protect aircraft and facilities, if needed, must be designed to accommodate a diverse set of legitimate airfield uses. Specifically, the TSA has proposed requiring that both GA reliever airports, which relieve congestion from major commercial airports, and GA airports that regularly serve scheduled commuter flights and public charter operations implement a security program. Vetting and Tracking GA Flights at the U.S. A provision of the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 ( P.L. These security-related airspace restrictions have been highly contentious because: they have a direct impact on air commerce and the freedom of movement by air; the potential for airspace violations has significant repercussions for both professional and private pilots; surveillance, airspace protection, and enforcement of airspace restrictions can be costly and resource intensive, and the effectiveness of some of these airspace restrictions has been questioned by the GA community and aviation security experts. | General aviation (GA)—a catch-all category that includes about 54% of all civilian aviation activity within the United States—encompasses a wide range of airports, aircraft, and flight operations. Because GA plays a small but important role in the U.S. economy, improving upon GA security without unduly impeding air commerce or limiting the freedom of movement by air remains a significant challenge. However, policymakers have received mixed signals about the relative security risk posed by GA, due to its diversity and a general lack of detailed information regarding the threat and vulnerability of various GA operations. While some recent high-profile breaches of GA security point to persisting vulnerabilities and limited intelligence information suggest a continued terrorist interest in using GA aircraft, it is evident that GA airports, aircraft, and operations vary considerably with regard to security risk. While the small size and slow speed of most GA aircraft significantly limit the risk they pose, some experts still fear that they could be used as a platform for a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack. Certain sectors of GA, such as crop dusters and larger business aircraft, present more specific risks because of their unique capabilities and aircraft characteristics.
Because various segments of GA differ significantly in terms of their perceived risk, mitigation, strategies should arguably be tailored to some degree based on risk. Based on an analysis of risk, a variety of options exist for mitigating security risks specific to GA airports and flight operations. These include surveillance and monitoring; airport access controls; background checks and vetting of pilots, airport workers, and others having access to GA facilities and aircraft; and physical protections for airports and aircraft. Steps may also be taken to address unique security risks in agricultural aviation, at flight schools, and among business and charter operators. The TSA has proposed rulemaking designed to strengthen security of operations involving GA aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds. The rules also seek to establish security programs for GA airports in major metropolitan areas as well as those that have regular scheduled commuter flights and public charter flights. Besides these steps to enhance GA security at airport and operator sites, homeland security efforts since 9/11 have focused extensively on restricting access to airspace around sensitive locations and, more recently, stepping up monitoring and inspections of international GA flights entering the United States. Airspace restrictions imposed on GA aircraft have been highly contentious because they have a direct impact on the freedom of movement by air, they are costly and resource intensive to implement effectively, and their effectiveness in preventing terrorist attacks has been questioned by some.
GA security has been a topic of continued interest to Congress. The FY2006 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-90) required the DHS to examine the vulnerability of high-risk sites to possible terrorist attacks using GA aircraft. The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), enacted in August 2007, requires the development and implementation of a standardized risk assessment program at GA airports; establishes a grant program for enhancing security at GA airports, if such a program is deemed feasible; and requires operators of GA aircraft to provide notification and passenger information to the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) prior to entering U.S. airspace. Also, in the 110th Congress, various Members have urged the TSA to step up its surveillance of GA operations, particularly operations of corporate and private jets. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R41375 | crs_R41375_0 | On May 23, 2005, during the first year of President George W. Bush's second term, OMB issued a memorandum to the heads of departments and agencies. Joshua B. Bolten, Director of OMB at that time, wrote that "effective immediately," OMB would involve itself systematically in some aspects of how agencies execute laws related to mandatory spending. For the most part, mandatory spending programs are provided for in substantive laws under the jurisdiction of House and Senate authorizing committees. If an agency wished to use discretion under current law in a way that would "increase mandatory spending," the memorandum required the agency to propose the action to OMB. For purposes of OMB's process, an increase was defined as spending more than the amount that the Administration assumed in its most recent projection of what is required under current law to fund the mandatory spending program. To offset such a difference in spending, the memorandum also required the agency to propose actions that would "comparably reduce" mandatory spending. The memorandum did not address, however, whether agencies' administrative actions and corresponding spending changes would be consistent with congressional intent or expectations, or whether agencies' proposals and OMB's decisions would be transparent to Congress and the public. The Administration elsewhere characterized the process as "augmenting its ... controls" on agency decisions, and, in addition, referred to the process as "administrative PAYGO." In using the term "PAYGO," the Administration juxtaposed this OMB involvement in agency decision making with a different, statutory mechanism that Congress has used when carrying out its power of the purse and legislative function (see Box 1 ). In 2009, the Barack Obama Administration said it would continue the OMB memorandum's process. After several years of implementation, however, very little is publicly known about the scope and effect of OMB's process or the rationales for OMB determinations. In one case, some details about OMB's process were disclosed publicly in June 2010, which prompted congressional concerns about agency policy implementation and the role of OMB. Even with a lack of transparency, it is nevertheless possible to analyze some of the memorandum's potential effects and implications, if the memorandum's process were used. For one thing, it suggests that the OMB process may have measurable effects on program outputs and outcomes. In addition, there may be instances in which this process may impose administrative burdens on federal agencies. Moreover, if agencies experience difficulty in identifying plausible offsets, it is conceivable that their behavior may be altered. For example, agencies may choose to not consider, pursue, or submit to OMB an administrative action that would cost money, regardless of the agency's perception of a policy's merits or whether it would be consistent with congressional intent. In approaching the subject of OMB controls on agency mandatory spending, Congress might consider at least five general options. First, if Congress sees no current need to engage in lawmaking or oversight of the process, it might continue with the status quo. Second, if Congress wished to learn more about the process, as practiced currently or in the past, Congress could conduct related oversight through hearings and inquiry. If Congress wished to address the topic prospectively through lawmaking, Congress might consider three additional options: increasing transparency of OMB's process, legislating in greater detail, or modifying how OMB's process operates. | On May 23, 2005, during President George W. Bush's second term, then-Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Joshua B. Bolten issued a memorandum to the heads of agencies. The memorandum announced that OMB would involve itself systematically in some aspects of how agencies execute laws related to mandatory spending. Under the process outlined in the OMB memorandum, if an agency wished to use discretion under current law in a way that would "increase mandatory spending," the memorandum required the agency to propose the action to OMB. Such actions might include regulations, demonstration program notices, and other forms of program guidance. For purposes of OMB's process, an increase was defined as spending more than the amount that the Administration assumed in its most recent projection of what is required under current law to fund the mandatory spending program. To offset such a difference in spending, the memorandum also required the agency to propose actions that would "comparably reduce" mandatory spending. The memorandum did not address, however, whether agencies' administrative actions and corresponding spending changes would be consistent with congressional intent or expectations, or whether agencies' proposals and OMB's decisions would be transparent to Congress and the public.
For the most part, mandatory spending programs are provided for in substantive laws under the jurisdiction of House and Senate authorizing committees. The Administration characterized the OMB review process as "augmenting its ... controls" on agency decisions. It also referred to the process as "administrative PAYGO." In using the term "PAYGO," the Administration juxtaposed this OMB involvement in agency decision making with a statutory and comparatively transparent mechanism that Congress has used when carrying out its legislative function.
In 2009, the Barack Obama Administration said it would continue the OMB memorandum's process. After several years of implementation, however, very little is publicly known about the scope and effect of OMB's process, the rationales for OMB determinations, or whether the process has achieved its stated purpose of constraining mandatory spending. In one case, concerning a program in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, some details about OMB's process were disclosed publicly in June 2010. The disclosure prompted congressional concerns about the relationships between congressional intent, agency policy implementation, and the role of OMB. Even though OMB's process is not transparent, it is possible to analyze some of the memorandum's other potential implications, if its process were used. While potentially limiting spending, the OMB process may have measurable effects on program outcomes for entitlement programs, for example, and may impose administrative burdens on federal agencies. Moreover, if agencies experience difficulty in identifying plausible offsets, it is conceivable that agencies may choose to not consider, pursue, or submit to OMB an administrative action that would cost money, regardless of the agency's perception of a policy's merits or whether it would be consistent with congressional intent. Differences may arise between OMB and CBO baselines of projected federal spending.
In approaching the subject of OMB controls on agency mandatory spending, Congress might assess at least five general options. First, if Congress sees no need to engage in lawmaking or oversight of the process, it might continue with the status quo. Second, if Congress wished to learn more about the process, Congress could conduct oversight. If Congress wished to address the topic prospectively through lawmaking, Congress might consider three other options: increasing transparency of OMB's process, legislating in greater detail, or modifying how OMB's process operates. |
crs_RL33575 | crs_RL33575_0 | Introduction and Overview
Congress has recently been presented with legislative proposals to address the legacy of pollution from abandoned hardrock mines that degrades the environment throughout the United States, particularly in the West. 5404 , by Representative James Duncan, identical bills introduced at the request of the Administration. The core concept underlying the bills is that, in order to address the problem of pollution from IAM sites, it is appropriate to encourage cleanup by voluntary entities, third parties who have no history of polluting at a particular site or legal responsibility for its pollution, but who step forward to clean up acid mine drainage or other pollution from an abandoned mine. The bills proposed incentives in the form of reduced liability from environmental laws (such as strict liability for cleanup costs and restoring damaged natural resources) and less stringent environmental standards applicable to cleanup activities. All four bills proposed to establish a process for issuing permits to those who would be Good Samaritans. In H.R. In the 109 th Congress, three House and Senate committees held hearings on Good Samaritan issues raised by the legislation. Reviewing these recent hearings and the Senate hearing in the 106 th Congress, it is evident that, except for EPA and congressional witnesses testifying in support of their own bills, no witness endorsed any of the specific legislative approaches totally or wholeheartedly. For example, some stakeholders want an expanded definition of who may be a remediating party and favor elimination of additional regulatory and legal disincentives. But every effort to broaden the proposals' scope seemingly enlarges the complexity of the legislation and raises stronger opposition from groups who prefer a narrower approach. Selected Issues in the Legislation
This report discusses several issues that have drawn attention: Eligibility for a Good Samaritan permit, standards applicable to a Good Samaritan cleanup, scope of liability protection, treatment of revenues from cleanup, enforcement and judicial review, the appropriate role for states and Indian tribes, funding, terminating a permit, and sunsetting the permit program. It has several aspects, including whether Good Samaritans should be limited to government entities or may also include the mining industry and others in the private sector, and how the legislation specifies that anyone with existing or prior responsibility for environmental pollution at the site is restricted from eligibility for the liability and regulatory relief exemptions provided by a Good Samaritan permit. What Cleanup Standard Should Apply to Good Samaritan Remediation? This issue is especially relevant to S. 1848 , S. 2780 , and H.R. None of the free-standing bills ( S. 1848 , S. 2780 , and H.R. | In the 109th Congress, several bills were introduced to address the legacy of pollution from inactive and abandoned hardrock mines (IAMs) that degrades the environment throughout the United States, particularly in the West. The Environmental Protection Agency has estimated that 40% of headwaters in the West have been adversely impacted by acidic and other types of drainage from abandoned sites where gold, silver, copper, lead, and iron ore were mined. The core concept underlying the bills is that, in order to address the problem of pollution from IAM sites, it is appropriate to encourage cleanup by so-called "Good Samaritan" entities. To do so, the bills proposed to establish a process for issuing permits to Good Samaritans and to provide incentives in the form of reduced liability from environmental laws and less stringent environmental cleanup standards.
This report discusses four bills introduced in the 109th Congress: H.R. 1266 (M. Udall), S. 1848 (Salazar), S. 2780 (Inhofe), and H.R. 5404 (Duncan). S. 2780 and H.R. 5404 were identical bills, introduced at the request of the Administration. Three House and Senate committees held hearings during the 109th Congress on issues raised by the legislation. In September, an amended version of S. 1848 was reported to the Senate, but no further action occurred on any of the proposals. This report discusses several key issues in these bills:
eligibility for a Good Samaritan permit (especially at issue is whether Good Samaritans should be limited to government entities or may also include the private sector); standards applicable to a Good Samaritan cleanup (defining what standards to apply to a remediation project is often a challenge); scope of liability protection (at issue is whether and to what extent the liability and other requirements of Superfund, the Clean Water Act, and other laws should be waived for Good Samaritans); treatment of revenues from cleanup (one particularly controversial issue is whether Good Samaritans should be allowed to benefit economically from minerals that are recovered during a cleanup); enforcement and judicial review; role for states and Indian tribes; funding (none of the bills proposed a comprehensive mechanism to fund hardrock remediation activities); terminating a permit; and sunsetting the permit program.
Reviewing testimony from congressional hearings on these issues, it is evident that, except for witnesses testifying in support of their own bills, no witness endorsed any of the specific legislative approaches in total. For example, some stakeholders want an expanded definition of who may be a remediating party and favor elimination of additional regulatory and legal disincentives. But every effort to broaden the proposals' scope seemingly enlarges the complexity of the legislation and raises stronger opposition from groups who prefer a narrower approach. |
crs_R40628 | crs_R40628_0 | Assuring Congressional Representation: Background
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, subsequent biological incidents, and natural threats such as hurricanes or pandemic illness, have motivated consideration of contingency planning options in the federal government and the private sector. In Congress, contingency planning efforts include the consideration of options for the succession of congressional leadership, or for filling multiple vacancies in either chamber that might occur due to wide-scale death of Members or their absence from Congress due to injury or incapacitation. Several proposed constitutional amendments to address the consequences of catastrophic losses of congressional membership have been introduced since the 2001 attacks. 52 , proposing an amendment to the Constitution to temporarily fill mass vacancies in the House and the Senate. H.J.Res. Analysis
Many of the proposals introduced since 2001 and between 1946 and 1962 have been designed to address two or more of the following issues: the conditions under which the vacancies would be filled, the number or percentage of vacancies needed to invoke implementation of the measure, the selecting agents, and the duration of the temporary appointments. | The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, subsequent biological incidents, and natural threats such as hurricanes or pandemic illness, have motivated consideration of contingency planning options in government and the private sector. In Congress, contingency planning includes the consideration of options for the succession of congressional leadership, or for filling multiple vacancies in either chamber that might occur due to wide-scale death of Members or their absence from Congress due to injury or incapacitation. Concerns have been expressed that current plans may be insufficient or raise constitutional issues.
Several proposed constitutional amendments to address the consequences of catastrophic losses of congressional membership have been introduced since the 2001 attacks, including H.J.Res. 52, introduced on May 20, 2009, to temporarily fill mass vacancies in the House and the Senate. Many of the proposals introduced since 2001 are similar to those introduced during the early years of the Cold War, between 1946 and 1962. In each era, the measures attempted to address two or more of the following issues: the conditions under which the vacancies would be filled, the number or percentage of vacancies needed to invoke implementation of the measure, and the duration of the temporary appointments.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40192 | crs_R40192_0 | Among the options, some have proposed reducing or eliminating the penalties on certain transactions in tax-advantaged retirement accounts. Two proposals have been suggested: (1) suspending the penalty tax for withdrawals from IRAs and DC plans that applies to individuals under the age of 59½; and (2) suspending the penalty tax for not taking Required Minimum Distributions (RMDs) from these plans, which would primarily affect individuals aged 70½ and older. In December 2008, the House and Senate passed H.R. 7327 , which suspends the RMD requirement for calendar year 2009. Early Withdrawal Penalty
Background
As the worsening economy increases Americans' economic insecurity, individuals may view their retirement accounts as a source of funds to help meet current expenses. Table 2 indicates that 14.6% of households that could borrow from their retirement plan in 2007 had an outstanding loan. Required Minimum Distributions
Background
Certain account holders are required to withdraw a percentage of their accounts each year, called a Required Minimum Distribution (RMD). In practice, most households hold a large fraction of their retirement accounts in equities. For households whose retirement account balances have lost value because of the decline in the stock market, suspending the tax for failure to take the RMD would allow these households to recoup the losses as the stock market rises faster than if they were required to withdraw the funds. On December 23, 2008, President George W. Bush signed this bill into law ( P.L. 110-458 ). One option would be to allow households to make the RMD based on their account balance at the time of the withdrawal, thus ensuring households that their RMD is not "too large" relative to the account balance at the end of the previous year. A distribution can be based on the account balance on December 31 of the previous year or any date in the current year prior to the first distribution. | In response to the economic downturn, Congress considered providing relief to Americans by suspending two tax penalties on defined contribution retirement plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). First, Congress considered allowing individuals to make withdrawals from their retirement accounts without paying a 10% penalty for withdrawals from retirement accounts by individuals under the age of 59½. Second, Congress considered suspending a requirement that most individuals aged 70½ and older withdraw a certain percentage of their retirement account balance each year (known as a Required Minimum Distribution [RMD]). In December 2008, the House and Senate passed H.R. 7327, which suspends the RMD requirement for calendar year 2009. On December 23, 2008, President George W. Bush signed this bill into law (P.L. 110-458). For calendar year 2010, RMDs have resumed.
The reasons for these proposals are that (1) the increased economic insecurity among American households means that households might consider using retirement account funds for current emergency expenses; and (2) since many individuals have at least a portion of their retirement accounts invested in the stock market, the decline in the stock market means that many retirement account balances have seen significant declines. Because the required minimum distribution taken in any year is a percentage of the account balance at the end of the previous year, many RMDs taken in 2008 were a larger percentage of the account balance on the date of the withdrawal than on December 31, 2007.
This report discusses the reasons offered in support of suspending these provisions, as well as the drawbacks. This report also presents data that estimates the number of households that these proposals would impact. Borrowing from retirement plans as an alternative to withdrawals is also discussed. Finally, the report discusses the kinds of proposals offered to either suspend or eliminate the early withdrawal penalty or the required minimum distribution provision.
This report will be updated as legislative activity warrants. |
crs_RL33328 | crs_RL33328_0 | The U.S.-Oman (FTA) is the fifth U.S. bilateral free trade agreement with a country in the proposed Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA). A sixth FTA is being negotiated with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). If the House passes its bill to the Senate, the Senate has an additional 15 days to consider the legislation. For final passage, both houses must vote the legislation up or down by a simple majority, and neither the implementing legislation nor the agreement itself may be amended. It is therefore trying to liberalize and diversify its trade regime as it seeks to broaden economic opportunities for a fast-growing workforce. U.S.-Oman Bilateral Trade and Investment
Oman is a small U.S. trade partner, ranking 88 th among all U.S. trade partners. Total U.S.-Oman trade at $1 billion in 2005 ($593 million in U.S. exports and $555 million in U.S. imports) accounts for 0.04% (four one-hundredths of one percent) of all U.S. trade. In 2005, the most important U.S. imports from Oman (see Table 1 ) were oil and natural gas (75%, constituting 1% of all U.S. oil and gas imports from MEFTA countries), and apparel (10%). The most important U.S. exports to Oman were various types of transport equipment and road vehicles (totaling 56%), and various types of machinery (24%). Foreign Direct Investment in Oman
Total U.S. foreign direct investment in Oman was $358 million in 2003, nearly double the $193 million investment in 2002. The U.S.-Oman FTA
The FTA with Oman is similar to other recent FTAs with MEFTA countries (Morocco and Bahrain), with slight variations. The U.S.-Oman FTA has three basic parts: new tariff schedules for each country, broad commitments to open markets and provisions to support these commitments, and protections for labor and the environment. The USITC argues that the economic effect of the agreement on the U.S. economy is expected to be small but positive, and that the impact on U.S. workers is likely to be minimal because trade with Oman is low. The USITC reports that tariff reductions and elimination under the U.S.-Oman FTA should restore some of the competitiveness of Oman's apparel exports among U.S. purchasers—and estimates that the resulting increase in imports would come at the expense of workers elsewhere in the world, not U.S. workers. Tariff Provisions
Under the U.S.-Oman FTA, the United States and Oman will provide each other immediate duty-free access for tariff lines covering almost all consumer and industrial goods, with special provisions for agriculture and textiles and apparel. Arguments in Favor of the Agreement
USTR Portman asserted that the U.S.-Oman FTA will contribute to economic growth and trade between both countries, generate export opportunities for U.S. companies, farmers, and ranchers, help create jobs in both countries, and help American consumers save money while offering them greater choices. On June 29 the House Ways and Means Committee also approved the draft implementing legislation ( H.R. The bill was signed by the President and became P.L. 109-283 on September 26, 2006. Some argue that this provision could obligate the United States to open up landside aspects of its port activities to operation by companies such as DP World. The United States Could Deny FTA Benefits to Owners of a "Shell" Operation; to Businesses Whose Owners Were Nationals of Countries Subject to U.S. Sanctions; or to Any Potential Investment Pursuant to the "Essential Security Exception" Described Below
If non-Omani persons set up an enterprise in Oman that was merely a "shell"—i.e., that was engaged in no substantial business activities in Oman—and that enterprise sought to make an investment in the United States, the FTA contains specific language that would arguably permit the United States to deny the FTA's investment-and services-related benefits to that enterprise. The United States Will Be Required to Offer Oman the Right to Bid to Operate at U.S. Ports—the Very Activities About Which Congress Expressed National Security Concerns During the Dubai Ports World Debate
Under the FTA, this right is conditional upon obtaining comparable market access in this sector from Oman. | In aiming to fight terrorism with trade, the United States negotiated and the President signed on January 19, 2006, the U.S.'s fifth bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) in the proposed 20-entity Middle-East-Free Trade Area (MEFTA). This FTA is with Oman. Other U.S.-FTAs are with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain. A sixth is being negotiated with the United Arab Emirates. Oman is a small oil-exporting U.S. trade partner that has been supportive of U.S. policies in the Middle East and is strategically located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Because its oil reserves could be exhausted within 15-20 years, Oman is trying to liberalize and diversify its trade regime beyond oil and gas to provide economic opportunities for its fast growing workforce. Supporters of the agreement typically cite political and economic reasons. Opponents typically point to labor and human rights issues.
The FTA with Oman is similar to other MEFTA FTAs and has three basic parts: new tariff schedules, broad commitments to open markets and provisions to support those commitments, and protections for labor and the environment. It provides immediate duty-free access for almost all consumer and industrial goods, with special provisions for agriculture and textiles and apparel.
Among all U.S. trade partners, Oman ranks 88th for the United States, while the United States ranks third for Oman (after the United Arab Emirates and Japan). U.S.-Oman trade at about $1 billion for 2005 represents 0.04% (four-one hundredths of one percent) of total U.S. trade. In 2005, the most important U.S. imports from Oman were oil and natural gas (75%), and apparel (10%). The most important U.S. exports to Oman were transport equipment (56%), and machinery (24%). The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) predicts that the economic effect of the U.S.-Oman FTA is likely to be minimal since trade levels are low; and any increase in U.S. imports of apparel would come at the expense of workers elsewhere in the world, not in the United States. Total U.S. foreign direct investment in Oman was $358 million in 2003, up from $193 million in 2002.
Supporters argue that the U.S.-Oman FTA will contribute to bilateral economic growth and trade, generate export opportunities for U.S. companies, farmers, and ranchers, and help create jobs in both countries. Critics argue that labor protections are inadequate for Omani workers, and that the FTA will not help level the playing field for Omani and U.S. workers. Critics also argue that a provision in Annex II of the FTA could obligate the United States to open up landside aspects of its port activities to operation by companies doing business in Oman—activities about which Congress expressed national security concerns during the Dubai Ports World debate. After the President submitted the agreement and the implementing legislation to Congress, relevant committees had 45 days to consider (or not consider) it, and either chamber had 15 more days to vote the legislation up or down without amendment to the agreement itself or the legislation. The Senate passed implementing legislation on June 29, 2006 (S. 3569); the House passed it (H.R. 5684) on July 20; the Senate re-passed it under the House number on September 19, and it became P.L. 109-283 on September 26, 2006. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL31911 | crs_RL31911_0 | Innocent Landowner Status as a Defense to Liability
Put most simply, the innocent landowner defense allows owners of contaminated property toescape CERCLA liability if the contamination was placed on the property before acquisition, andthe landowner did not know, or have reason to know, at the time of acquisition of thecontamination's presence. It began with the original Superfund Act in 1980. One of the few defenses to this stringent liability scheme is the "third-party defense,"available when the defendant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threatof release was caused solely by "an act or omission of a third party other ... than one whose act oromission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship , existing directly or indirectly, withthe defendant ...." (6) The third-party defense requiresfurther that the defendant establish that (a)he/she exercised due care as to the hazardous substance concerned, and (b) took precautions againstforeseeable acts or omissions of the third party. These clarifying efforts culminated in 2002 in the SBA. (12)
Not all property owners will be subject to the new "all appropriate inquiry" regulations. The SBA adds further prerequisites for invoking the innocent-landowner defense, relating to the defendant's conduct after land purchase. Alandowner lacks a contractual relationship with predecessors in the chain of title if the disposalof the hazardous substances on the site preceded acquisition and at time of land acquisitionhe/she did not know and had "no reason to know" that the hazardous substance had beendisposed of there. "No reason to know," in turn, means that before the date of acquisition,he/she made "all appropriate inquiry" (as defined above). (15) A de minimis settlement enables aparty identified by EPA as potentially liable to settle early with EPA and thereby avoidprotracted, expensive negotiations with the agency and a myriad of other liable parties over theallocation of liability at the site. Note also the absence of "all appropriate inquiry"and certain other prerequisites for innocent-landowner status as a third-party defense. Notwithstanding, EPA guidance demands all appropriate inquiry for de minimis settlementeligibility as well. Second, since "had no reason to know" requires allappropriate inquiry, the lack-of-constructive-knowledge prerequisite for settlement must beread to do the same. Prospective Purchasers
The prospect of CERCLA liability has long been thought to chill investment in realproperty that is known or feared to be contaminated. So EPA in 1989 established a policy toward prospectivepurchasers of contaminated property, (23) offeringin "very limited circumstances" to enter intoa "prospective purchaser agreement" (PPA) -- effectively, a settlement with the would-bepurchaser by which EPA covenants not to sue based on existing contamination at the site. Prospective purchasers of contaminated property were slow to take advantage of the new PPA device. For a Congress seeking to encourage redevelopment of brownfields, thisnumber was too low. For this reason, these voices have urged that buyers of such landconsider making use of both a PPA and the new BFPP exemption. | The Superfund Act contains several mechanisms that eliminate or contain liability, or reduce liability-related transaction costs, normally incurred under the Act by persons that acquirecontaminated land. This report covers three of them. Two mechanisms use innocent landowner status -- "innocent" referring to a landowner's lack of actual or constructive knowledge on the dateof site acquisition as to the presence of hazardous contamination there. The third is based on the bona fide prospective purchaser concept, and is intended to encourage redevelopment of sites knownat the time of acquisition to be contaminated.
The first innocent landowner mechanism uses that status to invoke the Superfund Act's third-party defense to liability. One prerequisite is that the release of hazardous substances musthave been caused solely by a third party lacking a contractual relationship with the defendant. Alandowner is defined to lack a contractual relationship with predecessors in the chain of title if thedisposal of the hazardous substances on the site preceded acquisition by the owner and at the timeof acquisition he/she did not know and had "no reason to know" that the hazardous substance hadbeen disposed of there. "No reason to know," in turn, means that before the date of acquisition,he/she made "all appropriate inquiry" into conditions at the site and the history of site uses. In 2002,Congress enacted an important clarification of the meaning of "all appropriate inquiry." The otherprerequisite is that the landowner continued after acquisition to exercise due care, took precautionsagainst foreseeable acts of the third party, etc.
The second innocent landowner mechanism makes a current landowner identified by EPA as potentially liable eligible for a "de minimis settlement" with the agency. A de minimis settlementenables a landowner to settle early with EPA and thereby avoid protracted, expensive negotiationswith the agency and a myriad of other liable parties over the allocation of liability at the site. Eligibility requires, among other things, that all appropriate inquiry was done by the owner prior toacquisition. This mechanism has not been used often.
The third mechanism aims not to exempt a landowner from liability, but to limit that liability prior to purchase. Its origin lies in the belief that Superfund liability may chill investment in realproperty that is known or feared to be contaminated ("brownfields"). In 1989, EPA offered in "verylimited circumstances" to enter into "prospective purchaser agreements" -- negotiated settlementswith would-be purchasers of land by which EPA covenanted not to sue. Congressional desire fora less resource-intensive method of encouraging redevelopment of brownfields led to its creation in2002 of a new exemption from liability, for the "bona fide prospective purchaser." Eligibilityrequires that the person not impede the site cleanup, made all appropriate inquiry, etc. Some haveurged that buyers of contaminated land pursue both prospective purchaser agreements with EPA andbona fide prospective purchaser status, but EPA guidance states that the availability of the formeris limited now. |
crs_RL33394 | crs_RL33394_0 | Sections 202(x) and 1611(e)(4)(A) of the Social Security Act specify that fugitive felons are not eligible to receive benefits administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA). This prohibition includes Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act as well as Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI, more commonly known as retirement and widows Social Security benefits) under Title II of the Social Security Act. These prohibitions went into effect January 1, 2005. Section 1611(e)(4)(A) of the Social Security Act provides the definition of fugitive felon for the SSI program whereas Section 202(x)(1)(A) provides the same definition for the SSDI and OASI programs. Cases involving violent crimes or felonies resulting from the use, sale, or manufacture of illegal drugs are not eligible for the mitigating circumstances exception; under no circumstances can a fugitive felon with an active outstanding warrant for these charges receive SSI, SSDI, or OASI benefits. The circuit court held that the SSA's interpretation of the statute embodied in POMS was in direct conflict with the plain language of the statute and its implementing regulations. SSA's Acquiescence Ruling
On April 6, 2006, the SSA issued an acquiescence ruling that explains how the agency will apply the Fowlkes v. Adamec ruling to agency decisions to suspend the benefits of persons deemed to be fugitive felons. Although the Fowlkes case dealt only with SSI benefits, this acquiescence ruling will apply to all administrative determinations or decisions by the SSA involving Title II and Title XVI applicants, Title II beneficiaries and Title XVI recipients who live in states within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (i.e., Connecticut, New York, and Vermont). | Fugitive felons are not eligible to receive benefits from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), or Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) programs administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA). For the purposes of these programs, fugitive felons are currently considered to be any persons with outstanding warrants for felony offenses. These prohibitions first went into effect in 1996 for the SSI program and in 2005 for the SSDI and OASI programs. This report includes an overview of the current laws, regulations, and internal SSA guidance related to fugitive felons; an explanation of the limited exception provided in cases of mitigating circumstances; and a brief legislative history of the provisions.
In December 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision in Fowlkes v. Adamec, 432 F. 3d 90 (2nd 2005), that struck down part of the SSA's interpretation of its fugitive felon regulations, and held that the mere existence of an outstanding arrest warrant does not make a beneficiary a fugitive felon whose benefits may be suspended. This report includes a discussion of this decision as well as an overview of the SSA's acquiescence ruling that will apply this decision to SSI, SSDI, and OASI cases in Connecticut, New York, and Vermont.
This report will be updated to reflect any policy changes. |
crs_RL33148 | crs_RL33148_0 | Introduction and Issues for Congress
On August 16, 2004, President Bush unveiled one of the most sweeping changes to the numbersand locations of military overseas basing facilities since the beginning of the Cold War. In 2004, the Congress chartered theCommission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (also known asthe Overseas Basing Commission) to provide an independent assessment of the DOD overseas basingneeds. (1)
The DOD plan could prompt budget and oversight decisions for the second session of the109th Congress. Congress could also have to consider appropriations requests for construction of infrastructure atnew overseas or expanded continental United States (CONUS) locations, as well as fund increasedimpact aid to local communities. Congress would have to oversee new acquisition programs formobility and logistics capabilities (such as airlift) needed for the strategy. Finally, the Senate may consider new or revised treatieswith new basing partners submitted for its advice and consent. Background
The Department of Defense Strategy
The Department of Defense Global Posture Review, also known as the Integrated GlobalPresence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), is intended to realign United States overseas forces over asix-to-eight-year period from the bases (basing "posture") left over from the Cold War (2) to a new posture optimizedto support current allies and confront new potential threats. Overall, the focus of military basing would shift south and east, closer to currentMiddle-Eastern hot-spots and Central Asia. (12) Officials view Africa asan increasingly important region in the war on terror. While theCommission concurred with the need to reshape the structure of U.S. overseas basing, in general,the report was critical of the DOD's overseas restructuring process and proposal. However, the report'smajor finding held that "the timing and synchronization of the global re-basing initiatives must berethought." The Commission expressed concern that the strain of conducting this sweeping seriesof moves, while also conducting major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has the potential to threatenthe capability of the force. (22)
The report highlighted claims that the re-basing plan would harm the quality of life ofvolunteer military personnel. Some critics, such as Philip H. Gordon at the Brookings Institution, fearthat moving forces away from long term allies to basing in nations less likely to restrain U.S. militaryoperations would give the Administration more latitude to take unilateral military action in futurecrises without consultation, thus further harming relationships and the U.S. image. The 2005 round of Base Realignment and Closure findings entered into forceon November 9, 2005. (33)
The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is under final review and scheduled to be sentto Congress on February 6, 2006. Thelegislation requires DOD to detail funding for these overseas locations in the annual budgetsubmission. The FY2006 Authorization legislation also requires the Secretary of Defenseto consult with state and local governments, as it develops its global posture implementation plans,regarding infrastructure and support needs driven by personnel returning from overseas basing. One reason for this eviction might have been StateDepartment pressure on the Tashkent government regarding recent human rights abuses. Thesemoves may have major impacts across many aspects of U.S. foreign and security policy. Others might also contend thatproposing a re-basing strategy before completing the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure round andthe Mobility Capabilities Study could result in mismatches of supporting infrastructure or mobilityassets. The Overseas Basing Commission argued that the preliminary diplomatic legwork had notbeen fully accomplished. Early evidence may indicate thatDOD and the State Department need to further examine potential treaty impacts. | On August 16, 2004, President Bush announced a program of sweeping changes to thenumbers and locations of military basing facilities at overseas locations, now known as theIntegrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) or Global Posture Review. Roughly 70,000personnel would return from overseas locations from Europe and Asia to bases in the continentalUnited States (CONUS). Other overseas forces would be redistributed within current host nationssuch as Germany and South Korea, while new bases would be established in nations of EasternEurope, Central Asia, and Africa. In the Department of Defense's (DOD) view, these locationswould be better able to respond to potential trouble spots. The second session of the 109th Congresscould have to consider approval of the DOD proposal, or review appropriations requests forconstruction of infrastructure, increased impact aid to local communities, and new acquisitionprograms for mobility and logistics capabilities (such as airlift). Finally, the Senate may have toconsider ratification of new or revised treaties.
In August 2005, the congressionally mandated Commission on the Review of OverseasMilitary Facility Structure of the United States (also known as the "Overseas Basing Commission")formally reported its findings. It disagreed with the "timing and synchronization" of the DODoverseas re-basing initiative. It also saw the initiative as potentially at odds with stresses on the forcefrom operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and possibly hampering recruiting and retention. TheCommission questioned whether sufficient interagency coordination had occurred. It expresseddoubts that the military had enough airlift and sealift to make the strategy work, and noted that DODhad likely underestimated the cost of all aspects associated with the moves (DOD budgeted $4billion, the Commission estimated $20 billion). DOD disagreed with much of the Commission'sanalysis. Meanwhile, some have voiced concern that the DOD plan would harm long-standingalliance relationships, while others questioned DOD's plans to accommodate the thousands of troopsreturning to the U.S. Critics also argued that the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)round, which entered into force on November 9, 2005, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),which is to be completed in early 2006, should have been finalized before completing the overseasbasing plan.
Congress acted on some of its concerns with the re-basing plan in the FY2006 DefenseAuthorization Act, tasking DOD with follow-on studies of overseas basing criteria and mobilityrequirements. It also directs DOD to further examine the state and local impacts on installationsgaining personnel from the re-basing implementation.
Recent international diplomatic and security developments could further influence debate onoverseas basing. Uzbekistan, one of the test cases for the new strategy, recently evicted U.S. forcesfrom the base in that Central Asian nation. Some analysts argue this eviction was prompted byRussia and China, who have begun to express concern with U.S. expansion of influence in theregion. This report will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R45099 | crs_R45099_0 | The NFIP is authorized by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 and was reauthorized until September 30, 2017, by the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (BW-12). The general purpose of the NFIP is both to offer primary flood insurance to properties with significant flood risk, and to reduce flood risk through the adoption of floodplain management standards. A longer-term objective of the NFIP is to reduce federal expenditure on disaster assistance after floods. This report summarizes key insurance reform provisions in recent legislation and identifies key issues for congressional consideration as part of the possible reauthorization of the NFIP. It describes selected provisions in the bill to reauthorize the NFIP passed by the House ( H.R. Unless reauthorized or amended by Congress, the following will occur on November 30, 2018:
The authority to provide new flood insurance contracts will expire. The authority for NFIP to borrow funds from the Treasury will be reduced from $30.425 billion to $1 billion. The 21 st Century Flood Reform Act ( H.R. H.R. 2874 passed the House on a vote of 237-189 on November 14, 2017. 2874 would authorize the NFIP until September 30, 2022. Three bills have been introduced in the Senate that reauthorize the expiring provisions of the NFIP: S. 1313 (Flood Insurance Affordability and Sustainability Act of 2017), S. 1368 (Sustainable, Affordable, Fair, and Efficient [SAFE] National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2017), and S. 1571 (National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2017). None of these bills have yet been considered by the committee of jurisdiction. 2874 , S. 1313 , S. 1368 , and S. 1571 . The NFIP also engages in many "non-insurance" activities in the public interest: it disseminates flood risk information through flood maps, requires communities to adopt land use and building code standards in order to participate in the program, potentially reduces the need for other post-flood disaster aid, contributes to community resilience by providing a mechanism to fund rebuilding after a flood, and may protect lending institutions against mortgage defaults due to uninsured losses. GAO has reported in several studies that NFIP's premium rates do not reflect the full risk of loss because of various legislative requirements, which exacerbates the program's fiscal exposure. Summary
The current categories of properties which pay less than the full risk-based rate are determined by the date when the structure was built relative to the date of adoption of the FIRM, rather than the flood risk or the ability of the policyholder to pay. FEMA has identified the need to increase flood insurance coverage across the nation as a major priority for the current reauthorization and beyond, and has set a goal of doubling flood insurance coverage by 2023, through the increased sale of both NFIP and private policies. The Role of Private Insurance in U.S. A reformed NFIP rate structure could have the effect of encouraging more private insurers to enter the primary flood market; FEMA's subsidized rates are often seen as the primary barrier to private sector involvement in flood insurance. In addition to providing flood insurance, the program identifies and maps flood hazards, sets minimum floodplain management standards, and offers grants and incentive programs for household- and community-level investments in flood risk reduction. Although the NFIP has always had borrowing authority from Congress, a robust approach has not been developed by which the NFIP can repay catastrophic flood losses, although the program has taken steps in this direction with the BW-12 reserve fund assessment, the HFIAA surcharge, and the purchase of reinsurance. To ensure the future financial solvency of the NFIP after catastrophic events, FEMA has suggested that a systematic analysis may consider the costs and benefits of using the reserve fund, borrowing authority, reinsurance, other forms of risk transfer, and perhaps a Treasury backstop at some catastrophic loss level. | The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA, 42 U.S.C. §4001 et seq.), and was most recently reauthorized until November 30, 2018 (P.L. 115-225). The general purpose of the NFIP is both to offer primary flood insurance to properties with significant flood risk, and to reduce flood risk through the adoption of floodplain management standards. A longer-term objective of the NFIP is to reduce federal expenditure on disaster assistance after floods. The NFIP also engages in many "non-insurance" activities in the public interest: it disseminates flood risk information through flood maps, requires community land use and building code standards, and offers grants and incentive programs for household- and community-level investments in flood risk reduction. Unless reauthorized or amended by Congress, the following will occur on November 30, 2018: (1) the authority to provide new flood insurance contracts will expire and (2) the authority for NFIP to borrow funds from the Treasury will be reduced from $30.425 billion to $1 billion.
The House passed H.R. 2874, the 21st Century Flood Reform Act, on November 14, 2017, on a vote of 237-189. H.R. 2874 would authorize the NFIP until September 30, 2022. Three bills have been introduced in the Senate to reauthorize the NFIP: S. 1313 (Flood Insurance Affordability and Sustainability Act of 2017), S. 1368 (Sustainable, Affordable, Fair, and Efficient [SAFE] National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2017), and S. 1571 (National Flood Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2017). None of these bills have yet been taken up by the committee of jurisdiction. Issues which Congress may consider in the context of reauthorization include (1) NFIP solvency and debt; (2) premium rates and surcharges; (3) affordability; (4) increasing participation in the NFIP; (5) the role of private insurance and barriers to private sector involvement; (6) recurrent flooding and properties with multiple losses; (7) administrative reforms; (8) non-insurance functions of the NFIP such as floodplain mapping and flood mitigation; and (9) future flood risks, including future catastrophic events.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has identified the need to increase flood insurance coverage across the nation as a major priority for the current reauthorization and beyond, with a goal of doubling flood insurance coverage by 2023 through the increased sale of both NFIP and private policies. The NFIP's premium rates do not reflect the full risk of loss because of various legislative requirements, which may exacerbate the program's fiscal exposure. The categories of properties which pay less than the full risk-based rate are determined by the date when the structure was built relative to the date of adoption of the Flood Insurance Rate Map, rather than the flood risk or the ability of the policyholder to pay. A reformed NFIP rate structure could have the effect of encouraging more private insurers to enter the primary flood market; however, full risk-based premiums could be unaffordable for some households.
Although the NFIP has always had borrowing authority from Congress, an approach has not been developed by which the NFIP can repay catastrophic flood losses. To ensure the future financial solvency of the NFIP after catastrophic events, FEMA has suggested that a systematic analysis may consider the costs and benefits of using the reserve fund, borrowing authority, reinsurance, other forms of risk transfer, and perhaps a Treasury backstop at some catastrophic loss level.
This report summarizes key insurance reform provisions in recent legislation, identifies issues for congressional consideration as part of the possible reauthorization of the NFIP, and describes selected provisions which relate to the issues listed above in the bill to reauthorize the NFIP passed by the House (H.R. 2874, the 21st Century Flood Reform Act) and the bills yet to be considered by the Senate (S. 1313, S. 1368, and S. 1571). |
crs_R43108 | crs_R43108_0 | T his report identifies various online sources for planning and acquiring funds for postsecondary education. Some resources also contain information on repaying, forgiving, or discharging educational debt. Students are often in the best position to determine which aid programs they may qualify for and which best meet their needs. This list includes both general and comprehensive sources, as well as those targeted toward specific types of aid and circumstances (e.g., non-need-based scholarships; female and minority students; students studying abroad; or veterans, military personnel, and their dependents). The selection of a resource for inclusion in this report is based on several criteria, including long-standing history in publishing print guides on financial aid and other college information guides (e.g., College Board, Peterson's, Princeton Review, Reference Service Press), key features or capabilities of the website, or focus on specific topics (e.g., educational disciplines or student characteristics). The resources in this report are provided as examples, not an all-inclusive list. Federal resources related to health professions and veterans are in the " Selected Specialized Aid Examples " section of this report. Financial Aid Searchable Databases
The following websites allow students (usually after completing a free registration process) to conduct and save scholarship, grant, and loan searches. Information is available in a variety ways, including by subscription, by individual fee, and for free. | Congressional offices are frequently contacted by constituents who are researching how to pay for postsecondary education. This report identifies various online sources targeted to students and parents that provide information on planning and acquiring funds for postsecondary education. Some resources also contain information on repaying, forgiving, or discharging educational debt.
Students are often in the best position to determine which aid programs they may qualify for and which best meet their needs. Many of the websites listed in this report enable a student to conduct and save scholarship, grant, and loan searches. This list includes both general sources and those targeted toward specific types of aid and circumstances (e.g., non-need-based scholarships; women and minority students; students studying abroad; or veterans, military personnel, and their dependents).
This report is not a comprehensive catalog of resources related to financial aid for students. The selection of a resource for inclusion in this report is based on several criteria, including long-standing history in publishing print guides on financial aid and other college information guides (e.g., College Board, Peterson's, Princeton Review, Reference Service Press), key features or capabilities of the website, or focus on specific topics (e.g., educational disciplines or student characteristics). The resources in this report are provided as examples and the inclusion of resources in this report does not imply endorsement by CRS. Similar guides are available in a variety of formats through libraries, high school guidance offices, college financial aid offices, and on the web. |
crs_R44582 | crs_R44582_0 | Introduction
Every year, Congress considers numerous pieces of legislation that would create or modify federal government programs and activities. The legislative framework for establishing and funding the activities of the federal government is based on a fundamental distinction between two types of laws (and provisions within those laws)—"authorizations" and "appropriations." The funding source for either mandatory or discretionary spending may be the General Fund of the Treasury, which is where revenue and other collections made by the federal government are generally deposited. In some cases, spending also may be funded through a dedicated revenue source or other types of collections that result from the business-like activities that the federal government undertakes (referred to for the purposes of this report as dedicated collections ). The purpose of this report is to discuss these approaches and illustrate them with examples of how they have been applied in practice. The discretionary spending approach creates general or specific authority for an activity through an authorization law, but it leaves the decision as to how much that activity will actually be funded, if at all, to the annual appropriations process. This alternative approach is often referred to as "appropriated mandatory" spending. A further example of mandatory spending for a specific amount is the appropriation provided by the Social Security Act for the HHS Technical Assistance for Tribal Child Welfare Programs account:
There is appropriated to the Secretary, out of any money in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise appropriated, $3,000,000 for fiscal year 2009 and each fiscal year thereafter to carry out this subsection. Appropriated Mandatory Spending
In the examples of mandatory funding mechanisms discussed above, the authorization law controls the amount of spending and also contains an appropriation to fund it. Examples of each of these funding source types are included to illustrate the variety of options that exist across the federal government. An example of a program funded in this manner is the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting program (MIECHV) at HHS, which supports home visiting services for families with young children who reside in communities that have concentrations of poor child health and other risk indicators. How a collection is structured and the type of law that controls it vary depending on whether the collection supports mandatory or discretionary spending. Mandatory Spending
In general, if a mandatory spending program is funded by a dedicated collection, the authorization act provides three essential authorities:
the authority to make the collection; the authority to retain the collection; and the authority to expend the collection for the purposes of that program. Mixed Sources
Like the Health Surveillance and Program Support account discussed above, some programs or purposes are funded by both the GF and dedicated collections. Discretionary Spending
The discretionary spending for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) review of human drugs, human medical devices, and veterinary drugs is also an example of activities with a funding source that is a mixture of dedicated collections and the GF. The authority to make collections that fund discretionary spending could be provided on a multiyear or permanent basis through authorization acts or each year through appropriations acts. In summary, some of the many factors that Congress may take into consideration when it is assessing potential funding mechanisms for a new or existing program include
the nature of the government program or service to be provided; whether funding stability or a guarantee of budgetary resources to meet whatever needs arise is important for the purposes or operation of the program; whether the program could adapt and still fulfill its mission if year-to-year funding levels are variable; how accurately the future funding needs of the program can be forecast; how often, and by what types of legislative vehicles, the parameters of the program (including its funding) should be reevaluated by Congress; what funding sources besides the GF could be used for the program; whether a program's dedicated funding source and spending from that source should be evaluated on the same or different schedules, and in the same or different legislative vehicles; and whether congressional control over various aspects of the funding itself, including the source of the funding, should be vested in one or more authorization committees, vested in the appropriations committees, or split between both types of committees. 4-5, 19 Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG), pp. 5-6, 17 Violence Against Women Family Research and Evaluation, p. 6 State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), p. 10 Technical Assistance for Tribal Child Welfare Programs, pp. 10-11 Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), pp. 11, 21-22 Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), p. 12 Supplemental Security Income (SSI), p. 13 Health Center Program, pp. 19-20 Immigration Examinations Fee Account, pp. 20-21 Manufactured Housing Standard Program, pp. 23-24 Medicare Part A and B, pp. 24-25 Prescription Drug User Fee Act (Food and Drug Administration), pp. | Every year, Congress considers numerous pieces of legislation that would create or modify federal government programs and activities. The variety of approaches used across the federal budget to fund these programs and activities involve different timelines for budgetary decisionmaking, and different processes (and committees) within Congress to make those decisions. How a particular funding mechanism is structured requires tradeoffs between the frequency of congressional review and the predictability of funding for the program. The purpose of this report is to explain these approaches, illustrating them with examples of how they have been applied in practice.
When attempting to understand the mechanism through which a program is funded, one of its most basic elements is the type of law that controls that funding. Such laws—and the provisions within them—can be distinguished based on whether their primary purpose is to create or modify federal government programs or activities ("authorizations"), or whether their purpose is to fund those activities ("appropriations").
Discretionary spending programs generally are established through authorization laws, but the annual appropriations process determines the extent to which those programs will actually be funded, if at all. Examples of discretionary spending discussed in this report include the Office of Apprenticeship (Department of Labor; DOL) and the Violence Against Women Family Research and Evaluation program (Department of Justice).
Mandatory spending is controlled by authorization laws. For this type of spending, the program usually is created and funded in the same law, often on a multiyear or permanent basis. Examples of this type of funding mechanism that are discussed in this report include the State Children's Health Insurance Program (Department of Health and Human Services; HHS), Technical Assistance for Tribal Child Welfare Programs (HHS), and Social Security Disability Insurance (Social Security Administration; SSA). Alternatively, a mandatory spending program might be created in an authorization law but funded annually through an appropriations act; this is often referred to as "appropriated mandatory" spending. Examples of appropriated mandatory spending include the Social Services Block Grant (HHS) and Supplemental Security Income (SSA).
In some cases, including the federal Health Center Program (HHS) and the Child Care and Development Fund (HHS), federal government programs are funded using a combination of mandatory and discretionary spending.
Besides the type of law that controls the spending, another important aspect of any funding mechanism is what the source of that funding will be. This is because there is a distinction between the authority to expend funds and the source of the funds themselves. Revenue and other collections made by the federal government are generally deposited in the General Fund (GF) of the Treasury, which is the default source of spending for many different types of federal government activities. Examples of funding mechanisms that utilize the GF include the Office of Apprenticeship (DOL) and the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting program (HHS). Spending also may be funded by dedicated collections that result from the business-like activities that the federal government undertakes. Both the legal authority to make these collections, and the legal authority to expend them, may be provided either through authorization or appropriations acts, and may support either mandatory or discretionary spending. Examples of dedicated collections that are discussed in this report include those associated with the Immigration Examinations Fee Account (Department of Homeland Security), the Manufactured Housing Standard Program (Department of Housing and Urban Development), and the Health Surveillance and Program Support account (HHS). In some cases, including Medicare Part A and B (HHS) and the Prescription Drug User Fee Act activities undertaken by the Food and Drug Administration (HHS), programs are funded using a combination of the GF and dedicated collections. |
crs_R43196 | crs_R43196_0 | Yet he has also indicated readiness, in principle, to maintain a small U.S. force presence after 2014, to focus on conducting counter-terrorism and supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). While troop levels and drawdown curves tend to steal the headlines, more fundamental is the question of how coherently all the facets of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan fit together as part of a single political strategy aimed at bringing the war to an acceptable conclusion that protects U.S. interests over the longer term. For Congress, next steps in the war in Afghanistan, including near-term policy decisions by the U.S. and Afghan governments, raise several basic oversight issues:
The costs associated with a continued U.S. force presence in Afghanistan. The challenges of "re-setting" the force and restoring its readiness as it comes home from Afghanistan. Accountability for sound strategy that protects U.S. interests. Integration of effort across U.S. government agencies in support of broad U.S. political strategy for Afghanistan. Appropriate prioritization of this effort compared to competing national security exigencies. Strategy
For the U.S. government, fundamental components of strategy for the war in Afghanistan include:
U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and the region; the minimum essential conditions—political, economic, security—that would need to pertain in Afghanistan and the region in order to protect U.S. interests over the long run; current and projected U.S. approaches, until and after 2014, for helping Afghans establish and sustain those conditions; the timeline by which, and extent to which, Afghans are likely to be able to sustain those conditions with relatively limited support from the international community; risks to U.S. national security interests if Afghans are unable to do so; and the importance of this overall effort—given its likely timeline, risks, and costs—compared to other U.S. priorities. That discussion most sensibly begins with the interests that the United States has at stake in Afghanistan and the region. Where if at all on that list should the following concerns figure: countering al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; preventing nuclear confrontation between nuclear-armed states; standing up for core U.S. values including human rights and the protection of women; preserving and strengthening U.S. ability to exercise leadership on the world stage? By most Afghan and coalition accounts, the basic logic of the campaign has proven to be sound—based on the overall improvement of Afghan forces, degradation of the insurgency, and adaptation by coalition forces. Coalition Forces
As the U.S. government, NATO, and the Afghan government consider the possibility of a post-2014 coalition force presence in Afghanistan, most observers agree that a prerequisite for any such presence is the ability of coalition forces to adapt to the advisory and enabling roles they would be required to play. What are the most helpful ways to evaluate the strength of the insurgency? In practice on the ground—and increasingly in coalition theory as well—advising can refer to a number of different, complementary activities. At issue is what it would take in each of these areas, at a minimum, to protect security gains and make them sustainable. Many observers suggest that the Afghan presidential elections scheduled to be held in April 2014 offer an opportunity to catalyze constructive changes in Afghan governance. How might these elements best inform each other over? | This is a critical time for U.S. efforts in the war in Afghanistan. U.S. military engagement beyond December 2014, when the current NATO mission ends, depends on the achievement of a U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), specifying the status of U.S. forces. Afghan President Hamid Karzai threw the BSA process into confusion by introducing new terms and conditions after a deal had been reached by negotiators. Even if a BSA is reached, U.S. decisions are still pending regarding the scope, scale, and timeline for any post-2014 U.S. force presence in Afghanistan. President Obama has indicated U.S. readiness, in principle, to maintain a small force focused on counter-terrorism and supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
While troop levels tend to steal the headlines, more fundamentally at stake is what it would take to ensure the long-term protection of U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the region. Arguably, the United States may have a number of different interests at stake in the region: countering al Qaeda and other violent extremists; preventing nuclear proliferation; preventing nuclear confrontation between nuclear-armed states; standing up for American values, including basic human rights and the protection of women; and preserving the United States' ability to exercise leadership on the world stage. At issue is the relative priority of these interests, what it would take in practice to ensure that they are protected, and their relative importance compared to other compelling security concerns around the globe.
U.S. efforts in Afghanistan include an array of activities: prosecuting the fight on the ground, in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), to counter the insurgency; supporting Afghanistan's political process, including the presidential elections scheduled to be held in April 2014; providing assistance to help Afghans craft and grow a viable economy; and facilitating Afghan-led efforts to achieve a high-level political settlement with the Taliban. At issue is whether these are the activities best suited to achieve a lasting outcome that protects U.S. interests, as well as how these activities might most constructively inform each other.
In 2013, most Afghan and ISAF commanders suggested that the campaign on the ground was gaining traction, reflected in the successful security transition to Afghan lead responsibility for security and in improvements in the ANSF; in the diminished strength of the insurgency; and in the successful adaptation by coalition forces to new roles and missions. Yet most observers agree that the long-term sustainability of campaign gains—and the protection of U.S. interests—would require major changes in the broader strategic landscape. Critical requirements would include sufficiently responsive Afghan governance; a viable economy that offers Afghans sufficient opportunities; a regional context that supports rather than undermines Afghan stability; and a conclusion to the war broadly acceptable to the Afghan people.
For Congress, next steps in the war in Afghanistan, including near-term policy decisions by the U.S. and Afghan governments, raise several basic oversight issues: the costs associated with a continued U.S. force presence in Afghanistan; the challenges of "re-setting" the force and restoring its readiness as it comes home from Afghanistan; accountability for sound strategy that protects U.S. interests; integration of effort across U.S. government agencies in support of broad U.S. political strategy for Afghanistan; and appropriate prioritization of this effort compared to competing national security exigencies. |
crs_R44875 | crs_R44875_0 | T he North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994 ( P.L. 103-182 ), establishing a free trade area as part of a comprehensive economic and free trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Although some industries may have reduced their U.S. operations, in general, NAFTA is considered to have benefitted the United States economically as well as strategically in terms of North American relations. President Trump has repeatedly stated that he intends to either renegotiate or withdraw from NAFTA. In May 2017, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) notified Congress of the Administration's intent to renegotiate NAFTA. The text box provides a summary of NAFTA's provisions that address agricultural trade. In the World Trade Organization (WTO) Uruguay Round, all import quotas were converted to tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). SPS Measures and Other Non-Tariff Barriers
In addition to tariffs and quotas, NAFTA addressed SPS measures and other types of non-tariff barriers that may limit agricultural trade. For agricultural exporters, SPS regulations are often regarded as one of the greatest challenges in trade, often resulting in increased costs and product loss and also the potential to disrupt integrated supply chains. A related issue involves technical barriers to trade (TBT). Agricultural Trade Trends with NAFTA Partners
Canada and Mexico are key U.S. agricultural trading partners. Since NAFTA was implemented, the value of U.S. agricultural trade with Canada and Mexico has increased sharply and now accounts for a large overall share of all U.S. agricultural exports and imports. Exports rose from $8.7 billion in 1992 to $38.1 billion in 2016, while imports rose from $6.5 billion to $44.5 billion over the same period ( Table 3 ). As a share of U.S. trade, Canada and Mexico are ranked second and third (after China) as leading export markets for U.S. agricultural products. In 2016, leading traded agricultural products under NAFTA were meat and dairy products; grains and feed; fruits, tree nuts, and vegetables; oilseeds; and sugar and related products. Many U.S. food and agricultural industry groups claim that NAFTA has positively affected their markets. Improved Market Integration
As part of its 20-year retrospective analysis of the impacts of NAFTA on the U.S. agricultural sectors, USDA concluded that "NAFTA has had a profound effect on many aspects of North American agriculture over the past two decades," contributing to increased market integration and cross-border investment and other "important changes in consumption and production." Others see renegotiation as an opportunity to address concerns regarding certain outstanding trade disputes. Among the types of potential gains hoped for by U.S. agricultural exporters from "modernizing" NAFTA are improving agricultural market access (e.g., liberalization of remaining dutiable agricultural products that were exempted from the agreement and may be subject to TRQs and high out-of-quota tariff rates). Some farm interest groups, however, are pushing for additional changes that go beyond those in the TPP. Renegotiating NAFTA could address trade liberalization of these additional products. Ensuring SPS Enforcement
Many have been frustrated by ongoing and protracted disputes between the United States and its NAFTA partners regarding trade in some agricultural commodities. For Canada, the 2017 NTE report highlights a number of U.S. concerns over agricultural products, some of which have been notified to the WTO:
Canada's restrictions on the sale, advertising, or importation of seed varieties that are not registered in the prescribed manner; Canada's cheese compositional standards that limit the amount of dry milk protein concentrate (MPC) that can be used in cheese making, restricting access of certain U.S. dairy products to the Canadian market; Canada's practice of supply management systems regulating its dairy, chicken, turkey, and egg industries involving production quotas, producer marketing boards to regulate price and supply, and TRQs; U.S. concerns involving Canada's concessions to the EU as part of its trade agreement involving GIs, which may restrict the sale of certain U.S. products to Canada; restrictions on U.S. grain exports due to Canadian statutory grades, which are reserved exclusively for grains grown in Canada; restrictions within Canadian provinces that restrict the sale of wine, beer, and spirits through province-run liquor control boards; and Canadian restrictions involving trade in softwood lumber. | The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994, establishing a free trade area as part of a comprehensive economic and trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. President Trump has repeatedly stated that he intends to either renegotiate or withdraw from NAFTA. In May 2017, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) formally notified Congress of the Administration's intent to renegotiate NAFTA. Reactions to the announcement have been mixed, with some industries supporting NAFTA "modernization" as a way to address a range of trade concerns, while others are urging the need to proceed more cautiously so as to not destabilize current U.S. export markets.
Canada and Mexico are key U.S. agricultural trading partners. Since NAFTA was implemented, the value of U.S. agricultural trade with its NAFTA partners has increased sharply. Agricultural exports rose from $8.7 billion in 1992 to $38.1 billion in 2016, while imports rose from $6.5 billion to $44.5 billion. As a share of U.S. agricultural trade, Canada and Mexico rank second and third (after China) as leading U.S. export markets. Leading NAFTA-traded agricultural products were meat and dairy products; grains; fruits, tree nuts, and vegetables; oilseeds; and sweeteners. In general, NAFTA is considered to have benefitted the United States both economically and strategically in terms of North American relations. Many U.S. food and agricultural industry groups claim that NAFTA has been positive for their industries. As part of its 2015 retrospective analysis of the impacts of NAFTA, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) concluded in a 2015 report that "NAFTA has had a profound effect on many aspects of North American agriculture over the past two decades," contributing to increased market integration and cross-border investment and resulting in "important changes in consumption and production."
Although NAFTA resulted in tariff elimination for most agricultural products and redefined import quotas for some commodities as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), some products—such as U.S. exports to Canada of dairy and poultry products—are still subject to high above-quota tariffs. In addition to tariffs and quotas, NAFTA addressed sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and other types of non-tariff barriers that may limit agricultural trade. SPS regulations are often regarded by agricultural exporters as one of the greatest challenges in trade, often resulting in increased costs and product loss and disrupting integrated supply chains.
The extent to which the terms of agricultural trade may be altered in a NAFTA renegotiation is unclear; however, what is clear is that U.S. agriculture has a large stake in NAFTA. Still, renegotiating NAFTA could provide an opportunity to "modernize" certain issues affecting U.S. agricultural exporters. Potential options could include the following:
Improving market access. Liberalize remaining dutiable agricultural products that are still subject to TRQs and high out-of-quota tariff rates. Updating NAFTA's SPS provisions. Address SPS concerns in agricultural trade by "going beyond" existing World Trade Organization (WTO) rights and obligations and include additional rapid response mechanism and enforcement regarding SPS and other technical barriers to trade. Addressing other trade concerns. Address concerns raised in outstanding disputes between the United States and its NAFTA partners, as well as geographical indications (GIs) or place names that identify products based on their reputation or origin.
A number of these types of trade concerns were addressed in recent U.S. trade negotiations under the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, and some farm interest groups claim that the TPP could provide a blueprint for NAFTA renegotiations involving U.S. agricultural trade concerns. |
crs_R42359 | crs_R42359_0 | In contrast, the income of C corporations is taxed once at the corporate level according to the corporate tax system, and then a second time at the individual-shareholder level. The fact that pass-throughs are responsible for more than half of business income is important because recent tax reform discussions have included the possibility of lowering the tax burden on these businesses. This report uses a nationally representative sample of individual tax returns to analyze who earns pass-through income. Who Earns Pass-Through Business Income? This section analyzes the distribution of pass-through income by adjusted gross income (AGI). Taxpayers with an AGI of $100,000 or greater earned 84% of pass-through income, while accounting for roughly 23% of returns reporting pass-through income. Conversely, taxpayers with AGI less than $100,000 earned about 16% of pass-through income, but accounted for 77% of returns with pass-through income. A significant proportion of pass-through income was concentrated among upper-income earners. Taxpayers with an AGI over $250,000, for example, received 63% of pass-through income, but accounted for just over 6% of returns reporting such income. Those with an AGI in excess of $1 million earned about 32% of pass-through income, while filing roughly 1% of all returns reporting pass-through income. Partnership net income was more concentrated among upper income individuals with nearly all of it accruing to taxpayers with AGI in excess of $100,000, including nearly 48% accruing to those with AGI over $1 million. Nearly all of S corporation income was also earned by taxpayers with an AGI over $100,000, but a greater share of S corporation income than partnership income was earned by those with an AGI over $1 million—about 52%. Sole proprietorship income is not distinguished in the data used in this analysis. Tax Reform Considerations
Recent tax reform discussions have included lowering the tax rates and tax burden on pass-through income. While lowering the tax burden on pass-through income could potentially stimulate the economy, particularly in the short-run, it may also reduce the progressivity of the tax code. As previously stated, 62% of pass-through income was earned by taxpayers with an AGI over $250,000, and 32% was earned by individuals with an AGI in excess of $1 million. The distributions of partnership and S corporation income were more heavily skewed to the upper end of the income distribution. By taxing business income at a lower rate than labor income, employee-owners of pass-throughs may characterize labor income as business income to take advantage of the lower tax rate. Additionally, a rate reduction on pass-through (or corporate) income by itself does little to simplify the tax treatment of businesses. The majority of the complexity in the tax system is the result of special tax incentives such as exclusions, credits, and deductions. | Pass-through businesses—sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations—generate more than half of all business income in the United States. Pass-through income is, in general, taxed only once at the individual income tax rates when it is distributed to its owners. In contrast, the income of C corporations is taxed twice; once at the corporate level according to corporate tax rates, and then a second time at the individual tax rates when shareholders receive dividend payments or realize capital gains. This leads to the so-called "double taxation" of corporate profits.
This report analyzes individual tax return data to determine who earns pass-through business income. The analysis finds that in 2011 over 82% of net pass-through income was earned by individuals with an adjusted gross income (AGI) over $100,000, although these taxpayers accounted for just 23% of individual returns with pass-through income. A significant fraction of pass-through income is concentrated among upper-income earners. Taxpayers with an AGI over $250,000, for example, received 62% of pass-through income, but accounted for just over 6% of returns with pass-through income. Individuals with an AGI in excess of $1 million earned about 32% of pass-through income, while filing roughly 1% of all returns with pass-through income
The findings change slightly when the data for each organizational type are analyzed separately. Nearly half of sole proprietorship income was earned by individuals with an AGI of $100,000 or less. Taxpayers with an AGI between $100,000 and $500,000 earned 39% of sole proprietor income. Individuals with an AGI in excess of $1 million earned 6% of sole proprietor income. Partnership net income was more concentrated among upper-income individuals with nearly all of it accruing to taxpayers with AGI in excess of $100,000, including nearly 48% accruing to those with an AGI over $1 million. Nearly all of S corporation income was also earned by taxpayers with an AGI over $100,000, but a greater share of S corporation income than partnership income was earned by those with an AGI over $1 million—about 52%.
Who earns pass-through income may have important implications for tax reform. Recent tax reform discussions have included taxing pass-through income at a lower rate than the current rate. While lowering the tax burden on pass-through income could potentially stimulate the economy, particularly in the short-run, it could also reduce the progressivity of the tax code given the share of pass-through income that is attributable to the upper end of the income distribution. Tax reform could also result in pass-through income being taxed at lower rates than labor income. This could lead some taxpayers to characterize labor income as business income to minimize taxes. Additionally, a tax rate reduction on pass-through (or corporate) income does little to simplify the tax treatment of businesses. The majority of the complexity in the tax system is the result of special tax incentives such as exclusions, credits, and deductions, formally known as "tax expenditures." Finally, reducing taxes on pass-through businesses could have important budgetary and revenue impacts. |
crs_R41042 | crs_R41042_0 | Introduction
In 1986, the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) was enacted to fund U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (USACE or the Corps) activities related to the routine operation and maintenance (O&M) of harbors, namely the dredging of harbor channels to their authorized depths and widths. U.S. waterborne exporters no longer pay the tax because a 1998 U.S. Supreme Court ruling found it unconstitutional. The tax revenues are deposited into the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) from which Congress annually appropriates funds for harbor maintenance. Consequently, a large "surplus" in the HMTF has developed. Under-maintained channels in busy U.S. ports could increase the risks of ship groundings or collisions, resulting in spilled cargo or fuel oil. They also could raise the cost of shipping, requiring ships to carry less cargo to reduce their draft or wait for high tide before transiting a harbor. To rectify this situation, some industry stakeholders seek to enact a "spending guarantee" to spend down the surplus in the HMTF. Some of these harbors or waterways are among the most expensive to maintain in the country and collectively they represent a significant portion of total HMTF expenditures. Given the amount of HMT collections not spent on harbors and the amount spent on harbors with little or no cargo, a rough estimate is that less than half and perhaps as little as a third of every HMT dollar collected is being spent to maintain harbors that shippers frequently use. The HMT was originally assessed at 0.04% of the cargo value. Generally, coastal and Great Lakes ports are subject to the tax. However, domestic shipping on the Great Lakes and along the coasts is only one-fifth the tonnage of U.S. foreign waterborne trade and domestic vessels account for less than one in every ten ship calls at U.S. ports. Based on the HMTF expenditures these ports have received and the HMT revenues generated on imported cargo alone (not counting domestic cargo or cruise ship traffic), Los Angeles and Long Beach likely receive less than a penny on the dollar, and Seattle and Tacoma just over a penny for every dollar that import shippers who use their port pay in HMT. New York, Boston, and Houston likely receive less than a quarter of tax revenues collected. Although little cargo moves through Grays Harbor, it is much more significant to commercial fishermen and recreational boaters. As mentioned above, according to the Corps analysis, full channel dimensions are available less than an average of 35% of the time at the 59 highest use U.S. harbors. Most, if not all, of the busiest ports in the country generate more than sufficient HMT revenue to cover Corps O&M expenditures at their port, even at exceptionally dredging-intensive ports like those on the Mississippi River in Louisiana. As indicated above, a good portion of the HMT revenues that shippers generate are used to dredge channels used mostly by either recreational boaters or commercial fishermen, which do not pay the HMT. Some might argue that to target one group of harbor users for assessing a fee and then to distribute revenues mostly, or entirely, in the case of some harbors, for the benefit of other users, undermines the "trust fund" and "user fee" concept. Legislative Activity in the 111th Congress
In the 111 th Congress, several bills were introduced to either change the tax rate or how revenues from the tax are spent. H.R. 3486 , H.R. 638 , S. 551 , and S. 1509 would repeal the tax on domestic waterborne non-bulk cargo and cargo imported from Canada through the Great Lakes for the purported purpose of mitigating highway congestion by diverting shipments from truck to water modes. H.R. H.R. 4844 / S. 3213 would provide a "spending guarantee" modeled after the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. H.R. 2355 would increase the tax rate to 0.4375% ($4.38 per $1,000 in cargo value) and expand use of the fund for landside port improvements in addition to the waterside maintenance performed by the Corps. The Obama Administration, in its FY2010 budget submission, requested that a pilot project be created to examine the feasibility of having local users finance the maintenance dredging of channels with little or no commercial traffic. Congress reduced the amount of funding for this program from $1.5 million to $1.4 million. | In 1986, Congress enacted the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) to recover operation and maintenance (O&M) costs at U.S. coastal and Great Lakes harbors from maritime shippers. O&M is mostly the dredging of harbor channels to their authorized depths and widths. The tax is levied on importers and domestic shippers using coastal or Great Lakes ports. Due to a Supreme Court decision in 1998, exporters no longer pay the tax because it was found unconstitutional. The tax is assessed at a rate of 0.125% of cargo value ($1.25 per $1,000 in cargo value). The tax revenues are deposited into the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) from which Congress appropriates funds for harbor dredging.
Despite a large surplus in the trust fund, the busiest U.S. harbors are presently under-maintained. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) estimates that full channel dimensions at the nation's busiest 59 ports are available less than 35% of the time. This situation can increase the cost of shipping as vessels carry less cargo in order to reduce their draft or wait for high tide before transiting a harbor. It could also increase the risk of a ship grounding or collision, possibly resulting in an oil spill. To rectify this situation, some are calling for increasing disbursements from the trust fund. However, Corps data indicate that a significant portion of annual HMTF disbursements are directed towards harbors which handle little or no cargo. The Oregon Inlet in North Carolina, Grays Harbor in Washington, Humboldt Harbor in California, and the Lake Washington Ship Canal in Seattle are some of the harbors or waterways that fit this description. Commercial fishermen and recreational boat (or yacht) owners account for most, if not all, of the vessel traffic in these harbors. Fishermen and recreational boaters do not pay the HMT. Some might argue that to target one group of harbor users for assessing a fee and then to distribute revenues mostly, or entirely, in some cases, for the benefit of other users, undermines the "trust fund" and "user fee" concept. The Administration requested and Congress provided funding for a pilot program that began in FY2010 to investigate the feasibility of having non-cargo harbor users finance the dredging requirements of harbors with little or no commerce.
In addition to the distribution of HMT revenues for the benefit of non-cargo harbor users, there are also equity issues associated with HMT revenue distribution among the nation's top commercial ports. Due to geological differences, ports vary greatly in the amount of dredging they require. About one-fifth of HMTF expenditures are spent in Louisiana. The ports of Mobile, AL, and Portland, OR also are relatively expensive to maintain. The amount of HMT revenue ports generate also varies significantly due to differences in the amount and characteristics of the cargoes they handle. Consequently, HMT revenues are redistributed from ports that are large import gateways with naturally deep channels to lower volume ports that require frequent dredging to maintain adequate channel depths and widths. The ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach, Seattle, and Tacoma, and to a lesser degree, Boston, New York, and Houston are large net generators of HMT revenue. International cargo predominates at most ports. Ports compete for this cargo, and the growth of containerized cargo and the prospective expansion of the Panama Canal have intensified competition among U.S. ports.
Legislation was introduced in the 111th Congress that had varying objectives regarding the HMT. H.R. 3447 and H.R. 4844/S. 3213 would spend down the surplus in the HMTF. H.R. 2355 would increase the tax rate and expand use of the HMTF for landside port infrastructure improvements. H.R. 3486, H.R. 638, S. 551, and S. 1509 would repeal the tax on non-bulk cargo shipped on the Great Lakes and along the coasts in an effort to divert truck cargo from congested highways to waterways. None of these bills were enacted. |
crs_R40620 | crs_R40620_0 | Amendments to that statute authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to carry out pilot programs to contract with a county or municipality for certain municipal services. The Secretary is authorized to enter into agreements to reimburse other entities for expenses they may incur in participating in the cleanup of a military installation under this program. Effect of the Proposed Amendment
This section of the proposed legislation would expand the scope of current law to allow the Secretary to enter into agreements for reimbursement of expenses that other entities may incur in "processing" a transfer of federal property, before or after cleanup is performed. The proposed language also is intended to prevent the Secretary from imposing certain conditions on the funding made available through a reimbursement agreement. If the Secretary enters into a reimbursement agreement with another entity, the Secretary would be required not to make the reimbursement conditional upon whether a state may take an enforcement action against the Department of Defense, or upon a state's willingness to enter into dispute resolution with the Department of Defense to avoid an enforcement action. Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)15
On September 8, 2005, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission submitted nearly 200 recommendations to President George W. Bush. President Bush approved the recommendations and, in accordance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (DBCRA), as amended, the Secretary of Defense is putting into effect the entire list prior to September 15, 2011. 2295 would further amend the DBCRA to expand the indemnification (holding harmless) of persons who have taken title to property on closed military installations and to require the conveyance at no cost of surplus military property under certain conditions. The statute permits the Secretary to transfer the property to the redevelopment authority under this authority at no cost if the recipient agrees to utilize proceeds from the sale or lease of any portion of the transferred property "during at least the first seven years after the initial transfer to support the economic development of, or related to, the installation," and executes the agreement of transfer and accepts control of the property "within a reasonable time after the date of the property disposal record of decision or finding of no significant impact under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. Under S. 590 / H.R. 1959 / H.R. Arguably, any agreements not concluded by the date of enactment of the bill would be subject to the new framework and would be eligible for transfer at no cost. Issues for Congress
Although the introductory sections of S. 590 and H.R. Are there advantages in broadening the Secretary of Defense's ability to reimburse agencies and organizations for military site cleanup activities to include expenses associated with "processing" of a conveyance of the property? | Several bills (S. 590, H.R. 1959, and H.R. 2295) that would modify or expand statutory authorities granted to senior executives of the Department of Defense (DOD) have been introduced to the 111th Congress. These authorities relate to the exchange of real property, the outsourcing of some military installation support services, and the reimbursement by DOD of some costs associated with military site cleanup. The proposed legislation would also amend the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the BRAC law, to expand existing legal protections granted to those who have taken title to property at closed military bases and to set conditions under which future title transfers for surplus military property would be carried out at no cost to the recipient.
S. 590 and H.R. 2295 are identical. If enacted, these bills would render permanent an expired authority held by the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary of a military department) to exchange any defense real property for real property held by non-DOD entities if the exchange will limit encroachment on military activities or will relieve a shortage of military housing. They would also expand and make permanent a limited pilot program that allows certain services currently performed at military installations by DOD employees or private contractors to be non-competitively outsourced to municipal or county governments.
Another section in the bills would expand the authority of the Secretary of Defense to enter into a cost-reimbursement agreement for the cleanup of a military site. Current law permits agreements that reimburse federal, state, and local agencies and other entities for certain costs incurred by participation in a cleanup program. The bill would allow reimbursement agreements to include costs incurred in the "processing" of a transfer of title of federal property and would prevent the Secretary from imposing certain conditions on the funding made available.
The remaining sections of the bills would amend the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the so-called BRAC law. They would expand the legal protections available to persons who have taken title to property on closed military bases and would require the conveyance of surplus military property at no cost if certain conditions are met.
This report analyzes the key provisions of the legislation, identifies probable effects of the proposed amendments to existing law, and suggests issues raised for congressional consideration. |
crs_RL33936 | crs_RL33936_0 | The insecurity resulting from ongoing violence in Iraq continues to have a marked impact on civilian displacement in various parts of the country. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) now estimates close to 4.7 million Iraqis are currently displaced from their homes, including roughly 2.7 million inside Iraq and 2 million refugees who have fled Iraq, mostly to neighboring Jordan and Syria. When the displacement crisis accelerated in 2006,UNHCR observed that the humanitarian crisis many feared would take place in March 2003 as a result of the war then began to occur. Then, as now, there were also concerns about the absorptive capacity of neighboring countries, whether they could provide adequately for the populations moving across borders, and the potential impact of refugee flows on stability in the region. While there are some reports of limited improvements—decreasing violence, reduced levels of displacement, and some returns in a few governorates—the situation in general remains serious and requires sustained attention. UNHCR estimates that the number of Iraqi IDPs who need food and shelter exceeds 1 million people. Experts suggest that what is badly needed—and quickly—is the development of a robust response on the part of the international community that provides and funds humanitarian relief; conducts a close examination of resettlement policies and options in third countries; develops a strategy to manage the displaced, particularly within Iraq; and implements increased funding to host countries and aid agencies outside Iraq. Displacement Within Iraq
Displacement within Iraq has usually been the result of sectarian conflict and general armed violence, local criminal activity, coalition military operations, and fighting among militias and insurgents. Profile of Displacement
There have been no reliable census data on Iraq's ethnic and sectarian makeup for decades. A Profile of the Displaced
Of those who have fled Iraq, various reports indicate that many refugees were from Iraq's now decimated middle class. U.S. Humanitarian Response in Iraq
Determining the immediate steps the United States can take with regard to Iraqi IDPs in particular (and in a more general sense to the Iraqi refugees) and how other international partners could be involved may prove to be critical in the next phase of the U.S. Iraq strategy. | Some aspects of the humanitarian crisis many feared would take place in March 2003 with the initial military operation in Iraq unfolded later as a result of the ongoing insurgency and sectarian violence. It is estimated that in total (including those displaced prior to the war) there may be as many as 2 million Iraqi refugees who have fled to Jordan, Syria, and other neighboring states, and approximately 2.7 million Iraqis who have been displaced within Iraq itself.
Between 2004-2007, the violence and insecurity resulting from the ongoing sectarian strife, terrorism, and insurgency in Iraq produced substantial civilian displacement in different parts of the country. There are continued concerns about the absorptive capacity of neighboring countries, whether they can provide adequately for the populations that have moved across borders, and the impact of refugee flows on stability in general. Many of Iraq's neighbors fear that they are being overwhelmed by refugees who have fled over Iraq's borders. While there is clear evidence of limited improvement in Iraq—decreasing violence, reduced levels of displacement, and some returns in a few governorates—the situation in general remains fragile and requires sustained attention. UNHCR estimates that the number of Iraqis displaced within Iraq who need food and shelter exceeds 1 million people.
This report provides an analysis of the current crisis, including an overview of the conditions for those displaced in Iraq and the refugee situations in Syria, Jordan, and elsewhere. It also provides information on the U.S. and international response and examines refugee resettlement options in the United States. Aspects of this crisis that may be of particular interest to the111th Congress include a focus on an immediate response (providing humanitarian relief funding), examining resettlement policies, and developing a strategy to manage the displaced, particularly within Iraq. This report will be updated as events warrant. For more information on Iraq, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31111 | crs_RL31111_0 | Technology issues: Will the United States be able to develop and deploymissile defenses that can intercept missiles of all ranges and at all phases of their flights? The report concludes with a summary of congressionalaction on the missile defense budget. Missile Defense Prior to the Bush Administration
The United States has pursued the development of missile defenses for more than 50 years. Missile defense has provento be a challenging and elusive endeavor. Moreover, the question of whether the United Statesshould deploy extensive defenses to protect against ballistic missile attack has been one of the mostdivisive political and national security issues of this generation. For many, concerns about nuclear stabilitybetween the United States and Russia have receded as the two nations expanded their areas ofcooperation and improved their relationship, especially in the U.S. lead war on terrorism. (1) Eventerrorist acquisition of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction is today part of thepolicy debate. Bush Administration's Proposed Approach
The Bush Administration sharply altered the debate over missile defense. In its missile defense program, the Bush Administration eliminated distinctions betweentheater and national missile defenses (TMD and NMD). Unlike theClinton Administration, the Bush Administration has not yet identified an architecture (a detailedmissile defense system with specific objectives and capabilities) that it will seek to deploy norestablished a schedule for the development and deployment of any particular system or element; but,a clear underlying objective is the early deployment of a defense designed against missiles aimed atU.S. territory. Actual withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty occurredJune 13, 2002. Russia has the most significant ballisticmissile inventory of all countries of concern. (12)
China. Previously, the United Statespursued missile defense concepts that employed nuclear weapons as interceptors. Layered Defenses. Acquisition Strategy & Congressional Oversight. (39)
The Administration and its supporters argue that the use of spiral development for the missiledefense program (or other weapon acquisition programs) will not prevent Congress from conductingeffective oversight, and could even improve Congress's oversight ability in some respects, becauseCongress will retain its role in approving each block, or segment, in a spiral development program,and because the information that DOD provides for the block to be approved will be more reliablethan the potentially speculative information it might present under the traditional acquisitionapproach about what the entire program might look like from beginning to end. TheAdministration said the United States would begin fielding initial missile defense capabilities in2004-2005 to meet the near-term ballistic missile threats to the U.S. homeland, to U.S. deployedforces, and to counter ballistic missile threats to U.S. friends and allies. New Missile. | The United States has pursued missile defenses since the dawn of the missile age shortly afterWorld War II. The development and deployment of missile defenses has not only been elusive, buthas been one of the most divisive issues of the past generation until recent years.
The Bush Administration substantially altered the debate over missile defenses. TheAdministration requested significant funding increases for missile defense programs, eliminated thedistinction between national and theater missile defense, restructured the missile defense programto focus more directly on developing deployment options for a "layered" capability to interceptmissiles aimed at U.S. territory across the whole spectrum of their flight path, adopted a new, untrieddevelopment and acquisition strategy, announced U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-ballisticMissile Treaty, and has deployed an initial national missile defense capability.
The Administration argued these steps were necessary in response to growing concerns overthe spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, especially on the part of ahandful of potentially hostile states and terrorists. In addition, they asserted that U.S. deterrencetheory has outlived its usefulness and that conventional or nuclear deterrence could not be reliedupon to dissuade unstable leaders in rogue states.
Critics, however, take issue with assertions that the threat is increasing, citing evidence thatthe number of nations seeking or possessing nuclear weapons has actually declined over the past 20years. Moreover, they argue that the technology for effective missile defense remains immature, thatdeployment can be provocative to allies, friends, and adversaries, and it is a budget-buster thatreduces the availability of funds to modernize and operate U.S. conventional military forces. Theyargue especially that some major powers view U.S. missile defense as an attempt at strategicdomination and that other, such as China, will expand their missile capabilities in response.
This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL32641 | crs_RL32641_0 | Sometimes desired programming cannot be provided because of private contractual network affiliation agreements between broadcast networks and local broadcast station affiliates. Most broadcast television stations' viewing areas extend far beyond the borders of their city of license, and in many cases extend beyond state borders. It identifies, for each state:
the number of television households in the state; the counties in the state assigned to DMAs for which the primary city is outside the state; the number of television households in those counties; the percentage of television households in the state that are located in DMAs for which the primary city is outside the state; and the full power broadcast television stations with city of license or transmitting location inside the state that are located in DMAs for which the primary city is outside the state. Under existing FCC rules, the licensee's explicit public interest obligation is limited to serving the needs of viewers within its city of license. Yet, in many cases, the population residing within the city of license is only a small proportion of the total population receiving the station's signal. For example, the licenses for the preponderance of stations serving the metropolitan New York City and Philadelphia areas are assigned to those cities, with very few licenses assigned to New Jersey, western Connecticut, or Delaware. As shown in Table 1 , 54.55% of the television households in Wyoming are located in television markets outside the state. If a cable system is located in a DMA in which the primary city is in another state, and most or all of the television stations in that DMA have city of license in the other state, then the broadcast television signals it must carry will be primarily or entirely from out of state. The Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004 (SHVERA) expanded the scope of in-state television signals that may be of local interest to subscribers that satellite operators are permitted (and, in the case of operators in Alaska and Hawaii, required) to offer subscribers. In addition to the signals of those broadcast television stations with city of license within the DMA in which the subscriber is located ("local-into-local" service), satellite operators may offer (subject to certain limitations) signals from outside the DMA if those signals are "significantly viewed" by those households in the subscriber's geographic area that only receive their broadcast signals over-the-air (not via cable or satellite). In addition, satellite operators may offer certain subscribers located in New Hampshire, Vermont, Mississippi, and Oregon certain in-state signals from outside the subscribers' DMA and must offer subscribers in Alaska and Hawaii certain in-state signals. This, in itself, provides broadcasters with some economic incentive to be responsive to the needs and interests of these viewers. Bills Introduced in the 110th Congress
To date, three bills that address cable and satellite carriage of local broadcast television station signals have been introduced in the 110 th Congress. | Most broadcast television stations' viewing areas extend far beyond the borders of their city of license, and in many cases extend beyond state borders. Under existing FCC rules, which are intended to foster "localism," the licensee's explicit public interest obligation is limited to serving the needs and interests of viewers within the city of license. Yet, in many cases, the population residing in the city of license is only a small proportion of the total population receiving the station's signal. Hundreds of thousands of television households in New Jersey (outside New York City and Philadelphia), Delaware (outside Philadelphia), western Connecticut (outside New York City), New Hampshire (outside Boston), Kansas (outside Kansas City, Missouri), Indiana (outside Chicago), Illinois (outside St. Louis), and Kentucky (outside Cincinnati) have little or no access to broadcast television stations with city of license in their own state. The same holds true for several rural states—including Idaho, Arkansas, and especially Wyoming, where 54.55% of television households are located in television markets outside the state. Although market forces often provide broadcasters the incentive to be responsive to their entire serving area, that is not always the case. This report provides, for each state, detailed county-by-county data on the percentage of television households located in television markets outside the state and whether there are any in-state stations serving those households.
The Nielsen Designated Market Areas (DMAs) also often extend beyond state borders. Local cable operators are required to carry the broadcast signals of television stations located in their DMA. If they are located in a DMA for which the primary city is in another state, and most or all of the television stations in that DMA have city of license in the other state, then the broadcast television signals they must carry will be primarily or entirely from out of state. In some cases, they may not be allowed to carry signals from within the state but outside the DMA to provide news or sports programming of special interest in their state because of network non-duplication, syndicated exclusivity, or sports programming blackout rules or because of private network affiliation contract agreements, or may be discouraged to do so because these signals do not qualify for the royalty-free permanent compulsory copyright license for local broadcast signals. The Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004 expanded the scope of in-state television signals that satellite operators are permitted (and in some cases required) to offer subscribers. In addition to the signals of those broadcast television stations with city of license within the DMA in which the subscriber is located ("local-into-local" service), satellite operators may offer (subject to certain restrictions) signals from outside the DMA if those signals are "significantly viewed" by those households in the subscriber's geographic area that only receive their broadcast signals over-the-air (not via cable or satellite). In addition, satellite operators may offer certain subscribers located in New Hampshire, Vermont, Mississippi, and Oregon certain in-state signals from outside the subscribers' DMA and must offer subscribers in Alaska and Hawaii certain in-state signals. This report will be updated as events warrant. To date, four bills on cable and satellite carriage of local broadcast television station signals have been introduced in the 110th Congress (S. 124, S. 760, H.R. 602, and H.R. 2821). |
crs_R44767 | crs_R44767_0 | FERC normally has five commissioners, with a quorum of three members required to be present to transact business. Creation of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
In 1977, Congress enacted the Department of Energy Organization Act (EOA, P.L. On January 25, 2017, President Trump designated Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur to serve as acting chairwoman of FERC, replacing Norman Bay as chair. Commissioner Bay subsequently resigned from the Commission effective February 3, 2017, leaving FERC without a voting quorum of three members; only acting Chairwoman LaFleur and Commissioner Colette Honorable remain as members of the Commission. Under EOA Section 401(e), "... a quorum for the transaction of business shall consist of at least three members present. Each member of the Commission, including the Chairman, shall have one vote. Actions of the Commission shall be decided by a majority vote of the members present." The Commission generally has three members from the party of the incumbent President, and two from the minority party. However, Republican Commissioner Philip Moeller left FERC in October 2015, and fellow Republican Tony Clark left the Commission following the expiration of his term on June 30, 2016. President Obama did not nominate replacements for either Commissioners Moeller or Clark, meaning that FERC was operating with only three Democratic commissioners since September 2016. Commissioner Honorable's current term expires on June 30, 2017, and Commissioner LaFleur's term expires on June 30, 2019. A quorum will not be restored until at least one new member is seated. The absence of a quorum limits FERC's authority to issue orders concerning projects or rate and tariff issues as discussed below. On February 3, 2017, anticipating that the lack of quorum would continue for an indefinite period, the Commission chose to issue an order (while it still had a quorum) delegating authority to staff for certain agency functions. FERC stated that the order was issued to assure that the Commission's regulatory obligations would be carried out "in an effective and efficient manner consistent with the public interest." This is not the first time the Commission has issued a delegation order following a loss of quorum. FERC took similar action to delegate authority to its staff to act in the absence of a quorum in 1993. FERC recognizes in the current delegation order that, in the absence of FERC authority, certain rate filings (for example, under the FPA and NGA) may take effect under operation of law "without suspension, refund protection, or the ability of contesting parties to appeal." Thus, FERC states that the delegation order is intended to "ensure that staff has the authority to prevent such filings from going into effect by operation of law during the period in which the Commission lacks a quorum." FERC staff can, however, continue to gather information and prepare analyses (such as for Environmental Impact Statements and Environmental Assessments for pipeline projects and hydropower licenses) necessary to process those applications. Staff may also prepare draft orders that the Commission may approve, once a quorum is restored. | On January 25, 2017, President Trump designated Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or the Commission) to serve as acting chairwoman of FERC, replacing Norman Bay as chair. Commissioner Bay subsequently resigned from the Commission effective February 3, 2017, leaving FERC without a voting quorum of three members, since only acting Chairwoman LaFleur and Commissioner Colette Honorable remain as members of the Commission. The absence of a quorum limits FERC's authority to issue orders concerning projects or rate and tariff issues. A quorum will not be restored until at least one new member is seated.
FERC normally has five commissioners, with a quorum of three members required to be present to transact business. Under Section 401(e) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (P.L. 95-91), "... a quorum for the transaction of business shall consist of at least three members present. Each member of the Commission, including the Chairman, shall have one vote. Actions of the Commission shall be decided by a majority vote of the members present."
The Commission generally has three members from the party of the incumbent President, and two from the minority party. However, Republican Commissioner Philip Moeller left FERC in October 2015, and fellow Republican Tony Clark left the Commission following the expiration of his term on June 30, 2016. President Obama did not nominate replacements for either Commissioners Moeller or Clark, meaning that FERC was operating with only three Democratic commissioners since September 2016. Commissioner Honorable's current term expires on June 30, 2017, and Commissioner LaFleur's term expires on June 30, 2019.
On February 3, 2017, anticipating that the lack of quorum will continue for an indefinite period, the Commission chose to issue an order (while it still had a quorum) delegating authority to staff for certain agency functions (e.g., certain actions related to rate filings, uncontested settlements, or uncontested requests for waivers on certain terms or conditions of filings). FERC stated that the order was issued to assure that the Commission's regulatory obligations are carried out "in an effective and efficient manner consistent with the public interest." This is not the first time the Commission has issued a delegation order following a loss of quorum. FERC took similar action to delegate authority to its staff to act in the absence of a quorum in 1993.
FERC recognizes in the current delegation order that, in the absence of FERC authority, certain rate filings (for example, under the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act) may take effect under operation of law "without suspension, refund protection, or the ability of contesting parties to appeal." Thus, FERC states that the delegation order is intended to "ensure that staff has the authority to prevent such filings from going into effect by operation of law during the period in which the Commission lacks a quorum."
The absence of a quorum means that FERC will not be issuing orders on business matters requiring member votes such as electric utility mergers and acquisitions, new policies or rulemakings, or natural gas pipeline certificates. However, staff will continue to issue Environmental Impact Statements and Environmental Assessments for pipeline projects and hydropower licenses. Staff may also continue to draft orders in preparing for member votes when a quorum is restored. |
crs_R43370 | crs_R43370_0 | A statutory formula determines monthly payment levels for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). In addition, the law also eliminates from benefit calculations one year of a SSDI beneficiary's lowest earnings for every five years of earnings (also known as the one-for-five rule), which equates to a maximum of five "disability dropout years" for an individual with 25 or more years of earnings. The application of CDYs is not common, affecting approximately 0.16% of SSDI beneficiaries between 2000 and 2013. This report describes how workers become insured for SSDI benefits, how SSDI benefits are calculated, and the use of dropout years in benefit calculations. Becoming Fully Insured for SSDI
Quarters of Coverage
To be fully insured, a worker must have worked a minimum amount of time in employment covered by Social Security. Generally, an individual must have one quarter of coverage (also referred to as "credits") for each calendar year after the age of 21 up to the year before the individual (1) reaches the age of 62, (2) dies, or (3) becomes disabled. A minimum of six quarters is required to become fully insured. In 2014, each quarter of coverage requires $1,200 in earnings, which is indexed annually to average wage growth. Recency of Work
In addition, a recency of work test requires the worker to have 20 quarters of coverage in the 40 quarters preceding the onset of disability (generally five years of work in the last 10). The AIME is calculated as the sum of indexed earnings over the computation period, divided by the number of "computation years" (in months). This adjusts a beneficiary's earnings to be comparable to the earnings level in the year he or she became disabled. This provision reduces the effects of years of lower earnings on a disabled worker's benefit amount. Childcare Dropout Years in AIME Calculations
In addition, in calculating the AIME, disabled workers who receive fewer than three disability dropout years under the one-for-five rule (as described above) may be credited with up to two additional dropout years based on the care of a child, for up to a total of three dropout years. | Eligibility for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits are based on a worker's insured status, and payment levels are associated with the individual's career earnings under covered employment. Monthly payments are calculated using a formula that takes into account the period of employment, a worker's average earnings over that period, and the application of "dropout years."
To be insured for SSDI benefits, a claimant must have worked a minimum amount of time in covered employment. First, a worker must be "fully insured," which requires one quarter of coverage for each calendar year after the age of 21, with a minimum of six quarters and a maximum of 40 quarters. In 2014, each quarter of coverage requires $1,200 in earnings. Second, a recency of work test requires 20 quarters of coverage in the 40 quarters preceding the onset of a disability; that is generally five years of work in the last 10, although fewer quarters are required for younger workers.
In calculating the SSDI benefit level, up to five years of a worker's lowest years of earnings are eliminated or "dropped" to minimize the effect of lower years of earnings on monthly payments. An eligible worker who becomes disabled has one year of earnings dropped (via the disability dropout year provision) for every five years of earnings, known as the one-for-five rule. A separate childcare dropout year (CDY) provision also disregards from benefit calculations up to two years in which a beneficiary received no income during periods when he or she was caring for a young child. The number of CDYs applied to a benefit calculation may be offset by the number of disability dropout years applied and vice versa. The CDY provision largely benefits a small subset of SSDI recipients with lower career earnings.
This report provides (1) an overview of the SSDI program and how workers become insured for SSDI benefits, (2) an explanation of how benefit payments are calculated, and (3) a description of how the dropout year provisions affect the calculation of disability benefit payments. The report concludes with a brief analysis of the earnings of disabled workers that have been credited with CDYs. |
crs_R41441 | crs_R41441_0 | Introduction
The Chinese government decided in 2007 to join a growing list of nations and create a sovereign wealth fund (SWF). In addition, one of the CIC's subsidiaries, the Central Huijin Investment Corporation (Central Huijin), made substantial investments in several larger Chinese banks and financial enterprises, which in turn, began to back outward foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investments by state-owned enterprises and private corporations. Although the CIC maintains that it is an institutional investor seeking to maximize its rate of return, some observers speculate that the CIC is operating as a vehicle for a Chinese government strategy to secure access and possibly control over resources necessary for China's growing economy. Some are concerned that China's expanding international holdings of energy and strategic resources may pose a risk to U.S. security. The CIC provided China with another avenue by which it could invest its growing foreign exchange reserves, which totaled $1.4 trillion as of September 2007, and which have continued to grow, standing at $2.45 trillion as of July 2010. The genesis of the CIC was apparently subject to political infighting among China's major financial institutions, with both China's central bank, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), and the Ministry of Finance vying for control over the new SWF. In the end, the CIC was placed directly under the control of the State Council, China's ruling executive body. According to the CIC's webpage, its mission "is to make long-term investments that maximize risk adjusted financial returns for the benefit of its shareholder [the State Council]." As a result, the CIC indirectly became a major stock holder in the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and other Chinese financial institutions. In 2009, the CIC's return on its total registered capital was 12.9% and its return on its global portfolio was 11.7%. In 2008, the return on capital was 6.8% and its global investments lost 2.1%. Based on its 2009 performance, the CIC has reportedly asked for an additional $200 billion in capital. First, just prior to and immediately after its establishment, the CIC focused its investments on financial institutions. Third, the CIC reactivated its investment activity starting in 2009, with a notable shift to investments in energy and natural resource companies. The apparent change has raised concerns about the commercial basis of CIC's investment strategy. According to a report submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in February 2010, the CIC had holdings in 82 different U.S. entities as of December 31, 2009, with a total worth of $9.627 billion. Investments by Central Huijin
Although Central Huijin is a wholly owned subsidiary of the CIC, according to its website, "the investment business of [the] CIC and the share management function conducted on behalf of the State Council by Central Huijin are completely separated." If the two investment agencies were separated, it was expected that the CIC would remain primarily an investor in overseas assets, while Central Huijin would become an administrator of state-owned financial assets—such as the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the China Development Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Concerns About the CIC
The recent investment activities of the CIC and its subsidiary, Central Huijin, have raised concerns among some financial analysts. However, some analysts have suggested that the recent changes do not adequately protect the United States from economic risks posed by SWFs and/or inward FDI from China. Among the regulatory changes that have been suggested are:
Requirements that any SWF interested in investing in the United States publicly release audited financial statements that follow international accounting standards on a regular basis; Restrictions on the percentage of a U.S. company that an SWF may own (other governments have such limits; for example, Hong Kong authorities have said they may withdraw the authority of Standard Chartered Bank to issue Hong Kong currency if the share of its stock owned by a Singaporean SWF exceeds 20%); Restrictions on the type of investment SWFs may make in U.S. companies—alternatives include restricting SWFs to the purchase of nonvoting shares, banning SWFs from negotiating a seat on the company's board of directors or representation in the company's senior management; and Changes in U.S. tax code—under current U.S. law, the profits of SWFs are generally tax-exempt; it has been suggested that the tax-exemption for SWFs be eliminated or restricted. In addition, policy analysts have suggested that access to U.S. financial markets should be contingent on the successful conclusion of a reciprocity agreement that would allow U.S. banks and financial institutions comparable access to the other nation's investment and financial markets. | China's ruling executive body, the State Council, established the China Investment Corporation (CIC), a sovereign wealth fund, in September 2007 to invest $200 billion of China's then $1.4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. As with other sovereign wealth funds worldwide, the CIC's existence allows China to invest its reserves in a wide range of assets, including stocks, bonds, and hedge funds. After a rocky start in which it incurred losses of 2.1% on its global investments in 2008 – caused in part by aftereffects of the global financial crisis of 2007 – the CIC's rate of return in 2009 rose to 11.7%. The State Council is reportedly considering a CIC request for an additional $200 billion out of China's $2.5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves.
Congress and financial analysts raised concerns about the CIC after its creation, partly because it was a comparatively large sovereign wealth fund, partly because it was government-owned, and partly because it reported directly to the State Council. Some observers were apprehensive that the Chinese government would use the CIC to acquire control over strategically important natural resources, obtain access to sensitive technology, and/or disrupt international financial markets. The CIC attempted to counter these concerns by announcing that its investment strategy would conform to international standards, and sought only to maximize its "risk-adjusted financial return." The CIC also promised to avoid politically and strategically sensitive investments.
The CIC has been the focus of discussions among China's leadership about its economic objectives and its organizational structure. Soon after its creation, the CIC became the sole owner of Central Huijin Investment Limited (Central Huijin), an investment fund established by China's central bank, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), as a vehicle for injecting capital into major Chinese banks. Over the last three years, Central Huijin has provided billions of dollars to the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and other financial institutions. Some analysts maintain that there is an inherent conflict between the CIC's goal to maximize its return on investments and Central Huijin's mission to provide capital to domestic financial institutions, and advocate their separation. While there have been reports of a possible separation, Central Huijin remains a subsidiary of the CIC.
Concerns about the CIC's investment activities reemerged in 2009 when it greatly expanded its overseas holdings, and began acquiring stakes in energy companies, natural resource companies and alternative energy companies. According to its filings with the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), the CIC had holdings in 82 U.S. entities as of December 31, 2009. Commentators once again questioned the true goals of the CIC's investment strategy. The CIC maintains that its main mission is to maximize its long-term, risk-adjusted rate of return.
For Congress, the investment activities of the CIC and its subsidiary, Central Huijin, raise questions about U.S. policies on inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and the global competitiveness of U.S. financial institutions. Some question if the current controls on inward FDI via the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, SEC, and other agencies provide adequate protection of U.S. strategic assets and technology from investments by the CIC and other Chinese entities. Others are concerned that Central Huijin's assistance to Chinese banks and financial institutions are part of a larger strategy to increase China's influence in strategic markets. These commentators suggest that more should be done to protect the United States from China's rising role in international capital markets.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44220 | crs_R44220_0 | Introduction
Some tax proposals have focused on broadening the tax base and lowering the rates of both individual and corporate income taxes. In some cases, these proposals have advanced a revenue-neutral tax reform. In other instances, they have proposed revenue increases. An example of a broad-based revenue-neutral income tax reform is H.R. 1 introduced in the 113 th Congress by then Ways and Means Chairma n Dave Camp. The bill proposed lowering both individual and corporate rates, while increasing the tax base through revising both business-related tax benefits (such as accelerated depreciation) and individual benefits (such as itemized deductions). Given the challenges of adopting a broad income tax reform, some proposals have focused on business-only tax reform. The Obama Administration has proposed such a reform, which would be revenue neutral and include cutting the corporate rate, reducing business-related tax expenditures, reducing taxes on manufacturing, simplifying taxes for small business, and reforming the international tax system. A challenge to confining tax reform to businesses is that many provisions that expand the tax base may affect pass-through businesses. Unlike income in regular corporations, which is subject to the corporate income tax rate, income in pass-through businesses passes through to the individual owners and is taxed at the individual income tax rate. The effects on pass-throughs of broadening the tax base most likely could not be offset by generally lowering individual tax rates because the vast majority of those individual rates apply to labor or passive income. The cost of lowering the individual rates on this labor or passive income would probably be prohibitive. As a result, a revenue-neutral tax reform composed solely of corporate rate reductions and base-broadening provisions would likely increase the tax burden on pass-through businesses in the absence of other revisions. The next section examines corporate tax expenditures and the extent to which those tax expenditures affect pass-through firms. S corporations elect to be taxed as proprietorships or partnerships. Shares of Total Business Income
Noncorporate business income is large relative to that of the corporate sector, but small relative to total individual income. The business and rental incomes, therefore, constituted 9.2% of income reported on individual income taxes. These relative sizes confirm the basic challenge to a corporate-only or business-only tax reform: provisions that broaden the base for business in general could have consequences for unincorporated businesses that constitute a large share of total business income earned by both sectors, but are such a small part of the individual income tax that cutting overall individual tax rates to offset noncorporate base-broadening provisions would create revenue losses for the large share of income that is not business income. Broadening the tax base could be achieved by eliminating various tax expenditures, such as exemptions, credits, or deductions. Provisions That are Primarily or Solely Corporate
Some provisions are almost entirely corporate. If this provision is not a potential source of revenue for corporate rate reduction, as may be the case (see the " Limit Reform to International Tax Changes " section), the tax expenditures that might be considered for base broadening that do not also spill significantly over into the noncorporate sector are limited. A simpler approach would be to reduce effective statutory rates for unincorporated businesses by allowing a deduction from taxable income for pass-through businesses following the model of the production activities deduction. This deferral of tax on foreign source income is the single largest corporate tax expenditure. | Some tax proposals have focused on broadening the tax base and lowering the rates of both individual and corporate income taxes. In some cases, these proposals have advanced a revenue-neutral tax reform. In other instances, they have proposed revenue increases. An example of a broad-based revenue-neutral income tax reform is H.R. 1 introduced in the 113th Congress by then Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp. The bill proposed lowering both individual and corporate rates, while increasing the tax base through revising both business-related tax benefits (such as accelerated depreciation) and individual benefits (such as itemized deductions).
Given the challenges of adopting a broad income tax reform, some proposals have focused on business-only tax reform. The Obama Administration has proposed such a reform, which would be revenue neutral and include cutting the corporate rate, reducing business-related tax expenditures, reducing taxes on manufacturing, simplifying taxes for small business, and reforming the international tax system.
A challenge to confining tax reform to businesses is that provisions that expand the tax base may affect pass-through businesses, such as partnerships, proprietorships, and small business (Subchapter S) corporations. Unlike income in regular corporations, which is subject to the corporate income tax rate, income in pass-through businesses passes through to the individual owners and is taxed at the individual income tax rate. The effects on pass-throughs of broadening the tax base most likely could not be offset by generally lowering individual tax rates because the vast majority of those individual rates apply to labor or passive income. The cost of lowering the individual rates on this labor or passive income would probably be prohibitive. As a result, a revenue-neutral tax reform composed solely of corporate rate reductions and base-broadening provisions would likely increase the tax burden on pass-through businesses in the absence of other revisions.
Noncorporate business income is large relative to that of the corporate sector, but small relative to total individual income. Noncorporate business and rental income is estimated to be 45% of total business income but only 9.2% of income reported on individual income taxes. Unincorporated businesses are estimated to own around 40% of the business capital stock.
Broadening the tax base could be achieved by eliminating various tax expenditures, such as exemptions, credits, or deductions. Of the major corporate tax expenditures and other provisions that might be considered for base-broadening, the largest is the deferral of tax on foreign source income, which accounts for about 40% of corporate tax expenditures and is almost entirely corporate. This provision, however, may not be available for corporate rate reduction, based on international tax reform proposals that have been advanced. Of the other tax expenditures, some have limited overlap with unincorporated businesses whereas others significantly affect pass-through businesses. The next two largest tax corporate tax expenditures, accelerated depreciation for equipment and the production activities deduction, also benefit pass-through businesses.
Increasing the tax burden on pass-through businesses to finance corporate rate reductions could lead to efficiency gains because corporate income currently is taxed more heavily than noncorporate income. Moreover, any tax reform will produce winners and losers (for example, creditors will also experience higher effective tax rates and industries will be affected differentially). Other options for business only tax reform are to target base-broadening provisions that are primarily corporate, limit changes in provisions to corporations, introduce or expand provisions that benefit small business, allow a deduction or alternative rate structure for pass-through income, or limit corporate reform to international tax changes. |
crs_RL33370 | crs_RL33370_0 | It is estimated that 90% of the cocaine coming to the United States originates in, or passes through, Colombia. In addition, the United States provides economic development aid from Development Assistance (DA), Child Survival and Health (CSH), and Economic Support Funds (ESF) accounts. Funding for ACI from FY2000 through FY2007 totals about $5.7 billion. FY2007 Funding Request
The Administration requested a total of $721.5 million for FY2007 for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, a slight reduction from FY2006. Related Funding Programs
Additional funding for the Andean region is provided through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, both managed by the State Department. For FY2006, DOD requested a total of $896 million globally for counternarcotics programs, of which it estimated spending $368 million in Latin America. The three have been designated foreign terrorist organizations by the United States. Peru shares its northern border with Colombia, and is the second largest cocaine producer in the world. 20 , P.L. Personnel Caps
The FY2005 National Defense Authorization Act changed existing law with regard to the cap on the number of U.S. military and civilian contractors that can be deployed in Colombia in support of Plan Colombia. Demobilization of Illegally Armed Groups in Colombia
The FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act makes funds available to assist in the demobilization and disarmament of former members of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), if the Secretary of State certifies that:
assistance will be provided only for individuals who have verifiably renounced and terminated any affiliation or involvement with FTOs, and are meeting all the requirements of the Colombia Demobilization program; the Colombian government is fully cooperating with the United States in extraditing FTO leaders and members who have been indicted in the United States for murder, kidnaping, narcotics trafficking, and other violations of U.S. law; the Colombian government is implementing a concrete and workable framework for dismantling the organizational structures of FTOs; and funds will not be used to make cash payments to individuals, and funds will only be available for any of the following activities: verification, reintegration (including training and education), vetting, recovery of assets for reparations for victims, and investigations and prosecutions. The 109 th Congress did not complete work on a number of appropriation bills, including Foreign Operations. Three continuing resolutions were passed to maintain funding into 2007 when the 110 th Congress finished all held-over spending bills. The final bill, the FY2007 Continuing Resolution ( H.J.Res. 20 / P.L. 109-289 , as amended by P.L. 110-5 ) was passed on February 15, 2007. The cut was made in response to reports that Bolivia's commitment to fighting drugs was lessening. FY2006 Supplemental Appropriations13
The Administration did not request additional counternarcotics funds for the Andean region in the supplemental. The legislation also authorized a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign in Colombia. 3057 ( H.Rept. 109-152 ) fully funding the ACI at $734.5 million. 109-102 ). | In February 2007, the 110th Congress finished consideration of FY2007 foreign operations appropriations legislation, held over from 2006, that provided foreign assistance to the Andean region. In addition to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), Andean countries benefit from Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds, and other types of economic aid. Congress continued to express concern with the volume of drugs readily available in the United States and elsewhere in the world. The three largest producers of cocaine are Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Ninety percent of the cocaine in the United States originates in, or passes through, Colombia.
The United States has made a significant commitment of funds and material support to help Colombia and the Andean region fight drug trafficking since the development of Plan Colombia in 1999. From FY2000 through FY2007, the United States provided a total of about $5.7 billion for the region in ACI funds. The United States also provides funding for Development Assistance (DA), Child Survival and Health (CSH), and Economic Support Funds (ESF) to some countries in the region. The Defense Department maintains a central counternarcotics account that funds activities in Latin America. Since 2002, Congress has granted expanded authority to use counternarcotics funds for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking and terrorist organizations in Colombia. Three illegally armed groups in Colombia that participate in drug production and trafficking have been designated foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department. In 2004, Congress also increased the level of U.S. military and civilian contractor personnel allowed to be deployed in Colombia, in response to an Administration request.
The FY2007 budget request, submitted to Congress on February 6, 2006, included a total of $721.5 million for ACI, an amount Congress approved in a continuing resolution. Congress did not complete work on the Foreign Operations bill in 2006, instead passing three continuing resolutions to maintain funding into 2007. The final bill, the FY2007 Continuing Resolution (H.J.Res. 20/P.L. 109-289, as amended by P.L. 110-5) was passed on February 15, 2007.
For FY2006, Congress approved the Administration's request for $734.5 million in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (H.R. 3057/P.L. 109-102), although a 1% across-the-board rescission reduced it to $727.2 million. |
crs_R44726 | crs_R44726_0 | Introduction
Member offices vary in their priorities and activities, but in addition to working on legislation, oversight, and other policy-related items, offices are commonly expected to provide constituent services. A broader discussion of constituent service and its relation to other commonly held views of Members' responsibilities can be found in CRS Report RL33686, Roles and Duties of a Member of Congress: Brief Overview . The expectation of constituent service has existed since the earliest Congresses. Often, constituents contact congressional offices and initiate requests. A constituent may contact a Member office requesting basic information about a government entity or process. Sometimes, a congressional office is one of several places a constituent can turn to. Other programs, opportunities, or services may require a Member office to serve as an intermediary. Constituent service can present an opportunity for Member offices to engage in outreach and provide education about federal government functions and services. Member offices will often post constituent service links on their official websites, or may mention available services in their newsletters or other constituent communications. Requests from constituents may also provide feedback for Members of Congress about how government programs are working and what issues could be addressed through formal oversight or legislation. The following sections provide a brief overview of many common constituent services provided by congressional offices. It is not intended to be an exhaustive or a prescriptive list, as Member offices are largely able to shape their own constituent service operations to suit their own representational priorities or the needs of their constituents. References to additional CRS products or other resources are also provided, when available. The House and Senate libraries, historian offices, and the Library of Congress may also be able to provide additional information of interest for staff giving tours. Constituents usually receive these from a Member office. Commemorations and Recognitions
Congressional Congratulations
Members of Congress may write letters recognizing constituents' public distinctions or achievements, subject to House or Senate franking rules. | Constituent service encompasses a wide array of non-legislative activities undertaken by Members of Congress or congressional staff, and it is commonly considered a representational responsibility. Member offices vary in their priorities, activities, and scope of constituent service, but most offices try to assist with certain requests when possible. Member offices have engaged in constituent service activities since the earliest Congresses. Depending on what the constituent is seeking, requests may be addressed by a Member's Washington, DC, office, or by a Member's district or state office.
Many constituents contact congressional offices to initiate their own requests, but Members of Congress may also engage in outreach to let constituents know of the ways in which a Member office might be able to assist them. Members of Congress often post constituent service links on their official websites and may mention constituent services in newsletters, in other communications, or at events. These activities can help facilitate a lasting connection between Member offices and constituents, and they may also provide feedback for Members of Congress about how government programs or legislation are affecting a district or state.
A congressional office is sometimes one of several places a constituent can turn to. Other programs, opportunities, or services may require a Member office to serve as an intermediary. Constituent service activities can be simple, like relaying contact information for a local federal office, or more complex, like providing internships or casework assistance. Limited office resources, along with House and Senate rules, may affect what level of assistance a congressional office is able to provide.
This report provides an overview of common constituent services provided by Member offices, along with references to additional CRS products or other relevant resources. The activities discussed in this report are divided into the following four categories:
Help with Government Opportunities for Students Assisting with Washington, DC, Visits Commemorations and Recognitions
The report is intended to provide guidance for Member offices regarding constituent service, but it is not intended to be an exhaustive nor a prescriptive list of activities. Within the parameters set by the House and Senate rules, Member offices may largely shape their own constituent service operations to suit their own representational priorities and the needs of their constituents. |
crs_97-1057 | crs_97-1057_0 | This report examines the legal procedures for effecting either a liquidation or a business or consumer reorganization under one of three of the five operative chapters of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq . Chapter 7 of the Code governs liquidation of the debtor's estate and is often referred to as a "straight bankruptcy." Chapter 11 of the Code governs business reorganizations, and chapter 13 governs consumer reorganizations which conform to prescribed statutory debt limits. Chapters 1, 3, and 5 govern general procedures involving management and administration of the bankruptcy estate which are applicable, as specified, to the operative chapters. 1. 5. Chapter 7—Liquidation
A. 11 U.S.C. 3. | This report examines the legal procedures for effecting either a liquidation or a business or consumer reorganization under the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., through an analysis of its individual sections.
The Code, in chapters 1, 3, and 5, establishes general procedures that are applicable to the operative chapters. Chapter 7 governs liquidation of the debtor's estate; chapter 11 governs business reorganization; and, chapter 13 addresses reorganization of an individual with regular income.
This report presents an overview of the Code's legislative history, its procedural chapters 1, 3, and 5, and operative chapters 7, 11, and 13. Reference is made to the impact of major U.S. Supreme Court decisions and the effect of recent legislative amendments. |
crs_R41024 | crs_R41024_0 | Background
Since 1971, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has been a self-supporting, wholly governmental entity. The USPS is a marketized government agency that was designed to cover its operating costs with revenues generated through the sales of postage and related products and services. The USPS's Financial Difficulties, FY2006-FY2011
Flattening Then Declining Revenues
After running modest profits from FY2004 through FY2006, the USPS lost $25.4 billion between FY2007 and FY2011. Were it not for congressional action to reduce a statutorily required payment to the RHBF, the USPS would have lost an additional $9.5 billion. The USPS's Financial Difficulties, FY2012
In the first three quarters of FY2012, the USPS had an operating loss of $11.5 billion, which included an $11.1 billion charge for payments due to the RHBF in FY2012. The USPS did not have sufficient cash to make a $5.5 billion payment to its Retiree Health Benefits Fund (RHBF) that was due on August 1, 2012. The USPS is unlikely to have sufficient liquidity to make a $5.6 billion RHBF payment due on September 30, 2012. The USPS will report its FY2012 year-end financial results in early November 2012. Nevertheless, a number of ideas for incremental reforms have been put forth that would improve the USPS's financial condition so that it might continue as a self-funding, government agency. Postal Service. Reducing the USPS's Retail and Nonretail Facilities
In recent years, the USPS has moved to close some of its facilities:
between 2006 and 2011, the USPS reduced the number of its area and district offices from 89 to 74; in late July 2011 USPS began an initiative to consider the closure of 3,652 retail postal facilities; and, in May 2012, the USPS announced it would close 48 mail processing facilities before September, and an additional 98 facilities between January and February 2013. | This report provides an overview of the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS's) financial condition, legislation enacted to alleviate the USPS's financial challenges, and possible issues for the 112th Congress.
Since 1971, the USPS has been a self-supporting government agency that covers its operating costs with revenues generated through the sales of postage and related products and services.
In recent years, the USPS has experienced significant financial challenges. After running modest profits from FY2004 through FY2006, the USPS lost $25.4 billion between FY2007 and FY2011. Were it not for congressional action, the USPS would have lost an additional $9.5 billion.
In the first three quarters of FY2012, the USPS had an $11.5 billion operational loss. The USPS did not have sufficient cash to make a $5.5 billion payment to its Retiree Health Benefits Fund (RHBF) that was due on August 1, 2012. The USPS is unlikely to have sufficient liquidity to make a $5.6 billion RHBF payment due on September 30, 2012.
A number of ideas have been advanced that would attempt to improve the USPS's financial condition in the short term so that it might continue as a self-funding government agency. All of these reforms would require Congress to amend current postal law. The ideas include (1) increasing the USPS's revenues by altering postage rates and increasing its offering of nonpostal rates and services; and (2) reducing the USPS's expenses by a number of means, such as recalculating the USPS's retiree health care and pension obligations and payments, closing postal facilities, and reducing mail delivery to less than six days per week.
This report will be updated after the USPS releases its quarterly financial results in early November 2012, and in the interim should there be any significant developments. |
crs_RL33160 | crs_RL33160_0 | Introduction
Scope
This report is designed to help the 110 th Congress better understand the characteristics and importance of measurement of counter-terrorism activities, the dynamics of the phenomenon to be measured, i.e. It is not intended to define counter-terrorism activities, nor to create a definitive, in-depth methodology for measuring progress against terrorism. Impact of Perceptions on Strategy
How one perceives and measures progress is central to formulating and implementing anti-terror strategy. The perception of progress has a major impact on establishing priorities and allocating resources. The parameters used to measure progress can also set the framework for measurement of failures. Positive progress is possible using diverse strategies, which may employ very different tactics. Success at each stage of the process can be measured in various ways, including relatively continuous metrics such as the number of recruits, the dollars expended, the economic value of targets, the number of casualties inflicted, etc. Arguably therefore, it is important not only to measure where terrorism is, but also how close terrorists are to the next quantum jump. Measuring Progress
Progress may be defined differently by the terrorists and those who oppose them. As long as measurements are clearly defined and linked to goals and objectives, these differences need not be divisive. However, a common pitfall is overreliance on quantitative data at the expense of its qualitative significance. Western policymakers often define success in terms of the amount of money confiscated from terrorist networks. To the extent that nations can reach a multilateral consensus concerning shared anti-terror strategies, goals and measurement criteria, the United States may be more successful in obtaining the support and assistance of other nations in anti-terror efforts. Trends
Trends are changes of incidents, attitudes and other factors, over time. Conclusion
Effective responses to terrorism may need to take into account, and to some degree be individually configured to respond to, the evolving goals, strategies, tactics, and operating environment of different terrorist groups. Although terrorism's complex webs of characteristics—along with the inherent secrecy and compartmentalization of both terrorist organizations and government responses—limit available data, the formulation of practical, useful measurement criteria appears both tractable and ready to be addressed. | This report is designed to support efforts of the 110th Congress to understand and apply broad based objective criteria when evaluating progress in the nation's efforts to combat terrorism. It is not intended to define specific, in-depth, metrics for measuring progress against terrorism.
How one perceives and measures progress is central to formulating and implementing anti-terror strategy. Perception has a major impact, as well, on how nations prioritize and allocate resources. On the flip side, the parameters used to measure progress can set the framework for the measurement of failure. The measurement process is also inextricably linked to strategies. Progress is possible using diverse strategies, under very different approaches. The goals of terrorists and those who combat them are often diametrically opposed, but may also be tangential, with both sides achieving objectives and making progress according to their different measurement systems.
Within the context of these competing views and objectives, terrorist activity may be seen as a process which includes discrete, quantum-like changes or jumps often underscoring its asymmetric and nonlinear nature. An approach which looks at continuous metrics such as lower numbers of casualties may indicate success, while at the same time the terrorists may be redirecting resources towards vastly more devastating projects. Policymakers may face consideration of the pros and cons of reallocating more of the nation's limited resources away from ongoing defensive projects and towards preventing the next quantum jump of terrorism, even if this means accepting losses.
Measurement of progress, or lack thereof, may be framed in terms of incidents, attitudes and trends. A common pitfall of governments seeking to demonstrate success in anti-terrorist measures is overreliance on quantitative indicators, particularly those which may correlate with progress but not accurately measure it, such as the amount of money spent on anti-terror efforts. As terrorism is a complex multidimensional phenomenon, effective responses to terrorism may need to take into account, and to some degree be individually configured to respond to, the evolving goals, strategies, tactics and operating environment of different terrorist groups. Although terrorism's complex webs of characteristics—along with the inherent secrecy and compartmentalization of both terrorist organizations and government responses—limit available data, the formulation of practical, useful measurement criteria appears both tractable and ready to be addressed. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32989 | crs_RL32989_0 | Under the Higher Education Act (HEA), institutions of higher education (IHEs) must be accredited by an agency or association recognized by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education (ED) to participate in HEA Title IV federal student aid programs. While this process is voluntary, failure to obtain accreditation could have a dramatic effect on an institution's student enrollment, as only students attending accredited institutions are eligible to receive federal student aid (e.g., Pell grants and student loans). Accrediting agencies are private organizations set up to review the qualifications of member institutions based on self-initiated quality guidelines and self-improvement efforts. As the 110 th Congress considers reauthorizing the HEA, it may consider making changes to the role accreditation plays with respect to federal student aid or to the accreditation process itself, such as the factors accrediting agencies must consider when evaluating an institution. These issues include, but are not limited to, the use of accreditation as a gauge of institutional quality, the elimination of accreditation as a prerequisite for participation in HEA Title IV programs, accreditation and distance education, accreditation and transfer of credit, and due process requirements that apply to accrediting agencies. For example, would student grades be a valid indicator of the quality of an institution? During the reauthorization process, Congress may consider revisiting statutory language relevant to due process. 609 , the College Access and Opportunity Act of 2005, and S. 1614 , the Higher Education Amendments of 2005—the primary vehicles for HEA reauthorization in the 109 th Congress. H.R. Both the House and Senate bills would have made several changes related to accreditation issues. | Under the Higher Education Act (HEA), institutions of higher education (IHEs) must be accredited by an agency or association recognized by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education (ED) to participate in HEA Title IV federal student aid programs. While this process is voluntary, failure to obtain accreditation could have a dramatic effect on an institution's student enrollment, as only students attending accredited institutions are eligible to receive federal student aid (e.g., Pell grants and student loans). Accrediting agencies are private organizations set up to review the qualifications of member institutions based on self-initiated quality guidelines and self-improvement efforts.
This report provides an overview of some of the possible accreditation issues that Congress may address during the HEA reauthorization process. For example, as Congress considers reauthorizing the HEA, it may consider making changes to the role accreditation plays with respect to federal student aid or to the accreditation process itself, such as the factors accrediting agencies must consider when evaluating an institution. More specifically, potential issues for consideration include, but are not limited to, the use of accreditation as a gauge of institutional quality, the elimination of accreditation as a prerequisite for participation in HEA Title IV programs, accreditation and distance education, accreditation and transfer of credit, and due process requirements that apply to accrediting agencies.
In the 109th Congress, both H.R. 609, the College Access and Opportunity Act of 2005, and S. 1614, the Higher Education Amendments of 2005, the primary vehicles for HEA reauthorization, would have altered accreditation requirements. Most notably, both bills would have added new requirements related to considering the mission of an institution when performing evaluations, outcome measures, distance education, transfer of credit, due process, and accrediting agency operations.
HEA reauthorization may also be considered by the 110th Congress. This report will be updated as warranted by legislative action. |
crs_R40813 | crs_R40813_0 | Introduction
In the climate change policy debate, methane capture projects have garnered attention for their ability to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The captured methane is generally flared or used for energy purposes. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified four sources of methane with the greatest potential for capture in the near term: landfills, coal mines, agriculture, and oil and gas systems. The amount of methane captured from each will depend on legislative developments, regulations, economics, technology, and outreach. Methane (CH 4 ) constituted approximately 8% of U.S. GHG emissions in 2008. Efforts to reduce emissions of methane—the second-most important GHG after carbon dioxide (CO 2 )—could play a significant role in climate change mitigation. This report will discuss the policy options for addressing methane capture (and their implications), legislative proposals for methane capture, domestic and international sources of methane, opportunities and challenges for methane capture, and federal programs that support methane capture. Policy Options for Addressing Methane Capture
If policymakers decide to address methane emissions, multiple strategies are available that would either encourage or require methane capture: market-based legislative approaches, such as a cap-and-trade program or emissions fees; carbon offsets or credits as a complementary design element of a market-based approach; emission performance standards; and/or maintaining existing programs and incentives. In addition, some of the source categories identified in Table 1 may be more amenable to emissions coverage than others. The strength of the incentive would depend on the stringency of the emission control program. Asia is reported as having emitted the most methane on a regional basis. Additionally, methane is emitted during oil production, transportation, and refining. Congress and the executive branch have supported methane capture projects through voluntary programs, energy management programs, and research and development programs. Methane-to-Markets Partnership
The Methane-to-Markets Partnership is an international initiative for methane capture and reuse from four sources: oil and gas, coal mines, landfills, and agriculture. Voluntary Methane Programs
EPA facilitates a number of voluntary programs related to the Methane-to-Markets initiative that seek to reduce domestic methane emissions from different sectors. The Landfill Methane Outreach Program (LMOP) encourages landfill gas energy projects. EPA's domestic methane programs avoided the release of more than 20.3 million metric tons of CO 2 e into the atmosphere in 2008, out of the roughly 308 million metric tons of CO 2 e of the methane emissions reported for the landfills, natural gas systems, petroleum systems, and coal mining categories. | Research on climate change has identified a wide array of sources that emit greenhouse gases (GHGs). Among the six gases that have generally been the primary focus of concern, methane is the second-most abundant, accounting for approximately 8% of total U.S. GHG emissions in 2008. Methane is emitted from a number of sources. The most significant are agriculture (both animal digestive systems and manure management); landfills; oil and gas production, refining, and distribution; and coal mining.
As policymakers consider options to reduce GHG emissions, methane capture projects offer an array of possible reduction opportunities, many of which utilize proven technologies. Methane capture projects (e.g., landfill gas projects, anaerobic digestion systems) restrict the release of methane into the atmosphere. The methane captured can be used for energy or flared. Methane capture challenges differ depending on the source. Most methane capture technologies face obstacles to implementation, including marginal economics in many cases, restricted pipeline access, and various legal issues.
Some of the leading methane capture options under discussion include market-based emission control programs, carbon offsets, emission performance standards, and maintaining existing programs and incentives. At present, methane capture technologies are supported by tax incentives in some cases, by research and demonstration programs in others, by regulation in the case of the largest landfills, and by voluntary programs. Congress could decide to address methane capture in a number of different ways, including (1) determining the role of methane capture in energy and environmental legislation; (2) determining whether methane capture should be addressed on an industry-by-industry basis; and (3) determining if current methane capture initiatives will be further advanced with legislative action regardless of other facets of the environmental policy debate. What role methane capture would play in prospective regulations to control GHGs is among the issues that Congress faces.
A few government programs have supported the capture of methane to mitigate climate change. The Methane-to-Markets Partnership, administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is an international initiative to reduce global methane emissions. EPA also oversees a variety of voluntary programs related to the Methane-to-Markets initiative (e.g., Coalbed Methane Outreach Program, Natural Gas STAR Program, Landfill Methane Outreach Program, AgSTAR Program).
This report discusses alternatives for addressing methane capture, sources of methane, opportunities and challenges for methane capture, and current federal programs that support methane recovery. |
crs_R42458 | crs_R42458_0 | In May 2011, the House Appropriations Committee proposed offsetting $1 billion of emergency supplemental appropriations for the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Disaster Relief Fund—the primary source of federal government assistance for people and communities affected by major disasters—which had been depleted at a faster rate than had been projected due to a number of major storms and floods earlier in the year. Beginning in November 2012 there were calls for supplemental appropriations for Hurricane Sandy relief efforts, as well as calls for offsets to pay for them. CRS examined legislation with offsetting rescissions and provisions affecting the DRF, looking for connections between supplemental DRF funding and offsets. The analysis takes a detailed look at three cases where legislation affecting the DRF was fully offset, but ultimately finds that from FY1990 through FY2013, Congress fully offset supplemental funding for the DRF through cuts elsewhere in the budget only once. Therefore, by not providing supplemental appropriations to the DRF and actually using DRF funds to pay for supplemental appropriations for other government elements, this legislation is not an example of supplemental funding for the DRF being offset. Use of Emergency Designations and Adjustments to Discretionary Spending Limits
What was a traditional pattern of using the supplemental appropriations process to cover the costs of major disasters may have changed with the enactment of the Budget Control Act and its allowable adjustment which can be used to cover the costs of major disasters under the Stafford Act. One of the primary reasons that supplemental funding for the DRF had not been offset over the period of analysis used in this report is the simple fact that it has not had to be offset, given the availability of the emergency funding mechanism to work around the budget caps. Instead, in the absence of an explicit prohibition on the practice as noted above, Congress chose to use emergency designations to fund disaster relief in excess of the allowable adjustment under the BCA. In the current budgetary environment, using allowable adjustments or emergency designations in supplemental appropriations legislation results in additional deficit spending. Historical Data
To show the relative impact of offsets on supplemental spending and the DRF, Table A-1 provides a breakdown of all appropriations bills that have become law carrying both supplemental spending and rescissions from FY1990 through FY2013. | This report discusses the history of the use of offsetting rescissions to pay for supplemental appropriations to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) from FY1990 through FY2013.
As Congress debated the growing size of the budget deficit and national debt, efforts intensified to control spending and offset the costs of legislation. Several times between FY1990 and FY2013, the question of offsetting disaster relief spending became a focus of congressional debate.
Usually, in the time reviewed, supplemental disaster relief funding was treated as emergency spending. This designation exempted it from counting against discretionary budget caps, and from needing an offset. However, supplemental spending measures at times have carried rescissions that have offset, to one degree or another, their budgetary impact. In some instances, supplemental spending measures have contained both appropriations for the DRF and offsetting rescissions, but without a specific link between the two.
With the passage of the Budget Control Act (BCA), a new mechanism was created that altered the congressional pattern of funding the DRF in part through supplemental appropriations. The BCA included an "allowable adjustment" for the federal costs of major disasters declared under the Stafford Act, which generally resulted in larger appropriations for the DRF in annual appropriations bills, and a reduced reliance on supplemental appropriations. When Hurricane Sandy struck in 2012, calls for supplemental appropriations to help pay for recovery efforts (the cost of which exceeded the size of the allowable adjustment) were met with calls for offsets from some quarters. Congress ultimately chose to provide supplemental appropriations, including funding for the DRF, with a combination of the allowable adjustment and emergency funding. Several billion dollars of appropriations under consideration for mitigation projects had their emergency designation struck on a point of order, and therefore those appropriations counted against discretionary spending limits.
In past debates over whether supplemental funding for the DRF should be offset, Congress discussed past precedents. Through independent research, CRS identified three specific incidences from FY1990 through FY2013 where bills that had an impact on the level of funding available in the DRF were fully offset, but only one case in which CRS can authoritatively state that supplemental funding for the DRF was completely offset by rescissions. |
crs_RS22923 | crs_RS22923_0 | Fuel prices rose dramatically in FY2008. According to one report, the Iraqi government reduced its subsidies from $6 billion in 2005 to approximately $2.5 billion in 2007. Comparing the cost of fuels delivered to the CENTCOM area of responsibility and the cost paid by Iraq's civilian population is difficult. Where comparable fuels such as gasoline and diesel are used, it is estimated that the military units pay higher prices than Iraqi civilians paying the official price for a number of reasons, including (1) the Iraqi government subsidizes the cost of gasoline and diesel in Iraq, (2) the military likely has higher transportation costs associated with bringing fuel into Iraq, and (3) the price charged by the DESC is the "level price" that it charges to all its military customers around the world, irrespective of the actual cost of fuel supplied to Iraq. | Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the average price of fuels purchased for military operations in Iraq has steadily increased. The disparity between the higher price of fuel supplied to the United States Central Command compared to Iraq's civilian population has been a point of contention. Several factors contribute to the disparity, including the different types of fuel used by the military compared to Iraqi civilians, the Iraqi government's price subsidies, and the level pricing that the DOD's Defense Logistics Agency charges for military customers around the world. The Iraqi government has been pressured to reduce its fuel subsidy and black market fuel prices remain higher than the official subsidized price. |
crs_R40798 | crs_R40798_0 | Although the 11 th recession of the postwar period officially ended in June 2009, one economic indicator that is very visible in people's daily lives—the unemployment rate—has continued to rise. With the unemployment rate at 9.8% in November 2010, those still employed or able to find jobs are quite likely to know personally others who have been less fortunate. The still high unemployment rate partly reflects the slow pace at which employers have been adding workers to their payrolls despite enactment of job creation legislation in February 2009 (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, P.L. 111-5 ), March 2010 (the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, P.L. 111-147 ), and August 2010 (the Education Jobs Fund at Title I of the FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act, P.L. 111-226 ). This report addresses the question of when one might reasonably expect to see sustained improvement in the unemployment rate and a steady resumption of job growth following a recession's end. It first provides an explanation of why it is unlikely that the unemployment rate would begin trending downward and the number of jobs on employer payroll would begin trending upward immediately after the start of a recovery. It then analyzes the trend in the unemployment rate and jobs data before and after the bottom of the prior 10 business cycles to confirm these statements. The very delayed improvement in the labor market following the 1990-1991 and 2001 recessions led to the ensuing rebounds of the economy being referred to as jobless recoveries. With employment at public and private sector employers similarly having failed to show consistent improvement for well over a year since the recession's end, many observers think the nation has been experiencing another jobless recovery. | Although the 11th recession of the postwar period officially ended in June 2009, one economic indicator that is very visible in people's daily lives—the unemployment rate—has continued to rise. With the unemployment rate at 9.8% in November 2010, those still employed or able to find jobs are quite likely to know personally others who have been less fortunate. The still high unemployment rate partly reflects the slow pace at which employers have been adding workers to their payrolls despite enactment of job creation legislation in February 2009 (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, P.L. 111-5), March 2010 (the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, P.L. 111-147), and August 2010 (the Education Jobs Fund at Title I of the FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act, P.L. 111-226).
This report addresses the question of when one might reasonably expect to see sustained improvement in the unemployment rate and a steady resumption of job growth following a recession's end. It first provides an explanation of why it is unlikely that the unemployment rate would begin trending downward and the number of jobs on employer payroll would begin trending upward immediately after the start of a recovery. It then analyzes the trend in the unemployment rate and jobs data before and after the bottom of the prior 10 business cycles to confirm these statements.
The report concludes by noting that the much delayed improvement in the labor market following the 1990-1991 and 2001 recessions led to the ensuing rebounds of the economy being referred to as jobless recoveries. With employment at public and private sector employers similarly having failed to show consistent improvement for well over a year after the recession's end, many observers think that the nation has been experiencing another jobless recovery. |
crs_RL34674 | crs_RL34674_0 | 6899 , House Democratic leadership's latest draft of broad-based energy policy legislation, the Comprehensive American Energy Security and Consumer Protection Act. Passed on September 16, 2008, the bill would expand oil and gas drilling offshore by allowing oil and gas exploration and production in areas of the outer continental shelf that are currently off limits, except for waters in the Gulf of Mexico off the Florida coast. Energy Tax Provisions in H.R. 6049 , another energy tax bill that was also approved by the House. H.R. 6899 is fully offset, raising $19 billion in taxes, including many of the same energy tax increases on oil companies also previously approved by the House. 6899 , the Republican leadership in the House has introduced its own energy tax bill, H.R. S. 3478
In the Senate, legislative efforts on energy tax incentives and energy tax extenders center around S. 3478 , the Energy Independence and Investment Act of 2008, a $40 billion energy tax bill offered by Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus and ranking Republican Charles Grassley. In addition, some Senate Republicans have objected to raising taxes on the oil and gas industry, particularly by repealing the IRC §199 deduction. A side-by-side comparison of H.R. | The Comprehensive American Energy Security and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 6899, was introduced on September 15, 2008, and approved by the House on September 16, 2008. This plan allows oil and gas drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), and it incorporates most of the energy tax provisions from an energy tax bill, H.R. 5351, and some of H.R. 6049, both of which were previously approved by the House of Representatives but failed to be taken up by the Senate.
In the Senate, legislative efforts on energy tax incentives and energy tax extenders center around S. 3478, the $40 billion energy tax bill offered by Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus and ranking Republican Charles Grassley, and supported by Senate Democratic leadership. In the Senate, controversy over tax increases on the oil and gas industry, particularly over proposed repeal of the tax code's §199 deduction for the major integrated oil companies, continues; it remains unclear whether an energy tax bill with this provision will pass a cloture vote to limit debate, and thus be taken up.
This report is a side-by-side comparison of energy tax bills H.R. 6899 and S. 3478. |
crs_RL33350 | crs_RL33350_0 | As authorized for FY2006, these grants are for three purposes: to assess handling of child abuse and neglect cases and make needed improvements (FY2006 fundingâ$12.9 million); to train judges, legal personnel, and attorneys in handling of child welfare cases (FY2006 fundingâ$10 million); and to improve timeliness of decisions regarding safety, permanence, and well-being of children (FY2006 fundingâ$10 million). The latter two grants were first authorized and funded by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. Funding under the CIP grant for assessing and improving court handling of child welfare cases was first made available in FY1995, and is provided as a set-aside from appropriations made for services to children and families under Title IV-B, Subpart 2 of the Social Security Act (now called the Promoting Safe and Stable Families program); that funding is set to expire with FY2006. The 109 th Congress may consider whether to extend funding for this initial CIP grant, whether to add to the relatively limited instructions provided in the Deficit Reduction Act regarding purposes of the two newest grants, and whether additional court-related measures intended to improve court performance on behalf of children in child abuse and neglect cases are needed. Legislative History
As first enacted in 1993 ( P.L. Funding was provided (as a set-aside from Title IV-B, Subpart 2) at $5 million for FY1995 and $10 million for each of FY1996-FY1998. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ) expanded the CIP and provided new, independently appropriated funds for the program. The law appropriates $20 million in each of FY2006-FY2010 (a total of $100 million over five years) for two new kinds of CIP grants:
to ensure that the safety, permanence, and well-being needs of children are met in a timely and complete manner, and to provide for the training of judges, attorneys and other legal personnel in child welfare cases. Applications
P.L. 109-171 provides that an application for any of the three grant programs must demonstrate "meaningful and ongoing collaboration" between the courts, the state child welfare agency (or any other agency under contract with the state child welfare agency to administer child welfare programs authorized under the Social Security Act), and Indian tribes (where applicable). This same formula is applied to each of the new grant programs. Table 2 shows funds authorized and appropriated for the Court Improvement Program for FY2006-FY2010 (by the grant purpose). Context for Recent Changes to the Court Improvement Program
In May 2004, after a little more than one year of study and deliberation, the Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care released its recommendations related to federal financing of child welfare services and improving court oversight of child welfare proceedings. The court-related suggestions made by the Commission were largely incorporated in legislation introduced earlier in the 109 th Congress: in the Senate ( S. 1679 by Senators DeWine and Rockefeller) and in the House ( H.R. In addition, to receive CIP funding to improve timely decision-making on behalf of children, courts must describe how they will collaborate with child welfare agencies to collect and share relevant data; finally, to receive training funds courts must assure that a part of the grant will be used to provide cross-training of court personnel and child welfare agency workers. P.L. 109-171 ), the Court Improvement Program represented the largest single source of funding and program authority related to court performance in child welfare proceedings. | The Court Improvement Program (CIP) was enacted in 1993 ( P.L. 103-66 ) to provide funds to eligible state highest courts to assess and make improvements to their handling of child welfare proceedings. Funding for the CIP was provided via a statutory set-aside from funding provided to state child welfare agencies for family preservation and family support services to children and families (Title IV-B, Subpart 2 of the Social Security Act). That set-aside, which totals $12.9 million for FY2006, will expire with FY2006. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ) requires and encourages collaboration between courts and public child welfare agencies, authorizes two new grants under the Court Improvement Program, and provides a total of $100 million for those grants. This mandatory funding is available for courts to improve their training of judges, legal personnel, and attorneys handling child abuse and neglect cases ($10 million for each of FY2006-FY2010), and to assist courts in improving the timeliness of their efforts on behalf of children in foster care ($10 million for each of FY2006-FY2010).
Federal child welfare policy has long assumed that courts and child welfare agencies must work in tandem to make timely decisions regarding the safety, permanency, and well-being of children. At the same time, almost all federal child welfare-related funding and requirements have applied to state child welfare agencies. Over the course of several decades, Congress has periodically authorized funds to courts to improve their efforts on behalf of children, and a May 2004 report from the Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care, which made numerous recommendations to improve court performance on children's behalf, renewed attention to this issue. The changes made by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ) were a part of the recommendations made by the Pew Commission and were also included in legislation introduced in the Senate ( S. 1679 âSenators DeWine and Rockefeller) and the House ( H.R. 3758 âRepresentative Schiff).
For various reasons, additional legislative activity related to the Court Improvement Program may occur in the 109 th Congress (likely as a part of the expected reauthorization debate for the child welfare program authorized under Title IV-B, Subpart 2 of the Social Security Act, now called the Promoting Safe and Stable Families (PSSF) program). Funding for the original CIP grant program (for improving and assessing court handling of child welfare proceedings) is statutorily reserved from total PSSF funding, and that funding is set to expire with FY2006. Congress may consider whether this funding set-aside for CIP should be extended, and if so, whether the authorization language for this grant meets the current program needs. In addition, Congress may want to review the adequacy of the authorizing language provided for the two new grant programs (related to timely decisions on behalf of children and training judges and other court/legal personnel), which was added during conference negotiations on the Deficit Reduction Act ( P.L. 109-171 ) and was not previously debated by Congress. Third, while the new grant programs, and several other changes made by P.L. 109-171 meet a number of court-related recommendations provided by the Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care, there are additional court-related child welfare issues that Congress may choose to address.
This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R45070 | crs_R45070_0 | Introduction
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) regulates robocalls. A robocall, also known as "voice broadcasting," is any telephone call that delivers a prerecorded message using an automatic (computerized) telephone dialing system, more commonly referred to as an automatic dialer or "autodialer." Robocalls are popular with many industry groups, such as real estate, telemarketing, and direct sales companies. The majority of companies who use robocalling are legitimate businesses, but some are not. Those illegitimate businesses may not just be annoying consumers—they may also be trying to defraud them. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regularly cite "unwanted and illegal robocalls" as their number-one complaint category. These complaints, as well as complaints to congressional offices, have spurred Congress to take action in an effort to protect consumers. The FTC received over 7.1 million complaints about robocalls in FY2017, up from 5.3 million complaints in FY2016. Additionally, the Detection Work Group developed, implemented, and tested a Do Not Originate (DNO) Registry to stop unwanted calls from reaching customers. With the FCC's permission, the Strike Force performed a trial of this concept. The trial was considered a success by the Strike Force and the FCC, playing a significant role in reducing IRS scam calls by about 90% from September 2016 to February 2017. Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking31
In November 2017, the FCC promulgated rules on the creation and use of the DNO Registry. The new rules explicitly allow service providers to block calls from two categories of number: (1) numbers that the subscriber has asked to be blocked, such as "in-bound only" numbers (numbers that should not ever originate a call); and (2) unassigned numbers, as the use of such a number indicates that the calling party is intending to defraud a consumer. Congressional Action, 115th Congress
In the 115 th Congress, 12 bills aimed at curtailing robocalls and protecting c onsumers have been introduced ( Table 2 ). Most of t hese bills are focused on the larger issue of spoofing, as well as curtailing robocalls for debt collection and politica lly oriented messages ; two bills are aimed at protecting seniors from predatory robocalls intended to defraud them. Outlook
Based on their long history, scammers appear determined to continue their attempts to defraud consumers. Robocalls make these efforts easier. The FTC asserts that law enforcement on its own cannot completely solve the problem of robocalls. Technological solutions, including robust call-blocking technology, likely will also be required. The DNO Registry, a technology solution that has been proven to significantly decrease robocalls, is supported by most stakeholders, but concerns remain with legitimate telemarketers who fear it may negatively impact them. The FCC intended to address these concerns in 2018. The impacts of the FTC initiatives on fraudulent robocalls, and the resulting impacts in the telemarketing industry, may continue to be oversight issues for Congress. Other legislation proposed in the House of Representatives during this timeframe would have
expanded the ability of the FCC to impose forfeiture penalties; expanded the statute of limitations and increased the maximum penalty for certain violations; expanded prohibitions on providing inaccurate caller ID data to apply to persons outside the United States if the recipient of the call is within the United States; directed providers of spoofing services to take such steps as the FCC may prescribe to verify that users do not engage in caller ID information violations; expanded the definition of "caller identification information" to include text messages; amended the federal criminal code to make it a crime to knowingly initiate a commercial robocall from within the United States or to a recipient within the United States; directed the FTC to establish an office within the Bureau of Consumer Protection to advise the FTC on the prevention of fraud targeting seniors; and directed the FTC to revise the DNC Registry provisions of the TSR to prohibit politically oriented recorded message telephone calls to telephone numbers listed on that registry. | The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) regulates robocalls. A robocall, also known as "voice broadcasting," is any telephone call that delivers a prerecorded message using an automatic (computerized) telephone dialing system, more commonly referred to as an automatic dialer or "autodialer." Robocalls are popular with many industry groups, such as real estate, telemarketing, and direct sales companies. The majority of companies who use robocalling are legitimate businesses, but some are not. Those illegitimate businesses may not just be annoying consumers—they may also be trying to defraud them.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regularly cite "unwanted and illegal robocalls" as their number-one complaint category. The FTC received more than 1.9 million complaints filed in the first five months of 2017 and about 5.3 million in 2016. The FCC has stated that it gets more than 200,000 complaints about unwanted telemarketing calls each year. These statistics, as well as complaints to congressional offices, have spurred Congress to hold hearings and introduce legislation on the issue in an effort to protect consumers. Congressional policymakers have proposed a number of changes to existing law and regulations to address the problem of illegal robocalls under the TCA, many of which are intended to defraud. These changes would, for example, expand the definition of what a robocall is, increase penalties for illegal spoofing, and improve protection of seniors from robocall scams. As yet, none of these proposals has become law.
On August 19, 2016, a 60-day Robocall "Strike Force" convened, culminating in the testing of a Do Not Originate (DNO) Registry to stop unwanted calls from reaching customers. The intent of the registry is to block fraudulent calls before they can reach a consumer. With the FCC's permission, the Strike Force performed a trial of this concept. The trial was considered a success by the Strike Force and the FCC, reducing calls associated with one particular scam by about 90% in the third quarter of 2016.
In November 2017, the FCC promulgated rules on the creation and use of the DNO Registry. The new rules explicitly allow service providers to block calls from two categories of number: (1) numbers that the subscriber has asked to be blocked, such as "in-bound only" numbers (numbers that should not ever originate a call), and (2) unassigned numbers, as the use of such a number indicates that the calling party is intending to defraud a consumer.
Notwithstanding the efforts above, based on their long history, scammers appear determined to continue their attempts to defraud consumers. Robocalls make these efforts easier. The FTC asserts that law enforcement on its own cannot completely solve the problem of robocalls. Technological solutions, including robust call-blocking technology, likely will also be required. The DNO Registry, a technology solution that has been proven to significantly decrease robocalls, is supported by most stakeholders, but concerns remain with legitimate telemarketers who fear it may negatively impact them. The FCC intended to address these concerns in 2018. The impacts of the FTC initiatives on fraudulent robocalls, and the resulting impacts in the telemarketing industry, may continue to be oversight issues for Congress.
In the 115th Congress, three hearings have been held, and 13 bills aimed at curtailing robocalls and protecting consumers have been introduced. Most of these bills are focused on the larger issue of spoofing, as well as curtailing robocalls for debt collection and politically oriented messages; two bills are aimed at protecting seniors from predatory robocalls intended to defraud them. |
crs_R40237 | crs_R40237_0 | Issue areas include onshore energy resources, administration of hardrock mining, wildfire protection, management of wild horses and burros, designation of the National Landscape Conservation System, wilderness designation, management of national forest roadless areas, Forest Service implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), BLM land sales, and national forest planning. Many of these issues have been of interest to Congress and the nation for decades. Background
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Forest Service (FS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) manage 449 million acres of land, more than two-thirds of the land owned by the federal government and one-fifth of the total U.S. land area. This report focuses on several issues affecting the agencies' lands that appear to be of interest to the 111 th Congress, including access to energy resources, administration of hardrock mining, wildfire protection, wild horses and burros management, the National Landscape Conservation System, wilderness designation, protection and use of national forest roadless areas and FS implementation of NEPA. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct05, P.L. Shortly before the end of the Bush Administration, the BLM recommended an oil and gas lease sale of 241 parcels on about 360,000 acres in Utah. Legislative Activity
Numerous bills have been introduced to provide a framework and incentives for developing renewable energy. The Secretary would have the authority to withdraw land from entry under the General Mining Law of 1872 based on specified criteria and would revise land use plans as appropriate to allow for a withdrawal from operations under the 1872 Mining Law. In an effort to contain fire costs and to reduce the need to transfer funds from other programs to fire fighting, Congress and the Obama Administration have taken actions to alter the way funds are provided for wildland fires. FLAME bills ( H.R. 111-11 ). seeks to protect wild horses and burros on federal land and places them under the jurisdiction of the BLM and FS. Controversial issues include the method of determining the "appropriate management levels" (AMLs) for herd sizes, as the statute requires; whether and how to remove animals from the range to achieve AMLs; methods—other than adoption—for reducing animals on the range, particularly fertility control and holding animals in long-term facilities; whether appropriations for managing wild horses and burros are adequate; and the slaughter, or potential for slaughter, of horses. The 111 th Congress established the system legislatively (in P.L. 111-11 ). Legislative Activity
The Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 ( P.L. P.L. The Obama Administration has not issued any general rulings on wilderness and roadless area protection. The wilderness subtitles of P.L. Since 2003, the FS has expanded the types of activities that can be conducted without environmental review, increasing the number of types from 18 to 27. Judicial Action
Several of the CE regulations have been challenged in court (see below). 3339 as introduced would make FLTFA permanent. None of the pending bills would not make other changes in areas that have been under recent debate. National Forest Planning
(by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed])
Background
The FS is required by the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA) to prepare comprehensive, integrated land and resource management plans for the national forests. | Congress, the Administration, and the courts are considering many issues related to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) public lands and the Forest Service (FS) national forests. Key issues include the following.
Energy Resources. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) led to new regulations on federal land leasing for oil and gas, oil shale, geothermal, and renewable energy. The Obama Administration is reviewing some rules and has withdrawn certain oil and gas leases in Utah.
Hardrock Mining. The General Mining Law of 1872 allows prospecting for minerals in open public domain lands. Several bills to reform aspects of the Law have been introduced to require royalties on production and establish a fund to clean up abandoned mines, among other changes.
Wildfire Protection. Various initiatives seek to protect communities from wildfires by expanding fuel reduction, and one related program was established in P.L. 111-11. Cost concerns led to new fire suppression accounts in the FLAME Act (Title V of P.L. 111-88).
Wild Horses and Burros. To reduce program costs and the number of wild horses and burros on the range, the Secretary of the Interior has proposed wild horse preserves and increased fertility controls. Legislation would prohibit the slaughter of healthy wild horses and burros and more.
National Landscape Conservation System. The 111th Congress affirmed BLM's 27 million-acre land protection system by establishing it legislatively (P.L. 111-11). Questions focus on funding and management for these specially protected conservation areas.
Wilderness. P.L. 111-11 designated more than 2 million acres of wilderness, and more wilderness bills have been introduced. Many recommendations for wilderness areas are pending. Questions persist about wilderness review and managing wilderness study areas (WSAs).
National Forest System Roadless Areas. Debates persist about managing roadless areas for different values, and bills have been introduced to protect the areas. Regulations from previous administrations were challenged successfully, leading to potentially conflicting court rulings.
FS NEPA Application. The FS has altered its process for activity review under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), and has added activities that can be categorically excluded from reviews. Many of these changes and proposals have been challenged in court.
BLM Land Sales. The Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act authorizes the sale or exchange of BLM lands and use of the proceeds for certain land acquisitions. The authority was extended to July 25, 2011. H.R. 3339 would make the authorization permanent, while S. 1787 would extend it to 2020.
National Forest Planning. The National Forest Management Act of 1976 requires land and resource management plans for the national forests. Regulations from previous administrations have not been implemented, and the Obama Administration has begun a new rulemaking effort. |
crs_R45068 | crs_R45068_0 | This report provides a brief overview of selected acquisition-related provisions found in the NDAAs for FY2016 ( P.L. 114-92 ), FY2017 ( P.L. 114-328 ), and FY2018 ( P.L. 115-91 ). This report also has a section on some of the more controversial and extensive changes in recent years:
the changes to the role of the Chiefs of the Military Services and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (collectively referred to as the Service Chiefs) in the acquisition process, the breakup of the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD [AT&L]), and the shift of authority from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the military departments. Acquisition Reform in the FY2016-FY2018 NDAAs
In recent years, Congress has generally exercised its legislative powers to affect defense acquisitions through Title VIII of the NDAA, entitled Acquisition Policy, Acquisition Management, and Related Matters . Congress has been particularly active in legislating acquisition reform over the last three years. For FY2016-FY2018, NDAA titles specifically related to acquisition reform contained an average of 82 provisions (247 in total), compared to an average of 47 such provisions (466 in total) in the NDAAs for the preceding 10 fiscal years (see Appendix A and Appendix B ). | Congress has long been interested in defense acquisition and generally exercises its legislative powers to affect defense acquisitions through Title VIII of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), entitled Acquisition Policy, Acquisition Management, and Related Matters. Congress has been particularly active in legislating acquisition reform over the last three years. For FY2016-FY2018, NDAA titles specifically related to acquisition contained an average of 82 provisions (247 in total), compared to an average of 47 such provisions (466 in total) in the NDAAs for the preceding 10 fiscal years.
This report provides a brief overview of selected acquisition-related provisions found in the NDAAs for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92), FY2017 (P.L. 114-328), and FY2018 (P.L. 115-91), including the following topics that were a focus of the legislation:
Major Defense Acquisition Programs, the acquisition workforce, commercial items, Other Transaction Authority, and contract types.
This report also discusses one of the more controversial and extensive legislative changes made in recent years affecting acquisition: the breakup of the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as well as the shift of authority from that office to the military departments. |
crs_R42551 | crs_R42551_0 | Overview of Sugar Program
The U.S. sugar program provides a price guarantee to producers of sugar beets and sugarcane and to the processors of both crops. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) further is directed to administer the program at no budgetary cost to the federal government by limiting the amount of sugar supplied for food use in the U.S. market. To achieve both objectives, USDA has four available tools—as reauthorized by the 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. These are:
extending price support loans to processors at specified levels (the basis for the price guarantee); setting marketing allotments to limit the amount of sugar each processor can sell; establishing import quotas to restrict the amount of sugar allowed to enter the U.S. market; and making a sugar-to-ethanol backstop available if marketing allotments and import quotas are insufficient to keep market prices above guaranteed levels. Supporters of Sugar Program
During farm bill debate, producers of sugar beets and sugarcane, and the beet refiners and raw sugar mills that process these crops into refined sugar and raw cane sugar, respectively, supported extending the U.S. sugar policy as contained in the enacted 2008 farm bill. Two floor amendments offered to change the Senate Agriculture Committee-reported measure were defeated. S.Amdt. S.Amdt. 2433 (defeated on a 46-53 vote) would have reverted most program authorities to those in effect prior to the 2008 farm bill changes and would have repealed the sugar-to-ethanol program. 6083 ) also would have reauthorized the sugar program without change. Legislative Activity in the 113th Congress
The Senate-passed farm bill ( S. 954 ) and the House-passed farm bill ( H.R. 1947 ) proposed to continue 2008-enacted U.S. sugar policy without change. This proposal, similar to H.R. For comparison, the table also lays out the provisions of the defeated Sugar Reform Act offered as floor amendments during the debate on the 2014 farm bill. 925 proposed to reduce price support levels (from 18.75¢/lb. for refined beet sugar), and to make a number of changes to require USDA to administer sugar marketing allotments and sugar import quotas in ways that would result in sugar being available "at reasonable prices." 693 (Sugar Reform Act) introduced earlier in 2013, and to the amendment offered during Senate floor debate. Cost Estimates
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected in its May 2013 baseline that the continuation of current sugar policy as approved by the Senate, and reported by the House Agriculture Committee, would result in budget outlays of $39 million over 5 years (FY2014-FY2018) and $188 million over 10 years (FY2014-FY2023). While CBO scored the operation of the sugar price support program at zero in each of these time periods, its projection assumed that USDA will in some years need to activate the sugar-to-ethanol program. Since the amendment would have repealed the sugar-to-ethanol program, this score implied that USDA in some years would record outlays in administering the sugar program's price support operations. With the actions that USDA took to head off loan forfeitures of 2012-crop processed sugar, and its subsequent decisions to implement the sugar-to-ethanol program using sugar that processors forfeited, the sugar program recorded $259 million in budget outlays (i.e., $141 million in FY2013, $118 million in FY2014). Sugar growers and processors sought the highest level possible, so long as the program's minimum price guarantee was met. Users of sugar in manufactured food products sought as low a price as possible within the basic structure of the 2008-enacted program. In reacting to final farm bill action, food manufacturers that use sugar signaled their intent to continue to fight for reform by working with House and Senate leaders to make sure the sugar program "is on the table, even if those legislative efforts must take place outside of the Farm Bill process." | The 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) continues the sugar and the sugar-to-ethanol programs without change for another five years (i.e., through FY2019). The sugar program provides a minimum price guarantee to sugar crop processors and is structured to operate at no cost to the federal government using two tools: marketing allotments that limit the amount that sugar processors can sell, and import quotas that restrict the quantity of foreign sugar allowed to enter the U.S. market. The sugar-to-ethanol program is intended to be used if marketing allotments and the administration of import quotas do not succeed in keeping market prices for sugar above minimum guaranteed levels. If activated, it ensures that stocks of sugar are not carried over to the following marketing year so as to continue to depress prices.
During farm bill debate, Members of Congress engaged in vigorous debate on future sugar policy on behalf of both sides. Sugar producers/processors and food manufacturers also waged aggressive media campaigns to influence the outcome of amendments offered during floor debate. Producers of sugar beets and sugarcane, and the processors of these crops into sugar, favored retaining the current program without change. They highlighted the jobs and economic activity created by the domestic sugar sector. Food manufacturers that use sugar in their products sought flexibilities in how the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers the program, with an eye toward paying lower prices as a result. In advocating changes, they pointed to the higher wholesale refined sugar prices paid since the 2008 farm bill provisions took effect (twice the level compared to the previous 2002 farm bill period), and to the jobs that their firms create.
The enacted provisions reflect those agreed to by the House and Senate Agriculture Committees in reporting out their respective farm bills. During the period that Congress considered this latest farm bill (2012-2014), opponents of the sugar program offered five floor amendments to change both committees' reported provisions and to instruct House conferees. All were defeated. In the 112th Congress, S.Amdt. 2393 to S. 3240 would have phased out the program within three years. S.Amdt. 2433 to S. 3240 would have reverted most program authorities to those in effect prior to the 2008 farm bill changes and repealed the sugar-to-ethanol program. In the 113th Congress, S.Amdt. 925 to S. 954 and H.Amdt. 227 to H.R. 1947 would have lowered price support levels to those in effect in FY2008, and made a number of changes to require USDA to administer sugar marketing allotments and sugar import quotas so that sugar would be available "at reasonable prices." It also would have repealed the sugar-for-ethanol program. These amendments were nearly identical to the freestanding Sugar Reform Act (S. 345 and H.R. 693).
In scoring the farm bill, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that if current sugar policy continued, a 10-year total of $188 million in outlays would occur for FY2014-FY2023, all of it associated with the sugar-to-ethanol program. CBO scored the Sugar Reform Act as reducing these outlays by $82 million over this period. Separately, USDA actions taken in late FY2013 to reduce sugar supplies and activate the sugar-to-ethanol program to prop up market prices did not boost prices sufficiently above program-guaranteed levels. Consequently, these, together with subsequent USDA actions to dispose of sugar pledged as collateral for loans by processors and then forfeited, resulted in $259 million in federal outlays associated with the 2012 sugar crops.
Although existing sugar policy remains intact in the 2014 farm bill, the debate between sugar program supporters and opponents, which largely revolves around the level of domestic sugar prices, is expected to continue. Sugar growers and processors seek the highest price possible, with backstops in place to ensure they receive the benefits of the current price guarantee. Users of sugar in manufactured food products want as low a price as possible within the basic structure of the current program. |
crs_R42696 | crs_R42696_0 | Introduction
High winds, especially when combined with precipitation from seasonal storms, can cause damage to electricity utility systems, resulting in service interruptions to large numbers of electricity customers. While most such power outages are caused by damage from trees and tree limbs falling on local electricity distribution lines and poles, major power outages tend to be caused by damage to electricity transmission lines, which carry bulk power long distances. Depending on the severity of the storm and resulting impairment, power outages can last a few hours or extend to periods of several days. This in turn can have real economic effects, as power outages can impact businesses (primarily through lost orders and damage to perishable goods and inventories), and manufacturers (mainly through downtime and lost production, or equipment damage). Congress has already recognized the importance of the reliable operation of the bulk power system with the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) authorization of an Electric Reliability Organization (ERO). Reducing Storm-Related Outages
Outages are largely a result of damage to distribution systems, which are generally exposed to the elements. This section will look at various scenarios for reducing storm-related outages. Undergrounding of Distribution/Transmission Lines
The practice of putting electricity distribution lines underground has come to be called "undergrounding." Implementing Smart Grid Improvements
Much of the infrastructure which serves the U.S. power grid is aging. Electric utilities should also be aware of local weather-related events in the past. Power delivery systems are most vulnerable to storms and extreme weather events. Improving the overall condition and efficiency of the power delivery system can only serve to improve the resiliency of the system, and help hasten recovery from weather-related outages. Ultimately, however, electric utilities are responsible for this infrastructure. They are in the business of selling electricity, and they cannot sell electricity if their power delivery systems are out of service. Congress could empower the National Institute of Standards or DOE or some other federal agency to develop standards for the consistent reporting of power outage data. While responsibility for the reliability of the bulk electric system is under FERC, no central responsibility exists for distribution systems. One possible option would be to bring these systems under the ERO for reliability purposes. This would not necessarily mean federal approval of MAAs, but may help in the cooperative coordination of additional federal and state resources, especially in a wide, multi-state weather event. While there has been much discussion of transmission system inadequacies and inefficiencies, many distribution systems are in dire need of upgrades or repairs. The cost of upgrading the grid to meet future uses is expected to be high, as the estimates of the ASCE show, and the importance of a robust grid to U.S. economic performance goes without question. While the federal government recently made funding available for specific Smart Grid projects or transmission lines under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, there has not been a comprehensive effort to study the needs, set goals, and provide targeted federal funding for the modernization of the U.S. grid as part of a long-term national energy strategy. Such an effort would also require decisions about the appropriate roles of government and the private sector. | High winds, especially when combined with precipitation from seasonal storms, can cause damage to electricity utility systems, resulting in service interruptions to large numbers of electricity customers. While most such power outages are caused by damage from trees and tree limbs falling on local electricity distribution lines and poles, major power outages tend to be caused by damage to electricity transmission lines, which carry bulk power long distances. Depending on the severity of the storm and resulting impairment, power outages can last a few hours or extend to periods of several days, and have real economic effects. Power outages can impact businesses (primarily through lost orders and damage to perishable goods and inventories), and manufacturers (mainly through downtime and lost production, or equipment damage). Data from various studies lead to cost estimates from storm-related outages to the U.S. economy at between $20 billion and $55 billion annually. Data also suggest the trend of outages from weather-related events is increasing.
Suggested solutions for reducing impacts from weather-related outages include improved tree-trimming schedules to keep rights-of-way clear, placing distribution and some transmission lines underground, implementing Smart Grid improvements to enhance power system operations and control, inclusion of more distributed generation, and changing utility maintenance practices and metrics to focus on power system reliability. However, most of these potential solutions come with high costs which must be balanced against the perceived benefits.
A number of options exist for Congress to consider which could help reduce storm-related outages. These range from improving the quality of data on storm-related outages, to a greater strategic investment in the U.S. electricity grid. Congress could empower a federal agency to develop standards for the consistent reporting of power outage data. While responsibility for the reliability of the bulk electric system is under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (as per the Energy Policy Act of 2005), no central responsibility exists for the reliability of distribution systems. One possible option could be to bring distribution systems under the Electric Reliability Organization for reliability purposes. Recovery after storm-related outages might be enhanced by a federal role in formalizing the review or coordination of electric utility mutual assistance agreements (MAAs). This would not necessarily mean federal approval of MAAs, but may help in the cooperative coordination of additional federal and state resources, especially in a wide, multi-state weather event. While there has been much discussion of transmission system inadequacies and inefficiencies, many distribution systems are in dire need of upgrades or repairs. The cost of upgrading the U.S. grid to meet future uses is expected to be high, with the American Society of Civil Engineers estimating a need of $673 billion by 2020. While the federal government recently made funding available of almost $16 billion for specific Smart Grid projects and new transmission lines under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, there has not been a comprehensive effort to study the needs, set goals, and provide targeted funding for modernization of the U.S. grid as part of a long-term national energy strategy. Such an effort would also require decisions about the appropriate roles of government and the private sector.
Power delivery systems are most vulnerable to storms and extreme weather events. Improving the overall condition and efficiency of the power delivery system can only serve to improve the resiliency of the system, and help hasten recovery from weather-related outages. Ultimately, however, electric utilities are responsible for this infrastructure. They are in the business of selling electricity, and they cannot sell electricity if their power delivery systems are out of service. |
crs_R45350 | crs_R45350_0 | Since 1956, federal surface transportation programs have been funded largely by taxes on motor fuels that flow into the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). A steady increase in the revenues flowing into the HTF due to increased motor vehicle use and occasional increases in fuel tax rates accommodated growth in surface transportation spending over several decades. The last $70 billion of these transfers were authorized in the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. The FAST Act funds federal surface transportation programs from FY2016 through FY2020. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections indicate that the imbalance between motor fuel tax receipts and HTF expenditures will persist beyond FY2020. In consequence, funding and financing surface transportation is expected to continue to be a major issue for Congress. The Highway Trust Fund Revenue Dilemma
The HTF has two separate accounts—highways and mass transit. It was believed at the time of SAFETEA's passage that the tax changes, a $12.5 billion unexpended balance in the trust fund, and higher fuel tax revenue due to expected economic growth would be sufficient to finance the surface transportation program through FY2009. Unless this is changed, $85 billion represents the minimum amount the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on Finance would need to find over the FY2021-FY2025 period in some combination of additional revenue and budget offsets for general fund transfers, should Congress choose to continue funding surface transportation at the current, or "baseline," level, adjusted for inflation. 86-342) raised the rate to 4 cents per gallon. During this period, revenues grew automatically from year to year as fuel consumption grew along with increases in vehicle miles traveled. A federal sales tax on motor fuel would likely be at best an interim solution to the long-term problem of financing transportation infrastructure because, as with the current motor fuel tax, it relies on fuel consumption to fund transportation programs. Implementation of a VMT charge would have to overcome a number of potential disadvantages relative to the motor fuel tax, including public concern about personal privacy; higher collection and enforcement costs (estimates range from 5% to 13% of collections); the administrative challenge of collecting the charge from roughly 265 million vehicles; and the setting and adjusting of VMT rates, which would likely be as controversial as increasing motor fuel taxes. Congress could consider imposing a similar federal fee. But the HTF is not essential to a federal role in transportation funding. By enacting the FAST Act, Congress chose to support the current funding model by transferring funds into the HTF, mostly from the Treasury general fund. Making a General Fund Share Permanent
By FY2020, the last year of the FAST Act, federal highway programs will have been funded for 12 years under a de facto policy of providing a Treasury general fund share. Congress could also consider a two-pronged approach to authorization. There are no federal restrictions on tolling of roads that are not part of the federal-aid system. All revenue from tolls flows to the state or local agencies or private entities that operate tolled facilities; the federal government does not collect any revenue from tolls. However, a major expansion of tolling might reduce the need for federal expenditures on roads. For these reasons, while tolls may be an effective way of financing specific facilities—especially major roads, bridges, or tunnels that are likely to be used heavily and are located such that the tolls are difficult to evade—they would likely be less effective in providing broad financial support for surface transportation programs. Asset Recycling
Asset recycling is the sale or lease to the private sector of government-owned infrastructure assets and the investment of the proceeds in new infrastructure. Because they are issued by state and local governments, the federal government has less control over the types of projects supported and the amount of the federal contribution than it does with grant and loan programs. Tax credit bonds typically do not pay interest. The FAST Act ( P.L. These provisions included
providing authority for a TIFIA loan to a state infrastructure bank (SIB) to capitalize a "rural project fund"; adding transit-oriented development (TOD) infrastructure as an eligible project (TOD infrastructure is a "project to improve or construct public infrastructure that is located within walking distance of, and accessible to, a fixed guideway transit facility, passenger rail station, intercity bus station, or intermodal facility"); allowing up to $2 million of TIFIA budget authority each fiscal year to pay the application fees for projects costing $75 million or less instead of requiring payment by the project sponsor; modifying or setting the minimum project cost thresholds for credit assistance at $10 million for TOD projects, the capitalization of a rural project fund, and local government infrastructure projects; and providing for a streamlined application process for loans of $100 million or less. | For many years, federal surface transportation programs were funded almost entirely from taxes on motor fuels deposited in the Highway Trust Fund. The tax rates, which are fixed in terms of cents per gallon, have not been increased at the federal level since 1993. Meanwhile, motor fuel consumption is projected to decline due to improved fuel efficiency, increased use of electric vehicles, and slow growth in vehicle miles traveled. In consequence, revenue flowing into the Highway Trust Fund has been insufficient to support the surface transportation program authorized by Congress since 2008.
Congress has yet to address the surface transportation program's fundamental revenue issues, and has given limited consideration to raising fuel taxes in recent years. Instead, since 2008 Congress has supported the federal surface transportation program by supplementing fuel tax revenues with transfers from the U.S. Treasury general fund. The most recent reauthorization act, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), authorized spending on federal highway and public transportation programs through September 30, 2020. The act provided $70 billion in general fund transfers to the Highway Trust Fund from FY2016 through FY2020. This use of general fund transfers to supplement the Highway Trust Fund will have been the de facto funding policy for 12 years when the FAST Act expires. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections indicate that the Highway Trust Fund insufficiency relative to spending will reemerge following expiration of the FAST Act. The projections indicate a shortfall of $85 billion over the first five years following the FAST Act, and $109 billion over the first six years.
As the September 2020 expiration of the FAST Act approaches, Congress may again examine adjustments to the funding and financing of the federal role in surface transportation.
Raising motor fuel taxes could provide the Highway Trust Fund with sufficient revenue to fully fund the program in the near term, but may not be a viable long-term solution due to expected declines in fuel consumption. It would also not address the equity issue arising from the increasing number of personal and commercial vehicles that are powered electrically and therefore do not pay motor fuel taxes. Replacing motor fuel taxes with a mileage-based road user charge would need to overcome a variety of financial, administrative, and privacy barriers, but could be a solution in the longer term. Treasury general fund transfers could continue to be used to make up for the Highway Trust Fund's projected shortfalls but could require budget offsets of an equal amount.
The political difficulty of adequately funding the Highway Trust Fund could lead Congress to consider altering the trust fund system or eliminating it altogether. This might involve a reallocation of responsibilities and obligations among federal, state, and local governments.
Some surface transportation needs can be met by private investment, including public-private partnerships, and federal loans from the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program. If it desires to promote private investment in transportation infrastructure, Congress could consider asset recycling incentive grants to state and local governments for the sale or lease of government-owned infrastructure if the proceeds are committed to new infrastructure.
Tolling may be an effective way to finance specific roads, bridges, or tunnels that are likely to have heavy use and are located such that the tolls are difficult to evade. All revenue from tolls flows to the state or local agencies or private entities that operate tolled facilities; the federal government does not collect any revenue from tolls. However, a major expansion of tolling might reduce the need for federal expenditures on roads. Tolls and private investment are unlikely to provide broad financial support for surface transportation needs, and many projects are not well suited to alternative financing. |
crs_RL31624 | crs_RL31624_0 | Congressional Interest
Pakistan is a key front-line ally in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition, and the BushAdministration has expressed satisfaction with ongoing Pakistan-U.S. cooperation in this area. Trade-related legislation may again arise, especially in the area of textile duties. The United States andPakistan now share pressing interests in the region. The United States continues to make large aid donations to Pakistan and to support thatcountry's interests in negotiations with international financial institutions. Yet there areconcerns that 2002 national elections in Pakistan were not sufficiently free and open by Westernstandards and that the military-dominated government in Islamabad intends to remain in powerthrough manipulation of constitutional and democratic processes. This possibility has led someMembers of Congress to seek the renewal of aid restrictions until such time that a more robustdemocratic process is sustained and a civilian-led government is effectively in place. There isalso possibly growing anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, and the potential "re-Talibanization" ofthat country's western provinces bordering Afghanistan could lead to a reduction of Pakistan-U.S.cooperation in counterterrorism efforts, thereby harming U.S. interests in the region. (16)
It was reported that, following Pakistan's October 2002 elections and the ascension of anIslamist coalition there, U.S. officials presented to the Islamabad government three policy priorities:1) a preference that the Islamists not be included in the ruling national coalition; 2) that provincialgovernments being run by Islamist politicians not be allowed to interfere with ongoing anti-terroroperations involving U.S. personnel; and 3) that the basic understanding between the United Statesand Pakistan -- agreed to between Secretary of State Powell and President Musharraf on September14, 2001, and guaranteeing full Pakistani cooperation with the U.S.-led anti-terror campaign -- "mustcontinue unhindered." (17)
This report reviews the current status of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation in the areasof law enforcement, intelligence, and military operations. U.S. arms transfers to and securitycooperation with Pakistan are also discussed. A following section addresses the major domesticrepercussions of Pakistan-U.S. counterterrorism efforts, the ways in which such efforts are perceivedby newly-empowered Pakistan Islamists and their followers, and the possible effects these dynamicsmay have on future Pakistan-U.S. cooperation in this realm. The final section assesses the overallstatus of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation and key points of U.S. concern. (20)
American military successes in Afghanistan in the final months of 2001 apparently ended theexistence of Al Qaeda as a coherent entity in that country. database in order to track themovements of Islamic militants. Differences over weapons proliferation and human rights violations could triggerfar-reaching restrictions on future U.S. aid to Pakistan. | Pakistan is a key front-line ally in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. After September2001, Pakistani President Musharraf ended his government's ties with the Taliban regime ofAfghanistan and has since cooperated with and contributed to U.S. efforts to track and captureremnants of Al Qaeda and Taliban forces that have sought refuge inside Pakistani territory. Pakistan's cooperation has been called "crucial" to past and ongoing U.S. successes in the region, butthere is growing concern that the bilateral relationship is fragile and may be undermined bypotentially disruptive developments in the areas of weapons proliferation, democracy-building, andPakistan-India relations.
Remaining proliferation- and democracy-related aid restrictions on Pakistan were removedin the final months of 2001, and the United States continues to make large aid donations to Pakistanand to support that country's interests in negotiations with international financial institutions. Thereare concerns that October 2002 national elections in Pakistan were not sufficiently free and open byWestern standards and that the military-dominated government in Islamabad intends to remain inpower through manipulation of constitutional and democratic processes. This possibility led someMembers of the 107th Congress to seek the renewal of aid restrictions or a modification of thePresident's waiver authority until such time that a more robust democratic process is sustained anda civilian-led government effectively is in place. There also is concern that possibly growinganti-American sentiment in Pakistan and the potential "re-Talibanization" of that country's western provinces bordering Afghanistan could adversely affect U.S. interests in the region.
During 2002, the United States took an increasingly direct, if low-profile, role in both lawenforcement and military operations being conducted on Pakistani territory. These operations haveled to favorable results in tracking and apprehending dangerous Islamic militants, but the activitiesof U.S. personnel in the country have led to increasing signs of anti-American backlash and Pakistanisovereignty concerns. Recent electoral gains by a coalition of Pakistani Islamist political parties areviewed as an expression of such sentiments that may lead to reduced Pakistan-U.S. cooperation incounterterrorism operations in the future. The civilian Parliament and Prime Minister that wereseated in Islamabad in November 2002 may powerfully influence the course and scope of future U.S.presence in the region.
This report reviews the status of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation in the areas of lawenforcement, intelligence, and military operations. U.S. arms transfers to and security cooperationwith Pakistan are also discussed. A following section addresses the major domestic repercussionsof Pakistan-U.S. counterterrorism efforts, the ways in which such efforts are perceived bynewly-empowered Pakistan Islamists and their followers, and the possible effects these dynamicsmay have on future Pakistan-U.S. cooperation in this realm. The final section assesses the overallstatus of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation and key points of U.S. concern. Broaderdiscussion of bilateral relations and relevant legislation is found in CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations . This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R40565 | crs_R40565_0 | Introduction
Renewable energy currently accounts for about 10% of U.S. total energy production according to the U.S. Department of Energy. Approximately 53% of all domestic renewable energy comes from biomass sources represented by biofuels, landfill gas, biogenic municipal solid waste, wood and wood-derived fuels, and other biomass such as switchgrass. A major argument that has been advanced for a national renewable energy (or electricity) standard is that it would encourage increased use of renewable energy. 890 , would establish a renewable electricity standard (RES). Background
Much of the debate over an RES revolves around whether there is a need for a federal requirement for renewable energy use by electric providers and whether the momentum in the states is truly moving the use of renewable energy forward. Generating electricity from renewable resources emits far less of such pollutants. Many consider carbon dioxide emissions from biomass sources as practically neutral, because biomass sources take in carbon dioxide during their growing cycle and release it when burned. Renewable energy is seen as a way to reduce fossil fuel use, and with growing awareness of the potential impacts of climate change, the role of renewable energy in reducing carbon emissions has garnered increasing public support. Given the identified concerns over biomass supplies in the southeastern states and the pivotal role the region will likely have in a federal RES debate, issues in this region will be used as the focus of this report. These definitions have varied over time with changes in the law and regulations, reflecting policy goals and technological change. The definition of biomass would be critical to determining which technologies and processes would be available to meet possible RES requirements. Availability of Biomass
Proponents of an RES assert that the Southeast has ample biomass resources to meet renewable energy requirements of an RES. Forest products companies are the primary users of biomass for manufacturing purposes. Biomass Potential
Increasing electricity generated from biomass sources may be a viable route for compliance with RES requirements nationally, especially as biomass is already the largest source of renewable energy in the United States today. Existing woody biomass stocks could be augmented by biocrops or other types of biomass to help fuel new power generation facilities. The needs of other, possibly competing, uses for biomass are considerations if biomass resources are to be sustained while meeting projected uses. Having a financially viable forest products sector producing wood wastes is important to the biomass power industry. New resources (such as dedicated biocrops) or other biomass sources (such as municipal solid waste) may need to be used if biomass from forest residues and forest product industry wastes do not prove sufficient to meet RES goals. Targets for biofuels production from a Renewable Fuels Standard may mean that increased amounts of biomass would be dedicated to meet the needs of that program, if the trend away from corn-based ethanol persists and gasoline demand increases. Sustainable management of forest resources is a basic consideration. | Congress has been debating establishment of a Renewable Electricity Standard (RES) to encourage increased use of all forms of renewable energy including generating electricity from biomass sources (H.R. 890, S. 433). Concerns over the potential impacts of a federal RES seem to revolve largely around the issue of whether, nationwide, sufficient renewable energy resources exist and are economically viable. States and electricity suppliers in the southeastern United States have been most vocal in their concern that they may be unfairly burdened by an RES. They contend there is a lack of wind or solar resources that can be delivered economically.
Today, biomass is the largest source of renewable energy in the United States. Approximately 53% of all renewable energy comes from biomass sources, represented by biofuels, landfill gas, municipal solid waste, wood and wood-derived fuels, and other biomass feedstocks. All renewable energy sources combined account for about 10% of the U.S. total energy production. The definition of what constitutes biomass has varied over time with changes in law and regulations, reflecting policy goals and evolution of potential uses.
A principal argument made by supporters of an RES is that it would provide benefits to the environmental goals. Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from biomass sources are considered practically neutral, as biomass sources take in CO2 during their growing cycle and release it when burned. Renewable energy is seen as a way to reduce fossil fuel use and, with growing awareness of the potential impacts of climate change, the role of renewable energy in reducing CO2 emissions from energy production has garnered increasing public support.
Biomass has been characterized by advocates for an RES in the Southeast (i.e., Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) as the region's main renewable resource which could be used to meet a standard. However, the region's major user of woody biomass and producer of wood wastes is the forest products industry. It is concerned that competition for biomass resources from new power generation facilities and from transportation fuel uses could drive up prices to the economic detriment of forest product companies.
If biomass from forest residues and forest product industry wastes do not prove sufficient to meet RES goals, new resources such as dedicated bioenergy crops or other biomass resources, such as municipal solid waste, may need to be used. The definition of which types of biomass are eligible under an RES would determine which resources, technologies and processes will be available to meet a possible federal RES mandate. Goals for biofuels production to meet a Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) may also mean that increased amounts of biomass would be dedicated to that use. Diversity of biomass resources seems likely to be key to the economic production of biomass-fired power generation. Sustainable management of forest resources is likely to be both a basic consideration and a possible constraint. The issue of whether there is enough biomass to meet both an RES and RFS is beyond the scope of this report.
The terms RES and RPS (Renewable Portfolio Standard) are often used interchangeably as no material difference exists in program goals. |
crs_RL32321 | crs_RL32321_0 | While military forces are considered indispensable for establishinginitial security and often are also used to maintain law and order in peacekeeping and related"stability" or "stabilization" operations designed to normalize conditions in post-conflict and post-interventionenvironments, their use is often controversial. (4) While its provisions were left largely unimplemented by the Clinton Administration, (5) the directiveremains in effect under the Bush Administration, which has begun implementing some measures.The other was the United Nations' August 2000 "Brahimi Panel" report, (6) which dealt with problemsof U.N. peacekeeping operations in general, but also contained four specific recommendations toaddress problems with the U.N. civilian police system, particularly in the areas of recruitment,training, and deployment of international civilian police personnel. 2616 ; (2) the diversification of international police forces ascurrently constituted, including the establishment of units of police with military skills (i.e.,"constabulary forces") to handle hostile situations such as crowd control (as is suggested for NATOunder H.R. This report maybe updated if warranted. Some analysts urge the eventual deployment of sizable contingents of international civilian policeto Afghanistan (where the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom are now working torecreate an indigenous police force) to Iraq (where the United States and Jordan are doing the same),and to Haiti. Thesegaps can be particularly troublesome in situations where not all parties to the conflict are dedicatedto peace or where criminal networks have taken root, and where local authority has been removedor replaced by an international intervention. In these cases, the police deployed often lack the necessary skills to handle the situation,in particular the military skills needed to carry out constabulary functions in hostile situations, andinvestigative and intelligence-gathering skills to deal with organized crime. The third is the institution gap , where the indigenous law enforcement system lacks adequate numbers of honest and efficient judicial and penal personnel, as well as sound judicialand penal institutions, and thus are unable to effectively follow-up to police work with prosecutionand punishment necessary for sustainable security. Member States contribute police personnel on a voluntary basis, following a United Nations Security Council resolutionauthorizing a peacekeeping operation. While asserting that the"training and preparedness of individuals and units being supplied to coalition peace operationsshould remain a national responsibility," PDD-71 recognized that "international organizations orother organizing bodies may need to supplement national training from time to time." Although many U.N. Manyanalysts emphasize a continued need to improve the current system, even though perceptions aboutthe U.S. civilian police program have become more positive with ongoing improvements over thelast few years. Police capabilities would include both civil status and police forces, capable ofperforming constabulary functions. 1414: Reform of U.N. Increase International Capability for Constabulary Forces. ( H.R. Most recently, in a bookpublished by the United States Institute for Peace, Perito outlines a comprehensive proposal forintegrating military and civilian personnel to form a "U.S. force for stability" that would constitutepart of U.S. intervention forces (86) In a lessextensive work on the same subject, Perito and a co-author stated that this proposal constitutes "a new approach topost-conflict intervention" that wouldclose security gaps and break the cycle of impunity caused by a law enforcement authority vacuumin the post-conflict period. If, as with the U.S. military reserve component, law enforcement and rule of lawpersonnel are to commit to deploy immediately when called, they may require the type of benefits(i.e., pension, salaries for regular training) such as members of the U.S. military reserve componentreceive. | One of the most crucial and difficult tasks in peacekeeping and related stability operations is creating a secure and stable environment, both for the foreign peacekeepers and for the indigenouspopulation. During the past decade, the United States and the international community have triedvarious approaches to providing that security. Most of these approaches have included the use ofUnited Nations International Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), whose forces are contributed on a caseby case basis by U.N. Member states. (While other countries usually contribute police personnelfrom their own national forces, the United States contracts those it contributes through a privatecorporation.) In a few cases, such as Afghanistan and Iraq at this time, coalition and U.S. militaryforces, and not the United Nations, train and work with indigenous police forces to provide security.
Despite continuing improvements over the past decade, the current system has several drawbacks. UNCIVPOL has been unable to provide an adequate number of well-trained policemenfor individual operations and to deploy them rapidly. Their police forces experience a lack ofconsistency in the type and levels of training and a shortage of needed skills. Military forces, on theother hand, are usually not trained to deal effectively with police situations. These deficiencies leadto three gaps that impede the establishment of law and order, particularly those cases where not allparties to the conflict are dedicated to peace or where criminal networks have taken root. The firstis the deployment gap, when international police are not available as quickly as needed. The secondis the enforcement gap, where those deployed lack necessary skills, in particular combined militaryand policing "constabulary" skills, as well as investigative and intelligence-gathering skills to dealwith organized crime. The third is the institution gap, where competent judicial and penal personnelare needed to provide follow-up services to police work.
Policymakers have long recognized these problems. In February 2000, the Clinton Administration sought to remedy them through Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 71's broadpolicy reforms and guidelines. Although it did not allocate or request the necessary resources foreffective implementation, the Bush Administration is implementing some provisions. In August2000, the U.N. Brahimi Panel report proposed several remedies to improve the U.N. civilian policesystem, as did another report by contributing nations. Some are being implemented.
Three pending bills would address policing and related capabilities for peacekeeping and stability operations. H.R. 1414 would establish a rapidly deployable U.N. civilianpolice corps. H.R. 2616 calls for NATO to establish a security component to be usedin post-conflict reconstruction environments and a U.S. police reserve for use in internationaloperations. S. 2127 provides for the United States to develop a corps of rapidlydeployable personnel, of which rule of law personnel may be a part. Related options recommendedby experts include improving training, increasing international constabulary capabilities, anddeveloping a "stability force" to supplement police with judicial and prison personnel. This reportmay be updated if warranted. |
crs_RS22926 | crs_RS22926_0 | It also provides updated estimates of costs of current operations. Estimates are in current year dollars that reflect values at the time of each conflict and in constant dollars that reflect today's prices. The table also shows estimates of war costs as a share of the economy. Comparisons of costs of wars over a 230-year period, however, are inherently problematic. One problem is how to separate costs of military operations from costs of forces in peacetime. In recent years, the DOD has tried to identify the additional "incremental" expenses of engaging in military operations, over and above the costs of maintaining standing military forces. Before the Vietnam conflict, however, the Army and the Navy, and later the DOD, did not view war costs in such terms. Figures are problematic, as well, because of difficulties in comparing prices from one vastly different era to another. Inflation is one issue—a dollar in the past would buy more than a dollar today. Perhaps a more significant problem is that wars appear more expensive over time as the sophistication and cost of technology advances, both for military and for civilian activities. The data in the attached table, therefore, should be treated, not as truly comparable figures on a continuum, but as snapshots of vastly different periods of U.S. history. Varying Definitions of War Costs
For the Vietnam War and the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, the figures reported here are DOD estimates of the "incremental" costs of military operations (i.e., the costs of war-related activities over and above the normal, day-to-day costs of recruiting, paying, training, and equipping standing military forces). Estimates of the costs of post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere through FY2009 are by [author name scrubbed] of CRS, based on (1) amounts appropriated by Congress in budget accounts designated to cover war-related expenses and (2) allocations of funds in reports on obligations of appropriated amounts by the DOD. These figures appear to reflect a broader definition of war-related expenses than earlier DOD estimates of incremental costs of the Vietnam and Persian Gulf conflicts. In the absence of official accounts of war expenditures, CRS estimated the costs of most earlier wars—except for the American Revolution, the Confederate side of the Civil War, and the Korean conflict—by comparing war-time expenditures of the Army and the Navy with average outlays for the three years prior to each war. The premise is that the cost of a war reflects, in each case, a temporary buildup of forces from the pre-war level. For the Korean conflict, therefore, CRS compared outlays of the DOD during the war with a trend line from average expenditures of the three years before the war to average expenditures of the three years after the war. | This CRS report provides estimates of the costs of major U.S. wars from the American Revolution through current conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. It presents figures both in "current year dollars," that is, in prices in effect at the time of each war, and in inflation-adjusted "constant dollars" updated to the most recently available estimates of FY2011 prices. All estimates are of the costs of military operations only and do not include costs of veterans benefits, interest paid for borrowing money to finance wars, or assistance to allies. The report also provides estimates of the cost of each war as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the peak year of each conflict and of overall defense spending as a share of GDP at the peak.
Comparisons of war costs over a 230-year period, however, are inherently problematic. One problem is how to separate costs of military operations from costs of forces in peacetime. In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has tried to identify the additional "incremental" expenses of engaging in military operations, over and above the costs of maintaining standing military forces. Figures used in this report for the costs of the Vietnam War and of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War are official DOD estimates of the incremental costs of each conflict. Costs of post-9/11 military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere are estimates of amounts appropriated to cover war-related expenses. These amounts appear to reflect a broader definition of war-related expenditures than earlier DOD estimates of incremental Vietnam or Persian Gulf War costs.
Before the Vietnam conflict, the Army and Navy, and later the DOD, did not identify incremental expenses of military operations. For the War of 1812 through World War II, CRS estimated the costs of conflicts by calculating the increase in expenditures of the Army and Navy compared to the average of the three years before each war. The premise is that increases reflect the cost of a temporary buildup to fight each war. Costs of the Revolutionary War and of the Confederate side in the Civil War are from other published sources. Costs of the Korean War were calculated by comparing DOD expenditures during the war with a trend line extending from the average of three years before the war to the average of three years after the war.
Figures are problematic, as well, because of difficulties in comparing prices from one vastly different era to another. Inflation is one issue—a dollar in the past would buy more than a dollar today. Perhaps a more significant problem is that wars appear vastly more expensive over time as the sophistication and cost of technology advances, both for military and for civilian purposes. The estimates presented in this report, therefore, should be treated, not as truly comparable figures on a continuum, but as snapshots of vastly different periods of U.S. history. |
crs_R44664 | crs_R44664_0 | Introduction
Congress faces infrastructure funding decisions that would support shipping on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway (GLSLS). In the Water Resources Development Act of 2016 ( H.R. 5303 , S. 2848 ), Congress may decide whether to permanently allocate 10% of certain harbor maintenance funds both to small ports and to Great Lakes ports as proposed in the Senate-passed version of the bill ( S. 2848 , sections 2010 and 2018). Also on the horizon is a debate over construction of a spare, parallel lock at Sault Ste. A new lock and a new icebreaker would likely cost several hundred million dollars and take several years to construct. These funding decisions concerning the GLSLS come at a time when the system's traffic base is eroding. There are reasons to think this trend will continue. It is largely the result of technological changes in manufacturing and transportation, as well as the globalization of production—factors beyond the scope of infrastructure funding. Moreover, federal funds for harbor maintenance are derived from cargo taxes predominantly paid by shippers using coastal ports, not Great Lakes ports. Coastal ports, especially those experiencing steady increases in cargo volume, wish to retain more of the cargo taxes they generate for their own infrastructure needs. About 85% of the cargo handled by U.S. ports on the Great Lakes is moving to or from other Great Lakes ports and therefore does not use the seaway. Since the mid-1980s, demand for North American grain has come mainly from Asia; most U.S. exports move to Pacific ports by rail or to New Orleans by barge. The sources of scrap metal are widely scattered and, therefore, it is shipped overwhelmingly by truck and rail. During the seaway's winter closure, shippers are expected to shift to rail transportation to East Coast ports. No such vessels operate through the St. Lawrence Seaway. The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway also face unit train competition for shipping grain and coal. Capital Needs of the GLSLS
The largest potential capital project on the GLSLS, as indicated above, is the construction of a second lock parallel to the Poe Lock at Sault Ste. Marie. The agencies also are dredging to maintain seaway depth. In 1986, Congress established the Harbor Maintenance Tax and Trust Fund in the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 ( P.L. Congress expressed no interest in this proposal. Improving the Price Competitiveness of GLSLS Shipping
The most promising strategy for attracting shippers to the GLSLS is for the system to offer a lower-cost alternative than the competition. Ships outcompete railroads in moving Mesabi iron ore to Great Lakes steel mills. | Congress faces infrastructure funding decisions that would support shipping on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway (GLSLS). In the Water Resources Development Act of 2016 (H.R. 5303, S. 2848), Congress may decide whether to permanently allocate 10% of certain harbor maintenance funds both to small ports and to Great Lakes ports. On the horizon are debates over construction of a second lock at Sault Ste. Marie, MI, and a second Great Lakes heavy icebreaker vessel. These projects would likely cost several hundred million dollars and take several years to complete.
These funding decisions come at a time when the GLSLS's traffic base is eroding. There are reasons to think this trend will continue. It is largely the result of technological changes in manufacturing and transportation, as well as the globalization of production—factors unrelated to Great Lakes infrastructure funding:
Most steel is now manufactured from scrap metal, which is moved by truck and railroad, rather than from iron ore shipped by vessel in the Great Lakes region. Dedicated single-cargo "unit" trains have helped the railroads compete with vessels in carrying dry bulk goods such as grain and coal. Shippers of high-value goods (including containerized cargo) are deterred from using the GLSLS by winter closure and locks that slow transit. Export demand for North American grain now comes mainly from Asia. The grain moves to Pacific or Gulf Coast ports rather than through the GLSLS. The boom in domestic production of unconventional oil and gas has increased demand for vessel transport on certain U.S. waterways, but the GLSLS has been unaffected.
These developments are major obstacles to efforts by the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, the U.S. government agency that shares responsibility for administering the seaway, to increase traffic on the GLSLS system.
Operation and maintenance of the system's locks and the dredging necessary to maintain the mandated 27-foot channel depth at Great Lakes ports are funded from the Harbor Maintenance Tax, which is predominantly paid by shippers using coastal ports, not Great Lakes ports. Coastal ports, especially those experiencing steady increases in cargo volume, wish to retain more of the cargo taxes they generate for their own infrastructure needs, raising questions about the future source of federal support for the GLSLS.
Congress could return to funding the GLSLS system with lock tolls instead of annual appropriations as was the case prior to 1986, but Congress expressed no interest when this was last proposed in 2006. It is too early to tell whether public-private partnership provisions enacted in the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 might be pursued with respect to the GLSLS. The most promising strategy for attracting shippers to the GLSLS is to reduce users' costs relative to the costs of shipping by truck, rail, or pipeline. |
crs_R43155 | crs_R43155_0 | Introduction
Some Members of Congress believe the contributions of small businesses to commercial innovation and economic growth could be enhanced through greater access to growing international markets. Only 1% of small businesses in the United States export. With roughly three-quarters of world purchasing power and almost 95% of world consumers living outside U.S. borders, more attention is being paid to the potential of small business programs to increase employment in the export sector. This report begins with the history, role, and scope of the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) export promotion activities and the creation of SBA's Office of International Trade (OIT). It then uses quantitative data from SBA and qualitative data from other sources to present performance analysis of SBA's international programs. SBA's Office of International Trade
SBA provides export promotion and financing services to small businesses through its business loan programs, management and training programs, and other initiatives. SBA's OIT coordinates these activities as it assists with four stages of export promotion: (1) identifying small businesses interested in export promotion, (2) preparing small businesses to export, (3) connecting small businesses to export opportunities, and (4) supporting small businesses once they find export opportunities. Congress does not directly provide an appropriation amount for each of the SBA's three export-focused loan programs or for trade-related counseling provided through SBA's management and training programs. 114-113 ) appropriated $18.0 million for the STEP program in FY2016. In the 114 th Congress, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P.L. Loan Programs
SBA has three loan programs that are specifically targeted toward exporters, and many of SBA's broader loan programs also support export-related activities. In general, the surveys indicate that these programs assisted small businesses at all stages of development. Issues for Congress
This section of the report introduces three policy issues for consideration as Congress looks to the future size and scope of SBA's export promotion activities: (1) are there barriers to exporting or market failures impeding smaller firms from international trade? Incomplete information among small businesses concerning the benefits of internationalization and how to internationalize their business could be indicative of a market failure, though, particularly if more information could allow small businesses to operate more efficiently and increase competition. As previously mentioned, Congress elevated the goal of export promotion within SBA when it established an assistant administrator to head the OIT in the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-240 ). In any case, co-location of some of these services (in the form of U.S. 114-125 contained provisions that are intended to increase coordination of federal export promotion programs, reform the Export.gov web portal to be more accessible to small business exporters, integrate state trade programs into federal trade programs, and clarify the role of the TPCC in promoting state and federal export promotion programs. | According to Census Bureau data, approximately 1% of small businesses in the United States currently export. With roughly three-quarters of world purchasing power and almost 95% of world consumers living outside U.S. borders, more attention is being paid to the potential of small business export promotion programs to grow small businesses and contribute to national economic output. In addition, some Members of Congress believe the contributions of small businesses to commercial innovation and economic opportunities for firms and workers could be enhanced through greater access to growing international markets.
Consistent with these policy goals, the Small Business Administration (SBA) provides export promotion and financing services to small businesses through its loan guaranty programs, management and training programs, and other initiatives. SBA's Office of International Trade (OIT) coordinates these activities as it assists with four stages of export promotion: (1) identifying small businesses interested in export promotion; (2) preparing small businesses to export; (3) connecting small businesses to export opportunities; and (4) supporting small businesses once they find export opportunities.
The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-240) elevated trade within SBA by establishing an assistant administrator to lead OIT and report directly to the SBA administrator. The act also first authorized the precursor to what is now known as the "State Trade Expansion Program" (STEP), which provides grants to states and territories to assist small businesses based on a trade promotion plan developed by the applicant state. The STEP program was appropriated $18.0 million for FY2016.
In FY2016, SBA's export-related loans amounted to approximately $1.5 billion (approximately 5.0% of the value of SBA's annual loan portfolio). Although SBA has three loan programs that are specifically targeted toward exporters, most of SBA's lending support for export-related activities occurred through its broader loan programs. Surveys indicate that relatively few clients of SBA's management and training programs request trade-related counseling.
This report begins with the history, role, and scope of SBA's export promotion activities and the creation of OIT. Next, it uses quantitative and qualitative data from SBA to provide performance analysis of SBA's international programs. This report concludes with a discussion of three policy issues for Congress.
First, export promotion programs could have a policy rationale if barriers to entry are indicative of a market failure to efficiently allocate investment toward small exporters (e.g., because of disproportionately high costs to comply with trading regulations or insufficient information about the net benefits of trade). Many of these conditions, though, could be due to higher risk profiles for small exporters instead of a market failure.
Second, export promotion is sometimes viewed as important to U.S. trade "competitiveness," by boosting U.S. exports in sectors that are cutting-edge, or have become displaced by lower-cost producers overseas. Some critique this theory by arguing that these policies are economically inefficient, if they distort capital from flowing to activities with the highest economic return.
Third, the range of federal export promotion programs has led to administrative challenges among some small-business clients and potentially led to the duplication of services using taxpayer money. The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125) enacted reforms intended to address some of these concerns. The 115th Congress might consider progress made toward these reforms as part of its small business policy agenda. |
crs_RL34377 | crs_RL34377_0 | Finally, in 2007, Congress amended the 1995 act to further enhance disclosure and reporting requirements for lobbyists and lobbying firms. The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 provided specific thresholds and definitions of lobbyists, lobbying activities, and lobbying contacts, compared to the 1946 act. The most recent amendments to the LDA, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA), mandated additional and more frequent disclosures. Pursuant to the 1946 act, the 1995 LDA, as amended by the 1998 act, and the HLOGA, the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate have had joint responsibility for implementing systems to register lobbyists. In addition to collecting registration and disclosure documents from lobbyists the Clerk and the Secretary are required to
1. provide guidance and assistance on the registration and reporting requirements of this Act and develop common standards, rules, and procedures for compliance with this Act; 2. review, and, where necessary, verify and inquire to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of registration and reports; 3. develop filing, coding, and cross-indexing systems to carry out the purpose of this Act, including— a. a publicly available list of all registered lobbyists, lobbying firms, and their clients; and b. computerized systems designed to minimize the burden of filing and maximize public access to materials filed under this Act; 4. make available for public inspection and copying at reasonable times the registrations and reports filed under this Act; 5. retain registrations for a period of at least 6 years after they are terminated and reports for a period of at least 6 years after they are filed; 6. compile and summarize, with respect to each semi-annual period, the information contained in registrations and reports filed with respect to such period in a clear and complete manner; 7. notify any lobbyist or lobbying firm in writing that may be in noncompliance with this Act; and 8. notify the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia that a lobbyist or lobbying firm may be in noncompliance with this Act, if the registrant has been notified in writing and has failed to provide an appropriate response within 60 days after notice was given under paragraph (7). Pursuant to these responsibilities, the Clerk and the Secretary have chosen to use a single electronic filing system, whereby lobbyists and lobbying firms register once and documents are automatically transmitted to both the Clerk and the Secretary. Role of Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate
The Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate are responsible for implementing lobbyist registration and disclosure provisions of the LDA, as amended by the HLOGA, for the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively. Publicly Available Registration and Disclosure Data
2 U.S.C. As required by Section 6 of the LDA, the Clerk and the Secretary on December 10, 2007, issued a joint guidance document. The guidance document was most recently updated on January 31, 2017. The guidance document is posted on both the Clerk's and Secretary's lobbying websites. Provides background information on the LDA and the responsibilities of the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate in providing guidance to the lobbying community. Identifies changes made to the guidance since the last update. The monetary thresholds are updated periodically to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). | On September 14, 2007, President George W. Bush signed S. 1, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-81), into law. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) amended the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 (P.L. 104-65, as amended) to provide, among other changes to federal law and House and Senate rules, additional and more frequent disclosures of lobbying contacts and activities. This report explains the role of the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate in implementing lobbying registration and disclosure requirements and summarizes the guidance documents they have jointly issued.
Under the HLOGA and predecessor lobbying laws, the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate manage the registration, filing, and the collection of documents submitted by the lobbyists and lobbying firms. Prior to the HLOGA, lobbyists were required to file paper documents with both the Clerk and the Secretary. These forms are now filed electronically and jointly with the Clerk and the Secretary. In addition, the Clerk and the Secretary are responsible for making documents publicly available and reporting incorrect or false filings to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia.
Beginning in December 2007, the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate issued joint guidance documents for HLOGA implementation. The guidance document identified eight substantive changes to the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act, and discussed how the Clerk and Secretary interpret and implement the HLOGA's provisions. In addition, the guidance document provided direction on successful completion of quarterly registration and disclosure documents, the new semi-annual reporting requirement, and interpretation of the Clerk and Secretary's role in referring non-compliance to the U.S. attorney.
Since issuing an initial guidance document in 2007, the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §1605, have conducted periodic reviews of existing guidance and have issued multiple updates. Most recently, the document was updated on January 31, 2017, to update registration thresholds pursuant to changes in the Consumer Price Index; provide additional clarifications on identifying clients and covered officials; provide additional examples for filing by outside lobbyists; clarify that all income and expenditure reporting should be rounded to the nearest $10,000; clarify that all "sole proprietors" are required to file two LD-203 disclosure forms—one for the registrant [firm] and one for the individual lobbyist; and encourage filers to use the online public database for compliance purposes.
For further analysis on the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act and the Lobbying Disclosure Act, see CRS Report R40245, Lobbying Registration and Disclosure: Before and After the Enactment of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44292, The Lobbying Disclosure Act at 20: Analysis and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43757 | crs_R43757_0 | 113-183 ) is an omnibus bill, including child welfare and child support provisions. 4980 ), which passed the House of Representatives by voice vote (under suspension of the rules) on July 23, 2014, and the Senate, by unanimous consent on September 18, 2014, represented a compromise between multiple bills acted on by the House of Representatives and the Senate Finance Committee earlier in the 113 th Congress. President Obama signed the bill into law on September 29, 2014, as P.L. 113-183 . The law establishes new requirements for state child welfare agencies, state child support enforcement agencies, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) which administers federal programs providing funding to those agencies. The law requires state child welfare agencies to develop and implement procedures that respond to concerns about sex trafficking of children in foster care (including those who are not in foster care but are served by the agency), to separately develop protocols to locate and serve children who run away from foster care, to report information about victims of sex trafficking and those who run away from foster care to various entities; and directs HHS to provide information on the numbers of sex trafficking victims identified by state child welfare agencies, establish a national advisory committee concerning sex trafficking of children in the United States, and prepare a report on children who run away from foster care. " For children in foster care under the age of 16, the law prohibits the use of the permanency plan "another planned permanent living arrangement" as an alternative to seeking reunification, adoption, legal guardianship, or placement with a fit and willing relative; requires state child welfare agencies to continue efforts to find permanent connections for youth age 16 or older who are assigned APPLA as their permanency plan; requires state child welfare agencies to involve children in foster care at age 14 or older in their own case and permanency planning and to inform these children of certain rights, including their right to specified key document (e.g., birth certificate, driver's license) when they are "aging out" of foster care. The law extends funding authorization for the Adoption Incentives Payment program for three years and revises the incentive payments to include incentives for achieving permanence via legal guardianship; extends funding for Family Connection grant program for one year; requires states to spend an amount equal to at least 30% of certain adoption assistance "savings" for services to strengthen families, including provision of post-adoption supports; ensures that children receiving federal guardianship assistance with a legal relative guardian can continue to do so if that guardian becomes ill or incapacitated and the child is placed with a previously named successor guardian; requires state child welfare agencies to notify the parent(s) of siblings of children who are entering foster care; and directs HHS to report on the number of children who are placed in foster care as a result of a legal guardianship or adoption that has been disrupted or has dissolved. The law provides for implementation of the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (and any other related treaties) to increase effectiveness of child support collections in cases where noncustodial parents live in foreign countries; seeks to improve child support collections involving tribal governments; requires state child support enforcement agencies to adopt certain data standardization measures and to implement electronic withholding of child support payments; and directs HHS to report on additional measures to improve child support enforcement. 113-183 amends the federal foster care program (authorized in Title IV-E of the Social Security Act) to require state child welfare agencies to develop and implement procedures to identify, document in agency records, and determine appropriate services for certain children or youth who are victims of sex trafficking, or at risk of being such victims. Supporting "Normalcy" for Children in Foster Care
The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act seeks to ensure that children in foster care have the opportunity to participate in activities that are appropriate to their age and stage of development. Defining a "Reasonable and Prudent Parent Standard"
P.L. Additionally, P.L. 113-183 requires that any child in foster care who is age 14 or older must be consulted in the development of, and any revisions to, his/her case plan and permanency plan. Additionally, P.L. 113-183 appropriates $15 million to continue Family Connection Grants for one year (FY2014). The child support provisions in P.L. 113-183 primarily seek to ensure that the United States is compliant with any multilateral child support treaties and make other changes that are intended to improve the ability of the CSE program to collect child support in cases where a noncustodial parent lives in a foreign country. 113-183 provides Indian tribes or tribal organizations access to the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) by designating them as "authorized persons." Separately, P.L. Data Exchange Standardization
P.L. 4980 authorizes expansions in federal support for child welfare programs and activities; however, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that costs will be more than fully offset by other provisions of the bill, which would reduce overall direct federal spending by $1 million over six years (FY2014-FY2019) and $19 million over 11 years (FY2014 -FY2024). Origins of H.R. | The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (H.R. 4980), an omnibus bill that includes both child welfare and child support provisions, was signed into law on September 29, 2014, as P.L. 113-183. The bill received broad congressional support, passing the House by voice vote (under suspension of the rules) on July 23, 2014, and the Senate by unanimous consent on September 18, 2014.
P.L. 113-183 amends the federal foster care program to require state child welfare agencies to develop and implement procedures for identifying, documenting in agency records, and determining appropriate services for certain children or youth who are victims of sex trafficking, or at risk of victimization. State child welfare agencies must also report to law enforcement and the U.S Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which administers child welfare programs, about such victims. In addition, HHS must establish a national advisory committee on child sex trafficking that must, among other responsibilities, develop policies on improving the nation's response to domestic sex trafficking. P.L. 113-183 also includes provisions to direct child welfare agencies to develop protocols on locating children missing from care.
The law also seeks to ensure children in foster care have the opportunity to participate in activities that are appropriate to their age and stage of development. It requires changes in state foster home licensing law to enable foster caregivers to apply a "reasonable and prudent parenting" standard when determining whether a child in foster care may participate in activities; and directs state child welfare agencies to provide training to caregivers on using this standard. Other provisions in the law seek to ensure permanent adult connections for older children and better aid their transition to successful adulthood. Under the new law, states are not permitted to assign a permanency plan of "another planned permanent living arrangement" (APPLA) to any child under the age of 16, and must take additional steps to support permanency for children age 16 or older who are assigned that permanency plan. Further, children in foster care who are age 14 or older must be consulted in the development of, and about any revisions to, their case and permanency plans. They must also be made aware of their rights while in care, including the right to receive critical documents (e.g., birth certificate, Social Security card) when they "age out" of care.
P.L. 113-183 separately extends funding authority for Adoption Incentive Payments for three years (FY2014-FY2016). It phases in a revised incentive structure that allows states to earn incentive payments for both adoptions and exits from foster care to legal guardianship, places additional focus on finding permanent homes for older children, and strengthens the way state performance is gauged under the program. The law requires 30% of any state savings (resulting from broadening federal eligibility for adoption assistance) to be used for family strengthening services, including post-adoption services. It also includes provisions to ensure continued federal assistance under the Title IV-E program for eligible children who, following the death or incapacitation of their legal guardian, are placed with previously named successor guardians. Separately, the law appropriates $15 million to continue Family Connection Grants for one year. These grants are intended to strengthen children's connections to their parents and other relatives.
The child support provisions in P.L. 113-183 are designed to improve child support collections in cases where the custodial parent and child live in one country and the noncustodial parent lives in another country. It ensures that the United States is compliant with any multilateral child support enforcement treaties and, as part of this, requires states to update their Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) law to incorporate any amendments adopted as of September 2008 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Further, P.L. 113-183 facilitates greater access to the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) by foreign countries and tribal governments as part of improving child support collections. It also requires HHS to submit a report to Congress that includes policy options aimed at improving the CSE program. In addition, P.L. 113-183 includes provisions to support standardizing data exchange of child support-related information, and require electronic processing of income withholding for child support.
Effective dates vary by provision of the law. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that enactment of H.R. 4980 would reduce overall direct federal spending by $19 million across 11 years (FY2014-FY2024). |
crs_R45179 | crs_R45179_0 | Introduction
The First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) is a federal agency created by Congress in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 ( P.L. As a result, Congress authorized FirstNet to enter into a public-private partnership to leverage commercial infrastructure and services, in exchange for access to FirstNet assets, including $7 billion in funding and 20 megahertz (MHz) of spectrum. In March 2017, FirstNet awarded the contract to build the network to AT&T. AT&T is also recruiting users to the network to ensure adoption targets are met. During the terrorist attacks of 9/11, public safety agencies could not communicate with each other. Radio channels were overloaded, and the multiple public safety agencies that responded to the events were operating on various frequencies and could not interoperate. Further, the 9/11 Commission noted that systems and channels were overloaded by the large number of responders trying to communicate that day. The Commission called for the expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety use. Major Developments in 2017
On March 30, 2017, FirstNet awarded AT&T with a 25-year contract to build, operate, and maintain the nationwide public safety broadband network. AT&T will provide FirstNet with access to its existing infrastructure, valued at more than $180 billion, and with $40 billion over the life of the contract to support the public safety network. Under the contract, AT&T will build a 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) network for public safety users. Some Members questioned FirstNet, AT&T, and state representatives on state plans, the opt-in/opt-out process, factors affecting opt-in/opt-out decisions, and critical aspects of the FirstNet/AT&T network, including coverage (rural and non-rural); the security, reliability and redundancy of the FirstNet network; features available on the network; site hardening (e.g., strengthening and protecting critical infrastructure from disasters); and cost. Users are needed to ensure that the network will be self-sustaining, as required in the act, and to achieve the intent of the law—to provide a single, interoperable network that public safety agencies can use to communicate and coordinate during disasters. Congress may consider requiring FirstNet to release the contract and state plans, or to provide greater detail on the network, so that Congress can ensure that the FirstNet/AT&T approach meets the requirements in the act, and the intent of the law: to provide a nationwide network for public safety to communicate and coordinate during response. Services Beyond the Initial Five-Year Deployment
By January 2018, all 50 states and 6 territories accepted the FirstNet/AT&T plan to deploy the network in their state, although some opted in reluctantly. While the provisions in the RFP reflect the requirements in the act, the proprietary nature of the contract and the state deployment plans makes it difficult to determine if the requirements of the law are being met, how the resources provided (e.g., $6.5 billion and 20 MHz spectrum) are being used, and if the network is being deployed as intended by Congress. Congress may consider requesting more information from FirstNet and AT&T on the FirstNet network's public safety grade features and when they will be available to public safety users, as these issues may affect state and local public safety agencies' decisions to join the network, the ability of the project to be self-sustaining, and the success of the network. AT&T can also monetize (i.e., earn revenue from) the excess capacity of FirstNet's 20 MHz of broadband spectrum, when it is not in use by public safety. Even if a state opted into the network (i.e., opted to have FirstNet/AT&T deploy the network in their state), the public safety agencies in the states are not required to subscribe to the network. A financial challenge for FirstNet/AT&T will be in enrolling subscribers to the system. Congress may continue oversight of the FirstNet network to better understand the deployment and critical aspects of the network; to ensure that the network is being deployed as intended by Congress; and to ensure that public safety users are subscribing to the network, which is needed to support current operations and future improvements to the network. 112-96 . | During the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), first responders could not communicate with each other. Some radios did not work in the high-rise World Trade Center; radio channels were overloaded by the large number of responders trying to communicate; and public safety radio systems operated on various frequencies and were not interoperable. There were also non-technical issues. Officials struggled to coordinate the multi-agency response, and to maintain command and control of the numerous agencies and responders.
The 9/11 Commission called for the "expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety purposes." Increased spectrum would allow public safety agencies to accommodate an increasing number of users; support interoperability solutions (e.g., shared channels); and leverage new technologies (e.g., live video streams) to enhance response.
In 2012, Congress acted on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. In Title VI of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), Congress authorized the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to allocate additional spectrum for public safety use; established the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) and authorized it to enter into a public-private partnership to build a nationwide public safety broadband network; and, provided $7 billion out of revenues from spectrum auctions to build the network.
February 22, 2017, marked five years since the act was signed into law. FirstNet has made progress in implementing the provisions in the act. In March 2017, FirstNet awarded a 25-year, $6.5 billion contract to AT&T to build and maintain the nationwide network for public safety. FirstNet provided AT&T with 20 megahertz (MHz) of broadband spectrum, which AT&T can monetize for public safety and non-public safety use. AT&T is providing FirstNet access to its infrastructure, valued at $180 billion, and $40 billion to maintain and improve the network.
In September 2017, FirstNet/AT&T presented states with plans detailing how the network would be deployed in each state. Governors could opt to have AT&T deploy the network (i.e., opt in), or have the state assume responsibility for the deployment (i.e., opt out). By January 2018, all 50 states and 6 territories opted in. This was viewed as a victory for FirstNet, AT&T, and public safety stakeholders who had long advocated for a nationwide network for public safety.
However, challenges remain. While governors allowed FirstNet/AT&T to deploy the network in their states, there is no requirement for state and local public safety agencies to use the network. FirstNet/AT&T must attract users to the network to ensure the network is self-sustaining, as required under the act. FirstNet set adoption targets and steep penalties that AT&T must pay if targets are not met. AT&T has offered specialized features and services (e.g., priority access to the network, support during disasters) to attract users to the network. However, Verizon has offered similar services to entice users to its network which may affect FirstNet/AT&T's enrollment efforts. There are other factors affecting enrollment. Some public safety agencies have expressed reluctance to join the FirstNet network, citing uncertainties with the resiliency, reliability, and security of the network, coverage, and cost. Other agencies have expressed an unwillingness to join until FirstNet can provide mission critical voice features—essential features that responders have on their radios and use during emergencies—that will not be available from FirstNet until 2019. Attracting users to the network will be challenging for FirstNet/AT&T, but necessary to meet the requirements in the law and achieve the intent of the act.
Congress may continue its oversight of FirstNet to ensure the FirstNet network is meeting public safety needs (e.g., security, reliability, and resiliency), requirements in the law are met, and the network is deployed as intended. Congress may monitor subscribership to ensure the network will be self-sustaining, as required in the act, and that the intent of the law is achieved. |
crs_R44266 | crs_R44266_0 | Introduction
Congress over the years has passed several domestic content laws that aim to protect American manufacturing and manufacturing jobs. These restrictions are commonly referred to as the Buy America Act, or more simply, Buy America; they differ from requirements under the Buy American Act of 1933, which applies to direct purchases by the federal government. Statements and actions by the Trump Administration about reinvigorating domestic manufacturing and reinvesting in infrastructure have stimulated renewed interest in Buy America. Today, Buy America refers to several similar statutes and regulations that apply to federal funds used to support projects in highways, public transportation, aviation, and intercity passenger rail, including Amtrak. Unless a nationwide or project-specific waiver is granted, Buy America requires the use of U.S.-made iron and steel and the domestic production and assembly of other manufactured goods, such as rolling stock used in public transportation. To evaluate the implications of Buy America on domestic manufacturing, this report analyzes the effects of Buy America on steel and rolling stock manufacturing in the context of industry trends. Even though FHWA waives Buy America requirements for manufactured products, except those made predominantly of iron and steel, this is not the case with other U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) agencies and Amtrak. For example, for the purchase of rolling stock using FTA funds, the Buy America requirement is waived only if (1) the cost of the components produced in the United States in FY2017 is more than 60% of the cost of all components of the rolling stock (65% for FY2018 and FY2019, and 70% for FY2020 onward); and (2) final assembly of the rolling stock occurs in the United States (49 U.S.C. In 2008, Congress incorporated a provision in the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 112- 141 ), enacted in July 2012, and the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act ( P.L. First, an executive memorandum requires the Secretary of Commerce to develop a plan to have all new pipelines in the United States "use materials and equipment produced in the United States, to the maximum extent possible and to the extent permitted by law." It is not clear how these requirements might be altered through the regulatory process, if at all, in response to President Trump's "Buy American and Hire American" executive order. Direct employment in steel has declined from almost 260,000 jobs in 1990 to around 140,000 jobs in 2016 ( Figure 2 ), due largely to higher productivity. Buy America and U.S. Rolling Stock Manufacturing
Besides its restriction on the sourcing of iron and steel, Buy America also places limits on state and local governments and Amtrak when using federal funds to purchase manufactured goods. One of the main manufactured products this affects is rolling stock, which includes intercity passenger rail trains, public transportation rail cars and buses, and associated equipment. Alternatively, if federal funding increases, demand for new domestically produced passenger rail cars will likely grow. Evidence of these effects, however, is largely anecdotal. The requirements have the potential to raise costs of transportation projects and contribute further to delays. The FAST Act, enacted in December 2015, did this by increasing the share of public transit rolling stock components and subcomponents that must be produced in the United States. Other bills, such as the Invest in American Jobs Act of 2015 ( S. 1043 , 114 th Congress), introduced by Senators Merkley and Baldwin, have proposed increasing the share to 100%. Broadening Buy America Restrictions
There are proposals to expand Buy America to other parts of the transportation system and to other sectors such as clean energy manufacturing. | With the aim of protecting American manufacturing and manufacturing jobs, Congress over the years has passed several domestic content laws. Statements and actions by the Trump Administration about reinvigorating domestic manufacturing and reinvesting in infrastructure have stimulated renewed interest in these laws, including Buy America. The President's "Buy American and Hire American" initiative includes an executive memorandum requiring the Secretary of Commerce to develop a plan for new pipelines in the United States to be made from domestically produced iron and steel, and a separate executive order directing agencies to strictly adhere to Buy America laws.
Buy America refers to several similar statutes and regulations that apply to federal funds used to support projects involving highways, public transportation, aviation, and intercity passenger rail, including Amtrak. Unless a nationwide or project-specific waiver is granted, Buy America requires the use of U.S.-made iron and steel and the domestic production and assembly of other manufactured goods. One of the main manufacturing industries this applies to is the production of rolling stock (rail cars and buses) used in federally funded public transportation and Amtrak's intercity passenger rail service. This report examines the effects of Buy America on these two industries, iron and steel manufacturing and rolling stock manufacturing, in the context of industry trends.
Buy America dates to passage of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1978 (STAA; P.L. 95-599), and is different from the Buy American Act, enacted in 1933, which applies to direct purchases by the federal government. Although the Buy America provisions have been in place in some form for almost 40 years, it is difficult to know how they have affected steel and rolling stock manufacturing in the United States, whether measured by jobs, output, or any other indicator. Empirical evidence on the economic benefits or costs of domestic content laws is largely lacking, in part because the effects are small compared with macroeconomic forces such as global economic growth and the related growth in demand for steel. Although employment in domestic steel manufacturing has declined sharply, this is largely attributable to higher industry productivity. Buy America has likely promoted the production of rail cars and buses in the United States, but these industries are relatively small, and demand is related strongly to the combined level of federal, state, and local government funding.
Buy America could increase the cost of some transportation projects by requiring the purchase of domestic steel, vehicles, and vehicle components when imported products might be cheaper. In some cases, the difficulty of complying with Buy America rules has been blamed for project delays. The cost of imports used in federally supported projects could rise because agencies within the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) require some imports be carried on U.S.-flag vessels in compliance with the FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 110-417, §3511). Requiring transport by U.S.-flag vessels may also contribute to project delays. Lack of information makes claims about project cost and delay difficult to assess.
Much of the congressional activity related to Buy America seeks to strengthen its requirements. The Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act (P.L. 114-94), enacted in December 2015, increased the share of public transit rolling stock components and subcomponents that must be produced in the United States from 60% in FY2017 to 65% in FY2018 and FY2019, and to 70% for FY2020 onward. Other bills have proposed increasing the share to 100%. Other legislative proposals have called for expanding Buy America to other parts of the transportation system, such as pipelines, and to other sectors, including clean energy manufacturing. |
crs_RL32838 | crs_RL32838_0 | Its 1.5 million acre Coastal Plain on the North Slope of the Brooks Range is viewed by industry as one of the more likely undeveloped U.S. onshore oil and gas prospects. What factors should determine whether to open the area? 96-487 . Legislative History of the Refuge, 1957-2000
The Early Years
The energy and biological resources of northern Alaska have raised controversy for decades, from legislation in the 1970s to a 1989 oil spill from the Exxon Valdez at the southern terminal of the pipeline that would carry ANWR oil to markets to more recent efforts to use ANWR resources to address energy needs or to help balance the federal budget. The 1980s
In 1980, Congress enacted the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA, P.L. From 1990 to 2000
There were several attempts to authorize opening ANWR to energy development in the 1990s. In the 106 th Congress, bills to designate the 1002 area of the Refuge as wilderness and others to open the Refuge to energy development were introduced. Only three recorded votes relating directly to ANWR development occurred from the 101 st through 106 th Congresses. All were in the Senate:
In the 104 th Congress, on May 24 1995, a motion to table an amendment that would have stripped ANWR development titles from the Senate version of H.R. In the 107 th Congress, for the FY2003 Interior appropriations bill, the House Committee on Appropriations had agreed to report language on the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) energy and minerals program in general, and stated that no funds were included in the FY2003 funding bill "for activity related to potential energy development within [ANWR]" ( H.Rept. If the House language had been adopted, ANWR development language might have been considered as part of a reconciliation measure to achieve the savings. In the end, the conferees on the budget resolution included no instructions to the House Resources and Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committees. After many weeks of debate in the Senate, as prospects of passage seemed to be dimming, Senators agreed to drop the bill they had been debating and to go back to the bill passed in the Senate of the 107 th Congress, when the Senate was under control of the other party. Senator Cantwell offered a floor amendment ( S.Amdt. ANWR was a major issue in conference. The Senate bill contained no ANWR development provisions. Legislative History of the Refuge, 2009-2010
No bills on the Refuge received floor consideration in the 111 th Congress in either the House or the Senate. 3408 in the form specified by the resolution (which included ANWR development), and on February 16, 2012, after considering several floor amendments, passed it (yeas 237, nays 187; Roll Call #71). On March 13, 2012, the Senate rejected S.Amdt. Similarly, in the second session, the House approved H.Amdt. 961 to designate the Coastal Plain as wilderness. The Senate took no floor votes on the Coastal Plain during the 114 th Congress. CRS Report RL31115, Legal Issues Related to Proposed Drilling for Oil and Gas in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) , by Pamela Baldwin. | Current law forbids the federal government from offering energy leases or from allowing activities leading to energy development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR, or the Refuge) in northeastern Alaska. For several decades, a major energy debate has been whether to approve energy development in ANWR, and if so, under what conditions, or to continue to prohibit development to protect the area's biological resources. ANWR is rich in fauna, flora, and commercial oil potential. Its development has been debated for more than 50 years, and the level of debate fluctuates with gasoline and natural gas prices, terrorist attacks, infrastructure damage from hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and turmoil in the Middle East.
This report provides a summary of legislative attempts to address issues of energy development and preservation in the Refuge from the 95th Congress (1977-1978) onward. (The substance of the issue is covered in other CRS reports.) There have been several periods of active congressional consideration, punctuated by periods of less activity and debate. In the 96th Congress (1979-1980), multiple floor votes occurred in the House and Senate, leading ultimately to the passage of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (P.L. 96-487). In the 104th Congress (1995-1996), floor votes related to ANWR development measures contained in budget reconciliation bills occurred in both bodies. These led, eventually, to a presidential veto. The 107th Congress (2001-2002) saw votes in both bodies in the context of measures to address energy resources. Ultimately, no ANWR provisions were approved. In the 108th and 109th Congresses (2003-2006), multiple floor votes occurred in both the House and the Senate, in some cases over amendments that were identical in each Congress. The ANWR development provisions were considered as parts of bills concerning energy programs, budget resolutions, and defense authorization.
Although no floor votes on the Refuge occurred in the House or the Senate during the 111th Congress, in the 112th Congress, the House approved H.R. 3408 on February 16, 2012. The measure included a provision to open the 1.5 million acre Coastal Plain to energy development. On March 13, 2012, the Senate rejected S.Amdt. 1826 to S. 1813, which would have expanded drilling into areas including the ANWR Coastal Plain. No House or Senate floor votes related to the Refuge occurred in the 113th Congress.
In the 114th Congress, there were House floor votes that related to the Coastal Plain, either directly or indirectly. One amendment (H.Amdt. 961) to designate the Coastal Plain as wilderness was rejected by the House; three amendments would block funds to implement a wilderness recommendation in a Refuge planning document. No related Senate floor votes occurred in the 114th Congress. |
crs_RL33672 | crs_RL33672_0 | An unexpected increase in revenues, as documented by both the Administration in its Mid-Session Review and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in its August update has led to a renewed discussion of the effect of the 2001-2004 tax cuts on the economy and the possible feedback effects on revenue. Some proponents of the tax cuts suggest that induced economic growth was large enough that taxes on the additional income more than offset the cost of the tax cuts, causing an increase rather than a decrease in revenues. Other observers doubt that economic growth was related to the tax cuts, or that it was large enough to significantly offset the cost of the cuts. After reviewing the data on the revenue increase, this report examines available economic studies, theory, and empirical data to assess the possible revenue feedback from the 2001-2004 tax cuts. They can be separated into three types of effects: demand-side stimulus effects including the eventual consequences of increased debt, "supply-side" effects on labor and capital, and changes in the allocation of consumption and other forms of taxpayer avoidance. As time goes on, assuming revenues are not fully recovered and as the stimulus fades, the effect of the tax cuts is to reduce output by reducing the capital stock from what it otherwise would have been, magnifying the deficit through growing interest payments and also reducing tax revenue from what it otherwise would have been by reducing output. CBO reports that debt service would add 25% to the cost of an across-the-board tax cut over 10 years. They do not likely explain the increase in revenues projected for FY2006 as they amount to no more than 2/10 of a percent of GDP even at the peak, and the effect should be declining. Should a Feedback Effect be Attributed to Tax Policy? Some of these latter effects are, however, already incorporated in conventional revenue estimates by the JCT. Note that theoretically, one cannot be sure whether this effect is positive or negative, because of income and substitution effects. A tax cut's marginal effects may increase taxable income through increased labor supply or shifting into taxable forms, but the income effect may reduce labor supply or increase charitable contributions. The permanent revenue feedback effect for the 2001-2004 tax cuts is also likely to be relatively small, no more than 10%, and the magnitude is not entirely clear. In the case of effects on the deficit, these offsetting effects probably occur within the first few years, and thereafter, the accumulation of debt and interest payments adds increasingly to the deficit beyond the conventional revenue costs. The studies and information presented in this report suggest that, at this time, there is not convincing evidence that the positive revenue feedback from the 2001-2004 tax cuts have been of sufficient scale to fully offset their cost to the Treasury. | An unexpected increase in revenues has led to a renewed discussion of the effect of the 2001-2004 tax cuts on the economy and the possible feedback effects on revenue. Some proponents of the tax cuts suggest that induced economic growth was large enough that taxes on the additional income more than offset the cost of the tax cuts, causing an increase rather than a decrease in revenues. Other observers doubt that economic growth was related to the tax cuts, or that it was large enough to significantly offset the cost of the cuts.
This report reviews available economic studies, theory, and empirical data to assess the possible revenue feedback from the 2001-2004 tax cuts at this time. Four sources of feedback are examined: short-run demand-side stimulus effects, supply-side effects on labor supply and savings, shifting of income from non-taxable to taxable form, and debt service effects.
Of the potential sources of feedback, none appears very large relative to the direct revenue cost, and offsetting effects suggest that the effects of the tax cut on the deficit will be to magnify the direct cost rather than reduce it. One source of effect is the short-run stimulus; this effect is temporary, and appears likely to be small, resulting at the peak (about a year and a half following adoption) of no more than a 14% feedback. At the same time, the effect of the deficit in crowding out private capital reduces tax revenues. The debt also adds to the deficit directly through debt service, which can increase the cost of a tax by as much as 25% over the first 10 years, and by larger amounts as time goes on.
Conventional supply-side effects arising from increased work and savings are unlikely to have feedbacks of over 10%, and there is some reason to believe that the short-run feedback effect is no more than 3%. There are also some potential feedback effects from shifting into taxable income forms and reducing avoidance, but adding these effects to the conventional supply-side effects still produces a feedback effect in the neighborhood of 10%. Moreover, some of these effects are already incorporated into conventional revenue estimates and they may be overstated for other reasons.
Given the positive and negative effects, it is likely that the feedback effect in the very short run would be positive, but at the current time as the stimulus effects have faded and the effect of added debt service has grown, the 2001-2004 tax cuts are probably costing more than their estimated revenue cost.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R43024 | crs_R43024_0 | As expected, Raúl Castro was selected for a second five year-term as president (until February 2018, when Raúl will be 86 years old), but Castro also indicated that this would be his last term in conformity with the new two-term limit for top officials. Short-term detentions for political reasons have increased significantly over the past several years, a reflection of the government's change of tactics in repressing dissent. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial transactions. In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy, a so-called second track, consists of support measures for the Cuban people. Just after the adjournment of the 113 th Congress, however, President Obama announced on December 17, 2014, that Cuba was releasing Alan Gross on humanitarian grounds and unveiled major changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba, including a restoration of diplomatic relations and new efforts toward engagement. The President maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about democracy and human rights in Cuba, but stated that "we can do more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through engagement." Background on the First Six Years of U.S. Policy Under President Obama
In April 2009, the Obama Administration fulfilled a campaign pledge and announced it would lift all restrictions on family travel and remittances. U.S. officials lauded the release of dozens of Cuban political prisoners in 2010 and 2011, but maintained that their release did not change the government's poor human rights record as it continued to resort to repeated short-term detentions. Securing the release of Alan Gross from prison in Cuba also remained a top U.S. priority. With regard to President Obama's announcement of a new direction for U.S. policy toward Cuba in December 2014, some Members of Congress lauded the Administration's actions as in the best interests of the United States and a better way to support change in Cuba, while other Members strongly criticized the President for not obtaining concessions from Cuba to advance human rights. With some Members vowing to oppose the Administration's efforts toward normalization, the direction of U.S.-Cuban relations is likely to be hotly debated in the 114 th Congress. Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations
For many years, Congress has played an active role in U.S. policy toward Cuba through the enactment of legislative initiatives and oversight on the many issues that comprise policy toward Cuba. These include U.S. restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba; U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba with conditions; funding and oversight of U.S.-government sponsored democracy and human rights projects; the imprisonment of USAID subcontractor Alan Gross in Cuba since December 2009; funding and oversight for U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba (Radio and TV Martí); terrorism issues; migration issues; bilateral anti-drug cooperation; and the status of Cuba's offshore oil development, including efforts to ensure adequate oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response efforts. In the first session of the 113 th Congress, both the House and Senate versions of the FY2014 Financial Services and General Government appropriations measure, H.R. 2786 and S. 1371 , had different provisions that would have tightened and eased travel restrictions respectively, but none of these provisions were included in the FY2014 omnibus appropriations measure, H.R. In the second session of the 113 th Congress, the House version of the FY2015 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act ( H.R. 5016 , and the FY2015 omnibus appropriations measure approved in December 2014 ( P.L. 113-235 ) did not include the provisions on Cuba in H.R. Several legislative initiatives were introduced in the 113 th Congress that would have lifted all travel restrictions: H.R. 872 (Rangel), and H.R. While the Senate Appropriations Committee-approved version of the FY2012 Financial Services appropriations measure ( S. 1573 ) had a provision that would have continued the definition of "payment of cash in advance" utilized in FY2010 and FY2011, this was not included in the final omnibus legislation. 873 (Rangel), while three other bills that would have lifted the overall embargo— H.R. 872 (Rangel), and H.R. 873 (Rangel); and H.R. 1917 (Rush)—each have a provision that would have repealed the trademark sanction. On March 21, 2013, Congress completed action on full-year FY2013 appropriations with the approval of H.R. 933 ( P.L. Congress ultimately completed action on FY2014 appropriations in January 2014 when it enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, H.R. 3547 ( P.L. Congress ultimately completed action on FY2015 appropriations when it enacted a FY2015 omnibus appropriations measure ( P.L. The statement also asserted that Gross's "detention remains an impediment to more constructive relations between Cuba and the United States." 113-6 ( H.R. Provides continued funding for Cuba democracy and human rights projects and Cuba broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí) for FY2013. P.L. 113-76 ( H.R. 113-235 ( H.R. Additional Measures
H.R. 105-277 ); prohibited restrictions on travel to Cuba; called on the President to conduct negotiations with Cuba to settle property claims of U.S. nationals for confiscated property and secure the protection of internationally recognized human rights; extended nondiscriminatory trade treatment to the products of Cuba; prohibited any limitations on annual remittances to Cuba; removed Cuba from the state sponsors of terrorism list; and called for the immediate and unconditional release of Alan Gross and, until then, would have urged Cuba to allow Mr. As approved, Section 126 of the bill would have prevented any funds in the Act from being used to approve, license, facilitate, authorize or otherwise allow people-to-people travel set forth in 31 C . F . R . 515.565(b)(2) of the CACR; Section 127 would have required a joint report from the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Homeland Security within 90 days of the bill's enactment with information for each fiscal year since FY2007 on the number of travelers visiting close relatives in Cuba; the average duration of these trips; the average amount of U.S. dollars spent per family traveler (including amount of remittances carried to Cuba); the number of return trips per year; and the total sum of U.S. dollars spent collectively by family travelers for each fiscal year. 5016 ( H.Rept. Most significantly, the Assembly also appointed 52-year old Miguel Díaz-Canel as First Vice President, making him Castro's constitutional successor. | Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country's political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In February 2013, Castro was reappointed to a second five-year term as President (until 2018, when he would be 86 years old), and selected 52-year old former Education Minister Miguel Díaz-Canel as his First Vice President, making him the official successor in the event that Castro cannot serve out his term. Raúl Castro has implemented a number of gradual economic policy changes over the past several years, including an expansion of self-employment. A party congress held in April 2011 laid out numerous economic goals that, if implemented, could significantly alter Cuba's state-dominated economic model. Few observers, however, expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system. While the government reduced the number of political prisoners in 2010-2011, the number increased in 2012; moreover, short-term detentions and harassment have increased significantly over the past several years.
U.S. Policy
Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. While U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, a second policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí) and support for human rights and democracy projects.
For most of the Obama Administration's first six years, it continued this similar dual-track approach. While the Administration lifted all restrictions on family travel and remittances in 2009, eased restrictions on other types of purposeful travel in 2011, and moved to reengage Cuba on several bilateral issues, it also maintained most U.S. economic sanctions in place. On human rights, the Administration welcomed the release of many political prisoners in 2010 and 2011, but it also criticized Cuba's continued harsh repression of political dissidents through thousands of short-term detentions and targeted violence. The Administration continued to call for the release of U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross, imprisoned in Cuba in 2009, and maintained that Gross's detention remained an impediment to more constructive relations.
Just after the adjournment of the 113th Congress, however, President Obama announced on December 17, 2014, that Cuba was releasing Alan Gross on humanitarian grounds and unveiled major changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba, including a restoration of diplomatic relations and new efforts toward engagement. The President maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about democracy and human rights in Cuba, but that "we can do more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through engagement."
Legislative Activity
Strong interest in Cuba continued in the 113th Congress with attention focused on economic and political developments, especially the human rights situation, and U.S. policy toward the island nation, including sanctions. The continued imprisonment of Alan Gross remained a key concern for many Members. In March 2013, Congress completed action on full-year FY2013 appropriations with the approval of H.R. 933 (P.L. 113-6); in January 2014, it completed action on a FY2014 omnibus appropriations measure, H.R. 3547 (P.L. 113-76); and in December 2014, it completed action on a FY2015 omnibus appropriations measure (H.R. 83; P.L. 113-235)—all of these measures continued funding for Cuba democracy projects and Cuba broadcasting (Radio and TV Martí). Both the House and Senate versions of the FY2014 Financial Services and General Government appropriations measure, H.R. 2786 and S. 1371, had provisions that would have tightened and eased travel restrictions respectively, but none of these provisions were included in the FY2014 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 113-76). The House version of the FY2015 Financial Services and General Government Appropriation bill, H.R. 5016 (H.Rept. 113-508), had a provision that would have prohibited the use of funds to approve, license, facilitate, or allow people-to-people travel, but the provision was not included in the FY2015 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 113-235).
Several other initiatives on Cuba were introduced in the 113th Congress, but no action was taken on these bills and resolutions. Several would have lifted or eased U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba: H.R. 214 and H.R. 872 (overall embargo); H.R. 871 (travel); and H.R. 873 (travel and agricultural exports). H.R. 215 would have allowed Cubans to play organized professional baseball in the United States. H.R. 1917 would have lifted the embargo and extended nondiscriminatory trade treatment to the products of Cuba after Cuba released Alan Gross from prison. Identical initiatives, H.R. 778/S. 647 would have modified a 1998 trademark sanction; in contrast, H.R. 214, H.R. 872, H.R. 873, and H.R. 1917 each had a provision that would have repealed the sanction. H.Res. 121 would have honored the work of Cuban blogger Yoani Sánchez. H.Res. 262 would have called for the immediate extradition or rendering of all U.S. fugitives from justices in Cuba.
With regard to President Obama's December 2014 announcement of a new direction for policy toward Cuba, some Members of Congress lauded the initiative as in the best interests of the United States and a better way to support change in Cuba, while other Members strongly criticized the President for not obtaining concessions from Cuba to advance human rights. With some Members vowing to oppose the Administration's efforts toward normalization, the direction of U.S.-Cuban relations is likely to be hotly debated in the 114th Congress.
This report reflects legislative activity through the 113th Congress and will not be updated; a new version of the report will be issued for the 114th Congress. For additional information, see: CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: President Obama's New Policy Approach; CRS Insight IN10202, Cuba: Release of Alan Gross and Major Changes to U.S. Policy; CRS Insight IN10204, U.S. Policy on Cuban Migration; and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. |
crs_R44993 | crs_R44993_0 | Introduction
There are two tax provisions that subsidize the child and dependent care expenses of working parents: the child and dependent care tax credit (CDCTC) and the exclusion for employer-sponsored child and dependent care. Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit
The child and dependent care tax credit is a nonrefundable tax credit that reduces a taxpayer's federal income tax liability based on child and dependent care expenses incurred so the taxpayer can work or look for work. Eligibility for the Credit
To claim the child and dependent care credit, a taxpayer must meet a variety of eligibility criteria. Q ualifying individual: A qualifying individual for the CDCTC is either (1) the taxpayer's dependent child under 13 years of age, or (2) the taxpayer's spouse or dependent who is incapable of caring for himself or herself. Earned income : A taxpayer must have earned income to claim the credit. The amount of qualifying expenses claimed for the credit cannot be greater than the taxpayer's earned income for the year (or the earned income of the lower-earning spouse in the case of married taxpayers). For married couples filing jointly, both spouses must have earnings unless one is either a student or incapable of self-care. Qualifying Expenses
Qualifying expenses for the credit are generally defined as expenses for the care of a qualifying individual so that a taxpayer (and their spouse, if filing jointly) can work or look for work. Calculating the Credit Amount
The amount of the CDCTC is calculated by multiplying the amount of qualifying expenses, after applying the dollar limits and earned income limits (discussed below), by the appropriate credit rate. The credit rate used to calculate the credit is based on the taxpayer's adjusted gross income (AGI). The credit rate is set at a maximum of 35% for taxpayers with AGI under $15,000. The maximum amount of expenses that can be multiplied by the credit rate is $3,000 if the taxpayer has one qualifying individual and $6,000 if the taxpayer has two or more qualifying individuals. Even though the credit formula—due to the higher credit rate—is more generous toward lower-income taxpayers, many receive little or no credit since the credit is nonrefundable, as illustrated in Figure 1 . The eligibility rules and definitions of the exclusion are similar to those of the credit. Specifically, the $5,000 limit applies irrespective of the number of qualifying individuals. Interaction Between the CDCTC and Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Child and Dependent Care
Taxpayers can claim both the exclusion and the tax credit but not for the same out-of-pocket child and dependent care expenses. For every pretax (i.e., excluded) dollar of employer-sponsored child and dependent care, the taxpayer must reduce the maximum amount of qualifying expenses for the credit (up to $3,000 for one child, $6,000 for two or more children). Data on the CDCTC
The aggregate data for the child and dependent care credit indicate several key aspects of this tax benefit. Income l evel of CDCTC c laimants: Middle- and upper-middle-income taxpayers claim the majority of tax credit dollars. Average c redit a mount: At most income levels the average credit amount is between $500 and $600. Lower-income taxpayers receive less than the average amount. This participation rate is significantly lower for lower-income taxpayers. However, survey data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that about 41% of employees have access to child and dependent care flexible spending accounts, while 11% have access to employer-sponsored childcare. Overall, the data indicate that these benefits are more widely available to more highly compensated employees at larger establishments. | Two tax provisions subsidize the child and dependent care expenses of working parents: the child and dependent care tax credit (CDCTC) and the exclusion for employer-sponsored child and dependent care. (Note these provisions were not changed by P.L. 115-97.)
The child and dependent care tax credit is a nonrefundable tax credit that reduces a taxpayer's federal income tax liability based on child and dependent care expenses incurred. The policy objective is to assist taxpayers who work or who are looking for work. A taxpayer must meet a variety of eligibility criteria including incurring qualifying child and dependent care expenses for a qualifying individual and have earned income. These three terms are defined below:
Qualifying expenses: Qualifying expenses for the credit are generally defined as expenses incurred for the care of a qualifying individual so that a taxpayer (and their spouse, if filing jointly) can work or look for work. (Married taxpayers who do not file a joint return are ineligible for the credit). Qualifying individual: A qualifying individual for the CDCTC is either (1) the taxpayer's dependent child under 13 years of age for the entire year or (2) the taxpayer's spouse or dependent who is incapable of caring for himself or herself. Earned income: A taxpayer must have earned income to claim the credit. For married couples, both spouses must have earnings unless one is a student or incapable of self-care.
The CDCTC is calculated by multiplying the amount of qualifying expenses—a maximum of $3,000 if the taxpayer has one qualifying individual, and up to $6,000 if the taxpayer has two or more qualifying individuals—by the appropriate credit rate. The credit rate depends on the taxpayer's adjusted gross income (AGI), with a maximum credit rate of 35% declining, as AGI increases, to 20% for taxpayers with AGI above $43,000. Even though the credit formula—due to the higher credit rate—is more generous toward lower-income taxpayers, many lower-income taxpayers receive little or no credit since the credit is nonrefundable.
In addition to the CDCTC, taxpayers can exclude from their income up to $5,000 of employer-sponsored child and dependent care benefits, often as a flexible spending account (FSA). Eligibility rules and definitions of the exclusion are virtually identical to those of the credit. However, this is one major difference—the $5,000 limit applies irrespective of the number of qualifying individuals. Taxpayers can claim both the exclusion and the tax credit but not for the same out of pocket child and dependent care expenses. In addition, for every dollar of employer-sponsored child and dependent care excluded from income, the taxpayer must reduce the maximum amount of qualifying expenses claimed for the CDCTC.
The aggregate data for the CDCTC indicate several key aspects of this tax benefit. First, middle- and upper-middle-income taxpayers claim the majority of tax credit dollars. Second, at most income levels the average credit amount is between $500 and $600. Lower-income taxpayers receive less than the average amount. Third, the credit is used almost exclusively for the care of children under 13 years old (as opposed to older dependents). On average 13% of taxpayers with children claim the credit. This participation rate is significantly lower for lower-income taxpayers.
Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that about 40% of employees have access to a child and dependent care flexible spending account, while 11% have access to other types of employer-sponsored childcare. Overall, these data indicate that these benefits are more widely available to higher-compensated employees at larger establishments. |
crs_R42653 | crs_R42653_0 | Introduction and Overview1
Congress addresses numerous water issues annually. Issues range from responding to natural disasters, such as droughts and floods, to improving the nation's water resource and water quality infrastructure, and protecting fish, wildlife, and other aquatic resources. Many congressional committees address these issues and are involved in legislating, funding, and overseeing the water-related activities of numerous federal agencies. More than two centuries of such involvement have resulted in a complex web of federal activities related to water. As a result, Congress often faces challenges related to overlap and gaps in federal water resource activities and in coordination and consistency among federal programs. Further, many federal authorities are discretionary or funded by discretionary appropriations. Consequently, there can be a significant difference between what federal agencies are authorized to do and what they are doing, and no one committee in Congress oversees this dichotomy. The responsibility for development, management, protection, and allocation of the nation's water resources is spread among federal, state, local, tribal, and private interests. Thus, the report focuses on the complexity of federal activities related to water. Instead, the authors have attempted to address the major federal activities authorized by Congress that affect water resource development, management, protection, and use in the United States. Similarly, this analysis does not cover every aspect of House and Senate committee jurisdiction affecting water issues. For definitive evaluation of committee jurisdictions related to water, the views of the House and Senate Parliamentarian Offices are official. Selected Federal Water Activities: Agencies, Authorities, and Congressional Committee Jurisdictions
The federal government has been involved in water resources development since the earliest days of the nation's creation. The four areas covered by the report are as follows:
Water Resources Development, Management, and Use ; Water Quality, Protection, and Restoration ; Water Rights and Allocation ; and Research and Planning . Appendix A discusses considerations in determining House and Senate committee jurisdictions and provides an example of the complexity in water topics and jurisdictional coverage. Appendix B and Appendix C present the official language from House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV, respectively, as indicators of congressional jurisdiction over water resources. Appendix D provides a glossary of abbreviations for federal agencies and House and Senate committees. These tables underscore the intricacy of the federal programs affecting water resource development, management, protection, and use in the United States. As apparent throughout the tables, numerous standing committees in the House and Senate have jurisdiction over various components of federal water policy; moreover, committees listed here generally exclude the extensive responsibilities of the appropriations committees in both chambers, as well as the direct and indirect activities of other committees in the relevant chambers that deal with banking, taxes, and finance issues. This section focuses on federal activities related to water resource development, management, and use and includes three tables:
Table 1 lists activities related to water supply and reservoir development and includes topic areas such as dams and dam safety; general water supply development; groundwater supply; irrigation assistance; rural water supply; water conservation; and water reclamation, reuse and desalination. | Congress addresses numerous issues related to the nation's water resources annually, and over time it has enacted hundreds of water-related federal laws. These laws—many of which are independent statutes—have been enacted at different points in the nation's history and during various economic climates. They were developed by multiple congressional committees with varying jurisdictions. Such committees are involved in legislating, funding, and overseeing the water-related activities of numerous federal agencies. These activities include responding to natural disasters such as droughts and floods, conducting oversight over federal water supply management, improving water resource and water quality infrastructure, and protecting fish and wildlife.
More than two centuries of federal water resource activity have resulted in a complex web of federal involvement in water resource development, management, protection, and use. As a result, Congress faces challenges related to overlap and gaps in federal water resource activities and in coordination and consistency among federal programs. Further, many federal authorities are discretionary or funded by discretionary appropriations. Consequently, there can be a significant difference between what federal agencies are authorized to do and what they are actually doing, and no one committee in Congress oversees this dichotomy.
Although the responsibility for development, management, protection, and allocation of the nation's water resources is spread among federal, state, local, tribal, and private interests, this report focuses on federal activities related to water and the congressional committees that authorize and oversee these activities. The report covers multiple topics and individual water-related subtopics ranging from water supply and water quality infrastructure to fisheries management and water rights. The report is not exhaustive; instead, the authors have attempted to cover the major federal activities authorized by Congress that affect water resource development, management, protection, and use in the United States. Similarly, the analysis does not cover every aspect of House and Senate committee jurisdiction affecting water issues. For definitive evaluation of committee jurisdictions related to water, the views of the House and Senate Parliamentarian Offices are official.
The report covers four general areas, or themes: (1) "Water Resources Development, Management, and Use"; (2) "Water Quality, Protection, and Restoration"; (3) "Water Rights and Allocation"; and (4) "Research and Planning." The sections addressing these themes are further divided into tables that list topic areas and individual water-related subtopics. For each subtopic, CRS has identified selected federal agencies and activities related to the subtopic, authorities for such activities, and relevant House and Senate committee jurisdictions, as specified in House and Senate rules. Appendixes address considerations in determining House and Senate committee jurisdictions and present the official language from House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV, respectively, which are indicators of congressional jurisdiction over water resources. The report also includes a glossary of abbreviations for federal agencies and House and Senate committees.
The nine tables that make up the body of this report underscore the complexity of federal activities affecting water resource development, management, protection, and use in the United States. As apparent throughout these tables, numerous standing committees in the House and the Senate have jurisdiction over various components of federal water policy. The wide range of federal executive responsibilities for water resources reflects comparably complex congressional legislative responsibilities and directives. |
crs_R44041 | crs_R44041_0 | The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. Not all of the missions of DHS are officially "homeland security" missions. Some criminal justice elements could arguably be included in a broad definition of homeland security. Rather than trying to resolve the question of what is and is not homeland security, this report is a survey of issues that have come up in the context of homeland security policy debates. It is neither exhaustive nor exclusive in its scope, but representative of the broad array of issues likely to be taken up in one way or another by Congress in the coming months. After initial discussion of the definitions of homeland security, the homeland security budget, and the role of homeland security actors in the intelligence community, the report groups the issues into four general themes:
Counterterrorism and Security Management; Border Security and Trade; Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery; and DHS Management Issues
As each topic under these themes is introduced, the author of the section is listed, along with their contact information. In many cases, a specific CRS report is highlighted as a source of more detailed information. Despite the reorganization put in motion after the attacks, including the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and concurrent evolution of homeland security policy, over 30 federal departments, agencies, and entities have homeland security responsibilities and receive annual appropriations to execute homeland security missions. The five mission areas are:
Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security; Secure and Manage our Borders; Enforce and Administer Our Immigration Laws; Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace; and Strengthen National Preparedness and Resilience. 107-296 ) gave the DHS responsibility for fusing together law enforcement and intelligence information relating to terrorist threats to the homeland. The completion of the exit component of the system has been a persistent subject of congressional concern. Each of these issues is briefly discussed below. An executive's private sector employer pays the salary and expenses; the federal government does not pay any compensation to the executive. | In 2001, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, "homeland security" went from being a concept discussed among a relatively small cadre of policymakers and strategic thinkers to a broadly discussed issue in Congress. Debates over how to implement coordinated homeland security policy led to the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Evolution of America's response to terrorist threats has continued under the leadership of different Administrations, Congresses, and in a shifting environment of public opinion.
DHS is currently the third-largest department in the federal government, although it does not incorporate all of the homeland security functions at the federal level, even if one constrains the definition of homeland security to the narrow field of prevention and response to domestic acts of terrorism. In policymaking terms, homeland security is a very broad and complex network of interrelated issues. In its executive summary the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review issued in 2014 delineates the missions of the homeland security enterprise as follows: prevent terrorism and enhance security; secure and manage the borders; enforce and administer immigration laws; safeguard and secure cyberspace; and strengthen national preparedness and resilience.
This report outlines an array of homeland security issues that may come before the 114th Congress. After a brief discussion of the definitions of homeland security, the homeland security budget, and the role of homeland security actors in the intelligence community, the report divides the specific issues into four broad categories:
Counterterrorism and Security Management, Border Security and Trade, Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, and DHS Management Issues.
Each of those areas contains a survey of topics briefly analyzed by Congressional Research Service experts. The information included only scratches the surface of most of these issues. More detailed information can be obtained by consulting the CRS reports referenced herein, or by contacting the relevant CRS expert. |
crs_97-417 | crs_97-417_0 | Price Support Program
From the late 1930s through the 2004 crop, the USDA operated the tobacco price support program. 108-357 ), the tobacco support program came to an end. Because of this tobacco buyout, CCC support program expenditures have been eliminated, and it is not anticipated there will be any future ad hoc assistance to tobacco farmers. Federal Crop Insurance
The federal crop insurance program, administered by USDA's Risk Management Agency, provides farmers with subsidized multi-peril insurance on tobacco and other crops. Net federal outlays are estimated to be $27.9 million in FY2006, and are budgeted at $28.7 million for FY2007. Tobacco Research
In the past, USDA-funded research related to tobacco production, processing, and marketing. Annual research spending by the USDA averaged about $6.6 million until it was terminated under the FY1995 agricultural appropriations law and subsequent laws. The restriction does not apply to research on medical, biotechnological, food, and industrial uses of tobacco. No similar spending is anticipated in FY2007. In FY1997, CSREES spent $680,000 on tobacco-related extension activities. All state and county extension activity related to tobacco is funded by the states. The USDA estimates that the cost of this effort for tobacco will be $200,000 in FY2006, and the budget for FY2007 is $205,000. | The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has long operated programs that directly assist farmers and others with the production and marketing of numerous crops, including tobacco. In most cases, the crops themselves have not been controversial. However, where tobacco is involved, the use of federal funds has been called into question. Taken together, all of the directly tobacco-related activities of the USDA generated net expenditures of an estimated $30.8 million in FY2006, and the budget anticipates net expenditures of $29.5 million for FY2007. Over 90% of this spending is related to crop insurance.
The federally financed tobacco price support program, once the major form of tobacco farmer assistance and in some years a costly program, was terminated at the end of crop year 2004. The USDA is prohibited by language in the annual appropriations law from spending funds to help promote tobacco exports and to conduct research relating to production, processing, or marketing of tobacco and tobacco products. Other tobacco-related activities have been subjected to congressional scrutiny. The USDA does operate numerous programs that are not tobacco-specific, but are available to farmers that produce tobacco and other crops. These are not examined in this report. |
crs_94-731 | crs_94-731_0 | § 3604 ," discussed below. § 43
This statute, which replaced the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, makes it a crime to "travel[ ] in interstate or foreign commerce, or use[ ] ... the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce—(1) for the purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise; and (2) in connection with such purpose—(A) intentionally damag[ing] or caus[ing] the loss of any real or personal property ... [or] (B) intentionally plac[ing] a person in reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury to that person, a member of the immediate family ... of that person, or a spouse or intimate partner of that person. Perhaps not on its face, but that appears to be its intent, as to read it otherwise would seem to defeat its purpose. For example, P.L. § 48
This statute, enacted as P.L. The statute was aimed at outlawing "crush video" films, in which small animals are crushed to death. §§ 777-777l
This statute is also known as the "Federal Aid in Fish Restoration Act" and the "Fish Restoration and Management Projects Act." Federal Law Enforcement Animal Protection Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. Recreational Hunting Safety and Preservation Act of 1994, 16 U.S.C. The statute does not provide for criminal penalties. | This report contains brief summaries of federal animal protection statutes, listed alphabetically. It includes statutes enacted to implement certain treaties, but it does not include treaties. Additionally, this report includes statutes that concern animals but that are not necessarily animal protection statutes. For example, it discusses a statute authorizing the eradication of predators, because one of the statute's purposes is to protect domestic and "game" animals; and it includes statutes to conserve fish even though the ultimate purpose of such statutes may not be for the benefit of the fish. This report also includes statutes that allow the disabled to use service animals and statutes aimed at acts of animal rights advocates—i.e., the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, and the Recreational Hunting Safety and Preservation Act of 1994. |
crs_R43620 | crs_R43620_0 | Since that time, the country has had five successive elected civilian governments, and a sixth is scheduled to assume power on July 1, 2014 with the inauguration of current Vice President Juan Carlos Varela as President. Current President Ricardo Martinelli, elected in 2009, remained generally popular during his presidency despite criticism at various junctures for his combative style of governing. Panama's largely services-based economy has been booming in recent years, spurred on by the Panama Canal expansion project that began in 2007 and is expected to be completed in early 2016. In the last year of his term, President Martinelli remained broadly popular in large part because of the strong performance of the Panamanian economy under his government buoyed by the ongoing Canal expansion and other large infrastructure projects (see " Economic Situation " below). May 2014 Elections
In Panama's May 4, 2014 elections, current Vice President Varela of the center-right PPA won the presidency with 39% of the vote in what was essentially a three-candidate race. One controversy that emerged, however, was the selection of Martinelli's wife, Marta Linares, as the CD's vice presidential candidate. Some critics feared that the first lady's candidacy could have allowed Martinelli to retain influence in the next government and give rise to a political dynasty. U.S.-Panama Relations
U.S. relations with Panama date to the country's independence from Colombia in 1903. Since the December 1989 U.S military intervention, however, and Panama's return to elected civilian democratic rule, U.S. relations with Panama have been close. Bilateral relations were strengthened with the approval of a bilateral free trade agreement that entered into force in October 2012. According to the State Department, the country's central location in the hemisphere, the Panama Canal, its transportation infrastructure, and its financial sector make it an important hub for global trade and a key U.S. strategic partner, but these same characteristics make Panama vulnerable to drug trafficking, money laundering, and organized criminal activity. At this juncture, the United States provides just small amounts of bilateral assistance to Panama, but Panama has also received U.S. assistance through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), a U.S. regional security program begun in FY2008 to help Central American states reduce drug trafficking while advancing citizen security. Panama has also made progress in improving financial transparency. As noted above, Panama and the United States originally negotiated a free trade agreement (FTA) in 2007. The Canal expansion is expected to reduce shipping rates between Asia and the U.S. Gulf and East coasts, resulting in significant savings and increased trade using that route; it is also expected to increase Latin American trade with Asia as well as intra-Latin American trade. A number of U.S. ports have begun readying themselves in order to take advantage of the trade expansion. The government's challenges include efforts to combat poverty and inequality and to continue to make headway in combating threats from drug trafficking, money laundering, and organized crime. | The Central American nation of Panama has had five successive elected civilian governments since its return to democratic rule in 1989, and a sixth is scheduled to assume power on July 1, 2014 with the inauguration of current Vice President Juan Carlos Varela as President. Hailing from the center-right Panameñista Party, Varela won the May 4, 2014 presidential election with 39% of the vote in a three-candidate race. Significantly, Varela defeated the candidate of the ruling Democratic Change party of current President Ricardo Martinelli, who was constitutionally prohibited from running for reelection. Elected in 2009, Martinelli remained generally popular during his presidency despite criticism at various junctures for his combative style of governing. Nevertheless, his popularity ultimately was not enough to convince voters to support his party's candidate. One controversy that emerged in the campaign was that Martinelli's wife became his party's vice presidential candidate. This led to some critics complaining of an attempt by Martinelli to extend his influence in the next government.
Panama's largely services-based economy has been booming in recent years, spurred on by several large infrastructure projects, including, most significantly, the Panama Canal expansion project that began in 2007 and is expected to be completed in early 2016. A challenge for the Varela government will be how to contend with slower economic growth rates as the Canal expansion project winds down. Another challenge for the government is making more headway in combating poverty and inequality in Panama, which still remain relatively high.
U.S. Relations
The United States has close relations with Panama, stemming in large part from the extensive linkages developed when the Panama Canal was under U.S. control and Panama hosted major U.S. military installations. Relations have been strengthened by a bilateral free trade agreement that entered into force in October 2012. As noted by the State Department, Panama's central location in the hemisphere, its transportation infrastructure (most notably the Canal), and its financial sector make it an important hub for global trade and a key U.S. strategic partner, but these same characteristics also make Panama vulnerable to drug trafficking, money laundering, and organized criminal activity.
Since Panama is relatively well developed economically compared to its Central American neighbors, the United States provides just small amounts of bilateral assistance to Panama. Nevertheless, the country receives additional assistance through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), a U.S. regional security program begun in FY2008 to help Central American states reduce drug trafficking while advancing citizen security. Panama's anti-drug cooperation with the United States is strong. While the country has made progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime, there are several factors that hinder the country's efforts to combat such activity.
The Panama Canal expansion project, which will accommodate a new generation of massive container ships, is expected to reduce shipping rates between Asia and the U.S. Gulf and East coasts, resulting in increased Canal transits and trade. A number of U.S. ports have begun readying themselves in order to take advantage of the expansion.
This report provides background on the political and economic situation in Panama and U.S.-Panama relations. An appendix provides links to selected U.S. government reports on Panama. For additional information, see CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. For further historical background, see the following two archived CRS reports: CRS Report RL30981, Panama: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations Through 2012, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL32540, The U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement. |
crs_RL33267 | crs_RL33267_0 | In recent years, the time it takes to comply with various environmental laws has been the subject of public scrutiny and debate in Congress. One law that has been the subject of particular scrutiny has been the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347). As a result of the debate between stakeholders regarding NEPA's implementation, numerous administrative and legislative actions have been proposed to expedite compliance with NEPA. The activities associated with such proposals are often collectively referred to as streamlining . However, the term is often used to describe a process or procedures intended to accelerate decision making, especially when the input of multiple federal, state, tribal, or local agencies is required to comply with multiple environmental laws, regulations, or executive orders. The NEPA Process
Levels of NEPA Analysis
Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires that all federal decisions include in "every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on the environmental impact of the proposed action." Specifically, federal agency compliance with NEPA may be required for actions that require a federal permit or other regulatory decision to proceed. Environmental Consequences. Issues in Attributing NEPA Implementation to Project Delays
Debate regarding the need for streamlining measures originates from assertions that NEPA delays federal projects. Also discussed below are selected issues associated with each element. Establishing a Coordinated Compliance Process
Most legislative streamlining provisions direct the lead agency to create some form of coordinated environmental review or compliance process. Specifying Categorically Excluded or Exempt Projects
One method of expediting the NEPA process includes specifically designating certain projects as categorical exclusions (CEs). One streamlining method involves the establishment of a specific statute of limitations on the judicial review of final agency actions related to NEPA (e.g., publication of a ROD). 824 et seq.) to establish, among other provisions, a process to coordinate federal authorizations required to site a transmission or distribution facility and designates the Department of Energy (DOE) as the lead agency responsible for coordinating all applicable federal authorizations or related environmental reviews. With a goal of reducing duplication of agency effort and maximizing the "exchange of relevant information related to the safety and security aspects of LNG facilities and the related marine concerns," the agreement:
designated FERC as the lead agency for environmental reviews under the NEPA and, as such, specified that it would coordinate its reviews with DOT's Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) and the Coast Guard; delineated the roles and responsibilities of each agency relative to LNG terminals and LNG tanker operations; stipulated that the agencies identify issues early and resolve them quickly; specified that the agencies share information and cooperate in the inspection and operational review of LNG facilities; and specified that required NEPA reviews will meet the needs of the participating agencies, as well as any other cooperating agencies, so that any necessary permits could be issued concurrently with the FERC authorizations. Streamlining proposals have generated a great deal of controversy among interested stakeholders (agency representatives, industry groups, environmental organizations, and others). | In recent years, the time needed to comply with various environmental laws has been the subject of public scrutiny and debate in Congress. As a result, numerous administrative and legislative efforts (both proposed and enacted) have intended to expedite or streamline the environmental compliance process. Although methods to do so vary, streamlining measures are often proposed or implemented when the participation of multiple local, state, tribal, or federal agencies is necessary to comply with various environmental requirements. Streamlining measures may be applied to various environmental compliance processes, such as federal permitting or approvals.
A major focus of streamlining efforts has been the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, et seq.), the implementation of which is overseen by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). Among other provisions, NEPA requires federal agencies to analyze environmental impacts and involve the public before proceeding with any major federal action significantly affecting the human environment.
Many agencies have implemented administrative and legislative streamlining actions, including the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of the Interior (DOI), Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), Department of Energy (DOE), and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Streamlining efforts vary from agency to agency but usually involve one or more of the following elements: designating a specific agency as the lead agency responsible for ensuring compliance with applicable requirements, directing the lead agency to develop a coordinated environmental review process, specifying certain lead agency authority (e.g., to establish project deadlines or develop dispute resolution procedures), codifying existing regulations, delegating specific federal authority to states, designating specific activities as being categorically excluded or exempt from certain elements of NEPA, and establishing limits on judicial review.
Streamlining proposals have generated a great deal of controversy. Proponents of such measures argue that streamlining efforts are needed to cut through the "bureaucratic red tape" often associated with federal project delivery. Others counter that such actions are an attempt to weaken environmental protection and lessen public participation in federal decision-making processes.
This report discusses elements of NEPA relevant to streamlining, issues associated with determining project delays attributed to NEPA, common streamlining methods, and recently enacted legislative and administrative streamlining activities. |
crs_R43134 | crs_R43134_0 | Introduction
Recent media stories about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance address unauthorized disclosures of two different intelligence collection programs. These programs arise from provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). As such, where possible, the information contained in this report distinguishes between the two. The second program targets the electronic communications of non-U.S. persons while they are abroad, but also collects some communications unrelated to those targets. The last section of this report discusses legislation that has been proposed in response to information disclosed about NSA surveillance. What Information Is Being Collected? Domestic Collection of Domestic Phone Records — collected under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT: On Wednesday, June 5, 2013, The Guardian reported that NSA collects in bulk the telephone records of millions of U.S. customers of Verizon, pursuant to an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Intelligence officials have stated that the data are limited to the number that was dialed from, the number that was dialed to, and the date and duration of the call. In accordance with Section 702, this collection program appears largely to involve the collection of data, including the content of communications, of foreign targets overseas whose emails and other forms of electronic communication flow through networks in the United States. Compared to the breadth of phone records collection under Section 215, this program is more discriminating in terms of its targets—it is focused on the communications of non-U.S. persons located outside the United States—but broader in terms of the type of information collected. Of these communications, 91% were acquired "directly from Internet Service Providers." The other 9% were acquired through what NSA calls "upstream collection," meaning acquisition while Internet traffic is in transit from one unspecified location to another. Specifically, Section 215 modified the business records provisions of FISA to allow the FBI to apply to the FISC for an order compelling a person to produce "any tangible thing," including records held by a telecommunications provider concerning the number and length of communications, but not the contents of those communications. Following the disclosure of the FISC order compelling Verizon to produce large amounts of telephony metadata, some commentators have expressed skepticism regarding how there could be "reasonable grounds to believe" that such a broad amount of data could be said to be "relevant to an authorized investigation," as required by the statute. The DNI has stated that the recently disclosed collection of foreign intelligence information from electronic communication service providers has been authorized under Section 702 of FISA, which specifically concerns acquisitions targeting non-U.S. persons who are overseas. Specifically, an acquisition:
May not intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States; May not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States; May not intentionally target a U.S. person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; May not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States; and Must be conducted in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Arguments For and Against the Two Programs
The Administration has argued that the surveillance activities leaked to the press, in addition to being subject to oversight by all three branches of government, are important to national security and have helped disrupt terror plots. These arguments have not always distinguished between the two programs, but generally the Administration appears to have taken the position that collection pursuant to Section 702 is an important tool on a broad range of national security issues and that collection pursuant to Section 215 has been useful in a discrete number of terrorism cases. Some Members have also proposed legislation intended to provide greater transparency of opinions of the FISC and FISCR. | Recent attention concerning National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance pertains to unauthorized disclosures of two different intelligence collection programs. Since these programs were publicly disclosed over the course of two days in June, there has been confusion about what information is being collected and under which authorities the NSA is acting. This report clarifies the differences between the two programs and identifies potential issues that may help Members of Congress assess legislative proposals pertaining to NSA surveillance authorities.
The first program collects in bulk the phone records—including the number that was dialed from, the number that was dialed to, and the date and duration of the call—of customers of Verizon and possibly other U.S. telephone service providers. It does not collect the content of the calls or the identity of callers. The data are collected pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT, which amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. Section 215 allows the FBI, in this case on behalf of the NSA, to apply to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for an order compelling a person to produce "any tangible thing," such as records held by a telecommunications provider, if the tangible things sought are "relevant to an authorized investigation." Some commentators have expressed skepticism regarding how such a broad amount of data could be said to be "relevant to an authorized investigation," as required by the statute. In response to these concerns, the Obama Administration subsequently declassified portions of a FISC order authorizing this program and a "whitepaper" describing the Administration's legal reasoning.
The second program targets the electronic communications, including content, of foreign targets overseas whose communications flow through American networks. These data are collected pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, which was added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. This program acquires information from Internet service providers, as well as through what NSA terms "upstream" collection that appears to acquire Internet traffic while it is in transit from one location to another. Although this program targets the communications of foreigners who are abroad, the Administration has acknowledged that technical limitations in the "upstream" collection result in the collection of some communications that are unrelated to the target or that may take place between persons in the United States. Notwithstanding these technical limitations, the FISC has held that this program is consistent with the requirements of both Section 702 and the Fourth Amendment provided that there are sufficient safeguards in place to identify and limit the retention, use, or dissemination of such unrelated or wholly domestic communications.
The Obama Administration has argued that these surveillance activities, in addition to being subject to oversight by all three branches of government, are important to national security and have helped disrupt terror plots. These arguments have not always distinguished between the two programs, and some critics, while acknowledging the value of information collected using Section 702 authorities, are skeptical of the value of the phone records held in bulk at NSA. Thus, recent legislative proposals have primarily focused on modifying Section 215 to preclude the breadth of phone records collection currently taking place. They have also emphasized requiring greater public disclosure of FISC opinions, including the opinion(s) allowing for the collection of phone records in bulk.
This report discusses the specifics of these two NSA collection programs. It does not address other questions that have been raised in the aftermath of these leaks, such as the potential harm to national security caused by the leaks or the intelligence community's reliance on contractors. |
crs_RS22243 | crs_RS22243_0 | Introduction
A major issue in the upcoming farm bill debate is likely to be funding for conservation programs. Current authorization for mandatory funding for most of these programs, under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 ( P.L. However, since FY2002, Congress has limited funding for some of the mandatory programs each year below authorized levels in annual appropriations acts. Advocates for these programs decry these limitations as significant changes from the intent of the farm bill, which compromise the programs' ability to provide the anticipated magnitude of benefits to producers and the environment. Others, including those interested in reducing agricultural expenditures or in spending the funds for other agricultural purposes, counter that, even with these reductions, overall funding has grown substantially. The programs that are limited and the amounts of the limitations change from year to year. Starting in FY2003, the requested reductions in mandatory funding below the authorized levels (shown in the table), are as follows:
In FY2003, the request was submitted before the farm bill was enacted, and did not include any requests to reduce funding levels. | The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 authorized large increases in mandatory funding for several agricultural conservation programs. Most of these programs expire in FY2007, and the 110th Congress is likely to address future funding levels in a farm bill. Since FY2002, Congress has acted, through the appropriations process, to limit funding for some of these programs below authorized levels. It limited total funding for all the programs to 97.6% of the authorized total in FY2003, and the percentage declined annually to 87.3% in FY2006. Program supporters decry these growing limitations as reductions that compromise the intent of the farm bill. Others counter that, even with the limitations, overall conservation funding has grown substantially, from almost $3.1 billion in FY2003 to almost $3.8 billion in FY2006. This report reviews the funding history of the programs since the 2002 farm bill was enacted. It will be updated periodically. |
crs_R40428 | crs_R40428_0 | Crediting Military Service under CSRS and FERS
Federal employees with permanent appointments earn pension benefits under one of two retirement plans. Employees hired after 1983 participate in the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS). Employees hired before 1984 participate in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) unless they elected to transfer to the FERS during open seasons held in 1987 and 1998. Under both CSRS and FERS, federal employees who have served in the military can add their years of active-duty military service to their civilian service for purposes of retirement eligibility and pension benefits. Because both CSRS and FERS require employees to contribute toward their future pensions, an employee may be required to make a deposit to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF) for military service to be credited toward a civil service retirement annuity. When Congress established the CSRS, it allowed veterans who subsequently became civilian federal employees to count their years of active-duty military service toward retirement eligibility and pension benefits under CSRS. 97-253 ) established a process by which federal employees who are veterans of military service can avoid having their civil service pensions reduced when they become eligible for Social Security benefits. Veterans who were hired into federal employment before October 1, 1982, are not required to make this deposit, but if they do not, their military service will count toward their civil service retirement annuities only until they are eligible for Social Security. If a veteran hired before October 1, 1982, has not made a deposit to the CSRDF before separating from federal service, his or her civilian federal retirement annuity will be reduced by the amount that is attributable to military service when he or she becomes eligible for Social Security. For employees enrolled in CSRS, the required deposit is 7.0% of the total amount of basic pay received while on active duty in the military. For employees enrolled in FERS, the required deposit is 3.0% of their total basic military pay. Interest is charged on deposits made after October 1, 1985. The OBRA of 1982 also provided that veterans hired into civilian federal employment after September 30, 1982, will receive civil service retirement credit for their post-1956 military service only if they make a deposit to the CSRDF. For employees enrolled in CSRS, the required deposit is 7.0% of the total basic pay they received while serving on active duty in the military. If the employee makes the deposit within two years of being hired into civilian federal employment, no interest is charged. For employees under FERS who were first hired before December 31, 2012, the required contribution of 3.0% of the total basic pay they received while serving on active duty in the military is more than the 0.8% of pay that would have been deducted if the employee had been in the civil service rather than the military during the years to be credited toward the FERS annuity. The statutes that allow military service to be credited toward a civil service retirement annuity have been amended several times over the years, mainly to coordinate civil service retirement benefits with benefits earned under Social Security. Deposits must be paid to the CSRDF before the individual separates from federal employment. | Federal employees with permanent appointments earn pension benefits under one of two retirement plans. Employees hired after 1983 participate in the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS). Employees hired before 1984 participate in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) unless they elected to transfer to the FERS during open seasons held in 1987 and 1998. When Congress established the CSRS in 1920, it allowed veterans who subsequently became civilian federal employees to count their years of active-duty military service toward retirement eligibility and pension benefits under CSRS. The statutes that allow military service to be credited toward a civil service pension have been amended several times over the years, mainly to coordinate civil service retirement benefits with benefits earned under Social Security.
Under both CSRS and FERS, federal employees who have served on active duty in the military can have their years of military service counted for retirement eligibility and pension benefits. The employee may be required to make a deposit to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF) for military service to be credited toward a civil service retirement annuity. Military service can be counted toward a civil service retirement annuity only if the individual is not receiving a military pension for that service.
Veterans of active-duty military service who were hired into civilian federal employment before October 1, 1982, who do not make a deposit to the CSRDF before separating from federal employment receive CSRS retirement credit for post-1956 military service only until they are eligible for Social Security. Their CSRS annuities are reduced by the amount that is attributable to their military service when they become eligible for Social Security benefits. Those who made deposits to the CSRDF before separating from federal employment do not have their civil service annuities reduced when they become eligible for Social Security. For employees enrolled in CSRS, the required deposit is 7.0% of the total amount of basic pay received while on active duty in the military. For employees enrolled in FERS, the required deposit is 3.0% of their total basic military pay. Deposits made before October 1, 1985, were not charged interest. Interest is charged on deposits made after that date.
Veterans of active-duty military service hired into civilian federal employment after September 30, 1982, receive civil service retirement credit for post-1956 military service only if they make a deposit to the CSRDF. For employees enrolled in CSRS, the required deposit is 7.0% of the total amount of basic pay received while on active duty in the military. For employees enrolled in FERS, the required deposit is 3.0% of their total basic military pay. If the employee makes the deposit within two years of being hired into civilian federal employment, no interest is charged. |
crs_RL34189 | crs_RL34189_0 | UNHCR also uses the 2006 range (30,000 - 50,000) as a working figure. While northeast China is generally far more economically developed and stable than North Korea, some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) report the poverty in the broader region of northern China is extreme and that conditions for the poor in both China and North Korea are roughly similar. China's Policy Towards North Koreans Seeking Refuge
Application of the Refugee Convention and Protocol
Despite being a party to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, China has not allowed U.N. agencies, in particular UNHCR, to have access to North Koreans who are residing in China because it views these individuals as economic migrants (rather than political refugees) who cross the border illegally, primarily in search of food. It does not want to provoke an ally, destabilize the Korean peninsula, or create a "pull"factor for individuals wanting to cross into China. China's Policy Considerations
In addition to being a formal ally with North Korea, the Chinese government wants to avoid a situation that could destabilize the broader region, such as the collapse of the North Korean regime. The North Korean Human Rights Act
Congressional attention to North Korean human rights and refugee issues has been consistent and critical. The legislation
authorizes up to $20 million for each of the fiscal years 2005-2008 for assistance to North Korean refugees, $2 million for promoting human rights and democracy in North Korea and $2 million to promote freedom of information inside North Korea; asserts that North Koreans are eligible for U.S. refugee status and instructs the State Department to facilitate the submission of applications by North Koreans seeking protection as refugees; and requires the President to appoint a Special Envoy to promote human rights in North Korea. Passage of the legislation was also driven by the argument that the United States has a moral responsibility to stand up for human rights for those suffering under repressive regimes. The Resettlement of North Korean Refugees in the United States
The NKHRA has as one of its goals the resettlement of North Korean refugees in the United States. Linking Security and Human Rights
The Six-Party Talks remain focused primarily on the nuclear weapons issue and Bush Administration negotiators in 2007 have linked establishing diplomatic relations and facilitating Pyongyang's re-entry into the international community with only the nuclear weapons issue rather than human rights and other issues. The appointment of a special envoy on human rights theoretically allows for a separate track, but, according to many observers, the predominant attitude of the Bush Administration in 2007 reflects the view that raising the profile of North Korea's human rights violations jeopardizes the progress of the nuclear disarmament negotiations. Despite this public statement, many observers say that securing cooperation from China and South Korea to deal with North Korean human rights and refugee issues is more difficult because of the distrust of the goals of some U.S. government officials. countries have been held. In addition, quiet pressure on other regional countries not to repatriate North Korean refugees and to streamline asylum seekers' cases with the South Korean government and UNHCR could help alleviate humanitarian concerns for fleeing North Koreans. | North Koreans have been crossing the border into China, many in search of refuge, since the height of North Korea's famine in the 1990s. The State Department estimates that 30,000-50,000 North Korean refugees currently live in China (some non-governmental organizations estimate the number is closer to 300,000) and believes those who are repatriated may face punishment ranging from a few months of "labor correction" to execution. A number of reports also document the difficult conditions faced by North Koreans who remain in China. The plight of the North Koreans focuses attention not only on those seeking refuge and their refugee status, but also points to the factors driving their decision to leave, primarily food shortages, deteriorating humanitarian conditions, and human rights violations. North Korea is generally characterized as one of the world's worst violators of human rights and religious freedom, an issue that some Members of Congress and interest groups say should assume greater importance in the formation of U.S. priorities towards North Korea. Congressional concern about human rights in North Korea and conditions faced by North Korean refugees led to the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA) in 2004.
North Korean refugees in China and human rights issues are frequently raised simultaneously, particularly in a congressional context. Although the situation for North Koreans seeking to leave their country and for those who remain inside its borders pose different questions and may call for separate responses, both focus on the nature of the regime in Pyongyang. Critics of the North Korean government have raised both issues together to put pressure on the regime, particularly when nuclear weapons program negotiations stalled. Some advocates do not want to link refugee and human rights issues, claiming that the former calls for a quieter, cooperative approach, while the latter requires a more outspoken response to the North Korean government's practices. Although some policy experts insist that the United States has a moral imperative to stand up for the oppressed, others say that this creates obstacles in the nuclear disarmament negotiations. In 2007, the Bush Administration entered into bilateral talks with North Korea and linked the prospect of diplomatic relations and Pyongyang's re-entry into the international community with only the nuclear issue, leaving out human rights and refugee concerns.
Nevertheless, North Korean human rights and refugee issues remain significant concerns and also have broader regional importance. China and South Korea want to avoid a massive outflow of refugees, which they believe could trigger the instability or collapse of North Korea. North Korean refugees seeking resettlement often transit through other Asian countries, raising diplomatic, refugee, and security concerns for those governments. South Korea, as the final destination of the vast majority of North Koreans, struggles to accommodate new arrivals and does not want to damage its relations with North Korea. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22931 | crs_RS22931_0 | Background
Islamic finance is based on shariah , an Arabic term that often is translated to "Islamic law." Standardization of Islamic finance regulations has been of increasing interest in the industry. Islamic finance laws and regulatory practices vary across countries. Islamic Finance Trends
Estimates vary of the size and growth rates of assets held internationally under Islamic finance, but suggest that Islamic finance is a rapidly growing industry. While it represents a small proportion of the global finance market (estimated at 1%-5% of global share), the Islamic finance industry has experienced double-digit rates of growth annually in recent years (estimated at 10%-20% annual growth). Global Financial Crisis
Internationally, Islamic banks appear to have been more resilient to the primary effects of the global economic turndown and international financial crisis than conventional banks. However, as Islamic banks operate within a global financial system, they have not been completely insulated from the recent economic and financial shocks. Traditionally concentrated in Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and Asia, in recent years, Islamic finance has expanded to other countries with smaller Muslim populations. A number of countries are revising their tax, legal, and regulatory frameworks to attract Islamic finance. Islamic capital market securities, now a fast-growing segment of the Islamic finance industry, were first introduced in 2001 (discussed in the next section). Peaking in 2007 at around $35 billion (although higher according to some estimates), sales of new Islamic bonds dropped to about $15 billion in 2008 and rose to $20 billion in 2009 (see Figure 1 ). Islamic Finance in the United States41
In the United States, there is growing interest for Islamic finance and business opportunities for lenders. Some U.S. financial institutions express concerns about the possible ties of some Islamic institutions to terrorist finance networks. | Islamic finance is based on principles of shariah, or "Islamic law." Major financial principles of shariah are a ban on interest, a ban on contractual uncertainty, adherence to risk-sharing and profit-sharing, promotion of ethical investments that enhance society, and asset-backing.
While the Islamic finance industry represents a fraction of the global finance market, it has grown at double-digit rates in recent years. By some estimates, total assets held globally under Islamic finance reached $1 trillion in 2010. Islamic banks have appeared to be more resilient than conventional banks to the immediate effects of the international financial crisis and global economic downturn. Some analysts have attributed this to Islamic banks' avoidance of speculative activities. However, the Islamic finance industry has not been completely immune to the general decline in demand and investor uncertainty. Global issuance of Islamic capital market securities (sukuk), a fast-growing segment of the Islamic finance industry, peaked in 2007 at $35 billion, declined to $15 billion in 2008 and then rose to $20 billion in 2009.
Islamic finance historically has been concentrated in Muslim-majority countries of the Middle East and Asia, but has expanded globally to countries with smaller Muslim populations. A number of European and other countries are working to reform their tax, legal, and regulatory frameworks to attract Islamic investments. There is a small but growing market for Islamic finance in the United States.
Through international and domestic regulatory bodies, there have been efforts to standardize regulations in Islamic finance across different countries and financial institutions, although challenges remain. Critics of Islamic finance express concerns about possible ties between Islamic finance and political agendas or terrorist financing and the use of Islamic finance to circumvent U.S. economic sanctions. Supporters argue that Islamic finance presents significant new business opportunities and provides alternate methods for capital formation and economic development. |
crs_RL32757 | crs_RL32757_0 | Overview
This report examines how unemployment has a different impact on the older worker. As workers age, negative—but previously temporary—events such as unemployment may push otherwise firmly entrenched workers out of the labor force. Older workers are less likely than others to experience a spell of unemployment, but those older workers who do experience unemployment have a higher incidence of withdrawing from the labor market. The workers find themselves faced with new decisions: should they search for a new job; create a new job through self-employment; spend down any non-retirement personal savings they may have accrued during their working years; opt to withdraw funds from retirement savings plans and/or receive Social Security benefits? Some studies have found that unemployment in older workers contributes up to a one-third increase in the probability of retirement. Rather, it is the relative scale of the phenomenon to the overall workforce that is new. The shifting demographics of the workforce have made what was once a fairly small policy issue grow in importance. The Aging Demographics of the Population
The pattern of unemployment leading to unexpectedly early retirement is not a new development. UC benefits may be offset by Social Security payments. Policy Issues
One policy issue is how to address the inherent tensions among the UC system, alternative working arrangements, and eligibility for and receipt of various types of retirement income including Social Security benefits. Another policy issue is how federal programs might better balance providing income support for older Americans with providing appropriate work incentives for those who would prefer to remain engaged in some type of work. | This is one in a series of papers that explore issues of our aging society. This report examines how unemployment has a different impact on the older worker. As workers age, negative—but previously temporary—events such as unemployment may push otherwise firmly entrenched workers out of the labor force. Older workers are less likely than others to experience a spell of unemployment, but those older workers who do experience unemployment have a higher incidence of withdrawing from the labor market. Some studies have found that unemployment in older workers contributes up to a one-third increase in the probability of retirement.
The pattern of unemployment leading to unexpectedly early retirement is not a new development. Rather, it is the relative scale of the phenomenon to the overall workforce that is new. The shifting demographics of the workforce have made what was once a fairly small policy issue grow in importance.
Depending on the age of the older unemployed workers, new alternative income sources such as retirement benefits and early Social Security benefits may be used while previous pillars of support such as unemployment compensation become less helpful in replacing income. Facing lowered expected wages and lower chances of rehire, older workers find themselves faced with new decisions: should they search for a new job; create a new job through self-employment; spend down any non-retirement personal savings they may have accrued during their working years; opt to withdraw funds from retirement savings plans, and/or opt to receive Social Security benefits?
One policy issue is how to address the inherent tensions among the Unemployment Compensation (UC) system, alternative working arrangements, and eligibility for and receipt of various types of retirement income including Social Security benefits. Another is how federal programs might better balance providing income support for older Americans with providing appropriate work incentives for those who would prefer to remain engaged in some type of work. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R43151 | crs_R43151_0 | Most Recent Developments
This section provides an overview of the current status of FY2014 legislative branch appropriations, with subsections covering each action from the initial submission of the request on April 10, 2013, to hearings and markups held by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, through the enactment of a continuing resolution ( P.L. 113-46 ) on October 17, 2013. That continuing resolution terminated the funding gap that began October 1 and provided budget authority through January 15, 2014. Another temporary CR ( P.L. 113-73 ), enacted on January 15, provided funding until the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, on January 17 ( P.L. By law, the legislative branch request is submitted to the President and included in the budget without change. House Subcommittee Markup
On July 9, 2013, the House subcommittee met to mark up the FY2014 bill. The mark would have provided $3.2 billion (not including Senate items, which are determined by the Senate). No amendments were offered, and it was reported to the full committee by voice vote. House Committee Markup
On July 18, 2013, the full House Appropriations Committee held a markup of the FY2014 bill. Seven amendments were considered before it was ordered reported to the House:
An amendment offered by Mr. Bishop related to cancelling sequestration, which failed; An amendment offered by Mr. Moran, to restore funding for Open World to the FY2013 post-sequester level, which was withdrawn; An amendment offered by Ranking Member Wasserman Schultz clarifying that the former House page dorm can only be used by the legislative branch and giving the House Appropriations Committee approval for any renovation plans (Section 1302), which was agreed to; An amendment offered by Ranking Member Wasserman Schultz transferring funding proposed for the Stennis Center to the Library, which was agreed to; An amendment offered by Mr. Kingston requiring the Government Accountability Office to study the cost savings associated with privatizing the Capitol Power Plant, which was agreed to; An amendment offered by Ms. Kaptur to increase funding for the Botanic Garden, which was withdrawn; and An amendment offered by Ms. Lee, that added a general provision (Section 214) stating, "It is the sense of the Congress that Congress should not pass any legislation that authorizes spending cuts that would increase poverty in the United States," which was accepted. Senate Committee Markup
The Senate committee held its markup of the FY2014 bill on July 11, 2013. The bill would have provided $2.978 billion (not including House items, which are determined by the House). No amendments were offered, and the bill was ordered reported by a roll call vote of 16-14 ( S. 1283 , S.Rept. 113-70 ). On October 16, 2013, the Senate passed H.R. The legislative branch previously experienced a funding gap in FY1996 (November 14-18, 1995). 113-76 ), with legislative branch funding contained in Division I. The act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), and less across-the-board rescissions required by Section 3004 of P.L. The act did not alter the sequestration reductions implemented on March 1, which reduced most legislative branch accounts by 5.0%. 112-74 ) provided $4.307 billion for the legislative branch. This level was $236.9 million (-5.2%) below the FY2011 enacted level. 112-10 provided $4.543 billion for legislative branch operations in FY2011. This level represented a $125.1 million decrease from the $4.668 billion provided in the FY2010 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act ( P.L. 111-68 ) and the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act ( P.L. 111-212 ). It shows the legislative branch as a proportion of total discretionary budget authority over this period has remained relatively stable at approximately 0.4%. Government Printing Office (GPO)32
GPO requested $128.5 million for FY2014. The FY2011 level represented a decrease of $623,000 (-5.2%) from the $12.00 million provided for FY2010, and the FY2010 level represented a decrease of $1.90 million (-13.7%) from the $13.90 million provided in the FY2009 Omnibus. Fiscal Year Information and Resources
Selected Websites
These sites contain information on the FY2014 legislative branch appropriations requests and legislation, and the appropriations process:
House Committee on Appropriations http://appropriations.house.gov/
Senate Committee on Appropriations http://appropriations.senate.gov/
CRS Appropriations Products Guide http://www.crs.gov/Pages/AppropriationsStatusTable.aspx?source=QuickLinks
Congressional Budget Office http://www.cbo.gov
Government Accountability Office http://www.gao.gov
Office of Management and Budget http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
Prior to the beginning of FY2014, congressional action occurred on an interim continuing resolution (CR) that would have provided continuing appropriations for projects and activities for which authority existed during the previous fiscal year. | The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance; Congressional Budget Office (CBO); Architect of the Capitol (AOC); Library of Congress (LOC), including the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Government Printing Office (GPO); Government Accountability Office (GAO); and Open World Leadership Center.
The legislative branch FY2014 budget request of $4.512 billion was submitted on April 10, 2013. By law, the President includes the requests submitted from the legislative branch in the annual budget without change.
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees' Legislative Branch Subcommittees held hearings to consider the FY2014 legislative branch requests.
The House subcommittee held its markup on July 9, 2013, and the full committee held a markup on July 18. Seven amendments were offered in the full committee, and four were agreed to by voice vote or accepted. The bill, which would have provided $3.233 billion (not including Senate items), was reported on July 23 (H.R. 2792, H.Rept. 113-173).
The Senate Appropriations Committee held a markup on July 11 (S. 1283, S.Rept. 113-70). It would have provided $2.978 billion (not including House items). No amendments were offered in the Senate markup.
Neither a legislative branch appropriations bill, nor a continuing appropriations resolution (CR), containing FY2014 funding was enacted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year on October 1. A funding gap, which resulted in a partial government shutdown, ensued for 16 days. The funding gap was terminated by the enactment of a CR (P.L. 113-46) on October 17, 2013. The CR provided funding through January 15, 2014. The legislative branch previously experienced a funding gap in FY1996 (November 14-18, 1995).
Following enactment of a temporary continuing resolution on January 15, 2014 (P.L. 113-73), a consolidated appropriations bill was enacted on January 17 (P.L. 113-76), providing $4.259 billion for the legislative branch for FY2014.
Legislative branch funding, which peaked in FY2010, remains below the FY2009 level of $4.501 billion. The FY2013 act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), less across-the-board rescissions that applied to all appropriations in the act, and not including sequestration reductions implemented on March 1. The FY2012 level represented a decrease of $236.9 million (-5.2%) from the FY2011 level, which itself represented a $125.1 million decrease (-2.7%) from FY2010. P.L. 112-10 (enacted on April 15, 2011) provided $4.543 billion for FY2011 legislative branch operations. P.L. 111-68 (enacted on October 1, 2009) provided $4.656 billion for FY2010. The FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212) provided an additional $12.96 million for the Capitol Police.
The smallest of the appropriations bills, the legislative branch comprises approximately 0.4% of total discretionary budget authority. |
crs_R42943 | crs_R42943_0 | Data on job openings provide information on the number of workers that employers intend to hire in the near future. This report provides information on the ratio of unemployed persons per job opening, which may be useful to Congress in that it adds nuanced information to the current mix of labor market indicators. Using unemployed persons from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and job openings from the JOLTS, the ratio divides the number of persons generally aged 16 and older who are not employed and actively looking for jobs by the number of job openings. The advantage to the statistic is that the ratio gauges the excess supply of labor relative to the unmet needs of employers. Four key findings arise from this analysis:
1. In the 2007-2009 recession, the ratio rises to very high levels, especially in the goods-producing industries (construction, manufacturing, mining, and logging). 3. 4. Even though the ratio has reduced, it remains at higher levels than prior to the 2007-2009 recession. Job openings are a measure of the demand for workers that are not currently met by employers. The following section discussing the ratio of unemployed persons per job opening as a unique indicator identifies a fourth finding: While the ratio is highly correlated with changes in the unemployment rate, the ratio saw modest improvements coming out of the recent recession sooner than the reductions in the unemployment rate. Finding 1
The ratio of unemployed persons per job opening is highly correlated with the unemployment rate between 2001 and 2012. Finding 2
The ratio of unemployed persons per job opening rises during the recessionary periods covered in this data set. The ratio of unemployed persons per job opening may serve as a useful addition to other labor force statistics providing information on the demand for workers by employers and the population of persons who are currently available for work. | New information that adds to the mix of labor market indicators may be useful to Congress. The ratio of unemployed persons per job opening provides information on how many unemployed persons on average there are for every job opening. It adds to the current mix of labor market indicators such as the unemployment rate, which is a measure of the excess supply of workers. In addition, it adds to employment statistics, which measures the demand for workers that have already been met by employers. By dividing the number of unemployed persons with the number of job openings, the ratio gauges the excess supply of workers relative to the demand, where job openings serve as a measure of the unmet need for workers. The resultant statistic compares the number of persons who are actively searching for jobs to the number of available opportunities.
Four key findings arise from this analysis:
1. The ratio of unemployed persons per job opening is highly correlated with the unemployment rate between 2001 and 2012. 2. The ratio of unemployed persons per job opening rises during the recessionary periods covered in this data set. In the 2007-2009 recession, the ratio rises to very high levels, especially in the goods-producing industries (construction, manufacturing, mining, and logging). 3. Although the ratio is highly correlated with changes in the unemployment rate, the ratio saw modest improvements coming out of the recent recession sooner than the reductions in the unemployment rate. 4. Even though the ratio has reduced, it remains at higher levels than prior to the 2007-2009 recession.
The analysis in this report combines two data sources:
The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), which provide information from a survey of U.S. business establishments on the dynamic job market where job openings are created, persons are hired, and employees leave. The Current Population Survey (CPS), which provides information on economic and demographic information from U.S. households. |
crs_R44789 | crs_R44789_0 | Overview
On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 13768, "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States." Among other things, the EO raises questions regarding whether, and to what extent, federal agencies will withhold federal grant funds that would have otherwise been awarded to a designated "sanctuary jurisdiction." Under the EO, the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) is directed to designate a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction at his discretion, and to the extent consistent with law, for those jurisdictions found to have willfully refused to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373, "Communication between government agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Among other things, the EO raises questions regarding potential restrictions of federal grant funding for sanctuary jurisdictions. This report discusses several questions that might be raised regarding the implementation of the executive order by federal grant-making agencies (also known as "federal awarding agencies) and the impact on federal grant funding for designated sanctuary jurisdictions. Concluding Remarks
Because of the complexity of implementing a centralized policy such as the EO through the decentralized structure of federal grants administration practices, there is uncertainty in determining the impact of the EO on federal grant funding for sanctuary jurisdictions. The impact could be affected by the discretion exercised by the Attorney General and the Secretary in defining a "federal grant," determining which programs are exempted because of providing necessary funding for law enforcement purposes, and determining what constitutes a "sanctuary jurisdiction." The impact of the EO on federal grant funding could also be affected by how federal grant awarding agencies utilize discretion in administering the grant programs, including review of eligibility and conditioning federal grant awards | On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 13768, "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States." Among other things, the EO raises questions regarding whether, and to what extent, federal agencies will withhold federal grant funds that would have otherwise been awarded to a designated "sanctuary jurisdiction." Under the EO, the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) is directed to designate a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction at his discretion, and to the extent consistent with law, for those jurisdictions found to have willfully refused to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373, "Communication between government agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service."
Among other things, the EO raises questions regarding potential restrictions of federal grant funding for sanctuary jurisdictions. This report discusses several questions that might be raised regarding the implementation of the executive order by federal grant-making agencies (also known as "federal awarding agencies") and the impact on federal grant funding for designated sanctuary jurisdictions.
Because of the complexity of implementing a centralized policy such as the EO through the decentralized structure of federal grants administration practices, there is uncertainty in determining the impact of the EO on federal grant funding for sanctuary jurisdictions. This could be affected by the discretion exercised by the Attorney General and the Secretary in defining a "federal grant," determining which programs are exempted because of providing necessary funding for law enforcement purposes, and determining what constitutes a "sanctuary jurisdiction." The impact of the EO on federal grant funding could also be affected by how federal grant awarding agencies utilize discretion in administering the grant programs, including review of eligibility and conditioning federal grant awards. |
crs_R43094 | crs_R43094_0 | At present, different fixed interest rates apply to each of the types of loans currently being made. Under current law, Direct Unsubsidized Loans are being made with a fixed rate of 6.8%, and Direct PLUS Loans are being made with a fixed rate of 7.9%. These include proposals to temporarily extend the current 3.4% interest rate on Direct Subsidized Loans as well as long-term proposals to establish a new interest rate structure for all loans made through the Direct Loan program during AY2013-2014 and future years. This is followed by brief descriptions of proposals that have been made during the 113 th Congress to either temporarily extend the authority to make Direct Subsidized Loans with a fixed 3.4% interest rate or to establish a new interest rate structure for Direct Loans made during AY2013-2014 and future years. For each proposal, information is presented showing a summary of the proposed interest rate structure, projections of future interest rates, and estimates of the interest expenses typical borrowers might be expected to pay if currently projected interest rates applied for future years. Legislation in the 113th Congress
In the 113 th Congress, numerous proposals have been made to amend or extend current policy for establishing the interest rates that borrowers pay on federal student loans made through the Direct Loan program. President's FY2014 Budget Proposal
President Obama's FY2014 budget would establish a market-indexed, fixed interest rate structure for all Direct Subsidized Loans, Direct Unsubsidized Loans, and Direct PLUS Loans made during AY2013-2014 and future years. On May 23, 2013, the House passed H.R. S. 953 would not affect the interest rate on other loans, nor loans made in future years. S. 897, the Bank on Students Loan Fairness Act
S. 897 would authorize a new source of funding for purposes of making Direct Subsidized Loans; and would establish a new fixed interest rate structure for Direct Subsidized Loans made during AY2013-2014 only. 1911 , the interest rate on Direct Subsidized Loans and Direct Unsubsidized Loans to undergraduate students would be the 10-year Treasury note rate, plus 2.05 percentage points, with a cap of 8.25%; the interest rate on Direct Unsubsidized Loans to graduate and professional students would be the 10-year Treasury note rate, plus 3.60 percentage points, with a cap of 9.50%; and the interest rate on Direct PLUS Loans to graduate and professional students, and to parent borrowers, would be the 10-year Treasury note rate, plus 4.60 percentage points, with a cap of 10.50%. On July 24, 2013, the Senate amended and passed H.R. Potential Market Indices for Student Loan Interest Rate Policy Options
Several of the proposals introduced in the 113 th Congress would index borrower interest rates to market rates. 1911 , S. 1003 , and the Senate amendment to H.R. In contrast, S. 897 would set the borrower rate for Direct Subsidized Loans made during AY2013-2014 only at the rate of the Federal Reserve discount window primary credit rate. The estimated monthly payment would be $634. 1911, the Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013
Undergraduate Dependent Borrower
Under the Senate amendment to H.R. Cost to the Government
There are a series of costs associated with making student loans. Since 2006, federal student loans have been made with fixed interest rates. For the student loans currently being made through the Direct Loan program, fixed interest rates are specified in a manner that does not adjust to account for variations in market conditions, nor borrower repayment risk. Interest Rate Structure
Throughout the history of the federal student loan programs, there have been two prevalent structures used for setting the rates borrowers pay: statutorily specified fixed interest rates and market-indexed variable interest rates. It also presents technical notes detailing assumptions that were made in the analysis of the student loan interest rate policy options examined in this report. | The interest rates that borrowers pay on federal student loans made through the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan program are specified in statutory language of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended. For the past two years, one type of loan—Direct Subsidized Loans—has been made with a fixed interest rate of 3.4%. Effective July 1, 2013, Direct Subsidized Loans began to be made with a fixed interest rate of 6.8%. Direct Unsubsidized Loans are currently being made with a fixed interest rate of 6.8% and Direct PLUS Loans are currently being made with a fixed interest rate of 7.9%.
In the 113th Congress, numerous proposals have been made that would affect the interest rates that borrowers pay on student loans made through the Direct Loan program. These include long-term proposals to establish a new interest rate structure for all Direct Loans made during future years, and short-term proposals to temporarily extend the authority to make Direct Loans at the rates currently in effect. Several of the long-term student loan interest rate proposals would amend the Direct Loan program to index student loan interest rates to market indices, such as the rate on 10-year Treasury notes. Some policy options would establish a market-indexed, fixed interest rate structure, while others would establish a market-indexed, variable interest rate structure.
In his FY2014 budget, President Obama proposed a market-indexed, fixed interest rate structure that would apply to Direct Loans made in future years. On May 23, 2013, the House passed H.R. 1911, which would establish a market-indexed, variable interest rate structure for new Direct Loans.
Numerous proposals were introduced in the Senate. Some bills would make short-term changes to student loan interest rates and would affect only Direct Subsidized Loans. S. 953 would extend for two years the authority to make Direct Subsidized Loans with a fixed interest rate of 3.4%. S. 897 would set the borrower interest rate on new Direct Subsidized Loans made only during the upcoming federal student aid award year at the Federal Reserve discount window primary credit rate. Other bills would establish a new market-indexed, fixed interest rate structure for Direct Loans made in future years. These include S. 1003 and the Senate amendment to H.R. 1911. On July 24, 2013, the Senate passed the amendment to H.R. 1911.
This report describes and analyzes student loan interest rate proposals that have been made in the 113th Congress to establish new policies for setting the interest rates that borrowers will pay on loans made through the Direct Loan program. The report compares and contrasts selected loan interest rate policy options and provides information on proposed student loan interest rate structures, projections of future interest rates, and estimates of future costs to the government. The report also presents estimates of borrower repayment amounts associated with the different interest rate proposals based on case simulations for three types of typical borrowers: undergraduate dependent students, undergraduate independent students, and parent borrowers.
Finally, the report highlights some of the perennial tensions that often arise when student loan interest rates are debated. Should federal student loan programs provide below-market or fair-market interest rates to borrowers? What value is ascribed with providing borrowers predictable fixed monthly payments as opposed to payments that may vary in accordance with market conditions? To what extent should the federal government seek to subsidize loans or borrower repayment and for what subset of borrowers should subsidies be available? |
crs_R43630 | crs_R43630_0 | This report provides information on the permissibility, under federal law, of a federal employee in an agency or department of the executive branch of government being a candidate for elective office. Under the provisions of federal law commonly known as the "Hatch Act," civilian employees in the executive branch of the federal government (other than the President and Vice President) have, since 1939, been prohibited from running as candidates in partisan elections. Amended in 1993, the Hatch Act now permits federal employees to engage in a wide range of voluntary, partisan political activities on their own, off-duty time, but still prohibits employees from being candidates "for election to a partisan political office." Such employees, it may be noted, may run for office in a "nonpartisan" election (that is, an election in which none of the candidates represents a political party); may run as an "independent" in partisan elections in certain specified, exempt localities in which a number of federal employees reside; and may generally be candidates for and hold positions in political parties and their affiliated organizations. Although the Hatch Act was significantly amended in 1993 to allow the vast majority of federal employees to engage in voluntary, off-the-job partisan political activities, certain employees in the executive branch, including those in law enforcement or national security agencies or offices, remain under much more restrictive provisions regarding political activities, even on their own free time. Political Party Positions
Most federal employees in the executive branch are allowed to hold and campaign for positions and offices in political parties and other partisan political organizations. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(2). | The federal law commonly known as the "Hatch Act" applies to all federal officers and employees—other than the President and Vice President—in the agencies, departments, bureaus, and offices of the executive branch of the federal government. Under the significant amendments made to the law in 1993, the Hatch Act now generally permits most federal employees to engage in a wide range of voluntary, partisan political activities on their own off-duty time and away from the federal workplace. Some employees in specified agencies and positions, including those dealing with law enforcement and national security matters, it should be noted, may be subject to further restrictions on their off-duty partisan political activities, and may not take any active part in political management or political campaigns.
Although most officers and employees in the executive branch of the federal government are now free to engage in most voluntary, partisan political activities on their own free time, employees in the executive branch may still not be candidates "for election to a partisan political office" (5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(3)), that is, federal employees may generally not be candidates for elective office in a partisan election. Most civilian employees in the executive branch may, however, (1) run for office in a "nonpartisan" election (that is, an election in which none of the candidates represents a political party); (2) run as an "independent" in partisan elections in certain specified, exempt communities in which a number of federal employees reside; and (3) be candidates for and hold positions in political parties and their affiliated organizations. |
crs_RL33632 | crs_RL33632_0 | Introduction
A key element of the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) amendments ( P.L. It was added to the CAA to enhance compliance by detailing for each covered facility all the emission control requirements to which the facility is subject. Adding these provisions to the CAA was controversial, and implementation, too, has generated controversies. Major Features of the Operating Permits Program
Prior to the 1990 amendments, the CAA required individual permits only for construction of new or modified industrial sources of air pollutants. Defining the parameters of this oversight has been a source of tension among EPA, states, and industry. Still, efforts to revise those rules have been driven by concerns of many permitting authorities and industrial sources that the current rules do not allow sufficient flexibility. In addition, EPA has issued some formal guidance on specific implementation issues. In part because of regulatory and program approval delays, state and local agencies were slow to begin issuing Title V permits. Permit issuance increased, but it continued to fall far short of the statutory deadlines and EPA's goals. A 2002 EPA Inspector General (IG) report criticized EPA and state and local agencies over the program's continuing problems. Key factors delaying the issuance of permits included insufficient state resources, complex EPA regulations and limited guidance, and conflicting state priorities, the IG reported. After that initial process, the ongoing tasks of permit reissuance (required after five years) and modification have become the focus of most permitting authorities' attention. Implications of Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Title V Permitting
In 2010 EPA initiated several CAA regulatory actions to limit emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) having implications for Title V permits and permitting. For Title V, this means including GHG control requirements in Title V permits. EPA's suite of regulatory actions regarding GHG emissions has been highly controversial. However, the Court upheld EPA's authority to require sources that already need Title V and PSD permits for conventional, non-GHG pollutants to comply with BACT requirements for GHGs. Most of the congressional criticism has focused on impacts of the PSD provisions of EPA's rules—not Title V—because the largest costs resulting from the GHG rules will be for compliance with BACT requirements, not the procedural requirements of Title V.
Title V Issues
Most stakeholders agree that at least some of the objectives and benefits identified by Congress when it enacted the Title V program in 1990 have been achieved:
Incorporating applicable requirements in one document that consolidates duplicative and redundant requirements is beneficial to regulatory agencies, the public, and regulated sources. At the same time, there also has been widespread dissatisfaction with the program as it exists, due to program complexity; confusion and uncertainty about some of its requirements; and criticism of costs to regulated entities, permit agencies, and even the general public. Rules to implement these aspects of the statute were promulgated in the 1992 Part 70 regulations. Clean Air Act issues have been of considerable interest during the 114 th Congress, especially scrutiny of EPA's regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. Although EPA's actions concerning GHGs involve multiple provisions of the act, this congressional attention has not included Title V. | The 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) amendments required major industrial sources of air pollutants to obtain operating permits. These permits, authorized in Title V of the act, are intended to enhance environmental compliance by detailing for each covered facility all of the emission control requirements to which it is subject. Title V also was intended to generate permit fees that would be used by state and local permitting authorities for administering the program. Implementation of these requirements affects more than 15,000 industrial sources of air emissions, as well as state and local air pollution control agencies. Adding these provisions to the act was controversial, and implementation, too, has generated controversies.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued regulations to implement Title V in 1992. Aspects of those rules (particularly concerning procedures to modify permits) have been contentious since then. EPA has considered a number of regulatory revisions but has not finalized any modifications. However, EPA has issued white papers and a number of formal and informal guidance documents that, together with the 1992 rules, comprise the agency's current interpretation of statutory and regulatory requirements.
Because of regulatory and program approval delays, state and local agencies were slow to begin issuing Title V permits, falling far short of statutory deadlines and EPA's goals. According to an EPA Inspector General report, key factors that delayed issuance of permits included insufficient state resources, complex EPA rules and limited guidance, and conflicting state priorities. Now, however, most initial permits have been issued, and permit reissuance (required after five years) and modification have replaced issuance of initial permits as the major ongoing task of permitting agencies.
Attention to the Title V program increased in 2010 when EPA initiated several controversial regulatory actions to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) under existing CAA authority with implications for Title V permits. For Title V, these actions mean including GHG control requirements in Title V permits issued for non-GHG. To minimize the costs and administrative burden of its GHG regulations, EPA issued a "Tailoring Rule" to impose requirements only on the largest sources of GHG emissions. In June 2014, the Supreme Court found that EPA exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the Tailoring Rule but upheld the agency's authority to require sources that already need permits for conventional pollutant emissions to comply with CAA requirements for GHGs.
Most stakeholders agree that at least some of the benefits of Title V identified by Congress in the 1990 CAA amendments have been achieved, such as incorporation of applicable air pollution control requirements in a single document that is accessible to regulators, the public, and industrial sources. At the same time, there also has been widespread dissatisfaction with the program's complexity, costs, and confusing requirements. Many believe that a lack of EPA guidance and oversight has contributed greatly to implementation problems. Congressional examination of Title V has been limited to a few oversight hearings, but none recently. Clean Air Act issues have been of considerable interest during the 114th Congress, especially scrutiny of EPA's regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. Although EPA's actions concerning GHGs involve multiple provisions of the act, this congressional attention has not included Title V. |
crs_RL30235 | crs_RL30235_0 | Introduction
When Congress crafted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) during 1937 and 1938, there appears to have been little concern about how its provisions might affect the territories and possessions of the United States. Gradually, through various procedures and over different time periods, the federal minimum wage has come to be applied in most of these jurisdictions. In Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, implementation was gradual, utilizing special industry committees (SICs) . By the late 1980s or early 1990s, the SICs for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands had been phased out. For Samoa, the SICs seem to have had little effect in raising wage rates, though the procedure remained in place, intermittently, until the summer of 2007 when it was abolished. The CNMI was acquired by the United States in the wake of World War II. In doing so, they retained responsibility for the insular minimum wage—and exercised control over aspects of insular immigration policy. Thus, among U.S. territories and possessions, the minimum wage had remained unresolved in American Samoa and the CNMI. Though the focus of congressional debate appears to have been upon Puerto Rico, the 1940 FLSA amendment applied to the Virgin Islands as well. Following from the hearings, the 85 th Congress adopted amendments to the FLSA under which Guam, American Samoa and certain other jurisdictions were specifically written into the act. The special industry committee arrangement was repealed with the 2007 FLSA amendments ( H.R. 17, following routine hearings and investigation into the condition of the various segments of the insular economy, concluded that the minimum wage for Samoa could be raised to the mainland level without risk that it would "substantially curtail employment in the industries" of the island. American Samoa and the 110th Congress
In 2007, a provision was inserted into the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act ( H.R. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), associated with the United States since the mid-1970s, had not been covered by the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA: rather, it was governed by its own insular minimum—lower than the FLSA standard. Rather, they seem to have been regarded as in temporary association with the United States. New Industrial Growth and Its Aftermath
By the 1980s, a garment industry had developed in the CNMI, based largely, it appears, upon three factors: (1) an initial minimum wage then about $2.15 per hour, substantially below that required by the FLSA, though it may not have extended to many workers; (2) importation of alien non-immigrant contract workers, many from China, who came to be employed in the insular garment factories; and (3) the capacity to move CNMI production in commerce, for tariff purposes, as Made in America. The bill (with some 222 cosponsors) had two provisions: (1) to raise the federal minimum wage, in steps, to $7.25 per hour, and (2) to render the federal minimum wage applicable to the CNMI through a series of increases to take place over several years. H.R. A second bill, H.R. | The minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is generally applicable to any state, territory, or possession of the United States such as Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). Implementation has been gradual, though the ultimate objective has been, consistently, to raise wages to the highest level that "is economically feasible without substantially curtailing employment."
In 1937 and 1938, when Congress crafted the FLSA, there appears to have been little concern about its impact upon the U.S. territories and possessions. In 1940, the act was amended to permit Special Industry Committees (SICs) to visit Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands to assess their economies and to make recommendations for a sub-minimum wage in certain industries. In 1956, the same procedure was instituted for American Samoa. Guam had always been under the act (though it may not have been implemented). The CNMI, in setting forth the terms of its association with the United States, had retained control over its own insular minimum wage.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands had emerged from the SICs procedures and come fully under the FLSA. Two territories remained to be accounted for: American Samoa and, in a different context, the CNMI.
It was generally assumed that the mainland minimum wage applied to American Samoa though it had not been implemented. During the early 1950s, the Department of the Interior moved to attract a new industry to the island group: namely, tuna canning. The first company, Van Camp Sea Foods, asked Congress to grant an exception from the FLSA and, in 1956, the Puerto Rican model was adopted. The exception remained in place until 2007 when, under the FLSA amendments of that year, the SIC system was abolished and the federal minimum wage, in steps, would be applied.
The CNMI was acquired by the United States in the aftermath of World War II. When, in the mid-1970s, it became a Commonwealth in association with the United States, the CNMI retained control over its minimum wage and certain aspects of immigration and trade policy. A decade later, in the 1980s, congressional hearings uncovered what were alleged to have been "sweatshop" practices involving the garment and tourism industries. With the 2007 FLSA amendments, the federal minimum wage will be applied, in steps, to the CNMI.
In the 110th Congress, several bills (H.R. 2, H.R. 976, H.R. 1591, H.R. 2206, and H.R. 5154) dealt with the minimum wage for Samoa and/or for the CNMI.
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL33072 | crs_RL33072_0 | Overview and Congressional Interest
On July 18, 2005, during the first state visit to Washington, D.C., by an Indian leader sinceNovember 2001, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a JointStatement resolving to establish a "global partnership" between the United States and India throughincreased cooperation on economic issues, on energy and the environment, on democracy anddevelopment, on non-proliferation and security, and on high-technology and space. (8) Such cooperation would require changes in both U.S. law and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)guidelines. Just weeks earlier,the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement. This report reviews the major provisions of U.S.-India bilateral agreements signed in 2005and further explicated in March 2006, including the status of issues addressed in the now completedNext Step in Strategic Partnership initiative, security relations, economic relations, and global issues. The report reviews arguments made in favor of and in opposition to increased bilateral cooperationin each major issue-area and includes Indian perspectives. Regional issues involving China,Pakistan, and Iran also are discussed. (10)
U.S.-India agreements in June and July 2005 represent a new set of landmarks in rapidlywarming ties between the world's two most populous democracies. (17)
The Administration's policy of assisting India's rise as a major power has significantimplications for U.S. interests in Asia and beyond. The course of U.S. relations with China andPakistan, especially -- and the relationship between Beijing and Islamabad, itself -- is likely to beaffected by an increase in U.S.-India strategic ties. Of most immediate interest to the U.S. Congressmay be the Bush Administration's intention to achieve "full civilian nuclear energy cooperation withIndia," and its promise to bring before Congress related and required legislative proposals. (18) Many in Congress alsoexpress concerns about India's relations with Iran and the possibility that New Delhi's policies towardTehran's controversial nuclear program may not be congruent with those of Washington. Morebroadly, congressional oversight of U.S. foreign relations in Asia likely will include considerationof the potential implications of increased U.S. cooperation with India in functional areas such asarms sales and high-technology trade. With rapid increases in Indian and Chinese influence on theworld stage, many in Congress will seek to determine how and to what extent a U.S.-India "globalpartnership" will best serve U.S. interests. (38)
During a September 8, 2005 hearing on U.S.-India relations, the first held after the July 18Joint Statement, Members of the House International Relations Committee expressed widespreadapproval of increasingly warm U.S.-India relations. However, many also expressed concerns aboutthe potential damage to international nonproliferation regimes that could result from changes in U.S.law that would allow for civil nuclear cooperation with India. U.S. diplomats have called bilateralmilitary cooperation among the most important aspects of transformed U.S.-India relations. | India is enjoying rapidly growing diplomatic and economic clout on the world stage, and thecourse of its rise (along with that of China) is identified as one of the most important variables in 21stcentury international relations. In recognition of these developments, U.S. policy makers havesought to expand and deepen U.S. links with India. On July 18, 2005, President George W. Bushand Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a Joint Statement resolving to establish a "globalpartnership" between the United States and India through increased cooperation on numerouseconomic, security, and global issues, including "full civilian nuclear energy cooperation." Suchcooperation would require changes in both U.S. law and international guidelines; the BushAdministration may present to Congress related and required legislative proposals in 2006. On June28, 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement that calls forexpanding bilateral cooperation in a number of security-related areas. U.S.-India bilateralagreements in 2005 represent a new set of landmarks in rapidly warming ties between the world'stwo most populous democracies. A policy of assisting India's rise as a major power has significantimplications for U.S. interests in Asia and beyond. The status of U.S. relations with China andPakistan, especially, is likely to be affected by increased U.S.-India strategic cooperation. Manyobservers view U.S. moves as part of an effort to "counterbalance" the rise of China as a majorpower.
Following major U.S.-India agreements, Congress held four relevant hearings during autumn2005. Two of these hearings focused specifically on the most controversial aspect of the July 2005Joint Statement: proposed civilian nuclear cooperation. Congressional approval of increasinglywarm U.S.-India relations appears to be widespread. However, some Members also have expressedconcerns about the potential damage to international nonproliferation regimes that could result fromchanges in U.S. export laws and international guidelines. Senior Members also have voicedconcerns about India's relations with Iran and the possibility that New Delhi's policies towardTehran's controversial nuclear program may not be congruent with those of Washington. Morebroadly, congressional oversight of U.S. foreign relations in Asia likely will include considerationof the potential implications of increased U.S. cooperation with India in functional areas such asarms sales and high-technology trade. With rapid increases in Indian and Chinese influence on theworld stage, many in Congress will seek to determine how and to what extent a U.S.-India "globalpartnership" will best serve U.S. interests.
This report reviews the major provisions of U.S.-India bilateral agreements, including thestatus of issues addressed in the recently completed Next Step in Strategic Partnership initiative,security relations, and economic relations. The report reviews arguments made in favor of and inopposition to increased bilateral cooperation in each major issue-area and includes Indianperspectives. Regional issues involving China, Pakistan, and Iran also are discussed. The report willbe updated as warranted by events. See also CRS Issue Brief IB93097, India-U.S. Relations , and CRS Report RL33016 , U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India . |
crs_R45086 | crs_R45086_0 | This CRS report provides context for the CSSR's statement by tracing the evolution of scientific understanding and confidence regarding the drivers of recent global climate change. | This CRS report provides context for the Administration's Climate Science Special Report (October 2017) by tracing the evolution of scientific understanding and confidence regarding the drivers of recent global climate change. |
crs_R43070 | crs_R43070_0 | Introduction
The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to questions about the oversight and regulation of agricultural fertilizer. Some attempt to ensure occupational safety, others environmental protection, and still others security. As a consequence, various federal, state, and local agencies collect mission-relevant information about chemical holdings, with some entities gaining a narrower, or broader, understanding of a facility's chemical inventories. The West Fertilizer Company possessed a variety of agricultural chemicals at its retail facility, but policy interest has focused on two chemicals: ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia. For example, the facility had not contacted the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which should have received information about ammonium nitrate or anhydrous ammonia stored at the facility. In addition to federal regulation requiring reporting and planning for ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia, most state and some local governments have laws and regulations regarding the handling of either or both of these chemicals. The vast majority of ammonium nitrate use occurs without incident. Most experts consider ammonium nitrate itself as a stable chemical with few handling restrictions, but, in combination with a fuel source, it can pose an explosion hazard. Ammonium nitrate requires certain conditions, such as added heat or shock, confinement, or contamination to explode. Ammonium nitrate is also used as a fertilizer. These accidents have rarely occurred, but have had high impacts. For example, the ammonium nitrate explosion in 1947 in Texas City, TX, where two ships carrying ammonium nitrate coated in wax and stored in paper bags caught fire and exploded, destroyed the entire dock area, including numerous oil tanks, dwellings, and business buildings. Anhydrous Ammonia
Ammonia has a variety of uses, for example, as an agricultural fertilizer and an industrial refrigerant. Many agricultural retailers and facilities with ammonia refrigeration systems store and use anhydrous ammonia. Thus, it is regulated to prevent release of the chemical into the atmosphere where it might travel as a cloud and impact workers and the surrounding environment. Policy Issues
As congressional policymakers consider the ramifications of the explosion in West, TX, they may face several policy issues. These policy issues include the challenges arising from relying on reporting of chemical inventories by regulated facilities; the potential for omission and duplication in existing regulatory reporting; the long intervals between inspection at many such facilities; the ability of federal, state, and local government agencies to share information effectively among themselves; and public and first-responder access to regulatory information. | The explosion on April 17, 2013, at the West Fertilizer Company fertilizer distribution facility in West, TX, has led to questions about the oversight and regulation of agricultural fertilizer. Facilities holding chemicals must comply with regulations attempting to ensure occupational safety, environmental protection, and homeland security. In addition to federal regulation requiring reporting and planning for ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia, most state and some local governments have laws and regulations regarding the handling of either or both of these chemicals.
The West Fertilizer Company possessed a variety of agricultural chemicals at its retail facility, but policy interest has focused on two chemicals: ammonium nitrate and anhydrous ammonia. Ammonium nitrate is a solid that can be used as a fertilizer, a use that generally occurs without incident. In combination with a fuel source and certain conditions, such as added heat or shock, confinement, or contamination, ammonium nitrate can pose an explosion hazard. Such accidents have rarely occurred, but have historically had high impacts. For example, the ammonium nitrate explosion in 1947 in Texas City, TX, where two ships carrying ammonium nitrate coated in wax and stored in paper bags caught fire and exploded, destroyed the entire dock area, including numerous oil tanks, dwellings, and business buildings. The bomb used in 1995 to attack the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK, contained ammonium nitrate as a component of its explosives.
Anhydrous ammonia has a variety of uses, including as an agricultural fertilizer. Many agricultural retailers store and use anhydrous ammonia. In contrast with ammonium nitrate, anhydrous ammonia is a gas more generally viewed as a threat from its inhalation toxicity. It is regulated to prevent release of the chemical into the atmosphere where it might travel as a cloud and impact workers and the surrounding environment.
Various federal, state, and local agencies collect mission-relevant information about chemical holdings. The West facility reportedly had not complied with all relevant and applicable regulatory requirements. For example, the facility reportedly had not contacted the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which should have received information about any ammonium nitrate or anhydrous ammonia stored at the facility. The extent to which agencies shared relevant information about chemical holdings in order to enable effective regulatory oversight is still unresolved.
As congressional policymakers consider the ramifications of the explosion in West, TX, they may face several policy issues. These policy issues include the:
challenges arising from relying on reporting of chemical inventories by regulated facilities; potential for omission and duplication in existing regulatory reporting; long intervals between inspections at many such facilities; ability of federal, state, and local government agencies to share information effectively among themselves; and public and first-responder access to regulatory information. |
crs_R44817 | crs_R44817_0 | Introduction
In a June 23, 2016, national referendum, a majority of British voters supported the United Kingdom (UK) exiting the European Union (EU), a process known as "Brexit." Since then, various Members of Congress have voiced support for launching U.S.-UK free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations, while other Members have moderated their support with calls to ensure that such negotiations do not undercut the promotion of broader U.S.-EU trade relations. During a meeting on January 27, 2017, President Trump and UK Prime Minister Theresa May discussed how the two sides could launch high-level talks and "lay the groundwork" for a future U.S.-UK FTA. In July, the two sides launched a U.S.-UK Trade and Investment Working Group to explore a possible post-Brexit FTA. U.S.-UK FTA negotiations would represent a change in U.S. transatlantic trade policy, which, under the Obama Administration, focused on negotiating a U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) FTA. Formal U.S.-UK FTA negotiations cannot start immediately. On March 29, 2017, Prime Minister May sent a letter to the European Council notifying the body of the UK's intention to leave the EU. So long as the UK is a member of the EU and in the absence of any preferential trade agreement between the United States and the EU, World Trade Organization (WTO) parameters continue to govern U.S.-UK trade—as they do for U.S. trade with all other EU member states. Meanwhile, the United States and the UK could pursue informal discussions on a potential bilateral FTA. Congress has important legislative, oversight, and advisory responsibilities regarding a potential U.S.-UK FTA. 114-26 ). Congress also would face a decision on future implementing legislation for a U.S.-UK FTA to enter into force. An FTA could receive expedited legislative consideration if Congress determines that it advances trade negotiating objectives in TPA and meets TPA's other requirements, including for the President to notify and consult with Congress on the status and content of the negotiations. Until the UK completes what could be prolonged negotiations for its withdrawal from the EU and formally exits, the UK remains a member of the EU, and the EU continues to have exclusive competence over the UK's trade policy as it does for other EU member states—meaning that the EU negotiates a common trade policy with non-EU countries on behalf of (and with input from) its member states. In the meantime, the United States and the UK could pursue preliminary "informal" discussions. Future UK-EU trade relations, in turn, depend on the outcomes of two negotiations: (1) the terms of the UK's negotiated withdrawal from the EU under the two-year Article 50 process of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); and (2) UK-EU negotiations on their future trade relationship. Specific Issues in Potential U.S.-UK FTA
Congress established U.S. trade negotiating objectives in the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation ( P.L. Potential areas of interest in a bilateral FTA include the following. Investment . Digital trade. Intellectual property rights (IPR) . | Prospects for a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) are of increasing interest for both sides. In a national referendum held on June 23, 2016, a majority of British voters supported the UK exiting the European Union (EU), a process known as "Brexit." The Brexit referendum has prompted calls from some Members of Congress and the Trump Administration to launch U.S.-UK FTA negotiations, though other Members have moderated their support with calls to ensure that such negotiations do not constrain the promotion of broader transatlantic trade relations. On January 27, 2017, President Trump and UK Prime Minister Theresa May discussed how the two sides could launch high-level talks and "lay the groundwork" for a future U.S.-UK FTA. In July, the two sides launched a U.S.-UK Trade and Investment Working Group to explore a possible post-Brexit FTA. Negotiations on a bilateral FTA between the United States and UK would represent a change in U.S. transatlantic trade policy, which under the Obama Administration had focused on negotiating a U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) FTA.
Formal U.S.-UK FTA negotiations cannot start immediately. On March 29, 2017, Prime Minister May sent a letter to the European Council notifying it of the UK's intention to leave the EU. This triggered the two-year Article 50 exit process under the Treaty of the European Union. Until the UK formally exits, it remains a member of the EU, which retains exclusive competence over trade negotiations. During this time, and in the absence of any preferential trade agreement between the United States and the EU, World Trade Organization (WTO) parameters continue to govern U.S.-UK trade—as they do for U.S. trade with all other EU member states. In the meantime, the United States and the UK could pursue preliminary "informal" discussions on a potential bilateral FTA.
The prospects for a future U.S.-UK FTA depend on a number of variables, including the terms of the UK's negotiated withdrawal from, and future trade relationship with, the EU, as well as the UK's redefined terms of trade within the WTO. A U.S.-UK FTA could include reciprocal provisions to expand access to goods, services, agriculture, and government procurement markets; enhance and develop new bilateral trade-related rules and disciplines in areas such as intellectual property rights (IPR), investment, and digital trade; and cooperate on regulatory issues such as transparency and sector-specific concerns.
Congress has important legislative, oversight, and advisory responsibilities with respect to any potential U.S.-UK FTA. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Congress also establishes overall U.S. trade negotiating objectives, which it updated in the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation (P.L. 114-26). In addition, Congress would face a decision on future implementing legislation for a final U.S.-UK FTA to enter into force. Under TPA, an FTA could be eligible to receive expedited legislative consideration if Congress determines that the FTA advances trade negotiating objectives and satisfies TPA's various other requirements, including notification to and consultations with Congress on the status of the negotiations. |
crs_RL33207 | crs_RL33207_0 | Introduction
This report discusses opinions of the Supreme Court and some lower courts that haveelucidated the meaning of the Origination Clause of the Constitution and delineated the Senate'spower to amend bills to raise revenue. It does not address parliamentary precedents of the Houseand Senate, which generally have interpreted the Clause more restrictively than the courts. (1)
Text and Purpose of the Origination Clause
Section 7, clause 1 of Article I of the United States Constitution, known as the OriginationClause, provides that:
All bills for raising revenue shall originate inthe House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on otherbills. The Supreme Court and lower courts have interpreted "bills for raising revenue" to applyonly to those that raise revenue to support the government generally and not to those thatincidentally may raise revenue to fund specific programs. These courtsalso have concluded that the Origination Clause denies the Senate power to amend a House billthat does not raise revenue with Senate text that raises revenue. Some lower courts have expressly interpreted the phrase "bills for raising revenue" --which must originate in the House and which the Senate may amend -- to encompass not onlyHouse bills that increase revenue, but also those that relate to or collect revenue. | The Origination Clause of the Constitution, Article I, Section 7, clause 1, states that, "Allbills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may proposeor concur with amendments as on other bills." This report discusses opinions of the Supreme Courtand some lower federal courts that have interpreted the text of the Clause and delineated the scopeof the Senate's power to amend revenue legislation. It does not address parliamentary precedents ofthe House and Senate, which generally have interpreted the Clause more restrictively than the courts.
These cases have limited the phrase "bills for raising revenue" to those that levy taxes forthe support of the government generally and not to those that raise revenue for specific programs. They have held that the Senate may attach amendments to raise revenue only to House bills that raiseit under this limited interpretation and not to House bills that do not raise revenue. Lower courtshave concluded that the Senate may amend a House bill to reduce revenue with Senate text thatincreases revenue.
This report will be updated. |
crs_R43297 | crs_R43297_0 | Introduction
Most consumer products under the jurisdiction of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) are imported into the United States. More recently, the CPSC reported that the agency, along with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland Security, had stopped millions of units of imported consumer products that violated U.S. safety rules from reaching consumers in FY2012. Among other things, the act contained new requirements for testing and certification of consumer products, as well as provisions addressing the CPSC's role with regard to the import and export of consumer products. The CPSC may also prohibit the export for sale of certain consumer products from the United States to foreign countries. The United States has undertaken international obligations with respect to the promulgation of technical regulations by central government bodies like the CPSC. These obligations are contained in World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements such as the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, as well as U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs). Import Safety
The CPSC plays a major role in evaluating the safety of consumer products offered for import into U.S. customs territory. In cooperation with CBP, the CPSC attempts to identify shipments intended for import that are likely to contain consumer products that violate import provisions enforced by the agency. The CPSC also determines whether to admit certain consumer products offered for import into U.S. customs territory. Under the amended CPSA and its implementing regulations, importers of finished products manufactured outside of the United States must certify that the products comply with all rules, bans, standards, or regulations applicable to the products under any act enforced by the CPSC. Prohibited Acts
The CPSA, as amended, makes it unlawful for any person to import into the United States any consumer product or substance under the CPSC's jurisdiction: (1) that fails to conform with an applicable consumer product safety rule promulgated by the CPSC under any act enforced by the agency; (2) to which a manufacturer has taken voluntary corrective action in consultation with the CPSC, provided that the CPSC notified the public of the action or the importer knew or should have known about it; (3) that is subject to a CPSC order for a recall or corrective action or a court order declaring an imminent hazard; or (4) that is a banned hazardous substance. The CPSIA amended the CPSA to specify that the CPSC may prohibit a person from exporting from the United States for the purpose of sale any consumer product that violates a safety rule promulgated under CPSA unless the importing country has told the CPSC that it accepts the importation of the consumer product. U.S. Free Trade Agreements
U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) contain additional obligations for the United States with respect to standards-related measures, including technical regulations. These obligations include requirements regarding nondiscrimination, transparency, and the use of international standards as a basis for regulations. International trade obligations of the United States pertaining to standards-related measures have been implemented in domestic laws applicable to the CPSC, particularly in the Trade Agreements Act (TAA) of 1979. Legislation in the 113th Congress: H.R. 1910 , the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2013, was introduced in the House on May 9, 2013. 1910 would require the Chairman of the CPSC to mandate that certain foreign manufacturers and producers of consumer products distributed in commerce establish a registered agent in the United States. This agent would have to be authorized to accept service of process on behalf of such manufacturer or producer for the purpose of any state or federal regulatory proceeding or civil action related to the product. In 2008, following widely publicized recalls of children's toys, Congress passed the CPSIA. Among other things, H.R. | Most consumer products within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) are imported into the United States. The CPSC is the central, federal authority for the promotion and enforcement of consumer product safety. In 2008, following several well-publicized national recalls of toys and children's products, many of which contained lead, Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA), which included provisions addressing the CPSC's role in ensuring the safety of imported and exported consumer products.
With regard to import safety, the CPSC acts in coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland Security, to evaluate the safety of consumer products offered for import into U.S. customs territory. Working together with CBP, the CPSC attempts to identify shipments that are likely to contain consumer products which violate import provisions that the agency enforces. The CPSC also determines whether to admit certain consumer products offered for import into U.S. customs territory. Importers of products manufactured outside of the United States must certify that finished products comply with all rules, bans, standards, or regulations applicable to the product under any act enforced by the CPSC.
The export of consumer products from the United States to foreign countries may also be subject to regulation by the CPSC. In the CPSIA, Congress provided that, among other things, the CPSC may prohibit the export from the United States for the purpose of sale any consumer product that violates a safety rule under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) unless the importing country informs the CPSC that it accepts the importation of the consumer product.
In addition to domestic laws pertaining to the CPSC's regulation of the import and export of consumer products, the United States has also agreed to undertake certain international obligations with respect to the promulgation of standards-related measures (e.g., product safety regulations) by its central government bodies, including the CPSC. These obligations are found in several international agreements to which the United States is party, including the multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), as well as bilateral and regional U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs). Among other things, the TBT Agreement establishes rules pertaining to the promulgation of technical regulations by central government bodies like the CPSC, including rules concerning nondiscrimination, transparency, and reliance on international standards as a basis for regulations. U.S. FTAs also contain additional obligations for certain parties with regard to transparency. Standards-related trade obligations have been implemented in U.S. law, particularly in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
In the 113th Congress, H.R. 1910, the Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act of 2013, would require the Chairman of the CPSC to mandate that certain foreign manufacturers and producers of consumer products distributed in commerce establish a registered agent in the United States to accept service of process on behalf of such manufacturer or producer for the purpose of any state or federal regulatory proceeding or civil action related to the product. |
crs_R40573 | crs_R40573_0 | Recent Congresses have considered legislation to establish a national water commission modeled after the 1968-1973 National Water Commission (NWC). Questions about whether a commission would be effective at addressing the nation's water resources challenges and what topics it would be charged with have raised interest in assessing the status of recommendations in the NWC's 1973 final report, Water Policies for the Future . After a brief introduction to U.S. water policy and the NWC, this report presents a general summary of the NWC report, its recommendations, and how these issues have evolved since 1973. Water Policy Challenges in a Federalist System
Nearly two centuries of water resource project development, environmental and resource management activities, and population shifts have resulted in a complex web of federal and state laws and regulations, local ordinances, tribal treaties, contractual obligations, and economies based on existing water use patterns and infrastructure. Congress has not enacted any comprehensive—or overarching—change in federal water resources management or national water policy since enactment of the 1965 Water Resources Planning Act (P.L. Any attempt to untangle the complexities of current water policy involves many constituencies with differing interests, and becomes politically difficult to sustain. Concern about water supply and its development, however, has bolstered recent interest in legislation to establish a national water commission to assess future water demands, study current management programs, and develop recommendations for a comprehensive strategy. Response to the National Water Commission
While progress has been made on addressing many of the problems identified by the Commission, particularly through successive enactment of many Water Resource Development Acts, Reclamation laws, and amendments to water quality legislation, few actions can be directly traced to the Commission's 1973 recommendations. Expectations for a commission to directly achieve changes in a complex system resistant to transformation may be unreasonable; instead, the influence of a commission may lie in how its recommendations combine with other drivers to create support for an evolution in policy. In analyzing the above themes, the text of the report, historical analysis of the Commission's work, and congressional statements and hearings following the release of the 1973 report, CRS has identified several broad issues areas: a need for reevaluation of federal project planning and evaluation, as well as relationships among federal, state, local and tribal entities with respect to water management and water rights; concern about the effects of water resources management on the natural environment; a movement toward recovering from direct beneficiaries the costs of federal investments in water projects; and concern over degraded water quality. In many cases, a discussion of how issues identified may have evolved is also included. Full-cost budgets and appropriations for water resources projects generally have not been used. Other chapters repeated this overarching theme of users pay—or beneficiary pays. Project planning has moved away from the recommended multi-objective or river basin planning approach recommended by the Commission. Shifts in organizations and institutional arrangements since 1973 have reduced coordination of federal water agencies and planning. State-federal tensions over proper and respective roles and responsibilities in water resource development, management, and allocation, continue to cloud resolution to the most difficult water resource issues. | Concern about the availability and use of water to support the nation's people, economy, and environment has bolstered interest in establishing a national water commission. The commission structure proposed in recent legislation (e.g., H.R. 135) is similar to that of the 1968-1973 National Water Commission (NWC or Commission). As proposed in H.R. 135, the commission would assess future water demands, study current management programs, and develop recommendations for a comprehensive water strategy. Questions about a commission as an effective model and which topics a commission might consider have raised interest in assessing what the NWC recommended in its 1973 report, Water Policies for the Future, and how the issues that it identified have evolved.
The NWC recommended addressing the interconnection between water development and the natural environment, implementing a "users pay" or "beneficiary pays" approach, accomplishing water quality improvements, and adapting governance and organizations to meet water challenges. Since 1973, progress has been made in some of these areas; however, few actions can be traced directly to the NWC's recommendations. Nonetheless, the influence of the NWC on the evolution of water policy cannot be dismissed. Many of the problems that the Commission identified remain today, and some actions since 1973 have moved water policy toward alignment with NWC recommendations; others have moved it in the opposite direction of NWC recommendations. Shifts in institutional arrangements in general have reduced coordination of federal water agency activities and in many ways have moved away from NWC-recommended multi-objective or river basin planning. State-federal tensions over proper and respective roles continue to cloud resolution of difficult water resource issues and complicate coordination efforts.
While many support better coordination of federal water activities and a clearer national "vision" for water management, Congress has not enacted overarching water policy legislation since the 1965 Water Resources Planning Act. Instead, water policy has largely evolved through executive and judicial actions, in many cases in response to piecemeal legislation. Congress continually modifies federal water projects through amendments to existing projects and programs through Water Resources Development Acts (WRDAs), Reclamation acts, water quality legislation, and appropriations decisions. Incremental and ad hoc evolution of water policy, however, is not surprising. Water management is complicated by past decisions and investments affecting a wide range of stakeholders pursuing different goals. Specifically, federal and state laws and regulations, local ordinances, tribal treaties, contractual obligations, and economies dependent on existing water use patterns and infrastructure all affect water management. Attempts to untangle such complexities involve many constituencies with differing interests, and success is difficult to achieve. Expectations for a commission to achieve change in a complex system resistant to transformation may be unreasonable; instead, the influence of a commission may lie in how its recommendations combine with other drivers to support policy evolution.
This CRS report presents the NWC's recommendations and analyzes how issues targeted by the recommendations have evolved during the intervening years. The report focuses on key federal-level recommendations, thereby targeting what has been accomplished since 1973, what issues remain unresolved, and what additional concerns have developed. |
crs_R42865 | crs_R42865_0 | However, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. The federal government's share of a state's expenditures for most Medicaid services is called the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP). The Medicaid statute requires that states make disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments to hospitals treating large numbers of low-income patients. This provision is intended to recognize the disadvantaged financial situation of such hospitals because low-income patients are more likely to be uninsured or Medicaid enrollees. While most federal Medicaid funding is provided on an open-ended basis, federal Medicaid DSH funding is capped. This report provides an overview of Medicaid DSH, including how state DSH allotments are calculated and the exceptions to the DSH allotments calculation; how DSH hospitals are defined and how DSH payments to hospitals are calculated; trends in DSH spending; variation in states' DSH expenditures; and requirements outlining the basic requirements for state DSH reports and independently certified audits. Hospitals often do not receive payment for services rendered to uninsured patients, and Medicaid provider payment rates are generally lower than the rates paid by Medicare and private insurance. Each state receives an annual DSH allotment, which is the maximum amount of federal matching funds a state is permitted to claim for Medicaid DSH payments. Currently, states' Medicaid DSH allotments are based on each state's prior year DSH allotment. Built on the premise that with the ACA insurance coverage provisions (including the ACA Medicaid expansion) reducing the number of uninsured individuals, there should be less need for Medicaid DSH payments, the ACA included a provision directing the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to make aggregate reductions in Medicaid DSH allotments equal to $500 million in FY2014, $600 million in FY2015, $600 million in FY2016, $1.8 billion in FY2017, $5.0 billion in FY2018, $5.6 billion in FY2019, and $4.0 billion in FY2020. There are federal requirements that states must follow in making these determinations, but for the most part, states are provided significant flexibility in defining DSH hospitals and calculating DSH payments. Institutions for Mental Disease DSH Limits
Federal statute limits the amount of DSH payments for institutions for mental disease (IMDs) and other mental health facilities. As shown in Figure 1 , total Medicaid DSH expenditures (i.e., including both federal and state expenditures) have remained relatively stable since the implementation of the federal DSH allotments in FY1993. The federal statute limits state DSH allotments (i.e., the maximum amount of Medicaid DSH federal funds) to no more than 12% of each state's total Medicaid medical assistance expenditures (i.e., including federal and state expenditures but excluding administrative expenditures), which means the federal share of DSH expenditures cannot be more than 12% of each state's total Medicaid medical assistance expenditures. | The Medicaid statute requires states to make disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments to hospitals treating large numbers of low-income patients. This provision is intended to recognize the disadvantaged financial situation of those hospitals because low-income patients are more likely to be uninsured or Medicaid enrollees. Hospitals often do not receive payment for services rendered to uninsured patients, and Medicaid provider payment rates are generally lower than the rates paid by Medicare and private insurance.
As with most Medicaid expenditures, the federal government reimburses states for a portion of their Medicaid DSH expenditures based on each state's federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP). While most federal Medicaid funding is provided on an open-ended basis, federal Medicaid DSH funding is capped. Each state receives an annual DSH allotment, which is the maximum amount of federal matching funds that each state is permitted to claim for Medicaid DSH payments. In FY2015, federal DSH allotments totaled $11.9 billion.
Built on the premise that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) insurance coverage provisions (including the ACA Medicaid expansion) would reduce the number of uninsured individuals, the ACA included a provision directing the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to make aggregate reductions in federal Medicaid DSH allotments for each year from FY2014 to FY2020. Since the ACA, five laws have amended the DSH reductions. Under current law, the Medicaid DSH reductions are to be in effect for FY2018 through FY2025.
Although states must follow some federal requirements in defining DSH hospitals and calculating DSH payments, for the most part, states are provided significant flexibility. One way the federal government restricts states' Medicaid DSH payments is that the federal statute limits the amount of DSH payments for institutions for mental disease and other mental health facilities.
Since Medicaid DSH allotments were implemented in FY1993, total Medicaid DSH expenditures (i.e., including federal and state expenditures) have remained relatively stable. Over this same period of time, total Medicaid DSH expenditures as a percentage of total Medicaid medical assistance expenditures (i.e., including both federal and state expenditures but excluding expenditures for administrative activities) dropped from 13% to 4%.
This report provides an overview of Medicaid DSH. It includes a description of the rules delineating how state DSH allotments are calculated and the exceptions to the rules, how DSH hospitals are defined, and how DSH payments are calculated. The DSH expenditures section shows the trends in DSH spending and explains variation in states' DSH expenditures. Finally, the basic requirements for state DSH reports and independently certified audits are also outlined. |
crs_RS20506 | crs_RS20506_0 | Background: Program Framework And Activities1
The International Military Education and Training program (IMET) was formally established in 1976 as part of a restructuring of the United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The United States in recent years has annually trained, on average, over 10,000 students from approximately 130 countries through IMET. Formal instruction involves over 2,000 courses, nearly all of which are taught in the United States at approximately 150 military schools and installations. These programs focus on service/national security policy and the politico-military aspects of Service/Defense policies and programs. The Value of IMET: Perspectives of Supporters and Critics
As worldwide U.S. military assistance funding levels have declined in the post-Cold War era, the IMET program is viewed by its supporters as a valuable tool in support of American foreign policy. Human Rights and IMET
In recent years, American concerns with human rights practices of certain nations that were recipients of United States foreign aid has led to restrictions or conditions being placed on their participation in the IMET program. | This report provides background on the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET). It discusses the program's main features and purposes, perspectives of the IMET's supporters and critics, and recent issues surrounding the program and its implementation. The United States in recent years has trained annually, on average, over 10,000 students from approximately 130 countries. Formal instruction under IMET involves over 2,000 courses, nearly all of which are taught in the United States at approximately 150 military schools and installations. As the size of the United States foreign assistance program has declined, the IMET program has attracted greater attention as an instrument for serving broad U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. At the same time the program, and placement of restrictions on its participants, has also been an instrument for expressing concerns about the human rights practices of certain nations that have been IMET program participants. This report will be revised should major changes occur in the IMET program. |
crs_RL32973 | crs_RL32973_0 | Legislation has been introduced in the past several Congresses that would allow churches to engage in at least some campaign activity without risking their § 501(c)(3) status. This report provides an overview of tax and campaign finance laws and discusses these bills. For further analysis of the legal restrictions on electioneering activities by churches, see CRS Report RL34447, Churches and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Current Law
Tax Law
Churches qualify for tax-exempt status as IRC § 501(c)(3) organizations. Campaign Finance Law
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which regulates the raising and spending of campaign funds, is separate and distinct from the tax code. No such legislation has yet been introduced in the 111 th Congress. 2275 (110th Congress)
H.R. 2275 would have repealed the political campaign prohibition in IRC § 501(c)(3). 235 (109th Congress)
Under H.R. 235 , the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, churches would not have been treated as participating in campaign activity "because of the content, preparation, or presentation of any homily, sermon, teaching, dialectic, or other presentation made during religious services or gatherings." 235 (108th Congress)
H.R. 4520 (108th Congress)
The provision in H.R. H.R. 2357 and S. 2886 (107th Congress)
H.R. 2357 and S. 2886 , the Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection Act, would have allowed § 501(c)(3) churches to engage in campaign activity so long as it was "no substantial part" of a church's activities. 2931 (107th Congress)
Under, H.R. | In recent years, there has been increased attention paid to the political activities of churches. Churches and other houses of worship qualify for tax-exempt status as Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) organizations. Under the tax laws, these organizations may not participate in political campaign activity. Separate from the prohibition in the tax code, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) may also restrict the ability of churches to engage in electioneering activities.
Legislation had been introduced in the past several Congresses that would have allowed churches to participate in at least some campaign activity without jeopardizing their § 501(c)(3) status. These bills were the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, H.R. 235 (109th Congress) and H.R. 235 (108th Congress); a provision briefly included in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, H.R. 4520 (108th Congress); the Houses of Worship Political Speech Protection Act, H.R. 2357 and S. 2886 (107th Congress); and the Bright-Line Act of 2001, H.R. 2931 (107th Congress). In the 110th Congress, H.R. 2275 would have repealed the prohibition against campaign intervention in IRC § 501(c)(3). Unlike the other bills, H.R. 2275 would have applied to all § 501(c)(3) organizations and not just churches. No similar legislation has yet been introduced in the 111th Congress.
This report provides an overview of the tax and campaign finance laws relevant to these bills and a discussion of how each bill would have amended current law. For further discussion of the laws restricting campaign activity by churches, see CRS Report RL34447, Churches and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Tax and Campaign Finance Laws, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43369 | crs_R43369_0 | During Senate debates over judicial nominations, differing perspectives have been expressed about the relative degree of success of a President's nominees in gaining Senate confirmation, compared with the nominees of other recent Presidents. In light of continued Senate interest in the judicial selection and confirmation process, this report seeks to inform the ongoing debate in four ways: (1) by using various statistical measures to compare the progress of President Obama's judicial nominees, during his first five years, in advancing through the Senate confirmation process with that of the judicial nominees during the first five years of the three most recent preceding Presidents who served two terms (Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Bill Clinton); (2) by providing statistics related to the length of time it has taken President Obama and his three predecessors to nominate individuals to vacant circuit and district court judgeships; and (3) by providing statistics related to judicial vacancies existing at the beginning of each President's fifth and sixth years in office. Bush, and Obama presidencies. Circuit Court Nominees
Table 1 presents, during the first five years of a presidency for Presidents Reagan through Obama, the total number of circuit court nominees, the total number (and percentage) of circuit nominees confirmed by the end of a President's fifth year in office, the number (and percentage) confirmed after his fifth year, and the number (and percentage) of circuit nominees never confirmed. President Clinton had the lowest percentage of circuit court nominees confirmed by the end of his fifth year in office (69.8%), followed by Presidents Obama (71.9%) and G.W. Bush (93.8%). The number of circuit court nominees confirmed during a fifth year ranged from a high of 22 during the Reagan presidency to a low of 7 during both the Clinton and G.W. Although President Obama had the second greatest number of district court nominees confirmed by the Senate during his fifth year in office, he trailed (as shown in Table 2 ) the other three Presidents in both the overall number and percentage of district court nominees confirmed during the first five years. Length of Time from Nomination to Confirmation
Figure 2 tracks by President the average and median number of days from nomination to confirmation for all circuit and district court nominees confirmed during a President's first five years in office. In terms of the median number of days from nomination to confirmation, President G.W. The median waiting times from nomination to confirmation for district court nominees ranged from a high of 214.0 days during President Obama's first five years to a low of 31.0 days during President Reagan's first five years. President Obama is the only President of the four for whom, during his first five years in office, a majority of U.S. circuit and district court nominees waited more than six months (approximately 180 days) to be confirmed after being nominated. U.S. Circuit Court Nominees
For confirmed circuit court nominees during the four presidencies, the fewest days, on average, that elapsed from first committee report to confirmation occurred during the first five years of the Reagan presidency (15.8 days). The mean number of days from committee report to confirmation for nominees who were confirmed during a President's first five years increased to 52.7 days during the first five years of the Clinton presidency and then to 109.4 days during the G.W. Bush presidency. U.S. District Court Nominees
As with President Reagan's confirmed circuit court nominees, district court nominees during his first five years waited, on average, a shorter amount of time from committee report to confirmation (12.2 days) than did the district nominees confirmed during the first five years of the three other Presidents. The median number of days for district nominees confirmed during the first five years of the Clinton and G.W. Bush presidencies were 6.0 and 18.0 days, respectively. Table 5 compares for the four Presidents: (i) the percentage of vacant U.S. circuit and district court judgeships on January 1 of a President's fifth year in office; (ii) the percentage of vacant U.S. circuit and district court judgeships vacant on January 1 of a President's sixth year in office; and (iii) the change in the percentage of vacant U.S. circuit and district court judgeships from January 1 of a President fifth's year to January 1 of his sixth year in office. Of the three Presidents, President Obama is the only one for whom the percentage of vacant circuit court judgeships deemed judicial emergencies increased from January 1 of his fifth year to January 1 of his sixth year (increasing from 37.5% to 58.8%). | The selection and confirmation process for U.S. circuit and district court judges is of continuing interest to Congress. Recent Senate debates over judicial nominations have focused on issues such as the relative degree of success of President Barack Obama's nominees in gaining Senate confirmation compared with other recent Presidents, as well as the relative prevalence of vacant judgeships compared to years past, and the effect of delayed judicial appointments on judicial vacancy levels. This report addresses these issues, and others, by providing a statistical analysis of nominations to U.S. circuit and district court judgeships during the first five years of President Obama's time in office and that of his three most recent two-term predecessors. Some of the report's findings include the following:
During his first five years in office, President Obama nominated 57 persons to U.S. circuit court judgeships. Of the 57, 41 (71.9%) were also confirmed during this same five-year period. The 41 confirmed Obama circuit court nominees represented the second-lowest number of nominees confirmed during recent Presidents' first five years. President Clinton had the lowest number at 37. The percentage of circuit court nominees confirmed during President Obama's first five years, 71.9%, was also the second-lowest, while the percentage confirmed during President Clinton's, 69.8%, was the lowest. Of the four Presidents, President Reagan had both the greatest number (55) and percentage (94.8%) of circuit court nominees confirmed within the first five years of his presidency. Of the 226 persons nominated by President Obama to U.S. district court judgeships during his first five years, 173 (76.5%) were confirmed. Of the four Presidents, this was the lowest number and percentage of district court nominees confirmed. Of the comparison group, President Clinton had the greatest number of district court nominees confirmed during his first five years (198) while President Reagan had the greatest percentage of district court nominees confirmed (95.5%)—followed closely by the percentage of district court nominees confirmed during the first five years of the G.W. Bush presidency (93.8%). The average number of days elapsed from nomination to confirmation for circuit court nominees confirmed during a President's first five years ranged from 56.8 days during the Reagan presidency to 402.0 days during the G.W. Bush presidency. The median number of days from nomination to confirmation for circuit court nominees confirmed during a President's first five years ranged from 37.0 days (Reagan) to 245.0 (G.W. Bush). The average and median number of days from nomination to confirmation for President Obama's circuit nominees were 253.7 and 228.0 days, respectively. The average number of days elapsed from nomination to confirmation for district court nominees confirmed during a President's first five years ranged from 50.0 days during the Reagan presidency to 223.3 days during the Obama presidency. The median number of days from nomination to confirmation for district court nominees confirmed during a President's first five years ranged from 31.0 days (Reagan) to 214.0 (Obama). President Obama is the only President of the four for whom, during his first five years in office, a majority of U.S. circuit and district court nominees waited more than 180 days to be confirmed after being nominated. President Obama is the only President of the four for whom there was an increase in the percentage of both U.S. circuit and district court judgeships that were vacant from January 1 of his fifth year in office to January 1 of his sixth year. The percentage of circuit court vacancies deemed "judicial emergencies" increased from January 1 of the fifth year to January 1 of the sixth year of the Obama presidency and decreased over the same period during the Clinton and G.W. Bush presidencies. The percentage of district court vacancies deemed judicial emergencies increased from January 1 of the fifth to the sixth years of the Clinton and Obama presidencies and decreased over the same period during the G.W. Bush presidency. |
crs_96-816 | crs_96-816_0 | General Information
This report provides a selection of materials for locating information on foreign countries and international organizations. This first section presents sources giving an overview of politics, economics, and recent history; the next section covers specialized topics. Included are titles of some of the most frequently consulted bibliographic sources that are available for use in many libraries. Finally, included is a list of foreign chanceries located in Washington, DC. Specialized Information
Listed below are selected sources on the following topics: human rights, immigration, international organizations, international trade and business, maps, military strengths, people, terrorism, travel, and working/studying abroad. This website provides "authoritative, in-depth information about the nations and other areas of the world." It also provides links to U.S. government agencies, foreign governments, news sources, and related sites. | This report provides a selection of authoritative materials for locating information on foreign countries and international organizations. In the general information section, it presents sources giving an overview of politics, economics, and recent history. A specialized information section cites sources on human rights, immigration, international organizations, military strengths, terrorism, and other topics. Included are titles of some of the most frequently consulted bibliographic sources that are available for use in many libraries. Electronic information on foreign countries is also provided, via the Internet, by agencies of the federal government, official foreign government websites, international organizations, and related sources. Included is a current list of foreign chanceries located in Washington, DC, as of the date of this report. This report will be updated periodically through the year as new materials become available. |
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