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crs_RS22855 | crs_RS22855_0 | 109-163 , as amended. Enacted in 2005 as a temporary authority, "Section 1206" authority, as it is known, has been regularly extended. (2) Should Section 1206 be codified as permanent law? From FY2010 on, Section 1206 has also provided considerable funding to train and equip foreign military forces for stability operations, in particular to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Section 1206 Programs and Funding, FY2015
For FY2015, DOD submitted in November 2014 a request for a first tranche of $136.4 million for programs in 12 countries. As of the date of this report, congressional committees have not completed their review of those programs. Trends FY2006-FY2014
Total funding FY2006-FY2014 is some $2.2 billion. During this period, Section 1206 funding supported bilateral programs in over 40 countries, several multilateral programs, and an associated global human rights program. Section 1206 authority permits the Secretary of Defense to provide Section 1206 support with the "concurrence" (i.e., the approval) of the Secretary of State. Congressional Action: FY2015
Senate Armed Services Committee Proposal and Conference Action
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) version of the FY2015 NDAA ( S. 2410 , as reported June 2, 2014) would codify (i.e., make permanent law) current Section 1206 global train and equip authority as part of Title X (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code, with a number of modifications. The conference version of the FY2015 NDAA, entitled the Carl Levin and Howard "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act of FY2015 ( S. 1847 , as contained in Rules Committee Print 113-58) retains the SASC proposal with a few changes. 3979), the conference version would make the following changes to current Section 1206 authority:
expand the uses of support to foreign national military forces for participating in or supporting military and stability operations from operations in which the U.S. Armed Forces are participating to include allied or coalition operations that benefit U.S. national security interests; expand the types of support that DOD may provide under Section 1206 from equipment, supplies, training, and small-scale military construction to include defense services; redefine forces eligible for assistance, with counterterrorism training limited to foreign national military forces, maritime and border security forces, and other national-level security forces that have a counterterrorism mission, rather than available to all security forces as currently in law; retain for FY2015 the authorized limit of $350 million on funding specifically authorized and appropriated for use under Section 1206 authority, but, in effect, virtually eliminate a cap on funding for Section 1206 activities by allowing programs to be conducted with funds "otherwise made available" through annual appropriations; raise the cap on funding for Section 1206's second purpose (i.e., to train and equip foreign military forces to participate in or support allied or coalition military or stability operations) from $100 million to $150 million; change the limit on small-scale military construction from $25 million per fiscal year to 5% of all funds made available for Section 1206 programs in a fiscal year; permit the use of funds for supplies, training, defense services, and small-scale military construction associated with equipment that is delivered the fiscal year after a program commences for the year that a foreign country takes receipt of such equipment and the following fiscal year; and permit the use of Section 1206 funds to conduct assessments of the effectiveness of the program. | Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended and regularly extended, provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces for two specified purposes—counterterrorism and stability operations—and foreign security forces for counterterrorism operations. Section 1206 authority now extends through FY2017.
The conference version of the FY2015 NDAA somewhat modifies a Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) proposal it its version of the FY2015 NDAA to codify this authority as permanent law under Title 10. In doing so, both the SASC proposal and the conference version would make several changes to the current temporary law.
The Department of Defense (DOD) values this authority as an important tool to train and equip military partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Through 2009, DOD used Section 1206 authority primarily to provide counterterrorism support. Since FY2010, Section 1206 authority has also been used to provide significant assistance to train and equip foreign military forces for military and stability operations in which U.S. forces participate. Currently, there is a cap of $350 million on Section 1206 obligations per fiscal year.
Total funding thus far for Section 1206 programs since its inception in FY2006 is some $2.2 billion. During this period, Section 1206 funding supported bilateral programs in over 40 countries, several multilateral programs, and an associated global human rights program.
FY2014 programs notified to Congress totaled $314 million. These provided assistance to enable 10 European countries to participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, as well as assistance to five African countries.
For FY2015, DOD submitted in November 2014 a request for a first tranche of $136.4 million for programs in 12 countries. As of the date of this report, congressional committees have not completed their review of those programs.
For several years, some Members have been concerned with several issues related to Section 1206 authority, both narrow and broad. Specific current concerns have included whether Section 1206 funds are being used appropriately and effectively. Some of these concerns have been partially addressed. One key Section 1206 issue for the lame duck session of the 113th Congress is whether Section 1206 should be made permanent law by codifying it under Title 10, as the Senate Armed Services Committee proposes in its version of the FY2015 NDAA (S. 2410). The conference committee version of that bill (S. 1847, as contained in the Rules Committee Print 113-58) contains a modified version of the SASC proposal. The codification proposal raises questions of effectiveness and utility, as well whether the codification to Title 10 is consistent with past practice and whether it has implications for DOD budgets, roles, and missions. |
crs_R44548 | crs_R44548_0 | Introduction
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 defines and prohibits the employment of "oppressive child labor" in the United States. Not all oppressive child labor is unlawful under the FLSA. This report is a guide to the FLSA child labor provisions, accompanying Department of Labor (DOL) regulations, and their administration. Taken together, these constitute what is commonly known as "federal child labor law." In addition, all states have child labor laws, compulsory schooling requirements, and other laws that govern children's employment and activities. No state law may weaken the worker protections provided by the FLSA. However, state laws that impose greater worker protections will supersede those provided by the FLSA. Such state protections are not discussed in this report. Provisions Addressing Oppressive Child Labor
The FLSA includes four child labor provisions, two of which address the employment of oppressive child labor, which the act defines—with some exceptions—as the employment of youth under the age of 16 in any occupation or the employment of youth under 18 years in hazardous occupations. However, the act includes several exemptions to the child labor provisions and the oppressive child labor definition that create a complex set of thresholds that depend on the child's age, local school hours, the nature of the work (e.g., occupation, industry, and work environment), parental involvement in the child's employment, and other factors. Notably, exemptions to the act's child labor provisions create separate rules governing children's employment in non-agricultural and agricultural work. Employment of Children in Non-Agricultural Work
For non-exempt children, the minimum age for employment in non-agricultural occupations is
18 years for occupations determined by the Secretary of Labor to be hazardous to the health and well-being of children (i.e., "hazardous occupations"); 16 years for employment in non-hazardous occupations; and 14 years for a limited set of occupations, with restrictions on hours and work conditions, as determined by the Secretary of Labor. Minimum Age for Employment in Agriculture
With some exceptions, the minimum age for employment in agricultural occupations is
16 years for employment in any agricultural job, including those determined to be hazardous by the Secretary of Labor, with no restrictions on hours of work; 14 years for employment in non-hazardous agricultural jobs outside of school hours; 12-13 years for employment in non-hazardous agricultural jobs, outside of school hours, with the written consent of a parent; written consent is not required if the work takes place on a farm that also employs the child's parent; 10-11 years for employment to hand-harvest select crops for up to eight weeks in non-hazardous agricultural jobs, outside of school hours, with the written consent of a parent, providing the employer has obtained a waiver permitting this employment from the Secretary of Labor; and Any age (up to 12 years), for employment in non-hazardous agricultural jobs, outside of school hours on certain small farms, with a parent's written consent. Administration of Child Labor Provisions
The FLSA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to conduct workplace inspections and investigations to determine if oppressive child labor is present and to enforce the child labor provisions. Civil Money Penalties
Employers who violate the FLSA child labor provisions may be assessed a civil penalty of
up to $11,000 for each employee who was the subject of a child labor violation, or up to $50,000 for each violation that causes the death or serious injury of a minor employee; a penalty may be doubled if the violation is a repeated or willful violation. An examination of WHD enforcement data reveals that, since FY2007, the agency has concluded over 9,700 cases (representing more than 176,000 violations) in which employers violated FLSA child labor provisions. Injunctions and Criminal Penalties
U.S. district courts have jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the FLSA's child labor provisions. Criminal penalties are also prescribed for willful violations of the FLSA's child labor provisions. Any person who willfully violates these provisions will, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000, imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. Courts' Consideration of FLSA Child Labor Provisions
Since the enactment of the FLSA, various courts have resolved cases involving the meaning and operation of the law's child labor provisions. | The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 prohibits the employment of "oppressive child labor" in the United States, which the act defines—with some exceptions—as the employment of youth under the age of 16 in any occupation or the employment of youth under 18 years old in hazardous occupations. The act includes several exemptions, however, that create a complex set of thresholds that depend on the child's age, local school hours, the nature of the work (e.g., occupation, industry, and work environment), parental involvement in the child's employment, and other factors. Notably, exemptions to the act's child labor provisions create separate rules governing children's employment in agriculture and in non-agricultural work.
For non-exempt children, the minimum age for employment in non-agricultural occupations is
18 years for hazardous occupations; 16 years for employment in non-hazardous occupations; and 14 years for a limited set of occupations, with restrictions on hours and work conditions.
With some exceptions, the minimum age for employment in agricultural occupations is
16 years for employment in any agricultural job, including hazardous agricultural occupations, with no restrictions on hours of work; 14 years for employment in non-hazardous agricultural jobs outside of school hours; and any age, for employment in non-hazardous agricultural jobs, outside of school hours, with parental consent, when certain conditions are met concerning farm size, the nature and duration of work, and other requirements.
The FLSA provisions prohibit (1) the employment of oppressive child labor for children covered by the act, and (2) the interstate shipment of goods produced in an establishment in or about which oppressive child labor is employed. But not all work performed by underage children is unlawful under the act.
The FLSA authorizes the Secretary of Labor to conduct workplace inspections and investigations to determine if oppressive child labor is present and enforce the child labor provisions. The Secretary may assess civil money penalties to employers who violate the provisions or pursue action in federal courts.
Employers who violate the FLSA child labor provisions may be assessed a civil penalty of
up to $11,000 for each employee who was the subject of a child labor violation, or up to $50,000 for each violation that causes the death or serious injury of a minor employee; a penalty may be doubled if the violation is a repeated or willful violation.
Since FY2007, the Department of Labor (DOL) has concluded more than 9,700 cases in which employers violated FLSA child labor provisions.
U.S. district courts have jurisdiction to enjoin violations of the FLSA's child labor provisions. Criminal penalties are also prescribed for willful violations of the FLSA's child labor provisions. Any person who willfully violates these provisions will, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000, imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.
Since the enactment of the FLSA, various courts have resolved cases involving the meaning and operation of the law's child labor provisions. Early cases focused on the movement of goods produced by minors and whether an employer's activities were restricted by the provisions. More recent cases have examined the direct employment of minors in oppressive child labor. Although there do not appear to be a substantial number of recent reported cases, DOL continues to pursue enforcement of the child labor provisions through litigation, as evidenced by court filings in 2015.
This report describes the FLSA child labor provisions, accompanying DOL regulations, and their administration. Taken together, these constitute what is commonly known as "federal child labor law." In addition, all states have child labor laws, compulsory schooling requirements, and other laws that govern children's employment and activities. No state law may weaken the worker protections provided by the FLSA. However, state laws that impose greater worker protections will supersede those provided by the FLSA. Such state protections are not discussed in this report. |
crs_R42925 | crs_R42925_0 | Introduction
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) states that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Codified at 28 U.S.C. Created as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS is an opaque statute initially intended to provide foreign nationals redress for violations of the law of nations. This was the first of the ATS "foreign cubed" cases, in which a foreign plaintiff brings a suit against a foreign defendant for torts committed on foreign soil. Soon victims of human rights violations used the ATS as a vehicle for claims against foreign corporations that aided and abetted local foreign governments in committing human rights abuses. In April 2013, the Supreme Court decided a long-awaited case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co . In this case, Nigerian nationals sued Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Royal Dutch), a Dutch company, and Shell Transport and Trading (Shell), a British company, for aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in committing human rights violations. After oral arguments, the Court then requested supplementary briefs and arguments on a new inquiry that called into question the past 30 years of ATS jurisprudence: "whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the ATS, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a foreign sovereign." The Court left a door open for cases that "touch and concern the territory of the United States," but only if those cases do so with enough force to rebut the presumption. The majority declined to comment on the question of corporate liability, resolving the case on the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Instead, the Court turned to the threshold question of whether the ATS provides federal courts with jurisdiction over extraterritorial cases with foreign plaintiffs and defendants. Royal Dutch and Shell are incorporated in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, respectively. Thus, the court held that Royal Dutch and Shell could not be held responsible under the ATS. As the Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. summarized, "when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none." But there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States....
Petitioners argued that the last sentence clearly indicated that 18 th century understanding was that the ATS applied to law of nations violations committed on foreign sovereign territory. "Touch and Concern"
After concluding that the presumption against extraterritorial application applies to the ATS, and that nothing in the text, history, or purposes of the statute rebuts the presumption, the majority barred the petitioners' case seeking relief because the conduct in question took place outside the United States. Finding that the presumption against extraterritoriality was not appropriate for the ATS, Justice Breyer looked to the principles and practices of international law. At least one commentator has read the Court's comment that "mere corporate presence" is insufficient to meet the touch and concern test as an implication that other potential ties to U.S. territory could be enough for corporate liability. With the new test for jurisdiction under the ATS, the Kiobel case has created some uncertainty for foreign cubed human rights cases. | The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) was originally drafted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in order to provide foreign plaintiffs with a forum to remedy violations of customary international law. Now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the ATS states that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." After being raised in only a handful of early cases, the ATS lay dormant for almost 200 years until a 1980 case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, signaled a new use for the statute as a vehicle for redressing human rights violations. Post-Filartiga, the ATS was used frequently for "foreign cubed" cases, which involve alien plaintiffs and defendants for torts committed on foreign soil. These cases first prompted debate that most recently has centered on the controversial question of whether corporate defendants can be held liable for aiding and abetting human rights violations under the ATS.
This was the question originally presented to the Supreme Court in the 2012 case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. A foreign cubed case, Kiobel involved Nigerian plaintiffs suing for human rights violations aided and abetted by Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Royal Dutch) and Shell Transport and Trading Co. (Shell), incorporated in the Netherlands and United Kingdom, respectively. After the first round of oral arguments, the Court ordered rebriefing and reargument on a new issue: whether federal courts even have jurisdiction over cases occurring on foreign soil.
Asking whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the ATS, for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a foreign sovereign, the Court held that the presumption against extraterritorial application applied to the ATS. Under Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the presumption against extraterritoriality provides that, "[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none." The presumption calls for judicial caution in hearing extraterritorial cases over which Congress has not expressly given the courts jurisdiction. The Kiobel court held that nothing in the text, history, or purpose of the ATS overcame the presumption.
The Court left a narrow opening for cases arising under the ATS that "touch and concern the territory of the United States" with "sufficient force" to overcome the presumption. Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggests that there could be an exception for cases involving "serious violations of international law principles," but the only example provided by the Court was that "mere corporate presence" is insufficient to rebut the presumption. Because the question of extraterritoriality was sufficient to resolve the case, the Court declined to address the question of corporate liability.
The decision in Kiobel could reduce the number of human rights cases successfully brought under the ATS. The "touch and concern" test leaves a small crack in the door for extraterritorial application, but the test is vague, and its contours unknown. While it appears the courts will proceed with caution, Congress is free to either explicitly give the courts extraterritorial jurisdiction, or clarify the limits of that jurisdiction at least in respect to human rights violations, as it did with the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). |
crs_RL31837 | crs_RL31837_0 | Rural Development Policy Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-355)
This legislation affirmed USDA as the lead agency for rural development. Amended the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act to authorize loans for business telecommunications partnerships and establish rural emergency assistance loans; Supporting rural business. Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994 (P.L. On February 7, 2014, the President signed into law the most recent farm bill, the Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. The Rural Development title of the 2014 farm bill reauthorized most existing rural development programs. The law also included a new provision directing the Secretary of Agriculture to begin collecting data on the economic effects of the projects that USDA Rural Development funds to assess their long- and short-term viability, and directed the Secretary to develop simplified applications for funding. The law also provided $150 million in mandatory spending for pending rural development loans and grants and $63 million in mandatory spending for the Value-Added Product Grants program. The law also reauthorized funding for programs under the Rural Electrification Act of 1936, including the Access to Broadband Telecommunications Services in Rural Areas Program and the Distance Learning and Telemedicine Program. For Access to Broadband Telecommunication Services in Rural Areas, the law also established new procedures to compare applications and to set funding priorities. Additionally, a new Gigabit Network Pilot Program for high-speed broadband service was authorized at $10 million for each fiscal year FY2014-FY2018. The law also authorized a new Rural Energy Savings Program to fund loans to qualified consumers to implement energy efficiency measures. USDA Rural Development Mission Agencies
The following sections outline the various loan and grant programs administered by the three principal USDA Rural Development mission agencies: Rural Housing Service (RHS), Rural Business-Cooperative Service (RBS), and Rural Utilities Service (RUS). An overview of the programs administered by USDA's Office of Community Development is also provided. It amends the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 and the United States Housing Act of 1937. Eligibility Criteria: Economic development projects benefitting rural areas. 113-79 ). | More than 88 programs administered by 16 different federal agencies target rural economic development. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers the greatest number of rural development programs and has the highest average of program funds going directly to rural counties (approximately 50%). The Rural Development Policy Act of 1980 also designated USDA as the lead federal agency for rural development. The Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agricultural Reorganization Act of 1994 created the Office of the Under Secretary for Rural Development and consolidated the rural development portfolio into four principal agencies responsible for USDA's mission area: the Rural Housing Service, the Rural Business-Cooperative Service, the Rural Utilities Service, and the Office of Community Development.
The Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79), the most recent farm bill, was enacted on February 7, 2014. Among other changes, the law consolidates several business loan and grant programs into a single business support platform. The law allows prioritization of rural development projects that support strategic economic and community development. The new law provides $150 million in mandatory spending for backlogged rural development loans and grants and $63 million in mandatory spending for the Value-Added Product Grants program. Most existing programs authorized by the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act and the Rural Electrification Act were reauthorized. The Access to Broadband Telecommunication Services in Rural Areas Program was reauthorized and establishes new procedures to compare applications and set funding priorities. Additionally, a new Gigabit Network Pilot Program for high-speed broadband service was authorized at $10 million for each fiscal year FY2014-FY2018. The bill also authorizes a new Rural Energy Savings Program to fund loans to qualified consumers to implement energy efficiency measures. A new provision directs USDA to begin collecting data on the economic activities it funds to assess the short- and long-term viability of award recipients.
This report provides an overview of the various programs administered by USDA Rural Development's mission agencies, their authorizing legislation, program objectives, eligibility criteria, and FY2005-FY2016 funding for each program. The report is updated as new USDA Rural Development programs are implemented or amended. |
crs_R43693 | crs_R43693_0 | And a host of different government agencies—primarily those housed within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—financially support biomedical research. In addition to directly supporting certain biomedical research projects, the government—primarily though the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—continually reviews the biomedical research that is used to support an application to market certain products, like drugs or medical devices. Collectively, the various federal agencies that either support or oversee biomedical research have a strong interest in ensuring that the underlying research is scientifically rigorous and free of bias. If a researcher has a conflict of interest—that is, a real or potential incompatibility between one's private interests and one's public or fiduciary duties —that conflict, including a financial conflict, can potentially undermine the research. As a result, a potential conflict may exist that could bias the research or at the very least undermine the credibility of the research. To prevent such financial conflicts of interest (FCOIs) from undermining government supported or regulated biomedical research, the relevant government agencies have established an often-complex set of regulations and policies governing the identification and management of financial conflicts as they relate to biomedical research. Nonetheless, the requirements of other federal agencies that often fund or regulate research, such as the FDA, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Defense, are also discussed. This report concludes with an overview of the current developments with respect to the law governing FCOIs and biomedical research. The United States Public Health Service (PHS) is the primary division of the department that oversees grants for research funded by the eight primary agencies and three human services divisions of HHS. Under that authority, HHS has promulgated rules applicable to PHS divisions to ensure federally funded biomedical research is objective and serves the public welfare. Some federal agencies outside the scope of PHS, but which also fund biomedical research, voluntarily follow the PHS regulations. However, the following are not considered significant financial interests:
1. Conflicts Determination
After each Investigator has disclosed all significant financial interests to the Investigator's Institution, the designated institutional official or committee must then determine whether any of the disclosed significant financial interests is "related to" the PHS-funded research and, if so, whether the interest is a FCOI. If the first step is met, and the financial interest is "related to" the funded research, the institutional official must then determine whether the interest "could directly and significantly affect the design, conduct, or reporting of PHS-funded research." Conflict Management and Reporting
When an institutional official determines that a FCOI exists, the agency must follow five steps. The primary implementation mechanism for the Common Rule is an Institutional Review Board (IRB). When the government provides funding for research involving human subjects the IRB's written assurance must be "satisfactory to the department or agency head" that the institution will comply with the minimum safeguards set out by the HHS Common Rule. In particular, like the HHS Common Rule, the FDA regulations on human subject testing bar a member of IRB from participating in the review of a project if that member has a "conflicting interest." A financial arrangement can be any of the following:
1. NSF requires that all investigators must disclose (1) any "significant financial interest" to the responsible party with the institution if the significant interest "reasonably appear[s] to be affected by" the research, or (2) if the research could reasonably appear to affect the financial interests of the entity in which the Investigator holds a significant interest. The revisions to the PHS objectivity rules included the lowering of financial interest reporting thresholds, expanding reporting obligations, and requiring institutions receiving federal funds to develop and enforce policies on FCOIs through training and education programs. | Every year the federal government through a host of different agencies spends billions of dollars supporting biomedical research. In addition, the federal government, through the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), continually reviews the biomedical research that supports an application to market certain products, like drugs or medical devices. Collectively, the various federal agencies that either support or oversee biomedical research have a strong interest in ensuring that the underlying research is scientifically rigorous and free of bias. However, if a biomedical researcher has a conflict of interest—that is, a real or potential incompatibility between one's private interests and one's public or fiduciary duties—that conflict, including a financial conflict, could bias the research or at the very least undermine the credibility of the researcher's conclusions.
To prevent such financial conflicts of interest (FCOIs) from undermining government-supported or -regulated biomedical research, the relevant government agencies have established an often-complex set of regulations and policies governing the identification and management of financial conflicts as they relate to biomedical research. The primary federal agency that funds biomedical research is the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Within HHS, the Public Health Service (PHS) oversees the 11 operating divisions of HHS that provide research grants and cooperative agreements. When funding is granted to an individual, private organization, public or private university, or other institution by any of the 11 funding agencies, the grantee institution must follow the PHS rules for "objectivity" in research.
The PHS objectivity rule provides that individual researchers must disclose "significant financial interests." A financial interest is "significant" if the interest exceeds the minimum threshold outlined under federal regulations and the interest "reasonably appears to be related" to the responsibilities of the researcher as dictated by the policies of the researcher's institution. If both of those requirements are met and a researcher has a "significant financial interest," the researcher must disclose the significant financial interest to his institution's designated official. The institution, in turn, must make a determination of whether the significant financial interest amounts to a FCOI. Such a determination is made by looking to whether the disclosed interest "relate[s] to the PHS-funded research" and, if so, whether the interest "could directly and significantly" affect the design, conduct, or reporting of the PHS-funded research. If the institution determines that a potential FCOI does exist, the institution must follow federal regulations to proactively address and manage a financial conflict.
Beyond the PHS objectivity rule, other federal rules respecting FCOIs and biomedical research exist, as well. For example, the HHS Common Rule may be applicable when an institution uses federal funds to conduct biomedical research involving human subjects. The Common Rule, by mandating that research institutions employ Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) to oversee human subject testing, have provided IRBs with the potential to scrutinize the effect of FCOIs on a particular research project. Moreover, the FDA has its own version of the Common Rule and a distinct set of regulations requiring a separate review of financial interests before certain products can be marketed. Importantly, covered applicants must disclose financial interests to the FDA even when no federal funds are used in the research and development of a product. Agencies outside HHS also fund biomedical research, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale. Most, but not all, of those agencies follow rules similar to the PHS objectivity requirements and Common Rule. This report summarizes the standards for disclosing financial interests for an institution conducting research funded by the National Science Foundation and the Department of Defense. Finally, this report concludes by discussing recent administrative and legislative developments with respect to the law regarding FCOIs and biomedical research. |
crs_RL33657 | crs_RL33657_0 | Why Do Governments Run Deficits? The FY2009 federal deficit swelled to $1.414 trillion, or nearly 10% of gross domestic product (GDP), as the economic recession depressed federal revenues and as financial interventions and "automatic stabilizer" income support programs increased federal spending. First, governments can prevent sudden changes in taxes by borrowing. Government debt that nears unsustainable levels, however, can inject turmoil into an economy, and governments may go bankrupt if they fail to repay what they borrow. Increased government spending financed by borrowing can stimulate economic activity, giving government a fiscal policy tool to counteract recessions. During economic downturns, government revenues fall and expenditures rise as more people become eligible for unemployment insurance and income support programs, causing deficits to increase or surpluses to shrink. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; H.R. 1 , P.L. Benefits and Costs of Using Deficits to Smooth Consumption
Helping households smooth income, according to standard public finance theory, may justify short-run deficits. Other researchers found that balanced-budget rules force governments to adjust spending and taxes sharply during economic downturns. When interest rates fall to low levels during an economic downturn, banks can become reluctant to lend when perceived lending risks outweigh anticipated gains, while fewer firms and consumers demand new loans. In such a situation, known as a liquidity trap, a monetary authority such as the Federal Reserve can do little to expand the money supply. Thus, while the monetary authority can cut short-term interest rates to nearly zero—or even to zero—lower interest rates or other monetary policy initiatives may do little to encourage new consumer spending or business investment. When a central bank faces a zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates, fiscal policy tools such as increased government spending or tax cuts, which increase deficits, may be a necessary complement to monetary policy. In better economic times, government spending becomes a less effective means of stimulating economic activity and can elbow out private consumption and investment or worsen trade deficits. Government fiscal stimulus, salt-water economists claim, can restore market balance by temporarily replacing private consumption and investment with government outlays, thus providing the demand to help push the economy back to its full potential. Running government surpluses reduces aggregate demand in the economy and helps restrain inflation. Some economists would argue that during times of a liquidity trap, when monetary policy loses potency, spending multipliers are higher. Corporate tax provisions generated the lowest multiplier. Some argue that budget enforcement legislation, such as pay-as-you-go requirements and discretionary budget caps, may help provide political underpinnings to a more consistent fiscal policy. Some budget analysts contend that mechanisms created by the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act ( P.L. 101-508 ) led to more sustainable fiscal policies. Furthermore, in this view, a fiscal policy that shifts some resources from younger to older generations can raise living standards of all following generations by transferring a portion of the benefits of future economic growth into the present. Foreign investment in the United States plays an important role between balancing domestic supply and demand of capital. Reducing government deficits can improve economic performance in at least three ways. Long-term deficits can be used to allow older generations to enjoy some of the anticipated fruits of future economic growth. Thus deficits can serve as a useful tool of economic management in the short run, but also can cause substantial economic damage to the economy over the long term. | Governments run deficits for several reasons. By running short-run deficits, governments can avoid raising taxes during economic downturns, which helps households smooth consumption over time. Running deficits can stimulate aggregate demand in the economy, thus giving policymakers a valuable fiscal policy tool to help support macroeconomic stability. In particular, short-run deficits may help boost economic activity when monetary policy loses its potency. When interest rates fall during an economic downturn, banks can become reluctant to lend when perceived lending risks outweigh anticipated gains, while fewer firms and consumers demand new loans. In such a situation, known as a liquidity trap, a monetary authority such as the Federal Reserve can do little to expand the money supply. Thus, while the monetary authority can cut short-term interest rates to nearly zero—or even to zero—lower interest rates or other monetary policy initiatives may spur little new consumer spending or business investment. Non-traditional monetary policy, however, can play a key role in economic management. During a liquidity trap situation, fiscal policy tools such as increased government spending or tax cuts that increase deficits may be an important complement to monetary policy. So-called "fresh-water" economists have questioned the logic of these fiscal policies. So-called "salt-water" economists, who have sought to put Keynesian fiscal theories on a more modern foundation, contend that government interventions can mitigate economic downturns. Most professional economic forecasters find that deficits can stimulate economic activity when the economy runs below its potential.
In better economic times, deficits may crowd out private investment or worsen trade deficits. But long-run deficits may transfer economic resources from younger to older generations, allowing older generations to enjoy anticipated benefits of future economic growth—long-run deficits may also impose large burdens on future generations. Some have argued this allows politicians to act opportunistically by providing benefits to current constituents while leaving future generations, an unrepresented constituency, with substantial fiscal burdens.
Between 2007 and 2009, federal tax revenues fell by 18.0% and corporate tax revenues fell 62.7%. Government outlays rose during the recession due to "automatic stabilizer" programs such as unemployment insurance and income support programs; federal support provided to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, and other companies; and economic stimulus legislation such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; H.R. 1, P.L. 111-5).
Anticipation of changes in partisan control of government can motivate deficits, as current policy makers may wish to restrict their successors' options. Research on state and foreign governments suggests that balanced-budget rules force governments to adjust spending and taxes sharply during economic downturns. Budget enforcement legislation, such as the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (P.L. 101-508), may have helped preserve budgetary compromises between parties, which may have contributed to a reduction in federal deficits.
Deficits can seriously harm national economies. In the short run, fiscal overstimulation leads to inflation. In the long term, deficits either reduce capital investment, which retards economic growth, or increase foreign borrowing, which swells the share of national income going abroad. Governments can spend more than they collect in revenues by printing money, which causes inflation, or by borrowing. In the long run, governments risk default and bankruptcy if they fail to repay borrowers, at least to the extent of stabilizing the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product. This report, updated with the assistance of Joseph McCormack, will be modified as events warrant. |
crs_RL32177 | crs_RL32177_0 | This report provides a brief overview of federal law with respect to six selected advertising issues: alcohol advertising, tobacco advertising, the Federal Trade Commission Act, advertising by mail, advertising by telephone, and commercial email (spam). There are numerous federal statutes regulating advertising that do not fit within any of these categories. As random examples, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) requires disclosures in advertisements for prescription drugs; the Truth in Lending Act governs the advertising of consumer credit; and a federal criminal statute makes it illegal falsely to convey in an advertisement that a business is connected with a federal agency. | This report provides a brief overview of federal law with respect to six selected advertising issues: alcohol advertising, tobacco advertising, the Federal Trade Commission Act, advertising by mail (including junk mail), advertising by telephone, and commercial email (spam). There are numerous federal statutes regulating advertising that do not fit within any of these categories. As random examples, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) requires disclosures in advertisements for prescription drugs; the Truth in Lending Act governs the advertising of consumer credit; and a federal criminal statute makes it illegal falsely to convey in an advertisement that a business is connected with a federal agency. |
crs_RL32131 | crs_RL32131_0 | In 1988, the federal government sued the State of Florida and two of its state agencies, alleging that water released onto federal lands from agricultural sources contained elevated levels of phosphorus and other nutrients in violation of state water quality standards. Based on a 1992 Consent Decree settling this lawsuit, Florida enacted the Everglades Forever Act in 1994. This act required the state to establish a numeric limit for phosphorus by December 2003 (i.e., phosphorus criterion) and required actions to comply with this limit by December 2006. In spring 2003, Florida amended the 1994 Act to create significant flexibility in deadlines for phosphorus mitigation, and in July 2003, Florida issued a rule establishing a limit for phosphorus and methods to measure compliance with that limit. This concern is reflected in the FY2004 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act ( P.L. 108-137 ), and FY2004 Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act ( P.L. deadline. The provisions require federal agencies to determine whether Florida is meeting the deadline, and if not, the provisions state that Congress may disapprove FY2004 funding for some Everglades restoration projects. 108-108 states that both FY2004 funds and funds appropriated in prior years for the Modified Water Deliveries project should be available unless an annual report filed by the Secretaries of the Interior and the Army, the Attorney General, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finds that Florida is not meeting state water quality standards, and the state numeric phosphorus criteria and water quality requirements set forth in the 1992 Consent Decree in Arthur R. Marshall Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge (LNWR) and Everglades National Park (ENP). Energy and Water Appropriations
The FY2004 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act provides that $137 million appropriated for restoring the Everglades (including funding for the Central and Southern Florida project, the Everglades and South Florida Ecosystem Restoration project, and the Kissimmee River Restoration project) will be available unless: (1) the Secretary of the Army files an unfavorable report with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the State of Florida on whether Florida is meeting water quality requirements in the 1992 Consent Decree, within 30 days of enactment of the bill (December 31, 2003); (2) Florida fails to submit a plan to comply within 45 days of the report; (3) the Secretary files a report confirming that Florida has not delivered the plan; and (4) either the House or Senate Committee on Appropriations issues a written notice disapproving further expenditure of the funds. These laws may cause some to question the viability of the federal-state partnership which has guided Everglades restoration over the last decade. This could be interpreted as a departure from the status quo of federal-state cooperation to restore the Everglades. This amendment did not explicitly set a 2006 deadline, or any deadline, for phosphorus mitigation. Results of 1994 EFA
Phosphorus mitigation by agriculture in the Everglades seems to be working. Further Historical Context
The preceding history provides some context for the FY2004 appropriations provisions that restrict federal funding for Everglades restoration based on compliance with water quality standards. The following appendices provide further context in the form of (1) a historical timeline of efforts to address Everglades phosphorus pollution and (2) a side-by-side analysis of pending appropriations legislation. | Provisions in the FY2004 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act ( P.L. 108-137 ) and the FY2004 Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act ( P.L. 108-108 ) restrict funding for restoration activities in the Florida Everglades if Florida does not achieve certain phosphorus mitigation and water quality standards in Everglades waters by 2006. The provisions also require several federal agencies to report whether Florida is meeting the deadline. If not, some provisions state that Congress may disapprove funding for some Everglades restoration projects, including some projects in the $7.8 billion Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP). (For more information, see CRS Report RS20702, South Florida Ecosystem Restoration and the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].)
These provisions may represent a turning point in the 10-year federal-state partnership to restore the Everglades. Since 1993, the federal, state, tribal and local governments have generally worked together towards restoration. Congress has not previously conditioned federal Everglades funding on Florida taking specific actions towards restoration, both because of this partnership and because a federal Consent Decree and a state law (the Everglades Forever Act) set a deadline of 2006 for phosphorus mitigation. However, in spring 2003, the Florida legislature amended the Everglades Forever Act to extend the deadline until at least 2016.
Phosphorus pollution has been a concern in the Everglades for many years. Excess phosphorus can cause imbalances in vegetation and habitat and alter native ecosystems. Much of this phosphorus is discharged in water from the Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA), which is located north of the Arthur R. Marshall Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge and the Everglades National Park. The EAA has been used intensively for farming, particularly sugar cane, since the 1950s. In 1988, the federal government sued the State of Florida and two of its agencies, alleging that water released onto federal lands from agricultural sources contained elevated levels of phosphorus and other nutrients in violation of state water quality standards. Based on a 1992 Consent Decree settling this lawsuit, Florida enacted the Everglades Forever Act in 1994. This act required the state to establish a numeric limit for phosphorus by December 2003 and required actions to comply with this limit by December 2006. The federal judge overseeing the Consent Decree later adopted the December 2006 deadline. In spring 2003, Florida amended the 1994 Act to create flexibility in meeting deadlines for phosphorus mitigation to 2016 or later, and in July 2003, Florida issued a rule establishing a limit for phosphorus of 10 parts per billion and methods to measure compliance with that limit.
This report discusses the FY2004 appropriations provisions that condition federal funding for Everglades restoration on compliance with water quality standards, provides a side-by-side analysis of pending appropriations legislation, and provides background and a timeline of efforts to address Everglades phosphorus pollution. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41797 | crs_R41797_0 | Introduction
A clean energy standard (CES) has been proposed as a tool to provide a more sustainable domestic energy supply, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and secure the United States as a leader in clean energy technology. Some assert that a CES could contribute to economic growth. Opponents of a CES contend that a CES could raise electricity prices, introduce grid reliability concerns, require significant investment in additional transmission lines, and depend on adopting some technologies not yet established for widespread commercial-scale use. A CES could require certain electricity providers to obtain a portion of their electricity from qualifying clean energy sources. On March 1, 2012, Senator Bingaman introduced the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 ( S. 2146 ), which would require large utilities to sell a percentage of their electricity from clean energy sources—at least 24% in 2015 and gradually increasing over time to 84% by 2035. RES legislative discussions date back to at least the 105 th Congress. A CES expands qualifying energy sources to include other "clean" energy sources (e.g., nuclear, natural gas, clean coal) along with renewable energy sources (e.g., wind, solar). Renewable sources constituted roughly 12% of total electric power net generation in 2011 (including conventional hydroelectric). Analysis from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) that does not include the addition of a federal RES or CES suggests that electricity generation from renewable sources (including conventional hydroelectric) will grow from 10% in 2010 to 16% in 2035. EIA analysis indicates that most of the growth in renewable electricity generation in the power sector, excluding hydroelectricity, from 2010 to 2035 will consist of generation from wind and biomass facilities. Each energy source has advantages and disadvantages, and each brings different natural resource, economic, and technical challenges. In evaluating individual energy sources for possible inclusion, Congress might consider the following criteria: geographic location of the energy source, energy source supply levels, job creation associated with the energy source, implementation time frame, EPA regulations (existing and forthcoming), environmental issues (air quality, water quality, water quantity, wildlife), greenhouse gas emissions, baseload versus non-baseload, energy balance, energy content, land use change, scalability, and cost. Issues Applicable to All Clean Energy Resources
A number of cross-cutting issues are associated with large-scale electricity production for many or all of the clean energy sources:
Technology. Electricity Transmission. In some cases, the energy source is located a considerable distance from where the electricity is needed. Variability. Material cost and supply. The following policy questions might arise when considering biomass as a qualifying CES energy source:
Will agricultural producers continue to receive support from the federal government to grow certain crops if a CES is established? Clean Coal36
There has been considerable discussion about including clean coal (coal-fired power plants equipped with carbon capture and sequestration) as a qualifying energy source for a CES. In order to reduce the cost of solar electricity, research and development initiatives may be necessary. Should legislation account for other sources and technologies that are not yet developed? How much clean electricity can be generated in the time frame specified from each qualifying energy source? Should a carbon accounting factor be assigned to each qualifying energy source? Will a time come when some resources (e.g., wind, solar) used to generate clean electricity cease to be considered a "free" resource? Should energy efficiency be included in a CES, and if so, how should it be included? How would a CES interact with state renewable electricity requirements? Who would assume the costs of new transmission capacity? | A clean energy standard (CES) has been identified as one possible legislative option to encourage a more diverse domestic electricity portfolio. A CES could require certain electricity providers to obtain a portion of their electricity from qualifying clean energy sources. A CES is broader than a renewable energy standard (RES), including "clean" energy sources along with renewable sources. The RES has been a topic of legislative attention since at least the 105th Congress. A CES gained legislative attention with the introduction of the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 (S. 2146). The bill would require large utilities to sell a percentage of their electricity from clean energy sources—at least 24% in 2015 and gradually increasing over time to 84% by 2035. Some assert that a CES could lead to economic growth, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and secure U.S. leadership in clean energy technology. Others argue that it could raise electricity prices, necessitate additional financial investment in grid infrastructure, and—in some cases—depend on energy technologies that are not yet established for widespread commercial-scale use.
Without a CES, some clean energy sources—mostly the renewables—may face barriers to penetrating and gaining traction in the electricity market. Renewable sources (including conventional hydroelectric) constituted roughly 12% of total electric power net generation in 2011. Analysis from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) suggests that without a CES or RES, electricity generation for renewable sources (including conventional hydroelectric) will grow from 10% in 2010 to 16% in 2035. EIA analysis indicates that most of the growth in renewable electricity generation, excluding hydroelectricity, in the power sector from 2010 to 2035 will consist of generation from wind and biomass facilities.
Policy, economic, and technical considerations arise when evaluating CES options. A primary question in the CES legislative discussion is which energy sources would be eligible to participate. Congress could take into account the following clean energy source selection criteria: geographic location of the energy source, energy source supply levels, job creation associated with the energy source, the implementation time frame, environmental regulations (existing and forthcoming), and cost. Each potential qualifying energy source has advantages and disadvantages, and has different natural resource, economic, and technical challenges. For instance, the cost to build, operate, and maintain clean energy power plants varies widely, from $63 (natural gas advanced combined-cycle) to $312 (solar thermal) per megawatt-hour. Moreover, some of the sources proposed have encountered public opposition (e.g., nuclear energy). Many proposed sources (e.g., solar) have received government support in the form of research and development assistance or favorable tax treatment. In some cases, the technology that might allow certain sources to qualify for a CES is not yet at commercial scale (e.g., coal-fired plants equipped with carbon capture and sequestration). Cross-cutting issues including electricity transmission, variability, and material cost and supply are associated with large-scale electricity production for many of the commonly discussed clean energy sources.
Many questions will need to be answered if a CES is established. How much clean electricity can be generated from each qualifying energy source, given the proposed CES time frame? Should a carbon accounting parameter be assigned to each source? Will a time come when some resources (e.g., wind, solar) used to generate clean electricity cease to be considered a "free" resource? Should energy efficiency be included in a CES, and if so, how should it be included? How would a CES interact with state renewable electricity requirements? Who would assume the costs of new transmission capacity? |
crs_R40076 | crs_R40076_0 | Introduction
Congressional commissions are formal groups established by Congress to provide independent advice, make recommendations for changes in public policy, study or investigate a particular problem or event, or perform a specific duty. Although no legal definition exists for what constitutes a "congressional commission," in this report, a congressional commission is defined as a multi-member independent entity that (1) is established by Congress, (2) exists temporarily, (3) serves in an advisory capacity, (4) is appointed in part or whole by Members of Congress, and (5) reports to Congress. These five characteristics effectively serve to differentiate a congressional commission from a presidential commission, an executive branch commission, or other bodies with "commission" in their names. Over 100 congressional commissions have been established since 1989. By establishing a commission, Congress can potentially provide a highly visible forum for important issues and assemble greater expertise than may be readily available within the legislature. Complex policy issues can be examined over a longer time period and in greater depth than may be practical for legislators. Finally, the non-partisan or bipartisan character of most congressional commissions may make their findings and recommendations more politically acceptable, both in Congress and among the public. Critics argue that many congressional commissions are established by legislators seeking "blame avoidance," and take difficult decisions out of the hands of Congress. The temporary status of congressional commissions and short time period they are often given to complete their work product makes it important that legislators craft statutes creating congressional commissions with care. Potential Value of Congressional Commissions
Throughout American history, Congress has found commissions to be useful tools in the legislative process. A wide variety of options are available for each of these organizational choices. Legislators can tailor the composition, organization, and working arrangements of a commission, based on the particular goals of Congress. As a result, individual congressional commissions often have an organizational structure and powers quite different from one another. | Congressional advisory commissions are formal groups established to provide independent advice; make recommendations for changes in public policy; study or investigate a particular problem, issue, or event; or perform a duty. While no legal definition exists for what constitutes a "congressional commission," in this report a congressional commission is defined as a multi-member independent entity that (1) is established by Congress, (2) exists temporarily, (3) serves in an advisory capacity, (4) is appointed in part or whole by Members of Congress, and (5) reports to Congress. These five characteristics differentiate a congressional commission from a presidential commission, an executive branch commission, or other bodies with "commission" in their names. Over 100 congressional commissions have been established since 1989.
Throughout American history, Congress has found commissions to be useful entities in the legislative process. By establishing a commission, Congress can potentially provide a highly visible forum for important issues and assemble greater expertise than may be readily available within the legislature. Complex policy issues can be examined over a longer time period and in greater depth than may be practical for legislators. Finally, the non-partisan or bipartisan character of most congressional commissions may make their findings and recommendations more politically acceptable, both in Congress and among the public. Critics argue that many congressional commissions are expensive, often formed to take difficult decisions out of the hands of Congress, and are mostly ignored when they report their findings and recommendations.
The temporary status of congressional commissions and short time period they are often given to complete their work product makes it important that legislators craft statutes creating congressional commissions with care. A wide variety of options are available, and legislators can tailor the composition, organization, and working arrangements of a commission, based on the particular goals of Congress. As a result, individual congressional commissions often have an organizational structure and powers quite different from one another.
This report provides an overview and analysis of congressional advisory commissions, information on the general statutory structure of a congressional commission, and a catalog of congressional commissions created since the 101st Congress. |
crs_RS20531 | crs_RS20531_0 | Although there is some variance among the standards, all of them limit sound levels at least to a degree that would prevent human hearing loss. Public interest in the federal regulation of noise and the adequacy of existing standards continues to be strong, especially among communities where sources of noise have proliferated, and as residential development has resulted in people living closer to sources of noise. Potential effects of various sound levels, and the roles of federal, state, and local governments in regulating individual sources of noise, are discussed below. The Noise Control Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-574) and several other federal laws require the federal government to set and enforce noise standards for aircraft and airports, interstate motor carriers and railroads, workplace activities, engines and certain types of equipment, federally funded highway projects, and federally funded housing projects. With this authority, EPA established standards for motorcycles and mopeds, medium and heavy-duty trucks over 10,000 pounds, and portable air compressors. For example, the FAA has promulgated regulations limiting noise from aircraft operations in the vicinity of Grand Canyon National Park. The federal role in regulating noise is primarily limited to transportation, workplace activities, certain types of equipment, and human activities on public lands owned by the federal government. State and local governments determine the extent to which other sources of noise are controlled, and regulations for such sources can vary widely among localities. Sources of noise commonly regulated at the state and local level include commercial, industrial, and residential activities. | Community perceptions of increasing exposure to noise from a wide array of sources have raised questions about the role of the federal government in regulating noise, and the adequacy of existing standards. The role of the federal government in regulating noise has remained fairly constant overall since the enactment of the Noise Control Act in 1972 (P.L. 92-574). With authorities under this and other related statutes, the federal government has established, and enforces, standards for maximum sound levels generated from aircraft and airports, federally funded highways, interstate motor carriers and railroads, medium- and heavy-duty trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, workplace activities, and portable air compressors. The federal government also regulates human exposure to noise in federally funded housing. In more recent years, the federal role has expanded to include regulation of noise generated by human activities on public lands, including National Parks. State and local governments determine the extent to which other sources of noise are regulated, including commercial, industrial, and residential activities. Although noise standards generally provide a level of protection sufficient to prevent human hearing loss, they vary among individual sources in terms of what level of sound is permissible. This report explains potential effects of various sound levels, describes the role of the federal government in regulating noise, characterizes existing federal standards, discusses the role of state and local governments, and examines relevant issues. |
crs_RL32824 | crs_RL32824_0 | The federal government increased its involvement in domestic law enforcement through a series of grant programs to encourage and assist states and communities in their efforts to control crime and in the expansion in the number of offenses that could be prosecuted in the federal criminal justice system. Over a 10-year period (1984-1994), Congress enacted five major anti-crime bills and increased appropriations for federal assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies. Within the past several years, however, some federal assistance to state and local law enforcement has declined, and the FBI refocused its resources on countering terrorism as federal post-9/11 law enforcement efforts have focused primarily on protecting the nation against terrorist attacks. This report focuses on the aforementioned crime-related issues and legislation that have been acted upon in the 110 th Congress. Violent Crime Rate
According to the UCR, the violent crime rate began to increase sharply in the 1960s. By the mid-1990s, however, the violent crime rate began to decline (see Figure 1 ). Despite the slight increases in the violent crime rate in 2005 and 2006, the rate remained at a 30-year low. The 110 th Congress is considering such legislation, and on May 3, 2007, the House passed the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 ( H.R. 1592 ). 1700 ) and on May 24, 2007, the Senate passed a different version of the COPS Improvement Act of 2007 ( S. 368 ). In the 110 th Congress, however, legislation was enacted on January 7, 2008 (the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007; P.L. 110-177 ). On April 9, 2008, the Second Chance Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-199 ) was enacted. The Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 (Title II of P.L. Congress, through the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, directed the U.S. In May 2007, the Commission proposed an amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines that would amend the guidelines by lowering the recommended penalties for crack cocaine offenses in an effort to alleviate some of the issues associated with the sentencing disparity in current law between crack and powder cocaine. S. 1276 , the Methamphetamine Production Prevention Act of 2008 ( P.L. 1199 , the Drug-Endangered Children Act of 2007 ( P.L. The Senate passed the Gang Abatement and Prevention Act of 2007 ( S. 456 ) on September 21, 2007. The Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2008 ( P.L. Additionally, the Act authorizes a new grant program that provides grants to state, local, and tribal governments to provide for (1) programs that offer law enforcement personnel specialized and comprehensive training in procedures to identify and respond appropriately to incidents involving individuals with mental illness; (2) the development of specialized receiving centers to assess individuals in the custody of law enforcement for suicide risk and mental health and substance abuse treatment needs; (3) computerized information systems (or to improve existing systems) to provide timely information to improve the response to mentally ill offenders; (4) the establishment and expansion of cooperative efforts by criminal and juvenile justice agencies and mental health agencies to promote public safety through the use of effective intervention with respect to mentally ill offenders; and (5) programs that offer campus security personnel training in procedures to identify and respond appropriately to incidents involving individuals with mental illness. The Debbie Smith Reauthorization Act of 2008 ( P.L. For example, the Federal Prison Industries Competition in Contracting Act of 2005 ( H.R. Other Issues
In addition to the aforementioned legislation, other crime-related issues have surfaced during the 110 th Congress, as discussed below. Maintaining the Fugitive Database
On September 18, 2008, the Senate Judiciary Committee amended and favorably reported (without a written report) the Fugitive Information Networked Database Act of 2008 (or the FIND Act; S. 3136 ). The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. | States and localities have the primary responsibility for prevention and control of domestic crime. As crime became more rampant, the federal government increased its involvement in crime control efforts. Over a period of 10 years, Congress passed five major anti-crime bills and increased appropriations for federal assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, federal law enforcement efforts have been focused more on countering terrorism and maintaining homeland security. Amid these efforts, however, Congress continues to address many crime-related issues.
Many have attributed the increased attention the federal government gave to crime issues in the 1980s and 1990s to the rising crime rate. The violent crime rate, for example, began to increase in the 1960s, continuing to rise in the mid-1990s before starting to decline in the late-1990s. The continued decline in the violent crime rate in the early 2000's coincided with national attention being focused away from domestic crimes and more on securing the homeland against terrorism. During this period, Congress began to increase federal funding to homeland security-related activities. In 2005, however, the violent crime rate began to increase and continued to increase in 2006, before declining again in 2007. The increase in the violent crime rate in 2005 and 2006, however, continues to remain at an over 30 year low.
The 110th Congress is considering a variety of crime-related legislation, some of which has either been enacted, reported out of committee, and/or passed one or the other Chamber. For example, the following Acts were enacted during the 110th Congress: the Court Security Improvement Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-177); the Second Chance Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-199); the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-326); the Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-358); the Drug-Endangered Children Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-345); the Debbie Smith Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-360); the Methamphetamine Production Prevention Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-415); and the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-416). The House passed the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 (H.R. 1592) and the COPS Improvement Act of 2007 (H.R. 1700). The Senate passed the Gang Abatement and Prevention Act of 2007 (S. 456), and the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported the COPS Improvement Act of 2007 (S. 368), the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2008 (S. 3155), and the Fugitive Information Networked Database Act of 2008 (S. 3136). In addition to the aforementioned legislation, other crime-related issues have surfaced during the 110th Congress that could warrant congressional action, such as the U.S. Sentencing Commission amending the federal sentencing guidelines by lowering the recommended penalties for crack cocaine offenses in an effort to alleviate some of the issues associated with the sentencing disparity in current law between crack and powder cocaine; reforming the Federal Prison Industries; reforming the federal sentencing system; and providing oversight of the various Department of Justice grant programs. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL33424 | crs_RL33424_0 | Public interest in the means by which the government may collect telephone call records has been raised by revelations in recent years regarding alleged intelligence activity by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). According to a USA Today article from May 11, 2006, the NSA allegedly sought and obtained records of telephone numbers called and received from millions of telephones within the United States from three telephone service providers; a fourth reportedly refused to provide such records. Additionally, a series of reports issued by the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG), most recently in January of 2010, indicate that, between 2002 and 2006, consumer records held by telephone companies had been provided to the FBI through the use of "exigent letters" and other informal methods that fell outside of the national security letter (NSL) process embodied in statute and internal FBI policies. This report summarizes legal authorities regarding access by the government, for either foreign intelligence or law enforcement purposes, to information related to telephone calling patterns or practices. Where pertinent, it also discusses statutory prohibitions against accessing or disclosing such information, along with relevant exceptions to those prohibitions. Statutory provisions authorizing, pursuant to court order, the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices exist in both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. Section 1841 et seq ., and, for law enforcement purposes, in 18 U.S.C. Section 3121 et seq . For example, FISA's "business records" provision, 50 U.S.C. Section 1861, authorizes court orders to compel the production of "any tangible thing" relevant to collection of foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person, or relevant to an investigation into international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. Access to stored electronic communications is also addressed in 18 U.S.C. Section 2701 et seq. Required disclosure of customer records to the government under certain circumstances is addressed under 18 U.S.C. Section 2703, including, among others, disclosure pursuant to a warrant or grand jury or trial subpoena. Section 2709 is a national security letter provision, under which a wire or electronic service provider may be compelled to provide subscriber information and toll billing records information, or electronic communication transactional records in its custody or possession in response to a request by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) if the Director of the FBI, or his designee in a position not lower than Deputy Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge designated by the FBI Director in a field office, certifies that the records or information sought is relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation of a U.S. person is not conducted solely on the basis of First Amendment protected activities. Finally, Section 222 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. Violations of the pertinent provisions of law or regulation may expose service providers to criminal sanctions, civil penalties and forfeiture provisions, 47 U.S.C. Under 50 U.S.C. Section 2702, voluntary disclosure of customer communications records by a service provider is prohibited unless it falls within one of several exceptions, including
disclosure as authorized in 18 U.S.C. | Public interest in the means by which the government may collect telephone call records has been raised by revelations in recent years regarding alleged intelligence activity by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). According to a USA Today article from May 11, 2006, the NSA allegedly sought and obtained records of telephone numbers called and received from millions of telephones within the United States from three telephone service providers; a fourth reportedly refused to provide such records. Additionally, a series of reports issued by the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG), most recently in January of 2010, indicate that, between 2002 and 2006, consumer records held by telephone companies had been provided to the FBI through the use of "exigent letters" and other informal methods that fell outside of the national security letter (NSL) process embodied in statute and internal FBI policies.
The Supreme Court has held that there is no Fourth Amendment protection of telephone calling records held in the hands of third party providers, where the content of any call is not intercepted. However, this report summarizes existing statutory authorities regarding access by the government, for either foreign intelligence or law enforcement purposes, to information related to telephone calling patterns or practices. Where pertinent, it also discusses statutory prohibitions against accessing or disclosing such information, along with relevant exceptions to those prohibitions.
Statutory provisions authorizing, pursuant to court order, the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices exist in both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. Section 1841 et seq., and, for law enforcement purposes, in 18 U.S.C. Section 3121 et seq.
FISA's "business records" provision, 50 U.S.C. Section 1861, provides authority, pursuant to court order, for requests for production of "any tangible thing" relevant to collection of foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person, or relevant to an investigation into international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. Under 50 U.S.C. Section 1861, an investigation concerning a U.S. person may not be based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment.
Access to stored electronic communications is addressed in 18 U.S.C. Section 2701 et seq. 18 U.S.C. Section 2702 prohibits voluntary disclosure of customer communications records by a service provider unless it falls within one of several exceptions. Required disclosure of customer records to the government under certain circumstances is addressed under 18 U.S.C. Section 2703, including, among others, disclosure pursuant to a warrant or grand jury or trial subpoena. 18 U.S.C. Section 2709 is a national security letter provision, under which a wire or electronic service provider may be compelled to provide subscriber information and toll billing records information, or electronic communication transactional records in its custody or possession.
Finally, Section 222 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, protects customer proprietary network information, and violations of pertinent provisions of law or regulation may expose service providers to criminal sanctions, civil penalties, and forfeiture provisions. |
crs_RL30624 | crs_RL30624_0 | Super Hornets and Growlers were procured in FY2005-FY2009 under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement. The Navy's proposed FY2012 budget requests about $2.4 billion for the procurement of 28 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet strike fighters and about $1.1 billion for the procurement of 12 EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft. 1540 funded the F-18 program at the requested levels. Senate
As reported to the Senate, S. 1253 cut $495 million and nine aircraft from the request for F/A-18E/Fs, citing Navy projections that the fighter shortfall would be less than earlier anticipated. 112-26 ) stated:
F/A–18E/F
The budget request included $2,431.7 million to purchase 28 F/A–18E/F aircraft. FY2012 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2219 reduced the EA-18G request by $77.8 million. 2219 cut $7 million from the EA-18G request to "reduce engineering change orders to 2010 levels." FY2011 Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. | The Navy's proposed FY2012 budget requests about $2.4 billion for the procurement of 28 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet strike fighters and about $1.1 billion for the procurement of 12 EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft. The F-18s will be procured under a multiyear procurement contract approved by Congress in FY2011.
FY2012 defense authorization bill:
The House Armed Services Committee funded the F-18 program at the requested level. The Senate Armed Services Committee cut $495 million and nine aircraft from the request for F/A-18E/Fs, citing Navy projections that the fighter shortfall would be less than earlier anticipated.
FY2012 DOD appropriations bill:
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees both approved the requested number of aircraft, but reduced the funds available to the program. The HAC cut $77.8 million from the EA-18G request and $63.5 million from the F/A-18E/F request. The SAC cut $7 million from the EA-18G request, $99.7 million from the F/A-18E/F request, and a further $54 million from the overall program. |
crs_RL32831 | crs_RL32831_0 | Introduction
American voters elect the President and Vice President of the United States under a complex arrangement of constitutional provisions, federal and state laws, and political party practices known as the electoral college system. Despite occasional close elections, this system has delivered uncontested results in 47 of 51 elections since adoption of the 12 th Amendment, effective in 1804. For further information on this proposal, please consult CRS Report RL32611, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections , by [author name scrubbed]. While a system that allows such a miscarriage of the popular will might have been acceptable in the 19 th century, opponents maintain that it has no place in the 21 st .
Reform Proposals in the 109th Congress
H.J.Res. 8
H.J.Res. 8 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary on January 4, 2005, and to its Subcommittee on the Constitution on March 2. 17
H.J.Res. H.J.Res. 36
H.J.Res. 17 ). H.J.Res. 50
H.J.Res. No further action was taken during the balance of the 109 th Congress. S.J.Res 11
S.J.Res. 11 was introduced by Senator Dianne Feinstein on March 16, 2005, and has been cosponsored by Senator Barbara Boxer. Section 1 of this proposal sought to establish direct popular election of the President and Vice President, eliminating the electoral college system. S.J.Res. 11 was read twice in the Senate on March 16, 2005, and immediately referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. First, the volume of proposed amendments that would reform the electoral college, as opposed to those that would eliminate the electoral college and substitute direct popular election, has declined almost to zero. | American voters elect the President and Vice President of the United States under a complex arrangement of constitutional provisions, federal and state laws, and political party practices known as the electoral college system. For additional information on contemporary operation of the system, please consult CRS Report RL32611, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections, by [author name scrubbed].
Despite occasional close elections, this system has delivered uncontested results in 47 of 51 elections since the 12th Amendment was ratified in 1804. Down these many years, however, it has been the subject of persistent criticism and numerous reform proposals. In the contemporary context, related measures fall into two basic categories: those that would eliminate the electoral college and substitute direct popular election of the President and Vice President, and those that would retain the existing system in some form, while correcting perceived defects.
Four relevant proposed amendments were introduced in the 109th Congress: H.J.Res. 8 (Representative Gene Green, and others); H.J.Res. 17 (Representative Eliot Engel and others); H.J.Res. 36, (Representative Jesse Jackson, Jr., and others); H.J.Res. 50 (Representative Zoe Lofgren and others); and S.J.Res. 11 (Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer). All proposed to eliminate the electoral college and substitute direct popular election, while H.J.Res. 8, H.J.Res. 17, H.J.Res. 50 and S.J.Res. 11 also sought to empower Congress to set federal standards for various aspects of voting registration and election administration procedures. The House measures were referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and to its Subcommittee on the Constitution, while S.J.Res. 11 was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. No further action was taken on any of them during the life of the 109th Congress.
For additional information on electoral college contingencies and broader aspects of reform proposals, please consult CRS Report RL30804, The Electoral College: An Overview and Analysis of Reform Proposals, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL31502 | crs_RL31502_0 | Subsequently, Congress legislated economic sanctions against countries that contribute to the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in a broad array of laws. Other foreign policy and national security concerns—terrorism, regional stability, human rights, and the nexus among these issues that shape rogue regimes—could result in increased use of economic sanctions. This report offers an alphabetic listing and brief description of legal provisions that require or authorize the imposition of some form of economic sanction on countries, companies, or persons who violate U.S. nonproliferation norms. For each provision, information is included on what triggers the imposition of sanctions, their duration, what authority the President has to delay or abstain from imposing sanctions, and what authority the President has to waive the imposition of sanctions. Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act of 200032
Sections 2 through 5 (Reports; Application; Procedures; Determination; 50 U.S.C. The President also may waive the sanctions if he finds it "vital to the national security interests of the United States" to do so, and so notifies the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations. 2139a) , relating to a requirement of prior consultation and the reorganization of the Department of State. | The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the means to deliver them, are front and center today for policy makers who guide and form U.S. foreign policy and national security policy, and economic sanctions are considered a valuable asset in the national security and foreign policy toolbox. The United States currently maintains robust sanctions regimes against foreign governments it has identified as proliferators (particularly Iran, North Korea, and Syria). If the 112th Congress takes up even a fraction of the proposals introduced by its predecessor involving economic sanctions, the President and the Departments of State, Commerce, and Treasury—those agencies that implement and administer the bulk of sanctions regimes—will likely find the role of Congress in determining the use of sanctions also robust.
This report offers a listing and brief description of legal provisions that require or authorize the imposition of some form of economic sanction against countries, companies, persons, or entities that violate U.S. nonproliferation norms. For each provision, information is included on what triggers the imposition of sanctions, their duration, what authority the President has to delay or abstain from imposing sanctions, and what authority the President has to waive the imposition of sanctions. |
crs_RS20821 | crs_RS20821_0 | General Findings
This report identifies assassinations of and other direct assaults against Presidents, Presidents-elect, and candidates for the office of President. There have been 15 such attacks (against 14 individuals), with five resulting in death. The tally of victims reveals the following:
Of the 43 individuals serving as President, 10 (or about 23%) have been subject to actual or attempted assassinations. All but one of the 15 assaults occurred within the United States. | Direct assaults against Presidents, Presidents-elect, and candidates have occurred on 15 separate occasions, with five resulting in death. Ten incumbents (about 23% of the 43 individuals to serve in the office), including four of the seven most recent Presidents, have been victims or targets. Four of the 10 (and one candidate) died as a result of the attacks. This report identifies these incidents and provides information about what happened, when, where, and, if known, why. The report will be updated and revised if developments require. |
crs_RS22509 | crs_RS22509_0 | Since 2001, five prime ministers have held office. PiS was founded in 2001 by identical twin brothers, Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski. After the elections, PiS and PO were expected to form a coalition, but talks soon collapsed. The formation of the coalition has had both domestic and continental repercussions: Poland's Foreign Minister tendered his resignation in protest, and in June, the European Parliament stated that the leaders of LPR "incite people to hatred and violence." Over the following months, additional high level government officials either resigned or were sacked, and the Kaczynskis reportedly consolidated their power by appointing loyalists to those posts. Observers believe the dispute will be resolved after August 22, when parliament reconvenes after recess. Early elections are possible. Under the new government Poland's relations with Germany and Russia have been strained at times. Relations with the United States
Poland and the United States have historically close relations. | Poland held presidential and parliamentary elections in the fall of 2005. After several months, a ruling coalition consisting of three populist-nationalist parties was formed; the presidency and prime minister's post are held by Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, identical twin brothers who have increasingly consolidated their power. Their government's nationalist policies have caused controversy domestically, in both the political and economic arenas, and in foreign relations as well. Relations with some neighboring states and the European Union have been strained at times, but ties with the United States have not undergone significant change. Some observers believe that a recent dispute within the coalition may spark early elections. This report may be updated as events warrant. See also CRS Report RL32967, Poland: Foreign Policy Trends, and CRS Report RL32966, Poland: Background and Current Issues, both by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44109 | crs_R44109_0 | Introduction
The President is responsible for appointing individuals to positions throughout the federal government. In some instances, the President makes these appointments using authorities granted by law to the President alone. Other appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate via the nomination and confirmation of appointees. This report identifies, for the 113 th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions requiring Senate confirmation in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other CRS reports. Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/ , the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code , and the 2012 Plum Book ( United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions ). Appointments During the 113th Congress
During the 113 th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted 69 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these nominations, 34 were confirmed, 34 were returned to the President, and 1 was withdrawn. The mean (average) number of days elapsed between nomination and confirmation was 123.9. The median number of days elapsed was 104.0. | The President makes appointments to positions within the federal government, either using the authorities granted by law to the President alone or with the advice and consent of the Senate. This report identifies all nominations that were submitted to the Senate for full-time positions in 40 organizations in the executive branch (27 independent agencies, 6 agencies in the Executive Office of the President [EOP], and 7 multilateral organizations) and 4 agencies in the legislative branch. It excludes appointments to executive departments and to regulatory and other boards and commissions, which are covered in other reports.
Information for each agency is presented in tables. The tables include full-time positions confirmed by the Senate, pay levels for these positions, and appointment action within each agency. Additional summary information across all agencies covered in the report appears in the appendix.
During the 113th Congress, the President submitted 69 nominations to the Senate for full-time positions in independent agencies, agencies in the EOP, multilateral agencies, and legislative branch agencies. Of these 69 nominations, 34 were confirmed, 1 was withdrawn, and 34 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, a mean (average) of 123.9 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 104.0.
Information for this report was compiled using the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System (LIS) at http://www.lis.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2012 Plum Book (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL34575 | crs_RL34575_0 | Introduction
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (S SCRA) provided civil protections and rights to individuals based on their service in the U.S. armed forces. On December 19, 2003, Congress enacted P.L. 108-189 , the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), in response to the increased utilization of Reserve and National Guard military units in the Global War on Terrorism, and as a modernization and restatement of the protections and rights previously available to servicemembers under the SSCRA. Much like with the SSCRA, the SCRA has been amended since its initial passage and proposed changes continue to be introduced in Congress. Congress has long recognized the need for protective legislation for servicemembers whose service to the nation compromises their ability to meet obligations and protect their legal interests. Forgiveness of all debts or the extinguishment of contractual obligations on behalf of servicemembers, who have been called up for active duty, is not provided, nor is absolute immunity from civil lawsuits granted. One measure that affects many who are called to active duty is the cap on interest at an annual rate of 6% on debts incurred prior to a person's entry into active duty military service (Section 207). The coverage ends in the event the orders to active duty are revoked. They serve to suspend civil liabilities of military personnel and preserve causes of action either for or against them. Protection of servicemembers against default judgments—Section 201 (50 U.S.C. For the purposes of Title IV of the SCRA, the following definitions apply:
'Policy' — "Policy" includes any individual contract for whole, endowment, universal, or term life insurance (other than group term life insurance), or benefit similar to life insurance that comes from membership in any fraternal or beneficial association and has to satisfy all of the following conditions:
1. the policy does not include a provision limiting the amount of insurance coverage based on the insured's military service; 2. the policy does not require the insured to pay higher premiums if he or she is in military service; 3. the policy does not include a provision that limits or restricts coverage if the insured person engages in any activity required by military service; and 4. the policy has to be "in force" (premiums have to be paid on time before any benefit guaranteed by these sections of the law can be claimed) for at least 180 days before the insured enters military service. | Recognizing the special burdens that members of the military may encounter trying to meet their financial obligations while serving their country, Congress passed the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (SSCRA) in 1940. The law was amended from time to time, ordinarily in response to military operations that required the activation of the Reserves. P.L. 108-189, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), was enacted on December 19, 2003, as a modernization and restatement of the protections contained in the SSCRA. Much like with the SSCRA, the SCRA has been amended since its initial passage and proposed changes continue to be introduced in Congress. This report summarizes the rights granted to persons serving on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces, and in some instances, to their dependents, under the SCRA.
The SCRA provides protections for servicemembers in the event that their military service impedes their ability to meet financial obligations incurred before entry into active military service. Forgiveness of all debts or the extinguishment of contractual obligations on behalf of servicemembers, who have been called up for active duty, is not provided, nor is absolute immunity from civil lawsuits granted. Instead, the act suspends civil claims against servicemembers and protects them from default judgments. The SCRA includes provisions that prohibit the eviction of military members and their dependents from rental or mortgaged property; create a cap on interest at 6% on debts incurred prior to an individual entering active duty military service; protect against the cancellation of life insurance or the non-reinstatement of health insurance policies; allow some professionals to suspend malpractice or liability insurance while on active duty; and proscribe taxation in multiple jurisdictions and forced property sales in order to pay overdue taxes. The U.S. Attorney General is authorized to commence a civil action to enforce provisions of the SCRA. Additionally, servicemembers and their dependents have the right to commence a civil action, that is, a private cause of action, to enforce protections afforded them under the SCRA. |
crs_97-856 | crs_97-856_0 | Introduction
Function of the Discharge Rule
The "discharge rule" of the House of Representatives (Rule XV, clause 2), provides a means by which a majority of Members may bring to the floor for consideration a measure that has not been reported from committee. During these years, the House adopted only 26 discharge motions. No further changes occurred until the 1990s, when the House:
eliminated a provision that had the effect of preventing debate on, or amendment of, a special rule reaching the floor through discharge (1991); provided that the names of Members signing discharge petitions be publicly available (1993); and made the procedure inapplicable to any special rule that would have the effect of permitting non-germane amendments, or that would provide for the consideration of more than one measure (1997). Data Presented
The data presented herein on use of the discharge procedure are of three kinds:
(1) overall figures on use of the discharge procedure in each Congress, 1931-2002 (72 nd -107 th Congresses);
(2) the number of signatures received by each discharge petition, 1993-2002 (103 rd -107 th Congresses); and
(3) a summary of any action beyond the committee stage that occurred on measures on which discharge petitions were filed, 1967-2002 (90 th -107 th Congresses). If the petition is filed on a special rule for considering the measure, however, then even if the committee reports the measure, it remains in order to discharge the Committee on Rules from the special rule. During this period, the Committee on Rules recurrently declined to respond to committee and leadership requests to report special rules for considering measures reported by committees. This form of discharge attempt has become uncommon in recent years, but it was used in the 107 th Congress after the House rejected a proposed special rule for considering a campaign finance reform bill, and the leadership declined to make another attempt to call it up. A second grouping of 36 petitions was signed by fewer Members than the strength of the minority party, but more than half this number (usually, by more than 100). Thirteen, by contrast, received between 30 and 60 signatures. On average throughout the entire period, fewer than 10% of petitions have been entered. Eight of these received floor consideration (6% of the 138 unreported measures on which petitions were filed). Among measures that were subjected to discharge attempts and reached the floor, the proportions that did so under procedures other than discharge itself were
50% when the petitions were filed directly on unreported measures, 80% when they were filed on special rules for unreported measures, and 100% when they were was filed on special rules for reported measures. These figures indicate that measures became increasingly likely to reach the floor under alternative procedures, rather than pursuant to the discharge rule itself, the more directly the form of the discharge effort represented a challenge to the normal control of the floor agenda by the leadership and the Committee on Rules. Of the 12 measures on which a petition was entered, nevertheless, the House passed only six. All six of the rejected measures were constitutional amendments, which require a two-thirds vote for passage. Correspondingly, of the 16 measures considered under other procedures, whether or not the petitions were entered, three (all of them constitutional amendments) were defeated. The House passed the other 13, none of which was a constitutional amendment. Number of Signatures
Table 8 notes which petitions obtained the full 218 signatures required before a motion to discharge may be offered on the House floor. | The discharge rule of the House of Representatives affords a way for Members to bring to the floor a measure not reported from committee. It may also be used to bring to the floor a special rule for consideration of a measure, either reported or unreported, if the Committee on Rules declines to do so. Before a motion to discharge may be made, 218 Members must sign a petition for that purpose.
Since the present form of discharge rule was adopted in 1931, 563 discharge petitions have been filed, of which 47 obtained the required signatures. The House voted for discharge 26 times, and passed 19 of the measures involved, but only two became law (and two others changed House Rules). Discharge attempts, however, may also lead indirectly to legislative success. The House considered 10 of the measures on which petitions were completed, under other procedures, and eight of these became law. It also took up, under other procedures, 32 measures on which petitions were still pending. Of these, all but three passed the House, and 17 received final approval. Overall, either the petition was completed, or the measure received floor action by some means, in about 16% of discharge attempts.
During the past 35 years (1967-2002), discharge petitions on 12 measures obtained the required signatures. The House voted for discharge six times, and considered the other six measures under other procedures. Six of the 12 measures were rejected, all of them proposed constitutional amendments, which require a two-thirds majority for passage. The House adopted one amendment to the discharge rule itself, one proposed constitutional amendment (which failed in the Senate), and four measures that became law. During this period, it also used other procedures (such as a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules) to consider 10 additional measures on which discharge was attempted, of which six became law.
Increasingly often in recent years, the Committee on Rules has responded to discharge efforts by reporting its own special rules for considering the measures involved. It often does so even when the petition is not completed, especially for petitions filed on special rules, rather than on the measures themselves. Since 1967, measures on which this form of petition was filed have had over twice as much chance of reaching the floor, especially under alternative procedures, as when the petition was filed on the measure itself. Perhaps as a result, this form of discharge has become more popular, amounting to almost 70% of petitions filed during the past decade (1993-2002).
Only since the 103rd Congress has the number of Members signing each discharge petition been public information. During that period, four petitions were signed by more Members than the number belonging to the minority party. Thirty-six were signed by fewer than this number of Members, but more than 90. Thirteen were signed by 30-60 Members, eight by 7-30, and nine by three or fewer. |
crs_R43404 | crs_R43404_0 | Introduction
In response to the disclosure of various National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance and data collection programs, a number of legislative changes to the government's intelligence operations authority have been suggested. Many of these proposals include amendments to the practices and procedures of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), and the FISA Court of Review, which reviews rulings of the FISC. These proposals might be understood to raise separation of powers issues, namely, the scope of the executive branch's control over national security information. Requiring the public disclosure of FISA opinions concerns many policy questions involving national security; this report, however, is limited to the legal implications of such a requirement. Current FISC Procedures
Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the FISC reviews government applications to, inter alia , conduct surveillance and engage in data collection for foreign intelligence purposes. Potential Article II Separation of Powers Issues
Legislation that requires the executive branch to publicly disclose FISA opinions might raise separation of powers questions. Shared Power over National Security
The Constitution assigns responsibility for the national defense to both Congress and the President. Control over Access to National Security Information
While courts have not clearly delineated the scope of presidential power that exists independent of congressional control, it appears that control over access to national security information is largely shared between the legislative and executive branches, rather than belonging exclusively to either one. In addition, an examination of historical practice reveals that Congress and the executive branch share power in this area. Congress, pursuant to its oversight function, requires consistent disclosure of sensitive national security information to the relevant intelligence and defense committees. Congress has also regulated control over access to national security information, passing legislation such as the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), FISA, and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Pursuant to these statutes, courts have required the executive branch to disclose information to the public and the judiciary. In fact, no statute regulating classified information has been held by courts to improperly intrude upon the President's power as Commander in Chief. Nevertheless, Congress's power to compel the release of information held by the executive branch might have limits. In addition, courts have crafted common law privileges that protect the executive branch from revealing certain military secrets. Consequently, there may be a limited sphere of information that courts will protect from public disclosure. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld statutes regulating information held by the executive branch. However, if the court is not convinced that the material is properly classified, it can order the government to disclose the materials. Common Law and Constitutional Limits to Disclosure
Nevertheless, courts have recognized the dangers of requiring the executive branch to release classified information. FISA opinions and orders, most of which contain at least some sensitive facts pertaining to national security, are a mixture of legal reasoning and sensitive national security information. | In response to the disclosure of various National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance and data collection programs, a number of legislative changes to the government's intelligence operations authority have been suggested. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) reviews government applications to conduct surveillance and engage in data collection for foreign intelligence purposes, and the FISA Court of Review reviews rulings of the FISC. Most FISA opinions are classified by the executive branch. Some have raised concerns that this practice permits the government to rely upon "secret law" to justify its activities, and have proposed requiring the public release of legal opinions and orders issued by the FISC and the FISA Court of Review. However, others might regard these proposals as raising separation of powers questions, including the scope of the executive branch's control over national security information.
FISA opinions and orders, most of which seem to contain at least some sensitive facts pertaining to national security, involve the legal analysis of sensitive national security information. Requiring the executive branch to release them implicates Article II of the Constitution because it compels the President to disclose potentially sensitive documents, and could override the President's classification decisions. After briefly reviewing the FISC's current procedures, this report will examine the Article II implications of requiring the executive branch to disclose FISA opinions.
The Constitution assigns responsibility for the national defense to both Congress and the President. However, the extent to which Congress may regulate the President's discretion over national security matters is a contentious issue. Some argue that the President possesses a sphere of authority that exists independent of any congressional delegation of authority. While courts have not precisely determined the scope of any such power, it appears that control over access to national security information is largely shared between the legislative and executive branches, rather than belonging exclusively to one branch. For example, courts have indicated that neither one possesses absolute power over classified information. In addition, an examination of historical practice reveals that Congress and the executive branch share power in this area. Congress requires consistent disclosure of sensitive national security information to the relevant intelligence and defense committees. Congress has also regulated control over access to national security information, passing legislation such as the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), FISA, and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Pursuant to these statutes, courts have required the executive branch to disclose information to the public and the judiciary. In fact, no statute regulating classified information has been held by courts to improperly intrude upon the President's power as Commander in Chief.
Nevertheless, Congress's power to compel the release of information held by the executive branch might not be absolute. The Supreme Court has observed that the President enjoys some power as Commander in Chief to control access to national security information. In addition, courts have crafted common law privileges that protect the executive branch from revealing certain military secrets. Consequently, there may be a limited sphere of information that courts will protect from public disclosure. |
crs_RL32659 | crs_RL32659_0 | Introduction
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States(also known as the 9/11 Commission) issued its final report on the September 11, 2001, attacks onthe World Trade Center and the Pentagon. (2) The commission recommended two alternative proposals to changethe current intelligence committee structure: (1) replace the existing Senate and House SelectIntelligence Committees with a joint committee on intelligence; or (2) consolidate intelligenceappropriation and authorization functions in the existing intelligence authorizing committees, therebyenhancing the power of the authorizing committees. The report(1) describes the proposal; (2) compares it to the existing committee system; (3) describes a 19thcentury precedent for consolidation; (4) provides selected arguments in favor of consolidation as wellas against; (5) discusses two alternatives to consolidating authorization and appropriation functions:a Joint Committee on Intelligence and separate intelligence appropriations subcommittees in theSenate and House Committees on Appropriations; and (6) describes current legislation. For information on the proposed joint committee on intelligence, see CRS Report RL32525 , A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals and Options From the 9/11 Commission and Others ,by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32538(pdf) , 9/11 Commission Recommendations: JointCommittee on Atomic Energy -- A Model for Congressional Oversight? The commission would transfer jurisdiction overintelligence appropriations from the Senate and House Appropriations Committees to the intelligenceauthorization committees. Senate. Counter-Balance Proposed Centralization of Executive BranchIntelligence. (35)
Provide Clear Congressional Accountability. Provide More Integrated Perspective on National Intelligence. Attract Members to Intelligence Committees. Opponents maintain thatconsolidation would significantly reduce oversight of program quality. May Weaken Intelligence Oversight. Concentrate Too Much Power in Intelligence Committees. , by [author name scrubbed].) It would retain program-quality andbudget analyses in separate appropriations and authorization committees, whichwould be lost under the 9/11 Commission's proposal. The disadvantages to establishing intelligence appropriations subcommittees, opponents argue, are that this approach too would be likely to (1) increase spending,unless the total intelligence amount is declassified or existing budget procedures aremodified; and (2) shortchange the intelligence needs of the military. On October 9, 2004, the Senate adopted, by a voteof 79-6, S.Res. On October 7, 2004, the House rejected, by a vote of 203-213, a proposal that, amongother provisions, would have required the Senate and House to establish in the 108thCongress either of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations to establish (1) a JointCommittee on Intelligence; or (2) a single committee in each chamber withjurisdiction over both intelligence authorizing and appropriating authorities. | On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States(also known as the 9/11 Commission) issued its final report on the September 11, 2001, terroristattacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Among other findings and recommendations,the commission stated that existing congressional oversight was "dysfunctional" and recommendedtwo alternative proposals to change the existing intelligence committee structure: (1) replace theexisting Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees with a joint committee on intelligence;or (2) consolidate intelligence appropriation and authorization functions in existing intelligenceauthorization committees. This report discusses the second of these two proposals. (For informationon the first proposal, see CRS Report RL32525 , A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals andOptions From the 9/11 Commission and Others , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32538(pdf) , 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy -- A Model forCongressional Oversight? , by [author name scrubbed].)
Under existing Senate and House rules, intelligence appropriations are under the jurisdictionof the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. Each committee distributes theseappropriations among five appropriations subcommittees, predominantly the Defense AppropriationsSubcommittees. The 9/11 Commission recommended transferring jurisdiction over intelligenceappropriations from the Senate and House Appropriations Committees to the intelligenceauthorization committees in each chamber.
Proponents of the commission's proposal have contended that its adoption would (1) improvecongressional oversight of intelligence, (2) counter-balance the commission's proposed consolidationof executive branch intelligence activities, (3) provide a more integrated perspective on nationalintelligence spending, (4) attract Members to the consolidated intelligence committees, and (5)provide clear congressional accountability on intelligence within Congress. Opponents argue thatconsolidation would (1) reduce oversight of program quality, (2) weaken intelligence oversight, (3)shortchange intelligence needs of the military, (4) concentrate too much power in intelligencecommittees, and (5) increase spending.
Opponents may accordingly argue that it would be preferable to adopt the alternativerecommendation of the 9/11 Commission to consolidate authorizing responsibility for intelligencein a joint committee. A third approach would be to consolidate responsibility for intelligenceappropriations in a new subcommittee of each the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations. On October 9, 2004, the Senate adopted S.Res. 445 , instituting this approach in theSenate. This action was based on a proposal by the Senate Majority and Minority Whips, the leadersof a bipartisan working group appointed by the Majority and Minority Leaders.
This report will be updated. |
crs_RL33721 | crs_RL33721_0 | By the close of the 109 th Congress, the Administration, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), which is the recognized bargaining agent for the members of the Foreign Service, and the leadership of House Committee on International Relations (HIRC) and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC) agreed on provisions establishing a new Foreign Service compensation system. 6060 passed the House of Representatives without the new Foreign Service performance-based compensation provisions. Introduction
The 110 th Congress may choose to decide if and how to address an issue that both the Department of State and the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) consider to be a high priority personnel issue for the Foreign Service—the elimination of a 18.59 % pay disparity between service in the continental United States and service abroad. The Administration, in its February 2007 Budget Request to the Congress for FY 2008, urged the enactment of legislation creating a new compensation system for the Foreign Service, and the appropriation of $34.5 million needed to implement the first phase of the new compensation system. However, reportedly due to cost concerns among the House Republican leadership, this proposal was not included in the final version of H.R. 109-472 . The current Foreign Service system was created under the authorities provided by the Foreign Service Act of 1980 ( P.L. The remaining third is generally posted in Washington, DC. The Bush Administration, however, opposes any changes in the Foreign Service compensation system unless it is linked to performance, and part of an overall review of Foreign Service personnel modernization. The Administration states its belief that the current civil service system is ineffective and needs to be tied to a market-sensitive, performance-based system. These provisions, which were designated as the Foreign Service Compensation Reform proposal, were supported by the Administration and AFSA. That support, however, was not unanimous. There were others who question the Administration's intent, considering the difficulty between labor and the Administration at the Departments of Defense and of Homeland Security as the Administration attempts to institute a new performance-based personnel structure at these two departments. Some of Members and congressional staff who are concerned about the proposed performance-based system state that congressional dynamics have changed with the 2006 election. Why Change the Compensation System? The new system would be a pay-for-performance system." Area of Continuing Concern Regarding the Legislative Proposal
Impact of the Loss of Automatic Pay Adjustments
Some members of the Foreign Service expressed concern that due to the lack of automatic increases in the new system because of the elimination of both the step adjustments and the ties to the ECI and Locality Pay increases, the Foreign Service compensation system could fall behind the Civil Service. The estimate total, at that time, was $554 million over five years. | At a time when increasing numbers of Foreign Service personnel are going to posts of greater hardship and danger, an 18.5% pay differential that currently exists between service in Washington, DC, and service abroad is impacting morale and assignment considerations. Provisions implementing a new compensation system to address this issue were developed and supported by the George W. Bush administration, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), and the bipartisan leadership of both the House Committee on International Relations (HIRC) and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC). These provisions, which were to be part of the Department of State Authorities Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-472; H.R. 6060), were dropped from the final version of the bill because of House Republican Leadership concerns over the five-year cost of implementing the new compensation system.
The Bush administration, AFSA, and the leadership of both HIRC and the SFRC were in discussion and negotiations for more than a year before developing the consensus compensation provisions. These provisions, the Foreign Service Compensation Reform proposal, would institute a new worldwide, performance-based system for the Foreign Service that would be tied to Washington, DC, salary rates. The compromise language addressed two outstanding issues—the morale-impacting pay disparity, and the institution of a performance-based pay system that the Administration believed would improve the Service. The Administration, once again, requested enactment of a new worldwide, performance-based, compensation system in its fiscal year 2008 budget request.
The concepts behind the agreed upon Foreign Service compensation system have wide support. However, support is not unanimous. Some members of the Foreign Service are concerned about the elimination of automatic pay increases that are inherent to the proposed performance-based system. Others question the Administration's intent with regard to the rights of labor. Further, House Republican Leadership expressed concerns regarding the reaction of some of the more fiscally conservatives Members to the more than $500 million five-year cost that is associated with the full implementation of this new compensation system.
This report discusses (1) the background leading to a proposal to change the compensation system from both an Administration and Foreign Service perspective, (2) the current Foreign Service (FS) System as established in the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and why the Foreign Service views its personnel system as already a performance-based system, (3) the 109th Congress agreements on this legislation, (4) major issues that remained to be resolved in arriving at the agreement, (5) continuing concerns, and (6) cost estimates. |
crs_R45211 | crs_R45211_0 | Introduction
Congress faces decisions about prioritizing lock construction projects on the inland waterway system ( Figure 1 ). As both houses debate differing versions of water resources and development bills ( S. 2800 , H.R. 8 ) and the FY2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill ( S. 2975 , H.R. 5895 ), the decision about which of these projects could be undertaken first will likely be among the most controversial issues. In recent years, a single project, the Olmsted Lock and Dam project on the Ohio River, has absorbed much of the available funding. This system is designed to allow for barge transportation, which is particularly useful for transporting heavy raw materials (e.g., grain, coal, petroleum, construction aggregates). As individual lock construction projects can take many years, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), which oversees the inland waterways and supervises lock construction, requires that the costs and benefits be reevaluated periodically. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will not request funding for a project unless the measured economic benefit is at least 2.5 times the expected cost. The 21 proposed projects are clustered in three regions, each facing different economic conditions that are affecting barge traffic
in the agricultural heartland, record corn and soybean harvests have reversed the long-term downward trend of cargo volumes on the Upper Mississippi River (seven locks); in the Ohio and Tennessee River Valleys, the closure of coal-fired generating plants has reduced the demand for moving coal by barge to power plants by nearly half (eight locks); along the Texas and Louisiana intracoastal waterway, tank barge traffic is in a state of flux as the petrochemical industry makes longer-term investments related to the Texas shale oil boom (six locks). Additional capacity is a motivation underlying many lock projects. However, on these river segments, tows may consist of only four or six barges. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) projects U.S. corn exports, which were essentially flat between 1990 and 2010, will increase slightly through 2027. These are just some of the variables that could influence future traffic through these locks. The decline of coal traffic can affect other commodities, as it could mean more empty backhaul movements of barges on the waterway, reducing overall efficiency. Of the four operating coal-fired electric power plants located on the river, three closed between 2013 and 2017. The cost estimate is $1.4 billion. 114-322 , §1401) at a cost of $17.4 million. Another factor that would seem to reduce the demand for domestic barge transport of oil along this waterway is the lifting of the crude oil export ban in 2015. | Congress faces decisions about prioritizing new lock construction projects on the inland waterway system. As both houses debate differing versions of water resources and development bills (S. 2800, H.R. 8) and the FY2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill (S. 2975, H.R. 5895), the decision about which of these projects could be undertaken first will likely be among the most controversial issues.
The inland waterway system supports barge transportation of heavy raw materials such as grain, coal, petroleum, and construction aggregates. The new locks are needed, according to the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and barge shippers, where existing locks are in poor condition, requiring frequent closures for repairs, and/or because a lock's size causes delays for barge tows. The total estimated cost for the 21 planned lock projects is several billion dollars (many of the individual projects have a cost estimate of between $300 million and $800 million). However, available funding for these projects is about $200 million per year. This is because of limited appropriations and cost-sharing capabilities. Under current cost-share arrangements, the barge industry pays half the cost of construction projects. It does this by paying a $0.29 per gallon fuel tax, which annually generates around $100 million.
Significant changes in traffic levels through particular locks may affect the benefits that were estimated as expansion projects were advanced. The calculation of benefits is critical to advancing a project: the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will not request funding for a project unless the estimated economic benefit is at least 2.5 times the expected cost. The lock projects are clustered in three regions, each facing different economic conditions that are affecting barge traffic
in the agricultural heartland, record corn and soybean harvests have reversed the long-term downward trend of cargo volumes on the Upper Mississippi River; in the Ohio and Tennessee River Valleys, the domestic natural gas boom has reduced the demand for coal by barge to power plants by nearly half; along the Texas and Louisiana intracoastal waterway, tank barge traffic is still in a state of flux as the petrochemical industry makes longer-term investments related to the Texas shale oil boom.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is expecting corn and soybean exports to increase slightly over the next decade, but this projection could be affected by possible Chinese tariff increases on U.S. agricultural goods, including soybeans. The closing of additional coal-fired electric power plants along the Ohio, Monongahela, and Tennessee Rivers would reduce waterway use, as the power plants generate 75% or more of the barge traffic through many of the locks on these rivers. The loss of coal traffic is significant for other commodities as well, as it could lead to more empty repositioning of barges, reducing economies of density for barge transport on the rivers. New pipeline construction and the lifting of the crude oil export ban at the end of 2015 are two factors that could influence barge demand over the long-term on the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. |
crs_R45387 | crs_R45387_0 | Introduction
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Morocco as an important regional partner on security, trade, and development. His Administration designated Morocco a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2004 and concluded a bilateral Free Trade Agreement the same year (authorized by Congress under P.L. The United States has continued to build strong relations with the kingdom under Presidents Obama and Trump, notwithstanding occasional friction over U.S. human rights criticism and the issue of Western Sahara, a disputed territory that Morocco claims and largely administers. High-level visits regularly occur, and the two countries recently agreed to restart a U.S.-Morocco Bilateral Strategic Dialogue (see " U.S. Relations "). Morocco's stability has taken on greater prominence amid conflicts in Libya and the Sahel region of West Africa. King Mohammed VI weathered large urban protests during the 2011 regional wave of unrest known as the "Arab Spring," to which he responded with a new constitution devolving some executive powers to elected officials. Since 2016, protests have surged in the historically marginalized north and east, apparently reflecting grievances over the economy, governance, and police brutality. Economic growth has been strong in recent years but has not always outpaced population growth. Foreign Relations
Morocco's foreign relations are focused on its Western partners (including the United States along with France, Spain, and the European Union); the Arab Gulf states; and friendly countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Since the "Arab Spring," Morocco has drawn closer to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which have provided aid and investment. In mid-2018, Morocco cut ties with Iran for the second time in a decade, after accusing it of providing weaponry to the Polisario via Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist network. Tensions between Morocco and Algeria—a regional rival and the Polisario's primary backer—have long stymied security and economic cooperation in North Africa. Partly in response, the king has launched various economic, trade, and exchange initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa, and Moroccan private sector investment in that region has accordingly increased since the 2000s. In 2016, in a sign of its increased outreach to Africa, Morocco joined the African Union (AU), having previously chosen to remain outside the organization due to the AU's recognition of the SADR as a member state. The king remains the arbiter of national political decision-making, the head of the military, and (as "Commander of the Faithful") the country's highest religious authority. Western Sahara
The four-decade dispute between Morocco and the independence-seeking Polisario Front over the former Spanish colony known as the Western Sahara remains unresolved. A small U.N. peacekeeping operation known as MINURSO, originally conceived to oversee a referendum on the final status of the region, monitors the ceasefire. Since 2007, the U.N. Security Council has called for Morocco and the Polisario to engage in "negotiations without preconditions" to pursue a "mutually acceptable political solution" to the situation. Neither side has shown an interest in compromise. Tensions within the territory and between Morocco and U.N. officials have often heightened during U.N. deliberations over MINURSO's mandate. In September 2018, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita met in Washington DC and announced their intent to reconvene a Bilateral Strategic Dialogue in 2019, to be the first such session since 2015. Morocco and the United States have built strong military-to-military ties through regular training engagements, a large annual exercise known as African Lion (hosted by Morocco), and Moroccan acquisitions of significant U.S.-origin materiel, including F-16 jets and M1A1 tanks. In November 2017, the United States and Morocco launched a "global initiative to address homegrown terrorism" under the multilateral Global Counterterrorism Forum. The U.S.-Morocco partnership extends into regional initiatives. Morocco is a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State. In 2013 and 2016, brief diplomatic crises erupted over perceived Obama Administration pressure on Morocco in the United Nations over Western Sahara. U.S. Foreign Aid
U.S. bilateral aid, totaling $38.6 million in FY2017, aims to help Morocco improve its education system, local governance, and livelihood opportunities. Morocco additionally began implementing a $450 million, five-year U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact in 2017, the country's second such program. This is the case for the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (§7041[g] of Division K, P.L. 115-141 ). | Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and local government entities. King Mohammed VI, who inherited the throne in 1999, maintains overarching political authority but has taken some liberalizing steps. In 2011, amid domestic and regional protests, the king introduced a new constitution providing more power to elected officials and expanding individual rights. The monarch nonetheless remains the arbiter of national political decision-making, the head of the military, and—as "Commander of the Faithful"—the country's highest religious authority. The king's seizure of the initiative in 2011 and quick response to protests arguably helped the monarchy retain its popular legitimacy and stability. In recent years, officials have struggled to respond to resurgent protests and other forms of activism that apparently reflect ongoing grievances over economic challenges, corruption, and police brutality.
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Morocco as an important regional security, trade, and development partner. Morocco is a designated Major Non-NATO Ally, and bilateral trade and investment have expanded since a U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement was signed in 2004. The United States allocated $38.6 million in bilateral aid in FY2017; Morocco is also implementing a five-year $450 million U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, its second such program. Security cooperation has also expanded amid instability in Libya and the Sahel region of West Africa. Morocco is a purchaser of U.S. defense materiel (including F-16 jets), hosts an annual military exercise in which some 1,000 U.S. personnel participate, and is a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State. In 2017, the United States and Morocco launched an "Initiative to Address Homegrown Violent Extremists" under the auspices of the multilateral Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). In September 2018, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita pledged to reconvene a high-level U.S.-Morocco Strategic Dialogue, last held in 2015.
With regard to the disputed territory of Western Sahara, the United States has recognized neither Morocco's claim of sovereignty, nor the self-declared Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), led by the independence-seeking Polisario Front from exile in Algeria. The United States has provided funding and diplomatic backing for a U.N. peacekeeping operation, known as MINURSO, which was conceived to organize a referendum on the territory's final status but currently observes a 1991 ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario. The U.N. Security Council—including the United States, a veto-capable permanent member—has called for Morocco and the Polisario to negotiate a "mutually acceptable political solution." U.S. officials have praised Morocco's proposal to grant the territory autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, while maintaining support for the U.N.-led diplomatic process. U.S.-Morocco tensions temporarily erupted in 2013 and 2016 over perceived Obama Administration support for greater pressure on Morocco in the United Nations. (See CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, for background.)
Congressional interest in the Western Sahara issue and the scope of U.S. aid has been reflected in recent appropriations legislation—most recently, §7041(g) of Division K, P.L. 115-141 and the accompanying Explanatory Statement—among other channels. Relevant bills and resolutions pending in the 115th Congress include the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (H.R. 6385 and S. 3108, respectively), as well as H.Res. 1101 (Affirming the historical relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Morocco […]).
Morocco's foreign policy focuses on its Western partners (including the United States along with France, Spain, and the European Union); the Arab Gulf states; and sub-Saharan Africa. Since the 2011 "Arab Spring," Morocco has drawn closer to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which have provided aid and investment; it has remained officially neutral in the current rift between Qatar and other GCC countries. In mid-2018, Morocco cut ties with Iran for the second time in the past decade, accusing it of providing military support to the Polisario via Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist network. Tensions between Morocco and neighboring Algeria—a regional rival and the Polisario's primary backer—have long stymied security and economic cooperation within North Africa. The king has instead launched various economic, trade, and exchange initiatives in sub-Saharan African countries, and in 2016, Morocco joined the African Union (AU), having previously refused to do so due to the organization's recognition of the SADR as a member state. |
crs_RL30563 | crs_RL30563_0 | Introduction
In General
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), also called the Lightning II, is a strike fighter airplane being procured in different versions for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. Current Department of Defense (DOD) plans call for acquiring a total of 2,456 F-35s for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy at an estimated total acquisition cost, as of December, 2017, of about $325.1 billion in constant (i.e., inflation-adjusted) FY2012 dollars. U.S. allies are expected to purchase hundreds of additional F-35s, and eight foreign nations are cost-sharing partners in the program. The Administration's proposed FY2019 defense budget requested about $10.7 billion in procurement funding for the F-35. This would fund the procurement of 48 F-35As for the Air Force, 20 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps, 9 F-35Cs for the Navy, and continuing development. DOD included the F-35 alternate engine program in its proposed budgets through FY2006, although Congress in certain years increased funding for the program above the requested amount and/or included bill and report language supporting the program. Moving procurement funds to R&D. This included 13 research and development aircraft and 2,443 production aircraft: 1,763 F-35As for the Air Force, 273 F-35Cs for the Navy, and 67 F-35Cs and 353 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps. In a related development, Section 141 of the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act included language authorizing DOD to enter into economic order quantity contracts for advance parts for F-35s to be procured in FY2019 and FY2020. Unit Cost Projections
The F-35 program continues efforts to make the F-35 cost-competitive with previous-generation aircraft. Section 223 of the conference report on the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.Rept. 2810 ) included language limiting funds to be expended on F-35 follow-on modernization (i.e., the Block 4 software) pending receipt of a previously required report that contains the basic elements of an acquisition program baseline for that modernization. | The largest procurement program in the Department of Defense (DOD), the F-35 Lightning II is a strike fighter aircraft being procured in different versions for the United States Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. Current DOD plans call for acquiring a total of 2,456 F-35s. Allies are expected to purchase hundreds of additional F-35s, and eight nations are cost-sharing partners in the program with the United States.
The F-35 promises significant advances in military capability. Like many high-technology programs before it, reaching that capability has put the program above its original budget and behind the planned schedule.
The Administration's proposed FY2019 defense budget requested about $10.7 billion in procurement and R&D funding for the F-35 program. This would fund the procurement of 48 F-35As for the Air Force, 20 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps, 9 F-35Cs for the Navy, and continuing development.
FY2018 defense authorization act: The FY2018 defense authorization bill funded F-35 procurement at $9.9 billion for 90 aircraft (56 F-35As, 24 F-35Bs, and 10 F-35Cs, an increase of 20 aircraft and $2.4 billion from the Administration's request), plus $1.5 billion in advance procurement, the requested level. The conference report accompanying the bill included language
authorizing economic order contracting for up to $661 million in parts for F-35s to be procured in fiscal years 2019 and 2020; limiting funds to be expended on F-35 follow-on modernization (Block 4 software) pending a previously-required report that contains the basic elements of an acquisition program baseline for that modernization, and; requiring the congressional defense committees be notified if Congress takes any action that would delay development of F-35 dual-capable aircraft (meaning those able to deliver nuclear weapons).
FY2018 defense appropriations bill: The final omnibus budget bill funded F-35 procurement at $10.2 billion for 90 aircraft (56 F-35As, 24 F-35Bs, and 10 F-35Cs, an increase of 20 aircraft and $2.6 billion over the Administration's request), plus $1.5 billion in advance procurement, the requested level. |
crs_R43043 | crs_R43043_0 | Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014
On January 17, 2014, the President signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( H.R. 3547 / P.L. Tables in Appendix A and Appendix B have been updated to show a comparison of the enacted FY2014 appropriations law with FY2013 post-rescission funding levels, the President's FY2014 request, and House- and Senate-recommended levels. FY2014 State-Foreign Operations Overview
The Administration's FY2014 request of $51.84 billion for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs represented about 1.4% of the total budget request for FY2014. It was 5.3% less than the FY2013 request and about 2% less than the FY2013 post-sequester funding estimate. (Unless otherwise noted, all of the FY2013 funding levels in this report reflect estimated funding levels after both sequestration and across-the-board rescissions are applied.) The State Department and related agencies request of $16.88 billion (including the mandatory Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund) represented a decline of 5.5% from the estimated FY2013 funding level of $17.86 billion. Within State-Foreign Operations, about $34.95 billion was requested for foreign operations accounts, which was a 0.2% decrease from the FY2013 estimated funding of $35.02 billion. 3547 ). 113-76 ) on January 17, 2014. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. For State Department operations and related programs, the enacted funding level of $15.86 billion is 3.6% below the Senate-proposed level of $16.46 billion, but 7.3% greater than the House-proposed total of $14.78 billion. While the transfer authority was not provided by the 112 th Congress, Section 1707 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013 ( H.R. In the 112 th Congress, House and Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations bills differed over MENA IF. This represented a 68% decline from the FY2013 estimated OCO funding of $7.33 billion. In P.L. | On April 10, 2013, the Obama Administration submitted to Congress its budget request for FY2014. The request for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs totaled $51.84 billion, which was about 2% below the FY2013 post-sequester estimated funding level of $52.88 billion. Within the request, $3.81 billion was designated as Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, which was 68% below FY2013-estimated OCO funding of $11.92 billion. Of the total request, $16.88 billion was for State Department Operations and related agencies, a 5.8% decline from the FY2013 funding estimate of $17.86 billion. About $34.95 billion was for Foreign Operations, a 0.2% decrease from the FY2013 estimate of $35.02 billion. After enacting appropriations for FY2014 with continuing resolutions in late 2013-early 2014, Congress completed action on, and the President signed, the Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76) in mid-January 2014.
This report provides a brief overview of the FY2014 State Department, Foreign Operations and Related Programs funding request, as well as top-line analysis of House and Senate State-Foreign Operations appropriations proposals, enacted continuing resolutions, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76). It does not provide information or analysis on specific provisions in the House and Senate legislation.
Tables in Appendix A and Appendix B provide side-by-side account-level funding data for FY2013, the FY2014 request, House- and Senate-proposed totals, and the enacted FY2014 funding levels in the Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76). The FY2013 funding data used as a point of comparison throughout this report represent post-sequestration estimates provided by the Department of State and reflect across-the-board rescissions. |
crs_R41288 | crs_R41288_0 | The total amount that FDA can spend, its program level, consists of direct appropriations (which FDA calls budget authority) and other funds, most of them user fees. It dictates the total for each of FDA's major program areas (foods, human drugs, biologics, devices and radiological health, animal drugs and feeds, tobacco products, and toxicological research) and several agency-wide support areas (Office of the Commissioner and other headquarter offices, rents to the General Services Administration, and other rent and rent-related activities). The FY2011 request—$4.032 billion—is 22.8% higher than FY2010-enacted appropriations. The increase would be mostly in user fees. The request for $2.508 billion in budget authority (BA) is 6.2% higher than the FY2010 appropriations. For continuing user fee programs (prescription drug, medical device, animal drug, animal generic drug, tobacco product, mammography quality standards, export certification, and color certification fees), the requested $1.233 billion is 33.7% above FY2010. These are generic drug user fee authority ($38 million), food export certification fees ($4 million), reinspection fees ($27 million), and food inspection and facility registration fees ($220 million). Initiatives . On September 29, 2010, neither the full Senate nor the full House had approved an agriculture appropriations bill for FY2011, nor had Congress passed any other of the regular FY2011 appropriations bills. The Senate amended and approved H.R. 3081 , the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, which would allow federal operations, including the FDA, to generally continue at FY2010 levels from October 1, 2010, the start of FY2011, through December 3, 2010. The House passed the continuing resolution early on September 30, 2010, and the President signed it later that day as P.L. 111-242 . Representative DeLauro stated that the bill would include $2.571 billion in budget authority for FDA; including user fee revenue, the total FDA program level would be $3.773 billion for FY2011, as shown in data column 6 of Table 2 . Senate
The Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies of the Senate Committee on Appropriations held a hearing on March 9, 2010, on the President's FY2011 budget request for FDA. On July 15, 2010, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3606 . For FY2011, the bill would provide $2.516 billion in budget authority and $1.233 billion in user fees for a total FDA program level of $3.75 billion. Updates to this report will track legislative activity. | The President's budget request for FY2011 included $4.032 billion for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The total is made of $2.508 billion in direct appropriations (which FDA calls budget authority) and $1.523 billion in user fees. Overall, the request is 22.8% more than the enacted FY2010 total appropriation, with budget authority up 6.2% and fees up 65.2%. Most of the increase would come from proposed new user fees to support generic drug activities, food export certification, reinspection, and food inspection and facility registration. For continuing user fee programs (prescription drug, medical device, animal drug, animal generic drug, tobacco product, mammography quality standards, export certification, and color certification), the $1.233 billion request is 33.7% above FY2010.
Budget justification documents describe FY2011 agency initiatives in food safety, medical product safety, and regulatory science. They also show the program-level budget request (both budget authority and user fees) and describe activities in each of FDA's program areas: human drugs, biologics, animal drugs and feeds, devices and radiological health, tobacco products, and toxicological research.
The Commissioner of Food and Drugs has testified to the subcommittees on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies of both the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations. On June 30, 2010, the House subcommittee approved Chair Rosa DeLauro's mark, copies of which were not made public. It included, for FY2011, $2.571 billion in budget authority for FDA. It recommended a total FDA program level, including user fees, of $3.773 billion. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3606 on July 15, 2010. It would provide FDA with $2.516 billion in budget authority and $1.233 billion in user fees for a total FY2011 program level of $3.75 billion.
On September 29, 2010, neither the full Senate nor the full House had approved an agriculture appropriations bill for FY2011, nor had Congress passed any other of the regular FY2011 appropriations bills. The Senate amended and approved H.R. 3081, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, which would allow federal operations, including the FDA, to continue at FY2010 levels from October 1, 2010, the start of FY2011, through December 3, 2010. The House passed the continuing resolution early on September 30, 2010, and the President signed it that day as P.L. 111-242.
Updates to this report will track legislative activity. |
crs_R43825 | crs_R43825_0 | Introduction
This report provides brief answers to frequently asked questions about selected campaign finance provisions in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( H.R. 83 ; P.L. The President signed the bill into law on December 16. The relevant language in P.L. 113-235 increased contribution limits to national political party committees. In practice, it appears that an individual's contributions to a national party could increase from at least $97,200 annually to at least $777,600. Under inflation adjustments announced in February 2015, it appears that an individual may contribute at least $801,600 to a national party committee in 2015. Although this report emphasizes increases in individual contribution limits, political action committees (PACs) may also make larger contributions to parties. For multicandidate PACs—the most common type of PAC—contributions to a national party appear to have increased from $45,000 to at least $360,000 annually. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is responsible for administering the increased limits. This report will be updated as additional information becomes available. For both parties, these include a headquarters committee (e.g., the Democratic National Committee), a House campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Congressional Committee), and a Senate campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Senatorial Committee). Specifically, the language permitted the national parties to establish up to three additional accounts for each purpose. Which party committees would be affected? As of this writing, the FEC has not yet announced regulations or formal guidance surrounding how it plans to interpret the new limits—including how the "base" contribution amounts might interact with the limits for the three new accounts, if at all. Similarly, the parties have yet to make widespread use of the new limits. | This report provides brief answers to frequently asked questions about increased campaign contribution limits in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83; P.L. 113-235), enacted and signed into law in December 2014. The relevant language increases certain contribution limits to national political party committees. This language changes the amounts the two major parties may solicit and collect.
Most notably, three units within each of the national Democratic and Republican parties could be affected. These include a headquarters committee (e.g., the Democratic National Committee), a House campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Congressional Committee), and a Senate campaign committee (e.g., the National Republican Senatorial Committee). The language permits all six of these national party committees to establish additional accounts, with higher contribution limits than previously permitted. In practice, it appears that maximum individual contributions to a national party have increased from at least $97,200 (or $129,600 if following a recent Federal Election Commission (FEC) advisory opinion) annually to at least $777,600. Inflation adjustments announced in February 2015 bring the individual total to at least $801,600 for 2015. Other national parties, such as third parties, would also be eligible for larger contributions. Although this report emphasizes individual contribution limits, political action committees (PACs) may also increase their party contributions under the bill, to a total of $360,000 for multicandidate PACs—the most common form of PAC.
This updated report is based on information available as of this writing. The FEC has not yet issued regulations or definitive guidance about how the limits will be interpreted. Similarly, political parties have yet to adopt widespread fundraising practices under the new limits. This report will be updated as additional information becomes available. |
crs_R42648 | crs_R42648_0 | Constitutional Background
The Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place." Commonly referred to as the Speech or Debate Clause, this language affords Members of Congress immunity from certain civil and criminal suits relating to their legislative acts. What Actions Are Protected by the Clause? The Clause is interpreted as extending its protection to aides because the Gravel Court recognized
that it is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the Members' performance that they must be treated as the latter's alter egos; and that if they are not so recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate Clause—to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary will inevitably be diminished and frustrated. Recent Cases
Employment and Personnel Actions
For some time now, there has been an open question as to whether the Speech or Debate Clause protects a Member from liability in civil actions arising from office personnel disputes. In light of the passage of the CAA and these previous cases, both the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the D.C. Circuit's "determination that jurisdiction attaches despite a claim of Speech or Debate Clause immunity is best read as a ruling on the scope of the Act, not its constitutionality." Executive Branch Criminal Investigations of Members
In recent years, both the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have issued opinions addressing the application of the Speech or Debate Clause privilege to executive branch criminal investigations of Members. On this last point, the two circuits appear to split. Searches and Seizures of Congressional Offices: United States v. Rayburn House Office Building
In March 2005, the FBI began an investigation of Representative William J. Jefferson to determine whether he and other persons had engaged in bribery and/or wire fraud. After having his request for a stay pending appeal denied by the district court, Representative Jefferson filed notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, seeking a stay of the lower court's order and any DOJ review of the seized documents. It concluded that the "compelled disclosure of privileged material to the Executive during execution of the search warrant ... violated the Speech or Debate Clause and that the Congressman is entitled to the return of documents that the court determines to be privileged under the Clause." The court carefully distinguished between the lawfulness of searching a congressional office pursuant to a search warrant—which the court held was clearly permissible—and the lawfulness of the way the search was executed considering the Member's potential Speech or Debate Clause protection. Representative Jefferson's specific privilege claims, based on his review of the documents pursuant to the court of appeals' remand order, were evaluated by the district court. United States v. Renzi
In 2009, Former Representative Richard Renzi was indicted on 48 criminal counts including extortion, money laundering, wire fraud, insurance fraud, and conspiracy related to alleged quid pro quo deals he orchestrated while representing Arizona's first district in the House of Representatives. During the course of the district court proceedings, Representative Renzi argued that the Speech or Debate Clause entitled him to (1) absolute immunity from prosecution because his negotiations with RCC and Aries were "legislative acts"; (2) dismissal of his indictment because privileged evidence was presented to the grand jury; and (3) a hearing to determine if the government used evidence protected by the Clause to obtain non-protected evidence. This part of the decision puts the Ninth Circuit at odds with the D.C. However, when the underlying action is not covered by the Clause, such as the investigations of alleged extortion and fraud in this case and Rayburn , other legitimate interests, like the ability of the executive branch to prosecute non-protected activities, outweigh concerns about legislative distraction. | Members of Congress have immunity for their legislative acts under Article I, Section 6, clause 1, of the Constitution, which provides in part that "for any speech or debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other place." Even if their actions are within the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause or some other legal immunity, Members of Congress remain accountable to the house of Congress in which they serve and to the electorate. In cases in which the Clause applies, the immunity is absolute and cannot be defeated by an allegation of an improper purpose or motivation. When applicable, the Clause provides both immunity from liability (in civil and criminal proceedings) and a complimentary evidentiary privilege.
Recently, two separate and previously unresolved issues arose with respect to the scope and application of the Speech or Debate Clause. The first case concerned claims of employment discrimination brought against Members' offices pursuant to the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995. Both the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Speech or Debate Clause does not automatically prevent such suits from proceeding. Additionally, an appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected because the Court ruled that it lacked a jurisdictional basis to decide the case. These decisions, however, appear to leave unanswered significant questions about the use and introduction of evidence related to "legislative acts," which are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Such questions could ultimately frustrate the ability of potential plaintiffs to pursue their claims successfully.
In August 2007, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) issued its opinion in a case arising from the execution of a search warrant on the Rayburn House Office of Representative William J. Jefferson. The search was conducted as part of the FBI's investigation of Representative Jefferson to determine whether he was involved in criminal activity, including bribery and other felonies. Such an action by the executive branch appears to be unprecedented. It raised significant constitutional questions about potential intimidation of the legislative branch and threats to its independence, which the Clause is designed to protect. Although Representative Jefferson lost his initial legal challenge, the appeals court subsequently held that the search violated the Speech or Debate Clause. The court ordered the district court to provide Representative Jefferson with copies of the seized materials and a chance to assert his privilege claims ex parte and in camera. Moreover, the appeals court ordered that the Department of Justice (DOJ) continue to refrain from reviewing any of the seized materials until the privilege claims were evaluated by the lower court.
In 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also weighed in on how to apply the Clause to executive branch criminal investigations of Members. In that case, Representative Richard Renzi was accused of agreeing to support legislation in exchange for a private land purchase agreement benefitting one of his creditors. He was indicted on numerous criminal counts, including extortion and fraud, which he challenged on Speech or Debate Clause grounds. The appeals court determined that his challenged actions were not covered by the Clause. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit appeared to split with the D.C. Circuit analysis in Representative Jefferson's case on whether the Clause prevents the executive branch from ever viewing protected evidence.
This report examines the constitutional background of the Speech or Debate Clause and these recent developments in jurisprudence. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL30719 | crs_RL30719_0 | Introduction
The "digital divide" is a term used to describe a gap between "information haves and have-nots," or in other words, between those Americans who use or have adequate access to telecommun ications and information technologies and those who do not. Broadband technologies are currently being deployed primarily by the private sector throughout the United States. While the numbers of new broadband subscribers continue to grow, studies and data suggest that the rate of broadband deployment in urban/suburban and high-income areas is outpacing deployment in rural and low-income areas. Some policymakers believe that disparities in broadband access across American society could have adverse consequences on those left behind, and that advanced telecommunications applications critical for businesses and consumers to engage in ecommerce are increasingly dependent on high-speed broadband connections to the internet. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ) appropriated $7.5 million to NTIA to update the national broadband availability map in coordination with the FCC and using partnerships previously developed with the states. Federal Broadband Programs
With the conclusion of grant and loan awards established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ), there remain two ongoing major federal vehicles which direct federal money to fund broadband: the Universal Service Fund (USF) programs under the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the broadband and telecommunications programs at the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The USF is being transformed in stages, over a multiyear period, from a mechanism to support voice telecommunications services to one that supports the deployment, adoption, and utilization of both fixed and mobile broadband. The 115 th Congress reauthorized and modified RUS broadband programs as part of the 2018 farm bill ( P.L. 115-141 ) contained many broadband-related provisions
Title VII, Section 779 of Division A (Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018) appropriates $600 million to RUS to "conduct a new broadband loan and grant pilot program." Concluding Observations
To the extent that Congress may consider various options for encouraging broadband deployment and adoption, a key issue is how to strike a balance between providing federal assistance for unserved and underserved areas where the private sector may not be providing acceptable levels of broadband service, while at the same time minimizing any deleterious effects that government intervention in the marketplace may have on competition and private sector investment. Title VII (MOBILE Now) would make more spectrum available for wireless broadband. | The "digital divide" is a term that has been used to characterize a gap between "information haves and have-nots," or in other words, between those Americans who use or have access to telecommunications and information technologies and those who do not. One important subset of the digital divide debate concerns high-speed internet access and advanced telecommunications services, also known as broadband. Broadband is provided by a series of technologies (e.g., cable, telephone wire, fiber, satellite, mobile and fixed wireless) that give users the ability to send and receive data at volumes and speeds necessary to support a number of applications including voice communications, entertainment, telemedicine, distance education, telework, ecommerce, civic engagement, public safety, and energy conservation.
Broadband technologies are currently being deployed primarily by the private sector throughout the United States. While the numbers of new broadband subscribers continue to grow, studies and data suggest that the rate of broadband deployment in urban/suburban and high-income areas is outpacing deployment in rural and low-income areas. Some policymakers, believing that disparities in broadband access across American society could have adverse economic and social consequences on those left behind, assert that the federal government should play a more active role to address the "digital divide" in broadband access.
With the conclusion of the grant and loan awards established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), there remain two primary ongoing federal vehicles which direct federal money to fund broadband infrastructure: the broadband and telecommunications programs at the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the Universal Service Fund (USF) programs under the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). RUS broadband programs were reauthorized and modified by the 2018 farm bill. The USF High Cost Fund is undergoing a major transition to the Connect America Fund, which is targeted to the deployment, adoption, and utilization of both fixed and mobile broadband.
Meanwhile, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) appropriated $600 million to RUS to conduct a new broadband loan and grant pilot program (called the ReConnect Program), and appropriated $7.5 million to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to update the national broadband availability map in coordination with the FCC. Additionally, P.L. 115-141 contained provisions seeking to facilitate deployment of broadband infrastructure on federal property, as well as making more spectrum available for wireless broadband.
To the extent that the 116th Congress may consider various options for further encouraging broadband deployment and adoption, a key issue is how to strike a balance between providing federal assistance for unserved and underserved areas where the private sector may not be providing acceptable levels of broadband service, while at the same time minimizing any deleterious effects that government intervention in the marketplace may have on competition and private sector investment. |
crs_R41702 | crs_R41702_0 | Overview
The March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami that occurred in Japan followed by the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Nuclear Complex, evacuations, and shortage of electricity are having a large negative economic impact on the country but a lesser effect on world markets. Japan has lost considerable physical and human capital. Physical damage has been estimated from $195 billion to as much as $305 billion, the latter figure being nearly four times as much as Hurricane Katrina ($81 billion) and roughly equivalent to the GDP of Greece and twice that of New Zealand. In excess of 23,000 persons in Japan are killed or missing, and more than 400,000 homes and other buildings have been totally or partially damaged. The earthquake-related events in Japan are still unfolding, but each round of economic assessments seems more and more pessimistic. Early data indicate that the economic damage is quite severe. Japan's economy has contracted for two quarters and essentially is in recession, but it may begin to expand later in the year because of rebuilding activity. Much depends on whether the damage from the nuclear plant can be contained, the speed at which electrical capacity can be restored, and how quickly Japan's industrial base can recover. As the third-largest economy in the world, Japan's GDP at $5.5 trillion accounts for 8.7% of global GDP. Congressional interest on the economic side centers on humanitarian concerns, radioactive fallout reaching the United States, the impact on U.S. citizens and American companies in Japan, the effects on trade and disruptions to supply chains, and increased volatility in Japanese and U.S. financial markets, interest rates, and the yen-dollar exchange rate. The damage from the earthquake and tsunami is being compounded by the evacuations and uncertainty from the problems at the Fukushima nuclear reactors. The net impact of the disaster on global GDP, therefore, is expected to be relatively small (minus about one-half a percentage point) with about half of that effect confined to Japan, itself. Japan plays a major role in global supply chains both as a supplier of parts and as a producer of final products. In this age of just-in-time production processes, even a small disruption in the provision of a single component can wreak havoc on an entire product line. Japan's production of automobiles, semiconductors, and electronics is likely to be affected the most, but companies in the United States that rely on Japan for critical components such as electronic parts and batteries or transmissions for electrical vehicles also will be affected. The value of the yen and interest rates also are being affected. In Japan, a concern is that the public debt, at about 200% of GDP, has become so high that borrowing to finance reconstruction could trigger a loss of confidence in the ability of the Japanese government to repay its debts. For example, in 2009, both U.S. exports to Japan and imports from Japan declined substantially, reflecting the effects of the global economic downturn. Legislative Activity
H.Res. S.Res. | The March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami that occurred in Japan followed by the nuclear crisis are having a large negative impact on the economy of Japan but a lesser effect on world trade and financial markets. Japan has lost considerable physical and human capital. Physical damage has been estimated to be from $195 billion to as much as $305 billion. (Greece's GDP is $330 billion.) In excess of 23,000 persons in Japan are killed or missing, and more than 400,000 homes and other buildings have been totally or partially damaged. The negative effects of the earthquake and tsunami have been compounded by the continuing crisis at the Fukushima nuclear reactors; the resulting evacuations, radioactive contamination, and shortages of electricity; continuing aftershocks; and the extensive damage to infrastructure, homes, manufacturing plants, and other buildings.
The earthquake-related events in Japan are still unfolding, but each round of economic assessments seems more and more pessimistic. Early data indicate that the economic damage is quite severe. Japan's economy has contracted for two quarters and essentially is in recession, but it may begin to expand later in the year because of rebuilding activity. Much depends on whether the damage from the nuclear plant can be contained, the speed at which electrical capacity can be restored, and how quickly Japan's industrial base can recover. As the third-largest economy in the world, Japan's GDP at $5.5 trillion accounts for 8.7% of global GDP. The net impact of the disaster on global GDP is that it is expected to shave about a half percentage point off global economic growth with about half of that effect confined to Japan, itself.
Congressional interest on the economic side centers on humanitarian concerns, radioactive fallout reaching the United States, the impact on U.S. citizens and American companies in Japan, the effects on trade and supply chain disruptions, and increased volatility in Japanese and U.S. financial markets, interest rates, and the yen-dollar exchange rate.
The impact on U.S. imports from and exports to Japan is expected to be modest as a proportion of overall trade, but particular sectors or companies may be affected considerably. The United States already has banned imports of certain vegetables and milk from the vicinity of the damaged nuclear reactors and is monitoring other foods for radiation. Japan plays a major role in global supply chains both as a supplier of parts and as a producer of final products. In this age of just-in-time production processes, even a small disruption in the provision of a single component can wreak havoc on an entire product line. Japan's production of automobiles, semiconductors, and electronics is likely to be affected the most, but companies in the United States that rely on Japan for critical components such as electronic parts and batteries or transmissions for electrical vehicles also will be affected. Tourist travel both into and out of Japan also has been falling.
There also is concern over speculation in currency markets and repatriation of assets back to Japan that raised the value of the yen before the G-7 monetary authorities in March intervened to weaken it. Another concern is that Japan's national debt, already at 200% of GDP, will rise significantly as the government borrows to finance reconstruction. This may raise interest rates in Japan and further complicate recovery efforts or, in the worst case, trigger a sovereign debt crisis and loss of confidence in Japanese government bonds.
Legislation: H.Res. 172, S.Res. 101. |
crs_RL33511 | crs_RL33511_0 | Background and Analysis
This report summarizes current research and development priority-setting issues—in terms of spending priorities, topical or field-specific priorities, and organizational arrangements to determine priorities. Defense R&D predominated in the 1980s but decreased to about 50% of total federal R&D in the 1990s, reflecting Clinton Administration policies. In non-defense R&D, space was important in the 1960s as the nation sought to compete with the Soviet Union in the space race; energy R&D joined space as a priority during the 1970s; and since the 1980s, health R&D funding has grown as the cohort of aged population increases and the promise of life sciences and biotechnology affects national expectations. FY2007 Budget Request
For FY2007, R&D was requested at almost $137 billion of budget authority, about 1.8% more than enacted in FY2006. The request sought to double funding over 10 years (for a total of about $50 billion) for three key federal agencies that support basic research in physical sciences and engineering, that is for NSF, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Science (for advanced energy research), and for the NIST laboratories, as part of the American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI) introduced in the 2006 State of the Union address to enhance U.S. innovation. Also, funding for NASA R&D would have been increased by about 8% largely for a development program called Constellation Systems to develop human space vehicles to replace the Space Shuttle. For FY2007, two appropriations bills were signed before adjournment—for DOD and DHS. The rest of the government is operating on a continuing resolution through February 2007, but which incoming Appropriations Committee chairmen say they will seek to continue throughout FY2007, thereby funding all other R&D activities at FY2006 levels. FY2007 appropriations action increased support for defense development and decreased homeland security R&D funding. Only a small percentage of federal non-defense R&D spending supports industrial R&D and innovation directly. H.R. H.R. H.R. 5970 , a tripartite tax bill which passed in the House, included the R&D tax credit. 6111 , which extended the credit for two years and widened eligibility for the credit. The FY2007 request would have increased NSF's R&D budget by 8.3% over the FY2006 level. OMB's term "combating terrorism" R&D includes homeland security R&D and overseas combating terrorism R&D. Federal R&D Priority-Setting Structures
Some observers recommend more centralized R&D priority-setting in Congress and in the executive branch. The FY2007 budget presented agency funding for two interagency R&D initiatives whose reporting is required by statute, "Networking and Information Technology R&D," requested at $3.1 billion, a 2% decrease from the estimated FY2006 amount, and "Climate Change Science Program," requested at $1.7 billion, a level flat with the FY2006 estimate. Other FY2007 interagency R&D initiatives included combating terrorism R&D and hydrogen R&D. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART)
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), P.L. | This report summarizes current research and development (R&D) priority-setting issues—in terms of expenditures; agency, topical, or field-specific priorities; and organizational arrangements to determine priorities. Federal R&D funding priorities reflect presidential policies and national needs. Defense R&D predominated in the 1980s, decreasing to about 50% of federal R&D in the 1990s. In non-defense R&D, space R&D was important in the 1960s as the nation sought to compete with the Soviet Union; energy R&D was a priority during the energy-short 1970s, and, since the 1980s, health R&D has predominated in non-defense science. This Administration's R&D priorities include weapons development, homeland security, space launch vehicles, and, beginning in 2006, more support for physical sciences and engineering. For FY2007, R&D was requested at almost $137 billion of budget authority, about 1.8% more than enacted in FY2006. The request would have increased funding for physical sciences and engineering programs in the National Science Foundation, the Department of Energy's Office of Science, and National Institute of Standards and Technology laboratories as part of the President's American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI) to enhance innovation. Funding for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's R&D would have increased by about 8% largely to develop human space vehicles. For FY2007, two appropriations bills were signed; the rest of the government is operating on a continuing resolution through February 2007, but likely to continue throughout FY2007, funding domestic agencies at FY2006 levels. Appropriations action increased support for defense development and decreases homeland security R&D funding.
The latest estimated expenditure for national (public and private) R&D is $312.1 billion for FY2004. Federal R&D expenditures, at $93.4 billion, have grown, but have declined to 30% of total national R&D spending. During the 109th Congress, some proposals to increase incentives for industrial R&D included H.R. 1454, H.R. 1736, S. 14, S. 627, S. 2199, and S. 2720. H.R. 6111, passed in both Houses, extended the R&D tax credit for two years and widened eligibility for the credit. The FY2007 budget would have emphasized three interagency R&D initiatives: networking and information technology; climate change science; and nanotechnology. Proposals to coordinate R&D include a continuing priority-setting mechanism; a cabinet-level S&T body; functional R&D budgeting; and reestablishment of a technology assessment function. The Administration opposes R&D earmarking, estimated at $2.4 billion in budget authority for FY2006. Although the Administration is using the Government Performance and Results Act and the Program Assessment Rating Tool for R&D budgeting, some critics say better data and concepts are needed before performance budgeting can be used to identify R&D priorities. |
crs_R44100 | crs_R44100_0 | Introduction
Congress is deeply divided over implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which President Obama signed into law in March 2010. Since the ACA's enactment, lawmakers opposed to specific provisions in the ACA or the entire law have repeatedly debated its implementation and considered bills to repeal, defund, delay, or otherwise amend the law. In addition to their attempts to repeal or amend the ACA through authorizing legislation, lawmakers have used the annual appropriations process in an effort to eliminate funding for the ACA's implementation and address other concerns they have with the law. ACA-related provisions have been included in enacted appropriations acts each year since the ACA became law. In October 2013, disagreement between the House and Senate over the inclusion of ACA language in a temporary spending bill for the new fiscal year (i.e., FY2014) resulted in a partial shutdown of government operations that lasted 16 days. ACA Provisions in Enacted Appropriations Acts
The House Appropriations Committee has added numerous ACA-related provisions to annual appropriations acts since the Republicans regained control of the House at the beginning of the 112 th Congress. Most of these provisions were included in the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) Appropriations Act, which funds CMS. A few were incorporated in the Financial Services and General Government (Financial Services) Appropriations Act, which funds the IRS. Appropriations bills drafted by the Senate Appropriations Committee remained largely free of ACA-related provisions during the 112 th and 113 th Congresses, while the Senate remained under Democratic control, with one key exception. The appropriations committees have used a number of legislative options available to them through the appropriations process in an effort to defund, delay, or otherwise address implementation of the ACA. Administrative Spending Levels
The appropriators have denied CMS and the IRS new funding to cover the administrative costs of ACA implementation. Limitation Provisions
House appropriators repeatedly have added limitations (often referred to as riders) to the LHHS and Financial Services appropriations bills. For example, House appropriators on multiple occasions have added language prohibiting an agency from using any of the funds for ACA implementation activities. Legislative Provisions
House appropriators have incorporated ACA-related legislative language in the LHHS appropriations bills. As an example, appropriators have included language to rescind (i.e., cancel) certain mandatory funding provided by the ACA. Reporting and Other Administrative Requirements
Appropriators have added to recent LHHS appropriations acts several reporting and other administrative requirements regarding implementation of the ACA. These include instructing the HHS Secretary to establish a website with information on the allocation of PPHF funds and to provide an accounting of administrative spending on ACA implementation. As already noted, none of the ACA limitations added by the House appropriators were included in the enacted LHHS and Financial Services appropriations acts. | Congress is deeply divided over implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the health reform law enacted in March 2010. Since the ACA's enactment, lawmakers opposed to specific provisions in the ACA or the entire law have repeatedly debated its implementation and considered bills to repeal, defund, delay, or otherwise amend the law.
In addition to considering ACA repeal or amendment in authorizing legislation, some lawmakers have used the annual appropriations process in an effort to eliminate funding for the ACA's implementation and address other aspects of the law. ACA-related provisions have been included in enacted appropriations acts each year since the ACA became law.
In October 2013, disagreement between the Republican-led House and Democratic-controlled Senate over the inclusion of ACA language in a temporary spending bill for the new fiscal year (i.e., FY2014) resulted in a partial shutdown of government operations that lasted 16 days.
The House Appropriations Committee has added numerous ACA-related provisions to annual appropriations acts since the Republicans regained control of the House in 2011. Most of these provisions were included in the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) Appropriations Act, which funds the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). A few provisions were incorporated in the Financial Services and General Government (Financial Services) Appropriations Act, which funds the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). By comparison, the LHHS and Financial Services appropriations bills drafted by the Senate Appropriations Committee were largely free of any ACA-related provisions while the committee remained under Democratic control through 2014.
Congressional appropriators have used a number of legislative options available to them through the appropriations process in an effort to defund, delay, or otherwise address implementation of the ACA. First, they have denied CMS and the IRS any new funding to cover the administrative costs of ACA implementation. Second, House appropriators repeatedly have added limitations (often referred to as riders) to the LHHS and Financial Services appropriations bills to prohibit CMS and the IRS from using discretionary funds provided in the bills for ACA implementation activities. To date, the ACA limitation provisions added by House appropriators have been removed during negotiations with the Senate. None of them have been included in any of the enacted appropriations acts.
Third, congressional appropriators have incorporated ACA-related legislative language in the LHHS appropriations bills. For example, appropriators have included language to rescind (i.e., cancel) certain mandatory funding provided by the ACA and delay (or place a temporary moratorium on) certain taxes and fees established by the ACA.
Finally, the appropriators have added to recent LHHS appropriations acts several reporting and other administrative requirements regarding implementation of the ACA. These include instructing the HHS Secretary to establish a website with information on the allocation of funding from the Prevention and Public Health Fund and to provide an accounting of administrative spending on ACA implementation. |
crs_RL33809 | crs_RL33809_0 | Introduction
The extent to which residents of the United States who are not U.S. citizens should be eligible for federally funded public aid has been a contentious issue since the 1990s. This issue meets at the intersection of two major policy areas: immigration policy and welfare policy. Over the past 20 years, Congress has enacted significant changes in both areas. Congress has also exercised oversight of revisions made by the 1996 welfare reform law (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, P.L. 104-193 ) concerning the rules governing noncitizen eligibility for public assistance, and of legislation covering programs with major restrictions on noncitizen eligibility (e.g., Medicaid). This report covers noncitizen eligibility in the four major federal means-tested benefit programs: the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps), the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash assistance, and Medicaid. 104-193 ) established comprehensive restrictions on the eligibility of noncitizens for means-tested public assistance—with significant exceptions for those with a substantial U.S. work history or military connection. Current Eligibility Policy
Under current law, lawful permanent residents' eligibility for the major federal means-tested benefit programs depends on their immigration status; whether they arrived (or were on a program's rolls) before August 22, 1996 (the enactment date of P.L. After this term, they generally are ineligible for SSI, but may be eligible, at state option, for Medicaid and TANF. LPRs with a substantial work history—generally 10 years (40 quarters) of work documented by Social Security or other employment records—or a military connection (active duty military personnel, veterans, and their families) are eligible for the full range of programs. LPRs are not eligible for SSI during the first five years even if they had 40 credits of earnings (e.g., as a temporary worker prior to receiving LPR status). States have the option to cover LPRs who are children or who are pregnant during the first five years. Under current law, FAS citizens are not eligible for federal public benefits (except emergency services and programs expressly listed, such as Medicaid for emergency medical care or Federal Emergency Management Agency disaster services). Federal and State Benefit Eligibility Standards for Unauthorized Aliens
Federal Benefits25
Unauthorized aliens (often referred to as illegal aliens) are not eligible for most federal benefits, regardless of whether they are means tested. 107-171 , the "farm bill," contained substantial changes to food stamp eligibility rules for noncitizens, expanding food stamp eligibility to include the following groups:
all LPR children, regardless of date of entry (it also ended requirements to deem sponsors' income and resources to these children); LPRs receiving government disability payments, so long as they pass any noncitizen eligibility test established by the disability program (e.g., SSI recipients would have to meet SSI noncitizen requirements in order to get food stamps/SNAP); and all individuals who have resided in the United States for five or more years as "qualified aliens"—that is, LPRs, refugees/asylees, and other non-temporary legal residents (such as Cuban/Haitian entrants). New entrants are not eligible for five years after entry. | The extent to which residents of the United States who are not U.S. citizens should be eligible for federally funded public aid has been a contentious issue since the 1990s. This issue meets at the intersection of two major policy areas: immigration policy and welfare policy. The eligibility of noncitizens for public assistance programs is based on a complex set of rules that are determined largely by the category of the noncitizen in question and the nature of services being offered. Over the past 20 years, Congress has enacted significant changes in U.S. immigration policy and welfare policy. Congress has also exercised oversight of revisions made by the 1996 welfare reform law (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, P.L. 104-193) concerning the rules governing noncitizen eligibility for public assistance, and of legislation covering programs with major restrictions on noncitizen eligibility (e.g., Medicaid).
This report deals with the four major federal means-tested benefit programs: the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps), the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash assistance, and Medicaid. Laws in place for the past 20 years restrict the eligibility of legal permanent residents (LPRs), refugees, asylees, and other noncitizens for most means-tested public aid. Noncitizens' eligibility for major federal means-tested benefits largely depends on their immigration status; whether they arrived (or were on a program's rolls) before August 22, 1996, the enactment date of P.L. 104-193; and how long they have lived and worked in the United States.
LPRs with a substantial work history (defined as 40 quarters of Social Security covered earnings) or military connection are eligible for the full range of programs, as are asylees, refugees, and other humanitarian cases (for at least five to seven years after entry). Other LPRs must meet additional eligibility requirements.
For SSI, they are not eligible for the first five years even if they had a substantial work history (e.g., as a temporary worker prior to receiving LPR status). For SNAP, they generally must have been LPRs for five years or be under age 18. Under TANF, they generally are ineligible for five years after entry and then eligible at state option. States have the option of providing Medicaid to pregnant LPRs and children within the five-year bar; otherwise LPRs are ineligible for the first five years.
Unauthorized aliens (often referred to as illegal aliens) are not eligible for most federal benefits, regardless of whether they are means tested, with notable exceptions for emergency services (e.g., Medicaid for emergency medical care or Federal Emergency Management Agency disaster services).
This report does not track legislation and will be updated as policy changes warrant. |
crs_RS20934 | crs_RS20934_0 | Prior to the issuance of the HIPAA privacy rule, federal laws did not address the confidentiality of health-care information collected and maintained by the private sector ( i.e. HIPAA
Several comprehensive medical records confidentiality bills were introduced during the past decade, with the end result being passage of the medical privacy requirements as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"). Section 264 of HIPAA requires HHS to submit to the Congress detailed recommendations on standards with respect to privacy rights for individually identifiable health information. HHS also recently issued a 20 page "Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule." The final privacy rule was criticized by some for its complexity, and for the imposition of substantial administrative and financial burdens on the health care industry. The August 2002 Privacy Rule
The Bush Administration and HHS re-opened the privacy rule to additional comment on February 8, 2001, and announced that it would accept further comments on the rule until March 30, 2001, see 66 Fed. On August 14, 2002, HHS published in the Federal Register the privacy rule with certain modifications, 67 Fed. Incidental Use and Disclosure. The December 2000 rule prevents a provider from disclosing protected health information to another entity for other than treatment purposes. | This report provides a brief overview of the modified HIPAA Privacy rule, "Standards for the Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information"("privacy rule") published on August 14, 2002 by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Issuance of the modified Privacy Rule by the Bush Administration is the culmination of a decades long debate over access to medical records that has pitted privacy advocates and civil libertarians against employers and much of the health care industry. As required by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), a privacy rule was issued in December 2000, and modified August 2002. The privacy rule went into effect April 14, 2001, with compliance required by April 2003 for most entities. The HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes a set of basic consumer protections and a series of regulatory permissions for uses and disclosures of protected health information. S. 16, introduced in the 108th Congress by Senator Daschle, would reverse some modifications to the rule. This report will be updated. |
crs_RL31979 | crs_RL31979_0 | Introduction
In 1993, Russia formally applied for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Its application was taken up by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the successor organization of the GATT. Russia's application has entered into its most significant phase as Russia negotiates with WTO members on the conditions for accession. The process had been moving forward, but, the last few years, differences over some critical issues have made the timing of Russian accession to the WTO uncertain. Accession to the WTO had been critical to Russia and its political leadership. President, now Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin had made it a top priority. However, in the last year, Russian leaders have sent mixed signals regarding their commitment to the accession process. In August 2008, Prime Minister Putin stated that WTO accession may not be beneficial to Russia. Russia has also changed some of its trade rules, such as lowering quotas on meat imports and raising tariffs on auto imports, that contradict commitments that it made to the United States, the European Union(EU) and other WTO members as part of the accession process. However, in December 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that Russia was committed to acceding to the WTO. Congressional interest in Russia's accession to the WTO is multifaceted. Members of Congress are concerned that Russia enters the WTO under terms and conditions in line with U.S. economic interests, especially gaining access to Russian markets as well as safeguards to protect U.S. import-sensitive industries. Some Members also assert that Congress should have a formal role in approving the conditions under which Russia accedes to the WTO, a role it does not have at this time. The Congress has a direct role in determining whether Russia receives permanent normal trade relations (NTR) status which has implications for Russia's membership in the WTO and U.S.-Russian trade relations. Without granting PNTR to Russia, the United States might not benefit from the concessions that Russia makes upon accession. This report will be updated as events warrant. Furthermore, the Russian government said it is reconsidering (unspecific) commitments its has made as part of the accession process, and Prime Minister Putin has expressed doubts about the benefits of WTO accession to Russia. The Bush Administration has indicated that Russia's accession to the WTO could be jeopardized because of Russia's August 2008 military incursion into Georgia and its recognition the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. If the United States does not extend permanent NTR to Russia, the United States would not benefit from the concessions, except tariff reductions, that Russia makes upon acceding to the WTO. Implications for Other Countries and the WTO
Russia is the largest and most populous country that is not a member of the WTO. | In 1993, Russia formally applied for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Its application was taken up by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor organization of the GATT, in 1995. Russia's application has entered into its most significant phase as Russia negotiates with WTO members on the conditions for accession.
Accession to the WTO had been critical to Russia and its political leadership. President, now Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin had made it a top priority. However, in the last year, Russian leaders have sent mixed signals regarding their commitment to the accession process. In August 2008, Prime Minister Putin stated that WTO accession may not be beneficial to Russia. Russia has also changed some of its trade rules, such as lowering quotas on meat imports and raising tariffs on auto imports, that contradict commitments that it made to the United States, the European Union and other WTO members as part of the accession process. However, in December 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that Russia was committed to acceding to the WTO. Russia is looking to join the WTO by January 1, 2010, but previous such goals have not been fulfilled, and outstanding issues may delay the process again.
Differences over some critical issues remain, making the time for Russian accession to the WTO uncertain. The European Union and the United States have raised concerns about Russian energy pricing policies which allow natural gas, oil, and electricity to be sold domestically far below world prices providing, they argue, a subsidy to domestic producers of fertilizers, steel, and other energy-intensive goods. Russia counters that the subsidies are not illegal under the WTO. Perhaps more significantly, Russia's WTO accession had been put on a virtual hold as a result of the early August 2008 Russian-Georgian armed conflict over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and due to some trade measures that Russia has taken that would appear to be in conflict with commitments it has made as part of the accession process.
Congressional interest in Russia's accession to the WTO is multifaceted. Members of Congress are concerned that Russia enters the WTO under terms and conditions in line with U.S. economic interests, especially gaining access to Russian markets as well as safeguards to protect U.S. import-sensitive industries. Some Members also assert that Congress should have a formal role in approving the conditions under which Russia accedes to the WTO, a role it does not have at this time. A number of Members of Congress and members of the U.S. business community have advised the Bush Administration not to agree too quickly to Russia's accession to the WTO and to ensure that U.S. concerns are met. The Congress has a direct role in determining whether Russia receives permanent normal trade relations (NTR) status which has implications for Russia's membership in the WTO and U.S.-Russian trade relations. Without granting permanent NTR (PNTR) to Russia, the United States might not benefit from the concessions that Russia makes upon accession. Issues regarding Russia's accession to the WTO may arise during the 111th Congress. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41236 | crs_R41236_0 | Introduction
Retiring Justice John Paul Stevens has not authored many opinions relating to intellectual property law, but those he has written reflect his interest in striking an appropriate balance between the protection of intellectual property rights and public access to the products of creative and inventive minds. This report examines Justice Stevens' opinions involving copyright law, patent law, and state sovereign immunity and patent infringement lawsuits. Fair Use and Consumer Electronics
For manufacturers of consumer electronics and personal computers, the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios is considered the "Magna Carta" of product innovation and the technology age. Sony's embrace of time-shifting as a "fair use" of copyrighted works has created a safe harbor from copyright infringement liability for developers and sellers of electronic devices that facilitate the recording, storage, and playback of copyrighted media, such as the digital video recorder (DVR and TiVo), portable music and video players (iPod), and personal computers. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion that garnered the support of four other justices. Extension of Copyright Terms
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution authorizes Congress: "To promote the Progress of Science ... by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings…." Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft , in which the Court upheld the CTEA by a vote of 7-2. Today more than 20,000 software patents are granted each year. In a 1978 case, Parker v. Flook , Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by five other justices, in which the Court rejected this attempt to runaround Benson . The opinion of the Court in Diamond v. Diehr was written by Justice Rehnquist, who had dissented in Flook . Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissent in Diehr , joined by three other justices who were in the Flook majority. He argued that "[t]he broad question whether computer programs should be given patent protection involves policy considerations that this Court is not authorized to address." Patent Remedy Act
Congress passed the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act) in 1992. The language of the statute specifically and unequivocally abrogated state sovereign immunity and subjected the states to suits for monetary damages brought by individuals for violation of federal patent law. College Savings Bank argued that Congress had lawfully done so pursuant to the due process clause by ensuring an individual an adequate remedy in the case of a deprivation of property perpetrated by the state in the form of patent infringement. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, joined by three other justices. He believed that the Patent Remedy Act was a proper exercise of Congress's power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent state deprivations of property without due process of law. | This report briefly surveys decisions of retiring Justice John Paul Stevens in intellectual property cases. An examination of Justice Stevens' written opinions relating to intellectual property law reveals a strong desire to ensure that the rights of intellectual property creators are balanced with the rights of the public to access creative and innovative works. No decision embodies this interest more than Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., a landmark copyright case issued in 1984 that paved the way for the development and sale of popular consumer electronics, such as the video recorder (VCR, DVR, TiVo), portable music and video players (iPod), personal computers, and other devices that permit the recording and playback of copyrighted content.
In addition, Justice Stevens issued a lengthy dissent in the 2003 case Eldred v. Ashcroft, in which he asserted that Congress lacked the power to pass a law that extended the term of existing copyrights by 20 years. Such a retroactive extension delays the entrance of copyrighted works into the public domain and, in Justice Stevens' opinion, is a violation of the Constitution's Copyright Clause that authorizes Congress to grant exclusive intellectual property rights to authors and artists for "limited Times."
In the area of patent law, Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in the 1978 case Parker v. Flook that sought to severely restrict the availability of patent protection on inventions relating to computer software programs. Yet just three years later, the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Diehr effectively opened the door to the allowance of patents on some computer programs. Justice Stevens wrote a strongly worded dissent in Diehr in which he suggested that Congress would be better suited than the Court to address the policy considerations of allowing patent protection for computer programs. His written opinions in both of these cases reveal an interest in judicial restraint, not wanting to extend patent rights into areas that Congress had not contemplated.
Justice Stevens dissented from the 1999 opinion, Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, in which a majority of the Court invalidated Congress's attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity and authorize patent holders to file suits for monetary damages against states and state instrumentalities that infringe their patent rights. Justice Stevens believed that the 1992 Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act was a proper exercise of Congress's authority under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent state deprivations of property without due process of law, and he expressed his disagreement with the majority opinion's expansive protection of states' rights. |
crs_R44621 | crs_R44621_0 | Introduction
This report describes and analyzes annual appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. The request amounted to a $332 million, or 0.8%, decrease from the $40.96 billion enacted for FY2016 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 , Division F). On May 26, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 3001 , accompanied by S.Rept. 114-264 . According to the committee report, S. 3001 included $41.2 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2017. This was $578 million (1.4%) above the level requested by the Administration, but $246 million (0.6%) above the enacted level for FY2016. On June 22, the House Committee on Appropriations reported out H.R. 5634 , accompanied by H.Rept. 114-668 . H.R. 5634 included $41.04 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2017. This was $426 million (1.0%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $95 million (0.2%) above the enacted level for FY2016. Continuing Resolutions
On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law P.L. 114-223 , which contained a continuing resolution that funded the government through December 9, 2016, at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.496%. A second continuing resolution was signed into law on December 10, 2016 ( P.L. 114-254 ), funding the government through April 28, 2017, at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.1901%. Enactment of Annual and Supplemental Appropriations for FY2017
On March 16, 2017, the Trump Administration submitted an amendment to the FY2017 budget request, which included a request for $3 billion in additional funding for DHS. Congress addressed this request at the same time as it resolved annual appropriations for the federal government, through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (signed into law as P.L. 115-31 on May 5, 2017). The act included both annual and supplemental appropriations for DHS as Division F, which is titled the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2017. The bill included $41.3 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority in annual appropriations, as well as $6.7 billion in funding for the costs of major disasters under the Stafford Act and $163 million in funding for overseas contingency operations. Title VI included over $1.1 billion in supplemental appropriations for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Secret Service. On September 1, 2017, the Trump Administration requested $7.85 billion in supplemental funding for FY2017, including $7.4 billion for the DRF. On September 6, the House passed the relief package requested by the Administration as an amendment to H.R. 601 . The House passed the Senate amended version of the bill on September 8, 2017, which became P.L. The Obama Administration requested $32.26 billion in FY2017 net discretionary budget authority for components included in this title, as part of a total budget for these components of $40.04 billion for FY2017. 115-56 . Appendix. | This report discusses the FY2017 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Its primary focus is on funding approved by Congress through the appropriations process. It includes an Appendix with definitions of key budget terms used throughout the suite of Congressional Research Service reports on homeland security appropriations. It also directs the reader to other reports providing context for and additional details regarding specific component appropriations and issues engaged through the FY2016 appropriations process.
The Obama Administration requested $40.62 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2017. The request amounted to a $332 million, or 0.8%, decrease from the $40.96 billion enacted for FY2016 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113, Division F).
On May 26, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 3001, accompanied by S.Rept. 114-264. S. 3001 included $41.2 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2017. This was $578 million (1.4%) above the level requested by the Obama Administration, but $246 million (0.6%) above the enacted level for FY2016. On June 22, the House Committee on Appropriations reported out H.R. 5634, accompanied by H.Rept. 114-668. H.R. 5634 included $41.04 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2017. This was $426 million (1.0%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $95 million (0.2%) above the enacted level for FY2016. Direct comparisons of certain aspects of the funding provided by the committee legislation have been complicated by a congressionally mandated restructuring of the department's appropriations.
On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed P.L. 114-223 into law, which contained a continuing resolution that funded the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.496%, through December 9, 2016. A second continuing resolution was signed into law on December 10, 2016 (P.L. 114-254), funding the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.1901%, through April 28, 2017. This report discusses anomalies in the continuing resolution that specifically addressed DHS.
On March 16, 2017, the Trump Administration submitted an amendment to the FY2017 budget request, which included a request for $3 billion in additional funding for DHS. Congress chose to address this request in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (signed into law as P.L. 115-31 on May 5, 2017), which would include both annual and supplemental appropriations for DHS as Division F. The bill included $41.3 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority in annual appropriations, as well as $6.7 billion in funding for the costs of major disasters under the Stafford Act and $163 million in funding for overseas contingency operations. Title VI included over $1.1 billion in supplemental appropriations for U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the U.S. Secret Service.
On September 1, 2017, the Trump Administration requested $7.85 billion in supplemental funding for FY2017, including $7.4 billion for the DRF. On September 6, the House passed the relief package requested by the Administration as an amendment to H.R. 601. On September 7, the Senate passed an amended version as part of a broader relief package. The House passed the Senate amended version of the bill on September 8, which was signed into law as P.L. 115-56. |
crs_R44013 | crs_R44013_0 | The goal is to develop 15 detailed actions governments can take to reduce tax avoidance by multinational corporations (as well as individuals) worldwide. This report is intended to assist Congress as it considers what, if any, action to curb profit shifting. There are indications that profits are being shifted to "tax-preferred" or "tax-haven" countries, and that the amount of profits involved (and therefore the tax revenue lost) could be considerable. In reality, no major economy has a pure worldwide or a pure territorial tax system. As long as the U.S. corporate tax rate is higher than the foreign country's rate, the foreign tax credit should—in principle—result in the corporation owing the same amount in total taxes (U.S. plus foreign) as it would if it earned the income in the Unites States. Several publically available datasets, however, do allow for an indirect examination into the extent that profit shifting may be occurring. The BEA also collects country-level data on the foreign direct investment (FDI) positions of U.S firms. Table 1 shows that the 10 most popular places to report profits were responsible for approximately 65% (or $789 billion) of the total $1.2 trillion in overseas earnings. Tax planning is one of the possible motivations for this corporate structure. Shown in Figure 3 are the 10 countries with the largest positions of U.S. FDI. American MNCs are reporting a significant share of their FDI as occurring in tax-preferred countries. The seven tax-preferred countries—Netherlands, Luxembourg, Bermuda, Ireland, United Kingdom Caribbean Islands, Singapore, and Switzerland—accounted for 47% of the FDI positions of American companies, compared to 24% for the three larger industrialized nations of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. FDI flow data (or change in FDI over a given point of time) show similar type patterns. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment Held Through Holding Companies
An increasingly popular way American companies have been structuring their operations and foreign investments is through the use of holding companies. Of that $2.2 trillion, 68% (or $1.5 trillion) was attributable to the seven tax-haven or tax-preferred locations of the Netherlands (27%), Luxembourg (16%), Bermuda (9%), Ireland (5%), the U.K. Caribbean Islands (5%), Singapore (4%), and Switzerland (2%). Indications of Worldwide Profit Shifting
Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggest that corporate profit shifting is not solely a U.S. issue. Policy Options and Considerations For Reducing Profit Shifting
The debate over reducing profit shifting and reforming the international tax system may involve a number of policy considerations and tradeoffs. There is also on the horizon the completion of OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative. The remainder of this report discusses these considerations generally. The general implications of moving closer toward either system are discussed below. A territorial system raises some of the same concerns that the current system does regarding profit shifting. Formula apportionment may also require international cooperation. Expanding the definition of Subpart F income to encompass more income related to intangible assets may help curb profit shifting; a significant share of profit shifting is believed to be associated with intangible assets. The OECD's BEPS Project
At the request of the G20 finance ministers, the OECD has initiated the development of an Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. If multinational corporations have the means to avoid or reduce taxes, and other taxpayers (including individuals) do not, then it may create the perception that the tax system is unfair. For example, a country that adopts the BEPS country-by-country reporting standards could require U.S. companies to report detailed operating information for each country they operate in to that country's tax authority so that the tax authority can determine whether their domestic tax base is being eroded by profit shifting. | Congress and the Obama Administration have expressed interest in addressing multinational corporations' ability to shift profits into low- and no-tax countries with little corresponding change in business operations. Several factors appear to be driving this interest. Economists have estimated that profit shifting results in significant tax revenue losses annually, implying that reducing the practice could help address deficit and debt concerns. Profit shifting and base erosion are also believed to distort the allocation of capital as investment decisions are overly influenced by taxes. Fairness concerns have also been raised. If multinational corporations can avoid or reduce their taxes, other taxpayers (including domestically focused businesses and individuals) may perceive the tax system as unfair. At the same time, policymakers are also concerned that American corporations could be unintentionally harmed if careful consideration is not given to the proper way to reduce profit shifting.
Consistent with the findings of existing research, the analysis presented in this report provides indications that the magnitude of profit shifting may be significant. For example, of the $1.2 trillion in overseas profits American companies reported earning in 2012, $600 billion was attributed to seven "tax haven" or "tax preferred" countries: Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, and the U.K. Caribbean Islands. The Netherlands was the most popular location to report profits, accounting for 14.1% of all overseas earnings of American companies. Further analysis reveals that the share of profits reported is significantly disproportional to the amount of hiring and investment made by American companies in these countries.
Data on the foreign direct investment (FDI) positions of American companies are also analyzed. Examining FDI data allows for an indirect investigation into the degree of profit shifting. The FDI data show that the same seven "tax haven" or "tax preferred" countries accounted for nearly half (47%) of the worldwide FDI position of the United States. The data also show that an increasing share of FDI is being held via holding companies. The report discusses that some of the increased use of holding companies may be tax motivated. Lastly, data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations (UN) on the location of the FDI positions of all countries indicate that profit shifting is likely an international issue.
Several policy options for addressing base erosion and profit shifting are briefly discussed. Included in the discussion are the tradeoffs and considerations involved in moving closer to either a pure worldwide tax system or a pure territorial tax system. The adoption of a minimum tax or a formula apportionment system is also discussed, as well as the effects of modifying current tax policy such as broadening the definition of Subpart F income or reducing corporate tax rates. The report concludes with a discussion of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) plan, which may have implications for American corporations even if the U.S. does not adopt the OECD's recommendations.
This report is intended to assist Congress as it considers what, if any, action to take to curb profit shifting. It is one of several CRS products related to the subject of profit shifting. Where appropriate, reference is made to related CRS products that discuss the more technical issues in the international corporate tax debate. |
crs_R43520 | crs_R43520_0 | Introduction
This report is intended as an introduction to the laws and rules governing the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and related programs. The CDBG program, administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was first authorized by Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA) of 1974, P.L. 93-383 . The program is one of the largest and longest-standing federal block grants in existence, annually allocating billions of dollars in federal assistance to state and local governments in support of community and economic development efforts. During the program's 40-year existence, Congress has appropriated approximately $145 billion in CDBG-formula grants to help state and local governments undertake housing, economic development, neighborhood revitalization, and other community development activities. The third category is block grants. States serve as pass-through agents and are prohibited from directly undertaking community development activities. Section 107 Special Project Grants
Currently eligible uses of Section 107 funds include grants:
to any state or local government that received an insufficient CDBG formula allocation as a result of a miscalculation of its share of formula grants awarded to eligible entities; to minority serving institutions, including historically black colleges and universities, and institutions of higher education serving Hispanic populations and Indian tribes; to Indian tribes, states, local governments, and area-wide planning organizations for the provision of technical assistance, knowledge transfer, and capacity building activities; to states or local government working jointly with institutions of higher education to carry out eligible CDBG activities; and to units of local government in nonentitlement areas to be used to assist these communities in undertaking community adjustment and economic diversification activities in response to proposed or actual base realignment activities (BRAC), cancellation of Department of Defense (DOD) contracts, or the public announcement of a planned reduction in DOD spending that would directly affect the economic base of the communities. Eligible activities must:
principally benefit low- and moderate-income persons defined as families and individuals whose household incomes do not exceed 80% of a jurisdiction's median income; aid in the prevention or elimination of slums or blight; or meet an urgent need by addressing conditions that pose a serious and immediate threat to the health and safety of residents. Income Targeting Requirement
In order to receive funds each entitlement community or state must certify that it will target at least 70% of its funds to activities that principally benefit low- and moderate-income persons over a one-, two-, or three-year period established by the entitlement community or state. These hearing are intended to identify housing and community development needs within the community, consider proposals for funding, and review program performance. If a jurisdiction's program is found to be in noncompliance with program requirements, HUD may take any of the following actions:
request that the state or entitlement community submit additional information and outline remedial actions that will bring the program into compliance; issue a letter of warning; in the case of noncompliance by a nonentitlement recipient of state CDBG funds, it may advise the state to suspend a questionable activity or to suspend the local government; institute conditions on the use of funds; terminate payments to the recipient; reduce payment to the recipient; limit payments to activities and projects not affected by activities found in noncompliance with statute and regulations governing the program; or seek civil action. Related Programs
In addition to authorizing funding of CDBG formula grants, the CDBG authorizing statute also includes language authorizing other programs and activities intended to work in coordination with CDBG formula grant in support of the program's national objectives. All eligible activities must meet the one of the three national objectives of the regular CDBG program. Recipients receiving Section 108 funds are required to file an annual performance report with HUD detailing progress made in meeting the objectives of its community development plan, including Section 108 activities. In addition, 42 U.S.C. Currently, grants are awarded to three national intermediaries to be used to help fund efforts to improve the technical and administrative capacities of neighborhood based community development corporations (CDCs) and community housing development organizations (CHDOs). Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grants (SCRPG) . | The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was first authorized by Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, P.L. 93-383 (42 U.S.C. 5301, et seq.). The program is one of the largest and longest-standing federal block grants in existence, annually allocating billions of dollars in federal assistance to state and local governments in support of local neighborhood revitalization, housing rehabilitation, and community and economic development efforts. During the program's 40-year existence, Congress has allocated approximately $145 billion in CDBG formula grants to help state and local governments undertake these activities. The block grant nature of the program provides recipient jurisdictions fairly substantial administrative discretion.
Funds are awarded by formula to so-called "entitlement communities" and states, who act as pass-through agents awarding funds to small communities unable to meet the minimum population threshold for entitlement status. During FY2013, approximately 1,237 entitlement communities and states qualified for a direct allocation of funds. Grant funds may be used to undertake any of 27 categories of eligible activities, including the acquisition, demolition, and sale of real property; the construction of public facilities; the undertaking of public services; historic preservation; energy conservation; and the provision of assistance to for-profit and not-for-profit entities in support of private-sector job creation. Although communities and states are given great discretion and flexibility in the selection of activities to be funded, the program's governing statute requires that all activities meet one of three national objectives. Eligible activities must:
principally benefit low or moderate income persons; aid in preventing or eliminating slums or blight; or address an imminent threat to the health and safety of residents.
In addition, the act quantifies the "principally low and moderate income persons" (LMI) benefits national objective by requiring each entitlement community and state to expend in the aggregate, over a one-, two-, or three-year period, at least 70% of its CDBG allocation on activities that principally benefit low and moderate income persons.
Before undertaking program activities, a recipient of funds must develop a consolidated plan assessing its current housing and non-housing community development conditions and it must propose a plan to address the community's housing and community development needs. Grant recipients are also required to submit to HUD an annual performance report detailing progress that has been made in achieving proposed outcomes and identifying the status of activities identified in its annual plan.
In addition to the CDBG formula portion of the program, HUD administers a number of smaller grant and loan guarantee programs intended to support or augment the activities and objectives of the larger CDBG formula grant program. These programs support regional planning, the reclamation of brownfields, rural housing, and the provision of technical assistance to community development corporations and community housing development organizations. Critics have contended that many of these programs duplicate the activities of the CDBG formula grant program.
This report is intended as a primer to acquaint the reader with a basic understanding of CDBG and related programs. In-depth policy discussions and funding history may be found in other CRS products, including CRS Report R43208, Community Development Block Grants: Funding Issues in the 113th Congress, and CRS Report R43394, Community Development Block Grants: Recent Funding History. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43362 | crs_R43362_0 | Among other things, FISA established the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to review government applications to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISA Court of Review) to review the decisions of the FISC. While some have proposed altering the underlying substantive law that regulates such surveillance, other proposals address the practice and procedures of authorizing such surveillance activities. These reforms include requiring the FISC to hear arguments from "friends of the court" or amici curiae , who would brief the court on the privacy or civil liberty interests implicated by a government application; mandating that in certain instances the FISC sit en banc —that is, with all 11 FISC judges; and altering the voting rules of the FISC and FISA Court of Review. At the heart of FISA is the FISC, a specialized Article III court that is empowered to "hear applications for and grant orders approving" of certain foreign intelligence gathering efforts. Operations of the FISA Courts
In light of the sensitive nature of its docket, the FISA courts operate largely in secret and in a non-adversarial fashion. Congress's Power to Regulate the Practice and Procedures of Federal Courts
Several congressional proposals attempting to reform United States foreign intelligence gathering efforts are aimed at changing the underlying practices of the FISC and FISA Court of Review. For example, some have suggested either explicitly permitting or mandating that the FISC hear from an amicus curiae or "friend of the court." Still others have suggested altering the voting rules of the FISC in an apparent attempt to create a higher threshold for government surveillance. While formally codifying the FISA courts' authority in statute could arguably clarify the scope of the courts' authority with respect to amici and encourage the courts to exercise that authority more frequently, it is unclear what legal difference a codification of the amicus authority ultimately makes, as the statutory authority is largely duplicative of the authority the FISA courts already possess as a matter of their inherent power. First, it can be argued that a "mandatory amicus " proposal potentially conflicts with the constitutional norm that Article III courts, like the FISC, must have some degree of autonomy or independence in controlling their internal processes. Another provision in Title 5 of the U.S. Code authorizes the head of the Office of Special Counsel to appear as an amicus in certain cases and requires a "court of the United States [to] grant the application of the Special Counsel to appear in any such action.... " While the plain language of these two laws appear to provide a mandate on the court to hear from certain government amici, no court has assessed the constitutionality of such a provision, leaving the constitutional status of a mandatory amicus statute judicially unresolved. Congressionally mandating that the FISC sit en banc prompts questions regarding the constitutionality of such proposals. Legal Issues with Requiring an En Banc Panel for "Significant Interpretations" of FISA
There does not appear to be a major constitutional question raised by legislation requiring, as opposed to allowing, a federal court to sit en banc in certain circumstances. While Congress has significant authority to regulate the practice and procedure of the federal courts, it is unclear whether directly setting the voting rules of a federal court falls within that power. | Recent disclosures concerning the size and scope of the National Security Agency's (NSA) surveillance activities both in the United States and abroad have prompted a flurry of congressional activity aimed at reforming the foreign intelligence gathering process. While some measures would overhaul the substantive legal rules of the USA PATRIOT Act or other provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), there are a host of bills designed to make procedural and operational changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a specialized Article III court that hears applications and grants orders approving of certain foreign intelligence gathering activities, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, a court that reviews rulings of the FISC. This report will explore a selection of these proposals and address potential legal questions such proposals may raise.
Due to the sensitive nature of the subject matters it adjudicates, the FISC operates largely in secret and in a non-adversarial manner with the government as the only party. Some have argued that this non-adversarial process prevents the court from hearing opposing viewpoints on difficult legal issues facing the court. To address these concerns, some have suggested either permitting or mandating that the FISC hear from "friends of the court" or amici curiae, who would brief the court on potential privacy and civil liberty interests implicated by a government application. While formally codifying the FISA courts' authority in statute could arguably clarify the scope of the court's authority with respect to amici and encourage the courts to exercise that authority more frequently, it is unclear what legal difference a codification of the amicus authority ultimately makes, as the statutory authority is largely duplicative of the authority the FISA courts already possess as a matter of their inherent power. Proposals to mandate, rather than permit, that the FISC hear from an amicus might also fall within Congress's considerable power to regulate the practices and procedures of federal courts. Nonetheless, such mandatory amicus proposals are uncommon and could potentially raise constitutional issues concerning the independence of the FISC to control its internal processes. Such proposals may also prompt questions to the extent that they conflict with constitutional rules about who can appear before federal courts and what powers those individuals may wield when there.
In another attempt to promote greater judicial scrutiny of FISA applications, some have suggested that Congress mandate that the FISC sit en banc—that is, conduct review by all 11 judges of the court—when making "significant" interpretations of foreign intelligence statutes. Under current law, the FISC is permitted in certain instances to hold a hearing or rehearing en banc, mainly to ensure uniformity of FISC decisions and when addressing legal questions of exceptional importance. Requiring that the FISC sit en banc does not appear to raise major constitutional questions as such a proposal would likely not hinder the FISC from performing its core constitutional functions, which primarily includes independently adjudicating matters before it with finality.
There have also been calls to alter the voting rules of either the FISC, when sitting en banc, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review apparently in an effort to create a higher threshold for government surveillance. While Congress has significant constitutional power to govern the practice and procedure of the federal courts, including the two foreign intelligence courts, it is unclear whether setting these voting rules falls within that power or, conversely, whether it may intrude upon the core judicial function of these federal tribunals. |
crs_R42071 | crs_R42071_0 | Overview of APEC
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was founded in 1989 for the purpose of promoting trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific as a means of fostering sustainable economic growth and prosperity in the region. APEC has three distinct features among multilateral trade organizations. First, all the liberalization measures taken by its members are voluntary. The United States is the host in 2011; Russia will be the host in 2012. The November APEC Meetings in Honolulu
Between November 8 and 13, 2011, the United States will host several senior-level APEC meetings in Honolulu, HI. The 5 th SOM will be followed by a Finance Ministers' Meeting on November 10, to be hosted by Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner. On November 11, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk will co-host the APEC Ministerial Meeting. At past meetings, the U.S. President held one or more separate bilateral meetings with other leaders, usually including a meeting with the leader of the host member. It is unknown if President Obama will hold similar meetings this year. The agenda of the Economic Leaders' Meeting usually is based on the host's theme for the year, implying this year's meeting will center on regional economic integration, sustainable development, and regulatory convergence. In addition, the United States may use the event to inform the APEC members about the status of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations and possibly publicly announce a significant landmark in the TPP talks. She then attended the EAS meeting in Hanoi in October 2010, at which it was disclosed that the United States—along with Russia—would become a full member in 2011. The heightened U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region has raised questions about APEC's continued role and relevance in U.S. foreign policy, particularly given the growing number of alternative regional events or organizations at which the United States can present its views. In addition, along with reemphasizing the importance of APEC to the region, the Obama Administration has spoken extensively about the "central role" of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Asia-Pacific relations. APEC and the EAS
Six days after the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting ends, President Obama is scheduled to attend the 6 th East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali, Indonesia. The APEC Economic Leaders Declaration of 2006 "acknowledged the role of high-quality, consistent, transparent and comprehensive Regional Trade Agreements/Free Trade Agreements (RTAs/FTAs)" and instructed APEC's officials to "undertake further studies on ways and means to promote regional economic integration, including a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific as a long-term prospect, and report to the 2007 APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Australia." The expectation is that the nine representatives of the current APEC members involved in the TPP negotiations—Australia, Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam—will announce the broad framework of a TPP agreement during the APEC meetings in Honolulu. Beyond the concerns expressed by other countries, analysts have frequently raised the more general issue of TPP's compatibility with APEC's historical approach to trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. According to the U.S. officials, APEC's primary role would be as an incubator for developing cutting-edge approaches to emerging trade issues (such as incorporating innovation and supply chain issues into FTAs), and the TPP would be the formal trade agreement which would adopt the agreed-upon, mature, formal results of APEC's trade and investment innovations. Some ASEAN members and analysts remain skeptical about the U.S. commitment to ASEAN; some suspect that U.S. interest in ASEAN is primarily focused on U.S. relations with China. The meetings to be held in November—the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, the U.S.-ASEAN Summit, and the East Asian Summit—may provide an opportunity for the Obama Administration to clarify the roles and relevance of each of these fora. Agenda for 2011 APEC Meetings
The Obama Administration has indicated that it wishes to prioritize three issues during the APEC meetings in November. Issues for Congress
Congressional interest in APEC has generally focused on three issues—implications for U.S. trade policy in general, potential effects on relations with China, and budgetary matters. The United States agreed in 2007 to join APEC's Business Travel Card (ABTC) program, which allows business travelers pre-cleared, facilitated short-term entry to participating member economies. H.R. | The United States will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC's) 19th Economic Leaders' Meeting in Honolulu, HI, on November 12 & 13, 2011. APEC was founded in 1989 to facilitate trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region. During the four days prior to the Economic Leaders' Meeting, APEC will hold the fourth Senior Officials Meeting for 2011, the Finance Ministers Meeting, and the APEC Ministerial Meeting. President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner, and U.S Trade Representative Ron Kirk are expected to attend their respective meetings. These meetings will culminate a year in which the United States hosted dozens of meetings.
Although the United States was among APEC's founding members, some U.S. officials have been frustrated with APEC's approach to trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. From its inception, APEC has used a consensus-based, non-binding approach in which its members unilaterally adopt non-discriminatory liberalization and facilitation measures. In much of its trade policy, the U.S. government has generally utilized an approach based on negotiated binding agreements applicable only to the parties to the agreement. As such, there has been frequent discussion about APEC's proper role in U.S. trade policy.
This discussion remains relevant in 2011 as three other multilateral fora have become increasingly important to the United States. The United States, along with eight other APEC members, is attempting to negotiate a comprehensive regional trade agreement—commonly referred to as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—that the Obama Administration has promoted as a model free trade agreement for the 21st century. In addition, the 6th East Asia Summit (EAS), to be held in Bali six days after the APEC Leaders' Meeting, will be the first at which the United States will participate as a full member. Reflecting the growing importance the U.S. government places on relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), President Obama is scheduled to attend the 3rd U.S.-ASEAN Summit, also in Bali, the day before the EAS Summit. The rising prominence of other Asian or Asia-Pacific events has also brought into question APEC's relevance and the necessity of the President's attendance at the annual Leaders' Meeting.
As host in 2011, the United States chose three main themes for the year—economic growth, green development, and cooperation and convergence of trade regulations. In addition, it is expected that there will be one or more major announcements regarding progress on the TPP negotiations during the Economic Leaders' Meeting. For more than a year, the Obama Administration has stated that it hopes substantial progress will be made on the TPP agreement in time for the APEC meetings in Honolulu. More recently, Japan's new Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda has indicated that his country is contemplating joining the TPP negotiations.
Congressional interest in APEC has generally focused on three issues—implications for U.S. trade policy in general, potential effects on relations with China, and budgetary matters. The voluntary unilateral trade and investment measures offered or agreed to by the United States at the annual Economic Leaders' Meetings may have implications for U.S. trade laws and regulations, as well as for the federal budget. For example, in the 112th Congress H.R. 2042 is intended to help advance the U.S. commitment in 2007 to join the APEC Business Travel Card program. In addition, U.S. initiatives under the auspices of APEC may impact relations with China. Finally, as an APEC member, the United States contributes to the organization's operational budget, and as host for 2011, the United States was responsible for much of the funding for the APEC meetings held throughout the year. |
crs_R43817 | crs_R43817_0 | Current U.S. farm policy is authorized by the 2014 farm bill (the Agricultural Act of 2014; P.L. 113-79 ) for the 2014-2018 crop years. This report assumes knowledge of the U.S. farm safety net programs and their function. As a result of the ruling and the potential for WTO-sanctioned retaliation, the United States made substantial policy changes in the past two farm bills to bring the related programs into WTO compliance. In general, the new suite of farm support programs shifts support away from the green/amber boxes and toward the blue/amber boxes, thus indicating greater potential for market distortion. In particular, the 2014 farm bill:
terminated several of the core "farm safety net" programs from the previous 2008 farm bill, including direct payments (DP), the counter-cyclical payment (CCP) program, and the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) and Supplemental Revenue Assurance (SURE) programs; retained the traditional marketing loan program (MLP)—which triggers payments when market prices drop below support levels (referred to as loan rates)—but with a single adjustment to the loan rate for upland cotton (which is now allowed to float within a formula-determined range of 45¢/lb to 52¢/lb as compared with the previous fixed value of 52¢/lb); replaced CCP with a similar counter-cyclical payment program called Price Loss Coverage (PLC) using substantially higher reference support prices; added several new shallow-loss programs, including Agricultural Risk Coverage (to replace ACRE) with county-level (ARC-CO) and farm-level (ARC-ID) options, a Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO), and Stacked Income Protection (STAX); and repealed the previous dairy product price support (DPPS) and Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) programs and replaced them with a new Dairy Margin Protection Program (DMPP) and Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP). U.S. green box notifications have grown from $46 billion in 1995 to $127.5 billion in 2012. DPs originated with the 1996 farm bill ( P.L. As a result, MLP outlays are fully coupled to market prices and planted acres. U.S. Repeal of the DPPS and MILC programs frees up substantial space for new program spending under the $19.1-billion U.S. amber box limit. Many of the new programs have yet to be fully implemented, producer participation is uncertain, and program outlays hinge on future market conditions. For example, under a relatively high price environment, as existed during the 2010-2013 period, U.S. program outlays would fall within proposed Doha Round limits with no or only modest changes. Alternatively, PLC and ARC-CO might be notified as blue box. Most studies suggest that, for U.S. program spending to exceed the $19.1-billion amber-box limit, a combination of worst-case events would have to occur, for example, low market prices generating large simultaneous outlays across multiple programs, in addition to the $1.4 billion of implicit costs associated with the sugar program. Such a scenario is unlikely, although not impossible, particularly since outlays under several of the programs (including the new dairy program, SCO, STAX, and crop insurance) are not subject to any per-farm subsidy limit. Perhaps more relevant to U.S. agricultural trade is the concern that—because the United States plays such a prominent role in most international markets for agricultural products—any distortion resulting from U.S. policy would be both visible and vulnerable to challenge under WTO rules. Furthermore, projected outlays under the new 2014 farm bill's shallow-loss and counter-cyclical price support programs may make it difficult for the United States to agree to future reductions in allowable caps on domestic support expenditures and related DM exclusions as envisioned in ongoing WTO multilateral trade negotiations. | The enacted 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014; P.L. 113-79) could result in potential compliance issues for U.S. farm policy with the rules and spending limits for domestic support programs that the United States agreed to as part of the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). In general, the act's new farm safety net shifts support away from classification under the WTO's green/amber boxes and toward the blue/amber boxes, indicating a potentially more market-distorting U.S. farm policy regime.
The 2014 farm bill eliminates many of the support programs of the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246) and replaces them with several new "shallow-loss" programs, addressing relatively small shortfalls in farm revenue—Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC), Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO), and Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX)—as well as a revamped counter-cyclical price support program, Price Loss Coverage (PLC), that relies on elevated support prices. Among the safety net programs, only the marketing loan program and the U.S. sugar program were extended unchanged. The sugar program will continue to count for $1.4 billion against the current U.S. limit of $19.1 billion for non-exempt, trade-distorting amber box outlays.
The most notable safety net change is the elimination of the $5-billion-per-year direct payment (DP) program, which was decoupled from producer planting decisions and was notified as a minimally trade-distorting green box outlay. DPs are replaced by programs that are partially coupled (PLC and ARC) or fully coupled (SCO and STAX), meaning that they could potentially have a significant impact on producer planting decisions, depending on market conditions. Fully and partially coupled farm programs influence planting decisions, both by increasing the overall profitability of farming (as low-price signals are muted) and by changing the relative returns to planting alternative crops. Increased profitability tends to increase total planted acreage and output, while changes in relative returns influence the share of acreage planted to each crop, with consequences that could spill over into international markets.
Many of the new programs authorized by the 2014 farm bill have yet to be fully implemented; thus producer participation is uncertain, while potential distortions have yet to be measured and will likely hinge on future market conditions. For example, under a relatively high market price environment, as existed during the 2010-2013 period, U.S. program outlays would be small and would fall within the $19.1 billion U.S. amber box limit. Most studies suggest that, for U.S. program spending to exceed the $19.1 billion limit, a combination of worst-case events would have to occur—for example, low market prices generating large simultaneous outlays across multiple programs, in addition to the $1.4 billion of implicit costs associated with the sugar program. Such a scenario is unlikely, although not impossible, particularly since outlays under several of the programs (including the new dairy program, SCO, STAX, and crop insurance) are not subject to any per-farm subsidy limit. Perhaps more relevant to U.S. agricultural trade is the concern that, because the United States plays such a prominent role in most international markets for agricultural products, any distortion resulting from U.S. policy would be both visible and vulnerable to challenge under WTO rules. Furthermore, projected outlays under the new 2014 farm bill's shallow-loss and counter-cyclical price support programs may make it difficult for the United States to agree to future reductions in allowable caps on domestic support expenditures and related de minimis exclusions, as envisioned in ongoing WTO multilateral trade negotiations. |
crs_R41013 | crs_R41013_0 | Enacted on March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("Affordable Care Act") includes provisions that address the coverage of abortion services by qualified health plans that will be available through health benefit exchanges ("exchanges") beginning in 2014. The Affordable Care Act's abortion provisions have been controversial, particularly with regard to the use of premium tax credits or cost-sharing subsidies to obtain health coverage that includes coverage for elective abortion services. This report reviews the Affordable Care Act's abortion provisions and provides background information on the so-called "Hyde Amendment," which restricts the use of federal funds appropriated for the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") to pay for elective abortion services provided through the Medicaid program. The Affordable Care Act addresses abortion coverage by the exchange plans with reference to the Hyde Amendment. The report also examines the coverage of elective abortions in the temporary high risk health insurance pool program established by the Affordable Care Act. Under the Hyde Amendment, funds appropriated for HHS may be used to pay for an abortion if a pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest, or if a woman's life would be endangered if an abortion were not performed. Following the Affordable Care Act's enactment, Executive Order No. 13535 was issued to "establish an adequate enforcement mechanism to ensure that federal funds are not used for abortion services (except in cases of rape or incest, or when the life of the woman would be endangered)." The executive order directed the OMB Director and HHS Secretary to develop a model set of segregation guidelines for state health insurance commissioners to use when determining whether exchange plans are complying with the Affordable Care Act's segregation requirements. The rule indicates that health benefit plans in the program cannot cover abortion services except when the life of a woman would be endangered or when a pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("Affordable Care Act") includes provisions that address the coverage of abortion services by qualified health plans that will be available through health benefit exchanges beginning in 2014. These provisions have been controversial, particularly with regard to the use of premium tax credits or cost-sharing subsidies to obtain health coverage that includes coverage for elective, non-therapeutic abortion services. The Affordable Care Act addresses abortion coverage by the exchange plans with reference to the so-called "Hyde Amendment," which permits the use of federal funds appropriated for the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") to pay for an abortion only if the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest, or if a woman's life would be endangered if the abortion were not performed. The Affordable Care Act permits exchange plans to cover both elective abortions and abortions for which federal funds appropriated for HHS are permitted, but requires plan issuers and enrollees to comply with funding segregation requirements if such plans are offered and selected.
Following the Affordable Care Act's enactment, Executive Order No. 13535 was issued to "establish an adequate enforcement mechanism to ensure that federal funds are not used for abortion services (except in cases of rape or incest, or when the life of the woman would be endangered)." The executive order, Ensuring Enforcement and Implementation of Abortion Restrictions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, required the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the HHS Secretary to develop a model set of segregation guidelines for state health insurance commissioners to use when determining whether exchange plans are complying with the Affordable Care Act's segregation requirements.
After the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, some also questioned whether elective abortions could be covered by health benefit plans offered in the temporary high risk health insurance pool program established by the law. The issuance of an interim final rule by HHS, however, appears to have settled that question. Health benefit plans in the program cannot cover abortion services except when the life of a woman would be endangered or when a pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest. |
crs_R40664 | crs_R40664_0 | Introduction
Since shortly after the establishment of limited Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s, the United States has periodically provided assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for civil security and counterterrorism purposes. Following the death of Yasser Arafat in late 2004 and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as his successor as PA president in early 2005, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice created the office of U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority to help reform, train, and equip PA security forces which had been personally beholden to Arafat and his political allies. Previous Israeli-Palestinian efforts at security cooperation collapsed during the second Palestinian intifada (also known as the Al Aqsa intifada , or "uprising") that took place earlier this decade. Since Hamas gained control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, head of the USSC since December 2005, has provided guidance to the Jordanian Public Security Directorate (JPSD) and international contractors in connection with their U.S.-funded "gendarmerie-style" training of West Bank-based PA security personnel. The funding has come through the State Department's INCLE account, managed by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs ("INL Bureau" or "INL"), which coordinates with the USSC. As of January 2010, approximately 400 Presidential Guardsmen and 2,200 National Security Forces (NSF) troops (comprising four NSF battalions) have been trained at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) near Amman (see " U.S. Training Assistance to PA Forces " below). Yet questions regarding the USSC mission persist. Might the PA forces establish a sustained pattern of success in countering and dismantling militant and terrorist networks, despite the facts that the United States may only supply non-lethal equipment to PA forces and that U.S.-sponsored training in Jordan has not concentrated heavily on counterterrorism techniques? Additionally, how might short-term operational success translate into permanent consolidation of competent, defactionalized civilian control over the PA forces and the broader criminal justice sector? If it can, what are the long-term implications vis-à-vis Hamas-controlled Gaza? They may prefer either to have the PA depend on itself or third parties for assistance or to transfer primary security responsibility in the West Bank to an international peacekeeping force. All troops, new or existing, are vetted before they are admitted to U.S.-sponsored training courses at JIPTC. There also could be calls for Congress to take into account how U.S. security assistance might lead to progress on (1) the Israeli-Palestinian political track (including Israel's willingness to halt settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and to contemplate redeployment from the West Bank in connection with final-status negotiations), (2) Palestinian civil society, governance, and economic development, and (3) efforts to end geographical and factional divisions between Palestinians in the West Bank and in Gaza. Expanding U.S. As discussed at various points above (see " Counterterrorism and Consolidation: Comprehensiveness of USSC Role " and " Criminal Justice Sector Reform "), some maintain that the U.S. mandate in security assistance matters should be expanded to give the USSC more comprehensive reach over all PA security organizations (including intelligence organizations), along with authority to help train and outfit these organizations more directly for counterterrorism operations, and perhaps also to give the State Department's INL Bureau an enhanced role in criminal justice sector reform. One way to do so would be to challenge the Administration to disclose whether it has options, and what those options are, in the event that one or more of the following short-, mid-, or long-range contingencies come to pass (listed in no particular order):
The conclusion of a final-status Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and/or the establishment of a Palestinian state The formation of a PA consensus or unity government that includes Hamas (either with or without the approval of the so-called "Quartet conditions" by all members of the government) A full or partial return of PA authority to the Gaza Strip (such as with regard to the border crossings) A Hamas victory in legislative and/or presidential elections The clear establishment of authoritarian rule in the West Bank and further segregation of the West Bank and Gaza from each other The clear pursuit by any key party of an alternative to a negotiated two-state solution An outbreak of factional Palestinian conflict within the West Bank and/or the Gaza Strip An outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian conflict An outbreak of war in the wider region
Depending on the contingency, response options might include cessation, reduction, or suspension of all U.S. assistance or various types of assistance, expansion of various types and levels of assistance, possible continuation of security assistance exclusively through either the PA president or the PA government (if one or the other is an unacceptable partner due to terrorist associations and/or its failure to meet the Quartet conditions), possible plans for coexistence/integration of PA forces and Hamas forces (assuming Hamas has met the Quartet conditions), and/or possible contribution to and/or coordination with a potential Arab and/or international peacekeeping/monitoring force. | Since shortly after the establishment of limited Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s, the United States has periodically provided assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) for civil security and counterterrorism purposes. Following the death of Yasser Arafat in late 2004 and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as his successor as PA President in early 2005, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice created the office of U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority to help reform, train, and equip PA security forces which had been personally beholden to Arafat and his political allies. Previous Israeli-Palestinian efforts at security cooperation collapsed during the second Palestinian intifada that took place earlier this decade.
Since Hamas gained control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, head of the USSC since November 2005, and the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) have helped with the "gendarmerie-style" training of West Bank-based PA security personnel. As of June 2009, approximately 400 Presidential Guardsmen and 2,200 National Security Forces troops have been trained at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) near Amman. All troops, new or already serving, are vetted for terrorist links, human rights violations, and/or criminal records by the State Department, Israel, Jordan, and the PA before they are admitted to U.S.-sponsored training courses at JIPTC. Approximately $395 million in U.S. funds have been reprogrammed or appropriated through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account for training, non-lethal equipment, facilities, and strategic planning assistance for the PA forces, and for PA criminal justice sector reform projects, including $100 million for FY2010 pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117).
The performance of the U.S.-sponsored forces in law-and-order operations—including crowd control assignments during the December 2008-January 2009 Gaza conflict between Israel and Hamas—and in some operations aimed at countering militant and/or terror organizations has appeared to produce some positive results. Yet questions regarding the USSC/INL mission persist. How might short-term operational success translate into (1) a general pattern of sustained success in countering and dismantling militant and terrorist networks in the West Bank and (2) permanent consolidation of competent, defactionalized civilian control over the PA forces and the broader criminal justice sector? Can this occur in a complex political environment featuring the continuing presence of Israeli occupying forces and settlers, as well as other overt and/or possible covert PA security assistance from, among others, Arab states, Russia, the United States, and Europe? If it can, what are the long-term implications vis-à-vis Hamas-controlled Gaza? There could be calls for Congress to take into account how U.S. security assistance might lead to progress on (1) the Israeli-Palestinian political track, (2) Palestinian civil society, governance, and economic development, and (3) efforts to end geographical and factional divisions between Palestinians in the West Bank and in Gaza. Some argue that the USSC's staff should be increased and that movement restrictions on U.S. members of the USSC staff should be lifted. Some maintain that the U.S. mandate in security assistance matters should be expanded to give the USSC across-the-board authority to train and outfit PA security organizations, including for counterterrorism operations, and perhaps also to give INL an enhanced role in criminal justice sector reform. Others support a more modest U.S. "footprint" in the region, or question the advisability of U.S. security assistance altogether—preferring either to have the PA depend on itself or third parties for assistance or to transfer primary security responsibility in the West Bank to an international peacekeeping force. |
crs_R43670 | crs_R43670_0 | I n Pom Wonderful v. Coca-Cola , Pom first brought a suit in 2008 against Coca-Cola, claiming that Coca-Cola's Pomegranate Blueberry beverage name and label violates the Lanham Act and California's unfair competition laws because it misleads consumers to believe that the beverage consists of primarily pomegranate and blueberry juices when it actually contains mostly apple and grape juices. The district court in California and the Ninth Circuit held that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) precludes Pom's Lanham Act claim due to the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) exclusive authority to regulate food labels and the absence of any FDA action against Coca-Cola for this label. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and in an 8-0 decision held that Pom Wonderful may bring a Lanham Act claim alleging unfair competition from false or misleading product descriptions on food and beverage labels regulated by the FDCA. The two legal issues before the courts in Pom Wonderful focused on the interaction of federal statutes with both state and federal laws. On remand, the lower courts will have to consider again the issues of preemption, specifically whether the FDCA preempts Pom's California state law claims when the state law provisions are not identical to the federal law. Additionally, the Supreme Court's preclusion analysis in Pom Wonderful adds to the current case law addressing preclusion of Lanham Act claims by the FDCA. However, further litigation may be needed to clarify how the Supreme Court's holding in Pom Wonderful applies to Lanham Act food and beverage claims that are dissimilar to Pom's Lanham Act claim as well as other FDA-regulated products like cosmetics. The report begins with an overview of the statutory and regulatory background of beverage labeling, including affirmative requirements for beverage labels, the FDCA and Lanham Act provisions for misbranding, and the enforcement of these two federal statutes. The following section examines the provisions in these two federal statutes on which the parties and the courts in Pom Wonderful relied for their legal analysis. Only beverages that are 100% juice may be called juice. Misbranding under the FDCA and the Lanham Act
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
Both the FDCA and the Lanham Act prohibit the "misbranding" of food and beverage labels. Only the federal government may enforce the provisions under the FDCA. The FDCA prohibits private litigants from suing to enforce compliance with the FDCA and its implementing regulations. However, due process principles are generally applied narrowly during post-seizure hearings because of the public health and safety concern. The specificity of the FDCA and the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) compared to the broad language in the Lanham Act, according to Coca-Cola, demonstrates Congress's intent to preclude a Lanham Act claim in these circumstances. Similarly, it is also unclear whether the Pom Wonderful holding applies to other FDA-regulated products such as drugs and cosmetics. | This report discusses two different federal statutes that regulate beverage labels. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and its implementing regulations outline requirements for beverage labels reflecting the different ingredients of the juice. The FDCA also prohibits misbranded food and beverages when labels are false and misleading. The Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute that regulates unfair competition, also prohibits misleading labels and advertisements that may hurt a competitor's business and/or goodwill. While these two statutes both impact juice labels, the overall purpose and enforcement of these two statutes differ. Only the federal government can enforce the FDCA, while the Lanham Act allows competitors to enforce the act's principles in the courts. The Lanham Act prohibits unfair competition, while the FDCA seeks to ensure public health and safety. These similarities and differences raise questions regarding the legal options for businesses claiming harm from a misleading or misbranded beverage label, such as the negative impact on the market for their products. Such questions include whether a business can seek relief against a competitor's misleading juice label in court.
The courts and parties in Pom Wonderful v. Coca-Cola encountered this issue, specifically regarding Coca-Cola's allegedly misleading juice label. In 2008, Pom brought suit against Coca-Cola alleging that Coca-Cola's Pomegranate Blueberry beverage name and label violates the Lanham Act and California's unfair competition laws because it misleads consumers to believe that the beverage consists of primarily pomegranate and blueberry juices when it actually contains mostly apple and grape juices. The district court in California and the Ninth Circuit held that the FDCA precludes Pom's Lanham Act claim because of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA's) exclusive authority to regulate food labels and the absence of any FDA action against Coca-Cola for this label. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Pom may bring a Lanham Act claim alleging unfair competition from misleading beverage labels regulated by the FDCA because of the absence of anything in the text, legislative history, or structure of the FDCA or the Lanham Act that shows congressional intent to preclude such Lanham Act claims.
The two legal issues before the courts in Pom Wonderful focused on the interaction of federal statutes with both state and federal laws. On remand, the lower courts will have to consider again the issues of preemption, specifically whether the FDCA preempts Pom's California state law claims when the state law provisions are not identical to the federal law. Additionally, the Supreme Court's preclusion analysis in Pom Wonderful adds to the case history addressing the preclusion of Lanham Act claims by the FDCA. However, as consumers appear increasingly concerned about how food products are labeled, further litigation may be needed to clarify how the Supreme Court's holding in Pom Wonderful applies to Lanham Act food and beverage claims that are dissimilar to Pom's Lanham Act claim. Similarly, it is unclear how Pom Wonderful may apply to other FDA-regulated products such as drugs and cosmetics. Despite the possibility for further litigation, Pom Wonderful provides a useful opportunity to observe and understand the interplay between two federal statutes that can be applied to the wider federal regulatory context. |
crs_R42027 | crs_R42027_0 | 112-34 ) extends funding authorization for five years (FY2012-FY2016) for certain programs that support child welfare-related child and family services (under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act). 112-34 renews the authority for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to annually approve up to 10 child welfare demonstration projects for each of three years (FY2012-FY2014). Authority for HHS to grant new waivers expired on March 31, 2006. President Barack Obama signed the bill into law on September 30, 2011 ( P.L. GAO Study on Service Funding and Access
Not later than 12 months after enactment of the Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act, GAO is required to submit a report to Congress that (1) identifies alternative sources of federal funding that states or other entities use to support the same purposes that are supported by any federal funds provided under Title IV-B, including those under the Child Welfare Services and Safe and Stable programs; and (2) assesses the needs of families eligible for such services and programs, including identifying underserved communities, and providing information on supports for caseworkers to manage their caseloads in a safe and appropriate manner, the length of time families wait to receive substance abuse and other preventive services, the number of families waiting for such services, and the effect of the delay on healthy, successful reunification outcomes for families. Further, P.L. P.L. 2883 (September 30, 2011). Congressional Action on the Bill
Substantively identical versions of the Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act were introduced on September 12, 2011, in the House and the Senate. The House bill ( H.R. 2883 ) was introduced by Representative Geoff Davis, with Representative Lloyd Doggett, and the Senate bill ( S. 1542 ) was introduced by Senator Max Baucus with Senator Orrin Hatch. Previous Legislation
Some of the provisions in the Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act were previously included in the Child and Family Services Extension and Improvement Act ( H.R. 2790 ), introduced on August 2, 2011, by Representative Geoff Davis, with Representative Doggett; the State Child Welfare Innovation Act ( S. 1013 ), introduced on May 17, 2011, by Senator Baucus, with Senators Hatch, Enzi, and Rockefeller; the Partners for Stable Families and Foster Youth Affected by Methamphetamine and Other Substance Abuse Act ( S. 1234 ), introduced on June 20, 2011, by Senator Grassley; and a bill to renew the authority of HHS to grant child welfare waivers ( H.R. Committee and Full Chamber Action
On September 14, 2011, the House Ways and Means Committee held a markup of H.R. 2883 and unanimously agreed to report the bill favorably to the full House. 112-210 ) to the full House on September 19, 2011. On September 21, 2011, the full House passed H.R. 2883 under suspension of the rules (with a recorded vote of 395-25). On September 20, 2011, the Senate Finance Committee held a markup of S. 1542 and agreed to report that bill favorably to the Senate floor (without amendment). 112-34 ). These discretionary funding authorizations provided in H.R. | The Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act (P.L. 112-34) extends funding authorization for the Stephanie Tubbs Jones Child Welfare Services Program and the Promoting Safe and Stable Families Program for five years (FY2012-FY2016). The programs are authorized under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act and received combined funding of $709 million in FY2011. They both had funding authorizations that, absent legislative action, would have expired on September 30, 2011. Further, P.L. 112-34 renews authority for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to grant approval for up to 10 child welfare demonstration projects (a.k.a., "waiver" projects) in each of three years (FY2012-FY2014). The authority of HHS to approve new child welfare waiver projects expired on March 31, 2006.
Substantively identical versions of the Child and Family Service Improvement and Innovation Act were introduced on September 12, 2011, in the House and the Senate. The House bill (H.R. 2883) was introduced by Representative Geoff Davis, with Representative Lloyd Doggett, and the Senate bill (S. 1542) was introduced by Senator Max Baucus with Senator Orrin Hatch. Some of the provisions in the Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act were previously included in other bills introduced or acted on in the 112th Congress (including H.R. 2790, H.R. 1194, S. 1234, and S. 1013).
On September 14, 2011, the House Ways and Means Committee held a markup of H.R. 2883 and unanimously agreed to report the bill favorably (and without substantive changes) to the full House. The committee reported the bill (H.Rept. 112-210) on September 19, 2011. One day later, September 20, 2011, the Senate Finance Committee held a markup of S. 1542 and unanimously agreed to favorably report S. 1542 (without amendment) to the full Senate.
On September 21, 2011, the full House passed H.R. 2883 under suspension of the rules (with a recorded vote of 395-25). On September 22, 2011, the full Senate passed H.R. 2883 by unanimous consent. The President signed the bill into law on September 30, 2011.
This report describes provisions in the Child and Family Services Improvement and Innovation Act (P.L. 112-34). |
crs_R40805 | crs_R40805_0 | The enacted bill provided a total of $122.1 billion, $15.1 billion (14.1%) more than the equivalent figure provided in FY2009 and $1.1 billion less than the amount requested by the Administration. DOT and HUD received additional funding in FY2009 through the ARRA emergency stimulus act (see Appendix for more information). The request for DOT was $72.4 billion, $1.0 billion (1.4%) more than the $71.5 billion of total new funding provided in the FY2009 THUD appropriations act. The HUD request was $45.5 billion, $4.0 billion (7.7%) more than the comparable amount of new funding provided in the regular annual appropriation for FY2009. The House-passed bill provided $47.1 billion, while the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $45.8 billion. The difference was due to the President's request for $5 billion for a new independent federal agency, a national infrastructure bank. Appropriators considered this request as part of the request for DOT funding. The President also requested the termination of five programs that received a total of $212 million in funding in the FY2009 THUD appropriations act. Emergency supplemental appropriations are not included in the figures. Department of Transportation Appropriations
Table 5 presents funding provided for DOT in the emergency supplemental funding act passed in February 2009 (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009); the funding provided in the FY2009 THUD appropriations act passed as Division I of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 in March of 2009, and the amounts requested for FY2010 by the Administration and reported by the House and the Senate Committee on Appropriations. That was $5.2 billion (7.7%) above the $67.2 billion, excluding emergency funding, provided for FY2009. 111-46 / H.R. The House provided $4 billion for this program, $3 billion more than the request, though it allowed $2 billion of that to be transferred to the national infrastructure bank, should that program be implemented during FY2010. The enacted legislation provided $2.5 billion. The House and Senate agreed with the requested level of funding, and this amount was provided in the enacted legislation. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
The President's budget requested $41.8 billion in funding for federal highway programs for FY2010, an increase of $88 million (less than 1%) over the comparable figure provided in FY2009. The House-passed bill provided $5.8 billion, an increase of $3.0 billion over the requested funding level. The enacted legislation provided $4.4 billion, $1.6 billion more than requested and $2.6 billion more than in FY2009. The House provided $1.8 billion for the New Starts program, the amount requested and virtually identical to the amount provided in the FY2009 appropriation act (an additional $750 million was provided in the emergency stimulus act passed in February 2009). The Senate Committee-reported version of H.R. 3288 , as well as P.L. It did not fund the Local Initiatives Fund. P.L. It included 461.8 billion for THUD agencies: $48.1 billion for DOT programs and $13.7 billion for HUD programs. | President Obama requested a total of $123.1 billion for the agencies included in H.R. 3288, the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations (THUD) bill for FY2010. This request represented an increase of approximately $14.1 billion (12.9%) over the $109.1 billion provided in the FY2009 THUD appropriations act (Division I of P.L. 111-8). The enacted legislation provided $122.1 billion, less than 1% ($977 million) below the President's request and 12% ($13.4 billion) more than the comparable FY2009 funding (not including the FY2009 emergency funding).
The single largest new item in the budget request was $5 billion for a new independent federal agency—a national infrastructure bank—that would provide federal funding for, and promote investment from other sources in, infrastructure projects of national or regional significance. Neither the House nor the Senate funded this request; the conference report encourages the administration to pursue the creation of such a program through the regular authorization process.
The FY2010 request for DOT totaled $72.4 billion, $5.2 billion (7.7%) more than the total of $67.2 billion in funding provided in the FY2009 THUD appropriations act (the House and Senate both reported the request as $77.4 billion, as they considered the $5 billion request for an infrastructure bank as part of the DOT request). The actual requested increase is somewhat less, as the reported funding level for FY2009 was reduced by a $3.5 billion rescission of contract authority which did not actually reduce the level of funding provided. The House-passed bill provides a total of $75.8 billion in funding for DOT, $3.4 billion (8%) more than the requested level. The Senate-passed bill provided $75.8 billion. The enacted legislation provided $75.7 billion, $3.3 billion (5%) more than the original DOT request.
The FY2010 request for HUD totaled $45.5 billion, $4.0 billion (7.7%) more than the comparable amount of new funding provided in the regular annual appropriation for FY2009. The House-passed bill provided $47.1 billion, the Senate-passed bill provided $45.8, and the enacted legislation provided $46.1 billion,1% more than the requested amount.
Throughout this report, the amounts being considered for FY2010 are compared to the amounts provided in the FY2009 THUD appropriations act. However, DOT and HUD also received significant amounts of supplemental funding in FY2009 through the economic stimulus act (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, P.L. 111-5/H.R. 1), which Congress passed in February of 2009. That act provided $48.1 billion in emergency supplemental funding for DOT and $13.7 billion for HUD, a total of $61.8 billion in additional funding. That represented an increase of 52% to the total new funding provided in the FY2009 THUD appropriations act. Not every office and program in the THUD bill received funding from that supplement, and not all of that additional funding was expended in FY2009. |
crs_R42006 | crs_R42006_0 | Russia has undertaken several largely piecemeal and halting efforts to revamp the armed forces it inherited from the Soviet Union. In 2007, near the end of then-President Vladimir Putin's second term in office, he appointed Anatoliy Serdyukov—the former head of the Federal Tax Service—as defense minister as part of an effort to combat corruption in the military and carry out reforms. After the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict revealed large-scale Russian military operational failures, the leadership became more determined to boost military capabilities, and a new wave of reforms was launched in September-October 2008. The national security strategy raises the possibility of improved U.S.-Russian ties, perhaps reflecting the early period of the bilateral "reset," while the latter does not. In December 2008, Serdyukov openly stressed that the reforms were intended to switch from a mass mobilization army for vast land, sea, and air wars to "a performance-capable, mobile, and maximally armed army and navy ready to participate in three regional and local conflicts, at a minimum." As set out by Serdyukov and other officials in October 2008, the reform plan called for reducing the total size of the armed forces from 1.2 million in 2008 to under 1 million by 2012. Three major initiatives were launched:
Accelerating planned cuts in the officer corps to reduce their numbers from 355,000 to 150,000. Consolidating partially manned units and reducing the four-tier command system of military districts, armies, divisions, and regiments to a basic two-tier system of strategic commands and fully manned brigades that could be deployed for combat operations within a few hours (termed "permanent readiness brigades"). Some Russian analysts compared these new commands to those in the U.S. and other Western militaries (except that, according to Russian military doctrine, the role of the military districts/JSCs are to defend Russia against foreign invasion). Weapons Modernization
Weapons modernization has been a fundamental aspect of recent reform efforts. It is difficult to estimate Russia's military spending. However, the reforms have faced myriad challenges, partial reversals, and other setbacks. Assessments of Prospects for the Military Reforms
According to most observers, the reforms launched by Serdyukov have gone further than previous reform efforts in altering the force structure and operations of the armed forces inherited from the Soviet Union. Seeming to support Bugajski's concerns about Russia's intentions, Felganhauer argues that Russian decision-makers continue to regard the United States and NATO as the main threats to Russia and that military reforms aim to counter these perceived threats. In his 2011 threat assessment, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified to Congress on February 10, 2011, that Serdyukov's defense reforms pose "both risks and opportunities for the United States and the West." He warned that "Russian military programs are driven largely by Moscow's perception that the United States and NATO are Russia's principal strategic challenges and greatest potential threat." Congress will continue to pay close attention to Russian policy statements of intentions and to the actual outcome of the military reforms over the next few years, and to assess them within the context of broader Russian domestic and foreign policy and U.S. engagement with Russia on international issues of U.S. national security interest. | Russia has undertaken several largely piecemeal and halting efforts to revamp the armed forces it inherited from the Soviet Union. In 2007, near the end of then-President Vladimir Putin's second term in office, he appointed Anatoliy Serdyukov—the former head of the Federal Tax Service—as defense minister as part of an effort to combat corruption in the military and carry out reforms. After the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict revealed large-scale Russian military operational failures, the leadership became more determined to boost military capabilities. U.S. government and congressional policymakers are following the progress and goals of these reforms as they consider issues related to U.S.-Russia relations and U.S. national security interests.
The reforms launched by Russian leadership called for reducing the total size of the armed forces from its size of 1.2 million in 2008 to under 1 million. Three major initiatives included accelerating planned cuts in the officer corps to reduce their numbers from 355,000 to a later-adjusted total of 220,000. The reforms also included revamping the training of noncommissioned officers to make them more effective and introducing military police, both aimed partly at boosting discipline in the barracks. The reforms aimed to reduce the four-tier command system of military districts, armies, divisions, and regiments to a two-tier system of strategic commands and fully manned brigades that could be quickly deployed for combat. A large-scale 10-year weapons modernization plan also was launched, and military budgets are being increased substantially. The weapons modernization plan prioritizes the procurement of new missiles and platforms to maintain strategic nuclear deterrence, but also includes new planes, helicopters, ships, missiles, and submarines for the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, and other arms of service.
Russia's national security strategy, military doctrine, and some aspects of the military reforms reflect assessments by some Russian policymakers that the United States and NATO remain concerns, if not threats, to Russia's security. Other assessments, however, emphasize enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities and possibly hedges against the rise of China. Seeming to stress these latter concerns, in December 2008, Serdyukov asserted that the reforms were aimed at switching to a performance-capable, mobile, and maximally armed military ready to participate in at least three regional and local conflicts.
Compared to Russia's previous attempts to revamp its armed forces, the current reform effort has gone further in altering the force structure and operations of the armed forces, according to most observers. However, the reforms face daunting delays, modifications, and setbacks. It remains highly uncertain whether Russia will be able to marshal the budgetary and demographic resources to field a substantially professional military with high readiness, as planned, or to modernize its ailing defense industries to obtain a new array of weaponry over the next 10 years.
U.S. policymakers have maintained that Serdyukov's defense reforms pose both risks and opportunities for the United States and the West. While warning that Russian military programs are driven largely by Moscow's perception that the United States and NATO remain the greatest potential threats, U.S. policymakers also have raised the possibility that Russia's military reforms might in the future make it feel less strategically vulnerable and that it might participate more in international peacekeeping operations. In general, U.S. policymakers and others have urged a policy of hedging against these possible risks through countervailing diplomacy and defense efforts while also following an engagement policy with Russia to cooperate on global issues of mutual interest and to encourage Russia to democratize, respect human rights, and embrace pro-Western foreign policies. |
crs_R44114 | crs_R44114_0 | The U.S. poultry industry is experiencing a severe outbreak of highly-pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). As of June 17, 2015, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) reported 223 cases of HPAI in domestic flocks in 15 states. More than 48 million chickens, turkeys, and other poultry have been euthanized to stem the spread of the disease. Cases have been caused by several highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza (AI) strains that result in substantial mortality in domestic poultry. Turkey and egg-laying hen farms in Minnesota and Iowa have been hardest hit. Commercial broiler farms have not been affected to date. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), no infections in humans have been associated with the current HPAI outbreak, and CDC considers the public health risk to be low. With the start of summer, the rate of new cases slowed. The last reported new case was in Iowa on June 17, 2015. In order to achieve this, the Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA; 7 U.S.C. §8301 et seq.) authorizes USDA to take extraordinary measures, such as seizing, restricting movement, or euthanizing animals to protect the health of animals. APHIS, in cooperation with state and local animal health officials, euthanize poultry, disinfect and clean poultry premises and equipment, and then test for the virus to ensure poultry farms can be safely repopulated. Poultry owners are indemnified for euthanized poultry, and APHIS pays for cleaning and disinfecting, and testing. USDA has received approval to use additional funds for HPAI from the CCC of nearly $700 million. As of July 7, 2015, APHIS has committed over $500 million to help producers control the spread of HPAI, including $190 million for indemnity payments. Economic Impacts of the HPAI Outbreak
The cost of the HPAI outbreak to the poultry industry is high. The economy-wide impact to date is estimated at $3.3 billion. Since the HPAI findings in December 2014, 18 trading partners have imposed bans on all shipments for U.S. poultry and products, and 38 trading partners have imposed partial, or regional, bans on shipments from states or parts of states experiencing cases (see Figure 4 ). China, Russia, and South Korea, 3 of the top 10 destinations for U.S. poultry meat in 2014, have banned all imports of U.S. poultry. The hearings covered the experiences and lessons learned from containing and eliminating the current outbreak, and touched on issues to be addressed for the future. It is believed that an HPAI outbreak is likely to occur again in the fall when wild birds begin their migrations through the four flyways. This may likely result in more spread of AI, possibly in the poultry-producing eastern and southeastern regions untouched during the current outbreak. States and the poultry industry are expected to reassess and implement disposal plans to manage a potential fall outbreak. | The U.S. poultry industry is experiencing a severe outbreak of highly-pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has reported 223 cases of HPAI in domestic flocks in 15 states. With the start of summer, the finding of new cases slowed. The last reported new case was in Iowa on June 17, 2015. More than 48 million chickens, turkeys, and other poultry have been euthanized to stem the spread of the disease. Cases have been caused by several highly pathogenic H5 avian influenza (AI) strains that result in substantial mortality in domestic poultry. Turkey and egg-laying hen farms in Minnesota and Iowa have been hardest hit. Commercial broiler farms have not been affected to date. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), no infections in humans have been associated with the HPAI outbreak, and the public health risk is low.
Under the Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA; 7 U.S.C. §8301 et seq.), APHIS, in cooperation with state and local animal health officials, has the authority to take extraordinary measures, such as seizing, restricting movement, or euthanizing animals to protect the health of animals. During the current outbreak, APHIS has paid to euthanize poultry, clean and disinfect poultry premises and equipment, and then test for the AI virus to ensure poultry farms can be safely repopulated. USDA has indemnified poultry owners for euthanized poultry.
USDA has received approval to use nearly $700 million in additional funds from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to address HPAI. As of July 7, 2015, APHIS has committed over $500 million of the $700 million to help producers control the spread of HPAI, including $190 million for indemnity payments. The agency is committed to covering cleaning and disinfecting costs on affected farms.
The cost of the HPAI outbreak to the poultry industry is high. The value of turkey and laying hen losses is estimated at nearly $1.6 billion. Economy-wide losses are estimated at $3.3 billion. Since the HPAI outbreak in December 2014, 18 U.S. trading partners have imposed bans on all shipments of U.S. poultry and products, and 38 trading partners have imposed partial, or regional, bans on shipments from states or parts of states with HPAI cases. China, Russia, and South Korea, 3 of the top 10 destinations for U.S. poultry meat in 2014, have banned all imports of U.S. poultry.
It is believed that an HPAI outbreak is likely to occur again in the fall when wild birds begin their migrations through the four flyways. This may result in more spread of AI, possibly in the poultry-producing eastern and southeastern regions untouched by the current outbreak. APHIS and the poultry industry are taking lessons from the current outbreak to prepare for the fall. USDA is developing a vaccine to be available for manufacture if the agency decides to adopt a vaccination policy to manage any future outbreak. APHIS and the poultry industry are reassessing biosecurity, indemnity payment formulas, and other measures that aim to improve the containment and elimination process. |
crs_RL31583 | crs_RL31583_0 | Introduction
Beginning with adoption of the Improving America's Schools Act (IASA) in 1994 ( P.L. 103-382 ), and continuing through enactment of the Education Flexibility Partnership Act of 1999 ( P.L. 107-110 ), the authorization of special forms of flexibility for grantees has been a major focus of most federal K-12 education assistance legislation. This report provides an overview of these authorizations for state and local flexibility in administering federal K-12 education programs. In general, these flexibility authorities apply to federal aid programs authorized by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the largest source of federal aid to K-12 education. ESEA programs are authorized through FY2008, and the 110 th Congress is considering whether to amend and extend the ESEA. This report will be updated regularly to reflect major legislative developments and available information. Purposes of Accountability Requirements
Federal K-12 education assistance program requirements include a broad range of activities, services, or outcomes that SEAs, LEAs, and other aid grantees are expected to provide, perform, or achieve with, or in return for, federal grants, in order to show evidence that program goals are being met—that is, to establish accountability for appropriate use of federal aid funds. These intended forms of accountability include
target accountability : assuring that funds are focused on eligible localities, pupils, and purposes, usually for the ultimate purpose of promoting more equal educational opportunities; outcome accountability : assuring that funds are used effectively to improve student achievement and enhance the quality of K-12 instruction—either in specific subject areas or for particular types of pupils, or overall; and fiscal accountability : assuring financial integrity and providing that federal aid funds constitute a net increase in resources for the eligible pupils or purposes, rather than potentially replacing (supplanting) state or local funds that would otherwise be available for the same purpose. The rationale offered for this preference is that "...State-Flex and Local-Flex participants have undergone comprehensive planning to improve teacher quality and the academic achievement of all students, especially disadvantaged students, and are held to a higher degree of accountability...."
Comparison With Other Flexibility Authorities in the No Child Left Behind Act
In comparison to the Transferability authority described earlier, State-Flex and Local-Flex are relatively broad, since all of the funds under the affected programs may be involved, the funds may be used for any purpose authorized under any ESEA program (including the exceptionally wide range of activities authorized under Title V-A), and only a comparatively small number of specified program requirements apply to the use of these funds. Each of the special flexibility authorities is significantly limited in terms of the number of states and LEAs that may participate, the number and size of the ESEA and related programs affected, and/or the range of program requirements that may be waived. With the major exceptions of the Transferability authority, the Innovative Programs block grant, and Title I-A schoolwide programs, states and/or LEAs are allowed to waive a variety of federal program requirements in return for some degree of accountability based on pupil achievement outcomes. These special flexibility authorities, particularly those enacted as part of the NCLB, have been adopted in a policy context of substantially increased accountability requirements and authorized degrees of flexibility in general for the ESEA and related federal programs. The flexibility authorities often include a variety of requirements for regular reporting on ways in which the authorities have been used, and the impact of increased flexibility on pupil achievement. How Significant Are the Degrees of Flexibility Allowed under These Authorities? For What Purposes Have Special Flexibility Authorities Been Used, and Is There Evidence That These Have Resulted in Increased Pupil Performance or Had Other Major Impacts? Are the Outcome Accountability Requirements Consistent with the Increased Flexibility Provided under These Authorities? | Beginning with the Improving America's Schools Act in 1994, and continuing through the Education Flexibility Partnership Act of 1999 and the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), the authorization of special forms of flexibility for grantees has been a focus of federal K-12 education legislation. These flexibility authorities apply primarily to programs under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the largest source of federal aid to K-12 education.
In general, federal K-12 education assistance program requirements include activities or outcomes that state or local educational agencies (SEAs, LEAs) are expected to provide or achieve in order to establish accountability for use of funds consistent with the purposes of authorizing statutes. These requirements are usually intended to provide target accountability, ensuring that funds are focused on eligible localities, pupils, and purposes; outcome accountability, ensuring that funds are used effectively to improve student achievement and improve the quality of K-12 instruction; and fiscal accountability, ensuring financial integrity and providing that federal funds constitute a net increase in resources.
Special flexibility authorities allow exceptions to these general requirements; they include Ed-Flex, Secretarial case-by-case waivers, ESEA Title I-A schoolwide programs, flexibility for small rural LEAs, the Innovative Programs block grant, Transferability authority, plus the State and Local Flexibility Demonstration Program (State-Flex and Local-Flex). In general, these authorities: (a) increase the ability of states or LEAs to use federal aid more completely in accordance with their own priorities; (b) are significantly limited in terms of the number of states and LEAs that may participate, the number and size of the programs affected, or the range of requirements that may be waived; (c) sometimes require a degree of accountability based on pupil achievement outcomes in return for increased flexibility, although the primary outcome requirements are applicable to all states and LEAs participating in Title I-A and other ESEA programs; (d) often attempt to require reports on ways in which the authorities have been used and the impact of flexibility on pupil achievement; and (e) have been adopted in a policy context of substantially increased accountability requirements and authorized degrees of flexibility in general with respect to some aspects of the ESEA and related programs.
Major issues regarding special forms of flexibility in federal K-12 education programs include the following: How significant are the degrees of flexibility allowed under these authorities? Is there substantial state or local interest in the authorized forms of flexibility? For what purposes have special flexibility authorities been used in the past, and is there evidence that these have resulted in increased pupil performance or had other major impacts? And are the outcome accountability requirements consistent with the increased flexibility provided under these authorities? ESEA programs are authorized through FY2008, and the 110th Congress is considering whether to amend and extend the ESEA. This report will be updated regularly to reflect major legislative developments and available information. |
crs_RS22218 | crs_RS22218_0 | The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. Nine programs authorized by the act to receive auction funds are: a program that would expend up to $1,500 million on coupons for households toward the purchase of TV set top boxes that can convert digital broadcast signals for display on analog sets; a grant program of up to $1,000 million for public safety agencies to deploy systems on 700 MHz spectrum they will receive as part of the transition; payments of up to $30 million toward the cost of temporary digital transmission equipment for broadcasters serving the Metropolitan New York area; payments of up to $10 million to help low-power television stations convert full-power broadcast signals from digital to analog; a program funded up to $65 million to reimburse low-power television stations in rural areas for upgrading equipment; up to $106 million to implement a unified national alert system and $50 million for a tsunami warning and coastal vulnerability program; contributions totaling no more than $43.5 million for a national 911 improvement program; and up to $30 million in support of the Essential Air Service Program. Spectrum License Allocation and Auction
One of the first steps the FCC takes in preparing for an auction is to develop a band plan that allocates the spectrum for specific purposes (for example, high-speed transmission, which benefits from bandwidth of at least 10 MHz per license) and to decide the number of licenses and the geographic coverage for each license (for example, 200 licenses for metropolitan areas). These decisions begin the process of shaping the auction: the size of the bandwidth has an impact on the type of service it can be used for, and the geographic coverage of licenses can be used to encourage, for example, small companies seeking a local license or large companies seeking to expand their national coverage by acquiring a regional or national license. The rules for the auction of licenses in the 700 MHz band are in a Second Report and Order adopted July 31, 2007. One reason for interest in the spectrum is that the airwaves used for TV have good propagation qualities, able to travel far and to penetrate building walls easily. The proposals for service rules that will provide the framework for licensee business models have dominated the controversy over the preparations for the auction of the 700 MHz airwaves. Some observers have called this the "100-year auction," because the decisions about its service rules could have a significant impact on spectrum management and the wireless industry for decades to come. Provisions in the auction rules, however, provide for a new, interoperable communications network for public safety users to be shared with commercial users. Not only do service contracts between consumers and wireless companies limit the customer's choice of wireless devices, but also, carriers are increasingly blocking access to certain services. This contract-driven business model is often referred to as a walled garden. A wholesale network could provide more market opportunities for new wireless devices, especially wireless devices that could provide unrestricted access to the Internet. The FCC will reclaim the spectrum and make it available to others. The Licensing Improvement section of the act laid out the general requirements for the FCC to establish a competitive bidding methodology and consider, in the process, objectives such as the development and rapid deployment of new technologies. The law prohibited the FCC from making spectrum allocations decisions based "solely or predominately on the expectation of Federal revenues...." The Emerging Telecommunications Technologies section directed the NTIA to identify not less than 200 MHz of auctionable radio frequencies used by the federal government that could be transferred to the commercial sector. | The United States, like most of the world, is moving to replace current television technology with a new, technically superior format generally referred to as digital television (DTV). As part of this transition, Congress has acted to move television broadcasters out of radio spectrum currently used for the old, analog technology. The vacated radio frequencies are now scheduled for release in accordance with provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-171 ), which sets a February 2009 date for the release of the spectrum. Auctions for commercial uses of the spectrum are scheduled to begin on January 24, 2008. About $10 billion of the auction proceeds has been designated for specific purposes by the act.
On July 31, 2007, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced the rules for the auction of airwaves now used for analog TV broadcasting (700 MHz). Because the decisions the FCC makes in setting up an auction of spectrum licenses can shape the bidding process and the eventual outcome of the auction, the FCC typically finds itself under pressure to set requirements that favor specific interests or policy goals. The preparations for the upcoming auction have been particularly fraught with controversy. The propagation characteristics of the spectrum are such that it is considered ideal for wireless broadband. For this and other reasons, control of this spectrum is sought not only by the incumbent wireless companies wishing to expand their capacity but also by companies eager to apply next-generation technologies for new business models. The auction rules introduce two innovative business models for spectrum management and assignment that represent departures from past policy. One model requires a shared network to accommodate both public safety and commercial users in a partnership. The other innovative model designates spectrum licenses for a network that could be managed to accept any suitable wireless device. The decisions the FCC has made for this auctionâand by extension for spectrum policyâhave framed a new debate about access to the airwaves, the nature of competition in the wireless industry, and wireless access to the Internet. |
crs_RL33557 | crs_RL33557_0 | Most importantly for the U.S. military, on November 28, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a directive setting forth a new DOD policy regarding stability operations, particularly peacekeeping and related post-conflict operations. These requirements have been problematic for many policymakers and for the U.S. armed forces, which have preferred to confront an enemy with the degree of force necessary to quickly defeat armed opponents (often referred to as "decisive" or "overwhelming" force) and to reserve its highly-skilled troops for combat missions. U.S. military experiences in Somalia and Haiti stigmatized peacekeeping and nation-building for many Members as an inefficient and inappropriate use of military resources, leading to restrictions on U.S. involvement in dealing with deteriorating conditions in the Balkans in the mid-1990s. The terrorist acts against the United States of September 11, 2001, changed the debate. In the wake of U.S. military action in Iraq, the question of continued U.S. military involvement has been framed in terms of whether the U.S. military should do "nation-building," and if it does, how it should prepare for it. Very few U.S. military personnel currently serve under U.N. command. Roughly 700 U.S. troops serve in the Sinai-based Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) ad hoc coalition operation, which has no U.N. affiliation. An ongoing drawdown is scheduled to reduce the number still further. A small number of U.S. troops, some 100 as of the end of 2006, work with the NATO Headquarters unit providing support to the EU in Bosnia. As a result, a large number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan which previously had been attached to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) were assigned to ISAF as of early October 2006. The Extended U.S. Military "Stabilization" Presence in Iraq19
U.S. troops in Iraq are engaged in a wide variety of activities, the most visible of which are counterinsurgency operations, but some of which are generally classified as peacekeeping duties. Although the current military occupation of Iraq falls in a gray area that defies easy definition, with a level of instability that many define as low-intensity conflict rather than peace enforcement, many of the activities that the U.S. military has undertaken there also have been undertaken in past peacekeeping operations. DOD Directive 3000.05 sets forth a radically new policy regarding missions known as "stability" operations, a major subset of which are peacekeeping and other peace operations. The Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations designates stability operations as "a core U.S. military mission." Nevertheless, events in Iraq since the United States invaded in 2003 have reinforced arguments that still greater efforts must be made to raise the possibilities for successful transitions. Force Size and Structure
Whether U.S. military forces should be sized and organized specifically to facilitate peacekeeping and related stability operations has been a longstanding issue. Others have urged more extensive changes in the force to better accommodate such missions. Some analysts view U.S. military nation-building as an essential element in the U.S. toolkit to respond to the Congressionally-mandated 9/11 Commission's recommendation to use all elements of national power "to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run...."
In immediate post-conflict situations, or extremely dangerous environments, military forces may be the only personnel available to perform such tasks. The Global Peace Operations Initiative29
The Bush Administration proposed a five-year, multilateral Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), to prepare other, largely African, nations to participate in peacekeeping operations. | The 110th Congress may well face several decisions regarding the preparation of U.S. military forces for stability missions, a major subset of which is peace operations. A November 28, 2005, Department of Defense (DOD) directive that designates stability operations as "core missions" of the U.S. military marks a major shift in attitudes regarding peacekeeping and related stability operations (also known as stabilization and reconstruction operations). Since then, DOD has worked to define specific changes that must be made to better accomplish such missions, some of which the U.S. military could implement on its own, while others would require Congressional approval.
For well over a decade, some Members of Congress expressed reservations about U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping operations. The Bush Administration initially opposed such missions and took steps to reduce the commitment of U.S. troops to international peacekeeping. This action reflected a major concern of the 1990s: that peacekeeping duties had overtaxed the shrinking U.S. military force and were detrimental to military "readiness" (i.e., the ability of U.S. troops to defend the nation). Many perceived these tasks as an inefficient use of U.S. forces, better left to other nations while the U.S. military concentrated on operations requiring high-intensity combat skills. Others thought that the United States should adjust force size and structure to accommodate the missions.
The events of September 11, 2001, brought new concerns to the fore and highlighted the value to U.S. national security of ensuring stability around the world. The 9/11 Commission report, which cited Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorists, pointed to the dangers of allowing actual and potential terrorist sanctuaries to exist. In 2003, the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, often referred to as a "stabilization and reconstruction" operation (which manifests some characteristics of a peace operation), reinforced the argument.
Thousands of U.S. military personnel currently serve in or support peacekeeping operations, although the number of troops serving in U.N. operations has decreased dramatically since the mid-1990s to some 26 in five operations under U.N. control. In the Balkans, some 1,700 U.S. troops serve with the NATO Kosova Force (KFOR). About 35,000 more serve in or support peacekeeping operations in South Korea, and roughly 700 serve in the Sinai. In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. troops are involved in a variety of stability tasks, including "nation-building" activities that have been undertaken in some peacekeeping operations as well as combat operations.
A major issue Congress continues to face is what, if any, adjustments should be made in order for the U.S. military to perform peacekeeping and stability missions—in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere—with less strain on the force, particularly the reserves. Of particular interest is whether the size and configuration of U.S. forces, especially the Army, should be further modified. Additional issues are whether to augment civilian and international capabilities in order to take on more of the burden. |
crs_R42780 | crs_R42780_0 | The Export Clause states that "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." Nonetheless, it is an important one for Congress because it is one of the few limitations on Congress's taxing power. The Clause prohibits any federal tax or duty that is imposed on goods during "the course of exportation" or targeted at exports, as well as those imposed on services and activities "closely related" to the export process. Tax v. User Fee
The Export Clause only prohibits the imposition of "taxes" and "duties." It does not prohibit user fees. Congress's choice to call something a tax or a fee will not be determinative in assessing the provision's constitutionality. Rather, a court will likely examine the provision's substantive characteristics to determine if it is a fee or tax. Thus, it is possible that a charge referred to in statute as a "fee" could be recharacterized by a court to be a "tax" if it failed to meet the characteristics of a user fee (described below), and vice versa. According to that case, the primary characteristics of a user fee for purposes of the Export Clause are that it, unlike a tax, is (1) proportional to the government services or benefits received by the payor and (2) not determined solely on an ad valorem basis (i.e., not solely based on the quantity or value of the goods or services on which it is placed). In 1998, the Court in U.S. Shoe struck down the imposition of the HMT as applied to exports. Claims for Damages Under the Export Clause
Courts have found several taxes to be unconstitutional as applied to exports, including the coal excise tax and the harbor maintenance tax (see the text box above). Taxpayers who overpay a federal tax are typically required to seek a refund from the IRS using the refund process found in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The question here is whether there is another option: can taxpayers bring suit in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act seeking damages from the government in the amount of unconstitutional taxes paid? This same question may arise in the event that a government charge outside the IRC refund procedure was invalidated (e.g., if a non-IRC "fee" was recharacterized by a court to be a "tax"): could a person who paid the unconstitutional charge bring suit under the Tucker Act outside of any applicable administrative refund procedure? First, the Tucker Act has a longer statute of limitations than the IRC—six years from the time the tax is paid, compared to three years from such time. As a result, the Tucker Act could allow parties farther down the supply chain (e.g., exporters) to bring claims alleging they deserved damages because they bore the economic burden of the tax through higher prices. A threshold issue is whether the Court of Federal Claims can hear these suits. Thus, a key question is whether the Export Clause provides a right to monetary damages when the government violates it. However, in a 2008 decision, United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co. , the Supreme Court held that taxpayers seeking refunds for the unconstitutionally imposed coal excise tax must comply with the IRC refund process. Notably, the Court did not address whether the Export Clause provides a cause of action that could be brought under the Tucker Act, finding that the IRC refund provisions would apply regardless. Because these issues are matters of statutory construction, Congress has the option to modify the refund procedures for taxes imposed in violation of the Export Clause, if it so chooses (e.g., as it did by providing an alternative refund process for the coal excise tax post- Clintwood Elkhorn ). | The Export Clause, found in Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution, directly states "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The Clause represents one of the few restrictions on Congress's otherwise broad taxing power. Examples of taxes that have been found unconstitutional as applied to exports include the harbor maintenance tax and the excise tax on domestically mined coal.
The Clause prohibits taxes and duties that are targeted at exports or imposed on goods during "the course of exportation." It also protects those services and activities that are "closely related" to the export process. Importantly, pre-export goods and services are not exempt from otherwise generally applicable taxes.
The Export Clause only prohibits the imposition of taxes and duties. It does not prohibit user fees. Congress's choice to call something a tax or a fee will not be determinative in assessing the provision's constitutionality; rather, a court will likely examine the provision's substantive characteristics to determine if it is a fee or tax. According to the Supreme Court, the primary characteristics of a user fee are that it, unlike a tax, is (1) proportional to the government services or benefits received by the payor and (2) not determined solely on an ad valorem basis (i.e., not based solely on the quantity or value of the goods or services on which it is placed). Thus, it is possible that a charge referred to in statute as a "fee" could be recharacterized by a court to be a "tax" if it failed to meet these criteria, and vice versa.
When a government charge has been imposed in violation of the Export Clause, one issue that arises is the remedy for persons who paid the unconstitutional amount. Typically, taxpayers who overpay a tax are required to seek a refund using the process found in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). In the event that a "fee" was recharacterized as an impermissible tax, there might be a similar administrative refund procedure. The question here is whether it is possible to bring suit in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act seeking damages from the government in the amount of unconstitutional amounts paid. Taxpayers may prefer the Tucker Act because it has a longer statute of limitations than the IRC—six years from the time the tax is paid versus three years—and, in some situations, might allow parties farther down the supply chain (e.g., exporters) to bring claims alleging they deserve damages because they bore the economic burden of the tax through higher prices.
A threshold issue has been whether the Court of Federal Claims can hear these suits. In order for a claim to be permissible under the Tucker Act, two things must be true: (1) the Export Clause must provide a right to monetary damages when the government violates it, and (2) it must be permissible to make such a claim independent of an IRC (or other administrative) refund claim. In 2008, the Supreme Court held that taxpayers must comply with the IRC procedures when seeking refunds for the unconstitutionally imposed coal excise tax. It appears the Court's holding would apply to any tax covered by the IRC refund process. The Court did not address whether the Export Clause provides a right to monetary damages, finding that the IRC refund process applies regardless. Because these issues are matters of statutory construction, Congress has the option to modify the refund procedures for taxes imposed in violation of the Export Clause, if it so chooses. For example, after the 2008 Supreme Court case, Congress provided an alternative refund process for the coal excise tax that extended the statute of limitations and expanded the opportunity for exporters to seek refunds. |
crs_RL31022 | crs_RL31022_0 | Current law prohibits petroleum and gas development in ANWR. Improved exploration and development technologies that have become more widely available include advanced seismic data analysis, ice-based technology, slim hole and high performance drilling techniques, and methods to reduce waste. Such innovation also is a factor in addressing the economic obstacles to finding and developing hydrocarbons. Potential Issues
While it can be reasonably argued that advanced arctic petroleum technologies substantially mitigate the environmental impact of oil and gas operations compared with how North Slope Alaska oil was developed originally, it also is contended that the use of natural resources such as gravel and water, the probability of spills, and the loss of wilderness as a result of human intrusion are issues that technology advances cannot address. History of North Slope Petroleum Activities
The North Slope is home to the two largest developed oil fields in North America; and it has the largest oil field discovered in the United States in the last decade. Project goals were to reduce costs and to reduce the environmental impact of industry activities. The amplitudes generated from a given fluid will have different strengths and can be used as hydrocarbon indicators (HI). Types of directional wells are extended reach, horizontal, and designer or complex wells. They are designed to reach small targets, several small oil accumulations at one time, or to go around geological barriers. Zero Discharge of Solid and Fluid Wastes
The major drilling wastes are drilling mud, water produced along with the oil, and drill cuttings. These benefits allow access to areas not open to conventional rigs and decrease the number of surface drilling sites. Multilateral wells and coiled tubing wells drilled as slim hole wells require less mud and produce less waste. Observations
Gains from North Slope Experience
Thirty years of development experience on the North Slope have led to considerable advances in exploration, drilling, and production operations, and a reduction in the size of the footprint of petroleum operations in Arctic environments. The use of 3-D seismic technology during the exploration for hydrocarbon fields and the production stages of fields on the North Slope enables geologists and geophysicists to be more proficient in interpreting seismic data and in identifying the type of hydrocarbon. Conclusions
There are supportable grounds for proponents of opening ANWR to energy development to assert that the advanced technologies for oil and gas development in the Arctic might significantly mitigate the effects on the environment of oil and gas operations. But opponents assert that, notwithstanding technological improvements, facilities of any size would be an industrial site and an intrusion on the ecosystem that would use the area's natural resources, interfere with wildlife, risk spills of hazardous materials, and result in a permanent loss of wilderness. | Congressional debate over opening the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) on a portion of the North Slope of Alaska to petroleum exploration and development is under way in the 109th Congress. Current law prohibits such development in ANWR.
The North Slope is home to the two largest oil fields in North America and to the largest U.S. oil field discovered in the last decade. The North Slope also is home to a diverse, unique, and fragile ecosystem – resulting in extensive federal, state, and local regulatory protection. Partly due to increased restrictions since the discovery of Prudhoe Bay, operators have developed less environmentally intrusive ways to recover arctic oil, primarily through innovations in several types of technology.
Seismic technology offers the exploration sector advanced analytical methods that generate high resolution images of geologic structures and that help identify oil and gas accumulations by looking for anomalies or hydrocarbon indicators in the seismic data. Ice-based technology has been improved so as to better serve remote areas during exploratory drilling and production. Computers now allow the manipulation and interpretation of vast amounts of data, offering more precise well locations, thereby reducing the number of wells needed to find hydrocarbon accumulations.
Recent advances in drilling can reduce the footprint of petroleum operations in arctic environments. New drilling bit designs, fluid formulas, and advanced forms of drilling, such as extended reach, horizontal, and designer wells, permit drilling to reach as far as five miles from a wellhead location and to drill around geological barriers to find and develop hydrocarbon accumulations. Advances in drilling allow less space for a drilling rig, and reduce volumes and weights of both equipment and drilling waste.
Production facilities are now more compact, with modules performing many functions. A project goal of operators on the North Slope is zero discharge of solid and fluid wastes. Production drilling techniques using slim hole technology, such as coiled tubing and multilateral drilling, can contribute to smaller footprints, less waste, and better recovery of hydrocarbons from each well.
Proponents of opening ANWR to energy development maintain that these technologies substantially mitigate the effects on the environment of oil and gas operations, and assert that the increase in domestically-produced energy would be worth any minimal environmental impacts. Opponents counter that a facility of any size would still be an industrial site and an intrusion on the ecosystem, and argue that the need for gravel and scarce water, the permanent roads, ports, and airstrips that would follow, and the unknown number of spills would destroy vegetation, contaminate water resources, and interfere with wildlife. |
crs_RL32875 | crs_RL32875_0 | Introduction
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program is a federal/state program that is designed to promote self-sufficiency of families in which one of the biological parents is living outside of the home. The program achieves its mission by trying to ensure that noncustodial parents meet their financial responsibility to their children. The CSE program provides seven major services on behalf of children: parent location, paternity establishment, establishment of child support orders, review and modification of support orders, collection of support payments, distribution of support payments, and establishment and enforcement of medical support. It began as a welfare cost-recovery program, but the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 ( P.L. The CSE program is estimated to handle about 60% of all child support cases; the remaining cases are handled by private attorneys, by collection agencies, or through mutual agreements between the parents. All of the data in this report are exclusively CSE program data. The underlying data for Figure 2 (shown in Table A-2 ) indicate that AFDC cases comprised 85% of the CSE caseload in FY1978, but TANF dropped to about 10% of the caseload in FY2015. The expectation is that as child support becomes a more consistent and stable income source/support, former TANF families will not have to return to the TANF rolls, and families that never resorted to the TANF program will never have to do so. Figure 5 shows the total (national) number of CSE cases with a child support order established during the period FY1991-FY2015. As mentioned earlier, in FY1999 OCSE started reporting data in categories designated as current assistance (i.e., child support collected on behalf of families that are currently receiving TANF cash assistance or Title IV-E foster care payments), former assistance (i.e., families that used to receive TANF assistance, AFDC benefits, or Title IV-E foster care), and never received assistance (i.e., families that never received AFDC, TANF, or Title IV-E foster care) rather than TANF and non-TANF. Interestingly, child support collections continued to increase even though the CSE caseload declined. During the period, the CSE caseload declined 7%, from 15.8 million to 14.7 million (see Table A-2 ). In FY2015, the CSE program collected only 20% of child support obligations for which it had responsibility if arrearage payments are taken into account (otherwise, 65%). It shows that in FY2015, $5.26 in child support was collected for every dollar spent on CSE activities (i.e., national average). During the 38-year period from FY1978 through FY2015, CSE collections increased 8-fold to $28.6 billion (adjusting for inflation), program expenditures increased almost 6-fold to $5.7 billion (adjusting for inflation), the number of children whose paternity was established or acknowledged (through the CSE program) increased 13-fold to 1.5 million, the number of CSE cases with child support orders almost doubled to 12.6 million (from FY1991-FY2015), and the CSE caseload increased 3-fold to 14.7 million. CSE data indicate that the program is collecting child support for a greater number and higher percentage of families, but the average monthly child support payment for families that actually received one is still relatively small, $264 per month in FY2015. Overall, about 7% of CSE collections obtained in FY2015 were used to reimburse the states and the federal government for monthly TANF benefits paid to current and former TANF families. This means that in FY2015, 93% of CSE collections ($26.6 billion) went to the families on the CSE rolls. | The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program is a federal/state program that is designed to promote self-sufficiency of families in which one of the biological parents is living outside of the home. The program achieves its mission by trying to ensure that noncustodial parents meet their financial responsibility to their children. The CSE program provides several services on behalf of children including parent location, paternity establishment, establishment of child support orders, and collection and distribution of child support payments.
In FY1978, families who received cash welfare comprised 85% of the CSE caseload and 45% of CSE collections. By FY2015, they comprised only 10.5% of the CSE caseload and 5% of CSE collections. Using a more recent classification of the CSE caseload, in FY2015 current Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) families and Title IV-E foster care families comprised 10.5% of the CSE caseload and 3% of collections, and former TANF families and Title IV-E foster care families comprised 42.8% of the CSE caseload and 31% of collections. Families that had never received TANF or Title IV-E foster care comprised 46.7% of the CSE caseload and almost 66% of collections. This reflects the underlying premise of the CSE program: as child support becomes a more consistent and stable income source/support, former cash welfare families will not have to return to the cash welfare rolls, and families that never resorted to cash welfare will not have to do so.
In FY2015, the CSE caseload was 14.7 million families. The CSE program is estimated to handle about 60% of all child support cases; the remaining cases are handled by private attorneys, by collection agencies, or through mutual agreements between the parents. All of the data in this report are exclusively CSE program data.
Before a state can enforce/collect a child support obligation, paternity must be determined and a child support order must be established. During the period FY2011-FY2015, the number of paternities established or acknowledged fell 12% nationwide, from nearly 1.7 million to 1.5 million. During that same period, the number of cases with a child support order established dropped 1% nationwide, from 12.8 million to 12.6 million.
The CSE program is characterized by paradoxes. It collected only 20% of the child support obligations for which it had responsibility in FY2015 (i.e., 65% of all current collections and 7% of obligations that were past due). However, during the period FY1999-FY2015 child support payments collected by CSE agencies increased 80% nationally, from $15.9 billion to $28.6 billion. Child support collections have continued to increase even though the CSE caseload has declined. Although the number and percentage of CSE cases with collections have been increasing over time, the average monthly child support payment for families that actually receive one has been decreasing and is relatively small, amounting to $264 per month in FY2015. Although the national cost of the CSE program was $5.7 billion in FY2015, $5.26 in child support was collected for every $1 spent on CSE activities. The CSE program began as a welfare cost-recovery program; however, in FY2015 93% of CSE collections went to CSE families (rather than the federal government or the states); the comparable figure in FY1979 was 56%. |
crs_R41697 | crs_R41697_0 | Introduction
The federal Sentencing Guidelines greatly influence the sentences imposed for federal crimes. The process involves assigning "offense levels" for a particular offense based on the nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed. Having identified the applicable Guideline range, the court, in the exercise of its sentencing discretion, considers it along with the other sentencing factors found in 18 U.S.C. In most instances, the Guideline Index notes the Guideline offense section that corresponds to the offense of conviction. Adjustments : The Guidelines make adjustments for victim-related factors, the extent of the offender's participation (role in the offense), obstruction, conviction for multiple offenses, and the offender's acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines devote five sections to matters related to the offender's role in the crime of conviction: (1) aggravating roles, (2) mitigating roles, (3) abuse of a position of trust or use of special skill, (4) use of a minor, and (5) use of body armor in a drug trafficking offense or a crime of violence. The Guidelines do so in the case of career offenders, professional offenders, armed career offenders, and child molesting recidivists. 3553(a). Imprisonment : Unless the sentence of conviction carries a statutory mandatory minimum, the Guidelines sentence is one that is within the sentencing range for the final offense level and criminal history category for the defendant's crime of conviction. The Guidelines establish an escalating series of fine ranges based on the offense level for crimes subject to the $250,000 cap. Several federal statutes supply the necessary authorization under most circumstances. Chapter 8 of the Guidelines establishes a separate, related but distinct, sentencing regime for organizations. | Sentencing for all serious federal noncapital crimes begins with the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Congress establishes the maximum penalty and sometimes the minimum penalty for every federal crime by statute. In between, the Guidelines establish a series of escalating sentencing ranges based on the circumstances of the offense and the criminal record of the offender. The Guidelines do so using a score-keeping procedure. The Guidelines process involves:
I. Identification of the most appropriate Guidelines section for the crime(s) of conviction, based on the nature of the offense (the most commonly applicable are noted in the Guidelines Index)
II. Identification of the applicable base offense level indicated by the section
III. Addition/subtraction of offense levels per section instructions for the circumstances in the case at hand
IV. Addition/subtraction of offense levels per instructions in those chapters of the Guidelines relating to
A. Victim related matters
B. Role in the offense
C. Obstruction
D. Multiple counts
E. Acceptance of responsibility
V. Calculation of the criminal history score
VI. Consideration of departures (more/less severe treatment) which the Guidelines permit
VII. Application Guidelines instructions relating to
A. Imprisonment (Sentencing Table)
B. Probation
C. Supervised release
D. Special assessments
E. Fines
F. Restitution
G. Forfeiture
VIII. Sentencing of Organizations
IX. Deviation based on the sentencing principles in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).
This is an abridged version of a longer report entitled to CRS Report R41696, How the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Work: A Brief Overview, without the footnotes, attribution, citations, or full content found in the longer report. |
crs_R42455 | crs_R42455_0 | Introduction
Energy storage technology has great potential to improve electric power grids, to enable growth in renewable electricity generation, and to provide alternatives to oil-derived fuels in the nation's transportation sector. In the electric power system, the promise of this technology lies in its potential to increase grid efficiency and reliability—optimizing power flows and supporting variable power supplies from wind and solar generation. In transportation, vehicles powered by batteries or other electric technologies have the potential to displace vehicles burning gasoline and diesel fuel, reducing associated emissions and demand for oil. In recent years, federal policy makers have become increasingly interested in promoting energy storage technology as a key enabler of broad electric power and transportation sector objectives. Statements such as those above highlight not only the technical opportunities for energy storage in the grid and in electric transportation, but also the attention being paid to energy storage technologies at the highest levels in the federal government. Finally, there are many aspects of market structure and economic regulation that affect energy storage deployment. This report attempts to summarize the current state of knowledge regarding energy storage technologies for both electric power grid and electric vehicle applications. It is intended to serve as a reference for policymakers interested in understanding the range of technologies and applications associated with energy storage, comparing them, when possible, in a structured way to highlight key characteristics relevant to widespread use. The report also discusses how aspects of policy and market structure affect competition among both mature and emerging technologies. It also discusses non-technical barriers including environmental, material, market, and policy challenges to widespread deployment. Though important, short-term discharge services can often be provided by non-storage options such as power electronics. However, in some applications, thermal storage can be functionally equivalent to electricity storage with efficiencies exceeding 90%, which is higher than most other storage technologies. The first is to improve the technical and economic performance of the electric power grid ("the grid"). Briefly, however, a primary historical challenge of storage deployment has been the limited ability of utilities to estimate and capture the full economic value of electricity storage, especially the many dynamic benefits to the grid of fast responding storage technologies. Their ability to provide energy services is more limited by both the storage capacity of the battery and the high cost of battery cycling. For hydrogen fueled FCEVs or HEVs, entirely new infrastructure is needed for fuel production, transport and refueling. R&D will likely further improve battery technical performance and reduce costs for multiple technologies. For grid applications, challenges to hydrogen storage include capital costs and low round-trip efficiency (well under 50%) compared to other commercially available energy storage technologies. Existing PHS facilities in the United States have high availability and few forced outages. There are also a significant number of proposed plants both in the United States and internationally. Typical instantaneous roundtrip efficiencies range from 80% to 90%. Load-shifting and frequency regulation flywheels also are dispatched differently. Conclusions
As a technology, TES has several advantages over conventional electricity storage devices. Table of Acronyms
AC - alternating current
AFC - alkaline fuel cell
ARPA-E - Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy
ARRA - American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
BSCCO - bismuth strontium calcium copper oxide (type of superconductor)
CAES - compressed air energy storage
CAISO - California Independent System Operator
CEC - California Energy Commission
CER - charging electricity ratio
CSP - concentrating solar power
CT - combustion turbine
DC - direct current
DMFC- direct methanol fuel cell
DoD - depth of discharge
DOE - Department of Energy
EC - electrochemical capacitors
EPRI - Electric Power Research Institute
ERCOT - Electric Reliability Council of Texas
EV - electric vehicle
FCEV - fuel cell electric vehicle
FERC - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FOA - funding opportunity announcement
GW - gigawatts
HEV - hybrid electric vehicle
HHV - higher heating value
HTF - heat-transfer fluid
ISO - Independent System Operator
ITC - investment tax credit
KOH - potassium hydroxide
kW - kilowatt
kWh - kilowatt hour
Li-Ion - lithium-ion
LTS - low temperature superconductor
MCFC - molten carbonate fuel cell
MWh - megawatt hour
NaS - sodium sulfur
NERC - North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NiMH - nickel metal hydride
NOx - nitrogen oxides
NREL - National Renewable Energy Laboratory
NYSERDA - New York State Energy Research and Development Authority
O&M - operations and maintenance
OCC - overnight construction cost
PAFC - phosphoric acid
PEM - polymer electrolyte membrane
PEMFC - proton exchange membrane fuel cells
PHEV - plug-in hybrid electric vehicles
PHS - pumped hydro storage
PSI - pounds per square inch
R&D - research and development
RD&D - research, development, and deployment
RTO - regional transmission organization
SLI - starting, lighting, and ignition
SMES - superconducting magnetic energy storage
SOFC - solid oxide fuel cell
T&D - transmission and distribution
TES - Thermal energy storage
TIO - technology improvement opportunities
TOU - time of use
TWh - terrawatt hour
UPS - uninterruptible power supply
V2G - hehicle-to-grid
VG - variable generation
VMT - vehicle mile traveled
VOC - volatile organic compound
WWSIS - Western Wind and Solar Integration Study
YBCO - yttrium barium copper oxide (type of superconductor) | Energy storage technology has great potential to improve electric power grids, to enable growth in renewable electricity generation, and to provide alternatives to oil-derived fuels in the nation's transportation sector. In the electric power system, the promise of this technology lies in its potential to increase grid efficiency and reliability—optimizing power flows and supporting variable power supplies from wind and solar generation. In transportation, vehicles powered by batteries or other electric technologies have the potential to displace vehicles burning gasoline and diesel fuel, reducing associated emissions and demand for oil.
Federal policy makers have become increasingly interested in promoting energy storage technology as a key enabler of broad electric power and transportation sector objectives. The Storage Technology for Renewable and Green Energy Act of 2011 (S. 1845), introduced on November 10, 2011, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Order 755, Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets, are just two recent initiatives intended to promote energy storage deployment in the United States. Numerous private companies and national laboratories, many with federal support, are engaged in storage research and development efforts across a very wide range of technologies and applications.
This report attempts to summarize the current state of knowledge regarding energy storage technologies for both electric power grid and electric vehicle applications. It is intended to serve as a reference for policymakers interested in understanding the range of technologies and applications associated with energy storage, comparing them, when possible, in a structured way to highlight key characteristics relevant to widespread use. While the emphasis is on technology (including key performance metrics such as cost and efficiency), this report also addresses the significant policy, market, and other non-technical factors that may impede storage adoption. It considers eight major categories of storage technology: pumped hydro, compressed air, batteries, capacitors, superconducting magnetic energy storage, flywheels, thermal storage, and hydrogen.
Energy storage technologies for electric applications have achieved various levels of technical and economic maturity in the marketplace. For grid storage, challenges include roundtrip efficiencies that range from under 30% to over 90%. Efficiency losses represent a tradeoff between the increased cost of electricity cycled through storage, and the increased value of greater dispatchability and other services to the grid. The capital cost of many grid storage technologies is also very high relative to conventional alternatives, such as gas-fired power plants, which can be constructed quickly and are perceived as a low risk investment by both regulated utilities and independent power producers. The existing market structures in the electric sector also may undervalue the many services that electricity storage can provide. For transportation storage, the current primary challenges are the limited availability and high costs of both battery-electric and hydrogen-fueled vehicles. Additional challenges are new infrastructure requirements, particularly for hydrogen, which requires new distribution and fueling infrastructure, while battery electric vehicles are limited by range and charging times, especially when compared to conventional gasoline vehicles.
Substantial research and development activities are underway in the United States and elsewhere to improve the economic and technical performance of electricity storage options. Changes to market structures and policies may also be critical components of achieving competitiveness for electricity storage devices. Removing non-technical barriers may be as important as technology improvements in increasing adoption of energy storage to improve grid and vehicle performance. |
crs_R42333 | crs_R42333_0 | Introduction
Until relatively recently, natural gas-rich shale formations throughout the United States were not considered to have significant resource value because no technologies existed to economically recover the gas. Development and deployment of advanced drilling and reservoir stimulation methods have dramatically increased the gas production from these "unconventional gas shales." The Marcellus Shale formation of the Appalachian basin, in the northeastern United States, potentially represents one of the largest unconventional natural gas resources in the United States. Directional drilling and "hydraulic fracturing" are essential to exploiting shale gas resources. Although oil and gas developers have applied these technologies in conventional oil and natural gas fields for some time, recent improvements in both technologies have allowed them to be applied effectively to unconventional gas shales on an industrial scale. As with oil and gas production generally, development of the Marcellus Shale is primarily subject to state law and regulation, and requirements for well construction and operation differ among the states. Additionally, provisions of two federal laws—the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA)—can apply to some activities, specifically those related to wastewater disposal through underground injection or discharge to surface waters. A second issue is the potential contamination of water wells from surface activities related to gas production. In this case, state regulators attributed the contamination to faulty well construction. The report also discusses relevant federal and state regulatory authorities, recent developments at the federal and state levels, and pending federal legislation. The black, organic-rich, Marcellus Shale lies beneath much of West Virginia, western and northeastern Pennsylvania, southern New York, eastern Ohio, and parts of Virginia and Maryland. Federal and State Laws and Regulations Affecting Marcellus Shale Gas Development
Development of natural gas resources in the Marcellus Shale is subject to regulation under several state and federal environmental laws. In particular, the large volumes of water needed to drill and hydraulically fracture the shale, and the disposal of this water and other wastewater associated with gas extraction, may pose significant water quality and quantity challenges that trigger regulatory attention. Groundwater and Drinking Water Protection
A controversial water quality issue associated with development of the Marcellus Shale regards the potential for hydraulic fracturing operations to contaminate groundwater and drinking water wells (as discussed under " Potential Risks to Groundwater "). Responding to widespread public concern, the 111 th Congress urged EPA to study the impact that fracturing may have on potable aquifers and drinking water supplies. However, EPA is not authorized to regulate the underground injection of fluids for hydraulic fracturing purposes, except where diesel fuel is used. The agency expects to publish initial research results in 2012, and a final report in 2014. to protect water resources. As noted, managing the large volumes of wastewater produced during natural gas production (including flowback from hydraulic fracturing and brine produced from the rock formation) has emerged as a major water quality issue related to Marcellus Shale development. (See " Other Surface Water Quality Issues .") Several of these states include watersheds that are subject to specific regulations, usually resulting from the adoption of an interstate compact. Three interstate compacts may have a direct impact on potential water resources for the development process: the Delaware River Basin Compact, the Susquehanna River Basin Compact, and the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact. | Until relatively recently, natural gas-rich shale formations throughout the United States were not considered to have significant resource value because no technologies existed to economically recover the gas. Development and deployment of advanced drilling and reservoir stimulation methods have dramatically increased the gas production from these "unconventional gas shales." The Marcellus Shale formation potentially represents one of the largest unconventional natural gas resources in the United States, underlying much of West Virginia and Pennsylvania, southern New York, eastern Ohio, western Maryland, and western Virginia. Directional drilling and "hydraulic fracturing" are essential to exploiting these low permeability shale gas resources. Although oil and gas developers have applied these technologies in conventional oil and natural gas fields for some time, recent improvements in both technologies have allowed them to be applied effectively to unconventional gas shales on an industrial scale.
While creating significant economic benefits, development of the Marcellus Shale faces infrastructure challenges, such as the need for gathering pipelines. Marcellus development also has generated controversy due to its potential scale and its potential impacts on land and water resources, communities, public infrastructure, and environmental quality.
Several water quality issues have arisen, including concerns about the potential for hydraulic fracturing operations to contaminate groundwater and drinking water supplies. The 111th Congress urged the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to study this issue, and the agency expects to publish initial research results in 2012 and a final report in 2014. Notably, EPA does not have the authority to regulate hydraulic fracturing (except where diesel fuel is used).
Additionally, managing the large volumes of wastewater produced during natural gas production (including flowback from hydraulic fracturing and water produced from the shale formation) has emerged as a major water quality issue related to Marcellus development. In some areas across the Marcellus Shale region, the geology may limit the use of underground injection wells (the most common produced-water disposal practice in oil and gas fields), and wastewater disposal is posing treatment, quality, and regulatory challenges. Both industry best practices and state regulations continue to evolve.
Other concerns associated with shale gas development include the contamination of water from surface spills, migration of methane gas and contaminants into residential water wells from faulty well construction, siltation of streams from drilling and pad construction activities, and potential impacts that large water withdrawals might have on water resources, streams, and aquatic life.
The development of the Marcellus Shale on private or state land is subject primarily to state laws and regulations, including requirements for well construction and operation. Provisions of two federal water quality laws—the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA)—can apply to activities related to wastewater disposal through underground injection and discharge to surface waters. Additionally, several of the states include watersheds that are subject to water resource regulations resulting from the adoption of interstate compacts (primarily the Delaware River Basin Compact and the Susquehanna River Basin Compact).
This report reviews the Marcellus Shale resource, development processes, and related surface water and groundwater issues. It also discusses related federal and state regulatory authorities and related developments, and pending federal legislation. |
crs_R40103 | crs_R40103_0 | To address these concerns, Congress has been debating a range of potential initiatives for reducing atmospheric CO 2 from U.S. sources. Legislative proposals would seek to limit U.S. CO 2 emissions to specific (historical) levels through emissions caps, carbon taxes, or other regulatory mechanisms. In the 110 th Congress, the most prominent CO 2 proposals sought reductions of nationwide CO 2 emissions to 1990 levels or lower by 2030. President-elect Barack Obama has proposed carbon reduction targets as well, intending to cut CO 2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and by an additional 80% by 2050. A fundamental policy question which arises from carbon control proposals is how the CO 2 reduction targets can be achieved. Policy Issues for Congress
Policy research and technical studies show that substantially reducing CO 2 emissions in the U.S. electricity sector over the next few decades likely requires successful deployment of every major carbon mitigation measure at the nation's disposal. However, it is also clear that significant uncertainties cast doubt on the potential of individual measures to achieve their hoped-for carbon impact. For the measures discussed in this report, the key uncertainties can be summarized as follows:
Energy efficiency —Can the United States overcome socioeconomic barriers to achieve four times more potential savings than ever before? Renewable energy —Will there be enough transmission for wind power? Is there enough land to grow the needed biomass? Nuclear power —Could the United States build new plants fast enough to matter? Advanced coal power —Will banks fund them and regulators approve them? Carbon capture and sequestration —Will the technology be commercially deployable in 10 years, 25 years, or never? Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles —How much "low carbon" electricity would be available to charge their batteries? Distributed energy resources —Would carbon costs change distributed energy economics enough to spur deployment? Failure of the CO2 Mitigation Portfolio
Notwithstanding the best efforts of federal policy makers, it is possible that, given the uncertainties they face, that few if any of the major measures proposed to moderate U.S. carbon emissions would achieve their anticipated impacts in a 20-year time frame. As the nation's CO 2 mitigation policies continue to develop, the inherent uncertainty associated with specific carbon measures may be a critical concern. Commitments, either domestic or international, to specific carbon emissions targets over time, or to a specific schedule of carbon costs (whatever form they may take) may be greatly affected by the success of the underlying measures relied upon to achieve them. As Congress considers implementing CO 2 policies, keeping a close eye on the technology and market developments associated with every key measure may be an oversight priority. Balancing responses to energy market volatility and unexpected structural changes against the need for a predictability in R&D and private capital investment may be essential to maintaining the nation on course to meaningful atmospheric CO 2 reduction. | Congress has been debating a range of potential initiatives for reducing atmospheric CO2 from U.S. sources. Legislative proposals would seek to limit U.S. CO2 emissions to historical levels through emissions caps, carbon taxes, or other mechanisms. In the 110th Congress, the most prominent CO2 proposals sought reductions of nationwide CO2 emissions to 1990 levels or lower by 2030. President-elect Barack Obama has proposed cutting carbon CO2 emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, and by an additional 80% by 2050.
A fundamental question arising from carbon control proposals is how the CO2 reduction targets can be achieved in the electricity industry, which is responsible for nearly 40% of U.S. CO2 emissions. It appears from the policy research and technical studies that substantially reducing CO2 emissions in the U.S. electricity sector over the next few decades would likely require every key carbon mitigation measure at the nation's disposal. However, it is also clear that significant uncertainty exists about the potential of individual measures to achieve their hoped-for carbon impact:
Energy efficiency—Can the United States overcome socioeconomic barriers to achieve four times more potential savings than ever before? Renewable energy—Will there be enough transmission for wind power? Is there enough land to grow the needed biomass? Nuclear power—Could the United States build new plants fast enough to matter? Advanced coal power—Will banks fund them and regulators approve them? Carbon capture and sequestration—Will the technology be commercially deployable in 10 years, 25 years, or never? Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles—How much "low carbon" electricity would be available to charge their batteries? Distributed energy resources—Would carbon costs change distributed energy economics enough to spur deployment?
As the nation's CO2 mitigation policies develop, the inherent uncertainty associated with specific carbon measures may be a critical concern. Commitments to specific carbon emissions targets over time, or to a specific schedule of carbon costs (whatever form they may take) may be greatly affected by the success of the underlying measures relied upon to achieve them. Notwithstanding the best efforts of federal policy makers, it is possible that, given the uncertainties each faces, few if any of the major measures proposed to moderate U.S. carbon emissions will achieve their anticipated impacts in a 20-year time frame. As Congress considers implementing CO2 policies, keeping a close eye on the technology and market developments associated with every key measure could be a priority. Balancing responses to energy market volatility and unexpected structural changes against the need for a predictability in R&D and private capital investment may be essential to maintaining the nation on course to meaningful atmospheric CO2 reduction. |
crs_RS21505 | crs_RS21505_0 | The HIPAA Privacy Rule covers health plans, health care clearinghouses, and those health care providers who conduct certain financial and administrative transactions electronically. Covered entities that fail to comply with the rule are subject to civil and criminal penalties, but individuals do not have the right to sue for violations of the rule. On April 17, 2003 HHS published an interim final "Enforcement Rule" that applies to standards, including the Privacy Rule, adopted under the Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA, 68 Fed. The interim final rule establishes procedures for investigations, imposition of penalties, and hearings for civil money penalties; and is effective May 19, 2003 thru September 16, 2003. It is to be revised when HHS issues a complete Enforcement rule that will include procedural and substantive requirements for the imposition of civil money penalties, such as HHS' policies for determining violations and calculating CMP's. A state law is "more stringent" if it meets one or more of the following criteria: 1) the state law prohibits or further limits the use or disclosure of protected health information, except if the disclosure is required by HHS to determine a covered entity's compliance or is to the individual who is the subject of the individually identifiable information; 2) the state law permits individuals with greater rights of access to or amendment of their individually identifiable health information; provided, however, HIPAA will not preempt a state law to the extent that it authorizes or prohibits disclosure of protected health information about a minor to a parent, guardian or person acting in loco parentis of such minor; 3) the state law provides for more information to be disseminated to the individual regarding use and disclosure of their protected health information and rights and remedies; 4) the state law narrows the scope or duration of authorization or consent, increases the privacy protections surrounding authorization and consent, or reduces the coercive effect of the surrounding circumstances; 5) the state law imposes stricter standards for record keeping or accounting of disclosures; 6) the state law strengthens privacy protections for individuals with respect to any other matter. | As of April 14, 2003, most health care providers (including doctors and hospitals) and health plans are required to comply with the new Privacy Rule mandated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), and must comply with national standards to protect individually identifiable health information. The HIPAA Privacy Rule creates a federal floor of privacy protections for individually identifiable health information; establishes a set of basic consumer protections; institutes a series of regulatory permissions for uses and disclosures of protected health information; permits any person to file an administrative complaint for violations; and authorizes the imposition of civil or criminal penalties. In hearings prior to the effective date of the Rule, there was widespread concern over aspects of the rule, including the extent to which it preempted state laws. On April 17, 2003, HHS published an interim final rule establishing the rules of procedure for investigations and the imposition of civil money penalties concerning violations. This interim final rule will be effective May 19, 2003 through September 16, 2003. HHS plans to issue a complete Enforcement Rule with both procedural and substantive provisions after notice-and-comment rulemaking. This report will be updated. |
crs_R45320 | crs_R45320_0 | F ederal campaign finance law is composed of a complex set of limits, restrictions, and requirements on money and other things of value that are spent or contributed in the context of federal elections. While the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA, or Act) sets forth the statutory provisions governing this area of law, several Supreme Court and lower court rulings also have had a significant impact on the Act's regulatory scope. Next, organized by regulatory context, and integrating governing court precedent, this report analyzes three primary areas of FECA regulation: contribution limits; source restrictions; and disclaimer and disclosure requirements. Since 2003, a series of Supreme Court decisions has invalidated several BCRA provisions. In addition, in 2010, the Court invalidated a long-standing prohibition on independent expenditures funded from the treasuries of corporations and labor unions. Generally, the Court has overturned such provisions as unconstitutional violations of First Amendment guarantees of free speech. According to the Court, limits on campaign contributions—which involve giving money to an entity—and expenditures—which involve spending money directly for electoral advocacy—implicate rights of political expression and association under the First Amendment. In contrast to base contribution limits, FECA also provided for limits on the amount of money a donor could contribute in total to all candidates, parties, and political committees, which is referred to as aggregate contribution limits. Additional Restrictions on Contributions
Ban on Contributions Made Through a Conduit
In addition to limiting the amount a donor may contribute to a campaign, FECA also places certain restrictions on the types of contributions that a donor can make. Furthermore, in a ruling that provided the legal underpinning for the establishment of super PACs, an appellate court has ruled that limits on contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures are unconstitutional. Enacted as part of BCRA, the invalidated provision of law is known as the "Millionaire's Amendment." As discussed above, the Court has expressly held several provisions of FECA unconstitutional:
individual, party, and political committee contribution limits that the Court deemed to be unreasonably low; limits on how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates, parties, and political committees (i.e., "aggregate limits"); a series of staggered increases in contribution limits applicable to candidates whose opponents significantly self-finance their campaigns; and a prohibition on campaign contributions by minors age 17 or younger. Source Restrictions
In addition to limits on how much a donor may contribute to a campaign, federal campaign finance law contains several bans—referred to as "source restrictions"—on who may make campaign contributions. The following sections of the report discuss key aspects of source restrictions, beginning with the ban on campaign contributions by corporations and labor unions and the Supreme Court's invalidation of limits on corporate and union independent spending on campaigns. In 2015, a unanimous en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Ban on Foreign National Contributions and Expenditures and Restrictions on Foreign National Involvement in U.S. Campaigns
FECA generally prohibits foreign nationals from donating or spending money in connection with any U.S. election. Disclaimer and Disclosure Requirements
FECA sets forth both disclaimer and disclosure requirements. In addition, entities other than political committees—such as labor unions and corporations, including incorporated tax-exempt Section 501(c)(4) organizations—making independent expenditures or electioneering communications have generally been required to disclose information to the FEC, including the identity of certain donors over specific dollar thresholds. The Court upheld the law as substantially related to the governmental interest of safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process, and announced that public disclosure "promotes transparency and accountability in the electoral process to an extent other measures cannot." In 2017, in Independence Institute v. Federal Election Commission , the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a three-judge federal district court ruling upholding the constitutionality of FECA's disclosure requirements for electioneering communications. Criminal Penalties
In addition to a series of civil penalties, FECA sets forth criminal penalties for knowing and willful violations of the Act. Notably, FECA provides specific penalties for knowing and willful violations of the prohibition on contributions made by one person "in the name of another person," discussed above in the section of the report entitled " Ban on Contributions Made Through a Conduit ." In most instances, the U.S. Department of Justice initiates the prosecution of criminal violations of FECA, but the law also provides that the FEC may refer an apparent violation to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution under certain circumstances. | Federal campaign finance law is composed of a complex set of limits, restrictions, and requirements on money and other things of value that are spent or contributed in the context of federal elections. While the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA, or Act) sets forth the statutory provisions governing this area of law, several Supreme Court and lower court rulings have had a significant impact on the Act's regulatory scope. Most notably, since 2003, a series of Supreme Court decisions has invalidated several FECA provisions that were enacted as part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), and in 2010, the Court invalidated a long-standing prohibition on independent expenditures funded from the treasuries of corporations and labor unions. Generally, the Court has overturned such provisions as unconstitutional violations of First Amendment guarantees of free speech.
As a foundational matter, FECA distinguishes between a contribution and an expenditure: a contribution involves giving money to an entity, such as a candidate's campaign committee, while an expenditure involves spending money directly for advocacy of the election or defeat of a candidate. Generally, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on contributions, while invalidating limits on expenditures. FECA regulates campaigns in three primary ways: contribution limits, source restrictions, and disclosure and disclaimer requirements.
Contribution Limits
Contribution limits refer to how much a donor can contribute as well as how they can contribute. Contribution limits include specific limits on how much money a donor may contribute to a candidate, party, and political committee, which are known as base limits. FECA also provides for related restrictions, including the ban on contributions made through a conduit; the ban on converting campaign contributions for personal use; and the treatment of communications a donor makes in coordination with a candidate or party as contributions. While the Supreme Court has generally upheld base limits, the Court has struck down FECA's aggregate limits, which capped the total amount of money a donor could contribute to all candidates, parties, and political committees; limits on contributions to candidates whose opponents self-finance; and limits on contributions by minors. In addition, based on Supreme Court precedent, an appellate court ruling provided the legal underpinning for the establishment of super PACs.
Source Restrictions
FECA contains several bans, referred to as source restrictions, on who may make campaign contributions. Source restrictions include the ban on corporate and labor union campaign contributions directly from treasury funds—although the Supreme Court has held that limits on corporate and labor union independent spending are unconstitutional, the Court has upheld limits on contributions. Source restrictions also include the ban on federal contractor contributions—known as the "pay-to-play" prohibition—which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld against a First Amendment challenge in 2015; the ban on foreign national contributions and expenditures; and the restrictions on foreign national involvement in U.S. campaigns.
Disclaimer and Disclosure Requirements
FECA also sets forth disclaimer and disclosure requirements. FECA's disclaimer requirements mandate that statements of attribution appear directly on campaign-related communications. FECA's disclosure requirements mandate that political committees register with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and comply with periodic reporting requirements. In addition, the law requires other entities—such as labor unions and corporations, including incorporated organizations that are tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code—that make independent expenditures or electioneering communications to disclose information to the FEC. Generally, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of disclaimer and disclosure requirements against First Amendment challenges as substantially related to the governmental interest of safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process by promoting transparency and accountability.
Criminal Penalties
For knowing and willful violations of any provision of the Act, FECA sets forth criminal penalties, including specific penalties for violations of the prohibition on contributions made through a conduit. In most instances, the U.S. Department of Justice initiates the prosecution of criminal violations of FECA, but the law also provides that the FEC may refer an apparent violation to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution under certain circumstances. |
crs_RL33687 | crs_RL33687_0 | 1105 , Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, which would provide funding for 9 of the 12 regular appropriations acts, including Labor-HHS-Education appropriations. 1 was signed by the President and became P.L. 111-5 on February 17, 2009. The ARRA provides $4.2 billion in funding for these WIA Title I workforce development programs. Introduction
The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 ( P.L. 105-220 ) provides job training and related services to unemployed and underemployed individuals. State and local WIA training and employment activities are provided through a system of One-Stop Career Centers. Title I of WIA authorizes numerous job training programs, including:
state formula grants for Youth, Adult, and Dislocated Worker Employment and Training activities; Job Corps; and national programs, including Native American programs, Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker programs, Veterans' Workforce Investment programs, the YouthBuild program, National Emergency Grants, and demonstration and pilot projects. This report briefly summarizes each WIA Title I program, provides a recent funding history of Title I programs, and summarizes funding for WIA programs in the ARRA. Program-by-Program Overview of WIA Title I
Except for Job Corps and the Veterans' Workforce Investment Program, all WIA programs are administered by the Department of Labor's (DOL) Employment and Training Administration (ETA). Since its inception in 1992, the program was administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but was moved to DOL by the YouthBuild Transfer Act ( P.L. 109-281 ), effective FY2007. Recent Trends in WIA Appropriations
FY2008 and FY2009 Funding
Table 1 shows appropriations for the FY2008 and FY2009. In FY2009, aggregate funding for WIA programs is $5.314 billion, an increase of 2.5% compared to the FY2008 funding level of $5.186 billion. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ), Congress rescinded $250 million from the unexpended balances for FY2005 and FY2006 that had been appropriated for state formula grants for the Youth, Adult, and Dislocated Worker programs authorized under Title I of WIA. Funding in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
On February 13, 2009, both the House and the Senate passed the conference version of H.R. | This report tracks recent appropriations and related legislation for Title I of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) (P.L. 105-220). Following a brief summary of each WIA program, the report presents information on WIA funding for FY2008 and FY2009 and the provisions for WIA Title I programs in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which was signed into law on February 17, 2009 (P.L. 111-5).
WIA provides, in general, job training and related services to unemployed and underemployed individuals. WIA programs are administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), primarily through DOL's Employment and Training Administration (ETA). State and local WIA training and employment activities are provided through a system of One-Stop Career Centers. Authorization of appropriations under WIA expired in FY2003 but is annually extended through appropriations acts. Reauthorization legislation was considered in the 108th and 109th Congresses.
WIA authorizes several job training programs: state formula grants for Adult, Youth, and Dislocated Worker Employment and Training Activities; Job Corps; and other national programs, including the Native American Program, the Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Program, the Veterans' Workforce Investment Program, Responsible Reintegration for Young Offenders, the Prisoner Reentry Program, and Community-Based Job Training Grants (also known as the Community College Initiative). An additional national program, YouthBuild, formerly in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was made a part of WIA on September 22, 2006, by the YouthBuild Transfer Act (P.L. 109-281).
Appropriations for WIA are made through the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Labor-HHS-ED). In FY2009, aggregate funding for WIA Title I programs is $5.31 billion, an increase of 2.5% compared to the FY2008 funding level of $5.19 billion. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161), Congress rescinded $250 million from the unexpended balances for FY2005 and FY2006 that had been appropriated for state formula grants for the Youth, Adult, and Dislocated Worker programs authorized under Title I of WIA. Funding of $4.2 billion for WIA Title I programs was provided through the ARRA and is in addition to the FY2009 appropriations.
This report will be updated as major legislative developments occur. |
crs_RL32369 | crs_RL32369_0 | Introduction
Congress might consider reforms to the nation's immigration system, and, thus, the detention of noncitizens (aliens) in the United States may be an issue. For example, while some want to increase the categories of aliens who are detained and increase the amount of detention space, others want to create alternatives to detention and exempt asylum seekers from mandatory detention. In addition, immigration enforcement activities affect the need for and allocation of detention resources. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides broad authority to detain aliens while awaiting a determination of whether they should be removed from the United States and mandates that certain categories of aliens are subject to mandatory detention (i.e., the aliens must be detained) by DHS. Aliens not subject to mandatory detention may be detained, paroled, or released on bond. The report also presents general policy issues surrounding detention of aliens, including concerns about the number of aliens subject to mandatory detention; the justness of mandatory detention, especially as it is applied to asylum seekers arriving without proper documentation; and the proper limits on the length of time in detention for aliens who have been ordered removed but cannot be returned to their home country. The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) amended the INA, effectively specifying levels of detention priority and classes of aliens subjected to mandatory detention. Additionally, after a removal order has been issued against an alien, the law provides that the alien subject to a final removal order be removed within 90 days, except as otherwise provided in the statute. Certain aliens subject to a removal order "may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of supervision." This provision had been interpreted as permitting indefinite detention where removal was not reasonably foreseeable, but in 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis , interpreted it as only permitting detention for up to six months where removal was not reasonably foreseeable. Others contend that DHS should be detaining more noncitizens to help effectuate removal but does not have enough detention space to house all those who should be detained. In FY2011, there were approximately 480,000 noncitizens in the United States who had been ordered deported and could not be confirmed to have left the country. Other proposed legislation, such as H.R. 1932 ). The bill would have allowed DHS to detain indefinitely, subject to six-month reviews, an alien under orders of removal who could not be removed if (1) there was a significant likelihood that the alien would be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future; (2) the alien would have been removed but for the alien's refusal to cooperate with the DHS Secretary's identification and removal efforts; (3) the alien had a highly contagious disease that posed a public safety threat; (4) release would have had serious adverse foreign policy consequences; (5) release would have threatened national security; (6) release would have threatened the safety of the community, and the alien had either been convicted of one or more aggravated felonies or other designated crimes or been convicted of one or more crimes of violence and due to a mental condition or personality disorder was likely to engage in future acts of violence; or (7) release would have threatened the safety of the community, and the alien has been convicted of at least one aggravated felony. | The 113th Congress may consider a comprehensive reform of the nation's immigration system (CIR), and during such discussions, the detention of noncitizens in the United States might be an issue. Congress may choose to reevaluate detention priorities (i.e., who should be detained, when they should be detained) and detention resources. Under the law, there is broad authority to detain foreign nationals (aliens/noncitizens) while awaiting a determination of whether the noncitizen should be removed from the United States. The law also mandates that certain categories of aliens are subject to mandatory detention (i.e., the aliens must be detained). Aliens subject to mandatory detention include those arriving without documentation or with fraudulent documentation, those who are inadmissible or deportable on criminal grounds, those who are inadmissible or deportable on national security grounds, those certified as terrorist suspects, and those who have final orders of deportation. Aliens not subject to mandatory detention may be detained, paroled, or released on bond. The priorities for detention of these aliens are specified in statute and regulations. For example, the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) increased the categories of aliens subject to mandatory detention. This increase has raised concerns about the justness of mandatory detention, especially as it is applied to asylum seekers arriving without proper documentation.
As of December 22, 2012, on an average day in FY2013, there were 34,696 noncitizens in Department of Homeland Security (DHS) custody. The amount of detention space is almost exclusively controlled by Congress through appropriations, and Congress has been active in providing oversight of detention space allocations and detention conditions. Since FY2002, Congress has increased the number of funded detention beds from 21,109 beds to 34,000 beds. As DHS increases its ability to identify aliens who are subject to removal from local jails in more remote locations, the nationwide allocation of detention space may become an issue.
Furthermore, the detention policy for aliens who have received a final order of removal may also be a congressional concern. After a final removal order has been issued against an alien, the law provides that the alien be removed within 90 days, except as otherwise provided in the statute. Certain aliens subject to a removal order "may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of supervision." This provision had been interpreted as permitting indefinite detention where removal was not reasonably foreseeable, but in 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, interpreted it as only permitting detention for up to six months where removal was not reasonably foreseeable. Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that its ruling was made "absent clear guidance from Congress" (i.e., that it was not clear what congressional intent was related to detaining aliens who could not be removed within 90 days). Comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) bills in the 109th and 110th Congress would have modified and codified the regulations regarding the detention of those with final orders of removal. In the 112th Congress, H.R. 1932, as reported by the House Judiciary Committee would have amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to allow DHS to indefinitely detain, subject to six-month reviews, aliens under orders of removal who could not be removed if certain conditions were met. |
crs_R43309 | crs_R43309_0 | Typhoon Haiyan and Its Aftermath
In the early morning of Friday, November 8, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (known in the Philippines as Yolanda ), one of the strongest typhoons to strike land on record, slammed into the central Visayas region. Over a 16 hour period, the super typhoon or cyclone, with a force equivalent to a Category 5 hurricane and clouds that covered two-thirds of the country, directly swept through six Philippine provinces and affected over 10% of the nation's population of 105 million people. However, in some of the hardest hit areas, particularly in coastal communities in eastern and western Leyte province and the southern tip of Eastern Samar, there appears to have been little defense against Haiyan's wrath. Two and a half months after the typhoon struck, based on figures provided by the Philippine government, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that 14.1 million people had been affected, with more than 4.1 million displaced (as of mid-January 2014, 26,000 were staying in evacuation centers). Estimates of the number killed had risen to 6,201 with more than 1,785 missing. The number of injured was unknown. In addition, assessments revealed that nearly 5.6 million people required food assistance and an estimated 1.1 million houses had been damaged or destroyed. Some Philippine leaders and political commentators argue that the U.S. military response to the disaster has strengthened the case for an enhanced U.S. military presence in the country, an issue that the two sides have been discussing intensively during the past few months (see " U.S.-Philippines Relations " below). The humanitarian relief operation, led by the Philippine government, was initially hampered by a number of significant challenges, not unusual in a disaster of this magnitude, including a general lack of transportation, extremely limited communications systems, and damaged infrastructure. Despite the physical and logistical challenges facing the relief effort, regular relief activities reportedly reached most of the worst-stricken areas within two weeks of the storm. Other agencies involved in relief efforts include the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Office of Civil Defense, and the Department of Health. The Philippine government launched a four-year Reconstruction Assistance in Yolanda (RAY) plan, on December 18, 2013. Requesting nearly $8.2 billion, RAY focuses on rebuilding areas affected by the typhoon and developing resilience to natural disasters. U.S. Humanitarian Efforts13
On November 9, 2013, U.S. As of January 31, 2014, the United States has provided over $87 million in humanitarian assistance through USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense (DOD), and $59 million in private sector contributions. The USS George Washington naval task force as well as elements of the 31 st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) from Okinawa formed the majority of Joint Task Force (JTF) 505, which was formed to conduct initial relief operations, dubbed Operation Damayan . Nearly 1,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed directly to the disaster area while the rest served on ships or provided support from bases around the world. The U.S. military delivered more than 2,495 tons of relief supplies and evacuated over 21,000 people, including over 500 American citizens. The United Nations, along with other partners, including the United States, has a strong relationship with the Philippines, and remains at the forefront of the current on-the-ground response for humanitarian assistance and early recovery. In the current crisis, apart from U.N. agencies, those responding to humanitarian crises include international organizations, NGOs, Private Voluntary Agencies (PVOs), and bilateral and multilateral donors. Strategic Response Plan
More than two months after the storm, humanitarian assistance is still required in some affected areas, particularly food, clean water, shelter, and basic health care. The HCT, in partnership with 14 U.N. organizations and 39 non-governmental and international organizations, designed a Strategic Response Plan (SRP) to support the government's activities in meeting immediate humanitarian needs, complement its reconstruction plan, and fill gaps identified by the government or through interagency assessments. U.S.-Philippines Relations25
The United States and the Republic of the Philippines maintain close ties stemming from the U.S. colonial period (1898-1946), a security alliance, extensive military cooperation, and common strategic and economic interests. Other pillars of the bilateral bond include shared democratic values and people-to-people contacts. The involvement of U.S. military forces in relief efforts following Typhoon Haiyan comes at a time of growing U.S.-Philippine security cooperation. Strategic questions: Congress may consider how the U.S. disaster response may impact the U.S.-Philippines relationship as well as regional geopolitical dynamics, and how existing and ongoing U.S. military activities in the Philippines may be affected by DOD's role in disaster relief. Selected U.N. | This report examines the impact of Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), which struck the central Philippines on November 8, 2013, and the U.S. and international response. Haiyan was one of the strongest typhoons to strike land on record. Over a 16 hour period, the "super typhoon," with a force equivalent to a Category 5 hurricane and sustained winds of up to 195 mph, directly swept through six provinces in the central Philippines. The disaster quickly created a humanitarian crisis. In some of the hardest hit areas, particularly in coastal communities in Leyte province and the southern tip of Eastern Samar, the storm knocked out power, telecommunications, and water supplies. The humanitarian relief operation was initially hampered by a number of significant obstacles, including a general lack of transportation, extremely limited communications systems, damaged infrastructure, and seriously disrupted government services. Despite the physical and logistical challenges, regular relief activities reportedly reached most of the worst-stricken areas within two weeks of the storm.
Two and a half months after the typhoon struck, United Nations (U.N.) agencies reported that 14.1 million people had been affected, with more than 4.1 million displaced. Estimates of the number killed had risen to 6,201 with more than 1,785 missing. The number of injured was unknown. In addition, assessments revealed that an estimated 1.1 million houses had been damaged or destroyed and nearly 5.6 million people required food assistance.
Ongoing humanitarian relief operations and recovery efforts are being led by the Philippine government. The United Nations, along with other partners, including the United States, remains at the forefront of the on-the-ground response. Apart from U.N. agencies, those responding to the crisis include international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Private Voluntary Agencies (PVOs), and bilateral and multilateral donors. As of January 31, 2014, international donors have contributed a total of $662.9 million to the relief efforts. U.S. assistance has included approximately $87 million in disaster aid and $59 million in private sector contributions, a massive U.S. military humanitarian effort, as well as diplomatic and legislative activity.
At their peak, 66 U.S. military aircraft and 12 naval vessels were involved in relief efforts and nearly 1,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed directly to the disaster areas. The USS George Washington naval task force as well as elements of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit from Okinawa formed the majority of Joint Task Force (JTF) 505, which coordinated and carried out U.S. military relief efforts (Operation Damayan) in cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine government. U.S. military assistance included clearing roads, transporting aid workers, distributing 2,495 tons of relief supplies, and evacuating over 21,000 people.
More than two months after the storm, humanitarian assistance is still required in some affected areas, particularly food, clean water, shelter, and basic health care. The Philippine government launched an $8.2 billion, four-year plan, Reconstruction Assistance in Yolanda (RAY), which focuses on rebuilding areas affected by the typhoon and developing resilience to natural disasters. The U.N. Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), in partnership with U.N. organizations and non-governmental and international organizations, designed a Strategic Response Plan (SRP) to support the Philippines government's activities in meeting immediate humanitarian needs and reconstruction goals.
The United States and the Philippines maintain close ties stemming from the U.S. colonial period (1898-1946), a security alliance, and common strategic and economic interests. Other pillars of the bilateral relationship include shared democratic values and extensive people-to-people contacts. The involvement of U.S. military forces in Haiyan relief efforts bolstered support for enhanced U.S.-Philippine military cooperation, an issue that the two sides have been discussing intensively during the past several months. Congressional concerns related to the storm and its aftermath include the short-term U.S. and international humanitarian response, the long-term U.S. foreign aid strategy for the Philippines, and how the U.S. response to the disaster may impact the U.S.-Philippines relationship as well as regional geopolitical dynamics.
This report will be updated as events warrant. For background and information on the Philippines, see CRS Report RL33233, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests. For background on how the U.S. responds to international disasters, see CRS Report RL33769, International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Response Mechanisms. |
crs_RL32897 | crs_RL32897_0 | Issues Concerning the Nationwide Threat Notification System
A perceived lack of coordination in the federal government's warning notification processand inconsistent messages regarding threats to the homeland have led to an erosion of confidencein the information conveyed to the Nation. Congress is now considering legislation( H.R. 1817 , The Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act for FY2006) toreform the Homeland Security Advisor System to assure greater confidence in the threat informationbeing conveyed to the Nation. (1) However, the circumstancesand explanations surrounding the warnings and changes in the Homeland Security AdvisorySystem's (HSAS) color code to date have called into question the utility and credibility of the system.In particular:
At times it appears the color-code has been raised based on speculation thata terrorist attack may occur rather than receipt of new threat information;
At other times, warnings of heightened threats have been issued withoutchanging the HSAS; and
On numerous occasions agencies have provided different, and sometimescontradictory, information about threats to the homeland. This Directive gave responsibility to the AttorneyGeneral to administer and make public announcements regarding threats to the Nation. (12)
In lowering the threat level on April 11, 2003, DHS released a statement that after anassessment of the threats by the intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security hadmade the decision to lower the threat advisory level. (18)
In this instance, a number of senior members of the Administration discussed the informationconsidered in the raising of the alert level, and one of the Secretary of Homeland Security's principaldeputies offered conflicting information regarding the specificity of that information. Neither ofthe following instances resulted in a change of the HSAS. Thismight be problematic for a number of reasons. One optionwould be to designate the NCTC the federal government's communicator of threat information tothe Nation. Congress could include language to allow for other Departments to disseminate threatinformation under exigent circumstances. Due to a lack of coordination and unity in message it appears that the generalpublic and affected localities are becoming desensitized or disinterested in the information containedin national threat warning notification messages. | A perceived lack of coordination in the federal government's warning notification processand inconsistent messages regarding threats to the homeland have led to an erosion of confidencein the information conveyed to the Nation. Congress is now considering legislation( H.R. 1817 , The Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act for FY2006) toreform the Homeland Security Advisor System to allow for greater confidence in the threatinformation conveyed to the Nation.
Since September 11, 2001, numerous federal government organizations have notified thepublic of threats to the Nation. At times, warnings have been issued in a government-widecoordinated manner; other times this has not been the case. In each situation that has led toincreasing the threat level, a number of organizations have made public pronouncements regardingthe nature of the threat prior to, during, or after the raising of the alert-level. The informationconveyed to the public often has been inconsistent regarding the threat or the timing of a suspectedattack. This lack of coordination and unity in message has led to a dilution in the American public'sbelief in the pronouncements and a questioning of the utility of the Homeland Security AdvisorySystem (HSAS). The focus of this paper is the federal government's coordination efforts in publiclyalerting the Nation of threats to the homeland. The report reviews past warnings and changes in thealert level, organizations that have made public statements regarding threats to the Nation, andexamples of how this lack of unity might lead to confusion and misinterpretations of the threat level.Options for Congress are provided regarding delineation of roles and responsibilities and whichgovernment entity should be held accountable for warning the Nation of threats to the homeland .
This paper may be updated based on future National threat notifications or changes in thenotification system. For a discussion and options regarding the Homeland Security AdvisorySystem's (HSAS) level of detail with respect to disseminated warnings, Department of HomelandSecurity's suggested protective measures, coordination of the HSAS with other current federalwarning systems, or the costs associated with threat levels changes see CRS Report RL32023 , Homeland Security Advisory System: Possible Issues for Congressional Oversight . |
crs_R41800 | crs_R41800_0 | Introduction
Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, is the fundamental building block for an individual's entire genetic makeup. DNA is a powerful tool for law enforcement investigations because each person's DNA is different from that of every other individual (except for identical twins). DNA can be extracted from a number of sources, such as hair, bone, teeth, saliva, and blood. Background
Federal law authorizes the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to operate and maintain a national DNA database where DNA profiles generated from samples collected from people under applicable legal authority and samples collected at crime scenes can be compared to generate leads in criminal investigations. Statutory provisions also authorize the collection of DNA samples from federal offenders and arrestees, District of Columbia offenders, and military offenders. State law dictates which arrestees and convicted offenders will have profiles entered into state DNA databases, but federal law dictates which profiles entered into state databases can be uploaded into the national DNA database. Increased awareness of the power of DNA testing to solve crimes has led to increased demand for DNA analysis, which has resulted in a backlog of casework for laboratory personnel. In addition to solving crimes, DNA analysis can also help exonerate people incarcerated for crimes they did not commit. The National DNA Index System (NDIS) and the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)
As early as the 1980s, states began enacting laws that required DNA samples from offenders convicted of certain sexual offenses and other violent crimes. In the late 1980s, the FBI Laboratory convened a working group of federal, state, and local forensic scientists to establish guidelines for the use of forensic DNA analysis in laboratories. The group proposed guidelines that are the basis of current national quality assurance standards, and it urged the creation of a national DNA database. A bulk of the programs focus on providing state and local governments with funding to reduce the backlog of forensic and convicted offender samples waiting to be processed and entered into the NDIS. However, some grant programs provide funding for other purposes, such as offsetting the cost of providing postconviction DNA testing. Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program
The Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program (hereinafter, "Debbie Smith grants") provides grants to state and local governments for five major purposes: (1) conducting analyses of DNA samples collected under applicable legal authority for inclusion in the NDIS, (2) conducting analyses of forensic DNA samples for inclusion in the NDIS, (3) increasing the capacity of state and local laboratories to carry out DNA analyses, (4) collecting DNA samples from people required to submit them and forensic samples from crimes, and (5) ensuring that analyses of forensic DNA samples are carried out in a timely manner. | Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, is the fundamental building block for an individual's entire genetic makeup. DNA is a powerful tool for law enforcement investigations because each person's DNA is different from that of every other individual (except for identical twins). DNA can be extracted from a number of sources, such as hair, bone, teeth, saliva, and blood. As early as the 1980s, states began enacting laws that required the collection of DNA samples from offenders convicted of certain sexual and other violent crimes. The samples are analyzed and their profiles entered into state databases. In the late 1980s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Laboratory convened a working group of federal, state, and local forensic scientists to establish guidelines for the use of forensic DNA analysis in laboratories. The group proposed guidelines that are the basis of current national quality assurance standards, and it urged the creation of a national DNA database. The criminal justice community began to utilize DNA analyses more often in criminal investigations and trials, and in 1994, Congress enacted legislation to authorize the creation of a national DNA database.
Federal law (34 U.S.C §12592(a)) authorizes the FBI to operate and maintain a national DNA database where DNA profiles generated from samples collected from people under applicable legal authority and samples collected at crime scenes can be compared to generate leads in criminal investigations. Statutory provisions also authorize the collection of DNA samples from federal offenders and arrestees, District of Columbia offenders, and military offenders. State laws dictate which convicted offenders, and in some states arrestees, will have profiles entered into state DNA databases, while federal law dictates the scope of the national database. Increasing awareness of the power of DNA to solve crimes has resulted in increased demand for DNA analysis, which has resulted in a backlog of casework. Some jurisdictions have started to use their DNA databases for familial searching, which involves using offender profiles to identify relatives who might be perpetrators of crimes. In addition to solving crimes, DNA analysis can also help exonerate people incarcerated for crimes they did not commit.
Congress has authorized several grant programs to provide assistance to state and local governments for forensic sciences. Many of the programs focus on providing state and local governments with funding to reduce the backlog of forensic and convicted offender DNA samples waiting to be processed and entered into the national database. Other grant programs provide funding for related purposes, such as offsetting the cost of providing postconviction DNA testing. |
crs_R41739 | crs_R41739_0 | Introduction
Recent high-profile military-related cases involving sexual assaults by U.S. servicemembers have resulted in increased public and congressional interest in military discipline and the military justice system. Questions have been raised regarding how allegations of sexual assault are addressed by the chain of command, the authority and process to convene a court-martial, and the ability of the convening authority to provide clemency to a servicemember convicted of an offense. Additionally, some military-related cases, including those of Major Nidal Hasan, the alleged shooter at Fort Hood, and Private first class Bradley Manning, the alleged source of leaked classified material through the organization WikiLeaks, have raised questions regarding the mental capacity of the accused and how the military justice system addresses this concern. In the criminal law system, some basic objectives are to discover the truth, punish the guilty proportionately with their crimes, acquit the innocent without unnecessary delay or expense, and prevent and deter further crime, thereby providing for the public order. Military justice shares these objectives in part, but also serves to enhance discipline throughout the Armed Forces, serving the overall objective of providing an effective national defense. Criminal proceedings provide both the opportunity to contest guilt and to challenge the government's conduct that may have violated the rights of the accused. Members of the Armed Forces are subjected to rules, orders, proceedings, and consequences different from the rights and obligations of their civilian counterparts. Under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to raise and support armies; provide and maintain a navy; and provide for organizing and disciplining them. Under this authority, Congress has enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which is the code of military criminal laws applicable to all U.S. military members worldwide. The President implemented the UCMJ through the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), which was initially prescribed by Executive Order 12473 (April 13, 1984). The MCM contains the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM), the Military Rules of Evidence (MRE), and the UCMJ. The seriousness of the offenses alleged generally determines the type of court-martial. Evid. Congress, in creating the military justice system, established three types of courts-martial: (1) summary court-martial, (2) special court-martial, and (3) general court-martial. The accused must consent to the proceedings and normally is not entitled to a lawyer. | Recent high-profile military-related cases involving sexual assaults by U.S. servicemembers have resulted in increased public and congressional interest in military discipline and the military justice system. Questions have been raised regarding how allegations of sexual assault are addressed by the chain of command, the authority and process to convene a court-martial, and the ability of the convening authority to provide clemency to a servicemember convicted of an offense. Additionally, some military-related cases, including those of Major Nidal Hasan, the alleged shooter at Fort Hood, and Private first class Bradley Manning, the alleged source of leaked classified material through the organization WikiLeaks, have raised questions regarding the mental capacity of the accused and how the military justice system addresses this concern.
In the criminal law system, some basic objectives are to discover the truth, acquit the innocent without unnecessary delay or expense, punish the guilty proportionately with their crimes, and prevent and deter further crime, thereby providing for the public order. Military justice shares these objectives in part, but also serves to enhance discipline throughout the Armed Forces, serving the overall objective of providing an effective national defense.
Under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to raise and support armies; provide and maintain a navy; and provide for organizing and disciplining them. Under this authority, Congress has enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which is the code of military criminal laws applicable to all U.S. military members worldwide. The President implemented the UCMJ through the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM). The Manual for Courts-Martial contains the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM), the Military Rules of Evidence (MRE), and the UCMJ. Members of the Armed Forces are subjected to rules, orders, proceedings, and consequences different from the rights and obligations of their civilian counterparts, and the UCMJ establishes this unique legal framework.
The UCMJ authorizes three types of courts-martial: (1) summary court-martial; (2) special court-martial; and (3) general court-martial. Depending on the severity of the alleged offense, the accused's commanding officer enjoys great discretion with respect to the type of court-martial to convene. Generally, each of the courts-martial provides fundamental constitutional and procedural rights to the accused, including, but not limited to, the right to a personal representative or counsel, the opportunity to confront evidence and witnesses, and the right to have a decision reviewed by a lawyer or a court of appeals.
The table that concludes this report compares selected procedural safeguards employed in criminal trials in federal criminal court with parallel protective measures in military general courts-martial. |
crs_RL31411 | crs_RL31411_0 | Introduction
In 2002, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) announced a reg ulation which redefined two key terms, "fill material" and "discharge of fill material," that identify the scope of certain activities subject to regulation under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. The 2002 final rule completed a rulemaking begun in 2000 by the Clinton Administration. Its proposal had generated support from the mining industry and other regulated groups, and opposition from environmental groups. The revised rule was specifically intended to clarify the regulatory definition of fill material under Section 404 by replacing two separate and inconsistent definitions with a single, common definition. In terms of the types of regulated filling activities, it expanded the types of discharge activities that are subject to Section 404 permit requirements specifically to include construction or maintenance of the infrastructure associated with solid waste landfills and mining overburden. Further, the revised rule removed regulatory language which previously excluded "waste" discharges from Section 404 jurisdiction, a change that some argue allows the use of 404 permits to authorize certain discharges that could harm the aquatic environment. The CWA contains two different permitting regimes: (1) Section 402 permits (called the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, or NPDES, permit program) address the discharge of most pollutants, and (2) Section 404 permits address the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the United States at specified sites. The Corps and EPA have complementary roles under Section 404. Landowners seeking to discharge dredged or fill material must obtain a permit to do so from the Corps. The act's two separate permit programs differ in nature and approach. In contrast to the NPDES program's specific focus on water quality, the Section 404 program has a broader focus on effects of the discharge on the aquatic ecosystem as a whole, including wetlands. The Corps and EPA have complementary roles and regulations for the Section 404 program. The determination of what is "fill material" is important, since fill material is subject to 404 permit requirements, while discharge of non-fill material is subject to NPDES permit requirements. Thus, the April 2000 proposal to amend EPA's and the Corps' regulations to include coal mining overburden in the definition of "discharge of fill material" was intended to conform those regulations with the historical practice, which both the Clinton and Bush Administrations contended is lawful, and the Administrations' position in that lawsuit. Legislation intended to reverse the revised regulations was introduced in the 111 th Congress ( H.R. 1310 , the Clean Water Protection Act). 6411 . | In May 2002, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) announced a regulation redefining two key terms, "fill material" and "discharge of fill material," in rules that implement Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. This report discusses the 2002 rule, focusing on how it changes which material and types of activities are regulated under Section 404 and the significance of these issues, especially for the mining industry.
The Clean Water Act contains two different permitting regimes: (1) Section 402 permits (called the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, or NPDES, permit program) address the discharge of most pollutants, and (2) Section 404 permits address the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the United States at specified sites. These permit programs differ in nature and approach. The NPDES program focuses on the effects of pollutant discharges on water quality. The 404 program considers effects on the aquatic ecosystem and other national and resource interests.
The Corps and EPA have complementary roles under Section 404. Landowners seeking to discharge dredged or fill material must obtain a permit from the Corps under Section 404. EPA provides environmental guidance on 404 permitting. The determination of what is "fill material" is important, since fill material is subject to 404 permit requirements, while discharge of non-fill material is regulated by EPA under the Section 402 NPDES permit program.
The revised rule was intended to clarify the regulatory definition of fill material by replacing two separate and inconsistent definitions with a single, common definition. It expanded the types of discharge activities that are subject to Section 404 specifically to include construction or maintenance of the infrastructure associated with solid waste landfills and mining overburden. Further, the revised rule removed regulatory language which previously excluded "waste" discharges from Section 404 jurisdiction, a change that some argue allows the use of 404 permits to authorize certain discharges that harm the aquatic environment.
The final rule completed a rulemaking begun in April 2000 by the Clinton Administration. Its proposal had generated support from the mining industry and other regulated groups, and considerable opposition from environmental groups. The final rule is substantially similar to the earlier proposal. Environmental groups say the rule allows for inadequate regulation of certain disposal activities, including disposal of coal mining waste. The Clinton and Bush Administrations said that the regulatory changes were intended to conform Corps and EPA regulations to existing lawful practice, but opponents contend that those practices violate the Clean Water Act (CWA).
Legislation to reverse the revised regulations was introduced in the 114th Congress (H.R. 6411, the Clean Water Protection Act). Similar legislation was introduced in previous Congresses, but has not advanced. |
crs_R43940 | crs_R43940_0 | Introduction
Economic growth and expanded global trade have led to substantial increases in goods movement over the past few decades. The growth in freight transportation demand, along with growing passenger-side demand, has caused congestion in many parts of the transportation system, making freight movements slower and less reliable. Because the condition and performance of freight infrastructure play a considerable role in the efficiency of the freight system, federal support of freight infrastructure investment is likely to be of significant congressional concern in the reauthorization of the surface transportation program. The program is currently authorized by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141 ) as extended to May 31, 2015, in the Highway and Transportation Funding Act of 2014 ( P.L. There is significant disagreement about the best way to accomplish improvements in freight system infrastructure. Among the most important areas of disagreement are how to raise new funds for investment, the magnitude of the amounts required, how to set priorities, and the role of the federal government in the planning process. Current Federal Freight-Related Program Elements
Grant Programs
There is no federal freight transportation program per se . Instead, the federal government promotes freight transportation through several programs that are designed to support both passenger and freight mobility. The most important of these are four of the five "core" programs of the federal-aid highway program, which collectively account for roughly 90% of highway spending authorized by MAP-21 and extension legislation. Although there is no discrete freight transportation program, there are certain programs and provisions within programs that specifically pertain to freight projects. Moreover, many types of freight infrastructure improvements are eligible uses of federal highway funds. Spending eligibilities could be written to narrowly circumscribe project selection by state departments of transportation and metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs). Historically, however, funding formulas for federal surface transportation projects have distributed funding widely and allowed these funds to be used on a broad array of projects at the discretion of states and localities. Freight Planning and Performance Management
The federal government can also influence project prioritization through the planning processes of state departments of transportation and MPOs. Greater federal funding for freight transportation infrastructure would require either reducing funding for other programs or generating new revenues. | Goods movement has increased substantially over the past few decades as the economy and global trade have expanded. Freight transportation demand in tandem with passenger-side demand has caused congestion in many parts of the transportation system, resulting in slower and less reliable freight movement. Also, the condition and performance of freight infrastructure play considerable roles in the efficiency of the freight system and, therefore, are likely to be of significant congressional concern in the reauthorization of the surface transportation program that is currently authorized through May 31, 2015.
There is no specific federal freight transportation program. Instead, the federal government supports freight infrastructure through several programs that promote both passenger and freight mobility. The most important of these are four of the five "core" programs of the federal-aid highway program, which together account for roughly 90% of highway spending. One of those five programs, the Surface Transportation Program, also provides limited support for freight rail projects. Federal assistance to ports and inland navigation, waterborne shipping, and air freight are beyond the scope of this report.
There is significant disagreement about the best way to accomplish improvements in freight system infrastructure. Among the most important points of contention are:
The magnitude of the investments required and related policies to manage demand for existing transportation infrastructure as an alternative to increasing capacity. How to cover the cost. Most federal freight investments are currently funded through the highway trust fund, whose main source of revenue is taxes on motor fuels. These taxes no longer raise sufficient revenue to fund existing federal surface transportation programs, and proposals to increase federal spending on freight infrastructure are often linked to other fees or taxes that have not gained support in Congress. How to set priorities. Most federal highway funding is distributed by formula to state departments of transportation, which determine spending priorities in cooperation with metropolitan planning organizations. This process forces freight projects to compete with passenger-oriented projects, which may have greater support—especially when a proposed freight project primarily benefits so-called through trucks (rather than trucks making local pick-ups and deliveries). Changes in the law to establish priority for freight infrastructure would run contrary to the trend in recent reauthorization acts to give states greater discretion over their spending of federal highway funds. The role of the federal government in the planning process. The 2012 surface transportation reauthorization, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141), established a performance measurement system for state departments of transportation and metropolitan planning organizations. However, these provisions have yet to be fully implemented. Eventually, they are intended to lead to federal evaluation of state and local decision-making, which is likely to prove controversial. |
crs_R41433 | crs_R41433_0 | Farm Bill Programs Without Baseline After FY2012
The 2008 farm bill (the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. These amounts were nearly 3% of the $484 billion five-year baseline available to write the 2014 farm bill, or 14% of the $100 billion five-year baseline if the nutrition title was excluded. Notable programs among this group were certain agricultural disaster programs, specialty crop research, organic research and certification, beginning/socially disadvantaged farmer programs, rural development, bioenergy, farmers market promotion, and some conservation programs. However, some programs may not be assumed to continue in the budget baseline beyond the end of a farm bill because:
the program did not receive new mandatory budget authority during the last year of a farm bill, or the baseline during the last year of a farm bill is below a minimum $50 million scoring threshold that is needed to continue a baseline, or the Budget Committees and Agriculture Committees did not agree to give the program a baseline in the years beyond the end of the farm bill—either to reduce the program's 10-year cost at the time the farm bill was written, or to prevent it from having a continuing baseline. Status in the 2014 Farm Bill of the 2008 Farm Bill Programs Without Baseline
The enacted 2014 farm bill provides 29 of these 37 programs with new mandatory funding that totals more than $6.2 billion over the five-year period FY2014-FY2018 ( Table 1 ). An estimated $9 billion to $14 billion would be needed to continue these programs for five more years. Congress needed to find offsets from other sources to continue them, a difficult task in a tight budget environment. The gap in mandatory funding during FY2013 for many of these programs was not necessarily intended. | The 2008 farm bill (the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110-246 provided mandatory funding for many programs. Some of these programs had budget baseline beyond the end of the farm bill in FY2012, while others did not. Those with continuing baseline essentially had built-in future funding if policy makers decided that the programs should continue.
However, 37 programs that received mandatory funds during the 2008 farm bill were not assumed to continue from a budgetary perspective because they did not have a budgetary baseline beyond FY2012. Notable programs among this group included certain agricultural disaster assistance programs, specialty crop research, organic research and certification, beginning and socially disadvantaged farmer programs, rural development, bioenergy, farmers market promotion programs, and some conservation programs. If policy makers wanted to continue these programs in the 2014 farm bill, they needed to pay for the programs with budgetary offsets.
Depending on the approach used to estimate the cost to extend the 37 programs for five years, an estimated $9 billion to $14 billion of offsets from other sources was needed. This was nearly 3% of the five-year CBO baseline used to write the 2014 farm bill (FY2014-FY2018), or 14% of the five-year baseline if the nutrition title is excluded. Finding this level of offsets sometimes was difficult in a tight budget environment, especially when many observers believed that some of the farm bill baseline would be used for deficit reduction.
The enacted 2014 farm bill provides 29 of these 37 programs with new mandatory funding that totals $6.2 billion over the five-year period FY2014-FY2018. |
crs_R43258 | crs_R43258_0 | "Invasive" species (alternatively known as an alien, exotic, injurious, introduced or naturalized, non-native, nonindigenous, nuisance, or noxious species) further refers to an animal or plant that is introduced into an environment where it is not native. The introduction of invasive species to the United States—whether deliberate or unintentional—from around the globe can pose a significant threat to native animal and plant communities, and may result in extinctions of native animals and plants, species disruptions as native species compete for limited resources, reduced biodiversity, and altered terrestrial or aquatic habitats. It is estimated that 50,000 non-native species have been introduced to the United States, including nonindigenous plant and animal species. Examples of some invasive species found in the United States, and the types of damages they may inflict, include the following:
Burmese pythons ( Python bivitattus ) have multiplied in south Florida, becoming a top carnivore and killing large numbers of native species of reptiles, birds, and mammals. Zebra mussels ( Dreissena polymorpha ) and quagga mussels ( Dreissena rostriformis bugensis ) from Eastern Europe have clogged intakes for urban water supplies and nuclear power plants in the Great Lakes and the Mississippi basin. The light brown apple moth ( Epiphyas postvittana ), a native pest of Australia, and the diamondback moth ( Plutella xylostella ), a native to the Mediterranean region, have both spread to the United States and are causing damage to a range of commercial fruit and vegetable crops. Leafy spurge ( Euphorbia esula ) has reduced the forage value of western grazing land, resulting in lower overall value to private landowners. Estimated Economic Costs
The introduction of invasive animal and plant species can result in a range of economic, ecologic, and cultural losses, including but not limited to reduced agricultural output from U.S. farms and ranches, degradation of U.S. waterways and coastal areas, as well as national parks and forests, and changed urban, suburban, and rural landscapes. Selected Federal Laws and Directives
Comprehensive legislation on the treatment of invasive species has never been enacted, and no single law directs coordination among federal agencies. Instead, the current legal framework is largely governed by a patchwork of laws, regulations, policies, and programs. Some laws are tailored to individual species or narrowly focused on what is affected by the species, such as agricultural production or certain aquatic or terrestrial ecosystems. Other laws have a broader intended purpose and may only peripherally address invasive species, such as certain environmental laws, resource management laws, and species or wildlife protection laws. Selected Federal Agencies
Numerous federal and interagency efforts share responsibilities for preventing, eradicating, and controlling invasive species. In FY2016, the U.S. government spent an estimated $2.3 billion across a range of federal agencies and activities in an effort to prevent, control, and eradicate invasive species domestically. Activities at the Department of Agriculture accounted for the bulk of available federal funding, nearly $1.2 billion (53% of total available funds). Activities at the Department of Homeland Security, comprised of mostly border protection and security activities, accounted for about $0.8 billion (33% of total funding). The remainder of federal funding, about $0.3 billion (about 14% of total funding), covers activities across a range of agencies at the Departments of Interior, Commerce, and Defense, and other independent agencies. National Invasive Species Council
NISC provides high-level interdepartmental coordination of federal invasive species actions and works with other federal and nonfederal groups to address invasive species issues at the national level. NISC was created by Executive Order 13112 in 1999. NISC is co-chaired by the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce. | An "invasive" species (alternatively known as an alien, exotic, injurious, introduced or naturalized, non-native, nonindigenous, nuisance, or noxious species) refers to an animal or plant that is introduced into an environment where it is not native. The introduction of invasive species to the United States—whether deliberate or unintentional—from around the globe can pose a significant threat to native animal and plant communities, and may result in extinctions of native animals and plants, species disruptions as native and non-native species compete for limited resources, reduced biodiversity, and altered terrestrial or aquatic habitats. This can result in a range of economic, ecologic, and cultural losses, including reduced agricultural output from U.S. farms and ranches; degradation of U.S. waterways, coastal areas, national parks, and forests; and altered urban, suburban, and rural landscapes.
It is estimated that 50,000 non-native species have been introduced to the United States. The potential economic costs associated with nonindigenous plant and animal species are estimated at more than $100 billion annually in the United States. A few examples of the types of damages attributed to non-native invasive species in the United States are as follows. Burmese pythons are multiplying in south Florida, becoming a top carnivore and killing large numbers of native species of reptiles, birds, and mammals. Zebra and quagga mussels from Eastern Europe are clogging intakes for urban water supplies and nuclear power plants in the Great Lakes and the Mississippi basin. The light brown apple moth, a native pest of Australia, has been detected in California and is causing damage to a wide range of plant species and commercial fruit and vegetable crops. Leafy spurge is lowering the forage value of western grazing land, and reducing overall land values.
In the United States, numerous federal and interagency efforts share responsibilities regarding invasive species. Among the federal agencies involved are the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Interior, Transportation, and others, including the Environmental Protection Agency and the Executive Office of the President. Of these, three Departments—Agriculture, Commerce, and Interior—play a major role by co-chairing the National Invasive Species Council (NISC). Created by Executive Order 13112 in 1999, NISC provides high-level interdepartmental coordination of federal invasive species actions and works with other federal and nonfederal groups to address invasive species issues at the national level.
In FY2016, the U.S. government spent an estimated $2.3 billion across a range of federal agencies and activities in an effort to prevent, control, and eradicate invasive species domestically. Activities at the Department of Agriculture accounted for the bulk of available federal funding, nearly $1.2 billion (53% of total available funds). Activities at the Department of Homeland Security, comprised of mostly border protection and security activities, accounted for about $0.8 billion (33% of total funding). The remainder of federal funding, about $0.3 billion (about 14% of total funding) covers activities across a range of agencies at the Departments of Interior, Commerce, and Defense, and other independent agencies.
Despite efforts to achieve high-level interdepartmental coordination, comprehensive legislation on the treatment of invasive species has never been enacted, and no single law provides coordination among federal agencies. Instead, the current legal framework is largely governed by a patchwork of laws, regulations, policies, and programs. Some laws are tailored to individual species or narrowly focused on what is affected by the species. Other laws have a broader intended purpose and may only peripherally address invasive species. Some laws, although they do not directly address invasive species control or prevention, may limit such introductions. |
crs_R42556 | crs_R42556_0 | During Senate debates in the 112 th Congress over judicial nominations, differing perspectives have been expressed about the relative degree of success of a President's nominees in gaining Senate confirmation, compared with nominees of other recent Presidents. This report seeks to inform the current debate in three ways: first, by providing a statistical overview of President Obama's nominees thus far to U.S. circuit court of appeals and U.S. district court judgeships, and of any actions taken on their nominations by the Senate Judiciary Committee and the full Senate; second, by using various statistical measures to compare the success to date of President Barack Obama's judicial nominees in advancing through the Senate confirmation process with the success of the judicial nominees of the four most recent preceding Presidents (Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush); and third, by identifying various factors which might help explain differences or variations found in judicial appointment statistics across the five presidencies. As mentioned above, this report focuses on nominations made by President Obama and other recent Presidents to the U.S. circuit courts of appeals and the U.S. district courts. Thus far, President Obama has nominated 41 persons to circuit court judgeships. As for U.S. district courts, Figure 1 shows that President Obama has had the greatest number of judges appointed to district courts located within the Ninth Circuit (22 confirmed district nominees), the Second Circuit (13), and the Fourth Circuit (13). The two circuits with the fewest confirmed Obama district court nominees are the First Circuit (3) and the Sixth Circuit (4). As Figure 3 indicates, 17 more circuit and district court judgeships are vacant than when President Obama took office (a total of 72 current vacancies, as of May 31, 2012, compared with 55 on January 20, 2009). For district court nominees, President Clinton had the greatest number confirmed during the first term of a presidency for this period (i.e., 169). Inherited Vacancies and Subsequent Vacancies at Selected Dates
Table 3 and Table 4 compare, for President Obama and his two most recent predecessors, (1) the number of U.S. circuit and district court vacancies that each inherited at the beginning of his presidency; (2) the number of circuit and district court vacancies as of February 1 of each President's second, third, and fourth years in office; and (3) the percentage of circuit and district court vacancies without nominees on February 1 of each of those years. Of the three Presidents, however, he is the only one who began his fourth year in office with more vacancies than existed when he took office (as is also the case with district court vacancies under President Obama). Bush but subsequently declined during the Obama presidency. The average waiting time, thus far, for President Obama's district court nominees from first nomination to first hearing, 83.2 days, is now nearly the same as the average waiting time experienced by district court nominees during the G.H.W. During the Obama presidency, the average number of days, thus far, has increased further to 105.1 days as 42 (35.9%) of President Obama's 117 confirmed district court nominees waited at least 100 days from first committee report to confirmation. Over the course of a presidency, opportunities for a President to make circuit and district court appointments continue to be affected by the rate at which judges depart office (by taking senior status, retiring, resigning, or dying). The level of consultation between a President and a nominee's home state Senators also can influence the President's pace in selecting nominees for judicial vacancies. According to one account, for example, judicial selection may not have been a priority for the Obama Administration during the 111 th Congress. Various studies, for example, have concluded that how long lower federal court nominees wait in the Senate confirmation process, from first nomination to final action, is affected by such factors as the extent of ideological differences between the President and the opposite party in the Senate, or of interest group opposition to certain nominees. Finally, another factor that might affect the processing of judicial nominations by the Senate (and, thus, judicial confirmation statistics) is the blue slip policy of the Senate Judiciary Committee, as set by its chair. | Recent Senate debates in the 112th Congress over judicial nominations have focused on issues such as the relative degree of success of President Barack Obama's nominees in gaining Senate confirmation (compared with other recent Presidents) as well as the effect of delayed judicial appointments on judicial vacancy levels. The following report addresses these issues, and others, by providing a statistical overview of President Obama's nominees to U.S. circuit court of appeals and U.S. district court judgeships, current through May 31, 2012. Findings include the following:
President Obama thus far in his presidency has nominated 41 persons to U.S. circuit court judgeships, 29 of whom have been confirmed. Of the 150 persons nominated thus far by President Obama to U.S. district court judgeships, 117 have been confirmed. The greatest number of President Obama's circuit court nominees have been confirmed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (6) and the Second Circuit (5). The greatest number of President Obama's district court nominees have been confirmed to judgeships located within the Ninth Circuit (22) and the fewest to district court judgeships within the First Circuit (3). District court vacancies have grown in number over the course of the Obama presidency, from 42 judgeships vacant when President Obama took office to 59 at present. There currently are 13 circuit court vacancies (the same number as when President Obama took office). During the Obama presidency thus far, fewer circuit court nominees have been confirmed by the Senate than were confirmed during the first terms of any of the four preceding Presidents (Reagan through G.W. Bush). Likewise, fewer Obama district court nominees have been confirmed by the Senate than were confirmed during the first terms of the four preceding Presidents. President Obama is the only one of the three most recent Presidents to have begun his fourth year in office with more circuit and district court judgeships vacant than when he took office. During the Obama presidency, the average waiting time from nomination to committee hearing has been, thus far, 69.6 days for circuit court nominees and 83.2 days for district court nominees. During the Obama presidency, the average waiting time from Senate Judiciary Committee report to Senate confirmation has been 139.7 days for circuit court nominees and 105.1 days for district court nominees.
Various factors might help explain differences or variation found in judicial appointment statistics across recent presidencies.
A President's opportunities to make circuit and district court appointments will be affected by the number of judicial vacancies existing at the time he takes office, as well as by how many judges depart office, and how many new judgeships are statutorily created, during his presidency. The time taken by a President to select nominees for judicial vacancies may be affected by whether the selection of lower court nominees must compete with filling a Supreme Court vacancy, whether the selection process itself is a priority for a President, the level of consultation between a President and a nominee's home state Senators, and the time taken by home state Senators to make judicial candidate recommendations. Institutional and political factors which may influence the processing of judicial nominations by the Senate include ideological differences between the President and the opposition party in the Senate, the extent of interest group opposition to certain nominees, the presence or absence of "divided government," the point in a congressional session when nominations arrive in the Senate, whether nominees have the support of both of their home state Senators, and whether the blue slip policy of the Senate Judiciary Committee requires the support of both home state Senators before a nominee can receive a hearing or committee vote. |
crs_RS21539 | crs_RS21539_0 | The winnerofthe special election then serves for the balance of the term. All House vacancies are filled by special election. For additional information, see CRS Report 97-1009(pdf) , House and Senate Vacancies: How Are They Filled? Special Elections in the U.S. House of Representatives: 108th Congress(2003-2004)
a In California, Rep. Robert T. Matsui died on Jan. 1, 2005, three days before the convening of the 109th Congress, towhich he had been reelected. A special primary election to fill the vacancy will be held on Mar. 8, 2005. If no candidate receives a majorityofvotes, the top vote-getters from each party will advance to a special runoff election on May 3, 2005.
b Three days before the 108th Congress convened on January 7, 2003, a special election was held to fill the vacancycaused during the 107th Congress by the death of Rep. Patsy Mink, who had been re-elected posthumously to the 108thCongress. (For further information on the 107th Congress vacancy and specialelection see CRS Report RS20814(pdf) , Vacancies and Special Elections: 107th Congress .) A special election to fill the vacancy caused by Rep. Fletcher's resignation was held on February 17,2004,at which time the House was in recess until Feb. 24, 2004. The vacancy continued throughout the remainder of the 108th Congress. e In North Carolina, a special election to fill the vacancy in the 1st congressional district was held on July 20, 2004, tocoincide with the state's primary elections. f In South Dakota, a special election to fill the vacancy in the at-large district was held on June 1, 2004, to coincidewith the state's primary elections. Because no candidatereceived a majority of the votes, a special runoff election was held on June 3, 2003, and the names of the two topvotegetters were on that ballot. | There were seven vacancies in the 108th Congress, all in the House. One,in the 2nd District of Hawaii, was caused by the death of the incumbent, who had been re-electedposthumously to the108th Congress. Five other vacancies were caused by the resignation of the incumbent in the19th District of Texas, the6th District of Kentucky, the at-large district of South Dakota, the 1st District of NorthCarolina, and the 1st District ofNebraska. The seventh vacancy, in the 5th District of California, was caused by the death of theincumbent three daysbefore the 109th Congress, to which he had been reelected, convened. The first vacancy was filled byspecial electionon January 4, 2003, three days before the 108th Congress convened. For further information, see CRS Report RS20814(pdf), Vacancies and Special Elections: 107th Congress. The second vacancy wasfilled by special election onJune 3, 2003. The third vacancy was filled by special election on February 17, 2004. The fourth vacancy was filledby special election on June 1, 2004. The fifth vacancy was filled by special election on July 20, 2004. The vacancyin the 1st District of Nebraska continued throughout the remainder of the 108th Congress. A special primary election tofill the vacancy in the 5th District of California for the 109th Congress will be held onMarch 8, 2005. If no candidatereceives a majority of votes, a special runoff election will be held on May 3, 2005. This report records vacanciesinthe offices of U.S. Representative and Senator that occurred during the 108th Congress. It providesinformation on theformer incumbents, the process by which these vacancies are filled, and the names of Members who filled the vacantseats. This report will not be updated. For additional information, see CRS Report 97-1009(pdf), House andSenateVacancies: How Are They Filled? |
crs_R40223 | crs_R40223_0 | However, some economists and forecasters had been concerned that a combination of factors might make this economic contraction much worse than other post-war slowdowns. The problems that began in housing, quickly spread to banking and financial services and were compounded earlier in 2008 by spikes in energy prices. In response, policymakers quickly moved to prevent the instability in housing and financial services from spilling over into the broader economy. Some economic stimulus proposals included infrastructure spending, revenue sharing with states, middle class tax cuts, business tax cuts, unemployment benefits, and food stamps. On January 22, 2009 the House Committee on Energy and Commerce marked-up selected health components and approved a stimulus bill, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1 on January 28, 2009. An amendment in the nature of a substitute ( S.Amdt. 1 and was approved by the full Senate on February 10, 2009. The Senate version of ARRA was referred to a joint Senate and House conference committee. The conference committee reached agreement and referred ARRA to the House and Senate, where it was passed on February 13, 2009. President Obama signed ARRA ( P.L. 111-5 ) on February 17, 2009. This report is a summary the Medicaid provisions in P.L. For more information on the Medicaid provisions included in House and Senate versions of ARRA, see CRS Report R40158, Medicaid Provisions in the House and Senate American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1, S.Amdt. 570) , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. For further information on implementation of the FMAP adjustments in ARRA, see CRS Report RL32950, Medicaid: The Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) . Under the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 ( P.L. To receive the increase, states are:
required to maintain their Medicaid eligibility standards, methodologies, and procedures as in effect on July 1, 2008; prohibited from receiving the increase if they are not in compliance with requirements for prompt payment of health care providers under Medicaid, and required to report to the Secretary of HHS on their compliance; prohibited from depositing or crediting the additional federal funds paid as a result of the increase to any reserve or rainy day fund; required to ensure that local governments do not pay a larger percentage of the state's nonfederal Medicaid expenditures than otherwise would have been required on September 30, 2008; and required to submit a report to the Secretary regarding how the additional federal funds paid as a result of the temporary FMAP increase were expended. Funding for Oversight and Implementation. | The economy officially was considered in a recession in December 2008, but many forecasters had long recognized the downturn and some believed this economic contraction would be more severe than other post-World War II slowdowns. A combination of factors combined to present policymakers with difficult decisions on how best to stimulate the economy. Troubling instability in the housing and financial services sectors, weak auto manufacturing demand, and high energy costs earlier in 2008 had slowed growth dramatically and forced millions into unemployment. With declining tax revenue and increasing costs to provide unemployment and other benefits to unemployed workers, states were implementing measures to rein in spending, including restricting Medicaid eligibility and services.
Congress considered legislation aimed at stimulating economic activity in selected industrial sectors to save existing and create new jobs, reduce taxes, invest in future technologies, and fund infrastructure improvements. In addition to reducing some taxes and funding infrastructure projects, ARRA provisions were designed to provide: temporary support to families and individuals by increasing unemployment compensation benefits; financial assistance for individuals to maintain their health coverage under provisions in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA); temporary increases in Medicaid matching rates; and increases in disproportionate share hospital allotments.
The House approved the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (H.R. 1) on January 28, 2009. The Senate passed an amendment (S.Amdt. 570) as a replacement for the House-approved version of ARRA on February 10, 2009. ARRA was referred to a joint House and Senate conference committee. The joint Senate and House Conference Committee reached agreement, and ARRA was passed by the House and Senate on February 13, 2009. President Obama signed ARRA (P.L. 111-5) into law on February 17, 2009. This report is a summary of ARRA's Medicaid provisions.
For more information on the Medicaid provisions included in House and Senate versions of ARRA, see CRS Report R40158, Medicaid Provisions in the House and Senate American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1, S.Amdt. 570), coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. This report will not be updated. For further information on implementation of FMAP changes in ARRA, see CRS Report RL32950, Medicaid: The Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP). |
crs_RL32254 | crs_RL32254_0 | Thus, the federal income tax burden on small firms and its effects on their formation and growth have been perennial issues for Congress. 115-97 (the tax revision act of 2017). If no such rationale can be found, then government support for small businesses may do more harm than good by distorting the allocation of domestic economic resources. Small business tax preferences entail the following economic costs: (1) the foregone revenue and any interest charges from federal borrowing to offset that revenue loss, (2) the resources required to comply with the rules governing the use of the tax benefits and to enforce compliance with those rules, and (3) the opportunity cost of the foregone revenue and the resources devoted to tax compliance and enforcement. How a Small Business Is Defined in the Federal Tax Code
Does the federal tax code use the SBA size standards to determine eligibility for small business tax benefits? Excluded from the list are subsidies available only to small firms in particular industries, such as life insurance, banking, and energy production or distribution. Nor does the list include tax benefits that may be claimed by many small firms but are available to firms of all sizes, such as the Section 41 research tax credit and the Section 168(k) 100% expensing allowance. The act repealed a second small business tax benefit from 2017: the rollover of gains from the sale of publicly traded securities into specialized small business investment companies under Section 1044. Such a difference existed under the tax law that was in effect in 2017. Nevertheless, a recent estimate by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) indicates that their revenue cost could exceed $17 billion in FY2018 (see Table 1 ). Cash-basis accounting can distort a firm's financial position in at least two ways. Exemption from Limitation on the Deduction for Business Interest Expenses
Before the enactment of P.L. Ordinary Income Treatment of Losses on Sales of Small Business Stock
IRC Section 1244 allows taxpayers to treat any loss from the sale, exchange, or worthlessness of qualified small business stock as an ordinary loss rather than a capital loss. Some small firms, however, are exempt from the uniform capitalization rule. Nonrefundable Tax Credit for Pension Plan Start-Up Costs of Small Firms
Under IRC Section 45E, certain small firms may claim a nonrefundable tax credit for a portion of the start-up costs incurred in setting up new retirement plans for employees. 111-148 ) added a provision to the federal tax code (IRC Section 45R) that grants certain small employers a tax credit for nonelective contributions to health plans that cover at least 50% of the cost for participating employees. This section describes the chief arguments for and against government support (including tax preferences) for small businesses. Arguments in Favor of Government Support
Proponents of government support for small business generally cite four reasons why they believe it is justified: (1) the special economic role played by small firms; (2) the financial barriers to their formation and growth; (3) the impact of relatively high marginal tax rates on the formation and growth of small entrepreneurial firms; and (4) the unique opportunities for individual economic advancement created by small business ownership. Some of this support is in the form of tax preferences (or expenditures) available to many small firms. | The federal tax burden on small firms and its effects on their formation and growth have long been matters of legislative concern for Congress. This abiding interest has helped pave the way for the enactment of a series of tax laws in recent years that included targeted tax relief for a number of small businesses.
This report describes the main federal tax preferences that benefit small firms and examines the main arguments for and against government support for small firms in general and for tax benefits targeted at such firms in particular. It addresses the tax preferences that can be claimed only by small firms in a wide range of industries and excludes those targeted at small firms in specific industries, such as the special deduction for small life insurance companies under Section 806 of the federal tax code. The small business tax preferences discussed here reflect the changes in the tax code under P.L. 115-97.
The following small business tax benefits are examined here:
Expensing allowance for machinery and equipment under Section 179 of the Internal Revenue Code; Cash-basis accounting under Section 446; Tax credit for a portion of the costs incurred by small firms in establishing pension funds for employees under Section 45E; Tax credit for costs incurred by small firms in complying with the Americans with Disabilities Act under Section 44; Full exclusion from the capital gains tax on the sale or exchange of qualified small business stock under Section 1202; Exemption from the limitation on the deduction for business interest expenses under Section 163; Tax credit for small firms that offer qualified health insurance coverage to employees under Section 45R; Simplified dollar-value last-in-last-out accounting under Section 474; Deduction for and amortization of business start-up expenses under Section 195; Ordinary income treatment of losses on the sale of certain small business stock under Section 1244; Treating losses on the sale of Small Business Investment Company stock as ordinary losses under Section 1242; Exemption from the uniform capitalization rule under Section 263A; and Use of research tax credit to reduce payroll tax for certain small firms under Section 41.
While available information does not allow for an estimate of the federal revenue cost of the small business tax preferences examined here, a recent estimate by the Joint Committee on Taxation suggests that the cost might exceed $17 billion in FY2018.
Tax preferences for small businesses raise several policy issues. For some, a key question is whether they can be justified on economic grounds. In the absence of such a justification, small business tax benefits, while promoting the survival and growth of firms that can take advantage of them, may cause more economic harm than good by distorting the allocation of domestic economic resources. |
crs_R45051 | crs_R45051_0 | Policymakers and experts generally agree that bank regulation should be tailored to account for these differences between institutions. To what degree the application of regulation should vary and how those variations should be designed and implemented are debated issues. Instead, this report examines selected classifications of banks, briefly discusses selected legislation that would amend the existing tailoring system, and analyzes three selected characteristics (size, business activities, and reliance on capital funding) across which banking organizations may measurably differ. Community banks are likely to be more concentrated in core commercial bank businesses of making loans and taking deposits and less involved in other activities such as securities trading or holding derivatives. As a result, they have created classifications and thresholds that subject each bank to certain regulations, exempt it from others, or otherwise alter its regulatory treatment. Policymakers have determined it is appropriate to subject banks exceeding this size to additional regulation, due to the amount of harm the failure of these banks could potentially cause to the economy and the resources available to the banks to dedicate to compliance. Other proposals assert this system (whatever the level of individual thresholds) is too heavily focused on one aspect of a bank (size) that does not directly reveal much about other characteristics, such as complexity, interconnectedness, and risk posed. Because these activities are complex and potentially expose individual banks and the financial system to additional risks, they have been proposed as tailoring-based criteria. In the 115 th Congress, S. 2155 , H.R. 10 and H.R. Capital-Based Criteria
A bank secures funding by either issuing liabilities or raising capital. The classification systems discussed above are generally rules-based; if an objective, numerical (sometimes called bright line ) threshold is crossed, then a bank becomes subject to or exempt from certain regulations. 3312 / S. 1893 ) and the TAILOR Act ( H.R. Bank Characteristics
The various classifications and exemptions involved in bank regulation are intended to appropriately tailor regulation based on each bank's characteristics and risks. To examine to what degree existing and proposed classifications accomplish this, it is helpful to understand the differences between banks that do or do not meet the classification criteria. The following section analyzes differences in the size, business activities, and capital levels of U.S. bank organizations and makes comparisons between organizations that meet certain criteria and those that do not meet those criteria. Nevertheless, it can be helpful to review and examine the characteristics of banks that fall within certain thresholds. Banks by Activities
Some observers are critical of asset size thresholds because they do not necessarily reflect the activities in which a bank is engaged, which may be an important component of what regulation should be applied to particular institutions. As shown in Table 5 , the data suggests that banking organizations with no derivative positions tend to be small institutions (average of $2.2 billion in assets), heavily focused on making loans (68% of assets) and taking deposits (91% of liabilities), and holding relatively high level of capital (11% leverage ratio). Because grouping banks with a modified, simplified criteria and comparing their characteristics in aggregate is still illustrative of differences across types of banks, this section compares banks that meet and do not meet the following criteria: (1) no trading assets or liabilities, (2) no equities or commodities derivatives positions, (3) less than $8 billion of total interest rate or exchange rate derivatives positions, and (4) at least a 10% assets minus liabilities-to-equity ratio (an approximation of a 10% leverage ratio). New or Changed Asset-Size Thresholds
Some bills would raise existing asset thresholds at which banks would be subjected to more stringent regulation, thus providing regulatory relief to banks above the current threshold but below the proposed one. H.R. For example,
The Community Lending Enhancement and Regulatory Relief Act ( S. 1002 ) includes provisions that would establish new exemptions from certain regulations based on asset-size thresholds. In addition, they generally further agree over broad characteristics of banks that would warrant greater or lesser regulatory stringency (e.g., small and traditional banks serving the credit needs of a community should be subject to less regulation than large and complex banks operating on a national or global scale). Policymakers and observers disagree over whether simple "bright line" rules based on certain criteria achieve appropriate tailoring. The Financial CHOICE Act ( H.R. | Banking organizations differ across a multitude of characteristics. The amount of assets they hold, the services they provide, and how they secure funding are just a few examples. These differences affect an individual organization's risk of failure and the risk its failure or distress could pose to the overall financial system. Policymakers generally agree that certain banking regulations should be tailored to account for such differences, and as a result, banks are currently subject to or exempt from various regulations if they meet certain criteria. To what degree existing bank classifications adequately tailor regulation and how tailoring should be designed and implemented are debated issues. This report examines
existing and proposed bank regulatory classifications, legislation that proposes to change existing classifications or create new ones, and, the characteristics of bank organizations that fall under existing and proposed classifications.
Banks are classified in a variety of ways. Some are informal classifications that refer to widely understood differences between community and Wall Street banks—two commonly recognized types of banks—but that are unofficial classifications that do not affect banking regulations. For example, community banks are understood to be small institutions that meet the credit needs of a community and Wall Street banks are understood to be large, complex institutions that could individually pose risk to the financial system. Existing regulatory classifications are official classifications applied to banks that meet some criteria and determine whether a bank is subject to certain regulations. In addition, several existing proposals would establish new regulatory classifications and criteria.
Often (but not always) existing criteria are size-based thresholds that subject a bank to more stringent regulation once it exceeds a certain amount of assets. Proponents of this system argue simple, "bright line" rules create certainty and transparency and that asset size is an adequate measurement to identify which institutions should or should not be subject to certain regulation. Critics argue it too narrowly focuses on one aspect of a bank organization, and thus may subject certain banks to inappropriate regulation. Critics may argue that new or additional criteria based on other characteristics (e.g., the business activities a bank engages in or the amount of capital it holds) should be implemented.
To investigate how well certain criteria would appropriately tailor regulation, it is informative to examine characteristics of banking organizations and compare banks that meet some criteria to those that do not. This report examines characteristics such as asset size; concentrations in loans, deposits, trading assets, and trading liabilities; activity in derivatives; and capital levels. The analysis generally suggests that these characteristics are correlated; larger banks tend to be involved in more business lines and hold less capital whereas smaller banks tend to be more focused on making loans and taking deposits and hold more capital. However, the large number of banks and the high degree of variation across multiple variables means that no set of criteria is easily and objectively identifiable as the best means of tailoring regulations.
In the 115th Congress, numerous bills—including H.R. 10, H.R. 1116, H.R. 1948, H.R. 2121, H.R. 3072, H.R. 3312, S. 1002, S. 1284, S. 1499, and S. 1893—would change the existing system of bank regulation tailoring. Some would alter existing size-based classifications or introduce new sized-based criteria, and others would establish new activities-based or capital-based criteria. |
crs_R41633 | crs_R41633_0 | Federal Government Debt and the Debt Limit3
The gross federal debt, which represents the federal government's total outstanding debt, consists of:
the debt held by the public and the debt held in government accounts, also known as intragovernmental debt. Federal government borrowing increases for two primary reasons: (1) budget deficits and (2) investments of any federal government account surpluses in Treasury securities as required by law. Almost all of the federal government's borrowing is subject to a statutory limit. Under current law, if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the issuance of obligations of the United States may not be made without exceeding the debt limit, a "debt issuance suspension period" may be determined. Past Treasury Actions to Postpone Reaching the Debt Limit
Treasury has yet to face a situation in which it was unable to pay its obligations as a result of reaching the debt limit. The debt limit was permanently increased on August 2, 2011, as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. The BCA provided for two additional debt limit increases. On February 4, 2013, the statutory debt limit was suspended through May 18, 2013, as part of the No Budget, No Pay Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-3 ). On October 17, 2013, the debt limit was suspended through February 7, 2014, as part of the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-46 ). On February 15, 2014, the debt limit was suspended for a third time through March 15, 2015, as part of the Temporary Debt Limit Extension Act ( P.L. 113-83 ). On March 16, 2015, the debt limit was reinstated and raised to $18,113 billion, a level which accommodated borrowing incurred during the suspension period. In the event of reaching the debt limit and the enactment of prioritization legislation, certain payments would receive priority. Budget outlays and revenue collections over the fiscal year, along with the funds contained in the extraordinary measures, will affect the timing of the debate over raising the debt limit. If the extraordinary measures are exhausted, Treasury will no longer be able to issue federal debt absent further legislative action. At that time, federal spending would have to be decreased or federal revenues would have to be increased by a corresponding amount to cover what cannot be borrowed. Implications of Future Federal Debt on the Debt Limit
It is extremely difficult for Congress to effectively influence short-term fiscal and budgetary policy through action on legislation adjusting the debt limit. The need to raise (or lower) the limit during a session of Congress is driven by previous decisions regarding revenues and spending. These decisions stem from legislation enacted earlier in the session or in prior years. Nevertheless, the consideration of debt limit legislation often is viewed as an opportunity to reexamine fiscal and budgetary policy. Consequently, House and Senate action on legislation adjusting the debt limit often is complicated, hindered by policy disagreements, and subject to delay. | The gross federal debt, which represents the federal government's total outstanding debt, consists of (1) debt held by the public and (2) debt held in government accounts, also known as intragovernmental debt. Federal government borrowing increases for two primary reasons: (1) budget deficits and (2) investments of any federal government account surpluses in Treasury securities, as required by law. Nearly all of this debt is subject to the statutory limit.
Treasury has yet to face a situation in which it was unable to pay its obligations as a result of reaching the debt limit. In the past, the debt limit has always been raised before the debt reached the limit. However, on several occasions Treasury took extraordinary actions to avoid reaching the limit which, as a result, affected the operations of certain programs. If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the issuance of obligations of the United States may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit, Treasury can make use of "extraordinary measures." Some of these measures require the Treasury Secretary to authorize a debt issuance suspension period.
Since 2011, the debt limit has been increased through provisions of four pieces of legislation. The debt limit was increased on August 2, 2011, as part of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25). The BCA also provided for two additional debt limit increases, which occurred in September 2011 and January 2012. On February 4, 2013, the statutory debt limit was suspended through May 18, 2013, as part of the No Budget, No Pay Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-3). On October 17, 2013, the debt limit was suspended again through February 7, 2014, as part of the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-46). On February 15, 2014, the debt limit was suspended for a third time, through March 15, 2015, as part of the Temporary Debt Limit Extension Act (P.L. 113-83). Between the enactment of each of these legislative measures, Treasury used extraordinary measures to continue financing obligations. On May 19, 2013, February 8, 2014, and March 16, 2015, the debt limit was reinstated at a level which accommodated borrowing incurred during the suspension periods.
Budget outlays and revenue collections along with the funds contained in the extraordinary measures will affect the timing of when the debt limit is reached. If the debt limit is reached and Treasury is no longer able to issue federal debt, federal outlays would have to be decreased or federal revenues would have to be increased by a corresponding amount to cover the gap in what cannot be borrowed.
It is extremely difficult for Congress to effectively influence short-term fiscal and budgetary policy through action on legislation adjusting the debt limit. The need to raise (or lower) the limit during a session of Congress is driven by previous decisions regarding revenues and spending stemming from legislation enacted earlier in the session or in prior years. Nevertheless, the consideration of debt limit legislation often is viewed as an opportunity to reexamine fiscal and budgetary policy. Consequently, House and Senate action on legislation adjusting the debt limit is often complicated, hindered by policy disagreements, and subject to delay. |
crs_R42063 | crs_R42063_0 | Despite the resumption of economic (output) growth in June 2009, the unemployment rate remains at an historically high level more than three years into the recovery from the 11 th recession of the postwar period. Not until the fourth quarter of 2012 did the unemployment rate drop below 8%, its lowest level since January 2009. The persistently high unemployment rate is a cause of concern to Congress for a variety of reasons. Potential output is an unobservable measure of the capacity of the economy to produce goods and services when available resources, such as labor and capital, are fully utilized. The rate of growth of potential output is a function of the rate of growth in potential productivity and the labor supply when the economy is at full employment. When the unemployment rate is high, as it is now, then actual GDP falls short of potential GDP. As a result, the proportion of the labor force that is employed will fall. "More specifically, according to currently accepted versions of Okun's law, to achieve a 1 percentage point decline in the unemployment rate in the course of a year, real GDP must grow approximately 2 percentage points faster than the rate of growth of potential GDP over that period." After eight of the eleven postwar recessions, it took at least eight months for the unemployment rate to fall by one full percentage point. The slowest decline occurred after the recession that ended in November 2001 when the unemployment rate stood at 5.5%, the lowest unemployment rate recorded at the start of an expansion. About 3½ years elapsed before the unemployment rate fell one-half of a percentage point. In contrast, the expansion that followed the July 1981-November 1982 downturn began with the highest unemployment rate of the postwar period (10.8%). In that case, it took only eight months for the unemployment rate to fall more than one percentage point (to a still high 9.4%). The difference between the recoveries from the 1990-1991, 2001, and 2007-2009 recessions and recoveries from earlier recessions appears to be that large output gaps (i.e., slow economic growth relative to trend) persisted well into the three jobless (high-unemployment) recoveries. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) regularly publishes projections of growth in potential output. CBO also projected in August 2012 that the annual average growth rate of real GDP will stay below the growth rate of potential output until 2018. The annual average rate of unemployment is therefore estimated to remain above 8.0% through 2014, and then fall to 5.9% by 2017 as the output gap progressively narrows. | A persistently high unemployment rate is of concern to Congress for a variety of reasons, including its negative consequences for the economic well-being of individuals and its impact on the federal budget. The unemployment rate was 9.5% when the economy emerged from the 11th postwar recession in June 2009. It climbed further to peak at 10.0% in October 2009. The rate has slowly declined since then. Although it dropped below 8% in the fourth quarter of 2012, the unemployment rate remains high by historical standards.
After most postwar recessions, it took at least eight months for the unemployment rate to fall by one full percentage point. The slowest decline occurred following the 2001 recession's end, when the unemployment rate was a comparatively low 5.5%. About 3½ years elapsed before the rate fell just one-half of one percentage point. In contrast, the recovery from the severe 1981-1982 recession began with the highest unemployment rate of the postwar period (10.8%). In that instance, it took only eight months for the rate to fall over one percentage point. Some hoped the unemployment rate would fall as quickly after the 2007-2009 recession, but the speed of improvement has been more typical of the so-called jobless recoveries from the 2001 and 1990-1991 recessions.
What appears to matter for a reduction in the unemployment rate is the size of the output gap, that is, the rate of actual output (economic) growth compared with the rate of potential output growth. Potential output is a measure of the economy's capacity to produce goods and services when resources (e.g., labor) are fully utilized. The growth rate of potential output is a function of the growth rates of potential productivity and the labor supply when the economy is at full employment. If potential output growth is about 2.5% annually at full employment, then the growth rate in real gross domestic product (GDP) would have to be greater to yield a falling unemployment rate. How much greater will determine the speed of improvement in the unemployment rate, according to a rule of thumb known as Okun's law.
In its August 2012 economic forecast, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the annual average growth rate of real GDP will gradually approach the growth rate of potential output over the 2012-2022 projection period. As a result of this slow narrowing of the output gap, the unemployment rate is forecast to 5.9% by 2017. |
crs_RL34435 | crs_RL34435_0 | Introduction
The historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), which have traditionally educated a significant number of the nation's blacks, have faced and continue to face substantial challenges in attempting to enhance their academic and research capabilities and develop programs to compete with other institutions of higher education. Some of these black institutions have a myriad of problems—aging infrastructures, limited access to computer resources and digital network technology, absence of state-of-the-art equipment, low salary structures, small endowments, and limited funds for faculty development and new academic programs for students. While many of these problems exist in other institutions, they appear to be considerably more serious in HBCUs. In addition, those HBCUs damaged by recent hurricanes and tornadoes have the added costs in the millions for replacing facilities and research equipment and rebuilding their infrastructure. HBCUs comprise almost 2.3% of all institutions of higher education and enroll approximately 11.6% of black students attending post-secondary institutions. Approximately 33.0%, on average, of the undergraduate degrees in science and engineering earned by blacks were awarded by HBCUs. In addition, some of the most successful programs designed to attract underrepresented minorities into the sciences and in research careers have been initiated at HBCUs. Data compiled by the NSF reveal that in 2006, HBCUs provided the education for approximately 20.1% of blacks earning bachelor degrees in engineering, 35.3% in the physical sciences, 25.3% in computer sciences, 32.8% in mathematics, 32.3% in the biological sciences, 44.9% in agricultural sciences, 15.4% in social sciences, and 21.1% in psychology. The distribution of federal funding for HBCUs is one of the critical issues facing these institutions. On March 30, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-152 ). The act includes, among other things, select provisions of the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act (SAFRA). SAFRA provisions are contained in Title II, Section 2103, and make changes to and extend mandatory appropriations for several HEOA programs for HBCUs and other minority serving institutions. The legislation continues two-year funding for HBCUs and minority serving institutions as outlined in the HEOA. HBCUs and minority serving institutions would be funded at $255.0 million for each of the years FY2010 through FY2019. Estimated support would be approximately $1.1 billion over a 5-year period and approximately $2.1 billion over a 10-year period. | The historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), which have traditionally educated a significant number of the nation's blacks, have faced, and continue to face, substantial challenges in attempting to enhance their academic and research capabilities. Some of these institutions have a myriad of problems—aging infrastructures, limited access to digital and wireless networking technology, absence of state-of-the-art equipment, low salary structures, small endowments, and limited funds for faculty development and new academic programs for students. While many of these problems exist in other institutions, they appear to be considerably more serious in HBCUs. In addition, those HBCUs damaged by recent hurricanes, tornadoes, and other weather disasters have the added costs in the millions of replacing facilities and research equipment and rebuilding their infrastructure. This is an issue for Congress because the distribution of federal funding for HBCUs is one of the critical issues facing these institutions.
HBCUs comprise approximately 2.3% of all institutions of higher education, and enroll approximately 11.6% of all black students attending post-secondary institutions. Approximately 33.0% of the undergraduate degrees in science and engineering earned by blacks were awarded at HBCUs. Some of the most successful programs designed to attract and retain underrepresented minorities into the sciences and in research careers have been initiated at HBCUs. Data compiled by the National Science Foundation (NSF) reveal that in 2006, HBCUs provided the education for approximately 20.1% of blacks earning bachelor degrees in engineering, 35.3% in the physical sciences, 25.3% in computer sciences, 32.8% in mathematics, 32.3% in the biological sciences, 44.9% in agricultural sciences, 15.4% in social sciences, and 21.1% in psychology.
On March 30, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-152). The act includes, among other things, select provisions of the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act (SAFRA). SAFRA provisions are contained in Title II, and make changes to and extend mandatory appropriations for several Higher Education Opportunity Act (HEOA) programs for HBCUs and other minority serving institutions. The legislation continues two-year funding for HBCUs and minority serving institutions as outlined in the HEOA. HBCUs and other minority serving institutions would be funded at $255.0 million for each of the years FY2010 through FY2019. Estimated support would be approximately $1.1 billion over a 5-year period and approximately $2.1 billion over a 10-year period. |
crs_RL31511 | crs_RL31511_0 | An important issue in this debate is the likely impact of initiatives of this sort on the commercial development of new medicines. Some initiatives would entail significant changes in one or more of the federal policies affecting new drug development. As will be seen, the federal tax code affects the incentive to invest in new drug development in several ways. The report begins with an examination of the distinguishing traits of the drug industry, then identifies the tax provisions that have the biggest impact on the industry's return on investment, and concludes with an assessment of the effects of federal taxation of the industry on the incentives to invest in new drug development. The information presented here may be of use to the 111 th Congress as it weighs the advantages and disadvantages of proposals to modify how health care is financed and delivered in the United States. Firms that develop new innovative medicines seem especially inclined to invest heavily in advertising. Federal Tax Burden on the Drug Industry and Major U.S. Industries from 2000 to 2006
Generally, the federal tax burden on an industry refers to how the tax code affects its return on past investment. A widely used measure of an industry's federal tax burden is its average effective tax rate, which is the ratio of its federal income tax liability after credits to its taxable income, expressed as a percentage. In addition, average effective tax rates do not provide a comprehensive measure of the federal tax burden for an industry because they cannot capture the influence of provisions in the tax code that accelerate the timing of tax deductions or delay the recognition of income for tax purposes. Table 3 shows the average effective federal tax rates for the drug industry and all major U.S. industries from 2001 to 2006. As noted above, the rates compare the industries' federal income tax liability after all credits except the foreign tax credit with their worldwide taxable income (as reported on their federal income tax returns). The data in the table indicate that the drug industry's federal tax burden in 2001 to 2006 was similar to the average tax burden for all industries. This is because the effects of some tax preferences that tend to benefit drug firms more than other firms are not fully reflected in average effective tax rates. Three tax preferences in particular are likely to yield significant tax savings for U.S.-based drug firms and thus warrant further examination: (1) the deferral of federal income taxes on net income retained by foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-based corporations; (2) the expensing (or deduction as a current cost) of qualified research spending; and (3) the expensing of advertising and promotional costs. But this might not be the case. As a firm's user cost of capital declines, the number of investment projects it can profitably undertake increases, all other things being equal. An indicator of the effect of tax policy on new drug development is the drug industry's federal tax burden, as measured by average effective tax rates. Among the key ones are the opportunities for novel drug compounds opened up through advances in basic research, the regulatory requirements for the drug approval process, the competitive strategies of drug firms, and the potential earnings from investing in the development of new drugs. | A key issue in congressional debates over expanding consumer access to prescription drugs is the impact of proposed initiatives on the development of new medicines. Some of the initiatives entail significant changes in one or more of the federal policies affecting new drug development. One such policy is federal taxation of firms that invest in this development.
This report examines the impact of federal taxation on the incentive to invest in new drug development. More specifically, it looks at the provisions in current tax law that affect the performance of the drug industry, compares the industry's federal tax burden with that of other major industries, and assesses the effect of federal taxation on the incentive to invest in new drug development. This information may be useful to the 111th Congress as it considers the pros and cons of proposed changes in the U.S. health care system. The report will be updated as necessary.
An industry's federal tax burden refers to the effects of federal taxation on its return on investment through statutory provisions that define taxable income, make adjustments to this income, and establish tax rates and credits against tax liability. Economists generally measure an industry's federal tax burden as its average effective tax rate, which is the ratio of its federal tax liability after all credits (except the foreign tax credit) to its taxable income, expressed as a percentage. This measure has some limitations, such as the inability of average effective rates to capture the effects of tax provisions that accelerate the timing of deductions or delay the recognition of income.
A comparison of average effective federal tax rates for the drug industry and major U.S. industries indicates that the share of the drug industry's worldwide net income paid as federal taxes was similar to the average share for all industries from 2000 through 2006. This has not always been the case. For much of the 1990s, the drug industry's tax burden was significantly lower than the average tax burden for all industries. But starting in the late 1990s, the drug industry's federal tax burden began to rise as the U.S. possessions tax credit was phased out. Drug firms were major beneficiaries of this credit. They also appear to benefit substantially, if not disproportionately, from three tax preferences whose combined effect is not fully reflected in average tax rates: (1) the deferral of federal income tax on the retained earnings of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.-based corporations, (2) the expensing of research outlays, and (3) the expensing of advertising outlays.
Available evidence suggests that current federal tax law bolsters the incentive to invest in new drug development for some firms but not for others. The most powerful drivers of this investment seem to be the quest by certain drug firms for sustained competitive advantage and profit growth and the available technological opportunities for developing new, safe, and effective medicines. Still, all other things being equal, a substantial increase in the industry's tax burden might slow growth in this investment by raising the industry's cost of capital and reducing its cash flow. |
crs_RL34309 | crs_RL34309_0 | Introduction
Congress uses data from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) to inform policy decisions and develop appropriate responses to crime. Because of the importance of crime data in both shaping policy and allocating federal funding, it is important to understand how each program collects data and the limitations of the data. This report reviews (1) the history of the UCR, the NIBRS, and the NCVS; (2) the methods each program uses to collect crime data; and (3) the limitations of the data collected by each program. The report then compares the similarities and differences of UCR and NCVS data. It concludes by reviewing issues related to the NIBRS and the NCVS. It was originally conceived as a way to measure the effectiveness of local law enforcement to provide law enforcement with data that could be used to help fight crime. UCR data are now used extensively by academics and government officials for research, policy, and planning purposes, and the data are widely cited in the media. The UCR also provides some of the most commonly cited crime statistics in the United States. However, the transition from the UCR to the NIBRS has been slow. Starting in the 1970s, consensus grew in the law enforcement community that the UCR needed to be updated to provide more in-depth data to meet the needs of law enforcement into the 21 st century. For each criminal incident, participating law enforcement agencies collect data on 53 different data elements, including data on the offense(s), the offender(s), the victim(s), the arrestee(s), and any property involved in the offense. The NIBRS does not use the UCR's Part I and Part II offense classifications. Group B contains 11 different offenses. National Crime Victimization Survey
The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is the primary source for information on the characteristics of criminal victimization and on the number and types of crime not reported to law enforcement. The NCVS has four major objectives: (1) developing detailed information about the victims and consequences of crime, (2) estimating the number and types of crimes not reported to police, (3) providing uniform measures of selected types of crimes, and (4) permitting comparisons over time and population types (e.g., urban, suburban, and rural). The survey asks respondents whether they have been the victim of
rape and sexual assault, robbery, simple and aggravated assault, purse snatching/pickpocketing, burglary, theft, or motor vehicle theft. In addition to estimating the number of annual victimizations, the NCVS also gathers data on the details of each victimization incident. | Crime data collected through the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) are used by Congress to inform policy decisions and allocate federal criminal justice funding to states. As such, it is important to understand how each program collects and reports crime data, and the limitations associated with the data.
This report reviews (1) the history of the UCR, the NIBRS, and the NCVS; (2) the methods each program uses to collect crime data; and (3) the limitations of the data collected by each program. The report then compares the similarities and differences of UCR and NCVS data. It concludes by reviewing issues related to the NIBRS and the NCVS.
The UCR represents the first effort to create a national, standardized measure of the incidence of crime. It was conceived as a way to measure the effectiveness of local law enforcement and to provide law enforcement with data that could be used to help fight crime. UCR data are now used extensively by researchers, government officials, and the media for research, policy, and planning purposes. The UCR also provides some of the most commonly cited crime statistics in the United States. The UCR reports offense and arrest data for 8 different Part I offenses and arrest data for 21 different Part II offenses.
The NIBRS was developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to respond to the law enforcement community's belief that the UCR needed to be updated to provide more in-depth data to meet the needs of law enforcement into the 21st century. The NIBRS collects data, including data on offense(s), offender(s), victim(s), arrestee(s), and any property involved in an offense, for 46 different Group A offenses and 11 different Group B offenses. Despite the more detailed crime data that the NIBRS can provide, nationwide implementation of the program has been slow, for a variety of reasons, including cost considerations.
The NCVS is the primary source of information on the characteristics of criminal victimization, and on the number and types of crime not reported to law enforcement. The NCVS has four major objectives: (1) to develop detailed information about the victims and consequences of crime, (2) to estimate the number and types of crimes not reported to police, (3) to provide uniform measures of selected types of crimes, and (4) to permit comparisons over time and population type (e.g., urban, suburban, and rural). The NCVS asks respondents whether they have been the victim of rape and sexual assault, robbery, simple and aggravated assault, purse snatching/pickpocketing, burglary, theft, or motor vehicle theft. In addition to collecting data on the number of victimizations, the NCVS gathers data on the details of each incident of victimization. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL33976 | crs_RL33976_0 | Introduction
Two major U.S. trade remedies, each set out in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, are antidumping (AD) law, which combats the sale of imported goods at less than their fair market value, and countervailing duty (CVD) law, which is aimed at offsetting foreign government subsidization of imported items. If dumped or subsidized imports are found to cause material injury, or threat, to a domestic industry, and the dumping margin or the net subsidy is not de minimis , antidumping or countervailing duties will be imposed. Both remedies are available when goods are imported from competitor countries that have free market policies. Since 1984, however, only AD law had been applied to goods from nonmarket or other "transitional" economies. With the continued economic growth of some of these economies, such as China and Vietnam, pressure has increased on the U.S. government to utilize both domestic trade remedies more aggressively against unfair imports from these countries. This report (1) discusses the application of antidumping and countervailing duty law to the goods of nonmarket economy (NME) countries, including the decision of the Department of Commerce (DOC) in 2007 to change its long-standing policy and apply CVD law to such goods; (2) reviews China's successful case in the World Trade Organization challenging the U.S. application of CVDs to Chinese products and the status of U.S. compliance efforts in the case; (3) examines the December 2011 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. Un i ted States holding that the U.S. CVD law does not authorize DOC to apply CVDs to NME country goods; (4) summarizes the subsequently enacted P.L. The injury determination is made by the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), an independent agency. Application of CVD Law to Imports from China: Coated Free Sheet Paper and Beyond
On November 27, 2006, DOC announced that it had initiated a CVD investigation against China with respect to coated free-sheet paper. While the text of Article VI does not itself distinguish between the products of market and nonmarket economy countries, an interpretative note to Article VI recognizes that AD duties may be imposed on the products of countries with government-controlled economies and that surrogate country data may possibly be used in making price comparisons involving normal value in such cases. In this case the benefit shall be the difference between these two amounts. Among other claims, China alleged the following:
that in connection with U.S. findings that the alleged provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration fulfilled the definition of a subsidy under the SCM Agreement, DOC erroneously determined that certain state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were public bodies for purposes of the definition, that DOC failed to find that the alleged benefits that trading companies had received from SOE-provided goods were passed on to the producers of the merchandise that was the subject of the CVD investigations, and, in an argument analogous to that used in challenges to the use of "zeroing" in antidumping cases, that DOC improperly included in subsidy benefit calculations only those transactions that produced a positive benefit, while excluding transactions that yielded no benefit; that the United States had failed to demonstrate that the alleged provision of land and land use rights for less than adequate remuneration was specific to an industry or group of industries; that in connection with finding that the government had provided loans on preferential terms, the United States had erroneously determined that certain state-owned commercial banks were public bodies, and also failed to find specificity; that although Article 15 of China's Accession Protocol permitted the United States choose a benchmark outside of China in order to determine the existence and amount of any subsidy benefit, the United States had improperly rejected the prevailing terms and conditions in China as the basis for making its determinations; that the United States had imposed a "double remedy" by using its nonmarket economy (NME) methodology for determining dumping and imposing antidumping duties simultaneously with a determination of subsidization and imposition of CVDs on the same product, resulting in the United States levying CVDs in excess of the subsidy found to exist in violation of the SCM Agreement; that the levied antidumping and countervailing duties were in excess of the "appropriate" amounts, as called for in Article 9.2 of the AD Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement; that the United States failed to make a "fair comparison" between export price and normal value in its antidumping determination as required under the WTO Antidumping Agreement; that the United States imposed antidumping duties in excess of the amount of dumping found to exist; and that the United States failed to grant China the most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment required under Article I of the GATT by not according it "the same unconditional entitlement to the avoidance of a double remedy for the same unfair trade practice that it accords to imports of like products from the territories of other WTO Members"; and that in conducting the antidumping and countervailing duty investigations in question, the United States made various procedural errors involving notification and transparency and improperly made adverse inferences from available information without having requested information from interested parties regarding the factual issue involved. As discussed in the next section of this report, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled in December 2011 in GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States that CVDs could not be imposed on NME goods under the existing CVD statute. 112-99 , signed on March 13, 2012, which authorizes DOC to impose CVDs on such merchandise effective November 20, 2006 (thus covering the investigations at issue in the WTO dispute), and establishes procedures for the department to address double counting as of the date of enactment. Notwithstanding its compliance activity, the United States did not fully comply by the April 25 deadline in the case. The new statute generally authorizes the application of CVDs to NME products; makes this authority effective as of November 20, 2006; and prospectively amends antidumping law to provide a mechanism for the department to address double counting in simultaneous AD and CVD investigations. 112-99 and remanded a number of issues to DOC. GPX challenged the constitutionality of P.L. The court did not explicitly consider the final Nachman factor but ultimately concluded that Congress did not act irrationally. | Two major U.S. trade remedies are antidumping (AD) law, which combats the sale of imported products at less than their fair market value, and countervailing duty (CVD) law, which aims to offset foreign government subsidization of imported goods. If dumped or subsidized imports are found to cause or threaten material injury to a domestic industry, antidumping or countervailing duties will be imposed. Both remedies are available when goods are imported from competitor countries with free market policies. As of 1984, however, only AD law had been applied to goods from nonmarket or "transitional" economies (NMEs). With the continued economic growth of some of these economies, such as China and Vietnam, pressure increased on the U.S. government to use both trade remedies more aggressively against unfair imports from these countries.
AD law has been amended several times since its inception in 1921. With Congress's continued statutory guidance, the Department of Commerce (DOC) has implemented several different methodologies for applying AD law, including using surrogate country data when the fair market value of a product in the originating country is not readily ascertainable. CVD law had not been used against NMEs, however, since DOC concluded in 1984 that it could not determine subsidization in such situations. In 1986, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, upheld DOC's interpretation of the CVD statute as reasonable. While DOC had generally refused to review CVD petitions against NME countries following this determination, it accepted a petition seeking a CVD on imports of coated free-sheet paper from China in 2006. DOC distinguished the current Chinese economy from the Soviet-style economies at issue in Georgetown Steel and found that the imported Chinese paper was subsidized. Although the U.S. International Trade Commission did not make the requisite final affirmative material injury determination in this case, subsequent CVD petitions were successful, resulting more than 20 CVD orders on NME merchandise.
World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, together with the WTO Accession Protocols of China and Vietnam, acknowledge that AD and CV duties may be imposed on these countries' goods, and that surrogate country data may be used to calculate dumping margins or subsidization. In a WTO case brought by China, however, the WTO Appellate Body found in an April 2011 report that the simultaneous imposition by the United States of AD and CV duties on the same Chinese merchandise, where surrogate country data was used to establish the fair market value of the goods in the AD case, remedied the same subsidization twice or "double counted" in violation of U.S. WTO obligations. More broadly, the CAFC held in December 2011 that CVDs may not be imposed on NME goods under any circumstance, finding in GPX Int'l Tire Corp. v. United States that Congress had legislatively ratified DOC's 1984 statutory interpretation and thus DOC could not interpret the statute to permit such duties. The CAFC affirmed a lower court decision that also prohibited DOC from imposing CVDs on NME goods, but did so because DOC had not eliminated double counting, the practice at issue in the WTO dispute. The Administration asked Congress to enact remedial legislation and, on March 5, 2012, requested that the CAFC rehear the GPX case. Congress responded quickly, enacting P.L. 112-99, signed March 13, 2012, which generally authorizes CVDs for NME goods, makes this authority effective as of November 20, 2006, and prospectively amends AD law to address double counting issues. DOC is preparing WTO-compliant determinations in China's WTO case and has stated that implementation of the new law will be a factor in this compliance effort. The United States did not fully comply by the April 25 deadline in the case, however, and has agreed to facilitate any WTO compliance review requested by China. In the GPX case, on January 13, 2013, the U.S. Court of International Trade upheld the constitutionality of P.L. 112-99, but remanded certain issues to DOC. |
crs_R45171 | crs_R45171_0 | Introduction
Apprenticeship is a workforce development strategy that trains a worker for a specific occupation using a structured combination of paid on-the-job training and related instruction. Increased costs for higher education and possible mismatches between worker skills and employer needs have led to increased congressional interest in alternative workforce development strategies such as apprenticeship. Registration is carried out by the Department of Labor (DOL) or a DOL-approved state agency. It begins by describing the long-established federal role in certifying apprenticeships programs through the registered apprenticeship system. Registration agencies also issue certificates of completion to apprentices who complete a registered program. or other eligible entity) to direct financial support from the federal government. It is very likely, however, that at least some federally registered programs do not receive any federal funds. In the federal context, "apprenticeship" has been typically synonymous with registered apprenticeship programs. Programs that may have a strategy or format similar to apprenticeship but are not registered are not typically considered apprenticeships by the federal government, though they may be considered on-the-job training under federal education and workforce programs. Registration Criteria and Process
To register an apprenticeship program, the apprenticeship sponsor must submit an application to the applicable registration body (either DOL or an SAA). Among other required content, the plan must include a work process schedule , which outlines the major competencies of the occupation and how a combination of on-the-job training and/or related instruction will lead to the worker demonstrating proficiency in those competencies. Standards relate to program design, apprentice protections, and rules related to administration and recordkeeping. Schedule of progressively increasing wages for the apprentice. Oversight, Program Performance, and Deregistration
Once a program is permanently registered, the registration agency must review the program no less than once every five years to ensure that it remains in compliance with the required standards. Role of Intermediaries in the Registration Process
While a sponsor has the option of designing an apprenticeship program independently and then registering the program directly with the applicable registration agency, many sponsors work with an intermediary in the development and registration of a program. Competitive Grant Programs
In recent years, the federal government has supplemented its registration and technical support efforts with competitive grants supported by multiple funding streams. Workforce Funding through the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act
The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) authorizes formula grants to state workforce agencies to support job training and career services. For example, veterans who use the Post-9/11 GI Bill (the most common education benefit for recent veterans) while pursuing a registered apprenticeship program qualify for a housing allowance while participating in the apprenticeship. Notably, registration of an apprenticeship program does not necessarily qualify it for federal student aid, and it is possible that there are apprenticeship programs that are not registered by a registration agency but are eligible for FSA funds. | Apprenticeship is a workforce development strategy that trains a worker for a specific occupation using a structured combination of paid on-the-job training and related instruction. Increased costs for higher education and possible mismatches between worker skills and employer needs have led to interest in alternative workforce development strategies such as apprenticeship.
The primary federal role in supporting apprenticeships is the administration of the registered apprenticeship system. In this system, the federal Department of Labor (DOL) or a DOL-recognized state apprenticeship agency (SAA) is responsible for evaluating apprenticeship programs to determine if they are in compliance with federal regulations related to program design, worker protections, and other criteria. Programs that are in compliance are "registered." While registration does not trigger any specific federal financial incentives, registered programs may receive preferential consideration in various federal systems and apprentices who complete a registered program receive a nationally recognized credential.
In the federal context, "apprenticeship" has typically been synonymous with registered apprenticeship programs. Programs that may have a strategy or format similar to apprenticeship but are not registered are not typically considered apprenticeships by the federal government, though they may be considered on-the-job training under other federal workforce programs.
To register an apprenticeship, a sponsor (an employer, union, industry group, or other eligible entity) submits an application to the applicable registration agency (either DOL or the appropriate SAA). The application must include a work process schedule that describes the competencies that the apprentice will learn and how on-the-job training and related instruction will teach those competencies. The application must also include a schedule of wage increases for the apprentice, a description of safety measures, and various assurances related to program administration and recordkeeping.
If the registration agency finds that the program is in conformity with the requirements, the program receives provisional registration. Once a program receives permanent registration, the registration agency is responsible for reviewing the program for conformity not less than once every five years.
In recent years, the federal government has supplemented its typical registration activities with competitive grants to support the expansion of registered apprenticeship. These grants have gone predominantly to states and other intermediaries to support apprenticeship expansion through partnerships with apprenticeship sponsors.
While registered apprenticeship sponsors do not necessarily qualify for federal funding, several education and workforce programs have identified apprenticeship as an eligible use of funds. For example, some veterans may qualify to receive GI Bill benefits while participating in a registered apprenticeship and registered apprenticeships are eligible for federal workforce development funds through the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA). |
crs_R40918 | crs_R40918_0 | Title I of the bill focuses on restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. Overall, the bill includes the following provisions:
Individuals would be required to maintain health insurance, and certain employers with more than 50 employees would be required to either provide insurance or pay a tax, with some exceptions. Several market reforms would be made, such as modified community rating and guaranteed issue and insurance renewal. Both the individual mandate and any employer requirements would be linked to essential health benefits coverage. Qualifying coverage would include: qualified health benefits plans (QHBPs) offered in or out of an exchange; new group or individual coverage that meets or exceeds minimum health benefits; grandfathered employment based plans; grandfathered nongroup plans; and other coverage, such as Medicare and Medicaid. Certain individuals with incomes below 400% of the federal poverty level could qualify for credits toward their premium costs and subsidies towards their cost-sharing. This financial assistance would be available only through exchanges. States would be provided the flexibility to establish basic plans for low-income individuals not eligible for Medicaid. However, existing small group plans would have to meet the applicable private market reforms by July 1, 2013. New plans could also be sold in both the individual and group market outside of an exchange, but only those new plans that meet the minimum requirements specified in the bill would satisfy the requirements for individuals and employers. Title VI includes a number of provisions to raise revenues to pay for expanded health insurance coverage. This report summarizes key provisions affecting private health insurance in Titles I and VI of America's Healthy Future Act of 2009, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Finance on October 19, 2009. Small employers could offer full-time employees and their dependents coverage in a QHBP. Individual and Small Group Market Reforms
S. 1796 would apply new federal health insurance standards to new, generally available health plans in the individual and small group markets. Under S. 1796 , those eligible for premium credits would also be eligible for cost-sharing subsidies. The bill provides these incentives primarily through the distribution of $6 billion in funding under the Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program. S. 1796 would define a qualified nonprofit health insurance issuer as an organization meeting the following requirements:
It must be organized as a non-profit, member corporation under State law; It must not be an existing organization that provides insurance as of July 16, 2009, and must not be an affiliate or successor of any such organization; Substantially all of its activities must consist of the issuance of qualified health benefit plans in the individual and small group markets in each state in which it is licensed to issue such plans; It must not be sponsored by a state, county, or local government, or any government instrumentality; Its governing documents incorporate ethics and conflict of interest standards protecting against insurance industry involvement and interference; Governance of the organization must be subject to a majority vote of its members; It must operate with a strong consumer focus, including timeliness, responsiveness, and accountability to members in accordance with regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of HHS; It must be in compliance with all the other requirements that other qualified health benefits plans must meet in any state, including solvency and licensure requirements, rules on payments to providers, rules on network adequacy, rates and form filing rules, and any applicable state premium assessments. Excise Taxes and Limitations on Employer Deductions
S. 1796 would impose excise taxes on health insurers and health plan administrators. | This report summarizes key provisions affecting private health insurance in S. 1796, America's Healthy Future Act of 2009, as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Finance on October 19, 2009.
Title I of the bill imposes new requirements on individuals, employers, and health plans; restructures the private health insurance market; sets minimum standards for health benefits; and provides financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. Title VI of the bill include a number of new provisions to raise revenues to pay for health care reform. These provisions include excise taxes, annual fees on health insurers, and limits on tax deductions for out-of-pocket health care expenses.
In general, the Senate Finance bill would require adult individuals to maintain health insurance, with some exceptions. Employers would not be required to provide health insurance, although certain employers with more than 50 full-time employees who did not provide insurance could be required to pay a tax, under certain circumstances. Several insurance market reforms would be made, such as modified community rating and guaranteed issue and renewal. Both the individual mandates and the employer requirements would be linked to essential health benefits coverage. Essential health benefits coverage would include (1) coverage under a qualified health benefits plan (QHBP); (2) new group or individual coverage that meets or exceeds minimum health benefits; (3) grandfathered employment-based plans; (4) grandfathered nongroup plans; and (5) other coverage, such as Medicare and Medicaid. Individual and small group coverage under qualified health benefits plans would be allowed to be offered through non-profit, member-run health insurance companies. Such non-profit insurers would be eligible for grants and loans distributed through the new Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program. QHBP exchanges would offer a choice of private plans for coverage in the individual and small group markets. Based on income, certain individuals could qualify for a credit toward their premium costs and a subsidy for their cost-sharing; the credits and subsidies would be available only through an exchange. States would have the flexibility to establish basic health plans for low-income individuals not eligible for Medicaid. Existing plans would be grandfathered; however, once the bill is fully implemented, the private market reforms applicable to the small group market would also apply to grandfathered small group plans. New plans would be allowed to be offered in the individual and group markets outside of the Exchange, but only those new plans that meet the minimum requirements specified in the bill would satisfy the requirements on individuals and employers. |
crs_R43251 | crs_R43251_0 | Introduction
Thousands of oil and chemical spills of varying size and magnitude occur in the United States each year. When a spill occurs, state and local officials located in proximity to the incident generally are the first responders and may elevate an incident for federal attention if greater resources are desired. The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan—often referred to as the National Contingency Plan (NCP) for short—establishes the procedures for the federal response to oil and chemical spills. Congress later enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (often referred to as the Clean Water Act) to provide explicit statutory authority for the federal response to discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or upon U.S. waters within the contiguous zone and the adjoining shorelines. The 1972 amendments also explicitly directed the preparation of the NCP to carry out these authorities. The report discusses the federal statutes that authorize the NCP and related executive orders; mechanisms for reporting incidents to the federal government; the framework under which federal, state, and local roles are to be coordinated; funding mechanisms for federal response actions, including liability for response costs and related damages; and circumstances under which the NCP may be integrated within the National Response Framework (NRF) to address multifaceted incidents, such as major disasters or emergencies. Statutory Response Authorities
Since its inception in 1968, the NCP has been revised on multiple occasions to establish regulatory procedures for implementing the federal statutory authorities that Congress has expanded over time to respond to incidents involving a discharge of oil or a release of a hazardous substance. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 established the Superfund program and expanded the authorities of the President to respond to releases of hazardous substances into the environment more broadly than Section 311 of the Clean Water Act. Executive Orders
Several executive orders have delegated the President's response authorities under the above statutes to the federal departments and agencies tasked with implementing the NCP. Coordination of the Federal Response
The NCP established the National Response System (NRS) as a multi-tiered framework for coordinating the federal response to a discharge of oil or a release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant. The NCP established 13 Regional Response Teams. Through its National Pollution Funds Center, the U.S. Coast Guard administers the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to finance the costs of responding to a discharge of oil. These two trust funds differ in terms of how the monies are made available to carry out a response. National Response Framework
The National Response Framework (NRF) is the federal government's broader administrative mechanism that is intended to coordinate the array of federal response plans. However, the NRF itself is not an operational plan that dictates a step-by-step process for responding to a specific type of hazard, nor is the NRF codified in federal regulation like the NCP. Situations in which the application of the NCP through the NRF may occur include
a major disaster or emergency declared under the Stafford Act, when state and local authorities are overwhelmed and federal assistance is requested; an incident to which a federal agency is responding under its own authority and requests support from other federal agencies to respond to aspects of the incident that involve the discharge of oil or release of hazardous materials; or an incident for which the Department of Homeland Secretary determines that it should lead the response because of special circumstances. | Thousands of oil and chemical spills of varying size and magnitude occur in the United States each year. When a spill occurs, state and local officials located in proximity to the incident generally are the first responders and may elevate an incident for federal attention if greater resources are desired.
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, often referred to as the National Contingency Plan (NCP), establishes the procedures for the federal response to oil and chemical spills. The scope of the NCP encompasses discharges of oil into or upon U.S. waters and adjoining shorelines and releases of hazardous substances into the environment. The NCP was developed in 1968 and has been revised on multiple occasions to implement the federal statutory response authorities that Congress has expanded over time. Three federal environmental statutes authorized the development of the NCP: the Clean Water Act, as amended; the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, as amended; and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
Several executive orders have delegated the presidential response authorities of these statutes to federal departments and agencies that implement the NCP. The lead federal agency serves as the On-Scene Coordinator to direct the federal response. Generally, EPA leads the federal response within the inland zone, and the U.S. Coast Guard serves as the lead agency within the coastal zone. However, a response to an incident occurring on a federal facility is coordinated by the federal department or agency that administers the facility. The NCP established the National Response System (NRS) as a multi-tiered framework to coordinate 15 federal departments and agencies on the National Response Team in providing specialized resources and expertise and involving state and local officials and other nonfederal entities.
Although the framework of the NRS is the same for responding to discharges of oil or releases of hazardous substances, the NCP establishes separate operational elements for responding to each type of incident, and these elements differ in some respects. The source of federal funding to carry out a response also differs. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund finances the federal response to a discharge of oil, and the Superfund Trust Fund finances the federal response to a release of a hazardous substance. Monies spent from these trust funds may be recouped from the responsible parties under the liability provisions of the Oil Pollution Act and CERCLA, respectively.
For multifaceted incidents (major disasters or emergencies), the NCP also could be invoked under the National Response Framework (NRF) to address an aspect of an incident involving a discharge of oil or release of a hazardous substance. The NRF is a broader administrative mechanism for coordinating the array of federal emergency response plans. However, the NRF itself is not an operational plan that dictates a step-by-step process. The NRF instead merely may apply the NCP as the operational plan to respond to an oil or hazardous substance incident.
This report discusses the authorities, relevant executive orders, and federal emergency response framework of the NCP, and identifies the funding mechanisms to carry out a federal response. |
crs_R42481 | crs_R42481_0 | Introduction
The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program is the federal government's largest needs-based housing assistance program, in terms of both the number of families served and the cost to the federal budget. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides federal funds to Public Housing Authorities (PHAs)—which are state-chartered local government entities—to administer the program. While the basic structure of the program, such as the type of assistance provided and who is eligible, is governed by federal statutes and regulations, many important elements of the program are left to the discretion of local PHAs. By the time the Section 8 housing assistance program—the precursor program to the Housing Choice Voucher program—was enacted in the mid-1970s, federal law governing public housing directed much of the administration of the program, including which families PHAs should serve (both in terms of income eligibility and priorities and preferences for certain types of families) and how much PHAs should charge families for rent. For example, PHAs have discretion to determine
which categories of families to prioritize for assistance (through a practice known as "local preferences"), which categories of families to exclude from assistance (through screening, denial of admission, and termination of tenancy policies), how families are chosen for assistance (through waiting list policies), how much time families have to use their assistance (through housing search time policies), how much families will be required to pay in rent (through minimum rent policies), and how often families' rents will be adjusted (through interim recertification policies). PHAs must update their administrative plans to reflect any new requirements as directed by HUD and to reflect any changes that might be the result of local circumstances. In total, 18 interviews were conducted with PHA officials. Yet, the findings of HUD's study are informative as to how PHAs used their discretionary authority when that authority was first made permanent and do offer a useful perspective on how PHAs' use of their discretionary authority has changed since 2000. PHAs may also use specific household characteristics, which are called "local preferences," to rank families on their waiting lists. In turn, these PHAs found it challenging to keep the preferences at a manageable number. PHA policies varied widely in terms of how far back they looked for disqualifying behavior when evaluating tenants. About 18% of PHAs reported having a policy of conducting fingerprinting, generally if a criminal background check had been inconclusive. Some of the PHA officials interviewed indicated that their PHAs have adopted stricter rules that allow little-to-no room for consideration of circumstances. Another official who cited a 20% denial rate indicated that most of the denials were related to bad debt or unmet financial obligations rather than criminal activity. This leaves PHAs with the discretion to evaluate families on a case-by-case basis and provides an opportunity for administrators to consider a family's circumstances. However, CRS also found that the majority of PHAs had selected the maximum minimum rent allowed. Implications
In general, PHA officials were favorably disposed to having some minimum rent, which is reflective of the survey data showing that at least 79% of PHAs had a minimum rent set at either $25 or $50. Findings
Although 79% of all PHAs in the sample required tenants to report all changes in income, most did not process interim recertifications for all income changes. However, it is possible that when PHAs prepare to open long-closed waiting lists, they will consider the use of a random selection method in place of their current date and time policy because most applications would be submitted within the same time frame. During discussions with CRS staff, several PHA officials indicated that the opening of their waiting lists was not likely to happen in the immediate future and some mentioned that they needed to reduce the number of tenants within their current programs and thus were not considering adding applicants to the waiting list. Search Time and Extensions
Once a family is selected from the waiting list, they have to find a landlord willing to accept the voucher. The majority of PHAs establish an initial search time of 60 days, which is the minimum required by regulations. However, there is limited information available about how the program is being administered in many communities. Two PHAs failed to supply copies of their plans for the study. Form
A number of PHA officials who were interviewed mentioned that they purchased their Section 8 administrative plans from private companies. As noted in the findings of this study, in several cases PHAs appeared to view their policy discretion in the Housing Choice Voucher program from the perspective of the options provided in the plan they had purchased rather than from the perspective of the full set of discretionary options provided under the law. Some PHAs have a broad definition for those that are homeless, while other PHAs have a more limited definition. | The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program is the federal government's largest needs-based housing assistance program, in terms of both the number of families served and the cost to the federal budget. Under the program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides funds to local public housing authorities (PHAs), which, in turn, provide subsidies to low-income households to use to rent private market apartments. Although the basic structure of the program is governed by federal law and regulations, PHAs have discretion to determine many important elements. How PHAs use their discretion has implications for how families experience the program, how local communities perceive the program, and the program's cost.
Little comprehensive information is available about how PHAs use their discretion under the HCV program. Thus, to gain insight that might be useful to Congress, CRS conducted a study that looked at a representative sample of PHAs. Data for the study were taken from the administrative plans that PHAs are required to produce. To supplement information from the plans, interviews were conducted with a subsample of PHA officials. Where possible, results of the CRS study were compared to a study conducted by HUD in 2000. The findings of this study may be relevant to policymakers as they consider HCV reform proposals.
Major Findings
Almost all PHAs (96%) use local preferences (i.e., specified categories of families) to rank families on waiting lists for assistance. This is a change from 2000, when only about 59% of PHAs used local preferences. All PHAs have policies that consider a family's prior criminal activity and most consider a family's prior unmet financial obligations when evaluating eligibility for assistance. The policies vary in terms of what PHAs look for (types of crime, evidence) and how far back they look. Most PHAs have also adopted policies that allow them to evaluate families on a case-by-case basis. PHAs use similar policies to terminate assistance for criminal activity. Most PHAs (79%) have adopted a minimum rent of more than $0 per month, and the majority (70%) have adopted the maximum allowable minimum rent ($50). Some PHA officials said they saw minimum rents as promoting fairness; cost savings were not generally mentioned. Most PHAs require families to report all changes in income between annual recertfications, but most PHAs do not adjust families' subsidies at that time unless the income increase is above a certain threshold. In interviews, some PHA officials said that the administrative hassle of recalculating subsidies was not worth the savings, but some noted that a recent verification system required by HUD had led them to recertify more frequently than they had been previously. It is commonly understood that most PHAs have long waiting lists and many PHAs have closed their waiting lists to new applicants. When opening their waiting lists, the majority of PHAs (77%) determine who is added based on the date and time the application was submitted. About 18% of PHAs use a random selection method. In interviews, several PHA officials noted that they found it challenging to manage the process of opening their waiting lists because of an overwhelming demand for vouchers. Once a family is selected from the waiting list, it has a limited time in which to use its voucher. Most PHAs provide families with the statutory minimum of 60 days of initial search time, although most also allow families an extension to 120 days without requiring the families to meet other conditions (such as being elderly or having a disability). While PHA administrative plans must be made publicly available, it was difficult for CRS to obtain copies of the plans in several cases. Most PHA officials who were interviewed saw their plans as program guidebooks, which is a different purpose than that envisioned by HUD. It appears that many PHAs have purchased their administrative plans from private companies. Based on CRS interviews with PHA officials, it seems that some PHAs perceive their discretionary authority as being limited to the options provided in the purchased plans, or they are unaware of the full discretionary authority that they have. |
crs_RL34339 | crs_RL34339_0 | One way to address the resulting conflicts is through coordinated planning that attempts to foster wise development while protecting natural resources. In recent decades, pressures for both preservation and development have grown more intense at many locations, as people continue to migrate to coastal areas to take advantage of economic opportunities, to retire, and to pursue recreational interests; as economic activities continue to concentrate in coastal locations; and as coastal natural resources, such as estuaries, beach systems, and wetlands, are threatened by the magnitude and location of these changes. Views about how the coastal zone might be managed are also shaped by recent events, such as Hurricane Katrina and other natural disasters; by new information, such as knowledge about the so-called "dead zones" where biological activity ceases during a portion of the year; and by current trends, such as the health of the economy and rising energy prices; as well as by views about the appropriate role for the federal government in land use planning, including uses and activities on non-federal lands. The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA, P.L. 1451-1464) was enacted in 1972, at a time when Congress was considering options to respond to widespread public concern about estuarine and oceanfront degradation. These amendments responded to evolutionary changes in national coastal issues. Participant Approaches to Coastal Zone Management
The general language of the CZMA and OCRM's implementation of it have given participants, the eligible states and territories, great latitude in both how to participate in the federal program and what topics they emphasize. These issues are addressed in some of the more than two dozen reauthorization proposals that have been introduced since the CZMA authorization expired in 1999. Most of these proposals would have made modest rather than major changes to the current law. On June 4, 2008, the House Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans voted to pass H.R. 5451 . A substitute amendment was introduced and approved with language from three previously introduced bills concerned with working waterfronts, climate change adaptation, and renewable energy projects. There was no further action on either bill during the 110 th Congress. 1905 , to provide grants to coastal states for coastal climate change adaptation planning and response programs; and H.R. A CZMA reauthorization bill has not been introduced, and it appears unlikely that reauthorization will be considered by the 111 th Congress. Each program addresses topics that can be central to coastal management efforts in some, but not all, locations. EPA administers this program. Some of the participants use their programs to accommodate coastal development, and do not do enough to protect natural resources and the environment. Provisions in the Coastal Zone Management Act, As Amended
Section 302 lists 13 congressional findings about the national interest in the condition and changing circumstances of the coastal zone. | The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) was first enacted in 1972, at a time when coordinated land use planning was generally supported in Congress. Planning was seen as central to protecting natural resources while fostering wise development in the coastal zone. Since 1972, pressures for both preservation and development have grown more intense as people continue to migrate to coastal areas to take advantage of economic opportunities, to retire, and to pursue recreational interests; as economic activities continue to concentrate in coastal locations; and as natural resources are threatened by the magnitude and location of these changes. The CZMA recognizes that many of these pressures are not compatible, and also that states (and in some states, local government) have the lead responsibility for planning and managing their coastal zones. The CZMA authorizes grants to states to develop and implement coastal management programs to address these pressures. The concepts behind the program combined with the modest grants have attracted 34 of the 35 eligible states and territories to participate. Although authorization for appropriations expired after FY1999, Congress continues to fund this program.
Congress has reauthorized or amended this act eight times since 1972, responding to changing issues combined with a continuing interest in assisting states to manage their coastal resources. Participants also have adjusted their programs to reflect their changing priorities. Since 1999, when the most recent reauthorization expired, Congress repeatedly has considered, but not enacted, reauthorization language. Reauthorization has proven difficult, in part, because the numerous stakeholders (broadly consisting of three groups: participants; use and development interests; and environmental interests) have divergent views about possible changes to the current approach and about which topics should be emphasized or eliminated from the purview of coastal management. Since the law expired in 1999, the context in which reauthorization legislation could be considered continues to change. These changes include events (such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005), new information (such as knowledge about places in coastal waters where biological activity ceases during some seasons, called "dead zones"), trends (such as rising energy prices), climate change, and other federal programs related to coastal issues.
Two bills, S. 1579 and H.R. 5451, were introduced to reauthorize the Coastal Zone Management Act during the 110th Congress. H.R. 5451 was reported by the House Committee on Natural Resources, Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans, but no further action was taken. In the 111th Congress, several bills related to climate change adaptation, working waterfronts, and renewable energy planning have been introduced that would amend the Coastal Zone Management Act. However, a reauthorization bill has not been introduced, and it appears unlikely that reauthorization will be considered by the 111th Congress. |
crs_R40821 | crs_R40821_0 | 3200 , America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, as introduced on July 14, 2009, was referred to the House Committees on Energy and Commerce, Ways and Means, Education and Labor, Oversight and Government Reform, and the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. 3200 on July 17, 2009. 3200 proposes sweeping reforms of the U.S. health insurance and health care system. The three major components of H.R. 3200 are designated Divisions A, B, and C. Division A, "Affordable Health Care Choices," focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. Division B, "Medicare and Medicaid Improvements," proposes modifications to the largest two health insurance programs to make them consistent with the changes proposed in Division A and to amend other provisions in existing federal statute. Division B also introduces a number of technical changes intended to improve quality of care, reduce federal and state expenditures, and address coverage gaps for both Medicare and Medicaid. For Medicaid, among other major proposals, Division B would expand Medicaid eligibility for traditional and non-traditional (mostly childless adults) beneficiary categories up to 133⅓% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). Division C, "Public Health and Workforce Development," would amend and expand existing health professions and nursing workforce programs. Financing. Payments to Territories. Demonstrations and Pilot Programs. Miscellaneous. Medicaid and Health Insurance Reform
Mandatory Eligibility Expansions
H.R. Provisions of H.R. 3200 , as of January 1, 2010, tobacco cessation products would be removed from Medicaid's excluded drug list. States have the option of covering language translation or interpretation services as a benefit, so Medicaid programs could receive federal financial participation for these services. Under H.R. The Medicaid financing provisions in H.R. The proposed changes would affect Medicaid purchases of prescription drugs, disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments, and graduate medical education (GME) payments. A number of changes to these allotments occurred after that time. 3200 would make a technical correction to the definition of Medicaid medical assistance to include payment for part or all of the cost of care and services, or the care and services themselves, or both covered under a state's Medicaid program on behalf of individuals eligible for benefits. To help the Secretary monitor prescription drug rebates, H.R. These requirements include reporting and monitoring waste, fraud, and abuse. Require Providers and Suppliers to Adopt Programs to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
Under H.R. 3200 would extend the period for states to repay overpayments to one year when the overpayment is due to fraud. 3200 , the Secretary would be required to establish an accountable care pilot program under Medicaid, and would apply one or more of the models for the Medicare program also included in this bill. 3200 the Secretary would be required to establish a three-year Medicaid demonstration project in which eligible states would be required to reimburse certain IMDs that are not publicly owned or operated for services provided to Medicaid eligibles between the ages of 21 and 65 who are in need of medical assistance to stabilize an emergency medical condition. | The 111th Congress has devoted considerable effort to health reform that seeks to increase health insurance coverage for more Americans and help to control increasing costs, while improving quality and patient outcomes. Health reform legislation, America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009 (H.R. 3200), was introduced in the House on July 17, 2009, and ordered reported by the Committee on Energy and Commerce on July 31, 2009. H.R. 3200 proposes sweeping reforms of the health care delivery system, which are described in the three major components of H.R. 3200 designated Divisions A, B, and C. Division A, "Affordable Health Care Choices," focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. Division B, "Medicare and Medicaid Improvements," proposes modifications to the largest two health insurance programs to make them consistent with the changes proposed in Division A and to amend other provisions in existing federal statute. Division C, "Public Health and Workforce Development," would amend and expand existing health professions and nursing workforce programs.
This report summarizes the 34 Medicaid provisions in Division B of H.R. 3200. Due to the breadth of the changes proposed in H.R. 3200, some provisions of Divisions A and C also could affect Medicaid, but these are not Medicaid-specific. Division B also introduces a number of technical changes intended to improve quality of care, reduce federal and state expenditures, and address coverage gaps. The Division B provisions would introduce changes or new provisions to Medicaid eligibility; benefits; financing; waste, fraud, and abuse; payments to territories; demonstrations and pilot programs; and other miscellaneous Medicaid components. A major provision in Division B would expand Medicaid eligibility for traditional and non-traditional (mostly childless adults) beneficiary categories to 133⅓% of the Federal Poverty Level. States would receive 100% federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP) matching rates for these expanded beneficiary categories for two fiscal years (FY2013-FY2014) and then 90% thereafter (FY2015 and beyond). Another eligibility expansion would permit states the option of covering extremely high prescription drug expenditures for individuals already eligible for Medicaid when their incomes exceeded customary levels. Under benefits, Medicaid programs would be required to cover preventive services, receive higher FMAP rates to cover translations or interpretation services, and tobacco cessation products would be removed from Medicaid's excluded drug list.
There are a number of financing changes that would affect Medicaid under H.R. 3200, including reducing Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments by $10 billion by FY2019, increasing prescription drug rebates, and extending prescription drug discounts to Medicaid-managed care enrollees. There are a number of additional waste, fraud, and abuse provisions affecting Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). These provisions include requirements to deny payment for health care acquired conditions, require new Medicaid Integrity Program evaluations and reports, increase the amount of time states would have to repay overpayments to one year when the overpayments were due to fraud, and require states to implement a national correct coding initiative, similar to the Medicare program. Under H.R. 3200, spending caps for the territories would be increased, and a series of demonstrations would be approved for Medicaid, including a medical home program, an accountable care organization program, and a program for stabilization of emergency medical conditions by privately owned or operated mental disease institutions. |
crs_RS20916 | crs_RS20916_0 | An alien is "any person not a citizen or national of the United States" and is synonymous with noncitizen . Refugees and Asylees
Refugee admissions are governed by different criteria and numerical limits than immigrant admissions. It indicates the proportion of foreign born residents is not as large as during earlier periods, but is approaching historic levels at the turn of the last century. Figure 2 illustrates that the sheer number—32.5 in 2002—has more than doubled from 14.1 million in 1980 and is at the highest point in U.S. history. Naturalization
Another tradition of immigration policy is to provide immigrants an opportunity to integrate fully into society. | Congress typically considers a wide range of immigration issues and now that the number of foreign born residents of the United States—32.5 million in 2002—is at the highest point in U.S. history, the debates over immigration policies grow in importance. As a backdrop to these debates, this report provides an introduction to immigration and naturalization policy, concepts, and statistical trends. It touches on a range of topics, including numerical limits, refugees and asylees, exclusion, naturalization, illegal aliens, eligibility for federal benefits, and taxation. This report does not track legislation and will not be regularly updated. |
crs_RL34477 | crs_RL34477_0 | The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA, P.L. 106-178 ) added two new provisions to the existing laws: it widened some of the sanctions applicable to foreign persons, and, in Section 6, contained a ban on U.S. government payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station unless the U.S. president makes a determination that Russia is taking steps to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ballistic and cruise missiles, to Iran. The President's announcement in 2004 that the space shuttle fleet would be retired in 2010 further increased that dependence. The House and Senate each passed the INA unanimously, and it was signed into law on March 14, 2000 ( P.L. Transporting astronauts to and from the ISS was carried out only in Russian Soyuz space vehicles until the shuttle Discovery returned to flight in July 2005. The act is now known as the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). On April 11, 2008, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin submitted a proposed amendment to INKSNA that would extend the exemption for Soyuz flights for the life of the ISS, or until the Moon flight vehicle, or a commercial crew transport vehicle, is fully operational. Title III of H.R. The U.S.-Russian civilian nuclear cooperation agreement was withdrawn from congressional consideration by the President on September 8, 2008. 2638 , The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 110-329 ). 106-178 to set the date of expiration for waiver authority to July 1, 2016. Contracting such services would also probably require exemption from the INKSNA. Nonproliferation Issues Involving Extending INKSNA Exemption
As in 2005, an amendment would be needed before payments could be made to Russia since the President has not made a determination pursuant to Section 6(b) of the INKSNA regarding Russian nonproliferation policy or proliferation activities to Iran, North Korea or Syria. In the past five years, after details about Iran's clandestine nuclear activities came to light, Russia has stepped up cooperation with the United States and other countries negotiating over Iran's nuclear program. President Bush, most recently at the April 2008 summit in Sochi, has praised Russian President Putin for his "leadership" in offering a solution to the Iranian nuclear negotiations. | The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (INA) was enacted to help stop foreign transfers to Iran of weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, and advanced conventional weapons technology, particularly from Russia. Section 6 of the INA banned U.S. payments to Russia in connection with the International Space Station (ISS) unless the U.S. President determined that Russia was taking steps to prevent such proliferation. When the President in 2004 announced that the Space Shuttle would be retired in 2010, the Russian Soyuz became the only vehicle available after that date to transport astronauts to and from the ISS. In 2005 Congress amended INA to exempt Soyuz flights to the ISS from the Section 6 ban through 2011. It also extended the provisions to Syria and North Korea, and renamed it the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA).
NASA has asked Congress in 2008 to extend the exemption for the life of the ISS, or until U.S. crew transport vehicles become operational. As in 2005, an exemption would be needed before payments could be made to Russia since the President has not made a determination pursuant to Section 6(b) of the INKSNA regarding Russian nonproliferation policy or proliferation activities to Iran, North Korea or Syria.
Since 2005, Russia has stepped up cooperation with the United States and countries over Iran's nuclear program. President Bush has praised Russian President Putin for his "leadership" in offering a solution to the Iranian nuclear negotiations. However, Russian military actions in the Republic of Georgia in August 2008 put into question congressional support to waive the INKSNA requirement. The waiver authority was nevertheless extended until July 1, 2016, in H.R. 2638, The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009. This bill was passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President on September 30 (P.L. 110-329). |
crs_R40494 | crs_R40494_0 | Although eradicated almost 60 years ago in the United States, malaria remained a serious problem in 109 countries in 2008. Malaria is a disease caused by a parasite that is transmitted to a person through the bite of a particular mosquito. It can lead to fever, muscle aches, and, without effective treatment, sometimes death. Globally, an estimated 247 million people become ill due to malaria every year; of these, nearly 1 million die, mostly children younger than five years old. Approximately 40% of the world's population is at risk of malaria, but most cases and deaths are in sub-Saharan Africa. In the past decade, the U.S. government and international community have increasingly recognized malaria prevention, treatment, and control as a fundamental factor in community health and economic growth in developing countries. Many U.S. policymakers have, likewise, demonstrated a strong interest in combating malaria. In recent years, Congress has passed legislation that states that a major objective of the U.S. foreign assistance program is to provide aid for the prevention, control, and cure of malaria; required the development of a U.S. global malaria strategy; and appropriated increased funding for U.S. programs that fight the disease globally. This report provides background on malaria's cause, consequences, and impact as well as key interventions for its prevention, control, and treatment. It examines congressional activities related to global malaria, and then it describes U.S. programs through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that address the disease internationally. It also raises possible issues for Congress related to U.S. funding levels, U.S. program priorities and strategies, access to and effectiveness of commodities, and oversight of U.S. programs. The incidence of malaria appears to correlate to many other factors affecting the health, economic development, and social well being of people and communities in many developing countries. 106-570 ) and the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act, P.L. 108-25 ). That year, President George W. Bush also proposed the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), a five-year initiative to halve the number of malaria-related deaths in 15 sub-Saharan African countries by 2010, and pledged an additional $1.2 billion over the five years for U.S. global malaria programs through PMI. In 2008, Congress passed the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act (Lantos-Hyde Act, P.L. 110-293 ), which authorizes $5 billion from FY2009 through FY2013 for U.S. global malaria efforts. It also directs the U.S. President to develop a comprehensive, five-year U.S. government strategy to fight global malaria and authorizes the position of a Coordinator of U.S. Government Activities to Combat Malaria Globally (U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator at USAID oversees and coordinates all U.S. government activities to fight malaria globally, including U.S. global malaria efforts in not only the 15 PMI countries in sub-Saharan Africa but also in other countries and regions that are not part of PMI. PMI is led by USAID and implemented by USAID in conjunction with CDC. It also authorizes up to $2 billion for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund) in FY2009 and such sums as may be necessary from FY2010 through FY2013. From FY2004 through FY2008, USAID and CDC received more than $915 million for U.S. efforts to fight global malaria ( Table 1 ). Of this, more than $484 million was directed to the President's Malaria Initiative from FY2005 through FY2008. For FY2009, Congress has appropriated $391.9 million for U.S. global malaria programs. | In 2008, malaria remained a serious problem in 109 countries, although it was eradicated almost 60 years ago in the United States. Malaria sickens an estimated 247 million people every year; of these, nearly 1 million die, mostly children younger than 5 years old. The disease is caused by a parasite that is transmitted to a person through the bite of a particular mosquito. Infection can lead to fever, muscle aches, and, without effective treatment, organ failure and sometimes death. Although approximately 40% of the world's population is at risk of malaria, most cases and deaths are in sub-Saharan Africa. In the past decade, the U.S. government and international community have increasingly recognized the impact of malaria prevention, treatment, and control on the health, economic development, and social well-being of people and communities in many developing countries.
U.S. policymakers have demonstrated a strong interest in combating malaria. In May 2003, Congress passed the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act (P.L. 108-25), which states, among other things, that a major objective of the U.S. foreign assistance program is to provide aid for the prevention, control, and cure of malaria, and authorizes funds to carry out these programs. In 2004-2006, congressional hearings on U.S. global efforts to combat malaria, especially those of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), discussed USAID policies associated with purchasing and distributing commodities like antimalarial drugs and insecticides, providing technical assistance, and promoting program transparency, and questioned the U.S. strategy for fighting global malaria. In July 2008, Congress passed the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act (P.L. 110-293), which authorizes $5 billion from FY2009 through FY2013 for U.S. global malaria efforts. It also directs the President to develop a comprehensive, five-year U.S. government strategy to fight global malaria, and authorizes the position of the U.S. Global Malaria Coordinator to oversee and coordinate all U.S. government programs to fight malaria globally.
In June 2005, President George W. Bush announced the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), a $1.2 billion, five-year initiative to reduce the number of malaria-related deaths in 15 sub-Saharan African countries by 50% by 2010. U.S. global malaria efforts include PMI, which is led by USAID and implemented in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); other USAID malaria programs; and CDC's global malaria activities.
From FY2004 through FY2008, USAID and CDC received $915 million for U.S. global malaria programs, of which more than $484 million was directed to PMI. During this time, the U.S. government also contributed more than $3 billion to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (Global Fund), which funds malaria projects among other projects. For FY2009, Congress has appropriated $391.9 million for U.S. global malaria programs and $900 million for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund.
This report provides background on malaria's cause, consequences, and impact as well as ways to prevent, treat, and control it. The report discusses not only USAID malaria programs and CDC's Malaria Branch, but also efforts to coordinate these bilateral efforts with multilateral efforts. The report describes funding for U.S. efforts to fight malaria. Finally, it raises possible issues related to these efforts for the 111th Congress, such as U.S. malaria funding levels, U.S. program priorities and strategies, access to commodities, and oversight of U.S. programs. |
crs_R45190 | crs_R45190_0 | When a bill is enacted into law, it may amend or repeal earlier laws, or it may create an entirely new or "freestanding" law. Recently enacted laws are first printed individually as separate statutes known as "slip laws." This report provides an overview of federal statutes in each of these forms, as well as basic guidance for congressional staff researching statutes. The United States Statutes at Large
Every two years at the end of a congressional session, slip laws (both public and private laws) are accumulated and published chronologically in a series of volumes entitled the United States Statutes at Large ( Statutes at Large ) . The U.S. Code has its roots in an 1866 law that initiated a project to "revise, simplify, arrange, and consolidate all statutes of the United States, general and permanent in their nature...." This endeavor was not fully realized until 1874, when the Revised Statutes of 1874 became the first official codification of U.S. laws. In the U.S. C ode , statutes are grouped by subject matter into 54 titles and five appendices. The most notable difference between the U.S. Code and the Statutes at Large , however, is that language in the U.S. Code exists as amended to reflect subsequent changes made by later laws. Section 101 of IRCA amended the INA by adding new §274A to the statute. Positive Versus Non-Positive Law Titles of the U.S. Code
In 1947, Congress began enacting whole titles of the U.S. Code into law, generally repealing the underlying statutes. 644" as the enacting law in the source credits because the underlying statutes that individually created the whole of Title 3 have been repealed. Searching the U.S. Code
As previously noted, statutes are incorporated into U.S. Code to facilitate retrieval and access, because searching by subject may be easier than searching by date in some cases. The tables will also indicate which sections of the U.S. Code were repealed, omitted, or transferred. | This report provides an overview of federal statutes in their various forms, as well as basic guidance for congressional staff interested in researching statutes. When a bill becomes a law, the newly enacted statute may amend or repeal earlier statutes or it may create a new or "freestanding" law. Either way, these new statutes are first printed individually as "slip laws" and numbered by order of passage as either public laws, or less frequently, private laws. Slip laws are later aggregated and published chronologically in volumes known as the United States Statutes at Large (Statutes at Large). Statutes of a general and permanent nature are then incorporated into the United States Code (U.S. Code), which arranges the statutes by subject matter into 54 titles and five appendices.
Statutes may be updated and published as amended public laws. As the statutes that underlie the U.S. Code are revised, superseded, or repealed, the provisions of the U.S. Code are also updated to reflect these changes. In these instances, the authoritative language remains the enacting statute, or the "base law." However, some titles of the U.S. Code have been passed into "positive law," meaning the law exists as it does in the U.S. Code and the title itself is the authoritative language. In these instances, it is the U.S. Code sections that are revised, superseded, or repealed, as the underlying statutes have all been revoked.
In arranging statutes by subject rather than date, the U.S. Code may be more convenient to search than the Statutes at Large. Moreover, the Office of the Law Revision Counsel publishes tools known as "Tables," to assist researchers in locating statutes, as well identifying statutes that may have been amended, omitted, transferred, or repealed. Nevertheless, certain laws are not added to the U.S. Code, such as laws appropriating funds, and thus researchers will often need to search laws in the other forms discussed herein. |
crs_RS22167 | crs_RS22167_0 | Background
The dispute in Gonzales v. Raich involved a conflict between California's Compassionate Use Act and the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Supreme Court's Decision
In reaching its conclusions, the Court relied heavily on its 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn , which held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act's federal quota system applied to bushels of wheat that were homegrown and personally consumed. Wickard stands for the proposition that Congress can rationally combine the effects that an individual producer has on an interstate market to find substantial impacts on interstate commerce. Thus, the Court concluded that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that "leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and market conditions." | In Gonzales v. Raich , the Supreme Court was presented with a conflict between California's state law, permitting the medicinal use of marijuana, and the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). The Ninth Circuit had found the federal law unconstitutional "as applied," concluding that its enforcement against medicinal users was beyond Congress's enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would substantially affect conditions in the interstate market. The Court, in reaching its decision, specifically relied on Wickard v. Filburn (1942), which held that Congress could aggregate the impact of individual actors on the interstate market to find a substantial impact on interstate commerce. |
crs_R45126 | crs_R45126_0 | Introduction
This report briefly summarizes the Advancing Chronic Care, Extenders, and Social Services (ACCESS) Act, enacted February 9, 2018, as Division E of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123 ). 1892 , enacted as the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. The topics specifically addressed in this report include the following:
Medicare ( Table 2 , Table 3 , Table 4 , Table 10 , Table 11 , and Table 12 ) State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) (in Table 1 ) Public Health Extenders (in Table 5 and Table 9 ) Children and Family Services (in Table 6 ) Foster Care (in Table 7 ) Social Impact Partnerships Program (in Table 8 ) Medicaid and Offsets (in Table 12 )
Along with the brief description of each provision in Division E, this report provides the contact information for the CRS analysts who can answer further questions. CRS is preparing additional reports analyzing subsets of these provisions by topic or program in greater detail. Those reports will be linked to this report as they become available. Division E is divided into twelve titles. | On February 9, 2018, President Donald Trump signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123). Division E of that law is titled the Advancing Chronic Care, Extenders, and Social Services (ACCESS) Act. This report provides a brief summary of each of the provisions included in the ACCESS Act, along with the contact information for the CRS expert who can answer questions about each provision. Division E consists of 12 titles. Each title is addressed in a separate table, and the provisions are discussed in the order they appear in the law. Topics discussed in this report include Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), public health, child and family services, foster care, social impact partnerships, child support enforcement, and prison data reporting.
Subsequent CRS reports examining selected subsets of these provisions will be linked to this report as they become available, such as CRS Report R45136, Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123): CHIP, Public Health, Home Visiting, and Medicaid Provisions in Division E. |
crs_RS21899 | crs_RS21899_0 | Most of these agencies were located in the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (BTS), which was charged with securing the borders; territorial waters; terminals; waterways; and air, land, and sea transportation systems of the United States; and managing the nation's ports of entry. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
CBP combined portions of the previous border law enforcement agencies under one administrative umbrella. As currently comprised, the USBP is the uniformed law enforcement arm of the Department of Homeland Security. At official ports of entry, CBP officers are responsible for conducting immigrations, customs, and agricultural inspections on entering aliens. Unlike CBP, whose jurisdiction is confined to law enforcement activities along the border, ICE special agents investigate immigrations and customs violations in the interior of the United States. Conclusion
This report has briefly outlined the roles and responsibilities of the four main agencies within the DHS charged with securing our nation's borders: the CBP, ICE, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the TSA. | After the massive reorganization of federal agencies precipitated by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), there are now four main federal agencies charged with securing the United States' borders: the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which patrols the border and conducts immigrations, customs, and agricultural inspections at ports of entry; the U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which investigates immigrations and customs violations in the interior of the country; the United States Coast Guard, which provides maritime and port security; and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is responsible for securing the nation's land, rail, and air transportation networks. This report is meant to serve as a primer on the key federal agencies charged with border security; as such it will briefly describe each agency's role in securing our nation's borders. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RS22887 | crs_RS22887_0 | It seeks to harmonize anti-doping commitments for sport. In 1999, the IOC created the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) as the first independent entity to monitor and enforce international anti-doping activities for non-professional sports. Ratification Status
On August 4, 2008, President Bush signed the instrument of ratification for the treaty. On June 24, 2008, the committee approved the treaty by voice vote, and the Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification on July 21, 2008 (Senate Congressional Record, Page S6980), subject to an understanding, a declaration, and a condition. Issues for Consideration
Consequences for Professional Sports
The International Convention Against Doping in Sport does not apply to U.S. professional sports. | The International Convention Against Doping in Sport seeks to harmonize anti-doping commitments for non-professional sports at the international level. This Convention, adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2005, entered into force on February 1, 2007. On July 21, 2008, the Senate approved the treaty for ratification (Treaty Doc 110-14), subject to an understanding, a declaration, and a condition. President George W. Bush signed the instrument of ratification for the treaty on August 4, 2008. Issues that may continue to arise as policymakers evaluate the treaty include its relationship to anti-doping regulations in professional sports and the legitimacy and effectiveness of current international anti-doping activities. U.S. ratification does not require changes to current federal laws. |
crs_R41884 | crs_R41884_0 | For example, one proposed reform that has been contemplated by policymakers is an amendment to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (hereinafter the Stafford Act) that would add a new category of disaster declaration known as a "catastrophic declaration" for events characterized by extraordinary devastation. This report examines concerns expressed by policymakers and experts that current Stafford Act declarations are inadequate to respond to, and recover from, highly destructive events, and presents the arguments for and against amending the act to add a catastrophic declaration amendment. These arguments are framed by data analyses of past and potential disasters that might be considered as "catastrophic." The report also explores alternative policy options that might obviate the need for catastrophic declarations. Overview of Stafford Act Declarations
The Stafford Act is the principal authority governing federal assistance for emergencies and disasters in the United States. The act authorizes the President to issue declarations that trigger federal assistance programs to help states respond to and recover from natural and human-caused incidents. The three currently authorized by the Stafford Act include (1) Fire Management Assistance Grants (FMAG), (2) emergency declarations, and (3) major disaster declarations. Emergency Declarations
The Stafford Act defines an emergency broadly as
any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. The definition for a major disaster is more precise than an emergency declaration, and the range of assistance available to state and local governments, private, nonprofit organizations, and families and individuals is much broader. A major disaster declaration may also include recovery programs such as community disaster loans. After an Incident
A catastrophic declaration could be used to automatically alter aspects of recovery policies and regulations. Analysis of Catastrophic Events Past and Future
This section analyzes incidents that might be deemed as catastrophic to help frame a debate concerning the need and desirability of amending the Stafford Act to include a catastrophic declaration. | The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) is the principal authority governing federal emergency and disaster response in the United States. The act authorizes the President to issue three categories of declaration: (1) major disaster, (2) emergency, or (3) fire management assistance grants in response to incidents that overwhelm the resources of state and local governments. Once a major disaster declaration is issued, a wide range of federal disaster assistance becomes available to eligible individuals and households, public entities, and certain nonprofit organizations. Disaster assistance authorized by the Stafford Act is appropriated by Congress and provided through the Disaster Relief Fund.
Emergency declarations supplement and promote coordination of local and state efforts such as evacuations and protection of public assets. They may also be declared prior to the impact of an incident to protect property, public health and safety and lessen or avert the threat of a major disaster or catastrophe. Major disaster declarations are issued after an incident and constitute broader authority to help states and localities, as well as families and individuals, recover from the damage caused by the event. Fire management assistance grants provide assistance to state and localities to manage fires that threaten to cause major disasters.
In the aftermath of especially large or damaging incidents discussion can develop considering whether the Stafford Act should be amended to include a fourth category, generally called a "catastrophic declaration." If approved, catastrophic declarations could be invoked for high-profile, large-scale incidents that threaten the lives of many people, create tremendous damage, and pose significant challenges to timely recovery efforts.
This report examines concerns expressed by policymakers and experts that current Stafford Act declarations are inadequate to respond to, and recover from, highly destructive events, and presents the arguments for and against amending the act to add a catastrophic declaration amendment. This report also includes data analyses of past and potential disasters to determine what incidents might be deemed as catastrophic, and explores alternative policy options that might obviate the need for catastrophic declarations.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
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