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crs_RL33318 | crs_RL33318_0 | Background
In its 2005 opinion United States v. Booker , the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the once-binding federal sentencing guidelines (the Guidelines) set by the United States Sentencing Commission are now only advisory, in order to be compatible with the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. The Supreme Court resolved that issue in its 2007 opinion Kimbrough v. United States , by holding that a federal court may impose a sentence below that called for under the Guidelines' then-existing 100:1 ratio, based on its conclusion that the ratio is greater than necessary or may foster unwarranted disparity. The judge had discretion to sentence the defendant but, with little ground for departure, only within the narrow sentencing range that the Guidelines provided for each offense level. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. An appellate court held that the federal courts are not compelled to lower a sentence recommended by the Guidelines based on the sentencing differential for crack cocaine versus powder cocaine. In some cases, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 2007 Amendment of the Sentencing Guidelines
In May 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission submitted proposed amendments to the Guidelines (including those applicable in Kimbrough ) that essentially did away with the 100:1 ratio for purposes of the Guidelines (except at the point at which the statutory mandatory minimums are triggered). It also recommended that Congress raise the thresholds for the statutory mandatory minimums for trafficking in crack, thereby eliminating the statutory 100:1 ratio. The drug quantity table that is part of the drug sentencing guideline, U.S.S.G. Prior to the amendments effective on November 1, 2007, each of the steps reflected a 100:1 ratio between crack and powder cocaine; for instance, offenses involving either more than 150 kilograms of powder cocaine or more than 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine were each assigned a step (1) offense level of 38. As a consequence, the 100:1 ratio has disappeared from the Guidelines (although the statutory 100:1 ratio in the quantities of powder cocaine and crack cocaine that trigger the mandatory minimum penalties still remains). Case Law Applying the Retroactive Crack Cocaine Amendments
In general, a federal court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." However, a court may not reduce a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum. § 3553(a):
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed: (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; the sentencing range established by the Commission; any pertinent policy statement issued by the Commission regarding application of the guidelines; the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. The Sentencing Commission's policy statement governing reduction of terms of imprisonment based on amended Guidelines ranges is Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.10. ... Additionally, the remedial holding in Booker invalidated only 18 U.S.C. On June 17, 2010, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Dillon , in which it sided with the position of the United States. Legislation in the 111th Congress
Several bills have been introduced concerning cocaine sentencing; to date, the Congress has passed one into law: S. 1789 (Fair Sentencing Act of 2010). Introduced by Senator Richard Durbin, S. 1789 will, among other things, increase the threshold amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum penalties to 28 grams (from 5 grams for the current 5-year sentence) and 280 grams (from 50 grams for the current 10-year sentence). This change will reduce the statutory 100:1 ratio to 18:1. The bill also eliminates the 5-year mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine. President Obama signed the bill into law on August 3, 2010 ( P.L. 111-220 ). 18 (Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 2009), which would equalize the triggering quantity for the mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine offenses at the crack cocaine levels (5 grams of powder cocaine would result in a 5-year sentence and 50 grams a 10-year sentence). 2178 (Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 2009), which would amend the Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act to treat 50 grams of crack the same as 50 grams of other forms of cocaine; 5 grams of crack the same as 5 grams of other forms of cocaine, and eliminate the 5-year mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine. | Pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress established basic sentencing levels for crack cocaine offenses. Congress amended 21 U.S.C. § 841 to provide for a 100:1 ratio in the quantities of powder cocaine and crack cocaine that trigger a mandatory minimum penalty. As amended, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) required a mandatory minimum 10-year term of imprisonment and a maximum life term of imprisonment for trafficking offenses involving 5 kilograms of cocaine or 50 grams of cocaine base. In addition, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) established a mandatory 5-year term of imprisonment for offenses involving 500 grams of cocaine or 5 grams of cocaine base. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) called for a 5-year mandatory minimum punishment for simple possession of crack cocaine. Although the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 revises these penalties (as discussed below), there still remains a disparity in the threshold amount of powder cocaine and crack cocaine that triggers the mandatory minimums in 21 U.S.C. § 841.
Federal sentencing guidelines (the Guidelines) established by the U.S. Sentencing Commission reflect the statutory differential treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenders. Until 2005, the Guidelines were binding on federal courts: the judge had discretion to sentence a defendant, but only within the narrow sentencing range that the Guidelines provided. In its 2005 opinion United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court declared that the Guidelines must be considered advisory rather than mandatory, in order to comply with the Constitution. Instead of being bound by the Guidelines, sentencing courts must treat the federal guidelines as just one of a number of sentencing factors (which include the need to avoid undue sentencing disparity).
In the aftermath of Booker, some judges, who did not believe that crack cocaine is 100 times worse than powder cocaine, imposed lower sentences on crack cocaine offenders than the ones recommended by the Guidelines. In 2007, the Supreme Court in Kimbrough v. United States upheld this practice, ruling that a court may impose a below-the-Guidelines sentence based on its conclusion that the 100:1 ratio is greater than necessary or may foster unwarranted disparity.
Also in 2007, the Sentencing Commission revised the Guidelines by lowering the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses by two levels, thereby eliminating the 100:1 ratio for future sentencing guideline purposes (except at the point at which the statutory mandatory minimums are triggered). In addition, the Sentencing Commission decided to make these amendments retroactively applicable, thus allowing eligible crack cocaine offenders who were sentenced prior to November 1, 2007, to petition a federal judge to reduce their sentences. On June 17, 2010, the Supreme Court decided Dillon v. United States, in which it held that Booker does not apply in a sentence modification proceeding that is based on the retroactive crack cocaine amendment to the Guidelines; thus, district courts do not have the authority to further reduce a crack cocaine offender's sentence in such proceedings below the retroactive, amended Guidelines range.
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (S. 1789) changes the statutory 100:1 ratio in crack/powder cocaine quantities that trigger the mandatory minimum penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). President Obama signed the bill into law on August 3, 2010 (P.L. 111-220). S. 1789 reduces the statutory 100:1 ratio to 18:1, by increasing the threshold amount of crack cocaine to 28 grams (for the 5-year sentence) and 280 grams (for the 10-year sentence). S. 1789 also eliminates the 5-year mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine. Other bills introduced in the 111th Congress would completely eliminate the statutory disparity in cocaine sentencing, including H.R. 18, H.R. 265, H.R. 1459, H.R. 2178, and H.R. 3245. Another bill, H.R. 1466, would repeal all statutory mandatory minimums for drug offenses. |
crs_RL33489 | crs_RL33489_0 | Department of Justice
The Department of Justice (DOJ) was created in June 1870, with the Attorney General as its head. Since its establishment, DOJ has expanded to include 40 agencies. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP), the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office, and the Office of Violence Against Women (OVW), provide grant funds to state, local, and tribal governments for crime prevention and intervention programs as well as funding for criminal justice system improvement programs. This report focuses on select DOJ grant programs administered through OJP and COPS. Select DOJ Grant Programs
This section discusses the following DOJ grant programs: Weed and Seed, the Drug Court Discretionary Grant program, the Prisoner Re-entry Initiative, the President's DNA Initiative, the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant program, the Kirk Bloodsworth Post-conviction DNA Testing program, the Paul Coverdell Grant program, assistance to Indian tribes (Indian Country Prison grants, Tribal Courts Grant program, Indian Country Alcohol and Crime Demonstration program), and Tribal Law Enforcement Assistance. Select Issues
Program Effectiveness
For years, some have questioned the effectiveness of DOJ grant programs and have called for program evaluations. | The Department of Justice (DOJ) was created in June 1870, with the Attorney General as its head. Since its establishment, DOJ has expanded to include 40 agencies. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP), the Community Oriented Policing Services Office (COPS), and the Office of Violence Against Women, provide grant funds to state, local, and tribal governments for crime prevention and intervention programs as well as funding for criminal justice system improvement programs. This report discusses several DOJ grant programs administered through OJP and COPS, including the Weed and Seed, the Drug Court Discretionary Grant program, the Prisoner Re-entry Initiative, the President's DNA Initiative, the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant program, the Kirk Bloodsworth Post-conviction DNA Testing program, the Paul Coverdell Grant program, assistance to Indian tribes (Indian Country Prison grants, Tribal Courts Grant program, Indian Country Alcohol and Crime Demonstration program), and Tribal Law Enforcement Assistance.
In recent years, Congress has questioned the effectiveness of many DOJ grant programs. As Congress continues to cut appropriations for many discretionary grant programs, there may be greater scrutiny of these programs. This report discusses this issue as well as issues concerning the effective management and accounting of DOJ grant programs. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL34002 | crs_RL34002_0 | Introduction
The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program provides monthly rental assistance to around 2 million low-income households each year. It is administered at the local level by quasi-governmental public housing agencies (PHAs). While some form of Section 8 rental assistance has been in place since the mid-1970s, the modern program was shaped largely by the 1998 assisted housing reform act ( P.L. 105-276 ). More than a decade later, the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program has come under new scrutiny, with PHA industry leaders, low-income housing advocates, both the Bush and Obama Administrations, and some Members of Congress calling for reforms. This report introduces the primary features of the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, issues that have arisen, and recent reform proposals. The current system for calculating income, as noted earlier in relation to rents, has been criticized as cumbersome and prone to errors. This raised concerns for both the George W. Bush Administration and Congress about the cost of the program. Recent Reform Proposals
Moving to Work Expansion
In recent years there have been calls to expand the Moving to Work (MTW) Demonstration. Some have made minor changes to their existing Section 8 voucher and public housing programs, such as limiting reporting requirements; others have implemented full funding fungibility between their public housing and voucher programs and significantly altered their eligibility and rent policies. The Section 8 Voucher Reform Act, ordered reported by the House Financial Services Committee in the 111 th Congress and introduced in the 112 th Congress, included a provision that would have replaced the existing Moving to Work program with a new Housing Innovation Program (HIP). Similar, bipartisan reform legislation was proposed in the 110 th Congress. The Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2007 ( H.R. 1851 , 110 th Congress) passed the House and the Section 8 Voucher Reform Act of 2008 ( S. 2684 , 110 th ) was introduced in the Senate. No reform legislation has been introduced in the 113 th Congress. 112th Congress
SEVRA
A version of SEVRA very similar to the one approved by the House Financial Services Committee in the 111 th Congress was introduced by Representative Waters in the 112 th Congress. It would have modified the inspection process to permit PHAs to inspect units every other year, rather than every year. SEVRA was not considered before the end of the 112 th Congress. The two draft versions of SESA both included many provisions from SEVRA, but also made changes; most notably, neither version of SESA included an expansion of MTW. It contained many provisions from SEVRA and SESA, but with several changes, including a new name, which reflected the fact that all of these bills included provisions beyond the Section 8 voucher program: the Affordable Housing and Self Sufficiency Improvement Act of 2012 (AHSSIA). Similar provisions were included in Section 8 voucher reform legislation considered in the 111 th Congress and included in SEVRA, SESA and, most recently, AHSSIA. | The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program provides monthly rental assistance to around 2 million low-income households each year and is the largest (both in terms of people served and annual cost). It is administered at the local level by nearly 2,500 quasi-governmental public housing agencies (PHAs). While some form of Section 8 rental assistance has been in place since the mid-1970s, the modern program was shaped largely by the 1998 public housing reform act (P.L. 105-276). More than a decade later, the Section 8 voucher program has come under new scrutiny, with PHA industry leaders, low-income housing advocates, and some Members of Congress calling for reforms. This report introduces the primary features of the Section 8 voucher program, issues that have arisen, and recent reform proposals.
Many of the key features of the program have been considered for reform, including its administration; eligible uses of program funds; the method by which tenant income is determined and rents are calculated; who is eligible and what conditions are placed on receipt of assistance; and other features of the program such as portability and quality inspections. Some reform proposals have focused on changing aspects of the program seen as administratively cumbersome and prone to errors. Other proposals have focused on altering the incentives in the program in order to promote policy goals such as homeownership, mobility and family self-sufficiency.
Issues have also arisen regarding how the Section 8 voucher program is funded, how changes in formula allocations have affected PHAs, and the cost of the program. Partly in response to funding issues, and partly in response to programmatic issues, there have been calls for deregulation of PHAs through expansion of the Moving to Work (MTW) Demonstration.
Section 8 voucher reform legislation has been considered in every Congress since at least the 108th Congress. One version of this reform legislation, called the Section 8 Voucher Reform Act (SEVRA), was introduced and considered in both the 110th and 111th Congresses (H.R. 1851 and S. 2684, 110th Congress; H.R. 3045, 111th Congress). These bills—which were largely similar, but with some changes—would have made modifications to several features of the Section 8 voucher program, including how income is calculated, how inspections are conducted, and how portability is treated, and they would have adopted a new funding formula. They also would have renamed, expanded, and modified the MTW Demonstration and permitted PHAs to implement alternate rent structures, within limits. A version of SEVRA that is very similar to H.R. 3045 was introduced in the 112th Congress (H.R. 1209) by Representative Waters. However, instead of taking up SEVRA, the House Financial Services Committee held hearings on new draft Section 8 voucher reform legislation, initially called the Section 8 Savings Act (SESA) and then titled the Affordable Housing and Self Sufficiency Improvement Act (AHSSIA). This draft legislation contained many of the same or similar provisions that have been included in SEVRA, including an expansion of a modified version of MTW. The draft AHSSIA was marked-up in subcommittee, but was not considered in full committee. Reform legislation has not been introduced in the 113th Congress. |
crs_RL34510 | crs_RL34510_0 | Introduction
On May 25, 2007, President George Bush signed into law a supplemental appropriations bill ( H.R. Under P.L. In addition, the bill raised wages in two insular territories of the Pacific: the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa. The federal minimum wage, now having been raised, may, perhaps, be dormant for a time. The Youth Sub-Minimum Wage
Under current law, a sub-minimum wage at $4.25 per hour is allowed for youth workers (under 20 years of age) through the first 90 consecutive days of employment with an employer. No change was made by the 2007 amendments. For either side, it may have been "too high a price to pay." Through the years, the level of the tip credit (the difference between $2.13 per hour and the minimum wage) has varied. The tip credit, thus, has become an issue of equity and of percentages. Clinton, Bush and the Companionship Exemption
In 1993 and again in 1995, proposed rules were published governing the nature of the companionship exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 3582 (Woolsey) and S. 2061 (Harkin)]. Indexation of the minimum wage has been a topic of discussion among economists through nearly a century. Although the issue was raised in almost every Congress through a series of individual bills, the concept was not linked to the more general enactments that were adopted in 1996 and in 2007. Significant numbers of workers were exempt (or not covered) by its provisions: for example, agricultural, retail and service workers (including public employees) and those who would be defined as not being engaged in interstate commerce. As the act was expanded and new groups of workers were included, protests arose from employers. In 1977, a general small business exemption was set at $362,500, but with other options included for particular industries. The measure was signed into law in mid-November 1989. Over time, the issues continued to be debated. Under this formula, wage rates were to be determined as follows:
"(A) lower than the minimum wage applicable under section 206 of this title,
"(B) commensurate with those paid to nonhandicapped workers, employed in the vicinity in which the individuals under the certificates are employed, for essentially the same type, quality, and quantity of work, and
"(C) related to the individual's productivity." Guam has always been under the act. In the 2007 FLSA amendments ( P.L. There are now 34 states and other jurisdictions that have wage rates in excess of the federal minimum, and several of the states have indexed the minimum rate to increase at regular intervals. The Executive, Administrative and Professional Exemption under FLSA
On March 31, 2003, Wage/Hour Administrator Tammy McCutchen published in the Federal Register a proposed rule updating Section 13(a)(1), that portion of the FLSA that deals with minimum wages and overtime coverage for executive, administrative or professional (EAP) workers. | On May 25, 2007, the President signed into law changes in the minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): P.L. 110-28. Although the wage issue may now have been momentary settled, the act includes other provisions that have been subject to legislation through the years and may again become the focus of legislative consideration. Examples include the following issues.
A youth sub-minimum wage, instituted in 1996, was not included in the 2007 amendments, and is $4.25 per hour. The cash wage employers of 'tipped employees' must pay, last updated in 1996, is $2.13 per hour. In 1989, the 'small business exemption' was restructured to exempt from minimum wage requirements qualifying firms with an income of under $500,000; but, as administered, exemptions have only been available for employees not involved in interstate commerce. In 2001, the Clinton Administration proposed restructuring of the 'companionship exemption' under the FLSA; in 2002, the measure was withdrawn. The issue has recently been the subject of a Supreme Court ruling (2007) and of proposed legislation (H.R. 3582 and S. 2061). Through nearly a century, some economists (and, later, some Members of Congress) have proposed, in various formats, indexation of the federal minimum wage—an issue that still sometimes arises. In 1986, Section 14(c) of the act was amended to remove any specific minimum wage floor for handicapped workers, replacing it with a negotiated wage 'commensurate' with the worker's productivity. It has been contested through the years. In 2003, a proposal was issued dealing with overtime pay for persons classified as 'executive, administrative, or professional' employees under Section 13(a)(1) of the act. At that time, the issue was extremely contentious. How has it worked out in practice? Industry has threatened to leave American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands were the full FLSA to be made applicable there, as it would be under P.L. 110-28. What will be the impact upon those islands? Increasingly, the states (now 34 in number) have moved to provide minimum wage rates higher than the federal rate. What implications can be expected, both in economic and political terms?
This report will be updated as the need may arise. |
crs_R40127 | crs_R40127_0 | Introduction
The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports that world food prices increased dramatically in the first half of 2008, and then over the second half, fell by nearly 50% ( Figure 1 ). This report does not explore the causes of food crises, but analyzes how high food prices, food insecurity, and hunger impact the health of people in countries where food prices increased dramatically. Background on Global Hunger and Food Insecurity
In a 2006 report, FAO estimated that 848 million people in the world were undernourished. Direct Health-Related Consequences of High Food Prices and Food Insecurity
Those who are most affected by higher food prices and disrupted food supplies are the impoverished. Indirect Consequences of High Food Prices and Food Insecurity
Some experts are concerned that the impoverished, who were struggling to feed, clothe, and educate their children before prices began to rise, might decrease spending on health and education. Another group of analysts contend that families struggling to feed themselves will be less likely to take a sick child to the clinic or a pregnant woman to the hospital, which could increase maternal and child mortality rates. Health experts expect that when food prices are high, poor parents will remove their children from school to spend their limited funds on food that has become more expensive rather than on school fees. Deeper Poverty
While global food prices have moderated recently, they remain higher than they were earlier in the decade. Some experts contend that many more may become impoverished and undernourished because forecasts indicate food supplies may remain insufficient and prices may stay higher than the averages of the past decade —though projections indicate they will ease over the next 10 years ( Table 2 ). Increases in Rural-to-Urban Migration
Even as food prices decline, poor farmers remain vulnerable to poverty and hunger. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable during times of food shortages, because of their lower social and economic status, prohibitions against female land inheritance (in some areas), and heightened nutritional needs during pregnancy or lactation. Impoverished women are also more likely to engage in transactional sex to feed their families, while men might turn to migrant or long-distance transportation work. Relatively high HIV transmission rates among migrant workers are well-documented. The CFA outlines two sets of actions to promote a comprehensive response to higher food prices. Issues for Congress
Since the noticeable rise in food prices in the first half of 2008, much of the discussions on how best to improve food security have focused on agriculture and its related issues. While many experts agree that increased investment in agriculture could help to address hunger and poverty, others urge policy makers to simultaneously bolster support for health interventions. Supporters of greater investment in basic health care assert that related programs are a relatively inexpensive way to effectively address hunger-related illnesses in the short- and long-terms. The section below discusses some of the issues the 111 th Congress might consider as it views the health needs of the millions threatened by food insecurity. U.S. efforts to address each of these areas, however, are not always coordinated. | The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports that world food prices spiked dramatically in the first half of 2008 and declined somewhat in the latter part of the year. From June 2007 to June 2008, FAO's food price index increased by 44%, with wheat and rice prices increasing by 90% and maize prices by 35%. The food spikes had negative social and economic impacts, especially in low income and least developed countries. Although food prices have stabilized somewhat, they remain higher than they have been over the past decade. In addition, those who were most affected by the food spikes remain vulnerable to future food crises because of persistent hunger and poverty.
Forecasts indicate that prices will remain higher than the averages of the past decade—though they are projected to continuously ease over the next 10 years. Latest estimates indicate that at the end of 2007, there were 923 million under-nourished people worldwide, nearly 90% of whom were in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. In 2007, high food prices prevented 75 million people from attaining sufficient quantities of food and forced 100 million into poverty.
Many health experts are concerned about the short- and long-term impacts of fluctuating food prices and inconsistent food supplies. In the period immediately following food price hikes, poor families who are already struggling to feed themselves begin to decrease spending on health and education. Some analysts contend that impoverished families will be less likely to take a sick child to the clinic or a pregnant woman to the hospital, which could increase maternal and child mortality rates. Health experts expect poor parents to remove their children from school to spend their limited funds on more expensive food. High food prices might also threaten efforts to control HIV/AIDS. Women and girls, who are particularly vulnerable during times of food shortages because of their lower social and economic status, inability to inherit land (in some areas), and heightened nutritional needs during pregnancy or lactation, might engage in transactional sex to feed their families. Males might turn to migrant or long-distance transportation work. Relatively high HIV transmission rates among these groups are well-documented. Malnutrition usually occurs after families can find no other way to cut spending and decrease food intake. The choices people make as they struggle to absorb the shocks of rising food prices affect other social issues, including housing, migration, education, and health. Responses to higher food prices, consequently, require a comprehensive approach which addresses each of these areas.
Since food prices have begun to rise, much of the discussions on how best to improve food security have focused on agriculture and its related issues. While many experts agree that increased investment in agriculture could help to address hunger and poverty, others urge policy makers to simultaneously bolster support for health interventions. Supporters of greater investment in basic health care assert that related programs are a relatively inexpensive way to effectively address hunger-related illnesses in the short- and long-terms. This report analyzes the direct and indirect effects of food insecurity and hunger on global health, reviews elements of the U.S. government response to global hunger, and identifies policy areas that Congress might examine as it debates how best to address the health needs of the millions threatened by high food prices in the 111th Congress. |
crs_R40790 | crs_R40790_0 | As Congress addresses health reform, there has been interest in increasing transparency, preventing inappropriate relationships, and requiring disclosure of gifts and other payments made to physicians. While companies are free to voluntarily disclose this information about gifts and other payments, there is no current federal requirement to do so. This report outlines the existing AMA guidelines on disclosure and describes certain state disclosure laws and selected federal legislation, in particular, the Physician Payment Sunshine Act of 2009 ( S. 301 , H.R. 3138 ). This report also analyzes various legal and constitutional considerations that may pertain to a federal disclosure requirement. Selected State Disclosure Measures
Legislation requiring pharmaceutical companies and other entities to disclose gifts and payments to health care professionals has been enacted in states such as Maine, Minnesota, Vermont, and Massachusetts, as well as the District of Columbia. Legal Analysis of a Federal Disclosure Requirement
In enacting a federal disclosure requirement, Congress may consider the following statutory and constitutional considerations. Conclusion
In sum, there have been recent efforts to crack down on perceived conflicts of interest between health care professionals and the pharmaceutical and other medical industries, in particular through disclosure of certain gifts or other payments. Several states have already enacted legislation requiring companies to disclose gifts and payments to these professionals. Pharmaceutical companies might challenge the provision on First Amendment grounds. However, it appears likely that it would survive judicial scrutiny under the various applicable tests of constitutionality. | In recent years, questions have been raised over the propriety of certain financial relationships between health care professionals such as physicians, and the pharmaceutical and other medical industries. As part of these relationships, companies may give gifts or make payments to healthcare professionals as part of their marketing efforts, or for other purposes. In an effort to promote transparency and prevent inappropriate relationships, there has been interest in requiring disclosure of certain types of payments. Several states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation requiring pharmaceutical companies to disclose gifts and payments made to health care professionals. While companies are free to voluntarily disclose this information, there is currently no federal requirement to do so.
This report briefly outlines American Medical Association (AMA) guidelines addressing gifts to physicians from industry, and describes selected state disclosure laws already in effect. The report also discusses proposed federal legislation, in particular, the Physician Payments Sunshine Act of 2009 (S. 301, H.R. 3138). In addition, the report analyzes potential legal and constitutional considerations associated with a federal disclosure requirement, including how a court may evaluate a federal disclosure requirement if it were challenged on First Amendment grounds. If a federal disclosure requirement was enacted and subsequently challenged on these grounds, it appears likely to survive judicial scrutiny. This report supersedes CRS Report RL34094, Requiring Disclosure of Gifts and Payments to Physicians: State Efforts and a Legal Analysis of Potential Federal Action, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R45135 | crs_R45135_0 | Since 2014, security risks to the power grid have become an even greater concern in the electric utility industry. Reflecting ongoing security concerns, legislative proposals in the 115 th Congress include provisions directed at power grid physical security. Congress also continues its oversight of FERC's grid security activities and the implementation of NERC's physical security standards. Federal Oversight and Support
Three entities play key roles in standards oversight and implementation support for bulk power physical security. NERC and FERC directly oversee implementation of the CIP-014 standards, while the Department of Energy (DOE) plays a supporting role in helping bulk power asset owners to protect their critical assets. The detailed findings of NERC's compliance activities are not publically disclosed due to the confidential nature of security information. However, NERC stated that, based on observations in 2016, the utility industry was "making progress towards effective implementation of and compliance with CIP-014-2." According to NERC, the audits completed to date have not uncovered any major compliance failures, and NERC has been "encouraged" by security measures that utilities have put in place so far. Since that time, there have been a number of apparent changes within the electricity sector related to increasing bulk power physical security. Nonetheless, anecdotal information in the public domain suggests that such changes may be significant and widespread. American Electric Power (AEP) also has incorporated asset criticality as a design criterion in its transmission planning. Policy Issues for Congress
Although NERC's CIP-014 standards have been promulgated, and bulk power asset owners have begun enhancing physical security, Congress continues to be concerned about the current state of electric grid physical security. Among many issues of potential interest, Congress may focus on several with overarching policy significance: security implementation oversight, cost recovery, hardening vs. resilience, and the quality of threat information. Conclusion
The 2013 attack on the Metcalf transformer substation marked a turning point for the U.S. electric power sector. The attack prompted utilities across the country to reevaluate and restructure their physical security programs. It also set in motion proceedings in Congress and at FERC which resulted in the promulgation of NERC's CIP-014 mandatory physical security standards in 2015. Although the electric power sector seems to be moving in the direction of more extensive physical security, many measures have yet to be implemented and the process of corporate realignment around physical security is still underway. Therefore, although it is probably accurate to conclude that, based on the objectives of the CIP-014 standards, the U.S. electric grid is more physically secure than it was five years ago, it has not necessarily reached the level of physical security needed based on the sector's own assessments of risk. Bulk power physical security remains a work in progress. As CIP-014 implementation and other physical security initiatives proceed, Congress may seek to maintain its focus on the power sector's overall progress, not only on short term compliance with NERC's security standards, but also on structural changes supporting physical security as a priority far into the future. | A 2013 rifle attack on a critical electric power substation in Metcalf, CA, marked a turning point for the U.S. electric power sector. The attack prompted utilities across the country to reevaluate and restructure their physical security programs. It also set in motion proceedings in Congress and at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) which resulted in a new mandatory Physical Security Reliability Standard (CIP-014) for bulk power asset owners promulgated by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) in 2015. In the three years since FERC approved this new standard, security risks to the power grid have become an even greater concern in the electric utility industry. Reflecting these ongoing security concerns, legislative proposals in the 115th Congress include provisions directed at power grid physical security. Congress also continues its oversight of grid security and implementation of NERC's security standards.
Three entities play key roles in standards oversight and support of implementation for bulk power physical security. NERC and FERC oversee implementation of the CIP-014 standards, while the Department of Energy plays a supporting role in helping bulk power asset owners to protect their critical infrastructure. The detailed findings of NERC's compliance activities are not publicly disclosed due to their confidential nature. However, NERC has stated that the utility industry is making progress towards effective implementation of the CIP-014 standard and NERC has been "encouraged" by grid security measures put in place so far. NERC compliance audits as of February 2018 have uncovered no major failures to date.
In addition to compliance with NERC's standards, there have been other observable changes within the electricity sector reflecting greater emphasis on bulk power physical security. These changes include realignment in corporate structure to support physical security, incorporating physical security in transmission planning, new security products and services, utility capital investment in physical security, and utility participation in voluntary security programs. While public information about such changes is limited, it suggests they may be significant and widespread.
Although the electric power sector seems to be moving in the overall direction of greater physical security for critical assets, many measures have yet to be implemented and the process of corporate realignment around physical security is still underway. NERC's CIP-014 standards have been promulgated recently, and bulk power asset owners have largely begun enhancing physical security under the standard over the last two years. Therefore, although it is probably accurate to conclude that, based on the objectives of the CIP-014 standards, the U.S. electric grid is more physically secure than it was five years ago, it has not necessarily reached the level of physical security needed based on the sector's own assessments of risk. Bulk power security remains a work in progress.
Congress continues to be concerned about the current state of electric grid physical security. Among many specific issues of potential interest, Congress may focus on several with policy significance: security implementation oversight, cost recovery, hardening vs. resilience, and the quality of threat information. As CIP-014 implementation and other physical security initiatives proceed, Congress also may seek to maintain its focus on the power sector's overall progress, not only on short term compliance with NERC's security standards, but also on structural changes supporting physical security as a priority far into the future. |
crs_R42607 | crs_R42607_0 | Most Recent Legislative Action
On March 21, 2013, Congress sent to the White House H.R. 933, the Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act, which the President signed into law (P.L. 113-6) on March 26, 2013. Division C of that legislation was a fully detailed DOD appropriations act for FY2013 that provided $597.1 billion for programs funded by that bill. Including funds provided for military construction in Division E of H.R. 933, the bill provided a total of $607.7 billion in discretionary budget authority for DOD. The Administration had not allocated that reduction among specific DOD appropriations accounts as of May 15, 2013. For discretionary DOD budget authority, the request included $613.93 billion, of which $525.45 billion is for "base" defense budget costs—that is, day-to-day operations other than war costs—and the remaining $88.48 billion was for "Overseas Contingency Operations" (OCO)—that is, military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The base budget request was $5.2 billion less than was appropriated for the base budget in FY2012 and $45.3 billion less than the FY2013 request the Administration had projected in February 2011 ( Figure 1 ). That reduction from the previously planned FY2013 request—and additional planned reductions of more than $50 billion per year compared to DOD's February 2011 budget projections through FY2021—reflected the Administration's plan to reduce federal spending as required by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, enacted on August 2, 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ). For the 10-year period covered by the BCA (FY2012-FY2021), the Administration's revised spending plan reduced DOD budgets by a total of $486.9 billion. In subsequent years, the BCA sets lowered spending caps to achieve the required savings. Overseas Contingency Operations Highlights
The Administration's $88.5 billion request for FY2013 war costs (OCO) amounts to $26.6 billion less than Congress appropriated for war costs in FY2012. This reduction reflects:
the cessation of U.S. combat operations in Iraq by the end of the first quarter of FY2012; and the reduction of the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, by the end of FY2012, to 68,000 personnel, thus ending the "surge" into that country of 33,000 additional U.S. troops announced by President Obama on December 1, 2009. Bill-by-Bill Analysis
FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act
The compromise final version of the FY2013 NDAA, signed by the President on Jan. 2, 2013 ( P.L. For DOD's base budget, the final bill would authorize $527.5 billion, practically splitting the difference between the $528.6 billion that would have been authorized by the House-passed version of the bill, and the $525.8 billion that would have been authorized by the Senate-passed version. NDAA: The Broad Outlines
Compared with annual defense authorization bills enacted in the previous decade, both H.R. (See Table 7 . ) (See Table 8 . ) However the Senate bill and the enacted version of H.R. The Administration's FY2013 budget request, unveiled in February 2012, would provide less than half of the amount earlier projected for FY2013—$564.9 million—and would defer construction of the first of the new ships until FY2021. 4310 authorized the amounts requested for SSBN(X). FY2013 DOD Appropriations Bill
DOD Appropriations Overview
The FY2013 DOD appropriations bill reported by the House Appropriations Committee May 25, 2012 ( H.R. By the same token, the House-passed appropriation is consistent with the defense funding cap set by H.Con.Res. 5856 reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on August 2, 2012, would provide $596.64 billion—$155.0 million less than the Administration's request and $1.06 billion less than the House-passed version ( Table 14 ). 933 ). Reduction in Personnel Transfers
The enacted version of FY2013 DOD appropriations bill ( H.R. Depot Maintenance 'Carryover'
The enacted version of the FY2013 defense appropriations bill—like the versions passed by the House and reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee - cut the Administration's budget request in an effort to reduce what the committees described in their reports as an excessive backlog of scheduled maintenance work by the services' depots, which perform major overhauls of aircraft, ground vehicles, engines, electronic equipment and other major items. Ground Combat Vehicle46
The enacted version of the appropriations bill—like the House-passed and Senate committee-reported versions of H.R. 5856 , H.R. In its report on the H.R. 4310 ; P.L. 5856 . 933 . | President Obama requested $613.9 billion in discretionary budget authority for the Department of Defense in Fiscal Year 2013, which is $31.8 billion less than had been appropriated for the agency in FY2012. The end of U.S. combat in Iraq and the declining tempo of operations in Afghanistan accounted for the bulk of the overall reduction: The budget request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)—DOD activities in those two countries—was $88.5 billion, which is $26.6 billion less than was provided for those operations in FY2012.
However, the Administration's $525.4 billion request for DOD's so-called "base budget"—funds for all DOD activities other than OCO—was $5.2 billion less than was provided for FY2012 and $45.3 billion less than the FY2013 base budget the Administration had projected a year earlier, in February of 2011. The proposed reduction in the base budget—and planned reductions of more than $50 billion per year through FY2021, compared with the FY2011 projection—reflected the Administration's effort to reduce federal spending as required by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, enacted on August 2, 2011 (P.L. 112-25). All told, the Obama Administration's February 2012 projection would reduce DOD budgets by $486.9 billion over a 10-year period (FY2012-FY2021), compared with its February 2011 plan. (See "
FY2013 Defense Budget Overview.")
According to the Administration, the FY2013 DOD budget request was consistent with the initial spending caps set by the BCA. However, both H.R. 4310, the version of the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) passed by the House on May 18, 2012, and H.R. 5856, the companion DOD appropriations bill for FY2013, reported by the House Appropriations Committee on May 25, 2012, exceeded the Administration request for those bills —by $3.7 billion in the case of the authorization bill and by $3.1 billion in the case of the appropriation bill.
On the other hand, S. 3254, the version of the NDAA reported June 4, 2012, by the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the version of the DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 5856) reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on August 2, 2012, kept FY2013 DOD funding within the initial BCA caps.
Neither the House nor the Senate considered either an NDAA or a DOD appropriations bill for FY2013 that conformed to the lowered BCA caps on defense spending.
The compromise version of the authorization bill (H.R. 4310), enacted on January 2, 2013 as P.L. 112-239, would authorize $544.9 billion for DOD's base budget—roughly splitting the difference between the House and Senate bills—and would authorize $88.5 billion for war costs.
In general terms, the House-passed and Senate committee-reported versions of the first DOD appropriations bill for FY2013 (H.R. 5856) paralleled the House and Senate versions of the FY2013 NDAA, respectively. However, the Senate did not act on that bill. For nearly the first six months of FY2013, DOD and other federal agencies had been funded by a continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 117; P.L. 112-175). On March 21, 2013, Congress sent to the White House H.R. 933, the Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act, which the President signed into law (P.L. 113-6) on March 26, 2013. Division C of that legislation is the Department of Defense Appropriations bill for FY2013 (See "DOD Appropriations Overview"). Although the amount provided by that section of the bill was $287.4 million more than the Administration's request for programs covered by that division of H.R. 933, the overall level of DOD funding provided by H.R. 933 (including funds provided for military construction in Division E) exceeded the request by $323.8 million.
Since the total DOD funding level for FY2013 of $607.7 billion exceeds the BCA spending cap, that law requires that DOD funds be reduced (or "sequestered) by $35.0 billion before the end of the fiscal year. As of May 15, 2013, the Administration has not allocated the required reduction among specific DOD programs. All FY2013 appropriations amounts cited in this report reflect the amounts appropriated by H.R. 933 prior to sequestration. |
crs_R40924 | crs_R40924_0 | The Obama Administration has taken direct measures to address U.S.-China automotive trade, such as the tariffs on Chinese tires. These concerns have focused on such issues as
China's export restrictions on certain raw materials, including rare earths, which are necessary for many auto parts production, including those for use in hybrid and electric cars; China's incomplete implementation of its commitments as a member of the World Trade Organization, especially with respect to domestic content rules, protection of non-Chinese firms' intellectual property rights, and technology transfer requirements; the extent to which Chinese firms are subsidized or otherwise supported and protected by the government when they compete with foreign companies domestically and with imports into China; and the implications of China's recently announced restrictions on foreign carmakers' expansion in China amid the government's efforts to promote domestic producers, for example, how they may affect U.S. auto companies' profitability and business prospects in China. This report provides an overview of China's auto sector development, including vehicle production, sales, market drivers, manufacturers, and automotive trade. It also examines how the Chinese government policies and measures guide and often direct the evolution of China's auto sector and discusses the prospects and implications for international automakers operating in China. China Becomes a Top Motor Vehicle Producer
The World Leader in Vehicle Output
Figure 1 illustrates the speed with which China has become one of the world's top automotive manufacturers. In contrast to its experience in the challenging environment in North America during the economic crisis, GM expanded rapidly in China and sold more cars in China than in the United States in 2010 and 2011. China's policy shift and the implications for global auto companies are discussed later in this report. China's Recent Auto Sector Policies and Measures
The United States and other producers had been highly critical of China's 1994 Industrial Policy for the Automotive Sector . Theses eight goals are summarized below:
Achieve a 10% average annual growth rate, based on the more than 10 million vehicles to be produced and sold in 2009; Increase auto consumption with a reasonable system of taxes and fees, and to create an infrastructure to support electric vehicles; Optimize the auto market demand structure so that small passenger cars with engine displacement of under 1.5 liters are to account for more than 40% of the market, while cars under 1.1 liters will comprise over 15% of the market and heavy trucks will account for 25% or more; Make progress on industry consolidation and restructuring, aiming to consolidate the current 14 major auto manufacturing groups, which command more than 90% of market share, into 10 such groups; to form 2 to 3 large auto groups with an annual capacity of over 2 million units, and 4 to 5 smaller groups with annual production capacity of over 1 million units; Increase the market share of Chinese brand vehicles to at least 40%, with about 10% of vehicle exports made by independent Chinese automakers; Increase production capacity of new-energy vehicles to 500,000 units, whose sales volume should account for 5% of total passenger cars; Improve automotive research and development to meet international standards; Expand capacity of auto parts manufacturing through mergers and restructuring, while seeking technological independence in key auto parts and systems such as engine transmission, steering, braking, drivetrain, suspension, and vehicle control. Foreign auto makers doing business in China, in general, could face cost increases and become more reliant on their Chinese partners. At the same time, the central government also offers various incentives to promote sales of new energy vehicles. This proposed procurement list has caused concerns among foreign car companies. In 2011, the United States exported 136,222 units of new passenger vehicles and light trucks to China, making it the fourth-largest export market in volume for U.S.-produced vehicles. In 2011, U.S. imports of auto parts from China were over $12 billion. After brief stagnation due to the global economic downturn, U.S. imports of Chinese auto parts surged between 2009 and 2011, becoming the second-largest source of U.S. imports of auto parts, behind only Japan. The U.S. auto industry also has restructured and its labor costs are becoming more competitive. The Chinese government has been pressuring all foreign-Chinese car manufacturers to develop local brands (i.e., jointly designed brands with their Chinese partners) aimed at small car buyers at the lower end of Chinese car market, as part of the drive to boost "indigenous innovation." To many industry and trade specialists, this move followed renewable energy trade disputes between China and the United States and appears largely symbolic. | The automobile industry, a key sector in China's industrialization and modernization efforts, has been developing rapidly since the 1990s. In recent years, China has become the world's largest automotive producer, with annual vehicle output of over 18 million units in 2011. China is now also the world's biggest market for automobile sales. Meanwhile, China's auto sector development and policies have caused concerns in the United States, from automotive trade, China's failure to effectively enforce trade agreements and laws, to market barriers and government policies that increasingly favor Chinese manufacturers, which could affect business operations and prospects of international companies doing business in (or with) China.
China's auto industry has developed extensively through foreign direct investment, which has come in the form of alliances and joint ventures between international automobile manufacturers and Chinese partners. These international automobile manufacturers, who generally dominate the higher end of the Chinese market, have focused on making cars for China's large and fast-growing market. The domestic Chinese automakers, who occupy the lower end of the market, struggle to improve design and quality to expand sales overseas.
China exports and imports relatively few vehicles. Most of the cars produced in China stay in China and its vehicle exports are mostly light trucks and passenger cars shipped to developing country markets. Automotive trade between the United States and China has increased in recent years, primarily in auto parts. In 2011, the United States imported over $12 billion in auto parts from China, making it the second-largest source of auto parts for U.S. imports (behind only Japan). Many of these imported parts are aimed at the aftermarket, as most of what China exports to the U.S. market now are standard products such as brake parts and electrical parts. But with high rates of investment and growth in China by the leading U.S. manufacturers of both cars and parts, major motor vehicle companies are increasingly sourcing parts from China.
There have been a number of auto sector trade disputes between the United States and China, addressing issues such as China's implementation of its WTO obligations, failure to implement an effective IPR enforcement regime, market barriers such as high tariffs on vehicle imports, export restrictions of raw materials such as rare earths, and various forms of government assistance to domestic auto and parts companies, such as tire producers.
An emerging issue is that the Chinese government's policies and measures are becoming increasingly restrictive towards foreign auto companies, while at the same time giving preferential support to its domestic car makers. As the central government designates clean-energy vehicles and their components as one of the seven "strategic and emerging" industries (in which it aspires to become a world leader), foreign companies, such as GM, reportedly have been pressured to transfer technology and/or help their Chinese partners to develop these new technologies. These new restrictions and conditions imposed by the Chinese government have caused concerns among global auto companies regarding the business environment in China and how these measures may affect their business operations, growth plans, and competitiveness.
This report provides an overview of China's auto sector development: vehicle production, sales, market drivers, foreign and domestic manufacturers, and automotive trade. It examines how the Chinese government policies and measures guide and often direct China's auto sector development. In addition, this report discusses the prospects and implications for global automakers operating in China. |
crs_R43498 | crs_R43498_0 | Overview
The United States and the Republic of the Philippines maintain close ties stemming from the U.S. colonial period (1898-1946), a history of extensive military cooperation, the bilateral security alliance bound by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, and common strategic and economic interests. Joint counterterrorism efforts, in which U.S. forces play a non-combat role, have helped to reduce terrorist threats in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago in the southern Philippines. Since 2012, the Philippines has played a key role in the Obama Administration's "rebalance" of foreign policy priorities toward Asia, particularly as maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea have intensified. The Obama Administration pledged greater security assistance to the Philippines as joint exercises began to focus on maritime security. During the past year, Washington and Manila have discussed the framework for an increased, non-permanent U.S. military presence in the Philippines. U.S. public and private support to the Philippines following Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan), which struck the central part of the country on November 8, 2013, bolstered the already strong bilateral relationship. China slowly has taken greater control over access to these reefs. These and other disputed territories could become flashpoints with a risk that overt conflict could occur, forcing the United States to choose whether to undertake a military response, and if so, what form of response. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) : The framework agreement, finalized in April 2014, allows for the increased presence of U.S. military forces, ships, aircraft, and equipment in the Philippines on a nonpermanent basis and greater U.S. access to Philippine military bases. Congress in its oversight and appropriations roles will scrutinize the objectives and costs of enhanced military cooperation. Internal Security : In January 2014, the Philippine government and the MILF finalized an accord, the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro, which would grant a large level of political autonomy to Muslim areas in Mindanao and Sulu. Resistance to the settlement, as well as sporadic armed attacks, small-scale bombings, and kidnappings by Islamist and communist groups has continued. Governance : Although President Aquino helped to reestablish public trust in government and has maintained the Philippines' upward economic growth trajectory, his term expires in 2016, and it is uncertain whether his cleaner style of government will continue. U.S. assistance programs in the Philippines have aimed to combat corruption, strengthen the judiciary, and improve fiscal policies, among other objectives. The Philippines-United States Partnership for Growth aims to accelerate broad-based economic growth in the Philippines. U.S. Foreign Assistance
In the past decade, the Philippines has been one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance in Southeast Asia, including both military and development aid. Enhanced U.S.-Philippine Military Cooperation
As part of the U.S. rebalancing toward Asia and what many analysts perceive as a response to China's growing assertiveness regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, U.S. and Philippine officials have discussed bolstering the U.S. military presence in the Philippines, including allowing greater U.S. ship and aircraft access to Philippine military facilities, particularly at Subic Bay; increasing U.S. military forces in the country on a non-permanent basis; and raising the number and frequency of joint military exercises, ship visits, and related activities. In January 2013, the Philippines formally requested that an Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS rule on whether China's claims and its actions comply with the Law of the Sea. The U.S. government does not take a position on the territorial disputes between the Philippines and China, but supports a peaceful resolution that is based upon international law and includes multilateral processes. Filipino Veterans
Roughly 250,000 Filipino soldiers and guerrilla fighters served under or alongside United States Armed Forces during World War II. | The United States and the Republic of the Philippines maintain close ties stemming from the U.S. colonial period (1898-1946), the bilateral security alliance bound by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, and common strategic and economic interests. In the past decade, the Philippines has been one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance in Southeast Asia, including both military and development aid. Many observers say that U.S. public and private support to the Philippines following Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan), which struck the central part of the country on November 8, 2013, bolstered the already strong bilateral relationship.
Although the United States closed its military bases in the Philippines in 1992, the two sides have maintained security cooperation. Joint counterterrorism efforts, in which U.S. forces play a non-combat role, have helped to reduce Islamist terrorist threats in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago in the southern Philippines. During the past year, Washington and Manila have held discussions on the framework for an increased, non-permanent U.S. military presence in the Philippines.
Since 2012, the Philippines has played a key role in the Obama Administration's "rebalancing" of foreign policy priorities to Asia, particularly as maritime territorial disputes between China and other claimants in the South China Sea have intensified. The U.S. government has pledged greater security assistance to the Philippines as joint military exercises reorient from a domestic focus to an outward one. In 2013, after exhausting other means of resolving its disputes with China, the Philippines formally requested that an Arbitral Tribunal under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) rule on whether China's claims and actions comply with the Law of the Sea. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS and does not take a position on the territorial disputes between the Philippines and China, but supports a peaceful resolution that is based upon international law and involves multilateral processes.
Key U.S. policy concerns related to the Philippines include the following issue areas:
External Security: China slowly has taken greater control over access to some disputed land features in the South China Sea. These and other disputed territories could become flashpoints, where many observers fear that aggressive behavior by claimants could escalate to overt conflict, forcing the United States to choose whether to undertake a military response. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA): The framework agreement, finalized in April 2014, allows for the increased presence of U.S. military forces, ships, aircraft, and equipment in the Philippines on a nonpermanent basis and greater U.S. access to Philippine military bases. Congress in its oversight and appropriations roles will scrutinize the objectives and costs of enhanced military cooperation. Internal Security: In January 2014, the Philippine government and the separatist insurgency Moro Islamic Liberation Front finalized an accord, the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro, which would grant a large level of political autonomy to Muslim areas in Mindanao and Sulu. However, resistance to the settlement, as well as sporadic armed attacks, small-scale bombings, and kidnappings by Islamist and communist groups in the southern Philippines, has continued. Governance: Although President Aquino helped to reestablish public trust in government and has maintained the Philippines' upward economic growth trajectory, his term expires in 2016, and it is uncertain whether his cleaner style of government will continue. U.S. assistance programs in the Philippines have aimed to combat corruption, strengthen the judiciary, improve fiscal policies, and promote broad-based economic growth, among other objectives.
Major efforts and aims of the 113th Congress have included providing assistance for Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) relief and recovery, reducing extrajudicial killings carried out by the Philippine Army, promoting a peaceful resolution to South China Sea disputes that is based upon international law and collaborative diplomatic processes, and supporting benefits for Filipino Veterans who served under or alongside U.S. Armed Forces during World War II. |
crs_RS21404 | crs_RS21404_0 | Four crucial points of convergence often cited as important to the success of those occupations inestablishing democracies,raise questions concerning the applicability of these models to a U.S. occupation of Iraq. Populations' Acceptance of U.S. Homogeneity of Occupied Populations. Ability to Manage Their Own Affairs Largely Using Existing Institutions. International Legitimacy and Support. The U.S. occupations in Japan andGermany were viewed by other countries as morally and legally legitimate, and there was widespread support forthem. | This report provides background on the U.S. occupation experiences in Japan andGermany after World War II, and discusses four sets of factors from this period that could be relevant to a U.S.occupation of Iraq. These are: (1) acceptance of U.S. goals, (2) homogeneity of the occupied populations, (3) ability to manage theirown affairs, and (4)international legitimacy and support. This report will not be updated |
crs_RL32359 | crs_RL32359_0 | The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, funded by the Department of Defense (DOD), are the most visible of these programs. Within a decade, however, CTR took on the goal of reducing the threat of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Now, however, many analysts support expanding cooperative threat reduction programs beyond Russia to other geographic areas. In the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 108-136 , Sec. 1308), Congress authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. As of September 2006, the Administration had spent $38.5 million in Albania for the purpose of eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. The report of the 9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to keep WMD away from terrorist groups. It describes potential recipients of such funding (those states with WMD programs and terrorism problems); the kinds of assistance that may be possible; potential legal, political, and technical constraints on assistance; and potential costs and benefits to the United States of providing such assistance. A few underlying issues may influence the ultimate success of CTR-like approaches. First, the nonproliferation regime has always focused on controlling ingredients at the source as the most effective first line of defense. How Significant Is the Nexus? Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as Precedent
For over a decade, U.S. government agencies (particularly the Departments of Energy and State) have spent nonproliferation assistance funds in countries outside of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Assistance of this kind in the nuclear area is beginning to be provided under IAEA auspices to India and Pakistan. Legal Constraints: Nonproliferation and Anti-Terrorism Laws
U.S. domestic laws contain the following restrictions that may be relevant to providing assistance to the states covered in this report: restrictions on financial assistance, exports (defense and dual-use) to states that have poor proliferation records (as recipients or suppliers of proliferation-related goods and technology); restrictions on financial assistance, exports to states on state sponsors of terrorism list; and restrictions on nuclear material and nuclear weapons cooperation. | Increasingly, Congress and the Bush Administration are looking to utilize nonproliferation assistance programs, including cooperative threat reduction, to help reduce the risk of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136, Sec. 1308), Congress authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. As of September 2006, the Administration had spent such funds only in Albania ($38.5 million) for the purpose of eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. The report of the 9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to keep WMD away from terrorist groups. This report, which will be updated as needed, analyzes the range of possible applications of CTR funds, the kinds of assistance that might be supplied, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance.
A key underlying issue is that the countries posing the greatest risks may be the least amenable to cooperative approaches. A second issue is that there is an array of U.S. domestic and international legal restrictions on the most useful kinds of cooperation. Both the executive branch and Congress may need to consider domestic and international legal and political restrictions on cooperation with states outside the nonproliferation regimes, low levels of transparency exhibited by most of the potential recipient states, and the lack of incentives for many of these states to pursue threat reduction measures. In addition, Congress may wish to consider whether potentially expanding the geographic scope of CTR may have a negative effect on existing programs. One school of thought believes Russia, as the largest source of stocks of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, should continue to be the main focus of attention. Other observers believe there is now an opportunity to focus on states within the nexus of terrorism and WMD.
This report complements CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union; CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan; and CRS Report RS21840, Expanding Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs: Concepts and Definitions (pdf). |
crs_RL34089 | crs_RL34089_0 | Introduction
Both chambers of Congress have passed comprehensive legislation to reauthorize expiring programs at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and to expand the agency's authority to help ensure the safety of certain medical products. The bills are the Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act ( S. 1082 ), and the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 ( H.R. 2900 ). The primary driver of the legislation is the renewal of FDA's authority for two key user fee programs set to expire at the end of FY2007: the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA; P.L. 107-188 ), and the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA; P.L. 107-250 ). The bills also would reauthorize two other expiring authorities, which are related to pediatric pharmaceuticals: the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA; P.L. 107-109 ), and the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA; P.L. The agency also regulates the safety and effectiveness of human drugs, biologics (e.g., vaccines), medical devices, and animal drugs. Combined, these fees would account for 87% of FDA's user fee revenue, and 19% of its total program level budget in FY2008. BPCA and PREA provide marketing exclusivity incentives and requirements for studying pediatric use of both on - and off-patent drugs. 2900 contain provisions relating to the public registration of clinical trials and the public posting of their results. S. 1082 and H.R. The remaining sections of this report contain descriptions of the key FDA programs addressed in the bills, certain programs considered but not included in the bills, and links to relevant CRS reports. FDA's authority for the first of these (the collection of user fees) will expire on October 1, 2007, unless Congress reauthorizes it, as is proposed in S. 1082 (Title III), and H.R. They are set to expire on October 1, 2007. 108-155 ). According to the Senate bill, the Secretary, in addition to routine active surveillance and other requirements, would have "to assess a signal of a serious risk with use of a drug; or to identify, based on a review of a demonstrated pattern of use of the drug, unexpected serious risks in a domestic population...." The House bill, unlike S. 1082 , addressing this outside of the REMS process, would authorize the Secretary to require, based on scientific information, a postapproval study to assess a known risk, assess signals of serious risk, or to identify a serious risk. Miscellaneous Provisions in S. 1082
S. 1082 contains a number of provisions that are not present in H.R. 2900 contains no food provisions. 2900 . One states that legislation should be passed that allows the FDA appropriate flexibility in the regulation of follow-on biologics . | Both the House and the Senate have passed comprehensive legislation to reauthorize existing Food and Drug Administration (FDA) programs and expand the agency's authority to ensure the safety of prescription drugs, medical devices, and biologics. The Senate passed the Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act (S. 1082) on May 9, 2007. The House passed the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (H.R. 2900) on July 11, 2007.
At its core, the legislation renews authority for two key user fee programs that are set to expire on October 1, 2007: the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA; P.L. 107-188) and the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act (MDUFMA; P.L. 107-250). These account for 87% of FDA's user fee revenue, and 19% of FDA's total FY2008 program level budget. Without the reauthorizations, and absent a substantial increase in FDA's annual appropriations, the agency would lose a significant source of funding. FDA had warned that a failure to reauthorize the user fee programs before August 1, 2007, would require the agency to issue layoff notices, but the agency has reportedly forestalled that necessity by switching to reserve funds.
In addition to user fee programs, the bills reauthorize two other FDA authorities related to prescription drugs for pediatric populations, which are also due to expire on October 1, 2007: the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA; P.L. 107-109) and the Pediatric Research Equity Act (PREA; P.L. 108-155). These laws provide marketing exclusivity incentives and requirements for studying pediatric use of on-patent and off-patent drugs. S. 1082 and H.R. 2900 also contain provisions related to drug safety, pediatric medical devices, clinical trial registration, and the creation of a new nonprofit entity to assist FDA with its mission. The bills' overlapping provisions are similar, but not identical.
S. 1082 contains some additional provisions that are not present in H.R. 2900, on the topics of food safety, prescription drug importation, and domestic pet turtle market access. Attempts to expand the legislation to address several other FDA-related issues, for example, follow-on biologics and genetic testing, have thus far been unsuccessful. Differences between the bills may be addressed in conference.
This report contains background information about the FDA relevant to S. 1082 and H.R. 2900. It presents a comparative overview of the bills' contents, and contains links to pertinent CRS reports. This report will be updated as further legislative events warrant. |
crs_R43260 | crs_R43260_0 | Introduction
Recent controversies over the nature of the government's foreign surveillance activity have prompted some to argue that the judiciary's review of government surveillance requests under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) should be far more exacting. This report will explore the novel legal concept that is the public advocate and discuss several major constitutional issues surrounding the FISA advocate idea, highlighting relevant issues to consider, including what is the legal role of a public advocate; how a FISA advocate can be constitutionally appointed; and whether employing a public advocate before a federal court adheres to the demands of the United States Constitution. In the wake of the recent revelations regarding the size and scope of the government's foreign surveillance activities, lawmakers and others have suggested transforming FISA proceedings such that the process is more adversarial in nature. In other words, a public advocate would "represent the privacy and civil liberties" interests of the general public by advocating for "legal interpretations that minimize the scope of surveillance and the extent of data collection and retention." As a public advocate would be representing a generalized interest divorced from any particular individual's harm, the FISA advocate's role is likewise distinguishable from that of a public defender in an ordinary criminal case. Appointment of a Public Advocate
Assuming that a permanent office of a FISA public advocate is an arm of the government and subject to the general requirements of the Constitution, several constitutional questions are raised by the proposals establishing such an entity. Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause establishes that the President:
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. Would a Public Advocate be a Principal or Inferior Officer? A unifying theme behind all of the proposals creating an office of the public advocate is to ensure that the advocate is independent from other entities within the executive branch, who would, presumably, be seeking an order from the FISA court authorizing foreign surveillance activities. Inter-branch Appointments and the Public Advocate
Assuming that the Supreme Court, in analyzing the appointments question presented by establishing a public advocate, abandons the Edmond test in favor of the Morrison approach such that a permanent public advocate could be an inferior officer, an additional issue is raised for those proposals that would allow the advocate, who is arguably acting in an executive role, to be appointed by the courts of law. Article III Issues Raised by a FISA Public Advocate
Apart from issues raised by the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution, Article III of the Constitution, which vests the judicial power of the United States in the Supreme Court and any inferior courts created by Congress, also poses significant legal questions with respect to proposals creating a FISA public advocate. Government applications for warrants are always ex parte . Generally, whenever an individual "invo[kes] ... [a] federal court['s] jurisdiction" and formally asks an Article III court to exercise its "remedial powers on his [or her] behalf," the Supreme Court has "consistently ... required" that the "party seeking judicial resolution of a dispute 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct" of the other party. The statement from Bowsher has been interpreted to mean that the "presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement," allowing "standingless" parties to continue to participate in the proceeding. Specifically, many of the proposals for a FISA advocate envision such a position as being wholly independent from the government and representing the public's privacy rights as an adversary to the government's official position. Intra- or Inter-branch Litigation
Nonetheless, assuming that the FISA advocate can feasibly be viewed as authorized by the government to seek judicial relief before the FISC, such a position may not resolve the constitutionality of allowing the FISA advocate to do more than serve as an amicus curiae . Assuming away that the general public as an indistinguishable mass has standing to challenge a given foreign surveillance practice and assuming away that the government can represent a real party in interest in the absence of any form of a legally recognized relationship with that real party, the underlying dispute between the "general public" and the executive branch over foreign surveillance sounds far more like an argument that is generally settled amongst the elected branches and far less like the "justiciable controversy" found in ICC , a "proceeding[] to settle who [was] legally entitled to sums of money," the government or certain railroads. Instead, an intra-branch dispute involving a public advocate appears to be centered on a dispute with respect to the relative importance of two conflicting sovereign interests—the need to engage in foreign surveillance to protect national security versus the need to protect the privacy rights of the public. If one assumes the FISA advocate does not have standing to seek judicial relief from a federal court, a proposal that provides a non-party relief through granting a motion to certify an appeal may run afoul of Article III's requirement that a federal court may only exercise its judicial power in favor of a party who has "shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by [the] favorable decision." | Recent revelations about the size and scope of government foreign surveillance efforts have prompted some to criticize the level of scrutiny that the courts—established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)—currently provide with respect to the government's applications to engage in such surveillance. In response to concerns that the ex parte nature of many of the proceedings before the FISA courts prevents an adequate review of the government's legal positions, some have proposed establishing an office led by an attorney or "public advocate" who would represent the civil liberties interests of the general public and oppose the government's applications for foreign surveillance. The concept of a public advocate is a novel one for the American legal system, and, consequently the proposal raises several difficult questions of constitutional law.
First and foremost is the question of what is the legal nature of the office of a public advocate. Some may argue that the advocate is functioning as a non-governmental entity, much like a public defender in an ordinary criminal prosecution, in serving as an adversary to the government's position. On the other hand, a public advocate, unlike a public defender, would not be representing the views of any particular individual, but rather the general interests of society in ensuring that the government's foreign surveillance efforts adequately protect the public's privacy rights. Given that a public advocate can potentially be deemed an agent of the government, perhaps as a member of the executive branch, the advocate could be viewed as an office that is subject to the general requirements of the United States Constitution.
Among these requirements is Article II's Appointments Clause that requires that "principal officers" of the United States be appointed by the President and confirmed with the advice and consent of the Senate and "inferior officers" be appointed by the President, the courts of law, or the Heads of Departments. Depending on the scope of the authority and the supervisory controls provided over the FISA advocate's office, the lawyer who leads such an office may be a principal or inferior officer of the United States whose appointment must abide by the Appointments Clause's restrictions.
Moreover, Article III of the Constitution which vests the judicial power of the United States in the courts of law over certain "cases" or "controversies" may also restrict the role of a public advocate. The nature of the FISA courts and their analogous position to how federal courts approve ordinary search warrants may arguably limit the application of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement to FISA proceedings. Nonetheless, Article III typically requires that parties asking a federal court to exercise its remedial powers on his or her behalf must either (1) have personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the other party before the court or (2) be authorized by or have some other connection to a party that has suffered such an injury to represent that entity. It is at the very least doubtful that a public advocate has either personally suffered a constitutionally sufficient injury or been properly authorized by or has a close relationship with an entity that has suffered a constitutionally sufficient injury. While a more permanent advocate could be potentially viewed as representing a sovereign interest in ensuring the privacy rights of the general public and could be viewed as having standing to assert that interest, such a position may raise other constitutional issues. For example, Article III generally prevents the government from litigating against itself, making it constitutionally problematic to have an intra-branch dispute over foreign surveillance resolved by a federal court. In addition, Article II has been interpreted to prevent the establishment of purely executive functions in independent entities, and, arguably, allowing a public advocate protected by "for cause" removal restrictions to seek judicial relief on an issue of national security could invade core executive branch prerogatives. In other words, allowing a public advocate to formally seek judicial relief from an Article III court may present serious constitutional questions. Instead, a more modest proposal that would allow an advocate to generally share its views of the law as a friend of the court or amicus curiae is far less likely to run afoul of the Constitution's restrictions.
Other constitutional questions are prompted by FISA public advocate proposals. For example, separation of powers concerns that no branch should aggrandize itself at the expense of a co-equal branch may prevent a public advocate from being housed within the judicial branch. Likewise, Article III of the Constitution may present an obstacle to efforts that would make appeals of FISA court decisions more frequent. Notwithstanding these concerns, there do exist constitutionally permissible means to ensure that the executive branch's foreign surveillance practices are thoroughly vetted and scrutinized. This report will explore all of these difficult constitutional issues prompted by the idea of making FISA court proceedings more adversarial. |
crs_R41751 | crs_R41751_0 | Background
The massive Tohoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011, caused extensive damage in northeastern Japan, including damage to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power installation, which resulted in the release of radiation. Some have called this incident the biggest manmade release ever of radioactive material into the oceans. Concerns arose about the potential effects of this released radiation on the U.S. marine environment and resources. Analyses of seawater taken from near the discharge from Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1-4 yielded readings of 130,000 Becquerels/liter (Bq/l) of iodine-131 (half-life of about 8 days), 32,000 Bq/l of cesium-137 (half-life of about 30 years), and 31,000 Bq/l of cesium-134 (half-life of about 2 years). In early April 2011, EPA monitors in California, Idaho, and Minnesota detected trace amounts of radioactive iodine, cesium, and tellurium in rainwater, consistent with the Japanese nuclear incident; to date, concentrations have been far below any level of concern. It is unknown whether marine organisms that migrated through or near Japanese waters to locations where they might subsequently be harvested by U.S. fishermen (possibly some tuna or salmon in the North Pacific) might have been exposed to radiation in or near Japanese waters, or might have consumed prey that had accumulated radioactive contaminants. Scientists at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution advised that radiation levels in seafood should continue to be monitored, but stated that radiation in the ocean very quickly becomes diluted and should not be a problem beyond the coast of Japan. The same is true of radiation carried by winds around the globe. Radioactive contaminants from Fukushima appear to have become sufficiently dispersed over time that they will not prove to be a serious health threat elsewhere, unless they bioaccumulate in migratory fish or find their way directly to another part of the world through food or other commercial products. It does not appear that nuclear contamination of seafood will be a food safety problem for consumers in the United States. According to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), because of damage from the earthquake and tsunami to infrastructure, few if any food products were being exported from the affected region. The most common foods imported from Japan include seafood, snack foods, and processed fruits and vegetables. Since radiation has been detected reaching various U.S. locations by atmospheric transport, rainfall is likely to already have introduced radioactive elements from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident into U.S. marine waters. Debris
Based on computer modeling of ocean currents, debris from the tsunami produced by the Tohoku earthquake of March 11, 2011, was projected to spread eastward from Japan in the North Pacific Subtropical Gyre. Initial models suggested that in a year, debris would reach the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument; in two years, the remaining Hawaiian islands could see this debris; in three years, the debris plume likely would reach the U.S. west coast, dumping debris on California beaches and the beaches of British Columbia, Alaska, and Baja California. Although much of the radioactive release from Fukushima Dai-ichi is believed to have occurred after the tsunami, there is the possibility that some of the tsunami debris might have been contaminated with radiation from Fukushima Dai-ichi. Legislation in the 112 th Congress ( H.R. 1171 , H.R. 6251 , and S. 1119 ) to reauthorize the Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and Reduction Act (33 U.S.C. | The massive Tohoku earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011, caused extensive damage in northeastern Japan, including damage to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power installation, which resulted in the release of radiation. Some have called this incident the biggest manmade release ever of radioactive material into the oceans. Concerns arose about the potential effects of this released radiation on the U.S. marine environment and resources.
Both ocean currents and atmospheric winds have the potential to transport radiation over and into marine waters under U.S. jurisdiction. It is unknown whether marine organisms that migrate through or near Japanese waters to locations where they might subsequently be harvested by U.S. fishermen (possibly some albacore tuna or salmon in the North Pacific) might have been exposed to radiation in or near Japanese waters, or might have consumed prey with accumulated radioactive contaminants.
High levels of radioactive iodine-131 (with a half-life of about 8 days), cesium-137 (with a half-life of about 30 years), and cesium-134 (with a half-life of about 2 years) were measured in seawater adjacent to the Fukushima Dai-ichi site after the March 2011 events. EPA rainfall monitors in California, Idaho, and Minnesota detected trace amounts of radioactive iodine, cesium, and tellurium consistent with the Japanese nuclear incident, at concentrations below any level of concern. It is uncertain how precipitation of radioactive elements from the atmosphere may have affected radiation levels in the marine environment.
Scientists have stated that radiation in the ocean very quickly becomes diluted and would not be a problem beyond the coast of Japan. The same is true of radiation carried by winds. Barring another unanticipated release, radioactive contaminants from Fukushima Dai-ichi should be sufficiently dispersed over time that they will not prove to be a serious health threat elsewhere, unless they bioaccumulate in migratory fish or find their way directly to another part of the world through food or other commercial products.
Radioactive contamination of seafood from the nuclear disaster in Japan has not emerged as a food safety problem for consumers in the United States. According to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the damage to infrastructure in Japan limited food production and associated exports from areas near the Fukushima nuclear facility. FDA and Customs and Border Protection continue to screen imported foods from Japan, including seafood, before they can enter the U.S. food supply.
Based on computer modeling of ocean currents, marine debris from the tsunami produced by the Tohoku earthquake was projected to spread eastward from Japan in the North Pacific Subtropical Gyre. Approximately two to three years after the event, the debris plume was projected to reach the U.S. West Coast, dumping debris on California beaches and the beaches of British Columbia, Alaska, and Baja California. However, initial debris is already arriving. Although most of the radioactive release from Fukushima Dai-ichi is believed to have occurred after the tsunami, there is a slight possibility that some of the tsunami debris might also be contaminated with radiation. A related concern is the transport of nonnative, and potentially invasive, species from Japan to U.S. shores on marine debris. Legislation (H.R. 1171, H.R. 6251, and S. 1119) has been introduced in the 112th Congress to address marine debris concerns. |
crs_R44683 | crs_R44683_0 | Introduction
The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in Congress, or job tenure, is a source of recurring interest among Members of Congress, congressional staff, those who study staffing in the House and Senate, and the public. There may be interest in congressional tenure information from multiple perspectives, including assessment of how a congressional office might oversee human resources issues, how staff might approach a congressional career, and guidance for how frequently staffing changes may occur in various positions. This report provides tenure data for 13 staff position titles that are typically used in House committees, and information for using those data for different purposes. The positions include the following:
Chief Clerk Chief Counsel Communications Director Counsel Deputy Staff Director Minority Professional Staff Member Minority Staff Director Press Secretary Professional Staff Member Senior Professional Staff Member Staff Assistant Staff Director Subcommittee Staff Director
Data Source and Concerns
Publicly available information sources do not provide aggregated congressional staff tenure data in a readily retrievable or analyzable form. House committee staff tenure data were calculated for each year between 2006 and 2016. Presentation of Tenure Data
Tables in this section provide tenure data for selected positions in House committees and detailed data and visualizations for each position. Table 1 provides a summary of staff tenure for selected positions since 2006. The "Trend" column provides information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. A number of staff who stay in a position for only a brief period may depress the average length of tenure. Finally, since each House committee serves as its own hiring authority, variations from committee to committee, which for each position may include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which data provided here might match tenure in a particular office. Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position, appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in nine position titles in House committees. The median tenure was unchanged for four positions. This may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States. Although pay is not the only factor that might affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job, staff in positions that generally pay less typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in higher-paying positions. Some of these lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level positions in some House committees; if so, House office employees in those roles appear to follow national trends for others in entry-level types of jobs, remaining in the role for a relatively short period of time. Similarly, those in more senior positions, which often require a particular level of congressional or other professional experience, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce. | The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in a particular position in Congress—or congressional staff tenure—is a source of recurring interest to Members, staff, and the public. A congressional office, for example, may seek this information to assess its human resources capabilities, or for guidance in how frequently staffing changes might be expected for various positions. Congressional staff may seek this type of information to evaluate and approach their own individual career trajectories. This report presents a number of statistical measures regarding the length of time House committee staff stay in particular job positions. It is designed to facilitate the consideration of tenure from a number of perspectives.
This report provides tenure data for a selection of 13 staff position titles that are typically used in House committee offices, and information on how to use those data for different purposes. The positions include Chief Clerk, Chief Counsel, Communications Director, Counsel, Deputy Staff Director, Minority Professional Staff Member, Minority Staff Director, Press Secretary, Professional Staff Member, Senior Professional Staff Member, Staff Assistant, Staff Director, and Subcommittee Staff Director. House committee staff tenure data were calculated as of March 31, for each year between 2006 and 2016, for all staff in each position. An overview table provides staff tenure for selected positions for 2016, including summary statistics and information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. Other tables provide detailed tenure data and visualizations for each position title.
Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position, appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in nine position titles in House committees. The median tenure was unchanged for four positions. These findings may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States.
Pay may be one of many factors that affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job. House committee staff holding positions that are generally lower-paid typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in generally higher-paying positions. Lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level roles; if so, tenure for House committee employees in these roles appears to follow national trends for other entry-level jobs, which individuals hold for a relatively short period of time. Those in more senior positions, where a particular level of congressional or other professional experience is often required, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce.
Generalizations about staff tenure are limited in some ways, because each House committee serves as its own hiring authority. Variations from office to office, which might include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which data provided here might match tenure in another office. Direct comparisons of congressional employment to the general labor market may have similar limitations. Change in committee leadership, for example, may cause staff tenure periods to end abruptly and unexpectedly.
This report is one of a number of CRS products on congressional staff. Others include CRS Report R43947, House of Representatives Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2016, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42920 | crs_R42920_0 | This report concentrates on motorized recreation on BLM and FS lands. The use of off-highway vehicles (OHVs) on federal lands and waters has been particularly contentious, and lawsuits have challenged their management. BLM and FS managers formulate guidance on the nature and extent of land uses, including OHV use, through regulations, national policies, land and resource management plans, and area-specific decisions. Legislative Activity
Congress has addressed motorized recreation on both BLM and FS lands (as well as other federal lands) through legislation and oversight hearings. A particular focus was on OHV recreation on BLM and FS lands, with issues covering the extent to which additional federal lands should be open to OHV use, agency OHV planning and designation processes, how to achieve balance among OHV and other recreational users of federal lands, the effects of OHV use on nearby communities and the economy more broadly, and sources of funding for OHV use (e.g., state OHV registration programs) and the purposes for which those funds are used. The growing and diverse nature of recreation on BLM lands has increased the challenge of managing different types of recreation, such as low impact (e.g., hiking) and high impact (e.g., OHV) uses. Guidance on OHV use on BLM lands is provided in law, executive orders, and agency regulations and policies. §8340), BLM has been designating public lands as open, limited, or closed to OHV use. Other regulations govern OHV use in particular areas. More recently, in 2011, BLM issued a manual on travel and transportation management, and in 2012 the agency released a related handbook, to cover planning and management of all modes of travel and public access needs. BLM manages transportation on its lands through a process described as Comprehensive Travel and Transportation Management. Goals include providing varied transportation routes for access to BLM lands and providing areas for a variety of motorized and non-motorized forms of recreation, while protecting sensitive areas. Travel and transportation management plans are developed for particular areas. Some of these bills sought to establish recreation areas in general or OHV areas in particular. Other bills provided for conveyances of BLM land for recreation purposes. H.R. In 2005, the FS finalized regulations to require forest plans to identify a system of roads, trails, and areas available for motorized vehicle use and prohibit the use of OHVs and other motorized vehicles outside the designated system. Many of the completed travel management plans have been challenged for either being too restrictive or not restrictive enough. While no general legislation on OHV activities in the national forests was introduced in the 112 th Congress, some measures addressed motorized recreation in areas with existing special designations. Still other 112 th Congress measures sought to designate other types of areas, including Special Management Areas, and govern the use of motorized vehicles in those areas. 4109 contained a variety of provisions relating to motorized recreation in the Los Padres National Forest. The FS also continues to develop accompanying motor vehicle use maps depicting where motor vehicle use is allowed. Agency determinations have been controversial in some areas. For instance, while some have expressed concern that motorized use on federal lands is too restricted to accommodate the recreating public, others have asserted that additional limits are needed to protect federal lands from resource damage. For the FS, bills in the 112 th Congress addressed motorized recreation in areas with special designations, such as wilderness. | The growing and diverse nature of recreation on federal lands has increased the challenge of balancing different types of recreation with each other and with other land uses. Motorized recreation on lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service (FS) has been controversial, with issues centering on access and environmental impacts. Congress, as well as the Administration, has addressed motorized recreation on these federal lands.
The use of off-highway vehicles (OHVs) on FS and BLM land is governed by a number of authorities, including law, executive orders, agency regulations and policies, land management plans, and area-specific decisions. Both agencies decide the extent of allowed OHV use in particular areas through their planning processes. Under BLM regulations, the agency has been designating public lands as open, limited, or closed to OHV use. Similarly, under FS regulations governing OHVs, the FS is designating roads, trails, and areas open for OHV use and prohibiting OHV use outside the designated system. The designations for some BLM and FS lands have been contentious.
BLM also has been addressing motorized recreation as part of a broader effort to manage all modes of travel and public access, including through the issuance of a 2011 manual and a 2012 handbook on travel and transportation management. The goal of BLM's Comprehensive Travel and Transportation Management program is to provide varied transportation routes for access to BLM lands and provide areas for a variety of motorized and non-motorized forms of recreation, while protecting sensitive areas. Travel and transportation management plans are developed for particular areas. Also, in response to recommendations of the Government Accountability Office regarding OHV use on federal lands, BLM has taken actions in areas including planning, law enforcement, and communication with the public.
The FS continues to develop motor vehicle use maps showing where motor vehicle use is allowed, based on its 2005 travel management regulations. These regulations continue to be under debate, with some asserting that they do not sufficiently protect national forest lands from damage resulting from OHVs, and others contending that motorized access is too restricted. Similarly, some of the agency's travel management plans have been challenged for either being too restrictive or not restrictive enough.
One bill with provisions on motorized recreation on FS lands (H.R. 145) has been introduced in the 113th Congress to date. In the 112th Congress, no general legislation on OHV activities on BLM and FS lands was introduced. However, a variety of legislative measures sought to regulate OHV use on particular lands administered by the BLM, the FS, or both agencies. For instance, some measures relating to BLM lands sought to establish recreation areas in general, or OHV areas in particular. Other bills provided for conveyance of BLM land for recreation purposes, including motorized recreation. Measures pertaining to FS lands addressed motorized recreation in areas with special designations, including wilderness. Other FS bills sought to designate other types of areas, such as special management areas and recreation management areas, and govern the use of motorized vehicles in those areas. Other bills contained varied provisions relating to motorized recreation in a particular national forest. |
crs_R41371 | crs_R41371_0 | They are generally classified in two main groups:
Solar radiation management (SRM) method: technologies that would increase the reflectivity, or albedo, of the Earth's atmosphere or surface, and Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) method: technologies or practices that would remove CO 2 and other GHGs from the atmosphere. Other proposed SRM methods are at the conceptualization stage. CDR methods include afforestation, ocean fertilization, and the use of biomass to capture and store carbon. However, if geoengineering technologies are deployed by the United States, another government, or a private entity, several new concerns are likely to arise related to government support for, and oversight of, geoengineering as well as the transboundary and long-term effects of geoengineering. Such was the case in the summer of 2012, when an American citizen conducted a geoengineering experiment (ocean fertilization) off the west coast of Canada that some say violated two international conventions. Geoengineering Governance
Geoengineering technologies aim to modify the Earth's energy balance in order to reduce temperatures and counteract anthropogenic climate change through large-scale and deliberate modifications. Geoengineering technologies attempt to mitigate continued warming of the Earth's climate. CDR methods remove CO 2 from the atmosphere. If proven effective and desirable, SRM methods could be deployed faster than CDR methods should the need arise to cool the planet quickly. SRM methods have been described, theoretically, as cheap, fast, and imperfect. Several questions have yet to be answered: Would the space-based reflectors be deployed to alter the climate at a global or regional level? These concerns include:
the technology is new and unproven, with ongoing and transformative scientific and technical evidence; the impacts of geoengineering activities are uncertain in scope, timing, and intensity; the range of stakeholders potentially affected by geoengineering activities is broad, including most nations, subnational groups, nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and civil societies; the number of actors potentially employing geoengineering activities may be small in comparison to the number of those affected; the global impacts of geoengineering activities—both its benefits and risks—may be unevenly distributed across stakeholders; and the costs of implementing geoengineering activities may be small compared to the economics of their full global impact. The federal government could expand these existing laws to specifically address geoengineering activities or develop new laws. To date, no multilateral treaty has been proposed with the intent of addressing the full spectrum of possible geoengineering activities. The international agreements on climate change are the most likely agreements to have significance for the full spectrum of geoengineering projects because they encourage their parties to implement national policies and mitigation actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. However, these agreements do not currently address geoengineering explicitly. These agreements include:
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) . Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) . In October 2010, the 10 th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD adopted provisions calling for the parties to abstain from geoengineering—including "any technologies that deliberately reduce solar insolution or increase carbon sequestration from the atmosphere on a large scale that may affect biodiversity"—unless the parties have fully considered the risks and impacts of those activities on biodiversity. Currently, many geoengineering technologies are at the conceptual and research stages, and their effectiveness at reducing global temperatures has yet to be proven. Very few studies have been published documenting the cost, environmental effects, socio-political impacts, and legal implications of geoengineering. Nevertheless, if geoengineering technologies are deployed, they are expected to have the potential to cause significant transboundary effects. However, in the United States, there is limited federal involvement in, or oversight of, geoengineering. Fourth, it could work with the international community to craft an international approach to geoengineering by writing or amending international agreements. | Climate change policies at both the national and international levels have traditionally focused on measures to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and to adapt to the actual or anticipated impacts of changes in the climate. As a participant in several international agreements on climate change, the United States has joined with other nations to express concern about climate change. Some recent technological advances and hypotheses, generally referred to as "geoengineering" technologies, have created alternatives to traditional approaches to mitigating climate change. If deployed, these new technologies could modify the Earth's climate on a large scale. Moreover, these new technologies may become available to foreign governments and entities in the private sector to use unilaterally—without authorization from the United States government or an international treaty—as was done in the summer of 2012 when an American citizen conducted an ocean fertilization experiment off the coast of Canada.
The term "geoengineering" describes an array of technologies that aim, through large-scale and deliberate modifications of the Earth's energy balance, to reduce temperatures and counteract anthropogenic climate change. Most of these technologies are at the conceptual and research stages, and their effectiveness at reducing global temperatures has yet to be proven. Moreover, very few studies have been published that document the cost, environmental effects, socio-political impacts, and legal implications of geoengineering. If geoengineering technologies were to be deployed, they are expected to have the potential to cause significant transboundary effects.
In general, geoengineering technologies are categorized as either a carbon dioxide removal (CDR) method or a solar radiation management (SRM) method. CDR methods address the warming effects of greenhouse gases by removing carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere. CDR methods include ocean fertilization, and carbon capture and sequestration. SRM methods address climate change by increasing the reflectivity of the Earth's atmosphere or surface. Aerosol injection and space-based reflectors are examples of SRM methods. SRM methods do not remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, but can be deployed faster with relatively immediate global cooling results compared to CDR methods.
To date, there is limited federal involvement in, or oversight of, geoengineering. However, some states as well as some federal agencies, notably the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Defense, have taken actions related to geoengineering research or projects. At the international level, there is no international agreement or organization governing the full spectrum of possible geoengineering activities. Nevertheless, provisions of many international agreements, including those relating to climate change, maritime pollution, and air pollution, would likely inform the types of geoengineering activities that state parties to these agreements might choose to pursue. In 2010, the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted provisions calling for member parties to abstain from geoengineering unless the parties have fully considered the risks and impacts of those activities on biodiversity.
With the possibility that geoengineering technologies may be developed and that climate change will remain an issue of global concern, policymakers may determine whether geoengineering warrants attention at either the federal or international level. If so, policymakers will also need to consider whether geoengineering can be effectively addressed by amendments to existing laws and international agreements or, alternatively, whether new laws and international treaties would need to be developed. |
crs_R45258 | crs_R45258_0 | Introduction and Overview
The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). President Trump submitted his FY2019 budget proposal to Congress on February 12, 2018. The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill totaled $36.341 billion—$6.878 billion (16%) below the FY2018 appropriation. A $375 million increase (3.5%) was proposed for DOE nuclear weapons activities. In contrast to the Administration proposal, the House and Senate versions of the FY2019 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill (Divison A of H.R. 5895 , H.Rept. 115-697 , S.Rept. 115-258 ) provided total appropriations above the FY2018 level. It was signed by the President on September 21, 2018 ( P.L. 115-244 ). FY2018 Energy and Water Development funding was included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. The FY2019 budget request proposed substantial reductions from the FY2018 level for DOE energy research and development (R&D) programs, including a cut of $1.320 billion (65.5%) in energy efficiency and renewable energy, $224.7 million (30.9%) in fossil fuels, and $448.0 million (37.2%) in nuclear energy. Funding would have been reduced for the Corps by $2.042 billion (29.9%), and Reclamation and CUP by $423.0 million (28.6%). The Senate-passed version of the bill would have increased funding for DOE's weapons activities, established a pilot interim storage facility for nuclear waste, provided nearly level funding for energy efficiency and renewable energy R&D, and continued the Title 17 Loan Guarantee program. The conference report on the FY2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, H.Rept. Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants
The FY2019 budget request proposed to terminate both the DOE Weatherization Assistance Program and the State Energy Program (SEP). However, the proposed FY2019 cuts were not adopted by the House and Senate, and the enacted bill provided a small increase from the FY2018 level. Nuclear Waste Management
The Administration's FY2019 budget request would have provided new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV; a similar funding request for FY2018 was not agreed to by Congress. Under the FY2019 request, DOE was to receive $120 million to seek an NRC license for the repository and to develop interim nuclear waste storage capacity. NRC would have received $47.7 million to consider DOE's application. The House voted to provide the Yucca Mountain funding requested for FY2018 and a $100 million increase for FY2019, but the Senate Appropriations Committee did not include it for FY2018, and it was not included in the Senate-passed bill for FY2019. The enacted FY2019 appropriations measure did not include the House-passed funding for Yucca Mountain or the Senate's nuclear waste pilot program provisions. A similar proposal to eliminate the programs in FY2018 was not enacted. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy
The Trump Administration's FY2019 budget would have eliminated the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), which funds research on technologies that are determined to have potential to transform energy production, storage, and use. The enacted FY2019 appropriations measure increased ARPA-E funding by 3.6%, to $366 million. The conference report directed that DOE "shall not use any appropriated funds to plan or execute the termination of ARPA-E."
Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead
DOE's FY2019 budget documents called for a low-yield version of the W76 LEP (Life Extension Program) nuclear warhead. The White House included $65 million for this modification in a budget amendment package submitted to Congress on April 13, 2018. The House- and Senate-passed bills both included the requested funding for the low-yield warhead, as did the enacted FY2019 appropriations measure. Surplus Plutonium Disposition
The Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which would make fuel for nuclear reactors out of surplus weapons plutonium, has faced sharply escalating construction and operation cost estimates. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 ( P.L. Energy Secretary Rick Perry sent a letter to Congress May 10, 2018, certifying that the cost-saving requirement for termination of MFFF would be met. For FY2019, the House-passed Energy and Water Development appropriations bill included a similar provision to the FY2018 enacted appropriations measure, allowing DOE to terminate MFFF with a cost certification. The enacted FY2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act provided $220 million, the same as the request, to begin shutting down the project. Renegotiation of milestones was also called for in the Trump Administration's FY2018 budget request. Title X of P.L. | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps); the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's total funding.
President Trump submitted his FY2019 budget proposal to Congress on February 12, 2018. The President's budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill totaled $36.341 billion—$6.871 billion (15.9%) below the FY2018 appropriation. A $375 million increase (3.5%) was proposed for DOE nuclear weapons activities. In contrast, the two versions of the FY2019 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill passed by the House and Senate (Division A of H.R. 5895, H.Rept. 115-697, S.Rept. 115-258) provided for total appropriations above the FY2018 level. The enacted FY2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, which was signed into law September 21, 2018 (Division A of P.L. 115-244), increased total funding to $44.660 billion (up 3.3%). FY2018 Energy and Water Development funding was included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141).
Major Energy and Water Development funding issues for FY2019 include the following:
Water Agency Funding Reductions. The Trump Administration requested reductions of 29.9% for the Corps and 28.6% for Reclamation for FY2019. Those cuts were largely not followed by the House and Senate or the enacted FY2019 appropriations measure (P.L. 115-244). Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants. DOE's Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy Program would have been terminated under the FY2019 budget request. Congress did not eliminate the grants for FY2018 and the proposed cuts were not included in the FY2019 House and Senate bills or the enacted appropriation. Reductions in Energy Research and Development. Under the FY2019 budget request, DOE research and development appropriations would have been reduced for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE) by 65.5%, nuclear energy by 37.2%, and fossil energy by 30.9%. The House and Senate bills largely did not include the proposed reductions. P.L. 115-244 increased R&D funding for fossil energy by 1.8% from the FY2018 level, energy efficiency and renewable energy by 2.5%, and nuclear energy by 10.0%. Nuclear Waste Repository. The Administration's budget request would have provided new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. DOE would have received $110 million to seek an NRC license for the repository, and NRC was to receive $47.7 million to consider DOE's application. DOE would also have received $10 million to develop interim nuclear waste storage facilities. The House bill included an additional $100 million for DOE above the request for Yucca Mountain licensing. The Senate bill provided no Yucca Mountain funds, nor did the enacted FY2019 appropriations measure. A similar Administration funding request for FY2018 also was not enacted. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E). The Trump Administration proposed to eliminate funds for new research projects by ARPA-E in FY2019, and called for terminating the program after currently funded projects were completed. The House approved an 8.0% cut and the Senate voted for a 6.1% increase. The enacted FY2019 appropriations measure boosted ARPA-E funding by 3.6%. A similar proposal to terminate ARPA-E in FY2018 was also not enacted. Low-Yield Warhead. DOE's FY2019 budget documents proposed a low-yield version of the W76 LEP nuclear warhead. DOE's initial FY2019 budget request did not include any funding specifically allocated to this modification, but the White House requested $65 million for it in a budget amendment package submitted to Congress on April 13, 2018. The House- and Senate-passed bills both included the requested funding for the low-yield warhead, as does the enacted FY2019 appropriations measure. Plutonium Disposition Plant Termination. The Administration proposed in FY2018 and FY2019 to terminate construction of the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which would make fuel for nuclear reactors out of surplus weapons plutonium. The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act conformed to provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-91) that allow DOE to pursue an alternative plutonium disposal program if sufficient cost savings are projected. The enacted FY2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act also conformed to the Defense Authorization provisions and provided $220 million, the same as the request, to begin shutting down the South Carolina project. The Administration certified under P.L. 115-91 on May 10, 2018, that the cost-saving requirement for termination of MFFF would be met, although the certification has been challenged in court. |
crs_RL32383 | crs_RL32383_0 | Background
A particularly interesting facet of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L.107-71 ) is the security screening opt-out provision (Sec. 108) that allows airports, with the approvalof the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to implement a system using private screenersin lieu of federal screeners to inspect airline passengers and baggage beginning in November 2004. (11) Airports generally viewed their role in aviation security assignificantly increasing following September 11, 2001. Another option thatairports would like to be able to consider is a hybrid model where TSA screeners could besupplemented by private screeners during peak periods to meet needs for a more flexible workforce. Finally, airports have expressed continuing concern over funding allocations for airportscreening. Privatization advocates argue that TSA's long term role should be focused on the followingfunctions, leaving the day-to-day airport security operations in the hands of private security firms,as the opt-out program provides for:
Developing aviation security specifications;
Sponsoring aviation security research and development;
Coordinating intelligence sharing between federal agencies and the aviationcommunity; and
Conducting oversight and monitoring performance of a unified, airport-runsecurity system. Evaluating the Ongoing Private Screening Pilot Program
In order to examine the relative cost and effectiveness of private screening, ATSA containeda provision establishing a pilot program using private screeners at five airports. However, the implementation of theprivate screening program has not been without criticism. First, the limited scope of the pilot program raises concern that inferences drawn fromcomparing these five airports to other airports under the federal screening system may not trulyrepresent differences between private screening contracts and federal screening operations, but maysimply reflect airport specific characteristics unique to the sites chosen for the pilot program. This is not to say that assessments of the pilot program airports cannot reveal valuableinsights and data to assist airports in identifying many of the pros and cons of private screeningoperations, and perhaps identify certain elements of private screening operations that may be usefulin developing proposals for participation in the opt-out program. (49)
The evaluation compared each of the five pilot program locations to 5 or 6 comparableairports where federal screeners are currently deployed. On the one hand, advocates for privatizing screening operations may highlight the lack ofdemonstrated differences in performance between federal and private screeners as an indicator thatsecurity effectiveness will be maintained under private screening contracts. Screening Performance. In order to successfully implement the opt-out program, TSA will likely have to develop asystem for evaluating private screening firms that is legally defensible. Private Screening Operations. | A provision in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71 § 108; 115Stat. 611) permits each airport where federal screeners are currently deployed to request privatescreeners instead of federal screeners starting in November 2004. A pilot program created by theact was established at five airports to examine the advantages and disadvantages of private airportscreening. Concerns have been raised, however, that the pilot program may provide too small asample and, as currently implemented, is too similar in design to the federal screening function tomake a valid comparison of federal and private screening, and that the pilot program airports maynot serve as ideal models for future private screening systems. Also, no regulatory framework orguidelines currently exist for evaluating private screening proposals and overseeing private screeningfirms. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is currently working on these and expectsto have preliminary information for airports on the program's implementation by mid-May 2004.
Many airports have expressed interest in pursuing private screening options but believe that legal protections, program flexibility to adapt to local needs, and stable funding mechanisms areneeded for successful implementation. Other issues to be addressed regarding private screening arerelated to how private screening entities will interface with federal aviation security functions suchas intelligence gathering and data sharing, and deployment of new screening technologies. Theeffect of private screening on the security screening workforce is also a critical issue, since highturnover rates among screeners before September 11, 2001, were a key factor in the decision tocreate a federal screening workforce under ATSA.
Implementation of the security screening opt-out provision is likely to be an issue ofconsiderable interest during the remainder of the 108th Congress. While privatization advocates arecalling for an expansion of the opt-out provision to allow for greater program flexibility and lessfederal control of private airport screening, advocates for federal control of aviation security viewa return to private screening as a move that could reintroduce deficiencies in aviation security thatexisted before the federalization of passenger screening under ATSA.
This report will be updated as warranted by events. |
crs_R41613 | crs_R41613_0 | 112-237 ( S. 3687 ), including language (1) directing the Secretary of the Interior to convey the McKinney Lake National Fish Hatchery to the state of North Carolina and (2) exempting from the Lacey Act certain water transfers by the North Texas Municipal Water District and the Greater Texoma Utility Authority for zebra mussel control. 2838 ), including provisions (1) clarifying restrictions on American Fisheries Act vessels; (2) creating a maritime environmental and technical assistance program, with one focus being research, development, assessment, and deployment of emerging marine technologies and practices related to controlling aquatic invasive species; (3) amending the Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and Reduction Act, including adding language defining a severe marine debris event and directing that a determination for such an event be made for the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami and for Hurricane Sandy; and (4) extending the authorization to engage foreign citizens in the U.S. distant water tuna fleet and give distant water tuna vessels in the western Pacific Ocean the option of using Guam as their required port of call. Such unilateral action occurred when the United States enacted the Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA), later renamed the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act and more recently the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA), ushering in a new era of federal marine fishery management. P.L. P.L. Sport Fisheries
P.L. P.L. P.L. 112-141 extended the authority to make expenditures from the Highway Trust Fund and other trust funds, including various programs under the Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund, through FY2014. 112-74 authorized the Corps of Engineers to take emergency measures to exclude Asian carp from the Great Lakes. 4348 ) created a Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund to promote consumption of Gulf of Mexico seafood as well as efforts to achieve long-term sustainability of the ecosystem, fish stocks, fish habitat, and the recreational, commercial, and charter fishing industry in the Gulf of Mexico. Aquaculture
Background
Aquaculture is broadly defined as the farming or husbandry of fish, shellfish, and other aquatic animals and plants, usually in a controlled or selected environment. Aquaculture Issues in the 112th Congress
The 112 th Congress considered a number of measures related to aquaculture. P.L. 112-55 included a provision directing the National Aquatic Animal Health Task Force to establish an infectious salmon anemia research program . P.L. 112-74 included a provision authorizing the Corps of Engineers to transfer to the Fish and Wildlife Service as much as $3,800,000 for National Fish Hatcheries in FY2012 to mitigate for fisheries lost due to Corps of Engineers projects. 5931 would have authorized and required the Fish and Wildlife Service to charge federal agencies for mitigation services provided by National Fish Hatcheries and other related facilities. The MMPA also authorizes the taking of marine mammals incidental to commercial fishing operations. The eastern tropical Pacific tuna fishery initially was excluded from the incidental take regimes. Additional Marine Mammal Issues in the 112th Congress
Legislation was introduced in the 112 th Congress to address several other issues related to marine mammals generally. Marine Mammal Commission
The Marine Mammal Commission (MMC) is an independent agency of the executive branch, established under Title II of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA; P.L. | Fish and marine mammals are important resources in open ocean and nearshore coastal areas; many federal laws and regulations guide their management as well as the management of their habitat. Aquaculture or fish farming enterprises seek to supplement food traditionally provided by wild harvests.
Commercial and sport fishing are jointly managed by the federal government and individual states. States generally have jurisdiction within 3 miles of the coast. Beyond state jurisdiction and out to 200 miles in the federal exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the federal government (National Marine Fisheries Service, NMFS) manages fisheries under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) through eight regional fishery management councils. Beyond 200 miles, the United States participates in numerous international agreements.
Some of the fishery measures enacted by the 112th Congress included bills with provisions to (1) authorize the Corps of Engineers to take emergency measures to exclude Asian carp from the Great Lakes (P.L. 112-74); (2) create a Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund to promote efforts to achieve long-term sustainability of the ecosystem, fish stocks, fish habitat, and the recreational, commercial, and charter fishing industry in the Gulf of Mexico (P.L. 112-141); (3) extend the authority to make expenditures from the Highway Trust Fund under the Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund, through FY2014 (also P.L. 112-141); (4) extend the authorization to engage foreign citizens in the U.S. distant water tuna fleet and give distant water tuna vessels the option of using Guam as their required port of call (P.L. 112-213); and (5) amend the Marine Debris Research, Prevention, and Reduction Act, to define a severe marine debris event and direct that a determination for such an event be made for the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami and for Hurricane Sandy (also P.L. 112-213).
Aquaculture—the farming of fish, shellfish, and other aquatic animals and plants in a controlled environment—is expanding rapidly abroad, yet with little growth in the United States. In the United States, important species cultured include catfish, salmon, shellfish, and trout. Some of the aquaculture measures enacted by the 112th Congress included bills with provisions to (1) direct the National Aquatic Animal Health Task Force to establish an infectious salmon anemia research program (P.L. 112-55); (2) authorize the Corps of Engineers to transfer funds to the Fish and Wildlife Service for National Fish Hatcheries in FY2012 to mitigate for fisheries lost due to Corps of Engineers projects (P.L. 112-74); and (3) direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey the McKinney Lake National Fish Hatchery to the state of North Carolina (P.L. 112-237).
Marine mammals are protected under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). With few exceptions, the MMPA prohibits harm or harassment ("take") of marine mammals, unless permits are obtained. It also addresses specific situations of concern, such as dolphin mortality associated with the eastern tropical Pacific tuna fishery. Other than annual appropriations, no marine mammal legislation was enacted by the 112th Congress.
The level of appropriations for fisheries, aquaculture/hatchery, and marine mammal programs administered by NMFS and the Fish and Wildlife Service was a recurring issue during the 112th Congress due to pressures to reduce federal spending. |
crs_R44255 | crs_R44255_0 | After the recent financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank; P.L. 111-203 ), a wide-ranging package of regulatory reform legislation. Some provisions mandated new securities regulations expanding required corporate disclosures to the SEC and the investing public. In subsequent congressional sessions, some Members have depicted various provisions of the act, including several requiring new corporate disclosures, as excessive regulation. Enacted in the 112 th Congress, the Jumpstart Our Businesses Startup Act of 2012 (JOBS Act; P.L. 112-106 ) generally reflected a different regulatory strategy than did Dodd-Frank. The 114 th Congress is currently considering securities legislation that in many instances would extend the JOBS Act's focus on providing corporate regulatory relief to foster capital formation. This report examines selected securities-related legislation that has been marked up by committee or has seen floor action in the 114 th Congress. 1334 (which passed the House on July 14, 2015), Section 601 of S. 1484 , and Section 971 of S. 1910 . Require the SEC to evaluate and vote on all "significant regulations" within the first 5 years after enactment and then every 10 years thereafter: H.R. Require the SEC to provide a legal safe harbor for research reports issued by brokers or dealers on Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) so that these reports are not considered securities "offers" and thus proscribed under federal securities laws: H.R. Amend the SEC's Form S-3 registration statement to give smaller reporting companies greater access to that shelf registration protocol (registering a new securities issue in advance so that later it can be quickly offered to the public during favorable market conditions): H.R. 114-94, Title LXXXV; H.R. 37, Title III; H.R. Modernizing SEC Disclosures (P.L. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. 3032 would repeal the requirement that the SEC annually report to Congress on the number of times that it sought the customer records of financial institutions. H.R. H.R. In July 2013, as required by the JOBS Act, the SEC adopted rules that lifted the historical ban on general solicitation and advertising (public marketing) of private placements under Rule 506 of Reg D.
As part of this, the agency also issued a separate proposal that would subject issuers using the Reg D exemption to additional requirements, including (1) requiring issuers to file a single Form D (i.e., the document issuers file with the SEC to facilitate the Reg D exemption) no later than 15 days after the first sale of securities in an offering (as currently required) and an additional Form D filing at least 15 days before engaging in general solicitation for an offering and updated information on their Form D filing within 30 days of completing an offering; (2) disqualifying an issuer for one year from obtaining a Reg D Form 506 exemption if the company has not complied with earlier Form D filing requirements for a Rule 506 offering; (3) requiring issuers adhere to certain cautionary statements in general solicitation materials used in a Rule 506 offerings to alert potential investors that an offering is confined to accredited investors and that such offerings may have certain risks; and (4) extending Rule 156 under the Securities Act of 1933, which gives guidance regarding the sales literature provided by SEC-registered investment companies, such as mutual funds, that could be fraudulent or misleading to the literature provided by private funds (such as hedge funds, venture capital funds, and private equity funds). 4852 as reported by the House Financial Services Committee ( H.Rept. H.R. Regulatory Relief for Investment Advisers (H.R. H.R. 114-504 ). H.R. H.R. 5421 ( H.Rept. 5424 ( H.Rept. | In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203), a wide-ranging package of regulatory reform legislation. Some provisions mandated new securities regulations that expanded required corporate disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the investing public. Some Members of Congress have characterized provisions of the act, including several requiring additional corporate disclosures, as excessive regulation.
Enacted in the 112th Congress, the Jumpstart Our Businesses Startup Act of 2012 (JOBS Act; P.L. 112-106) generally reflected a different regulatory strategy than did the Dodd-Frank Act. The legislation was broadly aimed at stimulating corporate capital formation, particularly for newer and smaller firms. It largely attempts to do so by giving such firms regulatory relief from various SEC disclosures generally required by federal securities laws.
Congress is currently considering securities legislation that in many instances would extend the JOBS Act's focus on corporate regulatory relief. The securities bills examined in this report have been reported by committee or have been approved in floor action in the 114th Congress. Most attempt to foster capital formation, potentially trading off some disclosure-based investor protections. Such bills include the following:
H.R. 22/P.L. 114-94 (Titles LXXIIV, LXXIV, LXXXI, and LXXXV) H.R. 37 (Titles III, VI, VII, IX, X, XI; passed the House) H.R. 414 (H.Rept. 114-504) H.R. 1334 (passed the House) H.R. 2064 (passed the House) H.R. 432 (passed the House) H.R. 1525 (passed the House) H.R. 1675 (H.Rept. 114-398) H.R. 1723 (passed the House) H.R. 1839 (passed the House) H.R. 1965 (H.Rept. 114-399) S. 1484 (Sections 601, 602, 604; reported from the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee without written report) S. 1910 (Sections 971, 972, 974; S.Rept. 114-97)
In addition to bills that reduce disclosure requirements, a number of other bills addressing securities regulation have been reported from committee or taken up on the floor. H.R. 1975 would require the agency to award certain SEC-regulated trading-related entities (such as NASDAQ) future credit for earlier excessive fees that they paid the agency. H.R. 2354 would require the SEC to evaluate and vote on all "significant regulations" within the first 5 years after enactment and then every 10 years thereafter. H.R. 2356 would require the SEC to provide a legal safe harbor for research reports issued by brokers or dealers on Exchange Traded Funds. H.R. 2357 would amend the SEC's Form S-3 (shelf) registration statement to give companies with public floats (i.e., regular shares that a company has issued to the public and are available for investor trades) below $75 million greater access to that registration protocol. H.R. 3032 would repeal a requirement that the SEC annually report to Congress on how often it sought financial institutions' customer records. |
crs_RL32799 | crs_RL32799_0 | Recent Developments
The Bush Administration requested $132.4 billion in federal research and development(R&D) funding for FY2006. This sum represents a $400 million increase over the FY2005 estimatedfunding level of $132 billion. CRS estimates that Congress has approved a record $135.7 billion forfederal R&D in FY2006, a 2.8% increase over the FY2005 estimated funding level. However, nearlyall of that increase can be attributed to increases in defense weapons systems and the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration's $877 million increase for human space explorationtechnology. (6)
Basic research funding would decline by 0.5% below the FY2005 estimated level, decliningto an estimated $26.7 billion in FY2006. Five agencies account for 90% of all federal basic researchexpenditures. Total federal research funding (the sum of basic and applied research) is projected toincrease $1 billion to $57 billion. However, the majority of that increase would go to NASA, whilemost of the remaining federal agencies would receive below inflation increases for research funding. While the President essentially requested flat funding for the Department of Defense (DOD)R&D programs, Congress approved an estimated $ 72.1 billion DOD R&D, a 4.2 % increase overFY2005 funding levels. Most of that increase is a result of Congress increasing DOD's proposedS&T budget by $2.5 billion more than was requested by the Administration. Funding for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) would decline, in nominal dollars forthe first time in 36 years. Since the completion of doubling NIH's budget (between 1998-2003),funding has declined to the FY2003 funding level, after adjusting for inflation. Most R&D funding agencies now face budgets that are shrinking to levels of years past, inreal dollars. While it has been 24 years since NIH's budget declined in real dollars, other agenciessuch as the National Science Foundation, DOE's Office of Science, NASA (excluding human spaceexploration), and Agriculture, have lived with stagnate budgets for several years. Consequently, inreal dollars, all of these agencies will have less R&D funding in FY2006 than they did in FY2003. | The Bush Administration requested $132.4 billion in federal research and development(R&D) funding for FY2006. This sum represents a $400 million increase over the FY2005 estimatedfunding level of $132 billion. CRS estimates that Congress has approved a record $135.7 billion forfederal R&D in FY2006, a 2.8% increase over the FY2005 estimated funding level. However, nearlyall of that increase can be attributed to increases in defense weapons systems and the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration's $877 million increase for human space explorationtechnology. (1) (See Table13)
Basic research funding would decline by 0.5% below the FY2005 estimated level, decliningto an estimated $26.7 billion in FY2006. Five agencies account for 90% of all federal basic researchexpenditures. Total federal research funding (the sum of basic and applied research) is projected toincrease $1 billion to $57 billion. However, the majority of that increase would go to NASA, whilemost of the remaining federal agencies would receive below inflation increases for research funding.
While the President essentially requested flat funding for the Department of Defense (DOD)R&D programs, Congress approved an estimated $ 72.1 billion DOD R&D, a 4.2 % increase overFY2005 funding levels. Most of that increase is a result of Congress increasing DOD's proposedscience and technology budget by $2.5 billion more than was requested by the Administration.
Funding for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) would decline, in nominal dollars forthe first time in 36 years. Since the completion of doubling NIH's budget (between 1998-2003),funding has declined to the FY2003 funding level, after adjusting for inflation.
Most R&D funding agencies now face budgets that are shrinking to levels of years past, inreal dollars. While it has been 24 years since NIH's budget declined in real dollars, other agenciessuch as the National Science Foundation, DOE's Office of Science, NASA (excluding human spaceexploration), and Agriculture, have lived with stagnate budgets for several years. Consequently, inreal dollars, all of these agencies will have less R&D funding in FY2006 than they did in FY2003. |
crs_RS21442 | crs_RS21442_0 | While both initiatives aimed to increase fuel efficiency of the automotive fleet, FreedomCAR extended the time frame by another 10 to 15 years and focused research on hydrogen fuel cell vehicles; PNGV focused mainly on diesel-fueled hybrid vehicles. The mission of the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative is to "research, develop, and validate fuel cells and hydrogen production, delivery, and storage technologies for transportation and stationary applications." Debate Over the Initiatives
The creation of FreedomCAR and the President's Hydrogen Fuel Initiatives have raised debate over several issues. These issues include the proper role of the government in R&D, as well as the proper level of funding, and concerns over energy efficiency and fuel consumption. | FreedomCAR and the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative are two complementary government-industry research and development (R&D) policy initiatives that promote the development of hydrogen fuel and fuel cell vehicles. Coordinated by the Department of Energy (DOE), these initiatives aim to make mass-market fuel cell and hydrogen combustion vehicles available at an affordable cost within 10 to 15 years from the launch of the initiatives. However, questions have been raised about the design and goals of the initiatives. This report discusses the organization, funding, and goals of the FreedomCAR and Fuel partnerships, and issues for Congress. |
crs_R42512 | crs_R42512_0 | Introduction
Pressure is building for passenger train use of freight railroad rights of way. Amtrak, the federally owned rail passenger operator, has eminent domain power over freight railroad facilities and can appeal to a federal adjudicator, the Surface Transportation Board (STB), to determine the terms of its access to freight railroad track. As passenger operators other than Amtrak have no statutory leverage when negotiating with freight railroads, they have little control over the price of access and may have no recourse if freight railroads reject their proposals. The tension between commuter and freight use of track was highlighted during mark-up of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-432 ). During House committee mark-up, a provision (§401) to require binding arbitration when commuter rail authorities and freight railroads fail to reach agreement over access proved controversial. The committee chose instead to require non-binding arbitration, leaving the possibility that the public authority might be unable to implement a proposed commuter-rail project. In the 112 th Congress, the Senate-passed version of surface transportation reauthorization legislation ( S. 1813 ) calls for the U.S. Department of Transportation to evaluate the best means to enhance intercity passenger service in shared-use rail corridors and to survey processes for resolving disputes over passenger access. Some Members of Congress have urged greater reliance on private companies to provide intercity rail services similar to those offered by Amtrak, but such private services may be difficult to develop so long as potential operators lack Amtrak's statutory right to compel freight railroads to allow passenger trains to use their tracks. Freight railroads can be expected to object to such initiatives as unfair "takings" of their private property. The freight railroad's requirements would severely curtail passenger rail operations. Railroads: Public Purposes but Private Property
Mandating passenger-train access to freight rights of way raises old but recurring arguments about the fundamental nature of privately owned railroads. A long line of court decisions holds that while railroads are not charities, neither are they completely like other businesses that are free to operate solely for profit maximization. In other words, while railroad rights of way are private property, there is substantial case law that has infused them with a public interest or a public duty component. In their charters, the government often gave railroads eminent domain power. These cases are important to present-day concerns about public access to freight railroad rights of way because eventually they established three important principles:
the public does have a right to some amount of control over rights of way; this public control is vested predominantly in the federal government, not the states, because railroads are intrinsically an inter state means of commerce; this control does not give the public the right to confiscate. Given the increasing demands on urban rail corridors, Congress may wish to consider alternatives for managing them. Thus, the fundamental issue is whether freight railroads and prospective passenger rail authorities should negotiate over the price of railroad property just as any private parties would or whether an independent, but governmental, third party, such as the STB, should have some role in determining the terms of sale. Given that a public service obligation is still attached to railroads, albeit largely lifted with respect to passenger service, do freight railroads have the right to solely set the price for passenger access or should the public's convenience and necessity be given some consideration? Creating track access rights for potential private operators of rail service may be a particularly thorny issue. | Pressure is building for greater passenger use of freight railroad rights of way. Freight railroad rights of way are owned by private, for-profit corporations, and the routes potentially most useful for passenger service are typically the busiest with freight traffic. In many cases, states or commuter rail authorities have reached agreement with freight railroads to share either their track or right of way. However, unlike Amtrak, which has eminent domain power over freight facilities and can appeal to a federal agency to determine the terms of its access to freight track, other would-be passenger rail operators do not have any statutory leverage when negotiating with freight railroads. This likely increases the price public authorities pay for access and leaves them with no apparent recourse when freight railroads reject their offers.
During House committee mark-up of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-432), a provision to require binding arbitration when commuter rail authorities and freight railroads fail to reach agreement over access proved controversial. The committee chose instead to require non-binding arbitration. Some Members of Congress have urged greater reliance on private companies to provide intercity rail services similar to those offered by Amtrak, but such private services may be difficult to develop so long as potential operators lack Amtrak's statutory right to compel freight railroads to carry passenger trains. Freight railroads can be expected to object to such initiatives as unfair "takings" of their private property. In the 112th Congress, the version of surface transportation legislation passed by the Senate (S. 1813) calls for a federal study to evaluate passenger service in shared-use rail corridors and to survey processes for resolving disputes over passenger access.
Passenger access to freight railroad track raises old but recurring questions about the fundamental nature of railroad rights of way. Railroads are not like other businesses that are free to decide how and where they allocate resources solely on the principle of maximizing shareholder returns. While railroad rights of way are private property, more than a century of case law has upheld a public duty on them. The public nature of railroads is evident from the fact that they were designated as "common carriers," granted eminent domain power, and regulated by government. However, the private interest of railroads is protected by the limitation that the government's right to regulate does not mean the right to confiscate. Railroad rights of way, unlike highways, were not considered part of the "public domain." When competition from other modes eroded passenger rail travel, it was confirmed that the public duty attached to railroads could obligate them to operate some trains at a loss, provided the railroad's overall operations were profitable.
The issue for Congress is whether freight railroads and prospective passenger rail authorities should negotiate over the terms of use of railroad property just as any private parties would or if a governmental third party, such as the federal Surface Transportation Board (STB), should have some role in determining the terms. Given that a public service obligation is still attached to railroads, albeit largely lifted with respect to passenger service, do freight railroads have the right to set the price for passenger access unilaterally, or should the public's convenience and necessity be given some consideration? Granting track access rights to potential private operators of passenger service could be a particularly thorny issue. Given the increasing demands on urban rail corridors, Congress might examine alternative methods for managing them. A public "rail port authority" might have some advantages over private railroads in optimizing an urban rail network. |
crs_R43472 | crs_R43472_0 | The federal budget is central to Congress's ability to exercise its "power of the purse." Recent economic turmoil put a strain on the federal budget due to declining revenues and increasing spending levels. Subsequently, policies enacted to restrain spending, along with a recovering economy, have improved the budget outlook, at least in the near term. In August 2011, budget negotiations resulted in the enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. This report will track legislative events related to the federal budget and will be updated as budgetary legislation moves through Congress. Overview
Each fiscal year Congress and the President undertake a variety of steps intended to set levels of spending and revenue and to make policy decisions. 112-25 ) and further modified by the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA; P.L. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. Subsequently, two pieces of legislation have revised this law. 112-25 ) was enacted on August 2, 2011. The BCA contained a variety of measures intended to reduce the deficit by at least $2.1 trillion over the FY2012-FY2021 period, along with a mechanism to increase the debt limit. These changes allow for more discretionary spending than was provided under the BCA for FY2014 and FY2015. Various deficit reduction measures were included to offset the cost of the increased discretionary spending. Budget for FY2015
The Obama Administration released its FY2015 budget in two parts—the first on March 4, 2014, and the second on March 10, 2014. Congress has also begun its consideration of the FY2015 budget. The budget proposes to eliminate the sequester on mandatory programs in FY2015. In his budget, President Obama proposes an "Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative" to provide additional funding for unspecified discretionary programs in FY2015. For FY2015, the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) contained a provision directing the House and Senate Budget Committee Chairmen to file spending and revenue levels in the Congressional Record that would be enforceable in the same manner as a concurrent budget resolution. However, nothing would preclude Congress from acting on a budget resolution for FY2015 even after levels have been filed. It has been reported that Senate Budget Committee Chairwoman Patty Murray has signaled that the provisions contained in the BBA make a budget resolution for FY2015 unnecessary. House Budget Resolution
On April 2, 2014, the House Budget Committee reported a budget resolution ( H.Con.Res. On April 10, 2014, the resolution was agreed to by the House by a vote of 219 to 205. Even as Congress and the President worked to enact deficit reduction legislation (i.e., the BCA), legislators are seen not to have made significant changes to the part of the budget that is projected to grow. CBO, GAO, and the Administration agree that the current mix of federal fiscal policies is unsustainable in the long term. | The federal budget is central to Congress's ability to exercise its "power of the purse." Each fiscal year Congress and the President undertake a variety of steps intended to set levels of spending and revenue and to make policy decisions. The purpose of this report is to provide an overview and background on the current budget debate. This report will track legislative events related to the federal budget and will be updated as budgetary legislation moves through Congress.
In recent years, policies enacted to restrain spending, along with a stronger economy, have led to reductions in the budget deficit. On August 2, 2011, the President signed into law the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). The BCA contained a variety of measures intended to reduce the deficit by at least $2.1 trillion over the FY2012-FY2021 period, along with a mechanism to increase the debt limit. Two subsequent pieces of legislation have modified the BCA since it was enacted—the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA; P.L. 113-67). Both pieces of legislation allow for more discretionary spending than was provided under the BCA for FY2013, FY2014, and FY2015. Various deficit reduction measures were included to offset the costs of the changes to spending levels in both ATRA and the BBA. The BCA and the BBA will continue to affect spending levels in FY2015 and beyond as Congress may debate whether or not to enact further changes.
The Obama Administration released its FY2015 budget in two parts—the first on March 4, 2014, and the second on March 10, 2014. In his budget, President Obama proposes an "Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative" to provide additional funding for unspecified discretionary programs in FY2015. The budget also proposes to eliminate the BCA sequester on mandatory programs in FY2015. These proposals yield a deficit for FY2015 that is slightly higher than what is currently projected in the CBO baseline.
Congressional consideration of FY2015 budget and appropriations legislation has already begun. The BBA contained a provision directing the House and Senate Budget Committee chairmen to file spending and revenue levels in the Congressional Record that would be enforceable in the same manner as a concurrent budget resolution for FY2015 if an agreement on a budget resolution could not be reached by April 15, 2014. However, nothing would preclude Congress from acting on a budget resolution for FY2015 even after those levels have been filed. It has been reported that Senate Budget Committee Chairman Patty Murray has signaled that the provisions contained in the BBA make a budget resolution for FY2015 unnecessary. On April 10, 2014, the House agreed to a budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 96, 113th Congress) by a vote of 219 to 205.
Though the federal budget deficit has fallen in recent years, CBO, GAO, and the Administration agree that current federal fiscal policies are unsustainable in the long term. Projections indicate that putting the federal budget on a sustainable long-term path will require an agreement on additional deficit reduction. Such an agreement could include increases in revenues, changes to large spending programs, or some combination of the two. |
crs_R41312 | crs_R41312_0 | Summary of the Agreement
On May 5, 2010, President Obama transmitted the text of a renewal of the U.S.-Australian civilian nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress for approval, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement would promote U.S. national security. Therefore, the agreement will enter into effect after a 30-day consultation period and a review period of 60 days of continuous session, unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval. Congress also has the option of adopting either a joint resolution of approval with (or without) conditions or standalone legislation that could approve or disapprove the agreement. The required congressional review period was reached on December 3, 2010, allowing for entry into force of the agreement. governs significant nuclear cooperation between the United States and other states. The United States has agreements for civil nuclear cooperation in place with almost 50 countries. The House passed H.R. 6411 by voice vote on November 30, 2010. 6411 would have approved the agreement notwithstanding the congressional review requirements of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. The U.S. Senate has not yet voted on ratification of this treaty. Australia's Nuclear Capacity
Although Australia is a major uranium exporter, it does not have any uranium enrichment plants, fuel fabrication facilities, or nuclear power plants. R&D Activities
Research Reactors
Australia currently operates one research reactor. In 1999, the United States and Australia signed an agreement that allowed for the transfer of SILEX technology to the United States. | Australia and the United States have cooperated in the peaceful use of nuclear energy since the mid-1950s. The framework for this cooperation is a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement as required by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. President Obama transmitted the text of the latest renewal agreement to Congress on May 5, 2010, along with the required Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) and his determination that the agreement promotes U.S. national security. Congress had 30 days of continuous session for consultations with the Administration, followed by an additional 60 days of continuous session to review the agreement. If not opposed by a joint resolution of disapproval or other legislation, then the agreement is considered approved at the end of this time period. Congress also has the option of adopting either a joint resolution of approval with (or without) conditions or standalone legislation that could approve or disapprove the agreement. On November 30, 2010, the House passed H.R. 6411 by voice vote. The bill would have approved the agreement even if the required congressional review period is not reached. The Senate has not yet acted on its version of the bill (S. 3844). The required congressional review period was reached on December 3, 2010.
The United States and Australia first concluded a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement in 1957. That agreement was updated in 1979. Australia sells around 36% of its $1 billion in uranium exports to the United States. The United States is also a major processor of Australian uranium sold to other countries. Australia does not currently possess any nuclear power plants, but it operates one research reactor. |
crs_RL32352 | crs_RL32352_0 | Introduction and Background
Located in the Executive Office of the President, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to coordinate the federal government's War on Drugs. The principal responsibilities of the Director of ONDCP, who is often referred to as the "drug czar," include
establishing policies, objectives, and priorities for the National Drug Control program; annually promulgating the National Drug Control Strategy and coordinating and overseeing the strategy's implementation by the respective drug control agencies of the federal government; making recommendations to the President regarding changes in the organization, management, budgets, and allocation of federal personnel engaged in drug enforcement; consulting with and assisting state and local governments with respect to their relations with federal drug control agencies and programs; appearing before committees and subcommittees of Congress to represent the drug policies of the executive branch; and notifying any federal drug control agency if its policies are not in compliance with the National Drug Control Strategy and transmitting a copy of the notification to the President. 6344 , the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, was signed into law ( P.L. 109 - 469 ) on December 29, 2006, reauthorizing ONDCP through FY2010. Legislative Activities in the 111th Congress
Senate Confirmation of New ONDCP Leadership
The nomination of Seattle police chief R. Gil Kerlikowske to be Director of National Drug Control Policy in the Obama Administration was received in the Senate on March 16, 2009, and referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. He went on to state, "There will be a renewed focus on evidence-based approaches to reduce demand for drugs, through prevention as well as treatment." The full Senate considered and approved his nomination by a vote of 91-1 on May 7, 2009. On April 10, 2009, President Obama announced his selection of A. Thomas McLellan to be Deputy Director of ONDCP. Reauthorization bills therefore will likely be introduced and considered by the 111 th Congress. In his opening statement, Chairman Kucinich set forth issues concerning "ONDCP's accountability and overall effectiveness" to be covered at the hearing, including
the lack of transparency and accountability at ONDCP, which impairs ONDCP's and Congress's ability to determine which federal drug control programs are effective in combating drug abuse; the failure of ONDCP to include in the national drug control budget "all funding requests for any drug control activity, including costs attributable to drug law enforcement activities such as prosecuting and incarcerating federal drug law offenders," as required by the reauthorization act; ONDCP's unwillingness "to comply with the standards of accountability Congress has imposed" in providing Congress with the reports mandated by the reauthorization act; the difficulty faced by Congress in determining whether progress is being made in combating drug abuse because ONDCP "doesn't employ consistent or useful performance measures and frequently shifts its policy goals"; and the imbalance in the national drug control budget between supply-side programs (such as source-country eradication and interdiction) and demand-side initiatives (such as prevention and treatment), with the supply side receiving a growing share of the budget "despite research that demonstrates that demand-side approaches are generally more cost-effective than supply-side approaches." The Deputy Director for State, Local, and Tribal Affairs is made responsible for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program and the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center. 103(f))15
U.S. Interdiction Coordinator
In 2002, Congress legislatively created the position of U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) within the Department of Homeland Security. ONDCP revised its method for compiling the national drug control budget summary in 2002. Current law (sec. Funding for Certain HIDTAs (Sec. National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign (Sec. Drug-Free Communities Act Reauthorization (Secs. Report on Intelligence Sharing (Sec. South American Heroin Strategy (Sec. Study of Iatrogenic Addiction (Sec. 1111)
The reauthorization act requires the Director to submit to Congress, within 90 days of enactment, a report that includes a plan to conduct, on an expedited basis, a scientific study of the use of mycoherbicides as a means of illicit drug crop elimination. Awards for Coerced Abstinence Programs (Sec. This was reiterated in the Government Reform Committee report on H.R. | Located in the Executive Office of the President, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is responsible for overseeing and coordinating the federal War on Drugs, preparing the National Drug Control Strategy, and running certain drug control programs, such as the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program, the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, and the Drug-Free Communities Program.
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a confirmation hearing on the nomination of Seattle police chief R. Gil Kerlikowske to be Director of National Drug Control Policy on April 1, 2008, at which the nominee promised "a renewed focus on evidence-based approaches to reduce demand for drugs, through prevention as well as treatment." The full Senate confirmed his nomination on May 7, 2009. A. Thomas McLellan, a drug treatment expert, has been nominated by President Obama to be Deputy Director of ONDCP, a post that also requires the advice and consent of the Senate.
The Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee held an ONDCP oversight hearing on March 12, 2008. The ONDCP Director presented testimony on the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy and the 2009 National Drug Control Budget. Two private sector drug researchers offered criticisms of the continuing emphasis on supply reduction and law enforcement and urged increased funding for treatment programs directed at hardcore drug users. Oversight activities are expected to resume in the 111th Congress, and measures to reauthorize ONDCP will likely be introduced and considered.
ONDCP was created in 1988 and has now been reauthorized three times since then, most recently on December 29, 2006, when the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006 (H.R. 6344) was signed into law (P.L. 109-469), reauthorizing ONDCP through FY2010.
The reauthorization act contains extensive amendments to current law. For example, it requires ONDCP's annual drug control budget to include all federal drug control activities, including demand reduction, supply reduction, and federally funded state, local, and tribal drug law enforcement. ONDCP revised its method for compiling the federal drug control budget in 2002, narrowing its scope. The act forces a return to more inclusive budget numbers for the federal drug control budget. It statutorily creates the position of U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) and the Interdiction Committee (TIC) within ONDCP. It contains numerous new reporting requirements, including South American and Afghan heroin strategies, a report on iatrogenic addiction caused by doctor-prescribed opioid analgesic pharmaceuticals, a national drug interdiction plan, a report on intelligence sharing within HIDTAs, and a study on the results of an awards program created by the act to fund demonstration programs on coerced abstinence. It allows the media campaign to focus on marijuana prevention. Mycoherbicides will be studied and tested on U.S. soil as a means of eliminating illicit drug crops.
This report will be updated in the event of further legislative and oversight activities in Congress relating to ONDCP and its leadership of the global War on Drugs. |
crs_R43852 | crs_R43852_0 | Introduction
President Obama's Immigration Accountability Executive Action of November 20, 2014, would revise some U.S. immigration policies and initiates several programs, including a revised border security policy for the Southwest border; deferred action programs for some unauthorized aliens; revised interior enforcement priorities; changes to aid the entry of skilled workers; promoting immigrant integration and naturalization; and several other initiatives the President indicated would improve the U.S. immigration system. The most controversial among these would grant deferred action to as many as 5 million unauthorized aliens. The President announced the executive action through 10 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) memoranda, 2 White House memoranda, and 3 Department of Labor (DOL) fact sheets. According to the President, the action was taken in response to the absence of legislation addressing major problems within the immigration system. The President has stated that his executive action is temporary, and that his successor can rescind some or all of its provisions. Those opposed to the executive action argue that it was taken largely for political purposes. They contend that once granted, the temporary measures it encompasses would be difficult to revoke. Separately, a debate has arisen as to whether the President has the legal authority to take such action, with the Administration and others arguing the President's action falls within his authority, and many in Congress arguing the President has overstepped it. That debate and its attendant legal questions are beyond the scope of this report. As the Administration proceeds to implement the executive action, some in Congress have vowed to halt some or all of its provisions. Summary of the President's Executive Action
The President's "Immigration Accountability Executive Action," announced on November 20, 2014, includes initiatives covering the following policy areas:
border security; interior enforcement and removals; Deferred A cti on for Childhood A rrivals (DACA);Deferred Action for P arents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA);p arole;provisional unlawful presence w aivers; high-skilled foreign w orkers ; immigrant integration and n aturalization ; immigrant visa s ystem; l abor protection; andcrime v ictims. These include Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers at POEs; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents; U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) personnel; additional federal law enforcement officers from agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Joint Task Force East would cover "the Southern maritime border and approaches." The new program would be called the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). The expansion of the provisional unlawful presence waiver program to specified relatives of U.S. citizens and LPRs—spouses and minor children of LPRs and adult children of U.S. citizens and LPRs—with approved immigrant visa petitions could help facilitate these individuals' acquisition of LPR status. The expansion of eligibility for DACA and the establishment of a new deferred action process for the unauthorized parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs who meet specified requirements could enable individuals in the newly covered groups to remain in the United States and, if granted employment authorization, to work legally. The Administration contends that employers use temporary worker visas to retain workers as they wait for LPR visa numbers to become available. Concurrently, DOL announced a review of the policies and regulations related to labor certification. In the High Skilled Memorandum, the DHS Secretary directed USCIS to issue guidance or regulations clarifying the circumstances under which the national interest waiver can be used. Regulations to implement this program must include income and resource requirements. The President's executive action would establish an interagency "White House Task Force on New Americans" with two primary objectives: (1) identify, promote, and expand immigrant integration best practices within states and localities; and (2) help determine steps that federal agencies can take to improve their own immigrant integration efforts. The action also directed USCIS to consider the feasibility of a partial fee waiver to the naturalization fee. Other Executive Action Initiatives
Modernizing the U.S. On November 21, 2014, as part of the President's executive action, DOL announced the creation of an inter-agency working group to "promote effective and consistent enforcement of federal labor, employment, and immigration laws, with the goal of protecting all workers regardless of legal status." Expanding Support for Crime Victims
U nonimmigrant status is reserved for victims of certain statutorily specified crimes that occurred within the United States. | On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced his Immigration Accountability Executive Action which would revise some U.S. immigration policies and initiate several programs, including a revised border security policy for the Southwest border; deferred action programs for some unauthorized aliens; revised interior enforcement priorities; changes to aid the entry of skilled workers; promoting immigrant integration and naturalization; and several other initiatives the President indicated would improve the U.S. immigration system. The most controversial among these provisions would grant deferred action to as many as 5 million unauthorized aliens.
The President announced the executive action through 10 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) memoranda, 2 White House memoranda, and 3 Department of Labor (DOL) fact sheets. Together, they comprise the following initiatives:
Border Security: forming three new task forces as part of DHS's Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Strategy that integrates efforts not only within DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) but also among other DHS agencies, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and the U.S. Coast Guard; Interior Enforcement and Removals: revising priorities for immigration enforcement and detention; ending the Secure Communities program and replacing it with the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), collecting and disseminating improved metrics on removals, and reforming the employment structure for ICE Enforcement and Removal Office (ERO) agents; Expanded Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): increasing the population eligible for the DACA program by expanding the eligibility criteria, and extending the duration of DACA and its related work authorization from two to three years; Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA): allowing parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to request deferred action and employment authorization if they meet residency and other criteria and pass required background checks; Parole Rules: revising conditions under which eligible family members of military personnel, persons traveling abroad, and certain entrepreneurs may receive parole; Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers: expanding the use of provisional unlawful presence waivers beyond spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens to also include the spouses and minor children of LPRs as well as the adult children of U.S. citizens, and clarifying the "extreme hardship" standard that must be met to obtain this waiver; High Skilled Workers: ensuring that all statutorily available LPR visas are fully utilized, reviewing the labor certification program and its regulations to strengthen its integrity and responsiveness to workforce changes, providing foreign workers with greater flexibility to change jobs, expanding the use of national interest waivers to retain selected highly qualified workers, expanding opportunities for students to gain on-the-job training through administrative rule changes, and clarifying the meaning of "specialized knowledge" to ensure U.S. workers are not being unfairly displaced; Immigrant Integration and Naturalization: initiating an inter-agency task force to identify and promote both immigrant integration "best practices" within states and localities as well as facilitating steps that can be taken administratively within and among federal agencies, and encouraging eligible LPRs to naturalize through additional payment options and possible partial fee waivers; Immigrant Visa System: providing recommendations to streamline, modernize, and improve immigrant and nonimmigrant visa processing; Labor Protection: creating an inter-agency working group to promote effective and consistent enforcement of federal labor, employment, and immigration laws to protect all workers regardless of legal status; and Crime Victims: expanding the DOL Wage and Hour Division's role in supporting foreign national victims of human trafficking and other select crimes.
According to the President, the action was taken in response to the absence of legislation addressing major problems within the immigration system. The President has stated that his executive action is temporary, and that his successor can rescind some or all of its provisions. Those opposed to the executive action argue that it was taken largely for political purposes. They contend that once granted, the temporary measures it encompasses would be difficult to revoke. Separately, a debate has arisen as to whether the President has the legal authority to take such action, with the Administration and others arguing the President's action falls within his authority, and many in Congress arguing the President has overstepped it. That debate and its attendant legal questions are beyond the scope of this report.
Because the President announced his executive action relatively recently, little guidance is available to clarify policies and answer questions related to the revisions and initiatives it contains. The two deferred action programs included in the action, both of which would require petitioners to submit fees, are the only initiatives in the executive action supported by independent fee-supported funding. The rest rely largely on changes in rules and regulations and on the coordination and marshaling of existing administrative resources. As the Administration proceeds to implement the executive action, some in Congress have vowed to halt some or all of its provisions. On February 23, 2015, Senator Collins introduced S. 534 that would invalidate almost all the provisions of the President's executive action. |
crs_R41517 | crs_R41517_0 | Early in December 2010, press reports indicated that legislators, especially in the Senate, were seeking to gather support for several water quality bills that could be considered during the post-election, lame duck session of the 111 th Congress, possibly packaged with others dealing with public lands and wildlife protection. These discussions resulted in a comprehensive bill, titled "America's Great Outdoors Act of 2010," that was introduced in the Senate on December 17 ( S.Amdt. 4845 to S. 303 ). This report describes water quality bills that were included in the package. All but one of the bills discussed below would have amended the Clean Water Act (CWA, 33 U.S.C. ), and all had been approved and reported by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. Similar House bills had been introduced for all but one of the Senate measures, and the House had passed two of them. With the exception of legislation that focused on Chesapeake Bay ( S. 1816 , discussed below), the individual bills were not considered to be controversial, although some Members criticized the expansive scope and cost of the entire omnibus bill. Most of the individual bills would either have reauthorized and in some cases modified existing CWA provisions that address water quality concerns in specified geographic areas, or they would have established similar provisions for other regions or watersheds. The 111 th Congress adjourned sine die on December 22 without taking up either the omnibus bill or individual measures that were included in S.Amdt. Whether the 112 th Congress will consider some or all of these bills is unknown for now. 4845 ) addressed issues for these geographic-specific areas and CWA programs:
Estuaries under the CWA's National Estuary Program, Chesapeake Bay, Columbia River Basin, Great Lakes, Gulf of Mexico, Lake Tahoe, Long Island Sound, Puget Sound, San Francisco Bay, and Monitoring water quality of coastal recreation waters. H.R. | Early in December 2010, press reports indicated that legislators, especially in the Senate, were seeking to gather support for several water quality bills that could be considered during the post-election, lame duck session of the 111th Congress, possibly packaged with others dealing with public lands and wildlife protection. These discussions resulted in a comprehensive bill, titled "America's Great Outdoors Act of 2010," that was introduced in the Senate on December 17 (S.Amdt. 4845 to S. 303). This report describes water quality bills that were included in the legislative package.
All but one of the bills discussed below would have amended the Clean Water Act (CWA), and all had been approved and reported by the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee. Similar House bills were introduced for all but one of the Senate measures, and the House had passed two of them. With the exception of a bill on Chesapeake Bay, the individual bills were not considered controversial. Most of the individual bills would either have reauthorized and in some cases modified existing CWA provisions that address water quality concerns in specified geographic areas, or would have established similar provisions for other regions or watersheds. The water quality issues and related 111th Congress bills are:
Estuaries under the CWA's National Estuary Program (H.R. 4715), Chesapeake Bay (S. 1816), Columbia River Basin (S. 4016), Great Lakes (S. 3073 and S. 933), Gulf of Mexico (S. 1311), Lake Tahoe (S. 2724), Long Island Sound (S. 3119), Puget Sound (S. 2739), San Francisco Bay (S. 3539), and Monitoring water quality of coastal recreation waters (S. 878).
The 111th Congress adjourned sine die on December 22 without taking up either the omnibus bill or individual measures that were included in S.Amdt. 4845. Whether the 112th Congress will consider some or all of these bills is unknown for now. |
crs_R44788 | crs_R44788_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Constitution—Article I, Section 2, clause 3, as modified by Section 2 of the 14 th Amendment—requires a population census every 10 years to serve as the basis for apportioning seats in the House of Representatives. Decennial census data are used, too, for within-state redistricting and in certain formulas that determine the annual distribution of more than $450 billion in federal funds to states and localities. Census counts are, in addition, the foundation for constructing intercensal estimates of current population size and projections of future size. Businesses, nonprofit organizations, researchers, and all levels of government are steady consumers of decennial and other census data. The Constitution stipulates that the once-a-decade enumeration is to be conducted "in such Manner as they [Congress] shall by Law direct." Congress, through Title 13 of the United States Code , has delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce and, within the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau). Title 13 U.S.C., Section 221, requires compliance with the census and provides for a fine of up to $100 for nonresponse. In accordance with provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Title 18 U.S.C., Sections 3559 and 3571, the possible fine has been adjusted to not more than $5,000. The resources committed to each decennial census, measured not only in large sums of public money but in years of planning, testing, and related efforts as well, serve one chief purpose: to obtain the best possible accounting of all U.S. residents, regardless of their race, ethnicity, socioeconomic characteristics, or living circumstances. The tension between funding the census sufficiently to produce good results and controlling census costs is apparent. The same was true in 2010. Long-form data—detailed data that formerly were collected from a population sample in conjunction with the decennial census—now are gathered by the American Community Survey (ACS). The bureau conducts the ACS separately from the census and at more frequent intervals. The Need to Contain Census Costs
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated in a 2016 report that, at a total life-cycle cost of about $13 billion, the 2010 census was the most expensive in U.S. history. Innovations for 2020 Census Cost Control
As the Census Bureau prepares for the next enumeration, it is focusing on cost-control innovations in the four key areas discussed below. After this initial phase of the census, the bureau attempted to contact, by telephone or personal visits, households from which it had not received completed forms and persuade them to respond. Governmental administrative records, chiefly "Undeliverable-as-Addressed" information from the U.S. Using Technology to Streamline Fieldwork
The bureau plans to rely on technology for managing 2020 census fieldwork "efficiently and effectively." Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing System
The bureau's overarching Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCaP) initiative dates from 2014. Areas identified by GAO include ensuring that only those authorized to see respondents' personal data have access to such data and that all bureau employees, both permanent and temporary, are aware of the need for security; protecting data on roughly 300,000 mobile devices that will be used for nonresponse follow-up; minimizing the threat of cybercrimes against data, respondents, and bureau employees; ensuring that those hired to fill key IT positions have expertise in information security; controlling "security performance requirements in a cloud environment"; and having "contingency and incident response plans" in place for all IT systems that will support the census. | The U.S. Constitution—Article I, Section 2, clause 3, as modified by Section 2 of the 14th Amendment—requires a population census every 10 years for apportioning seats in the House of Representatives. Decennial census data are used, too, for within-state redistricting and in certain formulas for distributing more than $450 billion annually in federal funds to states and localities. Census counts also are the foundation for estimates of current population size between censuses and projections of future size. Businesses, nonprofit organizations, researchers, and all levels of government are steady consumers of decennial and other census data.
The Constitution stipulates that every enumeration is to be conducted "in such Manner as they [Congress] shall by Law direct." Congress, through Title 13 of the United States Code, has delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce and, under the Secretary's purview, the Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau). Title 13 U.S.C., Section 221, requires compliance with the census and provides for a fine of up to $100 for nonresponse. In accordance with provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Title 18 U.S.C., Sections 3559 and 3571, the possible fine has been adjusted to not more than $5,000.
The 2020 census questionnaire, like that in 2010, will collect only the most basic population and housing information. Detailed socioeconomic data that formerly were gathered from a population sample in conjunction with the decennial census now are collected by the American Community Survey, which the bureau conducts separately from the census and at more frequent intervals.
April 1, 2020, the official date of the 24th decennial census, will mark the culmination of extensive census planning, testing, and other preparations. A key objective, as Congress has directed, is to make the census more cost-effective without jeopardizing coverage and accuracy. The total life-cycle cost of the 2010 census was about $13 billion, reportedly an all-time high. To hold the 2020 cost to approximately $12.3 billion, the Census Bureau is focusing on four innovations:
using governmental administrative records and satellite imagery to eliminate some of the fieldwork involved in updating census addresses and maps, which are the basis for an accurate enumeration; maximizing early census responses, especially online, to reduce the number of nonrespondents left for the bureau to contact by telephone or personal visits after the initial census phase; further limiting nonresponse follow-up by using administrative records to help fill gaps in census information; and better using technology to streamline fieldwork.
At the same time, the bureau has a mandate to obtain the best possible accounting of all U.S. residents, regardless of their race, ethnicity, or living circumstances. The tension between funding the census sufficiently to produce good results and controlling census costs is apparent.
Concerns as the 2020 census approaches include whether the bureau's enacted appropriations have been and will be sufficient to permit complete testing and implementation of the census plan; whether technology, notably the new Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing system, will be ready on schedule and will perform well; and whether information security will be adequate to deter cybercrimes against data, respondents, and bureau employees.
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R44586 | crs_R44586_0 | T he GI Bills® provide financial assistance to individuals, whose eligibility is based on their or a family member's experience in the uniformed services, while enrolled in approved programs of education or training programs. In FY2017, the GI Bills are estimated to provide over $14 billion in benefits to over 1 million veterans and servicemembers and their dependents. The largest program, the Post-9/11 GI Bill, is estimated to account for approximately 93% of the benefits and 80% of the participants. The hearings have explored a variety of subjects, including, but not limited to, the adequacy of the Post-9/11 GI Bill information technology (IT) claims processing system; the adequacy of the processes and criteria used to approve programs of education for GI Bill purposes; the adequacy and equity of GI Bill benefit levels; the applicability of benefit eligibility requirements; abuse of the GI Bill programs; and the return on the GI Bill investment. One amendment terminates the Reserve Educational Assistance Program (REAP). National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (P.L. 114-92 ) was enacted on November 25, 2015. 114-92 effectively ends REAP on November 25, 2019. Department of Veterans Affairs Expiring Authorities Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-228)
The Department of Veterans Affairs Expiring Authorities Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-228 ) was enacted on September 29, 2016. On September 22, 2016, ED made a determination to withdraw its recognition of the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools (ACICS). ACICS accredits approximately 900 educational institutions that offer GI Bill approved programs of education. 114-228 authorizes the VA to continue to treat a program of education that was previously approved on the basis of being offered directly by an educational institution that is accredited by an ED-recognized accrediting agency as approved for 18 months in the event that ED withdraws the recognition of the accrediting agency. 114-315)
The Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2016 ( P.L. 114-315 ) was enacted on December 16, 2016. CBO estimates that this provision will reduce spending by $56 million over 10 years. Processes and Standards for Approved Programs of Education
The following provisions are intended to make the processes and standards for approving programs of education for GI Bill purposes more rigorous. | The GI Bills® provide financial assistance to individuals, whose eligibility is based on their or a family member's experience in the uniformed services, while they are enrolled in approved programs of education, including training programs. In FY2017, the GI Bills are estimated to provide over $14 billion in benefits to over 1 million veterans and servicemembers and their dependents. The largest program, the Post-9/11 GI Bill, is estimated to account for approximately 93% of the benefits and 80% of the participants. This report provides a description of and background information on selected provisions in three laws that amended the GI Bills in the 114th Congress.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (P.L. 114-92) was enacted on November 25, 2015. The bill effectively ends the Reserve Educational Assistance Program (REAP) on November 25, 2019. It also prohibits nonexempt individuals from receiving a Post-9/11 GI Bill allowance while receiving Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX).
The Department of Veterans Affairs Expiring Authorities Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-228) was enacted on September 29, 2016. Among other purposes, the law authorizes the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to treat a program of education as approved for 18 months in the event that the Secretary of Education withdraws the recognition of the accrediting agency that accredited the educational institution at which the program of education was offered. This authority applies to those programs of education that were approved for GI Bill purposes on the basis of being offered directly by an educational institution that is accredited by an ED-recognized accrediting agency. The authority was intended to protect GI Bill participants attending approximately 900 educational institutions accredited by the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools (ACICS), which lost its ED recognition on December 12, 2016.
The Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-315) was enacted on December 16, 2016. The law enacted several provisions considered throughout the 114th Congress, including some providing for enhanced benefits for select individuals, others providing for more rigorous processes and standards for approving programs of education for GI Bill purposes, and some aiming to enhance information gathering and dissemination activities. Finally, the law was largely paid for ($56 million over 10 years) by reducing the GI Bill reporting fees paid to educational institutions and training establishments. |
crs_R44098 | crs_R44098_0 | Introduction
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) conducts scientific research in areas such as ecosystems, climate, global climate change, weather, and oceans; supplies information on the oceans and atmosphere; and manages coastal and marine organisms and environments. In 1970, Reorganization Plan No. 4 created NOAA in the Department of Commerce. Reorganization Plan No. 4 brought together environmental agencies from within the Department of Commerce, such as the National Weather Service, and from other departments and agencies, such as the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the National Science Foundation's National Sea Grant Program. The reorganization was intended to unify the nation's environmental activities related to oceanic and atmospheric research and to provide a systematic approach for monitoring, analyzing, and protecting the environment. One of NOAA's main challenges is related to this diverse mission of science, service, and stewardship. A review of research undertaken by the agency found that "the major challenge for NOAA is connecting the pieces of its research program and ensuring research is linked to the broader science needs of the agency." NOAA's administrative structure has evolved into five line offices: the National Ocean Service (NOS); National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS); Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR); National Weather Service (NWS); and National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS). In addition to NOAA's five line offices, Program Support (PS) provides cross-cutting services for the agency and includes the Office of Marine and Aviation Operations (OMAO), Corporate Services, the Office of Education, and Facilities. NOAA's Discretionary Budget and Accounts
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ) provided $5.441 billion for NOAA. President Obama has requested $5.975 billion for NOAA's FY2016 budget. This amount is $533.7 million (9.8%) more than the FY2015 enacted appropriation level. On June 3, 2015, the House passed the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 ( H.R. The House-passed bill would provide a total of $5.169 billion for NOAA in FY2016. This amount is $271.7 million (5.0%) less than the FY2015-enacted appropriation level and $805.4 million (13.5%) less than the Administration's FY2016 request. On June 16, 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016. The Senate committee-reported bill ( S.Rept. 114-66 ) would provide a total of $5.382 billion for NOAA in FY2016. This amount is $59.4 million (1.1%) less than the FY2015-enacted appropriation, $593.1 million (9.9%) less than the Administration's FY2016 request, and $212.3 million (4.1%) more than the level recommended by House-passed bill. In most years, more than 98% of NOAA's discretionary budget is appropriated to the Operations, Research, and Facilities (ORF) and the Procurement, Acquisition, and Construction (PAC) accounts. The Senate committee-reported bill would provide a total of $3.243 billion for the NOAA ORF account in FY2016. The following summaries also include selected appropriations highlights for each line office. | The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) conducts scientific research in areas such as ecosystems, climate, global climate change, weather, and oceans; supplies information and data on the oceans and atmosphere; and manages coastal and marine organisms and environments. In 1970, Reorganization Plan No. 4 created NOAA in the Department of Commerce. Reorganization Plan No. 4 brought together environmental agencies from within the Department of Commerce, such as the National Weather Service, and from other departments and agencies, such as the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the National Science Foundation's National Sea Grant Program. The reorganization was intended to unify the nation's environmental activities related to oceanic and atmospheric management and research and to provide a systematic approach for monitoring, analyzing, and protecting the environment. One of NOAA's main challenges is related to this diverse mission of science, service, and stewardship. A review of research undertaken by the agency found that "the major challenge for NOAA is connecting the pieces of its research program and ensuring research is linked to the broader science needs of the agency."
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015 (P.L. 113-235), provided $5.441 billion for NOAA. President Obama has requested $5.975 billion for NOAA's FY2016 budget. This amount is $533.7 million (9.8%) more than the FY2015 enacted appropriation level. On June 3, 2015, the House passed the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2578). The House-passed bill would provide a total of $5.169 billion for NOAA in FY2016. This amount is $271.7 million (5.0%) less than the FY2015 enacted appropriation level and $805.4 million (13.5%) less than the Administration's FY2016 request. On June 16, 2015, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016. The Senate committee-reported bill would provide a total of $5.382 billion for NOAA in FY2016. This amount is $59.4 million (1.1%) less than the FY2015- enacted appropriation, $593.1 million (9.9%) less than the Administration's FY2016 request, and $212.3 million (4.1%) more than the House-passed bill.
The following report provides a summary of actions taken by the Administration and Congress to appropriate funding for NOAA in FY2016. The summary compares the FY2015 enacted appropriations, the FY2016 Administration request, the House-passed bill, and the Senate committee-reported bill for NOAA's accounts, line offices, and selected programs. NOAA's two main accounts are Operations, Research, and Facilities (ORF) and Procurement, Acquisition, and Construction (PAC). NOAA's line offices include the National Ocean Service (NOS); National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS); Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR); National Weather Service (NWS); and National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS). In addition to NOAA's five line offices, Program Support (PS) provides cross-cutting services for the agency and includes the Office of Marine and Aviation Operations (OMAO), Corporate Services, the Office of Education, and Facilities. |
crs_R44590 | crs_R44590_0 | Introduction
Moving beyond its traditional place in personal computers and corporate servers, software today may be integrated in everyday consumer goods such as televisions, refrigerators, thermostats, coffee makers, garage door openers, automobiles, vacuums, and printers, as well as personal medical devices (for example, glucose meters, asthma inhalers, and blood pressure monitors ). Software enables modern consumer products' operations or provides users with convenient features such as automation, Wi-Fi connectivity, and remote control via laptops, smartwatches, and smartphones. When consumers purchase these "software-enabled" products from retailers, they become the owner of the hardware components of the device or machine. In contrast, however, they may only acquire a license (a form of legal permission) to use any embedded software during the time of their product ownership. For example, manufacturers have installed DRM in gourmet coffee makers and printers to prevent the use of third-party, unlicensed coffee pods and toner cartridges that are often cheaper and possibly easier to acquire than brand-name, manufacturer-authorized accessories. DRM also may be used to prevent consumers from modifying the software in their cell phones in order to connect the devices to different wireless carriers. The inclusion of licensed software and DRM in consumer products and devices has raised concerns about the ability of consumers to repair, modify, or resell their personal property because engaging in such activities may potentially violate provisions of the Copyright Act (or the Act). This report examines copyright law issues raised by software-enabled consumer goods. Advanced Copyright Law Concepts
Because software embedded in many modern consumer products may be subject to copyright protection, this section of the report will describe several advanced copyright topics, including fair use, first sale, and digital rights management, that may impact consumers' ability to repair, modify, or sell their electronic devices. However, the Copyright Act requires a federal court to consider and evaluate, on a "case-by-case" basis, several statutory factors in determining whether any particular conduct constitutes a "fair use":
the purpose and character of the use including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Analysis: Copyright Law and Software-Enabled Consumer Electronic Products
End user license agreements that apply to copyrighted software may prohibit the owner of an electronic device from reselling the product, or from modifying or repairing the installed software, unless such activities are performed by a service provider that has been authorized by the equipment manufacturer to do so. Resale of Devices
In many instances, the original equipment manufacturer may not develop the software programs embedded within consumer products; instead, the product manufacturer may enter into contracts with third-party software developers to produce customized software. After their initial service contract expires, consumers may wish to modify their cellphones, or have them "unlocked," in order to use them on a different service provider's network. Legislation
Legislation has been proposed, but not passed into law, at both the federal and state levels, that would modify the rights of consumers with respect to software-embedded consumer electronic devices and products. The Unlocking Technology Act of 2015 ( H.R. In addition, the courts have not yet directly considered how fair use, the first sale doctrine, or the DMCA applies to consumers owning software-embedded products. | Modern consumer electronic devices and products often contain software programs that facilitate their operations or provide automation, Wi-Fi and smartphone connectivity, remote control, and other sophisticated functions. Equipment manufacturers have integrated software in televisions, refrigerators, thermostats, coffee makers, garage door openers, automobiles, vacuums, printers, and medical devices. When consumers buy these "software-enabled" products from retailers, they acquire ownership of the physical hardware, but may only receive a limited license (a form of legal permission) to use the embedded software. However, the software license's terms and conditions may restrain certain consumer behavior after purchasing the product. Some consumer rights organizations and civil liberties groups have raised concerns that software licensing, in restricting the unauthorized resale of a product or prohibiting certain product modifications or repairs, unnecessarily limits how consumers can use software-enabled products.
In addition, some products may include "digital rights management" (DRM) technologies that prevent consumers from altering the installed software or control the types of accessories that may be used with them. For example, manufacturers have installed DRM in gourmet coffee makers and printers to prevent consumers from using generic, unlicensed coffee pods and toner cartridges, respectively, that are usually cheaper and easier to acquire than brand-name, manufacturer-authorized parts. Wireless carriers have also used DRM in smartphones to prevent the devices from connecting to, and operating on, unauthorized cellular networks. Thus, consumers with such "locked" cellphones cannot use them on a different service provider's network once their contract has expired with their original mobile carrier.
It may seem unusual that copyright law has any application or relevance to consumer electronic products. After all, such products do not, by themselves, fall within the traditional categories of copyrightable subject matter: literary, musical, dramatic, and pictorial works; motion pictures; and sound recordings. Yet the software embedded in many consumer electronic products may be subject to copyright protection; thus, these devices contain copyrighted content. As a result, copyright law may impact the rights of consumers to repair, modify, or sell their personal property that contains copyrighted software, to the extent that such activities involve making changes to the software or transferring ownership of the product with the original software still running on it. Consumers or businesses that engage in such actions with respect to software-enabled electronic products, without the authorization of the software developer or original equipment manufacturer, may be in violation of the federal Copyright Act.
This report provides a discussion and analysis of copyright law issues that may be implicated by the repair, modification, or resale of software-enabled consumer electronic devices. These issues include software licensing, fair use, the first sale doctrine, and the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). It also examines state and federal legislation that has been offered related to this issue, including the You Own Devices Act (H.R. 862), Breaking Down Barriers to Innovation Act of 2015 (S. 990), and the Unlocking Technology Act of 2015 (H.R. 1587). |
crs_R43469 | crs_R43469_0 | Introduction
Several states are experiencing varying degrees of drought, with several western states experiencing severe to exceptional drought conditions. Notwithstanding recent rains, California is experiencing its third consecutive dry year, which has resulted in abnormally low reservoir levels, as well as low surface and groundwater levels. Current drought conditions in California and much of the West have fueled congressional interest in drought and its effects on water supplies, agriculture, and ecosystems. Several bills have been introduced in the 113 th Congress to address different aspects of drought in California and other regions. S. 2198 includes two titles:
Title I , "Emergency Drought Relief," contains 14 provisions ranging from mandating maximization of California water supplies—consistent with laws and regulations—through specific project development, management, and operations directives and addressing project environmental reviews, to reauthorizing several water resources management laws (CALFED, P.L. Title II , "Federal Disaster Assistance," expands the assistance potentially available under an emergency declaration for drought (or other emergency) pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, and discusses in congressional findings the application of the act to drought. In relation to projects and operations that would address drought in California, S. 2198 would direct federal agencies to maximize water supplies and streamline environmental reviews while remaining "consistent" with law and regulations. This policy approach is aimed at addressing drought, and in doing so, touches upon many long-standing and controversial issues associated with operations of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP), managed by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (hereinafter referred to as Reclamation), and the State Water Project (SWP), managed by the California Department of Water Resources. The bill also would expand the Secure Water Act to include the state of Hawaii. In General
Section 103(a) would direct the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (together defined as "the Secretaries" under the act) to provide the maximum quantity of water supplies possible to CVP and Klamath Project agricultural, municipal and industrial (M&I), and refuge service and repayment contractors; SWP contractors; and any other locality or municipality in the state of California, by approving, consistent with applicable laws and regulations, the following types of projects and operations:
any project or operations to provide additional water supplies "if there is any possible way whatsoever that the Secretaries can do so," unless the project or operations result in a highly inefficient way of providing additional supplies; any project or operations "as quickly as possible" to address emergency conditions. Further, the actions specified in this section are only in effect until the governor of the state suspends the state of drought emergency declaration. This section also generates some potentially broad questions, discussed below. | Over the past five years, portions of the country have been gripped with extensive drought, including the state of California. Drought conditions in California are "exceptional" and "extreme" in much of the state, including in prime agricultural areas of the Central Valley, according to the U.S. Drought Monitor. Such conditions pose significant challenges to water managers who before this dry winter were already grappling with below-normal surface water storage in the state's largest reservoirs. Groundwater levels in many areas of the state also have declined due to increased pumping over the last three dry years. While recent rains have improved the water year outlook somewhat—moving the year from the driest on record in terms of precipitation to date to the third-driest—water managers are fearful of the long-term impacts of a relatively dry winter and little existing snowpack to refresh supplies later in the year.
Because of the extent of the drought in California, drought impacts are varied and widespread. Most of the San Joaquin Valley is in exceptional drought, and federal and state water supply allotments are at historic lows. Many farmers are fallowing lands and some are removing permanent tree crops. Cities and towns have also been affected, and the governor has requested voluntary water use cutbacks of 20%. The effects of the drought are also likely to be felt on fish and wildlife species and the recreational and commercial activities they support, potentially including North Coast salmon fisheries. The intensity of the drought in California has generated congressional interest.
Several bills have been introduced to address drought conditions in California. This report discusses S. 2198, which would address drought impacts in California and other states, and assist with drought response. This bill has two titles. Title I contains provisions ranging from mandating maximization of California water supplies through specific project development, management, and operations directives and addressing project environmental reviews—as long as actions are consistent with applicable law and regulations and not highly inefficient—to reauthorizing several water resources management laws. In addressing drought effects, Title I also would address project operations that relate to long-standing and controversial issues associated with management of the federal Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project (CVP) and the California Department of Water Resources' State Water Project (SWP). Title II would expand the assistance potentially available under an emergency declaration for drought (or other emergency) pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended. |
crs_R42158 | crs_R42158_0 | Introduction
The Klamath River Basin, a region along the California-Oregon border, has been a focal point for local and national discussions on water resources and species management. Water management issues were brought to the forefront when severe drought conditions in 2001 exacerbated competition for scarce water resources and generated conflict among several interests—farmers; fishermen (commercial and sport); other recreationists; federal wildlife refuge managers; environmental organizations; and state, local, and tribal governments. Low water conditions and a call for water by senior water rights holders in 2013 have again brought these issues to the forefront. The Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA) and the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement (KHSA), collectively referred to as the Klamath a greements in this report, were signed in 2010 by a wide array of basin interests (although not all basin interests support the agreements). The KBRA would, among other things, set limits for water allocations for irrigators and wildlife refuges under a range of conditions related to the amount of water forecast in a given year; attempt to make available supplemental water and power supplies in the basin; and provide for restoration and monitoring of certain fish species. The KHSA lays out a process that could lead to removal of four nonfederal hydroelectric dams currently owned and operated by a private entity, PacifiCorp. If carried out as envisioned, the project would be one of the largest, most complex dam removals in history. Although the Klamath agreements require congressional authorization to move forward on key components, some activities under existing authorities have already been undertaken. More recently, in the summer of 2013, a call on water rights under the newly released Oregon water rights adjudication resulted in limitations on water deliveries for junior water rights holders in the upper part of the basin. The 2013 "call" on water rights (in which senior water rights holders gave notice that their demands exceeded available flows) limited or shut off water deliveries to some junior water rights holders (for the most part, off-project irrigators) in the upper basin. Originally, both agreements were set to expire without congressional authorization by 2012, but this deadline has been extended to 2014. In response to concerns and outstanding issues in the upper basin, in 2013 a task force was convened to incorporate additional issues not addressed by the KBRA and KHSA. Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement
The KBRA was negotiated by stakeholders and other groups in the Klamath Basin. Most significantly, the KHSA lays out a process for additional studies and environmental review by the Secretary of the Interior to consider removal of the dams (known as the Secretarial Determination ). To be implemented, the Upper Klamath Basin agreement would need to be ratified along with the KBRA in any future authorizing legislation. Similar to legislation in the 113 th Congress, S. 133 would add new reporting requirements for dam removal (including a report on planned facilities removal to be published one to two years prior to the removal of the dams) and ecosystem restoration, plus several smaller alterations to individual provisions of the agreements. There is no formal estimate of potential future savings to state and federal governments associated with the agreements. Since authority for the Secretary of the Interior to make a final determination on dam removal is a key step in the KHSA, some argue that authorization of the agreements is the primary opportunity for Congress to weigh in for or against this decision. These same groups are also party to the KHSA. The Yurok Tribe, which initially supported the Klamath agreements, issued a notice of withdrawal from the agreements in September 2015. | The Klamath River Basin on the California-Oregon border is a focal point for local and national discussions on water allocation and species protection. Previously, water and species management issues have exacerbated competition and generated conflict among several interests—farmers; Indian tribes; commercial and sport fishermen; federal water project and wildlife refuge managers; environmental groups; hydropower facility operators; and state, local, and tribal governments. Drought conditions and a call for water by senior water rights holders in 2013 have again brought these issues to the forefront.
In 2010, the Secretary of the Interior and the governors of Oregon and California, along with multiple interest groups, announced the results of a multiyear negotiation process to resolve long-standing issues in the basin: two interrelated agreements, supported by the federal government and signed by the two states and numerous other parties. These agreements, known as the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA) and the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (KHSA), together aim to provide for water deliveries to irrigators and wildlife refuges, fish habitat restoration, and numerous other related actions. Generally, the KBRA provides for actions intended to restore Klamath fisheries and for assurances for water deliveries to wildlife refuges and federal project irrigators under certain circumstances, among other things. The KHSA lays out a process that could lead to the removal of four privately owned dams on the Klamath River. This dam removal would be one of the largest and most complex projects of its kind ever undertaken.
Some parts of the Klamath agreements are being carried out under existing authorities. Studies to inform a determination on dam removal under the KHSA by the Secretary of the Interior are complete, and some restoration actions have been initiated. However, congressional authorization is required for the most significant components of the agreements to be implemented.
The KBRA and KHSA did not address all outstanding issues in the basin. A water rights adjudication by the state of Oregon (in progress since the 1970s) is ongoing. In 2013, the adjudication reaffirmed "time immemorial" tribal water rights in the upper part of the Klamath Basin, confirming that tribal water rights are senior to those of other water rights holders. This resulted in a "call" on water rights (i.e., notice by senior water rights holders that their demands exceed available flows), and led to reductions to water supplies for some junior users during the low water year of 2013. To resolve these issues and prevent such a scenario from occurring again, a separate settlement agreement (the Upper Klamath Basin Settlement Agreement) was negotiated by stakeholders and finalized in April 2014. To be implemented, the agreement would need to be authorized along with the KBRA and KHSA.
The KBRA and KHSA were originally set to expire in 2012 if no authorizing legislation was enacted, but they have since been extended (most recently through 2015). Parties may also withdraw individually from the agreements, and several parties initiated this process of withdrawal.
In the 114th Congress, S. 133 would authorize the Klamath agreements, including a suite of new federal actions that have received support from disparate parties and are required for the agreements to be implemented. Previous legislation in the 113th Congress (S. 2379) was ordered to be reported out of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on November 13, 2014. |
crs_R43795 | crs_R43795_0 | Introduction
U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels remain a topic of interest among policy makers and stakeholders. On June 25, 2013, President Obama affirmed his commitment to reduce U.S. GHG emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 if all other major economies agreed to limit their emissions as well. In addition, during a November 2014 trip to China, President Obama and President Xi of China made a bilateral announcement concerning GHG emissions. President Obama announced a new policy target to reduce U.S. net GHG emissions by 26%-28% by 2025. U.S. GHG Emissions
As Figure 1 illustrates, U.S. GHG emissions increased during most of the years between 1990 and 2007, and then decreased substantially in 2008 and 2009. Although emissions increased in 2010, levels decreased again in 2011 and 2012, eventually reaching levels comparable to those in 1995. In terms of the President's 2020 emissions target (17% below 2005 levels), U.S. GHG emissions in 2012—the most recent year with available GHG emission data—were approximately 10% below 2005 levels. GHG Emissions by Source
GHG emissions are generated throughout the United States by millions of discrete sources: smokestacks, vehicle exhaust pipes, households, commercial buildings, livestock, etc. The figure indicates that CO 2 from the combustion of fossil fuels—petroleum, coal, and natural gas—accounted for 78% of total U.S. GHG emissions in 2012. The largest contribution (40%) is from electricity generation. One approach often taken in climate change analysis is to examine several broad energy-related factors that influence GHG emission levels, including
population, income—measured here as per capita gross domestic product (GDP), energy intensity—measured here as energy use per gross domestic product, and carbon intensity—measured here as CO 2 emissions per energy use. Although decreases in population and/or per capita income would contribute to lowering U.S. GHG emissions, policies that would seek to directly limit these emissions drivers are essentially outside the bounds of U.S. public policy. The figure indicates that energy use increased from 1990 to 2000 at an annual average rate of 1.6%, and then remained relatively constant (excepting some annual fluctuations) through 2013. In contrast, U.S. GDP (in 2009$) has increased at an average annual rate of approximately 2.5% from 1990 through 2013. As the figure illustrates, U.S. energy intensity has been declining by about 2% each year for two decades: the U.S. energy intensity in 2011 was 31% lower than it was in 1990. Carbon Intensity
In this report, carbon intensity measures the amount of CO 2 emissions generated during energy use, which includes fuel combustion for electricity generation and transportation purposes. Energy sources (e.g., coal, natural gas, petroleum, nuclear, and renewables) vary dramatically in the amount of carbon released per unit of energy supplied. As indicated in Table 1 , coal generates approximately 80% more CO 2 emissions per unit of energy than natural gas, and approximately 28% more emissions per unit of energy than crude oil. Moreover, other energy sources, such as nuclear or specific renewable sources, do not directly generate any CO 2 emissions. Carbon Content of Energy Use
Figure 7 illustrates the U.S. carbon content of energy use—CO 2 emissions per Btu—between 1990 and 2013. This includes energy used (i.e., consumed) in the electricity, industrial, transportation, commercial, and residential sectors. The figure indicates that this measure remained relatively constant from 1990 to 2005, when it began to decline. By 2013, the carbon content of energy use was approximately 8% lower than it was in 2005. Carbon Content of Electricity Generation
The recent changes in energy consumption are partially explained by changes in the energy sources used to generate electricity, because the electric power sector accounts for approximately 40% of total energy use. Moreover, the percentage share of renewable sources increased from 2% to 6%, and petroleum decreased from 3% to less than 1%. | On June 25, 2013, President Obama affirmed his commitment to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 if all other major economies agreed to limit their emissions as well. In addition, during a November 2014 trip to China, President Obama announced a new policy target to reduce U.S. net GHG emissions by 26%-28% by 2025. Whether these objectives will be met is uncertain, but emission levels and recent trends remain a topic of interest among policy makers.
U.S. GHG emissions increased during most of the years between 1990 and 2007, and then decreased substantially in 2008 and 2009. Although emissions increased in 2010, levels decreased again in 2011 and 2012, eventually reaching levels comparable to those from 1995. In terms of the President's 2020 emissions target, in 2012, U.S. GHG emissions were approximately 10% below 2005 levels—more than halfway toward the 2020 target.
In the United States, GHG emissions are generated by millions of discrete sources, including smokestacks, vehicle exhaust pipes, commercial buildings, and households. However, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels—petroleum, coal, and natural gas—have received the most attention because they account for the vast majority of human-related GHG emissions: 78% of total U.S. GHG emissions in 2012.
In addition, (1) CO2 emissions from large stationary sources are easy to measure and have been tracked for almost 20 years, and (2) CO2 emissions from smaller sources can be estimated through relatively straightforward calculations. In 2012, the percentage contributions of CO2 emissions by sector were as follows:
40% from electricity, 35% from transportation, 15% from industrial, 6% from commercial, and 4% from residential.
Although multiple factors have some level of influence on U.S. GHG emission levels, it may be instructive to examine several broad energy-related factors including population, income, energy intensity (energy use per economic output such as gross domestic product, or GDP) and carbon intensity (CO2 emissions per unit of energy use). Although decreases in population and/or income would contribute to reducing U.S. GHG emissions, policies that would seek to directly limit these emissions drivers are essentially outside the bounds of U.S. public policy. Therefore, this report focuses on the impacts of energy intensity and carbon intensity on GHG emission levels.
As energy use has grown at a slower rate than the economy, U.S. energy intensity declined by about 2% each year for more than two decades. Between 1990 and 2013, U.S. GDP (in 2009$) increased at an average annual rate of approximately 2.5%. Energy use, in contrast, increased from 1990 to 2000 at an annual average rate of 1.6%, but then remained relatively constant (excepting some annual fluctuations) through 2013.
The U.S. carbon content of energy use remained relatively constant from 1990 to 2005, but by 2013, it was approximately 8% lower than in 2005. In this report, carbon intensity measures the amount of CO2 emissions generated per unit of energy used. Energy sources—coal, natural gas, petroleum, nuclear, renewables—vary dramatically in the amount of carbon released per unit of energy supplied. For example, coal combustion accounts for almost twice the carbon content per unit of energy than natural gas, and some energy sources, when consumed, do not directly generate any emissions.
This recent decrease in the carbon content of energy use is partially explained by changes in the energy sources used to generate electricity, because the electric power sector accounts for approximately 40% of total energy use. For example, between 2004 and 2013, the percentage of electricity from coal generation decreased from 50% to 39%, while the percentage of electricity generated using natural gas increased from 18% to 28%. In addition, renewable energy use increased by 100%, and the use of petroleum to generate electricity decreased by approximately 100%. |
crs_R41002 | crs_R41002_0 | Limited Use of Federal Reservoir Storage for Municipal and Industrial (M&I) Water Supply
Increasing pressures on the quantity and quality of available water supplies are raising interest in—and concern about—changing operations at Corps facilities to meet municipal and industrial (M&I) demands. A reallocation embodies tradeoffs; shifting storage to M&I use from a currently authorized purpose (e.g., hydropower or navigation) changes the types of benefits produced by a dam and the stakeholders served. Congress recognized state primacy in developing M&I supplies in the Water Supply Act of 1958 (1958 WSA; P.L. 85-500; 72 Stat. M&I Water Storage at Corps Facilities
Authority for M&I Storage Can Be Project-Specific or General
Congress authorizes the Corps to undertake construction of dams and other water resources infrastructure. Congress Limited Agency Discretion for Reallocating Storage
In the 1958 WSA, Congress provided the Corps some general M&I water supply authority, but limited the agency's decision-making without congressional approval. In March 1977, the Corps adopted as part of its manual the following provision for determining when a reallocation does not require congressional approval:
Modifications of reservoir projects to allocate all or part of the storage serving any authorized purpose from such purpose to storage serving domestic, municipal, or industrial water supply purposes are considered insignificant if the total reallocation of storage that may be made for such water supply uses in the modified project is not greater than 15 per centum of total storage capacity allocated to all authorized purposes or 50,000 acre feet, whichever is less. 2009 Court Order Found the Corps Exceeded Its Authority
The questions of whether the Corps has regularly exceeded its discretionary authority and how many reservoirs have storage reallocated under this authority have received attention in the wake of a federal court decision related to Corps operations and reallocations at Lake Lanier (GA). The court found that the cumulative impacts of the Corps' actions exceeded its discretionary authority to reallocate. Other Texoma reallocations have been made with specific congressional approval. The 84,099 AF reallocation from hydropower to M&I use was approved in a 1985 Corps document that included a compensation arrangement for lost hydropower, which had been negotiated among Lake Texoma stakeholders. The Corps thus concluded that the transfer could be performed under the 1958 WSA without congressional approval, even though it exceeded the agency-established policy limiting reallocations without congressional approval to 50,000 AF. Whether the studies used to support the reallocations shown in Table 1 sufficiently evaluated how an M&I reallocation may affect authorized purposes or may constitute a major operational change is a general concern raised by the 2009 court order's questioning of the Corps evaluations related to Lake Lanier operations. An evaluation of the sufficiency of Corps reallocation analyses is beyond the scope of this CRS report. Whether Congress agrees with the Corps' interpretation and use of its discretionary authority is a policy issue of increasing relevance as interest grows in M&I reallocation at federal facilities. | Congress has limited the use of Army Corps of Engineers dams and reservoirs for municipal and industrial (M&I) water supply. Growing M&I demands have raised interest in—and concern about—changing current law and reservoir operations to give Corps facilities a greater role in M&I water storage. A reallocation of storage to M&I use from a currently authorized purpose (e.g., hydropower or navigation) changes the types of benefits produced by a facility and the stakeholders served.
While Congress has specifically authorized 91 Corps multi-purpose facilities for M&I supply, it also has delegated to the Secretary of the Army constrained authority to reallocate storage to M&I water supply. In the Water Supply Act of 1958 (1958 WSA; P.L. 85-500), Congress provided that storage at Corps facilities could be allocated to M&I water supply without congressional approval if this reallocation did not seriously harm authorized project purposes or involve major structural or operational changes. Whether the Corps has regularly exceeded its discretion to reallocate is a concern raised in response to a July 2009 federal court order that found the Corps exceeded its discretion at Lake Lanier (GA).
In order to guide its implementation of the discretionary authority to reallocate, the agency developed guidance on what may constitute a major change or serious harm to an authorized purpose. Since 1977 that guidance has included quantitative limits on reallocations conducted without congressional authorization. Issues for Congress include whether the Corps' interpretation of its discretionary authority is consistent with congressional intent and whether current law and policy are appropriate for current demands and constraints on water resources.
CRS analysis of available data indicates that the Corps generally has not exceeded agency-established quantitative limits, with two exceptions in addition to Lake Lanier. One of the exceptions, Cowanesque Lake (PA), was made with the consent of Congress but conducted under the 1958 WSA authority. The other exception was a 1985 reallocation from hydropower to M&I use at Lake Texoma (TX/OK). The Corps found that a reallocation at Lake Texoma would neither require significant modification of the project, nor seriously harm authorized purposes (as the result of compensation being provided for lost hydropower). The Corps concluded that it could make the reallocation without congressional approval using its discretionary authority, in spite of the reallocation exceeding the agency-established quantitative limit. Whether this or other Corps reallocations and operational changes performed without congressional authorization (including those that have fallen within agency-established quantitative guidelines) have seriously harmed other project purposes or constituted a major operational change cannot be independently determined by available data, and is beyond the scope of the analysis herein. |
crs_R42853 | crs_R42853_0 | Synthesis of Key Issues
The long-running policy debate over the future of nuclear energy is rooted in the technology's inherent characteristics. Spent nuclear fuel that is regularly removed from reactors during refueling must be isolated from the environment for up to 1 million years. The March 2011 disaster at Japan's Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, which forced the evacuation of areas as far as 30 miles away, has slowed nuclear power expansion plans around the world, particularly in Japan and Western Europe. Currently, two new reactors in Georgia are under construction. Existing U.S. nuclear power plants are facing difficult competition from natural gas and renewable energy. The extent to which the growth of nuclear power should be encouraged in the United States and around the world will continue to be a major component of the U.S. energy policy debate. Basic Facts and Statistics
The 98 licensed nuclear power reactors at 59 sites in the United States generate about 20% of the nation's electricity. Throughout the world, 451 reactors are currently in service or operable, and 54 more are under construction. 97-425 , NWPA), as amended in 1987, named Yucca Mountain, NV, as the nation's sole candidate site for a permanent high-level nuclear waste repository. The Trump Administration included funding to restart Yucca Mountain licensing in its FY2018 and FY2019 budget submissions to Congress, but the funding was not included in the enacted appropriations measures for either year. The Obama Administration appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future to develop an alternative nuclear waste policy, and its final report was issued in January 2012. DOE responded in January 2013 with a waste strategy that called for a "consent-based" process to select nuclear waste storage and disposal sites and for a surface storage pilot facility to open by 2021. DOE issued a Draft Consent-Based Siting Process shortly before the end of the Obama Administration. In the FY2019 appropriations bill, the House voted to provide $100 million more than requested for Yucca Mountain, but the Senate approved no Yucca Mountain funding. New Jersey enacted zero-emission credits for nuclear power in 2018. Recent Events
Following the Fukushima disaster, NRC established a task force to identify lessons applicable to U.S. reactors and recommend safety improvements. The task force's report led to NRC's first Fukushima-related regulatory requirements, on March 12, 2012. , Nuclear Regulatory Commission, web page, reviewed/updated May 8, 2018, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/priorities.html
Nuclear Safety: Countries' Regulatory Bodies Have Made Changes in Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Accident , Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, Government Accountability Office, GAO-14-109, March 2014, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-109
State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report , Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1935, November 2012, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1935
Security and Emergency Response
The level of security that must be provided at nuclear power plants has been a high-profile issue since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. Since those attacks, NRC issued a series of orders and regulations that substantially increased nuclear plant security requirements, although industry critics contend that those measures are still insufficient. 4, August 2015, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1523/ML15232A263.pdf
Backgrounder on Nuclear Security , Nuclear Regulatory Commission, web page, last reviewed/updated December 12, 2014, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/security-enhancements.html
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation
Encouraging exports of U.S. civilian nuclear products, services, and technology while making sure they are not used for foreign nuclear weapons programs has long been a fundamental goal of U.S. nuclear energy policy. However, recent proposals to build nuclear power plants in as many as 18 countries that have not previously used nuclear energy, including several in the Middle East and elsewhere in the less developed world, have prompted concerns that international controls may prove inadequate. | The policy debate over the role of nuclear power in the nation's energy mix is rooted in the technology's fundamental characteristics. Nuclear reactors can produce potentially vast amounts of useful energy with relatively low consumption of natural resources and emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants. However, facilities that produce nuclear fuel for civilian power reactors can also produce materials for nuclear weapons. In addition, the process of nuclear fission (splitting of atomic nuclei) to generate power produces radioactive material that can remain hazardous for thousands of years and must be contained. How to manage the weapons proliferation and safety risks of nuclear power, or whether the benefits of nuclear power are worth those risks, are issues that have long been debated in Congress.
The 98 licensed nuclear power reactors at 59 sites in the United States generate about 20% of the nation's electricity. Two new reactors are currently under construction. About a dozen more are planned, but with no specific construction dates. Whether they will eventually move forward will depend largely on their economic competitiveness with natural gas and renewable energy sources. Throughout the world, 451 reactors are currently in service or operable, and 54 more are under construction, according to the World Nuclear Association.
The March 2011 disaster at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan increased attention to nuclear safety throughout the world. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which issues and enforces nuclear safety requirements, established a task force to identify lessons from Fukushima applicable to U.S. reactors. The task force's report led to NRC's first Fukushima-related regulatory requirements on March 12, 2012. Several other countries, such as Germany and Japan, eliminated or reduced their planned future reliance on nuclear power after the accident.
Highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel that is regularly removed from nuclear power plants is currently stored at plant sites in the United States. Development of a permanent underground repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, was suspended by the Obama Administration. The Trump Administration requested funding for FY2018 and FY2019 to revive the program, but it was not approved by Congress. The House voted to provide Yucca Mountain funding in both years, but the Senate provided no funding, and it was not included in the final bills.
The Obama Administration had appointed the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future to recommend an alternative approach to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act's focus on Yucca Mountain. In response to the commission's recommendations, the Department of Energy issued a waste strategy in January 2013 that called for the selection of new candidate sites for nuclear waste storage and disposal facilities through a "consent-based" process and for a surface storage pilot facility to open by 2021. However, Congress has not enacted legislation for such a strategy, so Yucca Mountain remains the sole authorized candidate site.
The level of security that must be provided at nuclear power plants has been a high-profile issue since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. Since those attacks, NRC issued a series of orders and regulations that substantially increased nuclear plant security requirements, although industry critics contend that those measures are still insufficient.
Encouraging exports of U.S. civilian nuclear products, services, and technology while making sure they are not used for foreign nuclear weapons programs has long been a fundamental goal of U.S. nuclear energy policy. Recent proposals to build nuclear power plants in several countries in the less developed world, including the Middle East, have prompted concerns that international controls may prove inadequate. |
crs_R40827 | crs_R40827_0 | In the past, many academic institutions have enacted rules that protect individuals who are gay from discrimination on campus. As a result, some high schools and institutions of higher education have sought to bar military recruiters from their campuses and/or to eliminate Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs on campus in response to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) policy, which prohibits homosexual conduct by members of the armed services. These efforts, however, have largely been thwarted due to several laws that bar giving federal funds to campuses that block access for military recruiters. These laws include the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001, which amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) by requiring high schools that receive federal funds to provide certain student contact information to military recruiters upon request and to allow recruiters to have the same access to students as employers and colleges. This provision is different from similar Department of Defense (DOD) provisions that allow DOD to compile directory information on high school students for military recruitment purposes and that require colleges and universities that receive federal funds to give military recruiters the same access to students and campuses that is provided to other employers. Known as the Solomon Amendment, the latter provision was upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in the 2006 case Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) . This report describes the various laws regarding military recruitment on high school and college campuses, as well as discusses the policy and legal issues that they may raise. | In recent years, many academic institutions have enacted rules that protect individuals who are gay from discrimination on campus. As a result, some high schools and institutions of higher education have sought to bar military recruiters from their campuses and/or to eliminate Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs on campus in response to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) policy, which prohibits homosexual conduct by members of the armed services. These efforts, however, have largely been thwarted due to several laws that bar giving federal funds to campuses that block access for military recruiters.
These laws include the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001, which amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) by requiring high schools that receive federal funds to provide certain student contact information to military recruiters upon request and to allow recruiters to have the same access to students as employers and colleges. This provision is different from similar Department of Defense (DOD) provisions that allow DOD to compile directory information on high school students for military recruitment purposes and that require colleges and universities that receive federal funds to give military recruiters the same access to students and campuses that is provided to other employers. Known as the Solomon Amendment, the latter provision was upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in the 2006 case Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR).
This report describes the various laws regarding military recruitment on high school and college campuses, as well as discusses the policy and legal issues that they may raise. |
crs_RL33161 | crs_RL33161_0 | (2) Described as a "software-defined radio" JTRS is envisioned tofunction more like a computer than a conventional radio and is to be upgraded and modified tooperate with other communications systems by the addition of software as opposed to redesigninghardware - a more costly and time-consuming process. JTRS Clusters
a. Security for JTRS has emerged as asignificant developmental difficulty. (27)
Interoperability with Legacy Radio Systems. The Army's FCS program consistsof four "spin outs" -- formerly known as spirals -- that will introduce FCS technologies and systemsto the current force. (55) Preceding the JTRSprogram restructuring, Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) -- whoserve as lead systems integrators for the entire 18 system FCS program -- announced in June 2004that Cluster One and Five programs would be restructured to better meet the needs of the FCSprogram. Issues for Congress
The Viability of the Cluster One Program. It can be argued that network security would take on an even a more significant role in FCSthan compared to the Army's current force. | The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a Department of Defense (DOD) program thatwould play a significant role in the U.S Army's proposed Future Combat System (FCS) program. (For a more detailed description of the FCS program see CRS Report RL32888 , The Army's FutureCombat System(FCS): Background and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed].) JTRS,envisioned as a family of software programmable radios, has been described as the "backbone" ofthe FCS and is intended to link the 18 manned and unmanned systems that would constitute FCS.Two JTRS sub-programs managed by the Army -- Cluster One and Cluster Five -- have experienceddevelopmental difficulties, delays, and cost overruns which calls into question their viability. Thisreport will be updated on a periodic basis. |
crs_R45090 | crs_R45090_0 | Introduction
Wage earnings are the largest source of income for many workers, and wage gains are a primary lever for raising living standards. Appendix A provides details on the methodology used in this report. In summary, analysis of the data shows that overall wages rose in real terms over the 1979 to 2017 period at the top of the wage distribution, increased slightly at the middle of the wage distribution, and rose to an even lesser degree at the bottom of the distribution. Differential patterns of wage growth narrowed the gap between median earnings of men and women (i.e., the gender wage gap), but other wage gaps did not show such change over time. Real wages fell for workers with lower levels of educational attainment (i.e., a high school degree or less) and rose for highly educated workers, contributing to a wage gap between workers with different educational attainment that grew markedly over the 1979 to 2000 period and has plateaued since then . Occupational composition of worker groups appears to matter as well and may explain the failure of education alone to raise wages for some groups. Real Wage Trends
This section describes trends in real hourly wages over the 1979 to 2017 period at selected wage percentiles for nonmilitary, nonfarm workers between the ages of 25 and 64; wage patterns are disaggregated by sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and education. Median wage trends were not uniform across demographic groups, with wages decreasing for some groups (e.g., men and Hispanic workers) but increasing for others (e.g., women). While median wages for white men rose by 2.5%, from $25.33 to $25.96, over the 1979 to 2017 period, median wages for black and Hispanic men fell. The wage gap between black and white workers grew, as did the gap between median-wage Hispanic workers and median-wage non-Hispanic workers. Wages by Educational Attainment: The College Premium
The rise in real hourly wages for workers with higher levels of educational attainment stands out among wage trends over the 1979 to 2017 period. Skilled Trades
The previous section highlighted the strong wage growth experienced by workers with at least a bachelor's degree (relative to workers with a high school degree or less education) over the 1979 to 2000 period, and the high and sustained wage premium for these workers thereafter (see Figure 4 ). Worker Characteristics by Wage Group
Table 1 shows a general pattern of strong wage growth at the top of the wage distribution over the 1979 to 2017 period, with slower growth or falling wages at the median and bottom of the distribution. Shifts in occupation may affect wage trends as well. Overall, the analysis shows the following:
Workers were more likely to have completed a bachelor's or advanced degree in 2017 than workers in 1979, with the gains in educational attainment being particularly large for workers in the highest wage group. But educational gains do not translate into wage growth for all groups. High-Wage Workers
Although wage patterns varied across demographic groups for low-wage and middle-wage workers, wages grew in real terms at the 90 th percentile for all groups over the 1979-2017 period. Technological change, international trade, immigration and other factors affecting labor supply changes, along with the quality of job matches are among the key market factors thought to contribute to recent wage trends. Technological change can affect wage patterns by changing employers' demand for certain groups of workers. Where new technology raises workers' productivity (often for high-skilled workers)—and their value to employers—demand will rise, and put upward pressure on wages. For example, social and economic change dramatically increased women's labor supply in the latter half of the last century. At the same time, changes in pay-setting practices in certain high-pay occupations, the emergence of superstar earners (e.g., in sports and entertainment), and other factors may have improved wage growth for some workers at the top of the wage distribution. | Wage earnings are the largest source of income for many workers, and wage gains are a primary lever for raising living standards. Reports of stagnant median wages have therefore raised concerns among some that economic growth over the last several decades has not translated into gains for all worker groups. To shed light on recent patterns, this report estimates real (inflation-adjusted) wage trends at the 10th, 50th (median), and 90th percentiles of the wage distributions for the workforce as a whole and for several demographic groups, and it explores changes in educational attainment and occupation for these groups over the 1979 to 2017 period.
Key findings of this report include the following:
Real wages rose at the top of the distribution, whereas wages stagnated or fell at the bottom. Real (inflation-adjusted) wages at the 90th percentile increased over 1979 to 2017 for the workforce as a whole and across sex, race, and Hispanic ethnicity. However, at the 90th percentile, wage growth was much higher for white men and women and lower for black and Hispanic men. By contrast, middle (50th percentile) and bottom (10th percentile) wages grew to a lesser degree (e.g., women) or declined in real terms (e.g., men). The gender wage gap narrowed, but other gaps did not. From 1979 to 2017, the gap between the women's median wage and men's median wage became smaller. Gaps expanded between the median wages for black and white workers and for Hispanic and non-Hispanic workers over the same period. Real wages fell for workers with lower levels of educational attainment and rose for highly educated workers. Wages for workers with a high school diploma or less education declined in real terms at the top, middle, and bottom of the wage distribution, whereas wages rose for workers with at least a college degree. The wage value of a college degree (relative to a high school education) increased markedly over 1979-2000. The college wage premium has leveled since that time, but it remains high. High-wage workers, as a group, benefited more from the increased payoff to a college degree because they are the best educated and had the highest gains in educational attainment over the 1979 to 2017 period. Education and occupation patterns appear to be important to wage trends. Worker groups studied in this report were more likely to have earned a bachelor's or advanced degree in 2017 than workers in 1979, with the gains in college degree attainment being particularly large for workers in the highest wage groups. For some low- and middle-wage worker groups, however, these educational gains were not sufficient to raise wages. Occupational categories of workers appear to matter as well and may help explain the failure of education alone to raise wages.
The focus of this report is on wage rates and changes at selected wage percentiles, with some attention given to the potential influence of educational attainment and the occupational distribution of worker groups on wage patterns. Other factors are likely to contribute to wage trends over the 1979 to 2017 period as well, including changes in the supply and demand for workers, labor market institutions, workplace organization and practices, and macroeconomic trends. This report provides an overview of how these broad forces are thought to interact with wage determination, but it does not attempt to measure their contribution to wage patterns over the last four decades. For example, changes over time in the supply and demand for workers with different skill sets (e.g., as driven by technological change and new international trade patterns) is likely to affect wage growth. A declining real minimum wage and decreasing unionization rates may lead to slower wage growth for workers more reliant on these institutions to provide wage protection, whereas changes in pay-setting practices in certain high-pay occupations, the emergence of superstar earners (e.g., in sports and entertainment), and skill-biased technological changes may have improved wage growth for some workers at the top of the wage distribution. Macroeconomic factors, business cycles, and other national economic trends affect the overall demand for workers, with consequences for aggregate wage growth, and may affect employers' production decisions (e.g., production technology and where to produce) with implications for the distribution of wage income. These factors are briefly discussed at the end of the report. |
crs_96-228 | crs_96-228_0 | In effect, the final rule reaffirmed Departmental practice of the 1970s: the issue had come full circle. As the Davis-Bacon Act has been implemented by the Secretary of Labor, the Department has recognized apprentices and trainees in formal programs as a classification of workers for wage rate purposes. Helpers Under Davis-Bacon: The Context of the Issue
The Davis-Bacon Act (1931, as amended) requires that the "advertised specifications" for construction contracts in excess of $2,000 to which the government of the United States or of the District of Columbia is a party:
... shall contain a provision stating the minimum wages to be paid various classes of laborers and mechanics which shall be based upon the wages that will be determined by the Secretary of Labor to be prevailing for the corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics employed on projects of a character similar to the contract work in the city, town, village, or other civil subdivision of the State in which the work is to be performed.... (Emphasis added.) In mid-January 1981, as the Carter Administration was drawing to a close, a final rule was published. The Reagan Administration Regulations (1981 ff.) Legislative Initiatives of the 104th Congress
Through the years, Congress had sought to modify the Davis-Bacon Act through amendments to program legislation and through the appropriations process, as well as through free standing legislation—or, simply, to repeal the statute. The final rule (effective January 19, 2001), provides
(4) A distinct classification of "helper" will be issued in wage determinations applicable to work performed on construction projects covered by the labor standards provisions of the Davis-Bacon and Related Acts only where:
(i) The duties of the helper are clearly defined and distinct from those of any other classification on the wage determination;
(ii) The use of such helpers is an established prevailing practice in the area; and
(iii) The helper is not employed as a trainee in an informal training program. The Carter regulations were withdrawn and, in 1981, new regulations were proposed. Portions of the proposed rule won court approval and, through the years, were implemented. When the Associated Builders and Contractors sought a court order for enforcement of the regulation (summer 1996), the Department reopened the rulemaking process and, in December 1996, suspended implementation of the regulation until further notice. Congress had followed the administrative proposals dealing with the "helper" issue. | The Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, as amended, requires that not less than the locally prevailing wage (not necessarily the union rate) be paid to workers engaged in contract construction work to which the government of the United States or of the District of Columbia is a party. The coverage threshold is $2,000.
Under Davis-Bacon, the Secretary of Labor makes wage rate determinations for "the various classes of laborers and mechanics" employed on covered work. The Secretary has, through regulation, recognized apprentices and trainees, registered in formal programs, as special categories and allowed a special reduced wage for these workers. Some contractors, however, have created yet another category of worker: i.e., "helpers." These may be informal trainees, or they may simply be general utility workers employed outside of a craft classification. These workers are most often not recognized as a separate category for wage rate determination purposes.
Through the years, the Department of Labor (DOL) had rigorously adhered to this general worker classification system as necessary to assure that not less than the locally prevailing rate would be paid to "the various classes of laborers and mechanics" on a project. Were helpers indiscriminately substituted for journeymen or laborers, DOL holds, wage rates would be depressed and the intent of Congress in crafting the Davis-Bacon Act would be subverted.
In 1979, the Carter Administration began a general review of Davis-Bacon—including the helper issue. New regulations were issued in January 1981. Before they could be implemented, they were withdrawn and rewritten by the Reagan Administration (1982). Through the next decade, these new Davis-Bacon regulations were largely implemented—but the helper segment remained in litigation. When, in 1992 (following a series of legal maneuvers), judicial approval of the helper regulations was finally secured, Congress blocked their enforcement through the appropriations process, variously denying funding for their implementation.
In mid-1996, the Associated Builders and Contractors sought court assistance to require enforcement of the helper regulation. DOL responded by returning to the rulemaking process. Subsequently, DOL published a proposed rule (April 1999) defining the concept of helpers and soliciting comment. The proposed rule, essentially, reaffirmed Departmental practice of the 1970s with respect to the use of helpers: the issue had come full circle. This final rule was issued by the Department and took effect on January 19, 2001.
Administrative initiatives found a counterpart in legislative proposals, introduced periodically up through the 109th Congress. No such proposals have as yet been introduced in the 110th Congress. This report, which will be updated periodically as events unfold, tracks the administrative, judicial and legislative evolution of the "helper" issue. |
crs_R43407 | crs_R43407_0 | The likelihood of extended periods of severe drought and its effects on 21 st -century society in the United States raise several issues for Congress. These issues include how to respond to recurrent drought incidents, how to prepare for future drought, and how to coordinate federal agency actions, among other policy choices. Although a discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this report, understanding what drought is and its causes, how it has affected North America in the past, and how drought may affect the United States in the future all bear on actions Congress may take to prepare for and mitigate the effects of drought. Some part of the country is almost always experiencing drought at some level. The land area affected by drought can vary widely by year and also within a particular year. For example, in May 2017, only 3.8% of the total U.S. land area was affected by drought of at least moderate intensity (D1). In contrast, in September 2012, 55% of the nation faced drought of at least moderate intensity, and 35% of the country was under severe drought (D2) conditions at that time. Prehistorical and Historical Droughts in the United States
Some scientists refer to severe drought as "the greatest recurring natural disaster to strike North America." That claim stems from a reconstruction of drought conditions that extends back over 1,000 years, based on observations, historical and instrumental records where available, and tree-ring records or other proxies in the absence of direct measurements. Drought reconstructions from tree rings document that severe multi-decadal drought occurred in the American Southwest during the 13 th century, which anthropologists and archeologists suspect profoundly affected Pueblo society. "megadroughts." Colorado River: Approaching Historic Low Flows? Flow data seem to suggest that Colorado River flows since 2000 are approaching those historic low levels. Did Human-Induced Climate Change Cause the 2012-2016 California Drought? Drought Forecasts for the United States
Predicting the intensity and duration of severe drought over a specific region is not currently possible more than a few seasons in advance because of the many factors that influence drought. Even though forecasting drought at the regional scale is difficult, understanding potential changes in long-term trends is important for water managers at all levels—federal, state, local, and tribal. Water project operations and state water allocations typically are based on past long-term hydrological trends; significant deviations from such trends may result in difficult challenges for water managers and water users alike. Drought is a natural hazard with potentially significant economic, social, and ecological consequences. History suggests that severe and extended droughts are inevitable and part of natural climate cycles. Drought has for centuries shaped the societies of North America and will continue to do so into the future. Surface water conditions in California have recovered dramatically in 2017 from the effects of the 2012-2016 drought, but some consequences, such as the decline in groundwater levels from increased pumping, likely will linger for years. In response to the drought, the 114 th Congress enacted legislation ( P.L. 114-322 ) that altered the authorities regarding how federal water infrastructure in the state is managed and how new water storage may be developed. In the 115 th Congress, there is both interest in and concern about the federal role and funding for new water infrastructure to cope with the next drought and with hydrologic conditions that can quickly transition from drought to flood conditions. | Drought is a natural hazard with potentially significant economic, social, and ecological consequences. History suggests that severe and extended droughts are inevitable and part of natural climate cycles. Drought has for centuries shaped the societies of North America and will continue to do so into the future. The likelihood of extended periods of severe drought and its effects on 21st-century society in the United States raise several issues for Congress. These issues include how to respond to recurrent drought incidents, how to prepare for future drought, and how to coordinate federal agency actions, among other policy choices. Understanding what drought is and its causes, how it has affected North America in the past, and how drought may affect the United States in the future all bear on actions Congress may take to prepare for and mitigate the effects of drought.
The 2012-2016 drought in California and parts of other western states, and 16 years of dry conditions in the Southwest, have fueled congressional interest in drought and its near-term effects on water supplies and agriculture, as well as in long-term issues, such as drought forecasting and possible links between drought and human-induced climate change. Surface water conditions in California have recovered dramatically in 2017 from the effects of the drought, but some consequences, such as the decline in groundwater levels from increased pumping, likely will linger for years and may even be permanent. In response to the California drought, the 114th Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 114-322) that altered the authorities regarding how federal water infrastructure in the state is managed and how new water storage may be developed. In the 115th Congress, there is both interest in and concern about the federal role and funding for new water infrastructure to cope with the next drought and with hydrologic conditions that can quickly transition from drought to flood conditions.
Some scientists refer to severe drought as a recurring natural disaster in North America. Reconstructions of drought conditions that extend back over 1,000 years—based on observations, historical and instrumental records, and tree rings—illustrate that portions of the conterminous United States have experienced periods of severe and long-lasting drought termed megadroughts. For example, drought reconstructions from tree rings document that severe multi-decadal drought occurred in the American Southwest during the 13th century. These megadroughts have affected flows in major western rivers. For example, during the years 1130-1154, estimated Colorado River flows were less than 84% of normal. Recent data suggest that Colorado River flows since 2000 are approaching those previous lows—flows have been below average for 13 of the 16 years between 2000 and 2015.
Part of the country is almost always experiencing drought at some level. The land area affected by drought can vary widely by year and also within a particular year. In May 2017, only 3.8% of the total U.S. land area was affected by drought of at least moderate intensity. In contrast, in September 2012, 55% of the nation faced drought of moderate or greater intensity, and 35% of the country was under severe drought.
Predicting the intensity and duration of severe drought over a specific region is not currently possible more than a few months in advance because of the many factors that influence drought. Even though forecasting drought at the regional scale is difficult, understanding potential changes in long-term trends is important for water managers at all levels—federal, state, local, and tribal. Water project operations and state water allocations typically are based on past long-term hydrological trends; significant deviations from such trends may result in difficult challenges for water managers and water users alike. |
crs_RL32737 | crs_RL32737_0 | Introduction
By all accounts, the U.S. military dominates state-on-state conflict. (1)
In the past, combating non-state actors was seen by many to be a "lesser included case. "Non-state actors appeared to be less threatening to national security than the well funded, wellorganized, and much more militarily potent armed forces of an enemy nation-state. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 graphically illustrate, however, that small groupsof non-state actors can exploit relatively inexpensive and commercially available technology toconduct very destructive attacks over great distances. Background
The U.S. armed forces that are fielded today were organized, trained and equipped principallywith conventional, state-on-state warfare in mind. Senior leaders in the Department of Defense(DOD) appear to appreciate the distinct challenges that combating non-state actors present, however,and are taking steps to ensure that these challenges are reflected in long-term military plans,programs, and policies. The focus of this report is on a number of challenges associated with uses of military aviation incombating terrorists and other non-state actors directly. Even conventional state-on-state conflict presents collateral damage concerns. When combating non-state actors, however, civilians may needto be engaged at an unprecedented level. Winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population, orat least not alienating them could become a large part of the overall counter insurgent, or counterterrorist strategy. Almost by definition, non-stateactors employ weapons and methods that are inexpensive, when compared to training, equipping andemploying a military force. However, the cost to defend against non-state actors, or to combat them,can be high. Yet, some are more directly applicable than others. Close Air Support (CAS). Special Operations Forces can also take indirect action against non-state actors. Issues and Options
Introduction
There is a consensus view in defense circles that airpower is one of the United States' greatmilitary advantages. Some are increasingly concerned, however, that military aviation is focused toomuch on the demands of fighting conventional foes to the detriment of irregular warfare, and that"the challenge for the Air Force is to re-shape its forces to increase their relevance in small wars,while maintaining the capability to win major conflicts." (45)
Some argue that DOD's overall acquisition priorities are still too oriented toward large, "hightech" acquisition programs most applicable to fighting or deterring a peer competitor in state-on-stateconflict. training, doctrine, planning and organization). DOD already operates a number of aerial sensor platforms that can be used to detectnon-state actors. | By all accounts, the U.S. military dominates state-on-state conflict. In the past, non-stateactors (terrorists, guerrillas, drug traffickers) appeared to be less threatening to U.S. national securitythan the well funded, well organized, and potent armed forces of an enemy nation-state. The terroristattacks of September 11, 2001 illustrate, however, that small groups of non-state actors can exploitrelatively inexpensive and commercially available technology to conduct very destructive attacksover great distances.
Today's U.S. armed forces were developed principally with state-on-state conflict in mind.Combating non-state actors, however, presents a number of distinct challenges in terms ofoperations, cost, and mindset. Non-state actors generally strive to hide within civilian populations.While U.S. policy makers typically seek quick and decisive victories, non-state actors seek protractedwar. Non-state actors often employ cheap, commercially available weapons, that often result inexpensive responses by the United States.
Many of the weapons and methods employed today by U.S. armed forces can be used againstnon-state actors. Some, however, are more directly applicable than others. U.S. experience inconducting close air support (CAS), employing special operations forces (SOF) and advising friendlygovernments in using aviation to defend themselves from insurgents and terrorists may form a basisfor building capabilities against non-state actors.
Pursuing objectives against non-state actors while "winning the hearts and minds" of localpopulations, or at least not alienating them, appears to be a key consideration. Recent military actionhas killed or captured prominent terrorists, but it is unclear whether this action actually degraded theterrorist organization's capabilities. In some cases, these actions may have even strengthened them.
There is a consensus view that airpower is one of the United States' great military advantages.Some are increasingly concerned, however, that military aviation is focused too much on thedemands of fighting conventional foes to the detriment of irregular warfare (also called MOOTWA-- military operations other than war), and that the Department of Defense (DOD) must re-shape itsaviation forces to increase their relevance in small wars, while maintaining the capability to winmajor conflicts.
Determination of DOD needs for combating non-state actors and fielding more relevantforces raises a number of acquisition issues. Some argue that DOD's overall acquisition prioritiesare still too oriented toward large, "high tech" acquisition programs most applicable to fighting ordeterring a peer competitor in state-on-state conflict. Equally important, however, are the mindsetchanges that may be required to transition to a force equally adept at fighting conventional and nonconventional foes. These mindset changes could include changes to training, doctrine, planning andorganization. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43518 | crs_R43518_0 | Introduction
On November 19, 2015, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved AquaBounty Technologies' application to produce AquAdvantage Salmon, a genetically engineered (GE) Atlantic salmon, for human consumption. This is the first GE animal that has been approved for human consumption in the United States. FDA also has proposed voluntary guidelines for using labels that indicate whether food products are derived from GE salmon. These techniques are now being used to develop genetically engineered organisms for the aquaculture industry. Some have claimed that FDA's approval of GE salmon has been long overdue and the delays have been caused by political interference. They conclude that delays have hindered investment and development of the U.S. biotechnology sector. Another concern is that GE fish may interbreed with wild fish and allow the modified genetic material to become assimilated into the wild fish population. In addition, some in the fishing industry are concerned that greater efficiency in the aquaculture industry could harm salmon fisheries. In response to these concerns, legislation has been introduced during the last several Congresses to restrict the use and require the labeling of GE organisms. H.R. Two FY2016 appropriations bills for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies ( S. 1800 and S. 2129 ) include provisions that would provide funds to implement labeling requirements for GE salmon. 394 would prohibit most uses of GE fish, with some exceptions or if certain conditions are met. 4321) or an environmental impact statement (EIS). Most of FDA's regulatory authority to regulate food safety is provided by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §321). Salmon will be processed in Panama before being shipped to the United States for retail sale. Both facilities currently used by AquaBounty confine production to land-based freshwater areas. According to the application, production will continue in this manner. In 2009, AquaBounty provided FDA with the last required study of AquAdvantage Atlantic salmon for its new animal drug application (NADA). On November 19, 2015, FDA approved the Aquabounty application to produce GE Atlantic salmon and to sell this product in the United States. In the preliminary finding of no significant impact released on December 20, 2012, FDA reiterated that food from AquAdvantage Salmon is as safe as food from non-GE salmon and determined that there are no significant food safety hazards or risks associated with AquAdvantage Salmon. However, the potential consequences of the interbreeding of farm (including GE salmon) and wild Atlantic salmon remain a long-term concern of those attempting to conserve wild Atlantic salmon populations. Fishermen have concerns related to further increases in salmon aquaculture production and environmental harm to wild stocks. At least initially, annual production at the AquaBounty Panama facility is limited to a capacity of approximately 100 metric tons compared to the total U.S. fresh and frozen salmon supply of approximately 700,000 metric tons in 2014. 913 and S. 511 ) would require labeling of GE food products, including GE salmon. H.R. H.R. In addition to labeling requirements, S. 738 would require an EIS for any application related to the use of GE salmon intended for human consumption. In the 113 th Congress, several bills related to the production and labeling of GE salmon were introduced. S. 246 and H.R. H.R. H.R. Future Considerations
Some have asserted that the FDA's approach to GE salmon evaluation has failed to consider the full scope of potential impacts or to fully assess the risk of unintended consequences. FDA evaluated GE salmon as an NAD that is safe for human consumption. Questions remain as to whether the current process can afford adequate safeguards for the public and the environment while allowing for the timely approval and use of new genetic technologies. | On November 19, 2015, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved AquaBounty Technologies' application to produce AquAdvantage Salmon, a genetically engineered (GE) Atlantic salmon, for human consumption. This is the first GE animal that has been approved for human consumption in the United States. FDA also has proposed voluntary guidelines for using labels that indicate whether food products are derived from GE salmon.
Genetic engineering techniques are used by scientists to insert genetic material from one organism into the genome of another organism. Genetically engineered salmon have been modified to grow more quickly and to use feed more efficiently. However, some are concerned that, in this rapidly evolving field, current technological and regulatory safeguards are inadequate to protect the environment and ensure that these products are safe to eat.
Nearly twenty years ago, AquaBounty Technologies Inc. began the application process to obtain FDA approval for a genetically engineered Atlantic salmon. In 2009, AquaBounty submitted the last required study for its new animal drug (NAD) application. The FDA is regulating GE Atlantic salmon as an NAD under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA; 21 U.S.C. §321). An NAD is approved by the agency only after the drug is shown to be safe and effective. FDA has concluded that AquAdvantage Salmon is as safe as food from non-GE salmon and determined that there are no significant food safety hazards or risks associated with the product.
Environmental concerns related to the development of GE salmon include the potential for competition and interbreeding with wild fish. According to some, escaped GE salmon could spawn with wild Atlantic salmon and introduce the modified genetic material to the wild population. To address these concerns, AquaBounty will produce salmon eggs (all sterile females) in Canada, ship these eggs to Panama, grow and process fish in Panama, and ship table-ready, processed fish to the United States for retail sale. Aquabounty will limit production to land-based facilities to isolate GE salmon from the environment and minimize the likelihood of harm to wild fish populations. Production from these facilities is limited to approximately 100 metric tons, which is a small fraction of the current U.S. fresh and frozen salmon supply of 700,000 metric tons.
Some have asserted that FDA approval of AquAdvantage Salmon was overdue and that delays have hindered investment and development of the U.S. biotechnology sector. Others have questioned the adequacy of FDA's review of GE salmon and whether the existing approval process is equipped to fully evaluate the risks of this technology, especially potential environmental harm. Additional concerns have been voiced concerning food safety, labeling of GE salmon, and economic effects on existing wild salmon fisheries.
In response to concerns related to the production and use of GE salmon as food, legislation has been introduced during the last several Congresses to restrict the production and require the labeling of GE organisms. Legislation introduced in the 114th Congress related to labeling GE salmon specifically or to GE organisms generally includes H.R. 393, S. 738, H.R. 913, S. 511, and H.R. 1599. Two FY2016 appropriations bills for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies (S. 1800 and S. 2129) include provisions that would provide funds to implement labeling requirements for GE salmon. H.R. 394 would prohibit most uses of GE fish, with some exceptions or if certain conditions are met. In addition to labeling requirements, S. 738 would require an environmental impact statement for any application to produce GE salmon intended for human consumption. H.R. 1599 has been passed by the House, and H.R. 1800 has been reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations. Since they were introduced, no further action has been taken on the other bills related to genetic engineering. |
crs_RS22930 | crs_RS22930_0 | Background and Current Status
On July 23, 2004, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board) published ADA and Architectural Barriers Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG). In its June 17, 2008, Notice of Proposed Rule Makings (NPRM), DOJ proposed the adoption of Parts I and III of the Access Board guidelines and also proposed several other amendments. The regulations were sent to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) but were not released for publication in the Federal Register. On January 20, 2009, the White House issued a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies stating that, with certain exceptions, no proposed or final regulation should be sent to the Office of the Federal Register unless and until it has been reviewed or approved by a department or agency head appointed or designated by President Obama. In response to this memorandum, on January 21, 2009, the Department of Justice notified the OMB of its withdrawal of the draft final rules from the OMB review process. There is considerable uncertainty regarding what form, if any, new proposed regulations would take. However, it is instructive to briefly examine the provisions of the regulations which were proposed in June 2008. The proposed regulations for title III, like those for title II, also contain a "safe harbor" provision. Power-Driven Mobility Devices
Since 1990 when the ADA was enacted, the choices of mobility aids for individuals with disabilities have increased dramatically. | The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has often been described as the most sweeping nondiscrimination legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As stated in the act, its purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." (42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(1)) On June 17, 2008, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for ADA title II (prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities by state and local governments), and ADA title III (prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities by places of public accommodations). These proposed regulations are detailed and complex. They would adopt accessibility standards consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board. More specifically, the regulations include more detailed standards for service animals and power-driven mobility devices, and provide for a "safe harbor" in certain circumstances. Comments on the regulations were due by August 18, 2008. The regulations did not advance beyond the Office of Management and Budget during the Bush Administration.
On January 20, 2009, the White House issued a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies stating that, with certain exceptions, no proposed or final regulation should be sent to the Office of the Federal Register unless and until it has been reviewed or approved by a department or agency head appointed or designated by President Obama. In response to this memorandum, on January 21, 2009, the Department of Justice notified the OMB of its withdrawal of the draft final rules from the OMB review process. There is considerable uncertainty regarding what form, if any, new proposed regulations would take. However, it is instructive to briefly examine the provisions of the regulations which were proposed in June 2008. |
crs_RS20722 | crs_RS20722_0 | The Senate Convenes
The Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution directs that a new Congress convene at noon on January 3 in each odd-numbered year, unless the preceding Congress has by law designated a different day for the new Congress's convening. 129 , setting the convening date for the 114 th Congress as January 6, 2015. 113-201 ). Congressional leaders planned that the 115 th Congress would convene January 3, 2017, and that the 116 th Congress would convene January 3, 2019, obviating the need for a law to set the date. Oath of Office and Quorum
The first order of business in a new Senate is the swearing-in of Senators elected or reelected in the most recent general election and of newly appointed Senators. On occasion in recent years, the majority leader or the majority and minority leaders might first be recognized for brief remarks. If there is a contested or undecided Senate election, the leadership might provide a status report and plan for its resolution, before or after Senators are sworn in. Individuals might also record a ceremonial swearing-in. When there is a change in party control of the Senate, or when a vacancy in the office of President pro tempore occurs, a new President pro tempore is elected by simple resolution and then escorted to the front of the chamber to be sworn in by the Vice President. Party Leadership
Any changes in Senate party leadership take place in the respective party conference meetings prior to opening day or, if there is a vacancy, at another time. No floor votes are needed to ratify these changes. Other First-Day Floor Activities
Standing Orders for the Current Congress
Other organizational business is taken up on the Senate floor on the first day. These standing orders addressed—
meetings of the Select Committee on Ethics; limiting roll-call votes to 15 minutes; authorizing Senators to present reports at the desk; allowing 10 additional minutes daily to speak for each party leader (so-called leader time); forgoing the printing of conference reports and joint explanatory statements when they are printed as House reports; allowing the Appropriations Committee to file reports during an adjournment or recess of the Senate; authorizing the secretary of the Senate to make technical and clerical corrections to engrossments of Senate-passed bills, resolutions, and amendments; during an adjournment or recess of the Senate, authorizing the secretary of the Senate to receive presidential messages and, except for House legislation, House messages, and authorizing the President pro tempore to sign enrollments; allowing Senators to designate two staff members for floor access during the Senate's consideration of specific matters; allowing treaties and nominations to be referred when received; and permitting Senators to introduce bills and resolutions by taking them to the desk. Special Circumstances
Other first-day activities might occur as a consequence of specific circumstances. The Senate might also by unanimous consent set an initial date other than the convening day on which bills and joint resolutions may be introduced, and might also agree to begin consideration of legislation at a later date. Committee Organization
Negotiations between parties over committee sizes and ratios and separate committee assignment processes begin prior to the convening of a new Congress, and mostly within the party groups—the Democratic and Republican Conferences. Committee assignment resolutions are not normally considered on the opening day of a new Congress, but later in January. | The Constitution mandates that Congress convene at noon on January 3, unless the preceding Congress by law designated a different day. P.L. 113-201 set January 6, 2015, as the convening date of the 114th Congress. The 115th Congress convened on January 3, 2017. Congressional leaders announced the 116th Congress would convene January 3, 2019.
The Senate follows a well-established routine on the opening day of a new Congress. The proceedings include
swearing in Senators elected or reelected in the most recent general election (approximately one-third of the Senate) or newly appointed to the convening Senate; establishing the presence of a quorum; adopting administrative resolutions; adopting standing orders for the new Congress; agreeing by unanimous consent to a date, other than the convening date, on which bills and joint resolutions may begin to be introduced; and electing a new President pro tempore and one or more Senate officers if there is a vacancy or a change in party control.
The majority and minority leaders usually make welcoming remarks during the day's proceedings. If an election to a Senate seat is undecided or subject to consideration by the Senate, the majority leader and other Senators might address the Senate's posture on that election.
Other first-day activities may occur as a consequence of specific circumstances, such as providing for a joint session with the House to count electoral votes after a presidential election. After Senators are sworn or after organizational proceedings are completed, the Senate may turn to legislative or executive business or other activities.
Following their official swearing-in on the Senate floor, newly sworn Senators gather with their families in the Old Senate Chamber for ceremonial swearing-ins with the Vice President or another official of their choosing. The ceremonial swearing-ins may be photographed and recorded.
Negotiations between parties over committee sizes and ratios, parties' action on committee assignments, and parties' decisions on party leadership changes and organization may begin during the early organization meetings for the new Senate, which occur in November and December following a general election. The committee assignment process may continue after the beginning days of a new Congress. At some time, usually other than opening day, the Senate adopts committee assignment resolutions. Any changes in Senate party leadership take place in respective party conference meetings. There are no floor votes to ratify party leadership changes.
For an explanation of proceedings occurring on the first day in the House of Representatives, see the companion report: CRS Report RL30725, The First Day of a New Congress: A Guide to Proceedings on the House Floor. |
crs_R44669 | crs_R44669_0 | Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress increased focus on state and local homeland security assistance by, among other things, establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and authorizing DHS to administer federal homeland security grant programs. This report provides a brief summary of the development of DHS's role in providing homeland security assistance, a summary of the current homeland security programs managed by DHS, and a discussion of the following policy questions: (1) the purpose and number of programs; (2) the use of homeland security assistance program funding; and (3) the funding amounts for the programs. Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP)15
HSGP supports state and local activities to prevent terrorism and other catastrophic events and to prepare for threats and hazards that pose the "greatest" risk to the nation's security. HSGP is comprised of three grant programs—State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSP), Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and Operation Stonegarden (OPSG). Some may contend there is a need for the Congress to conduct further oversight hearings and legislate on policy issues related to DHS assistance to states and localities. However, the majority of homeland security assistance funding to states and localities has been appropriated to programs dedicated to preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks. DHS grants to states and localities are intended for grant recipients to meet national preparedness goals. One final question remains, and that is whether or not these grants are effective in assisting states and localities in meeting national preparedness goals. | Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress increased focus on state and local homeland security assistance by, among other things, establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and authorizing DHS to administer federal homeland security grant programs. These homeland security grants have been administered by numerous DHS entities, and these grants have focused on such preparedness activities as assistance to states and localities to prepare and respond to terrorist attacks, securing critical infrastructure such as rail and ports, securing nonprofit (nongovernmental) organizations, and securing high-threat and high-risk urban areas.
If homeland security continues to be of national interest, how homeland security assistance is funded, administered, and allocated will be of importance to Congress. Since Congress would continue to conduct oversight and legislate on homeland security assistance to states and localities, Members may elect to consider policy options that anticipate, as well as react to, future catastrophes.
Throughout the past 15 years, there has been a continued discussion on the number and purpose of the grant programs, state and locality use of grant program funding, and the funding amounts annually appropriated to the grant programs. All of these issues identify a potential need for Congress to continue its debate and consider legislation related to federal homeland security assistance for states and localities and the nation's overall emergency preparedness. One major issue remains, and is comprised of these other issues, and that is whether or not these grants are effective in assisting states and localities in meeting the national preparedness goals. |
crs_R41734 | crs_R41734_0 | Introduction
This is an outline of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). ECPA consists of three parts. The second, the Stored Communications Act, focuses on the privacy of, and government access to, stored electronic communications. The third creates a procedure for governmental installation and use of pen registers as well as trap and trace devices. It also outlaws such installation or use except for law enforcement and foreign intelligence investigations. Title III
Prohibitions : In Title III, ECPA begins the proposition that unless provided otherwise, it is a federal crime to engage in wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping; to possess wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping equipment; to use or disclose information obtained through illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping; or to disclose information secured through court-ordered wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, in order to obstruct justice. Finally, the results of electronic eavesdropping authorized under Title III may be disclosed and used for law enforcement purposes and for testimonial purposes. It is a federal crime to disclose, with an intent to obstruct criminal justice, any information derived from lawful police wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Finally, the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes a cause of action against the United States for willful violations of Title III, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or the provisions governing stored communications in 18 U.S.C. Third, there is the general immunity from civil liability afforded providers under subsection 2703(e). Section 2702 comes with its own set of exceptions which permit disclosure of the contents of a communication: (1) to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient; (2) as otherwise authorized in section 2517 [relating to disclosures permitted under Title III], 2511(2)(a)[relating to provider disclosures permitted under Title III for protection of provider property or incidental to service], or 2703 [relating to required provider disclosures pursuant to governmental authority] of this title; (3) with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or the subscriber in the case of remote computing service; (4) to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are used to forward such communication to its destination; (5) as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service; (6) to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in connection with a report submitted thereto under section 227 of the Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990; (7) to a law enforcement agency—(A) if the contents—(i) were inadvertently obtained by the service provider; and (ii) appear to pertain to the commission of a crime; or (8) to a federal, state, or local government entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without delay of communications relating to the emergency. Consequences : The use or installation of pen registers or trap and trace devices by anyone other than the telephone company, service provider, or those acting under judicial authority is a federal crime, punishable by imprisonment for not more than a year and/or a fine of not more than $100,000 ($200,000 for an organization). | This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).
It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given his prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); civil liability for damages, attorneys' fees and possibly punitive damages; disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate, but comparable, protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., email) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices.
Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches, and install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under ECPA and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R41733, Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, by [author name scrubbed], without the footnotes, quotations, attributions of authority, or appendixes found there. The longer report also serves as the first section of CRS Report 98-326, Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], which examines both ECPA and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). It too is available in abridged form as CRS Report 98-327, Privacy: An Abbreviated Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44495 | crs_R44495_0 | Introduction to HUD
Most of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts, typically as a part of the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill (THUD). HUD's programs are primarily designed to address housing problems faced by households with very low incomes or other special housing needs. FY2017 Status
Enactment of Full-Year Appropriations
On May 5, 2017, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017 was signed into law ( P.L. 115-31 ). Title II of Division K provides full-year FY2017 appropriations for HUD. The law appropriates $48.1 billion for HUD's programs and activities; after accounting for offsets, the net discretionary budget authority provided for the department by the bill totals $38.8 billion. This represents a $1 billion increase in funding over FY2016, which is primarily attributable to funding increases for the tenant-based rental assistance (TBRA) account (+$663 million) and project-based rental assistance (PBRA) account (+$196 million). The increased funding largely maintains current services for the roughly 3 million low-income families who receive housing assistance through the Housing Choice Voucher program and the project-based Section 8 program. The largest relative increase in funding is provided for HUD's lead hazard reduction programs (+32%). Continuing Resolutions
None of the FY2017 regular appropriations bills were enacted before the end of FY2016. House Action
On May 24, 2016, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of a FY2017 THUD appropriations bill ( H.R. 5394 ). The bill included $38.7 billion in net discretionary budget authority for HUD. That total reflects approximately $48 billion in new gross budget authority for HUD's programs and activities and more than $9 billion in savings from offsets and receipts. It included about $500 million less than was included in the Senate-passed bill, and nearly $1 billion less than was requested by the President. Senate Action
On May 12, 2016, the full Senate began consideration of FY2017 appropriations for Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies. 2577 , which is the House-passed version of the FY2016 THUD bill. The substitute amendment also included as Division B the text of the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies bill. It proposed $48.4 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD's programs and activities, which is a 3% increase from the FY2016 level. After accounting for savings from offsets and rescissions, the bill included $39.2 billion in net discretionary budget authority, which is a 2% increase from the FY2016 level. President's Request
On February 9, 2016, the Obama Administration submitted its FY2017 budget request to Congress. It included $48.9 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD (4% more than FY2016) and $39.6 billion in net discretionary budget authority (3.5% more than FY2016). (Similar FUP policy changes were proposed in the President's budget request.) 399 to H.R. The House and the Senate did not adopt a budget resolution for FY2017. | Most of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts, typically as a part of the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill (THUD). HUD's programs are primarily designed to address housing problems faced by households with very low incomes or other special housing needs. This report tracks FY2017 appropriations for the department.
Full-Year Appropriations: On May 5, 2017, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017 was signed into law (P.L. 115-31). Title II of Division K provides $48.1 billion in gross appropriations for HUD's programs and activities; after accounting for savings from offsets, the net new budget authority for the department totals $38.8 billion. The law provides a $1 billion increase in funding for HUD's policies and programs over FY2016, which is primarily attributable to funding increases for the largest accounts in HUD's budget: the tenant-based rental assistance (TBRA) account (+$663 million) and project-based rental assistance (PBRA) account (+$196 million). Those increases largely maintain current services for the roughly 3 million low-income families who receive housing assistance through the Housing Choice Voucher program and the project-based Section 8 program. The largest relative increase in funding was provided for HUD's lead hazard reduction programs (+32%).
Continuing Resolutions: Congress did not enact regular full-year FY2017 appropriations for HUD prior to the end of FY2016. Instead, HUD and most other federal agencies were funded through a series of continuing resolutions.
Senate Action: On May 19, 2016, the full Senate approved FY2017 appropriations for HUD as a part of a substitute amendment to H.R. 2577 (which incorporated both the committee-reported version of the THUD bill (S. 2844) and the committee-reported version of the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies bill). It included $48.4 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD's programs and activities, a 3% increase from the FY2016 level. After accounting for savings from offsets and rescissions, the bill included $39.2 billion in net discretionary budget authority, a 2% increase from the FY2016 level.
House Action: On May 24, 2016, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of a FY2017 THUD appropriations bill (H.R. 5394). It included $48 billion in gross discretionary appropriations and $38.7 billion in net discretionary budget authority for HUD, nearly $1 billion less than was requested and about $500 million less than was included in the Senate version. Like the Senate bill, H.R. 5394 proposed increases to the TBRA and PBRA accounts, but the increases were smaller than those in the Senate bill or requested by the President.
President's Budget Request: Congressional action followed the release of the Obama Administration's FY2017 budget request to Congress on February 9, 2016. The request included $48.9 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD (+4% from FY2016) and $39.6 billion in net discretionary budget authority (+3.5% from FY2016). The largest funding increases proposed were for the PBRA and TBRA accounts. |
crs_RL34225 | crs_RL34225_0 | Scope of the Problem
Transnational organized crime groups flourish in Burma, trafficking contraband that includes drugs, humans, guns, wildlife, gems, and timber. Contraband trafficking also remains a low-risk enterprise, as corruption among officials in Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), appears to facilitate trafficking and effectively provide the criminal underground immunity from law enforcement and judicial action. Congress has long been active in U.S. policy toward Burma for a variety of reasons, including on issues related to transnational crime. 110-286 , the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 (signed by the President on July 29, 2008). This law imposes further sanctions on SPDC officials and prohibits the indirect import of Burmese gems, among other actions. The 111 th Congress may choose to continue its interest in oversight of U.S. policy toward Burma, including the country's role in criminal activity. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in February 2009 the beginning of a review of U.S.-Burma relations. In September 2009, the conclusions of this policy review were released, noting in particular the beginning of direct dialogue with Burmese authorities on international crime-related issues, including compliance with U.N. arms sanctions and counternarcotics. Already in the first session of the 111 th Congress, both the Senate and the House have held hearings in which crime issues related to Burma have been addressed. In the same report, the Secretary of the Treasury also stated that Burmese government officials were suspected of being involved in the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Demand for Burma's contraband reaches beyond the region, including the United States. U.S. Policy
Sanctions and Special Measures
Burma is subject to a broad sanctions regime that addresses issues of U.S. interest, which include democracy, human rights, and international crime. Specifically in response to the extent of transnational crime occurring in Burma, the President has taken additional actions against the country under several different legislative authorities. | Transnational organized crime groups in Burma (Myanmar) operate a multi-billion dollar criminal industry that stretches across Southeast Asia. Trafficked drugs, humans, wildlife, gems, timber, and other contraband flow through Burma, supporting the illicit demands of the region and beyond. Widespread collusion between traffickers and Burma's ruling military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), allows organized crime groups to function with impunity. Transnational crime in Burma bears upon U.S. interests as it threatens regional security in Southeast Asia and bolsters a regime that fosters a culture of corruption and disrespect for the rule of law and human rights.
Congress has been active in U.S. policy toward Burma for a variety of reasons, including combating Burma's transnational crime situation. At times, it has imposed sanctions on Burmese imports, suspended foreign assistance and loans, and ensured that U.S. funds remain out of the regime's reach. The 110th Congress passed P.L. 110-286, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 (signed by the President on July 29, 2008), which imposes further sanctions on SPDC officials and prohibits the indirect importation of Burmese gems, among other actions. On the same day, the President directed the U.S. Department of Treasury to impose financial sanctions against 10 Burmese companies, including companies involved in the gem-mining industry, pursuant to Executive Order 13464 of April 30, 2008.
The second session of the 111th Congress may choose to conduct oversight of U.S. policy toward Burma, including the country's role in criminal activity. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced in February 2009 the beginning of a review of U.S.-Burma relations. In September 2009, the conclusions of this policy review were released, noting in particular the beginning of direct dialogue with Burmese authorities on international crime-related issues, including compliance with U.N. arms sanctions and counternarcotics. Already in the first session of the 111th Congress, both the Senate and the House have held hearings in which crime issues related to Burma have been addressed.
This report analyzes the primary actors driving transnational crime in Burma, the forms of transnational crime occurring, and current U.S. policy in combating these crimes. This report will be updated as events warrant. For further analysis of U.S. policy to Burma, see CRS Report RL33479, Burma-U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43571 | crs_R43571_0 | These programs offer borrowers a means to have all or part of their student loan debt forgiven or repaid in return for work or service in specific fields or professions or for satisfying certain conditions relating to borrower debt and income. Throughout the years, various federal loan forgiveness and loan repayment programs have been created, and presently, over 50 such programs are authorized, approximately 30 of which were operational as of October 1, 2017. While the various programs operate somewhat differently, they are generally intended to support at least one of the following goals:
Provide a financial incentive to encourage individuals to enter public service or a particular profession, occupation, or occupational specialty. Provide a financial incentive to encourage individuals to remain employed in a high-need profession or occupation—often in certain locations. Distinction among Loan Forgiveness and Loan Repayment Programs
In employment-focused loan forgiveness and loan repayment programs, a borrower typically must work or serve in a certain function, profession, or geographic location for a specified period of time to qualify for benefits. At the end of the specified term, some or all of the individual's qualifying student loan debt is forgiven or repaid on his or her behalf. One of the most important distinctions among these types of programs is whether the availability of benefits is incorporated into the loan terms and conditions and is thus considered an entitlement to qualified borrowers or whether benefits are made available to qualified borrowers at the discretion of the entity administering the program and whether the benefits are subject to the availability of funds. For the purposes of this report, the former types of programs are referred to as loan forgiveness while the latter are referred to as loan repayment . Availability of Loan Forgiveness Following Income-Driven Repayment
Loan forgiveness following income-driven repayment provides debt relief to borrowers who repay their federal student loans as a proportion of their income for an extended period of time but who have not repaid their entire student loan debt. Several issues related to loan forgiveness and loan repayment policy might be examined. For instance, should multiple programs make available loan forgiveness or loan repayment benefits for borrowers who engage in similar types of activities? Does the structure of some loan forgiveness or loan repayment programs lead to a financial windfall for borrowers who engage in the same type of activity they otherwise would have even if debt relief were not available? Is sufficient information available to assess whether existing programs are effectively achieving their intended purposes? For each program, the following information, where available, is provided:
statutory and regulatory citations, the federal administering agency and (where appropriate) the specific office within that agency, the program's purpose, types of loans eligible for forgiveness or repayment, qualifying service required of program participants, maximum amount of benefits program participants can receive, restrictions on eligibility for program benefits, requirements for program participants after receipt of all or part of a program's benefits, federal income tax treatment of benefits, budgetary classification of the program's spending, annual amounts appropriated in FY2013-FY2017, annual amount of loans discharged or repaid in FY2013-FY2017, annual number of program beneficiaries in FY2013-FY2017, and citations to relevant CRS reports and additional resources. These benefits are considered entitlements and are written into the terms and conditions of widely available federal student loans. Restrictions on eligibility: Loan repayment benefits may not be provided for the same service used to qualify for benefits under any federally supported loan forgiveness program, including under the National Health Service Corps (NHSC) Loan Repayment Program, the NHSC Students to Service Loan Repayment Program, the NHSC State Loan Repayment Program, the Nursing Education Loan Repayment Program (NURSE Corps), Stafford Loan Forgiveness for Teachers, the Civil Legal Assistance Attorney Student Loan Repayment Program, and the Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program. | Student loan forgiveness and loan repayment programs provide borrowers a means of having all or part of their student loan debt forgiven or repaid in exchange for work or service in specific fields or professions or following a prolonged period during which their student loan debt burden is high relative to their income. In both loan forgiveness and loan repayment programs, borrowers typically qualify for benefits by working or serving in certain capacities for a specified period or by satisfying other program requirements over an extended term. Upon qualifying for benefits, some or all of a borrower's student loan debt is forgiven or paid on his or her behalf.
A key distinction among these types of programs is whether the availability of benefits is incorporated into the loan terms and conditions and thus considered an entitlement to qualified borrowers, or whether benefits are made available to qualified borrowers at the discretion of the entity administering the program and subject to the availability of funds. For the purposes of this report, the former types of programs are referred to as loan forgiveness while the latter are referred to as loan repayment.
Loan forgiveness and loan repayment programs typically are intended to support one or more of the following goals:
Provide a financial incentive to encourage individuals to enter public service or a particular profession, occupation, or occupational specialty. Provide a financial incentive to encourage individuals to remain employed in a high-need profession or occupation—often in certain locations. Provide debt relief to borrowers who, after repaying their student loans as a proportion of their income for an extended period of time, have not completely repaid their entire student loan debt.
The number and availability of loan forgiveness and loan repayment programs have expanded considerably since the establishment of the first major federal loan forgiveness program by the National Defense Education Act of 1958. Currently, over 50 such programs are authorized at the federal level, approximately 30 of which were operational as of October 1, 2017.
While existing loan forgiveness and loan repayment programs may support similar broader goals, there is great variety across programs in their design and scope. Some programs are widely available to all borrowers who meet program eligibility criteria. However, many programs are narrowly focused on supporting specific public service or workforce needs and are available only to individuals serving in certain occupations or working in certain geographic regions, or individuals employed by certain federal agencies. In some programs, the availability of benefits is incorporated into the terms and conditions of borrowers' loans and is more certain, but in other programs, the availability of benefits is subject to discretionary funding and award criteria. Programs are also distinguished by types of loans that qualify for forgiveness or repayment, qualifying periods of service, the amount of debt that may be discharged, and the tax treatment of discharged indebtedness.
Congress may explore whether loan forgiveness and loan repayment programs are effectively achieving policy objectives. Several issues might be examined. For instance, should multiple loan forgiveness and loan repayment programs continue to exist to provide debt relief to borrowers who engage in similar types of activities? Does the structure of some programs lead to a financial windfall for borrowers who engage in the same type of activity they might otherwise have in the absence of program benefits? Are programs appropriately targeted? Is sufficient information available to assess whether existing programs are effectively achieving their intended purposes? |
crs_R43772 | crs_R43772_0 | The moratorium was recently converted to a permanent provision as part of Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-125 ), after being previously extended eight times as a temporary provision. Under the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), states who taxed Internet access before 1998 can continue taxing Internet access through June 30, 2020. 105-277 ) imposed on state and local governments a three-year moratorium, from October 1, 1998, to October 1, 2001, on (1) new taxes on Internet access, and (2) multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce. It extended the Internet tax moratorium and the grandfather clause protections through November 1, 2003, but made no additional changes to the law. ITNA changed the definition of Internet access to include DSL connections under the moratorium. Changes in ITNA also excluded Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services from the moratorium, allowing state and local governments to tax this service. In the 114 th Congress, ITFA was extended three times before the moratorium on taxing Internet access was made permanent by P.L. Moratorium on Taxing Internet Access
The moratorium on Internet access taxes established by ITFA and its subsequent extensions prohibits states or their political subdivisions from imposing any new taxes on Internet access services. One of the most significant effects of ITFA is that state and local governments cannot impose their sales taxes on the monthly payments that consumers make to their ISP, such as Comcast or AT&T, in exchange for access to the Internet. The Grandfather Clause
ITFA contained a grandfather clause to allow state and local governments to continue taxing Internet access if they already had a tax on Internet access that was generally imposed and actually enforced before October 1, 1998. Initially 13 states were included under the grandfather clause, but a number of states have voluntarily eliminated their Internet access taxes since the passage of ITFA. The grandfather clause protecting taxes on Internet access implemented before October 1, 1998, is set to expire on June 30, 2020
In addition to the original grandfather clause established in ITFA, an additional grandfather clause was established as part of the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act (ITNA) for certain taxes on Internet access imposed and enforced before November 1, 2003. For further discussion of interstate electronic commerce issues see CRS Report R41853, State Taxation of Internet Transactions , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R42629, "Amazon Laws" and Taxation of Internet Sales: Constitutional Analysis , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. The inequitable tax treatment under the moratorium violates the principle of horizontal equity. However, the blanket nature of the moratorium, where both low- and high-income individuals receive the benefits of a lower tax burden, likely reduces the economic efficiency gains produced by this policy. A large number of individuals would likely choose to purchase Internet access even if the price was higher due to state and local governments applying taxes to the service. | The Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA; P.L. 105-277), enacted in 1998, implemented a three-year moratorium preventing state and local governments from taxing Internet access, or imposing multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce. Under the moratorium, state and local governments cannot impose their sales tax on the monthly payments that consumers make to their Internet service provider in exchange for access to the Internet. In addition to the moratorium, a grandfather clause was included in ITFA that allowed states which had already imposed and collected a tax on Internet access before October 1, 1998, to continue implementing those taxes.
Previously under ITFA, the moratorium on Internet access taxes and the grandfather clause were temporary provisions. With the passage of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125), the moratorium on taxing Internet access was extended permanently, while the grandfather clause was extended temporarily through June 30, 2020.
The original three-year moratorium had been extended eight times before being converted to a permanent statute. As the original moratorium was extended, changes were made to the definition of Internet access to include and exclude different services and technology. Notable changes include the inclusion of digital subscriber lines under the moratorium and the exclusion of Voice over Internet Protocol services from the moratorium.
Over time the grandfather clause has protected a decreasing number of states' abilities to tax Internet access. While 13 states previously taxed Internet access and were protected under the grandfather clause, 7 states now tax Internet access. In addition, changes made to ITFA in 2007 rendered the grandfather provision inapplicable for states that repealed or nullified their taxes on Internet access before the enactment of these changes.
As a public policy, the moratorium on taxing Internet access has economic and fairness implications. The policy likely improves lower income individuals' ability to purchase Internet access, which has economic benefits, but the blanket nature of the moratorium likely results in some economic waste. Additionally, the moratorium results in unequal application of state and local taxes to the provision of services depending upon how the services are delivered.
Under the moratorium, state and local governments are prevented from taxing Internet access. This may have implications for state and local government revenues and provision of services.
The Internet Tax Freedom Act and its subsequent extensions are often conflated with issues related to the taxation of electronic commerce across state borders. ITFA is largely unrelated to these issues. For a discussion of interstate electronic commerce and taxation issues, refer to CRS Report R41853, State Taxation of Internet Transactions, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R42629, "Amazon Laws" and Taxation of Internet Sales: Constitutional Analysis, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33529 | crs_RL33529_0 | Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including unprecedented plans for civilian nuclear cooperation, are underway. The two countries inked a ten-year defense framework agreement in 2005 to facilitate expanded bilateral security cooperation. Unprecedented major U.S. arms sales to India are underway; more are anticipated. The influence of a geographically dispersed and relatively wealthy Indian-American community of some 2.7 million is reflected in Congress's largest country-specific caucus. More than 100,000 Indian students are attending American universities. Further U.S. interest in South Asia focuses on ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan rooted largely in competing claims to the Kashmir region and in "cross-border terrorism" in both Kashmir and major Indian cities. In the interests of regional stability, in particular as a means of forwarding U.S. interests in nearby Afghanistan, the United States strongly endorses an existing, but until recently moribund India-Pakistan peace initiative, and remains concerned about the
potential for conflict over Kashmiri sovereignty to cause open hostilities between these two nuclear-armed countries. The United States also seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles in South Asia. However, in May 2011, the lead U.S. diplomat for the region helpfully summarized U.S.-India relations under the rubric of four major "agendas":
an innovation agenda that includes collaboration on energy security, civil nuclear cooperation, agriculture, space, climate, and other sciences; a security agenda that includes military-to-military relations, arms sales, and nonproliferation; a people-to-people agenda that encourages civic engagement, and open governance and democracy initiatives; and a growth agenda focused on increasing bilateral trade and investment by removing barriers to both. Notable Developments in 2011
U.S.-India cooperation in the area of nuclear energy—an initiative launched in 2005 and approved by Congress in 2008—continues to be delayed by the lack of both a liability arrangement and an agreement on monitoring arrangements for U.S. nuclear exports to certain Indian entities (see the "U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation" section below). June 2010 Strategic Dialogue
The United States and India formally reengaged the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue initiated under President G.W. President Obama's November 2010 Visit to India
As the U.S. President planned his November 2010 visit to India, an array of prickly bilateral issues confronted him, including differences over the proper regional roles to be played by China and Pakistan; the status of conflict in Afghanistan; international efforts to address Iran's controversial nuclear program; restrictions on high-technology exports to India, outsourcing, and sticking points on the conclusion of arrangements for both civil nuclear and defense cooperation, among others. This last reflects a pervasive view in Washington that New Delhi is too hesitant to exercise India's growing power and influence. The effects of this bilateral conflict are seen to negatively affect U.S.-led efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Despite the anxieties elicited by the now simultaneous rise of Asia's two largest countries, New Delhi calls its relationship with Beijing a "priority" and asserts that the two countries have "stepped up functional cooperation in all areas, including efforts to build military-to-military trust and confidence through bilateral defense interactions" that are "growing." The value of bilateral trade was about $3.5 billion in 2009/2010, up more than 12% over the previous fiscal year. Yet, as India has grown closer to the United States and other Western countries in the new century, New Delhi's policy has slowly shifted—perhaps most notably when India voted with the United States (and the majority) at key International Atomic Energy Agency sessions in 2005 and 2006—leaving most aspects of the envisaged India-Iran partnership unrealized. India's Domestic Policy Setting
National Political System, Elections, and Parties
India is the world's most populous democracy and remains firmly committed to representative government and rule of law. India's Economy
Overview
India has been in the midst of a major and rapid economic expansion, with an economy projected to soon be the world's third largest. Rain has become more erratic in recent years as ground water is being depleted. As a reversal of three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, such proposed cooperation stirred controversy and required changes in both U.S. law and in NSG guidelines. | South Asia emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core U.S. foreign policy interests. India, the region's dominant actor with more than 1 billion citizens, is often characterized as a nascent great power and "indispensable partner" of the United States, one that many analysts view as a potential counterweight to China's growing clout. Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a "strategic partnership" based on shared values and apparently convergent geopolitical interests. Numerous economic, security, and global initiatives, including plans for civilian nuclear cooperation, are underway. This latter initiative—first launched in 2005 and codified in U.S. law in 2008—reversed three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy, but has not been implemented to date. Also in 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense framework agreement to expanding bilateral security cooperation. The two countries now engage in numerous and unprecedented combined military exercises, and major U.S. arms sales to India are underway. The value of all bilateral trade tripled from 2004 to 2008 and continues to grow; significant two-way investment also flourishes. The influence of a large, relatively wealthy, and geographically dispersed Indian-American community is reflected in Congress's largest country-specific caucus. More than 100,000 Indian students are attending American universities.
Further U.S. attention on South Asia focuses on ongoing, historically rooted tensions between India and Pakistan. In the interests of regional stability, in particular as a means of facilitating U.S.-led efforts to stabilize nearby Afghanistan, the United States strongly endorses an existing, but largely moribund India-Pakistan peace initiative, and remains concerned about the potential for conflict over Kashmiri sovereignty to cause open hostilities between these two nuclear-armed countries. The United States also seeks to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles in South Asia.
President Barack Obama's Administration has sought to build upon the deepened U.S. engagement with India begun by President Bill Clinton in 2000 and expanded upon during much of the past decade under President G.W. Bush. This "U.S.-India 3.0" diplomacy was most recently on display in July 2011, when the second U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue session saw a large delegation of senior U.S. officials visit New Delhi to discuss a broad range of global and bilateral issues. Many analysts view the U.S.-India relationship as being among the world's most important in coming decades and see potentially large benefits to be accrued through engagement on many convergent interests. Bilateral initiatives are underway in all areas, although independent analysts in both countries worry that the partnership has lost momentum in recent years. Outstanding areas of bilateral friction include obstacles to bilateral trade and investment, including in the high-technology sector; outsourcing; the status of conflict in Afghanistan; climate change; and stalled efforts to initiate civil nuclear cooperation.
India is the world's most populous democracy and remains firmly committed to representative government and rule of law. Its left-leaning Congress Party-led ruling national coalition has been in power for more than seven years under the leadership of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, an Oxford-trained economist. New Delhi's engagement with regional and other states is extensive and reflects its rising geopolitical status. The national economy has been growing rapidly—India's is projected to be the world's third-largest economy in the foreseeable future—yet poor infrastructure, booming energy demand, and restrictive trade and investment practices are seen to hamper full economic potential. Despite the growth of a large urban middle-class, India's remains a largely rural and agriculture-based society, and is home to some 500-600 million people living in poverty. This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_RS22081 | crs_RS22081_0 | In an attempt to resolve this problem, Senator Arlen Specter introduced S. 852 , the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution (FAIR) Act. The Claims Process
The bill would establish within the Department of Labor the Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation, which would award damages to claimants on a no-fault basis according to their respective levels of injury and asbestos exposure. For claimants who have asbestos claims pending in court, the statute of limitations would be five years from enactment of the bill. The Asbestos Injury Claims Resolution Fund
The Fund would be paid for by contributions from defendants in asbestos suits – "defendant participants" – and their insurers – "insurer participants." | This report provides an overview of S. 852, the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution (FAIR) Act of 2005. The bill would largely remove asbestos claims from the courts in favor of the no-fault administrative process set out in the bill. The bill would establish the Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation to award damages to asbestos claimants from the Asbestos Injury Claims Resolution Fund. Companies that have previously been sued for asbestos-related injuries—and insurers of such companies—would be required to make contributions totaling roughly $140 billion to this Fund. |
crs_RL33916 | crs_RL33916_0 | Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanns, at a public meeting on January 31, 2007, described the Administration's 65 recommendations for a new farm bill. In the following pages, Congressional Research Service analysts summarize current policy and programs, describe the USDA recommendations, and pose questions related to the policy, program, and/or budgetary impact of the recommendations. The organization of this report parallels that of the USDA report. This would occur after a new five-year farm bill has expired. The proposal also is included in the Administration's FY2008 budget proposal. Critics are concerned that the Administration may not be asking for a large enough increase in fruit and vegetable purchases and that its farm bill proposals are silent on potential expansion of a small ($15 million) existing fresh fruit and vegetable program operating in some 400 schools located in 14 states and on 3 Indian reservations. Title IX: Energy
Title IX of the 2002 farm bill ( P.L. A 1994 crop insurance act required the purchase of a crop insurance policy as a prerequisite for participating in the farm commodity programs. How does the Department currently determine what proportions of its Section 32 commodity acquisitions go to various domestic nutrition programs, and how would it do so for the proposed increases? Organic Agriculture
The Administration ' s 2007 farm bill proposal recommends considerably more funding for research and marketing programs, to support the continuing growth of the organic farming sector. | On January 31, 2007, the Secretary of Agriculture publicly released a set of recommendations for a 2007 farm bill. The proposal is comprehensive and follows largely the outline of the current 2002 farm bill, which expires this year. It includes proposals regarding commodity support, conservation, trade, nutrition and domestic food assistance, farm credit, rural development, agricultural research, forestry, energy, and such miscellaneous items as crop insurance, organic programs, and Section 32 purchases of fruits and vegetables.
The Administration delivered its report to Congress, not as a bill, but as a possible focus for debate and a foundation for developing legislation. CRS has received many questions about the content of and potential issues related to the Administration proposal. Given the early stage of the debate, this report poses some questions that may contribute to a better understanding of the proposal.
This report contains a brief description of current policy on each topic, a short explanation of the Administration's proposals, and then questions of a policy, program, and/or budgetary nature. In some cases proposals are repeated in more than one title, and where this happens the questions are duplicated. |
crs_R44802 | crs_R44802_0 | R eforms to the Medicaid program, which provides medical assistance for low-income and medically needy individuals, have been proposed during the 115 th Congress. One component of these reforms would allow states to impose some form of "work requirements" on certain categories of individuals as a stipulation for receiving coverage under the program. Both the House-passed American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628 , and the Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017, a draft amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. In addition to these proposals, which would take the form of legislative amendments to the Medicaid statute, work requirements have also been discussed in the context of waivers granted to states under the existing demonstration authority provided in Section 1115 of the Social Security Act (SSA). Several states have recently sought waivers to impose some type of Medicaid mandatory work incentives under Section 1115, but to date, such a waiver has not been approved by the Secretary. This report examines the scope of authority to grant such waivers under that provision, including the degree to which such waivers may be judicially reviewable and the level of scrutiny courts would apply in such cases. Section 1115 authorizes the HHS Secretary to waive a number of requirements imposed by the SSA, including Medicaid requirements contained in Section 1902, to the extent necessary to allow a state to undertake an "experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [Medicaid and other programs authorized by the SSA]." Numerous federal courts have held that the Secretary's decision to grant a waiver is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). As such, the ultimate conclusion reached by a reviewing court assessing whether the HHS Secretary's grant of a waiver under Section 1115 was arbitrary and capricious will likely depend upon the actual administrative record upon which the Secretary made his decision. Further, in examining whether there has been an abuse of agency discretion, courts have held that "[t]he APA does not give the court power 'to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,' but only to 'consider whether the decision was based on consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.'" | Proposals have been introduced in the 115th Congress to reform the Medicaid program, which provides medical assistance to low-income and needy individuals. One such approach, taken by House-passed H.R. 1628, the American Health Care Act of 2017, would allow states to impose work requirements on certain categories of individuals as a condition of coverage under the Medicaid program. A similar approach is also taken in the discussion draft of the Better Care Reconciliation Act, a proposed amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1628, which was published by the Senate Budget Committee on June 22, 2017, and updated on June 26, 2017.
In addition to these proposals, which would take the form of legislative amendments to the Medicaid statute, work requirements have also been discussed in the context of waivers granted to states under the existing demonstration authority provided in Section 1115 of the Social Security Act (SSA). Section 1115 authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to waive a number of Medicaid requirements to the extent necessary to allow a state to undertake an "experimental, pilot, or demonstration project" that is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of Medicaid. Several states have recently sought waivers to impose some type of Medicaid mandatory work incentives under Section 1115, but to date, the Secretary has not approved such a waiver. This report examines the scope of authority to grant such waivers under Section 1115, including the degree to which such waivers may be judicially reviewable and the level of scrutiny courts would apply in such cases.
Numerous federal courts have held that the Secretary's decision to grant a waiver under Section 1115 is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Such review uses the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard to evaluate the permissibility of agency action. In cases where Section 1115 waivers have been challenged, courts have held that the APA does not empower judges to substitute their judgment for that of the agency, but only to consider whether the Secretary's decision was based on consideration of relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Therefore, a court's evaluation of a particular Section 1115 waiver will likely turn upon the sufficiency of the actual administrative record relied upon by the HHS Secretary when deciding to grant a waiver. |
crs_R42408 | crs_R42408_0 | Introduction
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. These benefits and services include, among other things, hospital and medical care, disability compensation and pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, administration of life insurance as well as traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers, and death benefits that cover burial expenses. This report provides a preliminary analysis of the President's budget request for FY2013 for the programs administered by the VA. This not an exhaustive discussion of VA's budget request for FY2013. The FY2013 budget request for the VA is for approximately $140.3 billion in budget authority. This amount is $165 million over the FY2013 advance appropriated amount of $41.4 billion. In total the FY2013 budget request for VHA is $56.3 billion, including medical care collections (see Table 1 ). | The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides a range of benefits and services to veterans who meet certain eligibility criteria. These benefits and services include hospital and medical care, disability compensation and pensions, education, vocational rehabilitation and employment services, assistance to homeless veterans, home loan guarantees, administration of life insurance as well as traumatic injury protection insurance for servicemembers, and death benefits that cover burial expenses.
This report provides a preliminary analysis of the President's budget request for FY2013 for the programs administered by the VA. For FY2013, the Administration is requesting approximately $140.3 billion for the VA, an increase of $13.4 billion over FY2012 budget authority. This amount includes approximately $64.0 billion in discretionary funds and approximately $76.4 billion in mandatory funding.
The FY2013 budget request for VA medical care programs is $56.3 billion, with a FY2014 request of advance appropriations of $54.5 billion.
This report is not an exhaustive discussion of VA's budget request for FY2013. A full CRS report on FY2013 VA budget and appropriations issues is planned after initial congressional consideration of appropriations legislation. |
crs_RL34116 | crs_RL34116_0 | Background
The RPS Mechanism
Under a renewable energy portfolio standard (RPS), retail electricity suppliers (electric utilities) must either provide a minimum amount of electricity from renewable energy resources or purchase tradable credits that represent an equivalent amount of renewable energy production. The minimum requirement is often set as a percentage share of retail electricity sales, which is usually expressed in terms of kilowatt-hours (kwh). However, most targets range from 10% to 20% and are scheduled to be reached between 2010 and 2025. Tradable Credits
Many states have created tradable credits as a way to lower costs and facilitate compliance. In Senate floor action on H.R. 1537 proposed a 15% RPS. The proposal triggered a lively debate, but was ultimately ruled non-germane. 6 , which proposed a 15% national RPS requirement. Resource Availability and Electricity Price Impacts
In the Senate RPS debate, opponents argued that regional differences in availability, amount, and types of renewable energy resources could make a federal RPS unfair. Proponents counterargued that a national system of tradable credits would enable retail suppliers in states with less abundant resources to comply at the least cost by purchasing credits from organizations in states with a surplus of low-cost production. Perhaps most importantly, RPS proponents countered by citing a study prepared by the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA). The report examined the potential impacts of the 15% RPS proposed in S.Amdt. 1537 . Regarding resource availability, the report found that:
Biomass generation, both from dedicated biomass plants and existing coal plants co-firing with biomass fuel, grows the most by 2030, more than tripling from 102 billion kilowatt-hours (kwh) in the reference case to 318 billion kwh with the RPS policy. In a follow-up fact sheet to that study, EIA noted that "the South has significant biomass potential." EIA estimated that, relative to its base case projections for retail electricity prices, the 15% RPS would likely raise retail prices by slightly less than 1% over the 2005 to 2030 period. Further, the report estimated that relative to its base case projections for retail natural gas prices, the RPS would likely cause retail natural gas prices to fall slightly over the 2005 to 2030 period. House RPS Debate (H.Amdt. 3221)
In House floor action on H.R. 3221 , an RPS amendment ( H.Amdt. 748 ) was added by a vote of 220 to 190. The bill subsequently passed the House by a vote of 241 to 172. The RPS amendment would set a 15% target for 2020, and would allow up to 4 percentage points of the requirement to be met with energy efficiency measures. Informal House-Senate Negotiations
After the House completed action on H.R. 3221 continues to be key issue. On December 1, 2007, the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources stated that the House Leadership's intent to include an RPS led him to cease negotiations. Further, on December 3, 2007, the White House reportedly announced that it may veto the negotiated bill, if it includes an RPS and certain other provisions. | Under a renewable energy portfolio standard (RPS), retail electricity suppliers (electric utilities) must provide a minimum amount of electricity from renewable energy resources or purchase tradable credits that represent an equivalent amount of renewable energy production. The minimum requirement is often set as a percentage share of retail electricity sales. More than 20 states have established an RPS, with most targets ranging from 10% to 20% and most target deadlines ranging from 2010 to 2025. Most states have established tradable credits as a way to lower costs and facilitate compliance. State RPS action has provided an experience base for the design of a possible national requirement.
RPS proponents contend that a national system of tradable credits would enable retail suppliers in states with fewer resources to comply at the least cost by purchasing credits from organizations in states with a surplus of low-cost production. Opponents counter that regional differences in availability, amount, and types of renewable energy resources would make a federal RPS unfair and costly.
In Senate floor action on H.R. 6 in the 110th Congress, S.Amdt. 1537 proposed a 15% RPS target. The proposal triggered a lively debate, but was ultimately ruled non-germane. In that debate, opponents argued that a national RPS would disadvantage certain regions of the country, particularly the Southeastern states. They contended that the South lacks a sufficient amount of renewable energy resources to meet a 15% renewables requirement. They further concluded that an RPS would cause retail electricity prices to rise for many consumers.
RPS proponents countered by citing a study by the Energy Information Administration (EIA). The report examined the potential impacts of the 15% RPS proposed in S.Amdt. 1537. It indicated that the South has sufficient biomass generation, both from dedicated biomass plants and existing coal plants co-firing with biomass fuel, to meet a 15% RPS. EIA noted further that the estimated net RPS requirement for the South would not make it "unusually dependent" on other regions and was in fact "below the national average requirement...." Regarding electricity prices, EIA estimated that the 15% RPS would likely raise retail prices by slightly less than 1% over the 2005 to 2030 period. Further, the RPS would likely cause retail natural gas prices to fall slightly over that period.
In House floor action on an RPS amendment (H.Amdt. 748) to H.R. 3221, key points and counterpoints of the Senate RPS debate were repeated. The RPS was added (220 to 190), and the bill passed the House (241 to 172). The RPS amendment would set a 15% target for 2020, and would allow up to 4 percentage points of the requirement to be met with energy efficiency measures. After House action, informal bipartisan House-Senate negotiations began. The House RPS provision (§9006) continues to be key issue. On December 1, 2007, the Ranking Member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee stated that the House Leadership's intent to include an RPS led him to cease negotiations. Further, the White House has reportedly announced that it would veto the bill if it includes an RPS. |
crs_RL32258 | crs_RL32258_0 | Introduction
During the 108th Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate Finance Committeeapproved two different versions of a bill that would have reauthorized and revised the TemporaryAssistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant. This legislation, H.R. 4 , alsoincluded many changes to the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program, a component of thegovernment's social safety net. 4 was passed by the House in February 2003. TheSenate Finance Committee reported a substitute version of the bill in September 2003 ( S.Rept.108-162 ). On March 29-April 1, 2004, the Senate debated H.R. 4; disagreement aroseregarding amendments to the bill, a motion to limit debate was overruled, and the Senate did notvote on passage of the bill. 4 sought to improve the CSE program and raise collections so as to increase the economic independence of former welfare families and provide a stable sourceof income for all single-parent families with a noncustodial parent. Both versions of the bill revised some CSE enforcement tools and added others. (4)
Both versions of H.R. 4 would have provided incentives (in the form of federal cost sharing) to states to direct more of the child support collected on behalf of TANF families tothe families themselves, as opposed to using such collections to reimburse state and federal coffersfor welfare benefits paid to the families (often referred to as a "family-first" policy). However theapproaches of the bills differed with respect to the limitation on the federal cost-sharing and whetherto help states pay for the current cost of their CSE pass-through and disregard policies or toencourage states to establish such policies or increase the pass-through and disregard already inplace. In other words, the House-passed bill intended to increase theamount of child support that was passed through to TANF families (and disregarded) by the state. Unlike the House-passed bill, under the bill approved by the Senate Finance Committee the federal government would have shared in the costs of the entire amount of current pass-through anddisregard policies used by states. Former TANF Families. Similarly, H.R. Other Provisions
Both versions of the bill included provisions that would have (1) required states to review and if appropriate adjust child support orders of TANF families every three years; (2) required the HHSSecretary to submit a report to Congress on the procedures states use to locate custodial parents forwhom child support has been collected but not yet distributed; (3) established a minimum fundinglevel for technical assistance; and (4) established a minimum funding level for the Federal ParentLocator Service. 4 included a provision that would have established a $25 annual fee for individuals who had never been on TANF but received CSE servicesand who received at least $500 in any given year. The Senate Finance Committee-approved version of H.R. 4 included provisions that would have (1) increased funding for the CSE access and visitation program; (2) designatedIndian tribes and tribal organizations as persons authorized to have access to information in theFederal Parent Locator Service; and (3) required states to adopt a later version of the UniformInterstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) so as to facilitate the collection of child support paymentsin interstate cases. | During the 108th Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate Finance Committee approved two different versions of a bill that would have reauthorized and revised the TemporaryAssistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant. This legislation, H.R. 4 , alsoincluded many changes to the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program. H.R. 4 waspassed by the House in February 2003. The Senate Finance Committee reported a substitute versionof the bill in September 2003 ( S.Rept. 108-162 ). On March 29-April 1, 2004, the Senate debatedH.R. 4; disagreement arose regarding amendments to the bill, and Republicans failed topass a motion to limit debate. H.R. 4 was not passed by the Senate.
Although not identical, both versions of H.R. 4 were similar in focus, direction, and content with respect to the CSE provisions. Both versions of H.R. 4 includedprovisions that sought to improve the CSE program and raise collections so as to increase theeconomic independence of former welfare families and provide a stable source of income for allsingle-parent families with a noncustodial parent. Both versions of the bill provided incentives (inthe form of federal cost sharing) to states to direct more of the child support collected on behalf offamilies to the families themselves, thereby reducing the amount that state and federal governmentsretain (often referred to as a family-first policy). Under both bills, families currently receiving TANFbenefits as well as former TANF recipients would have potentially received a larger share of childsupport that was collected on their behalf.
The approach used by the bills differed significantly, however, with regard to how states would help TANF families receive more child support. Under the House-passed bill, states would havebeen given federal cost sharing incentives to encourage states to increase (or establish) the amountof child support payments they pass through to TANF families (and disregard in determining TANFbenefits). The Senate Finance Committee version of the bill provided federal cost-sharing for theentire amount that the state disregards and passes through to families. Moreover, the House-passedbill provided a more limited amount of federal cost sharing for state pass-through and disregardpolicies than the Senate Finance Committee bill.
Both versions of the bill would have revised some CSE enforcement tools and added others; increased funding for the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS); increased funding for federaltechnical assistance to the states; required states to review child support orders of TANF familiesevery three years; and required that a report be submitted to Congress on undistributed child supportcollections. The House-passed bill included a provision that would have established a $25 annualuser fee for individuals who had never been on TANF but received CSE services and who receivedat least $500 in any given year. The Senate Finance Committee-approved bill included provisionsthat would have increased funding for the CSE access and visitation program; and required statesto adopt a later version of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) so as to facilitate thecollection of child support payments in interstate cases. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32725 | crs_RL32725_0 | Currently there is no large-scale commercial production in the United States, and the U.S. market depends on imports. Congress made significant changes to federal policies regarding hemp in the 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. The 2014 farm bill provided that certain research institutions and state departments of agriculture may grow hemp under an agricultural pilot program. In addition, in subsequent omnibus appropriations, Congress has blocked the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and federal law enforcement authorities from interfering with state agencies, hemp growers, and agricultural research. Under current U.S. drug policy, all cannabis varieties—including industrial hemp—are considered Schedule I controlled substances under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), and DEA continues to control and regulate cannabis production. Among the bills addressing industrial hemp, the Industrial Hemp Farming Act would amend the CSA to specify that the term marijuana does not include industrial hemp, thus excluding hemp from the CSA as a controlled substance subject to DEA regulation. Other provisions in these bills would further facilitate hemp production in the United States. Many of the provisions in these bills are included in the Senate version of the 2018 farm bill legislation ( H.R. Similar provisions are not part of the House-passed 2018 farm bill ( H.R. 2 ). Myriad other bills introduced in both the House and the Senate would further amend the CSA and other federal laws to address industrial hemp. While marijuana generally refers to the psychotropic drug (whether used for medicinal or recreational purposes), industrial hemp is cultivated for use in the production of a wide range of products, including foods and beverages, personal care products, nutritional supplements, fabrics and textiles, paper, construction materials, and other manufactured goods. While marijuana is defined in U.S. drug laws, Congress established a statutory definition for industrial hemp as "the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of such plant, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis" as part of the 2014 farm bill. Hemp is generally characterized by plants that are low in delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (delta-9 THC), the dominant psychotrophic ingredient in Cannabis sativa . Hemp can be grown as a fiber, seed, or dual-purpose crop. Despite these efforts, industrial hemp continues to be subject to U.S. drug laws, and growing industrial hemp is restricted. Although hemp production is now allowed in accordance with the requirements under the 2014 farm bill provision, other aspects of production are still subject to DEA oversight, including the importation of viable seeds, which still requires DEA registration according to the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (CSIEA, 21 U.S.C. §§951-971). The 2016 guidance also clarifies DEA's contention that the commercial sale or interstate transfer of hemp continues to be restricted. The enacted FY2018 Agriculture appropriation states that none of the funds made available by the Agriculture or any other appropriation may be used in contravention of the 2014 farm bill provision or "to prohibit the transportation, processing, sale, or use of industrial hemp that is grown or cultivated" in accordance with the farm bill provision "to prohibit the transportation, processing, sale, or use of industrial hemp, or seeds of such plant, that is grown or cultivated" in accordance with the 2014 farm bill "within or outside the State in which the industrial hemp is grown or cultivated." Clarification regarding USDA research support for hemp . Ongoing Congressional Activity
2018 Farm Bill Debate
Congress has continued to introduce legislation to further advance industrial hemp and address continued perceived obstacles to hemp production in the United States. Specifically, an expanded version of the Industrial Hemp Farming Act—first introduced in the 109 th Congress—was introduced in the 115 th Congress in both the House and Senate ( H.R. 5485 ; S. 2667 ). 2 . § 1621 et seq. 113-79 , §7606; 7 U.S.C. | Industrial hemp is an agricultural commodity that is cultivated for use in the production of a wide range of products, including foods and beverages, cosmetics and personal care products, nutritional supplements, fabrics and textiles, yarns and spun fibers, paper, construction and insulation materials, and other manufactured goods. Hemp can be grown as a fiber, seed, or other dual-purpose crop. However, hemp is also from the same species of plant, Cannabis sativa, as marijuana. As a result, production in the United States is restricted due to hemp's association with marijuana, and the U.S. market is largely dependent on imports, both as finished hemp-containing products and as ingredients for use in further processing (mostly from Canada and China). Current industry estimates report U.S. hemp sales at nearly $700 million annually.
In the early 1990s there was a sustained resurgence of interest to allow for commercial hemp cultivation in the United States. Several states conducted economic or market studies and initiated or enacted legislation to expand state-level resources and production. Congress made significant changes to federal policies regarding hemp in the 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79, §7606). The 2014 farm bill provided that certain research institutions and state departments of agriculture may grow hemp under an agricultural pilot program. The bill further established a statutory definition for industrial hemp as "the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of such plant, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis." Delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol is the dominant psychotrophic ingredient in Cannabis sativa. In subsequent omnibus appropriations, Congress has blocked the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and federal law enforcement authorities from interfering with state agencies, hemp growers, and agricultural research. Appropriators have also blocked the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) from prohibiting the transportation, processing, sale, or use of industrial hemp that is grown or cultivated in accordance with the 2014 farm bill provision.
Despite these efforts, industrial hemp continues to be subject to U.S. drug laws, and growing industrial hemp is restricted. Under current U.S. drug policy, all cannabis varieties—including industrial hemp—are considered Schedule I controlled substances under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA, 21 U.S.C. §§801 et seq.). Although hemp production is generally allowed following requirements under the 2014 farm bill, some aspects of production remain subject to DEA oversight, including the importation of viable seeds, which still requires DEA registration according to the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. §§951-971). Other guidance from DEA, USDA, and the Food and Drug Administration provides additional clarification regarding federal authorities' position on hemp and its future policies regarding its cultivation and marketing. This guidance supports DEA's contention that the commercial sale or interstate transfer of industrial hemp continues to be restricted.
Congress has continued to introduce legislation to further advance industrial hemp and address these types of concerns in the next farm bill. Introduced legislation as part of the Industrial Hemp Farming Act—first introduced in the 109th Congress and greatly expanded over the past few years—seeks to further facilitate hemp production in the United States but would also amend the CSA to specify that the term marijuana does not include industrial hemp. An expanded version of this bill was introduced in the 115th Congress in both the House and Senate (H.R. 5485; S. 2667). Many of the provisions in these bills are included in the Senate-passed 2018 farm bill (H.R. 2) that is now being debated in Congress. Similar provisions are not part of the House version of the 2018 farm bill (H.R. 2). Myriad other bills introduced in both the House and the Senate would further amend the CSA and other federal laws to address industrial hemp. |
crs_R44243 | crs_R44243_0 | Introduction
This report briefly poses and answers several frequently asked questions in relation to the floor proceedings used to elect a Speaker of the House. For a more detailed treatment of these election procedures, as well as data on elections of the Speaker in each Congress since 1913, see CRS Report RL30857, Speakers of the House: Elections, 1913-2017 . For a list of all Speakers of the House and their periods of service, as well as additional discussion of selection procedures, see CRS Report 97-780, The Speaker of the House: House Officer, Party Leader, and Representative . Upon convening at the start of a new Congress, the House elects a Speaker by roll call vote. For Whom May a Member Vote? If no candidate receives the requisite majority of votes cast, the roll call is repeated. | This report briefly poses and answers several "frequently asked questions" in relation to the floor proceedings used to elect a Speaker of the House. Current practice for electing a Speaker, either at the start of a Congress or in the event of a vacancy (e.g., death or resignation), is by roll-call vote, during which Members state aloud the name of their preferred candidate. Members may vote for any individual. If no candidate receives a majority of votes cast, balloting continues; in subsequent ballots, Members may still vote for any individual.
For a more detailed treatment of these election procedures, as well as data on elections of the Speaker in each Congress since 1913, see CRS Report RL30857, Speakers of the House: Elections, 1913-2017. For a list of all Speakers of the House and their periods of service, as well as additional discussion of selection procedures, see CRS Report 97-780, The Speaker of the House: House Officer, Party Leader, and Representative. |
crs_R41383 | crs_R41383_0 | Introduction
The Florida Everglades is a unique network of subtropical wetlands that is now half its original size. The federal government has had a long history of involvement in the Everglades, beginning in the 1940s with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructing flood control projects that shunted water away from the Everglades. Many factors, including these flood control projects and agricultural and urban development, have contributed to the shrinking and altering of the wetlands ecosystem. Federal agencies began ecosystem restoration activities in the Everglades more than 15 years ago, but it was not until 2000 that the majority of restoration activities became coordinated under an integrated plan. 106-541 ), Congress approved the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) as a framework for Everglades restoration. The River of Grass acquisition by the State of Florida is the most recent of these "non-CERP" projects by the state. It involves a proposed land acquisition agreement by the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) to purchase large tracts of land south of Lake Okeechobee from the U.S. Sugar Corporation. The goal of the purchase is to acquire lands that will improve water quality and help regulate outflows from Lake Okeechobee. Based on subsequent real estate evaluations, a slightly scaled-back version of the original proposal (180,000 acres) was approved by the SFWMD Governing Board in December 2008, at an estimated cost of $1.34 billion. Under the revised agreement, SFWMD will purchase 26,800 acres immediately at a cost of $197 million. Analysis of Potential Consequences
Several questions have been raised regarding previous versions of the proposed land acquisition by the State of Florida. Some questions center on the potential advantages and disadvantages of the land sale for restoring the Everglades, the effect of the land acquisition on Florida's role in implementing restoration projects under CERP, and the overall effect of the land acquisition on reducing excessive phosphorus in the ecosystem. State funding for all restoration activities, including CERP, is expected to decline in the coming years. In light of this, some have questioned whether the proposed funding for the land acquisition deal might be better spent on CERP projects. The impact of the land acquisition on other Everglades restoration projects will depend on budgetary decisions made in late September 2010, which could potentially reduce or delay state funding for some CERP projects. Near-term delays resulting from any funding reductions for CERP projects could affect the Everglades ecosystem, including those efforts pertaining to phosphorus mitigation and planned water storage capacity. | The Florida Everglades is a unique network of subtropical wetlands that is now half its original size. The federal government has had a long history of involvement in the Everglades, beginning in the 1940s with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructing flood control projects that shunted water away from the Everglades. Many factors, including these flood control projects and agricultural and urban development, have contributed to the shrinking and altering of the wetlands ecosystem. Federal agencies began ecosystem restoration activities in the Everglades more than 15 years ago, but it was not until 2000 that Congress integrated the majority of restoration activities under an integrated plan, known as the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP).
The River of Grass acquisition is a proposed land acquisition by the State of Florida, which has the potential to affect the implementation of CERP. The proposal is to purchase tracts of land south of Lake Okeechobee from the U.S. Sugar Corporation. The state argues that the purchase would reduce phosphorus loads and help restore the historic north-south flow of water from Lake Okeechobee to the Everglades. Initially, acquisition of 187,000 acres was announced by Florida Governor Charlie Crist and subsequently approved by the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) in December 2008. Since then, the original proposal has been downsized on multiple occasions, both in terms of the size of the purchase and the purchase price. Most recently, a revised land purchase agreement was announced and approved by the SFWMD in August 2010. SFWMD now proposes a direct cash purchase of 26,800 acres, or approximately 14% of the original purchase proposed by the governor in 2008. The purchase would cost SFWMD $197 million.
Questions have been raised regarding the proposed acquisition. Some of these questions center on potential positive and negative consequences of the land purchase agreement. These include the effectiveness of the land acquisition in reducing nutrient loads that are detrimental to the Everglades and in restoring historic flows, as well as the effect of the initiative's funding requirements on Florida's other restoration projects, including projects with a non-federal cost share requirement under CERP. Since state funding for CERP activities is expected to decline in the coming years, some have questioned whether the proposed funding for the land acquisition deal might be better spent on CERP projects.
The impact of the land acquisition on CERP and other Everglades restoration projects will depend in part on budgetary decisions to be made by the state in late September 2010, which could potentially reduce or delay state funding for some CERP projects. Near-term delays resulting from any funding reductions for CERP projects may be of interest to Congress, as they would affect the overall federal effort to restore the Everglades ecosystem under CERP. |
crs_R40849 | crs_R40849_0 | Introduction: U.S. and Regional Interests1
As the Administration and Congress move forward to pursue engagement, harsher sanctions, or both, regional actors are evaluating their policies and priorities with respect to Iran. Iran's neighbors share many U.S. concerns, but often evaluate them differently than the United States when calculating their own relationship with or policy toward Iran. Because Iran and other regional concerns—the Arab-Israeli peace process, stability in Lebanon and Iraq, terrorism, and the ongoing war in Afghanistan—have become increasingly intertwined, understanding the policies and perspectives of Iran's neighbors could be crucial during the consideration of options to address overall U.S. policy toward Iran. Iran's neighbors seek to understand and influence changes in the following areas:
Iran's regional influence, Iran's nuclear program, Iran's role as an energy producer, and Iran's support for terrorism and non-state actors. For some of Iran's neighbors, Iran's regional influence is a domestic political concern. Bahrain relies on its relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia for its external security. On December 17, 2009, U.S. Issues for Congressional Consideration134
Although the Obama Administration may share many goals of the previous administration on Iran, it also sees the need for new strategies and approaches. The Obama Administration advocated a policy of engagement with Iran to determine the nature of its nuclear program and address other subjects of international concern. While post-election turmoil in Iran delayed these efforts temporarily, the Administration pursued engagement through the P5+1 framework. The United States, Israel, and the EU proposed the end of 2009 as a "firm" deadline for Iran to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate on the nuclear issue. That deadline has lapsed with no visible progress toward a resolution and the Administration is now working with its P5+1 partners to determine a course of action for 2010. Possible Regional Implications
Regardless of how they decide to proceed, any actions on the part of the Obama Administration, Congress, or the international community, and any developments in or provocations by Iran, will have implications for U.S. interests in the region as Iran's neighbors react and reevaluate their policies accordingly. | As the Administration and Congress move forward to pursue engagement, harsher sanctions, or both, regional actors are evaluating their policies and priorities with respect to Iran. Iran's neighbors share many U.S. concerns, but often evaluate them differently than the United States when calculating their own relationship with or policy toward Iran. Because Iran and other regional concerns—the Arab-Israeli peace process, stability in Lebanon and Iraq, terrorism, and the ongoing war in Afghanistan—have become increasingly intertwined, understanding the policies and perspectives of Iran's neighbors could be crucial during the consideration of options to address overall U.S. policy toward Iran.
Iran's neighbors seek to understand and influence changes in the following areas:
Iran's regional influence, Iran's nuclear program, Iran's role as an energy producer, and Iran's support for terrorism and non-state actors.
Although the Obama Administration may share many goals of the previous administration on Iran, it also sees the need for new strategies and approaches. The Obama Administration has advocated a policy of engagement with Iran to determine the nature of its nuclear program and address other subjects of international concern. While post-election turmoil in Iran delayed these efforts temporarily, it appears that the Administration is committed to pursue engagement through the P5+1 framework. At the same time, some Members of Congress have called for increased sanctions on Iran.
The United States, Israel, and the EU proposed the end of 2009 as a deadline for Iran to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate on the nuclear issue. That deadline has lapsed with no visible progress toward a resolution and the Administration is now working with its P5+1 partners to determine a course of action for 2010. Regardless of how they decide to proceed, any actions on the part of the Obama Administration, Congress, or the international community, and any developments in or provocations by Iran, will have implications for U.S. interests in the region as Iran's neighbors react and reevaluate their policies accordingly.
This report provides a description of Iran's neighbors' policies and interests, options for Congressional consideration, and an analysis of potential regional implications. For more information on Iran and regional perspectives, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and Relations with the United States, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS22323, Iran's Activities and Influence in Iraq, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R40653, Iran's 2009 Presidential Elections, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42099 | crs_R42099_0 | Although regulating concealed carry has been left to the states, Congress has passed a few laws that authorize certain individuals to carry concealed firearms across state lines, notwithstanding individual state provisions. This report first provides an overview of how concealed carry is generally regulated among the states. It then summarizes the federal laws regulating concealed carry. Lastly, it examines the concealed carry legislation pending before 112 th Congress. This report does not address carrying firearms on military installations by military personnel. In "shall-issue" jurisdictions, the issuing authority is required to grant an applicant the concealed carry permit (CCP) if he or she meets the statutory requirements. In "may-issue" jurisdictions, the issuing authority generally has the discretion to grant or deny a CCP based on a variety of statutory factors. Each state decides which out-of-state permits it will honor. This section discusses the Armored Car Industry Reciprocity Act of 1993, the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act of 2002, and the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2003. 2900 , is a broader bill that would authorize nationwide concealed carry. 822 , the National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011. As discussed in the beginning, eligibility requirements vary among states, as does reciprocity. H.R. H.R. 2900 , the Secure Access to Firearms Enhancement Act of 2011, was introduced by Representative Paul Broun. 822 as it would permit any person who (1) "is carrying a valid license issued pursuant to the law of any State and which permits the person to carry a concealed firearm"; or (2) "is entitled to carry a concealed firearm in and pursuant to the laws of the State in which the person resides carrying a concealed firearm in his state of residence" to carry concealed in any state "subject to the laws of the State in which the firearm is carried concerning specific types of locations in which firearms may not be carried." S. 176 (112th Congress)
Senator Barbara Boxer introduced S. 176 , the Common Sense Concealed Firearms Permit Act of 2011. S. 1588 (112th Congress)
S. 1588 , the Recreational Land Self-Defense Act of 2011, was introduced by Senator Jim Webb. | Whether an individual is permitted to carry a concealed firearm is a matter traditionally regulated by the states. State laws vary with respect to eligibility requirements to obtain a concealed carry permit (CCP). A majority of states, known as "shall-issue" jurisdictions, require the issuing authority to issue a CCP to an applicant so long as he or she meets certain statutory requirements. Another handful of states, known as "may-issue" jurisdictions, grant the issuing authority discretion to issue a CCP upon a finding of proper cause, or upon the applicant demonstrating good character. States decide which out-of-state CCPs to recognize, typically through the use of reciprocity agreements.
Although Congress has enacted federal firearm laws that govern, among other things, the possession, transfer, and sale of firearms, it has seldom legislated on the issue of concealed carry. It has passed only a few laws on concealed carry, allowing individuals in certain occupations and who meet certain qualifications to carry concealed nationwide notwithstanding state or local laws. These laws include the Armored Car Industry Reciprocity Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-55); the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296); the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA) (P.L. 108-277); and the Credit Card Act (P.L. 111-24). However, in the 112th Congress and past years, legislation has been introduced that would permit individuals to carry concealed nationwide, or on certain federal lands. These bills include H.R. 822, the National Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Act of 2011; S. 176, the Common Sense Concealed Firearms Permit Act of 2011; H.R. 2900, the Secure Access to Firearms Enhancement Act of 2011; and S. 1588, the Recreational Land Self-Defense Act of 2011.
This report first provides an overview of how concealed carry is generally regulated among the states. It then summarizes the federal laws regulating concealed carry. Lastly, it examines the concealed carry legislation pending before 112th Congress. This report does not address carrying firearms on military installations by military personnel. |
crs_R41302 | crs_R41302_0 | Congress is responsible for several activities in this regard, including (1) authorizing periodic appropriations for U.S. financial contributions to the institutions, and (2) overseeing U.S. involvement in the programs. Issues of congressional interest include the overall development assistance strategy of the United States, U.S. leadership in global environmental and economic affairs, and U.S. commercial interests in trade and investment. This report provides an overview of two of the larger and more recently instituted multilateral mechanisms—the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)—and analyzes their structure, funding, and objectives in light of the many challenges within the contemporary landscape of global environmental finance. Formally approved by the World Bank's Board of Directors on July 1, 2008, the CIFs have become an attempt to bridge the gap in climate financing between present obligations and a future global climate change agreement. The CIFs are composed of two separate trust funds—the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)—each with a specific scope, objective, and governance structure. Overall, 14 donor countries have pledged $7.6 billion (in historical value) to the funds since September 2008, which supports programming in 49 developing countries. The U.S. pledge in 2008 was for a total of $2 billion. U.S. contributions include the following:
FY2010, Congress approved $300 million for the CTF and $75 million for the SCF (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3288 ; P.L. 111-117 ). FY2011, Congress approved $184.6 million for the CTF and $49.9 million for the SCF (the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, H.R. 1473 ; P.L. 112-10 ). 2055 ; P.L. 112-74 ). FY2013, Congress approved $184.6 million for the CTF and $49.9 million for the SCF through a continuing resolution (the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, H.R. 933 ; P.L. 113-6 ). The CTF seeks to provide financing—principally to larger emerging economies and to regional groups—for demonstrating, deploying, and diffusing low-carbon technologies with the potential for long-term avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions. The SCF aims to help developing countries prepare for climate change by promoting low-carbon, climate-resilient development. The Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries (SREP) helps low-income countries adopt renewable energy solutions to aid in the development of their power generation sector. The Forest Investment Program . The effectiveness of the CIFs depends on how the trust funds address their programmatic issues, build upon their national investment plans, react to recent developments in the financial landscape, and respond to emerging opportunities. Country-led Process . Innovative Governance and Stakeholder Engagement . Issues in Support of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and Multilateral Assistance
The choice of financial mechanism and its administration is an important element to environmental finance. These advantages include, but are not limited to, the following:
Commitment to Private Sector Development . Possession of Fiduciary Standards. Issues of Concern for Developing Countries and NGOs
While advantages exist to financing climate programs through the institutional structure of the MDBs, concerns also persist. Potential for Additionality . Lack of Polluter Responsibility . Energy and En vironmental Policy at the Banks . | The United States contributes funding to various international financial institutions to assist developing countries to address global climate change and other environmental concerns. Congress is responsible for several activities in this regard, including (1) authorizing periodic appropriations for U.S. financial contributions to the institutions, and (2) overseeing U.S. involvement in the programs. Issues of congressional interest include the overall development assistance strategy of the United States, U.S. leadership in global environmental and economic affairs, and U.S. commercial interests in trade and investment. This report provides an overview of two of the larger and more recently instituted international financial institutions for the environment—the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs)—and analyzes their structure, funding, and objectives in light of the many challenges within global environmental finance.
The CIFs are investment programs administered by the multilateral development banks (MDBs) that aim to help finance developing countries' transitions toward low-carbon and climate-resilient development. Formally approved by the World Bank's Board of Directors on July 1, 2008, the CIFs are composed of two trust funds—the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)—each with a specific scope, objective, and governance structure. The CTF provides financing for demonstrating, deploying, and diffusing low-carbon technologies that have the potential for long-term avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions. The SCF—a suite of three separate funds, including the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), the Forest Investment Program (FIP), and the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program in Low Income Countries (SREP)—supports the least developed countries in their efforts to achieve low-carbon, climate-resilient development. Overall, donor countries have pledged $7.6 billion to the funds since September 2008 in support of programs in 49 developing countries. The U.S. pledge in 2008 was for a total of $2 billion. For FY2010, Congress approved $375 million for the CIFs (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3288; P.L. 111-117); for FY2011, Congress approved $234.5 million (the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, H.R. 1473; P.L. 112-10); for FY2012, Congress approved $234.5 million (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, H.R. 2055; P.L. 112-74); and for FY2013, Congress approved $234.5 million (the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, H.R. 933; P.L. 113-6). For FY2014, the Administration requested $283.7 million for the funds.
The CIFs are just one set of financial mechanisms in a larger network of international programs designed to address the global environment. Accordingly, their effectiveness depends on how the funds address programmatic issues, build upon national investment plans, react to recent developments in the financial landscape, and respond to emerging opportunities. Proponents of the CIFs point to several factors in support of the funds, including an innovative programmatic design, a country-led investment process, and a balanced governance structure with enhanced stakeholder engagement. Proponents of the MDBs' role in environmental assistance emphasize several advantages to financing climate programs through the MDBs, including its commitment to private sector development, its capacity to leverage large co-financing arrangements, and its possession of fiduciary standards and institutional expertise. However, critics highlight several factors of concern with the CIFs and their Trustee, including a lack of transparency, coordination, and "polluter pay" responsibilities; a potential for increased debt burdens on developing countries; and a prior economic development policy at the development banks that is considered a conflict of interest for environmental protection. |
crs_RL33085 | crs_RL33085_0 | The United States and the other 153 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been engaged in a set or "round" of negotiations called the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) since December 2001. The DDA's main objective is to refine and expand the rules by which WTO members conduct foreign trade with one another. A critical element of the DDA round is the negotiations pertaining to foreign trade in services. Trade in services has been covered under multilateral rules only since 1995 with the entry into force of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Uruguay Round Agreements creating the WTO. Many Members of Congress consider the services negotiations to be a critical part, if not the most critical part of the DDA round. These Members require strong commitments from U.S. trading partners to remove barriers in trade in services as part of an overall trade agreement they could support. The Negotiations
The negotiations on services in the DDA have two fundamental objectives. One objective is to reform the current GATS rules and principles. The Status of the DDA Negotiations and Major Issues
The WTO services negotiations have been going on for more than five years. However, as with the negotiations in agriculture and non-agriculture market access that have proceeded slowly with missed deadlines and disappointing results. In July 2006, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy suspended the entire DDA negotiations, including the services negotiations, because member countries could not agree on fundamental modalities for the negotiations in agriculture trade. He resumed the negotiations in 2007, continuing to the present. Negotiators from major groups of developed and developing countries worked to nail down the basic elements of a draft text; however, they failed so far to reach a consensus on the basic negotiating objectives. The prospects of the negotiations were set back when WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy suspended the DDA, including the services negotiations, indefinitely on July 24, 2006, after a meeting of the G-6 WTO members, consisting of the United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, Brazil, and India, failed to agree on the basic conditions or modalities, for conducting the agriculture and NAMA negotiations. Furthermore, services negotiations include many participants. The prospects for the negotiations are difficult to evaluate at this point. It is not unusual for negotiations to lag as participants wait to place their best negotiating positions on the table until just before crucial deadlines are reached. Several factors will determine if and when the services negotiations will be completed. One factor is the political will the WTO members can muster to overcome the obstacles that plague the negotiations. Another factor is the extent the various participants are willing to compromise on goals in order to reach agreements. And a third factor is how quickly the issues in agriculture and non-agriculture market access are resolved; the sooner they are resolved the sooner negotiators can devote their full attention to the services negotiations. | The United States and the other 153 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been conducting a set or "round" of negotiations called the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) since the end of 2001. The DDA's main objective is to refine and expand the rules by which WTO members conduct foreign trade with one another. A critical element of the DDA round is the negotiations pertaining to foreign trade in services. Trade in services has been covered under multilateral rules only since 1995 with the entry into force of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and of the Uruguay Round Agreements creating the WTO.
The negotiations on services in the DDA round have two fundamental objectives. One objective is to reform the current GATS rules and principles. The second objective is for each member country to open more of its service sectors to foreign competition. The WTO services negotiations have been going on for more than 10 years. However, as with the negotiations in agriculture and non-agriculture market access, the services negotiations have proceeded slowly with missed deadlines and few results.
The prospects for the negotiations are difficult to evaluate at this point. It is not unusual for negotiations to lag as participants wait to place their best negotiating positions on the table until just before crucial deadlines are reached. In July 2006, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy suspended the DDA negotiations, including the services negotiations, because major WTO members could not agree on the terms or modalities for negotiations in agriculture and non-agriculture market access. He resumed the negotiations in 2007. In 2009, negotiators from major groups of developed and developing countries have worked to nail down the basic elements of a draft text; however, they failed so far to reach a consensus on the basic negotiating modalities. 2010 also produced little progress as the services negotiations continued to be hostage to the negotiations on agricultural and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations, which also showed little progress. In general participants have been reluctant to liberalize services trade much beyond their commitments already established in the GATS.
Several factors will determine if and when the services negotiations will be completed. One factor is the political will the WTO members can muster to overcome the obstacles that hamper the negotiations. Another factor is to what degree the various participants are willing to compromise on goals in order to reach agreements. And a third factor is how quickly the issues in agriculture and non-agriculture market access are resolved; the sooner they are resolved the sooner negotiators can devote their attention to the services negotiations. This report will be updated as events warrant. Many Members of Congress consider the services negotiations to be a critical part, if not the most critical part, of the DDA round. These Members require strong commitments from U.S. trading partners to remove barriers in trade in services as part of an overall trade agreement they could support.. The DDA negotiations, including the negotiations on services, could be the subject of oversight during the 112th Congress. |
crs_R41317 | crs_R41317_0 | Roughly every five years, Congress debates and revises omnibus legislation—referred to as the "farm bill"—governing federal farm and food policy. Congress is currently reviewing U.S. farm policy before commodity provisions in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-246 ; the 2008 farm bill) expire in 2012. The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the broader farming community often refer to the price and income support programs of the farm bill's Title I and the crop insurance and disaster assistance programs of Title XII as encompassing the farm safety net. Several farm programs contain elements of a safety net, which is intended to protect farmers against risks or ensure a minimum level of economic well-being. Many policymakers and farmers consider federal support of farm businesses necessary for their financial survival, given the unpredictable nature of agricultural production and markets. In contrast, many environmental groups argue that these subsidies encourage overproduction on environmentally fragile land using excessive pesticides and fertilizers. Others, including budget hawks, have long argued that farm subsidies are an unfair market-distorting use of taxpayer dollars. As provided under the 2008 farm bill and other legislation, farm safety net programs can be divided into three main categories (as shown in Figure 1 and Table 1 ):
c ommodity programs provide income support and attempt to address farm price or revenue risk for selected field crops; risk management provides protection from declines in yield or revenue for a much broader set of commodities, including many field and specialty crops and some livestock; and supplemental disaster assistance is available for most commodities (crops and livestock) when weather-related losses are not covered by other programs. Historically, federal programs have primarily benefitted farmers (and landowners) of the major field crops, such as wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, cotton, and sugar. Importantly, farm support has evolved over many decades by modifying or adding programs. As a result, programs sometimes overlap or work at cross purposes, generating criticism that they are not well integrated, cost too much, or do not provide adequate risk protection. In recent years, prices for some commodities, including peanuts and cotton, have been below levels that trigger counter-cyclical payments. At best, this budget situation is likely to prevent any increase in overall new spending on a 2012 farm bill. Thus, the level of funding in the CBO baseline for agricultural programs will be of paramount importance as the development of a 2012 farm bill progresses. Thus, the pool of money for any proposed revisions to the farm safety net may likely come from the existing baseline for the farm commodity programs and the crop insurance program. The average for the actual outlays from FY2003 to FY2010 is $15.7 billion per year. The projected annual average for FY2011-FY2020 in the August 2010 CBO baseline is 5.6% smaller at $14.8 billion. Several issues might shape any potential changes to farm safety net programs in the next farm bill debate. WTO Compatibility of Current Farm Programs
A major constraint affecting future U.S. policy choices is the broad set of rules and disciplines of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which the United States, as a founding member, has agreed to adhere to and abide by. Under the AA, the United States is committed to spending no more than $19.1 billion per year on AMS amber box support. A Whole-Farm Safety Net Under the WTO
The WTO compatibility of a whole-farm safety net program would depend on many things. Will the program have adverse market effects? | Roughly every five years, Congress debates and revises omnibus legislation governing federal farm policy. Commodity provisions in the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246) expire in 2012, and Congress is currently reviewing U.S. farm policy. The collection of federal farm programs, which make payments to farmers and landlords, is often referred to by the broader farming community as the "farm safety net." Some programs such as "counter-cyclical payments" (which rise when crop prices decline) contain elements of a safety net—which is usually intended to protect recipients against economic risks. Other farm program payments, such as direct (fixed) payments, are made irrespective of market prices.
As provided under the 2008 farm bill and other legislation, farm safety net programs can be divided into three main categories. Commodity programs provide income support and attempt to address farm price or revenue risks for selected field crops. Risk management (primarily crop insurance) provides protection from declines in yield or revenue for a much broader set of commodities, including many field and specialty crops and some livestock. Supplemental disaster assistance is available for most agricultural commodities (crops and livestock) when weather-related production losses are not covered by other programs.
Many policymakers and farmers consider federal support of farm businesses necessary for their financial survival, given the unpredictable nature of agricultural production and markets. In contrast, many environmental groups and budget hawks argue that farm subsidies encourage overproduction on environmentally fragile land and are a market-distorting use of tax dollars.
Historically, federal programs have primarily benefitted farmers (and landowners) of the major crops, such as wheat, corn, cotton, and sugar, with policy constructed over many decades by modifying or adding programs. As a result, programs sometimes overlap or work at cross purposes, generating criticism that they are not well integrated, cost too much, or do not provide adequate risk protection. Additional potential issues for Congress in the next farm bill debate include the extent of the current commodity coverage, program complexity and its impact on participation and effectiveness, and the effect of biofuel subsidies on agriculture.
The current federal budget situation is likely to prevent any increase in overall spending on a 2012 farm bill. Thus, the level of funding in the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline budget for agricultural programs will be of paramount importance. Combined outlays for farm safety net programs have averaged $15.7 billion per year during FY2003 to FY2010, with a high of $20.5 billion in FY2006 and a low of $12.2 billion in FY2008. CBO's projected annual average for FY2011-FY2020 is $14.8 billion. With crop prices relatively high, counter-cyclical support has declined in recent years while crop insurance outlays (which are directly related to crop prices) have increased sharply. The pool of money for any changes to the farm safety net will likely come from the existing baseline for the commodity programs and the crop insurance program.
A constraint affecting future U.S. policy choices is the broad set of rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which the United States, as a founding member, has agreed to abide by. Farm bill proposals, if implemented, will affect U.S. commitments, mainly through cost, program design, implementation, and market effects. Under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the United States is committed to spending no more than $19.1 billion per year on "amber box" support (programs considered to be the most trade distorting). The WTO compatibility of any new proposal, such as a whole-farm safety net program, would depend on how its provisions mesh with WTO criteria for loss triggers, payment levels, and production and trade effects. |
crs_R43330 | crs_R43330_0 | Direct Services Provided by IHS Facilities
The IHS provides an array of medical services, including inpatient, ambulatory, emergency, dental, public health nursing, and preventive health care. The IHS does not have a defined medical benefit package that includes or excludes specific conditions or types of health care. As noted above, the majority of IHS facilities provide outpatient care. The focus of services is on primary and preventive care including preventive screenings and health education. Health Services Purchased by IHS Facilities
IHS-funded facilities provide services directly when possible; however, when services are not available, IHS beneficiaries may be referred to private providers for care. Disease or Condition-Focused Services
IHS provides a number of services directly or through ITs or TOs that target common health conditions among IHS beneficiaries. These include efforts to recruit and retain a skilled health workforce and to support the overhead and expenses associated with contracts and compacts that the IHS enters into with ITs and TOs to provide services. IHS Authorization
The Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA, P.L. 94-437 , as amended) is the major authorizing legislation for the IHS. It was preceded by several laws that included more general authorization for federal Indian programs. Congressional Committee Jurisdiction
A number of congressional committees exercise jurisdiction over legislation affecting the IHS, including its appropriations. Federal involvement in Indian health is rooted in treaties between Indian Tribes and the federal government. | The IHS provides an array of medical services, including inpatient, ambulatory, emergency, dental, public health nursing, and preventive health care. The IHS does not have a defined medical benefit package that includes or excludes specific health services or health conditions. The majority of IHS facilities provide outpatient care, focusing on primary and preventive care including preventive screenings and health education. IHS provides services directly when possible; when needed services are not available, IHS beneficiaries may be referred to private providers for care. This is called purchased/referred care (PRC).
IHS also provides a number of health services that target common health conditions among IHS beneficiaries. These include services for diabetes prevention and treatment, behavioral health services including suicide prevention and methamphetamine treatment, and programs aimed at the prevention of infectious diseases. In addition to health services, IHS funds a number of activities related to its unique mission. These include construction and maintenance of IHS facilities, efforts to recruit and retain a skilled health workforce who will work at IHS facilities, and support for the overhead and expenses associated with contracts and compacts that the IHS enters into with ITs and TOs.
The federal government has long-standing involvement in Indian health. The Indian Health Care Improvement Act is the major authorizing legislation for the IHS. It was preceded by several laws that included more general authorization for federal Indian programs. A number of congressional committees exercise jurisdiction over legislation affecting the IHS, including its appropriations. |
crs_R43588 | crs_R43588_0 | What Are Year-Round Schools? In general, year-round schools are schools that reorganize a traditional school year without allowing for any extended breaks in instruction (e.g., 10 week summer vacation). Rather, the days usually included in summer break are redistributed to create regular breaks throughout the year. Year-Round Schools by the Numbers
While year-round schools have existed in some form since the early 1900s, there was substantial growth in the number of year-round schools from the mid-1980s to 2000. In 1985, there were 410 year-round public schools, serving about 350,000 students. By 2000, the number of year-round public schools had grown to 3,059 schools, serving almost 2.2 million students in 45 states. During the 2011-2012 school year, there were 3,700 public schools across the nation operating on a year-round calendar cycle. Research on Year-Round Education
The research on the extent to which year-round schools affect student achievement has generally been found to be inconclusive and lacking in methodological rigor. Wu and Stone reached similar conclusions and noted that while "there is a general consensus that [year-round school] has no effect or a small positive effect on student performance, the methodology of many studies had left copious room for more rigorous verification." Using a modified school calendar creates opportunities to provide remediation and enrichment activities to students during the school year rather than waiting to provide these activities during summer school. Families may find it difficult to have their children on different schedules if year-round schooling is not offered districtwide or if their children end up on different tracks in a multitrack school. There may be a lack of opportunities for older students to have summer jobs, and there may be complications related to student participation in extracurricular activities over breaks. | In general, year-round schools are schools that reorganize a traditional school year without allowing for any extended breaks in instruction (e.g., 10-week summer vacation). Rather, the days usually included in summer break are redistributed to create regular breaks throughout the year. While year-round schools have existed to some extent since the early 1900s, there was substantial growth in the number of year-round schools from the mid-1980s to 2000. In 1985, there were 410 year-round public schools, serving about 350,000 students. By 2000, the number of year-round public schools had grown to 3,059 schools, serving almost 2.2 million students in 45 states. During the 2011-2012 school year, there were 3,700 public schools across the nation operating on a year-round calendar cycle.
The research on the extent to which year-round schools affect student achievement has generally been found to be inconclusive and lacking in methodological rigor. There is some consensus that year-round schooling has no effect or a small positive effect on student performance; however, the quality of the studies that led to these findings has been questioned.
There are various pros and cons raised in relation to year-round schools. Among the arguments in favor of this calendar approach are stemming the loss of learning over the summer, creating opportunities during the school year to provide remediation and enrichment activities, and cost savings. Among the arguments against the year-round school approach are the costs associated with the initial implementation of a year-round school, the greater need to focus instead on other aspects of education (e.g., effective teaching and parent involvement), scheduling difficulties for families if year-round schools are not implemented districtwide or if their children end up on different schedules within the same school; the lack of opportunities for older students to have summer jobs; and issues related to student participation in extracurricular activities while on breaks. |
crs_R40518 | crs_R40518_0 | Introduction
The Administration's 2010 and 2011 budget outlines contain a proposal to cap the value of itemized deductions at 28%, for high-income taxpayers. In the 2010 plan, the expected revenue was dedicated to addressing health care issues. Other revenue sources have been proposed for this purpose and the current proposal is part of the Administrations tax provisions for upper income taxpayers. The itemized deduction cap has generated considerable concern about its potential negative effect on charitable contributions, especially in light of the difficulties charities are having during current economic conditions. The proposed tax change, however, would not go into effect until 2011 and could actually increase current contributions in the short term. Thus, it is the longer-term, or permanent, effect on giving that is considered in this analysis. The analysis also considers the effects of other income tax changes and of the estate tax. The following section provides calculations of the consequences for charitable giving, which are estimated based on the share of giving that is affected by the cap, the magnitude of the price change, and the elasticity (behavioral response to tax changes). Two effects are considered for the cap: the effect of imposing a cap on the current (2009) top tax rate of 35% and the effect of imposing a cap on the top rate of 39.6% which is scheduled for 2011. Effects are calculated compared to two baselines: current tax rules with tax rates of 33% and 35% and tax rules in 2011 with rates of 36% and 39.6%. Currently, taxpayers are allowed to deduct the entire cost of appreciated property, without paying the capital gains tax. There are income effects associated with the charitable giving deduction cap itself, which are small since on average charitable contributions are a small part of a taxpayer's budget, typically less than 3%. Compared with 2011 law, charitable giving should rise by about a 1% due to the proposals. Effects by Types of Charitable Objectives
Different types of charities may be affected differently by the change because the negative effects are more concentrated on higher-income donors. If higher-income individuals contributed the same shares as overall contributions, the estimated effects in Table 4 would apply to all charities. These include religious organizations, combined purpose charities and charities designed to meet basic needs. Organizations that are more likely to be recipients of donations from high-income individuals will be more likely to have reductions in gifts and those reductions will be larger. Health will experience the greatest declines, followed by arts, other, and education. As in the case of the income tax discussion, this section examines historical changes in the estate tax, the estimated effect of different regimes on charitable giving through bequests, the effects of temporary changes, and the effects of the estate tax on gifts during the lifetime. Although changes in either the estate tax rate or the estate tax exemption are expected to elicit behavioral responses, estimates in this study are confined to the effect of changes in the estate tax rate in this study. Compared to the President's Budget Outline, the low elasticity estimate suggests a reduction of nearly 4% in total charitable contributions from a repeal of the estate tax, an increase of almost 1% from reverting to 2001 estate tax law and a decrease of nearly 1% from adopting the provision in the Senate Budget Resolution. One approach if the concern about the itemized deduction cap is primarily directed at charitable contributions is to exclude charitable deductions from the cap. The retention of the current estate tax rates compared with the elimination of the tax now scheduled for 2010 would increase charitable giving, but would lower it compared with the pre-2001 rates scheduled to be in effect if the Bush tax cuts expired. | The Administration's 2010 and 2011 budget outlines contain a proposal to cap the value of itemized deductions at 28%, for high-income taxpayers. In the 2010 proposal, the expected revenue was dedicated to addressing health care issues; as other sources are expected to finance health care, the proposal is now part of the increased taxes on upper income taxpayers. This proposal has generated considerable concern about its potential negative effect on charitable contributions. This concern has been heightened because charities are having difficulties in the current economic climate. The proposed tax change, however, would not go into effect until 2011 and thus the change could actually increase near-term contributions. Thus, it is the longer-term, or permanent, effect on giving that is the effect considered in this analysis. The analysis also considers the effects of other income tax changes and of the estate tax.
The estimated effects of the cap and other elements of the budget package depend on whether the proposals are compared with the current tax rates of 33% and 35% or the rates scheduled for 2011, 36% and 39.6%. Compared with current rules, estimated effects are between one-half a percent and 1% decline in charitable giving, depending on whether the effects of capital gains tax rates on gifts of appreciated property are included. When compared with tax rate provisions in 2011, charitable deductions are estimated to fall by about 1.5% if only the cap is considered, but if income effects from the entire budget package are included contributions actually rise 2.5%. The relatively modest effects of the proposal arise because (1) the effect of caps on the subsidy value is limited, (2) only a fraction (about 16%) of charitable giving is affected, and (3) because evidence suggests that behavioral responses to changes in subsidies are relatively small.
Different charities will be affected differently because the giving patterns of higher-income individuals differ from the average. Estimates show smaller reductions or larger increases for religious or combined charities, or charities directed at meeting basic needs, whereas the proposal is more likely to have negative effects for charities serving the health sector, and to a lesser extent art and education charities. Overall, contributions that benefit the poor will be less likely to fall or more likely to rise than the average contribution because the charitable purposes more favored by higher-income contributors are less likely to direct benefits to low-income recipients.
Estate tax changes would also affect charitable giving. The budget outlines hold the current 2009 estate tax rules constant. Allowing the estate tax to lapse in 2010, as would the current rules, could lead to reductions in charitable giving of around 4%. Returning to the higher estate tax rates currently scheduled for 2011 could increase charitable giving, by about 1%, while adopting the FY2010 Senate Budget Resolution provision could reduce charitable contributions by about 1%. Although a smaller share of charitable contributions are affected by the estate tax, the changes in subsidy value are much larger if the estate tax is repealed, and the estimated behavioral response is greater. The immediate effects on contributions and the distributional effects of changes are, however, uncertain. Over half of bequests involve gifts to foundations, which finance a variety of charitable objectives and provide benefits with a considerable delay.
Revenue from the cap on itemized deductions is currently directed at increasing revenues to finance other programs. If the cap is rejected either overall, or for charitable contributions, other revenue sources found, or the debt increased. Alternative revenue options include, among others, implementing a floor under charitable deductions and increases in tax rates on high-income taxpayers. |
crs_R42121 | crs_R42121_0 | Introduction
This report provides background data on U.S. arms sales agreements with and deliveries to its major purchasers during calendar years 2003-2010. It provides the total dollar values of U.S. arms agreements with its top five purchasers in five specific regions of the world for the periods 2003-2006, 2007-2010, and for 2010. It also reports the total dollar values of U.S. arms deliveries to its top five purchasers in five specific regions for those same years. In addition, the report provides a listing of the total dollar values of U.S. arms agreements with and deliveries to its top 10 purchasers for the periods 2003-2006, 2007-2010, and for 2010. U.S. U.S. Deliveries to Leading Purchasers, 2003-2010
The following regional tables ( Tables 7-11 ) provide the total dollar values of all U.S. defense articles and defense services delivered to the top five purchasers in each region indicated for the calendar year(s) noted for all deliveries under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. | This report provides background data on U.S. arms sales agreements with and deliveries to its major purchasers during calendar years 2003-2010, made through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. In a series of data tables, it lists the total dollar values of U.S. government-to-government arms sales agreements with its top five purchasers, and the total dollar values of U.S. arms deliveries to those purchasers, in five specific regions of the world for three specific periods: 2003-2006, 2007-2010, and 2010 alone. In addition, the report provides data tables listing the total dollar values of U.S. government-to-government arms agreements with and deliveries to its top 10 purchasers worldwide for the periods 2003-2006, 2007-2010, and for 2010 alone.
This report is prepared in conjunction with CRS Report R42017, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2003-2010, by [author name scrubbed]. That annual report details both U.S. and foreign arms transfer activities globally and provides analysis of arms trade trends. The intent here is to complement that elaborate worldwide treatment of the international arms trade by focusing exclusively on U.S. arms sales and deliveries, and providing the names of the major U.S. arms customers, by region, together with the total dollar values of their arms purchases or deliveries for the calendar years 2003-2006, 2007-2010, and 2010. |
crs_RS21666 | crs_RS21666_0 | Since then, Tunisia has taken key steps toward democracy. An elected National Constituent Assembly adopted a new constitution in 2014, and presidential and parliamentary elections were held the same year, formally ending a series of transitional governments. The coalition has advanced some economic reforms, political decentralization, and efforts to improve gender equality, including a gender-based violence law enacted in 2017. Although many Tunisians are proud of their country's progress, opinion polls have repeatedly revealed anxiety over the future. In May 2018, Tunisia held landmark local elections to fill posts created under a new political decentralization law. Tunisia has seen the rise of local violent extremist organizations since 2011, and has also faced threats from groups and individuals based in Libya. Tunisia has been a top source of Islamist foreign fighters in Syria and Libya, and several terrorist attacks in Europe have been carried out by individuals of Tunisian origin. U.S. Policy and Aid
U.S. high-level contacts and aid have expanded significantly since 2011, as U.S. officials have hailed the country's peaceful political transition and as Congress has appropriated increased bilateral assistance funding. President Trump and President Caïd Essebsi spoke over the phone in February 2017 and discussed Tunisia's democratic transition and continued security threats. Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan visited Tunisia in 2017, and in early 2018 he affirmed that the United States "will continue to support Tunisia's efforts to improve security and modernize its economy, amid formidable challenges." The U.S. military conducts intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities at a Tunisian facility and U.S. Special Operations Forces have reportedly played an advisory role in Tunisian counterterrorism operations. President Obama designated Tunisia a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization Ally in 2015, after meeting with President Caïd Essebsi at the White House. United States Agency for International Development opened an office in Tunis in 2014, reflecting increased bilateral economic aid allocations. The U.S. Embassy in Tunis also hosts the U.S. Libya External Office, through which U.S. diplomats engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. programs in Libya. (The State Department suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in 2014.) The Department of Defense (DOD) has provided substantial additional military aid, focused on counterterrorism and border security ( Table 2 , below). The Trump Administration proposed $54.6 million in bilateral aid for Tunisia in its FY2018 budget request, proposing to eliminate bilateral Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to cut bilateral economic aid by more than half. The FY2018 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018 (Division K of P.L. 115-141 ), however, provided "not less than" $165.4 million in aid for Tunisia. The Administration's FY2019 aid budget request for Tunisia totals $94.5 million. In addition, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) FY2019 budget proposal includes $292 million for an anticipated multi-year development compact with Tunisia that would aim to reduce water scarcity and address regulations seen as constraining job creation. Tunisia has expanded its acquisitions of U.S. defense materiel in order to maintain its U.S.-origin stocks and expand its counterterrorism capacity. The State Department licensed the sale of 12 Black Hawk helicopters in 2014, and Tunisia has also received significant equipment through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, including 24 Kiowa helicopters. | Tunisia has taken key steps toward democracy since its 2011 "Jasmine Revolution," and has so far avoided the violent chaos and/or authoritarian resurrection seen elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa region. Tunisians adopted a new constitution in 2014 and held national elections the same year, marking the completion of a four-year transitional period. In May 2018, Tunisia held elections for newly created local government posts, a move toward political decentralization that activists and donors have long advocated. The government has also pursued gender equality reforms and enacted a law in 2017 to counter gender-based violence.
Tunisians have struggled, however, to address steep economic challenges and overcome political infighting. Public opinion polls have revealed widespread anxiety about the future. Tunisia's ability to counter terrorism appears to have improved since a string of large attacks in 2015-2016, although turmoil in neighboring Libya and the return of some Tunisian foreign fighters from Syria and Libya continue to pose threats. Militant groups also operate in Tunisia's border regions.
U.S. diplomatic contacts and aid have expanded significantly since 2011. President Trump spoke on the phone with Tunisian President Béji Caïd Essebsi soon after taking office in early 2017, and Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan visited Tunisia in November 2017. President Obama designated Tunisia a Major Non- North Atlantic Treaty Organization Ally in 2015 after meeting with President Caïd Essebsi at the White House. United States Aid for International Development opened an office in Tunis in 2014, reflecting increased bilateral economic aid allocations. The U.S. Embassy in Tunis also hosts the U.S. Libya External Office, through which U.S. diplomats engage with Libyans and monitor U.S. programs in Libya. (The State Department suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli in 2014.)
U.S. bilateral aid administered by the State Department and USAID totaled $205.4 million in FY2017. The Trump Administration requested $54.6 million for FY2018, proposing to eliminate bilateral Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to cut bilateral economic aid by more than half. The FY2018 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018 (Division K of P.L. 115-141), however, provided "not less than" $165.4 million in aid for Tunisia. The Department of Defense (DOD) has provided substantial additional military aid focused on counterterrorism and border security. For FY2019, the Administration has requested $94.5 million in State Department and USAID-administered bilateral funds for Tunisia. In addition, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has requested $292 million for an anticipated multi-year development compact with Tunisia.
Much of Tunisia's defense materiel is U.S.-origin, and it has pursued U.S. arms sales to maintain its stocks and expand its capabilities. The State Department licensed the sale of 12 Black Hawk helicopters in 2014, and Tunisia has received significant equipment through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program, including 24 Kiowa helicopters and 24 guided missile "Hellfire" launchers notified to Congress in 2016. The U.S. military has acknowledged conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities from a Tunisian facility, and U.S. military advisors have reportedly played a role in some Tunisian counterterrorism operations.
Congress has focused on Tunisia's democratic progress, economic stability, and counterterrorism efforts through legislation, oversight, and direct engagement with Tunisian leaders. There is a bipartisan Tunisia Caucus. Relevant bills in the 115th Congress include the FY2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, and the Combatting Terrorism in Tunisia Emergency Support Act of 2017 (H.R. 157). |
crs_R43053 | crs_R43053_0 | Congress, which annually oversees and appropriates $1.55 billion in bilateral foreign aid to Egypt, is following the situation in Egypt closely, including the Islamist-led government's stated commitment to, among other things, pursuing democratic principles and continued peace with Israel. Congress could also pass legislation to shape U.S. policy toward Egypt at the IMF. It discusses the IMF program from a congressional perspective, including how debt relief for Egypt has been tied to an IMF program and legislation that would condition U.S. bilateral economic assistance to Egypt on an IMF program. Background
Deteriorating Economic Conditions in Post-Revolution Egypt
Economic conditions in Egypt have gradually deteriorated since the 2011 revolution, potentially exacerbating an already polarized Egyptian political climate. Unemployment rose from 9.2% in 2010 to 12.3% in 2012. The central bank's holdings of foreign exchange reserves fell from $34 billion in the fourth quarter of 2010 to $12 billion in 2012, a level that many economists fear puts the central bank at risk of running out of reserves and triggering a currency crisis. Two tentative ("staff-level") agreements were reached, in June 2011 and November 2012, but no agreement has been finalized or implemented. Egyptian authorities have been reluctant to commit to economic reforms that may be politically unpopular and ultimately saddle the economy with more debt. In turn, the IMF's lending policies prevent it from pursuing a program that does not have adequate conditionality commitments in place. Continuing political concerns and uncertainty in Egypt have also contributed to the delay. In the absence of an IMF deal, Egyptian authorities are increasingly turning to other countries in the region for financial assistance, such as Libya and Qatar (described in greater detail below). Tentative Deal #1: June 2011
At the time of the first staff-level agreement, in June 2011, the military-controlled Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), led by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, was exercising executive authority in Egypt and therefore negotiating with the IMF. In March 2013, the IMF suggested that Egypt could qualify for emergency short-term financing from the IMF to stave off imminent economic collapse. The United States can and wants to do more. Some lawmakers who oppose ongoing U.S. bilateral assistance to Egypt may oppose any existing or future IMF support of Egypt. First, some may be concerned that in the rush to stabilize Egypt, the Administration could be too lenient in terms of the reforms it seeks from the Egyptian government. Second, other lawmakers may not want the Administration to push for tough conditions on an IMF loan, fearing that onerous conditions could risk the Egyptian government avoiding an IMF loan and risking economic collapse, and/or risk pushing the Egyptian government to other sources of financing that may not be aligned with U.S. interests. If Congress wants to influence U.S. policy toward Egypt at the IMF, it has legislative tools at its disposal to do so. Congress could pass similar legislation directing the "voice and vote" of the U.S. Executive Director at the IMF with regard to IMF programs and policies toward Egypt. Using the IMF as a Benchmark for U.S. Assistance to Egypt
Some lawmakers may seek to use the terms of IMF conditions as "financial benchmarks" for the provision of existing or any new bilateral economic aid to Egypt. 44 ) would have, if adopted, conditioned the obligation of U.S. economic assistance to Egypt on the President's certification, among other things, that the government of Egypt has "signed and submitted to the International Monetary Fund a Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies designed to promote critical economic reforms and has begun to implement such measures." And the IMF is in negotiating for $4.8 billion. | Congress, which annually oversees and appropriates $1.55 billion in bilateral foreign aid to Egypt, is following the political and economic situation in Egypt closely. Economic conditions in Egypt have deteriorated rapidly since the 2011 "revolution." Political uncertainty abruptly reduced foreign capital flows into Egypt; growth, while still positive, has slowed substantially; the central bank is at risk of running out of foreign exchange reserves; and unemployment has increased from 9.2% before the revolution to 12.3% in 2012. Many policymakers and analysts fear that the fragile economic conditions in Egypt jeopardize the country's political transition and broader stability in the region.
Egyptian authorities and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been in negotiations for more than two years over an IMF loan to Egypt in exchange for policy reforms that, if successful, could stave off economic collapse and create more "inclusive" growth. The IMF reached tentative agreements with first the military-controlled Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in June 2011 and later with Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi in November 2012. The November 2012 program would have provided $4.8 billion in assistance, and other donors pledged about $9.7 billion in additional financing once the IMF program was in place. No agreement has been finalized or implemented to date.
Egyptian authorities have been reluctant to commit to economic reforms that may be politically unpopular and increase the country's debt. Pressure to cut fuel subsidies is a particular issue. More broadly, many Egyptians associate the IMF programs in the late 1980s and 1990s with adverse social outcomes. On its part, the IMF has resisted a program that does not have sufficient conditionality consistent with its lending policies. Continuing political concerns and uncertainty in Egypt have also contributed to the delay. In the absence of an IMF agreement, the Egyptian government has recently secured financial support from Libya and Qatar.
Issues for Congress
Some lawmakers who oppose ongoing U.S. bilateral assistance to Egypt may oppose any existing or future IMF support of Egypt, on several potential grounds. Some may be concerned that in the rush to stabilize Egypt, the Administration could be too lenient in terms of the reforms it seeks from the Egyptian government. Others may not want the Administration to overly politicize an IMF loan. They fear that the application of too much pressure on the Morsi government could make accepting a possibly unpopular IMF deal too politically controversial to pursue and that the lack of IMF involvement in Egypt could undermine U.S. interests in the region.
The United States makes the single largest financial commitment to the IMF, and, with the largest voting power at the IMF, the United States wields a high degree of influence over IMF decisions. If Congress wanted to shape U.S. policy toward Egypt at the IMF, it could pass a "legislative mandate" legislation directing the U.S. representative at the IMF to use its "voice and vote" to push for certain policies toward Egypt at the IMF.
Lawmakers may also want to use the terms of IMF conditions as "benchmarks" for the provision of existing or new bilateral economic aid to Egypt. Concerns about bilateral debt relief are, in part, related to the absence of an IMF agreement. Additionally, legislative language (S.Amdt. 44) proposed in March 2013, but not adopted, would have tied U.S. bilateral economic assistance to Egypt to, among other things, an IMF program. |
crs_R45164 | crs_R45164_0 | The primary federal law governing the manufacture, distribution, and use of prescription and illicit opioids is the Controlled Substances Act (CSA or the act), which is administered and enforced by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the U.S. Department of Justice. This report first provides a brief overview of the opioid epidemic and then describes in greater detail the current federal legal regime governing opioids and other controlled substances under the CSA and its implementing regulations. After that, the report examines DEA actions taken that are specifically targeted at addressing opioid abuse and describes recently enacted laws amending the CSA that impact the opioid regulatory system, including the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act ( P.L. 115-271 ), enacted by the 115 th Congress. Brief Background on the Opioid Epidemic29
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has declared that the nation "is in the midst of an opioid overdose epidemic," citing statistics that show the number of overdose deaths involving opioids (including prescription opioids and illegal opioids such as heroin and nonpharmaceutical fentanyl) has more than quadrupled since 1999, and on average 115 Americans now die each day from an opioid overdose. How the opioid epidemic occurred, and who is responsible for fueling it, are complicated questions, though reports have suggested that many parties are likely involved to some extent, including pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors, doctors, health insurance companies, rogue pharmacies, and drug dealers and addicts. The President's Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis also cited excessive prescribing of opioids since 1999 as a significant contributor to the proliferation of opioids. Overview of the CSA
This section provides a general overview of the CSA's closed system of distribution that regulates opioids and other types of controlled substances, including the schedules in which the substances are placed and the regulatory requirements and obligations that registrants must satisfy, such as (1) registering with the DEA, (2) keeping accurate and complete records of controlled substance inventories and transactions, (3) implementing security measures to safeguard controlled substances from theft or diversion, (4) reporting certain information to the DEA (including suspicious controlled substance orders), (5) meeting production quotas, and (6) prescribing controlled substances only for legitimate medical purposes. Scheduling of Controlled Substances
The CSA places various plants, drugs, and chemicals (such as narcotics, stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids) into one of five schedules based on the substance's medical use, potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability. Who Must Register with the DEA? The CSA requires any person who seeks to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or conduct research involving any controlled substance (such as drug manufacturers, wholesale distributors, physicians, hospitals, pharmacies, and scientific researchers) to obtain a registration from the DEA, unless they are exempt. DEA's Legal Authorities for Enforcing the CSA
The DEA's Office of Diversion Control is responsible for preventing, detecting, and investigating violations of the CSA involving controlled pharmaceuticals while also "ensuring an adequate and uninterrupted supply for legitimate medical, commercial, and scientific needs." The CSA also provides that if the DEA Administrator suspends or revokes an existing registration, all controlled substances owned or possessed by the registrant may "be placed under seal ... until the time for taking an appeal has elapsed or until all appeals have been concluded.... " Once a revocation order becomes final (meaning all judicial appeals have been exhausted), these controlled substances "shall be forfeited to the United States" and "[a]ll right, title, and interest in such controlled substances ... shall vest in the United States.... "
Immediate Suspension Orders
Simultaneously with the institution of administrative proceedings to revoke or suspend a registration (or at any time after the DEA Administrator issues an OTSC notifying the registrant that the DEA is taking action to revoke or suspend a registration), the DEA Administrator may exercise emergency power to suspend immediately any existing registration for a limited time period in order to avoid "an imminent danger to the public health or safety." | According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the annual number of drug overdose deaths involving prescription opioids (such as hydrocodone, oxycodone, and methadone) and illicit opioids (such as heroin and nonpharmaceutical fentanyl) has more than quadrupled since 1999. A November 2017 report issued by the President's Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis also observed that "[t]he crisis in opioid overdose deaths has reached epidemic proportions in the United States ... and currently exceeds all other drug-related deaths or traffic fatalities." How the current opioid epidemic happened, and who may be responsible for fueling it, are complicated questions, though reports suggest that several parties likely played contributing roles, including pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors, doctors, health insurance companies, rogue pharmacies, and drug dealers and addicts. Many federal departments and agencies are involved in efforts to combat opioid abuse and addiction, including a law enforcement agency within the U.S. Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which is the focus of this report.
The primary federal law governing the manufacture, distribution, and use of prescription and illicit opioids is the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), a statute that the DEA is principally responsible for administering and enforcing. The CSA and DEA regulations promulgated thereunder establish a framework through which the federal government regulates the manufacture, distribution, importation, exportation, and use of certain substances which have the potential for abuse or psychological or physical dependence, including opioids. Congress enacted the CSA in 1970 to facilitate the availability of controlled substances for authorized medical, scientific, research, and industrial purposes, while also preventing these substances from being diverted out of legitimate channels for illegal purposes such as drug abuse and drug trafficking activities. The CSA aims to protect the public's health and safety from dangers posed by highly addictive or dangerous controlled substances that are diverted into the illicit market, while also ensuring that patients have access to pharmaceutical controlled substances for legitimate medical purposes such as the treatment of pain.
This report describes the current federal legal regime governing opioids and other controlled substances under the CSA and its implementing regulations, including (1) the classification of various plants, drugs, and chemicals into one of five schedules based on the substance's medical use, potential for abuse, and safety or dependence liability; (2) who must register with the DEA in order to receive authorization to handle the substances (such as drug manufacturers, wholesale distributors, doctors, hospitals, pharmacies, and scientific researchers); (3) what obligations registrants must satisfy in order to maintain a valid registration (such as keeping records of drug inventories and transactions, submitting reports to the DEA, and providing security measures to safeguard controlled substances); and (4) the DEA's administrative, civil, and criminal authorities for enforcing regulatory compliance with the CSA (such as suspending or revoking a registrant's legal authority to handle controlled substances if the DEA Administrator finds that the registrant has "committed such acts as would render his registration ... inconsistent with the public interest."). The report then examines DEA initiatives and actions taken, pursuant to its legal authorities under the CSA, which specifically target the abuse of opioids. The report concludes by describing the legislative response to the opioid epidemic, including a summary of the amendments to the CSA made by legislation enacted by the 115th Congress, the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (P.L. 115-271). |
crs_RS21984 | crs_RS21984_0 | This is examination of principal federal criminal laws implicated by Internet gambling and of a few of the constitutional questions associated with their application. In very general terms, it is a federal crime (1) to use wire communications to place or receive bets or to transmit gambling information relating to sporting contests or events; (2) to conduct a gambling business in violation of state law; (3) to travel interstate or overseas, or to use any other facility of interstate or foreign commerce, to facilitate the operation of an illegal gambling business; (4) to conduct a gambling business and accept payment for illegal Internet gambling participation; (5) to systematically commit these crimes in order to acquire or operate a commercial enterprise; (6) to launder the proceeds of an illegal gambling business or to plow them back into the business; (7) to spend or deposit more than $10,000 of the proceeds of illegal gambling in any manner; or (8) to conspire with others, or to aid and abet them, in their violation of any of these federal laws. Offenders are subject to imprisonment for not more than two years and/or a fine of the greater of not more than twice the gain or loss associated with the offense or $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations).They may also have their telephone service canceled at law enforcement request, and conduct that violates the Wire Act may help provide the basis for a prosecution under the money laundering statutes, the Travel Act, the Illegal Gambling Business Act, RICO, or the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act. Illegal Gambling Business Act
Section 1955, which outlaws conducting an illegal gambling business, appears on its face to reach any illegal gambling business conducted using the Internet. Commentators seem to concur. And they have noted that "numerous cases have recognized that 18 U.S.C. Illegal gambling is at the threshold of any prosecution under the section, and cannot to be pursued if the underlying state law is unenforceable under either the United States Constitution, or the operative state constitution. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA)
The Wire Act, the Illegal Gambling Business Act, and the Travel Act implicitly outlaw Internet gambling and related activity. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) does so explicitly. Compliance with the various federal gambling laws remains a condition, 31 U.S.C. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
Illegal Internet gambling may trigger the application of federal racketeering (RICO) provisions. 1084 (Wire Act), 18 U.S.C. 1952 (Travel Act), 18 U.S.C. Any property involved in a violation of either section is subject to the civil and criminal forfeiture provisions of 18 U.S.C. | This is a summary of the federal criminal statutes implicated by conducting illegal gambling using the Internet. Gambling is primarily a matter of state law, reinforced by federal law in instances where the presence of an interstate or foreign element might otherwise frustrate the enforcement policies of state law. State officials and others have expressed concern that the Internet may be used to bring illegal gambling into their jurisdictions.
Illicit Internet gambling implicates at least seven federal criminal statutes. It is a federal crime (1) to conduct an illegal gambling business under the Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18 U.S.C. 1955; (2) to use the telephone or telecommunications to conduct an illegal gambling business involving sporting events or contests under the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. 1084; (3) to use the facilities of interstate commerce to conduct an illegal gambling business under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952; (4) to conduct the activities of an illegal gambling business involving either the collection of an unlawful debt or a pattern of gambling offenses, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provisions, 18 U.S.C. 1962; (5) to launder the proceeds from an illegal gambling business or to plow them back into such a business under money laundering provisions of 18 U.S.C. 1956; (6) to spend more than $10,000 of the proceeds from an illegal gambling operation at any one time and place under the money laundering provisions, 18 U.S.C. 1957; or (7) for a gambling business to accept payment for illegal Internet gambling under the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA), 31 U.S.C. 5361-5367.
Enforcement of these provisions has been challenged on constitutional grounds. Attacks based on the Commerce Clause, the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech, and the Due Process Clause have enjoyed little success. The commercial nature of a gambling business seems to satisfy doubts under the Commerce Clause. The limited First Amendment protection afforded crime facilitating speech encumbers free speech objections. The due process arguments raised in contemplation of federal prosecution of offshore Internet gambling operations suffer when financial transactions with individuals in the United States are involved.
This report is an abridged form, without footnotes, full citations, or supplementary material, of CRS Report 97-619, Internet Gambling: Overview of Federal Criminal Law. Related CRS reports include CRS Report RS22749, Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) and Its Implementing Regulations, and CRS Report R41614, Remote Gaming and the Gambling Industry. |
crs_R44387 | crs_R44387_0 | 111-5 , enacted February 17, 2009) provided $3.4 billion for carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) projects and activities at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Authority to spend Recovery Act funds expired on September 30, 2015. Of the $3.4 billion allocated for CCS activities, approximately $1.4 billion went unspent as of the 2015 spending deadline. The largest portion of the unspent funds, $795 million, was intended for DOE's flagship CCS project, FutureGen, which DOE suspended in February 2015. However, several other large CCS demonstration projects were canceled, suspended, or failed to spend all of their Recovery Act funding before the deadline. Congress has long been interested in the future of CCS as a mitigation strategy for lowering global emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). Since FY2008, it has appropriated more than $7 billion for CCS activities at DOE. Several bills introduced in the 114 th Congress address CCS directly or indirectly (e.g., S. 601 , S. 1283 , H.R. 3392 , and others). The Obama Administration has promulgated rules on CO 2 emissions from current and future fossil fuel-burning power plants and entered into a global agreement to limit CO 2 emissions. Congress remains divided over those executive branch decisions. DOE, however, has continued to embrace CCS as part of the Administration's strategy to reduce CO 2 emissions from power plants:
Roughly one-third of U.S. carbon emissions come from power plants and other large point sources. CCS and the Clean Power Plan
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) final rule for reducing CO 2 emissions from new fossil fuel power plants, part of the Administration's Clean Power Plan (CPP), found newly constructed power plants incorporating partial CCS to be the Best System of Emission Reduction (BSER). Technical feasibility is just one factor of many that determine whether a CCS demonstration project successfully reaches its goal of producing electricity and capturing CO 2 at commercial scale. In its final rule, EPA states that implementing partial CCS as the BSER is likely to boost future research and development in CCS technologies. Further, the boost would make CCS implementation even more efficacious and cost-effective. These issues, as well as the outcomes from promulgation of EPA's final rule, will likely continue to shape the outlook for CCS commercialization and deployment. Under the 2010 DOE CCS Roadmap , and with the large infusion of funding from the Recovery Act, DOE's goal has been to develop the technologies that will allow for commercial-scale demonstration in both new and retrofitted power plants and industrial facilities by 2020. Recovery Act-Funded Projects
Nine individual projects garnered approximately $2.65 billion of the $3.4 billion—about 78%—made available under the Recovery Act for CCS projects and activities. The projects in each category were awarded more than $100 million. They are listed to illustrate that DOE prioritized large-scale demonstration projects with Recovery Act funding. Some stakeholders argue that DOE CCS programs have been inadequately funded, and that the DOE incentive programs for deploying CCS are not as effective as they should be. One study concluded that even the financial boost from the Recovery Act was insufficient support for development and commercialization of CCS technology:
While the $3.4 billion allocated for CCS in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 was a good start in providing the kind of federal funding assistance needed for CCS technology development, much of those funds were returned to Treasury due to canceled projects. Large-scale CCS projects are complex endeavors, requiring large capital investment and multiyear planning and construction schedules. FutureGen, in particular, faced various impediments that led to its cancellation despite receiving nearly $1 billion of Recovery Act funds. As briefly discussed above (see " Challenges and Delays "), these impediments included delays in receiving the required injection-well permits from the Environmental Protection Agency, court challenges to its plan to sell electricity, and a lawsuit from an environmental advocacy group. DOE acknowledges that many of the Recovery Act-funded projects were technologically difficult and challenging, but it does not consider the relinquishment of unspent funds to signify project failure; rather, DOE takes the relinquishment of funds to mean that the projects simply did not meet the requirement to spend the funds by the deadline. DOE notes that due to its spending on CCS and its partnerships with industry, the costs of capturing CO 2 have dropped significantly and its projects have stored more than 10 million metric tons of CO 2 . | Federal policymakers have long been interested in the potential of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) as a mitigation strategy for lowering global emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). Congress has appropriated more than $7 billion since FY2008 to CCS activities at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The Obama Administration has promulgated rules on CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-burning power plants and entered into a global agreement to limit CO2 emissions. Congress remains divided over those executive branch decisions. DOE, however, has continued to embrace CCS as part of the Administration's strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from power plants. Several bills introduced in the 114th Congress address CCS directly or indirectly (e.g., S. 601, S. 1283, H.R. 3392, and others).
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act; P.L. 111-5) provided $3.4 billion for CCS projects and activities at DOE. The large infusion of funding was intended to help develop technologies that would allow for commercial-scale demonstration of CCS in both new and retrofitted power plants and industrial facilities by 2020. Nine individual projects garnered approximately $2.65 billion of the $3.4 billion—about 78%. Each of the nine projects was awarded more than $100 million, and these projects illustrate that DOE prioritized large-scale demonstration projects with Recovery Act funding. The lion's share of funding went to DOE's flagship CCS project FutureGen, which was awarded nearly $1 billion from the Recovery Act.
Authority to spend Recovery Act funds expired on September 30, 2015. Of $3.4 billion allocated for CCS activities, approximately $1.4 billion went unspent as of the spending deadline. The largest portion of the unspent funds, $795 million, was intended for FutureGen, which DOE suspended in February 2015. FutureGen faced various impediments that led to its cancellation, including delays in receiving required injection well permits from the Environmental Protection Agency, court challenges to its plan to sell electricity, and a lawsuit from an environmental advocacy group. Several other large CCS demonstration projects also were canceled, suspended, or failed to spend all of their Recovery Act funding before the 2015 deadline.
Some stakeholders argue that DOE's CCS programs have been inadequately funded, providing less incentive than they should for deploying CCS. One study concluded that even the financial boost from the Recovery Act was insufficient. To be sure, large-scale CCS projects are complex endeavors, requiring substantial capital investment and multiyear planning and construction schedules. However, the conclusion that more federal funding by itself would be sufficient to support development and commercialization of CCS technology may be overly simplistic. DOE acknowledges that many of the Recovery Act-funded projects were technologically difficult and challenging, but it does not consider the relinquishment of unspent funds to signify project failure. DOE notes that due to its spending on CCS and its partnerships with industry, the costs of capturing CO2 have dropped significantly and its projects have stored more than 10 million metric tons of CO2.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) final rule for reducing CO2 emissions from new fossil fuel power plants, part of the Administration's Clean Power Plan, found plants incorporating partial CCS to be the Best System of Emission Reduction (BSER). EPA asserts that CCS is technically feasible. Technical feasibility, however, is just one factor of many that determine whether a project successfully reaches its goal of producing electricity and capturing CO2 at commercial scale. EPA states that implementing partial CCS in the rule is likely to boost future research and development in CCS technologies and to make CCS implementation more efficacious and cost-effective. That may be the case; however, other issues also affect CCS implementation. These issues, as well as the outcomes from promulgation of EPA's final rule, will likely continue to shape the outlook for CCS commercialization and deployment. |
crs_R43228 | crs_R43228_0 | In the aftermath of the deep 2007-2009 recession, involving a huge loss of net worth and a large increase in the burden of debt, households' actions to repair their balance sheets is thought by many economists to be a key factor dissipating the strength of consumer spending and, in turn, slowing economy-wide recovery and job creation. Where households currently stand in repairing their balance sheets is likely to have a strong effect on the strength of consumer spending. If substantially complete, it would point to the prospect of stronger consumer spending and increased momentum of the economic recovery; but if substantial wealth building is still needed, it would diminish that prospect. The pace of economic recovery from the recession has been lackluster. Over four years of recovery, the annual rate of growth of real GDP has averaged 2%, well below the 3% to 5% typical of other post-WWII recoveries. As a result, the output gap—the difference between what the economy could produce and what it actually produced—has only declined from a high of 8.1% in mid-2009 to a still large 5.8% in mid- 2013 (see Figure 1 ). Albeit slower than hoped, the recovery has persisted. In part, steady growth was the result of support given to aggregate spending by policies of fiscal and monetary stimulus. However, fiscal stimulus has steadily dissipated since 2010 and in 2013 it has turned contractionary. And while monetary policy is expected to remain stimulative through 2013, it is unlikely to add to that stimulus to counteract increasing fiscal drag. Therefore, sustaining the recovery's momentum in the remainder of 2013 and into 2014 may require a greater push from private spending, particularly household consumption spending. Despite clear progress, more repair of the severely damaged household balance sheet may be needed before households begin to spend at a faster pace. The typical household has likely only seen modest improvement in its net worth (in large measure) because the value of real estate assets has only recently been rising. The rebound of the housing market portends well for the typical household rebuilding its wealth, but it is unlikely that this process will be completed in 2013, making it also likely that tepid spending by consumers will continue. A number of indicators paint a mixed picture of the prospect for stronger consumer spending. Policy Implications
If household net worth is judged not to have fully recovered from the damage incurred in 2008-2009, particularly for the typical household, then this would suggest to some a continuing need for macroeconomic policy to provide stimulus to maintain the recovery's upward momentum. The current state of household net worth, particularly the still large number of households with negative equity in their homes, could also have implications for the continuing need for federal policies such as the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) that are aimed at providing direct help in removing the burden of household debt through policies that restructure mortgage debt. | The pace of economic recovery from the 2007-2009 recession has been historically slow. Over four years of recovery, the annual rate of growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) has averaged 2%, well below the 3% to 5% typical of other post-WWII recoveries. As a result, the output gap—the difference between what the economy could produce and what it actually produced—has only declined from a high of 8.1% in mid-2009 to a still large 5.8% in mid- 2013. Slow growth of output has translated into a slow reduction of unemployment.
The recovery has persisted, in part, due to support to aggregate spending by policies of fiscal and monetary stimulus. However, fiscal stimulus has steadily dissipated since 2010 and in 2013 the federal budget has turned contractionary. While monetary policy is expected to remain stimulative through 2013, it is unlikely to add to that stimulus to counteract the increasing drag of falling federal budget deficits on economic activity. Therefore, sustaining the recovery's momentum in the remainder of 2013 and into 2014 may require a greater push from private spending, particularly household consumption spending.
In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 recession, which involved a substantial loss of net worth and increase in the burden of debt, households' actions to repair their severely damaged balance sheets by reducing debt and building wealth is thought by many economists to be a key factor dissipating the strength of consumer spending. Although this repair is necessary for building a stronger economy in the long run, it has slowed the economy-wide recovery and job creation in the short run.
Where households currently stand in repairing their balance sheets is likely to influence the strength of consumer spending going forward. If substantially complete, it would point to the prospect of stronger consumer spending and increased momentum of the economic recovery; but if substantial wealth building is still needed, it would diminish that prospect.
A number of indicators paint a mixed picture of the prospect for stronger consumer spending. Despite clear progress, more repair of the severely damaged household balance sheet may be needed before households begin to spend at a faster pace. The typical household has likely only seen modest improvement in its net worth in large measure because the value of real estate, most often the largest asset it holds, has only recently been increasing. The rebound of the housing market portends progress for the typical household rebuilding its wealth, but it is unlikely that this process will be completed in 2013, making it also likely that tepid spending by consumers will continue.
Determining the state of household net worth has implications for the optimal policy response going forward. If household net worth is judged to have not fully recovered from the damage incurred in 2007-2009, particularly for the typical household, some may regard this as an indicator of a continuing need for macroeconomic policy to provide stimulus to maintain the recovery's upward momentum. It could also have implications for federal policy measures that are aimed at providing direct help in removing the burden of household debt through programs that restructure mortgage debt. |
crs_R45396 | crs_R45396_0 | Overview
Through a series of statements and reports, the Trump Administration has outlined a goal to promote a "free and open Indo-Pacific" region (FOIP) which also seeks to integrate U.S. strategy toward East Asia and South Asia, two regions that have often been addressed in relative isolation. It is unclear how the FOIP concept relates to these initiatives. Secondly, it is in our interest, the U.S. interest, as well as the interests of the region, that India play an increasingly weighty role in the region. It is a democracy. Strategic Context
Strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region are undergoing significant change. Among the challenges the Administration may be responding to in developing the FOIP are:
the growth of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), under which Beijing pledges to finance infrastructure development across the region, and which many analysts argue would strengthen China both geopolitically and economically, at the expense of the United States, and give China leverage with investment recipients;
China's continued military modernization, and its militarization of the artificial islands it has built in the South China Sea, which many analysts argue has altered the strategic landscape of East Asia;
the expansion of China's naval activities in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and strategic mistrust between China and India;
China's continued growth as a trade, lending, and investment partner for many in the region, which some analysts fear will give Beijing greater leverage over neighbors in both East Asia and South Asia;
concerns across the Indo-Pacific about the sustainability of U.S. commitment to the region, given U.S. strategic commitments in other regions and budgetary constraints facing both military spending and overall foreign assistance;
the Trump Administration's decision to withdraw the United States from the proposed 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement (TPP) in January 2017, which has contributed to regional perceptions that the United States may lack an overall economic strategy toward the region; and
the prospect that China is challenging Western liberal democratic values and the United States' network of alliances and strategic relationships in the Indo-Pacific. Beyond the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS), Trump Administration officials have sought to articulate the Indo-Pacific strategy in numerous statements including Secretary of State Pompeo's economic and security cooperation initiatives announced in July and August 2018. Critiques of the FOIP Strategy
While the Trump Administration's Free and Open Indo-Pacific initiative has been viewed by some observers as seeking to reshape America's strategic approach to the region and manage China's rise, one source takes the view that "allies and adversaries alike are left wondering if the United States really has the will and resources to make it happen" adding that:
While the region welcomes the aspirations of the Indo-Pacific strategy as a sign of broader strategy and regional engagement, the challenge right now is that it's just aspirational—a set of goals with no real strategy, policy enumeration or implantation plan, let alone resourcing and budget. Others argue that the initial set of FOIP related initiatives are relatively small in scope. Others point to problems in messaging related to the FOIP concept. Some analysts argue that regional states tend to underestimate the value and importance of U.S. economic engagement with the region when it is compared with Belt and Road Initiatives by China because U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) is largely not state-led. The FOIP concept's emphasis on India, Japan, and Australia has led some to question where this leaves the concept of ASEAN centrality in America's strategy towards the region. Does it have such a strategy for implementing the Quad concept? To what extent does the FOIP initiative subsume other Administration initiatives? State Department staffing. Economic elements of the initiative . U.S. arms sales. U.S. foreign assistance. What implications does the Indo-Pacific strategy have for the scale or allocation of U.S. foreign assistance funding to the region? Appendix A. | The Trump Administration has outlined a goal of promoting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), seeking to articulate U.S. strategy towards an expanded Indo-Asia-Pacific region at a time when China's presence across the region is growing. The FOIP initiative is identified through a number of statements by the President and senior Administration officials. Insight into the initiative's context and perspective is also offered by the Administration's National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. The FOIP concept represents a significant change in U.S. strategic thinking towards the region because of its explicit linkage of South Asia and the Indian Ocean region with the Asia-Pacific region. The FOIP also emphasizes maritime issues. While recent statements by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have provided a more detailed understanding of the strategy, uncertainty remains over the specifics of the initiative.
Some critics of the initiative wonder if the United States has the vision, political will, or economic resources necessary to implement a FOIP strategy effectively. Some observers have pointed to inconsistencies with other Trump Administration initiatives toward the region, and to the lack of detail necessary to operationalize the concept. Some also argue that the economic aspects of the initiative are relatively small when compared to either China's lending, including under its Belt and Road Initiative, or the region's infrastructure investment needs. Another often-expressed concern is that the FOIP's initial emphasis on the "Quad" with Australia, India, and Japan raises concerns that it risks eroding U.S. influence in Southeast Asia by not sufficiently incorporating that sub-region's leading international body, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, into U.S. strategy toward the region.
Regional perceptions of the United States' commitment to the region were shaken by the Trump Administration's decision to withdraw from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement in 2017. This decision also led to perceptions that the United States lacked an integrated regional strategy despite the region's economic importance to the United States. According to the State Department, two-way trade between the United States and the Indo-Pacific is $1.4 trillion and U.S foreign direct investment in the region is $860 billion a year.
The FOIP initiative may raise questions for Congress related to its oversight and appropriations roles:
Does the initiative fully account for the strategic and economic environment in the Indo-Pacific, including implications related to but going beyond the rise of China and its Belt and Road Initiative? Does the initiative correctly identify and adequately secure U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region? Does it place proper emphasis on developing diplomatic approaches and economic institutions as well as military responses when crafting a strategic vision for the region? Are U.S. Indo-Pacific military forces properly deployed to secure U.S. interests? Is future defense procurement adequately funded to secure U.S. interests? Is the value to the United States of working with friends and allies in the region properly understood and are these alliance and defense relationships being properly managed in order to leverage U.S. strategic posture in the region? Are American values properly taken into account in developing a FOIP strategy? |
crs_RL30631 | crs_RL30631_0 | Background on Congressional Pensions
The Civil Service Retirement Act of 1920 (P.L. These amendments also required all Members of Congress to participate in Social Security as of January 1, 1984, regardless of when they first entered Congress. After mandating Social Security coverage of new federal employees beginning in 1984, Congress directed the development of a new retirement plan for federal workers with Social Security coverage as its foundation. The result of this effort was the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-335 ). The options for Members of Congress differed from those available to other federal employees because the 1983 amendments required all Members of Congress to participate in Social Security. There were 611 retired Members of Congress receiving federal pensions based fully or in part on their congressional service as of October 1, 2016. Of this number, 335 had retired under CSRS and 276 had retired under FERS. Their average retirement annuity in 2016 (not including Social Security) was $41,076. This is coverage by CSRS and Social Security, but with CSRS contributions and benefits reduced ("offset") by the amount of Social Security contributions and benefits. Members First Elected Since 1984
Members of Congress who were first elected in 1984 or later are covered automatically by the Federal Employees' Retirement System. 108-83 , however, Representatives entering office on or after September 30, 2003, may not elect to be excluded from such coverage. All Senators, regardless of date, and those Representatives serving as Members prior to September 30, 2003, continue to be able to decline this coverage. CSRS Offset
Members of Congress covered by the CSRS Offset Plan contribute 1.8% of pay up to the Social Security taxable wage base ($128,400 in 2018), and 8.0% of pay above this amount, to the Civil Service Retirement System. Members of Congress first covered by FERS after 2013 and congressional employees first hired after 2013 also contribute 4.4% of pay. FERS
Members first covered by FERS before 2013 pay 1.3% to FERS on total salary and 6.2% to Social Security on the Social Security taxable wage base (first $128,400 of salary in 2018). Assuming that a Member retired at the end of 2016 with 20 years of congressional service under FERS, and a high-3 average salary of $174,000, the resulting annual FERS pension would be
[$174,000 × .017 × 20] = $59,160
For Members of Congress covered by FERS after December 31, 2012, the accrual rate for congressional service covered by FERS is 1.0% per year of service, or, if the Member has at least 20 years of service and serves until at least the age of 62, the benefit accrual rate is 1.1% per year of service. For example, the pension for a Representative or Senator who retired in December 2014 at the end of the 113 th Congress with a total of 32 years of service (5 years covered under CSRS and 27 years covered under FERS) and a high-3 salary of $174,000 would be:
Retirement Benefits Under the CSRS Offset Plan
Members who were participating in CSRS before January 1, 1984, and who chose not to switch to FERS could elect either to have full coverage under both CSRS and Social Security or to stay in CSRS and have their CSRS contributions and benefits reduced ("offset") by the amount of Social Security taxes paid and Social Security benefits received. Initial CSRS annuities may not exceed 80% of a Member's final pay. | Prior to 1984, neither federal civil service employees nor Members of Congress paid Social Security taxes, nor were they eligible for Social Security benefits. Members of Congress and other federal employees were instead covered by a separate pension plan called the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). The 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act (P.L. 98-21) required federal employees first hired after 1983 to participate in Social Security. These amendments also required all Members of Congress to participate in Social Security as of January 1, 1984, regardless of when they first entered Congress. Because CSRS was not designed to coordinate with Social Security, Congress directed the development of a new retirement plan for federal workers. The result was the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-335).
Members of Congress first elected in 1984 or later are covered automatically under the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS). All Senators and those Representatives serving as Members prior to September 30, 2003, may decline this coverage. Representatives entering office on or after September 30, 2003, cannot elect to be excluded from such coverage. Members who were already in Congress when Social Security coverage went into effect could either remain in CSRS or change their coverage to FERS. Members are now covered under one of four different retirement arrangements:
CSRS and Social Security; The "CSRS Offset" plan, which includes both CSRS and Social Security, but with CSRS contributions and benefits reduced by Social Security contributions and benefits; FERS; or Social Security alone.
Congressional pensions, like those of other federal employees, are financed through a combination of employee and employer contributions. All Members pay Social Security payroll taxes equal to 6.2% of the Social Security taxable wage base ($128,400 in 2018). Members first covered by FERS prior to 2013 also pay 1.3% of full salary to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF). Members of Congress first covered by FERS in 2013 contribute 3.1% of pay to the CSRDF. Members of Congress first covered by FERS after 2013 contribute 4.4% of pay to the CSRDF. Members covered by CSRS Offset pay 1.8% of the first $128,400 of salary in 2018, and 8.0% of salary above this amount, into the CSRDF.
Under both CSRS and FERS, Members of Congress are eligible for a pension at the age of 62 if they have completed at least five years of service. Members are eligible for a pension at age 50 if they have completed 20 years of service, or at any age after completing 25 years of service. The amount of the pension depends on years of service and the average of the highest three years of salary. By law, the starting amount of a Member's retirement annuity may not exceed 80% of his or her final salary.
There were 611 retired Members of Congress receiving federal pensions based fully or in part on their congressional service as of October 1, 2016. Of this number, 335 had retired under CSRS and were receiving an average annual pension of $74,028. A total of 276 Members had retired with service under FERS and were receiving an average annual pension of $41,076 in 2016. |
crs_R45265 | crs_R45265_0 | Introduction
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), an agency within the Department of the Interior (DOI), is the principal federal agency tasked with the conservation, protection, and restoration of fish and wildlife resources across the United States and insular areas. FWS functions include administering the National Wildlife Refuge System, managing migratory bird species, protecting endangered and threatened species, and restoring fish species and aquatic habitats, as well as enforcing fish, wildlife, and conservation laws and conducting international conservation efforts. FWS also is responsible for the disbursement of fish and wildlife conservation and restoration funds to states, territories, and tribal governments. This report summarizes the history, organizational structure, and selected functions of FWS and provides an overview of the agency's appropriations structure. The report describes the actions Congress has taken to shape the structure and functions of FWS over time and notes selected issues of interest to Congress. In 1871, the first of FWS's predecessor agencies, the Office of the Commission of Fish and Fisheries (an independent agency), was established. The Bureau of Biological Survey remained within USDA through June 1939. In his attached message, President Roosevelt explained the further consolidation:
Reorganization Plan II transferred the Bureau of Fisheries of the Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Biological Survey of the Department of Agriculture to the Department of the Interior and thus concentrated in one department the two bureaus responsible for the conservation and utilization of the wildlife resources of the Nation. The service returned to Washington, DC, in 1947. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
The U.S. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Organizational Structure
FWS is composed of a three-tier structure, including national, regional, and field offices spread across the United States and insular areas. U.S. U.S. These activities include but are not limited to the following:
operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System; restoration of fisheries and fish habitats; protection of threatened and endangered species; management of migratory birds; assistance in international conservation efforts; enforcement of federal wildlife laws; and disbursement of funds to states and territories for wildlife and sport fish restoration and for hunting and fishing safety and education. FWS is responsible for administering, either through primary or secondary jurisdiction, more than 836 million acres as part of the NWRS; of this total, national wildlife refuges make up 146 million acres. NWRSAA has been amended several times, including through the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997. The Fish and Aquatic Conservation Program includes the National Fish Hatchery System, which is composed of 70 national fish hatcheries as well as fish health centers, fish technology centers, and the Aquatic Animal Drug Approval Partnership Program. Other fish hatcheries have been established through appropriations acts. The International Affairs program derives its authorities through multiple statutes and international agreements. Authority for several FWS-administered grant programs is provided in two statutes, the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937 (commonly known as the Pittman-Robertson Act) and the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act of 1950 (commonly known as the Dingell-Johnson Act). Pittman-Robertson and Dingell-Johnson are supported through revenues generated by excise taxes on hunting- and fishing-associated equipment, respectively. From FY2014 through FY2018, these programs were provided a combined total of more than $1 billion annually, on average, for wildlife and sport fish restoration and hunter education. U.S. Discretionary funding is used to support many of the agency's essential functions, and mandatory funding supports selected activities specified in previously enacted statutes, including a significant portion of FWS's financial assistance activities. From FY2009 through FY2018, FWS discretionary appropriations totaled $1.5 billion annually, on average; over the same period, mandatory appropriations amounted to $1.2 billion annually, on average. Congress also routinely considers FWS policy issues, such as those discussed in the " U.S. From FY2009 through FY2018, FWS discretionary funding has averaged $1.5 billion, allocated across nine appropriations accounts ( Figure 7 ). These programs support grant, financial, and technical assistance programs to states, international partners, tribes, and other stakeholders. FWS mandatory appropriations fund land acquisition for migratory bird habitat conservation, financial assistance to the states and territories for fish and wildlife conservation and related activities, and other purposes. | The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), an agency within the Department of the Interior (DOI), is the principal federal agency tasked with the conservation, protection, and restoration of fish and wildlife resources across the United States and insular areas. This report summarizes the history, organizational structure, and selected functions of FWS and provides an overview of the agency's appropriations structure. The report describes the actions Congress has taken to shape FWS's structure and functions over time and notes selected issues of interest to Congress.
The current structure of FWS is the result of more than 150 years of agency and departmental reorganizations. FWS began as two agencies: the Office of the Commission of Fish and Fisheries (established as an independent agency in 1871) and the Bureau of the Biological Survey (established in 1885 as an outgrowth of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's [USDA's] Division of Entomology). These two entities evolved into the Bureau of Fisheries (in the Department of Commerce) and the Bureau of Biological Survey in USDA. They were consolidated and established within DOI as the Fish and Wildlife Service in 1939. After that time, the service was further restructured on several occasions through both presidential reorganizations and congressional statutes. The most recent major reorganization took place in 1970, although FWS has continued to evolve pursuant to the passage of additional laws and the addition of new responsibilities. In its current form, FWS contains national, regional, and field offices spread across the United States, including its headquarters in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area, eight regional headquarter offices, and other field and FWS-administered sites.
Pursuant to authorizing statutes, FWS is responsible for a multitude of fish- and wildlife-related activities. These activities include administering the National Wildlife Refuge System; managing migratory bird species; protecting endangered and threatened species; restoring fish species and aquatic habitats; enforcing fish, wildlife, and conservation laws; conducting international conservation efforts; and disbursing financial and technical assistance to states, territories, and Indian tribes for wildlife and sport fish restoration and other activities.
For example, FWS is responsible for the enforcement of several wildlife-related statutes and international agreements, such as the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.), the Lacey Act (16 U.S.C. §§3371-3378 and 18 U.S.C. §§42-43), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. §§703-712). The service administers the National Wildlife Refuge System pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act (16 U.S.C. §§668dd-668ee), as amended, which includes more than 800 million acres of lands and waters that FWS administers through either primary or secondary jurisdiction, including 566 national wildlife refuges as well as other service lands and waters. FWS also manages more than 70 national fish hatcheries, fish health centers, and fish technology centers and oversees the Aquatic Animal Drug Approval Partnership Program. In addition, FWS coordinates both domestic and international conservation activities, including administering multiple international conservation statutes. FWS also is responsible for disbursing financial assistance pursuant to the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act (known as the Pittman-Robertson Act; 16 U.S.C. §§669 et seq.) and the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act (commonly known as the Dingell-Johnson Act; 16 U.S.C. §§777 et seq.), as well as State and Tribal Wildlife grants. From FY2014 through FY2018, Pittman-Robertson and Dingell-Johnson allocations together provided more than $1 billion annually to states, territories, and DC for wildlife and sport fish restoration and hunter education.
FWS is funded through a mix of discretionary and mandatory appropriations. Discretionary appropriations, which averaged $1.5 billion annually from FY2009 through FY2018, regularly have been allocated across nine accounts and have supported many of the agency's essential functions. FWS mandatory funding, which averaged $1.2 billion annually from FY2009 through FY2018, predominately has been derived through revenues generated from excise taxes on hunting- and fishing-related equipment. Mandatory funding supports land acquisition and financial assistance activities, including a significant portion of FWS's grant-making activities to states and insular areas. |
crs_R44671 | crs_R44671_0 | Introduction
In January 2016, Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, announced plans for a tax reform that would explore corporate integration. Corporate integration involves the elimination or reduction of additional taxes on corporate equity investment that arise because corporate income is taxed twice. This system produces differential tax burdens, potentially discouraging the realization of gains on the sale of corporate stock and favoring noncorporate equity investment over corporate investment, debt finance over equity finance, and retained earnings over dividends. This report provides an overview of CRS Report R44638, Corporate Tax Integration and Tax Reform , by [author name scrubbed], which contains a detailed analysis of corporate tax integration issues, data sources, and documentation. One is the increased importance of a global economy and multinational firms with investments and activities in many countries. Currently only about a quarter of the corporate stock of U.S. firms is estimated to be owned by shareholders subject to U.S. individual tax (compared with about half in 1992). If all profits were taxed at the statutory rate, distributed as a dividend, and then taxed at ordinary rates to a shareholder in the 35% bracket, the total tax on a corporate investment would be 58% (a 35% corporate tax and an additional 35% on the remaining 65% of profit) compared with a tax rate of 35% on noncorporate investment, for a 23 percentage point difference. Those effects, however, are smaller because of favorable treatment of dividends and capital gains (the top rate is 23.8%); options to invest stock through tax-exempt accounts, such as retirement plans, that pay no shareholder-level tax; and tax preferences that lower the effective corporate tax rate more than the effective noncorporate rate. Treatment of Debt Finance
If firms borrow to finance investments, the interest is deducted. These estimated rates show a small difference in tax burden overall between equity invested in the corporate versus the noncorporate sector, but show large differences across assets and large differences between debt and equity. These approaches can be divided into three basic types: (1) full integration; (2) partial integration, which addresses only dividends; and (3) proposals that also address the treatment of interest. Full Integration
Full integration would eliminate one of the levels of taxation and apply both to dividends and retained earnings. The tax could be made refundable, so that tax-exempt investors would pay no tax, or it would be nonrefundable, so that foreigners and tax-exempt shareholders would pay the corporate level tax, and taxable individuals would pay tax at the individual rate. Taxing at the Shareholder Level: Mark to Market
Mark to Market would repeal the corporate tax for publicly traded firms, tax dividends and capital gains at ordinary rates, and mark the value of stock to market—that is, tax capital gains on the stock regardless of whether it was sold. Taxing Dividends at the Shareholder Level and Retained Earnings at the Corporate Level
The final full integration proposal would tax dividends to shareholders by allowing a corporate dividend deduction, while eliminating capital gains tax on corporate stock. As with the dividend deduction, preferences could be dealt with by allowing excluded dividends paid out of taxable income. Disallowing interest deductions could be combined with integration approaches, except for mark-to-market. Revenue impacts are an important consideration in any tax reform proposal. These estimates suggest that allowing refundable credits or mark to market do not appear feasible if revenue neutrality is an objective. Mark to market could also be feasible if taxes are imposed directly on exempt or largely exempt firms. Similarly, most proposals would not have significant effects on the international allocation of capital, repatriation, profit-shifting and inversions. | In January 2016, Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, announced plans for a tax reform that would explore corporate integration. Corporate integration involves the elimination or reduction of additional taxes on corporate equity investment that arise because corporate income is taxed twice, once at the corporate level and once at the individual level. Traditional concerns are that this system of taxation is inefficient because it (1) favors noncorporate equity investment over corporate investment, (2) favors debt finance over equity finance, (3) favors retained earnings over dividends, and (4) discourages the realization of gains on the sale of corporate stock. Increasingly, international concerns such as allocation of investment across countries, repatriation of profits earned abroad, shifting profits out of the United States and into tax havens, and inversions (U.S. firms using mergers to shift headquarters to a foreign country) have become issues in any tax reform, corporate integration included.
This report summarizes findings in CRS Report R44638, Corporate Tax Integration and Tax Reform, by [author name scrubbed]. That report examines the effects of different tax treatment of the corporate and noncorporate sectors, the effect of tax preferences, the treatment of debt finance, and the treatment of foreign source income. Estimates suggest that there is little overall difference between corporate and noncorporate investment. A larger share of corporate assets benefits from tax preferences. Only a quarter of shares in U.S. firms is held by taxable individuals; the remainder is held by tax-exempt and largely tax-exempt pension and retirement accounts, nonprofits, and foreigners. Additionally, tax rates on individual dividends and capital gains are lower than ordinary rates.
Effective tax rates across assets differ markedly, with intangible assets most favored and structures least favored. Debt is treated favorably in both the corporate and noncorporate sectors, with large differences and in many cases negative tax rates. Differences in taxes affecting dividend payout choices or realization of capital gains on stock appear to be small because of low tax rates.
The report outlines several approaches to integration. Full integration would address both dividends and retained earnings. Tax could be imposed at the shareholder level with allocation of income and withholding (a modified partnership treatment). Credits for withheld taxes would be provided to shareholders, and credits could be made nonrefundable for tax-exempt and foreign shareholders. A different full integration approach would eliminate shareholder taxes and tax only at the firm level. A third would tax at the shareholder level and not the firm by imposing ordinary rates and taxing not only dividends and realized capital gains but also unrealized gains by marking shares to market prices (i.e., mark-to-market). Partial integration focuses on dividends and could provide either a dividend deduction by the firm (with a withholding tax and credits) or a dividend exclusion to the shareholder. Disallowing interest deductions in full or in part could be combined with most proposals.
The report compares these proposals with respect to impact on revenue, administrative feasibility, and effects on both traditional and international tax choices. Shareholder allocation or dividend deductions with refundable credits produce relatively large revenue losses, as does mark-to-market. Nonrefundability and making modifications in mark-to-market can substantially reduce these revenue losses. Most proposals would have modest efficiency gains or losses. Mark-to-market would tax economic income and potentially produce a number of efficiency gains but may not be feasible on administrative grounds. Disallowing or restricting deductions for interest would lead to efficiency gains on a number of margins and provide revenue to help achieve revenue-neutral reforms. |
crs_RS20301 | crs_RS20301_0 | In 2015, 5.8% of all U.S. births were to teens, and 12.9% of all nonmarital births were to teens. Although the birth rate for U.S. teens has dropped in 22 of the last 24 years, it remains higher than the teenage birth rate of most industrialized nations. Financial and Social Costs of Teen Births
Preventing teen pregnancy is generally considered a priority among policymakers and the public because of its high economic, social, and health costs for teen parents and their families. The high volume of pregnancies and birth rates among teenagers is associated with earlier sexual activity among teen girls. In 2006 and 2007, the decline in the teen birth rate was interrupted by a small increase. 104-193 ). 1981-1996: Reducing Pregnancies and Helping Adolescent Mothers
The Adolescent Family Life (AFL) program (Title XX of the Public Health Service Act), created in 1981, was the first federal program to focus on adolescents. From 1996 through 2009, federal teen pregnancy prevention efforts relied heavily on using abstinence-only education as the primary tool. Federal Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs54
Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) Program
P.L. 111-117 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2010, provided funding for a new discretionary TPP program that provides grants and contracts, on a competitive basis, to public and private entities to fund "medically accurate and age appropriate" programs that reduce teen pregnancy and for the federal costs associated with administering and evaluating such grants and contracts. P.L. Since its inception in FY2010, TPP program funding has ranged from a high of $110 million in FY2010 to a post-sequester low of $98.4 million in FY2013. Funding for TPP program evaluation was $4.5 million in FY2010 and $4.4 million in FY2011, it was increased to $8.5 million for each of FY2012 through FY2014, and was decreased to $6.8 million in FY2015 and FY2016. (See Appendix A for a funding history of the TPP program.) Pursuant to P.L. Pursuant to P.L. 113-235 (the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015; enacted December 16, 2014), the TPP program was funded at $101 million for FY2015 (plus $6.8 million for program evaluation). 114-53 (the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016; enacted September 30, 2015) the TPP was funded for FY2016 at the FY2015 rate of $101 million (plus $6.8 million for program evaluation) minus an across-the-board rescission of 0.2108%, through December 11, 2015, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation. 114-113 (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016; enacted December 18, 2015), the TPP was funded for FY2016 at $101 million (plus $6.8 million for program evaluation). Pursuant to P.L. 114-223 (the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act; enacted September 29, 2016), the TPP is funded for FY2017 at the FY2016 rate of $101 million annually (prorated) plus $6.8 million for program evaluation, minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, through December 9, 2016, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation. Personal Responsibility Education Program
P.L. 111-148 (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, ACA) established a new state formula grant program and appropriated $375 million at $75 million per year (mandatory spending) for five years (FY2010 through FY2014) to enable states to operate a new Personal Responsibility Education Program (PREP), which is a broad approach to teen pregnancy prevention that educates adolescents on both abstinence and contraception to prevent pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. It also provides youth with information on several adulthood preparation subjects (e.g., healthy relationships, adolescent development, financial literacy, parent-child communication, educational and career success, and healthy life skills). P.L. P.L. 114-10 (the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015) extended PREP ($75 million per year) through FY2017 (i.e., September 30, 2017). The Title V Abstinence Education program is considered a mandatory program and is funded by mandatory spending. The program's funding expired on June 30, 2009, but P.L. 111-148 , the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), reauthorized the program and restored funding to the Title V Abstinence Education formula block grant to states at the previous annual level of $50 million for each of the years FY2010 through FY2014 ($250 million over five years). P.L. 113-93 (the Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014) which was enacted on April 1, 2014, extended the Title V Abstinence Education block grant ($50 million per year) through FY2015 (i.e., September 30, 2015). P.L. 114-10 , the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, increased the Title V Abstinence Education block grant to $75 million per year for FY2016 and FY2017. P.L. Similarly, the FY2011 appropriation for the AFL program ( P.L. 112-10 included funding of $12.4 million for the AFL program for FY2011. P.L. Competitive Abstinence-Only Grants
Several appropriation laws included an additional $5 million for competitive grants for abstinence-only education for each of FY2012, FY2013, FY2014, and FY2015. 113-235 / P.L. P.L. P.L. P.L. P.L. 114-113 (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016; enacted December 18, 2015) included funding of $10 million for competitive grants that exclusively implement education in sexual risk avoidance (defined as refraining from nonmarital sexual activity) for FY2016. Pursuant to P.L. 114-223 (the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act; enacted September 29, 2016), the competitive sexual risk avoidance grant program (also referred to as abstinence education) is funded for FY2017 at the FY2016 rate of $10 million (annually, prorated) minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, through December 9, 2016, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation. Teen Birth Rates for Females Ages 15 Through 19 | In 2015, U.S. teen births accounted for 5.8% of all births and 12.9% of all nonmarital births. The birth rate for U.S. teenagers (ages 15 through 19) increased in 2006 and 2007 after a steady decline since 1991. However, in each of 2008 through 2015, the teen birth rate dropped below the 2006 teen birth rate, reversing the two-year upward trend. Although the birth rate for U.S. teens has dropped in 22 of the past 24 years, it remains higher than the teen birth rate of most industrialized nations. Preventing teen pregnancy is generally considered a priority among policymakers and the public because of its high economic, social, and health costs for teen parents and their families.
The Adolescent Family Life (AFL) program, created in 1981 (Title XX of the Public Health Service Act), was the first federal program to focus on pregnancy among adolescents. It was created to support demonstration projects that provide comprehensive and innovative health, education, and social services to pregnant and parenting adolescents, their infants, male partners, and their families. From 1998 to 2009, federal teen pregnancy prevention efforts in the AFL program and in general relied heavily on using abstinence-only education as their primary tool. The appropriation for the AFL program was $16.7 million in FY2010 and $12.4 million for FY2011. The AFL program has not received any funding since FY2011.
P.L. 111-117 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010) included a new discretionary Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program, funded at $110 million for FY2010, which provides grants and contracts, on a competitive basis, to public and private entities to fund "medically accurate and age appropriate" programs that reduce teen pregnancy. Since FY2010, funding for the TPP program has fluctuated from a high of $109 million in FY2011 to a low of $98.4 million in FY2013 (post-sequester). P.L. 113-76 (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014) provided $101 million for the TPP program (and $8.5 million for program evaluation) for FY2014. P.L. 113-235 (the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015) funded the TPP program at $101 million for FY2015 (plus $6.8 million for program evaluation). Pursuant to P.L. 114-53 (the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016; enacted September 30, 2015), the TPP was funded for FY2016 at the FY2015 rate of $101 million (plus $6.8 million for program evaluation) minus an across-the-board rescission of 0.2108%, through December 11, 2015, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation. Pursuant to P.L. 114-113 (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016; enacted December 18, 2015), the TPP was funded for FY2016 at $101 million (plus $6.8 million for program evaluation). Pursuant to P.L. 114-223 (the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act; enacted September 29, 2016), the TPP is funded for FY2017 at the FY2016 rate of $101 million annually (prorated) plus $6.8 million for program evaluation, minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, through December 9, 2016, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation.
P.L. 111-148 (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act-ACA) established a new state formula grant program and appropriated $375 million, at $75 million per year for five years (FY2010-FY2014), to enable states to operate a new Personal Responsibility Education Program (PREP), which is a broad approach to teen pregnancy prevention that educates adolescents on both abstinence and contraception to prevent pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. PREP also provides youth with information on several adulthood preparation subjects (e.g., healthy relationships, adolescent development, financial literacy, parent-child communication, educational and career success, and healthy life skills). P.L. 113-93 (the Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014), which was enacted on April 1, 2014, extended PREP ($75 million per year) through FY2015 (i.e., September 30, 2015). P.L. 114-10 (the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015) extended PREP ($75 million per year) through FY2017 (i.e., September 30, 2017).
The Title V Abstinence Education Block Grant to states was authorized under P.L. 104-193 (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996). The Title V Abstinence Education program is a formula grant program, specifically for abstinence-only education, funded by mandatory spending. The program's funding expired on June 30, 2009, but P.L. 111-148 reauthorized the program and restored funding at the previous annual level of $50 million for each of FY2010-FY2014. P.L. 113-93 extended the Title V Abstinence Education block grant ($50 million per year) through FY2015. P.L. 114-10 increased the Title V Abstinence Education block grant to $75 million per year for FY2016 and FY2017.
Several appropriation laws included an additional $5 million for competitive grants for abstinence-only education for each of FY2012, FY2013, FY2014, and FY2015 (P.L. 112-74, P.L. 113-6, P.L. 113-76, and P.L. 113-164/P.L. 113-235). P.L. 114-113 (the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016; enacted December 18, 2015) included funding of $10 million for competitive grants which exclusively implement education in sexual risk avoidance (defined as refraining from nonmarital sexual activity) for FY2016. Pursuant to P.L. 114-223 (the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, and Zika Response and Preparedness Act; enacted September 29, 2016), the competitive sexual risk avoidance grant program (also referred to as abstinence education) is funded for FY2017 at the FY2016 rate of $10 million (annually, prorated) minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.496%, through December 9, 2016, or enactment of applicable appropriations legislation.
This report briefly examines some of the data collected by the National Center for Health Statistics on teenage childbearing, offers potential reasons for high teen pregnancy and birth rates, and provides basic information on federal programs whose purpose is primarily to delay sexual activity among teenagers and to reduce teen pregnancy. Appendix A provides a funding history of the teen pregnancy prevention programs discussed in this report. |
crs_RL32629 | crs_RL32629_0 | Broad Doctrines That Mitigate Against Takings
The existence of war, terrorism, or other international conflict does not suspend the TakingsClause's protection of private property. Heightened judicial deference in regulatory takings cases
International dangers have consistently prompted courts to extend extra deference to responsive government measures when dealing with regulatory takings claims. When dealing in foreign commerce, these decisions say, the possibility of changingworld circumstances and U.S. response thereto make any expectation of government noninterference unreasonable . Deference to government conduct of foreign policy and the President's role as commander in chief / Political question doctrine
Yet another recurring hurdle for the taking plaintiff is judicial deference to the President's constitutional role as representative of the federal government in the field of international relations,and his latitude as commander in chief. Governmentdeclarations and decisions involving national emergencies, war, and foreign relations are often heldto be outside the judicial reach - generally on "political question" grounds. Status of the Property Owner and Location of the Property
The protection extended by the Takings Clause depends first on the legal status of the property'sowner - whether a U.S. citizen, friendly alien, or enemy alien. Court of Federal Claims. In Turneyv. nationals against foreign sovereigns and their assets, courts have universally rejected takingsattacks, though with an occasional caution. In contrast with the freezing of assets, vesting has the United States actually takingownership of the property, so that it may be "held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwisedealt with" by the U.S. (27) The Supreme Court hascautioned that "this summary power to seize property which is believed to be enemy-owned is rescued from constitutional invalidity under theDue Process and [Takings] Clauses ... only by those provisions of the act which afford a non-enemyclaimant a later judicial hearing as to the propriety of the seizure." (31) Researchreveals no successful takings claims in this area. Several federal agencies now combating terrorism have been on the receiving end of takings claims arising out of non-terrorism-related law enforcement. Physical Takings and Appropriations, Mostly by the Military
Impressing private property into public service
The courts have long regarded physical occupations and outright expropriations as the most serious sort of government interference with property. ,341 U.S. 114 (1951), where a taking was found based on the government's seizure and operation ofcoal mines during World War II, to avert a strike. (36)
Destruction of property in connection with actual battle
Nearer the thick of battle, even the deliberate destruction of private property by the military is usually noncompensable. A well-settled rule is that the wartime destruction of private property bythe United States to prevent its capture by an advancing enemy is not a taking. | Among federal actions dealing with international conflict, wars, and terrorism, direct impingements on private property are common. Besides the obvious ravages of battle, there havehistorically been military occupations and requisitions of property not in the actual theater of war. And, non-military measures may be used against assets, attachments on foreign assets, causes ofaction, and so on.
Unsurprisingly, holders of affected property interests have claimed that their property was "taken" and demanded compensation, invoking the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Thisreport finds that based on case law to date, Takings Clause limits on federal response to internationalthreats are few, but most certainly do exist - mostly when private property is impressed into militaryservice not in the theater of actual war.
Successful takings claims in the international area, often involving national security, are made difficult by four principles. First, international dangers have consistently prompted courts to extendextra deference to responsive government measures when resolving regulatory takings claims. Second, courts say that when dealing in foreign commerce, the possibility of evolving worldcircumstances and U.S. response thereto make any expectation of government noninterferenceunreasonable. Third, the benefit accruing to the property owner from the government action mayoutweigh the harm. And fourth, there is deference to the President's constitutional role asrepresentative of the federal government in the field of foreign relations - often expressed as the"political question doctrine."
The protection extended by the Takings Clause also depends on the legal status of the property's owner. The property of U.S. citizens gets the most protection; enemy alien property, none; andfriendly alien property somewhere in between, depending on whether the alien has "substantialconnections" with the United States.
Takings claims against the freezing and vesting of foreign assets have universally been rejected, though with an occasional judicial caution that an overly protracted freeze might be a taking. Inother areas, government frustration of performance under international commercial contracts appearsto have yielded no successful takings claims, while law enforcement, where physical damage resultsfrom the pursuit of criminal suspects or financial damage results from the operation of frontorganizations, has prompted some judicial concerns and a minority of successful takings claims atthe state level.
In sharp contrast with the poor record of takings claims in the above areas, claimants challenging the impressing of private property into military or related government service generallyhave prevailed - wartime or not. Examples include military overflights, seizure and operation ofcoal mines during wartime, and requisitioning of private property. But military destruction ofproperty in connection with actual battle, or to thwart an advancing enemy, is not compensable. |
crs_RL30149 | crs_RL30149_0 | Over time, the individual income tax has been used as a vehicle to promote various social and economic goals. This has been accomplished by according preferential tax treatment to certain items of income and expense. The net result, however, has been an erosion of the individual income tax base. By taking advantage of the preferences and incentives in the tax code, some individuals can substantially reduce their income taxes. To make sure that everyone paid at least a minimum of taxes and still preserve the economic and social incentives in the tax code, Congress, in 1969, enacted the predecessor to the current individual alternative minimum tax (AMT). Since its inception, the value and effectiveness of the minimum tax has often been the subject of congressional debate. Recently, the combined effects of inflation and legislative reductions in the regular income tax enacted as part of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), and the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (WFTRA) and their pending expiration increased congressional concern about the alternative minimum tax. 112-240 ) permanently indexed the parameters of the AMT for inflation beginning with the 2012 tax year. The so-called "permanent patch" of the AMT was estimated to reduce federal revenue by $1.816 trillion over the 2013 to 2022 budget window. The report will be updated as legislative action warrants. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA, P.L. Calculating AMT Liability
The alternative minimum tax for individuals is calculated in the following manner. First, an individual adds back various tax preference items to his taxable income under his regular income tax. Next, the amount of the basic exemption is calculated and subtracted from the AMT tax base. A two-tiered tax rate structure of 26% and 28% is then assessed against the remaining AMT tax base to determine AMT tax liability. The taxpayer then pays whichever is greater, his regular income tax liability or his AMT tax liability. Finally, the AMT tax credit is calculated as an item to be carried forward to offset regular income tax liabilities in future years. | Over time, the individual income tax has been used as a vehicle to promote various social and economic goals. This has been accomplished by according preferential tax treatment to certain items of income and expense. The net result, however, has been that by taking advantage of the preferences and incentives in the tax code, some individuals can substantially reduce their income taxes.
Congress, in 1969, enacted the predecessor to the current individual alternative minimum tax (AMT) to make sure that everyone paid at least a minimum of taxes and still preserve the economic and social incentives in the tax code. The AMT is calculated in the following manner. First, an individual adds back various tax preference items to his taxable income under his regular income tax. This amount then becomes the AMT tax base. Next, the basic exemption is calculated and subtracted from the AMT tax base. A two-tiered tax rate structure of 26% and 28% is then assessed against the remaining AMT tax base to determine liability. The taxpayer then pays whichever is greater, the regular income tax or the AMT. Finally, the AMT tax credit is calculated as an item to be carried forward to offset regular income tax liabilities in future years.
Since its inception, the value and effectiveness of the AMT has often been the subject of congressional debate. In 2012, the combined effects of inflation and the anticipated expiration of the 2001 and 2003 regular income tax cuts increased congressional concern about the alternative minimum tax. Many policymakers endorsed plans to either permanently patch the AMT as an adjustment for inflation or to repeal the tax outright. In early 2013, however, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA, P.L. 112-240) indexed the parameters of the AMT for inflation beginning retroactively with the 2012 tax year. The so-called permanent patch of the AMT is estimated to reduce federal revenue by $1.816 trillion over the 2013 to 2022 budget window.
This report will be updated as legislative action warrants. |
crs_R41423 | crs_R41423_0 | Introduction
The power to prescribe rules as to which aliens may enter the United States and which aliens may be removed resides solely with the federal government, and primarily with Congress. Concomitant to its exclusive power to establish rules which determine which aliens may enter and which may stay in the country, the federal government also has the power to proscribe activities that subvert this system and establish penalties for those who undertake prohibited activities. The INA establishes a comprehensive set of requirements for legal immigration, naturalization, and the removal of aliens, as well as rules governing aliens' continued presence in the United States. Moreover, alien removal (deportation) and associated administrative processes are civil in nature. Congressional authority to prescribe rules on immigration does not necessarily imply exclusive authority to enforce those rules. Congress may expressly authorize states and localities to assist in enforcing federal law. Moreover, there is a notion that has been articulated in some federal courts and by the executive branch that states may possess "inherent" authority to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law, even in the absence of express authorization by federal statute. States can therefore be precluded from taking actions that are otherwise within their authority if federal law would thereby be thwarted. This report discusses the authority of state and local law enforcement to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law through the investigation and arrest of persons believed to have violated such laws. It describes current provisions in federal law that permit state and local police to enforce immigration law directly; analyzes major cases concerning the ability of states and localities to assist in immigration enforcement, including the Supreme Court's ruling in Arizona v. United States ; and briefly examines opinions on the issue by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice. This report does not discuss legal issues raised by state and local measures intended to supplement federal immigration laws through the imposition of additional criminal or civil penalties. For more discussion of the legal implications of such measures, see CRS Report R42719, Arizona v. United States: A Limited Role for States in Immigration Enforcement , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R41991, State and Local Restrictions on Employing Unauthorized Aliens , by [author name scrubbed]. Major Judicial Rulings Concerning Immigration Enforcement by State and Local Police
At least until the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States , there had been considerable debate concerning the power of state and local police to enforce federal immigration law in the absence of express authorization in federal statute. For decades, the prevailing view had been that states were not precluded from arresting persons for criminal violations of the INA, but that they were generally preempted from arresting persons for civil violations making them removable. A few states subsequently passed measures that authorized state police to arrest certain categories of aliens who committed immigration status violations making them removable. The Supreme Court agreed to review one such challenge, concerning a comprehensive immigration enforcement measure enacted by Arizona, and held that states are generally preempted from arresting or detaining aliens on the basis of suspected removability under federal immigration law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth Circuit") and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ("Sixth Circuit") issued opinions which recognized that state and local law enforcement agencies were generally preempted from making arrests for civil violations of the INA in the absence of clear authorization under federal law, though each either expressly or impliedly endorsed the notion that states were not barred from arresting persons for criminal violations of federal immigration law. If such enforcement activity is not directly authorized by federal statute, it must still, at minimum, be pursuant to the "request, approval, or instruction from the Federal Government." | The power to prescribe rules as to which aliens may enter the United States and which aliens may be removed resides solely with the federal government, and primarily with Congress. Concomitant to its exclusive power to determine which aliens may enter and which may stay in the country, the federal government also has the power to proscribe activities that subvert this system. Congress has defined our nation's immigration laws in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a comprehensive set of laws governing legal immigration, naturalization, work authorization, and the entry and removal of aliens. These requirements are bolstered by an enforcement regime containing both civil and criminal provisions. Deportation and associated administrative processes related to the removal of aliens are civil in nature, while certain violations of federal immigration law, such as smuggling unauthorized aliens into the country, carry criminal penalties. Congressional authority to prescribe rules on immigration does not necessarily imply exclusive authority to enforce those rules. In certain circumstances, Congress has expressly authorized states and localities to assist in enforcing federal immigration law. Moreover, there is a notion that has been articulated in some federal courts and by the executive branch that states may possess "inherent" authority to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law, even in the absence of clear authorization by federal statute. Nonetheless, states may be precluded from taking actions if federal law would thereby be thwarted.
At least until the Supreme Court's decision in the 2012 case of Arizona v. United States, there had been considerable legal debate concerning the power of state and local police to enforce federal immigration law in the absence of express authorization in federal statute. For decades, the prevailing view had been that states were not precluded from arresting persons for criminal violations of the INA, but were generally preempted from arresting persons for civil violations making them removable. More recently, however, some courts (and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in a 2002 legal opinion) took the view that state and local police were not preempted from arresting persons for any violation of federal immigration law, including immigration status violations. A few states subsequently passed measures that authorized state police to arrest certain categories of aliens who committed immigration status violations making them removable. In Arizona, however, the Supreme Court held that states are generally preempted from arresting or detaining aliens on the basis of suspected removability under federal immigration law. Such action may be taken only when there is specific federal statutory authorization, or pursuant to "request, approval, or instruction from the Federal Government."
This report discusses the authority of state and local law enforcement to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law through the investigation and arrest of persons believed to have violated such laws. It describes federal statutes that expressly permit state and local police to enforce immigration law directly, and discusses the Supreme Court's ruling in Arizona v. United States and significant, pre-Arizona lower court decisions concerning the ability of states and localities to assist in immigration enforcement. The report also briefly examines pre-Arizona opinions on the issue by the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel. This report does not directly address legal issues raised by states and localities enacting their own immigration-related sanctions, including measures intended to supplement federal law through the imposition of additional criminal or civil penalties. For further discussion of the legal implications of such measures, see CRS Report R42719, Arizona v. United States: A Limited Role for States in Immigration Enforcement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R41991, State and Local Restrictions on Employing Unauthorized Aliens, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41230 | crs_R41230_0 | T his report provides an overview of the payment and other protections for subcontractors on certain federal prime contracts under the Miller Act, the 1988 amendments to the Prompt Payment Act, and the Small Business Act. Payment and other protections for subcontractors on federal contracts are of perennial interest to Members and committees of Congress, in part, because many subcontractors are small businesses, and it is the "declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small business concerns." Absent the Miller Act, such subcontractors would generally have to rely on breach of contract actions against the prime contractor under state law to recover payments due to them because of the operation of the legal doctrines of privity of contract and sovereign immunity. Although working pursuant to a subcontract under a federal contract, subcontractors generally cannot enforce the payment or other terms of the contract or subcontract against the federal government because there is no privity of contract, or direct contractual relationship, between the subcontractor and the government. Additionally, because the government has sovereign immunity and cannot be sued without its consent, the subcontractor cannot place a mechanic's lien on the improved property, as it potentially could with a private construction project. The second is a payment bond, which would assure that certain persons who supply labor or materials used in carrying out the work provided for in the contract receive payment. Contractors that fail to obtain performance bonds as required under the Miller Act are in breach of their contract with the government and could potentially be terminated for default by the government. Without the 1988 amendments, or similar contract terms, prime contractors would generally be free to agree to whatever payment terms they wish with their subcontractors and would not necessarily pay their subcontractors as quickly. The 1988 amendments require that every construction contract awarded by a federal agency contain clauses obligating the prime contractor to (1) pay the subcontractor for "satisfactory performance" under the subcontract within seven days of receiving payment from the agency and (2) pay interest on any amounts that are not paid within the proper time frame. The federal government cannot be interpleaded as a party to any disputes between contractors and subcontractors over late payments or interest, and contractors' obligations to pay subcontractors also cannot be passed on to the federal government in any way, including by contract modifications or cost-reimbursement claims. The Small Business Act
Section 8(d) of the Small Business Act provides several different protections to subcontractors that qualify as "small businesses" pursuant to the act, by generally requiring prime contractors to (1) agree to subcontract certain percentages of the work to be performed under federal contracts to various types of small businesses; (2) make "good faith efforts" to work with the subcontractors whom they "used" in preparing their bids or proposals; and (3) notify the contracting officer of the federal agency that awarded the contract in writing if payment to a subcontractor is late or reduced. If such percentage goals were not contained in the subcontracting plan, prime contractors would generally be free to subcontract with whomever they wish, and various categories of small businesses would not necessarily have this opportunity to obtain federal contract dollars. Only the government may generally do so. In addition, the SBJA amended Section 8(d) to require that prime contractors with subcontracting plans notify the contracting officer in writing if they pay a subcontractor a reduced price, or if payment is more than 90 days past due on a contract for which the federal agency has paid the prime contractor. | Payment and other protections for subcontractors on federal contracts are of perennial interest to Members and committees of Congress, in part, because many subcontractors are small businesses, and it is the "declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small business concerns." Subcontractors on federal contracts do not have "privity of contract"—or a direct contractual relationship—with the federal government. As such, subcontractors would generally lack the payment and other protections that federal prime contractors enjoy. However, Congress has enacted several measures that give small business and other subcontractors certain protections. Key among these are the Miller Act, the 1988 amendments to the Prompt Payment Act, and Section 8(d) of the Small Business Act.
The Miller Act of 1935, as amended, authorizes subcontractors who furnished labor or materials used in carrying out federal construction projects valued in excess of $150,000 to bring a civil action against prime contractors' payment bonds to obtain payments due. Congress enacted the Miller Act to compensate for the difficulties that subcontractors would otherwise have in obtaining payment from federal construction contractors, given that they cannot place a mechanic's lien on the work because the government has sovereign immunity. The doctrine of sovereign immunity protects the government from being sued without its consent, and the Contract Disputes Act waives the government's sovereign immunity only as to suits involving contracts to which the government is a party, not subcontracts under these contracts. Relatedly, because there is no privity of contract between the government and the subcontractor, the subcontractor generally cannot sue to enforce the payment or other terms of the subcontract against the government.
The 1988 amendments to the Prompt Payment Act provide an additional form of payment protection for subcontractors on federal construction contracts by requiring federal agencies to include in their contracts a clause obligating the prime contractor to pay the subcontractor for "satisfactory" performance within seven days of receiving payment from the government. Absent such a clause in the prime contract, the prime contractor would generally be free to agree to whatever payment terms it wishes with the subcontractor and would not necessarily pay the subcontractor as quickly. However, the federal government cannot be interpleaded as a party to any disputes between contractors and subcontractors over late payments or interest, and contractors' obligations to pay subcontractors cannot be passed on to the federal government in any way, including by contract modifications or cost-reimbursement claims.
Section 8(d) of the Small Business Act provides yet another payment protection for subcontractors by requiring that prime contractors notify officials of the federal agency that awarded the contract (known as "contracting officers") in writing whenever they pay a "reduced price" to a subcontractor for completed work, or whenever payment is more than 90 days past due. Section 8(d) also generally requires that prime contractors agree to plans for subcontracting certain percentages of the work to be performed under federal contracts to various types of small businesses. In addition, under Section 8(d), prime contractors must make "good faith efforts" to work with the subcontractors whom they "used" in preparing their bids or proposals, and provide agency contracting officers with a written explanation whenever they fail to do so. Without these subcontracting plans, or similar contract terms, prime contractors would generally be free to subcontract with whomever they wish for the completion of work under the contract and would not be required to deal with various categories of small businesses. |
crs_R41813 | crs_R41813_0 | Overview
Current Status
In March 2011, AT&T, the largest telecommunications company in the United States by market capitalization, announced an agreement to acquire T-Mobile USA (T-Mobile) from Deutsche Telekom on a debt-free basis for $25 billion in cash and $14 billion in AT&T stock, subject to the approval of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Post-merger, Deutsche Telekom would own approximately 8% of AT&T's stock. AT&T is the second-largest mobile wireless service provider in the United States; T-Mobile is the fourth-largest. The combined company would be the largest mobile wireless service provider in terms of revenues and number of subscribers. Under the terms of the agreement, if the merger is not consummated AT&T would have to pay Deutsche Telekom and T-Mobile a breakup fee of $3 billion in cash plus access to roaming and spectrum valued at an additional $3 billion. On August 31, 2011, DOJ filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to permanently enjoin (block) the merger. On November 29, 2011, the FCC issued an order granting the request to withdraw the applications "without prejudice"—allowing the parties to re-file applications at a later date—and concurrently released the staff report that concluded that the merger would result in significant harm to competition and that AT&T and T-Mobile had failed to demonstrate countervailing efficiencies and benefits that would result in the merger, on net, being in the public interest. The DOJ lawsuit was scheduled to go to trial in February 2012. But on December 12, 2011, in response to a request from AT&T and Deutsche Telekom that was agreed to by DOJ, the judge overseeing the lawsuit stayed the lawsuit, thereby delaying the proceedings and giving AT&T and T-Mobile time to sort out their options. On December 19, 2011, AT&T announced that it had agreed with Deutsche Telekom to end its bid to acquire T-Mobile. In a joint submission to the FCC, AT&T and T-Mobile state that combining their spectrum holdings and networks represents the most efficient way to alleviate each company's largest strategic challenge—AT&T's "network spectrum and capacity constraints" and T-Mobile's lack of a "clear path" to deployment of 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) network technology, "the gold standard for advanced mobile broadband services"—and that this is the primary motivation for the merger. They assert that the merger would turn two companies that currently are capacity-constrained into one "efficient capacity-enhancing combination" that would have the incentive to increase output, improve quality, and lower prices. Most notably, AT&T claims the merger "will enable it to deploy LTE to more than 97% of Americans—approximately 55 million more Americans than under AT&T's current plans" to build out its LTE network to just 80% of Americans. DOJ claims the merger likely would lessen competition for consumer mobile wireless telecommunications services—from the perspective of consumers, in 97 local markets, and from the perspective of suppliers, in the national market—and also would lessen competition in the national market for enterprise and government wireless telecommunications services. It claims actual and potential competition between AT&T and T-Mobile would be eliminated; competition in general likely would be lessened; prices likely would be higher than otherwise; the quality and quantity of services likely would be lower than otherwise due to reduced incentives to invest in capacity and technology improvements; and innovation and product variation likely would be reduced. DOJ asserts that the merging parties cannot demonstrate merger-specific, cognizable efficiencies sufficient to reverse the acquisition's anticompetitive effects. | In March 2011, AT&T announced an agreement to acquire T-Mobile USA (T-Mobile) from Deutsche Telekom for $25 billion in cash and $14 billion in AT&T stock, subject to the approval of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Post-merger, Deutsche Telekom (DT) would own approximately 8% of AT&T's stock. AT&T is the second-largest mobile wireless service provider in the United States; T-Mobile is the fourth-largest. The combined company would be the largest mobile wireless service provider. Under the terms of the agreement, if the merger is not consummated AT&T would have to pay Deutsche Telekom and T-Mobile a breakup fee of $3 billion in cash plus access to roaming and spectrum valued at an additional $3 billion.
On August 31, 2011, DOJ filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to permanently enjoin (block) the merger. On November 22, 2011, the FCC chairman announced that he would seek to designate the proposed merger for an administrative hearing to determine whether it would be in the public interest. On November 23, 2011, AT&T and DT filed a letter withdrawing their applications for a transfer of licenses, and on November 29, 2011, the FCC granted the request to withdraw "without prejudice," allowing the parties to re-file applications at a later date. The FCC concurrently released a staff report that concluded that the merger would result in significant harm to competition and that AT&T and T-Mobile had failed to demonstrate countervailing efficiencies and benefits that would result in the merger, on net, being in the public interest. AT&T and Deutsche Telekom have announced that they still plan to pursue the merger, that they "vigorously contest" the DOJ complaint, and that they plan to resubmit applications for the transfer of licenses from Deutsche Telekom to AT&T at a later date, most likely when the DOJ lawsuit has been resolved. The lawsuit was scheduled to go to trial in February 2012. But on December 12, 2011, in response to a request from AT&T and DT that was agreed to by DOJ, the judge overseeing the lawsuit stayed the lawsuit, thereby delaying the proceedings and giving AT&T and T-Mobile time to sort out their options. On December 19, 2011, AT&T agreed with DT to end its bid to acquire T-Mobile.
AT&T and T-Mobile state that combining their spectrum holdings and networks represents the most efficient way to alleviate each company's largest strategic challenge—AT&T's "network spectrum and capacity constraints" and T-Mobile's lack of a "clear path" to deployment of 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE) network technology, "the gold standard for advanced mobile broadband services." They assert that the merger would turn two companies that currently are capacity-constrained into "an efficient capacity-enhancing combination" that would have the incentive to increase output, improve quality, and lower prices. AT&T claims the merger "will enable it to deploy LTE to more than 97% of Americans—approximately 55 million more Americans than under AT&T's current plans" to build out its LTE network to just 80% of Americans. DOJ claims the merger likely would lessen competition for consumer mobile wireless telecommunications services—from the perspective of consumers, in 97 local markets, and from the perspective of suppliers, in the national market—and also would lessen competition in the national market for enterprise and government wireless telecommunications services. It claims actual and potential competition between AT&T and T-Mobile would be eliminated; competition in general likely would be lessened; prices likely would be higher than otherwise; the quality and quantity of services likely would be lower than otherwise due to reduced incentives to invest in capacity and technology improvements; and innovation and product variation likely would be reduced. DOJ asserts that the merging parties cannot demonstrate merger-specific, cognizable efficiencies sufficient to reverse the acquisition's anticompetitive effects. |
crs_R42586 | crs_R42586_0 | The impact of sequestration on the appropriations accounts covered in this report, as calculated by the Office of Management and Budget, are displayed in Table B-1 . Appropriation
Annual Appropriation
On February 14, 2012, President Barack Obama submitted to Congress his request for military construction appropriations to support federal government operations during the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 2012 (FY2013). The House Committee on Appropriations introduced its Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 2013 ( H.R. 112-491 ) on May 23, 2012. The Senate Committee on Appropriations introduced its own draft of the bill ( S. 3215 , S.Rept. 112-168 ) on May 22. The resolution was received in the Senate on September 19 and was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders (Calendar No. Nevertheless, Section 102(a) of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution stated
No appropriation or funds made available or authority granted pursuant to section 101 for the Department of Defense shall be used for: (1) the new production of items not funded for production in fiscal year 2012 or prior years; (2) the increase in production rates above those sustained with fiscal year 2012 funds; or (3) the initiation, resumption, or continuation of any project, activity, operation, or organization (defined as any project, subproject, activity, budget activity, program element, and subprogram within a program element, and for any investment items defined as a P-1 line item in a budget activity within an appropriation account and an R-1 line item that includes a program element and subprogram element within an appropriation account) for which appropriations, funds, or other authority were not available during fiscal year 2012. Final Appropriation for FY2013
On March 26, 2013, the day prior to the expiration of the continuing resolution then in effect, the President enacted the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 ( H.R. 933 , P.L. 113-6 ), which funded the government through the remainder of FY2013. Division E of that act constituted the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013. Supplemental Appropriation
In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, a Category 2 storm that struck the East Coast of the United States during late October 2012, the President requested $47.4 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations, including $259.9 million in military construction and veterans affairs funding. The House Committee on Armed Services reported its amendment of the bill on May 11 ( H.Rept. 112-479 , Part 2, submitted on May 15). Among the issues cited in its statement, OMB noted
the bill's prohibition on the use of funds to propose or plan for additional rounds of BRAC; language that would effectively freeze certain Air Force command structures, capabilities, and functions as they existed in 2011; reductions in the funding authorized for construction of the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Complex in Romania and requirement for new missile defense construction on the U.S. East Coast; the absence of an authorization for two new base closure (BRAC) rounds; and the inclusion of language enabling retroactive DOD liability for environmental conditions at military installations closed outside the BRAC process after October 24, 1988. The Senate received H.R. Title I: Department of Defense
Military Construction
The military construction appropriations account includes a number of appropriations subaccounts:
Military Construction accounts provide funds for new construction, construction improvements, and facility planning and design in support of active and reserve military forces and DOD agencies. Requesting New BRAC Rounds
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced on January 26, 2012, that the President would request congressional authorization to carry out two new BRAC rounds, in 2013 and 2015. Congress subsequently passed a new bill ( H.R. Extension of Authority to Use Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Funds for Military Construction
Both of the Committees on Armed Services reported versions of the NDAA for FY2013 that include a provision (Section 2803) that extends for a year the Secretary of Defense's authority to use up to $200 million in O&M funds from the defense appropriation for the construction of facilities in the geographic areas of responsibility of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and those areas on the continent of Africa formerly under CENTCOM responsibility. The VA has three primary organizations to provide these benefits: the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), and the National Cemetery Administration (NCA). 113-6 . For a discussion of VA health care appropriations, see CRS Report R42518, Veterans' Medical Care: FY2013 Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed]. U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims was established by the Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure and Judicial Review Act of 1988 ( P.L. The appropriation for the AFRH facilities is normally all from the Armed Forces Retirement Home Trust Fund. Table 7 shows the FY2012 enacted appropriations, the Administration request, and P.L. | The Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill provides funding for the planning, design, construction, alteration, and improvement of facilities used by active and reserve military components worldwide. It capitalizes military family housing and the U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program and finances the implementation of installation closures and realignments. It underwrites veterans benefit and health care programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), provides for the creation and maintenance of U.S. cemeteries and battlefield monuments within the United States and abroad, and supports the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Armed Forces Retirement Homes, and Arlington National Cemetery. The bill also funds advance appropriations for veterans' medical services.
President Barack Obama submitted his request to Congress for FY2013 appropriations on February 13, 2012. For the appropriations accounts included in this bill, his request totaled $145.2 billion in new budget authority, divided into three major categories: Title I (military construction and family housing) at $11.2 billion; Title II (veterans affairs) at $135.6 billion; and Title III (related agencies) at $219.5 million. Of the total, $74.4 billion (49.9%) would be discretionary appropriations, with the remainder considered mandatory. On May 15, the House Committee on Appropriations reported a bill recommending appropriating $10.9 billion for Title I (less $235 million in funds rescinded from prior years), $135.4 billion for Title II, and $347 million for Title III.
Military construction funding amounts requested by the President and enacted by Congress have fallen off as the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) round has reached completion, although Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has requested statutory authority to carry out two new BRAC rounds in 2013 and 2015. Funding support for military family housing construction has also declined as the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) continue their efforts to privatize formerly government-owned accommodations.
Funding for the VA between FY2012 and FY2013 in the Administration request, H.R. 5854, and S. 3215, reflects increases for mandatory veterans' benefits and health care. The largest percentage increases between FY2012 and FY2013 are for mandatory benefits, primarily disability compensation and pension benefits.
The House Committee on Appropriations reported its FY2013 bill (H.R. 5854) on May 16, 2012 (H.Rept. 112-491), and passed the bill on May 31. The Senate received H.R. 5854 on June 5. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its bill (S. 3215) on May 22 (S.Rept. 112-168), and the bill was placed on the Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Nevertheless, an appropriation bill was not enacted before the end of FY2012, and government operations continued under a continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 117, enacted September 28) that expired on March 27, 2013. The day prior, the President enacted the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (H.R. 933, P.L. 113-6), which funded the government through the remainder of FY2013. Division E of that act constituted the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013. In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, the Senate proposed an emergency supplemental appropriation that included additional military construction and veterans funding.
Because the appropriations by P.L. 113-6 reflected amounts for various accounts in excess of those imposed by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (P.L. 112-25), the law required that the excess be reduced ("sequestered") before the end of the fiscal year on September 30, 2013. The impact of sequestration on these appropriations is reflected in Table B-1 in Appendix B of this report. All other tables display "pre-sequestration" amounts. |
crs_R41940 | crs_R41940_0 | During the recession, both of these U.S. automakers and two auto financing companies, Chrysler Financial and GMAC, received federal financial assistance from the Bush and Obama Administrations. Reasoning that Chrysler was not financially strong enough to be an independent company, the Obama Administration reached an agreement with Fiat to take over the management of New Chrysler in a bankruptcy reorganization; Fiat also received a 20% equity ownership stake in the new company. In May 2011, the loans directly owed by New Chrysler were repaid; in July 2011, Fiat purchased the U.S. government's remaining interests in the company, thereby ending direct government involvement with New Chrysler. At that time, $24.8 billion in assistance was provided to the four companies, the first of what would eventually total nearly $80 billion in assistance through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The authorities within TARP were very broad, and when Congress did not pass specific auto industry loan legislation, the Bush Administration turned to TARP for funding, arguing that to not provide any assistance to Old Chrysler (and Old GM) would make the recession much worse. After it received the federal loan guarantee, Old Chrysler revamped its operations and developed several new vehicle lines, including the minivan. In testimony in the Senate, Old Chrysler Chairman and CEO Robert Nardelli explained the reasons the company sought federal aid in December 2008:
We are here because of the financial crisis that started in 2007 and accelerated at the end of the second quarter of 2008. Chrysler's Restructuring Through Bankruptcy
When it made the initial TARP loans to Chrysler, the Bush Administration required Old Chrysler to submit a viability plan in February 2009 as a precondition for further federal assistance. During April 2009, Old Chrysler worked with its stakeholders to devise a restructuring plan that would meet the requirements of the Auto Task Force and avert bankruptcy. While the company reached tentative agreements with most stakeholders, a group of creditors would not agree to the proposal. Old Chrysler could only avoid bankruptcy if all of its creditors approved the settlement, so the disagreement prompted a filing in bankruptcy court on April 30. The largest equity owner in New Chrysler in 2009 was the United Auto Workers' health care retirement trust, known as a VEBA (Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association). The bankruptcy court decision outlined steps that Fiat could take to raise its equity stake in New Chrysler by meeting three performance benchmarks, including production at a U.S. plant of both a new fuel efficient engine and a new vehicle with fuel efficiency of at least 40 miles per gallon. Fiat took additional steps in 2011 to buy additional equity in New Chrysler. This transaction was completed on July 21, 2011. In return for this $10.9 billion, the government is received a total of approximately $9.6 billion:
$5.5 billion in loan repayments; $1.9 billion in recoupment from the bankruptcy process of Old Chrysler; $1.66 billion in interest and other fees; and $560 million paid by Fiat for the U.S. government's New Chrysler common equity and rights. This $1.3 billion figure, however, does not fully include a number of other cost factors that one might include, such as the cost to the government to borrow the funds which it then provided to Chrysler, a premium to compensate the government for the riskiness of the loans, and the cost to the government in managing the assistance given. | The recent recession and accompanying credit crisis posed severe challenges for all automakers, but especially for General Motors and Chrysler. Executives of both companies testified before congressional committees in the fall of 2008 requesting federal bridge loans. Legislation that would have provided such financial assistance passed the House of Representatives but did not pass the Senate. In lieu of that assistance, the Bush Administration turned to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a $700 billion program that was enacted in October 2008 to shore up the financial system and prevent spillover to the broader economy.
The Bush Administration used TARP to provide both automakers and two auto financing companies with nearly $25 billion in loans, and told the automakers to submit viability plans if they were to seek additional aid. Chrysler submitted such a plan in February 2009, outlining how it planned to restructure its operations, including a strategic alliance with Fiat. Some questions were raised as to whether Chrysler could survive as a free-standing company, even with government assistance, because of its relatively small size. The Obama Administration rejected Chrysler's initial viability plan as insufficient and gave the company 30 days to develop a new plan in an effort to avert bankruptcy. Working with the Administration's Auto Task Force, Chrysler developed a restructuring plan that included a revised labor agreement, cost reductions from dealers and suppliers, reductions in creditor claims, and limitations on executive compensation.
Despite agreement with most stakeholders, all creditors did not agree to the restructuring, prompting Chrysler to file for bankruptcy in April 2009. With much of the restructuring plan in place, however, the bankruptcy court was able to quickly approve the proposals, including a creditor agreement. Many of the assets of Old Chrysler were sold to a new legal entity, Chrysler Group LLC, whose largest equity owner was the United Auto Workers' retiree medical trust fund, owning 67.7%. Fiat took a management role in the new company and a 20% equity stake, which was deemed central to the survival of New Chrysler.
Under new Fiat management, New Chrysler revamped its fleet of automobiles and light trucks, and has been profitable in 2011 and 2012. Its commercial and financial success accelerated its plans for repaying federal assistance. In May 2011, New Chrysler repaid a $5.9 billion debt to the U.S. government that was not fully due until 2017. On July 21, 2011, Fiat purchased the U.S. government's common equity interests and options in New Chrysler for $560 million. In addition, the ownership of New Chrysler significantly changed as Fiat met a series of performance benchmarks that allowed it to raise its equity stake to 58.5% at the end of 2011.
Of the $10.9 billion that was loaned to Chrysler through TARP, not all of it has been, or will be, recouped by the U.S. Treasury. Following the transaction that closed on July 21, 2011, the U.S. government has no remaining financial interest in New Chrysler. While $9.6 billion of the assistance given to the company has been recouped, an approximate $1.3 billion shortfall remains. New Chrysler has no legal responsibility to make up this shortfall. |
crs_R43051 | crs_R43051_0 | In the 1970s, the number of requests for tribal recognition by the Department of the Interior (Department) increased exponentially in the wake of the decisions in United States v. Washington , which recognized tribal treaty fishing rights in the Pacific Northwest, and Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy v. Morton , which recognized a tribal land claim on the East Coast. Faced with many requests for tribal recognition, in 1978, the Department adopted a uniform process and uniform criteria for considering whether a group should be acknowledged as an Indian tribe. One scholar on tribal acknowledgment explains the significance of tribal recognition as follows:
An administrative determination that a group is a tribe (i.e., that it merits federal acknowledgment or recognition) establishes a government-to-government relationship between it and the United States. General prohibitions or limitations also apply to federally recognized tribes. The Acknowledgment Process
The process set forth in 25 C.F.R. Part 83 includes procedures that the Department must follow and establishes the burden of proof for petitioners and the criteria that Indian groups must satisfy in order to be acknowledged as Indian tribes. The acknowledgment process is available to "American Indian groups indigenous to the continental United States." Only "groups that can establish a substantially continuous tribal existence and which have functioned as autonomous entities throughout history until the present" may be acknowledged. The Office of Federal Acknowledgment (OFA) reviews the documented petition and makes recommendations to the Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs (Assistant Secretary). Section 83.7(a) requires that the group "has been identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis since 1900." Section 83.7(c) requires that "[t]he petitioner has maintained political influence or authority over its members as an autonomous entity from historical times to the present." Section 83.7(d) requires the petitioner to provide a copy of the governing document, including membership criteria. Descent from an Indian Tribe
25 C.F.R. 83.7(e) requires that the petitioner's membership consists of individuals who descend from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes that combined and operated as a single entity. Second, the petitioner needs to demonstrate only that it is presently a community. Review of the Documented Petition
Expedited Negative Determinations
After technical assistance but before active consideration of the petition, the team within OFA reviews any petitions that it believes contains little or no evidence that establishes that its members descend from a historical Indian tribe or tribes; its members are not members of a federally recognized tribe; and it has not been the subject of congressional termination. The Assistant Secretary has discretion to extend this period depending on the extent of the comments received in response to the proposed finding. The Department does not defend the final determination during the reconsideration process. Changes to the Criteria
The proposed rule would make several changes to the criteria. First, the proposed rule would change criterion (a) from identification as an Indian entity from 1900 to the present to a narrative explaining, and proof of, tribal existence at some point in 1900 or before. Criterion 83.7(f) requires that the petitioner is composed principally of persons who are not members of federally recognized tribes. Under the current practice, OFA makes recommendations to the Assistant Secretary, whom the current regulations charge with making proposed findings and final determinations. Under the proposed rule, OFA would issue proposed findings and the Assistant Secretary would make final determinations. The Assistant Secretary's decision would be final for Interior, with no consideration by the IBIA. The proposed rule would provide for consideration of the criterion in stages and provide that petitioners receiving a negative proposed finding at any stage could appeal the finding to a judge within the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA). The OHA judge could hold a hearing and would issue recommendations for the Assistant Secretary to consider in making the final determination. | In 1978, the Department of the Interior (Department) adopted a final rule setting forth the process by which a group may be recognized (also acknowledged) as an Indian tribe by the Department. Prior to that time, the Department made decisions on an ad hoc basis. However, in the wake of the treaty fishing rights case United States v. Washington and eastern land claims, more groups started seeking recognition as Indian tribes, and the Department could no longer manage the recognition requests on a case-by-case basis. The acknowledgement process, codified in 25 C.F.R. Part 83, sets forth a uniform process and uniform criteria for acknowledging that groups exist as Indian tribes.
The key to federal acknowledgment under the current regulations is continuous political existence of an Indian group from historical times to the present. The federal acknowledgment process does not create tribes, and it does not give groups sovereignty. Rather, it acknowledges a political entity that already exists. To do this, 25 C.F.R. Section 83.7 provides seven mandatory criteria that groups must satisfy in order to establish that they exist and have existed as an autonomous political entity. First, in order to be acknowledged, a group must establish that it has been identified as an Indian entity from 1900 to the present. Second, it must establish that it has existed as a community from historical times to the present. Third, it must establish that it has exercised political control over its members from historical times to the present. Fourth, the group must provide a copy of its governing document, including membership criteria. Fifth, the group must establish that its members descend from a historical Indian tribe or historical Indian tribes that combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity. Sixth, the membership must be composed principally of persons who are not members of a federally recognized tribe. Finally, the group must establish that it is not the subject of congressional legislation terminating or forbidding the federal-tribal relationship.
The current regulations assign responsibility to the Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs (Assistant Secretary) to issue initial proposed findings and then final determinations. The Office of Federal Acknowledgment (OFA) makes recommendations to the Assistant Secretary on the proposed findings and the final determinations. A final determination may be appealed on limited grounds to the Interior Board of Indian Appeals.
Acknowledgment as an Indian tribe means that the group becomes a federally recognized tribe with which the United States has a government-to-government relationship. This relationship makes the tribe and its members eligible for certain benefits, as well as subject to certain protections. It also means that the tribe may exercise jurisdiction over its territory and members generally free from state law, subject to limitations of federal law.
After years of criticism of the acknowledgment process, the Department of the Interior has proposed several changes to the acknowledgment regulations. First, the proposed rule would change some of the criteria. Second, the proposed rule would assign responsibility for the proposed findings to OFA but keep responsibility for the final determinations with the Assistant Secretary. In rendering the proposed finding, OFA would consider the criteria in stages. Petitioners could appeal a negative proposed finding at any of the stages. The appeal would be heard by a judge within the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) who would issue a recommended decision for the Assistant Secretary to consider in issuing the final determination. The Assistant Secretary's decision would be final for the Department. |
crs_RL31431 | crs_RL31431_0 | The United States TerritoriesâAmerican Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the U. S. Virgin Islandsâall receive federal funding for their roads and highways. The Territories' treatment under the Federal-Aid Highway Program (FAHP), however, differs significantly from that of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Background
Prior to 1970 most road construction and maintenance was financed and carried out by the territorial governments. Territorial Highway Program (THP)
Founding Legislation
Despite the DOT recommendation against the establishment of a federally financed highway program for the territories, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 (FAHA70)(P.L. 91-605), section 112, established the Territorial Highway Program(THP). The Act authorized DOT to assist each of the three territories (the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa) in a program for the construction and improvement of a system of arterial highways and inter-island connectors (envisioned as road links from arterial highways to airports or seaports) to be designated by each territory's Governor. DOT was also directed to provide technical assistance to each territory to assist in the creation of an appropriate agency to administer the program. First, the bill added the Northern Mariana Islands to the THP and provided the Islands with $1 million annually for the life of the authorization, FY1979-FY1982. Transportation Equity Act for the Twenty First Century (TEA-21)(P.L. Non-THP Highway Funding for the Territories
The territories may receive highway funding from sources other than the THP, including the Emergency Relief Program, the High Priority Projects Program, and certain highway safety programs. Pro
The arguments generally made in support of federal aid to the territories, including highway aid, are usually framed in terms of the transportation and development needs of the territories, the benefits the territories provide to the United States, and their limited enfranchisement. The FAHP is funded from the highway account of the HTF. TEA-21 Reauthorization Options
As the debate over the reauthorization of federal surface transportation programs continues, Congress may address a number of options concerning federal highway funding for the territories. The overall issue for the territories is the appropriate extent of their participation in the FAHP. Options range from elimination of the THP to expanding territorial participation in FAHP programs to equal that of the states. Elimination of the THP is unlikely since the federal commitments to economic development of the territories would probably be strong enough to prevent elimination of the THP. On the other hand, the fact that the territories do not pay the taxes that provide revenue to the HTF will probably preclude them from full participation in the programs that the HTF pays for. Because the definition of a "state" in Title 23 U.S.C. The Bush Administration Reauthorization Proposal: the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003 (SAFETEA) (H.R. | The United States TerritoriesâAmerican Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the U. S. Virgin Islandsâall receive federal funding for their roads and highways. The Territories' treatment under the Federal-Aid Highway Program (FAHP), however, differs significantly from that of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Prior to 1970 most of the road construction and maintenance activity was financed and carried out by the territorial governments. In 1970, Congress established the Territorial Highway Program (THP) in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-605). The Act authorized the Department of Transportation (DOT) to assist each of the three territories, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa (the Northern Mariana Islands were added to the program in 1978), in a program for the construction and improvement of a system of arterial highways to be designated by each territory's Governor. DOT was also directed to provide technical assistance to each territory to assist in the creation of an appropriate agency to administer the program.
During the more than 30 years the program has existed the THP's enacting language (23 U.S.C. 215) has basically remained the same but the level of financing varied with each reauthorization. Program funding varied from a low of $4.5 million annually, in FY1970-FY1973 to a high of $36.2 million in FY2003. Some funding from other program sources has also gone to the territories. The Emergency Relief Program, the High Priority Project Program, and certain safety programs have provided funding for territorial highways over the years.
The arguments generally made in support of federal aid to the territories, including highway aid, are usually framed in terms of the transportation and development needs of the territories and the benefits the territories provide to the United States. The arguments against expanded territorial eligibility under federal-aid highway programs are framed by the territories' exemption from the taxes that support the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund (HTF), the implications of the territories limited land area, and their non-state status.
As reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21 st Century (TEA-21) ( P.L. 105-178 ), Congress may address a number of options concerning federal highway funding for the territories. The overall issue for the territories is the appropriate extent of their participation in the FAHP. The options range from elimination of the THP to expanding territorial participation in FAHP programs to equal that of the states. Elimination of the THP appears unlikely given the federal commitments to economic development of the territories. On the other hand, the fact that the territories do not pay the taxes that provide revenue to the HTF will probably preclude them from full participation in HTF programs. The Bush Administration proposal, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA)( H.R. 2088 ), would make a number of changes in the THP and retain its authorization at the TEA21 annual level of $36.4 million. This report will be updated as warranted by events. |
crs_R45073 | crs_R45073_0 | 115-174 on May 22, 2018, and President Donald Trump signed it into law on May 24, 2018. 115-174 changes a number of financial regulations; its six titles alter certain aspects of the regulation of banks, capital markets, mortgage lending, and credit reporting agencies. Others are designed to relax mortgage lending rules and provide additional protections to consumers, including protections related to credit reporting, veterans' mortgage refinancing, and student loans. Some P.L. 115-174 provisions amend the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. Proponents of the legislation assert it provides targeted financial regulatory relief that eliminates a number of unduly burdensome regulations, fosters economic growth, and strengthens consumer protections. Opponents of the legislation argue it needlessly pares back important Dodd-Frank safeguards and protections to the benefit of large and profitable banks. 115-174 , as passed, can be grouped into one of five issue areas: (1) mortgage lending, (2) regulatory relief for "community" banks, (3) consumer protection, (4) regulatory relief for large banks, and (5) regulatory relief in securities markets. 115-174 generally provided important consumer protections. In addition, P.L. 115-174 argue that the new compliance option will expand credit availability and appropriately align the incentives of the borrower and lender, critics of the proposal counter that the incentives of holding the loan in portfolio are insufficient to protect consumers and that the protections in the rule in place prior to the enactment of P.L. Section 104—Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Adjustment
Provision
Section 104 exempts banks and credit unions from certain Home Mortgage and Disclosure Act (HMDA; P.L. 94-200 ) reporting requirements—generally new requirements implemented by the Dodd-Frank Act. It also provided additional disclosure requirements. Regulatory Relief for Community Banks
Title II of P.L. Although some provisions relax certain regulations for all banks, Title II provisions are generally aimed at providing regulatory relief to institutions under certain asset thresholds. Whether multiple risk-based capital ratios should be replaced with a single leverage ratio is subject to debate. Section 203 and 204—Changes to the Volcker Rule
Provision
Section 203 creates an exemption from prohibitions on propriety trading—owning and trading securities for the bank's own portfolio with the aim of profiting from price changes—and relationships with certain investment funds for banks with (1) less than $10 billion in assets, and (2) trading assets and trading liabilities less than 5% of total assets. Analysis
By lengthening the time fraud alerts stay on credit reports and by allowing consumers to place security freezes on their credit reports, Section 301 gives consumers the ability to make it more difficult for identity thieves to get credit using a victim's identity. To address this issue, Section 307 extends consumer protections of the ability-to-repay requirement to PACE loans. Regulatory Relief for Large Banks
Title IV is intended to provide regulatory relief to certain large banks. Specifically, under criteria set by Dodd-Frank and the Basel III accords, organizations were divided into the following three tiers that determine which enhanced regulations they are subject to
1. about 38 U.S. bank holding companies or the U.S. operations of foreign banks with more than $50 billion in assets; 2. a subset of 15 a dvanced a pproaches banks with $250 billion or more in assets or $10 billion or more in foreign exposure; and 3. a further subset of g lobally s ystemically i mportant b anks (G-SIBs), designated as such based on a bank's cross-jurisdictional activity, size, interconnectedness, substitutability, and complexity. Large banks are also subject to other Basel III regulations that are not directly affected by P.L. 115-174 automatically exempts banks with assets between $50 billion and $100 billion from enhanced regulation, except for the risk committee requirements. Banks with between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets will still be subject to supervisory stress tests, and the Fed has discretion to apply other individual enhanced prudential provisions (except for most of those included in the "Financial Stability" bullet above) to these banks if it would promote financial stability or the institutions' safety and soundness. 115-174 generally agree that enhanced prudential regulation should apply to systemically important banks, but disagree about which banks could pose systemic risk. Capital Formation
Title V of P.L. No longer being classified as an investment company under the ICA reduces the qualifying fund's registration and disclosure requirements. In addition, prior to the enactment of P.L. Insurance . Federal Reserve Surplus. | Some observers assert the financial crisis of 2007-2009 revealed that excessive risk had built up in the financial system, and that weaknesses in regulation contributed to that buildup and the resultant instability. In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203; the Dodd-Frank Act), and regulators strengthened rules under existing authority. Following this broad overhaul of financial regulation, some observers argue certain changes are an overcorrection, resulting in unduly burdensome regulation.
The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (S. 2155, P.L. 115-174) was signed into law by President Donald Trump on May 24, 2018. P.L. 115-174 modifies Dodd-Frank provisions, such as the Volcker Rule (a ban on proprietary trading and certain relationships with investment funds), the qualified mortgage criteria under the Ability-to-Repay Rule, and enhanced regulation for large banks; provides smaller banks with an "off ramp" from Basel III capital requirements—standards agreed to by national bank regulators as part of an international bank regulatory framework; and makes other changes to the regulatory system.
Most changes made by P.L. 115-174 can be grouped into one of five issue areas: (1) mortgage lending, (2) regulatory relief for "community" banks, (3) consumer protection, (4) regulatory relief for large banks, and (5) regulatory relief for capital formation.
Title I of P.L. 115-174 relaxes or provides exemptions to certain mortgage lending rules. For example, it creates a new compliance option for mortgages originated and held by banks and credit unions with less than $10 billion in assets to be considered qualified mortgages for the purposes of the Ability-to-Repay Rule. In addition, P.L. 115-174 exempts certain insured depositories and credit unions that originate few mortgages from certain Home Mortgage Disclosure Act reporting requirements.
A number of Title II provisions provide regulatory relief to community banks. For example, banks with under $10 billion in assets are exempt from the Volcker Rule, and certain banks that meet a new Community Bank Leverage Ratio are exempt from other risk-based capital ratio and leverage ratio requirements.
Title III enhances consumer protections in targeted areas. For example, it subjects credit reporting agencies (CRAs) to additional requirements, including requirements to generally provide fraud alerts for consumer files for at least a year and to allow consumers to place security freezes on their credit reports. In addition, it requires CRAs to exclude certain medical debt from veterans' credit reports.
Title IV alters the criteria used to determine which banks are subject to enhanced prudential regulation from the original $50 billion asset threshold original set by Dodd-Frank. Banks designated as global systemically important banks and banks with more than $250 billion in assets are still automatically subjected to enhanced regulation. However, under P.L. 115-174 banks with between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets are automatically subject only to supervisory stress tests, while the Federal Reserve (Fed) has discretion to apply other individual enhanced prudential provisions to these banks. Banks with assets between $50 billion and $100 billion will no longer be subject to enhanced regulation, except for the risk committee requirement. In addition, P.L. 115-174 relaxes leverage requirements for large custody banks, and allows certain municipal bonds to be counted toward large banks' liquidity requirements.
Title V provides regulatory relief to certain securities regulations to encourage capital formation. For example, it exempts more securities exchanges from state securities regulation and subjects certain investment pools to fewer registration and disclosure requirements.
Title VI provides enhanced consumer protection for borrowers of student loans. For example, it requires CRA to exclude certain defaulted private student loan debt from credit reports.
Proponents of P.L. 115-174 assert it provides necessary and targeted regulatory relief, fosters economic growth, and provides increased consumer protections. Opponents of the legislation argue it needlessly pares back important Dodd-Frank protections to the benefit of large and profitable banks. |
crs_R44777 | crs_R44777_0 | Introduction
The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), finalized in December 2013, is the newest international trade agreement to enter into force at the World Trade Organization (WTO), after two-thirds of WTO member countries ratified the multilateral agreement as of February 22, 2017. The TFA is important to Congress because it may affect U.S. trade flows, the U.S. economy, and international capacity building efforts. This report discusses the TFA, its background and current status, potential impact on U.S. trade agreement provisions, plans for implementation, and relevant policy options for Congress to consider. While the TFA mandatory provisions are subject to WTO Dispute Settlement for enforcement, the agreement contains the Special and Differential Treatment provisions to provide additional implementation time and technical assistance and capacity building assistance for developing and least-developed countries. Core Provisions
The TFA has three sections. The first section is the heart of the agreement, containing the provisions—of which many, but not all, are binding and enforceable. The second section provides for special and differential treatment for developing country members and least-developed country (LDC) members, allowing them more time and assistance to implement the agreement. The third section of the agreement contains the institutional arrangements for administering the TFA. To that end, the TFA aims to address multiple trade barriers U.S. exporters confront. These include the lack of transparency on process and documentation requirements for exporting to a given country, which could also create opportunities for corruption. Similarly, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) finds that TFA implementation could lower trade costs 12.5%-17.5% globally. According to WTO estimates, export gains from full implementation of the TFA could range from $750 billion to over $3.6 trillion dollars per year. Trade Facilitation in U.S. FTAs
Existing and proposed U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) include trade facilitation commitments. The WTO TFA and U.S. FTAs share common features. In general, the TPP included more precise and enforceable terms than the TFA. In rankings of trade facilitation measures such as those outlined in the TFA, the United States scores relatively high in terms of availability of customs information, advance rulings, appeal procedures, documentation, automation, and other factors. U.S. Trade Priorities
In the United States, as in all countries, there is an inherent tension between efforts to promote efficient trade flows and trade enforcement (including consumer protection and duty collection). Several instruments used by CBP seek to balance these overarching objectives, and are aimed at knowing who is importing and what types of goods are being imported. Different sets of indicators by various international organizations exist to measure levels of trade facilitation and could be used to monitor TFA implementation and impact (see Text Box). To help alleviate their concerns, and promote implementation, the TFA is the first WTO agreement in which members determine their own implementation schedules and in which progress in implementation is explicitly linked to technical and financial capacity. Through the APEC Committee on Trade and Investment, the United States works with its partners to promote trade facilitation and provide capacity building. The TFA requires that donor members, including the United States, provide the needed support to developing and LDC members. | The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), finalized in December 2013, is the newest international trade agreement in the World Trade Organization (WTO), having entered into force on February 22, 2017, when two-thirds of WTO members, including the United States, ratified the multilateral agreement. Congress has an interest in the TFA since it may affect U.S. trade flows, the U.S. economy, and international capacity building efforts.
Trade facilitation measures aim to simplify and streamline international trade procedures to allow the easier flow of trade across borders and thereby reduce the costs of trade. There is no precise definition of trade facilitation, even in the WTO agreements. Trade facilitation can be defined narrowly as improving administrative procedures at the border or more broadly to also encompass behind-the-border measures and regulations.
The TFA aims to address multiple trade barriers confronted by exporters and importers, whether small and medium-sized enterprises engaged in e-commerce or large multinational firms managing complex global supply chains. These barriers include the lack of transparency on process and documentation requirements for exporting to a given country.
According to WTO estimates, global export gains from full implementation of the TFA could range from $750 billion to more than $3.6 trillion dollars per year. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) finds that TFA implementation could lower trade costs as much as 12.5%-17.5% globally. Different sets of indicators and indices by various international organizations exist to measure levels of trade facilitation and could be used to monitor TFA effects.
The TFA has three sections. The first section is the heart of the agreement, containing the provisions, of which many, but not all, are binding and enforceable. The second section provides for special and differential treatment for developing country members and least-developed country members, allowing them more time and assistance to implement the agreement. The TFA is the first WTO agreement in which members determine their own implementation schedules and in which progress in implementation is explicitly linked to technical and financial capacity. The TFA requires that "donor members," including the United States, provide the needed capacity building and support to developing and least-developed members. Finally, the third section of the agreement contains the institutional arrangements for administering the TFA.
Existing and proposed U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) include trade facilitation commitments. While the WTO TFA and U.S. FTAs share common features, there are also differences. U.S. FTAs generally include more enforceable provisions and specific time frames, and do not include special and differential treatment for developing country participants.
U.S. implementation of the TFA does not require changes from current processes, including planned efforts to update U.S. systems. In the United States, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) seeks to balance its overarching objectives of promoting efficient trade flows with enforcing trade laws designed to protect consumers from dangerous and unlawful imports, and collecting customs duties. The CBP uses several instruments to collect information aimed at knowing who is importing and what types of goods are being imported, including the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), and the International Trade Data System (ITDS).
This report provides an overview of the TFA, its provisions, and the United States' implementation and role in capacity building, and provides options for Congress to consider in relation to the TFA. |
crs_RL31900 | crs_RL31900_0 | North Korea, Pakistan, and India are three such examples in the case of nuclear weapons and missile technology. In October 2002, the Bush Administration announced that North Korea had been pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment program; U.S. intelligence officials leaked to the press a few days later that Pakistan, among other countries, was implicated. Pakistani government officials denied such trade. Both North Korea and Pakistan have been subject to sanctions in the past for WMD trade. Neither state lies completely outside the nonproliferation regimes. By the mid-1990s, however, North Korea had a proven track record in ballistic missiles, and Pakistan had demonstrated its uranium enrichment capabilities. Although Pakistan apparently was hampered by a lack of hard currency, it could provide North Korea with a route to nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium (HEU). This route would not only circumvent North Korea's Agreed Framework with the United States, but would also be difficult to detect using satellite imagery. North Korean Enrichment
At the time the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea was negotiated, there was concern about, but scant evidence of, North Korean interest in uranium enrichment. In the Deputy Director of National Intelligence's report, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," 1 January-31 December 2004 (pursuant to Section 721 of the of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act), there is no mention of any North Korean uranium enrichment activity or capability. Media reports suggested that the CIA had evidence of construction and of procurement. The second development program has been headed by Khan Research Laboratories. Pakistan now fields approximately 5 to 10 of these missiles and is developing longer-range variants. These solid-fueled, medium-range missiles apparently are based on Chinese M-11s. Pakistan's Nuclear Sales
The genesis of Pakistan's nuclear cooperation with North Korea is murky. There are a few reports in trade journals of equipment passing through Pakistan on the way to North Korea, but it is difficult to pinpoint when cooperation began. One report says that cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea expanded into the nuclear and missile areas in Benazir Bhutto's second term (1993 to 1996) to include exchanges of scientists and engineers. In a letter to key senators and members of Congress on March 12, 2003, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Paul Kelly wrote that "the Administration carefully reviewed the facts relating to the possible transfer of nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea, and decided that they do not warrant the imposition of sanctions under applicable U.S. Issues for Congress
North Korea's actions alone raise significant policy questions for Congress, specifically, on how to roll back a capability that North Korea refuses to admit it has. Second, this example of secondary proliferation highlights the critical roles of sanctions, interdiction, and intelligence. The example of WMD trade between North Korea and Pakistan raises particular questions about how to interpret proliferation threats within the nexus of terrorism and WMD. | In October 2002, the United States confronted North Korea about its alleged clandestine uranium enrichment program. Soon after, the Agreed Framework collapsed, North Korea expelled international inspectors, and withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). U.S. intelligence officials claimed Pakistan was a key supplier of uranium enrichment technology to North Korea, and some media reports suggested that Pakistan had exchanged centrifuge enrichment technology for North Korean help in developing longer range missiles.
U.S. official statements leave little doubt that cooperation occurred, but there are significant details missing on the scope of cooperation and the role of Pakistan's government. North Korea and Pakistan both initially denied that nuclear technology was provided to North Korea; President Musharraf admitted, however, in 2006 that such technology had been transferred. This report describes the nature and evidence of the cooperation between North Korea and Pakistan in missiles and nuclear weapons, the impact of cooperation on their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and on the international nonproliferation regime. It will be updated as events warrant.
The roots of cooperation are deep. North Korea and Pakistan have been engaged in conventional arms trade for over 30 years. In the 1980s, as North Korea began successfully exporting ballistic missiles and technology, Pakistan began producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the Khan Research Laboratory. Benazir Bhutto's 1993 visit to Pyongyang seems to have kicked off serious missile cooperation, but it is harder to pinpoint the genesis of Pakistan's nuclear cooperation with North Korea. By the time Pakistan probably needed to pay North Korea for its purchases of medium-range No Dong missiles in the mid-1990s (upon which its Ghauri missiles are based), Pakistan's cash reserves were low. Pakistan could offer North Korea a route to nuclear weapons using HEU that could circumvent the plutonium-focused 1994 Agreed Framework and be difficult to detect.
WMD trade between North Korea and Pakistan raises significant issues for congressional oversight. Are there sources of leverage over proliferators outside the nonproliferation regime? Do sanctions, interdiction, and intelligence as nonproliferation tools need to be strengthened? How is the threat of proliferation interpreted within the nexus of terrorism and WMD? Further, has counterterrorism cooperation taken precedence over nonproliferation cooperation? If so, are there approaches that would make both policies mutually supportive?
See also CRS Report RL33590, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RS21391, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31457 | crs_RL31457_0 | Overview
The federal tax code classifies state and local government bonds as either governmental bonds or private activity bonds. However, the federal tax code allows state and local governments to use tax-exempt bonds to finance certain projects that would otherwise be classified as private activities. The private activities that can be financed with tax-exempt bonds are called "qualified private activities." Generally, Congress limits the amount of tax-exempt debt that can be used for private activities and restricts the type of private activities that can be financed with tax-exempt bonds. Congress can, and does, encourage selected private activities by exempting the activity from the volume cap or by allowing tax-exempt financing for the private activity. For more on tax-exempt bonds generally, see CRS Report RL30638, Tax-Exempt Bonds: A Description of State and Local Government Debt , by [author name scrubbed]. What Is a Private Activity Bond? A private activity bond is one that primarily benefits or is used by a private entity. Bonds are private activity bonds and not tax-exempt if both of the following conditions are met:
(1) [use test] more than 10% of the proceeds of the issue are to be used for any private business use ,... [and]
(2) [security test] if the payment on the principal of, or the interest on, more than 10% of the proceeds of such issue is (under the terms of such issue or any underlying arrangement) directly or indirectly—
(A) secured by any interest in
(i) property used or to be used for a private business use, or
(ii) payments in respect to such property, or
(B) Or [if the payment is] to be derived from payments (whether or not to the issuer) in respect of property, or borrowed money, used or to be used for a private business use. What Are the Qualified Private Activities? A number of qualified private activities are granted special status in the tax code (see Table 2 ). The list of qualified private activities has gradually expanded to 27 activities from the 12 that were originally defined by the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968. The national limit is $15 billion and the bonds are not subject to state volume caps for private activity bonds. Many economic development projects would not qualify absent this ARRA provision. The annual cap was increased from the greater of $50 per capita or $150 million in 2000, to the greater of $105 per capita or $311.38 million in 2018 (and is adjusted annually for inflation). Figure 1 provides a comparative measure of the state-by-state volume capacity based on 2016 state personal income. | The federal tax code classifies state and local bonds as either governmental bonds or private activity bonds. Governmental bonds are intended for governmental projects, and private activity bonds are for projects that primarily benefit private entities. Typically, the interest earned by holders of governmental bonds is exempt from federal income taxes.
The federal tax code allows state and local governments to use tax-exempt bonds to finance certain projects that would be considered private activities. The private activities that can be financed with tax-exempt bonds are called "qualified private activities." Congress uses an annual state volume cap to limit the amount of tax-exempt bond financing generally and restricts the types of qualified private activities that would qualify for tax-exempt financing to selected projects defined in the tax code.
The economic rationale for the federal limitation on tax-exempt bonds for private activities stems from the inefficiency of the mechanism to subsidize private activity and the lack of congressional control of the subsidy absent a limitation. This report explains the rules governing qualified private activity bonds, describes the federal limitations on private activity bonds, lists the qualified private activities, and reports each state's private activity bond volume cap.
Since private activity bonds were defined in 1968, the number of eligible private activities has been gradually increased from 12 activities to 27. The state volume capacity limit has increased from $150 million and $50 per capita in 1986 to the greater of $311.38 million or $105 per capita in 2018. Because of the $311.38 million floor, many smaller states are allowed to issue relatively more private activity bonds (based on the level of state personal income) than larger states. Also, more recent additions to the list of qualified activities have been exempt from a state-by-state cap and subject to a national aggregate cap.
For more on tax-exempt bonds generally, see CRS Report RL30638, Tax-Exempt Bonds: A Description of State and Local Government Debt, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as legislative events warrant. |
crs_RL34714 | crs_RL34714_0 | The Energy Information Administration (EIA), in its October 2008 Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook (STEWFO), warned consumers that not only might they expect the prices of natural gas, heating oil, propane, and electricity to be higher in the winter of 2008-2009 compared to those of 2007-2008, but that the National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) projections forecast a 2.4% colder winter compared to last year. For the United States as a whole, the revised STEWFO projections are that natural gas customers might expect to see their expenditures rise by 0.2%, heating oil consumers might see their expenditures fall by 19.6%, propane expenditures might fall by 12.4%, and electricity expenditures might rise by 7.9%. Due to volatile market dynamics, the prices used in the STEWFO may not yield the forecasted declines in expenditures. If oil prices continue to fall, or stabilize at lower levels, the STEWFO estimates could be high. These increases follow a 4.3% increase in production in 2007. Key factors in determining the accuracy of the STEWFO projections are likely to be the weather, the effect of what appears to be a deteriorating economic condition, and the level of oil prices. As a result, the price of home heating oil is closely related to the price of oil as well as the price of diesel fuel. The key risk factor for consumers of home heating oil is the price of oil. Oil prices have been volatile in 2008. However, expenditure decreases for this heat source are less than those expected for home heating oil consumers. Electricity prices are directly affected by the cost of raw materials, notably natural gas prices, and coal prices, which are expected to continue to decrease from the peaks attained earlier in 2008. At the beginning of the 2008-2009 winter heating season the price of crude oil has been observed to be below $50 per barrel, a decline of almost 66% compared to the recent peak prices. A lower price of crude oil directly reduces the price of home heating oil and propane. Heating Expenditure Assistance
The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) is the primary federal government program to supplement home heating expenditures. | The Energy Information Administration in its Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook (STEWFO) for the 2008-2009 winter heating season initially warned consumers of the likelihood of higher heating costs. Average expenditures for those heating with natural gas were forecasted to see their expenditures rise by more than 18%. Home heating oil expenditures were forecast to rise by 23%, propane expenditures by 11% and electric heating expenses by 10%. The forecasted increases in total expenditures result from higher prices for all energy sources, as well as the expectation of a colder winter than the past several years.
A revised STEWFO, reflecting lower oil prices, projected declines in home heating expenditures for those using heating oil and propane. In contrast, heating expenditures were expected to increase for consumers of natural gas and electricity, although by less than initially forecasted.
However, oil markets have continued to experience downward volatility recently, with the price of crude oil falling over 50% compared to the peak price reached in July 2008. If the downward trend in oil prices continues through the winter 2008-2009 heating season, or stabilizes at a lower level, the expenditure estimates of even the revised STEWFO may be overly pessimistic. This is because the price of oil is a major factor influencing all the home heating prices surveyed in the STEWFO to some degree. The price of oil directly affects the prices of heating oil and propane, which are petroleum products. The price of oil indirectly affects the price of natural gas, and also, therefore, electricity through a historical price parity relationship.
The key risk factors for the STEWFO estimates are likely to be the extent to which the U.S. economy continues to experience an economic slowdown that results in further declines in the price of crude oil. Additionally, the variability of the weather could affect the expenditure estimates.
The Low Income Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), the primary federal program to assist with home heating costs, has been funded at higher levels than last year, and its eligibility requirements have been expanded. As a result, this program appears to be able to provide aid to consumers should heating costs escalate.
This report will be updated. |
crs_R43816 | crs_R43816_0 | On April 27, 2017, President Trump hosted a visit by Argentine President Mauricio Macri at the White House in which the two leaders discussed ways to deepen relations in such areas as trade and investment, cooperation on measures to combat illicit trafficking and financing, and cyber policy. The two leaders also agreed to work closely on the situation in Venezuela. Political and Economic Situation
Political Background
Argentina—a South American nation located in the continent's southern cone—has had elected civilian democratic rule since the military relinquished power in 1983 after seven years of harsh dictatorship. Cristina Fernández completed her second term as president in December 2015. 2015 Presidential Election
On November 22, 2015, Argentines went to the polls in the second round of the 2015 presidential race and opted for change by electing Mauricio Macri of the opposition Let's Change coalition representing center-right and center-left parties. Macri Administration
Inaugurated in December 2015, President Macri moved swiftly to usher in changes in the government's economic, foreign policy, and other policies. His election ended the 12-year run of Kirchnerismo that helped Argentina emerge from a severe economic crisis in 2001-2002 but also was characterized by protectionist and unorthodox economic policies and at times difficult relations with the United States. Economic Policy Changes. At times, however, there have been tensions in the bilateral relationship. Since Macri's election, U.S. relations with Argentina have notably improved. In August 2016, then-Secretary of State Kerry visited Argentina and, along with then-Argentine Foreign Minister Susana Malcorra, launched a High-Level Dialogue (HLD) to serve as a means of strengthening bilateral relations in such areas as trade and investment; law enforcement cooperation; people-to-people ties; and energy, science, and education cooperation. Legislative Action in the 115th Congress
U.S.-Argentine relations largely have been an oversight issue for Congress, although in the aftermath of Macri's election in 2015, key Members of Congress urged the Obama Administration to prioritize relations with Argentina. On April 3, 2017, the House approved by voice vote H.Res. 54 (Sires), which upholds commitment to the partnership between the United States and Argentina; reaffirms that Argentina is a major non-NATO ally of the United States; encourages the Department of State to coordinate a new interagency strategy with Argentina in areas of bilateral, regional, and global concern; commends Argentina for making far-reaching economic reforms; commends Argentina for resolving most of its business disputes at the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes; and encourages Argentina to continue to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires and the 2015 death of AMIA Special Prosecutor Alberto Nisman. A similar but not identical Senate resolution, S.Res. 18 (Coons), was introduced in January 2017, and reported (as amended) by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 5, 2017. Among Argentina's trade concerns with the United States, Argentina is seeking access to the U.S. market for fresh beef and lemons, and it is seeking reinstatement of U.S. preferential trade benefits under the GSP program. U.S. officials expressed concerns regarding IPR protection and Argentina's various trade restrictions on imports. Debt Issues70
Argentina's 2001 default has been a long-standing issue in relations with the United States. As noted above, H.Res. 201 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced in March 2017 near the date of the 25 th anniversary of the 1992 bombing, would express support to the government of Argentina for its investigation of the Israeli embassy bombing; among its provisions, the resolution would call on the U.S. government to assist Argentina in any way possible so that the perpetrators of the 1992 Israeli embassy bombing as well as the 1994 AMIA bombing are brought to justice. Economic adjustment measures triggered an economic downturn in 2016, with GDP declining by almost 2.3%, but also are leading to more sustainable growth in 2017, with a forecast for 2.2% growth. This is especially true as the country approaches legislative elections in October 2017, which many observers see as a referendum on the policies of the Macri government. In the foreign-policy arena, the Macri government has improved relations with neighboring Brazil and Uruguay, the promarket countries of the Pacific Alliance, and the UK. U.S.-Argentine relations have greatly improved under the Macri government compared to under the Kirchner governments, when the bilateral relationship was often tense. Macri's election brought to power a government that to date has demonstrated a strong commitment to constructive bilateral relations. The Obama Administration moved swiftly to engage the Macri government, highlighted by President Obama's state visit to Argentina in 2016 and the launching of a High-Level Dialogue in August 2016. Appendix. | Argentina, a South American country with a population of almost 44 million, has had a vibrant democratic tradition since its military relinquished power in 1983. Current President Mauricio Macri—the leader of the center-right Republican Proposal and the candidate of the Let's Change coalition representing center-right and center-left parties—won the 2015 presidential race. He succeeded two-term President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, from the center-left faction of the Peronist party known as the Front for Victory, who in turn had succeeded her husband, Néstor Kirchner, in 2007. Macri's election ended the Kirchners' 12-year rule, which helped Argentina emerge from a severe economic crisis in 2001-2002 but also was characterized by protectionist and unorthodox economic policies.
President Macri has moved swiftly since his December 2015 inauguration to usher in changes to the government's economic, foreign, and other policies. Among its economic policy changes, the Macri government lifted currency controls; eliminated or reduced taxes on agricultural exports; and reduced electricity, water, and heating gas subsidies. The government also reached a deal with remaining private creditors in 2016 that ended the country's 15-year default, an action that allowed the government to repair its "rogue" debtor status and to resume borrowing in international capital markets. Although economic adjustment measures resulted in a 2.3% economic contraction in 2016, the economy is forecast to grow by 2.2% in 2017. In the foreign policy arena, the Macri government has improved relations with neighboring Brazil and Uruguay and with the promarket countries of the Pacific Alliance. Forthcoming legislative elections in October 2017 can be seen as a referendum on Macri's policies.
U.S. Relations
U.S.-Argentine relations generally have been characterized by robust commercial relations and cooperation in such issues as nonproliferation, human rights, education, and science and technology. Under the Kirchner governments, however, there were periodic tensions in relations. Macri's election brought to power a government that has demonstrated a commitment to improved relations with the United States.
The Obama Administration moved swiftly to engage the Macri government on a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. Demonstrating the change in relations, President Obama traveled to Argentina in March 2016 for a state visit that increased cooperation in such areas as trade and investment, renewable energy, climate change, and citizen security. In August 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry launched a High-Level Dialogue with Argentina to serve as a mechanism to ensure sustained engagement.
Strong bilateral relations are continuing under the Trump Administration. President Macri visited the White House on April 27, 2017, with the two leaders discussing ways to deepen relations in such areas as trade and investment, combatting illicit trafficking and financing, cyber policy, and the situation in Venezuela. On trade issues, U.S. officials have raised concerns for a number of years about Argentina's enforcement of intellectual property rights protection and various restrictions on imports; Argentina is interested in the restoration of U.S. trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences, which were suspended in 2012, as well as in access to the U.S. market for fresh beef and lemons.
U.S.-Argentine relations largely have been an oversight issue for Congress, but in the aftermath of Macri's election in 2015 key Members of Congress urged the Obama Administration to prioritize relations with Argentina. In the 115th Congress, the House passed H.Res. 54 (Sires) on April 3, 2017, which, among other provisions, upholds commitment to the bilateral partnership between the United States and Argentina. On June 5, 2017, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported a similar but not identical resolution, S.Res. 18 (Coons), as amended. Another congressional interest has been Argentina's progress in investigating two terrorist bombings in Buenos Aires—the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA)—as well as the 2015 death of the AMIA special prosecutor. H.Res. 201 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced in March 2017, would express support for Argentina's investigation of the two bombings.
This report provides background on the political and economic situation in Argentina and U.S.-Argentine relations. An Appendix provides links to selected U.S. government reports on Argentina. |
crs_R43437 | crs_R43437_0 | In addition to facing the prospect of a federal criminal prosecution, those who violate the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) may suffer a number of additional adverse consequences under federal law. Nevertheless, without federal statutory sanction, more than 20 states have established medical marijuana regulatory regimes. Four have gone further and "legalized" marijuana under state recreational marijuana laws. Because controlled substances classified as Schedule I drugs have "a high potential for abuse" with "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States" and lack "accepted safety for use of the drug [] under medical supervisions," they may not be dispensed under a prescription, and such substances may be used only for bona fide, federal government-approved research studies. Medical Marijuana Laws
State medical marijuana laws follow a general pattern, although most have some individual characteristics and the manner in which they are enforced can differ considerably. In addition, the laws afford registered patients, care givers, cultivators, and distributors immunity from the consequences of state criminal laws. Retail Marijuana
Four states, Washington, Colorado, Oregon, and Alaska, have established retail marijuana regimes. The memorandum instructs federal prosecutors to prioritize their "limited investigative and prosecutorial resources to address the most significant [marijuana-related] threats" and identified the following eight activities as those that the federal government wants most to prevent: (1) distributing marijuana to children; (2) revenue from the sale of marijuana going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; (3) diverting marijuana from states that have legalized its possession to other states that prohibit it; (4) using state-authorized marijuana activity as a pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs; (5) using firearms or violent behavior in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; (6) exacerbating adverse public health and safety consequences due to marijuana use, including driving while under the influence of marijuana; (7) growing marijuana on the nation's public lands; and (8) possessing or using marijuana on federal property. The preemption doctrine stands at the threshold of the federal-state marijuana debate. The Supremacy Clause, therefore, "elevates" the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, federal regulations, and treaties above the laws of the states. The MMMA escaped obstacle preemption because it merely conveyed immunity from the consequences of state law: "the MMMA's limited state-law immunity for [medical marijuana] use does not frustrate the CSA's operation nor refuse its provisions their natural effect, such that its purpose cannot otherwise be accomplished.... [T]his immunity does not purport to alter the CSA's federal criminalization of marijuana, or to interfere with or undermine federal enforcement of that prohibition." FinCEN's guidance specifically addresses the obligations to file suspicious activity reports (SARs). FinCEN began its guidance by emphasizing the point made in the accompanying 2014 Cole Memorandum, that the Justice Department's investigation and prosecution of financial crimes would be focused on activities that conflict with any of several federal priorities:
preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states; preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; preventing violence and the use of firearms in cultivation and distribution of marijuana; preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use; preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property. The offender and any accomplices face an additional five-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for possession of a firearm; a seven-year mandatory term if he brandishes the firearm; and a 10-year mandatory term if discharges it. The question of whether marijuana users may be excluded from federally assisted housing is not the same as whether applicants for such housing may be required to undergo drug testing. Lawyers may advise their clients about the features of the state medical marijuana statute, but they may not assist clients in a violation of the CSA. Enacted Marijuana-Related Measures
P.L. However, there is some uncertainty regarding the legal effect of the provision. Legislative Proposals in the 114th Congress
P.L. | The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) outlaws the possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana except for authorized research. More than 20 states have regulatory schemes that allow possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana for medicinal purposes. Four have revenue regimes that allow possession, cultivation, and sale generally. The U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause preempts any state law that conflicts with federal law. Although there is some division, the majority of state courts have concluded that the federal-state marijuana law conflict does not require preemption of state medical marijuana laws. The legal consequences of a CSA violation, however, remain in place. Nevertheless, current federal criminal enforcement guidelines counsel confining investigations and prosecutions to the most egregious affront to federal interests.
Legal and ethical considerations limit the extent to which an attorney may advise and assist a client intent on participating in his or her state's medical or recreational marijuana system. Bar associations differ on the precise boundaries of those limitations.
State medical marijuana laws grant registered patients, their doctors, and providers immunity from the consequences of state law. The Washington, Colorado, Oregon, and Alaska retail marijuana regimes authorize the commercial exploitation of the marijuana market in small taxable doses.
The present and potential consequences of a CSA violation can be substantial. Cultivation or sale of marijuana on all but the smallest scale invites a five-year mandatory minimum prison term. Revenues and the property used to generate them may merely be awaiting federal collection under federal forfeiture laws. Federal tax laws deny marijuana entrepreneurs the benefits available to other businesses. Banks may afford marijuana merchants financial services only if the bank files a suspicious activity report (SAR) for every marijuana-related transaction that exceeds certain monetary thresholds, and only if it conducts a level of due diligence into its customers' activities sufficient to unearth any affront to federal interests.
Marijuana users may not possess a firearm or ammunition. They may not hold federal security clearances. They may not operate commercial trucks, buses, trains, or planes. Federal contractors and private employers may be free to refuse to hire them and to fire them. If fired, they may be ineligible for unemployment compensation. They may be denied federally assisted housing.
At the heart of the federal-state conflict lies a disagreement over dangers and benefits inherent in marijuana use. The CSA authorizes research on controlled substances, including those in Schedule I such as marijuana, that may address those questions. Members have introduced a number of bills in the 114th Congress that speak to the conflict. Additionally, a few marijuana-related provisions were enacted into law late in the 113th Congress.
This report is an abridged form, without footnotes or citations to authority, of CRS Report R43435, Marijuana: Medical and Retail—Selected Legal Issues, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. Portions of this report have been borrowed from CRS Report R43034, State Legalization of Recreational Marijuana: Selected Legal Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
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