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crs_RL31262 | crs_RL31262_0 | Declaring it necessary to bring to justice those responsible for the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, President Bush signed a Military Order (M.O.) authorizing the trial by military commission of certain non-citizens. The order directed the Secretary of Defense to establish the procedural rules for the operation of the military commissions convened pursuant to the M.O. This report provides a brief overview of procedural rules applicable in selected historical and contemporary tribunals for the trials of war crimes suspects. The chart that follows compares selected procedural safeguards employed in criminal trials in federal criminal court with parallel protective measures in military general courts-martial, international military tribunals used after World War II, including the International Military Tribunal (IMT or "Nuremberg Tribunal"), and the International Criminal Courts for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). For a comparison of the Department of Defense rules for military commissions that were struck down in Hamdan to recent legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL31600, The Department of Defense Rules for Military Commissions: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Proposed Legislation and the Uniform Code of Military Justice , by [author name scrubbed]. | Declaring it necessary to bring to justice those responsible for the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, President Bush signed a Military Order (M.O.) authorizing the trial by military commission of certain non-citizens. The order directs the Secretary of Defense to establish the procedural rules for the operation of the military commissions convened pursuant to the M.O. The Department of Defense prepared regulations providing for procedures of military commissions, but these were invalidated by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. The Bush Administration has proposed legislation to reinstate military commissions for the trials of suspected terrorists.
This report provides a brief overview of procedural rules applicable in selected historical and contemporary tribunals for the trials of war crimes suspects. The chart that follows compares selected procedural safeguards employed in criminal trials in federal criminal court with parallel protective measures in military general courts-martial, international military tribunals used after World War II, including the International Military Tribunal (IMT or "Nuremberg Tribunal"), and the International Criminal Courts for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).
For comparison of the Department of Defense rules for military commissions that were struck down in Hamdan to recent legislative proposals, see CRS Report RL31600, The Department of Defense Rules for Military Commissions: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Proposed Legislation and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44524 | crs_R44524_0 | Introduction
Both the United States and European Union (EU) have large, diverse, and economically important agricultural sectors. But EU policymakers have faced additional pressures to reform domestic agricultural policy, in particular due to the EU's steady growth to 28 European nations and 508 million people as of 2013—including most of the agriculturally intensive but economically poorer countries of Eastern Europe ( Table 3 ). The United States has more than double the farmland base (over 1 billion acres versus about 457 million acres in the EU), while the EU has more than five times the number of farms (10.8 million versus 2.1 million) spread across its 28 member countries ( Table 2 ). In general, the small size of EU farm holdings, their substantially larger number relative to the United States, and the generally larger share of rural population in the EU (25% versus 18%) have played a strong role in the formation of EU farm policy as compared to the United States. The EU tends to have a stronger rural development emphasis and allows frequent exemptions for identifiably small farming units from certain cross compliance restrictions and payment limitations. The United States has traditionally focused its producer support programs on dairy and row crops including grains, oilseeds, and cotton. EU agricultural policy provides support to a broader range of farm and food products—traditional row crops, sugar, and dairy as well as livestock products and fresh and processed fruits and vegetables—with more extensive cross compliance provisions. Traditionally, the United States uses less trade-distorting support than the EU, although the EU has made substantial reductions in the volume of its trade distorting support—as measured in both direct and implicit outlays ( Figure 2 ). When measured as a share of total gross farm receipts, support for market-distorting commodity programs has decreased for both the EU and United States, but the EU's share remains about double the U.S. share ( Figure 2 ). In both the EU and United States, support for less distorting non-commodity-type programs—for example, conservation, rural development, agro-forestry, nutrition, and bioenergy—has increased substantially and now accounts for a majority share of total farm support ( Figure 2 ). U.S. consumers have received net benefits from agriculture-based support programs (e.g, SNAP). In contrast, EU consumers have generally transferred more support to agricultural producers than has been received in off-setting benefits (i.e., the EU's consumer subsidy estimate is negative), although the net transfer has been declining over time as a share of gross farm receipts ( Figure 5 ). U.S. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The EU is one of the United States' chief agricultural trading partners and also a major competitor in world food markets. Both the EU and the United States heavily support their agricultural sectors. Because the United States and the EU figure so dominantly in the development and use of agricultural policy on the global level, information comparing the EU and U.S. farm support programs will likely continue to be of interest to Congress as the United States prepares for another round of domestic farm bill negotiations and as it continues to engage in international trade negotiations on several fronts, including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the EU and the Trans-Pacific Partnership with Pacific Rim nations and within the WTO's multilateral negotiating forum. | The European Union (EU) is one of the United States' chief agricultural trading partners but also a major competitor in world markets. Historically, both the United States and the EU have provided significant government support for their agricultural sectors. In the United States, federal farm policy has traditionally focused on price and/or income support programs concentrated on row crops including grains, oilseeds, and cotton as well as sugar and dairy. In contrast, the EU provides more extensive support to a broader range of farm and food products—including livestock products and fresh and processed fruits and vegetables.
Significant structural differences in their respective farm sectors have helped to shape differences in farm policy. The United States has double the farmland base (over 1 billion acres versus about 457 million acres), while the EU has five times the number of farms at 10.8 million with an average size of 47 acres, compared with 2.1 million U.S. farms at an average size of 441 acres. As a result, EU outlays per acre appear much larger than in the United States, whereas U.S. outlays per farm appear much larger. In general, the small size of EU farm holdings, their substantially larger number of farms relative to the United States, and the larger share of rural population (25% versus 18%) has played a strong role in the formation of EU farm policy as compared to the United States. The EU tends to have a stronger rural development emphasis and allows frequent exemptions for identifiably small farming units from certain cross compliance restrictions and payment limitations.
Since the mid-1990s, both regions have reoriented their domestic agricultural policy toward less market-distorting policies in response to both internal budget pressures and international trade commitments. EU policymakers have faced additional pressures to reform domestic agricultural policy, due to the EU's steady growth to 28 European nations and 508 million people by 2013—including the agriculturally intensive but economically poorer countries of Eastern Europe.
Several policy trends have emerged in both the EU and United States, including the following:
Traditionally, the United States uses less trade-distorting support than the EU, although the EU has made substantial reductions in the volume of its trade distorting support. When measured as a share of total gross farm receipts, support for market-distorting commodity programs has decreased for both the EU and United States, but the EU's share remains about double the U.S. share. In both the EU and United States, support for less distorting non-commodity-type programs (e.g., conservation, rural development, agro-forestry, and nutrition) has increased substantially and now accounts for a majority of total farm support. U.S. consumers have received net benefits from agriculture-based support programs, whereas EU consumers have generally transferred more support to agricultural producers than they have received in off-setting benefits (i.e., the EU's consumer subsidy estimate is negative), although the net transfer has been declining over time as a share of gross farm receipts.
Because the United States and the EU figure prominently in the development and use of global agricultural policy, information comparing their farm support programs will likely be of interest to Congress as the United States prepares for another round of domestic farm bill negotiations and engages in international trade negotiations on several fronts, including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) with the EU, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with Pacific Rim nations, and within the WTO's multilateral negotiating forum. |
crs_R43506 | crs_R43506_0 | Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of health care and LTSS to certain eligible low-income individuals. Established under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (SSA), the Medicaid program is state-operated within broad federal guidelines, and is jointly funded by the federal government and states. In response, Congress has enacted several laws aimed at limiting the ability of individuals to divest financial resources in an effort to protect them (e.g., preserve them for a family member), thereby meeting financial requirements for Medicaid and any applicable LTSS. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA, P.L. 97-248 ) was the first such legislation enacted to limit the actions of individuals who divest resources for this purpose. The Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 93, P.L. 103-66 ) included several provisions to restrict access to Medicaid LTSS to only those individuals who were low-income or to those who applied their financial resources toward the cost of their care. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171 ) was the most recent action taken by Congress to amend the SSA by further limiting the ability of individuals to divest their resources for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid LTSS. This report provides an overview of the financial requirements used for determining eligibility for Medicaid LTSS. It first provides background information on the Medicaid program, including general eligibility requirements. Next, it describes federal statute as well as selected regulations and guidance regarding these financial eligibility requirements, including rules related to spousal impoverishment, asset transfers, treatment of certain assets, post-eligibility treatment of income, and estate recovery. Medicaid Financial Eligibility for Long-Term Services and Supports
Eligibility for Medicaid is determined by both federal and state law, whereby states set individual eligibility criteria within federal minimum standards. In addition to categorical and financial eligibility criteria, individuals in need of Medicaid-covered LTSS must also meet state-based functional eligibility criteria. For example, under federal Medicaid law, states are required to provide coverage to aged and disabled individuals receiving cash-assistance through the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. In doing so, Medicaid eligibility for aged and disabled individuals uses SSI program rules as the basis for determining financial eligibility. However, federal law also gives states the option to use financial eligibility criteria that are more restrictive than SSI (i.e., 209(b) states). States may also extend Medicaid coverage to other aged and disabled individuals, referred to as optional eligibility groups. For aged and disabled individuals eligible for Medicaid through optional eligibility groups, states may use SSI program rules or they may use more liberal standards for determining financial eligibility than those specified under SSI. Most states use these Medicaid statutory provisions to ignore or disregard certain types of income and/or resources, thereby extending Medicaid eligibility to aged and disabled individuals with higher asset levels. In contrast, the rules for determining financial eligibility for most of Medicaid's non-elderly populations (i.e., parents, children, pregnant women) use modified adjusted gross income (MAGI). These MAGI rules also apply to those individuals eligible under the ACA Medicaid expansion. According to CMS, in ACA Medicaid expansion states individuals under age 65 with disabilities who have LTSS needs are likely to continue to qualify for Medicaid under optional eligibility groups related to disability. In general, states are not required to offer LTSS for individuals in the ACA Medicaid expansion group. However, the ACA Medicaid expansion affords states options to include LTSS or otherwise make available state plan Medicaid-covered LTSS to certain newly eligible enrollees. States have further flexibility to modify SSI program rules in determining income and resource requirements for other optional eligibility groups. Payments from the trust to or for the benefit of the individual must be considered income of the individual. These rules are commonly referred to as the post-eligibility treatment of income (PETI) rules. | Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of health care and long-term services and supports (LTSS) to certain eligible low-income individuals. Established under Title XIX of the Social Security Act (SSA), the Medicaid program is state-operated within broad federal guidelines, and is jointly funded by the federal government and states. To qualify for Medicaid, individuals must meet certain categorical and financial requirements. To qualify for Medicaid LTSS, individuals must also meet state-based functional eligibility criteria that determine need for long-term care. The rules for determining financial eligibility for persons who need LTSS under the Medicaid program are complex. Generally, individuals must have assets that are equal to or below established thresholds to be considered eligible for Medicaid. While these financial eligibility rules also vary by state, states must set these limits in accordance with certain federal requirements.
Under federal Medicaid law, states are required to provide coverage to aged, blind, and disabled (ABD) persons receiving cash-assistance through the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, also referred to as mandatory eligibility groups. However, federal law gives states the option to use eligibility criteria that are more restrictive than SSI. States that use this alternative to SSI program rules are typically referred to as "209(b) states." Thus, in general the Medicaid program uses SSI program rules as the basis for determining financial eligibility. States may also extend Medicaid coverage to other population groups, referred to as optional eligibility groups. For elderly and disabled individuals potentially eligible for Medicaid LTSS coverage through these optional eligibility groups, states may use more liberal standards for determining financial eligibility than those specified under SSI program rules. Section 1902(r)(2) of the SSA gives states flexibility to modify SSI program rules with respect to counting assets (both income and resources) for the purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility. Most states use these Medicaid statutory provisions to ignore or disregard certain types of income and/or resources, thereby extending Medicaid coverage to ABD individuals with higher asset levels.
In addition, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) included the ACA Medicaid expansion, which allows states to expand Medicaid eligibility beyond the historical categorical eligibility groups to individuals under age 65 with income up to 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) (effectively 138% FPL). In general, states are not required to offer LTSS under the ACA Medicaid expansion. However, the ACA Medicaid expansion affords states options to include LTSS or otherwise make available state plan Medicaid-covered LTSS to certain beneficiaries. As of January 1, 2014, most of Medicaid's non-elderly populations (i.e., parents, children, pregnant women) now use modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) financial eligibility rules to determine financial eligibility for Medicaid, including those individuals eligible under the ACA Medicaid expansion.
Congress has enacted several laws over the years aimed at limiting the ability of individuals to divest financial resources in order to become eligible for Medicaid LTSS. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA, P.L. 97-248) was the first such legislation enacted to limit the actions of individuals who divest resources for this purpose. The Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 93, P.L. 103-66) included several provisions to restrict access to Medicaid LTSS to only those individuals who were low-income or to those who applied their assets toward the cost of their care. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171) was the most recent action taken by Congress to amend the SSA by further limiting the ability of individuals to divest their assets for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid LTSS.
This report provides an overview of the financial requirements used for determining eligibility for Medicaid LTSS. It first provides background information on the Medicaid program, including general eligibility requirements. Then it describes federal statute as well as selected regulations and guidance regarding these financial eligibility requirements, including rules related to spousal impoverishment, asset transfers, treatment of certain assets, post-eligibility treatment of income, and estate recovery. |
crs_R43353 | crs_R43353_0 | Maintaining the benefits afforded by space is central to a wide range of U.S. national interests. These include significant government (military, intelligence, and civil ) and commercial interests. Decades of human space flight—primarily U.S. and Russian space activities—have littered the Earth's orbit with debris. NASA defines orbital debris as "all man-made objects in orbit about the Earth which no longer serve a useful purpose." Since 2007, two significant debris-generating events have greatly increased the amount of debris in orbit. One expert reported it likely that debris from the Chinese ASAT test damaged a small Russian satellite six years later in 2013. On February 10, 2009, an operational U.S. Iridium communications satellite collided at a near right angle with a defunct Russian Cosmos satellite. The study concluded that the amount of debris currently in orbit will continually collide with itself, leading to the growth rate of debris and increases in spacecraft failures. The population growth will be primarily driven by catastrophic collisions that are likely to occur every five to nine years. The United States also pursues efforts to prevent future collisions in space. DOD provides notifications to other governments and commercial satellite operators of potentially hazardous conjunctions between orbiting objects. In addition, some believe that perhaps one of the most beneficial TCBMs for ensuring sustainability and security in space could be the adoption of best practice guidelines or a code of conduct to promote responsible behavior in space. Although international compliance with common mitigation measures is widely accepted as necessary, as mentioned earlier there is a growing view within international space agencies and the scientific community that mitigation alone is no longer sufficient to prevent the continual increase of space debris. The actual cleanup and removal of orbital debris would raise some major legal issues. A few hearings in recent years have touched on orbital debris issues, but Congress might consider additional hearings from major stakeholders in the military, intelligence, civil, and commercial sector on whether proposed mitigation measures are in the national interests of the United States. International compliance with mitigation measures is widely seen as critically important, but many experts believe that mitigation efforts alone are insufficient. For this reason, more aggressive measures, such as active debris removal, could be considered to protect U.S. national security interests in space and the long-term sustainability of the space environment. | After decades of activities in space, Earth's orbit is littered with man-made objects that no longer serve a useful purpose. This includes roughly 22,000 objects larger than the size of a softball and hundreds of thousands of smaller fragments. This population of space debris potentially threatens U.S. national security interests in space, both governmental (military, intelligence, and civil) and commercial. Congress has broadly supported the full range of these national security interests and has a vested concern in ensuring a strong and continued U.S. presence in space.
Two events in recent years dramatically increased the amount of fragmentation debris in orbit. One was the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test and, in 2009, an active U.S. commercial satellite accidentally collided with a defunct Russian satellite. Although the 2013 movie Gravity exaggerated the issue and took certain artistic liberties, the film graphically depicted and drew the public's attention to the potential destruction of operational satellites and other platforms in space from collisions with orbital debris. Some experts maintain the population growth of debris in space will be primarily driven by catastrophic collisions that are likely to occur every five to nine years.
For decades, the United States has worked to minimize the amount of orbital debris left from its space launches and inactive satellites. Many space-faring nations have adopted similar mitigation measures, and additional voluntary international codes of conduct are being pursued.
Many experts now believe that mitigation efforts alone are insufficient to prevent the continual increase of space debris. A growing view among experts holds that some level of active removal of debris from the space environment is necessary. Nevertheless, such efforts are technologically immature and face significant budgetary and legal obstacles.
Congress has an opportunity to explore these issues through hearings, for instance with major stakeholders in the U.S. national security and civil space communities, and the commercial sector. Efforts to find international agreement on mitigation may involve congressional prerogatives on advice and consent, and any program to pursue remediation will likely entail appropriations support from Congress. |
crs_RS20593 | crs_RS20593_0 | However, farm assets and business assets represent a relatively small share of total taxable estate value, approximately 17.1% of gross taxable estate value in 2009. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) annually publishes data on the distribution of assets in estate tax returns filed in a tax year. This report uses data for returns filed in 2009 and 2010. The estate tax was repealed for those who died in 2010, thus the data for the returns filed in 2010 do not reflect the impact of the tax. The 2010 data are provided as an Appendix to this report. Table 2 suggests the progressivity of the estate and gift tax in 2009. In contrast to farm estates, assets typically associated with non-farm businesses are concentrated in estates valued over $10 million. | This report provides data on the distribution of assets in estates as reported on estate tax returns filed in 2009 and 2010. The data for 2010 are unique, as the estate tax was repealed for those who died in calendar year 2010. Thus, the 2010 data are presented as an appendix to this report. Based on the 2009 data, this report finds that farm and business assets represent a small share of the total value of taxable estates that filed tax returns in 2009 (3.25% and 13.86%, respectively). That share is concentrated in estates valued over $10 million. For an overview of the estate tax, see CRS Report RL30600, Estate and Gift Taxes: Economic Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as new data become available. |
crs_R43455 | crs_R43455_0 | Introduction
On May 27, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) jointly announced a final rule defining the scope of waters protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The rule revises regulations that have been in place for more than 25 years. Revisions were proposed in March 2014 in light of Supreme Court rulings in 2001 and 2006 that interpreted the regulatory scope of the CWA more narrowly than the agencies and lower courts were then doing, and created uncertainty about the appropriate scope of waters protected under the CWA. On October 9, 2015, a federal court issued an order to stay implementation of the rule nationwide, pending further developments (see " Recent Developments "). Waters that are jurisdictional are subject to the multiple regulatory requirements of the CWA: standards, discharge limitations, permits, and enforcement. Non-jurisdictional waters, in contrast, are not subject to these federal legal requirements. According to the agencies, the new rule—which they now refer to as the Clean Water Rule—revises the existing administrative definition of "waters of the United States" in regulations consistent with legal rulings—especially the recent Supreme Court cases—and science concerning the interconnectedness of tributaries, wetlands, and other waters to downstream waters and effects of these connections on the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of downstream waters. The rule is particularly focused on clarifying the regulatory status of surface waters located in isolated places in a landscape (the types of waters with ambiguous jurisdictional status following the Supreme Court's 2001 ruling in SWANCC ) and small streams, rivers that flow for part of the year, and nearby wetlands (the types of waters affected by the Court's 2006 ruling in Rapanos ). Waters That Are Categorically Jurisdictional
Under the first section of the revised regulation, the following six categories of waters would be jurisdictional by rule without additional or case-specific analysis:
Waters susceptible to interstate commerce, known as traditional navigable waters (no change from existing rules or the 2014 proposal); All interstate waters, including interstate wetlands (no change from existing rules or the 2014 proposal); The territorial seas (no change from existing rules or 2014 the proposal);
Tributaries of the above waters if they meet the definition of "tributary" (these waters are jurisdictional under existing rules, but the term "tributary" is newly defined in the proposed and final rule); Impoundments of the above waters or a tributary, as defined in the rule (no change from existing rules or the 2014 proposal); and All waters, including wetlands, ponds, lakes, oxbows, and similar waters, that are adjacent to a water identified in the above categories (these are considered jurisdictional under the final rule because the agencies conclude that they have a significant nexus to a traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas; the final rule provides a revised definition that for the first time sets limits on what will be considered "adjacent"). Nevertheless, the agencies acknowledge that the rule would increase the categorical assertion of CWA jurisdiction, when compared to a baseline of current practices under the 2003 and 2008 EPA-Corps guidance. This results in part from the agencies' expressly declaring some types of waters categorically jurisdictional and not requiring case-specific evaluation of them (such as all waters adjacent to a jurisdictional water). The agencies believe that the rule does not protect any new types of waters that have not been protected historically (that is, beyond the existing regulations, which the new rule will replace) and that it does not exceed the CWA's coverage. That is, while it would enlarge categorical jurisdiction beyond that under the 2003 and 2008 EPA-Corps guidance, which the agencies believe was narrower than is justified by science and the law, they believe that it would not enlarge jurisdiction beyond what is consistent with the Supreme Court's current reading of jurisdiction. In an Economic Analysis document accompanying the final rule, the agencies estimate that the new rule will result in 2.84%-4.65% more positive assertions of jurisdiction over U.S. waters, compared with current field practice. Congressional interest in the rule has been strong since the proposed rule was announced in March 2014. EPA and Corps officials believe that the final rule responds to those criticisms. The agencies' intention has been to clarify the rules and make jurisdictional determinations more predictable, less ambiguous, and more timely. Some stakeholders believe that the agencies largely succeeded in that objective, while others do not. Recent Developments
Legal challenges to the Clean Water Rule were filed in multiple federal courts soon after it was announced. These lawsuits, filed by industry groups, more than half of the states, and several environmental groups (nearly 90 plaintiffs so far), will test whether the agencies' interpretation of CWA jurisdiction is consistent with the Supreme Court's rulings and whether the rule complies with substantive and procedural requirements of the CWA and other laws. | On May 27, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) jointly announced a final rule defining the scope of waters protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The rule revises regulations that have been in place for more than 25 years. Revisions are being made in light of 2001 and 2006 Supreme Court rulings that interpreted the regulatory scope of the CWA more narrowly than the agencies and lower courts were then doing, and created uncertainty about the appropriate scope of waters protected under the CWA.
According to the agencies, the new rule revises the existing administrative definition of "waters of the United States" consistent with the CWA, legal rulings, the agencies' expertise and experience, and science concerning the interconnectedness of tributaries, wetlands, and other waters and effects of these connections on the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of downstream waters. Waters that are "jurisdictional" are subject to the multiple regulatory requirements of the CWA. Non-jurisdictional waters are not subject to those requirements.
This report describes the final revised rule—which the agencies refer to as the Clean Water Rule. It includes a table comparing the existing regulatory language that defines "waters of the United States" with the revisions. The rule is particularly focused on clarifying the regulatory status of surface waters located in isolated places in a landscape. It does not modify some categories of waters that are jurisdictional under existing rules (traditional navigable waters, interstate waters and wetlands, the territorial seas, and impoundments). The rule also lists waters that would not be jurisdictional, such as prior converted cropland and certain ditches. It makes no change to existing statutory exclusions, such as CWA permit exemptions for normal farming and ranching activities. The rule will replace EPA-Corps guidance that was issued in 2003 and 2008, which has guided agency interpretation of the Court's rulings but also has caused considerable confusion. Much of the controversy since the Supreme Court rulings has focused on the degree to which isolated waters and small streams are jurisdictional. Under the EPA-Corps guidance, many of these waters have required case-specific evaluation to determine if jurisdiction applies. Under the final rule, some of these waters would continue to need case-specific review, but fewer than under the existing agency guidance documents. The final rule also explicitly excludes specified waters from the definition of "waters of the United States" (e.g., prior converted croplands, stormwater management systems, and groundwater).
Changes in the final rule would increase the categorical assertion of CWA jurisdiction, in part as a result of expressly declaring some types of waters jurisdictional by rule (such as all waters adjacent to a jurisdictional water), making these waters subject to the act's permit and other requirements if pollutant discharges occur. Nevertheless, the agencies believe that the rule does not exceed the CWA's lawful coverage or protect new types of waters that have not been protected historically (i.e., under existing rules that the new rule will replace). While it would enlarge jurisdiction beyond that under the existing EPA-Corps guidance, they believe that it would not enlarge jurisdiction beyond what is consistent with the Supreme Court's current reading of jurisdiction and would reduce jurisdiction over some waters, as a result of exclusions and exemptions. The agencies estimate that the new rule will result in approximately 3-5% more positive assertions of jurisdiction over U.S. waters, compared with current field practice.
Congressional interest in the rule has been strong since it was proposed in 2014 and has continued in the 114th Congress. The agencies contend that the final rule responds to criticisms of the proposed rule. Their stated intention has been to clarify the rules and make jurisdictional determinations more predictable, less ambiguous, and more timely. Some stakeholders believe that the agencies largely succeeded in that objective, while others do not. Challenges to the rule were filed in multiple federal district and appellate courts by industry groups, more than half of the states, and several environmental groups. The rule became effective on August 28, 2015, but on October 9, 2015, a federal court blocked the rule's implementation nationwide. The legal question of which federal court should review the challenges to the rule remains in limbo. |
crs_RL32001 | crs_RL32001_0 | Moreover, the adult prevalence rate in several countries in the Caribbean and Central America are among the highest outside of sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, the mode of transmission in several Caribbean and Central American countries has been primarily through unprotected heterosexual contact, which has made it more difficult to contain the epidemic because it affects the general population. The Caribbean countries with the highest prevalence or infection rates in 2006 were Haiti, the Bahamas, Belize, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, with rates between 2% and 4%; and Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Suriname, with rates between 1% and 2%. Consequences of the Epidemic
The AIDS epidemic in the Caribbean and Central America has begun to have negative consequences for economic and social development in the region. Response to the Epidemic
The response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Caribbean and Central America has involved a mix of support by governments in the region, bilateral donors (such as the United States, Canada, and European nations), regional and multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Many countries in the region have national AIDS programs that are supported through these bilateral, regional, and multilateral programs. For more on the Global Fund, see CRS Report RL33396, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Progress Report and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed].) (For more, see CRS Report RL33485, U.S. International HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Spending: FY2004-FY2008 , by [author name scrubbed].) U.S. government funding to combat HIV/AIDS in the Caribbean and Central America has increased in recent years. Foreign aid to the region rose from $11.2 million in FY2000 to $33.8 million in FY2003. Because of the inclusion of Guyana and Haiti in the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), largely funded through the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) foreign assistance account, assistance to the region for HIV/AIDS increased from $47 million in FY2004 to an estimated $139 million for FY2008. For FY2009, the Administration requested $139 million, with $92 million for Haiti and $20 million for Guyana through the GHAI account. In the 110 th Congress, H.R. 848 (Fortuño), introduced February 6, 2007, would add 14 Caribbean countries to those countries targeted as focus countries under PEPFAR. The additional countries are Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, and the Dominican Republic. On April 2, 2008, the House approved H.R. The Senate version of the PEPFAR reauthorization bill, S. 2731 (Biden), reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 15, 2008, would also authorize $50 billion over FY2009-FY2013, to fight AIDS, TB, and malaria, but would not designate the additional 14 Caribbean countries as focus countries. For further information, see CRS Report RL33485, U.S. International HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Spending: FY2004-FY2008 , by [author name scrubbed]. | The AIDS epidemic in the Caribbean and Central America has begun to have negative consequences for economic and social development in several countries, and continued increases in HIV infection rates threaten future development prospects. In contrast to other parts of Latin America, the mode of HIV transmission in several Caribbean and Central American countries has been primarily through heterosexual contact, making the disease difficult to contain because it affects the general population. The countries with the highest prevalence or infection rates are Belize, the Bahamas, Guyana, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago, with rates between 2% and 4%; and Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and Suriname, with rates between 1% and 2%.
The response to the AIDS epidemic in the Caribbean and Central America has involved a mix of support by governments in the region, bilateral donors (such as the United States, Canada, and European nations), regional and multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Many countries in the region have national HIV/AIDS programs that are supported through these efforts.
U.S. government funding for HIV/AIDS in the Caribbean and Central America has increased significantly in recent years. Aid to the region rose from $11.2 million in FY2000 to $33.8 million in FY2003. Because of the inclusion of Guyana and Haiti as focus countries in the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), U.S. assistance to the region for HIV/AIDS increased from $47 million in FY2004 to an estimated $139 million in FY2008. For FY2009, the Administration requested almost $139 million in HIV assistance for the Caribbean and Central America, with $92 million for Haiti and $20 million for Guyana.
In the 110th Congress, H.R. 848 (Fortuño), introduced February 6, 2007, would add 14 Caribbean countries to the list of focus countries under PEPAR. The additional countries are Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, and the Dominican Republic. In the second session of the 110th Congress, the language of H.R. 848 was included in PEPFAR reauthorization legislation, H.R. 5501 (Berman), approved by the House on April 2, 2008. The Senate version of the PEPFAR reauthorization, S. 2731 (Biden), which was reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 15, 2008, does not have a similar provision expanding the list of Caribbean countries that are focus countries.
This report, which will be updated periodically, examines the characteristics and consequences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Caribbean and Central America and the response to the epidemic in the region. Also see CRS Report RL33485, U.S. International HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Spending: FY2004-FY2008, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33396, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Progress Report and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33771, Trends in U.S. Global AIDS Spending: FY2000-FY2008, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42338 | crs_R42338_0 | Privacy and security concerns surrounding smart meter technology arise from the meters' essential functions, which include (1) recording near-real time data on consumer electricity usage; (2) transmitting this data to the smart grid using a variety of communications technologies; and (3) receiving communications from the smart grid, such as real-time energy prices or remote commands that can alter a consumer's electricity usage to facilitate demand response. The data must also be transmitted to electric utilities—and possibly to third parties outside of the smart grid—subjecting it to potential interception or theft as it travels over communications networks and is stored in a variety of physical locations. These characteristics of smart meter data present privacy and security concerns that are likely to become more prevalent as government-backed initiatives expand deployment of the meters to millions of homes across the country. In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Congress appropriated funds for the implementation of the Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) program administered by the Department of Energy. Installation of smart meters and the communications technologies that accompany them may have unforeseen legal consequences for those who generate, seek, or use the data recorded by the meters. This report examines federal privacy and cybersecurity laws that may apply to consumer data collected by residential smart meters. General federal privacy safeguards provided under the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 (FPA) protect smart meter data maintained by federal agencies, including data held by federally owned electric utilities. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) allows the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to bring enforcement proceedings against electric utilities that violate their privacy policies or fail to protect meter data from unauthorized access, provided that the FTC has statutory jurisdiction over the utilities. However, depending upon the manner in which smart meter services are presented to consumers, smart meter data may be protected from unauthorized disclosure or unauthorized access under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). If smart meter data is protected by these statutes, law enforcement would still appear to have the ability to access it for investigative purposes under procedures provided in the SCA, ECPA, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Then it will discuss whether there are sufficient differences between the use of smart meters and traditional third-party cases to counsel against its application. Third-Party Doctrine
Traditionally, there has been no Fourth Amendment protection for information a consumer gives to business as part of their business dealings. Traditionally, utility records have been handled similarly to bank records and telephone records. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. This depth of intrusion suggests that customers may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in smart meter data. Additionally, the dragnet theory may apply to collection of energy usage data. A court could, among other options: (1) find that the meaning of "persons" in Section 5 is ambiguous, and thus defer to the FTC's broad interpretation of its own jurisdiction because of the Chevron doctrine; (2) find that the statute is ambiguous, but that principles of federalism outweigh the court's usual Chevron deference to the Commission's interpretation of its own jurisdiction—a determination that may require a court to find that the state is acting in its sovereign capacity when the state (or one of its subdivisions) operates an electric utility; or (3) find that Congress clearly intended "persons" to include government entities because Section 5 should be read together with the other antitrust laws, under which the term "person" includes state and local government entities—a determination that may require a court to find that the state is performing a proprietary function when the state (or one of its subdivisions) operates a utility. | Fueled by stimulus funding in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), electric utilities have accelerated their deployment of smart meters to millions of homes across the United States with help from the Department of Energy's Smart Grid Investment Grant program. As the meters multiply, so do issues concerning the privacy and security of the data collected by the new technology. This Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) promises to increase energy efficiency, bolster electric power grid reliability, and facilitate demand response, among other benefits. However, to fulfill these ends, smart meters must record near-real time data on consumer electricity usage and transmit the data to utilities over great distances via communications networks that serve the smart grid. Detailed electricity usage data offers a window into the lives of people inside of a home by revealing what individual appliances they are using, and the transmission of the data potentially subjects this information to interception or theft by unauthorized third parties or hackers.
Unforeseen consequences under federal law may result from the installation of smart meters and the communications technologies that accompany them. This report examines federal privacy and cybersecurity laws that may apply to consumer data collected by residential smart meters. It begins with an examination of the constitutional provisions in the Fourth Amendment that may apply to the data. As we progress into the 21st century, access to personal data, including information generated from smart meters, is a new frontier for police investigations. The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to have probable cause to search an area in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, courts have used the third-party doctrine to deny protection to information a customer gives to a business as part of their commercial relationship. This rule is used by police to access bank records, telephone records, and traditional utility records. Nevertheless, there are several core differences between smart meters and the general third-party cases that may cause concerns about its application. These include concerns expressed by the courts and Congress about the ability of technology to potentially erode individuals' privacy.
If smart meter data and transmissions fall outside of the protection of the Fourth Amendment, they may still be protected from unauthorized disclosure or access under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). These statutes, however, would appear to permit law enforcement to access smart meter data for investigative purposes under procedures provided in the SCA, ECPA, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), subject to certain conditions. Additionally, an electric utility's privacy and security practices with regard to consumer data may be subject to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recently focused its consumer protection enforcement on entities that violate their privacy policies or fail to protect data from unauthorized access. This authority could apply to electric utilities in possession of smart meter data, provided that the FTC has statutory jurisdiction over them. General federal privacy safeguards provided under the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 (FPA) protect smart meter data maintained by federal agencies, including data held by federally owned electric utilities.
A companion report from CRS focusing on policy issues associated with smart grid cybersecurity, CRS Report R41886, The Smart Grid and Cybersecurity—Regulatory Policy and Issues, by [author name scrubbed], is also available. |
crs_RS22652 | crs_RS22652_0 | China's Destruction of its Satellite in Space
On January 11, 2007, at 5:28 pm EST, the PRC conducted its first successful direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test, launching a ballistic missile armed with a kinetic kill vehicle (not an exploding conventional or nuclear warhead) to destroy the PRC's Fengyun-1C weather satellite at about 530 miles up in low earth orbit (LEO) in space. Russia downplayed the test. China has known about international concerns about space debris. The longer-term implications concern some questions about China's capability and intention to attack U.S. satellites. Assessments? Also, U.S. intelligence reportedly knew about the PLA's previous tests and preparations for this latest ASAT test. | On January 11, 2007, the People's Republic of China (PRC) conducted its first successful direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test in destroying one of its own satellites in space. The test raised international concerns about more space debris. Longer-term, the test raised questions about China's capability and intention to attack U.S. satellites. The purpose of this CRS Report, based on open sources and interviews, is to discuss that ASAT test by China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and issues about U.S. assessments and policies. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45189 | crs_R45189_0 | This report provides information and analysis on several aspects of the judicial nomination and confirmation process during President Donald Trump's first year in office (as well as during the first year of each of his three immediate predecessors—Presidents Barack Obama, George W. Bush, and Bill Clinton). The number of U.S. district court vacancies increased by 38, from 86 to 124, from the beginning of the first year to the beginning of the second year of the Trump presidency. The percentage of district court judgeships that were vacant at the beginning of President Trump's first year in office was 12.8%, while the percentage vacant at the beginning of his second year was 18.4%. Circuit Court Nominees
Overall, during his first year in office, President Trump nominated 19 individuals to U.S. circuit court judgeships, of whom 12 (or 63%) were also confirmed during the first year of his presidency. In addition to having more circuit court nominees confirmed during his first year in office compared to each of the first years of his three immediate predecessors, the number of individuals confirmed as circuit court judges during President Trump's first year in office was also the greatest number of nominees confirmed to such judgeships during the first year of any presidency since at least 1945. U.S. District Court Nominees
During his first year in office, President Trump nominated 49 individuals to U.S. district court judgeships—of whom 6 (12%) were also confirmed during the first year of his presidency. Of individuals nominated during President Trump's first year in office, 79% (15 of 19) were men and 21% (4) were women. Of individuals nominated during President Trump's first year, 89% (17 of 19) were white and 11% (2) were Asian American. No African American or Hispanic individuals were nominated to circuit court judgeships during this period. Of individuals nominated during President Trump's first year in office, 76% (37 of 49) were men and 24% (12) were women. Race
Figure 4 shows the racial background of individuals nominated to U.S. district court judgeships during each President's first year in office. Of individuals nominated during President Trump's first year, 92% (45 of 49) were white, 4% (2) were Asian American, 2% (1) were African American, and 2% (1) were Hispanic. Circuit Court Nominees
As shown by Figure 5 , of President Trump's U.S. circuit court nominees, 84% (16 of 19) received a rating of well qualified, 11% (2) received a rating of qualified, and 5% (1) received a rating of not qualified. U.S. District Court Nominees
As shown by Figure 6 , of President Trump's U.S. district court nominees, 53% (26 of 49) received a rating of well qualified, 41% (20) received a rating of qualified, and 6% (3) received a rating of not qualified. As shown by the table, the average number of days from nomination to confirmation for U.S. circuit and district court nominees confirmed during President Trump's first year in office was 115 days. Historically, the Senate has confirmed most district and circuit court nominations by unanimous consent or by voice vote. As shown by the table, 11 of 12 U.S. circuit court nominations that were approved by the Senate during President Trump's first year in office received more than 20 nay votes at the time of confirmation. Two of the district court nominees confirmed during the first year of the Trump presidency, Scott L. Palk and Trevor N. McFadden, were, of the total 22 district court nominees confirmed by roll call vote during the first years of the Trump, Obama, and Bush presidencies, the only two district court nominees who received any nay votes at the time of confirmation (none of President Clinton's first-year district court nominees were confirmed by roll call vote). | This report, in light of continued Senate interest in the judicial confirmation process during a President's first year in office, provides statistics related to the nomination and confirmation of U.S. circuit and district court nominees during the first year of the Trump presidency (as well as during the first year of each of his three immediate predecessors—Presidents Barack Obama, George W. Bush, and Bill Clinton).
Some of the report's findings regarding circuit court nominations include the following:
The number of U.S. circuit court vacancies decreased by 1, from 17 to 16, during the first year of the Trump presidency. The percentage of circuit court judgeships that were vacant decreased from 9.5% to 8.9%. During his first year in office, President Trump nominated 19 individuals to U.S. circuit court judgeships, of whom 12 (or 63%) were also confirmed during the first year of his presidency. Of individuals nominated to circuit court judgeships during President Trump's first year in office, 15 (79%) were men and 4 (21%) were women. Of individuals nominated to circuit court judgeships during President Trump's first year in office, 17 (89%) were white and 2 (11%) were Asian American. The average age of President Trump's first-year circuit court nominees was 49. Of individuals nominated to circuit court judgeships during President Trump's first year in office, 16 (84%) received a rating of well qualified from the American Bar Association, 2 (11%) received a rating of qualified, and 1 (5%) received a rating of not qualified. The average length of time from nomination to confirmation for President Trump's first-year circuit and district court nominees (combined) was 115 days, or approximately 3.8 months. Each of the circuit court nominees confirmed during President Trump's first year in office was confirmed by roll call vote (and none by unanimous consent or voice vote). Of the 12 circuit court nominees confirmed during President Trump's first year in office, 11 received more than 20 nay votes at the time of confirmation (and of the 11, 9 received more than 40 nay votes).
Some of the report's findings regarding district court nominations include the following:
The number of U.S. district court vacancies increased by 38, from 86 to 124, during the first year of the Trump presidency. The percentage of district court judgeships that were vacant increased from 12.8% to 18.4%. During his first year in office, President Trump nominated 49 individuals to U.S. district court judgeships, of whom 6 (12%) were also confirmed during the first year of his presidency. Of individuals nominated to district court judgeships during President Trump's first year in office, 37 (76%) were men and 12 (24%) were women. Of individuals nominated to district court judgeships during President Trump's first year in office, 45 (92%) were white, 2 (4%) were Asian American, 1 (2%) was African American, and 1 (2%) was Hispanic. The average age of President Trump's first-year district court nominees was 51. Of individuals nominated to district court judgeships during President Trump's first year in office, 26 (53%) received a rating of well qualified, 20 (41%) received a rating of qualified, and 3 (6%) received a rating of not qualified from the American Bar Association. Each of the district court nominees confirmed during President Trump's first year in office was confirmed by roll call vote (and none by unanimous consent or voice vote). Of the six district court nominees confirmed during President Trump's first year in office, two received more than five nay votes. |
crs_RL33078 | crs_RL33078_0 | Introduction
Hurricane Katrina has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of families from theirhomes. While its magnitude is unprecedented, the resulting need to shelter and house displacedfamilies is not. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the nation's agencywith a mission to provide safe and decent housing for all Americans, has played a role in meetingthose needs in the past and is playing a role in the wake of Katrina. While most aspects of emergency response are led and organized at the state and local level,the federal government provides resources to aid their efforts. (6)
Existing HUD Programs and Authority
In responding to disasters, HUD generally focuses on aiding families in the final two stagesof housing need; temporary and permanent housing. The primary project-based rental assistance programsare Section 8 project-based rental assistance, the Section 202 program for the elderly, and the Section811 program for the disabled. Inthe past, Congress has also created special emergency short-term vouchers that can be used toprovide temporary housing to displaced families. For more information on the use of CDBG fundsfor disaster recovery, see CRS Report RS22303, Community Development Block Grant Funds inDisaster Relief and Recovery , by [author name scrubbed]. Mortgage Programs
While HUD does not provide any direct mortgage loan programs, the Federal HousingAdministration (FHA) does provide both single and multifamily mortgage insurance. A Look At Past Disasters
In order to better understand the role of HUD in meeting the housing needs of families andcommunities impacted by disasters, the following section looks at several past disasters characterizedby major housing losses. (27) HOME dollars were alsodistributed to each of the nine flood-damaged states. The Northridge Earthquake was the costliest in the nation's history, with lossesestimated at between $20 and $40 billion. Prior to the allocation of emergency CDBG funds, HUD took a number of steps to respondto the 2004 Florida hurricanes. FEMAassistance is available to meet a range of housing needs, from emergency shelters, to trailers, to homerepair grants. The review of past disasters included in this report shows that HUD's programs haveprimarily been used to provide longer-term housing aid, such as rental vouchers and new housingconstruction, as well as aid to communities to repair infrastructure and promote economicdevelopment. In the months following 2005's Hurricane Katrina, HUD's programs were not calledon to play a major role in responding to families' housing needs. As the focus shifts from response to Katrina to the inevitable review ofthat response, the appropriate role for HUD to play following a disaster may be the subject ofCongressional debate. | Hurricane Katrina has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of families from theirhomes. While its magnitude is unprecedented, the resulting need to shelter and house displacedfamilies is not. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the nation's agencywith a mission to provide safe and decent housing for all Americans, has played a role in meetingthose needs in the past and is playing a role in the wake of Katrina. This report looks at HUD'scurrent programs and how they have been used to respond to past disasters.
The report begins by introducing the concept of a continuum of housing needs following adisaster. Displaced families' needs range from emergency shelter to temporary and permanenthousing. While the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has primary responsibilityfor coordinating disaster relief efforts and providing certain services to help communities recover,other federal agencies, including HUD, also play an important role.
HUD's programs fall into three distinct categories. The direct housing assistance programsinclude the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, the public housing program, andproject-based rental assistance (including Section 202 and Section 811 programs for the elderly anddisabled). They can be used to provide temporary housing for both families who were receivinghousing assistance at the time of the disaster as well as those who were not. The block grantprograms, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and HOME Investment PartnershipsPrograms, provide flexible funding sources to states and localities to meet housing and othercommunity development needs, including those in times of disaster. The Federal HousingAdministration (FHA) at HUD provides single-family and multi-family mortgage insurance, the rulesof which become more flexible following a disaster.
In order to better understand the role HUD has played in response to disasters, this reportprofiles crises in which the housing stock was severely damaged. Congress provided emergencysupplemental funding to HUD in response to each of the following disasters: Hurricane Andrew,Midwest Flooding, the Northridge Earthquake, and the 2004 Florida Hurricanes.
HUD programs have been used as a conduit for funneling short-, interim-, and long-termfunding to disaster-stricken communities many times in the past, however, Katrina's impact on theregion's housing stock eclipses that of any other natural or manmade disaster in the history of thiscountry. While looking to prior uses of HUD resources in times of disaster may be informative,given the scope of Katrina, new and broad initiatives to meet the interim- and long-term needs of theaffected region and its residents may be considered in the 109th Congress. This report containsreferences to other CRS products that track activities specifically in response to Hurricane Katrina. This report will not be updated.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: ALD -- American Law; DSP -- Domestic Social Policy; G&F --Government and Finance |
crs_RL34205 | crs_RL34205_0 | Introduction
The federal government provides elementary and secondary education and educational assistance to Indian children, either directly through federally funded schools or indirectly through educational assistance to public schools. The Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) in the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) oversees the federally funded BIE system of elementary and secondary schools. The ED ESEA Title VII-A programs, on the other hand, serve a broader set of students: (1) members of federally recognized tribes and their first and second degree descendants; (2) members of two types of nonfederally recognized tribes, state-recognized tribes and tribes whose federal recognition was terminated after 1940, and their first and second degree descendants; (3) members of an organized Indian group that received a grant under the ED Indian Education formula grant program as it was in effect before the passage of the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994; (4) Eskimos, Aleuts, or other Alaska Natives; and (5) individuals considered to be Indian by the Secretary of the Interior, for any purpose. NCES's race/ethnicity-based AI/AN student population is not the same as the student population served by federal Indian education programs. NCES data based on race/ethnicity, then, cannot be assumed to accurately represent the Indian student population served by federal Indian programs. BIE Schools and Students
The BIE funds a system consisting of elementary and secondary schools, which provide free education to eligible Indian students, and "peripheral dormitories" (discussed below). In addition, some schools are operated through a cooperative agreement with a public school district. BIE funds 169 schools and 14 peripheral dorms. Federal Indian Elementary and Secondary Education Programs and Services
Federal Indian elementary and secondary education programs serve Indian elementary and secondary students in public schools, private schools, and the BIE system. Public schools instead receive most of their federal assistance for Indian education through the U.S. Department of Education (ED). Indian students benefit from ED's general assistance as they attend public schools. ED Indian education funding to public and BIE schools flows through a number of programs, most authorized under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) or the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), although other acts also authorize Indian education assistance. In many instances, BIE schools are included in the definition of local educational agency (LEA) in the ESEA and IDEA, so many ED programs may provide funding to BIE schools even when the programs have no BIE set-aside or other specific provision for BIE schools, but these programs are not discussed here. Issues in Indian Education
Some of the issues of concern with regard to Indian education pertain to the comparatively poor academic outcomes of Indian students, Indian communities' desire for greater control of education, the effect of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) on Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools, the poor condition of BIE school facilities, and the allocation of Johnson O'Malley funds. Beginning in 2012, Congress appropriated funds specifically to promote tribal self-determination with respect to public schools. Poor Academic Achievement and Outcomes
There are significant gaps in educational outcomes for Indian students in BIE schools and American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN) students in public schools compared to other students. A counter argument is that native language instruction detracts from the core curriculum. Federal administration of BIE schools is complicated by statutory provisions. AI/AN students in public schools demonstrate higher academic achievement than BIE students, which lends some support for this option. Congress has periodically directed the BIA to develop replacement school priority lists. | The federal government provides elementary and secondary education and educational assistance to Indian children, either directly through federally funded schools or indirectly through educational assistance to public schools. Direct education is provided by the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) in the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), through elementary and secondary schools funded by the BIE. Educational assistance to public schools is provided chiefly through programs of the U.S. Department of Education (ED). The student population served by federal Indian education programs consists of members (or descendants of members) of Indian tribes, not American Indians/Alaska Natives (AI/ANs), as identified by race/ethnicity. Most of this Indian education population attends public schools. Most federal data on Indian students are based on race/ethnicity, however, which complicates analysis of results for the population served by federal Indian education programs.
The BIE was originally part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in DOI. The BIA began the current system of direct Indian education in the decades following the Civil War, with congressional approval and funding. The system developed gradually to its current structure. In the late 19th century, the BIA began placing a few students in public schools, a trend that accelerated after about 1910. At present, over 90% of the Indian student population attends public schools.
The BIE-funded education system for Indian students includes 169 schools (and 14 "peripheral dormitories" for students attending public schools nearby). Schools and dorms may be operated by the BIE itself or by tribes and tribal organizations. A number of BIE programs provide funding and services, supplemented by set-asides for BIE schools from ED programs. Federal funding for Indian students in public schools flows to school districts chiefly through ED programs, with a small addition from a single BIE program. Most of the ED funds are authorized under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA).
A perennial issue regarding Indian education is comparatively poor academic achievement among students in BIE schools and AI/AN students in public schools. Since the 1970s, federal policies to address this issue include permitting greater tribal control and influence through tribally operated BIE schools and culturally relevant educational curriculum and language instruction, and encouraging collaboration between states, local educational agencies, and public schools and tribes and parents of Indian students. ESEA standards and accountability requirements also aim to promote the academic achievement of students. With respect to BIE schools, Congress has wrestled to find a BIE administrative structure that will support greater academic achievement of BIE students. Other issues that Congress and Administrations have attempted to address are the condition of school facilities, the incidence of violence and alcohol and drug use among Indian students, the differential administration of discipline in public schools, and the adequacy of funding. |
crs_R42980 | crs_R42980_0 | Introduction
Leaders in both chambers of Congress have indicated that immigration reform is a legislative priority in the 113 th Congress. The main elements of "comprehensive immigration reform" (CIR) legislation typically include increased border security and immigration enforcement, improved employment eligibility verification, revision of legal immigration, and options to address the millions of unauthorized aliens residing in the country. Several of these elements also were among the features that President Barack Obama emphasized later the same month when he called for the 113 th Congress to "quickly" take up CIR legislation, though President Obama has not endorsed new temporary worker visas. Similar to President Obama's recent statements on CIR, former President George W. Bush stated that comprehensive immigration reform was to be a top priority of his second term. President Bush's principles of immigration reform included increased border security and enforcement of immigration laws within the interior of the United States, as well as a major overhaul of temporary worker visas, expansion of permanent legal immigration, and revisions to the process of determining whether foreign workers were needed. Then—as well as now—the thorniest of these issues centered on unauthorized alien residents of the United States. Substantial efforts to enact CIR legislation failed in the 109 th and 110 th Congresses, prompting some to characterize the issue as a "third rail" that is too highly charged to touch. The three major bills CIR bills that received floor action were
Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 ( H.R. 4437 as passed by the House in the 109 th Congress), Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 ( S. 2611 as passed by the Senate in the 109 th Congress), and Comprehensive Immigration Reform and for other purposes ( S. 1639 as considered by the Senate in 110 th Congress)
This report opens with brief legislative histories of CIR in the 109 th and 110 th Congresses. CIR in the 109th Congress
During the 109 th Congress, both chambers passed major overhauls of immigration law but did not reach agreement on a comprehensive reform package. These proposed revisions to legal immigration included expanded guest worker visas and increased legal permanent admissions. The major bills would not have made sweeping changes to the inadmissibility grounds, but they would have revised specific grounds pertaining to national security and illegal entry. The three bills would also have added gang membership as a ground for inadmissibility. All three bills would have broadened the categories of aliens subject to expedited removal. All three bills would have increased the criminal penalties for immigration and document fraud. All three bills would have expanded the categories of aliens subject to mandatory detention. The House-passed bill in the 109 th Congress would have criminalized unauthorized presence. In contrast, the Senate bills in the 109 th and 110 th Congresses would have created avenues for unauthorized aliens who met a set of criteria and paid prescribed penalties to acquire "earned legalization." 4437 did not contain provisions that would have reformed legal immigration, nor did it have provisions that would have legalized the status of unauthorized aliens in the United States. Comprehensive Immigration Reform and for Other Purposes ( S. 1639 in 110 th Congress)
S. 1639 included provisions aimed at strengthening employment eligibility verification and interior immigration enforcement, as well as increasing border security. | Leaders in both chambers of Congress have listed immigration reform as a legislative priority in the 113th Congress. Most policymakers agree that the main issues in "comprehensive immigration reform" (CIR) include increased border security and immigration enforcement, improved employment eligibility verification, revision of legal immigration, and options to address the millions of unauthorized aliens residing in the country. These elements were among the features that President Barack Obama emphasized when he called for the 113th Congress to take up CIR legislation.
Similar to President Obama's recent statements on CIR, former President George W. Bush stated that comprehensive immigration reform was a top priority of his second term. President Bush's principles of immigration reform included increased border security and enforcement of immigration laws within the interior of the United States, as well as a major overhaul of temporary worker visas, expansion of permanent legal immigration, and revisions to the process of determining whether foreign workers were needed. Then—as well as now—the thorniest of these issues centered on unauthorized alien residents of the United States.
During the 109th Congress, both chambers passed major overhauls of immigration law but did not reach agreement on a comprehensive reform package. In the 110th Congress, Senate action on comprehensive immigration reform legislation stalled at the end of June 2007 after several weeks of intensive floor debate. The House did not act on comprehensive legislation in the 110th Congress.
The three major CIR bills in the 109th and 110th Congresses were the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R. 4437 as passed by the House in 109th Congress), the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 (S. 2611 as passed by the Senate in 109th Congress), and the Comprehensive Immigration Reform (S. 1639 as considered by the Senate in 110th Congress). All three of the major CIR bills had provisions that would have
increased resources for border security, expanded employment eligibility verification, increased the worksite enforcement penalties, broadened inadmissibility grounds pertaining to national security and illegal entry and added a ground for gang membership, expedited the implementation of the automated entry-exit system known as US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology), broadened the categories of aliens subject to expedited removal, increased the criminal penalties for immigration and document fraud, and expanded the categories of aliens subject to mandatory detention.
Despite these similarities, there were substantial differences between the chambers regarding the treatment of unauthorized aliens as well as allocations of visas across family and employment categories for future flows of legal immigrants. The House-passed bill in the 109th Congress would have criminalized unauthorized presence. In contrast, the Senate bills in the 109th and 110th Congresses would have created avenues for unauthorized aliens who met a set of criteria and paid prescribed penalties to acquire "earned legalization." The Senate bills also had provisions that would have made substantial revisions to legal permanent admissions, notably revising and expanding the employment-based permanent and temporary visa categories.
The failure of these substantial efforts to enact CIR in the 109th and 110th Congresses has prompted some to characterize CIR as a "third rail" issue that is too highly charged to touch. |
crs_98-223 | crs_98-223_0 | 97-253 ; September 8, 1982) suspended previously existing permanent law pertaining to cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for federal civilian and military retirees. FY1984 (1983) COLA Actions
The COLA situation for military retirees remained unchanged during FY1984 legislative activity (that which took place during calendar year 1983), despite efforts from the Administration and in the Congress. The Administration proposed to:
Repeal the provisions of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1982 (1) authorizing COLAs effective May 1, 1984, and June 1, 1985, and (2) providing for the COLAs of nondisabled retirees under age 62 to be calculated on a different basis from all other retirees' COLAs; Permanently shift the payment date for federal civilian and military retirement COLAs to January 1 of each year, beginning with January 1, 1985. FY1988 (1987) and FY1989 (1988) COLA Actions
The Reagan Administration's FY1988 and FY1989 DOD budgets did not propose any changes in military retirement COLA provisions contained in permanent law. As this report indicates, this was a major change from previous years. First, it proposed to cancel the COLA that would be paid on January 1, 1990. FY1992 (1991) and FY1993 (1992) COLA Actions
The original FY1992 and FY1993 budgets of the Bush Administration, submitted in early 1991 and 1992, respectively, proposed no military retirement COLA reductions. The Boren-Danforth proposal did not exempt disability retirement and survivor benefits from its provisions. Administration Budget
The FY1997-FY1998 DOD budgets of the Clinton Administration included no proposals for changes or cuts in military retirement COLAs—i.e., the budgets for all five years assumed that the law as it stood after enactment of FY1996 legislation would stand: payment of each fiscal year's COLA on January 1 of each year. FY1999-FY2005 (1998-2004) COLA Actions
In each of the seven fiscal years FY1999-FY2005, all military retirement COLAs were first paid on January 1 of those years. There were no proposals in the Administration budgets and no congressional actions directed at any COLA changes in these years. These seven years are the longest period since military retirement COLAs were first authorized in 1963 in which no legislative changes in the COLA mechanism have been even proposed. Similarly, the eight fiscal years FY1997-FY2005 (calendar years 1996-2004), contained no changes in the COLA formula, the longest such period since 1963 in which no actual changes were made. | The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1982 (which applied to FY1983 budget issues) suspended previously existing permanent law pertaining to cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for federal civilian and military retirees, and changed the COLA calculation formulas to postpone and/or reduce future COLAs for military retirees during 1983-1985 (FY1984-FY1986). Although the COLA situation during 1983 (FY1984) remained unchanged, despite some proposals to modify the 1982 legislation so as to further reduce COLAs, the period from 1984 (the FY1985 budget) to 1986 (the FY1987 budget) was marked by intense debate over reducing COLAs and an actual elimination of the 1986 (FY1987) COLA. Reagan Administration budget proposals in both 1987 (FY1988) and 1988 (FY1989) did not propose any changes in military retirement COLA provisions contained in permanent law, a major change from the previous several years. Neither did any such changes take place as a result of congressional action.
The original Bush Administration budgets in both 1989 (FY1990) and 1990 (FY1991) proposed canceling the COLAs scheduled for January 1, 1990, and January 1, 1991, respectively, and reducing future COLAs. However, none of these proposals were eventually enacted into law. The Bush Administration budgets in 1991 (FY1992) and 1992 (FY1993) did not include any proposals for reducing COLAs, and no such proposals were acted on by the Congress.
The Clinton Administration's budgets for 1993-1999 (FY1994-2000) did not include any proposals for reducing COLAs, although COLA reduction proposals were considered by the Congress during some of these years. Some were enacted in each of the years 1993-1995 (FY1994-1996), providing that in each of those years, disabled military retirees and survivor benefit recipients were first paid their COLA on January 1; nondisabled military retirees first received their COLAs on April 1. However, the FY1997-FY2005 budgets, enacted in 1996-2004 respectively, contained no changes in the COLA formula. Hence, the FY1997-FY2005 military retirement COLAs were first paid on January 1 of each of those years, respectively, to all classes of military retirees. These nine years are the longest period since military retirement COLAs were first authorized in 1963 in which no legislative changes in the COLA mechanism have been made; the seven years FY1999-FY2005, calendar years 1998-2004, are the longest period in which no COLA cuts have even been proposed, let alone enacted. |
crs_R43154 | crs_R43154_0 | ESRD and Medicare Eligibility
End-stage renal disease (ESRD) is the final phase of chronic kidney disease — a gradual loss in kidney function over time. Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health care services, which include kidney transplantation for eligible beneficiaries. For beneficiaries who are eligible for Medicare due to ESRD, Medicare may provide coverage on the first month of eligibility if the beneficiary is admitted to a Medicare-approved hospital to undergo a kidney transplant procedure or elects to receive dialysis treatment at home. Medicare Coverage of ESRD-Related Services
Medicare consists of four distinct parts: Part A (Hospital Insurance, or HI), Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance, or SMI), Part C (Medicare Advantage), and Part D (outpatient prescription drugs). For ESRD-related services, Medicare Part A includes coverage for inpatient services in an approved hospital for covered kidney transplants and cost of care for the kidney donor. According to the United States Renal Data System (USRDS), in 2010, total Medicare expenditures for beneficiaries with ESRD were estimated to be $32.9 billion, or roughly 6.3% of total Medicare expenditures. Part B immunosuppressive drug expenditures consisted of $345 million in 2010. Of the individuals under the age of 65 that have received a successful kidney transplant at a prior date and no longer required dialysis treatment in 2010 (142,923 patients), roughly 41% were not eligible for Medicare coverage (58,728 patients); see Figure 1 . Medicare Coverage of Immunosuppressive Drugs for Kidney Transplant Recipients
Individuals with a functioning kidney transplant usually require immunosuppressive drugs for life to minimize the risk of their immune system rejecting the "foreign" donor kidney. Currently, Medicare provides coverage for immunosuppressive drugs under Part B if the transplant was covered by Medicare and in an approved facility. Beginning January 1, 2014, beneficiaries with a functioning kidney transplant who are no longer entitled to Medicare may have greater access to health insurance in the private market (and therefore potential coverage of immunosuppressive drugs), due to provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. Beginning in 2005, Medicare's Part B drug payment methodology is based on manufacturers' reported average sales price (ASP) for each drug, plus a 6% handling and storage payment. Part D Payment Policy of Immunosuppressive Drugs
Beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Part D can receive coverage for any additional outpatient prescription drugs and/or for immunosuppressive drugs if the transplant was not covered by Medicare. Medicare Part D will not provide immunosuppressive drug coverage for beneficiaries who have received a Medicare-covered transplant regardless if the beneficiary is enrolled in Part B and/or Part D. Payment for drugs is determined by the prescription drug plan and cost-sharing amounts for covered drugs vary by plan; however, in general, prescription drug plans have lower cost-sharing amounts for generics compared to brand name drugs. While beneficiaries with ESRD who received a functioning kidney transplant no longer require dialysis treatment to survive, such individuals are not considered "cured" of the disease—instead requiring immunosuppressant therapy rather than dialysis as a form of treatment. Since the 105 th Congress, legislation has been introduced in each Congress to extend some form of Medicare coverage after the 36 months following a kidney transplant for individuals who are not otherwise eligible to enroll in Medicare. In addition, in 2014, individuals with a functioning kidney transplant may have greater access to immunosuppressive drug coverage from private health plans in the individual and small business marketplace. | End-stage renal disease (ESRD) is substantial and permanent loss in kidney function. Persons with ESRD require either a regular course of dialysis treatment (a process that removes harmful waste products from an individual's blood stream) or a kidney transplant to survive. The Medicare program provides coverage for health care services for the vast majority of individuals diagnosed with ESRD, regardless of age.
In 2010, roughly 489,000 Medicare beneficiaries received ESRD-related services—less than 1% of the total Medicare population. According to the United States Renal Data System (USRDS), in 2010, Medicare expenditures for the ESRD-related services totaled $32.9 billion, or roughly 6.3% of total Medicare expenditures.
The Medicare program consists of four parts: Part A (Hospital Insurance, or HI), Part B (Supplementary Medical Insurance, or SMI), Part C (Medicare Advantage), and Part D (outpatient prescription drug coverage). Under Part A, Medicare-covered ESRD-related services include dialysis treatments upon admission to a hospital, inpatient services in an approved hospital for covered kidney transplants, and the cost of care for the individual donating a kidney. Under Part B, Medicare-covered ESRD-related services include dialysis treatments in a dialysis facility or at home, physicians' services for kidney transplant procedures, and certain prescription drugs—including immunosuppressive drugs (for individuals who received a Medicare-covered transplant). Under Part D, beneficiaries can also enroll in a prescription drug plan to receive coverage for drugs that treat ESRD-related symptoms and any additional outpatient prescription drugs. Coverage of immunosuppressive drugs for individuals whose transplant was not covered by Medicare may be covered under Part D.
Individuals who have received a kidney transplant usually require immunosuppressive drugs for the rest of their life to minimize the risk of their immune system rejecting the donor kidney. In 2010, Part B expenditures for immunosuppressive drugs totaled $345 million. Under Part B, Medicare provides payment for immunosuppressive drugs based on manufacturers' reported average sales price (ASP), for each drug, plus a 6% handling and storage payment. Since 2009, the ASP for commonly used immunosuppressive drugs has decreased by over 50%—most likely due to the use of generics.
For ESRD beneficiaries, Medicare covers a lifetime of dialysis treatments. For Medicare-eligible individuals with a functioning kidney transplant, Medicare covers the cost of the transplant and 36 months of follow-up care (which includes immunosuppressive medication). According to the USRDS, at the end of 2010, approximately 41% of individuals under the age of 65 who had a functioning kidney transplant and thus no longer required dialysis were not covered by Medicare. Since the 105th Congress, legislation has been introduced in each Congress to provide some form of Medicare coverage for post-transplant recipients who are no longer entitled to Medicare following 36 months of a successful kidney transplant. Individuals who are not covered by Medicare who require immunosuppressive drugs and do not have health insurance may have to pay the cost of immunosuppressive drugs out-of-pocket. In 2014, individuals who are not covered by Medicare and who have a functioning kidney transplant may have greater access to immunosuppressive drug coverage from private health plans due to provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and a recent decline in the price of commonly used immunosuppressive drugs. |
crs_RL32706 | crs_RL32706_0 | For example, they want software providers to be required to obtain the consent of an authorized user of a computer ("opt-in") before any software is downloaded onto that computer. They may be on a disk or other media, downloaded from the Internet, or downloaded when opening an attachment to an electronic mail (e-mail) message. Typically, users have no knowledge that spyware is on their computers. Another oft-cited example of spyware is "adware," which may cause advertisements to suddenly appear on the user's monitor—called "pop-up" ads. Spyware also can refer to "keylogging" software that records a person's keystrokes. All typed information thus can be obtained by another party, even if the author modifies or deletes what was written, or if the characters do not appear on the monitor (such as when entering a password). In the context of the spyware debate, the concern is that such software can record credit card numbers and other personally identifiable information that consumers type when using Internet-based shopping and financial services, and transmit that information to someone else. Some of these software applications, including adware and keylogging software, do, in fact, have legitimate uses. Additionally, the FTC maintains its own list of cases. FTC Advice to Consumers
The FTC has consumer information on spyware that includes a link to file a complaint with the commission through its "OnGuard Online" website. The FTC has also issued a consumer alert about spyware that lists warning signs that might indicate a computer is infected with spyware. Legislative Action—111th Congress
No legislative action on spyware. Additional Reading
Federal Trade Commission "Microsite" on Spyware [web page]. 4661 ) and the Senate Commerce Committee reported S. 2145 , but there was no further action. | The term "spyware" generally refers to any software that is downloaded onto a computer without the owner's or user's knowledge. Spyware may collect information about a computer user's activities and transmit that information to someone else. It may change computer settings, or cause "pop-up" advertisements to appear (in that context, it is called "adware"). Spyware may redirect a web browser to a site different from what the user intended to visit, or change the user's home page. A type of spyware called "keylogging" software records individual keystrokes, even if the author modifies or deletes what was written, or if the characters do not appear on the monitor. Thus, passwords, credit card numbers, and other personally identifiable information may be captured and relayed to unauthorized recipients.
Some of these software programs have legitimate applications the computer user wants. They obtain the moniker "spyware" when they are installed surreptitiously, or perform additional functions of which the user is unaware. Users typically do not realize that spyware is on their computer. They may have unknowingly downloaded it from the Internet by clicking within a website, or it might have been included in an attachment to an electronic mail message (e-mail) or embedded in other software.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has produced a consumer alert on spyware. The alert provides a list of warning signs that indicate that a computer might be infected with spyware and advice on what to do if it is. Additionally, the FTC has consumer information on spyware that includes a link to file a complaint with the commission through its "OnGuard Online" website.
Several states have passed spyware laws, but there was no specific federal law and no legislation introduced in the 111th Congress. |
crs_RL30472 | crs_RL30472_0 | Background and Structure of the Oil-For-Food Program
The establishment of the United Nations "oil-for-food" program (OFFP) reflected a longstanding U.N. Security Council effort to alleviate human suffering in Iraq while pressing Iraq to comply with all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. The U.N. Sanctions Committee administered the implementation of sanctions on Iraq and was responsible for ensuring that Iraq complied with all relevant U.N. sanctions, including the embargo on oil sales outside of the program, during the rule of Saddam Hussein. In order to ensure that only humanitarian objectives were served, the OFFP placed substantial controls on approved Iraqi oil exports and humanitarian imports under its jurisdiction. Accomplishments of the Program
There is a consensus among U.N. officials and outside observers that the OFFP eased substantially, but did not eliminate, severe economic hardship in Iraq. The smart sanctions plan was intended to defuse criticism by several governments, including permanent members of the U.N. Security Council France, Russia, and China, that the United States was using international sanctions to promote the overthrow of the Iraqi government or to punish Iraq indefinitely for the invasion of Kuwait. Iraq's neighbors maintained that enhanced border controls would harm their economies. Since then, Iraq has sold its oil unfettered: oil revenues are no longer held in a U.N.-run escrow account, and the program's oil sales monitoring infrastructure is no longer in operation. Since the handover of sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government on June 28, 2004, Iraq's Ministry of Trade has managed the receipt and distribution of residual contracts. Others said they were improperly named in the Iraqi newspaper because the paper sought to expose politicians that had been somewhat supportive of Saddam Hussein's regime. Non-Oil-For-Food Program Illicit Trade: Trade Protocols, Illicit Oil Sales, and Oil Smuggling
According to the IIC report, Saddam Hussein's regime earned $11 billion from illicit oil sales that began before the OFFP started and remained outside of the scope or authority of the U.N. OFFP and in violation of U.N. sanctions on Iraq. The United States and other members of the U.N. Sanctions Committee took note of Iraq's illicit oil sales to some of its neighbors but, for a number of reasons, chose not to take direct action to halt the sales or punish states or entities engaged in them prior to the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003. The United Nations did not formally approve this export route, and the United States argued that the trade was illegitimate and contrary to pledges made to the Bush Administration in early 2001. As in the case of Jordan, the Clinton and Bush Administrations annually waived unilateral U.S. sanctions on Turkey that could be imposed because of this illicit trade. Oil-For-Food Program: Allegations of Mismanagement and Abuse
Current allegations regarding the mismanagement and abuse of the U.N. OFFP fit into two broad categories: (1) allegations of mismanagement of the contracts and administration of the OFFP by contractors and U.N. staff, and (2) abuse of the U.N. program through vouchers, surcharges, and kickbacks by the regime of Saddam Hussein. | The "oil-for-food" program (OFFP) was the centerpiece of a long-standing U.N. Security Council effort to alleviate human suffering in Iraq while maintaining key elements of the 1991 Gulf war-related sanctions regime. In order to ensure that Iraq remained contained and that only humanitarian needs were served by the program, the program imposed controls on Iraqi oil exports and humanitarian imports. All Iraqi oil revenues legally earned under the program were held in a U.N.-controlled escrow account and were not accessible to the regime of Saddam Hussein.
The program was in operation from December 1996 until March 2003. Observers generally agree that the program substantially eased, but did not eliminate, human suffering in Iraq. Concerns about the program's early difficulties prompted criticism of the United States; critics asserted that the U.S. strategy was to maintain sanctions on Iraq indefinitely as a means of weakening Saddam Hussein's grip on power. At the same time, growing regional and international sympathy for the Iraqi people resulted in a pronounced relaxation of regional enforcement—or even open defiance—of the Iraq sanctions. The United States and other members of the United Nations Security Council were aware of billions of dollars in oil sales by Iraq to its neighbors in violation of the U.N. sanctions regime and outside of the OFFP, but did not take action to punish states engaged in illicit oil trading with Saddam Hussein's regime. Successive Administrations issued annual waivers to Congress exempting Turkey and Jordan from unilateral U.S. sanctions for their violations of the U.N. oil embargo on Iraq. Until 2002, the United States argued that continued U.N. sanctions were critical to preventing Iraq from acquiring equipment that could be used to reconstitute banned weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. In 2002, the Bush Administration asserted that sanctions were eroding, and the Administration decided that the overthrow of that regime had become necessary.
The program terminated following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the assumption of sovereignty by an interim Iraqi government on June 28, 2004, and the lifting of Saddam-era U.N. sanctions. However, after the fall of the regime, there were new allegations of mismanagement and abuse of the program, including allegations that Saddam Hussein's regime manipulated the program to influence U.N. officials, contractors, and politicians and businessmen in numerous countries. New attention also has been focused on Iraq's oil sales to neighboring countries outside the control or monitoring of the U.N. OFFP. Several investigations revealed evidence of corruption and mismanagement on the part of some U.N. officials and contractors involved with the OFFP, and called into question the lack of action on the part of U.N. Sanctions Committee members, including the United States, to halt Iraq's profitable oil sales outside of the program over a ten year period.
This product will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security. |
crs_RL34285 | crs_RL34285_0 | Subsection (g) of Section 612 states that when cable systems with 36 channels or more reach 70% of U.S. households and 70% of households "passed" by these cable systems actually subscribe to that service, the FCC "may promulgate any additional rules necessary to provide a diversity of information sources." The FCC previously had determined that the first prong of the so-called "70/70" test had been met. If the FCC determines that the test has been met, the Commission will then have the authority to "promulgate any additional rules necessary to provide a diversity of information sources." The House Report seems to suggest that Subsection 612(g) was intended to grant the FCC power to promulgate such rules in the event the 70/70 test was met. Thus, subsection 612(g) provides a mechanism to assure there is adequate flexibility to develop new rules and procedures with respect to the use of leased access channels as the cable industry develops and serves more citizens in the future. In 1992, however, Congress enacted the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act, which amended Section 612 to give the FCC more authority to regulate leased access. In other words, all of the powers Congress, in the House Report, had suggested would be conferred upon the FCC under 612(g) were granted expressly to the Commission by the 1992 Cable Act revisions of Section 612. The scope of the FCC's authority under 612(g), therefore, remains an open question. Proponents of broad authority under 612(g) argue that if Congress granted the FCC the power to promulgate "any" rule to promote a diversity of information sources, Congress meant to do exactly as it said and did not mean to restrict the FCC's powers to leased access. Judicial Review of the Scope of Subsection 612(g)
Judicial review of the scope of the FCC's power to promulgate rules under 612(g) would likely begin with a determination of whether or not the court is required to defer to the agency's interpretation of its authority. | The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) recently issued a report requesting data to aid in determining whether the so-called "70/70" test for cable market penetration has been met. Under Section 612(g) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, when 70% of households in the United States are able to subscribe to cable services of 36 channels or more and 70% of those households actually subscribe to such services, the FCC will be empowered to "promulgate any additional rules necessary to provide a diversity of information sources." A House Report issued when the provision was enacted indicated that 612(g) was intended to provide "a mechanism to assure there is adequate flexibility to develop new rules and procedures with respect to the use of leased access channels as the cable industry develops and serves more citizens in the future." Subsequent amendments to Section 612 granted the FCC greater power to regulate leased access to cable systems. In fact, all of the powers Congress, in the House Report, had suggested would be conferred upon the FCC under 612(g) were granted expressly to the Commission by the subsequent revisions of Section 612. Congress did not, however, repeal Subsection 612(g). The scope of the FCC's authority under 612(g), therefore, remained an open question.
The FCC has yet to determine whether the level of market penetration required to trigger 612(g) has been met. Consequently, neither the courts nor the FCC has interpreted the extent of the FCC's authority to promulgate new regulations that would "provide a diversity of information sources." Two main arguments have been made regarding the scope of the Commission's power under the 70/70 provision. The first argument would grant the FCC broad authority to promulgate any rule that encourages a "diversity of information sources." The second argument would grant the FCC more narrow authority to promulgate new rules relating to leased access of cable systems by unaffiliated persons. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41963 | crs_R41963_0 | Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agencies for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified more than 40 provisions in PPACA that require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation. The Unified Agenda
A potentially better way for Congress to identify upcoming PPACA rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (hereafter, Unified Agenda), which is published twice each year (usually in the spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration, for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date (sometimes just the projected month and year) for the next regulatory action. Each entry also contains an element indicating the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act). This Report
The July 7, 2011, edition of the Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan is the second edition that RISC has compiled and issued after the enactment of PPACA. This report examines the July 7, 2011, edition of the Unified Agenda and identifies upcoming proposed and final rules and long-term actions that were expected to be issued pursuant to PPACA in the next 12 months. Within the proposed and final rule sections of the table, the entries are organized by agency. | Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agencies for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148) is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified more than 40 provisions in PPACA that require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation.
One way for Congress to identify upcoming PPACA rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, which is published twice each year (spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration, for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The Unified Agenda lists upcoming activities, by agency, in five separate categories or stages of the rulemaking process: the prerule stage, the proposed rule stage, the final rule stage, long-term actions, and completed actions. All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date for the next regulatory action. Each entry also contains an element indicating the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act).
This report examines the most recent edition of the Unified Agenda, published on July 7, 2011 (the second edition that RISC compiled and issued after the enactment of PPACA). The report identifies upcoming proposed and final rules listed in the July 7, 2011, Unified Agenda that are expected to be issued pursuant to PPACA. (A previous CRS report identified the rulemaking actions that were listed in the December 2010 version of the Unified Agenda.) The Appendix lists these upcoming proposed and final rules in a table. The report also briefly discusses the long-term actions listed in the Unified Agenda, as well as some options for congressional oversight over the PPACA rules. |
crs_R43780 | crs_R43780_0 | Recent reports that certain entities continued to receive federal government contracts after reincorporating overseas have prompted questions about current and proposed restrictions on contracting with "inverted domestic corporations." These questions are shaped, in part, by the broader debate over whether such corporations are to be seen as "deserters," who change their corporate citizenship to avoid paying U.S. taxes, or as evidencing systemic problems in the U.S. tax code. However, they also reflect long-standing debate over whether and to what degree the federal procurement process should be used to promote socioeconomic goals that one court described as "only indirectly related to conventional procurement considerations" (i.e., acquiring the supplies and services that best meet the government's needs at the lowest price). Congress has sought to discourage corporate inversions by barring certain contracts with inverted domestic corporations ever since it enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 , §835). As amended, this act prohibits the Department of Homeland Security from awarding a contract to an inverted domestic corporation, or a subsidiary thereof, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that a waiver is necessary in the interest of national security. The act also establishes its own definition of inverted domestic corporation , which is different from that in the Internal Revenue Code. Subsequent legislation imposed similar prohibitions upon other agencies, although only as to funds appropriated or otherwise made available under specific acts of Congress. However, some commentators have argued that inverted domestic corporations have continued to receive federal contracts because of "loopholes" or "gaps" in these measures. Thus, some Members of the 114 th Congress have proposed legislation to reduce or remove opportunities for inverted domestic corporations to receive government contracts. Similar legislation was introduced in the 113 th Congress. There have also been calls by Members of both the 113 th and 114 th Congresses for the executive to take action to further restrict agencies' ability to contract with inverted domestic corporations. This report provides the answers to 14 frequently asked questions regarding the current restrictions on contracting with inverted domestic corporations, proposed amendments thereto, and the relationship between the prohibitions upon contracting with inverted domestic corporations and other provisions of law that restrict dealings with "foreign" contractors. H.R. | Recent reports that certain entities continued to receive federal government contracts after reincorporating overseas have prompted questions about current and proposed restrictions on contracting with "inverted domestic corporations." These questions are shaped, in part, by the broader debate over whether such corporations are to be seen as "deserters," who change their corporate citizenship to avoid paying U.S. taxes, or as evidencing systemic problems in the U.S. tax code. However, they also reflect long-standing debate over whether and to what degree the federal procurement process should be used to promote socioeconomic goals that some assert are tangential to the primary purpose of the procurement process (i.e., acquiring the supplies and services that best meet the government's needs at the lowest price).
Congress has sought to discourage corporate inversions by barring certain contracts with inverted domestic corporations ever since it enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 , §835). As amended, this act prohibits the Department of Homeland Security from awarding a contract to an inverted domestic corporation, or a subsidiary thereof, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that a waiver is necessary in the interest of national security. The act also establishes its own definition of inverted domestic corporation , which is different from that in the Internal Revenue Code. Subsequent legislation imposed similar prohibitions upon other agencies, although only as to funds appropriated or otherwise made available under specific acts of Congress. However, some commentators have argued that inverted domestic corporations have continued to receive federal contracts because of "loopholes" or "gaps" in these measures. Thus, some Members of the 114 th Congress have proposed legislation ( H.R. 1809 , S. 975 ) to reduce or remove opportunities for inverted domestic corporations to receive government contracts. Similar legislation was introduced in the 113 th Congress. There have also been calls by Members of both the 113 th and 114 th Congresses for the executive to take action to further restrict agencies' ability to contract with inverted domestic corporations.
This report provides the answers to 14 frequently asked questions regarding the current restrictions on contracting with inverted domestic corporations, proposed amendments thereto, and the relationship between the prohibitions upon contracting with inverted domestic corporations and other provisions of law that restrict dealings with "foreign" contractors. |
crs_RL31745 | crs_RL31745_0 | Introduction
In an effort to expand the options for health coverage, 35 states have established high risk health insurance pools. These programs target individuals who cannot obtain or afford health insurance in the private market, primarily due to preexisting health conditions. Many states also use their high risk pools to comply with the portability and guaranteed availability provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA, P.L. 104-191 ). In general, state high risk pools tend to enroll a small percentage of the uninsured. For example, approximately 200,000 individuals were enrolled in the 34 high risk pools in operation in 2008. In addition to state-established high risk pools, the 111 th Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which President Obama signed into law ( P.L. Benefits
Although health benefits provided through high risk pools vary across plans and states, they generally reflect coverage that is available in the private nongroup market. Congress established a grant program, administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), to provide seed grants to states that did not already have high risk pools but wanted to establish them, and operational and bonus grants to existing state pools. 107th Congress
With enactment of the Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. The Trade Act authorized and appropriated $20 million in the form of seed grants. Nineteen states were awarded operational grants in FY2003; 22 states in FY2004. 109th Congress
With expiration of authorizing legislation for the grant program, the House passed H.R. 4519 , the State High Risk Pool Funding Extension Act of 2006, on December 17, 2005. 4519 reauthorized federal grants to state high risk pools through FY2010, and changed the funding formula used for such grants. H.R. 4519 also allowed operational grants to cover up to 100% of pool losses and authorized the following amounts for FY2006: $15 million for seed grants and $75 million for operational and bonus grants. The Senate passed H.R. 4519 without amendment on February 1, 2006, and President Bush signed it into law ( P.L. 109-172 ) on February 10, 2006. As part of the budget reconciliation process, the Senate passed S. 1932 , the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) conference agreement. This measure also included conforming language on enactment of H.R. 653 , the House agreed to the Senate-amended bill on February 1, 2006. 109-171 ). That same year, CMS awarded grants to 31 states that experienced operational losses in 2005. Of those 31 states, 25 also received bonus grants, exhausting the entire appropriations for operational and bonus grants. 110th Congress
Pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ), Congress made additional funding available for grants to state high risk pools. On July 21, 2008, CMS announced that 30 states received grants totaling $49, 126,500. 111th Congress
The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 ( P.L. On September 30, 2009, CMS awarded operational grants to 31 states and bonus grants to 28 states (see Table 4 ). Furthermore, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ) provided $55,000,000 in additional appropriations for high risk pools. PPACA, as amended, requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a temporary high risk pool program, prior to 2014, to provide health insurance coverage to certain individuals with preexisting health conditions who have been uninsured for six or more months. | In an effort to expand the options for health coverage, 35 states have established high risk health insurance pools. These programs target individuals who cannot obtain or afford health insurance in the private market, primarily because of preexisting health conditions. Also, many states use their high risk pools to comply with the portability and guaranteed availability provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-191).
In general, state high risk pools tend to enroll a small percentage of the uninsured. In December 2009, approximately 208,000 individuals were enrolled in high risk pools. State-established nonprofit organizations typically run these pools, with private insurance companies handling day-to-day operations, along with plan administrative staff. Although benefit packages vary across states and plans, they generally reflect health benefits that are available in the private insurance market. The majority of high risk pools cap premiums between 150% to 200% of market rates, and pools are subsidized through insurer assessments and other funding mechanisms.
The Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210) appropriated a total of $100 million for FY2003-FY2004. With the expiration of authorizing legislation for federal funding of state pools, the 109th Congress took up this issue. The House passed H.R. 4519, the State High Risk Pool Funding Extension Act of 2006, which reauthorized federal grants to state high risk pools through FY2010, and changed the funding formula used for such grants. The act authorized $15 million for seed grants and $75 million for operational and bonus grants for FY2006. The Senate passed H.R. 4519 without amendment, and it was signed into law (P.L. 109-172) on February 10, 2006.
As part of the budget reconciliation process, the Senate passed S. 1932, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) conference agreement, which provided appropriations for the grants authorized under H.R. 4519. The measure also included conforming language on enactment of H.R. 4519. The House agreed to the Senate-amended DRA bill, and it was signed into law (P.L. 109-171) on February 8, 2006. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) awarded grants to 31 states that experienced operational losses in 2005. Of those 31 states, 25 also received bonus grants. In 2006, CMS awarded seed grants to five states, and to another five states in 2007.
The 110th Congress took up the issue of extending the federal grant program by making funding available pursuant to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-161). The grant funding totaled $49,127,000. In July 2008, CMS announced that 30 states received operational and bonus grants totaling $49,126,500.
The 111th Congress provided $75 million in appropriations for grants to state high risk pools under the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8). On September 30, 2009, CMS awarded operational grants to 31 states and bonus grants to 28 states. Furthermore, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-117) provided $55 million in additional appropriations for high risk pools.
In addition to state-established high risk pools, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148), as amended, requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a temporary high risk pool program to provide health insurance coverage for certain uninsured individuals with preexisting health conditions.
This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_R42893 | crs_R42893_0 | Medicaid Background
Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term services and supports (LTSS). Medicaid is jointly financed by the federal government and the states. Medicaid Expenditures
In FY2012, federal Medicaid payments to states totaled $271 billion (see Figure 1 ), which was almost 8% of all federal spending. Proposals to Reduce Federal Medicaid Expenditures
Since Medicaid accounts for a relatively large and growing portion of the federal budget, controlling federal Medicaid spending has been a focus of deficit reduction and budget proposals, such as the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, the Debt Reduction Task Force, the President's FY2013 budget proposal, the FY2013 House Budget Resolution, and the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) choices for deficit reduction (see the Appendix for a description of these proposals). The major recommendations and options to reduce federal Medicaid expenditures include repealing or delaying the ACA's Medicaid expansion, restructuring Medicaid financing, reducing or eliminating states' use of provider taxes, reforming the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP), changing coverage options for dual eligibles, reducing federal Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) allotments, and limiting Medicaid reimbursement for durable medical equipment (DME). Federal Medical Assistance Percentage48
The federal government's share for most Medicaid expenditures is determined by the FMAP rate. The FMAP formula compares each state's per capita income to U.S. per capita income. Some of the proposals discussed in this report would reduce overall Medicaid expenditures (e.g., repealing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion, changing coverage options for dual eligibles, and limiting Medicaid reimbursement for durable medical equipment), while other options would reduce federal Medicaid expenditures (e.g., block granting Medicaid, reducing or eliminating states' use of provider taxes, and reforming the FMAP). The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform final report included federal savings from Medicaid totaling $58 billion from FY2012 to FY2020. The savings came from eliminating states' ability to fund Medicaid through provider taxes and covering dual eligibles under managed care arrangements. The President's FY2013 budget included a number of Medicaid provisions estimated by the Administration to reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by $55.7 billion from FY2013 to FY2022. The Medicaid provisions included limiting states' ability to use provider taxes in financing the state share of Medicaid expenditures, replacing the current federal Medicaid financing structure with a blended FMAP rate, limiting Medicaid reimbursement of durable medical equipment, and extending Medicaid DSH reductions. Additional detail on budgetary objectives and justifications was provided in Chairman Ryan's report entitled The Path to Prosperity: A Blueprint for American Renewal , issued the same day. H.Con.Res. The major Medicaid proposal would restructure the Medicaid program from an individual entitlement to a block grant. The options affecting the Medicaid program include repealing the ACA Medicaid expansion, converting the federal share of LTSS into a block grant, and reducing the FMAP floor. Together, CBO estimated these options would reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by $156 billion in FY2020. | Medicaid is a means-tested entitlement program that finances the delivery of primary and acute medical services as well as long-term services and supports (LTSS). Medicaid is jointly financed by both the federal government and the states. The federal government's share for most Medicaid expenditures is called the federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP), and under the FMAP, the federal government pays a larger portion of Medicaid costs in states with lower per capita incomes relative to the national average (and vice versa for states with higher per capita incomes).
Federal Medicaid funding to states is open-ended, and in a typical year, the federal government funds 57% of the total cost for Medicaid. In FY2012, federal Medicaid expenditures accounted for almost 8% of all federal spending. As a result, controlling federal Medicaid spending has been a focus of deficit reduction and budget proposals.
The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform's final report included savings from Medicaid totaling $58 billion over 10 years. The provisions with Medicaid savings included eliminating states' ability to fund Medicaid through provider taxes and covering dual-eligibles under managed care arrangements.
The Bipartisan Policy Center's Debt Reduction Task Force estimated its proposals would reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by about $25 billion over 10 years. The task force proposed removing barriers for states to use managed care to cover dual eligibles and limiting the growth in Medicaid expenditures by changing the structure of Medicaid financing.
The President's FY2013 budget included a number of Medicaid provisions estimated by the Administration to reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by $56 billion over the next 10 years. The Medicaid provisions in the President's budget included limiting states' ability to utilize provider taxes, implementing a blended FMAP rate, limiting Medicaid reimbursement of durable medical equipment, and "rebasing" Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments.
The House FY2013 Budget Resolution (H.Con.Res. 112), based on Representative Ryan's Path to Prosperity: A Blueprint for American Renewal document, proposed restructuring the Medicaid program from an individual entitlement to a block grant and repealing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Together these provisions are estimated to reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by $1.4 trillion from FY2013 to FY2022.
In November 2012, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published the document Choices for Deficit Reform, which provides the following options to reduce federal Medicaid expenditures: repealing the ACA Medicaid expansion, converting the federal share of LTSS into a block grant, and reducing the FMAP floor. Together, CBO estimated these options would reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by $156 billion in FY2020.
This report provides some background about Medicaid, including information about Medicaid expenditures. Then, the report explains the major proposals to reduce federal Medicaid expenditures. These proposals include repealing the ACA's Medicaid expansion, restructuring Medicaid financing, reducing or eliminating states' use of provider taxes, reforming the FMAP, changing coverage options for dual eligibles, reducing federal Medicaid DSH allotments, and limiting Medicaid reimbursement for durable medical equipment. |
crs_R44882 | crs_R44882_0 | Introduction
This report tracks and provides an overview of actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2018 appropriations for the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The three trade-related agencies are funded through the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations act. This report also provides an overview of the enacted FY2017 appropriations for the three trade-related agencies. 115-31 ) provided a total of $636.5 million for the trade-related agencies. It requested $442.5 million (-$40.5 million, -8.4%) in direct funding for ITA, $87.6 million (-$3.9 million, -4.3%) for USITC, and $57.6 million (-$4.4 million, -7.1%) for USTR. 601 ; P.L. House Action
The House Appropriations Committee reported its CJS proposal in July 2017 ( H.R. 3267 ). The House incorporated H.R. 3267 into Division C of the Consolidated Appropriations bill, H.R. 3354 , which passed the House on September 14, 2017. 3354 recommended a total of $627.5 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. It included $467.0 million for the ITA in direct appropriations, $92.5 million for USITC, and $68.0 million for USTR, of which $15 million would be derived from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund. Senate Action
The Senate reported S. 1662 on July 27, 2017, but did not consider the proposal on the floor. It included a total of $631.1 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. It included $482.0 million for the ITA in direct appropriations, $91.5 million for USITC, and $57.6 million for USTR, of which $10 million would be derived from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund. On March 23, 2018, Congress passed and the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. The act provides $482.0 million for ITA, $93.7 million for USTIC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, of which $15 million is to be drawn from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund. The FY2018 appropriations for the three CJS trade-related agencies is $648.3 million, an amount 1.9% greater than the FY2017 appropriation, and 10.3% more than the Administration's request. House-passed H.R. The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act provides a total of $72.6 million for USTR, a 17.1% increase from the FY2017 enacted amount, and 26.0% more ($15.0 million) than the Administration's request. | This report tracks and provides an overview of actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2018 appropriations for the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). These three trade-related agencies are funded through the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations act. This report also provides an overview of three trade-related programs administered by ITA, USITC, and USTR.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) provided a total of $636.5 million for the three agencies, including $483.0 million for ITA, $91.5 million for USITC, and $62.0 million for USTR for FY2017.
For FY2018, the Administration requested a total of $587.7 million for the three trade-related agencies. The total included $442.5 million for ITA, $87.6 million for USITC, and $57.6 million for USTR. The Administration's request for all three agencies is less than the FY2017-enacted appropriations.
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported CJS proposals in July 2017 (H.R. 3267 and S. 1662). The House incorporated H.R. 3267 into Division C of the Consolidated Appropriations bill, H.R. 3354, which passed the House on September 14, 2017. House-passed H.R. 3354 recommended a total of $627.5 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. It included $467.0 million for the ITA in direct appropriations, $92.5 million for USITC, and $68.0 million for USTR, of which $15 million would be derived from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund.
The Senate reported S. 1662 on July 27, 2017, and included a total of $631.1 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. It included $482.0 million for the ITA in direct appropriations, $91.5 million for USITC, and $57.6 million for USTR, of which $10 million would be derived from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund.
On March 23, 2018, Congress passed and the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141). The act provides $482.0 million for ITA, $93.7 million for USTIC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, of which $15 million is to be drawn from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund. The FY2018 appropriation for the three CJS trade-related agencies is $648.3 million, an amount 1.9% greater than the FY2017 appropriations, and 10.3% more than the Administration's request. |
crs_RL34166 | crs_RL34166_0 | 110-81 , on September 14, 2007. Background
The intent of the statutory amendments and the internal congressional rules changes was to address the concerns over allegations and appearances of improper or undue influence of special private interests, and their hired lobbyists, over high-ranking government officials and decision makers. The statute and rule changes which have been adopted address five general areas of reform: (1) broader and more detailed disclosures of lobbying activities by paid lobbyists, and more disclosures concerning the intersection of the activities of professional lobbyists and government policy makers; (2) more extensive restrictions on the offering and receipt of gifts for Members of Congress and their staff, including gifts of transportation and travel expenses; (3) new restrictions addressing the so-called "revolving door," that is, post-government-employment "lobbying" activities by former high level government officials on behalf of private interests; (4) reform of the pension provisions with regard to Members of Congress found guilty of abusing the public trust; and (5) greater transparency in the internal legislative process in the House and Senate, including "earmark" disclosures and accountability. The provisions of S. 1 , 110 th Congress ( P.L. "Ethics" Rule Changes Concerning Gifts, Travel, and Contacts With Lobbyists
The provisions of S. 1 , 110 th Congress ( P.L. The provisions in S. 1 regarding the Senate rules on gifts are similar in many aspects to the internal changes made to the rules of the House in H.Res. Similar changes to House rules were adopted in H.Res. 363 , 110 th Congress). 6). 110-81) | Significant changes were made by Congress to the current lobbying laws, and to internal House and Senate rules on ethics and procedures, by the passage of S. 1 , 110 th Congress ( P.L. 110-81 , 121 Stat. 735, September 14, 2007) and the adoption of H.Res. 6 , 110 th Congress. In the face of mounting public and congressional concern over allegations and convictions of certain lobbyists and public officials in a burgeoning "lobbying and gift" scandal, and with a recognition of legitimate concerns over undue influence and access of certain special interests to public officials, Congress has adopted stricter rules, regulations, and laws attempting to address these issues.
This report provides summaries of the changes made to law and congressional rule in S. 1 , 110 th Congress ( P.L. 110-81 ), and the changes adopted to internal House rules earlier in the Congress in H.Res. 6 . The statutory and internal congressional rule changes which have been adopted address five general areas of reform: (1) broader and more detailed disclosures of lobbying activities by paid lobbyists, and more disclosures concerning the intersection of the activities of professional lobbyists with government policy makers; (2) more extensive restrictions on the offering and receipt of gifts and favors for Members of Congress and their staff, including gifts of transportation and travel expenses; (3) new restrictions addressing the so-called "revolving door," that is, post-government-employment "lobbying" activities by former high-level government officials on behalf of private interests; (4) reform of the government pension provisions with regard to Members of Congress found guilty of abusing the public trust; and (5) greater transparency in the internal legislative process in the House and Senate, including "earmark" disclosures and accountability. |
crs_RL30648 | crs_RL30648_0 | (5)
The biotechnology industry is notable both for its heavy concentration of small businesses and its weighty research and development (R&D) expenses. (7)
Given their small size and heavy expenses, many observers believe that firms in the biotechnology industry rely upon their ability to raise venture capital. (8) The patent law has beenidentified as a facilitator of these R&D financing efforts. (9)
Although many commentators believe that the patent law plays a crucial role in the biotechnology industry, (10) numerous legal,economic and policy issues have arisen concerning thepatenting of biotechnology. A brief reviewof some principal biotechnologies follows. The market capitalization of many biotechnology and other high-technology enterprises has been impacted by patent-relateddevelopments. (113)
Other commentators have expressed concerns over diminishing genetic diversity. (127) In arguing that biotechnology may be put to work todiminish animal suffering, some observers have pointed to the genetically engineered transgenicchicken that resists avian leukemia virus. The Utility Requirement
Section 101 of the Patent Act also mandates that patents issue only to "useful" inventions. Under Justice Story's view, the utility requirement does not provide a significant place for technology assessment. However, other commentators remain deeplyconcerned over the implications of patenting living inventions, genetic materials and otherbiotechnologies, as well as the patenting of biotechnological inventions with unknown or speculativeutilities. The impact of these exceptions is that a signatory may disallow patents from issuing on living entities other than microorganisms. U.S.law arguably includes this exception already, given case law requiring that biotechnologicalinventions be subject to artificial invention in order to be patentable. Congress could examine whether the definition of patentable utility should be legislatively specified. | The biotechnology industry is notable both for its heavy concentration of small businesses and its weighty research and development (R&D) expenditures. Given the small size and heavy expensesof many biotechnology firms, their ability to raise venture capital may be of some consequence. Thepatent law has been identified as a facilitator of these R&D financing efforts.
Although many observers believe that the patent law plays a significant role in the biotechnology industry, two principal issues have arisen regarding biotechnology patenting. First,observers have fundamentally questioned whether patents should be granted for living inventions,genetic materials and other biotechnologies. Ethical issues, concerns that biotechnology patentingpromotes animal suffering and decreases genetic diversity, as well as regard for the traditionalagricultural community animate many of these objections. Supporters of biotechnology patentingcounter that trade secret protection is a less attractive social alternative, observe that patents havelong been granted for biotechnologies, and question whether the patent law is the appropriate vehiclefor technology assessment.
Commentators have also differed over the extent to which an inventor must show a specific, practical use for a biotechnology in order to be awarded a patent. Some observers favor a strict viewof the utility requirement due to concerns over overlapping upstream patents that discourage researchand commercialization. Others believe that the utility requirement should be applied leniently,stating that a strict view of utility will only lead to industry concentration and that biotechnologyresearch tools cannot be meaningfully distinguished from other sorts of inventions.
Congress may choose to exercise oversight on these issues. Such consideration would likely include examination of U.S. commitments in international agreements along with other factors. |
crs_RL33289 | crs_RL33289_0 | Social Security plays an important role in reducing poverty, not only among the aged but among children as well. Children may be eligible for Social Security benefits when a parent who is a covered worker dies, becomes disabled, or retires. In addition to receiving Social Security benefits in their own right, children may economically benefit from Social Security by living with other family members who receive benefits. The estimates presented in this report are based on a CRS analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data in April 2013. CRS analysis of SIPP data for April 2013 indicates that among an estimated 73.0 million children under age 18, an estimated 8.5 million (11.6%) lived in families in which one or more family members received Social Security—over two and one-half times the number of children estimated to receive Social Security benefits based on the administrative data discussed above from four months earlier (3.3 million in December 2012). Children living in families who received Social Security were about equally as likely to be poor in April 2013 as children living in families who didn't—24.8% compared to 23.3% (the third and second bars, respectively). Figure 3 shows, for example, that 47.8% of children living in families that received Social Security would have been considered poor based on their families' incomes from sources other than Social Security. Figure 4 focuses on just the 5.1 million children who are classified as either child beneficiaries and/or children whose parent(s) or guardian(s) received Social Security, whereas Figure 5 shows the other 3.4 million children who are in families in which Social Security is received only by extended family members other than a parent or guardian. Thus, over two-fifths of Social Security dollars paid to families with children goes to children who would otherwise be counted as poor. Among families with child beneficiaries, about $3.847 billion in Social Security benefits were reported in April 2013 (about $46.167 billion on an annualized basis). Of this amount, nearly half (49.2% , $1.892 billion, or $22.702 billion on an annualized basis), went to families that had total incomes, excluding Social Security , below the poverty line, which is more than five times the estimated $4.485 billion in federal cash welfare spending under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in FY2013. An additional 1.893 million children lived with a parent or guardian who reported receiving Social Security on the SIPP in April 2013, but who did not indicate that benefits were received on behalf of a child. These 5.068 million children are differentiated from the remaining 3.430 million children who live in families in which Social Security was received only by extended family (e.g, grandparents, aunts, uncles, nieces or nephews) or other family members (adult sibling). For the former group, Social Security's effect on child poverty is more directly related to Social Security policy, whereas for the latter group, Social Security's effect on child poverty is incidental, being more directly related to children's incidental family living arrangements. | Social Security plays an important role in reducing poverty, not only among the aged but among children as well. Children may be eligible for Social Security benefits when a parent who is a covered worker dies, becomes disabled, or retires. In addition to receiving Social Security in their own right, children may economically benefit from Social Security by living with other family members receiving benefits.
Based on a Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data, in April 2013, an estimated 8.5 million children lived in families in which one or more family members received Social Security—11.6% of all children. Of this number, an estimated 5.1 million were either child beneficiaries in their own right, or lived with a parent or guardian who reported receiving Social Security. The remaining 3.4 million children lived in families in which Social Security was received only by extended family members (e.g, grandparents, aunts, uncles, nieces or nephews) or other family members (adult siblings). For the former group, Social Security's effect on child poverty is more directly related to Social Security policy, whereas for the latter group, Social Security's effect on child poverty is more directly related to children's incidental family living arrangements.
Children living in families who received Social Security were about equally as likely to be poor (24.4%) in April 2013 as children living in families who didn't (23.3%). Children estimated to have received Social Security benefits on their own behalf and/or to live with a parent or guardian who received Social Security were more likely to be poor (27.2%) than children who incidently were living in families in which Social Security is received only by extended family members (e.g., grandparent, aunt, uncle) or adult sibling (21.3%).
Social Security benefits lifted an estimated 1.952 million children above the official poverty line in April 2013. Among children in families that received Social Security, an estimated 47.8% (4.062 million) would have been considered poor based on family income other than Social Security. The addition of Social Security to family income reduces the incidence of poverty among these children to 24.8% (2.110 million).
In April 2013, it's estimated that over two-fifths of Social Security dollars paid to families with children helped children who otherwise would be counted as poor. Social Security benefits paid on behalf of children and/or their parents or guardians amounted to nearly an estimated $3.847 billion in April 2013, or $46.167 billion on an annualized basis. Of this amount, nearly half (49.2%), $22.072 billion on an annualized basis, went to families who would have been considered poor based on their pre-transfer income (i.e., excluding Social Security), about two and one-half times the estimated $8.738 billion in combined federal and state cash welfare spending under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in FY2013, and five times the federal (only) share of $4.485 billion. |
crs_RL31263 | crs_RL31263_0 | Though small in scale compared to the scenarios envisioned bybioterrorism experts and played out in recent government exercises, the recent anthrax attacksstrained the public health system and exposed weaknesses at the federal, state, and local levels. Improving public health preparedness and response capacity offersprotection not only from bioterrorist attacks, but also from naturally occurring public healthemergencies. On June 12, 2002, the President signed into law the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-188 , H.R. 3448 ), which is intendedto bolster the nation's ability to respond effectively to bioterrorist threats and other public healthemergencies. It adds to the programs and authorities established in Title III of the PublicHealth Service (PHS) Act by the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-505 ,Title I) and creates a new PHS Act Title XXVIII: National Preparedness for Bioterrorism and OtherPublic Health Emergencies. P.L. 107-188 is a 5-year authorization act, which calls for a total of $2.4billion in funding for FY2002, $2.0 billion for FY2003, and such sums as may be necessary for theremaining years. It also directs the Secretary to upgrade and renovate CDC's facilities. Inaddition, the act authorizes the HHS Secretary to purchase smallpox vaccine and expand the nationalstockpile of medicine and medical supplies to meet the nation's health security needs. P.L. 107-188 contains several provisions to protect the nation's food and drug supply and enhance agricultural security. All foreignand domestic food facilities are required to register with the FDA. 107-188 includesa set of provisions aimed at protecting the nation's drinking water supply, including authorizing $160million to provide financial assistance to community water systems to conduct vulnerabilityassessments and prepare response plans. The bioterrorism legislation also includes language reauthorizing the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), which was set to expire on September 30, 2002. | Last fall's anthrax attacks, though small in scale compared to the scenarios envisioned by bioterrorism experts, strained the public health system and raised concern that the nation isinsufficiently prepared to respond to bioterrorist attacks. Improving public health preparedness andresponse capacity offers protection not only from bioterrorist attacks, but also from naturallyoccurring public health emergencies.
On June 12, 2002, the President signed into law the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-188 , H.R. 3448 ), which is intendedto bolster the nation's ability to respond effectively to bioterrorist threats and other public healthemergencies. The act builds on the programs and authorities established in Title III of the PublicHealth Service (PHS) Act by the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-505 ,Title I).
P.L. 107-188 is a 5-year authorization bill, which calls for a total of $2.4 billion in funding in FY2002, $2.0 billion in FY2003, and such sums as may be necessary for the remaining years. Theact authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to upgrade and renovate facilitiesat the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), purchase smallpox vaccine, expand thenational stockpile of drugs, vaccines, and other emergency medical supplies, and provide grants tostate and local governments and hospitals to improve preparedness and planning. The Secretariesof HHS and Agriculture are required to register and regulate facilities that handle potentiallydangerous biological agents.
The anti-bioterrorism legislation also includes provisions to protect the nation's food and drug supply and enhance agricultural security, including new regulatory powers for the Food and DrugAdministration (FDA) to block the importation of unsafe foods. To protect the drinking watersupply, the act requires community water systems to conduct vulnerability assessments and developemergency response plans. P.L. 107-188 also reauthorizes the Prescription Drug Use Fee Actthrough FY2007.
The following analysts may be contacted for additional information: |
crs_RS21342 | crs_RS21342_0 | RS21342 -- Immigration: Diversity Visa Lottery
Updated April 26, 2004
Background
The purpose of the diversity visa lottery is, as the name suggests, to encourage legal immigration from countries other than the majorsending countries of current immigration to the United States. Recipients of the visas become legal permanent residents(LPRs) of the UnitedStates. As Figure 1 illustrates, European immigrants comprised 39.4%of the diversity visa recipients incontrast to 10.4% of the family-based and employment-based immigrants in FY2002. (7) For the first time,applications for the diversity lottery must have been submitted electronically. Some are arguing that the INA should be amended to prevent nationals from countries that the United States identifies as sponsors ofterrorism from participating in the diversity visa lottery. | The diversity visa lottery offers an opportunity for immigration to nationals of countriesthat do not have high levels of immigration. Aliens from eligible countries had until noon on December 30, 2003to submit theirapplications for the FY2005 diversity visa lottery. Aliens who are selected through the lottery, if they are otherwiseadmissible underthe Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), may become legal permanent residents of the United States. Participation in the diversityvisa lottery is limited annually to 55,000 aliens from countries that are under-represented among recent immigrantadmissions to theUnited States. In FY2001, over 8 million aliens from around the world sent in applications for the FY2003 lottery. Of the diversityvisas awarded in FY2002, European immigrants comprised 39.4% of the diversity visa recipients and Africanimmigrants received38.1%. This report does not track legislation and will not be regularly updated. |
crs_RL34579 | crs_RL34579_0 | If the next generation of nuclear power plants consists of LWRs, what is the potential role of advanced nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies? Prominent among the policy issues currently before Congress is the direction of the existing nuclear energy programs in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Advanced nuclear reactors that could increase efficiency and safety are being developed by DOE's Generation IV program, which is looking beyond today's "Generation III" light water reactors. While long a goal of nuclear power proponents, the reprocessing or recycling of spent nuclear fuel is also seen as a weapons proliferation risk, because plutonium extracted for new reactor fuel can also be used for nuclear weapons. Therefore, a primary goal of U.S. advanced fuel cycle programs, including GNEP, has been to develop recycling technologies that would not produce pure plutonium that could easily be diverted for weapons use. The "proliferation resistance" of these technologies is subject to considerable debate. Removing uranium from spent nuclear fuel through reprocessing would eliminate most of the volume of radioactive material requiring disposal in a deep geologic repository. DOE Advanced Nuclear Programs
DOE's advanced nuclear technology programs date back to the early years of the Atomic Energy Commission in the 1940s and 1950s. In particular, it was widely believed that breeder reactors would be necessary for providing sufficient fuel for a commercial nuclear power industry. Early research was also conducted on a wide variety of other power reactor concepts, some of which are still under active consideration. Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
GNEP is the Bush Administration's program for commercial deployment of reprocessing or recycling of spent nuclear fuel. As part of GNEP, AFCI is conducting R&D on an Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR) that could destroy recycled plutonium and other long-lived radioactive elements. Typically, the Senate recommends more for the program than the House does, and that pattern appears to be continuing for FY2009. The House Appropriations Committee recommended no FY2009 funding for the ABR. As shown by the industry studies described above, the advanced nuclear technologies under development by GNEP and Gen IV will require many years of government-supported development before they reach the current stage of LWRs. The Bush Administration has renewed the federal research effort on these technologies, so now the question before Congress is whether the time has come to move to the next, more expensive, development stages. | Current U.S. nuclear energy policy focuses on the near-term construction of improved versions of existing nuclear power plants. All of today's U.S. nuclear plants are light water reactors (LWRs), which are cooled by ordinary water. Under current policy, the highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel from LWRs is to be permanently disposed of in a deep underground repository.
The Bush Administration is also promoting an aggressive U.S. effort to move beyond LWR technology into advanced reactors and fuel cycles. Specifically, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), under the Department of Energy (DOE) is developing advanced reprocessing (or recycling) technologies to extract plutonium and uranium from spent nuclear fuel, as well as an advanced reactor that could fully destroy long-lived radioactive isotopes. DOE's Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems Initiative is developing other advanced reactor technologies that could be safer than LWRs and produce high-temperature heat to make hydrogen.
DOE's advanced nuclear technology programs date back to the early years of the Atomic Energy Commission in the 1940s and 1950s. In particular, it was widely believed that breeder reactors—designed to produce maximum amounts of plutonium from natural uranium—would be necessary for providing sufficient fuel for a large commercial nuclear power industry. Early research was also conducted on a wide variety of other power reactor concepts, some of which are still under active consideration.
Although long a goal of nuclear power proponents, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is also seen as a weapons proliferation risk, because plutonium extracted for new reactor fuel can also be used for nuclear weapons. Therefore, a primary goal of U.S. advanced fuel cycle programs, including GNEP, has been to develop recycling technologies that would not produce pure plutonium that could easily be diverted for weapons use. The "proliferation resistance" of these technologies is subject to considerable debate.
Much of the current policy debate over advanced nuclear technologies is being conducted in the appropriations process. For FY2009, the House Appropriations Committee recommended no further funding for GNEP, although it increased funding for the Generation IV program. Typically, the Senate is more supportive of GNEP and reprocessing technologies.
Recent industry studies conducted for the GNEP program conclude that advanced nuclear technologies will require many decades of government-supported development before they reach the current stage of LWRs. Key questions before Congress are whether the time has come to move beyond laboratory research on advanced nuclear technologies to the next, more expensive, development stages and what role, if any, the federal government should play. |
crs_RS22947 | crs_RS22947_0 | Like current AAVs, the EFV is designed to roll off a Navy amphibious assault ship, move under its own power to the beach, and cross the beach and operate inland. In 2003, the Marines renamed the program the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program. Program Cost and Funding25
The Marines originally planned to procure 1,025 EFVs at a total cost of $8.5 billion. Each EFV was expected to cost about $24 million apiece. There were concerns that the high cost of the EFV could consume up to 90% of the Marines' ground equipment budget. Decision to Terminate the EFV43
On January 6, 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that, based on recommendations from the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, he had decided to recommend termination of the EFV. Secretary Gates stated that his decision "does not call into question the Marines' amphibious assault mission." Opposition to EFV Cancellation48
Reports suggest that Secretary Gates's decision to cancel the EFV could face congressional opposition. Despite the Marines' agreement to cancel the program, some Members reportedly believe that the EFV is central to the Marines' ability to launch an amphibious assault far enough off shore to protect the fleet. Other Members have also suggested that the EFV cancellation would lead to eliminating hundreds of high-skilled manufacturing jobs as well as hurting local economies in states and districts associated with the EFV program. General Dynamics' Proposal to Continue the Program
General Dynamics, the EFV's developer, suggests that it would be more affordable to "finish what's already been started," and build 200 EFVs and save the amount of money that it will take to terminate the program. General Dynamics says that this would save $6 billion, which it believes would be the costs to terminate the EFV, upgrade current AAVs, and to develop and procure a new amphibious vehicle. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)55
The Marines, a little more than a month after Secretary Gates's EFV cancellation announcement, initiated a new competition to upgrade existing AAVs and develop a successor to the EFV (previously called the New Amphibious Assault Vehicle [NAV] but now called the Amphibious Combat Vehicle [ACV]). The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos, has committed the Marine Corps to fielding the ACV within four years. FY2012 EFV Budget Request56
The Marines did not submit a budget request for FY2012 funding for the EFV. Instead, FY2011 and FY2010 funds will be used to cover termination costs as well as complete ongoing testing and developmental work, to include delivery of EFV-related software. This examination could help to ensure that there is "value added" by these technologies and that they meet "cost-benefit" criteria—in other words, these technologies meet ACV key performance parameters (KPPs) and are not expensive "nice to have" features that could potentially drive up the ACV per unit cost. Congress might wish to review whether the Marines' plan to field the ACV in four years is overly ambitious. During the Navy's presentation of its FY2012 Budget Request, it was reported that Navy and Pentagon officials stated that the "soonest that the ACV would be ready was 2024." As previously noted, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos, has committed the Marine Corps to fielding the ACV within four years. | The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is an armored amphibious vehicle program that originated two decades ago to replace the 1970s-era Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV). Like current AAVs, the EFV is designed to roll off a Navy amphibious assault ship, move under its own power to the beach, and cross the beach and operate inland. The EFV has experienced a variety of developmental difficulties, resulting in significant program delays and cost growth. The EFV is currently in its second systems design and development (SDD) phase attempting to improve the EFV's overall poor reliability and performance that it demonstrated during its 2006 operational assessment. On January 6, 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced, based on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy and Commandant of the Marine Corps, that he would recommend the cancellation of the EFV. Secretary Gates also reaffirmed the Marines' amphibious assault mission and pledged to fund future efforts to acquire a more affordable and sustainable replacement and also to upgrade existing amphibious assault vehicles.
The Marines originally planned to procure 1,025 EFVs at a total cost of $8.5 billion, but increasing costs compelled the Marines to reduce their procurement to 573 EFVs. Each EFV was expected to cost about $24 million apiece, and there were concerns that the high cost of the EFV could consume up to 90% of the Marines' ground equipment budget. There has been congressional opposition to Secretary Gates's decision to cancel the EFV. Despite the Marines' agreement to cancel the program, some Members reportedly believe that the EFV is central to the Marines' ability to launch an amphibious assault far enough off shore to protect the fleet. Other Members have also suggested that the EFV cancellation would lead to eliminating hundreds of high-skilled manufacturing jobs, as well as hurting local economies in states and districts associated with the EFV program.
The Marines, a little more than a month after Secretary Gates's EFV cancellation announcement, initiated a new competition to upgrade existing AAVs and develop a successor to the EFV (previously called the New Amphibious Assault Vehicle [NAV] but now called the Amphibious Combat Vehicle [ACV]). The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Amos, has committed the Marine Corps to fielding the ACV within four years. General Dynamics, the EFV's developer, suggests that it would be more affordable to "finish what's already been started," and build 200 EFVs and save the amount of money that it will take to terminate the program.
The Marines did not submit a budget request for FY2012 funding for the EFV. Instead, FY2011 and FY2010 funds will be used to cover termination costs as well as complete ongoing testing and developmental work, to include delivery of EFV-related software.
Potential issues for Congress include the possible evaluation of General Dynamics' proposal to build only 200 EFVs, which it contends would save $6 billion. Another issue is a possible examination of EFV technologies that the Marines plan to incorporate into the ACV to help to ensure that there is "value added" by these technologies and that they meet "cost-benefit" criteria. Another possible issue is the Marines' plan to field the ACV in four years, which could be considered by some as overly ambitious. Navy and Pentagon officials stated that the soonest that the ACV would be ready was 2024, while the Commandant of the Marines Corps has committed the Marines to field the ACV in four years. This report will be updated. |
crs_R43443 | crs_R43443_0 | The Government's Landlord
The General Services Administration (GSA) is the federal government's primary civilian real property management agency with 11 regional offices that oversee GSA owned and leased properties across the nation. At the end of FY2012, GSA—through its real property office, the Public Buildings Service (PBS)—owned or leased 8,708 buildings with more than 422 million square feet of floor space, which represents about 12.6% of the government's 3.354 billion total building square footage. GSA's inventory includes offices, courthouses, and land ports of entry. Prospectus Approval Process
Under the Public Buildings Act, as amended (PBA), GSA is required to submit a formal document, known as a prospectus, to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure (referred to throughout this report as the authorizing committees) as part of the process to authorize and appropriate funds for constructing, purchasing, leasing, or renovating real property. Each prospectus must include
a brief description of the building to be constructed, altered, or leased; the building's location; an estimate of the maximum cost of the project; a statement by the Administrator that suitable space in existing government-owned buildings is not available; a statement of rents and other housing costs currently being paid by agencies that would occupy the newly constructed, renovated, or leased space; and an estimate of the future energy performance of the building. Each committee must pass a resolution approving the prospectus before the project is authorized to receive appropriations. It is not uncommon for the cost of real property projects—particularly the construction of new buildings—to escalate as the project proceeds. Prospectus Approval as Oversight
The prospectus approval process provides Congress with an opportunity to exercise oversight of GSA's real property activities. Congress may also use the prospectus approval process to evaluate cost and space projections. Factors that Limit Oversight
The usefulness of the prospectus approval process as an oversight tool may be limited by data that are not available to authorizing committees. Nonetheless, GSA's lease prospectuses do not include a comparison of the costs of leasing versus owning space over time, known as an alternative analysis. While GSA is not required by law to include an alternative analysis in its prospectuses, the absence of comparative cost data means Congress is making decisions without knowing whether a proposed lease is the most cost-effective option. Such alterations are not necessarily included in the cost estimate of a lease prospectus because the actual building in which space will be leased has not been selected when GSA submits a prospectus. 2612 , the Public Buildings Service Savings and Reform Act, on July 8, 2013. Key Provisions Related to Prospectus Process
Required Offsets for New Space
Section 2(a) would require any prospectus that proposes new space, whether leased or owned, in fiscal years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, to include the details of the elimination of at least an equal amount of space from GSA's inventory. Reports on Leases
Section 4(a) would require GSA to submit to the authorizing committees, by December 3 of each year, a list of all leases that it entered into during the previous fiscal year. It would also require GSA to notify the authorizing committees, in writing, of any project that would increase in cost, or increase or decrease in scope or size beyond its authorized size or scope by 5% or more. Analysis
If H.R. H.R. It is also not clear how Congress would track proposed disposals to ensure they are completed as detailed in the prospectus. H.R. The bill proposes a new requirement that may provide Congress with a "red flag" for projects at risk for significant cost escalation. A second cost containment measure in the bill would require GSA to notify the authorizing committees in writing before entering into certain leases that fall below the prospectus threshold. H.R. 2612 . There are several committees that are considering real property reform bills which share some of the core objectives of H.R. 2612 . | The General Services Administration (GSA) controls more than 8,700 owned and leased buildings with 422 million square feet of floor space, which represents about 12.6% of the government's 3.354 billion total building square footage .Sometimes referred to as the "government's landlord," GSA has the authority to acquire, operate, and dispose of real property on behalf of other federal agencies, including the judiciary. Its portfolio includes courthouses, land ports of entry, and federal office space.
Prior to seeking appropriations, GSA is required to obtain congressional authorization for constructing, purchasing, leasing, or renovating real property. To that end, GSA submits a prospectus to two committees—the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure—for each proposal that exceeds $2.85 million. The prospectus provides detailed information about the project, including its location and estimated cost. By law, a project that exceeds the $2.85 million threshold may not receive appropriations unless both committees pass resolutions approving of the prospectus.
While the prospectus process provides Congress an opportunity to evaluate GSA real property activities, oversight may be limited by data that are not available to the authorizing committees. GSA's prospectuses, for example, do not always include a comparison of the costs of leasing versus owning space over time, which means Congress is making decisions without knowing whether a proposed project is the most cost effective option. Similarly, many lease prospectuses do not include the cost of altering space to meet agency needs, such as upgraded security, which means authorizing committees may not be aware of the full costs of the projects they are considering. In addition, there are instances where GSA fails to submit prospectuses for projects that exceed the threshold.
Several bills in the 113th Congress propose reforms to the real property process, particularly the process for disposing of unneeded buildings. Examples include the Excess Federal Building and Property Disposal Act (H.R. 328), the Federal Real Property Asset Management Reform Act (S. 1398), and the Civilian Property Realignment Act (H.R. 695 and S. 1715). Another bill, the Public Building Service Savings and Reform Act of 2013 (H.R. 2612) proposes changing the prospectus approval process. The bill would require GSA to include in its prospectuses a plan to offset any new space acquired by eliminating an equal amount of existing space from its inventory. It would also require GSA to ensure it is obtaining the best possible rental rate for leases that fall below the prospectus threshold. Other provisions would require GSA to provide the authorizing committees with an annual report listing all of the leases it entered into during the previous fiscal year; to notify Congress if a project's costs increased by 5% or more; and, when requesting authorization to acquire space, to explain why existing federal space could not be used.
H.R. 2612 could mitigate several long-standing weaknesses in the prospectus process. The bill proposes to help control costs by ensuring that the authorizing committees have access to comparative cost data, and by requiring GSA to provide cost estimates of alterations associated with a new lease that are not included in the estimate of rent. In addition, H.R. 2612 might enhance oversight by requiring GSA to provide a more detailed justification for requesting new space, and to notify Congress when a project exceeds the cost and size parameters established in the prospectus.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22429 | crs_RS22429_0 | On May 15, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection , one of two important Clean Water Act (CWA) cases heard in its 2005-2006 term. The decision addressed a fundamental issue as to the role of state water quality concerns in the licensing (or relicensing) of hydropower facilities by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In brief, the Court held that the state where the hydropower facility is located, through water quality certification under CWA Section 401, can impose conditions on such licensing. The act requires a FERC-issued license for the construction, operation, and maintenance of hydropower dams located in any navigable water of the United States. S.D. Section 401 conditioning is an important tool. Examples include decisions under several federal environmental statutes. | On May 15, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court decided S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection, unanimously holding that states, through water quality certification under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, can impose conditions on Federal Energy Regulatory Commission licensing (or relicensing) of hydropower facilities. The Court may have taken the case, involving a technical issue of statutory construction, to indulge its continuing interest in questions of federal-state allocation of authority under federal environmental statutes and elsewhere. States and environmental groups view Section 401 as an important tool for conditioning the construction and operation of federally licensed projects, and had feared that an adverse decision in S.D. Warren would hinder the ability of states to require measures to ameliorate the harmful effects of hydropower dams on water quality and aquatic life. |
crs_RS20985 | crs_RS20985_0 | RS20985 -- Stewardship Contracting for Federal Forests
Updated April 10, 2003
Traditional Contracting to Procure Services
Procurement contracts are used by federal agencies to perform a wide variety of tasks, and could be used for many forest stewardshipservices. (7) Because of this need and the high cost of manyactivities, some have proposed a different approach to contracting for forest stewardship: trading goods(commercially valuabletimber) for services (other activities in the same area). (9)
The goods-for-services demonstration projects, and the general expectations of the approach, have been modified timber sales toallow the agencies to impose non-timber harvesting requirements on the purchasers. | Many forests, especially the national forests, are widely thought to have unnaturallyhighamounts of dead and dying trees, dense undergrowth, and dense stands of small trees. This biomass can exacerbateinsect and diseaseinfestations and wildfire threats. Because much of this biomass has little or no commercial value, some haveproposed stewardshipcontracting to reduce these threats. Two approaches have been suggested: traditional service procurement contractsand contracts thatinclude exchanging goods (timber) for stewardship services. Congress authorized goods-for-services contractingthrough FY2013 byamending a previous pilot program in the FY2003 Omnibus Appropriations law. This report discusses theadvantages and limitationsof each of these approaches. It provides background on the issue and is unlikely to be updated. |
crs_R42806 | crs_R42806_0 | Following passage of HAVA, states enacted laws to implement the act's identification requirement, and in some cases, more stringent requirements, leading to a doubling over the next few years in the number of states with voter ID requirements. Voter ID Legislation in the 114th Congress
Several bills introduced in the 114 th Congress contain provisions pertaining to voter ID. H.R. H.R. 2867 and S. 1659 would restrict the use of voter ID. H.R. H.R. Several states that do not require voter ID currently require an affidavit or signature by a voter before the voter can cast a ballot. H.R. S. 1912 would modify state voter ID requirements. The other 18 states and the District of Columbia do not require a voter to provide any ID to vote—they have a range of nondocument requirements instead. In a state with a strictly enforced requirement, a voter who does not present the required ID at the polling place—with certain exceptions that vary among the states—either cannot cast a ballot at all or must cast a provisional ballot and take action after leaving the polling place to verify his or her identity in order for the ballot to be counted. Examples of such alternative means of identification include signing an affidavit or providing a nonphoto ID. All states accept driver's licenses or nondriver IDs issued by that state. These laws have been challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and state constitutional provisions. Such challenges have drawn attention in view of a 2008 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, discussed below, that upheld the constitutionality of an Indiana voter photo ID law. Challenges under Section 2 of the VRA are also notable because in the past, Section 2 has generally been invoked in the context of redistricting. Likewise, leading up to the November 8, 2016, presidential election, there has been ongoing litigation challenging certain state laws. This section of the report analyzes challenges to voter photo ID laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA, specifically addressing, by way of example, recent court rulings in North Carolina and Texas; provides an overview of a challenge to a voter photo ID law under a state constitutional provision; and finally, discusses some potential implications of these challenges. Therefore, case law applying Section 2 to voter photo ID laws is evolving and ultimately, may be considered by the U.S. Supreme Court. Concluding Observations
Given recent state legislative activity on photo ID, and identification requirements generally, it is likely that legislators in the states will continue to consider similar legislation in the future. The 2016 election may provide useful data on the implementation and performance of voter ID laws, data that Congress may choose to examine. As more experience is obtained with the impacts of the range of voter ID requirements in different states on both individual voters and elections, a consensus may emerge about the benefits and disadvantages of those requirements, including answers to questions such as the following:
Does attempted voter fraud occur frequently enough that it poses significant risk to the validity of the outcome of elections? In any case, voter ID is likely to continue to be a topic of significant interest well beyond the November 2016 election. The tables briefly summarize the major requirements for each state, describing
the types of IDs accepted, whether the requirements apply to absentee and mail-in voting as well as in-person balloting, exceptions to the ID requirements for specified classes of voters, the recourse available to voters who do not present an accepted ID, year of enactment of the requirement (for photo ID states) and additional information such as whether an expired ID will be accepted and whether the state makes an ID available without charge to qualified voters. | About 60% of U.S. voters live in the 32 states that require a voter at a polling place to produce an identification document (ID) before casting a ballot. Among those states, 19 permit voters without ID to cast a ballot through alternative means, such as signing an affidavit; 13 strictly enforce the ID requirement. The other 18 states and the District of Columbia have a range of nondocument requirements instead.
Over the last two decades, the number of states requiring voter IDs has tripled. The stringency of those requirements is controversial. States vary substantially in the range of IDs accepted, the information they must contain, and the ease with which a voter can procure an ID. Although all states requiring voter ID accept a local driver's license, no two states have the same overall requirements. Among states with voter ID laws, 18 require photographic identification (photo ID), while 14 permit a nonphoto ID. In addition, eight states require ID for voters casting absentee or mail-in ballots.
Several states enacted voter ID laws that have been struck down by courts or are not yet in effect. Recent congresses have seen a number of bills with voter ID provisions, including H.R. 885, H.R. 2867, H.R. 3277, H.R. 3364, H.R. 5557, S. 1659, and S. 1912 in the 114th Congress. State legislatures also continue to consider the issue.
Supporters of the more stringent requirements often emphasize the need to prevent voter fraud, while opponents emphasize the need to avoid disenfranchising legitimate voters who do not have ready access to an accepted ID. Polling data suggest that most voters and most local election officials support a voter ID requirement but that many are also concerned about the risk of disenfranchisement. Both voter fraud and disenfranchisement pose potential risks to the integrity of the electoral process, but the policy debate is being conducted in the absence of a consensus about the evidence pertaining to those risks, with available studies producing a broad range of results.
As with the 2014 election, leading up to the November 8, 2016, presidential election, state voter photo ID laws have been challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and state constitutional provisions. Such challenges have drawn attention in view of a 2008 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that upheld the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of a voter photo ID law, and because some suits have been brought under Section 2 of the VRA, which in the past, has generally been invoked in the context of redistricting. As the case law challenging voter photo ID laws under Section 2 of the VRA is just beginning to develop, it ultimately may be considered by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Election administration is complex, and changes in voter ID requirements may affect elections in unanticipated ways, such as a need for more provisional ballots, increased waiting times at polling places, and misapplication of the rules by pollworkers. The longer that election officials have to implement changes to voting procedures, the lower the risk of unintended and potentially harmful consequences may be.
The impact of state voter ID laws is likely to continue to be a topic of high interest beyond November 2016. It seems likely that state legislators will continue to consider such legislation in the future. The 2016 election may provide useful data on the implementation and performance of voter ID laws, which Congress may choose to examine, and which may lead to greater consensus about the benefits and disadvantages of voter identification requirements. |
crs_R44079 | crs_R44079_0 | The central issue in the case is whether the Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) gave authority to the U.S. Department of the Treasury to make premium tax credits available to eligible individuals in every state (including the District of Columbia) or just the states that chose to establish their own health insurance exchanges (state-based exchanges, or SBEs). Loss of premium tax credits would directly affect the affordability of health insurance for the consumers who no longer have the credits. To the extent that consumers and others (referred to as stakeholders in this report) may be motivated to respond to the Court decision (and respond to other stakeholder actions), this report provides a timeline that identifies selected 2015 dates related to exchange establishment and operation, legislative calendars, and regulation of the individual health insurance market, among other issues. As indicated above, the direction and scope of the Court decision is not known. Implications of the decision beyond issues related to private health insurance are outside the scope of this report. The Supreme Court is expected to issue a decision in King v. Burwell by the end of its term in June 2015. | The Supreme Court is expected to issue a decision in King v. Burwell by the end of June. The central issue in the case is whether the Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) gives authority to the U.S. Department of the Treasury to make premium tax credits available to eligible individuals in every state (including the District of Columbia) or just the states that choose to establish their own health insurance exchanges (state-based exchanges, or SBEs).
As of the date of this report, the direction and scope of the Court decision is unknown. However, it is generally agreed that a Court decision favoring the plaintiffs would affect the health insurance options of millions of consumers, as loss of premium tax credits would affect the affordability of health insurance for the consumers who no longer have the credits. Such a decision and its effects may motivate insurers, consumers, legislators, and others (referred to as stakeholders in this report) to act.
To the extent stakeholders are motivated to respond to the Court's decision, this report provides a timeline that identifies selected 2015 dates related to exchange establishment and operation, legislative calendars, and regulation of the individual health insurance market, among other issues. This information may be useful for setting parameters around potential stakeholder actions. |
crs_RL33427 | crs_RL33427_0 | The Committee reported H.R. 5385 lie within the jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. Continuing Resolutions
In the absence of an annual appropriation, Fiscal Year 2007 funding for all of the accounts included in the House version of H.R. 20 is included later in this report. Status of Legislation
Summary and Key Issues
Appropriations Subcommittee Jurisdiction Realignment, 109th Congress
House
During the first session of the 109 th Congress, the Committee on Appropriations reorganized its subcommittee structure and realigned subcommittee jurisdictions. In the resulting redistribution of subcommittee responsibilities, the Subcommittees on Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development (VA-HUD) and Military Construction were eliminated and some of their responsibilities were assigned to a new Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies. Senate
At the same time, the Senate Committee on Appropriations dissolved its Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development and transferred its responsibilities for Veterans Affairs, the American Battle Monuments Commission, Cemeterial Expenses, Army (Arlington National Cemetery), the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and the Selective Service Commission to the former Subcommittee on Military Construction, which retained its responsibility for military construction appropriations. The BRAC 2005 account funds the many realignment and closure actions, to include the movement of units and equipment, the construction of new infrastructure at receiving installations, and the realignment and closure of property deemed excess in the current BRAC round. The President requested $5.6 billion for FY2007. The House Committee on Appropriations recommended a $5.3 billion appropriation for FY2007, while the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $5.2 billion. The House-passed version recommends $74.6 billion in new budget authority for veterans benefits and services. In addition to the increased number of beneficiaries, much of the projected increases in recent years result from cost-of-living adjustments for compensation benefits and from liberalizations to the Montgomery GI Bill, the primary education program. 5385 provides $32.7 billion for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) for FY2007, about the same amount as the President's request. The House-passed bill does not include any provisions that would give VA the authority to implement fee increases as requested by the Administration's budget proposal for VHA for FY2007
On July 20, 2006, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out of committee its version of the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations bill (MIL-CON-VA-appropriations bill) for FY2007 ( H.R. 5385 , as amended, provides $32.7 billion for VHA for FY2007, about the same as the House-passed amount and the President's request. | The structure of the Committees on Appropriations were changed at the beginning of the 109th Congress, altering jurisdictions over the appropriations covered in this report, including military construction, military housing allowances, military installation maintenance and operation, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and other veteran-related agencies, rested in the House Committee on Appropriations with the new Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life and Veterans Affairs. In the Senate Committee on Appropriations, jurisdiction for military construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and other veteran-related agencies were vested in the Subcommittee on Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, while military housing allowances and military installation maintenance and operation are the responsibility of the Subcommittee on Defense. At the opening of the 110th Congress, the House subcommittee structure was again adjusted, returning some non-construction defense activities to the Subcommittee on Defense. Authorization jurisdictions lie with the two Committees on the Armed Services and Committees on Veterans Affairs.
Key issues in congressional action to date include:
Military Construction: The changing structure of the Army, the redeployment of troops from overseas garrisons to domestic bases, and implementation of the current BRAC round have drawn committee attention during the appropriation process. To fund the activities included in the military construction and family housing portion of this bill, the President requested $16.7 billion, the House appropriated $15.9 billion, and the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $16.3 billion. Veteran Benefits: Entitlement spending is rising as the number of beneficiaries is increasing, education benefits are being augmented, and annual cost of living adjustments are being granted. Benefits such as disability compensation, pensions, and education are mandatory payments and constitute more than half ($37.2 and $41.4 billion, respectively) of the VA appropriation of approximately $71 billion for FY2006 and almost $78 billion proposed for FY2007. Veteran Medical Care: The Administration has again requested legislative changes to increase certain co-payments and other cost sharing fees for veterans in lower priority categories. The House passed version of H.R. 5385 provides $32.7 billion for the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) for FY2007, about the same amount as the President's request. On July 20, 2006, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out of committee its version of H.R. 5385. H.R. 5385, as amended, provides $32.7 billion for VHA for FY2007, almost equivalent to the House-passed amount and the President's request. The House-passed bill and the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported bill do not include any provisions that would give VA the authority to implement fee increases. |
crs_RL31558 | crs_RL31558_0 | In international trade, the expression "most-favored-nation," usually abbreviated "MFN,"status (or treatment) has a specific meaning quite different from what it appears to mean. Because of this fact and for reasonsof historical continuity both terms (MFN and NTR) are used in this report with the identical meaningand also interchangeably with the term "nondiscriminatory," a term also often used in U.S. tradelegislation. In this report, the MFN (NTR) treatment is discussed in the specific context of tariffs,because of the origins and historical development of the concept in the U.S. law and practice,particularly the denial or restoration of such treatment to nonmarket economy countries
Evolution of U.S. Most-Favored-Nation Policy
There are three basic, often overlapping, ways in which the United States accords generalMFN treatment to its trading partners. 876) applied theSection 5 suspension to "any country or area dominated by Communism" and thereby placed injeopardy MFN tariff status of Yugoslavia as well as of Poland. While restoration of permanent NTRtreatment can take place only through legislation enacted under general legislative procedure, NTRtreatment as such can be restored to a "nonmarket economy" (NME) country subject to Section 5suspension on a temporary basis by a specific procedure provided in Title IV of the Trade Act of1974. The continuation in force of an NME country's temporary MFN status is contingent on (1)automatic triennial extensions of the underlying trade agreement and (2) periodic renewal of theauthority of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Periodic renewal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment authority by the President must takeplace: (1) in the case of full compliance with the requirements of the amendment, by semiannualreports (by June 30 and December 31) by the President to Congress that the country continues to be,in effect, in full compliance with the freedom-of-emigration requirements of the statute; and (2) inthe case of waivers, by a Presidential recommendation, which must be made by June 3 of every year,that the overall waiver authority and the existing individual country waivers be extended for another12-month period (through July 2 of the following year). Legislation was introduced, but not acted upon, to extend permanent nondiscriminatory tarifftreatment to Afghanistan (whose PNTR status has since been restored by Presidential action; seebelow), Cuba, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). By the time the mid-2001 waiver was issued for China , legislation to approve thecomprehensive bilateral trade agreement with China, containing a reciprocal grant of permanentnondiscriminatory treatment, had already been enacted (see p. 10). The invocation is still in effect since Moldova is still subject to theconditional MFN treatment under Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act. Countries to which MFN tariff status is at present being extended after having beenconditionally restored temporarily under the provisions of Title IV are:
(1) under the waiver of Jackson-Vanik amendment requirements, which must be renewedannually and the renewal of which is subject to disapproval by joint resolution of Congress: Belarus,Turkmenistan, and Vietnam (see p.17); and
(2) under the determination of continued "nonviolation" (i.e., full compliance with) theJackson-Vanik amendment criteria, which, after the initial one, must be renewed semiannually andis subject to disapproval by joint resolution of Congress at the time of year-end renewal: Azerbaijan,Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine , and Uzbekistan (see p. 16). The term "most favored nation" has been replaced in U.S. legislation by law in all seveninstances in which it appeared with the expression "normal trade relations" or another appropriateterm and is to be so replaced in all future legislation. | In international trade, the term most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment has a meaning atvariance with what it appears to mean: the expression means equal -- rather than exclusivelyfavorable -- treatment and is often used interchangeably with "nondiscriminatory." To make thisdistinction clearer and avoid a possibly misleading interpretation of the most-favored-nation term,legislation was enacted in 1998 to replace it in U.S. law with the term "normal trade relations," orNTR. In this report, both terms are used interchangeably with "nondiscriminatory." The UnitedStates accords general MFN treatment as a matter of international obligation as well statutory policyto all trading partners; however, MFN tariff treatment of several countries has been suspended underspecific legislation. Virtually all such suspensions, initially applied to 21 countries or politicalentities, took place under the mandate of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, and twomore under country-specific legislation. MFN tariff treatment of countries suspended under the 1951law can be restored and maintained in effect for one-year periods by using the procedure providedunder Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 for such restoration to "nonmarket economy" (NME)countries. Under this procedure, an NME country needs to conclude with the United States a tradeagreement containing a reciprocal MFN clause, and be in compliance with the criteria of theJackson-Vanik (J-V) freedom-of-emigration provision of that act. The two countries whose MFNstatus was suspended by country-specific legislation could -- and did -- have it restored byPresidential action under conditions specified in the suspending law.
Trade agreements with NME countries must be approved by joint resolution, and aretriennially self-renewable, but their renewal is also subject to Presidential confirmation. To maintainin force the compliance with the J-V criteria (and the MFN status), such compliance must be eitherdetermined semiannually, or waived annually, by the Secretary of State, and such determinations orwaivers are annually subject to possible disapproval by joint resolution. Repeated past legislativeaction to disapprove some waivers, particularly those for China, has been unsuccessful and NTRtreatment contingent on a waiver has invariably remained in effect. Permanent restoration of NTRstatus of any country generally requires specific legislation.
Of the 29 countries, today's successors of countries or areas originally subject to the 1951suspension, 15 had their permanent NTR status restored by specific legislation (five directly and tenafter a period of conditional restoration under the Jackson-Vanik amendment), one (Poland) by thePresident under then existing statutory authority, and one (East Germany) administratively throughunification with West Germany. The status of seven of them is still temporary, subject to thedetermination of full-compliance with the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and of three of them underthe Jackson-Vanik waiver provision. Two countries (Cuba, and North Korea) are denied NTR statusaltogether. The NTR status of two countries, suspended by individual legislation, has been restoredpermanently by Presidential action as authorized by the suspending legislation.
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RS22570 | crs_RS22570_0 | Strategic Significance of Guam for Defense Buildup
Guam is the westernmost U.S. territory long valued as strategically significant to U.S. forward deployments in the Western Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. With the U.S. military's drawdown from Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. defense strategy of January 2012 declared a "rebalancing" toward a strengthened presence in the Pacific. Soon after, on February 17, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tokyo and signed the bilateral "Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam" that reaffirmed the "Roadmap" of May 1, 2006. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) . The two sides agreed to "adjust" the Realignment Roadmap of 2006 and separate the move of marines from the plan for the FRF, in order to make progress separately. The Joint Statement provided more specific numbers for the relocation of marines: out of about 9,000 marines to be relocated from Okinawa, about 5,000 marines would move to Guam, "when appropriate facilities are available to receive them." At a hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness on August 1, 2012, Defense Department officials acknowledged that they had no timeline for the distributed laydown but called for starting the move of marines to Guam, partly to shore up political support in Japan in accordance with the Joint Statement and to boost U.S. credibility in the "rebalancing" strategy. However, the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee in October 2013 pointed to a later relocation from Okinawa to Guam that will start in the first half of the 2020s. Obama and Abe issued a U.S.-Japan Joint Statement, which reaffirmed that "the United States and Japan are also making sustained progress towards realizing a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific, including the development of Guam as a strategic hub." Budgets
Despite Japan's dispute over the FRF in Okinawa, Japan has allocated funds in the defense budgets for the Marines' relocation and buildup on Guam. Relatedly, under President Obama, the United States has paid greater attention to Southeast Asia. There has been a question about whether North Korea deployed this IRBM. As discussed above, the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement of April 2012 revised the cost of the Marines' move to $8.6 billion. The Master Plan for Guam (dated July 2014), as cited above, estimated that the total cost to complete 124 projects through FY2028 would be about $8.7 billion (in FY2012 dollars). Subsequently, trying to move forward, Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb called in May 2011 for a re-examination of plans to restructure military forces in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. Washington and Beijing have long differed over China's threats to use the People's Liberation Army (PLA) against Taiwan. "Rebalance" and Engagement with China. To blunt charges that Guam's buildup targeted China, PACOM's Commander, Admiral Fallon, invited PLA observers to the U.S. "Valiant Shield" exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam in June 2006. The Members urged the National Security Advisor to lead a review of the strategy on the Asia-Pacific. 4495 , the Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act. 109-286 ) on the Military Construction and Veteran Affairs Appropriations Act, which expressed concerns about a construction program on Guam estimated to cost $10.3 billion (with Japan paying 60%) and expectations of a master plan for Guam from the Defense Secretary by December 29, 2006. As part of the realignment of the Global Defense Posture, he requested $378 million to start construction in Guam to support the relocation of 8,000 marines from Japan in order to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. Section 2832 stipulates that none of the authorized funds and none of the amounts provided by Japan for construction activities on land under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense may be obligated to implement the realignment of Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam or Hawaii until: (1) the PACOM Commander provides an assessment of the strategic and logistical resources needed to ensure the distributed lay-down of the Marine Corps meets the contingency operations plans; (2) the Secretary of Defense submits master plans for the construction of facilities and infrastructure to execute the lay-down, including a description of the cost and schedule; (3) the Secretary of the Navy submits a plan for proposed investments and schedules to restore facilities and infrastructure at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma; and (4) a plan coordinated by pertinent Federal agencies describing work, costs, and a schedule for completion of construction, improvements, and repairs to the non-military utilities, facilities, and infrastructure, if any, on Guam affected by the realignment of forces. 4435 (McKeon), the NDAA for FY2015 . H.R. On December 2, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees agreed on legislation for the FY2015 NDAA (based on H.R. 113-66 , thus removing the restrictions on the use of funds of the United States and Japan to implement the marines' realignment to Guam. H.R. 3979 became P.L. 113-291 on December 19. The 113 th Congress resolved an overall issue for progress in Guam's buildup. | Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam (west of Hawaii) to increase U.S. operational presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to crises, disasters, or other contingencies to support Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, Taiwan, or others in Asia. Since 2006, Valiant Shield exercises based at Guam have boosted U.S. military readiness for joint operations in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China has concerns, suspecting Guam's buildup to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could target Guam with missiles. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has increased activities in waters around Guam. Still, Guam's role expanded in engaging with the PLA.
In 2006, the United States and Japan had agreed on a Realignment Roadmap to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Goals were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009, the Secretary of State signed a U.S.-Japan agreement on the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel from Okinawa to Guam that reaffirmed the "Roadmap" of May 1, 2006. However, the Marines' relocation will not occur by 2014 and will be more geographically distributed. Opposition on Okinawa to the U.S.-Japan plan for a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) to replace the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma brought implications for the Marines' move from Okinawa to Guam. Despite the dispute over the FRF, Japan has budgeted for its contributions to the Marines' move.
By 2011, some Members urged attention to concerns that included Japan's impasse, expanded costs, and the delay in the realignment even as a strong U.S. military presence and readiness remain critical in the Asia-Pacific. On May 11, 2011, Senators Carl Levin, John McCain, and Jim Webb called for a review of plans to restructure military forces in Japan, ROK, and Guam, in order to make progress. President Obama issued in January 2012 the defense guidance for the strategy of "rebalancing" diplomatic, defense, and economic priorities more to the Asia-Pacific. This "rebalance" further raised Guam's profile as a "strategic hub." China has tried to raise doubts about the U.S. rebalance. In February 2012, the United States and Japan agreed to adjust the Roadmap and separate the move of marines from the plan for the FRF, in order to make progress separately. A U.S.-Japan Joint Statement of 2012 specified that out of about 9,000 marines to be relocated from Okinawa, about 5,000 marines would move to Guam. Out of the new estimated cost of $8.6 billion, Japan would contribute $3.1 billion. A Joint Statement of 2013 pointed to a later relocation of marines to Guam that will start in the first half of the 2020s.
In April 2014, President Obama issued a U.S.-Japan Joint Statement, reaffirming that "the United States and Japan are also making sustained progress towards realizing a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific, including the development of Guam as a strategic hub." Progress includes a draft environmental study (April 2014), a final study (expected in 2015), and a Master Plan for Guam (July 2014). The Master Plan estimated total costs of $8.7 billion. Using this amount as the cap on costs (allowing for inflation), on December 2, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees agreed on the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that resolved an overall issue by removing restrictions on the use of funds of the United States and Japan to implement the realignment of marines to Guam. Legislation includes H.R. 4495 (Forbes); and FY2015 NDAA, H.R. 4435 (McKeon), S. 2410 (Levin), and H.R. 3979, which became P.L. 113-291 on December 19. Updated through the 113th Congress, this CRS Report discusses major defense developments and policy issues. |
crs_RS20553 | crs_RS20553_0 | RS20553 -- Air Quality and Electricity: Initiatives to Increase Pollution Controls
Updated October 25, 2002
Background
Since the mid-1990s, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has initiated actions that have resulted in regulatorymandates and enforcement actions that would, if implemented, substantially reduce air pollutants (particularlynitrogenoxides - NOx) emitted by some electric generating facilities. In a supplementary action, 12 states petitioned EPA under Section 126 of the CAA, concerninginterstate pollution, alleging that NOx originating in upwind states prevented their attainment of ozone standards. An EPAOffice of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance audit of New Source Review (NSR) applications requiredunderprovisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA) that began in late 1996 was the precursor to the enforcement initiative; itled inNovember 1999 to lawsuits against seven utilities in the Midwest and South and an administrative order against theTennessee Valley Authority alleging violations of NSR requirements of the CAA. (1)
The first two initiatives, the Ozone Transport Rule and the Section 126 petitions, are related to each other substantively. Based on the eight petitions EPA has ruled on, EPA's Section 126 determinations wouldinvolvea subset of the NOx SIP Call's 19 states - 12 states and the District of Columbia. Of particular interest is an EPA recommendation thata newrulemaking be commenced on the definition of "routine maintenance," a key point of contention in the abovelawsuits. Concerned about the piecemeal nature of these initiatives, some in Congress have been workingoncomprehensive, multi-pollutant alternative strategies to reduce emissions. In June 2002, the Senate EnvironmentandPublic Works Committee reported out S. 556 - a comprehensive, multi-pollutant bill that would incorporatemarket-oriented mechanisms to control NOx, SO2, and CO2, and tonnage limitations on Hg. | Since the mid-1990s, EPA has initiated actions resulting in regulatory mandatesand enforcement actions directed primarily at coal-fired electric generating utilities. These actions would, ifimplemented,substantially reduce air pollutants, particularly nitrogen oxides (NOx). These initiatives include the OzoneTransport Rule(also called the NOx SIP Call); a set of "Section 126 petitions" in which 12 states allege under Section 126 of theClean AirAct (CAA) that pollutants originating in upwind states prevent their attainment of clean air standards; and a set ofenforcement actions based on New Source Review (NSR) requirements of the CAA that have resulted in lawsuitsagainstseveral utilities and an administrative order against the Tennessee Valley Authority. Although these are separateinitiatives,they are related in that each ultimately focuses on emissions from utilities in the Midwest and South. As of January22,2001, the EPA has declared 11 states and the District of Columbia as failing to submit revised SIPs required undertheOzone Transport Rule; the EPA has approved four section 126 petitions; and two of the NSR lawsuits have resultedinconsent decrees (Tampa Electric Co. and PSEG), and two others have been settled in principle (Virginia Power andCinergy). In June 2002, the Bush Administration recommended new rulemaking be commenced on the definitionof"routine maintenance": a key point of contention in the lawsuits. Legislative activity focuses on multi-pollutantstrategiesas an alternative to these piecemeal initiatives. In June 2002, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committeereported out S. 556 - a comprehensive, multi-pollutant reduction bill. This report will be updated as eventswarrant. |
crs_R40902 | crs_R40902_0 | Introduction
The 111 th Congress has devoted considerable effort to health reform that seeks to increase health insurance coverage for more Americans and help control increasing costs while improving quality and patient outcomes. H.R. 3962 , the Affordable Health Care for America Act, was passed by the House of Representatives on November 7, 2009. H.R. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200 , America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, which was originally introduced on July 14, 2009, and was reported separately on October 14, 2009, by three House Committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means. One major difference between H.R. 3200 and H.R. 3962 is the addition of Division D, "Indian Health Care Improvement," which would reenact, authorize, and amend the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA). Division D differs from much of the other divisions of H.R. 3962 in that it targets a specific population group—American Indians and Alaska Natives, a group that, in general, has lower health status, lower life expectancy, and higher rates of a number of diseases, including diabetes, than the U.S. population as a whole. The goal of the division—to improve the health of American Indians and Alaska Natives—is consistent with the changes proposed in other divisions that also propose to improve health care access and quality, augment the health care workforce, and increase access to mental health services. 3962 may also affect American Indians and Alaska Natives. This report summarizes the provisions of Division D of H.R. The division contains two titles. Title I contains three sections. Section 3101(a) would replace current IHCIA language with new language that would reenact, amend, and reauthorize all eight titles of IHCIA. Sections 3102 and 3103 make changes to Indian programs not in IHCIA. Title II of Division D contains five sections (Sections 3201-3205), three of which amend sections of the Social Security Act (SSA), and none of which amend IHCIA. Section 3101(a) contains IHCIA's general provisions and its eight titles: (1) Indian health workforce, (2) health services, (3) health care and sanitation facilities, (4) access to federal reimbursements, (5) health services for urban Indians, (6) IHS organizational improvements, (7) behavioral health programs, and (8) miscellaneous. Other Sections of Title I of Division D
The provisions in subsections 3101(b)-(c) of Title I would make technical corrections to other federal law as necessitated by IHCIA Section 601's creation of a new Assistant Secretary for Indian Health. | The 111th Congress has devoted considerable effort to health reform that seeks to increase health insurance coverage for more Americans and help control increasing costs while improving quality and patient outcomes. H.R. 3962, the Affordable Health Care for America Act, was passed by the House of Representatives on November 7, 2009. H.R. 3962 is based on H.R. 3200, America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, which was originally introduced on July 14, 2009, and was reported separately on October 14, 2009, by three House Committees—Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means. One major difference between H.R. 3200 and H.R. 3962 is the addition of Division D, "Indian Health Care Improvement," which would reenact, authorize, and amend the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA). Division D differs from much of the other divisions of H.R. 3962 in that it targets a specific population group—American Indians and Alaska Natives, a group that, in general, has lower health status, lower life expectancy, and higher rates of a number of diseases, including diabetes, than the U.S. population as a whole. The goal of the division—to improve the health of American Indians and Alaska Natives—is consistent with the changes proposed in other divisions that also propose to improve health care access and quality, augment the health care workforce, and increase access to mental health services.
This report summarizes the provisions of Division D of H.R. 3962. The division contains two titles. Title I contains three sections (3101-3103), of which Section 3101(a) would replace current IHCIA language with new language that would reenact, amend, and reauthorize all eight titles of IHCIA. Section 3101(a) contains IHCIA's general provisions and its eight titles: (1) Indian health workforce, (2) health services, (3) health care and sanitation facilities, (4) access to federal reimbursements, (5) health services for urban Indians, (6) Indian Health Service (IHS) organizational improvements, (7) behavioral health programs, and (8) miscellaneous. Sections 3101(b) and (c) would make technical corrections to other federal law as necessitated by IHCIA Section 601's creation of a new Assistant Secretary for Indian Health. Sections 3102 and 3103 would make changes to Indian programs not in IHCIA. Title II of Division D contains five sections (Sections 3201-3205), three of which amend the Social Security Act (SSA) as related to American Indians and Alaska Natives. None of these sections amend IHCIA. |
crs_RL34392 | crs_RL34392_0 | With this "leg-up," Putin easily won election in March 2000 and was reelected with no real opposition four years later. Putin's presidency was a period of relative political stability, but as the end of his second term drew near, the succession question reemerged as a burning issue. Putin explained this move as necessary to "prepare the country" for forthcoming elections, which immediately triggered speculation that Zubkov might be Putin's choice for president in 2008, perhaps as a "place holder," a mechanism that would allow Putin to retain control and/or return to the presidency after a brief interregnum. But in Russia's election cycle, the vote for president (March 2, 2008) was preceded the parliamentary election (December 2, 2007), which was seen as a harbinger of the presidential contest. And despite Putin's apparent genuine popularity, they were determined to take no chances on the outcome. The preordained result of the December 2, 2007 balloting for the Duma was a sweep by United Russia, which reportedly won 64.3% of the popular vote and 315 of the 450 seats—more than the two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution. (See CRS Report RS22770, Russia ' s December 2007 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications , by [author name scrubbed].) The 42-year-old Medvedev, a long-time Putin protégé, had headed the Presidential Administration before Putin made him First Deputy Prime Minister in 2005. One day after his anointment, Medvedev announced that, if elected, he would ask Putin to serve as prime minister. Under the present super-presidential constitution, the prime minister serves at the pleasure of the president and may be dismissed by the president at any time. Others suggest that President Medvedev may voluntarily cede substantial power to Prime Minister Putin, allowing the mentor to continue wielding real power. Another scenario envisions Medvedev resigning after a "decent interval," necessitating a new presidential election in which Putin would be eligible to run, since he would not have served more than two consecutive terms. Possible Implications for U.S. : Putinism will prevail with or without Putin. Others argue that Russia's post-Soviet political evolution is still a work in progress, that the policies and preferences of Russia's paramount leader can be decisive in setting the nations' course – and its relations with the United States – as was the case when Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to the Kremlin and adopted policies that wrought profound, albeit sometimes unintended, consequences. Nor has Medvedev been in the chorus of top Russian officials sharply and ostentatiously criticizing the Bush Administration, U.S. policies, NATO, and the West. The answer to this question has potentially far-reaching implications for the United States. | First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev, President Putin's chosen successor and long-time protege, was elected President on March 2, 2008, as expected, with about 70% of the vote. There was little real opposition. Medvedev had previously announced that if elected, he would propose Putin as Prime Minister and Putin has said that he will accept this post. The Putin regime has brought TV and radio under tight state control and virtually eliminated effective political opposition, assuring this "transition." The Kremlin's Unified Russia party had previously swept the parliamentary election (December 2, 2007), winning more than two-thirds of the seats in the Duma.
The Russian Constitution limits the president to no more than two consecutive four-year terms. President Putin's second term ends in May 2008. Uncertainty about the post-Putin succession had dominated and roiled Russian politics for most of 2007, until late in the year, when Putin made clear that he would relinquish the presidency and take the position of prime minister after Medvedev was elected president.
Putin's genuine popularity at home, combined with the near-total control that he and his regime exercise over nearly every aspect of the political scene, guaranteed the electoral outcomes sought by the Kremlin. Major questions remain, however, about the configuration of political power after Medvedev succeeds Putin as president. What will be the balance of power between the President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin? Will a diarchy of power be stable? Will Putin seek to regain the presidency after a Medvedev interregnum which would legalize a third (and fourth) non-consecutive term for Putin? The answers to these questions will help determine the course of Russia's political evolution – continuing and consolidating the authoritarianism that Putin has fostered, or moderating that trend. At the same time, Russia's domestic political evolution will likely have a strong influence on its relations with its neighbors, with the EU and NATO, and with the United States. Related CRS reports include CRS Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS22770, Russia's December 2007 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32662, Democracy in Russia: Trends and Implications for U.S. Interests, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RS21341 | crs_RS21341_0 | RS21341 -- Credit Scores: Credit-Based Insurance Scores
Updated January 19, 2005
Background on Insurance Scoring
An insurance score, a type of credit score, is a number produced by a proprietary computer scoring model that analyzes a person's credit history information,such as payment history, collection, balances, and bankruptcies. (1) CRAs aresubject to the consumer protections set forth in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). (2) Credit scores have been used widely for some time in credit-relatedbusinesses such as banks, home mortgage lenders, and credit card issuers, but the use of insurance scores by insurersis relatively new. (4) Insurers maintain that there is a clearstatistical connection between a person's insurance score and the likelihood of that person filing claims, aswell as how expensive such claims might be. Either way, insurers say the link betweeninsurance scores and insurance losses is clear,and point to two possible explanations. This isgenerally referred to as the "disparate impact" of the use of credit scores. CongressmanGutierrez previously introduced H.R. 108-159 ). State Regulatory Aspects
Unlike banks and other financial institutions that are regulated primarily at the federal level, insurers are regulated primarily at the state level. The law was described in congressional testimony (13) as requiring "insurers:
to notify an applicant for insurance if credit information will be used in underwriting and rating;
to notify a consumer in the event of an adverse action based on credit information, includingnotification of factors that were the primaryinfluences on the adverse action;
to re-underwrite and re-rate a policyholder whose credit report was corrected;
to indemnify insurance agents/brokers who obtained credit information and/or insurance scoresaccording to an insurer's procedures andaccording to applicable laws and regulations;
to file its scoring models with the applicable state department of insurance; such filings are deemedtrade secrets." This proposed study, however, provokedsignificant debate and opposition. | An insurance score, a type of credit score, is a number produced by a computer scoringmodel that analyzes aperson's credit information (i.e., payment history, collections, balances, and bankruptcies) obtained principally fromthat person's credit reports. Increasingly,insurers have been using insurance scores as an underwriting factor to evaluate insurance applications, especiallyfor automobile and homeowners insurance, inpredicting possible future insurance claims an applicant might generate. Insurers maintain that there is a clearstatistical connection between a person'sinsurance score and the likelihood of that person filing claims, as well as how expensive such claims might be. Byusing insurance scores, insurers say that theyare able to charge lower premiums to most customers who are better risks. On the other hand, some consumeradvocates dispute the insurers' position andargue that the use of insurance scores has a disparate effect on minorities, and is merely a new method by whichinsurers can increase premium rates.
Even though credit scores have been widely used for some time by credit-related businesses such as homemortgage lenders and credit card issuers, the use ofinsurance scores by insurers is relatively new. The growing discontent regarding the use of credit-based scoring hasbeen reflected in proposed legislationamending the Fair Credit Reporting Act to require additional consumer protections, and in increased litigation. Insurance scores, like other credit scores basedon credit reports, are regulated to some degree at the federal level. Unlike other credit scores, however, insurancescores used in the underwriting process arealso subject to state insurance laws and regulations. Most of the states have been active in recently reviewing theirlaws and regulations in this area. Federallegislation in the 108th Congress that would have affected insurance scoring included H.R. 1473,H.R. 2796, H.R. 2622,and S. 1753. The latter two were the House and Senate versions of what would become P.L. 108-159, whichmandated a study on the impact ofinsurance scoring. This report will be updated in the event of significant legislative or regulatory developments. |
crs_RL34712 | crs_RL34712_0 | If resulting policy decisions, along with prevailing economic conditions, lead to levels of government spending which exceed revenue collection, the government will incur a budget deficit. Data on the levels of federal debt are often reported in three categories: debt held by the public, debt held by federal government accounts (intragovernmental), and gross (total) federal debt. Debt held by the public is the total amount the federal government has borrowed from the public and remains outstanding. Gross federal debt is composed of debt held by the public and intragovernmental debt. Factors influencing movements in debt include spending levels, revenue collections, and economic growth. In most years, debt held by the public has increased on a nominal basis. Nominal measures of debt, however, do not control for inflation. As long as the economy grows faster than the debt, the debt will become less burdensome relative to the economy as a whole. Observing historical trends in federal debt levels can illustrate how budget policy and the economy affect the debt outlook and illustrate the reasons why large changes in debt levels occurred. In order to make an appropriate comparison over time, outlays, receipts, and debt will be measured as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). After the war ended, federal debt fell in nearly every year, as a percentage of GDP, for the next three decades as a result of strong economic growth during most of the period. After years of declining debt, the trend reversed in the 1980s and debt as a percentage of GDP began rising. In the absence of changes in spending and receipts, GDP growth allows an economy to absorb higher levels of debt and will generally result in a decrease in the ratios of both the gross debt and debt held by the public, as a percentage of GDP. During the FY1940 to FY2009 (the period analyzed in this report), GDP growth alone did not necessarily result in the expected movements in debt as a percentage of GDP, showing that other factors influenced changes in debt levels. In some instances, increases in spending or decreases in tax revenue outweighed strong GDP growth, causing debt as a percentage of GDP to increase rather than decrease. At other times, a combination of tax revenue increases, spending reductions, and strong economic performance led to declines in debt as a percentage of GDP. If large primary deficits (deficits in excess of the net interest payment) are expected to persist, or if the interest rate on the debt is expected to exceed economic growth indefinitely, then it may become more and more difficult for the federal government to sell new securities. In other words, it may become harder for the federal government to find investors willing to finance its deficits. This was followed by a long period of steady economic growth, which generally exceeded budget deficits and resulted in declining levels of federal debt as a percentage of GDP. During the 1990s, spending cuts, revenue increases, and strong GDP growth, combined with a strong economy and budget process reforms, all contributed to the reductions in the debt held by the public as a percentage of GDP seen at the end of the decade. Increases in gross debt as a percentage of GDP as a result of intragovernmental debt are a significant concern over the long run. Long-Term Effects of Federal Borrowing
Over the long-term, high levels of debt can have a significant impact on future federal spending and revenue decisions and the economy. In June 2010, CBO projected that a permanent and immediate combination of spending cuts and revenue increases amounting to 6.9% of GDP will be necessary in order to maintain the present level of debt (as a percentage of GDP) 50 years from now. If prompt actions are not taken, the magnitude of changes required in the future would be greater. | Financing the obligations of the United States has always been a central concern of Congress and the President. If policy decisions and economic conditions lead to levels of government spending which exceed revenue collection, the government will incur debt. Levels of federal debt are reported in terms of debt held by federal government accounts (intragovernmental), and gross (total) federal debt. Debt held by the public is the total amount the federal government has borrowed from the public and remains outstanding. Intragovernmental debt is the amount owed by the federal government to other federal agencies. Gross federal debt is composed of debt held by the public and intragovernmental debt.
Movements in federal debt occur over time. Historical trends can be useful in synthesizing how policy and the economy affect the debt outlook. In most years, debt held by the public has increased on a nominal basis. Nominal measures of debt, however, do not control for inflation. As long as the economy grows faster than the debt, the debt will become less burdensome relative to the economy as a whole. Measuring debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) controls for effects such as inflation and economic growth, allowing for comparisons over time.
Factors influencing movements in debt levels include spending levels, revenue collections, and economic growth. These factors can lead to changes in debt as a percentage of GDP which cannot always be anticipated. For example, if increases in spending or decreases in tax revenue outweigh strong GDP growth, debt as a percentage of GDP can increase. At other times, increases in tax revenues and declines in spending, in combination with strong economic performance, can lead to declines in debt as a percentage of GDP.
World War II resulted in unprecedented levels of debt as a percentage of GDP as a result of rapidly increasing outlays, which outpaced GDP growth. After the war ended, debt as a percentage of GDP fell in nearly every year over the next three decades as a result of strong economic growth. After that period of strong GDP growth, rapid increases in defense spending and tax cuts during the 1980s resulted in a decade-long trend of rising debt as a percentage of GDP. The early 1990s were characterized by tax increases, a recession, and rising debt as a percentage of GDP. This was followed by several years of budget surpluses and a strong economy, which led to declines in debt as a percentage of GDP in the late 1990s. Currently, tax cuts, increases in spending, and a weak economy have resulted in rising debt levels as a percentage of GDP.
High levels of debt can have a significant impact on the federal budget and the economy over the long term. Though debt levels today do not match historical highs, future levels of debt concern many. CBO projected that a permanent and immediate combination of spending cuts and revenue increases amounting to 6.9% of GDP will be necessary in order to maintain the present level of debt (as a percentage of GDP) 50 years from now. If immediate actions are not taken, the magnitude of changes required in the future would be greater. If large primary deficits (deficits in excess of the net interest payment) persist or if the interest rate on the debt exceeds economic growth indefinitely, it may become harder for the federal government to find investors willing to purchase new debt. This might lead to an inherently unstable situation with regard to the government's ability to incur future debt. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33885 | crs_RL33885_0 | Overview
Allegations of North Korean (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) drug production, drug trafficking, and other crime-for-profit activities have been an issue of concern for Congress, the Administration, the media, and the diplomatic community. A challenge facing policy makers is how to balance pursuing anti-drug, counterfeiting, and crime policies vis-à-vis North Korea against effectively pursuing other high-priority U.S. foreign policy objectives, including (1) limiting possession and production of weapons of mass destruction, (2) limiting ballistic missile production and export, (3) curbing terrorism, and (4) addressing humanitarian needs. A core issue is whether the income from the DPRK's reportedly widespread criminal activity has financed the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and has strengthened the DPRK's ability to maintain, until recently, truculent, no-compromise positions on the issue of its nuclear weapons program. Some also speculate that the DPRK's criminal smuggling networks could help facilitate the illicit movement of nuclear materials in and out of the country. As the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program have proceeded in 2008, it appears that the U.S. goal of denuclearization has outweighed concerns related to DPRK illicit activity (with the exception of proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and materials). Media reports also have indicated that North Korea may be engaged in insurance fraud, endangered species trafficking, and human trafficking as a matter of state policy. The estimated aggregate scale of DPRK's crime-for-profit activity has been and may still be significant—and arguably provides important foreign currency resources to the heavily militarized North Korean state. DPRK crime-for-profit activities are reportedly orchestrated by a special office charged with bringing in foreign currency under the direction of the ruling Korean Worker's Party. Such activity, particularly production and trafficking of methamphetamine and trade in counterfeit cigarettes, appears to be continuing. With the caveat that dollar value estimates of clandestine activities are highly speculative, conservative estimates suggest North Korean criminal activity generates as much as $500 million in profit per year, with some estimates reaching the $1 billion level. As a result, some surmise that in some years as much as $1 billion has been financed by illicit activity. Illicit narcotics, counterfeit brand cigarettes and pharmaceuticals were seized as well. For those assuming that the Pyongyang regime wants to curb its crime-for-profit activity, an important question yet unresolved is the degree to which the leadership will be able to do so. Hence, they maintain that proposals to shift DPRK crime-related income toward legitimate-source income ignore the fact that the current regime diverts some illicit earnings to slush funds designed to sustain the loyalty of a core of party elite and to underwrite weapons development programs. | Strong indications exist that the North Korean (Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) regime has been involved in the production and trafficking of illicit drugs, as well as of counterfeit currency, cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals. It appears that drug trafficking has declined and counterfeiting of cigarettes may be expanding. Reports indicate that North Korea may engage in insurance fraud, human trafficking, and wildlife trafficking as a matter of state policy. DPRK crime-for-profit activities have reportedly brought in important foreign currency resources and come under the direction of a special office under the direction of the ruling Korean Worker's Party.
With the caveat that dollar value estimates of clandestine activities are highly speculative, conservative estimates suggest North Korean criminal activity has generated as much as $500 million in profits per year (about a third of DPRK's annual exports) but has decreased in recent years. A core issue is whether the income from the DPRK's reportedly widespread criminal activity is used to finance the development of weapons of mass destruction or other key military programs, thereby contributing to the DPRK's reluctance to curb its aggregate level of such activity. Some also speculate that the DPRK's criminal smuggling networks could help facilitate the illicit movement of nuclear or other materials in and out of the country.
Policy analysts in the past have suggested that North Korean crime-for-profit activity has been carefully controlled and limited to fill specific foreign exchange shortfalls. However, some concern exists that North Korean crime-for-profit activity could become a "runaway train" that once established could escape control. If the DPRK's crime-for-profit activity has become entrenched, or possibly decentralized, some analysts question whether the current Pyongyang regime (or any subsequent government) would have the ability to effectively restrain such activity, should it so desire. Moreover, some suggest that proposals to shift DPRK crime-related income toward legitimate-source income ignore the fact that the current regime diverts some illicit earnings to slush funds designed to sustain the loyalty of a core of party elite and to underwrite weapons development programs.
A challenge facing U.S. policy makers is how to balance pursuing anti-drug, counterfeiting, and crime policies vis-à-vis North Korea against effectively pursuing several other high priority foreign policy objectives, including (1) nuclear nonproliferation negotiations via the Six-Party talks, (2) limiting ballistic missile production and export, (3) curbing terrorism, and (4) addressing humanitarian needs. As the Six-Party process has proceeded in 2008, it appears that the U.S. overriding goal of denuclearization outweighs concerns related to DPRK illicit activity (with the exception of proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and materials). Such illicit activity, however, could surface again as an issue as talks proceed on diplomatic normalization with the DPRK. This report will be periodically updated.
For additional CRS analysis of DPRK issues, see CRS Report RL33590, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL32422 | crs_RL32422_0 | Balancing Flexibility with Oversight
Administrations have frequently asked Congress to give the Department of Defense flexibilityin allocating funds to cover costs of military operations. Most recently, on May 12, 2004, the WhiteHouse requested $25 billion in a "contingent emergency reserve fund" for FY2005 to cover costs ofoperations in Iraq and Afghanistan during part of the fiscal year. The issue for Congress is to determine howmuch flexibility the Defense Department may need to carry out operations Congress intends tosupport, while also ensuring that funds are used in amounts and for purposes that Congress hasapproved. Faced with the challenge of balancing DOD's need for flexibility to respond to the uncertainties of military operations with congressional oversight responsibilities, Congress has responded tosimilar requests for DOD in different ways in recent years. This report
(1) briefly reviews the Administration's request for flexibility in the $25 billion contingent emergency reserve fund that it has requested forFY2005;
(2) discusses options Congress has to provide flexible funding for military operations based on precedents discussed in more detail later in thereport;
(3) reviews standard peacetime procedures governing reprogramming of defense funds as a benchmark against which to assess flexibility Congress hasoften provided for wartime or contingency operations;
(4) reviews congressional responses to Administration requests for funding flexibility from the first Persian Gulf War in 1990 through post-9/11 wartimeappropriations to date; and
(5) analyzes congressional action and current issues. Appendix A includes tables comparing the amounts that Congress has provided for military operations since 9/11 in flexible spending accounts and in regular appropriations accounts. Congress is likely to vote on the conference version of the FY2005 DOD Appropriations bill, H.R. 4613 , before going on recess on July 26, 2004 but is not likely to address theFY2005 DOD Authorization until after the recess. (3)
Language of the Request
The specific language of the request is as follows:
For additional expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary to support operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, $25,000,000,000, available October 1, 2004,and to remain available until expended: Provided , That the funds made available under this headingshall be available only to the extent that an official budget request for all or part of the funds istransmitted by the President to the Congress and includes designation of the amount of that requestas an emergency and essential to support activities and agencies in Iraq or Afghanistan: Providedfurther , That funds made available under this heading, may be available for transfer for the followingactivities:
Up to $14,000,000,000 for "Operation andMaintenance, Army";
Up to $1,000,000,000 for "Operation and Maintenance,Navy";
Up to $2,000,000,000 for "Operation and Maintenance,Marine Corps";
Up to $1,000,000,000 for "Operation and Maintenance,Air Force";
Up to $2,000,000,000 for "Operation and Maintenance,Defense-Wide;
Up to $5,000,000,000 may be used to reimburse otherappropriations or funds of the Department of Defense and classifiedprograms:
Provided further , That in addition to the transfersauthorized in the previous proviso, after consultation with the Director of the Office of Managementand Budget, the Secretary of Defense may transfer the funds provided herein to any appropriationor fund of the Department of Defense or classified programs, to be merged with and available forthe same purposes and for the same time period as the appropriation to which transferred: Providedfurther, the Secretary of Defense shall notify the Committees on Appropriations and the AuthorizingCommittees five days prior to the transfer of funds made available under the previous proviso: Provided further , That upon a determination that all or part of the funds transferred from thisappropriation are not necessary for the purposes provided herein, such amounts may be transferredback to this appropriation: Provided further , That the transfer authority provided under this headingis in addition to any other transfer authority available to the Department ofDefense. Congressional Action
Both the House and Senate provide the $25 billion requested by the Administration for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the FY2005 DOD authorization bill ( H.R. 4200 and S. 2400 ) and the FY2005 DOD appropriation bills ( H.R. Reporting Requirements and Funding Limits. Standard Statutory Restrictions on Moving Funds After Enactment
Congress provides most of DOD's annual funding in regular appropriation accounts, which cover fairly broad categories of expenses. Congress rejected bothAdministration requests. On September 12,2001, the Administration formally requested that Congress immediately appropriate$20 billion to respond to the previous day's terrorist attacks. Congress was also to be notified in advance -- nospecified number of days -- if DOD planned to spend the funds in ways that differedfrom allocations in conference report language. Reporting Requirements. | Administrations have periodically asked Congress to give the Department of Defense flexibility in allocating funds to cover the costs of military operations. Most recently, on May 12, 2004, theWhite House requested $25 billion as a "contingent emergency reserve fund" for FY2005 to coverthe costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for part of the fiscal year. If enacted in its currentform, DOD could transfer funds, in any amounts, to individual accounts as long as the Office ofManagement and Budget agreed and Congress received a five-day advance notification. The issuefor Congress is a perennial one: to determine how much flexibility the Defense Department mayneed to carry out military operations Congress intends to support while also ensuring that funds areused for purposes and in amounts that Congress endorses.
Faced with the challenge of balancing DOD's need for some funding flexibility for operations with congressional oversight responsibilities, Congress has responded in various ways to DODrequests. In general, Congress has rejected Administration requests to provide broad authority tofinance military operations in advance. In the run-up to the first Persian Gulf War in 1990, forexample, Congress rejected an Administration request for blanket authority to spend moneycontributed by allies.
Congress has, however, periodically appropriated money for ongoing or anticipated military operations into flexible "transfer accounts," where DOD can then move funds into regular accountsto meet evolving requirements. At the same time, Congress has generally imposed variousrestrictions and reporting requirements.
The least restrictive requirements Congress has imposed in recent years applied to $20 billion that Congress appropriated in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001. Although the Administration requested similar flexibility in later supplementals, Congressgradually reverted to normal practices by limiting the amount of funding in flexible accounts andby requiring advance notification if DOD decides to spend monies in ways that differ from thosespecified in statutory or report language.
By the standards of earlier congressional action, the Administration's current request for a contingency reserve would allow the Defense Department broad flexibility comparable to thatgranted by Congress immediately after September 11. In congressional action on the FY2005 DODauthorization ( H.R. 4200 and S. 2400 ), and appropriations bills( H.R. 4613 ), both houses limited DOD's flexibility by allocating most of the $25 billionto regular appropriation accounts, and setting various reporting requirements. This report reviewsrecent precedents for funding military operations, outlines options for monitoring that spending, andanalyzes congressional action on the Administration's $25 billion request for FY2005. Congress isexpected to vote on the conference version of the FY2005 DOD Appropriations bill, H.R.4613, which includes the $25 billion, before going on recess on July 26, 2004. |
crs_R45052 | crs_R45052_0 | Introduction
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203 ) created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Office of Financial Research (OFR), among other changes, in response to the financial crisis that followed the mortgage boom and bust of the 2000s. To pursue its mission, the FSOC is to foster communication among financial regulators, monitor systemic risks in the financial system as evaluated by the OFR, designate systemically important financial institutions (SIF Is) and financial market utilities (FMUs) for enhanced prudential regulation, provide annual reports on emerging risks and current responses, and alert Congress and the President to any unaddressed potential systemic risks. The FSOC and its OFR have a number of additional responsibilities, including making nonbinding recommendations to member agencies, encouraging research in financial stability, and promoting data standards for the financial industry. FSOC Structure
Membership
The FSOC has 15 members: 10 voting members and 5 nonvoting members (see Table 1 ). In addition to the Treasury Secretary (chair of the FSOC) and the director of the OFR, nine council members are the heads of federal financial regulatory agencies, one is an insurance expert, and three are state-level financial regulatory representatives. The FSOC's voting members include the Treasury Secretary, the heads of the banking agencies (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [FDIC], Federal Reserve Board [FRB], Office of the Comptroller of the Currency [OCC], and National Credit Union Administration [NCUA]), securities agencies (Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] and Commodity Futures Trading Commission [CFTC]), Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and an independent insurance expert appointed by the President. Nonvoting members include the directors of the OFR and the Federal Insurance Office (FIO), and one state regulatory representative for each of insurance, banking, and securities. Some FSOC actions require a supermajority council vote and an affirmative vote by the chair. FSOC must also identify regulatory gaps that might have systemic significance. Certain large bank holding companies (BHCs) are automatically considered SIFIs and subject to heightened prudential regulation independently of FSOC designation. The FSOC published the following simplified summary of how it determines if a SIFI threatens the financial stability of the United States:
The FSOC considers a "threat to the financial stability of the United States" to exist if a nonbank financial company's material financial distress or activities could be transmitted to, or otherwise affect, other firms or markets, thereby causing a broader impairment of financial intermediation or of financial market functioning. Identifying Regulatory Gaps and Overlaps that Could Cause Financial Instability
The FSOC is supposed to help coordinate member agencies within a complex regulatory architecture. The Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 ( H.R. It would rescind the FSOC's authority to designate firms as systemically important, eliminate the OFR, subject the FSOC to the congressional appropriations process, alter council membership, remove the ability to stay CFPB rules, and alter voting procedures and open meeting requirements, as well as implement broader regulatory changes. An alternative bill moving through the House, the Financial Stability Oversight Council Improvement Act of 2017 ( H.R. 4061 ), would require FSOC to consider additional factors during its designation process and make a number of other procedural changes to the designation process, including more opportunities for firms to participate in the process. A narrower proposal, the Financial Stability Oversight Council Insurance Member Continuity Act ( P.L. 115-61 ), became law on September 27, 2017, and modified the FSOC's independent insurance member's term to allow the current member to continue to serve in the event of a delay in the naming of a successor by the end of the member's six-year term. FSOC Membership for Agencies Led by Commissions and Boards
Currently, if an agency is led by a board or commission, instead of by a single director, the chair of the agency is a member of the FSOC. However, the OFR has salary and administrative requirements for professional researchers similar to those of other economic data collection and monitoring bureaus. FSOC recommendations to other agencies are nonbinding. | The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and its Office of Financial Research (OFR) were established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) to address several potential sources of systemic risk. Some observers argue that communication and coordination of financial regulators was insufficient to prevent the financial crisis of 2008. To foster coordination and communication, the FSOC assembles the heads of federal financial regulators, representatives from state regulatory bodies, and an independent insurance expert in a single venue. The OFR supports the FSOC with data collection, research, and analysis.
The FSOC does not generally have direct regulatory authority; its role is to make policy recommendations to member agencies where authority already exists or to Congress where additional authority is needed. However, it is responsible for monitoring financial stability and designating nonbank financial companies and financial market utilities as systemic, which subjects those entities to heightened prudential regulation and the direct regulatory authority of other agencies. The FSOC considers a company to pose a threat to financial stability if a company's financial distress or activities could be transmitted to other firms or markets, causing broader disruptions to financial intermediation or other financial market functions. Three of the many relevant factors used for designation include leverage, interconnectedness with other systemically important nonbank financial institutions (SIFIs), and whether a primary prudential regulator already has responsibility for the SIFI and the activity.
Additional FSOC and OFR responsibilities include
collection and analysis of financial data, issuing nonbinding recommendations to member agencies, facilitating the resolution of jurisdictional issues among member agencies, issuing a congressionally mandated annual report, and reviewing Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) rules under some circumstances.
The FSOC is composed of 15 members: 10 voting members and 5 nonvoting members. Voting members include the chair of the FSOC (Treasury Secretary), heads of the banking agencies (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National Credit Union Administration), Securities and Exchange Commission, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Federal Housing Finance Agency, CFPB, and an independent insurance expert appointed by the President. Nonvoting members include the directors of the OFR and Federal Insurance Office, and state regulatory representatives, one each for insurance, banking, and securities. If an agency is led by a commission or board, the chair is a member, not other commissioners or board members. Additionally, some FSOC actions require a supermajority council vote and an affirmative vote by the chair.
The FSOC also monitors regulatory gaps and overlaps to identify emerging sources of systemic risk. Regulatory gaps and overlaps occur in part because agencies have different policy missions and authorities. The financial regulatory architecture includes agencies that issue and enforce behavioral mandates and bans, balance a set of risky but permissible activities, and administer an emergency program or participate in the financial system similarly to a private firm. These diverse missions continue to create regulatory gaps and overlaps.
In the current Congress, the House has passed the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 (H.R. 10) to amend the FSOC. The bill would repeal the FSOC's ability to designate entities as systemic; eliminate the OFR; subject the FSOC to the congressional appropriations process; repeal the FSOC's ability to set aside CFPB regulations; and modify council membership, voting procedures, open meeting requirements, and other duties. The Financial Stability Oversight Council Improvement Act of 2017 (H.R. 4061), another bill that has received congressional action, would require FSOC to consider additional factors during its designation process and make a number of other procedural changes to the designation process, including more opportunities for firms to participate in the process. Additionally, the Financial Stability Oversight Council Insurance Member Continuity Act (P.L. 115-61) became law on September 27, 2017, and modified the term of the FSOC's independent insurance member. |
crs_R42079 | crs_R42079_0 | These critics call for more oversight, transparency, and disclosure for the Fed. More specifically, critics have focused on Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits of the Fed and the disclosure of details on the identities of borrowers and terms of loans. Some of these critics downplay the degree of Fed oversight and disclosure that already takes place, which is outlined in this report. Contrary to popular belief, GAO has conducted frequent audits of the Fed since 1978, subject to statutory restrictions discussed below. In addition, the Fed's annual financial statements are audited by private-sector auditors. 111-203 ) resulted in an audit of the Fed's emergency activities during the financial crisis, released in July 2011, and an audit of Fed governance, released in October 2011. In December 2010, as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Fed released individual lending records for emergency facilities, revealing borrowers' identities for the first time. Going forward, the act requires individual records for discount window and open market operation transactions to be released with a two-year lag; the Fed began releasing those records in the third quarter of 2012. Although oversight and disclosure are often lumped together, they are separate issues and need not go together. Oversight entails independent evaluation of the Fed; disclosure concerns what internal information the Fed releases to the public. Contrary to a common misperception, a GAO audit would not, under current law, result in the release of any confidential information identifying institutions that have borrowed from the Fed or the details of other transactions. It also issues semiannual reports to Congress that provide an overview of its activities. 111-203)
Title XI of the Dodd-Frank Act included provisions that allow GAO for the first time to audit open market operations, discount window lending, actions taken under emergency authority (§13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act), and programs created in response to the financial crisis for
(A) the operational integrity, accounting, financial reporting, and internal controls governing the credit facility or covered transaction;
(B) the effectiveness of the security and collateral policies established for the facility or covered transaction in mitigating risk to the relevant Federal reserve bank and taxpayers;
(C) whether the credit facility or the conduct of a covered transaction inappropriately favors one or more specific participants over other institutions eligible to utilize the facility; and
(D) the policies governing the use, selection, or payment of third-party contractors by or for any credit facility or to conduct any covered transaction. If the Fed deviated from its rule, it would have triggered a GAO audit not subject to the remaining statutory restrictions and testimony by the Fed chair before the committees of jurisdiction. 24 would eliminate statutory prohibitions on GAO audits of activities related to monetary policy and Fed lending, and it would require a one-time GAO audit of the Fed within 12 months of enactment that is not subject to remaining statutory restrictions, similar to H.R. The Fed is statutorily required to have its financial statements annually audited by an independent auditor. Despite the limited scope of statutory requirements, particularly related to monetary policy, the Fed has publicly disclosed extensive information on its operations on a voluntarily basis. Public and congressional interest in Fed disclosure increased in response to the significant financial assistance the Fed provided the financial sector during the financial crisis. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (P.L. Greater disclosure and outside evaluation, such as GAO audits of monetary policy, could potentially help Congress perform its oversight duties more effectively. Most economists believe that the Fed's independence to carry out day-to-day decisions about monetary policy, unburdened by short-term political considerations, strengthens the Fed's credibility in the eyes of the private sector that it will achieve its mandated goal of price stability. Although few policymakers argue for total independence or total disclosure and oversight, the policy challenge is to strike the right balance between Fed independence and Fed accountability. With regard to its GAO audit provision, she stated that the bill
would politicize monetary policy and bring short-term political pressures into the deliberations of the FOMC by putting into place real-time second guessing of policy decisions…. | Critics of the Federal Reserve (Fed) have long argued for more oversight, transparency, and disclosure. Criticism intensified following the extensive assistance the Fed provided to financial firms during the financial crisis. Some critics downplay the degree of Fed oversight and disclosure that already takes place.
For oversight, the Fed is required to provide a written report to and testify before the committees of jurisdiction semiannually. In addition, these committees periodically hold more focused hearings on Fed topics. Critics have sought a Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the Fed. The Fed's financial statements are annually audited by private-sector auditors. Contrary to popular belief, GAO has periodically conducted Fed audits since 1978, subject to statutory restrictions, and a GAO audit would not, under current law, release any confidential information identifying institutions that have borrowed from the Fed or the details of other transactions. The Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) resulted in an audit of the Fed's emergency activities during the financial crisis and an audit of Fed governance. GAO can currently audit Fed activities for waste, fraud, and abuse. Effectively, the remaining statutory restrictions prevent GAO from evaluating the economic merits of Fed policy decisions. H.R. 24 would remove these restrictions and require a GAO audit that would not be subject to remaining statutory restrictions.
For disclosure, the Fed has publicly released extensive information on its operations, mostly on a voluntary basis. It is statutorily required to release an annual report and a weekly summary of its balance sheet. In December 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act required the Fed to release individual lending records for emergency facilities created during the financial crisis, revealing borrowers' identities and loans' terms. Going forward, individual records for discount window and open market operation transactions have been released with a two-year lag. More recently, congressional attention has shifted to disclosure related to Fed regulation.
Although oversight and disclosure are often lumped together, they are separate issues. Oversight entails independent evaluation of the Fed; disclosure is an issue of what internal information the Fed releases to the public. A potential consequence of greater oversight is that it could undermine the Fed's political independence. Most economists contend that the Fed's political independence leads to better policy outcomes and makes policy more effective by enhancing the Fed's credibility in the eyes of market participants. Chair Yellen believes that the GAO audit provision "would politicize monetary policy and bring short-term political pressures into the deliberations of the FOMC by putting into place real-time second guessing of policy decisions." Disclosure helps Congress and the public better understand the Fed's actions. Up to a point, this makes monetary and regulatory policy more effective, but too much disclosure could make both less effective because they rely on confidential, market-moving information. The challenge for Congress is to strike the right balance between a desire for the Fed to be responsive to Congress and for the Fed's decisions to be immune from short-term political calculations. A potential drawback to greater disclosure is that publicizing the names of borrowers could potentially stigmatize them in a way that causes runs on those borrowers or causes them to shun access to needed liquidity. Either outcome could result in a less stable financial system. A potential benefit of publicizing borrowers is to safeguard against favoritism or other conflicts of interest. |
crs_98-928 | crs_98-928_0 | Instead, a provisional agreement on tariffs and trade rules, called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was reached and went into effect in 1948. For example, customs unions, free-trade areas, and special treatment for developing countries are permitted. One of the most important changes that came about from the Uruguay Round was the establishment of a new trade structure, the World Trade Organization (WTO), which incorporated the many changes reached during the Uruguay Round: the former GATT with its newly negotiated reforms, bodies to oversee the new trade agreements, a stronger dispute resolution procedure, a regular review of members' trade policies, and many other committees and councils. The WTO went into effect on January 1, 1995. The World Trade Organization
There are 150 members of the WTO, representing over 95% of world trade, 31 observer governments (most of which have applied for membership in the WTO), and seven international organization observers. All decisions are made by member countries, and decisions are usually by consensus. The WTO is located in Geneva, Switzerland. The highest level body in the WTO is the Ministerial Conference , which is the body of political representatives (trade ministers) from each member country. It must meet at least every two years. The WTO's Director-General is Pascal Lamy of France, whose three-year term began on September 1, 2005. The second meeting of the Ministerial Conference was held in Geneva on May 18 and 20, 1998. The body that oversees the day-to-day operations of the WTO is the General Council , which consists of a representative from each member country. The General Council also meets in two other, unique capacities. Those annexed Agreements are the agreements reached during the Uruguay Round covering trade in goods, trade in services, intellectual property rights, dispute settlement, and other trade areas. The WTO recognizes certain allowable exceptions such as national security. The current TPA legislation expired in July 2007, and Congress may renew or extend TPA if a Doha Round agreement is reached. Congress may also consider changes to U.S. trade laws in response to possible adverse rulings under WTO Dispute Settlement procedures. The Administration has called for greater authority in trade negotiations, saying that the need for repeated reauthorization of trade promotion authority interrupts U.S. trade policy and keeps the United States from participating in trade negotiations. | The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on January 1, 1995, under an agreement reached during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The Uruguay Round was the last of a series of periodic trade negotiations held under the auspices of the WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The WTO is the most important international organization that governs world trade. Decisions are made by the member countries. The WTO has 151 members and 31 observer governments (most of which have applied for membership), and members represent over 95% of world trade. The highest-level decisions are made at the Ministerial Conference, which is the meeting of trade ministers from member countries. The Ministerial Conference must meet at least every two years. The General Council is the body of national representatives that oversees the day-to-day operations of the WTO. The General Council meets approximately monthly. It also meets in two other capacities: it reviews national trade policies, and it oversees the dispute settlement process. Under the General Council are numerous committees, working groups, and other bodies.
Assisting the members is a WTO Secretariat that numbers about 635 and is located in Geneva, Switzerland. The top official of the Secretariat is Director-General Pascal Lamy of France, whose three-year term began on September 1, 2005.
Trade agreements administered by the WTO cover a broad range of goods and services trade and apply to virtually all government practices that directly relate to trade, for example tariffs, subsidies, government procurement, and trade-related intellectual property rights. The WTO agreements are based on the principle of non-discriminatory treatment among countries. Some exceptions however, such as preferential treatment for developing countries, are allowed. Other basic principles of the WTO are open information on rules and regulations, negotiated limits on trade barriers, and settlement of disputes under specific procedures.
The 110th Congress may examine the relationship between the United States and the WTO in two ways. Congress may consider implementing legislation for a potential Doha Round agreement. U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) expired on July 1, 2007, however, Congress may extend or reauthorize TPA to consider such an agreement. Secondly, Congress may consider changes to U.S. laws in response to WTO dispute settlement procedures. |
crs_RS21714 | crs_RS21714_0 | DOD Policy and Terms
During the confirmation process, it is DOD policy to inform the President and the SASC of adverse information concerning thenominated senior military officers. DOD Instruction1320.4 describes the procedures used to process these personnel actions. In general, military officers are selected forpromotion to one- or two-star rank by a centralized ad hoc selection board of general/flag officers. Recent hearings and statements suggest a concern in the Senate about the accountability of senior militaryofficers whofailed to promote a proper leadership climate in the organizations they commanded. | This report describes the Department of Defense (DOD) process which discloses to theSenate adverse information about senior military officers awaiting confirmation of a General or Flag Officer (GFO)personnel action,such as a promotion or appointment. It also describes the DOD mechanism used to investigate administrative orcriminalmisconduct of Generals and Flag Officers (Admirals). Finally, the report analyzes trends in the way the Senatescrutinizes seniormilitary leaders during the confirmation process, especially if these leaders failed to promote a proper leadershipclimate in theorganizations they commanded. This report will be updated, as needed. (1) |
crs_RS21414 | crs_RS21414_0 | Historically, the preservation of the public health has been the primary responsibility of state and local governments, and the authority to enact laws relevant to the protection of the public health derives from the state's general police powers. With respect to the preservation of the public health in cases of communicable disease outbreaks, these powers may include the institution of measures such as quarantine and isolation or the enactment of mandatory vaccination laws. News reports have highlighted health care workers fired for refusing to be vaccinated against influenza. Vaccination Orders During a Public Health Emergency
Many states also have laws providing for mandatory vaccinations during a public health emergency or outbreak of a communicable disease. Role of the Federal Government
Federal jurisdiction over public health matters derives from the Commerce Clause, which states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States...." Thus, under the Public Health Service Act, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services has authority to make and enforce regulations necessary "to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession." This power includes the authority to issue vaccination requirements for immigrants seeking entry into the United States. Military regulations require American troops to be immunized against a number of diseases, including tetanus, diphtheria, influenza, hepatitis A, measles, mumps, rubella, polio, and yellow fever. | Historically, the preservation of the public health has been the primary responsibility of state and local governments, and the authority to enact laws relevant to the protection of the public health derives from the state's general police powers. With regard to communicable disease outbreaks, these powers may include the enactment of mandatory vaccination laws. This report provides an overview of the legal precedent for mandatory vaccination laws, and of state laws that require certain individuals or populations, including school-aged children and health care workers, to be vaccinated against various communicable diseases. Also discussed are state laws providing for mandatory vaccinations during a public health emergency or outbreak of a communicable disease.
Federal jurisdiction over public health matters derives from the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, which states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States...." Congress has enacted requirements regarding vaccination of immigrants seeking entry into the United States, and military regulations require American troops to be immunized against a number of diseases. The Secretary of Health and Human Services has authority under the Public Health Service Act to issue regulations necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the states or from state to state. Current federal regulations do not include any mandatory vaccination programs; rather, when compulsory measures are needed, measures such as quarantine and isolation are generally utilized to halt the spread of communicable diseases. |
crs_R44823 | crs_R44823_0 | On June 24, 2016, Speaker Ryan released the Tax Reform Task Force Blueprint, or the Better Way tax reform. For the individual income tax, the plan would broaden the base, lower the rates, and alter some of the elements related to family size and structure. For business income, the current income tax would be replaced by a cash-flow tax rebated on exports and imposed on imports, with a top rate of 20% for corporations and 25% for individuals. The proposal would also repeal estate and gift taxes. A recent announcement by congressional and administration leaders indicated that border tax adjustments would be dropped from future tax plans. These provisions were enacted in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The Better Way proposal does not address these taxes but indicates that all taxes imposed by the ACA will be repealed in different task force proposals. The most important deduction eliminated is the state and local taxes (income, sales, and property) deduction. This treatment would convert the income tax to a cash-flow tax and impose a zero effective marginal tax rate on investment (and a negative tax rate on research investment). Eliminating the border tax adjustment would make the tax a cash-flow tax imposed on production rather than consumption. The U.S. tax system would be territorial in the sense that no tax would be imposed on foreign-source income of U.S. firms by virtue of its being foreign source (i.e., producing abroad for the non-U.S. market). Labor supply is affected by income and substitution effects. In addition, note that the incentive for charitable contributions will also be reduced through repeal of the estate and gift tax. Effects on Investment and Saving
In several respects the proposal will likely lead to efficiency gains in the allocation of capital, by type and by form (equity or debt). These effects are demand-side effects. Firms with losses will not be able to benefit from the export subsidy and to the extent that the subsidy does not have a value, it will cause the border tax adjustment to act partially as a tariff (and thus discourage imports). The destination basis would also eliminate the incentive for firms to invert (shift their headquarters to another country), which may require a tax induced merger. Both analyses, however, show a general pattern of favoring higher-income individuals, probably largely because of the reductions in business and corporate taxes. The Tax Foundation also provides a distributional analysis after the growth effects are incorporated with much larger and more even benefits. Tax Treatment of Families of Different Size and Composition
To examine the first horizontal equity issue, the effective tax rates arising from current and proposed structural elements of the tax system are compared across family types. Penalties can arise at low-income levels because of phase outs, particularly in the earned income credit. As in the case of the basic horizontal equity issues, the structural elements are not that different from current law, with larger standard deductions offsetting the loss of itemized deductions, the new child and dependent credit largely replacing the personal exemption, and the limits on itemized deductions offsetting the flattening of the rate structure. New Tax Planning Possibilities with a Border Adjustment
An example of the potential type of tax planning that might occur centers around the exemption of the export of intangibles combined with a territorial tax system. Consequences for International Agreements: The WTO and Bilateral Tax Treaties with a Border Adjustment
The blueprint's border adjustments may be found to be illegal tariffs and export subsidies by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Individual income taxes (outside of pass-through income) would be less radically changed, although the significant reduction in the number of itemizers could have revenue consequences for the states. The analysis yields a percentage change in output dQ/Q, which is a function of the changes in the tax rate on capital income, the average tax rate on labor income and the marginal tax rate on labor income:
dQQ=αS+ES-EI(1- α) Vdt1-t+EIdta(1-ta)-EStm(1-tm)
where α is the share or capital income
V=ER (R1-t)/(SR1-t+ER R1-t+d)
Because this model applies to small changes, to get a better approximation of discrete changes, the initial tax rate is set at the midpoint of the old and new tax rates. | On June 24, 2016, House Speaker Paul Ryan released the Better Way Tax Reform Task Force Blueprint, which provides a revision of federal income taxes. For the individual income tax, the plan would broaden the base, lower the rates (with a top rate of 33%), and alter some of the elements related to family size and structure by eliminating personal exemptions, allowing a larger standard deduction, and adding a dependent credit. For business income, the current income tax would be replaced by a cash-flow tax rebated on exports and imposed on imports, with a top rate of 20% for corporations and 25% for individuals. The cash-flow tax would be border-adjusted (imports taxed and exports excluded), making domestic consumption the tax base, although a recent announcement from congressional leaders has indicated that a border adjustment would be dropped in any future tax plan. The system would also move to a territorial tax in which foreign source income (except for easily abused income) would not be taxed. In addition, the proposal would repeal estate and gift taxes. Although the Affordable Care Act (ACA) taxes are not repealed in the Better Way tax reform proposal, ACA taxes are repealed in the Healthcare Task Force proposals.
One objective of tax reform is to increase output and efficiency. However, the plan's estimated output effects appear to be limited in size and possibly negative. The direct effect of lower marginal tax rates on labor supply is limited because the reduction in marginal tax rates is small and largely offset by an increased base that increases effective marginal rates. Capital income effects are also somewhat limited even with the movement to a cash-flow tax (that generally imposes a zero rate) because the current effective tax rate is low, due to current accelerated depreciation and the negative tax rate on debt financed investment. Growth effects are also limited because most empirical evidence does not support large savings and labor supply responses. As currently proposed, the plan loses significant revenue which, according to some estimates, could more than offset the supply responses and eventually lead to a contraction in output.
The plan would achieve efficiency gains, particularly in the allocation of capital by type and industry and in the even treatment of debt and equity finance. It would eliminate many distortions associated with multinational firms, including eliminating the tax treatment that discourages repatriation of foreign source income to the United States and the incentive for firms to invert (shift headquarters abroad) by merging.
Although claims have been made that the border adjustment would penalize imports and favor exports, a true border-adjusted tax has no effect on imports and exports due to the dollar's appreciation. There may be transitory effects, and for the blueprint, the export exemption may not be received by all exporters, which could cause the plan to act in part as a tariff. There are, however, a number of methods that might be used to obtain the benefits of the export exemption.
Studies of the distributional effects indicate that the plan increases the after-tax income of higher-income individuals compared with lower-income individuals. The plan's treatment of families of different compositions remains similar to current law, with families with children favored at low incomes and disfavored at high incomes.
The plan would simplify the tax system's administration and compliance by reducing the number of itemizers, eliminating the estate tax, simplifying depreciation, and eliminating the need for most international tax planning to shift profits out of the United States. However, some new complications would be introduced, including separating favored capital income of pass-through businesses from labor income of their owner-operators and implementing border-tax adjustments.
Other concerns about the tax reform are that the border adjustment will be found illegal by the World Trade Organization and violate bilateral tax treaties. Major changes in business taxes may also complicate the tax administration of state and local governments. |
crs_RL33442 | crs_RL33442_0 | The renewed interest in nuclear power has resulted primarily from higher prices for natural gas, improved operation of existing reactors, and uncertainty about future restrictions on coal emissions. Nuclear power's relatively stable costs and low air emissions may now appear more attractive, particularly combined with a substantial tax credit for nuclear generation and other incentives provided by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ). New nuclear plant applications can also take advantage of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act made in the early 1990s to reduce licensing delays. As indicated in Figure 1 , although no new U.S. reactors have started up since 1996, U.S. nuclear electricity generation has since grown by more than 20%. Much of this additional output resulted from reduced downtime, notably through shorter refueling outages, which typically take place every 18 months. Licensed commercial reactors generated electricity at an average of 89.8% of their total capacity in 2006, after averaging around 75% in the mid-1990s and around 65% in the mid-1980s. Falling operating costs have improved the outlook for the nation's existing fleet of nuclear power plants. From 1989 to 1998, 12 commercial reactors were closed before reaching the end of their 40-year licenses—California's Rancho Seco plant and Oregon's Trojan plant after only 14 and 16 years of operation, respectively. By the late 1990s, there was real doubt about whether any reactors would make it to 40 years. Since 2000, however, 48 commercial reactors have received 20-year license extensions from NRC, giving them up to 60 years of operation. Without the production tax credit contained in the 2005 Energy Policy Act, a nuclear facility is not competitive with either coal-fired or natural gas-fired facilities under base case assumptions. Under base case conditions, it seems unlikely that a new nuclear power plant would be constructed in the United States, barring a sustained, long-term increase in natural gas prices and the creation of a substantial, mandatory greenhouse gas reduction program that would increase coal-fired and natural gas-fired generating costs. As indicated in Table 4 , the production tax credit contained in EPACT is sufficient to make nuclear power competitive with either natural gas-fired or coal-fired facilities. The advantage provided to nuclear power by the production tax credit is not definitive; however, it appears sufficient to allow a decision on constructing a nuclear power station to move beyond initial economic considerations to examining other relevant factors, such as fossil fuel prices and the regulatory environment for both nuclear power and future fossil fuel-fired generation. Greenhouse Gas Control
Any substantial mandatory greenhouse gas control program would probably affect the cost of new coal-fired and natural gas-fired generation. In all current proposals before the Congress, nuclear power is assumed to have no greenhouse gas emissions. Nuclear Waste
Highly radioactive spent fuel produced by nuclear reactors poses a disposal problem that could be a significant factor in the consideration of new nuclear plant construction. In the near term, continued storage at reactor sites and interim storage at central locations would be the most likely possibilities. | Nearly three decades after the most recent order was placed for a new nuclear power plant in the United States, several utilities are now expressing interest in building a total of up to 30 new reactors. The renewed interest in nuclear power has resulted primarily from higher prices for natural gas, improved operation of existing reactors, and uncertainty about future restrictions on coal emissions. A substantial tax credit and other incentives for nuclear generation provided by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) are also likely to improve the economic viability of qualifying new reactors. New nuclear plant applications can also take advantage of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act made in the early 1990s to reduce licensing delays.
Currently, there are 103 licensed and operable power reactors at 65 plant sites in 31 states, generating about one-fifth of U.S. electricity. Although no new U.S. reactors have started up since 1996, U.S. nuclear electricity generation has since grown by more than 20%. Much of this additional output resulted from reduced downtime, notably through shorter refueling outages. Licensed commercial reactors generated electricity at an average of 89.8% of their total capacity in 2006, after averaging about 75% in the mid-1990s and about 65% in the mid-1980s.
Falling operating costs have helped renew the economic viability of the nation's fleet of nuclear power plants. From 1989 to 1998, 12 commercial reactors were closed before reaching the end of their 40-year licenses. By the late 1990s, there was real doubt that any reactors would make it to 40 years. Since 2000, however, 44 commercial reactors have received 20-year license extensions from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), giving them up to 60 years of operation, and more are pending.
The nuclear production tax credit in the Energy Policy Act could have a significant impact on the economic viability of new nuclear power plants. Under base case assumptions, new reactors are not competitive with either coal-fired or natural gas-fired facilities. However, if new reactors are able to take full advantage of the nuclear production tax credit, nuclear power appears competitive with either natural gas-fired or coal-fired facilities.
Other factors will also be important in the commercial decision to invest in new nuclear plants, such as fossil fuel prices and the regulatory environment for both nuclear power and future fossil fuel-fired generation. If natural gas prices remain at historically high levels, future nuclear plants will be more likely to be competitive without federal tax credits. However, natural gas prices have been highly cyclical in the past, raising the possibility that nuclear costs could be undercut in the future.
Any substantial mandatory greenhouse gas control program would probably affect the cost of new coal-fired and natural gas-fired generation relative to nuclear power, particularly if nuclear power is assumed to have no greenhouse gas emissions. Continued delays in nuclear waste disposal facilities—forcing spent fuel to be stored at plant sites—could also affect the decision to construct new reactors. |
crs_RL34340 | crs_RL34340_0 | Unemployment Compensation and Exhaustion of Benefits
The cornerstone of an unemployed worker's income support is the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program, which may provide income support through the payment of UC benefits. In response to economic recessions, the federal government sometimes has augmented the regular UC benefit with both permanent (the Extended Benefit program) and temporary extensions (including the Emergency Unemployment Compensation of 2008 program) of the duration of unemployment benefits. 111-5 , also known as ARRA or the 2009 stimulus package, signed into law on February 17, 2009) contained several provisions affecting EB. 111-312
Beginning on December 17, 2011, P.L. P.L. Table A-1 in the Appendix briefly summarizes these temporary programs as well as the permanently authorized EB program. Table A-4 provides information on the EUC08 program benefits and triggers. Generally, this debate has examined the efficacy of using the IUR or TUR as a trigger for extending unemployment benefits. Using the Insured Unemployment Rate Versus Total Unemployment Rate
The Federal-State Extended Benefit Program, created by P.L. 110-252 ). 110-449 and then again in P.L. Table A-5 in the Appendix provides information on the timing of the recessions, changes in unemployment of at least 1 million compared with same month in the previous year, and federal enactment of the temporary extensions of benefits. Congressional Interest in "Paying for Temporary Benefits"
Increases in Revenues or Decreases in Expenditures Related to Temporary Unemployment Benefit Legislation
Debate in Congress has included substantial interest in whether benefit extension legislation should include measures to "pay for" the proposals and be subject to House and Senate PAYGO requirements or whether these extensions should be considered "emergency" measures and exempt from the PAYGO requirements. With the exceptions of P.L. 111-92 , P.L. 112-78 , and P.L. The second column lists all decreases in federal expenditures or increases in federal tax revenues that are related to unemployment benefits within these laws. P.L. P.L. P.L. | This report describes the history of temporary federal extensions to unemployment benefits from 1980 to the present. Among these extensions is the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) program created by P.L. 110-252 (amended by P.L. 110-449, P.L. 111-5, P.L. 111-92, P.L. 111-118, P.L. 111-144, P.L. 111-157, P.L. 111-205, P.L. 111-312, P.L. 112-78, P.L. 112-96, and P.L. 112-240).
This report contains five sections. The first section provides background information on unemployment compensation (UC) benefits. It also provides a brief summary of UC benefit exhaustion and how exhaustion rates are related to the business cycle.
The second section provides the definition of a recession as well as the determination process for declaring a recession. It also provides information on the timing of all recessions since 1980.
The third section summarizes the legislative history of federal extensions of unemployment benefits. It includes information on the permanently authorized Extended Benefit (EB) program as well as information on temporary unemployment benefit extensions. It also includes a brief discussion on the role of extended unemployment benefits as part of an economic stimulus package.
The fourth section provides figures examining the timing of recessions and statistics that may be considered for extending unemployment benefits.
The fifth section briefly discusses previous methods for financing these temporary programs. In particular, it attempts to identify provisions in temporary extension legislation that may have led to increases in revenue or decreases in spending related to unemployment benefits. |
crs_R44864 | crs_R44864_0 | Introduction
In 1992, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA, now called PDUFA I) gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to collect fees from the pharmaceutical industry and to use the revenue to support "the process for the review of human drug applications." The most recent reauthorization was Title I of the Food and Drug Administration Reauthorization Act (FDARA, P.L. 115-52 ), which extends the user fee program through September 30, 2022. Congress first passed PDUFA to supplement the FDA budget outside of direct appropriations from Congress. Industry, consumer groups, and FDA agreed that the time from submission of a drug or biologics application to FDA's decision was unacceptably long. FDA Drug Review and PDUFA Coverage
Prior to marketing a drug, a manufacturer must submit to FDA a new drug application (NDA) demonstrating that the drug is safe and effective for its intended use. With subsequent reauthorizations, Congress has amended that definition to expand the scope of activities covered by PDUFA. PDUFA II expanded the range of activities for which FDA could use prescription drug user fee revenue to include those related to preclinical and clinical trial phases of a new drug's development. PDUFA III extended the range of activities for which FDA could use prescription drug user fee revenue to include three years into the postapproval and marketing period. PDUFA IV removed the three-year limitation on postapproval activities and again expanded the list of postmarket safety activities that the fees could support. PDUFA V and VI did not change the definition of the "process for the review of human drug applications," thus maintaining the PDUFA IV scope of activities that fees could support. PDUFA I connected prescription drug user fees to performance goals and targets. PDUFA Impact on Review Time and FDA Budget
Review Time
The approval times for NDAs and BLAs provide a measure of PDUFA's effectiveness in meeting its primary goal: reducing the time between a manufacturer's submission of an NDA/BLA and FDA's approval decision. PDUFA VI Package
The PDUFA VI package consists of two parts: (1) the performance goals and procedures agreement between FDA and industry, which this report refers to as the Commitment Letter or the Agreement (summarized in Appendix A ), and (2) statutory language that reauthorizes the program (summarized in Appendix B ). The timeline for the development of the Agreement and the reauthorization of the program is shown in Figure 3 . On April 25, 2017, user fee legislation was introduced in the Senate ( S. 934 ) that would have reauthorized PDUFA and the three other human medical product user fee programs, among other things. 2430 was signed into law as FDARA ( P.L. Title I reauthorizes PDUFA, allowing FDA to collect fees and use the revenue to support specified activities for the review of prescription brand-name drugs. FDARA includes eight other titles. A separate CRS report describes provisions in those titles, which cover reauthorization of the medical device, generic drug, and biosimilar biological product user fees, as well as provisions concerning pediatric drugs and devices, reauthorizations and improvements related to drugs, inspections and regulatory improvements related to devices, improvements to generic drug access, and a set of miscellaneous provisions. | The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA, now called PDUFA I) was reauthorized as PDUFA VI by the Food and Drug Administration Reauthorization Act of 2017 (FDARA, P.L. 115-52). First passed by Congress in 1992, PDUFA gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to collect fees from the pharmaceutical industry and to use the revenue to support "the process for the review of human drug applications." FDA regulates the safety and effectiveness of drug and biological products sold in the United States. Prior to marketing a drug, a manufacturer must submit to FDA a new drug application (NDA) or a biologics license application (BLA) demonstrating that the product is safe and effective for its intended use.
FDA's review of NDAs and BLAs is funded through a combination of annual discretionary appropriations from Congress and user fees collected from the pharmaceutical industry. Prior to FDARA, Congress had last reauthorized PDUFA, for a five-year period, through September 30, 2017, via Title I of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144).
User fees provided 65% of the Human Drugs Program funding for FY2016, accounting for 3,351 full-time equivalent employees. Therefore, as each reauthorization deadline approaches, FDA, industry groups, and many Members of Congress generally see PDUFA and the other human medical product user fees as must-pass legislation. Congress originally intended PDUFA to diminish the backlog of new drug applications at FDA and shorten the time from submission to decision. The general view is that PDUFA has succeeded. FDA has added review staff and reduced its review times. Throughout the reauthorizations, stakeholders (e.g., FDA, industry, and patient groups) have raised different concerns in the context of PDUFA, resulting in changes to the scope of activities covered by PDUFA. For example,
PDUFA II expanded the user fee program's scope to include activities related to the investigational phases of a new drug's development, and to increase FDA communications with industry and consumer groups. PDUFA III again expanded the scope of activities that user fees could support to include a three-year postapproval period. PDUFA IV removed the three-year limitation on postapproval activities and concentrated on new measures concerning postmarket drug safety.
PDUFA V and VI maintained the scope of activities that PDUFA fees could support, and these fees now generally cover the full lifecycle of the drug product. Each reauthorization has connected prescription drug user fees to performance goals and targets, negotiated between FDA and the pharmaceutical industry. Over time, these goals have changed to reflect advancements in the regulatory science surrounding drug development.
Similar to previous reauthorizations, the PDUFA VI package consists of two parts: (1) statutory language that reauthorizes the program and (2) the performance goals and procedures agreement between FDA and industry for FY2018 through FY2022.
Title I of FDARA reauthorizes PDUFA, allowing FDA to collect fees and use the revenue to support specified activities for the review of prescription brand-name drugs and biologics. Additionally, FDARA includes eight other titles that reauthorize the medical device, generic drug, and biosimilar user fee programs through FY2022; modify the drug and device regulatory processes to encourage the development of drugs and devices for pediatric use; amend the law regarding medical device, prescription drug, and generic drug regulation; and make changes in several cross-cutting areas, such as annual reporting on inspection and analysis of use of funds. |
crs_R44745 | crs_R44745_0 | Introduction
The federal government supports adoption in two primary ways: federal grants to state governments and tax benefits for individual taxpayers that help offset the costs of adopting a child. This report focuses on federal adoption tax benefits, which consist of an adoption tax credit and an income tax exclusion for employer-provided adoption assistance. The Adoption Tax Credit
The adoption tax credit helps qualifying taxpayers offset some of the costs of adopting a child. Although the credit may be claimed for nearly all types of adoptions (excluding the adoption of a spouse's child), there are some special rules related to claiming the credit for intercountry adoptions and for adoption of children with special needs. In 2018, taxpayers may be able to receive an adoption credit of up to $13,810 (this amount is annually adjusted for inflation). The credit is reduced for taxpayers with income over $207,140 and is phased out completely for taxpayers with more than $247,140 in income (these amounts are subject to annual inflation adjustment). However, the credit may be carried forward and claimed on future tax returns for up to five years after initially claimed. Instead, for the purposes of these tax benefits, special needs adoptions are the adoptions of children whom the state child welfare agency considers difficult to place for adoption. The Exclusion for Employer-Provided Adoption Assistance
Taxpayers whose employers offer qualifying adoption assistance programs as a fringe benefit may not have to pay income taxes on some or all of the value of this benefit. The maximum amount that can be excluded from the taxpayer's income is capped at a maximum amount per adoption which is the same maximum amount of the credit: $13,810 in 2018. Taxpayers can claim the exclusion and the credit concurrently for the same adoption, but cannot claim both tax benefits for the same expenses. Specifically, from 2002 through 2010, the law
extended the adoption credit for the adoption of children other than special needs children; increased the maximum credit and exclusion amount from $5,000 ($6,000 for a special needs child) to $10,000 per eligible child, including special needs children (this amount was adjusted annually for inflation); provided that for the adoption of special needs children the credit and exclusion amount equal the maximum credit and exclusion amount ($10,000) regardless of actual expenses (this amount was adjusted annually for inflation occurring since 2002); and increased the income level at which the credit and exclusion phased out from $75,000 to $150,000 (these amounts were adjusted annually for inflation). There is currently little evidence, however, that adoption tax benefits are an effective policy tool to increase adoptions. As previously discussed, the vast majority of adoption tax benefits go to upper-income Americans, even though data suggest that a significant number of lower- and middle-income Americans adopt. Challenges with Administering Adoption Tax Benefits
Recent evidence suggests that adoption tax benefits have been difficult for the IRS to administer to keep both erroneous benefit claims and taxpayer burden low. Congress may in the future seek further modifications to the credit or exclusion for employer-provided adoption assistance to achieve certain policy goals. Replace the Current Tax Benefits with a Direct Spending Program
Given that there is little evidence that adoption tax benefits increase adoptions, Congress may be interested in eliminating these benefits and replacing them with direct spending on adoption, especially if it views a direct spending program as more effective at encouraging adoptions. Alternatively, Congress could eliminate adoption tax benefits and direct any additional revenue to deficit reduction. Make the Credit Refundable
Congress could choose to make the adoption tax credit refundable, so that taxpayers with little or no tax liability could claim the entire value of the credit in a given year. | The federal government supports adoption in two primary ways: federal grants to state governments and tax benefits for individual taxpayers that help offset the costs of adopting a child. This report focuses on federal adoption tax benefits, which consist of an adoption tax credit and an income tax exclusion for employer-provided adoption assistance.
The adoption tax credit helps qualifying taxpayers offset some of the costs of adopting a child. Although the credit may be claimed for nearly all types of adoptions (excluding the adoption of a spouse's child), there are some special rules related to claiming the credit for intercountry adoptions and for adoptions of children with special needs (generally children whom the state child welfare agency considers difficult to place for adoption).
In 2018, taxpayers may be able to receive an adoption credit of up to $13,810 (this amount is annually adjusted for inflation). The credit is reduced for taxpayers with income over $207,140 and is phased out completely for taxpayers with more than $247,140 in income (these amounts are subject to annual inflation adjustment). The adoption credit is not refundable. However, the credit may be carried forward and claimed on future tax returns for up to five years after initially claimed.
In addition, taxpayers whose employers offer qualifying adoption assistance programs as a fringe benefit may not have to pay income taxes on some or all of the value of this benefit. The amount that can be excluded from a taxpayer's income is capped at a maximum amount per adoption which is the same maximum amount of the credit: $13,810 in 2018. Taxpayers can claim the exclusion and the credit concurrently for the same adoption, but cannot claim both tax benefits for the same expenses. Many of the eligibility rules for the adoption tax credit apply to the exclusion for employer-provided adoption assistance.
The legislative history of the current adoption tax benefits indicates that Congress enacted these incentives to encourage more adoptions. However, there is currently little evidence that adoption tax benefits are an effective policy tool to increase adoptions. Instead, data suggest that adoption tax benefits are often a windfall to families that would have adopted in their absence. In addition, the vast majority of adoption tax benefits go to upper-income Americans, even though data indicate that a significant number of lower- and middle-income Americans adopt. Finally, recent evidence suggests that adoption tax benefits have been difficult for the IRS to administer in terms of keeping both erroneous benefit claims and taxpayer burden low.
In light of these concerns with current adoption tax benefits, Congress may consider modifying the credit or the exclusion for employer-provided adoption assistance to achieve certain policy goals. For example, Congress may move to replace these benefits with a direct spending program, especially if Congress views direct spending as more effective at encouraging adoptions. Alternatively, Congress could eliminate adoption tax benefits and direct any additional revenue to deficit reduction. Congress could also choose to make the adoption tax credit refundable, so that taxpayers with little or no tax liability could claim the entire value of the credit in a given year. Or Congress could modify adoption tax benefits in other ways, such as changing the maximum amount of the credit or the income level at which the credit phases out. Finally, policymakers could modify some of the eligibility rules or methods to make the credit easier to administer. |
crs_R40672 | crs_R40672_0 | Introduction
Title I, Part A, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) authorizes federal aid to local educational agencies (LEAs) for the education of disadvantaged children. Title I-A grants provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other pupils attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of pupils from low-income families. In recent years, they have also become a "vehicle" to which a number of requirements affecting broad aspects of public K-12 education for all pupils have been attached as a condition for receiving Title I-A grants. These include requirements for assessments of pupil achievement; adequate yearly progress (AYP) standards and determinations for schools, LEAs, and states; consequences for schools and LEAs that fail to make AYP for two consecutive years or more; plus teacher and paraprofessional qualifications. The ESEA was initially adopted in 1965, and was most recently reauthorized and amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), P.L. 107-110 . Currently, although the authorization for ESEA Title I-A has expired, appropriations have continued to be provided, and the program continues to be implemented under the policies established by the most recent authorization statute. The 111 th Congress is expected to consider proposals to extend and amend the ESEA. This report will not be updated. In summary, major Title I-A reauthorization issues regarding allocation formulas are likely to include the following:
Should annual variations in the poverty estimates used to calculate Title I-A grants be reduced through multi-year averaging or other methods? Has the targeting of Title I-A funds on high poverty LEAs increased since 2001? Should the population weighting factors of the Targeted and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) formulas be modified to more equally favor LEAs with large numbers of school-age children in poor families and LEAs with high poverty rates? Should the expenditure factor continue to play a major role in the Title I-A formulas? Should the authorization level for Title I-A continue to be specified for future years, and if so, at what levels? Should the effort factor in the EFIG formula be modified? Should the equity factor in the EFIG formula be modified? Issues Affecting a Limited Number of States or LEAs:
Should the remaining special constraints on grants to Puerto Rico, the cap on aggregate population weights in the Targeted Grant formula, be removed? Should the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) formula factor be eliminated? Description of the ESEA Title I-A Allocation Formulas
For the allocation of funds to states and LEAs, ESEA Title I-A has four separate formulas: the Basic, Concentration, Targeted, and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) formulas. Once these funds reach LEAs, they are no longer treated separately; they are combined and used without distinction for the same program purposes. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a "population factor," consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an "expenditure factor" based on state average per pupil expenditures for public K-12 education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the population and expenditure factors. Distinctive allocation patterns illustrated in Table 7 , all of which will be discussed further in the issue analyses at the end of this report, include the following:
Grants per formula child are much higher than average under the Targeted and EFIG grant formulas for the selected LEAs with very large numbers of formula children; The selected LEAs with very high percentages of formula children receive higher than average grants per formula child under the Targeted and EFIG formulas, but much lower than the LEAs with very large numbers of formula children, partially due to their treatment under these formulas but primarily because they are located in states with low expenditure factors; The selected LEAs in minimum grant states receive higher grants per formula child than LEAs in any other category under all formulas except possibly Concentration Grants; The selected LEAs with relatively large numbers, but relatively low percentages , of formula children receive Concentration, Targeted, and EFIG grants per formula child that are above the national average, in spite of their low formula child percentages; and The selected LEAs with low numbers and percentages of formula children receive grants per formula child that are well below average under all formulas except Basic Grants. Should There Be Some Consolidation of the Four Different Allocation Formulas? Should the Current Provisions for Intra-LEA Allocation Be Reconsidered? Should Each County Portion of New York City and Other Multi-County LEAs Continue to Be Treated as Separate LEAs Under the Title I-A Allocation Formulas? | Title I, Part A, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) authorizes federal aid to local educational agencies (LEAs) for the education of disadvantaged children. Title I-A grants provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other pupils attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of pupils from low-income families. In recent years, they have also become a "vehicle" to which a number of requirements affecting broad aspects of public K-12 education for all pupils have been attached as a condition for receiving Title I-A grants. These include requirements for assessments of pupil achievement; adequate yearly progress (AYP) standards and determinations for schools, LEAs, and states; consequences for schools and LEAs that fail to make AYP for two consecutive years or more; plus teacher and paraprofessional qualifications.
The ESEA was initially adopted in 1965, and was most recently reauthorized and amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), P.L. 107-110. Currently, although the authorization for ESEA Title I-A has expired, appropriations have continued to be provided, and the program continues to be implemented under the policies established by the most recent authorization statute. The 111th Congress is expected to consider proposals to extend and amend the ESEA.
For the allocation of funds to states and LEAs, Title I-A has four separate formulas: the Basic, Concentration, Targeted, and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) formulas. Once these funds reach LEAs, they are no longer treated separately; they are combined and used without distinction for the same program purposes. While there are numerous complications and special features associated with the Title I-A allocation formulas, each has the same underlying structure. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a "population factor," consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an "expenditure factor" based on state average per pupil expenditures for public K-12 education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the population and expenditure factors, and/or the population factor is modified to direct increased funds to LEAs with concentrations of poverty.
Major Title I-A reauthorization issues regarding allocation formulas are likely to include the following: Should annual variations in the poverty estimates used to calculate Title I-A grants be reduced through multi-year averaging or other methods? Has the targeting of Title I-A funds on high poverty LEAs increased since 2001? Should the population weighting factors of the Targeted and Education Finance Incentive Grant (EFIG) formulas be modified to more equally favor LEAs with large numbers of school-age children in poor families and LEAs with high poverty rates? Should the expenditure factors continue to play a major role in the Title I-A formulas? Should there be some consolidation of the four different allocation formulas? Should the authorization level for Title I-A continue to be specified for future years, and if so, at what levels? Should the effort factor in the EFIG formula be modified? Should the equity factor in the EFIG formula be modified? Should the current provisions for intra-LEA allocation be reconsidered? Should the remaining special constraints on grants to Puerto Rico, the cap on aggregate population weights in the Targeted Grant formula, be removed? Should the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) formula factor be eliminated? And finally, should each county portion of New York City and other multi-county LEAs continue to be treated as separate LEAs under the Title I-A allocation formulas? This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL34252 | crs_RL34252_0 | These programs are administered by the Children's Bureau, within the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the legislation amending them was primarily reported by the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. Amendments to the Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) program, which is authorized under Subtitle B of the Victims of Child Abuse Act, are also discussed. It is administered within the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) at the Department of Justice (DOJ), and legislation amending it was reported by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. The changes enacted affect a broad spectrum of child welfare policies, which range from who is an eligible child and what are eligible costs for which states may claim reimbursement under the Title IV-E Foster Care and Adoption Assistance program to the provision of new support for services to children affected by a parent/caretaker's abuse of methamphetamine or other substances and to required collaboration between welfare agencies and courts. The recently enacted laws also added a number of specific new requirements for state child welfare agencies. With regard to children in foster care, each state must have in place new or revised policies or procedures related to (1) the quality and quantity of caseworker visits; (2) consultation with medical professionals on health treatment; (3) placement of children across state lines; (4) verification of citizenship or immigration status; and (5) background checks of prospective foster and adoptive parents. Further, states are required to have in place policies or procedures enabling them to continue providing necessary child welfare services during a disaster. These changes were enacted in seven bills, each of which is briefly discussed below in order of their enactment. Fair Access to Foster Care Act of 2005
The Fair Access to Foster Care Act of 2005 ( P.L. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005
The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act ( P.L. Safe and Timely Interstate Placement Act of 2006
P.L. P.L. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006
An omnibus measure, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-288 ) amended and/or reauthorized the Child Welfare Services, Promoting Safe and Stable Families, Court Improvement, and Mentoring Children of Prisoners programs (all authorized under Title IV-B of the Social Security Act) and made one amendment to the section of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act that defines the case review procedures required for each child in foster care. Child Welfare Services Amendments
P.L. P.L. 109-432 ). | This report summarizes changes enacted in federal child welfare policy during the 109th Congress. Most federal child welfare programs are authorized in Title IV-B and Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, and the bulk of the changes enacted amended programs in those parts of the law. These programs include Child Welfare Services, Promoting Safe and Stable Families, Court Improvement, and Foster Care and Adoption Assistance. Legislation amending these programs is typically reported by the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, and the programs are administered within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Changes made to the Court-Appointed Special Advocates (CASA) program (Subtitle B of the Victims of Child Abuse Act), which were included in legislation reported by the House and Senate Judiciary committees, are also discussed. That program is administered within the Department of Justice (DOJ).
The changes enacted affect a broad spectrum of child welfare policies, ranging from who are eligible children and what are eligible costs for which states may claim reimbursement under the Title IV-E Foster Care and Adoption Assistance program to the provision of new support for services to children affected by a parent or caretaker's abuse of methamphetamine or other substances and to required collaboration between child welfare agencies and courts. The recently enacted laws also added a number of specific new requirements for state child welfare agencies. With regard to children in foster care, each state must have in place new or revised policies or procedures related to (1) the quality and quantity of caseworker visits; (2) consultation with medical professionals on health treatment; (3) placement of children across state lines; (4) verification of citizenship or immigration status; and (5) background checks of prospective foster and adoptive parents. Further, states are required to have in place policies or procedures enabling the agency to continue providing necessary services during a disaster.
The child welfare provisions of the seven laws providing for these changes are discussed in this report in order of their enactment. These laws are the Fair Access to Foster Care Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-113), the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-162), the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171), the Safe and Timely Interstate Placement Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-239), the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-248), the Child and Family Services Improvement Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-288), and the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-432). This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32375 | crs_RL32375_0 | The negotiations proved unexpectedly difficult. President Bush and Australian PrimeMinister Howard had committed to completing the negotiations by the end of 2003, but differencesover agriculture and other sensitive issues caused the deadline to slip. Tariffs on bilateral trade in most manufactured goods are already low. (Chapter 17 pertains to intellectual property rights protection.) The USAFTA obligates the United States and Australia in other aspects of their bilateral trade in services. (28)
Although, endorsing the agreement, the majority of the ACTPN expressed some concerns:
that some issues regarding Australia's sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regime still needed to be resolved before U.S. agricultural exporters will be able to take full advantage ofthe agreement;
that the agreement does not include an investor-state dispute provision and calls for the U.S. government to ensure that such a provision be added if it proves warranted;and
that the environmental provisions in the agreement are adequate for Australia, since Australia has a strong record on environmental protection, but they should not be considereda model for other U.S. FTA agreements where the partners' records on the environmental protectionis not so strong. (32)
Congress and the USAFTA
United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and Australian Trade Minister Mark Vailesigned the agreement on May 18, 2004, in Washington. On July 6, 2004, the President formally submitted legislation to implement the agreement. On July 8, the House Ways and Means Committee favorably reported out the implementing bill, H.R. 4759 , by voice vote, and the full House approved the measure (314-109) on July15. On July 15, the Senate Finance Committee reported out bill, and the full Senate approved themeasure (80-16) on July 16. The bill was sent to the President for his signature. President Bushsigned the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act on August 3, 2004( P.L.108-286 ). The FTA entered into force on January 1, 2005. (34)
Under the USAFTA, the United States and Australia addressed the few significant irritants in their bilateral economic relationship. Accordingly, the agreement could further solidify an alreadystrong relationship. For Australia, those irritants include U.S. restrictions on beef and dairyproducts. For the United States they include Australian local content requirements in televisionprogramming, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, state-sanctioned monopolies in exportsof wheat and other grains, and screening of foreign investments. In some cases, such as U.S.restrictions on beef and dairy and Australian investment screening, the two sides agreed to loosenrestrictions. In the case others, such as the Australian SPS measures and state-sanctionedmonopolies, they agreed to establish mechanisms for further discussion. However, in the case ofsome irritants, such as U.S. import controls on sugar, the two countries agreed no change waspossible. | After more than a year of negotiations, U.S. and Australian trade officials concluded a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) on February 8, 2004. The negotiations proved unexpectedly difficult. President Bush and Australian Prime Minister Howard had committed to completing the negotiationsby the end of 2003, but differences over agriculture, especially sugar, and other sensitive issuescaused the deadline to slip.
The U.S.-Australia FTA (USAFTA) is a comprehensive agreement. It commits the United States and Australia not only to eliminate tariffs on most of their bilateral trade in goods, but alsoto ensure nondiscriminatory treatment in most areas of bilateral trade in services, governmentprocurement, in foreign investment as well as improved protection of intellectual property rights.
Under the USAFTA, the United States and Australia addressed the few significant irritants in their bilateral economic relationship. In so doing, the agreement could further solidify an alreadystrong relationship. For Australia, those irritants include U.S. restrictions on beef and dairyproducts. For the United States they include Australian local content requirements in televisionprogramming, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, state-sanctioned monopolies in exportsof wheat and other grains, and screening of foreign investments. In some cases, such as U.S.restrictions on beef and dairy and Australian investment screening, the two sides agreed to loosenrestrictions. In the case others, such as the Australian SPS measures and state-sanctionedmonopolies, they agreed to establish mechanisms for further discussion. However, in the case ofsome irritants, such as U.S. import controls on sugar, the two countries agreed no change waspossible.
United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick and Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile signed the agreement on May 18, 2004, in Washington. On July 6, 2004, the President submittedlegislation to implement the agreement. On July 8, the House Ways and Means Committee reportedout the implementing bill, H.R. 4759 , by voice vote, and on July 15, the full Housepassed the measure (314-109) in a largely bipartisan vote. On July 15, reported the Senate FinanceCommittee reported out the companion bill, and on July 16 the full Senate passed the measure(80-16), and it was sent to the President for his signature. President Bush signed the U.S.-AustraliaFree Trade Agreement Implementation Act on August 3, 2004 ( P.L. 108-286 ). On November 17,2004, trade officials from each country exchanged diplomatic notes indicating that implementinglegislation passed by the other country met the requirements of the FTA. However, this occurredonly after discussions were held to resolve U.S. concerns over provisions contained in the Australianimplementing legislation pertaining to pharmaceutical patents. The FTA is entered into forceJanuary 1, 2005. |
crs_RL33727 | crs_RL33727_0 | 4772 , styled the Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 2006, combines process and substance. Its process provisions would ease or eliminate certain current hurdles to a federal takings or substantive due process claim being adjudicated in federal court on the merits, where government interference with property rights is alleged. Its substantive provisions would have the effect of facilitating success on the merits when such claims are brought, through "clarifications" of those same takings and substantive due process constraints. The bill was reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary on September 14, 2006 and passed the House on September 29, 2006 (231-181). Provisions of the Bill
H.R. The process features do not affect the property owner's access to state courts for adjudicating those federal claims, which courts remain generally available. For example, H.R. § 1983 (against political subdivisions of states) or against the United States, where based on property deprivation, are subject to a "clarification": the judgment shall be based on whether the government action is " arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. " Moreover, it is likely that this would preclude abstention in most cases since plaintiff, to ensure that abstention does not occur, would have only to delete any claims of state law violation from his complaint. Definition of "Final Decision"
The same Supreme Court decision that debuted state exhaustion in 1985 imposed a second ripeness requirement on federal takings claims: "a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking ... is not ripe until the government entity ... has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue." Such give-and-take between developer and regulating authority is currently a routine part of the land use control process in this country. More recently, the Court has reaffirmed that "[t]he power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary" and similarly that "it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees." Moving past the constitutionality issue in sections 5 and 6, the following compares the three prescriptions therein with existing takings and substantive due process caselaw, to indicate the degree to which H.R. First, it would apply the exaction takings test to conditions as well as exactions. As above, the lower courts are divided on the reach of the exactions takings test here—some saying that only physical dedication exactions are covered, others that monetary assessments are covered also. "Clarification" of Status in Takings Law of Subdivided Lots
Takings law dictates that a court, in deciding whether a regulatory taking has occurred, must look at the property owner's loss relative to the value she retains —requiring the court to define the "parcel as a whole" for assessing that residual value. 4772 would lower the bar for federal substantive due process claims involving property, facilitating their being brought in federal court. As this report shows, the federal judicial aversion to involvement in local land-use disputes may be manifested through use of several legal devices—abstention, certification of state law questions to state courts in the hope of a clarification that avoids the federal question in the case, declining to find a final decision by the local land-use authority, and most significantly, insisting (per Supreme Court directive) that federal takings claims be litigated first in the state courts, with the consequence that relitigation in federal court generally is barred under various legal theories. | H.R. 4772, titled the Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 2006, passed the House in September 2006 and may, if the Senate acts, move forward during the 2006 lame-duck session.
The bill combines process and substance. The process provisions would ease or eliminate four current hurdles to a federal takings or substantive due process claim being adjudicated in federal court on the merits—in those cases where government interference with property rights is alleged. Those hurdles are abstention, the takings ripeness requirements that the plaintiff must first obtain a final decision from the land-use control agency and exhaust state court remedies, and certification of state law questions to the state courts. The bill does not affect the property owner's access to state courts, which are also available to vindicate such claims.
The bill's limitations on federal court abstention would allow the plaintiff to preclude abstention by not including any claim of state law violation. The bill's elimination of the current state exhaustion prerequisite for a ripe takings claim may well be beyond Congress's authority if, as sound argument suggests, that prerequisite is constitutionally based. The final decision definition in the bill involves a trade-off between easing the procedural burdens on the property owner on the one hand, and the routine give-and-take of local land-use negotiations and informational needs of courts for applying the takings test on the other.
The substantive provisions of the bill provide "clarification" of takings and substantive due process constraints on government interference with property rights. As for federal takings claims, the bill declares that the Supreme Court's test for when exaction conditions on development constitute takings shall apply broadly—to both exactions and other conditions on development, to both adjudicatory and legislative conditions and exactions, and to both land dedications and monetary fees. Also, when a taking claim involves a subdivided lot recognized as an individual property unit under state law, that lot shall be deemed the "parcel as a whole" in the takings analysis. As for substantive due process claims, the bill says that the criterion is whether the government action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
The key issue with the substantive provisions is whether they are constitutional. Suggesting unconstitutionality is the principle that it is the responsibility of the courts, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees. But there are plausible counter-arguments—e.g., that the bill is merely a statutory overlay to constitutional guarantees, not a redefinition of them. Leaving aside the constitutionality question, the provisions expand the circumstances in which property owners can prevail on takings and substantive due process claims. For example, in requiring substantive due process claims to be assessed on a "not in accordance with law" standard, the bill significantly lowers the bar relative to existing judicial standards for such violations, which are typically more deferential to government. |
crs_R41546 | crs_R41546_0 | Introduction
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which applies to all executive branch and independent agencies, prescribes procedures for agency rulemakings and adjudications, as well as standards for judicial review of final agency actions. This report provides a brief overview of the APA's core rulemaking and judicial review provisions. After addressing the various methods through which agencies may promulgate rules, the report highlights the numerous exceptions to the APA's general procedural requirements, including the "good cause" standard, and the rules regarding agency issuance of policy statements, interpretive rules, and rules of agency procedure. Types of Rulemaking
The APA describes rulemaking as the "agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule." The method by which an agency issues a rule may have significant consequences for both the procedures the agency is required to undertake and the deference with which a reviewing court will accord the rule. In addition, the APA contains whole or partial exceptions to the statute's otherwise applicable procedural rulemaking requirements. § 553. Formal
Although rules are typically promulgated through the informal rulemaking process, in limited circumstances, federal agencies must follow formal rulemaking requirements. Although there is no express statutory authorization for direct-final rulemaking, this type of rulemaking has been justified under the "unnecessary" portion of the APA "good cause" exception, discussed infra , as well as the informal notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. It should be noted that Executive Order 13771 does not, and cannot, permit an agency to dispense with statutorily imposed procedural requirements when repealing or amending rules in order to implement the Order's cost-offset requirement. | The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which applies to all agencies of the federal government, provides the general procedures for various types of rulemaking. The APA details the rarely used procedures for formal rules as well as the requirements for informal rulemaking, under which the vast majority of agency rules are issued. This report provides a brief legal overview of the methods by which agencies may promulgate rules, which include formal rulemaking, informal (notice-and-comment or § 553) rulemaking, hybrid rulemaking, direct final rulemaking, and negotiated rulemaking. In addition, this report addresses the legal standards applicable to the repeal or amendment of existing rules.
There is substantial case law regarding APA procedures and agency rulemakings. This report summarizes both the procedural and substantive standards that reviewing courts use to discern whether agency rules have been validly promulgated, amended, or repealed. Additionally, the report highlights the numerous exceptions to the APA's general procedural requirements, including the "good cause" standard, and the rules regarding agency issuance of policy statements, interpretive rules, and rules of agency procedure.
This report also briefly addresses the requirements of presidential review of agency rulemaking under Executive Order 12866 and its successors, as well as the recently established requirement to offset costs under Executive Order 13771. The report does not, however, discuss other statutes that may impact particular agency rulemakings, such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Congressional Review Act, or the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. |
crs_R44813 | crs_R44813_0 | Introduction
Congress has granted many federal agencies the authority to issue regulations that carry the force of law. An important and commonly performed type of regulatory analysis is a cost-benefit analysis (CBA)—a systematic examination, estimation, and comparison of the economic costs and benefits resulting from the implementation of a new rule. Agencies are given this independence in part so that experts writing technical rules have some degree of insulation from political considerations. However, others argue that financial regulators should be subject to greater requirements to increase accountability. In response, a number of bills in recent Congresses have proposed increased requirements. This report examines issues related to financial regulators and CBAs, including potential difficulties facing such regulators and methods available to them when preforming a CBA; the analytical requirements the agencies currently face; and the arguments for and against increasing requirements on financial regulators. This report also briefly describes several examples of proposed legislation that would change the requirements facing financial regulators. This raises questions about the appropriate scope, level of detail, and degree of quantification that should be required of analysis performed in the rulemaking process. Finally, requiring uncertain and contestable CBAs may allow self-interested parties to impede socially beneficial regulation by challenging agency analysis in court and offering their own subjective analysis. 12866 requires covered agencies—that is, agencies other than independent regulatory agencies, which includes most of the financial regulators—to submit "significant" rules to the Office of Management and Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review, along with an initial cost and benefit assessment. For rules that are determined to be significant because their annual economic effect is likely to exceed a $100 million threshold, covered agencies are required to conduct a more in-depth CBA. The document provides some specific information that agencies should generally include in their analyses, such as the statutory or judicial directives that authorize the action; the underlying problem or market failure prompting the regulation; consideration of a "reasonable number" of regulatory alternatives; and both a cost-benefit analysis and a cost-effectiveness analysis. 12866 and OMB Circular A-4. However, the requirements facing financial regulators are not trivial, and financial regulations have been vacated following judicial review when the court found the CBA performed during rulemaking to be deficient. Cross-Cutting Analytical Requirements
The following statutes contain analytical requirements that apply to all federal regulatory agencies, including the financial regulators. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1980 ( P.L. Agency-Specific Requirements for CBA
Certain individual agencies—the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)—are statutorily required to perform certain analysis in rulemaking specific to the agency. The National Securities Market Improvement Act ( P.L. The Commodity Exchange Act (P.L. Some observers argue that financial regulators should maintain a relatively high degree of discretion over the role and form of CBAs in the rule-writing process. They assert
certain characteristics of the finance industry—discussed in detail below—necessitate CBAs with more easily contestable assumptions and uncertain results than in other industries; and performing highly contestable and uncertain CBAs does not discipline agencies, but instead may provide an opportunity for interested parties to impede socially beneficial regulation. Others argue that financial regulators should be subject to more stringent requirements than is currently the case. They assert
performing CBAs for regulation of the finance industry does not pose greater difficulties than for regulation of other industries, and imposing requirements on financial regulators would spur them to overcome methodological and other challenges; and financial CBAs—despite contestable and uncertain results—would be the best tool for ensuring that regulation is implemented responsibly with due consideration of consequences. Arguments That Financial Regulator Discretion is Appropriate
Some observers assert that performing CBAs for financial regulation is different from other types of regulation. They claim financial regulation CBAs are more uncertain and contestable, and this limits the effectiveness of CBA requirements. Instead of increasing accountability and regulatory efficiency, they argue CBAs could disguise agency judgement as objective, scientific measurement. Proponents further assert that financial regulation CBA seems to face such difficult challenges because it has been exempt from certain requirements and oversight. In these ways, they argue uncertain CBAs can play an important role in showing when a proposed regulation is hard to justify or easy to defend. | Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the federal rulemaking process is the systematic examination, estimation, and comparison of the potential economic costs and benefits resulting from the promulgation of a new rule. Agencies with rulemaking authority implement regulations that carry the force of law. While this system allows technical rules to be designed by experts that are to some degree insulated from political considerations, it also results in rules being implemented by executive branch staff that arguably are not directly accountable to the electorate.
One method for Congress to increase accountability is to require the regulators to conduct analyses of likely effects of proposed regulations. In this way, an agency demonstrates that it gave reasoned consideration to the effects of the proposed rules. CBA is an important type of such analysis, as comparing costs and benefits can be useful in determining whether or not a regulation is beneficial. However, performing CBA can be a difficult and time-consuming process, and it produces uncertain results because it involves making assumptions about future outcomes. Some observers argue that financial regulation CBA is particularly challenging. This raises questions about what parameters and level of detail agencies should be required to include in their CBA.
While most federal regulatory agencies are directed by Executive Order 12866 and Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4 in their performance of CBAs, financial regulators are generally not subject to these directives. Financial regulators are statutorily required to perform certain CBA: requirements such as the Paperwork Reduction Act (P.L. 104-13) and Regulatory Flexibility Act (P.L. 96-354) generally apply to all financial regulators; financial regulators that regulate the banking system are subject to requirements set out in the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act (P.L. 103-325); and agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB,) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) face requirements specific to them. However, the requirements facing individual financial regulators generally allow them to perform analysis under less specific instruction than is contained in the requirements that are cited above and apply to nonindependent regulatory agencies.
Whether the requirements facing financial regulators should allow for this discretion is a contentious issue. Some observers assert that financial regulators should maintain a relatively high degree of discretion over when and how to conduct CBA. They argue that characteristics of the financial industry and regulation make CBAs in this area especially uncertain and contestable, and assert that financial regulation effects depend entirely on human and market reactions; finance plays a central role in a huge, complex economic system; and financial regulations' effects are more likely (relative to other types of regulation) to include transfers between groups not well accounted for in net measurements. They further argue that requisite CBAs that are uncertain and contestable are more likely to disguise agency discretion as objective fact and provide the opportunity for interested parties to challenge socially beneficial regulation with their own subjective, self-interested analyses.
Other observers assert that financial regulators should face more stringent requirements than they currently do. They refute claims that financial CBAs are necessarily more uncertain or contestable than in other areas. Also, they argue that tools and techniques would be developed to overcome challenges if CBAs were required. They further argue that even uncertain and contestable CBAs are effective in disciplining agencies because they create transparency of the agency's evaluations of proposed regulations and allow for outside assessment of that evaluation.
Recent Congresses have been active on this issue, and the House has passed several bills in the 115th Congress that would increase CBA requirements. Recent proposals would affect either all regulators including financial regulators, financial regulators as a group, or individual financial regulators. |
crs_97-727 | crs_97-727_0 | Political Background
Georgia gained its independence at the end of 1991 with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Shevardnadze was ousted in the wake of a suspect legislative election in late 2003, and coup co-leader Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president in January 2004. The United States pledged the largest amount—$1 billion—for these efforts (see below, " U.S. Humanitarian and Rebuilding Aid after the Russia-Georgia Conflict "). U.S. Relations
The U.S.-Georgia Charter
Signed in January 2009, the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership reflects strong U.S. support for Georgia's continued sovereignty and independence. Meeting with then-Prime Minister Nikoloz Gilauri, then-Secretary Clinton stated that "the United States will not waver in its support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. During his state visit to the United States in January 2012, President Saakashvili met with President Obama, who praised efforts in Georgia to increase the honesty of police, the rule of law, and free market reforms, and called for free elections in the future. U.S. Assistance Overview
The United States has been Georgia's largest bilateral aid donor, budgeting cumulative aid of $3.37 billion in FY1992-FY2010 (all agencies and programs). Georgia has regularly ranked among the top world states in terms of per capita U.S. aid. U.S.-budgeted aid for Georgia in FY2012 was $85.5 million. Requested foreign assistance for FY2014 is $62.0 million (data for FY2012 and FY2014 include "Function 150" programs and exclude Defense and Energy Department funds; estimates for FY2013 are not yet available). There has been no lethal military assistance to Georgia since the August [2008] conflict." | The small Black Sea-bordering country of Georgia gained its independence at the end of 1991 with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. The United States had an early interest in its fate, since the well-known former Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, soon became its leader. Democratic and economic reforms faltered during his rule, however. New prospects for the country emerged after Shevardnadze was ousted in 2003 and the U.S.-educated Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president. Then-U.S. President George W. Bush visited Georgia in 2005, and praised the democratic and economic aims of the Saakashvili government while calling on it to deepen reforms.
The August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict caused much damage to Georgia's economy and military, as well as contributing to hundreds of casualties and tens of thousands of displaced persons in Georgia. The United States quickly pledged $1 billion in humanitarian and recovery assistance for Georgia. In early 2009, the United States and Georgia signed a Strategic Partnership Charter, which pledged U.S. support for democratization, economic development, and security reforms in Georgia. The Obama Administration has provided ongoing support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The United States has been Georgia's largest bilateral aid donor, budgeting cumulative aid of $3.37 billion in FY1992-FY2010 (all agencies and programs). Georgia has regularly ranked among the top world states in terms of per capita U.S. aid. U.S.-budgeted aid for Georgia in FY2012 was $85.5 million. The Administration has requested $62.0 million for foreign assistance for Georgia for FY2014 (data for FY2012 and FY2014 include "Function 150" programs and exclude Defense and Energy Department funds; estimates for FY2013 are not yet available). |
crs_RL32949 | crs_RL32949_0 | 104-104 ), represented the first major rewrite of our nation's telecommunications policy. 151 et seq.) to address the emergence of competition in what were previously considered to be monopolistic markets. Despite its relatively recent enactment, however, a consensus has been growing that the 1996 Act fails to adequately address the convergence and technological changes now facing the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors. Although many policymakers (as well as the popular and trade press) have labeled efforts to revise existing telecommunications law "the rewrite or revision of the 1996 Act," in actuality the revisions being considered are likely to go beyond what is included in the 1996 Act and will add to and modify the underlying statute which is the 1934 Act. In the 109 th Congress efforts to pass a comprehensive telecommunications measure, while successful in the House ( H.R. 5252 ), did not make it to the Senate floor for consideration. The 110 th Congress has held hearings on a wide range of topics including broadband deployment, the digital television transition, media ownership, universal service fund reform, FCC oversight, and public safety communications. Unlike in the 109 th Congress however, where energy was focused on the passage of a single comprehensive telecommunications reform measure, it appears that the 110 th Congress, to date, is focusing on more narrowly targeted incremental revisions which may be passed as stand-alone measures or in conjunction with other legislative vehicles. Regardless of the outcome of legislative proposals, however, the 110 th Congress has taken, and is expected to continue to take, an active role in examining and debating the issues that such a revision may entail. This report provides an introduction to selected issues which the 110 th Congress has begun, or is likely, to address as it continues to examine possible revision of telecommunications law. While far from an exhaustive list, the following issues have been selected for discussion due to their relevance and prominence in the current telecommunications reform debate: broadband Internet regulation and access; broadcast indecency; digital television transition; Federal Communications Commission structure and reform; media ownership rules; municipal deployment of broadband; public safety communications; the "savings clause" and monopoly issues; spectrum auctions; and universal service fund reform. The underlying references to CRS products included at the end of each issue, should be used to update relevant events and, to track Congressional activity. This report will be updated occasionally. (47 U.S.C. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ( P.L. | The passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act (P.L. 104-104) resulted in a major revision of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) to address the emergence of competition in what were previously considered to be monopolistic markets. Although less than a decade has passed, a consensus has grown that existing laws that govern the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors have become inadequate to meet the Nation's changing telecommunications environment. Technological changes such as the advancement of Internet technology to supply data, voice, and video, the transition to digital television, as well as the growing convergence in the telecommunications sector have, according to many policymakers, made it necessary to consider another "rewrite" or revision, of the laws governing these markets.
In the 109th Congress efforts to pass a comprehensive telecommunications measure, while successful in the House (H.R. 5252), did not make it to the Senate floor for consideration. The 110th Congress has held hearings on a wide range of topics including broadband deployment, the digital television transition, media ownership, universal service fund reform, FCC oversight, and public safety communications. Unlike in the 109th Congress however, where energy was focused on the passage of a single comprehensive telecommunications reform measure, it appears that the 110th Congress, to date, is focusing on more narrowly targeted incremental revisions which may be passed as stand-alone measures or in conjunction with other legislative vehicles. Regardless of the outcome of legislative proposals, however, the 110th Congress is taking, and is expected to continue to take, an active role in examining and debating the issues that such a revision may entail.
This report provides an overview of selected topics which the 110th Congress has begun, or is likely, to address in its examination of telecommunications issues. While far from a definitive list, the issues selected are wide-ranging and touch upon topics central to the telecommunications reform debate. The issues included in this report cover: broadband Internet regulation and access; broadcast indecency; digital television transition; Federal Communications Commission structure and reform; media ownership rules; municipal deployment of broadband; public safety communications, the "savings clause" and monopoly issues; spectrum auctions; and universal service fund reform.
This report addresses major issues, rather than addressing specific legislative activity. The underlying references to CRS products, included at the end of each issue, should be used to expand upon the issue, update relevant events and, where appropriate, track Congressional activity. This report will be updated occasionally. |
crs_RL31810 | crs_RL31810_0 | The Houseconsidered and passed the bill on June 26, 2003. On July 10, the Senate amended H.R. 2559 by striking thetext and substituting that of S. 1357 . The Senate passed the amended bill on July 11(91-0) and requested a conference with the House. While the Senate considered its version of the bill ( S. 1689 ), the House passed its bill( H.R. The Senate substituted the text of S.1689 for that of H.R. The conference report ( H.Rept. The bill was presented to the President on November 5. 1588 ) began on July 22 and has not yet concluded. The bill funds construction projects and some of the facilitysustainment, restoration and modernization of the active Army, Navy and Marine Corps, Air Force,and their reserve components; (1) additionaldefense-wide construction; U.S. contributions to theNATO Security Investment Program (formerly known as the NATO Infrastructure Program); (2) andmilitary family housing operations and construction. Several special accounts are included within the military construction appropriation. This year, the President submitted hisFY2004 budget request to the Congress on February 3, 2003. Following a series of hearings by the House Subcommittee on MilitaryAppropriations, the full Committee marked up its bill on June 17. The conferees agreed on theirbill on November 4. This was amended upward by the House Appropriations Committee to $9,237,096,000 because of transfers from the defense appropriations bill (11) to themilitary construction appropriations bill and calculations performed by theCongressional Budget Office (CBO) pursuant to an Administration request for ageneral provision of funding related to the "Foreign Currency Fluctuations,Construction, Defense" account. (13)
Fiscal Year 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Request
On September 21, 2003, the President forwarded to Congress his request for an emergency, non-offset supplemental appropriations for FY2004. The request also includes authorization to transfer significant funding into construction from other accounts. Iraqi Freedom Fund. Contingency Construction. The Committee recommended emergency military construction appropriations equal to the President's request, totaling $119.9 million to the Military Construction,Army (emergency) account and $292.6 million to the Military Construction, AirForce (emergency) account, for a total of $412.5 million. 3289 . Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). The report of the House Appropriations Committee on the defense appropriations bill ( H.R. S. 1357 was reported as an original measure on June 26, 2003.The Senate began consideration of H.R. 2559 . Defense Authorization
H.R. Table 4. CRS Report RL31805 . Authorization and Appropriations for FY2004: Defense , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL32090 , FY2004 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism: Military Operations & ReconstructionAssistance , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and RhodaMargesson. Appropriations and Authorization for FY2003: Defense , coordinated by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. | The military construction (MilCon) appropriations bill provides funding for (1) military construction projects in the United States and overseas; (2) military family housing operations andconstruction; (3) U.S. contributions to the NATO Security Investment Program; and (4) the bulk ofbase realignment and closure (BRAC)costs.
The President forwarded his fiscal year 2004 budget request to the Congress on February 3, 2003. The original military construction request of $9.0 billion was later increased to $9.2 billiondue to reprogramming from the defense appropriations bill ( H.R. 2658 ) and anAdministration request related to foreign currency fluctuations as calculated by the CongressionalBudget Office.
On June 17, 2003, the House Appropriations Committee reported a bill ( H.R. 2559 ) that recommends $9.2 billion in military construction appropriations. This is $41 millionbelow the President's revised request and $1.5 billion below the FY2003 appropriation. The Housepassed the bill on June 26. The Senate Appropriations Committee marked up an original version ofthe bill ( S. 1357 ) and reported it to the Senate on June 26. On July 10, the Senate beganconsideration of H.R. 2559 , substituting the text of S. 1357 , and passedthe amended bill on July 11. The conference committee reported its bill on November 4, 2003.
Authorization of military construction is included within the defense authorization bill. The House passed its version of the bill ( H.R. 1588 ) on May 22. The Senate substituted thetext of S. 1050 for that of H.R. 1588 and passed the amended bill on June4, 2003. The conference committee began meeting on July 22 and had not reported its bill as of thiswriting. For a comprehensive report on defense authorization legislation, see CRS Report RL31805 , Authorization and Appropriations for FY2004: Defense , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
In late September, the President submitted to Congress an emergency supplemental appropriations request for Fiscal Year 2004 (H.R. 3289) that included $412 million in fundingspecific to military construction and unlimited authority to transfer unspecified additional funds fromthe Iraqi Freedom Fund ($1.99 billion) to military construction and up to $500 million from otherDepartment of Defense funds into a contingency construction account. The bill was passed by bothchambers and was presented to the President on November 5. For more information on thesupplemental, see CRS Report RL32090 , FY2004 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq,Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism: Military Operations & Reconstruction Assistance ,by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
Key Policy Staff
* FDT = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service. |
crs_R44314 | crs_R44314_0 | After the Windsor decision, the Social Security Administration (SSA) started processing Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) applications for some claimants in a same-sex marriage. Under the Social Security Act, eligibility for spousal benefits depends on the applicant's marital status as defined by the state in which the Number Holder is domiciled. However, until Obergefell v. Hodges , the legality of some same-sex marriages remained in flux as state legislatures and courts changed and interpreted state marriage laws. Because the Social Security Act determines marital status by considering the laws of the state in which the Number Holder is domiciled, SSA could only process spousal benefits for some same-sex couples whose domicile state would recognize their marriage, even if they were married legally in another state. In Obergefell , the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to permit a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out of state. This report addresses eligibility for Social Security spousal benefits for individuals in a same-sex marriage. Social Security and Same-Sex Marriage
Same-sex couples were not always eligible for Social Security spousal benefits, as Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) had required that marriage be defined as the union of one man and one woman for the purpose of federal enactments. Social Security Eligibility After United States v. Windsor
On June 26, 2013, in United States v. Windsor , the Supreme Court held that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is unconstitutional, finding, in part, that it violated the Constitution's equal protection and substantive due process guarantees. Because eligibility for Social Security spousal benefits depends on whether the state would recognize the applicant's marriage to the Number Holder at the time of the application, individuals in a same-sex marriage are now eligible for spousal Social Security benefits, if they have met other statutory requirements. With respect to policy guidance concerning the processing of applications for same-sex couples who may have been ineligible for benefits before Obergefell , SSA further stated: "We are working with the Department of Justice to analyze the [ Obergefell ] decision and provide instructions for processing claims." The agency indicates that new information regarding implementation of the Obergefell decision will be posted to its website as it becomes available. | This report addresses eligibility for Social Security spousal benefits for individuals in a same-sex marriage.
Key Takeaways
Under the Social Security Act, eligibility for spousal benefits depends on the applicant's marital status as defined by the laws of the state as interpreted by the courts of that state in which the Number Holder, the person on whose work record the benefit is based, is domiciled. Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) had required that marriage be defined as the union of one man and one woman for the purpose of federal enactments, rendering individuals in a same-sex marriage ineligible for spousal Social Security benefits. In United States v. Windsor, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was unconstitutional, finding, in part, that it violated the Constitution's equal protection and substantive due process guarantees. In response to the Windsor decision, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has started processing Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) applications for some claimants in same-sex marriages. However, until Obergefell v. Hodges, the legality of some same-sex marriages remained in flux as state legislatures and courts changed and interpreted state marriage laws. Because the Social Security Act determines marital status by considering the laws of the state in which the Number Holder is domiciled, the Social Security Administration could only process spousal benefits for some same-sex couples whose domicile state would recognize their marriage, even if they were married legally in another state. In Obergefell v. Hodges (June 26, 2015), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to permit a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out of state. Thus, because same-sex couples may now marry in all states, individuals in a same-sex marriage are eligible for spousal Social Security benefits, if they have met other statutory requirements. With respect to policy guidance concerning the processing of applications for applicants in same-sex marriages who may have been ineligible for benefits before Obergefell, SSA has stated that it is working with the Department of Justice to analyze the Obergefell decision in order to provide instructions for processing claims. The agency has indicated that new information regarding implementation of the Obergefell decision will be posted to its website as it becomes available. |
crs_RL32161 | crs_RL32161_0 | (1) Most important, Japan has told North Koreait is prepared to offer a large-scale economic aid package -- on the order of $5 billion - $10 billion-- to compensate for the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910-1945. Japan also is important to the North Korean situation because it is a significant source of North Korea's foreign exchange. Not only is Japan North Korea's third-largest trading partner, but theJapanese market also is a major destination for the North Korean government's suspected drug-running operationsand of remittances from Korean permanent residents in Japan. Finally, Japan arguably has been the strongest supporter in East Asia of the Bush Administration's policy of pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. (3)
The Pyongyang Declaration
The Koizumi-Kim Summit
On September 17, 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held a one-day summit in Pyongyang that momentarily restarted normalization talksbetween the two countries, which had been stalled since November 2000. Koizumi, in turn,apologized for Japan's colonization of the Korean Peninsula and offered to provide North Koreawith a large-scale economic aid package, much as it gave South Korea economic assistance whenTokyo and Seoul normalized relations in 1965. (6)
The Talks Break Down
The Japan-North Korea normalization talks and parallel security talks stalled due to two developments shortly after the Koizumi-Kim summit: North Korea's October 2002 admission toU.S. officials that it has a secret nuclear weapons program based on the process of uraniumenrichment; and popular outrage in Japan at Kim Jong-il's admission that North Korea hadkidnapped 13 Japanese, eight of whom the North Koreans said had died since their abductions. Selected Issues in Japan's Policy toward North Korea
North Korea's Nuclear Program and Japan's Increased Willingness to Consider Coercive Diplomacy
In the Pyongyang Declaration, Japan and North Korea promised to "abide by all relevant international agreements in order to comprehensively resolve the nuclear issue on the Koreanpeninsula." (8)
Since the revelations about North Korea's uranium nuclear program were made public in October 2002, Japan has been the Northeast Asian country most supportive of the BushAdministration's policy of combining multilateral dialogue and pressure to convince North Koreato abandon its nuclear program. Remittances to North Korea are estimated to be in the tens of millions ofdollars annually. The shipment reportedly was bound for Thailand, and from there was to be sent to North Korea. (16)
Like most Japanese leaders, however, Koizumi has equivocated on the subject of taking more coercive measures against North Korea, such as economic sanctions, absent an escalation of thesituation by Pyongyang. Japan worries that an outbreak of military hostilities could lead NorthKorea to launch long or medium range missiles at Japan -- including U.S. bases. (23) Japanese officials have not deniedthese reports. | Japan and North Korea have not established official relations since the Korean Peninsula, which the Japanese Empire annexed in 1910, was liberated from Japanese rule and divided into twoseparate states following Japan's defeat in World War II. Attempts to establish normal relations inthe early 1990s and again in 2000 ended in failure, due to seemingly unresolvable obstacles. InSeptember 2002, a one-day summit was held in Pyongyang between Japanese Prime MinisterJunichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, the first ever between the leaders of thetwo countries. Koizumi and Kim momentarily appeared to break longstanding stalemates on severalissues and agreed to restart bilateral normalization talks, but the talks subsequently stalled, due totwo developments: North Korea's apparent admission to U.S. officials in October 2002 that it hada secret nuclear weapons program based on the process of uranium enrichment; and popular outragein Japan at Kim Jong-il's admission that North Korea kidnapped 13 Japanese in the 1970s and 1980and brought them to North Korea to live. Subsequently, according to the North Korean government,eight of whom died.
Japan's role is potentially critical in the current crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons programs for a number of reasons. Most importantly, Japan has promised North Korea a large-scaleeconomic aid package to compensate for the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula from1910-1945, much as it gave South Korea economic assistance when Tokyo and Seoul normalizedrelations in 1965. The assistance is to be provided after the countries agree to normalize relations,a process that Japan now links to a resolution of the nuclear issue. Reportedly, Japanese officialsare discussing a package on the order of $5-$10 billion, an enormous sum for the North Koreaneconomy, the total GDP of which is estimated to be in the $20 billion range. Currently, Japan is asignificant source of North Korea's foreign exchange, by virtue of the large Japanese market for theNorth Korean government's suspected drug-running operations, and of remittances from Koreanpermanent residents in Japan. Japan is North Korea's third-largest trading partner.
Since the fall of 2002, Japan has been the Northeast Asian country most supportive of the Bush Administration's policy of pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, and has takena number of steps to curtail North Korea's ability to earn hard currency and to import dual-usetechnology. Since North Korea launched a long-range missile over Japan in 1998, relations withNorth Korea have been a highly politicized issue inside Japan, creating strong domestic support fortaking a hard line against Pyongyang. Prime Minister Koizumi, however, has equivocated on takingmore coercive measures against North Korea, such as economic sanctions, absent an escalation ofthe situation by Pyongyang. Japan fears such measures could provoke a military response by NorthKorea and/or trigger a surge in refugees.
This report will be updated periodically to track developments in Japan-North Korea relations. |
crs_RL34030 | crs_RL34030_0 | Introduction
Issue Definition
President George W. Bush has stated that comprehensive immigration reform is a top priority of his second term, and his principles of reform include increased border security and enforcement of immigration laws within the interior of the United States, as well as a major overhaul of temporary worker visas, expansion of permanent legal immigration, and revisions to the process of determining whether foreign workers are needed. Some are advocating to replace or supplement the current legal immigration preference system with a point system that would assign prospective immigrants with credits if they have specified attributes (e.g., educational attainment, work experience, language proficiency). Replacing or supplementing the current preference system for admitting legal permanent residents (LPRs) with a point system is garnering considerable interest for the first time in over a decade. Briefly, point systems such as those of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand assign prospective immigrants with credits if they have specified attributes, most often based upon educational attainment, skill sets used in shortage occupations, extent of work experience, language proficiency, and desirable age range. Pro/Con Summation
Proponents of point systems maintain that such merit-based approaches are clearly defined and based upon the nation's economic needs and labor market objectives. A point system, supporters argue, would be more acceptable to the public because the government (rather than employers or families) would be selecting new immigrants and this selection would be based upon national economic priorities. Opponents of point systems state that the judgement of individual employers are the best indicator of labor market needs and an immigrant's success. Some warn that the number of people who wish to immigrate to the United States would overwhelm a point system that is comparable to those of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand. In turn, this predicted high volume of prospective immigrants, some say, would likely lead to selection criteria so rigorous that it would be indistinguishable from what is now the first preference category of employment-based admissions (persons of extraordinary ability in the arts, science, education, business, or athletics; outstanding professors and researchers; and certain multi-national executives and managers) and ultimately would not result in meaningful reform. Administration of a point system could also be difficult. The bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform legislation was negotiated with Bush Administration officials and introduced in the Senate on May 21, 2007, as S.Amdt. 1150 to S. 1348 . On June 28, 2007, the key cloture vote on S. 1639 failed. | Replacing or supplementing the current preference system for admitting legal permanent residents (LPRs) with a point system is garnering considerable interest for the first time in over a decade. Briefly, point systems such as those of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand assign prospective immigrants with credits if they have specified attributes, most often based on educational attainment, skill sets used in shortage occupations, extent of work experience, language proficiency, and desirable age range.
President George W. Bush has stated that comprehensive immigration reform is a top priority of his second term, and his principles of reform include increased border security and enforcement of immigration laws within the interior of the United States, as well as a major overhaul of temporary worker visas, expansion of permanent legal immigration, and revisions to the process of determining whether foreign workers are needed. The Bush Administration is reportedly among those advocating to replace or supplement the current legal immigration preference system with a point system that would assign prospective immigrants with credits if they have specified attributes.
Proponents of point systems maintain that such merit-based approaches are clearly defined and based on the nation's economic needs and labor market objectives. A point system, supporters argue, would be more acceptable to the public because the government (rather than employers or families) would be selecting new immigrants and this selection would be based on national economic priorities. Opponents of point systems state that the judgement of individual employers are the best indicator of labor market needs and an immigrant's success.
Opponents warn that the number of people who wish to immigrate to the United States would overwhelm a point system comparable to those of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand. In turn, this predicted high volume of prospective immigrants, some say, would likely lead to selection criteria so rigorous that it would be indistinguishable from what is now the first preference category of employment-based admissions (persons of extraordinary ability in the arts, science, education, business, or athletics; outstanding professors and researchers; and certain multi-national executives and managers) and ultimately would not result in meaningful reform.
The bipartisan compromise proposal for comprehensive immigration reform introduced in the Senate on May 21, 2007, as S.Amdt. 1150 to S. 1348, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, includes a point system. A modified version of that compromise legislation (S. 1639), which also featured a point system, stalled in the Senate on June 28, 2007. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32209 | crs_RL32209_0 | ThisCRS report lists and compares military expenditures of the United States and foreign countries usingtwo of the most commonly cited and readily available publications: The Military Balance, publishedin October of each year by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)andWorld Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), published about annually by the U.S.Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control. (1)
Although the IISS and U.S. State Department aim to provide figures that are as consistent and accurate as possible, cross-national comparisons of defense spending are inherently imperfect. Available sets of figures are useful for comparative purposes, but often do not correspond with oneanother for a variety of reasons. This report provides two sets of figures from widely recognizedsources in order to offer Congress a sample of the data published on this topic. | This report lists and compares military expenditures of the United States and foreign nations using two sources: the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies' (IISS) The MilitaryBalance, and the U.S. State Department's World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT).
Although the IISS and the U.S. State Department aim to provide figures that are as consistent and accurate as possible, cross-national comparisons of defense spending are inherently imperfect. Available sets of figures are useful, but often do not correspond with one another for a variety ofreasons. This report provides two sets of figures from widely recognized sources in order to offerCongress a sample of the data published on this topic. This report will be updated as necessary. |
crs_RL33888 | crs_RL33888_0 | Section 527 was added to the IRC in 1975 to provide tax-exempt status to political organizations , as defined in that statute. At that time, it was generally thought that, with respect to groups participating in federal elections, political organizations correlated directly with political committees as labeled by and operating under federal election law. In 2000, however, it came to light that some groups engaged in federal-election-related issue advocacy were claiming exempt status under IRC § 527 while not being regulated under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did not generally require these organizations to file tax returns or pay taxes. That interpretation permitted regulation of only those communications containing express advocacy (i.e., communications containing explicit terms urging the election or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates). By avoiding such terms, groups arguably could promote their views and issue positions in reference to particular elected officials, without triggering the disclosure and source restrictions of FECA. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)
On March 27, 2002, H.R. Without amending FECA's definition of "political committee," "expenditure," or "contribution," Title II created a new term in federal election law, "electioneering communications"—political advertisements that refer to clearly identified federal candidates, broadcast within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election. Groups wishing to engage in these activities and still avail themselves of the unlimited sources of money no longer available to political parties may qualify for tax-exempt status under IRC § 527. The Bush-Cheney campaign filed its own lawsuit to block activities of some prominent 527 groups during the 2004 elections; both the House Administration and Senate Rules and Administration Committees held hearings in 2004 and 2005; both committees reported bills to regulate 527 organizations under FECA in the 109 th Congress; and the House passed such legislation on two occasions in 2006. BCRA supporters have tended to see the enormous amounts of money raised and spent in recent elections as a result of what they argue is the FEC's failure to enforce existing law, and they have also launched an effort to replace the agency with what they see as a more effective enforcement body. BCRA critics, however, insist that what has occurred has been the predictable result of the ban on soft money activity by the national parties, thus redirecting massive amounts of unregulated money to outside groups that are less accountable to the political system. The fourth alternative consisted of two "sub-alternative" tests: Alternative 2-A would consider that all 527s have the major purpose of nominating or electing federal office candidates, with five exceptions: (1) if the 527 is the campaign organization of an individual seeking nomination, election, appointment, or selection to a non-federal office; (2) if the 527 is organized solely for the purpose of promoting the nomination or election of a candidate to a non-federal office; (3) if the 527 is a group of persons whose election or nomination activities relate solely to elections where no candidate for federal office appears on the ballot; (4) if the 527 operates solely within one state and, pursuant to state law, must file financial disclosure reports with the state government, showing all activities within that state; or (5) if the 527 is organized solely for the purpose of influencing the nomination or appointment of individuals to a non-elected office or to political party leadership positions. These bills included H.R. H.R. Two other 527 bills have also been introduced in the 110 th Congress. | Several prominent groups organized under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) were prominent players in the 2004 presidential election, raising and spending approximately $435 million and being widely seen as having an impact on the outcome of the race. Yet, some so-called "527" organizations remain outside the purview of federal election law. Section 527, added to the IRC in 1975, provides tax-exempt status to federal, state, and local political organizations. At first, it was generally thought that, with respect to federal election activities, political organizations correlated directly with political committees as defined under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). It became clear by 2000, however, that this was not necessarily true because prevailing judicial interpretation of Supreme Court precedent has permitted FECA regulation of only those communications containing express advocacy (i.e., explicitly urging the election or defeat of clearly identified federal candidates). By avoiding such terms, groups could arguably promote issue positions in reference to particular federal elected officials without triggering FECA's disclosure, contribution limits, and source restrictions. Still, the groups qualified for the favorable tax treatment of § 527 organizations because that benefit is not limited to groups that conduct express advocacy.
In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) addressed express advocacy, but regulated only messages broadcast within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election that referred to a federal office candidate. BCRA left unregulated such areas as broadcasts aired before elections and voter mobilization efforts. Groups wishing to engage in these activities and still avail themselves of the unlimited funding sources no longer available to political parties generally qualify for tax-exempt status under IRC § 527. Supporters of BCRA have led the effort to extend federal election law regulation to these types of 527 organizations, seeing the enormous amounts of money raised and spent in recent years as a result of the FEC's failure to enforce existing law. BCRA critics, however, insist that what occurred since 2004 was the predictable result of the ban on soft money activity by national parties, thus redirecting massive amounts of unregulated money to outside groups that are less accountable to the political system; they insist that many of these groups not engaging in express advocacy cannot be constitutionally regulated.
In the 109th Congress, the House twice passed similar bills to add 527 organizations to FECA's political committee definition, unless involved solely in state and local elections. The Senate Rules and Administration Committee reported a similar measure, but the Senate did not act on it. Similar bills (H.R. 420 and S. 463) have been offered in the 110th Congress. Other bills (H.R. 2316; H.R. 1204) that would affect 527s have also been introduced in the 110th Congress. This report explores the evolution of the 527 issue and attempts to address it in the courts, the Federal Election Commission, and Congress. It will be updated periodically to reflect further developments. |
crs_R43994 | crs_R43994_0 | Federal employees are entitled to use sick leave for four primary reasons: (1) personal medical needs, (2) care of a family member, (3) death of a family member, and (4) adoption of a child. For example, a full-time federal employee accrues four hours of sick leave per bi-weekly pay period (a total of 104 hours, or 13 days, per year). Alternative Leave Options for Exhausted Sick Leave
A federal employee might lack the amount of sick leave necessary to cover a prolonged medical absence from work. One exception is unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. Policy Issues
In recent years, both the Obama Administration and some Members of Congress have made efforts to expand the scope and amount of leave available to federal employees for personal or family medical situations. On January 15, 2015, President Barack Obama signed a presidential memorandum that appeared to encourage, among other things, paid parental leave for federal employees. The memorandum directed agencies to ensure that their leave policies, pursuant to relevant laws and "irrespective of current leave balances," offer employees the maximum amount of (1) advanced sick leave for birth or adoption of a child (240 hours), and (2) advanced annual leave for foster care placement or care of a newborn or newly adopted child. Maximization of Paid Leave for Family Care
On June 23, 2014, President Barack Obama signed a presidential memorandum that encouraged agencies to maximize the availability and use of workplace flexibilities and work-life programs to increase recruitment and retention of federal employees. For example, the memorandum directed agencies to ensure employee access to annual and sick leave for care of an ill family member and FMLA unpaid leave for parental responsibilities. Other past legislation has attempted to expand the use of existing unpaid leave under the FMLA to care for sick relatives. Voluntary Leave Donation Programs
Past legislation has proposed expanding the type of leave available through leave donation programs. Namely, the Federal Employees Leave Transfer Act of 2011would have allowed a federal employee to donate his or her sick leave through the Voluntary Leave Transfer or Voluntary Leave Bank program for a peer experiencing a medical emergency. | This brief provides an overview of sick leave for federal employees, including leave options for employees when sick leave has been exhausted. Full-time federal employees can earn up to 104 hours (13 days) of sick leave per year and are entitled to use such leave for four primary reasons: (1) personal medical needs, (2) care of a family member, (3) death of a family member, and (4) adoption of a child.
A federal employee might experience a situation in which he or she does not have enough accrued sick leave to cover a prolonged absence from work for personal or family medical reasons. In these instances, a federal employee can often use alternative leave options to cover the absence. Alternative paid leave options include advanced sick leave, using annual leave for sick leave purposes, and voluntary leave donation programs. Alternative unpaid leave options include leave without pay and leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-3).
In recent years, both the Administration and Congress have attempted to expand the availability and use of paid leave for family care and related activities. On January 15, 2015, President Obama signed a presidential memorandum that appears to encourage expanded use of existing paid leave for parental activities. Namely, the memorandum directed agencies to ensure that their policies offer the maximum amount of advanced annual and sick leave for childbirth or adoption, or care of a newborn or newly adopted child.
Legislation has also proposed enhancements to leave options available to federal employees for purposes of family care. Specifically, H.R. 532 (114th Congress) has proposed paid leave for parental responsibilities and H.R. 2698 (113th Congress) proposed short-term disability insurance that could be used for purposes of childbirth or adoption. Expansion of existing unpaid leave options for care of sick relatives or bereavement has also been proposed (see, for example, S. 846 and S. 226 in the 113th Congress). Finally, H.R. 3028 (112th Congress) proposed expanded voluntary leave donation programs to include the donation of sick leave to federal employees experiencing a medical emergency. |
crs_R40442 | crs_R40442_0 | President Obama's budget outline for FY2010 includes several proposals to reduce federal spending by $16 billion over 10 years on the farm commodity and crop insurance programs. Reaction to the proposal has been generally negative from groups affiliated with or supportive of agriculture. The most vehement reaction has been to a proposal to eliminate direct payments to farms with more than $500,000 of sales. They would not be part of the annual appropriations process. such action would be viewed as "reopening" the 2008 farm bill, which most in the agriculture community see as a five-year contract with farmers. if budget reconciliation is ordered by the budget committees, and the agriculture committees are tasked to find savings of a certain magnitude, then the President's farm proposals may draw more attention from Congress. Even then, the proposal likely would be modified or a different budget-saving approach chosen, given the reaction by farm groups and agriculture committee members. Specifically, the President's FY2010 budget proposes four reductions in the farm subsidies, including direct payments, payment limits, cotton storage payments, and crop insurance. Prohibit "direct payments" to farmers with sales exceeding $500,000 per year. 7 This would be a new and different type of "payment limit." About 76,500 farms in 2007 receiving government payments had sales over $500,000 (11% of farms receiving government payments, Table 4 ). Midwestern farms would be affected in the greatest number, but the proportion of cotton and rice farms affected would be greater than for corn, soybean, and wheat farms. The Administration estimates savings of $9.8 billion over 10 years. 2. Tighten payment limits (maximum amount of subsidies paid) to $250,000 per person . The proposal is not detailed, but indications suggest it would re-impose limits on marketing loan benefits and tighten the limit on direct and counter-cyclical payments. The Administration estimates $126 million of savings over 10 years. Eliminate storage payments for cotton. Only cotton has a payment program to pay storage costs for crops placed under government loan. The Administration estimates savings of $570 million over 10 years. Reduce crop insurance subsidies. The proposal is not detailed, but savings could be achieved by reducing the subsidy on premiums that farmers pay, reducing underwriting gains received by the insurance companies that sell the policies, or reducing administrative and operating expense reimbursements to the insurance companies. The Administration estimates savings of $5.2 billion over 10 years. About one-third of the 76,500 affected farms in the nation are in these four states. | President Obama's budget outline for FY2010—in the context of fiscal discipline—includes several proposals to reduce federal spending by $16 billion over 10 years on the farm commodity and crop insurance programs. Reaction to the proposal has been generally negative from groups that are affiliated with or supportive of agriculture. The most vehement reaction has been to a proposal to eliminate direct payments to farms with more than $500,000 of sales.
Any change would require legislative action by Congress; it would not be part of the annual appropriations process. Such action would be viewed as "reopening" the 2008 farm bill, which most in the agriculture community see as a five-year contract with farmers. The agriculture committees are neither obligated nor likely to take up the proposal. If budget reconciliation is ordered by the budget committees, and the agriculture committees are tasked to find savings, then the President's farm proposals may draw more attention—but even then, the proposal likely would be modified or a different budget-saving approach could be chosen.
Specifically, the President's FY2010 budget proposes four reductions in the farm subsidies:
Prohibit "direct payments" to farmers with sales exceeding $500,000 per year. This would add a new type of "payment limit." About 76,500 farms in 2007 receiving government payments had sales over $500,000 (11% of farms receiving government payments). They received 47% of government payments. Midwestern farms would be affected in the greatest number. Four states (Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, and Nebraska) account for one-third of the number of farms affected nationally. But the proportion of cotton and rice farms affected would be greater than for corn, soybean, and wheat farms (36%-43% compared to 17%-21%, respectively). The Administration estimates savings of $9.8 billion over 10 years, a reduction of about 22% of expected direct payments. Tighten payment limits (the maximum amount of subsidies paid) to $250,000 per person. The proposal is not detailed, but indications suggest it would re-impose limits on the marketing loan program and tighten the limit on direct and counter-cyclical payments. The Administration estimates $126 million of savings over 10 years. Eliminate storage payments for cotton. Only cotton has a payment program to pay storage costs for crops placed under government loan. The Administration estimates savings of $570 million over 10 years. Reduce crop insurance subsidies. The proposal is not detailed, but savings could be achieved by reducing the subsidy on premiums that farmers pay, reducing underwriting gains to insurance companies that sell policies, or reducing administrative and operating expense reimbursements. The Administration estimates savings of $5.2 billion over 10 years, about 7.2% of expected outlays. |
crs_R40201 | crs_R40201_0 | Although emergency response has improved since 1993 and hazard mitigation programs have reduced some risks, the region's flood risk continues to increase as more investments and people are concentrated in flood-prone areas affected by extreme precipitation. Congress and federal agencies have taken steps to address selected flood challenges; at the same time, climate, population, and investment trends have increased the threat, vulnerability, and consequences of flooding. Since 2005, Congress has considered legislation and enacted other measures to address some flood issues; broader efforts to adopt a comprehensive flood policy and management strategy, however, have not been pursued. Many of these tools would require action by local governments, regulation of floodplain use, significant changes to federal programs, and substantially increased investment in flood damage reduction. The report then discusses lessons from the 2008 Midwest flood and contrasts the 2008 flood with the 1993 flood. Flood Policy in a Federalist System: Shared Responsibilities
In the United States, flood-related roles and responsibilities are shared; local governments are responsible for land use and zoning decisions that shape floodplain and coastal development, but state and federal governments also influence community and individual decisions on managing flood risk. The federal government also supports hazard mitigation, offers flood insurance, and provides emergency response and disaster aid for significant floods. Although floodwaters overtopped and breached many Midwest levees and a few dams in 1993 and 2008 causing significant economic damage, the dams and levees worked largely as designed. Much of the railroad traffic in the Midwest was halted. The lower regional damage estimates in 2008 ($15 billion compared to $30 billion in 1993) fail to capture the challenge of recovery in severely affected communities. The general sense is that flood risk reduction in the Mississippi River basin since 1993 paid off in 2008. It authorized using a portion of federal disaster assistance to cover 75% of the cost to acquire, relocate or elevate flood-prone homes and businesses; prior to the change, the federal cost share had been 50%. Recent Congressional Steps to Address the Flood Challenge
The 2008 Midwest flood, Hurricane Katrina, and other levee breaches have increased the congressional debate about how to manage flood and infrastructure risks, what is an acceptable level of risk—especially for low-probability, high-consequence events—and who should bear the costs to reduce flood risk (particularly in the case of levee construction and rehabilitation). A challenge for Congress is structuring federal actions and programs so they provide incentives to reduce flood risk without unduly infringing on private property rights or usurping local decision making. Tackling this challenge would require significant adjustments in the flood insurance program, disaster aid policies and practices, and programs for structural and nonstructural measures and actions. However, levees represent only a portion of the nation's efforts at flood risk management. Reducing Flood Risk
Recommendations for how to improve flood policy abound. These events have raised both concerns about the state of the nation's flood policies, programs, and infrastructure, and awareness of the tradeoff between the benefits and risks of developing flood-prone areas. In summary, although federal programs have improved through congressional and agency action since 1993, the fundamental direction and approach of national flood policies and programs remain largely unchanged. | Floods remain a significant hazard in the United States. Developing and investing in flood-prone areas represents a tradeoff between the location's economic and other benefits and the exposure to a flood hazard. In the United States, flood mitigation, protection, emergency response, and recovery roles and responsibilities are shared. Local governments are responsible for land use and zoning decisions that shape floodplain and coastal development. State and federal programs, policies, and investments influence community and individual decisions on managing flood risk. The federal government constructs some of the nation's dams and levees, offers flood insurance, supports nonstructural risk reduction actions (known as hazard mitigation), and provides emergency response and disaster aid.
In June 2008, a series of storms in several midwestern states caused $15 billion in damages. The 2008 flooding drew comparisons to the devastating 1993 Midwest flood and raised questions about whether the lessons from the 1993 flood were heeded. In 1993, hundreds of levees throughout much of the basin were breached in the Midwest causing $30 billion in damages; much of the damage was agricultural and occurred in soaked upland areas. In contrast, the majority of the 2008 damages were concentrated along a few Mississippi River tributaries and in population centers with breached levees. The magnitude of the two floods simply overwhelmed the region's levees and dams, illustrating that some residual risk remains to people and investment behind these protective structures. Since 1993, emergency response and hazard mitigation programs have reduced risks in some Midwest communities; however, the region's flood risk continues to increase as more investments and people are located in flood-prone areas.
Since 1993, Congress, federal agencies, state, and local governments have taken steps aimed at reducing the nation's flood risk; at the same time, climate, population, and investment trends have increased the threat, vulnerability, and consequences of flooding. For example, Congress authorized using federal disaster assistance to cover more of the costs to acquire, relocate or elevate flood-prone homes and businesses. However, broader efforts to adopt a comprehensive flood policy and management strategy have not been pursued. The fundamental direction and approach of the national policies and programs remain largely unchanged since 1993. A comprehensive strategy would require regulation of floodplain use, significant changes to federal programs, and increased investment in flood risk reduction by all levels of government. Although they would reduce flood risk, these changes face significant opposition.
The 2008 Midwest flooding, Hurricane Ike in 2008, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 have renewed interest in the suite of tools available to improve flood resiliency. The issue for Congress is deciding on whether and how to enact and implement feasible and affordable flood policies and programs to reduce flood risk. The challenge is how to structure federal actions and programs so they provide incentives to reduce flood risk without unduly infringing on private property rights or usurping local decision making. Tackling this challenge would require adjustments in the flood insurance program, disaster aid policies and practices, and programs for structural and nonstructural flood risk reduction measures and actions. |
crs_R40756 | crs_R40756_0 | Introduction
U.S. foreign assistance is carried out by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD) and several other federal government agencies. There is no overarching mechanism in place to coordinate or evaluate the broad range of foreign assistance activities. Nor is there consensus about the need for better coordination, though congressional interest in the issue appears to be increasing. 2410 , the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011; H.R. 2139 , the Initiating Foreign Assistance Reform Act of 2009; and S. 1524 , the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act of 2009. This report discusses the many agencies involved with U.S. foreign assistance, the mechanisms currently in place to coordinate foreign aid programs, particularly those related to development assistance, and agency coordination issues that Congress may consider as part of foreign assistance reform. Recent Trends in Foreign Assistance
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, authorized the consolidation of most foreign assistance programs under a new agency that would become the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). First, total U.S. foreign assistance spending across appropriations bills has grown considerably in current dollars since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, from just over $15 billion in FY2001 to more than $45 billion in FY2007, including supplementals ( Table 1 ). U.S. Aid-Related Activities, by Agency
With so many entities administering foreign aid, often with different objectives, many aid experts have questioned whether these agencies are sometimes working at cross-purposes. Where agencies have similar objectives, there is concern that they may be duplicating each others' efforts. No single overarching mechanism coordinates the whole range of U.S. foreign assistance policies and programs, but several less comprehensive systems of coordination exist among various departments and agencies, such as National Security Council policy coordination committees, new information sharing technology systems, and inter-agency staff exchanges. There is no formal inter-agency coordination structure. Selected Coordination Options39
In the decades since the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 became law, Congress, various Administrations, and a number of Commissions have reviewed the foreign aid programs and proposed ways to improve the coordination of U.S. foreign assistance, usually by consolidating or otherwise restructuring various agencies. The lack of a national strategy has been cited by many aid professionals as enabling the proliferation of incoherent development policies and aid programs. Some development experts believe that a single lead entity coordinating all U.S. foreign assistance could improve the effectiveness of American foreign aid and result in budget savings through improved efficiency. Legislative Activity
In the 111 th Congress, foreign assistance reform proposals incorporating aid coordination provisions have been introduced in both the House and Senate. The language on coordination in H.R. | In the decades since the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 became law, Congress, various Administrations, and a number of Commissions, have reviewed U.S. foreign aid programs and proposed ways to improve the coordination and effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance by consolidating or otherwise restructuring various agencies. Two recent trends in foreign assistance have renewed interest in this issue. First, foreign assistance funding has expanded considerably since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, from just over $15 billion in FY2001 to more than $45 billion in FY2007, including supplemental appropriations. Second, there has been an increase during this same time period in the number of agencies implementing foreign assistance.
U.S. foreign assistance has long been carried out by multiple U.S. government agencies, including the State Department (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD) and many others, to a lesser extent. In 2007, 24 U.S. government agencies reported disbursing foreign assistance resources. With so many entities administering foreign aid, often with different objectives, many aid experts have questioned whether these agencies are working at cross-purposes. Where agencies have similar objectives, there is concern that they may be duplicating each others' efforts. There is no overarching mechanism in place for coordinating or evaluating this broad range of activities. There are, however, several less-comprehensive systems of coordination in place among various departments and agencies, using means as varied as National Security Council policy coordination committees, new information-sharing technology systems, and inter-agency staff exchanges.
There is little consensus among policy makers and aid experts about how best to improve coordination, or even the need for more formal coordination. Some argue that the multiple funding accounts and implementing agencies appropriately reflect the wide range of competencies that development programs require, as well as diverse U.S. foreign assistance objectives. Others say the lack of centralized coordination authority impedes U.S. foreign aid transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness. Still others argue that there has been insufficient evaluation of foreign assistance programs to know whether coordination is needed to improve program efficiency and effectiveness. Proposals aimed largely or in part at addressing these concerns include developing a national foreign assistance strategy, authorizing a new or existing agency to coordinate all foreign assistance programs, coordinating through the National Security Council, enhancing the ability of U.S. missions abroad to coordinate aid activities at the country level, separating strategic aid programs from development assistance programs, and enhancing monitoring and reporting activities.
In the 111th Congress, foreign assistance reform proposals incorporating aid coordination provisions have been introduced by leaders of both the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. On the House side, H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, and H.R. 2139, the Initiating Foreign Assistance Reform Act of 2009, both include provisions to improve inter-agency coordination of foreign assistance. On the Senate side, coordination provisions are included in S. 1524, the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act of 2009.
This report may be updated to reflect congressional action. |
crs_R41640 | crs_R41640_0 | Introduction
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill has caused significant socioeconomic injuries to the Gulf of Mexico fishing industry. Perhaps of greater concern are intermediate and long-term harm to Gulf of Mexico ecosystems. Congress may continue to conduct oversight of efforts to promote fishing industry recovery and Gulf restoration. 101-380 ) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) regulations under OPA, the Administration has proposed a long-term plan to restore the Gulf region. The spill also has harmed the Gulf environment, resulting in mortality of organisms, eggs, and early life stages and harm to habitat and other elements of the Gulf ecosystem. Impacts on Landings and Markets
Closing and Reopening Areas
The closing and opening of areas has involved a tradeoff between ensuring public safety and providing fishing opportunities to recreational and commercial fishermen. In addition to public health concerns, marketing of oil-tainted products would further compromise the reputation of Gulf seafood. On the other hand, closures directly constrain recreational and commercial fishermen and delays in reopening areas are costly to the fishing industry. For federal waters reopened through November 15, 2010, sensory analyses have found no detectable oil or dispersant odors or flavors, and results of chemical analyses have been well below levels of concern. Some scientists have speculated that these populations have increased because of the oil spill-related fisheries closures and reduced harvest. Financial assistance to compensate for economic injuries to individuals and businesses affected by an oil spill are defined in statute by the Oil Pollution Act. Additional sources of assistance have been provided through BP grants, the Vessels of Opportunity Program, and the Small Business Administration. On May 3, 2010, BP began paying emergency compensation to individuals and businesses. Some claimants have voiced concerns with the transparency of the claims process, the lack of information in GCCF responses to claims, and the adequacy of payments, but the actual proportion of unsatisfied fishing industry claimants is not known at this time. For many in the fishing industry, their dilemma is related to uncertainty in determining the extent and duration of damages to fisheries resources. Restoration of Gulf ecosystems would likely maintain and enhance current fisheries production. Natural Resource Damage Assessment
The federal government's role in restoration is defined in statute by OPA and in NOAA regulations for developing a NRDA. The report put forward a plan to restore the environment, economy, and public health of residents. Ongoing efforts by federal agencies and states to ensure seafood safety and to regain and maintain the reputation of Gulf seafood are the most immediate challenges. As the NRDA process moves from the planning to restoration phase, questions may arise regarding the level of the potential settlement and the types of restoration activities identified by the trustees. In contrast to restoration efforts developed under NRDA that are based on existing law, funding and governance of the Administration's comprehensive and long-term Gulf of Mexico restoration plan would require congressional action. Three bills have been introduced in the 112 th Congress that address elements of the Administration's restoration plan, including the Gulf Coast Restoration Act ( H.R. All three bills would establish a Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Fund and require 80% of any amounts collected by the United States as penalties, settlements, or fines under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1319, § 1321) to be deposited into the fund. They would also establish a governing body to distribute funding and coordinate restoration efforts such as a Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force ( H.R. | On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig was destroyed by an explosion and fire, and the oil well began releasing oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The oil spill caused significant economic harm to the Gulf fishing industry because of fishery closures and consumer concerns related to the safety of Gulf seafood. Intermediate and long-term concerns are related to impacts on marine populations and degradation of fisheries habitat necessary for spawning, development of early life stages, and growth.
The closing and opening of fishing grounds has involved a tradeoff between ensuring public safety and providing fishing opportunities to recreational and commercial fishermen. In addition to public health concerns, uncertainties related to Gulf seafood safety could further compromise the reputation of Gulf seafood. Most areas have been reopened and landings of commercial and recreational species are recovering. For Gulf waters re-opened through November 15, 2010, sensory analyses of seafood samples have found no detectable oil or dispersant odors or flavors, and results of chemical analyses have been well below levels of concern. However, some scientists and the public remain skeptical of claims that Gulf seafood is safe. This may inhibit the recovery of Gulf recreational and commercial fisheries.
Under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), harmed individuals and businesses may make claims for economic injuries to the responsible party, in this case BP. Although many in the fishing industry have benefited from their damage claims and associated payments, ongoing issues include the legitimacy of some claims, lack of transparency in the claims review process, eligibility to make a claim, and level of payments. Other assistance to the fishing industry includes BP grants to states, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) fishery disaster assistance, the BP Vessels of Opportunity Program, and Small Business Administration efforts.
Environmental restoration of fisheries habitat and Gulf ecosystems would support the long-term recovery and productivity of Gulf fisheries. The federal government's role in restoration is defined in statute by OPA and in NOAA regulations, which require development of a Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA). NRDA restoration plans are currently being developed by state and federal trustees. The Obama Administration also has committed to developing a separate long-term Gulf of Mexico plan to restore the environment, economy, and public health of residents. Implementation of the plan will require sustained funding and a governance structure to oversee and coordinate restoration efforts.
The 112th Congress may continue to conduct oversight of efforts to promote fishing industry recovery, adequate compensation to fishermen and businesses, and Gulf restoration. Ongoing efforts by federal agencies and states to ensure seafood safety and to regain and maintain the reputation of Gulf seafood are the most immediate challenges currently faced by the fishing industry. As the NRDA process moves from the planning to restoration phase, questions may arise regarding the level of the potential settlement and the types of restoration activities identified by the trustees. In contrast to NRDA, three bills have been introduced in the 112th Congress to address elements of the Administration's restoration plan. All three bills would establish a Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Fund and require 80% of any amounts collected by the United States as penalties, settlements, or fines under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to be deposited into the fund. They would also establish a governing body to distribute funding and coordinate restoration efforts. Potential issues involve the allocation of funds, focus of restoration projects, and coordination with other restoration efforts. |
crs_R43144 | crs_R43144_0 | Introduction
Spaceflight fascinates and inspires many Americans, but in a time of constrained federal budgets, it must compete with a multitude of other national priorities. As the 114 th Congress conducts oversight and considers authorization and appropriations legislation for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), an overarching question will be how NASA should move forward within budget constraints. How will the needs of the human spaceflight program affect resources for NASA's science missions, aeronautics research, and education programs? Its FY2015 budget is $18.010 billion. In the past decade, Congress has enacted three NASA authorization acts: the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Acts of 2005 ( P.L. 111-267 ). The 2010 act set a new direction for NASA's human spaceflight programs. First, for access to low Earth orbit, including the International Space Station (ISS), it confirmed NASA's plans to develop a commercial space transportation capability for both cargo and astronauts. At present, NASA relies on Russian Soyuz spacecraft for astronaut access to the ISS, and NASA's human spaceflight activities are focused on ISS operations and research, the development of a U.S. commercial capability to launch crews into Earth orbit, and the development of future spacecraft for human exploration beyond Earth orbit. ISS Service Life Extension
To increase the return on the resources invested in ISS construction, the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 extended U.S. operation and utilization of the ISS by five years, to at least FY2020. Issues for Congress include the schedule for Orion and SLS development and the likely schedule of flights once operational, the payload capability of the SLS, the potential use of Orion and the SLS for crew access to the ISS if commercial crew transportation services fail to materialize, and the destination for human exploration using Orion and the SLS once they are available. An uncrewed test flight of Orion without the SLS (on a commercial Delta IV rocket) was conducted in December 2014. Orion/SLS as Backup Option for ISS Access
Although the Orion and the SLS are primarily intended for exploration beyond Earth orbit, the 2010 NASA authorization act directs that they should be capable of serving as a backup system for delivering crew and cargo to the ISS in the event that commercial and partner-supplied spacecraft are not available. NASA states that it plans to send humans to an asteroid by 2025 and to Mars in the 2030s. The ARM has met with opposition in Congress. The Space Operations account funds operational programs: the International Space Station, including the cost of Soyuz flights to carry U.S. astronauts to and from the ISS and commercial cargo flights for ISS resupply; the Space and Flight Support program, which supports activities such as launch services and space-ground communications; and (before FY2014) the space shuttle, including program closeout costs. Because much of the program supports research relating to climate change, however, some in Congress object to proposals to increase support for Earth Science, especially when other NASA activities may face decreases. In recent years, NASA has proposed near-term reductions in funding for Mars Exploration. Near-Earth Objects
Another Planetary Science activity, research on near-Earth objects (NEOs), received increased congressional and public attention following the explosion of a small asteroid over Chelyabinsk, Russia, in February 2013. Education
In addition to NASA's Office of Education, the mission directorates historically conducted substantial education activities. Reorganization Proposals
In the FY2014 budget, the Administration proposed a government-wide reorganization of activities in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education. | Spaceflight fascinates and inspires many Americans, but in a time of constrained federal budgets, it must compete with a multitude of other national priorities. As the 114th Congress conducts oversight and considers authorization and appropriations legislation for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), an overarching question will be how NASA should move forward within budget constraints.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267) set a new direction for NASA's human spaceflight programs. For access to low Earth orbit, including the International Space Station (ISS), it confirmed NASA's plans to develop a commercial space transportation capability for both cargo and astronauts. The first commercial cargo flight for ISS resupply was conducted in May 2012. Pending the planned availability of commercial crew transportation in 2017, NASA is paying Russia to carry U.S. astronauts to and from the ISS on Soyuz spacecraft. Issues for Congress include the cost, schedule, and safety of future commercial crew services, as well as the need for alternatives if commercial providers do not succeed.
For human exploration beyond Earth orbit, the 2010 NASA authorization act mandated development of the Orion Multipurpose Crew Vehicle and the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket to launch Orion into space. A test flight of Orion, on an existing rocket and without a crew, took place in December 2014. The first test flight of Orion on the SLS, again without a crew, is planned for FY2018. The first test flight with a crew is planned for FY2021-FY2022. Issues include NASA's ability to meet that schedule, the feasibility of accelerating the schedule, the payload mass capability of the SLS in the near and long term, and how Orion and the SLS should be used when operational. NASA plans to send humans to an asteroid by 2025 and to Mars in the 2030s, but some in Congress would prefer to focus on returning humans to the Moon. Orion and the SLS could also be used as a backup option for access to the ISS, but that option raises additional questions about cost and schedule.
U.S. use of the ISS is currently authorized through FY2020. NASA has announced that it plans to extend ISS operations through at least 2024. In addition to crew access concerns and issues related to service life extension, Congress is likely to examine the utilization of the ISS for research, both through traditional NASA mechanisms and via the independently managed ISS national laboratory process.
Many in Congress are concerned that the needs of the human spaceflight program may reduce the resources available for NASA's other activities, including science, aeronautics research, and education. Funding for Earth science satellites is particularly contentious, because of their use for climate change research. Proposed cuts in funding for planetary science have encountered opposition in both Congress and the scientific community. The explosion of a small asteroid over Chelyabinsk, Russia, in 2013 may have increased congressional interest in the science and potential threat of near-Earth asteroids and comets. The Administration's proposals to reorganize federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education programs would affect numerous NASA education activities, especially those outside the Office of Education.
NASA's budget for FY2015 is $18.010 billion, an increase from $17.647 billion in FY2014. The 113th Congress considered NASA reauthorization legislation, but none was enacted. |
crs_RL33968 | crs_RL33968_0 | Introduction
Head Start, a federal program that has provided comprehensive early childhood development services to low-income children since 1965, was last reauthorized in 1998 for fiscal years 1999-2003. The program has remained alive in subsequent years through the annual appropriations process. After unsuccessful efforts by the 108 th and 109 th Congresses to complete the reauthorization process, the 110 th Congress has undertaken the task. The House and Senate have each passed its own version of a reauthorization bill, the Senate version adopting the House bill's number ( H.R. On November 9, 2007, House and Senate conferees filed a conference report ( H.Rept. 110-439 ). This report does not yet reflect the provisions contained in that agreement. The Improving Head Start Act of 2007 ( H.R. 1429 ) was introduced by Representative Kildee on March 9, 2007. The following week, the House Committee on Education and Labor debated, amended, and approved the bill (42-1), and the committee's written report accompanying the legislation ( H.Rept. 110-67 ) was filed on March 23, 2007. That bill was taken to the House floor on May 2, and was approved (with nine amendments) by a vote of 365-48. The Head Start for School Readiness Act ( S. 556 ) was introduced by Senator Kennedy on February 12, 2007, and approved via voice vote by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) on February 14. The Chairman's amended version of the bill was subsequently reported on March 29, 2007; a written report ( S.Rept. 110-49 ) was filed April 10, 2007. Overview of Provisions
Both reauthorization bills propose to amend Head Start with the purpose of improving the program's ability to promote low-income children's school readiness by supporting their cognitive, social, emotional, and physical development. The means for doing so encompass a wide range of provisions, covering issues of program funding, administration, eligibility, accountability, quality, governance, and coordination. The table does not reflect the provisions agreed to in conference. Both bills would increase the percentage of the total appropriation reserved for funding Early Head Start programs, with a caveat that these percentages may only be reached provided appropriation levels suffice. Under both the House bill and Senate bill, agencies would be designated as a grantee for no more than five years at a time, after which recompetition may be required. 648A of current law to increase staff qualifications for Head Start teachers (but with different requirements). Both bills would allow for expansion of eligibility up to 130% of the poverty line, with the House version of H.R. 1429 , and current law. As stated earlier, the table does not include provisions agreed to in the conference report ( H.Rept. | Head Start, a federal program that has provided comprehensive early childhood development services to low-income children since 1965, was last reauthorized in 1998 for fiscal years 1999-2003. The program has remained funded in subsequent years through the annual appropriations process. After unsuccessful efforts by the past two Congresses to complete the reauthorization process, efforts to do so are underway in the 110th Congress. The House and Senate have each passed their own version of a reauthorization bill (H.R. 1429), and on November 9, 2007, conferees filed a conference report (H.Rept. 110-439). This report does not yet reflect the provisions included in the conference agreement.
The Improving Head Start Act of 2007 (H.R. 1429) was introduced by Representative Kildee on March 9, 2007. The following week, the House Committee on Education and Labor debated, amended, and approved the bill (42-1), and the committee's written report accompanying the legislation (H.Rept. 110-67) was filed on March 23, 2007. That bill was taken to the House floor on May 2, and was approved (with nine amendments) by a vote of 365-48.
The Head Start for School Readiness Act (S. 556) was introduced by Senator Kennedy on February 12, 2007, and approved via voice vote by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) on February 14. The Chairman's amended version of the bill was subsequently reported on March 29, 2007, with a written report (S.Rept. 110-49) filed April 10, 2007. On June 19, under unanimous consent, the full Senate passed the committee's bill, with a few technical changes, under the House bill number (H.R. 1429).
Both reauthorization bills amend Head Start with the goal of improving the program's ability to promote low-income children's school readiness by supporting their cognitive, social, emotional, and physical development. The means for doing so encompass a wide range of provisions, covering issues of program funding, administration, eligibility, accountability, quality, governance, and coordination. Authorization levels for funding would be increased above current funding amounts by both bills, and eligibility would be expanded to allow for serving children up to 130% of the poverty line. Both bills include provisions that would increase competition for Head Start grants, by limiting the period for which a grantee may receive grant funds to five years, before recompetition may be required.
Other similarities include increasing the percentage of the appropriation to be reserved for Early Head Start; emphasizing coordination and collaboration with other state and local early childhood programs; increasing staff qualifications; specifying requirements of shared governance principles in statute; and suspending use of the National Reporting System. Although the overall areas addressed by the two reauthorization bills are similar, a side-by-side comparison of provisions, alongside current law, reveals notable differences in detail. The table does not reflect the provisions agreed to in conference. |
crs_RL30743 | crs_RL30743_0 | Introduction
Overview of Assignment Process
Committee sizes and ratios are determined before Senators are assigned to committees. Although the size of each committee is set in Senate rules, changes to these rules often result from interparty negotiations before each Congress. Senate party leaders also negotiate the party ratio of each committee during the discussions of committee size. Senate Republicans primarily use a Committee on Committees for this purpose, although the Republican leader nominates Senators for assignment to some standing committees. Senate Democrats use a Steering and Outreach Committee to nominate Democrats for assignment to all standing committees. The processes these two panels use are distinct, but the nominations of each panel require the approval of the full party conference and, ultimately, the Senate. Senate approval of the committee nominations of its parties usually is pro forma because the Senate respects the work of each party. Committee Ratios and Sizes
Following general elections, one of the first orders of business for leaders of both parties in the Senate is the setting of standing committee ratios and sizes. These determinations usually are made before assigning Senators to standing committees because the party organizations that make committee assignments need to know the numbers of seats available to each party on each committee. The "A" and "B" categories, are as follows:
" A " COMMITTEES Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Appropriations Armed Services Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Commerce, Science, and Transportation Energy and Natural Resources Environment and Public Works Finance Foreign Relations Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Judiciary Select Committee on Intelligence
" B " COMMITTEES Budget Rules and Administration Small Business and Entrepreneurship Veterans' Affairs Special Committee on Aging Joint Economic Committee
The "C" category comprises three non-standing committees: the Select Committee on Ethics, the Committee on Indian Affairs, and the Joint Committee on Taxation. In making nominations for committee assignments, the Steering and Outreach Committee is bound by the categories of committees and the limitations on committee assignments contained in Senate Rule XXV, discussed earlier. Senate Democrats also have an informal practice of prohibiting two Democratic Senators from the same state from serving on the same committee. Nominations for assignment are made on a seat-by-seat basis, and Steering and Outreach members usually make nominations by consensus. The "C" committees are exempt from the assignment limitations in Senate rules, so a Senator may serve on any number of them without regard to his or her other assignments. Specific rules regarding Senate membership on and appointments to non-standing committees often are contained in the legislation creating these panels. Thus, the procedures vary from committee to committee. | Because of the importance of committee work, Senators consider desirable committee assignments a priority. The key to securing favorable committee slots is often said to be targeting committee seats that match the legislator's skills, expertise, and policy concerns.
After general elections are over, one of the first orders of business for Senate leaders is setting the sizes and ratios of committees. Although the size of each standing committee is set in Senate rules, changes in these sizes often result from inter-party negotiations before each new Congress. Senate party leaders also negotiate the party ratios on standing committees. Determinations of sizes and ratios usually are made before the process of assigning Senators to committees.
Once sizes and ratios of standing committees are determined, a panel for each party nominates colleagues for committee assignments. Senate Republicans primarily use a Committee on Committees for this purpose, although the Republican leader nominates Senators for assignment to some standing committees. Senate Democrats use a Steering and Outreach Committee to nominate Democrats for assignment to all standing committees. The processes these panels use are distinct. Republicans rely on a seniority formula to make nominations, while Democrats make nominations on a seat-by-seat basis, considering a variety of factors.
The processes also have many common features. After the general election, each panel solicits preferences for committee assignment from party colleagues, then matches these preferences with vacancies on standing committees. Senate rules, along with party rules and practices, guide the work of the Committee on Committees and the Steering and Outreach Committee. Senate rules, for instance, divide the standing and other Senate committees into three groups, the so-called "A" "B" and "C" categories. Senators must serve on two "A" committees and may serve on one "B" committee, and any number of "C" committees. Exceptions to these restrictions are sometimes approved by the Senate. Both parties place further limitations, for example, by generally prohibiting two Senators from the same party and state from serving on the same committee.
The nominations of each of these panels require the approval of the pertinent full party conference and ultimately the Senate. Approval at both stages usually is granted easily, because of the debate and decision-making earlier in the process.
Specific rules regarding Senate membership on and appointments to non-standing committees vary from committee to committee, but party leaders usually are included in the process.
For more information on Senate and party rules governing assignment limitations, see CRS Report 98-183, Senate Committees: Categories and Rules for Committee Assignments. |
crs_RL32431 | crs_RL32431_0 | Introduction
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are a core component of the Clean Air Act (CAA). The EPA and states are in the process of finalizing the implementation of the NAAQS for particulates promulgated in 1997, delayed because of court challenges and other factors. The EPA's 1997 revisions to the particulate matter standards (also referred to as the particulates NAAQS) included separate requirements for PM 2.5 for the first time. EPA's and states' experiences following the promulgation of the PM 2.5 NAAQS 13 years ago could provide relevant insights as EPA and states encounter issues in the initial stages of implementing the PM 2.5 NAAQS as revised in October 2006 and as the agency proceeds with its current review of the particulates NAAQS. States were required to submit, by April 2008, their State Implementation Plans (SIPs) for how the designated nonattainment areas will meet the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. States with nonattainment areas were to be in compliance with the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS by April 5, 2010, unless they are granted an extension. In a July 11, 2008, decision ( North Carolina v. EPA ), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. On August 2, 2010, EPA published a proposed "Transport Rule" intended to supersede the current CAIR. EPA's next round of the periodic review of the particulates NAAQS is under way. EPA has targeted proposing any changes to the standards by February 2011, and October 2011 for final standards. By the end of August 2008, final nonattainment designations were in effect for 39 areas, comprising 205 counties within 20 states (and the District of Columbia) nationwide, with a combined population of almost 90 million. Demonstrating Attainment with the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS
As noted earlier in this report, several areas previously designated nonattainment for the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS currently have air quality that attains the level set by the standards based on certified ambient air monitoring data for the period 2006-2008. SIPs include pollution control measures that are to be implemented by federal, state, and local governments, and rely on models of the impact on air quality of projected emission reductions to demonstrate attainment. On November 27, 2009, EPA published its findings that three states failed to meet the deadline for submitting complete SIPs (74 Federal Register 62251-62255). For the remaining designated areas, states either submitted a complete SIP or EPA made a final approval that the area attained the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS based on 2006-2008 air quality data. Recent Actions and Their Implications for Achieving Attainment of the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS
A number of events, most notably the D.C. Circuit's Decision Vacating the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)97
The EPA's Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, or the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), published in May 2005, was identified as an important tool for helping states address the interstate transport of pollutants (SO 2 and NOx) from electric generating units (EGUs) hindering downwind states from attaining the eight-hour ozone and 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS. States and local governments will be required to develop and implement new plans (SIPs) for addressing emissions in those areas that do not meet new standards. Circuit court decision regarding the 2006 particulates NAAQS. However, the court's subsequent December 23, 2008, ruling temporarily reinstating CAIR until EPA promulgates a replacement rule, allowed implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS to continue in the interim. | Particulate matter (PM), including fine particulate matter (PM2.5) and larger, but still inhalable particles (PM10), is one of the six principal pollutants for which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has set National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) under the Clean Air Act (CAA). EPA most recently revised the particulates NAAQS in October 2006, but is due to propose revised standards in February 2011 and promulgate them by October 2011.While currently much of the interest in the particulates NAAQS is focused on reviewing the NAAQS and speculation as to the degree of stringency of any new standards, implementing revised standards can take many years. EPA and states are in the early stages of implementing the 2006 revised standards, and have not finalized implementation of the standards promulgated in 1997 after years of litigation and other delays. This report outlines the implementation process for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS and describes issues raised as EPA and states developed and employed implementation strategies for achieving attainment.
The EPA's final designation of 39 areas, consisting of 205 counties in 20 states and the District of Columbia, as "nonattainment" (out of compliance) areas for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS became effective in April 2005. A combined population of almost 90 million resides in these areas. States with PM2.5 nonattainment areas are required to develop comprehensive implementation plans, referred to as State Implementation Plans (SIPs), demonstrating how attainment will be reached by a designated deadline. SIPs include pollution control measures that rely on models of the impact on air quality of projected emission reductions to demonstrate attainment. States were required to submit SIPs for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS by April 2008, but EPA did not begin receiving most submissions until July 2008. On November 27, 2009, EPA published its findings that three states failed to meet the deadline for submitting complete SIPs. For the remaining designated areas, states either submitted a complete SIP or EPA made a final approval that the area attained the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS based on 2006-2008 air quality data. States must be in compliance by 2010, unless they are granted an extension.
A number of issues will continue to be debated as the implementation of the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS progresses. Notably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's July 11, 2008, decision (North Carolina v. EPA) to vacate the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) introduced new concerns and disruptions with respect to the implementation of the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS. Implementation of CAIR would have assisted states in addressing the interstate transport (upwind state) emission contributions in achieving attainment. The court's December 23, 2008, modified decision allows CAIR to remain in effect, but only temporarily until EPA promulgates a replacement rule, which could have future implications for implementing the PM2.5 NAAQS. On August 2, 2010, EPA published a proposed "Transport Rule" intended to supersede the current CAIR. In addition, other promulgated and proposed EPA rulemakings that influence various aspects of regulating air quality, including EPA's 2006 changes to the particulates NAAQS, continue to impact the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS implementation process.
EPA and states have encountered similar issues in implementing the 2006 revised particulates NAAQS. Whatever the outcome of the current review of the particulates NAAQS, implementation of any changes to the standards in many regards will also likely mirror the experience of EPA and states following the promulgation of the PM2.5 NAAQS 13 years ago. |
crs_R43091 | crs_R43091_0 | Temporary duty assignments, mobilization, and deployments to areas that do not allow the military member's dependent(s) to accompany them (such as aboard ships or in hostile fire zones) require the servicemember to have contingency plans providing for the care and well-being of their dependent(s) to include temporary custody arrangements if necessary. In some instances, custody battles have ensued when the military parent leaves for duty and the other parent decides to file for temporary or permanent custody of the child in the absence of the servicemember. The Issue
The increased deployment of servicemembers resulting from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has raised difficult child custody issues that some argue could potentially impact the welfare of military children and the ability of servicemembers to effectively serve their country. According to a 2010 Department of Defense (DOD) report,
Approximately 142,000 members of the Armed Forces (active, Guard, and Reserve) are single custodians of minor children. However, proponents of federal child custody legislation argue the lack of uniform state laws in the treatment of deployed and deploying military parents complicate child custody matters and that the potential exists for state courts to use a servicemember's deployment, or potential deployment, against them when making child custody determinations. Those proposing a national standard for determining military child custody cases argue such legislation would eliminate this possibility by prohibiting state courts from using deployment or the possibility of deployment against a servicemember when making child custody determinations. Opponents, however, argue that such legislation encroaches on the historical precedent of a state's right to adjudicate family law matters, would ultimately place the legal rights of the servicemember above those of the best interest of the child, and is not necessary given that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) already protects a servicemember's rights in child custody proceedings. Congressional interest in federal legislation for military child custody cases stems from Congress's authority to raise and support the standing armed forces of the U.S. and Congress's authority to, "make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval Forces" as well as to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States." §§501-597b) that would establish a national standard for litigating child custody cases in which the child custodian is in military service. Similar language has passed only in the House on seven separate occasions; six times as part of the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act (FY08/09/10/11/12/13), and once as a stand-alone bill by voice vote in 2008 ( H.R. 6048 ). However, all versions of the proposed legislation have failed to pass in the Senate where concerns exist over enacting federal legislation that would preempt State laws and their approach to child custody issues. National Standard vs. States' Rights and Expertise
At the heart of the legislative debate is the potential conflict between the protection of the rights of servicemembers, which is arguably a federal responsibility, and jurisdiction over child custody issues, which traditionally falls within the purview of the States. Effects of Deployment and the Best Interest of the Child
Although both sides of the debate agree that no court should show a bias for a non-deploying parent or a prejudice against a military parent solely because military service may require the servicemember to be temporarily away from the child, they disagree on the extent to which deployment or the threat of deployment plays in determining the best interest of the child. 1898 would lead directly to federal court involvement in military child custody cases. CHILD CUSTODY PROTECTION. 4201 ) Military Child Custody Legislative Efforts
H.R. | The increased deployment of servicemembers beginning in 2001 as a result of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom has raised difficult military child custody issues that in some cases potentially affect the welfare of military children as well as servicemembers' ability to effectively serve their country. Approximately 142,000 members of the Armed Forces (active, Guard, and Reserve) are single custodians of minor children. Temporary duty assignments, mobilization, and deployments to areas that do not allow the military member's dependent(s) to accompany them require the servicemember to have contingency plans providing for the care and well-being of their dependent(s) to include temporary custody arrangements if necessary. In some instances, custody battles have ensued when the military parent leaves for duty and the other parent decides to file for temporary or permanent custody of the child in the absence of the servicemember. Some servicemembers involved in such child custody cases have expressed concern that family courts in some states are using their military service against them in determining custodial arrangements. The issue addressed in this report is whether a federal child custody law is needed to protect servicemembers' rights in custodial disputes.
Since 2008, the Congress, led by Representative Michael Turner, has proposed federal military child custody legislation that would establish a national standard for litigating child custody cases in which the custodian is in military service. Although legislative efforts in the House have passed on several occasions (as part of the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act from FY2008 through FY2013) and once as a stand-alone bill by voice vote in 2008 (H.R. 6048), all versions of the proposed legislation have failed to pass in the Senate. At the heart of the legislative debate is the potential conflict between the protection of the rights of servicemembers, which is arguably a federal responsibility, and jurisdiction over child custody issues, which traditionally falls within the purview of the States.
Proponents of federal child custody legislation argue the lack of uniform state laws in the treatment of deployed and deploying military parents complicate child custody matters and that the potential exists for state courts to use a servicemember's deployment, or potential deployment, against them when making child custody determinations. Those proposing a national standard for determining military child custody cases argue such legislation would eliminate this possibility by prohibiting state courts from using deployment or the possibility of deployment against a servicemember when making child custody determinations. Opponents, however, argue that such legislation encroaches on the historical precedent of a state's right to adjudicate family law matters, would ultimately place the legal rights of the servicemember above those of the best interest of the child, and is not necessary, given that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act already protects a servicemember's rights in child custody proceedings. Nevertheless, both sides of the debate agree that no court should show a bias for a non-deploying parent or a prejudice against a military parent solely because of military service. However, both sides disagree on the extent to which deployment or the threat of deployment plays in determining the best interest of the child which is the ultimate criterion for determining child custody cases.
Congressional interest in federal legislation for military child custody cases stems from Congress's authority to raise and support the standing armed forces of the U.S. and Congress's authority to make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval Forces as well as to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States. |
crs_RL31957 | crs_RL31957_0 | Congress authorized around $1 billion for U.S. programs that provide nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union in the FY2012 budget—including $508.2 million for DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, around $450 million for the Department of Energy's (DOE) nonproliferation programs in Russia, and around $75 million for State Department nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union. With these programs, the United States seeks to help the recipient nations transport, store, and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; secure and eliminate the materials used in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and prevent proliferation of the knowledge needed to produce these weapons to nations or groups outside the former Soviet Union. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. It has also expanded financially, from an initial level of approximately $400 million per year to a total of nearly $1 billion per year across the three agencies. An Evolving Program
Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance under Nunn-Lugar as an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union. The Bush Administration also linked U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet States to U.S. efforts to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
Program Objectives
At its inception, the CTR program sought to provide Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in the safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. In addition, $33 million in funding for the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow moved from the DOD budget to the State Department budget. It has also helped construct storage facilities for missiles removed from deployment and fuel removed from deactivated missiles. The State Department also manages the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program. Analysts have raised numerous questions about the science center programs. It seeks to coordinate these and other U.S. efforts to identify and stop the smuggling of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or materials. These are mainly research facilities that operate nuclear reactors. This program is designed to bring commercial enterprises to Russia's closed nuclear cities, so that Russia can reduce the size of its weapons complex and so that the scientists and engineers will not be tempted to sell their knowledge to nations seeking nuclear weapons. government." Furthermore, Russia has not provided the United States with access to many facilities in Russia's nuclear weapons complex, leaving large holes in the U.S. ability to improve security for the nuclear materials at those facilities. They argued that the President should have only a limited ability to waive the certification requirements. | Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget to over $1 billion per year across three agencies—DOD, DOE, and the State Department. It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups, to a global program to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these nations eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under the START Treaty, secure weapons storage areas, construct a storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials.
The State Department manages the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev. These centers have provided research grants to scientists and engineers so that they will not sell their knowledge to other nations or terrorist groups. The State Department has also provided assistance with export and border control programs in the former Soviet states. The Department of Energy manages programs that seek to improve the security of nuclear warheads in storage and nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and nuclear weapons complex facilities. It also funds programs that help nuclear scientists and engineers find employment in commercial enterprises. DOE is also helping Russia dispose of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons and shut down its remaining plutonium-producing reactors by replacing them with fossil-fuel plants.
Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs in the U.S. government, questions about Russia's willingness to provide the United States with access to its weapons facilities, questions about the President's ability to waive certification requirements so that the programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the efforts into a global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union.
This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R42007 | crs_R42007_0 | Introduction
The Florida Everglades is a unique network of subtropical wetlands that is currently half its historical size. The federal government has a long history of involvement in the Everglades, beginning in the 1940s with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) constructing flood control projects that shunted water flowing south into the Everglades to make way for agricultural and urban development. 106-541 ), Congress approved the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) as a framework for Everglades restoration. Since passage of CERP, nine non-pilot CERP projects have been authorized. Most observers agree that, although progress has been made on Everglades restoration, much more time and funding would be required to achieve restoration as currently contemplated. At issue for Congress is oversight and implementation of efforts to restore the Everglades, including the ongoing federal funding commitment and the priority of Everglades restoration relative to other federal commitments. This report provides information on Everglades restoration, with a focus on the federal role in funding this restoration and related issues for Congress. The report discusses background, trends, and major accomplishments and challenges to date in federal efforts to restore the Everglades. CERP considered and assumed implementation of a number of non-CERP projects; thus, both efforts are considered to be complementary. As of 2014 (when the total cost estimate was last updated), the Corps estimated that completing construction of CERP projects would take more than 50 years and would cost $16.4 billion. Pursuant to CERP, project construction costs are shared 50/50: the federal government is required to pay half of project costs, and an array of state, tribal, and local agencies (i.e., nonfederal sponsors) must pay the other half. Federal Everglades restoration activities not authorized under CERP are often referred to as "non-CERP" or "Foundation" activities. Most (but not all) of the authorities for this funding predate the enactment of CERP in 2000. Similar to CERP funding, non-CERP activities of the Department of the Interior and the Corps typically receive much attention and are often the focal point of congressional consideration. It aims to improve water deliveries to Everglades National Park by removing barriers in and around the Tamiami Trail. Non-CERP DOI Everglades restoration funding provides for a number of different activities in addition to the Mod Waters project. Overall, from FY1993 to FY2016, the total federal investment in Everglades restoration (including agencies other than the Corps and DOI) is estimated to have exceeded $5 billion. For instance, after authorization in FY2007, federal funding for "Generation 1" CERP projects (i.e., projects authorized in WRDA 2007) increased as project construction commenced after years of study and pilot projects; these funding levels began to decline in FY2012 as Generation 1 project construction activities wound down and "Generation 2" projects (i.e., projects with completed project-implementation reports that were proposed and eventually authorized in WRRDA 2014) were awaiting construction authorization. Comparing Federal and State CERP Funding
Many Everglades restoration supporters view the status and amount of federal CERP funding relative to nonfederal funding for restoration activities under CERP as an important indicator of the federal government's commitment to Everglades restoration. As a result, a considerable amount of nonfederal funding for Everglades restoration has been expended by the state of Florida for land acquisition related to the expected "footprint" of future CERP projects. In recent years, the state of Florida's funding of CERP has decreased due to a number of factors, including a decline in state tax revenues and a focus on other aspects of Everglades restoration. Although some projects are nearing completion, the project schedules envisioned in earlier program documents have for the most part not been maintained; a fraction of the project implementation reports originally envisioned under CERP have been finalized. | The Everglades is a unique network of subtropical wetlands in South Florida that is approximately half of its historical size, due in part to degradation from federal water projects built by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps). In 2000, Congress authorized a plan, termed the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), as a comprehensive framework for the restoration of the Everglades ecosystem in southern Florida. When originally authorized, it was estimated that CERP would cost a total of $8.2 billion and take approximately 30 years to complete. More recent estimates indicate that the plan will cost $16.4 billion and will take approximately 50 years to implement. At issue for Congress is oversight and implementation of this commitment.
Under CERP, the federal government (through the Corps and various bureaus within the Department of the Interior) is required to fund half of the costs for restoration, with an array of state, tribal, and local agencies paying the other half. In addition to activities under CERP, a number of ongoing federal and state efforts that predate CERP (known collectively as "non-CERP" or "Foundation" activities) also factor into Everglades restoration. Although non-CERP efforts technically are not part of CERP, the two sets of activities are widely viewed as complementary.
Since passage of CERP in 2000, the federal investment in Everglades restoration has increased. As of the end of FY2016, the federal government had provided in excess of $1.2 billion in funding for CERP, with the state providing matching funds for CERP projects, as well as advanced funding for land acquisition and construction for expected future CERP projects. Federal funding for non-CERP activities has also continued over this period. Together with CERP, all federal Everglades restoration efforts are estimated to have totaled in excess of $5 billion from FY1993 to FY2016. While estimates of nonfederal funding contributions to CERP vary depending on what methodology and assumptions are used, observers agree that to date, the state of Florida has spent more on Everglades restoration than has the federal government.
Although overall progress has fallen short of initial timelines, progress has been made on a number of Everglades restoration projects. The majority of the land necessary for restoration projects under CERP has been acquired, and significant progress has been made on non-CERP activities (including improved water deliveries to Everglades National Park). Of the nine CERP projects that had been authorized by the end of 2016 (not including pilot projects), construction was ongoing or complete at eight projects and studies were completed or under way for a number of other projects. Despite this progress, some projects have seen setbacks in the form of schedule delays and cost escalations. Assuming that the plan does not change significantly and most of the 50 projects included in the original CERP plan are eventually required to complete the effort, many new authorizations and significant additional funding would be necessary. Reviewers of the restoration program have pointed out that at current rates of project authorization and funding, additional delays would be likely.
Reductions to state funding and the enactment of new CERP project authorizations in 2014 and 2016 legislation have brought renewed attention to Everglades restoration. Restoration of the Everglades is one of the largest and most mature efforts of its kind; thus, debate and resolution of Everglades restoration issues has implications not only for South Florida but also for large-scale restoration initiatives elsewhere. This report provides an overview of the federal role in Everglades restoration. It discusses background, funding history, and major accomplishments and challenges to date in federal efforts to restore the Everglades. |
crs_R45323 | crs_R45323_0 | T he Constitution establishes a "system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government," with each state having its "own government," "endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence." As the Supreme Court has recognized, states "possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause," the provision of the Constitution that makes federal law the "supreme Law of the Land" and prohibits states from contravening lawful enactments of Congress. Although the Supremacy Clause grants Congress a degree of authority to "impose its will on the States," the federal government may not exceed "the powers granted it under the Constitution." The Constitution only endows the federal government with a "limited" and "defined" set of enumerated powers, while reserving most other powers to the states. The various principles that delineate the proper boundaries between the powers of the federal and state governments are collectively known as "federalism," a doctrine based on the Framers' conclusion that allocating "powers between the National Government and the States enhances freedom, first by protecting the integrity of the governments themselves, and second by protecting the people, from whom all governmental powers are derived." The report then discusses "internal" limitations on Congress's exercise of several of its enumerated powers, including its spending and commerce powers, its authority to enact certain types of legislation to implement international treaties, its enforcement authority under the Civil War Amendments, and its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Second, beyond the internal limits on Congress's powers, the Constitution also imposes "external" constraints on congressional action—that is, affirmative prohibitions found elsewhere in the text or structure of the document. Regulating Activities that Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce
Finally, Congress possesses the constitutional authority to regulate "activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." The Supreme Court, applying these factors, has periodically ruled that Congress may not invoke the Commerce Clause to regulate certain purely intrastate non-economic activities. Necessary and Proper Clause
Supplementing Congress's enumerated powers is the Necessary and Proper Clause, which grants Congress the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the" powers enumerated in Article I of the Constitution, as well as "all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." External Federalism Limitations on Congress's Powers
In addition to the "internal" limitations on Congress's powers discussed above, the Supreme Court has recognized a variety of federalism doctrines that affirmatively prohibit Congress from taking certain actions even if Congress would otherwise be authorized to act pursuant to one of its enumerated powers. The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity
In addition to the aforementioned external constraints on Congress's power, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution—which states that "the Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State"—establishes additional limitations on the federal government's power vis-à-vis the states. The Eleventh Amendment thereby implicates federalism by limiting the federal government's ability to regulate the states and thereby restricting Congress's authority to enact statutes that subject states to suit. As a result, a lawsuit against that officer effectively constitutes a suit against an individual rather than the state itself. The equal sovereignty principle thereby limits Congress's ability to enact legislation that subjects different states to unequal burdens. | The U.S. Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the states and the federal government, with each state having its own government, endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence. Although the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution designates "the Laws of the United States" as "the supreme Law of the Land," other provisions of the Constitution—as well as legal principles undergirding those provisions—nonetheless prohibit the national government from enacting certain types of laws that impinge upon state sovereignty. The various principles that delineate the proper boundaries between the powers of the federal and state governments are collectively known as "federalism." Federalism-based restrictions that the Constitution imposes on the national government's ability to enact legislation may inform Congress's work in any number of areas of law in which the states and the federal government dually operate.
There are two central ways in which the Constitution imposes federalism-based limitations on Congress's powers. First, Congress's powers are restricted by and to the terms of express grants of power in the Constitution, which thereby establish internal constraints on the federal government's authority. The Constitution explicitly grants Congress a limited set of carefully defined enumerated powers, while reserving most other legislative powers to the states. As a result, Congress may not enact any legislation that exceeds the scope of its limited enumerated powers. That said, Congress's enumerated powers nevertheless do authorize the federal government to enact legislation that may significantly influence the scope of power exercised by the states. For instance, subject to certain restrictions, Congress may utilize its taxing and spending powers to encourage states to undertake certain types of actions that Congress might otherwise lack the constitutional authority to undertake on its own. Similarly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution's Commerce Clause to afford Congress substantial (but not unlimited) authority to regulate certain purely intrastate economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce in the aggregate. Congress may also enact certain types of legislation in order to implement international treaties. Additionally, pursuant to a collection of constitutional amendments ratified shortly after the Civil War, Congress may directly regulate the states in limited respects in order to prevent states from depriving persons of certain procedural and substantive rights. Finally, the Necessary and Proper Clause augments Congress's enumerated powers by empowering the federal government to enact laws that are "necessary and proper" to execute its express powers.
In addition to the internal constraints on Congress's authority, the Constitution also imposes external limitations on Congress's powers vis-à-vis the states—that is, affirmative prohibitions on certain types of federal actions found elsewhere in the text or structure of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has recognized, for instance, that the national government may not commandeer the states' authority for its own purposes by forcing a state's legislature or executive to implement federal commands. Nor may Congress apply undue pressure to coerce states into taking actions they are otherwise disinclined to take. Furthermore, the principle of state sovereign immunity—which limits the circumstances in which a state may be forced to defend itself against a lawsuit against its will—imposes significant constraints on Congress's ability to subject states to suit. Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized limits to the extent to which Congress may subject some states to more onerous regulatory burdens than other states. |
crs_R43219 | crs_R43219_0 | The 113 th Congress has seen several developments in the effort to reform the housing finance system. In the House, the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013 (PATH Act; H.R. 2767 ), which proposes to wind down the GSEs and would reform FHA, was ordered to be reported out of the House Financial Services Committee on July 24, 2013. In the Senate, the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act ( S. 1217 ) was ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on May 15, 2014. This report briefly explains the different approaches to housing finance reform contained in these legislative proposals, focusing on efforts to replace Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and to reform FHA. The report does not describe every provision of the proposals but discusses major concepts and themes. It would replace them with a National Mortgage Market Utility that would facilitate mortgage securitization but would not provide a government guarantee. The act would also eliminate or delay the implementation of certain existing regulations that some believe are inhibiting the recovery in the mortgage market. In addition, the PATH Act would reform FHA, making it an independent agency and taking steps intended to improve its finances, more narrowly target its market role, and increase the role of private capital. The Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act (S. 1217)
The Johnson-Crapo GSE bill ( S. 1217 , as ordered to be reported by the Senate Banking Committee) would wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and would replace FHFA with a new entity to be called the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation (FMIC). The FMIC would be an independent agency charged with supporting the mortgage market and providing reinsurance on eligible MBS. These MBS would have an explicit government guarantee, and the FMIC would regulate aspects of the mortgage market related to these MBS. The proposal would also establish a new multifamily housing finance system and method of funding affordable housing initiatives. Phase Out of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Wind Down . Similar to the single-family program, the FMIC guarantee would require private capital in a first-loss position. The FHA Solvency Act of 2013 (S. 1376)
While S. 1217 generally does not include any FHA provisions, a separate Senate bill proposes to make a number of changes to FHA aimed at strengthening its financial position. That bill, commonly referred to as the Johnson-Crapo FHA bill ( S. 1376 ), was reported out of the Senate Banking Committee on December 19, 2013.Most of the changes included in the bill are aimed at ensuring that FHA's programs are financially sound, but do not focus on limiting FHA's market role or shifting risk to the private sector to the degree that the PATH Act does. Table 2 compares the FHA reforms in the PATH Act and the Johnson-Crapo FHA bill. | The 113th Congress has seen several developments in the effort to reform the housing finance system. In the House, the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013 (PATH Act; H.R. 2767) was ordered to be reported out of the House Financial Services Committee on July 24, 2013. The PATH Act proposes to wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs) over several years. In this context, wind down refers to dissolving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac by removing their charters and placing certain assets and liabilities into a receivership entity. It would replace them with a National Mortgage Market Utility that would facilitate private market mortgage securitization but would not provide a government guarantee. The PATH Act would retain in a modified form the existing government guarantee programs, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The act would also eliminate or delay the implementation of certain existing regulations that some believe are impeding recovery in the mortgage market. In addition, the PATH Act proposes to reform FHA by, among other things, making it an independent agency and taking steps intended to improve its finances, better target its role in the mortgage market, and increase the amount of private capital in the market.
In the Senate, the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act (Johnson-Crapo GSE bill; S. 1217) was ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The Johnson-Crapo GSE bill would wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and would replace the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) with a new Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation (FMIC). The FMIC would be an independent agency charged with supporting the mortgage market and providing reinsurance on eligible mortgage-backed securities (MBS). These MBS would have an explicit government guarantee. The FMIC would only pay out on its guarantee after a significant amount of private capital absorbed the first losses. In addition, the FMIC would regulate aspects of the mortgage market related to its guaranteed MBS and would establish a new multifamily housing finance system.
The Johnson-Crapo GSE bill generally does not include FHA-related provisions. However, a stand-alone FHA reform bill has been introduced in the Senate. The FHA Solvency Act of 2013 (S. 1376; commonly referred to as the Johnson-Crapo FHA bill), which would reform FHA, was reported out of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on July 31, 2013. The Johnson-Crapo FHA bill proposes a number of changes to FHA aimed at ensuring that FHA's single-family programs are financially sound, including a number of provisions that have been sought by FHA.
This report will briefly explain the different approaches to housing finance reform offered by these legislative proposals, focusing on efforts to replace Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and reform FHA. The report does not describe every provision of the proposals but discusses major concepts and themes. |
crs_R41625 | crs_R41625_0 | In FY2009, federal spending on programs for people with low income was almost $708 billion, and totaled nearly $578 billion the previous year. Most of the growth between the two years was related to the recession and associated policy responses, with almost two-thirds (64%) of the increase coming from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ). In both years, four programs accounted for almost 60% of total spending, and 10 programs accounted for more than 75%. The distinguishing feature of federal programs examined here is their explicit focus on low-income populations, as distinct from social insurance programs such as Social Security, Medicare, or Unemployment Insurance. Social insurance programs aim to protect American workers universally against lost wages and work-related benefits due to retirement, disability, or temporary periods of unemployment. The next section looks specifically at the 10 largest programs, which together account for three-fourths of all spending in the report, followed by an overview of all programs, organized by major category in order of FY2009 spending: health care, cash aid, food assistance, housing and development, education, social services, energy assistance, and employment and training. Overview of Federal Spending on Benefits and Services for People with Low Income
Federal spending on benefits and services for low-income people totaled $708 billion in FY2009 and $578 billion in FY2008. These programs generally seek to mitigate the effects of low income by helping people meet basic needs such as health care, food, or shelter, or to address the root causes of economic disadvantage through services, education, or job training. Key target populations for many of these programs, including some of the largest, include low-income elderly and disabled individuals, and dependent children and their families. Almost two-thirds (64%) of the additional spending was provided under ARRA, the economic stimulus enacted in February 2009. As Table 2 shows, Medicaid is the single largest program and alone accounts for nearly 40% of low-income spending. Next in size are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the refundable portion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Instead, these large programs either allocate funds to states or another unit of government by formula, as just described, or give benefits to eligible individuals directly (or through a nongovernment intermediary). Programs use different concepts to define who is eligible. Other target groups for selected programs include veterans, students, people who are homeless, Indians, and refugees, among others. With the exception of postsecondary student aid, education programs typically do not require individuals to be determined income-eligible for assistance; rather, they target assistance toward areas or entities where low-income students are likely to be served (such targeting mechanisms are discussed later in the report). Many programs in this report are formula grants (as compared with competitive or discretionary awards, or direct benefits to individuals), and use population-based allocation factors as a way to direct resources toward areas with large concentrations of the program's target group. This report provides a snapshot of policies and spending in FY2008 and FY2009 on specified categories of benefits and services for low-income people. Many of these programs require states, or sometimes other entities within states, to spend a certain amount of nonfederal funds to access their full federal grant. Individual eligibility criteria: States must give priority to low-income women. However, states may supplement the federal benefit with their own funds. S+C: Competitive grants to states and local governments and public housing authorities. Federal Poverty Guidelines and Related Poverty Measures
Federal Poverty Guidelines, Research and Measurement —include links to current and prior poverty guidelines and frequently asked questions about the guidelines, their use by various federal programs to determine eligibility, and the federal poverty thresholds:
http://aspe.hhs.gov/ poverty/ index.shtml
U.S. Census Bureau: Poverty —includes links to information about poverty data reported by the Census Bureau from several major household surveys and programs, including the Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey, the American Community Survey, the Survey of Income and Program Participation, and the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates:
http://www.census.gov/ hhes/ www/ poverty/ poverty.html
Department of Veterans Affairs Income Thresholds
VA Health Care—National Income Thresholds for FY2011 and FY2010 :
http://www4.va.gov/ healtheligibility/ Library/ pubs/ VAIncomeThresholds/ VAIncomeThresholds.pdf
Questions and Answers on Veterans Pension Program :
http://www.vba.va.gov/ bln/ 21/ pension/ vetpen.htm#1
Pension Rate Table, effective December 2009 —provides annual income limits for maximum annual pension rates, and includes links to prior year limits:
http://www.vba.va.gov/ bln/ 21/ Rates/ pen01.htm
Supplemental Security Income
Monthly Federal SSI Payment (Maximum) and Monthly Income Limits, 2010 :
http://www.ssa.gov/ pubs/ 10003.html
Understanding Supplemental Security Income—SSI Eligibility Requirements, 2010 Edition :
http://www.ssa.gov/ ssi/ text-eligibility-ussi.htm
Earned Income Tax Credit
Income Limits and Maximum Credit Amounts, 2010 , and links to prior year limits:
http://www.irs.gov/ individuals/ article/ 0,,id= 150513,00.html
Median Income
State median income data published by the Census Bureau :
http://www.census.gov/ hhes/ www/ income/ statemedfaminc.html
FY2010 HUD Income Limits Briefing Material :
http://www.huduser.org/ portal/ datasets/ il/ il10/ IncomeLimitsBriefingMaterial_FY10.pdf
FY2010 Income Limits for the Public Housing and Section 8 Programs :
http://www.huduser.org/ portal/ datasets/ il/ il10/ HUD-sec8.pdf
Frequently Asked Questions, FY2010 Income Limits :
http://www.huduser.org/ portal/ datasets/ il/ il10/ faq_10.html
"Need Analysis" System
The EFC Formula, 2010-2011 (June 2010 update) —explains the formula used to calculate a student's "expected family contribution" and the amount of aid the student would be eligible to receive:
http://www.ifap.ed.gov/ efcformulaguide/ attachments/ 062810EFCFormulaGuideUpdate1011.pdf
Lower Living Standard Income Levels
Federal Register notice of determination of Lower Living Standard Income Levels for 2010 , and links to LLSILs for prior years:
http://www.doleta.gov/ llsil/ 2010/ | The federal government spent almost $708 billion in FY2009 on programs for low-income people, and nearly $578 billion the previous year. The increased spending between the two years was largely due to the recession, with almost two-thirds coming from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5), the economic stimulus enacted in February 2009.
Low-income programs discussed in this report are distinct from social insurance programs, such as Social Security or Medicare, which aim to protect American workers universally against lost wages or benefits when they retire, become disabled, or lose a job. In contrast, programs addressed here focus explicitly on low-income populations. They provide assistance in obtaining basic needs, such as health care, food, or housing, and seek to address the causes of low income through education, training, or other services. While these programs are very diverse, the analysis in this report yields certain general findings:
• Health care dominates all other categories of benefits and services, accounting for nearly half of federal spending for low-income people. Cash aid is second but trails far behind, comprising 18% of spending in FY2009. Other categories, in decreasing size, are food assistance, housing and development, education, social services, energy assistance, and employment and training.
• Four programs account for 60% of federal spending for low-income people and 10 programs make up more than three-fourths. Medicaid alone accounted for nearly 40% of FY2009 low-income spending; next were the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps), Supplemental Security Income, and the refundable portion of the Earned Income Tax Credit.
• Elderly and disabled individuals, and families with children are key target populations for much of the spending for low-income people. Federal policy toward families with children generally encourages work and includes incentives to "make work pay." Other populations served by selected programs include veterans, students, homeless people, Indians, and refugees.
• Within broad target populations, programs use different concepts to determine who is eligible. Most spending is on behalf of people determined individually eligible by virtue of their low income or eligibility for another income-tested program. "Low income" is defined in a multitude of ways, using different percentages of the federal poverty guidelines, specific dollar amounts, percentages of local area median income (primarily for housing programs), or other measures.
• Many programs distribute funding to states or other entities to provide benefits and services to low-income people, using population-based allocation factors, cost-sharing formulas, or other mechanisms to target resources toward areas or entities with the greatest need. Some of these programs (especially in elementary and secondary education) have no further requirements for individuals to be determined income-eligible.
• Programs for low-income people are most likely to use formula grants to distribute funds to states or another unit of government. Under many of these programs, notably including Medicaid, states must spend a specified amount of their own funds to receive federal dollars. State and local governments administer most of these federal programs; however, many of the largest programs provide federal benefits directly to individuals or via a nongovernmental intermediary. |
crs_R43862 | crs_R43862_0 | As the size and scope of federal government activities increased during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the congressional practices related to authorizations and appropriations began to change. Second, associated with these provisions, these committees began to conduct reviews and enact revisions to authorization laws for certain agencies and departments on periodic schedules, instead of on an as-needed basis. In response, the legislative committees began to explore new legislative language that would influence budgetary outcomes, both with respect to the action of the appropriators, and also in their oversight of the agencies under their jurisdiction. Emergence of Explicit Authorizations of Appropriations
The first significant change in the form of authorization laws occurred after the 1920s, when authorization laws began to include provisions that explicitly "authorized to be appropriated" future budgetary resources tied to certain purposes. The types of provisions periodically authorizing appropriations that were developed during this period have continued to be used through the present day. These provisions generally indicate two schedules of legislative review: "annual" and "multiyear." Annual authorizations of appropriations explicitly authorize appropriations for a single fiscal year. Multiyear authorizations of appropriations explicitly authorize appropriations for more than one fiscal year at a time (typically between two and five). The proportion of agencies that were subject to annual reauthorizations expanded significantly during the mid-twentieth century. Changes to Authorizations of Appropriations in Practice: Selected Examples
The historical development of the form and timing of authorizations over the past century has been characterized by a number of themes:
The legislative committee's adoption of an annual reauthorization schedule was due to a desire for increased involvement in both agency and congressional budgetary decisions. Annual authorizations tended to be characterized by incremental program changes, whereas multiyear authorizations tended to involve widespread policy changes. The amounts authorized in annual measures tended to be more similar to the amount eventually appropriated when compared to multiyear authorizations. The out-years of multiyear authorizations tended to be characterized by a growing gap between the amount authorized and amount appropriated. To illustrate one or more of these general themes, the following subsections summarize aspects of the authorization histories of the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Peace Corps. These case studies also discuss the reasons for the shifts to the new authorization schemes, such as the legislative committee's decision to review and make policy changes to the program on a less frequent schedule, or difficulties in enacting annual authorizations prior to appropriations. In addition, until the enactment of P.L. As the NSF and NASA transitioned to a more long-term reauthorization schedule over the past thirty years, their reauthorization laws have become more policy-focused and contained more instances of significant program changes. | The congressional budget process distinguishes between "authorizations," which establish or define the activities of the federal government, and "appropriations," which finance those activities. The purpose of this report is to discuss the changes in the form and frequency of authorization laws that have occurred over the past century.
As the congressional approach to authorizations and appropriations developed over the nineteenth century, distinct roles for these types of laws were established. However, that approach began to shift in the early twentieth century as the size and scope of federal government activities increased, and the legislative committees began to explore new methods of influencing budgetary outcomes, both with respect to the action of the appropriators and for the agencies under their jurisdiction. Toward that end, those committees began to include provisions that explicitly authorized appropriations in authorization acts. In addition, these committees began to use these provisions to establish periodic schedules of review for revisions to authorization laws for certain agencies and departments, instead of enacting such laws on an as-needed basis.
The types of provisions periodically authorizing appropriations that were developed during the mid-twentieth century have continued to be in use through the present day. Such provisions can generally be divided into two schedules of review: "annual" and "multiyear." Annual authorizations of appropriations explicitly authorize appropriations for a single fiscal year. Multiyear authorizations of appropriations explicitly authorize appropriations for more than one fiscal year at a time, typically between two and five of them.
The evolution of the form and frequency of authorizations since the 1920s have been characterized by a number of general themes. Annual reauthorization schedules were often adopted due to the legislative committee's desire for increased involvement in agency and congressional budgetary decisions. Annual authorizations tended to be characterized by more incremental program changes, whereas multiyear authorizations tended to involve more widespread policy changes. Over the past thirty years many agencies on annual schedules have been transitioned to multiyear or long-term schedules. These transitions have often been motivated by delays in the enactment of annual authorizations each year, or the legislative committee's decision to conduct more extensive reviews of agency programs and policies on a less frequent schedule. The amounts annually authorized have tended to be more similar to the amount eventually appropriated when compared to multiyear authorizations. In particular, the outyears of multiyear authorizations have tended to be characterized by a growing gap between the amount authorized and amount appropriated.
To illustrate the themes identified in the first section of the report, the second section describes aspects of the authorization histories of the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Peace Corps. In general, all three of these agencies experienced eras of annual reauthorization, and then most recently transitioned to a more long-term or intermittent schedule. |
crs_R44924 | crs_R44924_0 | T he National Park Service's (NPS's) backlog of deferred maintenance (DM)—maintenance that was not done as scheduled or as needed—is an issue of ongoing interest to Congress. The agency estimated its DM needs for FY2016 at $11.332 billion. Although other federal land management agencies also have DM backlogs, NPS's backlog is the largest. This report addresses frequently asked questions about NPS DM. NPS's estimated maintenance backlog increased for most of the past decade before dropping in FY2016. Over the decade as a whole (FY2007-FY2016), Figure 1 and Table 2 show a growth in NPS DM of $1.718 billion in nominal dollars and $0.021 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars. What Factors Contribute to Growth or Reduction of the Backlog? NPS has taken a number of steps over the decade to improve its asset management systems and strategies. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recommended further improvements. From year to year, the completion of individual projects, changes in construction and repair costs, and similar factors play a role in the growth or reduction of NPS DM. Which Park Units Have the Largest Maintenance Backlog? It is not possible to determine the total amount of funding allocated each year to address NPS's DM backlog, because NPS does not aggregate these amounts in its budget reporting. NPS has used discretionary appropriations, allocations from the Department of Transportation, park entrance fees, donations, and other funding sources to address the maintenance backlog. Some Members of Congress and other stakeholders have proposed sources of additional funding to address NPS's DM needs. Among other sources, stakeholders have proposed to increase NPS DM funding with resources from the Land and Water Conservation Fund, offshore oil and gas revenues that currently go to the General Treasury, income tax overpayments and contributions, motorfuel taxes, and coin and postage stamp sales. By contrast, others have suggested that NPS DM could be reduced without additional funding—for example, by improving the agency's capital investment strategies, increasing the role of nonfederal partners in park management, or disposing of assets. Management Questions
How Does NPS Prioritize Its Deferred Maintenance Needs? Projects are prioritized based on their FCI and API ratings, as well as on other criteria related to financial sustainability, resource protection, visitor use, and health and safety. What Legislation Has Been Proposed in the 115th Congress to Address NPS Deferred Maintenance? Bills in the 115 th Congress related to NPS deferred maintenance include the following. H.R. 1577 , the National Park Service Transparency and Accountability Act, would require the Secretary of the Interior to submit to Congress a report evaluating the NPS's Capital Investment Strategy and its results, including a determination of whether the strategy is achieving its intended outcomes and any recommendations for changes. H.R. H.R. | This report addresses frequently asked questions about the National Park Service's (NPS's) backlog of deferred maintenance—maintenance that was not performed as scheduled or as needed and was put off to a future time. NPS's deferred maintenance, also known as the maintenance backlog, was estimated for FY2016 at $11.332 billion. More than half of the NPS backlog is in transportation-related assets. Other federal land management agencies also have maintenance backlogs, but NPS's is the largest and has drawn the most congressional attention.
During the past decade (FY2007-FY2016), NPS's maintenance backlog grew steadily before decreasing in FY2016. Overall, the deferred maintenance estimate grew by an estimated $1.718 billion in nominal dollars and $0.021 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars over the decade. Many factors might contribute to growth or reduction in deferred maintenance, including the aging of NPS assets, the availability of funding for NPS maintenance activities, acquisitions of new assets, agency management of the backlog, completion of individual projects, changes in construction and related costs, and changes in measurement and reporting methodologies. The backlog is distributed unevenly among states and territories, with California, the District of Columbia, and New York having the largest amounts of deferred maintenance. The amounts also vary among individual park units.
Sources of funding to address NPS deferred maintenance include discretionary appropriations, allocations from the Department of Transportation, park entrance and concessions fees, donations, and others. It is not possible to determine the total amount of funding from these sources that NPS has allocated each year to address deferred maintenance, because NPS does not aggregate these amounts in its budget reporting.
NPS prioritizes its deferred maintenance projects based on the condition of assets and their importance to the parks' mission, as well as other criteria related to financial sustainability, resource protection, visitor use, and health and safety. NPS has taken a number of steps over the decade to improve its asset management systems and strategies. Some observers, including the Government Accountability Office (GAO), have recommended further improvements.
Some Members of Congress and other stakeholders have proposed new sources of funding to address NPS's deferred maintenance needs. Bills in the 115th Congress to increase NPS funding for deferred maintenance—including H.R. 2584, H.R. 2863, S. 751, and S. 1460—would draw from mineral revenues currently going to the Treasury. Other proposed funding sources have included monies from the Land and Water Conservation Fund, income tax overpayments and contributions, new motorfuel taxes, and coin and postage stamp sales.
Other stakeholders have suggested that NPS deferred maintenance could be reduced without additional funding—for example, by improving the agency's capital investment strategies or increasing the role of nonfederal partners in park management. H.R. 1577 would require the Secretary of the Interior to evaluate NPS's Capital Investment Strategy and report on any recommended changes. |
crs_RL34527 | crs_RL34527_0 | President George W. Bush submitted to the Senate 283 nominations to executive department full-time positions. Of these 283 nominations, 233 were confirmed; nine were withdrawn; and 41 were returned to the President under the provisions of Senate rules. President Bush made a total of 13 recess appointments to the departments during this period. All 13 were made during recesses within the first or second session of the 109 th Congress ( intrasession recess appointments). None were made during the recess between the first and second sessions of the 109 th Congress ( intersession recess appointments). For those nominations that were confirmed, an average of 75 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 57. These statistics exclude days during summer recesses and between sessions of Congress. The 33 days during the summer 2005 recess, the 11 days between the first and second sessions of the 109 th Congress, and the 31 days during the summer 2006 recess were subtracted from the "days to confirm" for those nominations that spanned one or more of these recesses. | During the 109th Congress, the President submitted to the Senate 283 nominations to executive department full-time positions. Of these 283 nominations, 233 were confirmed; nine were withdrawn; and 41 were returned to him in accordance with Senate rules. For those nominations that were confirmed, an average of 75 days elapsed between nomination and confirmation. The median number of days elapsed was 57. These statistics do not include the days during which the Senate was adjourned for its summer recesses and between sessions of Congress.
President George W. Bush made a total of 13 recess appointments to the departments during this period. All 13 were made during recesses within the first or second session of the 109th Congress (intrasession recess appointments). None were made during the recess between the first and second sessions of the Congress (intersession recess appointments).
Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, the Congressional Record (daily edition), the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the "Plum Book" (United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions).
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33834 | crs_RL33834_0 | In March 2009, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) appointed a Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform to conduct a systematic review of the defense acquisition system. On March 23, 2010, the panel issued its final report, and provided the HASC its findings and recommendations. 5013 , the Implementing Management for Performance and Related Reforms to Obtain Value in Every Acquisition Act (IMPROVE) of 2010, was introduced on April 14, 2010, by Representative Robert Andrews. AFCAP is an "umbrella" contract, similar to the U.S. Army's LOGCAP. The first AFCAP contract was awarded as a result of a competitive bidding process. LOGCAP is an initiative to manage the use of civilian contractors who perform services in support of DOD missions during times of war and other military mobilizations. To date, $1.8 billion has been obligated under the LOGCAP IV contracts. With inclusion of the core logistics support, theater transportation, and postal operations services (CPT), 76 percent of LOGCAP work has been competitively awarded under LOGCAP IV. According to the Army, the LOGCAP IV contract award as based on a full and open competition. Latest Update on LOGCAP III Contract
In May 2010, the U.S. Army announced that it would not hold a new competition for contract support services in Iraq. Rather, the Army would continue to use KBR to execute the LOGCAP III contract to provide support services until the scheduled withdrawal of all troops in December 2011. Previous to this announcement, the Army had maintained that the LOGCAP III contract would be cancelled and that all services would be transferred to the LOGCAP IV contract. However, the Army has reportedly completed a business case analysis and concluded that keeping the LOGCAP III contract would be of greater benefit to the federal government. Some Members of Congress have questioned this decision and asked the Secretary of Defense to reconsider, particularly in light of the Justice Department's decision to bring civil action against the LOGCAP III contractor. In June 2007 the ASC selected three companies to serve as performance contractors—DynCorp International LLC, Fort Worth, TX; Fluor Intercontinental, Inc, Greenville, SC; and KBR, Houston, TX. Each company will compete for task orders. Each of the three contracts will have a maximum value of $5 billion per year, with a collective annual maximum value of $15 billion and lifetime maximum value of $150 billion for LOGCAP IV. Performance Task Orders
The U.S. Army Sustainment Command announced the award of the first performance task order under LOGCAP IV, on September 25, 2008, to Fluor Intercontinental, Inc. Each company has been awarded task orders under LOGCAP IV. Recent assessments from GAO, DOD's IG, and the SIGIR reveal a lack of federal oversight, management, and accountability for funds spent for Iraq contracting. Government Accountability Office
GAO-08-857. H.R. Key provisions are listed below:
Section 802 prohibits future contracts for the use of new Lead System Integrators; Section 813 requires the Comptroller General to report to Congress on potential modifications to the organization and structure of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Programs; Section 816 directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to conduct an annual review on the systematic deficiencies in Major Defense Acquisition Programs; Section 830 directs the Comptroller General to report to Congress on DOD's use of noncompetitive awards; Section 841 establishes a commission to study federal contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, called the "Commission on Wartime Contracting;" Section 842 requires the DOD Inspector General, the SIGIR for Iraq Reconstruction, and the SIGIR for Afghanistan Reconstruction to collaborate on the development of comprehensive plans to perform a series of audits on DOD contracts, subcontracts, and task and delivery orders for the performance of logistical support activities of coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as audits for federal agency contracts, subcontracts, and task and delivery orders for the performance of security and reconstruction functions in Iraq and Afghanistan; Section 851, which would require that the Secretary of Defense (as part of the Strategic Human Capital Plan for 2008) include a separate section of the report focused on the military and civilian acquisition workforce; Section 852 establishes a Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund; Section 861 requires coordination between the DOD, the Department of State, and the United States Agency for International Development through the creation of a Memorandum of Understanding between the three agency heads on matters relating to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan; Section 862 requires that the Secretary of Defense prescribe, within 120 days of enactment, regulations on the selection, training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under a covered contract or covered subcontract in a combat area. | This report examines Department of Defense (DOD) logistical support contracts for troop support services in Iraq and Afghanistan administered through the U.S. Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), as well as legislative initiatives which may impact the oversight and management of logistical support contracts. LOGCAP is an initiative designed to manage the use of civilian contractors that perform services during times of war and other military mobilization. The first LOGCAP was awarded in 1992. Four LOGCAP contracts have been awarded for combat support services in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current LOGCAP III contractor supports the drawdown in Iraq by providing logistical services, theater transportation, augmentation of maintenance services, and other combat support services.
On April 18, 2008, DOD announced the Army's LOGCAP IV contract awards to three companies—DynCorp International LLC, Fort Worth, TX; Fluor Intercontinental, Inc, Greenville, SC; and KBR, Houston, TX, through a full and open competition. The LOGCAP IV contract calls for each company to compete for task orders. Each company may be awarded up to $5 billion annually for troop support services with a maximum annual value of $15 billion. As of March 2010, each company has been awarded at least one task order under LOGCAP IV. Over the life of LOGCAP IV, the maximum contract value is $150 billion. The U.S. Army Sustainment Command awarded the first performance task order on September 25, 2008, to Fluor Intercontinental, Inc., for logistical support services in Afghanistan. As of April 2010, approximately 12 tasks orders have been awarded under LOGCAP IV for a total of $1.8 billion in obligations under LOGCAP IV contracts.
In May 2010, the U.S. Army announced that it would continue to use the LOGCAP III contract to provide support services until the scheduled withdrawal of all troops in December 2011. Previous to this announcement, the Army had announced that the LOGCAP III contract would be cancelled and that all services would be transferred to the LOGCAP IV contract. However, the Army has reportedly completed a business case analysis and concluded that keeping the LOGCAP III contract would be of greater benefit to the federal government. Some Members of Congress have questioned this decision and asked the Secretary of Defense to reconsider, particularly in light of the Justice Department's decision to bring civil action against the LOGCAP III contractor.
Congress is concerned about the federal oversight and management of DOD contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly under programs like LOGCAP. Assessments from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), DOD Office of the Inspector General (DOD-IG), the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the Defense Contract Audit Agency reveal a lack of accountability for large sums of money spent for Iraq contracts.
Congressional concerns over the federal oversight and management of defense contracts were the subject of a House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform to conduct a systematic review of the defense acquisition system. On March 23, 2010, the panel provided the HASC its findings and recommendations. Largely as a result of the panel's work, H.R. 5013, the Implementing Management for Performance and Related Reforms to Obtain Value in Every Acquisition Act (IMPROVE) of 2010, was introduced on April 14, 2010, seeking to improve the management and oversight of DOD's procurement of goods and services. |
crs_R41395 | crs_R41395_0 | The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) for all "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Based on the conclusions of that review, the agency can decide an EIS is needed because of the impacts found, or it may issue a "finding of no significant impact," known as a FONSI. Monsanto Corporation, the developer of herbicide-tolerant varieties of GE alfalfa and sugar beet (marketed under the name of Roundup Ready alfalfa and Roundup Ready sugar beet), petitioned APHIS for deregulation of these items in 2004 (for GE alfalfa) and 2005 (for GE sugar beets). APHIS conducted EAs of the GE plants to assess the impacts of growing them on a commercial scale. APHIS issued EA-FONSIs for GE alfalfa in June 2005 and for GE sugar beets in March 2005. This challenge (litigation discussed below) resulted in a court directing APHIS to prepare an EIS. The final EIS, which addresses the 244,000 comments received on the draft EIS, was published on December 16, 2010. On January 27, 2011, Secretary Vilsack announced that APHIS was granting GE alfalfa full deregulation. Separate judges found that the environmental reviews were inadequate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court determination that the injunction was appropriate under the circumstances. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the scope of the injunction was too broad—the district court had overstepped its authority in preventing APHIS from designing a different way of regulating GE alfalfa and from preventing any planting or harvesting of the product. Essentially, the Supreme Court holding contemplates the possibility that instead of preparing (or in addition to preparing) an EIS for full deregulation of GE alfalfa, as required by the district court, APHIS could conduct a separate, partial deregulation process. The district court held that APHIS had complied with the law. GE Sugar Beet Litigation
The district court that reviewed GE sugar beets used the same reasoning as the district court in the GE alfalfa case and reached the same conclusion: APHIS should have prepared an EIS for its deregulation determination. However, the GE sugar beet court did not examine whether deregulation would lead to herbicide-resistant weeds, stating that APHIS's failure to consider gene transmission was enough to find that the EA violated NEPA. According to the court, in the five years between when GE sugar beets were deregulated and an injunction was sought, GE sugar beets became the industry standard, with over 95% of all sugar beets planted being GE. While the court did not issue an injunction, it vacated the deregulation decision of APHIS. APHIS announced on September 1, 2010, that it was issuing permits to sugar beet seed producers to authorize seedling production in fall 2010. The permits would prohibit seedling flowering or transplanting without additional approval. In December, the court ordered the seedlings uprooted. A final EA-FONSI was issued on February 4, 2011, when the agency announced that it would partially deregulate GE sugar beet root crop production, but not seed crop production. Provisions to amend APHIS's regulatory procedures under the Plant Protection Act were introduced in the 112 th Congress in the House farm bill ( H.R. 6083 ) and in the House Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 5973 ). The latter provision would have required the Secretary to grant producers permits to continue planting a GE crop if a regulatory decision was vacated by the court, as happened with GE alfalfa and sugar beets. The permits would permit growers to continue planting, under conditions set by the Secretary, until a final determination on deregulation was made. No further legislative action was taken on these two bills in the 112 th Congress. In the 113 th Congress, the House farm bill ( H.R. 1947 ) omitted the proposed revisions to APHIS's deregulation process. The provision requiring the Secretary to grant permits in the event of a vacated regulatory decision was passed as Section 735 in H.R. 933 , the FY2013 appropriations bill. The provision will expire at the end of FY2013. | Monsanto Corporation, the developer of herbicide-tolerant varieties of genetically engineered (GE) alfalfa and sugar beet (called Roundup Ready alfalfa and Roundup Ready sugar beet), petitioned USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) for deregulation of the items. Deregulation of GE plants is the final step in the commercialization process. Monsanto filed a petition for deregulation of its GE alfalfa in 2004, and for GE sugar beets in 2005.
As part of the deregulation process, APHIS conducts an environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to determine whether any significant environmental impacts would result from deregulation. APHIS conducted a limited review, known as an environmental assessment (EA), of the GE plants to assess the impacts of growing them on a commercial scale. APHIS issued a "finding of no significant impact" (FONSI) for GE alfalfa and GE sugar beets.
Lawsuits subsequently challenged the adequacy of the EAs in separate actions. Both courts held that APHIS should have prepared a more analytically thorough environmental impact statement (EIS) for the deregulation decisions. Separately, the courts directed APHIS to complete an EIS on the effects of deregulating GE alfalfa and GE sugar beets.
The court in the GE alfalfa case halted planting of the genetically modified seed, and nullified the deregulation. The injunction was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the injunction was too broad and that the court should have considered partial deregulation. The Supreme Court did not discuss the appropriateness of the environmental review. In the meantime, APHIS completed the environmental review directed by the lower court, releasing a final EIS for GE alfalfa on December 16, 2010. On January 27, 2011, Secretary Vilsack announced that APHIS was granting GE alfalfa full deregulation. On January 5, 2012, a federal district court rejected claims that the deregulation violated the law, and the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed this decision on May 17, 2013.
The court in the GE sugar beet case did not formally prohibit planting sugar beets, but it voided APHIS's deregulation decision in August 2010, undoing the five-year-old approval of GE sugar beets, from which nearly half of U.S. sugar is derived. APHIS issued four permits authorizing seedling production that would not allow flowering or transplanting without additional authorization. In November 2010, a judge ordered those seedlings pulled from the ground, holding that APHIS had violated NEPA in issuing the permits. The Ninth Circuit temporarily halted that decision in December 2010, ultimately holding in February 2011 that the seedlings did not have to be removed.
APHIS announced on February 4, 2011, that the agency would partially deregulate GE sugar beet root crop production, but would continue full regulation for sugar beet seed crop production while the EIS was prepared. The final EIS for GE sugar beets was published June 1, 2012. On July 20, 2012, APHIS issued its determination of non-regulated status for GE sugar beets.
Provisions to amend APHIS's regulatory procedures under the Plant Protection Act were introduced in the 112th Congress in the House farm bill (H.R. 6083) and in the House Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 5973). The latter provision would have required the Secretary to grant producers permits to continue planting a GE crop if a regulatory decision was vacated by the court, as happened with GE alfalfa and sugar beets. Such permits would permit growers to continue planting, under conditions imposed by the Secretary, until a final determination on deregulation was made. No further legislative action was taken on these two bills in the 112th Congress.
In the 113th Congress, the House farm bill (H.R. 1947) omitted the proposed revisions to APHIS's deregulation process. The provision requiring the Secretary to grant permits in the event of a vacated regulatory decision was passed as Section 735 of H.R. 933, the FY2013 appropriations bill. The provision will expire at the end of FY2013. |
crs_R43811 | crs_R43811_0 | Introduction
Businesses generally use one of two accounting methods for calculating their federal tax liabilities or for financial reporting. The choice of accounting method determines the timing of the recognition of revenue and expenses. Under cash basis accounting, revenue and expenses are recorded when cash is actually paid or received. Under accrual basis accounting, revenue is recorded when it is earned and expenses are reported when they are incurred. This report introduces the differences between cash and accrual methods of accounting. The IRC's current requirement that certain businesses use the accrual method arguably addresses the concern that if related revenue and expense items that contribute to income are assigned to different years, then neither year's income nor tax liability will be properly reported by the business. Specifically, the Small Business Accounting and Tax Simplification Act ( H.R. 947 ), Start-up Jobs and Innovation Act ( S. 1658 ), and Small Business Tax Certainty and Growth Act ( S. 1085 ) would each expand the use of cash method accounting by raising the threshold of average gross receipts to $10 million from $5 million. Similar legislation was introduced in the 112 th Congress, the Small Business Tax Simplification Act ( H.R. The Tax Reform Act of 2014, formally introduced as H.R. 1 by House Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp on December 10, 2014, would more broadly modify the rules surrounding the choice of accounting method for some businesses. In addition to raising the threshold from $5 million to $10 million, the bill would require certain partnerships, S corporations, and PSCs to use accrual basis of accounting when their average annual gross receipts exceed $10 million. Former Senate Committee on Finance Chairman Max Baucus included a similar provision in his Cost Recovery and Accounting staff discussion draft, which has not been formally introduced as legislation. U.S. Government Financial Reports
A number of congressional proposals would change how the U.S. government's financial reports are prepared. 476 ) would require the federal government's budget, financial reports, and performance evaluation reports to be prepared using both cash and accrual basis of accounting. 545 , encouraged the use of accrual accounting by expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the federal government should adopt and use accrual basis generally accepted accounting principles for government budgeting, financial reporting, and performance evaluation purposes. If a business incurs a large expense to provide a service before it has received the payment for the service, the business's financial statements may communicate a distorted financial condition of the business. Accrual Basis
Accrual basis of accounting is in accordance with GAAP. Examples of Cash Versus Accrual Basis of Accounting
To illustrate how the choice of accounting method determines the timing of when revenue and expenses are recognized (and ultimately tax liability and cash flow), two different scenarios are presented. 1 ) proposes changes in accounting rules for tax purposes; under the legislation certain partnerships, S corporations, and PSCs with average gross receipts in excess of $10 million would be required to use the accrual method. Changing from the cash method to accrual method could cause taxpayers to recognize income as a result of the change in accounting methods. Reporting in both the cash basis and accrual basis of accounting might provide the executive branch, Congress, and U.S. citizens with a more informative picture of the government's performance and future obligations than relying only on the cash or modified cash basis of accounting. | This report introduces two general methods of accounting—the cash basis method and accrual basis method. The choice of accounting method determines the timing of the recognition of revenue and expenses. Under cash basis accounting, revenue and expenses are recorded when cash is actually paid or received. Under accrual basis accounting, revenue is recorded when it is earned and expenses are reported when they are incurred. Understanding the differences between these two accounting methods could be helpful to Congress as it considers reforming the tax system and changing the federal government's financial reporting requirements.
Currently with certain exceptions, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) requires some companies with gross receipts in excess of $5 million to use accrual basis, instead of cash basis, of accounting to determine their tax liabilities. The IRC's requirement to use the accrual method, arguably, ensures that revenue and the expenses incurred to generate that revenue are realized in the same year. Types of companies that may be excepted from using accrual basis of accounting for income taxes are sole proprietors and certain qualified personal service corporations (PSCs) in such fields as health, law, engineering, accounting, performing arts, and consulting firms, as well as farms that are not corporations or do not have a corporate partner.
Some Members of Congress have put forth proposals to revise the circumstances under which certain companies are able to use cash method. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp introduced H.R. 1, the Tax Reform Act of 2014, on December 10, 2014. Among the changes proposed in the bill is the requirement that some partnerships, S corporations, and PSCs use the accrual method instead of the cash method to determine their federal taxable liability. Specifically, these business types would be required to use the accrual method if their average annual gross receipts exceeded $10 million. Former Senate Committee on Finance Chairman Max Baucus included a similar provision in his Cost Recovery and Accounting staff discussion draft, which has not been formally introduced as legislation. The Small Business Accounting and Tax Simplification Act (H.R. 947), Start-up Jobs and Innovation Act (S. 1658), and Small Business Tax Certainty and Growth Act (S. 1085), introduced in the 113th Congress, would raise the gross receipt test limit from $5 million to $10 million.
The President's budget is prepared primarily using cash basis. The Financial Report of the United States Government is prepared using both accrual and modified cash basis. For the past 17 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued a disclaimer of opinion on the Financial Report of the United States Government. One of the reasons stated by GAO for the disclaimer of opinion for the 2013 financial report was that the federal government's process for preparing the consolidated financial statements was ineffective to determine whether the financial reports were presented fairly in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
A number of congressional proposals would change how the U.S. government's financial reports are prepared. In the 113th Congress, the GAAP Act (H.R. 476) and H.Res. 545 would require the federal government's budget, financial reports, and performance evaluation reports to be prepared using both cash and accrual method.
This report introduces the difference between cash and accrual methods by providing an overview of concepts and theories that underlie these accounting methods. It then explores these concepts through the business cycle of a fictitious small business and how the basis of accounting would affect the financial condition of the business. |
crs_R42157 | crs_R42157_0 | Introduction
The Klamath River Basin, a region along the California-Oregon border, has become a focal point for local and national discussions on water and species management. Water management issues were brought to the forefront when severe drought conditions in 2001 exacerbated competition for scarce water resources and generated conflict among several interests—farmers, anglers (commercial and sport), other recreationists, federal wildlife refuge managers, environmental organizations, and state, local, and tribal governments. Subsequent issues with Klamath Basin fisheries, including events in 2002 and 2006, exacerbated these conflicts. As is true in many regions in the West, the federal government plays a prominent role in the Klamath Basin's water management. This role stems from (1) operation and management of the Bureau of Reclamation's Klamath Water Project; (2) management of federal lands in the basin, including several national wildlife refuges managed by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); and (3) implementation of federal laws, such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Clean Water Act (CWA), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Under the KHSA, the Secretary of the Interior determines whether removal of these dams is in the public interest. The dams produce hydroelectric power for the basin (including power for irrigators), as well as other areas. 2010 Klamath Settlement Agreements
In response to the earlier conflicts and other issues in the Klamath basin, the federal government led talks among multiple groups between 2002 and 2010, with a goal of achieving long-term solution to the water and endangered species issues in the Klamath Basin. The first agreement, known as the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA), lays out numerous actions by local, state, and federal parties that would restore river and ocean fish populations, establish water and power supplies for certain agricultural, municipal, and environmental users, and provide for various other actions. The second agreement, known as the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (KHSA), lays out the process for removing four dams owned by PacifiCorp, as well as other related actions. Under the agreement, implementation of the Endangered Species Act would also continue. Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement
The Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (referred to here as the KHSA) lays out a process for additional studies and environmental review by the Secretary of the Interior to consider removal of the four hydroelectric dams on the Klamath River that are owned by PacifiCorp (J.C. Boyle, Iron Gate, Copco 1, and Copco 2). For the KBRA, this includes the states of Oregon and California, three tribes, two counties, parties representing to the Reclamation Project and some off-project interests, and several other groups (including environmental interests). Other groups and individuals were not "party" to the agreements but have stated their support for them. The States of California and Oregon, as well as the Obama Administration, support the agreements because as a whole, they represent a potential solution to the protracted resource conflicts in the Upper and Lower Basins. 3398 and S. 1851 , respectively). Obligation of the Federal Government
The role of the federal government in the Klamath Basin is likely to be a central question related to congressional consideration of the Klamath agreements. In considering authorization of the Klamath legislation, Congress may decide whether the federal government has an obligation to act on the agreements and, if so, to what extent. In particular, most of the actions in the KBRA are funded by the federal government, including most of the costs for the water resources, fisheries restoration, and tribal components of the agreement. | The Klamath River Basin on the California-Oregon border is a focal point for local and national discussions on water allocation and species protection. Previously, water and species management issues have exacerbated competition and generated conflict among several interests—farmers, Indian tribes, commercial and sport fishermen, federal wildlife refuge managers, environmental groups, and state, local, and tribal governments. As is true in many regions in the West, the federal government plays a prominent role in the Klamath Basin's waters. This role stems primarily from (1) operation and management of the Bureau of Reclamation's Klamath Water Project; (2) management of federal lands, including six national wildlife refuges; and (3) implementation of federal laws such as the Endangered Species Act.
Allocation of the Klamath Basin's water has been contentious in the past. Controversy peaked in 2001 when the federal government halted irrigation water deliveries to protect species listed as threatened under the federal Endangered Species Act. Later issues with basin fisheries exacerbated these conflicts. Efforts to permanently settle many of the basin's water and species issues began during the Bush Administration and were continued by the Obama Administration.
In 2010, the Secretary of the Interior and the governors of Oregon and California, along with multiple interest groups, announced two interrelated settlement agreements, supported by the federal government and signed by numerous other parties. These agreements are meant to address many of the previous conflicts in the basin. The first agreement, known as the Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KBRA), provides for restoration, water deliveries, and related actions, including a defined range of water supplies for Reclamation project users as well as projects to restore and protect threatened and endangered fish species. The second agreement, known as the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement (KHSA), lays out a process for studies and a decision by the Secretary of the Interior regarding whether the removal of four dams in the Lower Klamath Basin (funded by power customers in Oregon and California, as well as the State of California) would be in the public interest. Together, removal of the dams would constitute one of the largest, most complex dam removal projects ever undertaken.
More than forty groups are signatories (or "parties") to the Klamath agreements, including the states of Oregon and California, three area tribes, Reclamation Project irrigators, environmental interests, and others. In addition to these parties, many who were not formally involved in negotiations also support the agreements. Opponents of the agreements include a subset of non-Reclamation project ("off-project") irrigators, as well as some other environmental groups, tribes, Siskiyou County in California, and other area residents. The Obama Administration has endorsed the Klamath agreements, but Congress has to formally authorize both agreements for the federal government to move forward with most of their actions.
Legislation currently before Congress (H.R. 3398 and S. 1851) would authorize the agreements, including approximately $800 million for federal actions (mostly in the KBRA). Considerations related to the Klamath agreements may include whether the federal government is obligated to act beyond current activities in the Klamath Basin (and, if so, to what extent) and what specific strategies should be authorized. |
crs_RS22807 | crs_RS22807_0 | Such lighting includes fluorescent bulbs. Unlike tubes, CFLs are made to fit into products that can be plugged into standard household light sockets like table lamps and ceiling fixtures. Increased Use of CFLs
CFL sales have increased significantly in the past two years. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 290 million Energy Star-qualified CFLs were sold in 2007. That is nearly double the number sold in 2006 (the year that CFL market share increased from a steady 5% to 11%), and represents almost 20% of the U.S. light bulb market. According to the Department of Energy (DOE), CFLs use about 75% less energy than standard incandescent bulbs and last up to 10 times longer. New Energy Efficiency Standards for Lighting
Another factor that may further increase the use of CFLs is the development of energy efficiency standards for lighting. Sections 321 and 322 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 ( P.L. CFLs already meet the Energy Act's energy standard. Mercury is an essential component of CFLs that allows a bulb to be an efficient light source. Fluorescent bulbs, unlike many other mercury-containing consumer products, are among the few products for which non-mercury substitutes do not exist. Concerns About Mercury Releases During CFL Use
Increased use of CFLs has generated concern among some over the potential danger the bulbs may pose if broken in the home during use or after disposal. In guidance provided by the Energy Star program, it has been noted that the use of CFLs in place of incandescent bulbs could actually reduce the amount of mercury emissions to the environment. Coal-fired power plants currently account for 40% of mercury emissions in the United States. During a five-year span, by some estimates, a coal-fired power plant emits 9.3 mg of mercury in the course of producing the same amount of electricity needed to power an incandescent bulb, compared to 2.3 mg of mercury emissions from a CFL over the same period. The mercury levels in CFLs would potentially cause them to be deemed household hazardous waste. If household garbage disposal is the only option, EPA recommends that certain precautions be taken. Also, regional groups have formed to develop recycling options. Finally, under § 321(h) of the Energy Act, EPA is directed to submit to Congress a report describing recommendations relating to the means by which the federal government may reduce or prevent the release of mercury during the manufacture, transport, storage, and disposal of light bulbs. | Compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs), a smaller version of fluorescent tubes, are produced with technology that allows them to fit into standard lighting products such as lamps and ceiling fixtures. The bulbs use one-fifth to one-quarter the energy and can last 10 times longer than traditional incandescent light bulbs. These factors have led to a significant increase in the sales of CFLs. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), CFL sales doubled in 2007 and now represent 20% of the U.S. light bulb market. Sales may be expected to increase with the implementation of new energy efficiency standards for lighting specified in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140, enacted December 19, 2007). Those standards require certain light bulbs to use 25% to 30% less energy than today's products beginning in 2012. CFLs already meet the standards.
The increased use of CFLs has led to concern among some groups over the presence in the bulbs of mercury, a potent neurotoxin. By way of example, EPA has likened the amount of mercury in individual bulbs to that which could fit on the tip of a ballpoint pen—ranging from 2 to 6 milligrams (mg). At these levels, mercury is virtually harmless to consumers. Still, EPA recommends that caution be taken in cleaning up broken CFLs to minimize potential mercury exposure. EPA also recommends that spent bulbs be recycled, instead of disposed of with household garbage, in areas where CFL recycling is available. (Federal regulations that apply to the disposal of mercury-containing products (e.g., lighting, switches, thermometers) do not apply to households.) Further, EPA has noted that increased CFL use may actually reduce overall mercury emissions to the environment by potentially reducing power use—coal-fired power plants are the greatest individual source of mercury emissions in the United States.
This report discusses reasons why CFL sales have increased dramatically in the past two years, concerns that have arisen regarding their use and disposal, and some media reports that have exaggerated the potential danger associated with the mercury in CFLs. |
crs_R43979 | crs_R43979_0 | Introduction1
Congress has shown significant interest in altering the current patent system in response to concerns about entities that engage in patent litigation tactics that have been criticized as abusive or deceptive. In June 2015, the House Judiciary Committee approved the Innovation Act ( H.R. This report describes how the major provisions of current patent litigation reform legislation, with a particular focus on these two bills that have seen the most legislative activity, would change existing patent law to address the perceived problems in the patent litigation system. Three trial proceedings comprise the current system of administrative patent challenges: inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and the transitional post-grant review for covered business method patents (CBM). The Innovation Act, H.R. Like the Innovation Act (as reported), the Senate's PATENT Act would require a court to stay discovery pending the resolution of preliminary motions (which must be filed prior to the first responsive pleading), including the motion to dismiss, the motion to transfer venue, and the motion to sever accused infringers. Upon the filing of an initial complaint for patent infringement, plaintiffs would be required to disclose to the USPTO, the court, and all adverse parties the following information relating to entities that own or have a financial interest in the patent:
1. the assignee(s) of the patent(s) involved in the case; 2. any entity with a right to sublicense or enforce the patent(s) at issue; 3. any entity, other than the plaintiff, that the plaintiff knows to have a financial interest in the patent(s) at issue or in the plaintiff; 4. the ultimate parent entity of any assignee, or the entities identified in #2 and #3 above; 5. a clear and concise description of the principal business, if any, of the party alleging infringement; 6. a list of each complaint filed, of which the party alleging infringement has knowledge, that asserts or asserted any of the patents identified above; 7. for each patent identified, a statement as to whether the patent is subject to certain licensing requirements (imposed by the federal government, a foreign government, or by a standards development organization). Section 5 of the Innovation Act would codify a modified version of the customer suit exception by amending the Patent Act to require a court to suspend or postpone litigation against a customer of a product or process that contains allegedly infringing technologies, if several requirements are satisfied:
1. the manufacturer is a party to the civil action or a separate action involving the same patent(s); 2. the customer agrees to be bound by the decisions of the court in the action involving the manufacturer, with respect to any issues that the customer and manufacturer have in common; and 3. the customer requests the court to stay the action no later than the later of (a) 120 days after the date on which the first pleading in the action is served (if such pleading specifically identifies the product or process that is the source of the customer's alleged infringement of the patent, and the pleading specifically explains how the product or process is alleged to infringe the patent), or (b) the date on which the first scheduling order in the case is entered. In addition, Brooks Furniture held that the prevailing party must prove its entitlement to attorney fees by "clear and convincing evidence." Section 3(b) of the Innovation Act would amend Section 285 to require a court, in any patent case, to award attorney fees to a prevailing party (plaintiff or defendant), unless the court finds that either
1. the nonprevailing party's position and conduct are "reasonably justified in law and fact" or 2. there are "special circumstances (such as severe economic hardship to a named inventor) [that] make an award unjust." Unlike the Innovation Act's creation of what appears to be a presumption of an award of attorney fees, Section 7(b) of the PATENT Act would require the prevailing party to first make a motion for the fees, after which the court must determine whether the position of the nonprevailing party was "objectively reasonable in law and fact, and whether the conduct of the nonprevailing party was objectively reasonable." If the court finds that the nonprevailing party's position and conduct does not satisfy these standards, the court must award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party, unless special circumstances would make an award unjust. Section 3(c) of the Innovation Act would establish mandatory joinder rules when the nonprevailing party alleging infringement is unable to pay the fee award ordered by the court and other expenses. The PATENT Act contains a mechanism for recovering fee awards from interested parties that is similar to the Innovation Act (as reported). The Innovation Act states that it is the "sense of Congress" that "it is an abuse of the patent system and against public policy for a party to send out purposely evasive demand letters to end users alleging patent infringement." H.R. 1896 , the "Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015," outlines both content and disclosure requirements for demand letters. Under both the TROL Act and the STRONG Patents Act, the Federal Trade Commission would enforce any violations of the provisions above. The Senate's PATENT Act addresses both abusive demand letters and demand letters sent as pre-suit notification. Instead, the Innovation Act and PATENT Act (as reported) would require that the PTAB, in IPR and PGR proceedings, use the same claim construction standard that is applied by federal courts; that is, the PTAB would need to construe a patent claim "in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent." The Innovation Act and the PATENT Act (as reported) would also require the PTAB to consider prior claim construction by a court in a civil action in which the patent owner was a party. Section 9 of the Innovation Act and Section 14(a) of the PATENT Act would narrow the estoppel effect arising from a PGR by removing the phrase "or reasonably could have raised" in the statute. However, the PATENT Act (as reported) does not change the evidentiary standard for proving unpatentability, as the STRONG Patents Act would. Sections 102(d) and 103(d) of the STRONG Patents Act would provide even more stringent standing requirements for persons wanting to initiate a PGR or IPR. The STRONG Patents Act would put an end to USPTO fee diversion. The Innovation Act (as reported) would effectively overturn VE Holding Corp. by imposing limitations on the judicial districts in which a civil action may be brought for patent infringement or for a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid or not infringed. Provisions Concerning Small Businesses
The patent reform litigation legislation introduced in the 114 th Congress contains several provisions designed to help small businesses that are involved in the patent system either as patent owners or as defendants in infringement lawsuits. | This report describes how current patent litigation reform legislation would change existing patent law to address the perceived problems caused by entities that engage in patent litigation tactics that have been criticized as abusive or deceptive. The bills introduced in the 114th Congress include the Innovation Act (H.R. 9), Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act (PATENT) Act (S. 1137), Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015 (H.R. 1896), Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act (H.R. 2045), and the Support Technology and Research for Our Nation's Growth (STRONG) Patents Act of 2015 (S. 632). The legislation includes the following changes to the patent system:
Heightened Pleading Requirements: The Innovation Act and the PATENT Act would require parties alleging patent infringement in a civil action to include in the court pleadings specified details concerning each claim of each patent infringed, and the acts of the alleged infringer.
Limits on Discovery: The Innovation Act (as reported by the House Judiciary Committee) and the PATENT Act propose limitations on discovery pending the resolution of certain motions, including motions to dismiss, transfer venue, and drop parties.
Transparency of Patent Ownership: The Innovation Act and the PATENT Act would require plaintiffs in patent cases to disclose to the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the court, and all adverse parties information relating to entities that own or have a financial interest in the patent.
Customer-Suit Exception: The Innovation Act and the PATENT Act would allow a court to stay litigation against a customer of a product that contains allegedly infringing technologies, if the manufacturer of the product is a party to the same or other action on the same patent and other requirements are satisfied.
Shifting of Attorney Fees: The Innovation Act would require a district court to award attorney fees to a prevailing party in patent cases, unless the court finds that the nonprevailing party's position and conduct "were reasonably justified in law and fact or that special circumstances ... make an award unjust." The PATENT Act would require the prevailing party to make a motion to the court to determine whether the nonprevailing party's position and conduct were "objectively reasonable"; if they were not, then the court must award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party unless there are special circumstances that would make an award unjust.
Fee Recovery: The Innovation Act and the PATENT Act contain provisions that address the situation when the nonprevailing party alleging infringement is unable to pay the fee award and other expenses. The Innovation Act (as reported) and the PATENT Act would allow a defendant to submit a statement early in the litigation claiming that the plaintiff's primary business is the assertion and enforcement of patents; the plaintiff would then need to certify that it has sufficient funds to satisfy any potential award of attorney fees that may be assessed, and to identify (and provide notice to) any "interested parties" that could be held accountable for the award if the plaintiffs are unable to pay it.
Demand Letters: Several bills propose various approaches to address demand letters. The STRONG Patents Act and the TROL Act would impose specific enforcement and content requirements for demand letters. The Innovation Act expresses the sense of Congress that purposely evasive demand letters are abusing the patent system in a manner contrary to public policy. The Demand Letter Transparency Act proposes both disclosure and content requirements directed towards "abusive" demand letter practices, and the PATENT Act focuses on pre-suit notifications.
Post-Grant Review Reforms: The Innovation Act, PATENT Act (as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee), and the STRONG Patents Act would mandate that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), in inter partes review (IPR) and post-grant review (PGR) proceedings, follow the same claim construction standard used by district courts. The Innovation Act and the PATENT Act (as reported) would require the PTAB to consider prior claim construction by a court in a civil action in which the patent owner was a party. In addition, the Innovation Act and the PATENT Act would narrow the estoppel effect arising from a PGR. The Innovation Act (as reported) and the STRONG Patents Act would heighten the standing requirements for persons wanting to initiate a PGR or IPR. The STRONG Patents Act would also require the IPR/PGR petitioner to prove unpatentability of a patent claim by "clear and convincing evidence."
Elimination of USPTO Fee Diversion: The STRONG Patents Act would permit the USPTO to spend all fee revenue that it collects without further appropriation action or fiscal year limitation.
Venue: The Innovation Act (as reported) would impose limitations on the judicial districts in which a civil action may be brought for patent infringement or for a declaratory judgment that a patent is invalid or not infringed.
Assistance for Small Businesses: The Innovation Act, STRONG Patents Act, and the PATENT Act contain provisions designed to help small businesses that participate in the patent system either as patent owners or as defendants. |
crs_RL32097 | crs_RL32097_0 | (3)
Toward that end, President Bush issued his National Strategy to Combat Weapons of MassDestruction in December, 2002. The Administration's plan combines efforts aimed atcounterproliferation, (4) nonproliferation, and WMDconsequence management. Its purported intentis to eliminate or "roll back" WMD from certain states and terrorist groups who possess suchweapons or are close to acquiring them, including potentially the use of force and aggressivemethods of interdiction of WMD-related goods, technologies, and expertise. (5) The use of interdictionas a counterproliferation measure appears to be part of a strategy that foresees the U.S. taking"anticipatory action to defend ourselves" against terrorists and rogue states, "even if uncertaintyremains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack," (6) and "to detect and destroy an adversary'sWMD assets before these weapons are used." (8)
In May 2003, President Bush announced a new facet of the WMD strategy, to be known as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). (12) However, recognizing thatcooperation may not always be forthcoming from all nations whose assistance is requested, theAdministration has intimated that it will act unilaterally, if necessary. (13)
These developments raise questions related to the international law of jurisdiction. This report provides an overview of the international law of the sea as it relates to thepermissible range of methods for interdicting WMD-related contraband on the sea and in the air, andalso of selected pertinent international regimes and agreements. After a short outline of the currentlegal regime for the international control of WMD, the report outlines the basic concepts ofjurisdiction in international law. Next, the report describes concepts central to the law of the sea,the rights and limitations. The report then turns to the international legal framework limiting theconduct of nations as it applies during times of war and peace, as well as during what might be called"quasi war," as is often deemed to be the case today. (50) The law of the seabalances the rights of maritime States to navigatefreely with the rights of coastal States to maintain security. Legal Divisions of Waters
Under the law of the sea, the world's waters are divided into two basic categories: national and international waters. The Right of Self Defense. | President Bush outlined a specific plan to counter WMD proliferation in his National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction of December, 2002. The Administration's plan combinesefforts aimed at counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and WMD consequence management. Theintent, it says, is to eliminate or "roll back" WMD in the possession of certain States and terroristgroups, including potentially the use of force and aggressive methods of interdiction ofWMD-related goods, technologies, and expertise. The use of interdiction as a counterproliferationmeasure appears to be part of a strategy that foresees the U.S. taking "anticipatory action to defendourselves" against terrorists and rogue States, "even if uncertainty remains as to the time and placeof the enemy's attack," and "to detect and destroy an adversary's WMD assets before these weaponsare used." A recent refinement of the WMD strategy is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),which would involve cooperation among friendly nations to interdict transfers of restricted weaponsand related technologies "at sea, in the air, and on land." However, the Administration hasrecognized that cooperation may not always be forthcoming, and has intimated that it will actunilaterally, if necessary.
Aspects of this national security strategy raise questions related to the international law of jurisdiction, the law of the sea (which also references airspace), and international civil aviationagreements. The right of States to conduct self-defense and law enforcement activities abroad hasthe potential to collide with the rights of other States to maintain their sovereign integrity andconduct free navigation and commerce. These rights are not absolute. This report provides anoverview of the international law of the sea and other agreements as they relate to the permissiblerange of methods for interdicting WMD-related contraband. After a short summary of the currentlegal regime for international arms control related to WMD, the report outlines the basic conceptsof jurisdiction in international law. Next, the report describes concepts central to the law of the sea,including the division of the world's waters and airspace into "international" and "national" territory,and a description of the rights, duties and limitations that apply depending on where the conducttakes place. The report then turns to the international legal framework limiting the conduct ofnations as it applies during times of war and peace, and during what has been called "quasi war." |
crs_R42116 | crs_R42116_0 | While numerous concerns exist about whether Pakistan can be accountable in how it uses U.S. aid and whether it is capable of being a reliable U.S. partner in combating terrorism, many experts believe that key U.S. strategic interests are inextricably linked with a stable Pakistan and region. Current Law
Over past decades Congress has expressed concern with the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and has placed limitations and reporting requirements on U.S. aid to Pakistan in both authorization and appropriation laws. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013—H.R. 112-239)
H.R. Section 1227 of the act extends authority of Coalition Support Fund (CSF) reimbursements for FY2013 and limits CSF reimbursements to Pakistan to $1.2 billion for that fiscal year. It prohibits CSF reimbursements for the period between November 2011-July 2012 when Pakistan had barred NATO from transiting along its Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) linking Afghanistan with the Arabian Sea. The Secretary may waive these certification requirements for U.S. national security reasons. Section 1228 extends the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) through FY2013 and extends the limitation of funds until the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, certifies to certain congressional committees that the government of Pakistan is demonstrating efforts to counter IEDs, is cooperating on counterterrorism efforts, and is not detaining Pakistani citizens, including Dr. Shakil Afridi, as a result of their cooperation with the U.S. government on counterterrorism efforts. The President signed in into law ( P.L. Of the funds appropriated under this heading for assistance for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
assistance may be provided for cross border stabilization and development programs between Afghanistan and Pakistan; funds appropriated by this act for assistance for Afghanistan and Pakistan may be made available for government-to-government assistance only if the Secretary of State certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that the U.S. government and the government of the recipient country have agreed, in writing, to clear and achievable goals and objectives for the use of such funds, and have established mechanisms within each implementing agency to ensure that such funds are used for the purposes for which they were intended; any such cash transfer assistance shall be subject to prior consultation with the Committees on Appropriations; the Secretary of State should suspend any such cash transfer assistance to an implementing agency if the Secretary has credible evidence of misuse of such funds by any such agency; any decision to significantly modify the scope, objectives, or implementation mechanisms of United States assistance programs in Afghanistan or Pakistan shall be subject to prior consultation with, and the regular notification procedures of, the Committees on Appropriations, except that the prior consultation requirement may be waived if it is determined that failure to do so would pose a substantial risk to human health or welfare; in case of any such waiver, notification to the Committees on Appropriations shall be provided as early as practicable, but in no event later than three days after taking the action to which such consultation requirement was applicable; and of the funds made available under this heading for assistance for Pakistan, $2 million shall be transferred to, and merged with, funds available under the heading "Administration of Foreign Affairs, Office of Inspector General" for oversight of programs in Pakistan. The Secretary of Defense may waive this for vital U.S. national security interests. Pending Legislation in the 113th Congress
Some Members of the 113 th Congress have concerns about providing billions of dollars of annual aid to a country that appears unwilling or unable to act as a reliable U.S. partner. The certification must be transmitted by the President to Congress. 111-73 ) by
withholding amounts appropriated for assistance to Pakistan unless the Secretary of State annually certifies for Congress that assistance has to date made or is making measurable progress toward achieving the principal objectives of U.S. assistance to Pakistan contained in the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report and a memorandum explaining the reasons justifying the certification; removing the EPPA's national security waiver; and altering some of the EPPA's Section 203 limitations on security assistance and arms transfers, including adding to required certification criteria that Pakistan (1) is fully assisting the United States with investigating the existence of an official or unofficial support network in Pakistan for Osama bin Laden, including by providing the United States with direct access to Osama bin Laden's relatives in Pakistan and to Osama bin Laden's former compound in Abbottabad and any materials therein; and (2) is facilitating the issuance of entry and exit visas for official U.S. visitors engaged in counterterrorism efforts and training or other cooperative programs and projects in Pakistan. Section 2 of the bill would prohibit all U.S. aid to Pakistan except aid that would ensure the security of nuclear weapons. The House version contains restrictions and reporting requirements regarding aid to Pakistan. | The 113th Congress continues to debate levels of U.S. assistance to Pakistan in light of signs that Pakistan may not be a fully willing and effective U.S. partner, and that official Pakistani elements continue to support Islamist militant forces. During a period of economic and budget crises in the United States, Obama Administration officials and some senior Members of Congress have voiced concerns about the efficacy of continuing the flow of billions of U.S. aid dollars into Pakistan, with some in Congress urging more stringent conditions on, or even curtailment of, such aid. At issue is whether Pakistan's civilian government and security services are using the aid as intended domestically while actively supporting U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and combat regional insurgent and terrorist elements. Existing aid restrictions and the certification process required for greater accountability on the part of Pakistan continue to be under scrutiny.
A number of current laws restrict or place conditions on certain aid to Pakistan. Others require the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of State to certify that Pakistan meets specific criteria to receive U.S. aid. Criteria include that the implementing agency is qualified to manage the funds; that the Pakistani government has agreed to clear, achievable goals; that it is meeting human rights goals; and that the country is making progress in achieving U.S. aid objectives and is cooperating with the United States in combating terrorist networks and securing its nuclear weapons. Reporting requirements often are included. Current law includes authority for the President to waive certification requirements in the interest of U.S. national security.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (H.R. 4310), which became P.L. 112-239 in January 2013, limits FY2013 Coalition Support Fund reimbursements to Pakistan to $1.2 billion and prohibits reimbursements for the period (November 2011-July 2012) when Pakistan barred NATO from transiting along its Ground Lines of Communication linking Afghanistan with the Arabian Sea. The act also includes a measure to extend the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) through FY2013. Disbursement of PCF requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to certify that Pakistan is demonstrating efforts to counter improvised explosive devices, is cooperating on counterterrorism efforts, and is not detaining Pakistani citizens, including Dr. Shakil Afridi, as a result of their cooperation with the U.S. government on counterterrorism efforts. The Secretary of Defense may waive this certification requirement in the interest of U.S. national security.
Pending bills include measures that would preclude or limit CSF reimbursements and require certification by the Secretary of Defense for disbursement of these funds; another would limit assistance to $50 million in agricultural or medical supplies to five countries that might seek to do harm to Americans or its allies, Pakistan among them.
This report provides a list of existing laws and pending legislation containing conditions, limitations, and reporting requirements for U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan. It will track the debate on this topic and resulting changes. For broader discussion of U.S.-Pakistan relations, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. A. Kronstadt. See also CRS Report R41856, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by [author name scrubbed] and K. A. Kronstadt. |
crs_R45115 | crs_R45115_0 | Introduction
The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA; P.L. During the 115 th Congress, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce marked up and reported with amendments the Promoting Real Opportunity, Success, and Prosperity through Education Reform Act (PROSPER Act; H.R. 4508 ), which would provide for the comprehensive reauthorization of the HEA. 4508 amendments would extend the authorization of most HEA programs through FY2024. 4508 reflect several key themes: (1) simplifying the federal approach to providing student aid; (2) modifying federal student aid rules; (3) eliminating or winding down programs; (4) revising the educational quality and financial accountability requirements applicable to IHEs; (5) revising public accountability, transparency, and consumer information requirements; and (6) establishing specified limitations to the Secretary of Education's (the Secretary's) authority. They include the following:
Three grant programs: the Federal Pell Grant program, the Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grant (FSEOG) program, and the Scholarships for Veteran's Dependents program (also known as the Iraq and Afghanistan Service Grants). 4508 would redesign the current federal approach to student aid programs by transitioning toward the provision of aid through a smaller number of programs. To do so, the bill would eliminate those student aid programs that are not currently operational, immediately eliminate or phase-out some others that are currently funded and operational (e.g., TEACH Grants, FSEOG, Direct Loans), continue to wind down the Perkins Loan program (current statute specifies new Perkins Loans may not be made after September 30, 2017), and create a new federal student loan program, the Federal ONE Loan program. Under the amendments proposed in H.R. 4508 , the availability of need-based aid would be limited to undergraduate students and made available through the Pell Grant and FWS programs. All other forms of federal student aid would be made available without regard to a student's financial need. In the Federal Pell Grant program, a new Pell Grant bonus would be made available to students who enroll for at least 30 credit hours per award year. For undergraduate students, annual borrowing limits would be set at $2,000 above what may currently be borrowed through the Direct Loan program. Elimination and Winding Down of Programs
The HEA authorizes numerous programs to support both individuals pursuing postsecondary education and institutions of higher education. All of the programs in Title VIII were incorporated into the HEA by the HEOA and most of them have never been funded. 4508 would make adjustments to the standards IHEs must meet to participate in the Title IV student aid programs. 4508 would make several changes to current fiscal accountability provisions. Among other amendments, H.R. A different type of Federal ONE Loan would be made available to each of three borrower types: Federal ONE Loans to undergraduate students, Federal One Loans to graduate and professional students, and Federal ONE Parent Loans to parents of dependent undergraduate students. Loan Repayment Plans. Programmatic Loan Repayment Rate
For accountability purposes, the HEA currently requires the use of limited student outcome metrics as indicators of institutional quality. If the student completed
0% to 24% of the payment or enrollment period, 0% of Title IV aid would be earned and 100% would be unearned; 25% to 49% of the payment or enrollment period, 25% of Title IV aid would be earned and 75% would be unearned; 50% to 74% of the payment or enrollment period, 50% of Title IV aid would be earned and 50% would be unearned; or 75% to 99% of the payment or enrollment period, 75% of Title IV aid would be earned and 25% would be unearned. The 90/10 Rule
To address issues of waste and abuse in the Title IV aid programs and concerns that proprietary institutions were failing to consistently provide students with a quality education or training and focusing instead on obtaining federal student aid dollars, Congress adopted the predecessor to the 90/10 Rule (the 85/15 Rule) in the Higher Education Amendments of 1992 ( P.L. Repeals
H.R. 4508 would make several changes to the HEA that relate to campus security in general and specifically to sexual violence. 4508 would add some specificity to procedures for institutional disciplinary actions that must be used by IHEs. 4508 would require most domestic IHEs that receive federal financial assistance under the HEA to conduct campus climate surveys regarding attitudes on campus toward sexual assault and the institution's treatment of sexual assault at least once every three academic years. 4508 would repeal the entirety of the existing Title II and replace it with a competitive grant program to expand "earn-and-learn programs" developed by partnerships of employers and IHEs. An earn-and-learn program would be defined as "an education program, including an apprenticeship program, that provides students with structured, sustained, and paid on-the-job training and accompanying, for credit classroom instruction[.]" Grantees are required to submit annual program reports to ED. Table A-1 presents information on the authorization of appropriations and budget authorities for HEA programs and activities that would be authorized under the HEA, should the amendments proposed in H.R. Table A-2 lists existing HEA programs and other related programs (e.g., programs authorized under the Education for the Deaf Act) that under H.R. | During the 115th Congress, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce marked up and ordered reported with amendments the Promoting Real Opportunity, Success, and Prosperity through Education Reform Act (PROSPER Act; H.R. 4508), which would provide for the comprehensive reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA).
H.R. 4508 would make numerous amendments to the HEA, many of which address six themes: (1) redesigning the federal approach to providing student aid; (2) modifying federal student aid rules; (3) eliminating or winding down programs; (4) revising the educational quality and financial accountability requirements applicable to institutions of higher education (IHEs); (5) amending public accountability, transparency, and consumer information requirements; and (6) establishing limits on the Secretary of Education's authority.
H.R. 4508 would extend the authorization of many currently operating HEA programs through FY2024, repeal or wind down many HEA programs and activities, and make amendments to myriad HEA programs and activities.
The amendments proposed in H.R. 4508 signal an attempt to redesign the federal approach to providing student aid by transitioning toward the delivery of student aid through fewer programs. The bill would terminate or phase-out several programs (e.g., TEACH Grants, Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants, Direct Loans), establish a new Federal ONE Loan program, and eliminate programs that have not been funded in recent years or that have never been funded. By 2024, the Title IV federal student aid programs would include two grant programs (Pell Grants and Iraq and Afghanistan Service Grants), the Federal ONE Loan program, and the Federal Work-Study (FWS) program.
Regarding changes to student aid benefit levels and award rules, under H.R. 4508 a new Pell Grant bonus would be available to students who enroll for at least 30 credit hours per award year. In the Federal ONE Loan program, annual loan limits would be increased by $2,000 above what undergraduate students may borrow through the Direct Loan program, while firm loan limits would be established for graduate students and parent borrowers. Federal ONE Loans would be repaid according to a limited set of repayment plans, and fewer loan forgiveness benefits would be available compared with what is offered under the Direct Loan program. FWS funds would be awarded to institutions according to a restructured allocation formula. Need-based aid would be made available only to undergraduate students through the Pell Grant and FWS programs. All other federal student aid would be made available without regard to financial need.
Aside from changes to the types of aid available and to student aid benefit levels and award rules, other amendments proposed in H.R. 4508 include the following:
changes to rules for disbursing Title IV aid to recipients, which would include annual aid counseling for recipients and more-frequent, smaller disbursements; the elimination or wind down of numerous programs supporting IHEs and programs they operate, which are authorized under the HEA and other higher education laws, including the Strengthening Institutions Program, programs to enhance teacher education and preparation (HEA Title II), and all of the programs in HEA Title VIII; changes to HEA provisions designed to hold IHEs accountable for the educational programs they offer, including the repeal of the gainful employment regulations, the establishment of a programmatic loan repayment rate metric, and amendments to Department of Education recognition criteria for accrediting agencies that would require accreditors to examine student learning and other student outcomes relative to what should be expected from institutions or educational programs; adjustments to the fiscal accountability standards institutions must meet to participate in the HEA Title IV programs, including the repeal of the 90/10 Rule, which requires that at least 10% of institutional revenues come from sources other than HEA Title IV aid at proprietary schools; amendments to institutional information gathering and reporting requirements, which are designed to generate information that can assist students in making college-going decisions; changes to ED's administrative functions and the establishment of specified limitations on the Secretary's authority to promulgate regulations; amendments to address campus safety and sexual violence issues at IHEs that would add specificity to procedures for institutional disciplinary actions that must be used by IHEs in alleged incidents of sexual violence and would require most domestic IHEs to administer campus climate surveys of attitudes on campus toward sexual assault; and creation of a new competitive grant program to expand earn-and-learn programs developed by partnerships of employers and IHEs that would provide students with on-the-job training and accompanying for-credit classroom instruction. |
crs_RL31460 | crs_RL31460_0 | This report focuses on those IMGs who are foreign nationals, hereafter referred to as foreign medical graduates (FMGs). Many FMGs first entered the United States to receive graduate medicaleducation and training as cultural exchange visitors through the J-1 cultural exchange program. After that time, they are required to returnhome for at least two years before they can apply to change to another nonimmigrant status or legalpermanent resident (LPR) status. Under current law, a J-1 physician can receive a waiver of thetwo-year home residency requirement in several ways:
the waiver is requested by an interested government agency (IGA);
the FMG's return would cause extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or LPRspouse or child; or
the FMG fears persecution in the home country based on race, religion, orpolitical opinion. Historically, the Department of Health and Human Services had been veryrestrictive in its sponsorship of J-1 waiver requests. In December 2002, HHS announced that it wouldbegin sponsoring J-1 waiver requests for primary care physicians and psychiatrists in order toincrease access to healthcare services for those in underserved areas. United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). "Conrad 20" Program for States. Under this program, participating states were allowed tosponsor up to 20 waiver applications annually. Recent Developments
HHS Policy Change. Expiration of "Conrad 30" Program. (17) As discussed below, several billshave been introduced in the 108th Congress toaddress the concerns of medically underserved areas that rely on J-1 physicians. Recommendations from the states for the J-1 visa waiver program included the following:
allow states to determine the appropriate use of the program;
allow states to determine the number of waivers needed based on the needs ofthe states;
allow fees to support the program;
have HHS coordinate ongoing support and technical assistance;and
have the Department of State and USCIS provide information and technicalassistance to the states. When USDA announced it would no longer participate in the J-1 waiver program in February 2002, the Texas Primary Care Office conducted a second survey, on the impact of the agency'swithdrawal on states and their use of "Conrad 20." (23)
When asked to suggest changes to the program, states continued to express an interest in: the re-distribution of unused slots; possibly increasing the number of waivers available to states to 40;making the program permanent; and allowing the state departments of health or programadministrators decide where the physicians would be placed. Legislation in the 108th Congress
Several bills have been introduced to address the May 2004 expiration of the "Conrad 30"program. The amended bill extends the program until June 1, 2006;exempts waiver recipients from the H-1B cap; allows recruiting of primary and speciality carephysicians; and allows placement of up to five physicians in shortage areas designated by the states. On November 17, 2004, S. 2302 was debated and passed by the House. Commonlyreferred to as the "Conrad 20" program after its sponsor Senator Kent Conrad, it was originally slatedto end on June 1, 1996. On December 3, 2004, the "Conrad 30" program was once again extended. | The Educational and Cultural Exchange Visitor program has become a gateway for foreign medical graduates (FMGs) to gain admission to the United States as nonimmigrants for the purposeof graduate medical education and training. The visa most of these physicians enter under is the J-1nonimmigrant visa. Under the J-1 visa program, participants must return to their home country aftercompleting their education or training for a period of at least two years before they can apply foranother nonimmigrant visa or legal permanent resident (LPR) status, unless they are granted a waiverof the requirement.
The J-1 visa waiver program has recently undergone significant change. In February 2002, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), which had historically been the largest sponsorof waivers, decided to end its participation as an interested government agency (IGA). Thisdevelopment and the pending expiration of the "Conrad 20" program, which allowed 20 waivers perstate, threatened the continued availability of waivers. These developments raised concerns amongmany in medically underserved areas because it is often difficult for them to find U.S. medicalgraduates willing to practice in these areas. Bills introduced in the 107th Congress proposed changesto the "Conrad 20" program, including expanding the program and making it permanent.
In an effort to ensure the continued availability of medical care in underserved areas, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announced it would assume USDA's role as asponsor of J-1 primary care physicians. This was a policy change for HHS which has historicallybeen very restrictive in its sponsorship of waivers. Prior to this announcement, HHS had limitedsponsorship to research physicians and scientists involved in research of international or nationalsignificance.
On November 2, 2002, the "Conrad 20" program was extended until 2004 and the number of waivers available to states was increased to 30. This program, which is now referred to as the"Conrad 30"or "State 30" program, expired on June 1, 2004.
Several measures, to address the expiration of the "Conrad 30" program were introduced in the108th Congress. On December 3, 2004, S. 2302 became P.L. 108-441 . The new lawextends the program until June 1, 2006; exempts physicians granted waivers from the H-1Bnumerical limits; allows states to hire primary and speciality care physicians; and place up to fivephysicians in shortage areas designated by the state. |
crs_R40774 | crs_R40774_0 | The basic framework that is used today for congressional consideration of budget policy was established in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (the Budget Act). This act provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget as a mechanism for setting forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, the surplus or deficit, and public debt. The Budget Act also established standing committees in both chambers of Congress with jurisdiction over, among other things, the concurrent resolution on the budget. This report describes the structure and responsibilities of the Committee on the Budget in the House of Representatives. Under House rules, members of the House Budget Committee may not serve more than four in any six successive Congresses. The committee, however, sometimes establishes ad hoc task forces to study specific issues. This report discusses the Budget Committee's responsibilities under the following categories: the budget resolution, reconciliation, budget process reform, oversight of the Congressional Budget Office, revisions of allocations and adjustments, and scorekeeping. | The basic framework that is used today for congressional consideration of budget policy was established in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This act provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget as a mechanism for setting forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, and public debt. The act also established standing committees in both chambers of Congress with jurisdiction over, among other things, the concurrent resolution on the budget. This report describes the structure and responsibilities of the Committee on the Budget in the House of Representatives.
House and party rules specify the composition of the committee's membership and also stipulate that most members of the House Budget Committee may not serve more than four in any six successive Congresses. Unlike most other committees, the Budget Committee does not have subcommittees. Instead, the committee sometimes establishes ad hoc task forces to study specific issues.
In addition to committee structure, this report covers the House Budget Committee's responsibilities divided into categories related to the annual budget resolution, reconciliation, budget process reform, oversight of the Congressional Budget Office, revisions and adjustments of allocations, and scorekeeping. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL30448 | crs_RL30448_0 | While some other federal education programs—such as ESEA Title I, Part A programs—also provide services to both disadvantaged young children and their parents, Even Start is the only federal program specifically dedicated to this purpose. Typically, Even Start programs do not directly provide all of these services, rather they establish networks of service providers, including Head Start programs and grantees under the AEA. P.L. The program's funding was significantly reduced to $99,000,000 in FY2006. For FY2007, the Administration has requested no funding, the House Committee on Appropriations has recommended $70 million in funding, and the Senate Committee on Appropriations has recommended no funding. The services most often provided directly by Even Start programs are early childhood education and parenting skills education. 107-110 (the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001), the Elementary and Secondary Education Act reauthorization legislation, which was signed into law on January 8, 2002, moved the William F. Goodling Even Start Family Literacy Programs from Title I Part B of the ESEA, to Subpart 3 of Title I Part B of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. The only change to the program was an amendment allowing states to use funds for state-level activities to improve the quality of family literacy services provided (in addition to other previously authorized uses). The Even Start program was reauthorized in the 106 th Congress in H.R. 4577 , the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2001, signed into law as P.L. 106-554 . ESEA Title I, Part B was renamed the William F. Goodling Even Start Family Literacy Programs, and was reauthorized for five years beginning with an authorization of $250 million for FY2001. The reauthorizing language is largely the same as language contained in the Literacy Involves Families Together Act, H.R. 3222 (Goodling), which was passed by the full House on September 12, 2000. However, language in H.R. 3222 specifying that religious organizations should be treated the same as other nongovernmental organizations in the awarding of subgrants was not included in the final reauthorization language. 3222 proposed authorizing $250 million in funding for Even Start for FY2001, and proposed to:
Rename Section 1202, Part B: "The William F. Goodling Even Start Family Literacy Programs"; Require more stringent qualifications and standards for staff paid out of Even Start funds; Permit Even Start programs to serve children aged 8 or older if services are provided in collaboration with ESEA Title I, Part A programs; Authorize states to use a share of their grants to improve the quality of services provided by local grantees whose services have been of low quality, and to permit states to provide technical assistance to help local programs of demonstrated effectiveness to "access and leverage additional funds"; Require grantees to use instructional programs "based on scientifically based reading research" for children (including reading readiness activities for preschool children), and if possible, for adults; Would have added to the list of indicators of an area's need for a program: whether an area has a high percentage of parents who have been victims of domestic violence, or who are receiving assistance under a state program funded under Part A of Title IV of the Social Security Act; Reserve not more than 3% of funds appropriated for Even Start to provide technical assistance to, and to carry out an independent evaluation of, programs receiving Even Start assistance; Increase the amount of funds reserved for migrant programs, outlying areas and Indian tribes from 5% to 6%, if the amount appropriated for the program exceeds $200 million; Specify that no state shall award a subgrant for less than $52,500 in the ninth and subsequent years; Provide for a one-time coordination grant for each eligible state in the amount of: the lesser of $1 million or the amount the appropriation for Even Start exceeds the previous year's appropriation; Require Even Start programs to employ "continuing use of evaluation data for program improvement," and to provide information on how their plan "provides for rigorous and objective evaluation of progress toward" meeting the program's stated objectives; Reserve, in years in which the current year's appropriation for Even Start exceeds that of the previous year: "the lesser of $2 million or 50% of the increase in total Even Start appropriations each year" to be used by the National Institute for Literacy to conduct, through "an entity ... that has expertise in carrying out longitudinal studies of the development of literacy skills in children": scientifically based reading research on adult literacy and helping parents support the literacy development of their children; Move the Inexpensive Book Distribution Program from ESEA Title X, Part E, and add it as Title II under this act; with an authorization of $20 million; Amend the definition of an eligible entity to include "a religious organization." | The Even Start program provides education and related services jointly to parents lacking a high school diploma (or equivalent) and their young children. Even Start services include basic academic instruction and parenting skills training for the adults, and early childhood education for their children, along with necessary supplementary services such as child care or transportation. Generally, Even Start programs do not directly provide all of these services; rather, they establish networks of service providers, including Head Start programs and grantees under the Adult Education Act (AEA). Even Start is the only federal program specifically dedicated to providing services to both disadvantaged young children and their parents.
The families served by Even Start programs are highly disadvantaged, with very low levels of education and income, and increasing proportions of them have limited English language skills.
The Even Start program was reauthorized in the 106th Congress, in P.L. 106-554, the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2001. ESEA Title I, Part B was renamed the William F. Goodling Even Start Family Literacy Programs and was reauthorized for five years beginning with an authorization of $250 million for FY2001. The reauthorizing language is largely the same as language contained in the Literacy Involves Families Together Act, H.R. 3222 (Goodling), which was passed by the full House on September 12, 2000. However, language in H.R. 3222 specifying that religious organizations should be treated the same as other nongovernmental organizations in the awarding of subgrants was not included in the final reauthorization language.
P.L. 107-110 (the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001), the Elementary and Secondary Education Act reauthorization legislation, which was signed into law on January 8, 2002, moved the William F. Goodling Even Start Family Literacy Programs from Title I Part B of the ESEA to Subpart 3 of Title I Part B of the No Child Left Behind Act and extended the authorization period through FY2007. The only change to the program was an amendment allowing states to use funds for state-level activities to improve the quality of family literacy services provided (in addition to other previously authorized uses).
The Even Start program's funding was reduced to $99 million for FY2006 (including the FY2006 across-the-board reduction). For FY2007, the Administration has requested no funding for the program, the House Committee on Appropriations has recommended $70 million in funding for the program, and the Senate Committee on Appropriations has recommended no funding for the program. |
crs_RL34487 | crs_RL34487_0 | Hailed as an example of the success of the international non-proliferation regime, Japan has consistently taken principled stands on non-proliferation and disarmament issues. Today, Japanese officials and experts remain remarkably uniform in their consensus that Japan is unlikely to move toward nuclear status in the short-to-medium term. North Korea's test of a nuclear device in 2006 and China's military modernization have altered the strategic dynamics in the region, and any signs of stress in the U.S.-Japan alliance raises questions among some about the robustness of the U.S. security guarantee. All of these factors together increase the still unlikely possibility that Japan will reconsider its position on nuclear weapons. Any reconsideration of Japan's policy of nuclear weapons abstention would have significant implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. Globally, Japan's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) could damage the most durable international non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Japan "going nuclear" could set off a nuclear arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan and, in turn, India, and Pakistan may feel compelled to further strengthen their own nuclear weapons capability. Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made the decision without U.S. support, the move could indicate Tokyo's lack of trust in the American commitment to defend Japan. An erosion in the U.S.-Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia, a shift that could indicate a further strengthening of China's position as an emerging hegemonic power. These ramifications would likely be deeply destabilizing for the security of the Asia Pacific region and beyond. The rejection of nuclear weapons by the Japanese public appears to be overwhelmingly driven by moral, rather than pragmatic, considerations, but Japan's leaders have based their policy of forswearing nuclear weapons on protection by the U.S. nuclear arsenal. An Evolving Security Environment in Asia
Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly in the past decade, developments in the region have increased Japan's sense of vulnerability and caused some in the policy community to rethink Japan's policy of forswearing nuclear weapons development. Producing nuclear weapons would require expertise on bomb design including metallurgists and chemists; while a reliable deterrent capability may also require reliable delivery vehicles, an intelligence program to protect and conceal assets from a first-strike, and a system for the protection of classified information. Japanese Legal and Political Restraints
Domestic Factors
Public Opinion
In general, public opinion on defense issues in Japan appears to be shifting somewhat, but pacifist sentiment remains significant. | Japan, traditionally one of the most prominent advocates of the international non-proliferation regime, has consistently pledged to forswear nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, evolving circumstances in Northeast Asia, particularly North Korea's nuclear test in October 2006 and China's ongoing military modernization drive, have raised new questions about Japan's vulnerability to potential adversaries and, therefore, the appeal of developing an independent nuclear deterrent. The previous taboo within the Japanese political community of discussing a nuclear weapons capability appears to have been broken, as several officials and opinion leaders have urged an open debate on the topic. Despite these factors, a strong consensus—both in Japan and among Japan watchers—remains that Japan will not pursue the nuclear option in the short-to-medium term.
This paper examines the prospects for Japan pursuing a nuclear weapons capability by assessing the existing technical infrastructure of its extensive civilian nuclear energy program. It explores the range of challenges that Japan would have to overcome to transform its current program into a military program. Presently, Japan appears to lack several of the prerequisites for a full-scale nuclear weapons deterrent: expertise on bomb design, reliable delivery vehicles, an intelligence program to protect and conceal assets, and sites for nuclear testing. In addition, a range of legal and political restraints on Japan's development of nuclear weapons, including averse public and elite opinion, restrictive domestic laws and practices, and the negative diplomatic consequences of abandoning its traditional approach is analyzed.
Any reconsideration and/or shift of Japan's policy of nuclear abstention would have significant implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. In this report, an examination of the factors driving Japan's decision-making—most prominently, the strength of the U.S. security guarantee—analyzes how the nuclear debate in Japan affects U.S. security interests in the region. Globally, Japan's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would damage the world's most durable international non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Japan "going nuclear" could set off an arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan. India and/or Pakistan may then feel compelled to further expand or modernize their own nuclear weapons capabilities. Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made the decision without U.S. support, the move could indicate a lack of trust in the U.S. commitment to defend Japan. An erosion in the U.S.-Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia, a shift that could strengthen China's position as an emerging hegemonic power. All of these ramifications would likely be deeply destabilizing for the security of the Asia Pacific region and beyond.
This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
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