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crs_R44259 | crs_R44259_0 | O n August 31, 2015, the New York Times ( Times ) ran a story with the headline "Murder Rates Rising Sharply in Many U.S. The Times story followed reports from other media outlets about a growing number of violent crimes in some cities. The general consensus is that it is too early to draw any conclusions about the reversal of long-term trends. Also, there are several explanations for why some cities might be experiencing an increase in violent crime other than that the recent era of diminishing violent crime is coming to a close. Violent Crime and Homicide Trends in the United States
Reports of an increasing number of violent crimes in some cities do not necessarily mean that the United States is in the midst of a crime wave. Violent crime and homicide rates have been trending downward for more than two decades ( Figure 1 ). For example, even though violent crime and homicide rates have been on a downward trend since the early 1990s, there were years where one or both increased, but those year-to-year increases did not portend a break in the overall trend. There are several factors that might help explain some of the reported upticks in violent crime across the country:
Year-to-year changes in crime rates can be subject to random fluctuations and not related to how the police do their job . Crime is subject to seasonal effects. Percentage change in reported crimes is a relative measure and is sensitive to magnitude. Data from the nation's 60 most populous cities show that reported homicides were up 16% overall and up by 20% or more in 26 cities. The majority of cities (44 of 60) have not seen statistically significant increases in homicides, but the overall increase in homicides is statistically significant. Select Theories About Why Violent Crime is Increasing in Some Cities
While it might be too early to make any definitive conclusions about whether there has been a reversal of the decades-long decrease in violent crime, several commentators have speculated about why some cities are experiencing spikes in violent crime. Specifically, this theory suggests that in the wake of recent high-profile officer-involved deaths , the police have become reluctant to engage in proactive policing, thereby emboldening criminals. Another theory is that law enforcement is facing a legitimacy problem in communities where residents feel that they are not treated fairly by the police. Two criminologists argue that when people lose trust in the police they are more likely to take matters into their own hands when conflicts arise. It's the repeat offenders. There is discussion about whether increasing violent crime rates in some cities highlights the lack of nationwide "real time" crime data. More frequent and consistent crime data might be able to provide more insight into crime trends. | On August 31, 2015, the New York Times ran an article with the headline "Murder Rates Rising Sharply in Many U.S. Cities." The story highlighted double-digit percentage increases in homicide rates in several cities, and came on the heels of reports from other media outlets of recent spikes in violent crime in cities across the country. Accounts of rising violent crime rates in some cities have generated speculation about whether the United States is in the midst of a new crime wave.
Overall, homicide and violent crime rates have been trending downward for more than two decades, and both rates are at historic lows. An analysis comparing 2014 and 2015 homicide data from the nation's 60 most populous cities suggests that violent crime is not increasing. Overall, reported homicides were up 16% in 2015, but a majority of cities (44 of 60) have not seen a statistically significant increase in homicides. The general consensus is that it is too early to draw any conclusions about the reversal of long-term trends. Also, even if homicide and violent crime rates do increase this year, it may not portend a break in the long-term trend. Even though both rates have been on a downward trend since 1990, there were years where either the homicide rate or violent crime rate increased.
There are several short-term factors that might help explain some of the reported upticks in violent crime across the country.
Year-to-year changes in crime rates can be subject to random fluctuations. Crime rates are subject to seasonal effects. Many cities are experiencing increases from historically low levels of crime. Percentage change in reported crimes is a relative measure and is sensitive to magnitude.
While it might be too early to make any definitive conclusions about whether violent crime is on the rise, several commentators have speculated as to why some cities are experiencing spikes in violent crimes. Suggested explanations include the following:
The "Ferguson effect" (i.e., in the wake of a spate of high-profile officer-involved deaths, police have become reluctant to engage in proactive policing, thereby emboldening criminals). Law enforcement is facing a legitimacy problem in some communities where residents feel that they are not treated fairly by the police, and this may mean that people are more likely to take matters into their own hands when conflicts arise. The increase in violence can be attributed to battles between gangs for control of drug turf or released violent offenders committing new crimes.
The recent discussion about the increases in violent crime in some cities might raise the question of whether there is a need for more "real time" nationwide crime statistics. More frequent and consistent crime data might be able to provide greater insight into crime trends. However, there are logistical issues involved with collecting and reporting timely and accurate crime statistics from the nation's approximately 18,000 law enforcement agencies. |
crs_98-379 | crs_98-379_0 | Responsibilities
The IGs' four principal responsibilities are (1) conducting and supervising audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations of the agency; (2) providing leadership and coordination and recommending policies to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of these; (3) preventing and detecting waste, fraud, and abuse in these; and (4) keeping the agency head and Congress fully and currently informed about problems, deficiencies, and recommended corrective action. IGs, moreover, implement the cash incentive award program in their agencies for employee disclosures of waste, fraud, and abuse (5 U.S.C. Along with this, the Inspector General Act prohibits the transfer of "program operating responsibilities" to an IG. With but a few specified exceptions, neither the agency head nor the officer next in line "shall prevent or prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena...." Under the IG Act, the heads of only six agencies—the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury, plus the U.S. When exercising this power, the head must explain such action within 30 days to the House Government Oversight and Reform Committee, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and other appropriate panels. And the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is the only IG appointed by the President alone. 12805, issued in 1992, are the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and a parallel Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE). Establishment
Statutory offices of inspector general have been authorized in 67 current federal establishments and entities, including all 15 cabinet departments; major executive branch agencies; independent regulatory commissions; various government corporations and boards; and five legislative branch agencies. All but nine of the OIGs are directly and explicitly under the 1978 Inspector General Act. Separate recommendations have arisen in the recent past, such as consolidating DFE OIGs under presidentially appointed IGs or under a related establishment office (GAO-02-575). The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2009 ( H.R. 5959 and S. 2996 ) would create an inspector general for the entire Intelligence Community, a provision opposed by the Bush Administration; and would grant statutory recognition to specified OIGs in the Defense Department. These proposals are designed to increase the IGs' independence and powers. | Statutory offices of inspector general (OIG) consolidate responsibility for audits and investigations within a federal agency. Established by public law as permanent, nonpartisan, independent offices, they now exist in more than 60 establishments and entities, including all departments and largest agencies, along with numerous boards and commissions. Under two major enactments—the Inspector General Act of 1978 and its amendments of 1988—inspectors general are granted substantial independence and powers to carry out their mandate to combat waste, fraud, and abuse. Recent initiatives have added offices in the Architect of the Capitol Office (AOC), Government Accountability Office (GAO), and for Afghanistan Reconstruction; funding and assignments for specific operations; and mechanisms to oversee the Gulf Recovery Program. Other proposals in the 110th Congress are designed to strengthen the IGs' independence, add to their reports, and create new posts in the Intelligence Community. [Note: 5 U.S.C. Appendix covers all but nine of the statutory OIGs. See CRS Report RL34176, Statutory Inspectors General: Legislative Developments and Legal Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; U.S. President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, A Strategic Framework, 2005-2010 http://www.ignet.gov; Frederick Kaiser, "The Watchers' Watchdog: The CIA Inspector General," International Journal of Intelligence (1989); Paul Light, Monitoring Government: Inspectors General and the Search for Accountability (1993); U.S. Government Accountability Office, Inspectors General: Office Consolidation and Related Issues, GAO-02-575, Highlights of the Comptroller General's Panel on Federal Oversight and the Inspectors General, GAO-06-931SP, and Inspectors General: Opportunities to Enhance Independence and Accountability, GAO-07-1089T; U.S. House Subcommittee on Government Management and Organization, Inspectors General: Independence and Accountability, hearing (2007); U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Strengthening the Unique Role of the Nation's Inspectors General, hearing (2007); Project on Government Oversight, Inspectors General: Many Lack Essential Tools for Independence (2008).] |
crs_R43729 | crs_R43729_0 | T he Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) is a provision of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26 of the U.S. Code) that provides a tax credit to employers that hire workers with certain personal characteristics, including veterans, recipients of certain public benefits, or other specified populations. The credit was most recently extended by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (Division Q of P.L. 114-113 ). Calculation of Credit and Maximum Credits
The amount of the WOTC is calculated as percentage of qualified wages paid to an eligible worker during the eligible employee's first year of employment. An employer may claim a credit equal to 40% of the eligible employee's qualified wages if the eligible worker works at least 400 hours during the first year of employment. If the eligible employee works fewer than 400 hours but at least 120 hours, the employer may claim a credit equal to 25% of the eligible employee's wages. If the eligible employee works fewer than 120 hours, an employer may not claim the WOTC. Statute defines the maximum amount of qualified wages that are WOTC-eligible for each eligible population, so the maximum credit would be equal to 40% of these statutory limits. 2. Eligible Employers
WOTC is a nonrefundable credit. As such, an employer must have tax liability to claim the credit. Mechanics of the WOTC
Individuals' eligibility for the WOTC is determined by state workforce agencies (SWAs). These state agencies also process WOTC certifications. Once a new hire is certified, the employer may claim WOTC as part of the General Business Credit. If an employer does not have tax liability in the tax year that the WOTC-eligible worker was hired, the credit from the WOTC—as part of the General Business Credit—can be carried back up to one year or carried forward up 20 years before expiring. Usage and Costs
Definitive data on the usage and costs of the WOTC are not available. DOL tracks the number of individuals who are certified as eligible for the WOTC, but, since not every certified worker meets the employment retention requirements, it is likely that the number of individuals on behalf of whom the WOTC is claimed is lower. Some changes were temporary, others were permanent. 112-56 , the VOW to Hire Heroes Act, expanded the qualified veterans group covered by WOTC and changed the amount of first-year wages that can be claimed for the credit, such that
for veterans who are members of a family receiving SNAP benefits for at least three months in the year prior to being hired, the maximum wages for the credit would be $6,000; for veterans who have been unemployed for an aggregate of at least four weeks, but less than six months, in the year prior to being hired, the maximum wages for the credit would be $6,000; for veterans eligible for disability compensation from the VA and within one year of discharge or release from active military duty when hired, the maximum wages for the credit would be $12,000; for veterans who have been unemployed for an aggregate of at least six months in the year prior to being hired, the maximum wages for the credit would be $14,000; and for veterans who are eligible for disability compensation from the VA and have been unemployed for an aggregate of six months or more in the year prior to being hired, the maximum wages for the credit would be $24,000. | The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) is a provision of the Internal Revenue Code that allows employers that hire individuals with certain personal characteristics to claim a tax credit equal to a portion of the wages paid to those individuals. WOTC-eligible populations include recipients of certain public benefits (such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or Temporary Assistance to Needy Families), qualified veterans, ex-felons, and other specified populations. In 2015, the WOTC was extended through 2019 as part of the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (Division Q of P.L. 114-113).
The amount of the WOTC is calculated as a percentage of qualified wages paid to an eligible worker during the worker's first year of employment, up to a statutory maximum. An employer may claim a credit equal to 40% of an eligible employee's qualified wages if the qualified employee worked at least 400 hours during the first year of employment, up to a statutory maximum. If the employee worked fewer than 400 hours but more than 120 hours, the employer may claim a credit equal to 25% of the employee's qualified wages. If the employee worked fewer than 120 hours, an employer may not claim the WOTC. The WOTC is a nonrefundable tax credit, so an employer must have had tax liability to claim it.
Statute defines the maximum amount of qualified wages that were WOTC-eligible, so the maximum credit is equal to 40% of these statutory limits. The limit of wages that are WOTC-eligible varies by the characteristics of the worker. The most common wage ceiling is $6,000 (for a maximum credit of $2,400), though some subpopulations are eligible for a higher or lower maximum.
To claim the WOTC, an employer must have the employee certified as eligible by the appropriate state workforce agency. To do this, the employer submits a form to the state agency within 28 days of hiring the WOTC-eligible worker. The state agency determines that the individual meets the requirements and certifies the application. The employer may claim the credit as part of the General Business Credit. These credits can be carried back one tax year or carried forward up to 20 tax years.
Definitive data on WOTC claims by employers are not available. Data on the number of individuals certified by state workforce agencies are available, but these data likely include some individuals who were certified as eligible for the WOTC but did not subsequently work the minimum number of hours necessary for the employer to be eligible for the credit. In FY2017, the most recent year for which data are available, approximately 2 million workers were certified as eligible for the WOTC. |
crs_R41696 | crs_R41696_0 | Introduction
The federal Sentencing Guidelines greatly influence the sentences imposed for federal crimes. The Guidelines process involves:
I. Identification of the most appropriate Guidelines section for the crime(s) of conviction, based on the nature of the offense (the most commonly applicable are noted in the Guidelines Index)
II. Identification of the applicable base offense level indicated by the section
III. Addition/subtraction of offense levels per section instructions for the circumstances in the case at hand
IV. Addition/subtraction of offense levels per instructions in those chapters of the Guidelines relating to
A. Victim related matters
B. Role in the offense
C. Obstruction
D. Multiple counts
E. Acceptance of responsibility
V. Calculation of the criminal history score
VI. Application Guidelines instructions relating to
A. Imprisonment (Sentencing Table)
B. Probation
C. Supervised release
D. Special assessments
E. Fines
F. Restitution
G. Forfeiture
VII. Consideration of departures (more/less severe treatment) which the Guidelines permit
VIII. 3553(a). The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider -
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed -
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for -
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines -
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission ... ; and
(ii) that ... are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ... ;
(5) any pertinent policy statement -
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission ... ; and
(B) that ... is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced. "Under 18 U.S.C. | Sentencing for all serious federal noncapital crimes begins with the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Congress establishes the maximum penalty and sometimes the minimum penalty for every federal crime by statute. In between, the Guidelines establish a series of escalating sentencing ranges based on the circumstances of the offense and the criminal record of the offender. The Guidelines do so using a score-keeping procedure. The Guidelines process involves:
I. Identification of the most appropriate Guidelines section for the crime(s) of conviction, based on the nature of the offense (the most commonly applicable are noted in the Guidelines Index)
II. Identification of the applicable base offense level indicated by the section
III. Addition/subtraction of offense levels per section instructions for the circumstances in the case at hand
IV. Addition/subtraction of offense levels per instructions in those chapters of the Guidelines relating to
A. Victim related matters
B. Role in the offense
C. Obstruction
D. Multiple counts
E. Acceptance of responsibility
V. Calculation of the criminal history score
VI. Consideration of departures (more/less severe treatment) which the Guidelines permit
VII. Application Guidelines instructions relating to
A. Imprisonment (Sentencing Table)
B. Probation
C. Supervised release
D. Special assessments
E. Fines
F. Restitution
G. Forfeiture
VIII. Sentencing of Organizations
IX. Deviation based on the sentencing principles in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a).
This report is available in an abridged version entitled CRS Report R41697, How the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Work: An Abridged Overview. |
crs_RS22815 | crs_RS22815_0 | Introduction
Prior to its termination, the Technology Innovation Program (TIP) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) was created to "to support, promote, and accelerate innovation in the United States through high-risk, high-reward research in areas of critical national need," according to the authorizing legislation. According to NIST, no new TIP projects were funded in FY2011. The $44.8 million appropriated for the program in P.L. Accordingly, "The Program is currently taking the necessary actions for an orderly shutdown." 110-69 ) and replaced the Advanced Technology Program (ATP). The final FY2011 appropriations legislation, P.L. There is no funding for TIP in the FY2012 appropriation ( P.L. 112-55 ). TIP appears to have been designed to avoid what opponents of the ATP program argued was government funding of large firms that had no need for federal support for R&D activities. The House Committee on Science and Technology report to accompany H.R. 1868 , part of which was incorporated into the COMPETES Act, stated that TIP replaces ATP in consideration of a changing global innovation environment focusing on small and medium-sized companies. The structure of TIP also "acknowledges the important role universities play in the innovation cycle by allowing universities to fully participate in the program." A Different Approach
While similar to ATP in the promotion of high-risk R&D that would be of broad-based economic benefit to the Nation, there are several differences in the operation of TIP primarily associated with the size of eligible companies. The elimination of ATP, as well as the creation of TIP and its recent termination, have renewed the debate over the role of the federal government in promoting commercial technology development. In arguing for less direct federal involvement, advocates believe that the market is superior to government in deciding technologies worthy of investment. Mechanisms that enhance the market's opportunities and abilities to make such choices are preferred. It is suggested that agency discretion in selecting one technology over another can lead to political intrusion and industry dependency. On the other hand, supporters of direct methods argue that it is important to focus on those technologies that have the greatest promise as determined by industry and supported by matching funds from the private sector. They assert that the government can serve as a catalyst for cooperation. | The Technology Innovation Program (TIP) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) was established in 2007 to replace the Advanced Technology Program (ATP). This effort was designed "to support, promote, and accelerate innovation in the United States through high-risk, high-reward research in areas of critical national need," according to the authorizing legislation. Grants were provided to small and medium-sized firms for individual projects or joint ventures with other research organizations.
While similar to the Advanced Technology Program in the promotion of R&D that is expected to be of broad-based economic benefit to the nation, TIP appeared to have been structured to avoid what was seen as government funding of large firms that opponents argued did not necessarily need federal support for research. The committee report to accompany H.R. 1868, part of which was incorporated into the final legislation, stated that TIP replaces ATP in consideration of a changing global innovation environment focusing on small and medium-sized companies. The design of the program also "acknowledges the important role universities play in the innovation cycle by allowing universities to fully participate in the program."
Financing for TIP decreased significantly in FY2011 such that no new awards were made. There is no funding for the program in P.L. 112-55, the final FY2012 appropriations legislation. According to NIST, "The Program is currently taking the necessary actions for an orderly shutdown."
The elimination of ATP, as well as the creation of TIP and its subsequent termination renewed the debate over the role of the federal government in promoting commercial technology development. In arguing for less direct federal involvement, advocates of this approach believe that the market is superior to government in deciding technologies worthy of investment. Mechanisms that enhance the market's opportunities and abilities to make such choices are preferred. It is suggested that agency discretion in selecting one technology over another can lead to political intrusion and industry dependency. On the other hand, supporters of direct methods argue that it is important to focus on those technologies that have the greatest promise as determined by industry and supported by matching funds from the private sector. They assert that the government can serve as a catalyst for cooperation. As the Congress makes appropriation decisions, the discussion may serve to redefine thinking about governmental efforts in facilitating technological advancement in the private sector. |
crs_RL34432 | crs_RL34432_0 | Nationally, estimated Medicaid rehabilitation expenditures have increased. In FY1999, total state and federal rehabilitation expenditures reported by states to MSIS were approximately $3.6 billion. Between FY1999 and FY2005, federal and state Medicaid rehabilitation expenditures increased by 76.7%. This letter reiterated regulatory guidance that rehabilitation services were intended to be "medical and remedial in nature for the maximum reduction of physical or mental disability and restoration of a recipient to his best possible functional level." Rehabilitation Services Proposed Rule
In August 2007, CMS issued a proposed rehabilitation services rule to more clearly define the scope of the rehabilitation benefit for states. CMS officials testified that the changes embodied in the proposed new rule were intended to clearly define allowable services that may be claimed as rehabilitative services under Medicaid. CMS estimated that the proposed rule would reduce federal Medicaid spending by approximately $180 million in FY2008 and $2.24 billion for the period FY2008-FY2012. Legislative and Other Proposals
The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 (MMSEA, P.L. 110-173 ) imposed a moratorium until June 30, 2008, on implementation of the rehabilitation proposed rule and other Medicaid program changes. 5613 ) was introduced, which would extend until April 1, 2009, moratoria on regulations affecting Medicaid, including rehabilitation services. On May 22, 2008, the Senate passed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 ( H.R. 2642 ), which contained a moratorium until April 1, 2009, on implementation of the rehabilitation regulation. 2642 was amended by the House and passed on June 19, 2008. The House amendments included moratoria for six Medicaid regulations, including rehabilitation services. On June 26, 2008, the Senate passed H.R. 2642 without changes to the House legislation, so that implementation of six Medicaid regulations, including rehabilitation services, would be delayed until April 1, 2009. H.R. The President signed P.L. 110-252 into law on June 30, 2008. Earlier, on June 4 and 5, 2008, the Senate and House, respectively, adopted the final version of the budget resolution ( H.Rept. 110-659 accompanying S.Con.Res. 70 ). Among other provisions, the conference agreement establishes a number of deficit-neutral reserve funds and a sense of the Senate provision that would delay Medicaid administrative regulations, including Medicaid rehabilitation services. | Medicaid rehabilitation includes a full range of treatments that licensed health practitioners may recommend to reduce physical or mental disability or restore eligible beneficiaries to their best possible functional levels. Over the last seven years of available data (1999-2005), reported Medicaid expenditures for rehabilitation increased from $3.6 billion to $6.4 billion, an increase of 77%. In comparison, over the same period, total Medicaid spending increased from approximately $147.4 billion (FY1999) to $275.6 billion (FY2005), an 87% increase.
Both the executive and legislative branches have addressed Medicaid rehabilitation services. For instance, in recent annual budget submissions, the Bush Administration proposed administrative changes to reduce Medicaid rehabilitation expenditures. Congressional and executive branch oversight organizations have documented inconsistent policy guidance and states' practices for claiming federal matching funds that failed to comply with Medicaid rules. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a proposed rule on August 13, 2007, for Medicaid rehabilitation services. The proposed rule was intended to more clearly define for states the scope of the rehabilitation benefit and identify services that can be claimed as rehabilitation under Medicaid. CMS estimated that the proposed changes would reduce federal Medicaid expenditures by approximately $180 million in FY2008 and $2.2 billion between FY2008 and FY2012.
The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 (MMSEA, P.L. 110-173) imposed a moratorium until June 30, 2008, on implementation of the rehabilitation proposed rule. On May 22, 2008, the Senate passed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 (H.R. 2642), which contained a moratorium until April 1, 2009, on implementation of the rehabilitation regulations. H.R. 2642 was amended by the House and passed on June 19, 2008. The House amendments included moratoria until April 1, 2009, for six Medicaid regulations, including rehabilitation services. On June 26, 2008, the Senate passed H.R. 2642 without changes to the House legislation, so that implementation of six Medicaid regulations, including rehabilitation services, would be delayed until April 1, 2009. The President signed P.L. 110-252 into law on June 30, 2008.
Earlier, on June 4 and 5, 2008, the Senate and House, respectively, adopted the final version of the budget resolution (H.Rept. 110-659 accompanying S.Con.Res. 70). The conference agreement established budget-neutral reserve funds that could be used to impose moratoria on Medicaid rules and administrative actions and also includes a sense of the Senate provision on delaying Medicaid administrative regulations including rehabilitation services.
This report describes Medicaid rehabilitation services, discusses major provisions of the Medicaid rehabilitation regulation, and provides various perspectives on the rehabilitation proposed rule. This report will be updated with legislative and regulatory activity. |
crs_R41646 | crs_R41646_0 | Background
Several events in the past decade sharpened congressional interest in the nation's ability to track and respond to health threats. Key incidents include the airline and anthrax attacks in 2001, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the H1N1 influenza ("flu") pandemic in 2009. In 2006, the 109 th Congress established or reauthorized relevant programs and activities, principally in the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Homeland Security (DHS), responding to problems identified during prior incidents. Given the current budgetary climate, spending for public programs, including emergency management programs, may be significantly constrained. Under the circumstances, Congress may be interested in approaches to improve the efficiency of incident response mechanisms, to enhance the integration of the private sector in planning and response activities, to fully leverage routine capabilities for incident response, and to strengthen program accountability, among other things. This report, which will be updated as needed, summarizes key issues in the preparedness for and response to domestic, civilian public health and medical incidents, citing other CRS reports and additional sources of information. 109-417 ), passed in 2006, established or extended programs for public health emergency preparedness and response activities in HHS, and established the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) to spur the development of medical countermeasures. Appropriations authority for a number of activities last reauthorized in PAHPA has expired, or will expire at the end of FY2011, and the 112 th Congress may consider reauthorization. These include, for example, the authority of the HHS Secretary to declare a public health emergency, and to access a special fund for response purposes; authorities of the HHS Secretary or the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to ensure the safety of foods and medical products; and authorities of the President to declare an emergency or a major disaster and provide specified forms of assistance pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act). Issues for Congress
Government Leadership, Organization, and Capacity
Federal Leadership and Coordination
For public health and medical preparedness and response, the roles and responsibilities of principals in HHS and DHS have shifted in past years. Also, it is not clear that a flu pandemic or bioterrorism incident would qualify as a major disaster under the Stafford Act. State Grants for Public Health Preparedness and Response
From FY2002 through FY2010, Congress provided about $7.6 billion in cooperative agreement funds to states and territories to strengthen public health preparedness for public health threats (see Figure 1 ). Depending on the circumstances, federal funds may be available from a variety of sources. Since 2001, the federal government has sought to establish this capacity in the private sector, with mixed success. Disaster Victims and Health Care Costs
There is no federal assistance program designed purposefully to cover the uncompensated or uninsured costs of individual health care that may be needed as a result of a disaster. Development, Procurement, and Use of Countermeasures
Project BioShield82
The 108 th Congress launched Project BioShield to encourage the development of medical countermeasures (such as drugs, vaccines, and diagnostic tests) that lack commercial markets. Each of these matters poses its own set of management challenges in ensuring that the right medical products are available and can be delivered to the right recipients in a timely manner. | Key recent events—the 2001 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and the H1N1 influenza ("flu") pandemic, among others—sharpened congressional interest in the nation's ability to respond to health threats. For the response to health emergencies, most authority resides with state and local governments, and most capacity resides in the private sector. The federal government plays a key role, however, providing numerous forms of assistance for planning and preparedness, as well as for response and recovery. Previous Congresses passed a number of laws intended to establish clear federal leadership roles and responsibilities and effective organizational structures, in the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Homeland Security (DHS) in particular. Nonetheless, challenges persist in coordinating federal preparedness and response efforts.
From FY2002 through FY2010, Congress provided about $11.4 billion in grants to states and territories to strengthen public health and medical system capacity in preparedness for health threats. However, depending on the incident, dedicated funding for the actual response to these threats may or may not be available. For example, it is not clear that infectious disease incidents (such as bioterrorism or a flu pandemic) would qualify for major disaster assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act). Also, although the HHS Secretary has authority for a Public Health Emergency Fund, Congress has not appropriated monies to the fund for many years. Finally, there is no federal assistance program designed purposefully to cover uncompensated or uninsured health care costs for disaster victims.
Another challenge is ensuring that the right medical products are available, and that they can be delivered to those in need in a timely manner. Previous Congresses established Project BioShield and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in HHS to encourage private-sector development of medical countermeasures, such as drugs and vaccines, that lack commercial markets. Given the high cost and financial risk inherent in the development of new medical products, debate continues about how to balance these costs and risks between the federal government and product developers.
Given the current budgetary climate, spending for public programs, including emergency management programs, may be significantly constrained. Under the circumstances, the 112th Congress may be interested in approaches that improve community resilience in the face of disasters through better integration of the private sector in planning and response activities and better leveraging of routine capabilities for incident response, among others. The 112th Congress is also likely to remain interested in optimizing coordination, efficiency, and accountability in federal activities. Finally, for a number of health emergency activities authorized by previous Congresses, appropriations authority has expired or will expire at the end of FY2011. If the 112th Congress considers reauthorization, the matter of efficient use of federal resources is likely to be front and center during its deliberations.
This report, which will be updated, summarizes key issues in domestic public health and medical preparedness and response, and discusses selected federal programs, citing other CRS reports and other sources of additional information. Specifically, it discusses issues regarding government leadership, organization, and capacity; health system preparedness and response; the development, procurement, and use of countermeasures; and the defense against specific threats, including foodborne outbreaks and bioterrorism, among others. |
crs_RS22189 | crs_RS22189_0 | On June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court handed down Kelo v. City of New London , one of its three property rights decisions during the 2004-2005 term. In Kelo , the Court addressed the City's condemnation of private property to implement its area redevelopment plan aimed at invigorating a depressed economy. By 5-4, the Court held that the condemnations satisfied the Fifth Amendment requirement that condemnations be for a "public use," notwithstanding that the property, as part of the plan, might be turned over to private developersâa private-to-private transfer. The property owners argued for a flat rule that economic development is not a public use. | In Kelo v. City of New London , decided June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court held 5-4 that the city's condemnation of private property, to implement its area redevelopment plan aimed at invigorating a depressed economy, was a "public use" satisfying the U.S. Constitutionâeven though the property might be turned over to private developers. The majority opinion was grounded on a century of Supreme Court decisions holding that "public use" must be read broadly to mean "for a public purpose." The dissenters, however, argued that even a broad reading of "public use" does not extend to private-to-private transfers solely to improve the tax base and create jobs. Congress is now considering several options for responding to the Kelo decision. |
crs_R41842 | crs_R41842_0 | Separately, Congress, also in 2008, required the National E9-1-1 Implementation Coordination Office (ICO) to prepare a national plan for migration to Next Generation 911 (NG9-1-1) and to identify possible actions for Congress to take in advancing goals identified through the planning process. Planning efforts for both of these emergency communications have since been initiated by the FCC. The emergency communications technologies of the future are expected to be developed for common IP-enabled platforms that can operate on any IP-enabled network. IP-enabled wireless devices using technologies such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) will deliver advanced services anywhere, any time. Implementation of the next generation of emergency communications technology may alter the patterns of the past 30 years of technology development and adoption for public safety radios and systems. Given the many potential sources of funds available to states and communities, it is debatable whether rules attached to federal grants can be used to drive a process that would coordinate the construction and operation of a seamless, nationwide network to serve first responders and other emergency personnel. Radios
In addition to cooperation for sharing network resources, the FCC has anticipated that commercial partners would lead, and fund, the development costs of the radio technologies that will operate within the frequencies assigned to the Public Safety Broadband License and the D Block. Questions related to policy issues raised in this report include the possible impact of proprietary broadband technologies on
network and device equipment costs borne by public safety relative to commercial costs;
the ability for public safety to benefit from innovation in wireless technologies;
the likelihood of terminated product lines or new mandatory releases that result in unique costs to public safety relative to commercial technologies;
public safety interoperability at the application, devices, and network levels among networks provisioned by different vendors;
the ability of public safety users to enter into partnerships with commercial wireless providers;
competition in the public safety communications equipment market; and
the FCC's National Broadband Plan finding that encouraged incentive-based partnerships with a variety of commercial operators. The costs of building and maintaining a new data network, therefore, are some fraction of total obligations to assure emergency communications capabilities. Using revenue generated by the sale of radio frequency spectrum to fund wireless networks might increase the proportion of federal money available for one-time investments in infrastructure and therefore the federal role in decision making. Legislation in the 112th Congress
The House of Representatives, on December 13, 2011, approved the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 ( H.R. 3630 , Representative Camp). 3630 , Title IV contains provisions from the Discussion Draft of the Jumpstarting Opportunity with Broadband Spectrum (JOBS) Act of 2011, as amended, approved in markup on December 1, 2011, by the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 3630 is under consideration by a conference committee for which a major focus of discussion is an extension of payroll tax cuts and how to fund them. In the Senate, the legislative response to H.R. 3630 may include provisions from the American Jobs Act of 2011 ( S. 1549 and others) and from the Public Safety and Wireless Innovation Act ( S. 911 , as amended, Senator Rockefeller). S. 911 received bi-partisan approval by the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Under H.R. These bills include the Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act ( S. 28 , Rockefeller), the Broadband for Public Safety Act of 2011 ( S. 1040 , Lieberman), the Strengthening Public-safety and Enhancing Communications Through Reform, Utilization, and Modernization (SPECTRUM) Act ( S. 911 , Rockefeller, as amended), the Public Safety and Wireless Innovation Act ( H.R. 2482 , would create a private, non-profit Public Safety Broadband Corporation to provide governance for a nationwide interoperable network for public safety communications. Broadband for First Responders Act, H.R. | The United States has yet to find a solution that assures seamless communications among first responders and emergency personnel at the scene of a major disaster. Since September 11, 2001, when communications failures contributed to the tragedies of the day, Congress has passed several laws intended to create a nationwide emergency communications capability. The 111th Congress considered pivotal issues, such as radio frequency spectrum license allocation and funding programs for a Public Safety Broadband Network (PSBN), without finding a solution that satisfied the expectations of both public safety and commercial network operators. Congressional initiatives to advance public policies for Next Generation 911 services (NG9-1-1) also remained incomplete. The 112th Congress is under renewed pressure to come to a decision about the assignment of a block of radio frequency spectrum licenses referred to as the D Block, and to provide a plan for federal support of broadband networks for emergency communications. The cost of constructing new networks (wireless and wireline) is estimated by experts to be in the tens of billions of dollars over the long term, with similarly large sums needed for maintenance and operation. Identifying money for federal support in the current climate of budget constraints provides a challenge to policy makers. The greater challenge, however, may be to assure that funds are spent effectively toward the national goals that Congress sets.
After years of debate, a majority in the public safety community has agreed to implement common technologies using Internet Protocol (IP)-enabled networks and the wireless technology known as Long Term Evolution (LTE) to build a nationwide PSBN. IP-enabled networks are also considered essential to the introduction of NG9-1-1. The adoption of the Internet Protocol for emergency communications represents a significant advance in the technologies available for response and recovery operations. IP-enabled technologies are faster and smarter, capable of analyzing and directing communications as they move through networks. Achieving the transition to a leading-edge, broadband network powered by the next generation of IP technologies requires significant changes in operations and long-standing agency traditions, major investments in infrastructure and radios, and the development of enabling technologies.
The need appears increasingly urgent for timely decisions by policy makers on new infrastructure for emergency communications and spectrum allocation for public safety radios. Commercial deployment of wireless networks using LTE standards that might also support public safety use are out-pacing the planning efforts of public safety and government officials.
The House of Representatives, on December 13, 2011, approved the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 (H.R. 3630, Representative Camp). H.R. 3630, Title IV contains provisions, approved in markup on December 1, 2011, by the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, House Committee on Energy and Commerce. H.R. 3630 is under consideration by a conference committee for which a major focus of discussion is an extension of payroll tax cuts and how to fund them. On the Senate side, the legislative response to H.R. 3630 will likely include provisions from the American Jobs Act of 2011 (S. 1549 and others) and from the Public Safety and Wireless Innovation Act (S. 911, as amended, Senator Rockefeller). S. 911 received bi-partisan approval by the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
Other legislation that has been introduced in the 112th Congress to address some of these issues includes the Broadband for Public Safety Act of 2011 (S. 1040, Lieberman), and the Broadband for First Responders Act (H.R. 607, King). |
crs_RL34270 | crs_RL34270_0 | Debate Centers on Relative Value of Open Source
Intelligence professionals generally agree that open source information is useful and that such information should be collected and analyzed, just as is data derived from classified sources. In response to this congressional direction, the Administration opted to establish a National Open Source Enterprise built around several key principles:
the establishment of the position of Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source with overall oversight responsibility of the open source effort; coordination by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) for open source funding requests in the DNI's budgetary submissions and allocations; the creation of a "Guild" of open source experts at an Open Source Center and by ensuring that open source competency becomes an Intelligence Community requirement; a single open source requirements management system to balance resources and acquisitions against priorities; establishment of a single open source architecture to facilitate access to a wide range of potential consumers at federal, state, local, and tribal levels; and creation of an entity to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies and processes that advances efforts to acquire and utilize open source information. Summary
Although unclassified information has often been slighted by the Intelligence Community, a consensus now exists that open source information must be systematically collected and in fact constitutes an essential component of analytical products. This has been recognized by various commissions and by Congress in statutory language. Responding to legislative direction, the Intelligence Community has established the position of Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Open Source and the National Open Source Center. The goal is not only to perform open source acquisition and analysis functions; but also, to create a center of excellence in open source collection and analysis that will support and encourage all agencies in the Intelligence Community in the effective use of open source. The effort has been only underway since late 2005 but the NOSC is up and running, and providing support, including training, to open source professionals throughout the Intelligence Community. It is less clear that administrative mechanisms are in place to ensure that there is a comprehensive community-wide open source effort. It appears to observers that not all agencies have as yet made comprehensive commitments to acquiring and using open source information, nor that the ODNI has taken sufficient steps to ensure that open sources are fully exploited. Observers suggest that congressional oversight of the open source process might provide insight into current progress of Administration efforts as well as identify areas that need modification. A particular focus of congressional interest might be potential tradeoffs between classified and open source collection to ensure that needed information is obtained in the best and most cost-effective manner. The goal would be to ensure that vulnerable human agents and expensive surveillance systems are focused on obtaining information that is being actively hidden and obtainable through no other means. | Open source information (OSINT) is derived from newspapers, journals, radio and television, and the Internet. Intelligence analysts have long used such information to supplement classified data, but systematically collecting open source information has not been a priority of the U.S. Intelligence Community. In recent years, given changes in the international environment, there have been calls, from Congress and the 9/11 Commission among others, for a more intense and focused investment in open source collection and analysis. However, some still emphasize that the primary business of intelligence continues to be obtaining and analyzing secrets.
A consensus now exists that OSINT must be systematically collected and should constitute an essential component of analytical products. This has been recognized by various commissions and in statutes. Responding to legislative direction, the Intelligence Community has established the position of Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Open Source and created the National Open Source Center. The goal is to perform specialized OSINT acquisition and analysis functions and create a center of excellence that will support and encourage all intelligence agencies.
The effort has been only underway since late 2005 but the Center is up and running, and providing support, including training, to OSINT professionals throughout the Intelligence Community. Administrative mechanisms are in place to ensure that there is a comprehensive community-wide open source effort. It appears, however, to some observers that not all agencies have as yet made comprehensive commitments to acquiring and using open source information, nor that the ODNI has taken sufficient steps to ensure that open sources are appropriately exploited. Observers suggest that congressional oversight of the OSINT process might provide insight into current progress as well as identify areas that need modification. A particular focus of congressional interest might be potential tradeoffs between classified and open source collection to ensure that needed information is obtained in the best and most cost-effective manner. Proponents maintain that this approach helps to ensure that agents and expensive surveillance systems are focused on obtaining information that is being actively hidden.
The collection and analysis of OSINT information will be ultimately judged by its contribution to the overall intelligence effort. Collecting information from open sources is generally less expensive and less risky than collection from other intelligence sources. The use of OSINT may result not only in monetary savings but also in less risk than utilizing sensitive technical and human sources. OSINT can also provide insights into the types of developments that may not be on the priority list for other systems or may not be susceptible to collection through other intelligence approaches—innovative applications of new technologies, shifts in popular attitudes, emergence of new political and religious movements, growing popular discontent, disillusionment with leadership, etc. Supporters of OSINT maintain that the future contribution of the Intelligence Community will be enhanced by its ability to provide detailed information and incisive analyses of such developments. This report will be updated as new information becomes available. |
crs_RS21764 | crs_RS21764_0 | Background
Congress enacted § 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 effectively to prohibit Cuban nationals or their non-Cuban successors in interest from protecting certain trademarks or trade names in the United States. This provision was challenged by the European Community in the World Trade Organization as being inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). Under Articles 21 and 22 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), a WTO Member whose measure is found to be inconsistent with WTO obligations must inform the DSB of its intentions with regard to implementation of the rulings and recommendations of the DSB. Others would include compliance as part of a broader rollback in Cuban sanctions. | The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has ruled against certain restrictions on the trademark rights of Cubans imposed under § 211 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998. Congress has responded with several proposals to comply with the ruling, some focused on repeal of § 211 as part of broader proposed amendments to Cuban trade sanctions, others on repeal coupled with alternative methods of ensuring Cuba's protection of trademark rights of Americans. This report will be updated as legislative activity occurs or other events warrant. |
crs_R44289 | crs_R44289_0 | C ongress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993 in part to "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families." To that end, the act provides eligible employees of covered employers with entitlement to specified amounts of unpaid leave per 12-month period. This report first provides background on leave eligibility, notice requirements, and enforcement under the FMLA. Then the report discusses the U.S. Supreme Court cases that have considered and clarified some provisions of the FMLA. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs and Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland , the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of lawsuits against state entities under the FMLA. In Coleman , the Court utilized the same analysis that it earlier relied upon when considering an FMLA suit against a state entity in Hibb s . The Court first observed that Congress expressly authorized suits against state entities for interfering with an employee's rights under the FMLA's self-care provision, just as it did in Hibbs with regard to suits for interference with an employee's right to take leave to care for a spouse, son, daughter, or parent with a serious health condition. | Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993 in part to "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families." To that end, the FMLA entitles eligible employees of covered employers to set amounts of unpaid, job-protected leave for specified family and medical reasons. These reasons include, for example, the care of a spouse, son, daughter, or parent with a serious health condition, and the care of a newborn or newly adopted child. Employers who interfere with an employee's exercise of FMLA rights or retaliate against an employee for exercising her FMLA rights may face liability. This report first provides background on leave eligibility, notice requirements, and enforcement under the FMLA. Then the report discusses the U.S. Supreme Court cases—Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, and Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland—that have considered and clarified some provisions of the FMLA. |
crs_RL32624 | crs_RL32624_0 | Green payments generally are defined as payments to agricultural producers for providingenvironmental services on working farms . This discussion will review U.S. green payments within the context ofmodern U.S. agri-environmental policy, which is evolving from programs focusing primarily on landretirement to programs encouraging sound environmental management on working farms. The European Union (EU) views green payments more broadly than does the United States,using them to achieve socioeconomic and rural development goals as well as environmental goals.The EU makes agri-environmental (green) payments to farmers within the framework of its ruraldevelopment policy, which encompasses not only environmental activities but also investments tomodernize farms, programs to help young farmers get established or promote early retirement,assistance with processing and marketing farm products, and programs to promote the non-farm ruraleconomy such as agri-tourism or preservation of cultural heritage. Voluntaryincentives have been dominant in U.S. agri-environmental policy, and are viewed by most agricultureinterests as being central to efforts to improve the environmental performance of producers. U.S. cross-compliance mechanisms, first enacted in the Food Security Act of 1985 ( P.L.99-198 ), include Highly Erodible Land Conservation (also known as "Conservation Compliance"and "Sodbuster") and Wetland Conservation (called "Swampbuster"). Land Retirement Programs. Working Lands Programs. EQIP has been described as the first major U.S. "green payments"program specifically designed to pay farmers for environmental benefits while allowing continuedagricultural production. GRP also targets grasslands threatened with conversion to other uses. Conservation Security Program (CSP) (2002). This contrast has caused some analyststo characterize CSP as the most comprehensive U.S. "green payments" program. (17) These increases have notbeen fully realized, however, because some of the increases authorized in the 2002 farm bill weresubsequently cut in annual appropriations. These include, among others,landscape, rural amenities, and cultural heritage. Successive reforms of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992, 2000, and2003 have placed increasing emphasis on green payments to meet farm policy and social objectives. General EU Environmental Policy and Agriculture
Beginning in the 1970s, the EU issued a number of directives outlining measures to deal withwater pollution, nitrates, pesticides, and habitats and wild birds. Water Protection. (29)
For the agri-environmental accompanying measures, assistance, in the form of payments,would be made to farmers or herders who voluntarily participated in measures to:
reduce the use of fertilizers and chemical inputs;
introduce or continue with organic farming methods
change production methods toward or maintain extensification ofproduction;
reduce the number of animals per forage unit;
maintain the countryside and landscape and generally promotebio-diversity;
ensure the upkeep of abandoned farmland or woodlands;
set aside farmland for at least 20 years for nature reserves or parks or to protecthydrological systems; and
manage land for leisure activities and public access. Under compulsory modulationfunds from commodity support will be transferred to rural development support. Differences between the United States and the EU in how green payments have been definedand translated into policy and programs may make consideration of EU agri-environmental policyas a model or source of ideas problematic. | Green payments are generally defined as payments made to agricultural producers ascompensation for environmental benefits that accrue at levels beyond what producers mightotherwise achieve under existing market and regulatory conditions. They may support bothenvironmental and farm income objectives.
Modern U.S. agri-environmental programs began in 1985 by paying farmers to retire landand limiting conversion of wetlands and highly erodible land to cultivation, thereby reducingnegative environmental effects associated with production agriculture. These initial programsfocused on a single agricultural benefit, limiting erosion. Since then, these programs haveproliferated in number and overall funding, and now pay farmers to provide additional conservationbenefits either while maintaining agricultural production on working lands, or by retiring land fromproduction. These environmental benefits include stemming wetland loss and wildlife habitatdeterioration, protecting farmland from conversion to other uses, and improving water and airquality. The Conservation Security Program (CSP), enacted in the 2002 farm bill ( P.L. 107-171 ) isthe most recent step in the evolution of U.S. agri-environmental policy. CSP pays producers tocapture environmental benefits across their entire agricultural operation, while producingcommodities. It has been characterized by some as the most comprehensive U.S. "green payments"program.
General environmental policy in the European Union (EU) deals with negative externalitiesfrom water pollution, nitrates, and pesticides, among other issues, and also affects agriculturalproduction. EU farm policy since 1985, however, has included payments to farmers to compensatefor costs incurred or income forgone from undertaking agri-environmental measures that meet farmpolicy and rural development objectives. Such measures include, inter alia , reducing use of fertilizerand chemical inputs, adopting organic production methods, maintaining countryside and landscape,or managing land for leisure activities or public access. Successive reforms of the EU's CommonAgricultural Policy (CAP) have placed greater emphasis on such green payments -- and increasedfunding for them -- as agri-environmental measures have been integrated into a broad ruraldevelopment policy.
Congressional interest in green payments today is driven by pressure from international tradenegotiations and the anticipated development of the next farm bill, which will likely contain the U.S.policy responses to the results of these negotiations. These negotiations create considerableuncertainty over future farm program options, and green payments, in some fashion, are widelyviewed as an option that could be designed so as to satisfy both international obligations anddomestic agriculture constituencies. Differences between the United States and the EU in how greenpayments have been defined and translated into policy and programs may make consideration of EUagri-environmental policy as a model or source of ideas problematic. This report, which comparescurrent U.S. and EU efforts in the area of green payments, will be updated. |
crs_94-834 | crs_94-834_0 | COLA Formulas and Amounts
Only federal employees hired before 1984 participate in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). Cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for CSRS annuities are based on the average monthly percentage change in the CPI-W in the third quarter (July to September) of the current calendar year compared with the third quarter of the base year, which is the year in which the last COLA was applied. COLAs for benefits paid under FERS also are based on the percentage change in the CPI-W from third quarter to third quarter, but payment of COLAs under FERS is limited according to the eligibility category of the beneficiary and th e rate of inflation. COLAs are not paid to nondisabled FERS retirees as long as they are under the age of 62. All COLAs paid under FERS are limited if the rate of inflation exceeds 2.0%, according to the following formula:
From the third quarter of 2017 (the current base year) to the third quarter of 2018, the CPI-W increased by 2.8%. Therefore, paid out beginning January 2019, the CSRS COLA is 2.8% and the FERS COLA is 2.0%. 87-793 (enacted in 1962) was the first law that provided for automatic adjustments in civil service retirement and disability benefits whenever the CPI in the current year exceeded the CPI in the base year (the year in which the last adjustment occurred) by 3.0% or more. Under the restriction, an annuity could not be increased by a COLA to an amount that exceeded the greater of the maximum pay for a GS-15 federal employee or the final pay of the employee (or high-3 average pay, if greater), increased by the average annual percentage change (compounded) in rates of pay of the General Schedule for the period beginning on the retiree's annuity starting date and ending on the effective date of the adjustment. Thereafter, all COLAs were to be effective in December and payable in January and were to be based on the change in the average monthly CPI-W from third-quarter to third-quarter. The CPI measurement period was not changed. | Cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) are based on the rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W). COLAs for both CSRS and FERS are determined by the average monthly CPI-W during the third quarter (July to September) of the current calendar year and the third quarter of the base year, which is the last previous year in which a COLA was applied. The "effective date" for COLAs is December, but they first appear in the benefits issued during the following January.
All CSRS retirees and survivors receive COLAs. Under FERS, however, nondisabled retirees under the age of 62 do not receive COLAs. Survivors and disabled retirees are eligible for COLAs under FERS regardless of age. CSRS pays a COLA that is equal to the percentage change in the CPI-W during the measurement period, but COLAs under FERS are limited if the rate of inflation is greater than 2.0%. If the rate of inflation during the measurement period is between 2.0% and 3.0%, the COLA under FERS is 2.0%. If inflation is greater than 3.0%, then the COLA for FERS benefits is equal to the CPI-W minus one percentage point.
Congress passed the first law requiring automatic COLAs for federal civil service retirement benefits in 1962, and it has adjusted either the formula by which they are calculated or the date on which they take effect more than a dozen times since then.
If consumer prices as measured by the CPI-W do not increase from the third quarter of the base year to the third quarter of the current calendar year, there is no COLA for annuities paid under CSRS or FERS. For example, from the third quarter of 2014 to the third quarter of 2015, the CPI-W fell by 0.4%. Therefore, no COLA was paid under either CSRS or FERS beginning January 2016.
From the third quarter of 2017 to the third quarter of 2018, the CPI-W increased by 2.8%. Therefore, beginning in January 2019, the CSRS COLA is 2.8% and the FERS COLA is 2.0%. |
crs_R43949 | crs_R43949_0 | Introduction
The State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is a federal-state program that provides health coverage to certain uninsured, low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid eligibility levels but do not have health insurance. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and the states and is administered by the states. Federal appropriations for CHIP are provided in statute. 115-120 ), and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. This report provides an overview of CHIP financing, beginning with an explanation of the federal matching rate. It describes various aspects of federal CHIP funding, such as the federal appropriation, state allotments, the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, redistribution funds, and outreach and enrollment grants. The report ends with a section about the recent legislative activity that has resulted in federal funding for CHIP being provided through FY2027. Federal Matching Rate
The federal government's share of CHIP expenditures (including both services and administration) is determined by the enhanced federal medical assistance percentage (E-FMAP) rate. Statutorily, the E-FMAP (or federal matching rate) can range from 65% to 85%. The continuing resolution enacted on January 22, 2018 ( P.L. Most of the federal CHIP expenditures are from state CHIP allotments, which are the federal funds allocated to each state to finance its CHIP program. FY2018 began on October 1, 2017, without federal CHIP funding having been appropriated for the fiscal year. Then, February 9, 2018, BBA 2018 provided appropriations for FY2024 through FY2027. These sources include the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, redistribution funds, and Medicaid funds. The full-year FY2018 appropriation for CHIP was not provided until January 22, 2018, when CHIP was provided appropriations for FY2018 through FY2023. 115-120 extends the increase to the E-FMAP rate by one year (i.e., through FY2020), but the increase is to be 11.5 percentage points rather than 23 percentage points (i.e., the increase for FY2016 through FY2019). | The State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is a means-tested program that provides health coverage to targeted low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid eligibility levels but have no health insurance. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and the states, and the states are responsible for administering CHIP.
The federal government's share of CHIP expenditures (including both services and administration) is determined by the enhanced federal medical assistance percentage (E-FMAP) rate. The E-FMAP varies by state; statutorily, the E-FMAP can range from 65% to 85%. The E-FMAP is increased by 23 percentage points for FY2016 through FY2019 and by 11.5 percentage points for FY2020. In FY2021, the E-FMAP is to return to the regular E-FMAP rates.
The federal appropriation for CHIP is provided in statute. From this federal appropriation, states receive CHIP allotments, which are the federal funds allocated to each state and the territories for the federal share of their CHIP expenditures. In addition, if a state has a shortfall in federal CHIP funding, there are a few sources of shortfall funding, such as the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, redistribution funds, and Medicaid funds.
FY2018 began on October 1, 2017, without federal CHIP funding having been appropriated for the fiscal year. The full-year FY2018 appropriation for CHIP was not provided until January 22, 2018, when CHIP was provided appropriations for FY2018 through FY2023 through the continuing resolution enacted on January 22, 2018 (P.L. 115-120). Then, on February 9, 2018, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123) provided CHIP appropriations for FY2024 through FY2027.
This report provides an overview of CHIP financing, beginning with an explanation of the federal matching rate. It describes various aspects of federal CHIP funding, such as the federal appropriation, state allotments, the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, redistribution funds, and outreach and enrollment grants. The report ends with a section about the recent legislative activity that has resulted in federal funding for CHIP being provided through FY2027. |
crs_R44588 | crs_R44588_0 | Scope of the Agriculture Appropriations Bill
The Agriculture appropriations bill—formally known as the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act—provides funding for
All of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except the Forest Service, which is funded in the Interior appropriations bill. In even-numbered fiscal years, CFTC appears in the enacted Agriculture appropriation. The bill includes mandatory and discretionary spending, but the discretionary amounts are the primary focus during the bill's development. Within the discretionary total, the largest discretionary spending items are for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); rural development; agricultural research; FDA; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance program salaries and loans; food safety inspection; conservation; and animal and plant health programs ( Figure 1 ). The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, and other food and nutrition act programs), child nutrition (school lunch and related programs), crop insurance, and farm commodity and conservation programs paid through USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Action on FY2017 Appropriations8
The FY2017 appropriation for Agriculture and Related Agencies was enacted on May 5, 2017, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 115-31 , Division A). The fiscal year started on October 1, 2016, under continuing resolutions (CRs) that lasted for seven months. In regular action, the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees reported their FY2017 Agriculture appropriations bills ( H.R. It achieves this primarily by increasing budgetary offsets over the FY2016 level through greater rescissions of prior appropriations and greater scorekeeping adjustments primarily from "negative subsidies" from loan programs that charge fees. Comparison of Amounts in the FY2017 Appropriation
The budget authority provided to agencies in the major titles of the bill increases by $462 million (the top of the shaded bars in Figure 3 ), even though the official total decreases by $623 million compared with the FY2016 discretionary appropriation. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Food and Drug Administration. +$42 million , including $36 million more for food safety activities. Farm Service Agency. +$20 million to modernize headquarters facilities. Disaster assistance. -$114 million , comprised from $38 million less appropriated for programs than in FY2016 ($206 million in the second CR plus $28 million in the omnibus appropriation) and $76 million more in disaster designation offsets that do not count against budget caps. -$46 million , comprised primarily of $25 million more for Agriculture and Food Research Initiative (AFRI) grants, and $26 million more for Agricultural Research Service (ARS) operations, offset by $112 million less for ARS buildings and facilities. Policy Issues
In addition to setting budgetary amounts, the Agriculture appropriations bill is also a vehicle for policy-related provisions that direct how the executive branch should carry out the appropriation. The FY2017 appropriation prohibits FSIS from inspecting horse slaughter facilities. The enacted appropriation limits the scope of rules for the 2014 farm bill's changes to inventory requirements for SNAP-authorized retailers. SNAP Households' Reporting Requirements. The law provides $25 million, $5 million less than was provided in FY2016. Processed Poultry from China. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)—in the House Agriculture Appropriations subcommittee only, and 3. | The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and—in even-numbered fiscal years—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). (For CFTC, the Agriculture appropriations subcommittee has jurisdiction in the House but not in the Senate.)
Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill's development, since mandatory amounts are generally set by authorizing laws such as the farm bill.
The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; FDA; rural development; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance programs; food safety inspection; conservation; and animal and plant health programs. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), child nutrition, crop insurance, and the farm commodity and conservation programs paid by the Commodity Credit Corporation.
The FY2017 appropriation for Agriculture and Related Agencies was enacted on May 5, 2017, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-31, Division A). The fiscal year started on October 1, 2016, under continuing resolutions (CRs) that lasted for seven months. About a year earlier, the House and the Senate Appropriations Committees reported their FY2017 Agriculture appropriations bills (H.R. 5054, S. 2956) in April and May 2016.
The discretionary total of the enacted appropriation is $20.877 billion, which is $623 million less than enacted in FY2016 (-2.9%). It achieves this primarily by increasing budgetary offsets over the FY2016 level through greater rescissions of prior appropriations and greater scorekeeping adjustments.
However, the budget authority for FY2017 provided to agencies in the major titles of the bill actually increases by $462 million compared to FY2016. Increases primarily include $163 million more for discretionary conservation programs than in FY2016, $119 million more for rural development, $65 million more for discretionary domestic nutrition programs, $52 million more for animal and plant health programs, $51 million more for agricultural research programs, $42 million more for the Food and Drug Administration, $29 million more for the Farm Service Agency, $20 million more for USDA administrative facilities, and $17 million more for food safety inspections. Reductions primarily come from a rescission of unused domestic nutrition assistance funding ($850 million rescission), supplemental funding for international food aid ($116 million less than in FY2016), agricultural research facilities ($112 million less), greater use of a disaster designation that does not count against budget caps ($76 million extra offset), and disaster assistance ($38 million less).
The appropriation also carries mandatory spending that totaled about $132.5 billion. The overall total of the FY2017 Agricultural appropriation therefore exceeded $153 billion.
In addition to setting budgetary amounts, the Agriculture appropriations bill is also a vehicle for policy-related provisions that direct how the executive branch should carry out the appropriation. Notable policy provisions in the FY2017 appropriation include provisions prohibiting inspection of horse slaughter facilities, importing processed (cooked) poultry meat from China, rules about inventory requirements for SNAP-authorized retailers, requirements for SNAP households to report moves out of state, and waivers for schools to not meet whole grain and sodium requirements. |
crs_RL33737 | crs_RL33737_0 | 109-8 , the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). BAPCPA also requires debtors, after they file for bankruptcy relief, to receive personal financial management training. Although the Act does not change BAPCPA's credit counseling provisions, section 1220 of the Pension Protection Act amends section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code, providing new standards that a credit counseling agency must meet to be eligible for a federal income tax exemption. Credit Counseling Requirements Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
Section 106 of BAPCPA adds credit counseling as a prerequisite to Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing or relief. Under the new section 109(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may be exempt from the mandatory credit counseling requirement in certain circumstances. Disability under the 11 U.S.C. Approval Requirements for a Personal Financial Instructional Management Course
Section 111(d) lists the requirements for approval by the U.S. trustee for a personal financial management instructional course. Credit Counseling After Bankruptcy Petition Filed
BAPCPA amends section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code to require an individual to receive credit counseling prior to filing a petition for bankruptcy. | Section 106 of P.L. 109-8, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), creates credit counseling requirements for consumers seeking to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 (governing the liquidation of a debtor's assets) and Chapter 13 (governing the financial reorganization of a debtor's assets). BAPCPA amends the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §109, to require an individual to receive credit counseling before filing a petition for bankruptcy. In certain circumstances, these requirements may be waived. BAPCPA also requires debtors, after they file for bankruptcy relief, to take a personal financial management course. Both credit counseling agencies and personal financial management instructional course providers must obtain approval from a U.S. trustee before offering a course to satisfy these requirements. Section 106 of BAPCPA creates a new provision that specifies the approval requirements for both credit counseling agencies and personal financial management instructional courses. Finally, section 1220 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 amends the Internal Revenue Code and establishes new standards that a credit counseling organization must meet to be exempt from federal income tax. |
crs_R43793 | crs_R43793_0 | IAAs for FY2014 and FY2015: Selected Legislative Provisions
The Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 ( P.L. 113-126 . 113-293 . 4681 passed in December. Table 3 lists selected provisions in the IAA for FY2015 ( P.L. | Two Intelligence Authorization Acts (IAAs) were passed in 2014. The IAA for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 (P.L. 113-126) was passed in July and an IAA for FY2015 (P.L. 113-293) was passed in December. This report examines selected provisions in the legislation and provides an intelligence community framework in the Appendix. |
crs_R42632 | crs_R42632_0 | Introduction
The U.S. government uses federal credit (direct loans and loan guarantees) to allocate capital to a range of areas including home ownership, education, small business, farming, energy, infrastructure investment, and exports. Thus, at the end of FY2013, outstanding federal credit totaled $3,154 billion. FCRA measures the cost of new federal credit as the net present value of cash flows over the life of the loan or loan guarantee at the time the credit is extended, using Treasury interest rates to discount the value of future cash flows. Background
Before FY1992, the budgetary cost of a new loan or new loan guarantee was reported as its net cash flow for that fiscal year. This cash flow measure did not accurately reflect the cost of a loan or loan guarantee (federal credit) to the federal government because it did not provide a good measure of the economic and budgetary effects. Beginning with FY1992, FCRA changed the methodology in the unified budget for measuring and reporting the cost of federal direct loans and federal loan guarantees. The four stated purposes of FCRA were listed in Section 501:
(1) measure more accurately the costs of federal credit programs;
(2) place the cost of credit programs on a budgetary basis equivalent to other federal spending;
(3) encourage the delivery of benefits in the form most appropriate to the needs of beneficiaries; and
(4) improve the allocation of resources among credit programs and other spending. FCRA defines [subsidy] cost as "the estimated long-term cost to the government of a direct loan or loan guarantee, calculated on net present value basis, excluding administrative costs and any incidental effects on governmental receipts or outlays" [Section 502(5A)]. Funding for the subsidy costs of discretionary credit programs is provided in appropriation acts and must compete with other discretionary programs for funding available under the constraints of a budget resolution. Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board
In October 1990, the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB or "the Board") was established by the Secretary of the Treasury, the director of OMB, and the Comptroller General to consider and recommend accounting principles for the federal government. Thus, for their credit programs, agencies' accounting procedures were now required to be consistent with their budgetary procedures. Balanced Budget Act of 1997
On August 5, 1997, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 was enacted. This law amended the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 to make some technical changes including codifying several OMB guidelines. Proposals for the Expansion of Reforms
Four major proposals to expand credit reform have been discussed in recent years. Inclusion of Government-Sponsored Enterprises
The principles of credit reform could be applied to government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Extension to Federal Insurance
The principles of credit reform could be extended to federal insurance, which is treated primarily on a cash flow basis. Inclusion of Market Risk
The budgetary cost to taxpayers of providing federal credit could be changed to include market risk. Inclusion of Administrative Costs
As was discussed in the 1990 debate, administrative costs of credit programs could be included in the calculation of the costs of these programs. Proposed Legislation in the 113th Congress
Two bills have been introduced in the 113 th Congress that included major proposals to reform the budgetary treatment of federal credit. Honest Budget Act of 2013 (H.R. Budget and Accounting Transparency Act of 2014 (H.R. Further, Title II of the legislation states that
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Directors of the Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget shall each prepare a study and make recommendations to the Committees on the Budget of the House of Representatives and the Senate as to the feasibility of applying fair value concepts to budgeting for the costs of Federal insurance programs. Federal Credit Data
Appendix C. Budgetary Treatment of Federal Credit Before FY1992
Before the implementation of the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, the unified budget treated federal credit in two different ways. This bill includes an appropriation of (in this example) $100 million for the subsidy budget authority of program L. Within agency A, this $100 million is appropriated to the credit program account for program L. Furthermore, this appropriations bill must include an estimate of the dollar amount of new direct loan obligations supported by the subsidy budget authority appropriated to agency A for program L. For example, if program L has an estimated subsidy rate of 20%, the dollar amount of new direct loan obligations supportable would be $500 million. | The U.S. government uses federal credit (direct loans and loan guarantees) to allocate financial capital to a range of areas, including home ownership, higher education, small business, agriculture, and energy. At the end of FY2013, outstanding federal credit totaled $3.2 trillion. This report explains the budgetary treatment of federal credit, examines proposed reforms, and describes recent legislation.
Title V of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508), the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 or FCRA, changed how the unified budget reports the cost of federal credit activities (i.e., federal direct loans and loan guarantees) to an accrual basis beginning in 1992. Before FY1992, for a given fiscal year, the budgetary cost of a new direct loan or loan guarantee was the net cash flow for that fiscal year. This cash flow measure did not accurately reflect the cost of a loan or loan guarantee, which is its subsidy cost over the entire life of the loan or loan guarantee, that is, its accrual cost.
Beginning with FY1992, FCRA required that the reported budgetary cost of a credit program equal the estimated subsidy costs at the time the credit is provided. FCRA defines the subsidy cost as "the estimated long-term cost to the government of a direct loan or a loan guarantee, calculated on a net present value basis, excluding administrative costs." This arguably places the cost of federal credit programs on a budgetary basis equivalent to other federal outlays. Because the subsidy costs of discretionary credit programs (such as the business loan programs of the Small Business Administration and the loan guarantee programs of the Export-Import Bank) are now provided through appropriations acts, this change meant that discretionary credit programs must compete with other discretionary programs on an equal basis. In contrast, funding for most mandatory credit programs (generally entitlement programs) is provided by permanent appropriations. The director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for coordinating the estimation of subsidy costs to the federal government.
Since the passage of FCRA, federal agencies, working with OMB, have steadily improved their compliance with credit reform standards. In October 1990, the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) was established. In August 1993, this board required that agencies' accounting procedures be consistent with their budgetary procedures for their federal credit programs. On August 5, 1997, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) was enacted, amending FCRA to make technical changes, including codifying several guidelines set by OMB.
Four proposals to expand credit reform have been discussed: the principles of credit reform could be applied to government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs); the principles of credit reform could be extended to federal insurance programs; the budgetary cost of capital for credit programs could be changed to include market risk; and the administrative costs of credit programs could be included in the calculation of the costs of these programs. These proposals are described in this report.
In the 113th Congress, two bills have been proposed with provisions concerning the budgetary treatment of federal credit: the Honest Budget Act of 2013 (H.R. 1270) and the Budget and Accounting Transparency Act of 2014 (H.R. 1872). The latter passed the House but has not been acted on by the Senate. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL31551 | crs_RL31551_0 | These plans receive tax benefits in that contributions and earnings are nottaxed to individuals until received as pensions (or payments on separation). These plans fall into twobasic types: defined benefit plans (where workers are guaranteed a certain benefit related to earningsand years of service) and defined contribution plans, where employees receive benefits based on thesize of assets and accumulated earnings. Employer stock may be one of the choices; employercontributions may also be made in the form of employer stock. Only defined benefit plans have restrictions on theamount of employer stock that can be held (10%). Some types of plans with retirement features(Employee Stock Ownership Plans, or ESOPs) must hold assets primarily in the form of employerstock. Plans may be combined. Tax benefits are also provided for acquiring employer stock that is not restricted to retirement plans. These problems apply bothto general education and to certain types of on-the-job training. One way that firms may attempt to remedy this problem is through use of stock options(which provide employees an incentive to increase the firm's value) and stock ownership plans,which provide some alignment with the shareholders' objectives. (2)
Employee stock ownership can also work against shareholder interests and economic efficiency. Firms where employees hold a large fraction of stock are more impervious to hostile takeovers, asemployees and managers may otherwise fear loss of pay and jobs in such a circumstance. Rationales for Government Intervention
The previous section has suggested private motives even in the absence of tax benefits fordefined benefit pension plans and for stock ownership plans, but there does not appear to be a strongprivate rationale for defined contribution plans not held in the form of employer stock. Clearlyanother reason for pension and profit sharing plans that may play a crucial role in encouraging theseplans, particularly defined contribution plans not invested in employer stock, is the tax benefitsassociated with them. And why should it intervene with mixed signals, including both benefitsfor and restrictions on ownership of employer stock in pension plans? For example, rules mandating earlyvesting are in conflict with objectives to increase on-the-job training (objectives that might be worthyof pursuit by the government as well), although they may be appropriate to increase pension coverageand employee security. Economic problems arising from principal-agent costs or worker monitoring costs may beargued to justify government subsidies to stock ownership plans to increase efficiency beyond whatprivate markets may do. However, they are unlikely to be addressed by ownership of employerstock among rank and file employees of large companies, where most tax subsidies for pensions aredirected. It would appear better for administrative and other reasons to impose the limits on the share of contributions made ratherthan the share of assets. Of course, investmentadvice is not costless, and it could significantly discourage the use of these plans in the case of smallfirms. Moreover, virtually any independent investment advisor would counsel against holding alarge part of retirement assets in a single stock, but many advisors would suggest taking on generalstock market risk. | The loss of retirement assets held in Enron stock by Enron employees has stimulated proposals to restrict the holding of employer stock in retirement plans, and other proposals to regulate theseplans. Stock in the Enron plan came from firm contributions in the form of stock that was notallowed to be sold and from voluntary investment by employees. This report focuses on rationalesfor providing employer retirement plans and for holding (or not holding) employer stock in theseplans, both from the perspective of the private sector and of government policy.
Retirement plans fall into two types: defined benefit plans, where a pension based on earningsand years of service is provided; and defined contribution plans, where individuals receive benefitsbased on accumulated principal and interest. Either plan can hold employer stock, but holdings arelimited to 10% of assets in the case of defined benefit plans. These plans receive tax subsidies, asdo employee stock purchase plans and certain types of stock options.
The analysis suggests that there are economic reasons that firms and employees may engage in pension and profit sharing (or stock ownership) plans even in the absence of tax subsidies. Pensionplans, primarily defined benefit plans, may be attractive for administrative and risk-reductionreasons, for dealing with inadequate investment in on-the-job training, and for smoothing theretirement of older workers. Stock options and stock ownership plans may be useful for addressinginconsistency in objectives between shareholders and managers and worker monitoring problems,although these benefits are not likely to accrue to stock ownership by the rank and file of largecompanies. These employee stock ownership plans may also deter hostile takeovers, which mayundermine economic efficiency and stockholder interests. Stock contributions are also popularbecause they do not reduce cash flow, which has both benefits and costs from an economic efficiencyperspective.
Government subsidies to plans may be justified to increase retirement incomes and access to annuities because of a shortfall in optimal savings and certain economic problems with self selectionin purchasing annuities. These objectives also underlie the justification of Social Security. Pursuingthese goals may actually conflict with another worthy objective, on-the-job training. However,objectives that are addressed via employee stock ownership do not appear important in shaping thenature of large, broadly-based, retirement plans. Diversification of plan assets and prudentinvestment portfolios do appear consistent with rationales for government intervention.
Attempts to address this issue might take several forms: restrictions on shares of employer stock in plans, prohibiting employer stock contributions or lifting restrictions on sale, denying a taxdeduction on employer contributions until they could be sold, and requiring independent investmentadvice. The last proposal is not costless and could undermine participation for small firms. Foradministrative and other reasons, it may be rational to impose share restrictions on allocations ofcontributions, rather than on assets. There are no plans to update this report. |
crs_R43025 | crs_R43025_0 | Introduction
The Adoption Incentive program (Section 473A of the Social Security Act) provides federal payments to state child welfare agencies that increase adoptions of children who are in need of new permanent families. However, as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ), Congress extended states' eligibility to earn adoption incentive payments for an additional year and appropriated $37.9 million to make those payments. 4980 , introduced on June 26, 2014, draws on language in both of those legislative proposals. In addition to extending funding authority for incentive payments through FY2016, Title II of H.R. 4980 would make changes to the incentive structure established in the 2008 law—including by changing the award categories to focus more on permanency for children 9 years of age or older, establishing incentive payments for states that appropriately move children from foster care to legal guardianship, determining improvements in state performance based on the rate (or percentage) of children leaving foster care to adoption or guardianship (rather than the number), and putting additional focus on achieving permanence through adoption or guardianship for older children. Specifically, the bill would
extend $15 million in annual mandatory funding for Family Connection Grants for one year (FY2014); that grant program was first established and funded in the 2008 law; adjust eligibility criteria for Title IV-E kinship guardianship assistance (which was first established in the 2008 law) to ensure continuous program eligibility for a child who must go to live with a "successor guardian" due to the incapacitation or death of his/her relative guardians; seek to further ensure siblings have the opportunity to live together while in foster care, by specifying that a 2008 requirement for state agencies to identify and give notice to grandparents and other relatives of children entering foster care includes identifying and providing notice to any parent of a sibling of a child entering care (provided that parent has custody of the sibling); and require additional reporting by states to ensure they spend any savings resulting from the expanded federal support for Title IV-E adoption assistance provided for in the 2008 law, and require that no less than 30% of any identified savings be used by the state to provide post-adoption or post-guardianship services and services to ensure safety and well-being of children who might otherwise enter foster care. Legislation to Extend Adoption Incentive Payments
On June 26, 2014, Representative Camp, with Representatives Levin, Reichert, and Doggett, introduced the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act ( H.R. The bill's introduction was jointly announced by Representatives Camp and Levin, along with Senators Wyden and Hatch, and was described as "bipartisan legislation [that] reflects agreements reached between the House and Senate negotiators." Title II of H.R. 3205 , introduced by Representative Camp, with Representatives Levin, Reichert, and Doggett), which was passed by the House in October 2013, and Title I of the Supporting At-Risk Children Act ( S. 1870 ), which was approved by the Senate Finance Committee in December 2013. Title II of H.R. 4980 would renew discretionary funding authority for the program, renamed as Adoption and Legal Guardianship Incentive Payments, at the current annual level ($43 million) through FY2016. Award Amounts by Category
Under current law, a state's total adoption incentive payment is generally equal to the number of increased adoptions multiplied by the incentive payment amount tied to each category—$4,000 for foster child adoptions, $4,000 for special needs (under age 9) adoptions, and $8,000 for older child adoptions. H.R. Title II of H.R. Subsequent Activities in the Senate
On September 30, 2013, the Senate Finance Committee posted a discussion draft bill to reauthorize Adoption Incentive Payments and make certain other changes to federal child welfare policies. 110-351 ). 105-89 ). There are fewer children in foster care who are "waiting for adoption," and the average time it takes to complete an adoption has declined by roughly one year. Growth in the Number of Adoptions Out of Foster Care
The annual number of adoptions from foster care climbed from less than 30,000 in the mid-1990s, to a peak of some 57,000 in FY2009. Viewed as a rate—that is the number of children adopted during a given fiscal year for every 100 children who were in foster care on the last day of the preceding fiscal year—public child welfare agency adoptions more than doubled since the late 1990s (from a rate of roughly 6 adoptions per 100 children in foster care to 13 per 100). Established by ASFA in 1997 (at Section 473A of the Social Security Act), the Adoption Incentive program has been amended and extended twice: first, by the Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 ( P.L. Specifically, states may earn incentive payments for an increase in the
number of children adopted out of foster care overall; number of children adopted at age 9 or older; number of children adopted with special needs and who are under the age of 9; or rate at which children were adopted from foster care. However, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. In addition, no state may receive an award for an increase in the number of special needs adoptions of children under the age of 9, unless that state, in that same year, also shows an increase in of the number of foster child or older child adoptions (compared to what the state achieved in FY2007), or an increase in the state's rate of foster child adoption (compared to the rate it achieved in FY2002, or any higher rate achieved in a prior subsequent year). During the life of the program, all 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have earned Adoption Incentive payments in one or more years and more than $423 million has been awarded to all states through FY2012. Awards by Category for Adoptions Finalized in FY2008-FY2012
Under the incentive structure used to make awards for adoptions finalized in FY2008-FY2012, states were eligible to receive $212 million and received a total of $202 million in Adoption Incentive payments. Many states report spending incentive funds on adoption-related purposes, including post-adoption support services (e.g., support for adoptive parent mentors or adoptive family support groups, respite care, casework and supports for adoptive families of children at risk of re-entering foster care); recruitment of adoptive homes (e.g., support for online adoption exchange or photo-listing, development of promotional materials, child-specific recruitment efforts); and training or conferences to improve adoption casework. At least one state reported using these incentive funds for foster care maintenance payments. | Under the Adoption Incentive program (Section 473A of the Social Security Act), states earn federal incentive payments when they increase adoptions of children who are in need of new permanent families. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have earned a part of the $424 million in Adoption Incentive funds that have been awarded since the program was established as part of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA, P.L. 105-89). Discretionary funding authorized for this program has been extended twice since it was established, most recently in 2008 (P.L. 110-351).
Although funding authority for the Adoption Incentive program expired on September 30, 2013, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76) permits states to continue to receive the Adoption Incentive payments and appropriates $37.9 million for them. In addition, Title II of the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (H.R. 4980), which was introduced on June 26, 2014, would extend current annual discretionary funding authority ($43 million) for Adoption Incentive payments through FY2016. Beyond this, Title II of H.R. 4980 would add incentive payments for states that make improvements in appropriately moving children from foster care to legal guardianship and would determine awards based on the percentage (or rate) of children leaving foster care to adoption and/or guardianship, instead of the absolute number of children leaving. In similar statements issued on June 26, 2014, by the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance, Representatives Camp and Levin, along with Senators Wyden and Hatch, announced H.R. 4980 as "bipartisan legislation [that] reflects agreements reached between House and Senate negotiators" on legislation previously approved in the House and in the Senate Finance Committee. Specifically, Title II of H.R. 4980 draws on H.R. 3205, passed by the House in October 2013, and provisions included in Title I of S. 1870, approved by the Senate Finance Committee in December 2013.
Congress has long shown interest in improving the chances of adoption for children who cannot return to their parents and who might otherwise spend their childhoods in temporary foster homes before "aging out" of foster care. Since ASFA's enactment in 1997, the annual number of children leaving foster care for adoption has risen from roughly 30,000 to more than 50,000 and the average length of time it took states to complete the adoption of a child from foster care declined by close to one year (from about four years to less than three). Over the same time period, and in significant measure due to the greater number of children leaving foster care for adoption and at a faster pace, the overall number of children who remain in foster care declined by 29%—from a peak of 567,000 in FY1999 to 400,000 in FY2012. Despite these successes, however, the number of children "waiting for adoption" (102,000 on the last day of FY2012) remains about double the number of children who are adopted during a given year. Adoptions of older children remain far less common than adoptions of younger children, and some 23,000 youth aged out of foster care in FY2012, compared to just 19,000 in FY1999.
Under the current award structure, a state's adoption incentive payment equals the specified incentive amount for a given category of adoptions multiplied by the number of adoptions in the category that is above the number completed by the state in FY2007. The specified incentive amount is $4,000 for foster child adoptions, $8,000 for older child (9 years or more) adoptions, and—provided a state is eligible for an incentive in another award category—$4,000 for special needs (under age 9) adoptions. Additionally, if sufficient appropriations are available in the fiscal year, a state may also earn incentive payments for improving the rate (or percentage) of foster child adoptions. In the five years (FY2008-FY2012) that this incentive structure has been in place, states received combined incentive payments of nearly $202 million, including $95 million for increases in the number of foster child adoptions, $57 million for increases in older child adoptions, and $48 million for increases in special needs (under age 9) adoptions. They also received about $2 million for increases in the rate of foster child adoptions. (This amount was significantly less than the nearly $12 million states were eligible to receive based on improved adoption rates. However, that full amount was not paid because nearly all appropriations provided were needed to make incentive payments for increased numbers of adoptions.)
States are permitted to use Adoption Incentive payments to support a broad range of child welfare services to children and families. Many states report spending incentive funds on adoption-related child welfare purposes, including post-adoption support services, recruitment of adoptive homes, and training or conferences to improve adoption casework. A smaller number of states report using these funds for adoption assistance payments, improved adoption homes studies, child protection casework, foster care maintenance payments, or other child welfare purposes.
In addition to amending and extending Adoption Incentive payments, Title II of H.R. 4980 would extend funding for Family Connection Grants (Section 427 of the Social Security Act) for one year, add new reporting and spending requirements for states with regard to certain federal funds they receive under the adoption assistance component of the Title IV-E program, and make possible continued federal Title IV-E guardianship assistance eligibility for children already receiving that assistance who are subsequently placed with a "successor guardian." Additionally, the bill would make changes to federal foster care requirements intended to further facilitate placement of siblings together while in foster care. |
crs_RL34229 | crs_RL34229_0 | Echoing some issues raised in Hubbard's article, Kevin Hassett indicated that the corporate tax was not an effective way to raise revenues and suggested that lowering the rate would raise revenues. Overall, these results suggest that the corporate tax rate has little effect on corporate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP. If the corporate tax falls on owners of the corporation, or on capital in general, it contributes to a progressive tax system, since higher income individuals have more income from capital than from labor. Two studies have been based on data in the United States. Lower corporate tax rates would also reduce this distortion. Reducing Tax at the Firm Level and Increasing Individual Level Taxes; Shifting Between Corporate and Individual Form
Given the value of lowering the corporate tax rate to reduce the shifting of income into tax havens and concerns over the U.S. position among other countries, one change that would allow this reduction is to raise the tax at the individual level and use the revenues to lower the corporate tax rate. This approach also allows more scope for lowering corporate tax rates without creating sheltering opportunities for high-income individuals. Conclusion
Is there an urgent need to lower the corporate tax rate, as some recent discussions and analyses have suggested? The claims that behavioral responses could cause revenues to rise if rates were cut do not hold up on both a theoretical basis and an empirical basis. Studies that purport to show a revenue-maximizing tax rate of 30% contain econometric errors that produce biased and inconsistent results; when those problems are corrected the results disappear. Cross-country studies to provide direct evidence showing that the burden of the corporate tax actually falls on labor in some cases yield unreasonable results and prove to suffer from econometric flaws that also lead to a disappearance of the results when corrected. Similarly, claims that high U.S. tax rates will create problems for the United States in a global economy suffer from a misrepresentation of the U.S. tax rate compared to other countries and are less important when capital is imperfectly mobile, as it appears to be. Although these new arguments appear to rely on questionable data, the traditional concerns about the corporate tax appear valid. Although many economists believe that the tax is still needed as a backstop to individual tax collections, it does result in some economic distortions. These economic distortions, however, have declined substantially over time as corporate rates and shares of output have fallen. There are a number of revenue-neutral changes that could reduce these distortions, allow for a lower corporate statutory tax rate, and lead to a more efficient corporate tax system. To illustrate in the simplest fashion, suppose the remaining sector of the economy is a non-corporate non-traded sector of the economy whose price is denoted by a capital P:
(C3)
This commodity has no taxes and if the effects on r and w are estimated, those can be used to determine the change in P.
What ultimately to be determined is the fraction of the tax, rK c (where K c is the capital in the corporate traded sector) that falls on labor, that is what share of Ldw, where L is total labor in the economy, is of rK c .
To derive the real change in wages, the change in nominal wage is divided by the change in total price level in the economy, or, if the corporate sector is responsible for (1-) of output in the economy the percentage change in real wage (which is denoted with a capital W) can be expressed as follows:
(C4)
If s is the share of the burden falling on labor income, from equation (1), and . | Interest in corporate tax reform that lowers the rate and broadens the base has developed in the past several years. Some discussions by economists in opinion pieces have suggested there is an urgent need to lower the corporate tax rate, but not necessarily to broaden the tax base, an approach that presents some difficulties given current budget pressures. Others see the corporate tax as a potential source of revenue.
Arguments for lowering the corporate tax rate include the traditional concerns about economic distortions arising from the corporate tax and newer concerns arising from the increasingly global nature of the economy. Some claims have been made that lowering the corporate tax rate would raise revenue because of the behavioral responses, an effect that is linked to an open economy. Although the corporate tax has generally been viewed as contributing to a more progressive tax system because the burden falls on capital income and thus on higher-income individuals, claims have also been made that the burden falls not on owners of capital, but on labor income—an effect also linked to an open economy.
The analysis in this report suggests that many of the concerns expressed about the corporate tax are not supported by empirical evidence. Claims that behavioral responses could cause revenues to rise if rates were cut do not hold up on either a theoretical or an empirical basis. Studies that purport to show a revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate of 30% (a rate lower than the current statutory tax rate) contain econometric errors that lead to biased and inconsistent results; when those problems are corrected the results disappear. Cross-country studies to provide direct evidence showing that the burden of the corporate tax actually falls on labor yield unreasonable results and prove to suffer from econometric flaws that also lead to a disappearance of the results when corrected, in those cases where data were obtained and the results replicated. Many studies that have been cited are not relevant to the United States because they reflect wage bargaining approaches and unions have virtually disappeared from the private sector in the United States. Overall, the evidence suggests that the tax is largely borne by capital. Similarly, claims that high U.S. tax rates will create problems for the United States in a global economy suffer from a misrepresentation of the U.S. tax rate compared with other countries and are less important when capital is imperfectly mobile, as it appears to be.
Although these new arguments appear to rely on questionable methods, the traditional concerns about the corporate tax appear valid. While an argument may be made that the tax is still needed as a backstop to individual tax collections, it does result in some economic distortions. These economic distortions, however, have declined substantially over time as corporate rates and shares of output have fallen. Moreover, it is difficult to lower the corporate tax without creating a way of sheltering individual income given the low tax rates on dividends and capital gains.
A number of revenue-neutral changes are available that could reduce these distortions, allow for a lower corporate statutory tax rate, and lead to a more efficient corporate tax system. These changes include base broadening, reducing the benefits of debt finance through inflation indexing, taxing large pass-through firms as corporations, and reducing the tax at the firm level offset by an increase at the individual level. Nevertheless, the scope for reducing the tax rate in a revenue-neutral way may be limited. |
crs_R45072 | crs_R45072_0 | Introduction
Venezuela continues to be in the throes of a deep political crisis under the authoritarian rule of President Nicolás Maduro. Underpinning the political crisis is an acute and increasingly unstable economic crisis. The 2014 collapse in oil prices hit Venezuela's economy hard. Venezuela's economy has contracted by 35% since 2013, a larger contraction than the United States experienced during the Great Depression in the 1930s. In addition, the crisis is marked by inflation, shortages of consumer goods, default on the government's debt obligations, and deteriorating living conditions with significant humanitarian consequences. The report also examines how the crisis affects U.S. economic interests, including U.S. investors' holdings of Venezuelan bonds, Venezuelan assets in the United States, U.S.-Venezuelan trade and direct investment, and possible future involvement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the crisis. In November 2017, the government's increasingly dire fiscal situation came to a head, as the government announced it would seek to restructure its debt. Such legal challenges against the Venezuelan government could result in the seizure of Venezuela's overseas assets, such as CITGO, a subsidiary of Venezuela's state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA); oil shipments; and cash payments for oil exports. In August 2017, new U.S. sanctions exacerbated the government's precarious fiscal position. Any comprehensive restructuring of Venezuelan debt is expected to be a long and complex process, due to the following factors:
the number of parties involved, including hundreds or even thousands of bondholders who are in the early stages of organizing, as well as China and Russia, whose lending to Venezuela may be driven in part by geopolitical considerations; legal challenges likely to be initiated by bondholders, which could take years to resolve and could result in the seizure of Venezuelan assets in the United States, including CITGO (owned by PdVSA), oil shipments, and cash payments for oil; differences in legal provisions in different bonds, including differences between the sovereign and PdVSA bonds; U.S. sanctions, which prohibit U.S. investors from accepting any new debt issued in a debt restructuring or from engaging with Vice President Tareck El Aissami and Economy Minister Simon Zerpa, who are leading the debt negotiations and subject to U.S. sanctions for drug-trafficking and corruption charges; and lack of any economic reform agenda in Venezuela to accompany the restructuring, such as an IMF program. In December 2017, the Economist Intelligence Unit projected that Venezuela's economy will contract by 11.9% in 2018 and 5.4% in 2019, a more significant contraction in economic growth than it or the IMF envisioned just two months prior. Venezuela's economic and broader political crisis, combined with low oil prices, has contributed to a contraction in U.S.-Venezuela trade, and some major U.S. firms operating in Venezuela have left or curtailed operations. The contraction in U.S.-Venezuela trade is more consequential for Venezuela than the United States. From the U.S. perspective, Venezuela is a relatively minor trading partner. However, in response to the political and economic instability, several large U.S. companies have left Venezuela, curtailed operations there, or restructured subsidiaries to minimize the exposure of parent companies. Bondholders
U.S. investors could face substantial losses if Venezuela suspends payment or seeks an aggressive restructuring of its debt. Venezuelan government and PdVSA dollar-denominated bonds were largely issued under New York law. CITGO Ownership
In 2016, PdVSA secured a $1.5 billion loan from the Russian state-oil company Rosneft. PdVSA used 49.9% of its shares in CITGO as collateral for the loan. Reportedly, Rosneft is negotiating to swap its collateral in CITGO for oilfield stakes and a fuel supply deal. Possible Future Economic Support for Venezuela
Congress is considering using nongovernmental organizations to provide humanitarian aid to Venezuela, including food and medicine, to address its humanitarian crisis. However, if the Maduro government or a new government in Venezuela engages in a significant reorientation of policy, U.S. policymakers might pursue options to provide broader economic support to rebuild Venezuela's economy. In addition to lifting sanctions that restrict Venezuela's access to the U.S. financial system, policymakers might explore how the international community, particularly the IMF, could provide an international financial assistance package, and whether debt incurred by the National Constituent Assembly, widely viewed as an illegitimate legislature, should be enforced. If there is no significant change in Venezuelan policies, the United States may reconsider its policy stance and potentially pursue harsher sanctions against the government. | Venezuela's Economic Crisis: Overview
Venezuela is facing a political crisis under the authoritarian rule of President Nicolás Maduro, who appears to have continued to consolidate power over the political opposition in recent months. Underpinning Venezuela's political crisis is an economic crisis. Venezuela is a major oil producer and exporter, and the 2014 crash in oil prices, combined with years of economic mismanagement, hit Venezuela's economy hard. Venezuela's economy has contracted by 35% since 2013, a larger contraction than the United States experienced during the Great Depression. Venezuela is struggling with inflation, shortages of food and medicine, substantial budget deficits, and deteriorating living conditions with significant humanitarian consequences.
In response to the Maduro regime's increasingly undemocratic actions, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions restricting Venezuela's access to U.S. financial markets in August 2017, increasing fiscal pressure on the government. In November 2017, the Venezuelan government announced it would seek to restructure its debt. The government and the state-oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), subsequently missed key bond payments, leading credit rating agencies to issue default notices. Debt restructuring is expected to be a long and complex process, and it is unclear whether Venezuela will make coming debt repayments. The outlook for the economy is bleak; the Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts the Venezuelan economy will contract by 11.9% in 2018.
Implications for U.S. Economic Interests
The political crisis in Venezuela and low oil prices have contributed to a contraction in U.S.-Venezuela trade. Venezuela is a relatively minor trading partner of the United States; the contraction in bilateral trade is more consequential for Venezuela, for which the United States is its largest trading partner. In response to the political and economic instability, several large U.S. companies have left Venezuela or curtailed operations there.
U.S. investors holding Venezuelan and PdVSA bonds could face substantial losses if Venezuela suspends payment or seeks an aggressive restructuring of its debt. Bondholders are in the early stages of organizing to enter restructuring negotiations and/or pursue legal challenges against the Venezuelan government. Venezuelan dollar-denominated bonds were issued under New York law, and bondholder lawsuits seeking repayment would take place in U.S. courts. Legal challenges could result in the seizure of Venezuela's assets in the United States, such as CITGO (whose parent company is PdVSA), oil exports, and cash payments for oil exports.
Venezuela's precarious fiscal position also raises concerns for U.S. energy security. In 2016, Venezuela's state oil company PdVSA secured a loan from the Russian state-oil company Rosneft. PdVSA used 49.9% of its shares in CITGO as collateral. If PdVSA defaults on its Rosneft loan, it is not clear whether Venezuela's portion of CITGO ownership would be transferred to Rosneft. Reportedly, Rosneft is negotiating to swap its collateral in CITGO for other PdVSA assets.
Looking Ahead
Congress is considering providing humanitarian aid to Venezuela through nongovernmental organizations. If the Maduro government or a new government in Venezuela engages in a significant reorientation of policy, U.S. policymakers may be interested in providing broader economic support to rebuild Venezuela's economy. Policymakers might explore how the international community, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), could provide an international financial assistance package, and whether debt incurred by the National Constituent Assembly, widely viewed as an illegitimate legislature, should be enforced. If the Maduro regime stays in power and does not reorient its policies, the United States may revisit its policies and potentially pursue harsher sanctions.
For additional information on Venezuela from CRS, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy; CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political and Economic Crisis and U.S. Policy; and CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions. |
crs_R45188 | crs_R45188_0 | D rug trafficking is a significant public health and safety threat facing the United States. The federal government has taken a variety of actions aimed at countering drug trafficking. These activities have ranged from giving law enforcement more tools for combatting traffickers to establishing programs and initiatives to reduce the supply of and demand for illegal drugs. Within the larger framework of the federal government's efforts to counter drug trafficking is the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program. Congress initially created the HIDTA program through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 ( P.L. 100-690 ). Administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the HIDTA program provides assistance to law enforcement agencies—at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels—operating in areas of the United States that have been deemed as critical drug trafficking regions. These range from multiagency enforcement initiatives involving investigation, interdiction, and prosecution, to drug use prevention and treatment initiatives. It also examines issues that policymakers may consider as they debate the future of the HIDTA program: whether the county is still the appropriate unit of inclusion for the HIDTA, whether the criteria for inclusion remain adequate, whether the program is effective in accomplishing its goals, whether its tangential effects can be measured, whether the current bounds on the use of HIDTA funds are still appropriate, and which federal entity may be best suited to administer the program. The HIDTA program is designed with the county as its geographic unit of inclusion. There are 29 designated HIDTAs in the United States and its territories, as outlined in Table 1 . However, each of the HIDTA regions is governed by its own Executive Board. ONDCP notes that a "central feature of the HIDTA program is the discretion granted to these Executive Boards to design and implement initiatives that confront the specific drug trafficking threats in their respective regions." From the total HIDTA program appropriation, each HIDTA receives a base amount of funding to support initiatives in its region. Support. A prevailing issue will be how much funding to provide for the program. The current method of county-by-county inclusion has thus far encompassed counties in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. These restrictions on the use of funding for prevention and treatment initiatives were enacted when the HIDTA program was formally authorized in the Office of National Drug Control Reauthorization Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-469 ). | Drug trafficking is a significant public health and safety threat facing the United States. The federal government has taken a variety of actions aimed at countering this threat. These have ranged from giving law enforcement more tools for combatting traffickers to establishing programs and initiatives to reduce the supply of and demand for illegal drugs. Within the larger framework of the federal government's efforts to counter drug trafficking is the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program. The program supports multiagency activities ranging from enforcement initiatives involving investigation, interdiction, and prosecution, to drug use prevention and treatment initiatives.
Congress initially created the HIDTA program through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690) and permanently authorized it in the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-469). The HIDTA program provides assistance to law enforcement agencies—at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels—operating in areas of the United States that have been deemed as critical drug trafficking regions. The program is designed with the county as its geographic unit of inclusion. There are 29 designated HIDTAs in the United States, cutting across all 50 states, the District Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
The HIDTA program is administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). However, each of the HIDTA regions is governed by its own Executive Board, which has the flexibility to design and implement initiatives that confront the specific drug trafficking threats in its region. For FY2018, Congress appropriated $280.0 million for the HIDTA program, a 10.2% increase over the FY2017 appropriation of $254.0 million. Each HIDTA receives a base amount of funding (ranging from approximately $3.1 million to $14.6 million in FY2017) to support initiatives in its region, and the remainder is allocated to support specific initiatives throughout the country.
There are several issues that policymakers may consider when they debate the future of the HIDTA program. A prevailing issue will be how much funding to provide for the program. Congress may also choose to exercise oversight and evaluate related issues such as whether the county is still the appropriate unit of inclusion for the HIDTA, whether the criteria for inclusion remain adequate, whether the program is effective in accomplishing its goals, whether its tangential effects can be measured, whether the current bounds on the use of HIDTA funds are still appropriate, and which federal entity may be best suited to administer the program. |
crs_RS22852 | crs_RS22852_0 | States use a number of different reimbursement methods for different types of services provided in outpatient hospital departments and clinics. The Proposed Rule on Outpatient Hospital Services Under Medicaid
The proposed rule (72 Federal Register 55158, September 28, 2007) would limit the definition and scope of Medicaid outpatient services in a hospital clinic, hospital facility, or rural health clinic. In light of these views, and given this moratorium, CMS elected to exclude from its final OPH rule the proposed regulatory language delineating methods for demonstrating compliance with the Medicaid upper payment limit on outpatient hospital and clinic services provided in privately operated facilities. CMS did adopt the proposed outpatient hospital service definition effective December 8, 2008. As of January 26, 2009, 12 states have submitted pending state plan amendments to comply with the new final regulation. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ) prohibits the Secretary of Health and Human Services from taking any action until after June 30, 2009 (through regulation, regulatory guidance, use of federal payment audit procedures, or other administrative action, policy, or practice, including a Medical Assistance Manual transmittal or state Medicaid director letter), to implement the final regulation covering outpatient hospital facility services. On May 6, 2009, CMS issued a proposed rule (74 Federal Register 21292) that would rescind the Medicaid outpatient services rule in its entirety, among other actions. Public comments on this proposed rule will be accepted until June 1, 2009. | On September 28, 2007, a proposed Medicaid rule was published that would (1) change the definition of outpatient hospital and rural health clinic services and (2) change the methods states must use to demonstrate compliance with the federal upper payment limit on outpatient hospital services provided in private outpatient facilities. A number of groups have expressed concern that this rule will have a significant negative impact on coverage of certain services, which may harm Medicaid beneficiaries. On November 7, 2008, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a final Medicaid rule on outpatient hospital services that excluded the proposed regulatory language delineating methods for demonstrating compliance with the upper payment limit on outpatient hospital services provided in private outpatient facilities. The effective date of the regulation had been December 8, 2008. As of January 26, 2009, 12 states have submitted state plan amendments in response to the regulation. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) prohibits the Secretary of Health and Human Services from taking any action until after June 30, 2009 (through regulation, regulatory guidance, use of federal payment audit procedures, or other administrative action, policy, or practice, including a Medical Assistance Manual transmittal or state Medicaid director letter), to implement the final regulation covering outpatient hospital facility services. On May 6, 2009, CMS issued a proposed rule that, among other actions, rescinded the final Medicaid rule defining outpatient services. Public comments on this proposal will be accepted until June 1, 2009. |
crs_R45140 | crs_R45140_0 | The FY2018 request is divided between the bureau's two major accounts:
Current Surveys and Programs would receive $246.0 million, $24.0 million (8.9%) less than the $270.0 million enacted for FY2017 and 16.4% of the total requested for the bureau; Periodic Censuses and Programs—the account that funds the decennial census—would receive $1,251.0 million, $51.0 million (4.3%) more than the $1,200.0 million approved for FY2017 and 83.6% of the bureau's total request. The Administration requests $800.2 million for the 2020 Decennial Census in FY2018, a $32.9 million (4.3%) increase from the $767.3 million enacted for FY2017. The Administration's FY2018 request for the ACS is $213.6 million, $8.0 million (3.6%) below the FY2017-enacted amount of $221.6 million. House Action
Economics and Statistics Administration/Bureau of Economic Analysis
The House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 3267 , the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018, on July 17, 2017. The committee-recommended funding for BEA in FY2018 is $96.0 million, $1.0 million (1.0%) less than the requested $97.0 million, and $7.8 million (7.5%) below the $103.8 million enacted for FY2017. 3267 , as reported, became Division C of H.R. Census Bureau
H.R. 3354 , would provide $1,507.0 million for the Census Bureau in FY2018, $37.0 million (2.5%) more than the FY2017 funding level of $1,470.0 million and $10.0 million (0.7%) above the $1,497.0 million requested for FY2018. Current Surveys and Programs would receive $256.0 million, $14.0 million (5.2%) below the FY2017-enacted amount of $270.0 million and $10.0 million (4.1%) more than the $246.0 million requested for FY2018. Periodic Censuses and Programs would be funded at $1,251.0 million, the same amount as requested for FY2018 and $51.0 million (4.3%) more than the $1,200.0 million enacted for FY2017. Senate Action
Economics and Statistics Administration/Bureau of Economic Analysis
The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its FY2018 CJS appropriations bill, S. 1662 , on July 27, 2017, with recommended funding of $99.0 million for ESA. The $99.0 million is $8.3 million (7.7%) less than the $107.3 million enacted for ESA in FY2017, $2.0 million (2.1%) more than the $97.0 million FY2018 request for BEA, and $3.0 million (3.1%) more than the House-passed $96.0 million for BEA in FY2018. Census Bureau
As reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee, S. 1662 recommends $1,521.0 million for the Census Bureau in FY2018, $51.0 million (3.5%) over the $1,470.0 million FY2017-enacted amount, $24.0 million (1.6%) above the $1,497.0 million budget request, and $14.0 million (0.9%) more than the $1,507.0 million House-passed amount. The FY2018 committee-recommended amount for Current Surveys and Programs is $270.0 million, identical to what was enacted for FY2017, $24.0 million (9.8%) more than the $246.0 million FY2018 request, and $14.0 million (5.5%) above the House-passed $256.0 million. For Periodic Censuses and Programs in FY2018, the committee recommends $1,251.0 million, which matches the requested and House-passed amounts and is $51.0 million (4.3%) above the $1,200.0 million FY2017-enacted level. Continuing Appropriations Acts, 2018
Final FY2018 CJS appropriations legislation was not enacted by the end of FY2017. In general, Division D, Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018, Section 101, provided federal agencies with FY2018 funding at FY2017 appropriations levels, reduced by 0.6791%, through December 8, 2017. Division D, Section 118, however, allowed the Census Bureau to apportion the funds provided under Section 101 for Periodic Censuses and Programs "up to the rate for operations necessary to maintain the schedule and deliver the required data according to statutory deadlines in the 2020 Decennial Census Program." A fifth bill, H.R. 1892 , P.L. 115-56 , Division D, through March 23, 2018, with an additional $182.0 million for the 2020 census. | This report discusses FY2018 appropriations (discretionary budget authority) for the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau), historic components of the Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce. This report will be updated as legislative developments warrant.
The Administration's FY2018 budget request assumes the termination of ESA and proposes $97.0 million for BEA, $6.8 million (6.6%) less than the $103.8 million enacted for FY2017.
The FY2018 request for the Census Bureau is $1,497.0 million, $27.0 million (1.8%) more than the FY2017-enacted $1,470.0 million. The FY2018 request is divided between the bureau's two major accounts: $246.0 million for Current Surveys and Programs, $24.0 million (8.9%) less than the $270.0 million enacted for FY2017; and $1,251.0 million for Periodic Censuses and Programs, $51.0 million (4.3%) more than the $1,200.0 million approved for FY2017. The foremost program under this account is the 2020 Decennial Census, with an $800.2 million FY2018 request that is $32.9 million (4.3%) above the $767.3 million enacted for FY2017. A second key program is the American Community Survey (ACS), with an FY2018 request of $213.6 million, $8.0 million (3.6%) below the $221.6 million FY2017-enacted amount.
The House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 3267, the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018 (CJS), on July 17, 2017. Committee-recommended funding for BEA in FY2018 is $96.0 million, $1.0 million (1.0%) less than requested and $7.8 million (7.5%) less than enacted for FY2017. The Census Bureau would receive $1,507.0 million in FY2018, $37.0 million (2.5%) more than enacted for FY2017 and $10.0 million (0.7%) above the FY2018 request. The $256.0 million recommended for Current Surveys and Programs is $14.0 million (5.2%) below the FY2017-enacted amount and $10.0 million (4.1%) more than requested for FY2018. Periodic Censuses and Programs would receive the requested $1,251.0 million, $51.0 million (4.3%) more than enacted for FY2017. H.R. 3267, as reported, became Division C of H.R. 3354, which the House passed on September 14, 2017.
The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its FY2018 CJS appropriations bill, S. 1662, on July 27, 2017. It continues to recognize ESA and recommends funding it at $99.0 million in FY2018, $8.3 million (7.7%) below the $107.3 million enacted for ESA in FY2017, $2.0 million (2.1%) more than the FY2018 request for BEA, and $3.0 million (3.1%) more than the House-passed BEA funding level. The Census Bureau would receive $1,521.0 million in FY2018, $51.0 million (3.5%) over the FY2017-enacted amount, $24.0 million (1.6%) above the request, and $14.0 million (0.9%) more than the House recommendation. The Senate committee recommends $270.0 million for Current Surveys and Programs in FY2018, identical to what was enacted for FY2017, $24.0 million (9.8%) more than the FY2018 request, and $14.0 million (5.5%) above the House-passed level. Periodic Censuses and Programs would receive $1,251.0 million in FY2018, which matches the requested and House-passed amounts and is $51.0 million (4.3%) above the FY2017-enacted level.
FY2017 ended without enactment of final FY2018 CJS appropriations legislation. Four continuing appropriations acts provided federal agencies with FY2018 funding at FY2017 appropriations levels, reduced by 0.6791%, through February 8, 2018. The Census Bureau, however, could apportion the funds for Periodic Censuses and Programs "up to the rate for operations necessary to maintain the schedule and deliver the required data according to statutory deadlines in the 2020 Decennial Census Program." A fifth act, H.R. 1892, P.L. 115-123, continues these provisions through March 23, 2018, with an additional $182.0 million for the 2020 census. |
crs_RS22388 | crs_RS22388_0 | This remained the situation for three decades: Taiwan and China remained officially at war; the United States continued to support the ROC claim as the legitimate government of all China, refused to recognize the legitimacy of the PRC, and maintained a defense alliance with the ROC government on Taiwan. Official U.S. The Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8 )—which remains the domestic legal authority for conducting unofficial U.S. relations with Taiwan today. Much of the TRA deals with the logistics of U.S.-Taiwan relations: the establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) as the unofficial U.S. representative for diplomatic interactions with Taiwan, including details about its staffing, functions, and funding. Strategic Ambiguity
After normalization of Sino-U.S. relations and the severing of the U.S.-ROC military alliance, the PRC was largely satisfied with U.S. "one-China" formulations alluding to Taiwan's political status. In that communiqué, the PRC cited it had a "fundamental policy" of striving for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question, while Washington stated that the United States did not:
seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan. – The Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, January 1, 1979 "In the Joint Communiqué [of January 1, 1979]... the United States of America ...acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.... Given the historical record and with continuing transformations in both the PRC and Taiwan political systems, U.S. officials may be facing new and more difficult policy choices concerning Taiwan in the coming years. Measures introduced in the 111 th Congress as of this writing include:
A bill establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan: H.Con.Res. 18 (introduced January 9, 2009, by Representative John Linder); A measure expressing U.S. concern over and support for peaceful resolution to Taiwan's political status: H.Con.Res. 200 (introduced October 15, 2009, by Representative Robert Andrews); A provision funding democracy assistance to Taiwan: in S. 1434 , the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 2010 (introduced July 9, 2009); And a provision requiring the Pentagon to assess and submit a report on the capabilities of Taiwan's air force and a five-year plan for fulfilling U.S. defense obligations to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act: in S. 1390 , the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (introduced July 2, 2009). | In 1979, official U.S. relations with Taiwan (the Republic of China) became a casualty of the American decision to recognize the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as China's sole legitimate government. Since then, U.S. unofficial relations with Taiwan have been built on the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8) and shaped by three U.S.-China communiqués. Under these agreements, the United States maintains its official relations with the PRC while selling Taiwan military weapons and having extensive economic, political, and security interests there. But developments in both the PRC and Taiwan political systems mean U.S. officials continually are facing new policy choices. These developments include ongoing transformations in both Taiwan's and the PRC's political systems, economic and trade cycles and, in 2008, a renewal of contacts, talks, and agreements between the two sides.
This report is intended as a background overview of the historical and political complexity associated with Taiwan's status in the world and its continuing policy ramifications. In brief, this report discusses the civil war on China in the 1940s that resulted in the victory of communist forces and the ROC government's flight to Taiwan; reviews the Taiwan government's continued recognition as the sole government of China by much of the world and the United States until 1979; and discusses the Taiwan government's eventual loss of diplomatic relations with the United States and with all but a handful of countries. The report further discusses how the United States handles its extensive ongoing economic and security interests in Taiwan in the absence of official relations, and places in context the recurring policy complications that these interests pose for U.S. relations with the PRC. This report lays out the background and framework that affect how U.S. relations with both Taiwan and China are conducted today. This report will not be updated, and readers wishing to follow current policy issues involving Taiwan and China should consult other regularly updated CRS reports. As of the date of this report, these include CRS Report R40493, Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Developments and Policy Implications; and CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.
Relevant legislation introduced in the 111th Congress as of the date of this report includes a measure that would establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan (H.Con.Res. 18, introduced January 9, 2009); a measure expressing U.S. concern over and support for peaceful resolution to Taiwan's political status (H.Con.Res. 200, introduced October 15, 2009); a provision funding democracy assistance to Taiwan (in S. 1434, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for 2010, introduced July 9, 2009); and a provision requiring the Pentagon to assess and submit a report on the capabilities of Taiwan's air force and a five-year plan for fulfilling U.S. defense obligations to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (in S. 1390, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010, introduced July 2, 2009). |
crs_RL34744 | crs_RL34744_0 | Introduction
This report provides an overview of the process for filling positions to which the President makes appointments with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions). It also specifies, for the 109 th Congress (January 2005-December 2006), all nominations to full-time positions on 33 regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions that have such positions (e.g., the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Election Assistance Commission). Profiles of each board and commission provide information on their organizational structures, membership as of the end of the 109 th Congress, and appointment activity during that Congress. Three distinct stages mark the appointment process: selection, clearance, and nomination by the President; consideration by the Senate; and appointment by the President. Most nominations are sent to a single committee. Appointments During the 109th Congress
During the 109 th Congress, President George W. Bush submitted nominations to the Senate for 84 of the 151 full-time positions on 33 regulatory and other boards and commissions. (Most of the remaining positions on these boards and commissions were not vacant during that time.) A total of 111 nominations were submitted for these positions, of which 79 were confirmed, 6 were withdrawn, and 26 were returned to the President. The number of nominations exceeded the number of positions for two reasons. President Bush made 12 recess appointments to regulatory and other boards and commissions: 10 when the Senate was adjourned during a session (intrasession recess appointments) and 2 between sessions (intersession recess appointments). Table 1 summarizes the appointment activity for the 109 th Congress. At the end of the 109 th Congress,12 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 12 vacancies among the 151 positions. The organizational sections discuss the statutory requirements for the appointed positions, including the number of members on each board or commission, their terms of office, whether or not they may continue in their positions after their terms expire, whether or not political balance is required, and the method for selection of the chair. The chair is also appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. | The President makes appointments, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to some 151 full-time leadership positions on 33 federal regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. This appointment process consists of three distinct stages: selection, clearance, and nomination by the President; consideration by the Senate; and appointment by the President. These advice and consent positions can also temporarily be filled by the President alone through a recess appointment. Membership positions on this set of collegial bodies often have fixed terms, and incumbents are often protected from arbitrary removal by the President. The enabling statutes for most of these boards and commissions require political party balance in their membership.
During the 109th Congress, President George W. Bush submitted nominations to the Senate for 84 of these 151 positions. (Most of the remaining positions on these boards and commissions were not vacant during that time.) A total of 111 nominations were submitted, of which 79 were confirmed, 6 were withdrawn, and 26 were returned to the President. The number of nominations exceeded the number of positions for reasons discussed in this report (e.g., nominations to a single position for successive terms). President Bush made 12 recess appointments to regulatory and other boards and commissions: 10 when the Senate was adjourned during a session (intrasession recess appointments) and 2 between sessions (intersession recess appointments). At the end of the 109th Congress, 12 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 12 vacancies among the 151 positions.
This report specifies, for the 109th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions on 33 regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. Profiles of each board and commission provide information on their organizational structures, membership as of end of the 109th Congress, and appointment activity during that Congress. The organizational section discusses the statutory requirements for the appointed positions, including the number of members on each board or commission, their terms of office, whether or not they may continue in their positions after their terms expire, whether or not political balance is required, and the method for selection of the chair. Membership and appointment activity are provided in tabular form. The report also includes tables summarizing the collective appointment activity for all 33 bodies, and identifying Senate recesses during the 109th Congress.
Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System at http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2004 edition of United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (more commonly known as the "Plum Book").
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RS21711 | crs_RS21711_0 | The regulation of online pharmacies and doctors consists of a patchwork of federal and state laws in an array of areas. At the federal level, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates prescription drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), which governs, among other things, the safety and efficacy of prescription medications, including the approval, manufacturing, and distribution of such drugs. Online prescription drug sales by both U.S.-based and foreign Internet pharmacies may raise additional legal questions involving drug importation. Like NABP, FSMB has developed a specific policy with regard to online pharmacies and doctors that prescribe drugs over the Internet. | This report provides a legal analysis of issues related to prescription drug sales on the Internet, including issues involving online pharmacies and physicians who prescribe medications over the Internet. Specifically, this report provides an overview of the various federal and state laws that regulate this field, including laws and regulations covering prescription drugs, controlled substances, doctors, and pharmacies. Legislators have introduced the following bills in the 110th Congress: H.R. 194, H.R. 380, S. 242, S. 251, S. 554, S. 596, and S. 980. Additionally, in May 2007, the Senate passed S. 1082, which would create a new section addressing online sales of prescription drugs in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). |
crs_R42090 | crs_R42090_0 | Introduction
Each year, in October, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) publishes the Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook (STEWFO). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides heating degree-day estimates to the EIA for the STEWFO. Regional differences in weather, along with regional fuel usage patterns, can cause regional expenditure projections to vary from the U.S. average. In the Northeast, heating degree-days are expected to increase by 3.4%, while in the West they are expected to decrease by 3.1%. On average, the EIA projects that U.S. household expenditure on heating fuel for the 2013-2014 heating season will rise for households heating with natural gas, electricity, and propane while those using heating oil will see their expenditures decline. The STEWFO projects an increase in total natural gas consumption of less than 1% from 2013 to 2014. As a result, the price of home heating oil is closely related to the price of crude oil as well as the price of diesel fuel. The EIA projects increasing heating expenditures for areas heating with electricity. In a period of relatively weak economic growth, with persistent high unemployment, the key relationship may be that between the level of economic activity, measured by the real growth rate of gross domestic product, and the prices of natural gas and crude oil. Even in the face of a growing reserve base and increased production, U.S. natural gas prices are expected to increase by about 11% for consumers, on average, this heating season. Heating Expenditure Assistance
The Low Income Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) is the primary federal government program to supplement home heating expenditures. It has not been announced whether the program will continue in the 2013-2014 winter heating season. | The Energy Information Administration (EIA), in its Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook (STEWFO) for the 2013-2014 winter heating season, projects that American consumers should expect to see heating expenditures that on average will be somewhat higher than last winter. Average expenditures for those heating with natural gas are projected to increase by 13.4%, while those heating with electricity are projected to see an increase in expenditures of about 2.1%. These two fuels serve as the heating source for about 89% of all U.S. household heating. Propane and home heating oil consumers are also projected to see increased and decreased expenditures, respectively.
Within the U.S. average projections, differences exist with respect to region of the country and type of fuel.
Economic conditions of slow growth and relatively high unemployment suggest that lower consumption of all fuels may occur, especially in the context of the mixed winter weather conditions as forecast by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). While the price of natural gas is expected to increase, the price of oil has been relatively high over the past year. If the price of oil spikes for an extended amount of time, or if the price of natural gas increases more than projected, heating costs might be expected to rise above projected levels for many consumers. Lower prices could reduce seasonal heating expenditures.
Uncertainty exists with respect to the status of funding for the Low Income Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), the key federal program assisting low-income households with heating expenditures.
It has not been announced whether the CITGO program to assist some U.S. heating oil consumers will be continued. |
crs_RS20771 | crs_RS20771_0 | Thiscomprehensive assessment could profoundly effect the nation's ability to carry out its national security strategy inthe new millennium. Its most significant contributions includedsuggestions that DoD undertake a major quadrennial strategy review and thatthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a clear vision for future joint operations. The Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996 established the independent National Defense Panel (NDP) as a forum to review the results of the 1997 QDR. (10)
The purpose of the 2001 QDR as stated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 is to1) delineate a military strategy consistent with the most recent NationalSecurity Strategy (11) , 2) define the defense programsto successfully execute the full range of missions assigned the military by that strategy, and 3) identify the budgetplan necessary tosuccessfully execute those missions at a low-to-moderate level of risk. Timing of the QDR. | The congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directs DoD toundertake a wide-ranging review of strategy, programs,and resources. Specifically, the QDR is expected to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the mostrecent National Security Strategy by defining force structure,modernization plans, and a budget plan allowing the military to successfully execute the full range of missionswithin that strategy. The report will include an evaluation by theSecretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the military's ability to successfully execute itsmissions at a low-to-moderate level of risk within the forecast budgetplan. The results of the 2001 QDR could well shape U.S. strategy and force structure in coming years. This reportwill be updated as future events warrant. |
crs_R44948 | crs_R44948_0 | Introduction
The Social Security Administration (SSA) is responsible for administering two federal entitlement programs that provide income support to individuals with severe, long-term disabilities: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSDI is a work-related social insurance program that provides monthly cash benefits to nonelderly disabled workers and their eligible dependents, provided the workers accrued a sufficient number of earnings credits during their careers in jobs subject to Social Security taxes. In contrast, SSI is a need-based public assistance program that provides monthly cash payments to aged, blind, or disabled individuals (including blind or disabled children) who have limited assets and little or no Social Security or other income. In 2017, SSDI and SSI combined paid an estimated $199 billion in federally administered benefits to 14.5 million qualified disabled individuals and 1.5 million non-disabled dependents of disabled workers. Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), commonly known as Social Security, is a federal social insurance program established under Title II of the Social Security Act that provides workers and their families with a measure of protection against the loss of income due to the worker's retirement, disability, or death. The SSDI component of the program, which was enacted in 1956 and implemented in 1957, provides monthly benefits to statutorily disabled workers who are under Social Security's full retirement age (FRA) and to their eligible spouses, divorced spouses, minor children, student children, and disabled adult children. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) component of Social Security also provides benefits to eligible disabled dependents of retired workers and to eligible survivors of deceased beneficiaries and deceased insured workers. Although these individuals are not technically disability insurance beneficiaries, they are often included in the term SSDI , because they receive Social Security benefits due to a qualifying impairment. Cash Benefits
Social Security Benefit Formula
Initial monthly Social Security benefits are based on an insured worker's creditable, career-average earnings in Social Security-covered employment or self-employment. Social Security is financed primarily by dedicated payroll and self-employment taxes levied on the earnings of workers in jobs covered by Social Security. SSI is commonly known as a program of "last resort" because claimants must first apply for most other benefits for which they may be eligible; cash assistance is awarded only to those whose assets and other income (if any) are within prescribed limits. The basic federal SSI payment is the same for all recipients and is reduced by most other income that an individual receives. Some states supplement the federal payment using state funds. Under the SSI program, an individual or couple must be aged, blind, or disabled to qualify for payments. For example, the program excludes the following:
the first $20 per month of any income (earned or unearned), other than unearned income based on need that is totally or partially funded by the federal government or by a non-governmental agency (e.g., TANF); the first $65 per month of earned income plus one-half of any earnings above $65; the first $30 per calendar quarter of infrequent or irregular earned income; the first $60 per calendar quarter of infrequent or irregular unearned income; food assistance provided under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program; energy assistance provided under the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP); housing assistance provided by most federally funded housing programs; federal tax refunds and advanced tax credits, including the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the child tax credit (CTC); assistance based on need that is funded wholly by a state or local entity; the first $2,000 received during a calendar year as compensation for participation in a clinical trial involving research and testing of treatments for a rare disease or condition; impairment-related work expenses (IRWEs) for disabled recipients and blind work expenses (BWEs) for blind recipients; and any income used to fulfill a plan to achieving self-support (PASS). Most adults are considered disabled for SSDI and SSI eligibility purposes if they are "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Adults generally qualify as disabled for SSDI and SSI purposes if they have an impairment (or combination of impairments) of such severity that they are unable to perform any kind of substantial work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, taking into consideration their age, education, and work experience. | The Social Security Administration (SSA) is responsible for administering two federal entitlement programs established under the Social Security Act that provide income support to individuals with severe, long-term disabilities: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSDI is a work-related social insurance program authorized under Title II of the act that provides monthly cash benefits to nonelderly disabled workers and their eligible dependents, provided the workers accrued a sufficient number of earnings credits during their careers in jobs subject to Social Security taxes. In contrast, SSI is a need-based public assistance program authorized under Title XVI of the act that provides monthly cash payments to aged, blind, or disabled individuals (including blind or disabled children) who have limited assets and little or no Social Security or other income. In 2017, SSDI and SSI combined paid an estimated $199 billion in federally administered benefits to 14.5 million qualified disabled individuals and 1.5 million non-disabled dependents of disabled workers.
SSDI is part of the federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, commonly known as Social Security. OASDI benefits are based on an insured worker's career-average earnings in jobs covered by Social Security and designed to replace a portion of the income lost to a family due to the worker's retirement, disability, or death. Workers become insured against these events by acquiring a certain number of earnings credits during their careers in covered employment or self-employment. The SSDI component of the program provides benefits to disabled workers who are under Social Security's full retirement age and to their eligible spouses and children. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) component also provides disability benefits to eligible disabled dependents of retired workers and to eligible disabled survivors of deceased beneficiaries and deceased insured workers. Although these individuals are not technically disability insurance beneficiaries, they are often included in the term SSDI because they receive Social Security benefits due to a qualifying impairment. SSDI and OASI disability benefits are paid from the Social Security trust funds, which are financed primarily by payroll and self-employment taxes levied on the earnings of covered workers.
SSI is a federal assistance program that provides needy aged, blind, or disabled individuals with a guaranteed minimum income to meet their basic living expenses. Although there are no work or contribution requirements to qualify for payments, the program is based on need and therefore is restricted to individuals with limited financial means. SSI is commonly known as a program of "last resort" because claimants must first apply for most other benefits for which they may be eligible; cash assistance is awarded only to those whose assets and other income (if any) are within prescribed limits. The basic federal SSI payment is the same for all recipients and is reduced by the amount of other income that an individual receives. Some states supplement the federal SSI payment with solely state funds. Unlike Social Security, SSI is financed by appropriations from general revenues.
Most claimants are considered disabled for SSDI and SSI eligibility purposes if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that is expected to last for at least 12 months or to result in death. In 2018, the SGA earnings limit is $1,180 per month for most individuals. Claimants generally qualify if they have an impairment (or combination of impairments) of such severity that they are unable to perform any kind of substantial work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, taking into consideration their age, education, and work experience. If a claimant's application for benefits is denied at any point during the disability determination process, the claimant has the right to appeal the determination or decision. |
crs_RL34077 | crs_RL34077_0 | 110-153 ) on S.Con.Res. The FY2008 budget resolution includes reconciliation instructions that direct authorizing committees to report legislation to reduce mandatory spending for the period FY2007-FY2012. These reductions in mandatory spending are sufficiently large that they offset a broad array of new and enhanced student aid benefits. FY2008 Budget Reconciliation Provisions
The savings in mandatory spending required by the FY2008 budget reconciliation instructions for the House Committee on Education and Labor, and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and enacted in P.L. 110-84 , are achieved through changes to the FFEL program. On June 25, 2007, the House Committee on Education and Labor reported H.R. 2669 , the College Cost Reduction Act of 2007 ( H.Rept. 110-210 ). On July 10, 2007, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions reported S. 1762 , the Higher Education Access Act of 2007. Through these measures, each committee reported reconciliation recommendations meeting the requirements of the FY2008 budget resolution. On July 11, 2007, the House passed H.R. The Senate incorporated all of the provisions of S. 1762 into H.R. 2669 and passed it on July 20, 2007. 2669 , H.Rept. On September 27, 2007, the President signed the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 into law as P.L. 110-84 . This section of the report begins by reviewing and briefly describing the major proposals contained in each the House-passed and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 2669 to achieve savings in mandatory spending through changes to the federal student loan programs and to enhance student aid benefits and make other changes to existing federal student aid programs and provisions. It then proceeds to review and describe the major changes enacted under P.L. 110-84 that are projected to achieve savings in mandatory spending and those that establish new or enhanced student aid benefits or that otherwise amend pre-existing federal student aid programs. This report is structured to provide a record of proposals designed to achieve savings in mandatory spending or to provide new or enhanced student aid benefits considered during FY2008 budget reconciliation and that have gained passage by one or both chambers, as well as those enacted into law. The provisions for new or enhanced aid to specific institutions of higher education (IHEs), or adjustments to campus-based aid would
establish a competitive grants program through a mandatory appropriation of $15 million per year in FY2008-FY2012, for IHEs that have an annual percentage increase in net tuition that is equal to or less than the percentage change in the higher education price index for that year, with funds to be distributed by the IHE in the form of need-based grant aid to students who are eligible for Pell Grants; and provide bonus rewards to IHEs for guaranteeing the amount of tuition and fees a student will pay for a specific number of years with funds to be distributed by the IHE in the form of need-based grant aid to students who are eligible for Pell Grants; provide a mandatory appropriation of $15 million per year in FY2008-FY2012 to establish cooperative education grant rewards for IHEs that restrain tuition increases and support demonstration projects, training and resource centers, and research related to cooperative education; create Centers of Excellence at minority-serving institutions (MSIs) which are focused on teacher preparation programs; and provide $50 million for the period covering FY2008-FY2012, through a mandatory appropriation; create a new program for historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), Hispanic-serving institutions (HSIs), tribal colleges and universities, Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian-serving institutions, Predominantly Black Institutions (PBIs), and Asian and Pacific Islander-serving institutions and provide through mandatory appropriation $100 million per year for FY2008-FY2012; create and support through a mandatory appropriation of $300 million for the period covering FY2008-FY2012, a College Access Challenge Grant Program, which makes funds available to philanthropic organizations to provide need-based grants, mentoring, and outreach programs; provide, through mandatory appropriation, $30 million per year for FY2008-FY2011 to support specified Upward Bound programs that receive a high rating on their grant application; and provide $100 million in mandatory funding for Perkins Loan federal capital contributions each year for FY2008-FY2012. They also generate the $750 million in savings over the 2007-2012 period needed to meet the requirements of the reconciliation directives. The projected net savings is roughly $752 million over the 2007-2012 period and $3.6 billion over the 2007-2017 period. | The College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 was enacted as P.L. 110-84 on September 27, 2007. P.L. 110-84 makes changes to programs authorized under the Higher Education Act of 1965 and, in so doing, achieves projected savings of $752 million in mandatory spending over the period covering FY2007 through FY2012 and $3.6 billion over the period covering FY2007 through FY2017.
The FY2008 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 21, H.Rept. 110-153) contains reconciliation instructions that require the House Committee on Education and Labor and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions to report reconciliation legislation to reduce mandatory spending by $750 million over the period covering FY2007 through FY2012. As required, these committees reported reconciliation recommendations producing the required savings to their parent chamber prior to September 10, 2007.
Each of the aforementioned authorizing committees marked up a bill in June of 2007 with reconciliation recommendations that generate the required savings in mandatory spending. Each chamber also considered a broad set of Higher Education Act (HEA) amendments in conjunction with the reconciliation proposals. Under each bill, the required savings are achieved through cuts in payments to Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program lenders and guaranty agencies. Both bills generate substantially higher levels of savings in mandatory spending than required by the reconciliation directive, and the additional savings offset costs associated with a broad array of new or enhanced student aid benefits.
On June 25, 2007, the House Committee on Education and Labor reported H.R. 2669, the College Cost Reduction Act of 2007 (H.Rept. 110-210), containing the required reconciliation proposals. On July 11, 2007, the measure was adopted by the House. On July 10, 2007, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions reported S. 1762, the Higher Education Access Act of 2007, containing its reconciliation recommendations. The provisions of S. 1762, were incorporated into the Senate version of H.R. 2669, which the Senate passed on July 20, 2007.
This report reviews and briefly describes the major proposals contained in both the House-passed and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 2669 to achieve savings in mandatory spending through changes to federal student loan programs and to enhance student aid benefits or make other changes to existing federal student aid programs. It also reviews and describes the major changes enacted under P.L. 110-84 that are projected to achieve savings in mandatory spending and those that establish new or enhanced student aid benefits or that otherwise amend pre-existing federal student aid programs. This report is structured to provide a record of proposals to achieve savings in mandatory spending or to provide new or enhanced student aid benefits considered during FY2008 budget reconciliation and that have gained passage by one or both chambers, as well as those enacted into law. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45163 | crs_R45163_0 | F rom 2007-2009, the United States experienced what many commentators believe was the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. In the wake of the financial crisis, policymakers began working on legislation to reform the financial system, and in July 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank or the Act). Title IX of Dodd-Frank, entitled "Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities," focuses on the powers and authorities of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an independent agency created by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to enforce federal securities law. Title IX authorizes the SEC to promulgate certain rules intended to enhance corporate accountability and governance. This report discusses two aspects of Title IX that have seen significant developments in early 2018. First, in February 2018, the Supreme Court rendered a potentially significant decision with respect to a new SEC whistleblower program instituted by Dodd-Frank, resolving a dispute that had arisen among the lower courts as to the scope of individuals who could avail themselves of anti-retaliation protections provided by the Act. The report discusses the SEC's adoption of the rule, the rule's operation, and potential challenges that may be brought to the pay ratio disclosure requirement now that it is in operation. In a ruling that narrows the scope of Section 922, on February 21, 2018, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Digital Realty, Inc. v. Somers . Specifically, in Digital Realty , the Court held that Section 922's whistleblower protections do not apply to internal whistleblowers—that is, those who report violations within their organizations but not to the SEC. This tension between Dodd-Frank's definition of the term "whistleblower" and its incorporation of SOX in the anti-retaliation provision is at the heart of Digital Realty . Dodd-Frank Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule: Recent Developments
Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank directs the SEC to promulgate a rule requiring reporting companies to disclose in certain public filings the ratio of (a) the median annual total compensation of all of its employees (i.e., the median employee's compensation) to (b) the annual total compensation of its chief executive officer. In setting forth the "formula" for the pay ratio calculation, as discussed in more detail below, the SEC opted for a largely flexible approach that it regarded as being compliant with applicable statutory requirements while taking due consideration of compliance costs. The Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 would repeal the section of Dodd-Frank authorizing the conflict minerals rule. | From 2007-2009, the United States experienced what many commentators believe was the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. In the wake of the crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) in 2010. Title IX of Dodd-Frank, entitled "Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities," focuses on the powers and authorities of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and authorizes the SEC to promulgate certain rules intended to enhance corporate accountability and corporate governance. This report discusses recent developments with respect to two aspects of Title IX, including legislative proposals such as the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 (H.R. 10, 115th Cong.) that would change or repeal aspects of Title IX.
First, in February 2018, the Supreme Court issued a potentially significant decision in Digital Realty, Inc. v. Somers. The case involved the new SEC whistleblower program instituted by Section 922 of Dodd-Frank and resolved a dispute that had arisen among the lower courts as to the scope of individuals who could avail themselves of anti-retaliation protections provided by the Act. In Digital Realty, the Court held that Dodd-Frank's whistleblower protections do not apply to internal whistleblowers—that is, those who report violations within their organizations but not to the SEC. The dispute between the parties (and the lower courts) resulted from the tension between Dodd-Frank's definition of the term "whistleblower" and its incorporation of a reference to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in Section 922's anti-retaliation provision. As this report discusses, the Supreme Court's decision has potentially important implications for the enforcement of securities law, especially as Congress considers further changes to Dodd-Frank's whistleblower program.
Second, in early 2018, reporting companies began to formally comply with the SEC's "pay ratio rule." That rule was promulgated pursuant to Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank, which requires public disclosure of the ratio between the annual total compensation of a company's median employee to the annual total compensation of its Chief Executive Officer (i.e., the company's median worker to CEO pay ratio). In promulgating the rule, the SEC adopted a largely flexible approach that it regarded as satisfying Dodd-Frank's statutory requirements while taking due consideration of the high compliance costs for companies. The report further discusses potential challenges that may be brought to the pay ratio disclosure requirement. Included in this discussion is a comparison between the pay ratio rule and the so-called "conflict minerals rule" and "resource extraction rule" the SEC previously promulgated pursuant to Dodd-Frank. |
crs_R44469 | crs_R44469_0 | Historical Regulation of Government Employees' Political Activities
Employees in the executive branch of the federal government have been subject to certain limitations and restrictions on their partisan political activities for over a century. A general ban on voluntary, off-duty participation in partisan politics by merit system employees was instituted by executive order in 1907. Employees retained their right to vote and privately express political opinions, but were prohibited from taking "active part in political management or in political campaigns." Known as Civil Service Rule 1, this restriction and all of the administrative interpretations under it were eventually codified in 1939 and made applicable to most federal executive branch employees under a law commonly known as the Hatch Act. With the advent of the modern, more independent and merit-based civil service, and the adoption of increased statutory and regulatory protections of federal employees against improper coercion and retaliation, the need for a broad ban on all voluntary, outside activities in politics as a means to protect employees was seen as less necessary and more restrictive of the rights of private expression of millions of citizens than was needed to accomplish the goals of the Hatch Act. The 1993 amendments allow most federal employees to engage in a wide range of voluntary, partisan political activities in their time off-duty, away from their federal jobs, and off of any federal premises. These restrictions generally prohibit such employees from the following:
using their "official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election"; soliciting, accepting, or receiving political campaign contributions from any person; running "for election to a partisan political office"; soliciting or discouraging participation in political activity of any person who either has an application for a grant, contract, or other status pending before the employing agency or is the subject of an ongoing audit, investigation, or enforcement action by the employing agency; engaging in partisan political activity on official duty time; on federal property; while wearing a uniform or insignia identifying them as federal officials or employees; or while using a government vehicle. Further Restricted Employees
Some employees covered by the Hatch Act are subject to additional restrictions under current law, and may be referred to as "further restricted employees." The changing nature of the workplace may raise questions regarding the balance between personal and professional activity, including various platforms of political activity such as email, mobile devices, social media, and telework. The scope of the prohibition on political activities on duty, including such activities conducted in the federal workplace, depends largely on the general definitions of these terms. These terms are particularly relevant when applying the Hatch Act to new work scenarios. Email and Mobile Communications
Although email has been a common tool in federal offices for decades, the prevalence of smartphones, both for personal and professional use, over the last decade has highlighted new issues in regulation of political activity under the Hatch Act. | Federal officers and employees historically have been subject to certain limitations when engaging in partisan political activities. Although they have always retained their right to vote and privately express political opinions, for most of the last century, they were prohibited from being actively involved in political management or political campaigns. At the beginning of the 20th century, civil service rules imposed a general ban on voluntary, off-duty participation in partisan politics by merit system employees. The ban prohibited employees from using their "official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the result thereof." These rules were eventually codified in 1939 and are commonly known as the Hatch Act.
By the late 20th century, such broad restrictions were seen as unnecessary due to other changes in the nature of the federal workforce, including the advent of a more independent and merit-based civil service and adoption of increased protections for employees against coercion and retaliation. Accordingly, the Hatch Act was significantly amended in 1993 to relax the broad ban on political activities, and now allows most employees to engage in a wide range of voluntary, partisan political activities in their free time, while away from the federal workplace. Some employees may be subject to additional restrictions depending on the employing agency or an employee's specific position.
The nature of the federal workforce and work environment has continued to evolve since these amendments, and new issues have arisen for congressional consideration in recent years. In particular, the increased use of technology has raised questions about how email and mobile communications may be regulated under the Hatch Act. The increased availability and use of smartphones may be seen as blurring an employee's time, either by using a personal device while working or using a government device while off-duty. Additionally, alternative work arrangements, for example, telework, have presented similar dilemmas in understanding how Hatch Act restrictions might be applied in the modern workplace.
This report examines the history of regulation of federal employees' partisan political activity under the Hatch Act and related federal regulations. It discusses the scope of the application of these restrictions to different categories of employees and provides a background analysis of the general restrictions currently in place. Finally, it analyzes potential issues that have arisen and interpretations that have been offered related to the application of these restrictions to new platforms of activity, for example, email, social media, and telework. |
crs_R44649 | crs_R44649_0 | The Department of the Treasury
This report examines FY2017 appropriations for the Treasury Department and its operating bureaus, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). At its most basic level of organization, the Treasury Department is a collection of departmental offices and operating bureaus. The operating budgets for most Treasury bureaus and offices are funded largely through annual discretionary appropriations. This is true for the IRS, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, Office of the Inspector General, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and Community Development Financial Institutions Fund. Treasury Appropriations Accounts and Their Purposes
Treasury appropriations in FY2016 were distributed among the following 11 accounts. Of the requested funding, $38 million would have gone to executive direction, $59 million to international affairs and economic policy, $76 million to domestic finance and tax policy, $117 million to TFI, and $43 million to Treasury management and related programs. It also incorporated decreases of $1.0 million from non-recurring expenses, $1.4 million from efficiency improvements; $7.0 million from covering Treasury's cost for administering the Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund in through a withdrawal of $7.0 million from the Fund, and $3.0 million from transferring DO cybersecurity investments to a new account: the Cybersecurity Enhancement Account. 115-31
Under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, DO is receiving $224.4 million in appropriations, or $1.9 million more than the amount enacted for FY2016. Office of Inspector General
Budget Request
The Obama Administration's FY2017 budget request for the Treasury Department included $37.0 million in appropriated funds for OIG or $1.6 million more than the amount enacted for FY2016. Bureau of the Fiscal Service
The President's budget request would have given the BFS $353.1 million in appropriations in FY2017, or $10.8 million less than the amount enacted for FY2016. Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF)
The Treasury Department's budget request for FY2017 would have canceled permanently $657.0 million in unobligated balances from the TFF. Of this amount, $2.469 billion was to go to taxpayer services, $5.216 billion to enforcement (including a $231.3 million program integrity cap adjustment under Section 251(b)(2) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 ( P.L. 5485
As passed by the House, the bill would have provided $10.999 billion in appropriations for the IRS in FY2017, or $236 million below the amount enacted for FY2016 and $1.281 billion below the budget request. Under H.R. S. 3067
The bill, as reported by the Senate Finance Committee, would have provided $11.235 billion in appropriations for the IRS in FY2017, or the same amount that was enacted for FY2016 but $1.045 billion less than the budget request. In reviewing future IRS budget requests, Congress may want to consider the advantages and disadvantages of paying for increases in IRS's enforcement activities through such an adjustment. | At its most basic level of organization, the Treasury Department is a collection of departmental offices and operating bureaus. The bureaus as a whole typically account for 95% of Treasury's budget and workforce. Most bureaus and offices are funded through annual appropriations.
Treasury appropriations are distributed among 12 accounts in FY2017: (1) Departmental Offices (DO), (2) Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), (3) Cybersecurity Enhancement Account (CEA), (4) Department-wide Systems and Capital Investments Program (DSCIP), (5) Office of Inspector General (OIG), (6) Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), (7) Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), (8) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), (9) Bureau of the Fiscal Service (BFS), (10) Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (ATTB), (11) Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFIF), and (12) the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
The President's budget request for FY2017 called for the Treasury Department to receive $13.144 billion in appropriations, including a rescission of $657 million for the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF). Of the requested funds, $12.280 billion would have gone to the IRS; $353 million to the BFS; $217 million to DO; $117 million to TFI; $246 million to CDFIF; $170 million to TIGTA; $115 million to FinCEN; $106 million to ATTB; $41 million to SIGTARP; $37 million to OIG; and $5 million to DSCIP.
In July 2016, the House approved a bill (H.R. 5485) providing appropriations for the Treasury Department and several other agencies in FY2017. Under the measure, Treasury would have received $11.694 billion in appropriations, including a rescission of $754 million from the TFF. This amount was $248 million less than the amount enacted for FY2016 and $1.450 billion less than the budget request.
During the previous month, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported a bill (S. 3067) to fund Treasury in FY2017. Under the measure, Treasury would have received $12.040 billion in appropriations, including a rescission of $657 million from the TFF. The recommended amount was $98 million below the amount enacted for FY2016 and $1.104 billion less than the budget request.
The congressional debate over funding for the IRS in FY2017 raised at least three issues: (1) the appropriate size of the IRS budget in light of recent budget cuts, (2) the advantages and disadvantages of using discretionary funding cap adjustments under the Balanced Budget Act of 2011 to pay for new IRS enforcement activities, and (3) the impact on the IRS budget of the budget scoring convention of disregarding the net revenue effect of agency administrative programs, including enforcement actions.
Under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), the 12 Treasury appropriations accounts received the following amounts for FY2017: (1) DO: $224.4 million, (2) TFI: $123.0 million, (3) CEA: $47.7 million, (4) DSCIP: $3.0 million, (5) OIG: $37.0 million, (6) TIGTA: $169.6 million, (7) SIGTARP: $41.2 million, (8) FinCEN: $115.0 million, (9) BFS: $353.1 million, (10) ATTB: $111.4 million, (11) CDFIF: $248 million, and (12) IRS: $11.235 billion. |
crs_RS22183 | crs_RS22183_0 | Trade Preferences and GATT MFN Requirements
As parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), World Trade Organization (WTO) Members must under Article I:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) grant most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment "immediately and unconditionally" to like products of other Members with respect to customs duties and import charges, internal taxes and regulations, and other trade-related matters. Tariff preference programs for developing countries, however, are facially inconsistent with MFN obligations. Because of the conflict with MFN obligations, GATT Parties in 1971 adopted a waiver of Article I for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to allow developed contracting parties to accord more favorable tariff treatment to the products of developing countries for 10 years. The Enabling Clause has since been incorporated into the GATT 1994. The United States has also obtained waivers for the following programs: (1) the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), as amended, through December 31, 2014; (2) the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), as amended, through December 31, 2014; and (3) the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), through September 30, 2015. The AB found instead that developed countries can grant preferences beyond those provided in their GSP to developing countries with particular needs, but only if identical treatment is available to all similarly situated GSP beneficiaries. In December 2010, Congress enacted legislation extending Andean trade preferences, as accorded to Colombia and Ecuador, through February 12, 2011. Andean benefits for Peru, which has been a party to a free trade agreement with the United States since February 2009, were terminated as of December 31, 2010, in the same enactment. While Congress did not reauthorize the GSP program upon its December 2010 expiration, it has since extended the program through July 31, 2013, and authorized the retroactive application of duty-free rates and other GSP benefits to entries of goods made after December 31, 2010, in P.L. 112-40 . The U.S-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, P.L. 112-42 , extended ATPA benefits to Colombia and Ecuador through July 31, 2013, with retroactive application to February 12, 2011; however, pursuant to the act, the President removed Colombia from the GSP and ATPA programs when the U.S-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement entered into force on May 15, 2012. Congress has made the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) program permanent and has authorized through September 30, 2020, the expanded tariff benefits contained in the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act and as well as tariff preferences for Haiti enacted in 2010. 2387 (McDermott), S. 105 (Ensign), and S. 1244 (Inouye) would extend duty-free benefits to certain apparel items from the Philippines subject to the President's certification that the Philippines is meeting enumerated trade and customs-related conditions. Under H.R. 2387 and S. 1244 , benefits would remain in effect for seven years after they were proclaimed by the President and would terminate were the Philippines to become ineligible for GSP treatment. S. 105 would extend benefits for 10 years after proclamation, subject to GSP eligibility. S. 1443 (Feinstein) would authorize through December 31, 2022, duty-free treatment for certain items deemed import-sensitive under the GSP as well as extend certain AGOA textile benefits for certain least-developed countries in Asia and the South Pacific. H.R. | Article I:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) requires World Trade Organization (WTO) Members to grant most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment "immediately and unconditionally" to like products of other Members with respect to tariffs and other trade-related measures. Programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), under which developed countries grant preferential tariff rates to developing country goods, are facially inconsistent with this obligation because these programs accord goods of some countries more favorable tariff treatment than that accorded to like goods of other WTO Members. Because such programs have been viewed as trade-expanding, however, parties to the GATT incorporated a clause to provide a legal basis for one-way tariff preferences (the Enabling Clause) into the GATT 1994 agreement. In 2004, the WTO Appellate Body ruled that the Enabling Clause allows developed countries to offer differing treatment to developing countries in a GSP program, but only if identical treatment is available to all similarly situated beneficiaries.
In addition to GSP programs, some WTO Members may also grant preferences to products of particular groups of countries. In such cases, Members have generally obtained time-limited WTO waivers of GATT Article I:l and, if needed, other GATT obligations. The United States holds temporary WTO waivers for tariff preferences granted to the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and for three regional preference schemes: (1) the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), as amended; (2) the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), as amended; and (3) the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
Congress has made the CBERA program permanent and has authorized through September 30, 2020, the expanded tariff benefits contained in the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act and subsequent legislation particular to Haiti. The AGOA program is authorized through September 30, 2015. In December 2010, Congress extended Andean trade preferences, as accorded to Colombia and Ecuador, through February 12, 2011, and terminated Andean benefits for Peru, which has been a party to a free trade agreement with the United States since February 2009. While Congress did not reauthorize the GSP program upon its December 2010 expiration, it has since extended the program through July 31, 2013, and authorized the retroactive application of duty-free rates and other GSP benefits to entries of goods made after December 31, 2010, in P.L. 112-40. The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, P.L. 112-42, extended ATPA benefits to Colombia and Ecuador through July 31, 2013, with retroactive application to February 12, 2011; however, pursuant to the act, the President removed Colombia from the GSP and ATPA programs after the U.S-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement entered into force on May 15, 2012.
H.R. 2387 (McDermott), S. 105 (Ensign), and S. 1244 (Inouye) would extend duty-free benefits to certain apparel items from the Philippines subject to the President's certification that the Philippines is meeting enumerated trade and customs-related conditions. Under H.R. 2387 and S. 1244, benefits would remain in effect for seven years after they were proclaimed by the President and would terminate were the Philippines to become ineligible for GSP treatment. S. 105 would extend benefits for 10 years after proclamation, subject to GSP eligibility. S. 1443 (Feinstein) would authorize through December 31, 2022, duty-free treatment for certain items deemed import-sensitive under the GSP as well as extend certain AGOA textile benefits for certain least-developed countries in Asia and the South Pacific. |
crs_R42393 | crs_R42393_0 | Enduring U.S. However, many long-standing U.S. goals in the region endure. Congress and U.S. Policy28
The fluidity and ambiguity of events in the Middle East since early 2011 have created a challenging menu of choices for Members of Congress and Administration officials. U.S. What overarching principles and interests should guide the U.S. response to change in the Middle East? With what relative importance and priority? Should U.S. responses be tailored to individual circumstances or guided by a unified set of principles, assumptions, and goals? How can U.S. interests in security, commerce, energy, good governance, and human rights best be reconciled? What are the relative risks and rewards of immediately or directly acting to shape the course of unrest and transitions in the Arab world? What are the potential risks and rewards of a gradual response or of a "wait-and-see" approach? What are other regional and global actors doing or not doing to shape outcomes? Why or why not? At what risk or benefit to U.S. interests? How have established patterns of interaction and existing policies in the Middle East served U.S. interests over time? How have they shaped the range of choices now available to U.S. decision makers, both from a regional perspective and in specific countries? In what ways, if any, should legislative precedent, bureaucratic infrastructure, and funding patterns be revisited? What are the relative roles and responsibilities of Congress and the executive branch in defining future policy? How are U.S. interests and options affected by trends associated with the ongoing change in the Middle East, such as the democratic empowerment of Islamist parties, the weakening of state security authority, or the increased assertiveness of public opinion as an influence on regional policy makers? What new opportunities and risks might these trends entail? How should U.S. policy responses to political change in the broader Middle East be informed by parallel and longer-standing concerns about the Iranian nuclear program, transnational terrorism, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? How should an understanding of the implications of Arab political change inform U.S. policy on other major policy questions? | The political change and unrest that have swept through the Middle East and North Africa since early 2011 are likely to have profound consequences for the pursuit of long-standing U.S. policy goals in the region with regard to regional security, global energy supplies, U.S. military access, bilateral trade and investment, counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, and the promotion of human rights. The profound changes in the region may alter the framework in which these goals are pursued and challenge the basic assumptions that have long guided U.S. policy.
This report assesses some of the policy implications of recent and ongoing events in the region, provides an overview of U.S. responses to date, and explores select case studies to illustrate some key questions and dilemmas that Congress and the executive branch may face with regard to these issues and others in the future. Questions for possible congressional consideration raised in this report and in corresponding country reports include:
What overarching principles and interests should guide the U.S. response to change in the Middle East? With what relative importance and priority? Should U.S. responses be tailored to individual circumstances or guided by a unified set of principles, assumptions, and goals? How can U.S. interests in security, commerce, energy, good governance, and human rights best be reconciled? What are the relative risks and rewards of immediately or directly acting to shape the course of unrest and transitions in the Arab world? What are the potential risks and rewards of a gradual response or of a "wait-and-see" approach? What are other regional and global actors doing or not doing to shape outcomes? Why or why not? At what risk or benefit to U.S. interests? How have established patterns of interaction and existing policies in the Middle East served U.S. interests over time? How have they shaped the range of choices now available to U.S. decision makers, both from a regional perspective and in specific countries? In what ways, if any, should legislative precedent, bureaucratic infrastructure, and funding patterns be revisited? What are the relative roles and responsibilities of Congress and the executive branch in defining future policy? How are U.S. interests and options affected by trends associated with the ongoing change in the Middle East, such as the democratic empowerment of Islamist parties, the weakening of state security authority, or the increased assertiveness of public opinion as an influence on regional policy makers? What new opportunities and risks might these trends entail? How should U.S. policy responses to political change in the broader Middle East be informed by parallel and longer-standing concerns about the Iranian nuclear program, transnational terrorism, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? How should an understanding of the implications of Arab political change inform U.S. policy on other major policy questions? |
crs_R41408 | crs_R41408_0 | Introduction
The term revenue is defined as funds collected from the public that arise from the government's exercise of its sovereign or governmental powers. Federal revenues come from a variety of sources, including individual and corporate income taxes, excise taxes, customs duties, estate and gift taxes, fees and fines, payroll taxes for social insurance programs, and miscellaneous receipts (such as earnings of the Federal Reserve System, donations, and bequests). The executive branch often uses the term receipts or governmental receipts in place of the term revenues . The collection of revenue is a fundamental component of the federal budget process that provides the government with the money necessary to fund agencies and programs. Further, the collection of revenue directly effects individual citizens and businesses and, in some cases, can achieve specific policy outcomes. The Constitution grants Congress this considerable power to "lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." Most revenue is collected by the federal government as a result of previously enacted law that continues in effect without any need for congressional action. However, Congress routinely considers revenue legislation that repeals existing provisions, extends expiring provisions, or creates new provisions. Congress may consider such legislation either as a measure dedicated solely to revenues or as a provision in another type of measure. As with all legislation considered by Congress, revenue measures are subject to general House and Senate rules. In addition, revenue measures are subject to further House and Senate rules, as well as constitutional and statutory requirements (e.g., the Origination Clause, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974). The purposes of such revenue-specific rules are generally to centralize and coordinate the development and consideration of revenue legislation, to provide Members of Congress with the information necessary to judge the merits of revenue legislation, and to control the budgetary impact of revenue measures. This report provides an overview and analysis of the most consequential revenue-specific rules that apply during the process of developing and considering revenue legislation, including when they apply and to what legislation. However, revenue measures are sometimes considered under the reconciliation process, which carries with it additional unique procedures, particularly in the Senate. | The term revenue is defined as funds collected from the public that arise from the government's exercise of its sovereign or governmental powers. Federal revenues come from a variety of sources, including individual and corporate income taxes, excise taxes, customs duties, estate and gift taxes, fees and fines, payroll taxes for social insurance programs, and miscellaneous receipts (such as earnings of the Federal Reserve System, donations, and bequests). The executive branch often uses the term receipts or governmental receipts in place of the term revenues.
The collection of revenue is a fundamental component of the federal budget process that provides the government with the money necessary to fund agencies and programs. Further, the collection of revenue directly affects individual citizens and businesses and, in some cases, can achieve specific policy outcomes. The Constitution grants Congress this considerable power to "lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises."
Most revenue is collected by the federal government as a result of previously enacted law that continues in effect without any need for congressional action. However, Congress routinely considers revenue legislation that repeals existing provisions, extends expiring provisions, or creates new provisions. Congress may consider such legislation either in a measure dedicated solely to revenues or as a provision in another type of measure.
As with all legislation considered by Congress, revenue measures are subject to general House and Senate rules. In addition, revenue measures are subject to further House and Senate rules, as well as constitutional and statutory requirements (e.g., the Origination Clause, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974). The purposes of such revenue-specific rules are generally to centralize and coordinate the development and consideration of revenue legislation, to provide Members of Congress with the information necessary to judge the merits of revenue legislation, and to control the budgetary impact of revenue measures.
This report provides an overview and analysis of the most consequential revenue-specific rules that apply during the process of developing and considering revenue legislation. It highlights certain rules and precedents that apply specifically to revenue measures and distinguishes them into four categories: (1) rules that apply to the origination and referral of revenue measures; (2) rules that require supplemental materials or information to be included with revenue measures; (3) rules that apply to the budgetary impact of revenue measures; and (4) rules related to the consideration of revenue measures under the budget reconciliation process, which carries with it additional unique procedures. |
crs_RL34031 | crs_RL34031_0 | Most Recent Developments
The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, which was enacted on December 26, 2007, provides $3.97 billion in new budget authority for the legislative branch. From the beginning of the fiscal year on October 1, until the enactment of the consolidated bill ( H.R. 2764 ), the legislative branch was funded by a series of continuing appropriations resolutions. On September 29, 2007, the President signed into law P.L. The law provided for continued funding for most federal activities, including the legislative branch, at FY2007 levels through November 16, 2007. 110-116 , which was enacted on November 13, continued this funding through December 14, 2007. S. 1686 , the Senate version of the FY2008 Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, was reported to the Senate on June 25, 2007. The bill, which proposed nearly $2.78 billion in new budget authority (not including House items), had been marked up by the Senate Committee on Appropriations on June 21. The House bill would have provided $3.1 billion in new budget authority (not including Senate items). Status of FY2008 Appropriations
Action on the FY2008 Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill
Submission of FY2008 Budget Request on February 5, 2007
The FY2008 U.S. Budget contained a request for $4.3 billion in new budget authority for legislative branch activities, an increase of 14% from FY2007 levels. The Senate Subcommittee on Legislative Branch held hearings on the FY2008 budget requests on March 2 for the Architect of the Capitol; on March 16 for the Government Accountability Office, the Government Printing Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Office of Compliance; on March 30 for the Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper and the U.S. Capitol Police; and on May 3 for the Secretary of the Senate and the Library of Congress. Major issues considered at both markups included efforts to rename the Great Hall of the Capitol Visitor Center "Emancipation Hall," the future of the Open World Leadership Program, and the use of funds to renovate an FDA building proposed for use as swing space for House offices. Senator Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, chairman of the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch during the 110 th Congress, noted that the committee's bill would provide nearly $2.8 billion in new budget authority (not including House items), a 5% increase ($138.65 million) over the FY2007 budget and $289 million below agency requests. Both Senator Landrieu and Senator Wayne Allard of Colorado, the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, voiced their concern over using this bill to change the name of the main hall of the Capitol Visitor Center, as proposed by the House, and noted that the Senate version of the bill contains language to effectuate the merger between the U.S. Capitol Police and the Library of Congress Police. A new supplemental appropriations measure, H.R. 2771. In FY2007, $54.2 million was requested, but not provided, for this project in the Architect's Library Buildings and Grounds account. | From beginning of the fiscal year on October 1, 2007, until the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act on December 26, 2007, funding for the legislative branch was provided through a series of interim continuing appropriations measures. The first, which was signed by President Bush on September 29, 2007, provided funding at FY2007 levels through November 16, 2007. Three additional continuing appropriations measures were enacted on November 13, December 14, and December 21, 2007.
Legislative branch entities requested $4.3 billion in new budget authority for FY2008. The House version of the FY2008 Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, H.R. 2771, was introduced on June 19, 2007. The bill proposed $3.1 billion in new budget authority for the legislative branch for FY2008, not including Senate items. This amount reflects a 4.1% increase over the $2.98 billion (including the FY2007 supplemental but not including Senate items) approved by Congress for FY2007 and less than the 13% increase requested.
The Senate version of the FY2008 Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill, S. 1686, was reported to the Senate on June 25, 2007. The bill would have provided approximately $2.78 billion in new budget authority, not including House items. This amount reflects an increase of 5.2% over the nearly $2.65 billion (including the FY2007 supplemental but not including House items) approved by Congress for FY2007 and less than the 16% increase requested.
By comparison, in FY2007, overall legislative branch budget authority was increased by approximately 1.5% (including supplemental appropriations), which had followed a 4.2% increase in new budget authority for FY2006 and a 3.1% increase approved for FY2005.
Among issues that were considered during discussions on the FY2008 budget are the following:
completion of the Capitol Visitor Center and consideration of the Architect of the Capitol's request for an additional $20 million for this project; the renaming of the "Great Hall" of the Capitol Visitor Center; repair of the Capitol Power Plant tunnels and the role of the Office of Compliance in monitoring progress on this effort; funds requested to support the "Greening of the Capitol" initiative and the use of alternative fuels; the merger of the U.S. Capitol Police and the Library of Congress Police; funding for the acquisition of new technology for the "Books for the Blind" program; and the future of the Open World Leadership Program.
This report will be updated to reflect major congressional action. |
crs_R42895 | crs_R42895_0 | EPA's regulations on greenhouse gas emissions from both mobile and stationary sources and on conventional and hazardous air pollutants emitted by electric power plants, cement kilns, and boilers have been of particular interest, as have the agency's efforts to revise ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter. EPA's Greenhouse Gas Regulations
A continuing focus of congressional interest under the Clean Air Act (CAA) has been EPA regulatory actions to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions using existing CAA authority. The agency has proposed the standards for new and existing power plants, but other than that, has not yet taken the agreed-upon actions. More importantly, he directed the agency to propose GHG emission standards for existing power plants by June 2014, with promulgation by June 2015. 3826 , which would have prohibited EPA from promulgating or implementing GHG emission standards for fossil-fueled power plants until at least six power plants representative of the operating characteristics of electric generation units at different locations across the United States have demonstrated compliance with proposed emission limits for a continuous period of 12 months on a commercial basis. 3826 in H.R. EPA's GHG regulations have also been challenged in court. In a decision handed down June 23, 2014, the court generally held that EPA's motor vehicle GHG standards did trigger permitting requirements for stationary sources, although it put some limits on the sources that would be required to obtain permits ( Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA ). Emissions of Other Pollutants from Power Plants
Issues related to emissions other than GHGs from electric power plants—principally sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury—have been another focus of interest. Coal-fired power plants are among the largest sources of air pollution in the United States. This group, which includes about one-third of coal-fired capacity, are generally referred to as "grandfathered" plants. SO2 and NOx: The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)
Unable to obtain congressional approval of its multi-pollutant bill (the "Clear Skies" bill), the Bush Administration's EPA announced on March 10, 2005, that it would use existing CAA authority to promulgate final regulations similar to those in the bill for utility emissions of SO 2 and NOx in 27 eastern states and the District of Columbia. A separate regulation, the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), promulgated at the same time, established a cap-and-trade system for mercury emissions. This is not complicated or new technology. The Senate did not consider either bill, but it did consider S.J.Res. Oral argument had not been scheduled as of this writing. 2401 , the Transparency in Regulatory Analysis of Impacts on the Nation (TRAIN) Act of 2011, which the House passed September 23, 2011, would have:
established a panel of representatives from 11 federal agencies to report to Congress on the cumulative economic impact of a number of listed EPA rules, guidelines, and actions concerning clean air and waste management; rendered both the Cross-State rule and the MATS rule "of no force and effect"; reinstated the CAIR rule to replace the Cross-State rule for at least six years following enactment; required that any subsequent replacement allow trading of emission allowances among entities irrespective of the states in which they are located; delayed promulgation of a replacement for the MATS rule until at least one year after submission of the cumulative impacts report and delayed compliance for at least five years after that date; required that the MATS replacement impose the least burdensome regulatory alternative from among the alternatives authorized under the Clean Air Act; and required EPA to take into consideration feasibility and cost in setting health-based ambient air quality standards. The same provisions passed the House a second time as Title III of H.R. The proposal, which would revise standards for wood stoves and pellet stoves and for the first time establish standards for other types of wood heaters, appeared in the Federal Register on February 3. The subject has also been raised during hearings on EPA's FY2015 appropriation request, and legislation ( H.R. Air Quality Standards
The Obama Administration's EPA has also reviewed several national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), as it is required to do by Section 109 of the Clean Air Act. On January 19, 2010, EPA proposed a revision to the ozone NAAQS. EPA's December 2014 Proposal
Meanwhile, EPA has proceeded with the regularly scheduled five-year review of the 2008 standard, as the President indicated the agency would. The agency's proposal was released on November 26 and appeared in the Federal Register on December 17. Environmental groups generally disagree that the agency has overreached in setting Clean Air Act standards. | Oversight of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory actions was the main focus of interest as the 113th Congress considered air quality issues. Of particular interest were EPA's proposed regulations on the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from power plants.
Reducing GHG emissions to address climate change is a major goal of President Obama, but Congress has been less enthusiastic about it. In the absence of congressional action, the President has directed EPA to promulgate GHG standards using existing authority under the Clean Air Act. This authority has been upheld on at least three occasions by the Supreme Court, but it remains controversial in Congress.
EPA's most recent GHG actions have involved fossil-fueled (coal, oil, and natural gas) power plants, which EPA refers to as electric generating units (EGUs). On June 18, 2014, the agency proposed GHG emission standards for existing EGUs. These plants are the source of one-third of the nation's GHG emissions, so it is difficult to envision a regulatory scheme that reduces the nation's GHG emissions without addressing their contribution. At the same time, affordable and reliable electric power is central to the nation's economy and to the health and well-being of the population.
Thus, the effects of the proposed rule on the electric power system are of considerable interest. Even before proposal of the existing power plant standards, the House had passed legislation (H.R. 3826) that would effectively have prohibited EPA from promulgating or implementing power plant GHG emission standards. On September 18, 2014, the House passed the same language a second time, in H.R. 2. The Senate did not consider either bill.
Although it has not finalized the power plant GHG regulations as of this writing, EPA has implemented permit and Best Available Control Technology requirements for new stationary sources of GHGs under a separate Clean Air Act provision, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program. Minimum thresholds have exempted smaller pollution sources from this program, and few facilities have needed to obtain permits. Nevertheless, EPA's authority to implement these requirements was challenged in court. In a June 23, 2014, decision, the Supreme Court largely upheld EPA's authority.
Besides addressing climate change, EPA has taken action on a number of other air pollution regulations, often in response to court actions remanding previous rules. Remanded rules included the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) and Clean Air Mercury Rule—rules designed to control the long-range transport of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury from power plants through cap-and-trade programs. Other remanded rules included hazardous air pollutant standards for boilers and cement kilns.
The agency has also developed revisions of several existing air standards—in general, the Clean Air Act mandates that existing standards be reviewed periodically and revised if appropriate. On March 3, 2014, EPA revised regulations that limit the sulfur content of gasoline, in conjunction with tighter ("Tier3") standards for motor vehicle emissions. The agency has also proposed revised standards for wood and pellet stoves and proposed standards for other types of wood heaters for the first time.
EPA is also reviewing ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone. The agency proposed revisions to the ozone NAAQS on December 17, 2014. NAAQS serve as EPA's definition of clean air for six widespread pollutants, and drive a range of regulatory controls.
The cost-effectiveness of some of these regulations and/or whether the agency has exceeded statutory authority in proposing and promulgating them are among the issues that have been raised by some in Congress. Others in Congress have supported EPA, noting that the Clean Air Act, often affirmed in court decisions, has authorized or required the agency's actions. |
crs_R41588 | crs_R41588_0 | The final premium rate calculation often is adjusted to reflect several other factors, such as making up for a previous financial loss and providing excess capital to manage various risks generally regulated under state solvency standards. Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS's) Producer Price Index (PPI) for health insurance companies indicates that the year-over-year percentage increase by month in private health insurance premiums has averaged around 4.4% between 2004 and 2010, but has accelerated some since 2009, ranging from 4.8%-5.5% ( Figure 1 ). However, in the past few years employers have shifted incrementally more of that cost to workers. Using available public data, this report explores the potential drivers of the growth trend in health insurance premiums. Drivers of Premium Increases
In general, the premiums charged by health insurance companies represent the estimated amount that would be required to cover initially three major components: (1) the expected cost of the health benefits covered, (2) the administrative costs of operating the coverage, and (3) a profit margin consistent with the strategic business goals of the company. Health benefits expenses represent the largest component of premiums. The Underwriting Cycle
The health insurance underwriting cycle refers to the tendency for health insurance premiums and insurer profitability to cycle over certain time intervals. Review of Health Insurance Rates
The regulation of private health insurance has traditionally been under the jurisdiction of the states. Most states have used their regulatory authority over the business of insurance to require the filing of health insurance documents containing rate information for one or more market segments or plan types. 111-148 , ACA, as amended), the federal government assumed a role in health insurance rate reviews by providing grant funding to states for such reviews and requiring, among other things, that insurers justify rate increases under certain circumstances. There is substantive variation in state regulation of health insurance rates. Federal Rate Review Under ACA
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. The justification requirement does not provide the HHS Secretary with the authority to prohibit the plan from implementing the rate increase. In other words, this is a "sunshine" provision designed to publicly expose premium increases determined to be unreasonable. Final Rule on Rate Review
CMS published the final rule implementing the rate review provisions in ACA in the Federal Register on May 23, 2011. The final rule clarifies which proposed rate increases would be subject to review (i.e., defining "unreasonable" rate increase), establishes a process for rate review to be conducted either by the state or CMS, and specifies notice requirements to inform the public about the process and outcome of the rate reviews. On the other hand, increasing cost-sharing reduces the value of the coverage at the same time premiums are going up. However, the Milliman Medical Index estimates that for a typical family of four with private employer group coverage, out-of-pocket cost sharing has increased between 5.4% and 10.5% annually between 2006 and 2010. | In general, the premiums charged by health insurance companies represent actuarial estimates of the amount that would be required to cover three main components: (1) the expected cost of the health benefits covered under the plan, (2) the business administrative costs of operating the plan, and (3) a profit. The final premium calculation often is adjusted upward or downward to reflect several factors, such as making up for a previous financial loss, that are often referred to as the "underwriting cycle."
Health insurance premiums have been trending up, while the value of coverage generally has been trending down. Specifically, the year-over-year percentage increase by month in private health insurance premiums has averaged around 4.4% between 2004 and 2010, but has accelerated some since 2009, ranging from 4.8% to 5.5%. At the same time, cost-sharing requirements have generally increased. For example, a typical family of four with private employer-sponsored health benefits has seen its out-of-pocket cost sharing increase between 5.4% and 10.5% annually between 2006 and 2010.
Of the main components that constitute the premium amount, health benefits expenses represented about 85% of that amount in 2010. Publicly available data indicate that medical costs have steadily risen over the past several years, but the rate of growth in these expenses slowed between 2008 and 2010. The data also suggest that the rise in medical costs is primarily attributable to the price of services, not increased utilization.
The rise in the cost of health insurance has received considerable attention by Congress and resulted in calls for more regulation. The regulation of private health insurance has traditionally been under the jurisdiction of the states. Most states have used their regulatory authority over the business of insurance to require the filing of health insurance documents containing rate information for one or more insurance market segments or plan types.
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148, ACA, as amended), the federal government will assume a role in private health insurance rate reviews by providing grants to states and requiring health insurance companies to provide justifications for proposed rate increases determined to be unreasonable. However, ACA does not authorize the federal government to decline or bar implementation of proposed rate increases; such authority still is retained by the states. On May 23, 2011, Health and Human Services (HHS) issued the final rule implementing the rate review provisions in ACA. The rule clarified which proposed rate increases would be subject to review (i.e., defining "unreasonable" rate increase), established a process for rate review to be conducted either by the state or HHS, and specified notice requirements to inform the public about the process and outcome of the rate reviews.
This report provides an overview of the concepts, regulation, and available public data regarding private health insurance premiums. Specifically, this report analyzes the four broad components of health insurance premiums: medical claims, administrative costs, profit, and the underwriting cycle. Finally, the report discusses state requirements to review health insurance rates, and rate review provisions under federal health reform. |
crs_R43582 | crs_R43582_0 | Introduction to Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations
The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations subcommittees are charged with drafting bills to provide annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and six small related agencies. Title II of the annual THUD appropriations bill funds HUD. FY2015 THUD Discretionary Funding Allocation
The discretionary funding allocation to the Senate THUD subcommittee is $2.4 billion more than that provided to the House subcommittee. Table 2 shows the discretionary funding provided for THUD in FY2014, the Administration request for FY2015, and the amount allocated by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to the THUD subcommittees. FY2015 THUD Funding and Sequestration
The President's FY2015 budget included a request for $126.7 billion for THUD, $22 billion more than appropriated for THUD in FY2014. Most of this increase was for highway, transit, and rail funding under the Administration's surface transportation reauthorization proposal. The request for HUD is $4 billion more than provided in FY2014, but $3 billion of that increase reflects a decline in offsetting receipts; the decline in offsetting receipts means that HUD's appropriation would have to increase by $3 billion in order to provide the same amount of funding as HUD received in FY2014. The committee recommended that the reduction be divided roughly evenly between DOT and HUD, with cuts in DOT's TIGER grant program (-$500 million), New Starts transit grant program (-$252 million), Amtrak (-$200 million), and rescissions of other DOT funding (-$354 million). The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended a total of $108.1 billion. This is $3.7 billion over the amount provided in FY2014, but only $700 million more than the FY2014 level once the $3 billion reduction in offsetting receipts in FY2015 is taken into account. Due to a $3 billion reduction in offsetting collections in FY2015 compared to FY2014, it would cost the THUD subcommittees an additional $3 billion in discretionary funding in FY2015 to provide the same level of total funding as provided in FY2014. Thus Congress is considering FY2015 DOT appropriations in the context of uncertainty about DOT's future program structure and funding. Overall, the FY2015 budget request totals $90.9 billion in new budget resources for DOT. Transportation authorization is outside the jurisdiction of the appropriations committees, but since most of DOT's appropriations come from the highway trust fund, the status of the fund is a key concern. The House bill would provide $70.2 billion in net new budget authority, $1 billion (1%) less than provided in FY2014. The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $155 million, the amount requested. High Speed and Intercity Passenger Rail
Reflecting the Administration's surface transportation reauthorization proposal, the budget proposed a total of $4.8 billion for a new National High Performance Rail System program within the Federal Railroad Administration, consisting of two grant programs: $2.5 billion for a Current Passenger Rail Service grant program (which would primarily fund maintenance and improvement of existing intercity passenger rail service, i.e., Amtrak) and $2.3 billion for a Rail Service Improvement grant program (which would fund new intercity passenger rail projects as well as some improvements to freight rail). For FY2015, the Administration requested $2.5 billion for the program, roughly $550 million (28%) more than the $1.94 billion appropriated in FY2014. The House bill would provide $1.69 billion, $250 million (13%) less than the FY2014 level. The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $2.161 billion, less than requested but more than provided in FY2014. The President's budget requested $950 million for the HOME program, a 5% decrease from the FY2014 enacted level of $1 billion. | The House and Senate Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations subcommittees are charged with providing annual appropriations for the Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and related agencies. THUD programs receive both discretionary and mandatory budget authority; HUD's budget generally accounts for the largest share of discretionary appropriations, but when mandatory funding is taken into account, DOT's budget is larger than HUD's budget. Mandatory funding typically accounts for around half the total annual THUD appropriation.
The THUD bill's appropriation totaled $104 billion in FY2014: $51 billion in net discretionary funding and $53 billion in mandatory funding. But there is a decrease of $3 billion in offsetting receipts to HUD for FY2015 compared to FY2014. Thus, just to maintain the FY2015 THUD bill's overall budgetary resources at the same level as in FY2014, the THUD bill would need $3 billion more in budget authority than it received in FY2014. The House Appropriations Committee's FY2015 discretionary budget allocation to its THUD subcommittee is $52 billion ($1 billion more than the FY2014 discretionary funding level); the Senate Appropriations Committee's FY2015 allocation to its THUD subcommittee is $54 billion ($3 billion more than FY2014).
The Administration requested net budget authority of $127 billion (after scorekeeping adjustments) for the THUD bill for FY2015, an increase of $22 billion (21%). Most of this increase was for highway, transit, and passenger rail programs in DOT, reflecting the increased funding proposed in the Administration's surface transportation reauthorization proposal.
Congress is considering DOT appropriations in the context of the expiration of highway and transit authorizations at the end of the summer of 2014, and the projected insolvency of the highway trust fund before the end of the summer. The Administration requested a total of $91 billion in discretionary and mandatory funding for DOT for FY2015, an increase of roughly $20 billion (28%) over FY2014. The House provided $70 billion for DOT, $1 billion less than in FY2014. The reductions were primarily to the TIGER grant program (-$500 million), the New Starts transit grant program (-$253 million), and Amtrak capital grants (-$200 million). The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $72 billion for DOT, $1 billion more than the FY2014 level.
The President requested $37 billion in net new budget authority for HUD in FY2015, $4 billion more than provided in FY2014 ($33 billion). The House provided $35 billion for HUD, $2 billion above the net discretionary funding in FY2014. The Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $36 billion, $3 billon more than the FY2014 level.
The Administration requested a total of $346 million for the agencies in Title II (the Related Agencies). This is $20 million (5%) less than the $366 million they received in FY2014. The reduction is almost entirely in the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation ($204 million in FY2015, $182 million requested). The House agreed to the requested level; the Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended $351 million, adding $4.6 million to the Neighborhood Investment Corporation. |
crs_RS20787 | crs_RS20787_0 | RS20787 -- Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and Issues for Congress
Updated March 11, 2004
Background
Modernization is not a new issue or objective for U.S. military forces, but it has taken on new urgency because of: the post-Cold War downsizing andprocurement reductions, the new global environment and unexpected requirements, and the promise of a "revolutionin military affairs" (RMA) suggested byrapid developments in computers, communications, and guidance systems. These Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces wouldeventually meld into the transformedObjective Force of the future. The Army is fielding a new capability based on the SBCT. All vehicles weigh less than 20 tons. It is an infantrybrigade of about 3,500 soldiers with the armored mobility needed to fight on a mid-intensity battlefield. Future Force. (6) A key component is expected to be a FutureCombat System (FCS) that could, as one capability, assume the role currently held by the Abrams tank. The ongoing program to replace old truckswill continue. Does the Army's planstrike the right balance in allocating resources between modernizing the current legacy force and developing andfielding the Future Force? For the short term, it is projected that some amount of modernization for current forces is needed to prevent further aging and degradation. Feasibility. Affordability. | The U.S. Army continues an ambitious program intended to transform itself into astrategically responsive forcedominant in all types of ground operations. As planned, its Future Force will eventually meld all ongoing initiativesinto a force based on a high-tech FutureCombat System (FCS). Its Current Force is beginning to provide a new combat capability, based oncurrent-technology armored vehicles, for the mid-intensitycombat operations that seem prevalent in today's world. Its current "legacy force" of existing systems is beingmodernized and maintained to ensure effectivelight and heavy force capabilities until the Future Force is realized. This short report briefly describes the programand discusses issues of feasibility, viability,and affordability of potential interest to Congress. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R43176 | crs_R43176_0 | However, other EU members have implemented renewable electricity support policies with various designs and objectives. The directive codified the EU goal that 20% of total final EU energy consumption be produced from renewable energy sources by 2020. Each EU member country has discretion to decide what policies and incentives are offered that might motivate renewable energy development in order to achieve the binding EU renewable energy targets. Wind and Solar Electricity Incentive Policies in Selected EU Countries
Renewable electricity policy history, evolution, incentives, financial mechanics, and market impacts are dependent on a particular country's situation. Germany, Spain, and Italy are EU member countries that have been quite active in terms of renewable electricity policy, development, and technology deployment. As of the end of 2012, Germany and Italy were the top two countries in the world in terms of cumulative installed solar PV capacity, with 32,000 Megawatts (MW) and 17,000 MW, respectively. National Policy Evolution
Government support for renewable energy in Germany dates back to as early as 1985 with the introduction of various forms of policy support and financial incentives within certain German states. The EEG was subsequently modified to include a cumulative solar PV capacity limit of 52,000 MW, at which time FiT incentives will no longer be available for new projects. Generally, the objective of degression is to set feed-in tariffs at a level that stimulates investment in project development and expands the market for renewable electricity generation, while at the same time avoiding windfall profits for project owners and the potential for over-deployment of renewable electricity projects. Impacts on Wind and Solar Deployment
Feed-in tariff incentives are generally credited with the rapid deployment of renewable electricity generation in Germany, especially the deployment of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems. Since then, Spain has implemented a variety of policies that encourage renewable electricity generation through grid access, specified tariffs for renewable electricity, and market premium options for certain renewable power generators. As a result, Spain became the largest global market for solar power installations in 2008. In January 2012, Spain became the first European country to completely suspend FiT and market premium incentives for new renewable electricity generation. However, over the long term these retroactive measures will likely introduce an element of policy risk into the financing equation for future renewable electricity generation projects and could deter future deployment. To meet this requirement, Italy has implemented various policy measures to stimulate investment in renewable electricity generation, renewable heating/cooling, and transportation. However, in an effort to reduce the cost of financial incentive programs to electricity consumers—and since the country is very close to achieving its 2020 renewable electricity target—Italy has imposed annual FiT support limits for renewable electricity generation. Support costs for the green certificate program, feed-in tariffs/premiums for non-solar renewable power generation, and the Conto Energia FiT program for solar PV are calculated, and a surcharge is added to consumer electricity bills to pay for the financial support programs. According to the Italian government, these costs are equal to roughly 20% of the average electricity bill in Italy. Energy supply motivations may be relatively more compelling in the European Union. Renewable Electricity Incentives in the EU and U.S. are Similar, but Reversed
Both the EU and the United States offer a number of incentives that support deployment of renewable electricity generation. Generally, the European Union sets binding renewable electricity requirements for each member, and each member country provides a unique set of financial incentives to motivate deployment of renewable power systems that will achieve the EU-level targets. Solar PV market growth in EU countries provides an illustrative example. EU Countries are shifting from Electricity Production-based to Market Integration-based Incentives
Following several years of significant renewable electricity deployment, especially solar PV, some EU countries are changing financial support mechanisms to encourage electricity market integration—i.e., selling electricity in the wholesale market, allowing for curtailment under certain circumstances—instead of electricity generation. Retroactive Incentive Reductions Can Have Multi-dimensional Consequences
Multiple EU member-countries have made policy decisions to retroactively reduce financial incentives for renewable electricity projects. | European Union (EU) countries have provided support for the development and deployment of renewable energy technologies, dating back to as early as the 1980s. Today, the European Union has established binding renewable energy targets with the goal of having the entire EU derive 20% of total energy consumption (electricity, heating/cooling, and transportation) from renewable sources by 2020. EU member countries have discretion to decide how best to achieve EU-level targets. Each country uses a unique set of policies and financial incentives to stimulate renewable energy production. While EU and U.S. energy markets are very different, knowledge of the history, evolution, financial mechanics, and market impacts of EU renewable electricity policies may be useful to Congress during future debates about renewable electricity policy in the United States.
Renewable electricity generation is one component of the EU energy sector that has been emphasized. Several member countries have designed and implemented various mechanisms to encourage renewable electricity production. To date, the majority of renewable electricity deployment has been in the form of onshore wind and solar photovoltaic (PV) power generation. Feed-in tariffs (FiT) are the most commonly referenced incentive mechanism used by EU countries. However, other mechanisms, such as market premiums, green certificates, and reverse auctions are also used to motivate renewable electricity generation.
Germany, Spain, and Italy are EU countries that have deployed renewable electricity generation systems at a relatively large scale. At the end of 2012 Germany and Italy were the top two countries in terms of cumulative installed solar PV capacity with 32 Gigawatts (GW) and 17 GW, respectively. Spain was the largest global solar PV market during calendar year 2008. Those high deployment levels have established these countries as leaders in renewable electricity generation. However, political, economic, and power system concerns are causing these same countries to adjust, modify, and often reduce financial support incentives. Further, the policies, deployment profiles, financial mechanics, and incentive modifications differ for each country.
To control escalating surcharges on consumer electricity bills, German policy officials have been rapidly reducing financial incentives for solar PV and have instituted a solar PV capacity support limit of 52GW, at which point incentives will no longer be available for new projects. Similarly, Italy has placed limits on financial support—also paid through consumer surcharges—for all renewable electricity generation. In 2012, Italy's renewable electricity surcharge represented approximately 20% of the average electricity bill. As of June 2013, financial support limits for solar PV in Italy were reached and feed-in tariffs are no longer available for new projects. Spain has completely suspended FiT incentives for renewable electricity and has implemented retroactive incentive reduction policies that affect revenue, cash flow, and investment returns for existing operational projects.
EU countries are transitioning from electricity production-based incentives (i.e., feed-in tariffs) to market integration incentives such as market premiums, bonus payments for remotely controlled wind and solar projects, and flexibility premiums for renewable generation that can reduce grid instability. Power market integration of renewables, combined with declining costs of renewable electricity, may result in a more stable, albeit smaller, competitive market for renewable electricity generation. A second trend in EU countries is the implementation of retroactive incentive reductions to control costs associated with renewable electricity support. While retroactive measures may be fiscally necessary, they will likely affect future renewable electricity deployment by introducing an element of policy risk that causes financing costs, and thus production costs, to rise. These trends are likely to result in lower EU renewable capacity additions for some member countries. However, carbon policies and declining technology costs may support future EU renewable electricity market growth. |
crs_R43766 | crs_R43766_0 | As currently enacted, the program includes three components: the Basic Center program (BCP), which provides short-term services for youth under age 18; the Transitional Living program (TLP), which provides housing and supports for youth ages 16 through 22; and the Street Outreach program (SOP)—referred to in statute as the Sexual Abuse Prevention program—which serves youth living on the streets who are unstably housed. These issues are grouped as follows:
demographic and other data on runaway and homeless youth; effectiveness of programs that serve this population; efforts to connect RHY with their families; access to and funding for the program; supports for vulnerable RHY populations, including youth who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, or questioning (LGBTQ); those who have been victims of sex trafficking or are at risk for sex trafficking; and those who have other risk factors; and interaction between the RHY system and child welfare and juvenile justice systems. Two notable efforts include an HHS report to Congress on ending youth homelessness and a strategy put into place by the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness to end youth homelessness by 2020. In June 2010, USICH released this plan, entitled Opening Doors . As Congress considers reauthorization of the Runaway and Homeless program, it may wish to (1) determine if HHS's efforts (underway with USICH) are adequate in addressing the data reporting provisions that are specified in the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act; (2) determine whether the act provides adequate direction to HHS about its role in carrying out data collection efforts in coordination with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which administers multiple programs for homeless individuals; and (3) the extent to which funding should be appropriated through new funding or by reallocating funds, such as through existing funding within the Runaway and Homeless Youth program, for the studies required by the law and/or new activities to improve data collection. The act also directed HHS to assess the characteristics of these youth. This encompasses sheltered youth in runaway and homeless youth programs (including those that may not be funded under the federal program). The Runaway and Homeless Youth Act specifies that BCP and TLP providers are required to submit to HHS information about the number and characteristics of the youth they serve. Further, some intervention models focus on families separated because their teens identify as LGBT. Program and Youth Outcomes
This section first describes how HHS currently assesses whether grantees receiving Runaway and Homeless Youth program funds are meeting the needs of youth who have run away and/or are homeless, and how HHS determines whether the Runaway and Homeless Youth program is effective overall. Access to Funding
A related issue that may be of interest to Congress is youth access to the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act programs. Estimates of youth who have run away or are homeless exceed 1 million, and the program provides services to just a fraction of these youth. Table 1 shows the number of youth who were turned away from the BCP and TLP due to a lack of bed space from FY2007 through FY2014. Continuum of Care (CoC) Program Funding
On a related point, providers of services to youth who have run away or are experiencing homelessness may have limited access to funding from the major program through which HUD supports homeless services providers, known as the Continuum of Care (CoC) program. In addition, 15 points are available that can be awarded for addressing youth homelessness, including to CoCs that (1) have strategies for addressing the unique needs of unaccompanied homeless youth and the existence of a proven strategy that addresses homeless youth trafficking and other forms of exploitation; (2) demonstrate an increase in the number of unaccompanied homeless youth (up to age 24) served who were residing on the streets or in places not meant for human habitation prior to ending a project for homeless individuals; (3) demonstrate a plan to increase funding for unaccompanied homeless youth programs; (4) describe how they collaborate with local education authorities and school districts to assist in identifying individuals and families who become or remain homeless and informing them of eligibility of services; and (5) demonstrate the extent to which youth service providers and education providers and CoC representatives have participated in each other's meetings over the past 12 months (including how the CoC collaborates with the McKinney-Vento local education liaisons and state education coordinators under the McKinney-Vento Education for Homeless Children and Youths program). HUD has otherwise encouraged CoCs to partner with Runaway and Homeless Youth program grantees. Recent research has also suggested that HHS could provide more extensive training and technical assistance on meeting the needs of LGBTQ youth. Nonetheless, the capacity for runaway and homeless youth agencies to respond to the needs of sex trafficking victims is believed to be limited. | The Runaway and Homeless Youth program is authorized by the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act, and funds organizations throughout the country to provide services to youth who have run away and/or experience homelessness. The program, which is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), includes three components: (1) the Basic Center program (BCP), which provides outreach, temporary shelter, and counseling for up to 21 days to youth under age 18 who have run away or are homeless; (2) the Transitional Living program (TLP), which supports residential services and services to youth ages 16 through 21 for up to 18 months; and (3) the Street Outreach program (SOP), which provides street-based outreach and education—including treatment and referrals—for runaway and homeless youth who have been subjected to sexual abuse and exploitation or are otherwise unstably housed. Funding authorization for the programs expired on September 30, 2013.
The federal government, led by an independent agency known as the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH), has developed a plan for ending youth homelessness. In 2010, USICH released Opening Doors, which included goals of ending chronic homelessness and homelessness among youth and other specified populations. An amendment to the plan in 2012 specifically introduced the Federal Framework to End Youth Homelessness, which includes improved data collection on these youth and developing and testing effective intervention models. This plan is consistent with the 2008 reauthorization of the Runaway and Homeless Youth program, which directed HHS to estimate the number of youth who have run away or are homeless and to assess the characteristics of these youth. Congress may wish to determine whether actions taken by HHS and its partners are addressing the data requirements in the law. Related to this, little is known about the outcomes of youth who participate in programs funded under the act, though efforts are underway by non-governmental research organizations to further study this population.
Congress may also be interested in the extent to which the Runaway and Homeless Youth program should more actively engage the families of runaway and homeless youth. Family conflict is a primary reason why youth leave home or are forced to leave home. The Runaway and Homeless Youth Act addresses family relationships primarily through the BCP. Some providers have models for helping build stronger connections between youth and their families. Another issue that may be of interest is demand. The programs serve a small fraction of the overall number of youth believed to be runaway or homeless, and the number of youth turned away from the BCP and TLP due to a lack of capacity has ranged from about 9,000 to 11,000 annually. Advocates assert that additional funding is needed to serve more youth, particularly because other federal funding sources for homeless service are believed to be limited. For example, the Continuum of Care (CoC) program directs homeless service providers to coordinate with runaway and homeless youth providers; however, CoC funding may not be available to some Runaway and Homeless Youth program grantees that are already not CoC funded.
Finally, runaway and homeless youth tend to have multiple challenges. Congress may consider the role that the Runaway and Homeless Youth Act could play in meeting the specific needs of youth who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, or questioning (LGBTQ); youth who are sex trafficked; and youth who are or were engaged in foster care or the juvenile justice system. For example, recent research on LGBTQ youth suggests that some RHY providers have difficulty identifying this population and could benefit from technical assistance for serving them effectively. In addition, runaway and homeless youth appear to be vulnerable to sex trafficking and some have a history of such victimization. The act could be amended to ensure that training and technical assistance is available to RHY providers to assist particular groups of youth. |
crs_R42537 | crs_R42537_0 | Introduction
Recent congressional interest in U.S. energy policy has focused in part on ways through which the United States could secure more economical and reliable petroleum resources both domestically and internationally. Many forecasters identify petroleum products refined from Canadian oil sands as one possible solution. Increased production from Canadian oil sands, however, is not without controversy, as many have expressed concern over the potential environmental impacts. A number of key studies in recent literature have expressed findings that GHG emissions per unit of energy produced from Canadian oil sands crudes are higher than those of other crudes imported, refined, and consumed in the United States. Hence, the 2014 Final EIS made similar findings to the 2011 Final EIS, including the following:
1. Canadian oil sands crudes "are more GHG-intensive than the other heavy crudes they would replace or displace in U.S. refineries, and emit an estimated 17% more GHGs on a life-cycle basis than the average barrel of crude oil refined in the United States in 2005," and 2. The second section of the report, " Results of Selected Life-Cycle Emissions Assessments ," compares several of the publicly available assessments of life-cycle GHG emissions data for Canadian oil sands crudes against each other, against those of other global reference crudes, and against those of other fossil fuel resources. For a specific analysis of the GHG emissions attributable to the proposed Keystone XL pipeline, see CRS Report R43415, Keystone XL: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Assessments in the Final Environmental Impact Statement , by [author name scrubbed] . As reported in NETL 2008, discounting the final consumption phase of the life-cycle assessment (which can contribute up to 70%-80% of Well-to-Wheels emissions), Canadian oil sands emit an estimated 80% more GHGs on a Well-to-Tank (i.e., "production") basis than the weighted average of transportation fuels sold or distributed in the United States (in reference year 2005). Design Factors and Input Assumptions for Life-Cycle Assessments of Canadian Oil Sands Crudes
Most published and publicly available studies on the life-cycle GHG emissions data for Canadian oil sands crudes identify two main factors contributing to the difference in emissions intensity relative to other reference crudes:
1. oil sands are heavier and more viscous than lighter crude oil types on average, and thus require more energy- and resource-intensive activities to extract; and 2. oil sands are chemically deficient in hydrogen, and have a higher carbon, sulfur, and heavy metal content than lighter crude oil types on average, and thus require more processing to yield consumable fuels by U.S. standards. Extraction Process. Compared to selected energy- and resource-intensive crudes, Well-to-Wheels GHG emissions from gasoline produced from a weighted average of Canadian oil sands crudes are found to be "within range" of those produced from heavier crudes such as Venezuelan Bachaquero and Californian Kern River, as well as lighter crudes that are produced from operations that flare associated gas (e.g., Nigerian Bonny Light). Individual estimates of WTW GHG emissions from Canadian oil sands crudes from the primary studies listed in Table 1 range from 9% to 19% more GHG-intensive than Middle Eastern Sour, 5% to 13% more GHG-intensive than Mexican Maya, and 2% to 18% more GHG-intensive than various Venezuelan crudes (including both Venezuelan Conventional and Bachaquero). Some studies suggest that GHG emissions intensities of Canadian oil sands crudes should be measured against a global average in order to assess the full environmental impacts of the resource. | Canadian Oil Sands and Climate Change
Recent congressional interest in U.S. energy policy has focused in part on ways through which the United States could secure more economical and reliable petroleum resources both domestically and internationally. Many forecasters identify petroleum products refined from Canadian oil sands as one possible solution. Increased production from Canadian oil sands, however, is not without controversy, as many have expressed concern over the potential environmental impacts. These impacts include emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) during resource extraction and processing. A number of key studies in recent literature have expressed findings that GHG emissions per unit of energy produced from Canadian oil sands crudes are higher than those of other crudes imported, refined, and consumed in the United States. The studies identify two main reasons for the difference: (1) oil sands are heavier and more viscous than lighter crude oil types on average, and thus require more energy- and resource-intensive activities to extract; and (2) oil sands are chemically deficient in hydrogen, and have a higher carbon, sulfur, and heavy metal content than lighter crude oil types on average, and thus require more processing to yield consumable fuels by U.S. standards.
Selected Findings from the Primary Published Studies
CRS surveyed the published literature, including the U.S. State Department-commissioned studies for the Keystone XL pipeline project in both the 2011 Final Environmental Impact Statement and the 2014 Final Supplementary Environmental Impact Statement. The primary literature reveals the following:
Canadian oil sands crudes are generally more GHG emission-intensive than other crudes they may displace in U.S. refineries, and emit an estimated 17% more GHGs on a life-cycle basis than the average barrel of crude oil refined in the United States; compared to selected imports, Well-to-Wheels GHG emissions for Canadian oil sands crudes range from 9% to 19% more emission-intensive than Middle Eastern Sour, 5% to 13% more emission-intensive than Mexican Maya, and 2% to 18% more emission-intensive than various Venezuelan crudes; compared to selected energy- and resource-intensive crudes, Well-to-Wheels GHG emissions for Canadian oil sands crudes are within range of heavier crudes such as Venezuelan Bachaquero and Californian Kern River, as well as lighter crudes that are produced from operations that flare associated gas (e.g., Nigerian Bonny Light); discounting the final consumption phase of the life-cycle assessment (which can contribute up to 70%-80% of Well-to-Wheels emissions), Well-to-Tank (i.e., "production") GHG emissions for Canadian oil sands crudes are 9%-102% higher than for selected imports; the estimated effect of the Keystone XL pipeline on global GHG emissions remains uncertain, as some speculate that its construction would encourage an expansion of oil sands investment and development, while others suggest that the project would not substantially influence either the rate or magnitude of oil extraction activities in Canada or the overall volume of crude oil transported to and refined in the United States.
Scope and Purpose of This Report
Congressional interest in the GHG emissions attributable to Canadian oil sands crudes has encompassed both a broad understanding of the resource as well as a specific assessment of the proposed Keystone XL pipeline. This report focuses on the broader resource. It discusses the methodology of life-cycle assessment and compares several of the publicly available studies of GHG emissions data for Canadian oil sands crudes against each other and against those of other global reference crudes. For a detailed analysis of the GHG emissions attributable to the proposed Keystone XL pipeline, and the findings from the State Department's Final Environmental Impact Statement, see CRS Report R43415, Keystone XL: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Assessments in the Final Environmental Impact Statement. |
crs_R44895 | crs_R44895_0 | Introduction and Overview
The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill includes funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior's Central Utah Project (CUP) and Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), the Department of Energy (DOE), and a number of independent agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget proposal to Congress on May 23, 2017. The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill totaled $34.189 billion (including offsets)—$4.261 billion (11.1%) below the FY2017 appropriation. The largest proposed increase was for DOE nuclear weapons activities, up by $994 million (10.7%). For the first time since FY2010, under the request, DOE would have received new funding to pursue an NRC license for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, totaling $120 million (including funding for interim nuclear waste storage). DOE science programs would have been cut by $920 million (17.1%). After passing a series of continuing resolutions, Congress largely rejected the Administration's proposed FY2018 budget cuts in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ), which was signed into law March 23, 2018. Most of the Administration's proposed reductions in nuclear and fossil energy R&D were not agreed to by the House, nor was the proposed elimination of the ARC. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill (S. 1609, S.Rept. For FY2017, funding for energy and water development programs was provided by Division D of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. The Senate Appropriations Committee would have provided a 2.1% increase for the Corps and a 1.4% boost for Reclamation from their FY2017 levels. Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants
The FY2018 budget request proposed to terminate both the DOE Weatherization Assistance Program and the State Energy Program (SEP). Proposed Cuts in Energy R&D
Appropriations for DOE research and development on energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear energy, and fossil energy would have been cut from $3.497 billion in FY2017 to $1.619 billion (53.7%) under the Administration's FY2018 budget request. The proposed energy R&D reductions were not included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which instead increased R&D funding for energy efficiency and renewable energy by 11.2% over the FY2017 level, nuclear energy by 18.5%, and fossil energy by 8.8%. Nuclear Waste Management
The Administration's budget request would have provided new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, but it was not included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2018. Under the Administration request, DOE was to receive $110 million to seek an NRC license for the repository, and NRC would have received $30 million to consider DOE's application. DOE would also have received $10 million to develop interim nuclear waste storage facilities. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2018 provided $122 million for the project. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy
The Trump Administration FY2018 budget would have eliminated the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E), which funds research on technologies that are determined to have potential to transform energy production, storage, and use. However, funding for ARPA-E was increased by 15.5% by the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2018—to $353.3 million. The House approved the Administration's proposal to terminate ARPA-E, but the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended that ARPA-E receive a $24 million increase over FY2017, to $330 million. The House approved the Administration's funding request. Surplus Plutonium Disposition
The Mixed-Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which would make fuel for nuclear reactors out of surplus weapons plutonium, has faced sharply escalating construction and operation cost estimates. The Obama Administration had also recommended the dilute-and-dispose option. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 ( P.L. Congressional Hearings
The following hearings were held by the Energy and Water Development subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on the FY2018 budget request. | The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps); the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's total funding.
President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget proposal to Congress on May 23, 2017. The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill totaled $34.189 billion (including offsets)—$4.261 billion (11.1%) below the FY2017 level. DOE nuclear weapons activities were proposed for a $994 million increase (10.7%). Final FY2018 funding for energy and water development programs was generally increased by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), which was signed by the President on March 23, 2018.
Major Energy and Water Development funding issues for FY2018 include
Water Agency Funding Reductions. The Trump Administration requested reductions of 17.2% for the Corps and 14.3% for Reclamation for FY2018. Those cuts were largely rejected by the House, the Senate Appropriations Committee, and the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants. DOE's Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy Program would have been terminated under the FY2018 budget request. The cuts were not included in the Consolidated Appropriation, and were also not approved by the House or by the Senate committee. Reductions in Energy Research and Development. Under the FY2018 budget request, DOE research and development appropriations would have been reduced for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE) by 69.6%, nuclear energy by 30.8%, and fossil energy by 58.1%. The House approved most of the reductions in EERE research and development (48.1% cut from FY2017 enacted levels) but largely did not follow the proposed nuclear and fossil energy reductions (4.7% and no cut, respectively). The Senate committee largely did not follow the proposed reductions in EERE, nuclear energy, and fossil energy and instead included reductions of 7.3%, 10.9%, and 16.6%, respectively. Energy R&D funding was increased 12.9% by the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Nuclear Waste Repository. The Administration's budget request would have provided new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. DOE would have received $110 million to seek an NRC license for the repository, and NRC would have received $30 million to consider DOE's application. DOE would also have received $10 million to develop interim nuclear waste storage facilities. The requested funding for Yucca Mountain and interim storage was not included in the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. The House had approved the request but the Senate panel had not. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E). The Trump Administration proposed to eliminate funds for new research projects by ARPA-E, and called for terminating the program after currently funded projects were completed. The ARPA-E termination was approved by the House. The Senate committee recommended against the termination, providing $330 million—$24 million above the FY2017 level. The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act increased funding for ARPA-E by 15.5%—to $353.3 million. Plutonium Disposition Plant Termination. Construction of the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which would make fuel for nuclear reactors out of surplus weapons plutonium, was proposed for termination under the Trump Administration request. The Obama Administration had recommended termination since FY2015, but Congress had provided funds to continue construction. For FY2018, the House bill would have continued construction, but the Senate panel accepted the Administration request to terminate the project. The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act conforms to provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-91) that allow DOE to pursue an alternative plutonium disposal program if sufficient cost savings are projected. |
crs_R44768 | crs_R44768_0 | Today, a "Dear Colleague" letter is official correspondence sent by a Member, committee, or officer of the House of Representatives or Senate and that is widely distributed to other congressional offices. These letters are named for their the most common opening salutation—"Dear Colleague"—and are often used to encourage others to cosponsor, support or oppose legislation; collect signatures on letters; invite Members to events; update congressional offices on administrative rules; and provide general information. This report provides a comparative analysis of how the use of the e-"Dear Colleague" system in the House of Representatives has changed between the 111 th Congress (2009-2010) and the 113 th Congress (2013-2014). To evaluate the overall volume of dear colleague sent since 2003, the first dataset, which contains the total number of "Dear Colleague" letters sent electronically between January 2003 and December 2014, was utilized. In all cases, the data do not include paper "Dear Colleague" letters or electronic "Dear Colleague" letters that were not sent through the House's email "Dear Colleague" system or the e-"Dear Colleague" system. Examining the number of electronic "Dear Colleague" letters sent each year provides an overall picture of the increased use of email- and web-based distribution to send "Dear Colleague" letters. In both the 111 th and 113 th Congresses, the most popular category was healthcare (8.8% and 8.3%, respectively). This was followed by foreign affairs (7.9%; 6.9%) in both congresses. In the 111 th Congress, education (6.0%) was third most popular followed by family issues (5.8%). For the 113 th Congress, family issues was third most popular (6.1%), followed by education (5.5%). For the data from the 111 th Congress, five categories were utilized:
1. solicited cosponsors for legislation 2. collected signatures for letters to executive branch officials or congressional leadership 3. invited other Members and staff to events 4. provided information or advocated on public policy, floor action, or amendments 5. announced administrative policies of the House
For letters from the 113 th Congress, the initial five categories were expanded into seven categories by dividing the invitation and information categories to better capture the content of "Dear Colleague" letters. Cosponsorship
Soliciting cosponsors for bills and resolutions was the most common reason for sending "Dear Colleague" letters in both the 111 th Congress (53.0%) and the 113 th Congress (42.0%). In the 113 th Congress, the number of letters asking for signatures increased to 25.4%. Information
Members, committees, and commissions also use "Dear Colleague" letters to provide information to other Members. In the 111 th Congress, administrative "Dear Colleague" letters accounted for 1.2% of letters in the database. Questions for Congress
Since the adoption and implementation of the e-"Dear Colleague" system in August 2008, the number of "Dear Colleague" letters sent in the House has continued to increase. In light of the analysis of the volume, use, characteristics, and purpose of "Dear Colleague" letters, several possible administrative and operations questions could be raised to aid the House in future discussions of the e-"Dear Colleague" system. As it currently stands, the e-"Dear Colleague" system is searchable by sender, letter title, and self-selected issue category. In 2003, 5,161 "Dear Colleague" letters were sent by email. This report analyzed the number of "Dear Colleague" letters sent and showed that, overall, the volume of letters sent continues to rise. In the 113 th Congress, those letters accounted for 30.9% of all letters sent. | The practice of one Member, committee, or office broadly corresponding to other Members, committee, or officers dates back to at least the 1800s. At least as early as 1913, this correspondence was labeled as "Dear Colleague" letters. Since 2003, it has been possible to track the volume of House "Dear Colleague" letters sent through an email-based distribution system (from 2003 to 2008) and a web-based distribution system (since 2008). The creation of the web-based e-"Dear Colleague" distribution system in 2008 has made it possible to systematically examine "Dear Colleague" letters, thereby offering a clearer understanding of what are largely, but not exclusively, intra-chamber communications.
Named for their opening salutation, "Dear Colleague" letters are official correspondence widely distributed to congressional offices. Members, committees, and officers of the House of Representatives often use "Dear Colleague" letters to encourage others to cosponsor, support, or oppose legislation. Additionally, senders use these letters to collect signatures, invite members to events, update congressional offices on administrative rules, and provide general information.
In analyzing data on the volume of "Dear Colleague" letters sent between January 2003 and December 2014 in the House of Representatives, several discernable trends can be observed. Overall the total number of "Dear Colleague" letters continued to increase from 5,161 letters sent in 2003 to 40,487 letters sent in 2014. Additionally, examining data from the web-based e-"Dear Colleague" system from the 111th Congress (2009-2010) and the 113th Congress (2013-2014) shows that the most common reason "Dear Colleague" letters are sent is to solicit cosponsorships for legislation. These cosponsor "Dear Colleague" letters accounted for 53.0% of letters in the 111th Congress and 42.0% in the 113th Congress. The second most frequent category in both congresses was asking for signatures for letters to congressional leadership, the President, or executive branch officials. These letters accounted for 20.8% of all letters in the 111th Congress and 25.4% in the 113th Congress.
Each "Dear Colleague" letter can be tagged in the electronic system with up to three self-selected policy categories. Analysis of the self-selected categories shows that the broad public policy issues that were most frequently tagged in the 111th Congress remained similar in the 113th Congress. Healthcare was the most frequently selected issue category with 8.8% of letters in the 111th Congress and 8.3% of letters in the 113th Congress. In both congresses, the next most popular category was foreign affairs (7.9% and 6.9%, respectively). In the 111th Congress, education (6.0%) was third most popular followed by family issues (5.8%). For the 113th Congress, family issues was third most popular (6.1%), followed by education (5.5%).
In light of the analysis of the volume, use, characteristics, and purpose of "Dear Colleague" letters, several possible administrative and operational questions are raised in this report to aid the House in future discussion of the electronic "Dear Colleague" system. These include questions on handling the growth in volume of "Dear Colleague" letters sent per year, and the potential to create additional mechanisms within the e-"Dear Colleague" system to aid subscribers in managing the "Dear Colleague" letters they receive.
For a brief explanation of how to send "Dear Colleague" letters, see CRS Report RL34636, "Dear Colleague" Letters: Current Practices, by Jacob R. Straus. |
crs_RL32858 | crs_RL32858_0 | Introduction
The Institute of Medicine (IOM), the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics(NCVHS), and other expert panels have identified information technology (IT) as one of the mostpowerful tools for reducing medical errors, lowering health costs, and improving the quality ofcare. There are significant financial, legal, andtechnical obstacles to the adoption of health IT systems. Congress and the Administration have already taken a number of important steps to promotehealth IT. The 2003 Medicare Modernization Act instructed the HHS Secretary to adopt electronicprescription standards and establish a Commission for Systemic Interoperability. The Commissionis charged with developing a comprehensive strategy for implementing data and messaging standardsto support the electronic exchange of clinical data. On April 27, 2004, President Bush called for thewidespread adoption of interoperable electronic health records (EHRs) within 10 years andestablished the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONCHIT). ONCHIT has developed a strategic 10-year plan outlining steps to transform the delivery of healthcare by adopting EHRs and developing a National Health Information Infrastructure (NHII) to linksuch records nationwide. They include: providing grants to stimulate EHRs and regionalinformation exchange systems; offering low-rate loans and loan guarantees for EHR adoption;amending federal rules (e.g., Medicare physician self-referral law) that may unintentionally impedethe development of electronic connectivity among health care providers; and using Medicarereimbursement to reward EHR use. Lawmakers in the 109th Congress are likely to consider legislation to boost federal investmentand leadership in health IT and provide incentives both for EHR adoption and for the creation ofregional health information networks, which are seen as a critical step towards the goal ofinterconnecting the health care system nationwide. Congress laid the groundwork for establishingan NHII when it enacted the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). HIPAA instructed the HHS Secretary to develop privacy standards to give patients more control overthe use of their medical information, and security standards to safeguard electronic patientinformation against unauthorized access, use, or disclosure. (3)
Barriers to the Adoption of Health IT
The U.S. health care industry, which represents about 15% of GDP, lags far behind othersectors of the economy in its investment in IT, despite growing evidence that electronic informationsystems can play a critical role in addressing many of the challenges the industry faces. The framework identifies several potential policy options for providing incentives for EHRadoption. H.R. | The Institute of Medicine, the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, and otherexpert panels have identified information technology (IT) as one of the most powerful tools forreducing medical errors, lowering health costs, and improving the quality of care. However, the U.S.health care industry lags far behind other sectors of the economy in its investment in IT, despitegrowing evidence that electronic information systems can play a critical role in addressing the manychallenges the industry faces. Adoption of health IT systems faces significant financial, legal, andtechnical obstacles.
Congress and the Administration have taken a number of important steps to promote healthIT. The 2003 Medicare Modernization Act instructed the HHS Secretary to adopt electronicprescription standards and establish a Commission for Systemic Interoperability. The Commissionis charged with developing a comprehensive strategy for implementing data and messaging standardsto support the electronic exchange of clinical data. On April 27, 2004, President Bush called for thewidespread adoption of interoperable electronic health records (EHRs) within 10 years andestablished the position of National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. Pursuant tothe President's order, the National Coordinator has developed a strategic 10-year plan outlining stepsto transform the delivery of health care by adopting EHRs and developing a National HealthInformation Infrastructure (NHII) to link such records nationwide.
The strategic plan identifies several potential policy options for providing incentives for EHRadoption. They include: providing grants to stimulate EHRs and regional information exchangesystems; offering low-rate loans and loan guarantees for EHR adoption; amending federal rules (e.g.,Medicare physician self-referral law) that may unintentionally impede the development of electronicconnectivity among health care providers; and using Medicare reimbursement to reward EHR use.
Health IT has broad bipartisan support among lawmakers. The 109th Congress is likely toconsider legislation to boost federal investment and leadership in health IT and provide incentivesboth for EHR adoption and for the creation of regional health information networks, which are seenas a critical step towards the goal of interconnecting the health care system nationwide. Severalhealth IT bills were introduced during the last Congress and, to date, two bills ( H.R. 747 , S. 16 ) have been introduced this year. Congress laid the groundwork forestablishing an NHII when it enacted the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act(HIPAA). HIPAA instructed the HHS Secretary to develop privacy standards to give patient morecontrol over the use of their medical information, and security standards to safeguard electronicpatient information against unauthorized access, use, or disclosure. |
crs_RL34741 | crs_RL34741_0 | Some opposed to drilling under the Great Lakes are concerned about the potential environmental, economic, and public health consequences of drilling. They contend that drilling will raise the risks of oil spills, hazardous gas leaks, and pollution that may harm lakeside residents and the Great Lakes ecosystem. Proponents of drilling contend that the risks of oil spills and other accidents are extremely low due to new technologies, that drilling would not be environmentally harmful, and that it would lead to the generation of revenues, additional employment, and expanded domestic energy supplies. The federal government became involved in banning drilling in the Great Lakes when the Congress enacted a temporary ban on the federal and state issuance of permits for drilling under the Great Lakes in 2001 ( P.L. 107-66 ; Title V, §503), extended it in 2003 , and then again through 2007. Some also proposed a permanent ban against drilling in or under the Great Lakes. A permanent ban on issuing federal or state permits for new directional, slant, or offshore drilling in or under the Great Lakes was included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ). Some contend that the decision of whether to drill in the Great Lakes should be made by each state bordering the lakes. This report provides background information on the history of drilling in the Great Lakes, current production statistics (where available) for U.S. and Canadian wells, and a summary of some environmental and economic issues related to drilling. Oil and Gas Production in the Great Lakes
No offshore oil and gas drilling in the Great Lakes has occurred in U.S. waters. Legal Implications of a Federal Drilling Ban
As described above, absent federal law to the contrary, states have the authority to regulate the use of Great Lakes resources within their territory and have instituted a variety of approaches for dealing with oil and gas drilling within their respective boundaries. Congress has broad authority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to regulate both the navigable waters and oil and gas development. While Congress likely possesses the authority to regulate or ban oil and gas drilling in or under the Great Lakes, such action might also constitute a "taking" of private property for which just compensation would be required. Congress has weighed in on these issues and enacted a permanent ban on the issuance of new federal or state leases or permits for oil and gas drilling in or under the Great Lakes. | Drilling for oil and gas in or under the Great Lakes has generated interest among Great Lakes stakeholders, states, and Congress. Some opposed to drilling are concerned about the potential environmental, economic, and public health consequences. They contend that drilling will raise the risks of oil spills, hazardous gas leaks, and pollution that may harm lakeside residents and the Great Lakes ecosystem. Proponents of oil and gas drilling contend that drilling will increase local and regional tax revenues and employment, increase domestic energy production, and not be an environmental problem because of new technologies that lower the risks of oil spills and other accidents.
Issuing federal or state permits for new drilling operations under the U.S. portions of the Great Lakes was banned in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58, §386). Specifically, the provision enacts a permanent ban on the issuance of federal or state permits for new directional, slant, or offshore drilling in or under the Great Lakes. Congress had enacted a temporary ban on any new federal and state permits for drilling under the Great Lakes in 2001 (P.L. 107-66; Title V, §503) and extended it to 2007. This temporary ban was in addition to several state bans on drilling in or under the Great Lakes. In contrast to U.S. law, Canadian law permits onshore gas and oil drilling under the Great Lakes, and offshore gas drilling in the Great Lakes.
Some contend that the decision of whether to ban drilling is a state responsibility. The states have the authority to regulate the use of Great Lakes resources within their territory and have instituted a variety of approaches for dealing with oil and gas drilling. Yet Congress has broad authority to regulate both the navigable waters and oil and gas development. Some critics of federal action to prohibit drilling say that while Congress may have the authority to regulate or ban oil and gas drilling in or under the Great Lakes, such action might also constitute a "taking" of property for which just compensation would be required.
This report provides background information on historical and current drilling practices in the Great Lakes, and statistics on oil and natural gas production by Canada and the United States, where data are available. It describes state laws regarding drilling in the Great Lakes and analyzes the environmental, socioeconomic, and legal aspects of drilling in or under the Great Lakes. |
crs_RL31812 | crs_RL31812_0 | Most Recent Developments
Conferees agreed to a FY2004 legislative branch appropriation of $3.548 billion contained in H.R. The President signed the bill into law on September 30, 2003, P.L. The act also contains $937.6 million for FY2003 emergency supplementalappropriations (for non-legislative branch programs). 2657). During markup on July 9, the Senate Committee on Appropriations added $2.044 billion in FY2003 emergency supplemental appropriations in a new title, Title III, of S. 1383 . 108-83 are those
authorizing the recruitment and training of sworn positions for assignment to the Library of Congress, including 23 positions in FY2004;
restating a requirement that the Capitol Police notify and consult with the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations on plans that "result in theredistribution, reprogramming, or reallocation of FTE's or funds in a manner different fromthat presented in each budget year's appropriation hearings; position reports to theCommittees; and the final approved budget;" (14)
authorizing any counsel providing legal assistance and representation to the Capitol Police to appear in any federal or state court;
directing that hazardous materials response team members assisting the Capitol Police be treated as members of the force in order to receive retirement benefits thatare comparable to benefits available to other federal firefighters and law enforcementpersonnel;
providing for a "more effective and efficient" transfer of Library of Congress police to the Capitol Police force; (15)
redefining and extending the physical jurisdiction of the Capitol Police over traffic within and around the Capitol grounds to limit and prohibit trucks, referred to asthe "truck interdiction program;"
directing the Capitol Police Board to make regulations regarding "implementation, execution and maintenance" of the truck interdiction program and to submitits regulations to the Committee on House Administration and the Senate Committee on Rulesand Administration for approval; and
directing that FY2004 basic training expenses of the Capitol Police at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center be paid from Department of Homeland Securityfunds. Among other activities and personnel costs theappropriation funds are two additional FTE positions. (40) GAOalso requested authority to use an additional estimated $6.0 million in revenues, which wasapproved by both houses in their versions of the FY2004 legislative funding bill. (50)
Government Printing Office. 108-11 , FY2003 EmergencyWartime Supplemental Appropriations Act. | Summary
On September 30, 2003, the President signed into law H.R. 2657 , the FY2004 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act ( P.L. 108-83 ). The Act contains $3.548 billion for FY2004legislative branch activities, and $937.6 million for FY2003 emergency supplemental appropriations(for executive and judicial programs).
During markup on July 9, 2003, the Senate Committee on Appropriations added $1.989 billion in FY2003 emergency supplemental appropriations to its version of the FY2004 legislative branchfunding bill, S. 1383 . It placed the funds in Title III of the bill. The Senate amendedthe supplemental to contain $2.0 billion, and conferees reduced the funding level to $937.6 million.
Among elements considered during discussions on the FY2004 budget were
the level of additional funds necessary to complete construction and furnishing of the Capitol Visitors' Center;
additional security enhancements within and around the Capitolcomplex;
the level of funding for activities of the Capitol Police;and
requests of the Capitol Police to expand their physical jurisdiction, establisha mounted police unit, authorize officers to carry guns (other than those used for official duty) whenoff-duty, and expand the law enforcement duties of officers outside the physical jurisdiction of theCapitol Police, including Members' home districts and states.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: GOV/FIN = Government and Finance |
crs_RL33838 | crs_RL33838_0 | Congress has not passed legislation, however, regarding how the soon-to-be-released spectrum should be used. Second, an initiative by the Administration to improve spectrum efficiency gives responsibility to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to provide policy recommendations that include spectrum uses for homeland security and public safety. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which has jurisdiction over spectrum used by state and local public safety agencies, is pursuing its own initiative. Options for Congress that have been suggested by public safety experts include requiring the Department of Homeland Security to expedite its own plans, requiring greater participation of the FCC in the DHS planning process, curtailing the right of the FCC to regulate network development for public safety, and turning over management of spectrum used for public safety to the NTIA. Finding appropriate spectrum to carry these vital transmissions as well as finding ways to use spectrum more efficiently are among the policy decisions to be addressed as part of the national effort to develop a robust, interoperable, emergency communications capability. The need for spectrum capacity among first responders and other emergency workers is variable. A national network might be comprised of regional agreements grouping states that are working to develop networks that are available to local and tribal emergency workers. DHS, Office of Emergency Communications
The Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 created an Office of Emergency Communications within DHS to lead a cooperative planning effort to create a "national response capability" for communications. A section of this law— P.L. 109-295 , Title VI , Subtitle D—the 21 st Century Emergency Communications Act of 2006—established an Office of Emergency Communications and the position of Director, reporting to the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications. Reportedly, the committee will be studying existing public safety communications programs that might provide a model for a national system. In December 2006, the FCC issued a new Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that proposed to turn over management of the 24MHz of spectrum designated for public safety to a not-for-profit group. . .[with] a centralized and national approach to maximize public safety access. . . ."
The NPRM outlines seven points: (1) allocate 12 MHz from the 700 MHz band assigned to public safety for broadband use by state and local public safety members; (2) assign this 12 MHz of spectrum to a single licensee, nationwide; (3) permit this licensee to operate commercially on the remaining 12 MHz allotted to public safety with public safety having priority access when needed; (4) permit the licensee to provide public safety broadband access on a fee for service basis; (5) permit the licensee to provide unconditionally preemptible access to commercial operators; (6) facilitate the shared use of commercial mobile infrastructure; and (7) "establish performance requirements for interoperability, build out, preemptibility of commercial access, and system robustness." Federal Access . Joint management by agencies . Spectrum management . Market-driven pricing has been proposed by the FCC, among others. Funding . This would be in the form of a distribution from the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Fund created by the Deficit Reduction Act. Possible Outcomes
This report has described three separate policy initiatives from different sectors of the federal government that appear to be moving in different directions. | Wireless communications capacity and capability provide essential support to emergency workers. First responders, state, local, tribal and federal emergency officials, utility workers, ambulance drivers, hospital personnel, forest fire fighters, federal law enforcement agents, the National Guard, and members of all branches of the military are among those who might respond to an emergency and need to be equipped to communicate among themselves and with each other.
The management of spectrum that carries wireless communications for public safety and homeland security has emerged as a time-critical policy issue for the 110th Congress due largely to several recent actions by Congress and the Administration, some with near-term deadlines.
Congress has mandated that an important band of spectrum be released for public safety use not later than February 18, 2009 (Deficit Reduction Act, P.L. 109-171, Sec. 3002). Congress has also mandated that a billion-dollar fund for public safety communications, created by the Deficit Reduction Act, be fully distributed by the end of FY2007 (S. 2653). As part of the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Congress put in place a number of requirements for an Office of Emergency Communications that, among other objectives, is to work with community, state and regional representatives to develop a national emergency communications capability (P.L. 109-295, Title VI, Subtitle D). Funding for part of this effort would be authorized as part of H.R. 1 (Representative Thompson).
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is moving forward with the Presidential Spectrum Policy Initiative planning process which includes evaluating spectrum use for public safety and homeland security. The Spectrum Advisory Committee created for this effort has announced that it will study several advanced systems operated by public safety agencies that might serve as a model for designing a national system.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in December 2006, announced a proposed rulemaking for a plan to provide a national emergency communications network using the spectrum band assigned by Congress to public safety, noted above. At the core of the FCC proposal is the appointment of a not-for-profit entity to administer access to the designated spectrum and to design a network that would be shared by public safety and commercial users.
These various initiatives appear to be moving in different directions. Congress may opt to establish policies for spectrum management that could require other approaches or objectives by the various agencies and departments involved.
This report will be updated. |
crs_R40443 | crs_R40443_0 | The majority of both total funding and total staffing, however, is with the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which regulates most meat and poultry, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which regulates virtually all other foods. It then provides a detailed overview of the major provisions in the newly enacted law—the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, P.L. In the 111 th Congress, major food safety legislation—the subject of this report—was passed, focusing on changes related to FDA, not USDA. §§ 301 et seq.). The 110 th Congress made several amendments to FDA's food safety authorities, and increased funding for the primary food safety agencies, but more comprehensive food safety legislation was not enacted. FSMA generally expands or modifies existing FDA authorities under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA; 21 U.S.C. Among its many provisions, the new law increases frequency of inspections at food facilities, tightens record-keeping requirements, extends more oversight to certain farms, and mandates product recalls if a firm fails to institute them voluntarily. FSMA requires food processing, manufacturing, shipping, and other regulated facilities to conduct an analysis of the most likely food safety hazards and to design and implement risk-based controls to prevent them. The new law requires the establishment of science-based "performance standards" for the most significant food contaminants. The new law also requires that additional registration information be submitted. Imported Food Safety . FSMA increases scrutiny of food imports, which account for a growing share of U.S. consumption; food import shipments must be accompanied by documentation that they can meet safety standards that are at least equivalent to U.S. standards. Such certifications may be provided by foreign governments or other so-called third parties accredited in advance. FSMA also contains provisions for certifying or accrediting laboratories, including private laboratories, to conduct sampling and testing of food, among other provisions. The law provides for limited amounts of fees and other offsets; its implementation will depend largely on discretionary appropriations. Some have already questioned whether an expanded investment in this area is appropriate in the current budgetary climate. 111-353), with Previously Existing Law | The 111th Congress passed comprehensive food safety legislation in December 2010 (the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, or FSMA, P.L. 111-353). Although numerous agencies share responsibility for regulating food safety, this newly enacted legislation focused on foods regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and amended FDA's existing structure and authorities, in particular via the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA; 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.). The new law does not directly affect activities at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which oversees the safety of most meat and poultry.
FSMA generally expands or modifies existing FDA authorities rather than creating a new food safety structure or authorities. Among its many provisions, the new law will increase frequency of inspections at food facilities, tighten record-keeping requirements, extend more oversight to certain farms, and mandate product recalls if a firm fails to institute them voluntarily. The new law will require food processing, manufacturing, shipping, and other regulated facilities to conduct an analysis of the most likely safety hazards and to design and implement risk-based controls to prevent them. FSMA also will facilitate the establishment of science-based "performance standards" for the most significant food contaminants. Other provisions in the new law are also intended to improve the nation's foodborne illness surveillance systems. FSMA also mandates increased scrutiny of food imports, which account for a growing share of U.S. consumption; food import shipments will have to be accompanied by documentation that they can meet safety standards that are at least equivalent to U.S. standards. Such certifications might be provided by foreign governments or other so-called third parties accredited in advance. FSMA also contains provisions for certifying or accrediting laboratories, including private laboratories, to conduct sampling and testing of food, among other provisions. This report provides a detailed overview of these and other major provisions in the newly enacted law.
The 112th Congress will likely provide oversight and scrutiny of how the law is implemented, including FDA's coordination with other federal agencies. Implementation of the law will depend largely on the availability of discretionary appropriations, and some have questioned whether funding should be provided in the current budgetary climate. In addition, the 112th Congress may consider changes to other food safety laws and policies that continue to be actively debated in Congress. Continued congressional interest in reforming the nation's food safety laws and in monitoring food safety issues is expected, given other perceived problems with the current food safety system. |
crs_R42810 | crs_R42810_0 | Introduction
The Honoring America's Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012 ( H.R. 1627 , P.L. This report provides information on the various provisions of P.L. 112-154 by program, benefit, or topic, rather than by each legislative provision. However, for each change in a program, benefit, etc., the section number of P.L. 112-154 is provided. Health Care1
Medical Care for Camp Lejeune Veterans and Family Members
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), through the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), operates the nation's largest integrated direct health care delivery system. From time to time, Congress has passed legislation providing special treatment authority for certain groups of veterans. 103-210 to provide additional authority for the VA to provide health care for Persian Gulf War veterans, for medical conditions possibly related to exposure to toxic substances or environmental hazards during their active duty service in the Southwest Asia theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War. 112-154 provides eligibility to VA provided hospital care, medical services, and nursing home care to certain veterans and their eligible family members who were stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, from January 1, 1957 to December 31, 1987, during which time the well water was contaminated. The VA Secretary is required to issue a report to Congress within 180 days of enactment (August 6, 2012) on the beneficiaries of the initiative and an analysis of the initiative. 112-154 makes a number of changes to the VA's Specially Adapted Housing (SAH) Program, which provides grants to veterans and servicemembers with certain service-connected disabilities to assist them in purchasing or remodeling homes to fit their needs. P.L. P.L. 112-154 expands specific provisions of the VR&E program for veterans affected by natural or other disasters, as identified by the VA Secretary. | Congress has in the past enacted legislation providing authority for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to treat certain veterans for specific medical conditions resulting from their exposure to certain toxic substances or environmental hazards while on active military duty.
In the 1980s, officials at Camp Lejeune became aware of the presence of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in drinking water samples. Camp Lejeune was placed on the National Priorities List by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1989, and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry continues to monitor samples from the water table.
The Honoring America's Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012 (H.R. 1627, P.L. 112-154, enacted on August 6, 2012) provides authority for the VA to provide medical services for 15 specific illnesses to certain veterans as well as their eligible family members, who were stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, from January 1, 1957, to December 31, 1987.
In addition to providing the VA authority to provide medical services associated with these specific illnesses to veterans and their families stationed at Camp Lejeune during this time period, P.L. 112-154 makes a number of changes to other VA programs, including housing and other benefit programs. Some of these changes affect VA administration and expand congressional oversight of the VA through increased reporting to Congress, while other changes made by P.L. 112-154 would impact the larger population of veterans. That is, the changes would impact all veterans utilizing these programs, not just veterans stationed at Camp Lejeune during the above specified period.
This report provides information on the various provisions of P.L. 112-154 by program, benefit, or topic, rather than by each legislative provision. However, for each change in a program, benefit, etc., the section number of P.L. 112-154 is provided. |
crs_RL33469 | crs_RL33469_0 | Introduction
Violence in the home is not a new phenomenon. (4)
The impact on children of domestic violence was an issue of interest in the 109th Congress.The first session of the 109th Congress ended with the passage of the Violence Against Women andDepartment of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ), which contained new initiativesto address concerns about children and youth exposed to and victimized by domestic violence. Federal Programs and Initiatives
Since 1999, several federal programs and initiatives have been created specifically to addressconcerns related to children who witness domestic violence. The programs include the Safe StartProgram (administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Juvenile Justice andDelinquency Prevention, or OJJDP), Safe Havens for Children Program (sponsored by DOJ's Officeof Violence Against Women, or VAWO), and the Safe and Bright Futures for Children Initiative andthe Demonstration of Enhanced Services to Children and Youth Who Have Been Exposed toDomestic Violence (both administered by the Department of Health and Human Services, or HHS). The latter two programs are partially funded through proceeds from the Stop Family Violencepostage stamp that was created through the Stamp Out Domestic Violence Act of 2001, Section 653of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2002 ( P.L. The U.S. PostalService was directed to issue a semi-postal stamp in order to allow the public a direct and tangibleway to contribute to domestic violence funding. To date, proceeds from the stamp have generated $3.03 million. (5)
In addition, the Greenbook Initiative is a federal multi-agency demonstration project thatimplements the suggested guidelines for policy and practice of the National Council of Juvenile andFamily Court Judges "Greenbook" designed to assist child welfare, domestic violence agencies, andfamily courts to respond more effectively when domestic violence and child maltreatment occursimultaneously. 106-386 ), to provide supervisedand safe visitation exchange of children by and between parents in situations involving domesticviolence, child abuse, sexual assault, or stalking. The Keeping Children and Families Safe Act stipulated that when funds appropriated forstate Family Violence Prevention (FVP) grants exceeded $130 million in a fiscal year, the HHSSecretary must use a portion of those surplus funds to assist children who have witnessed domesticviolence. Such grants are intended to empower schools to train schooladministrators, faculty, counselors, coaches, health care providers, security employees and other staffregarding the needs, concerns of, and impact on students who experience domestic and datingviolence, sexual assault, or stalking; to develop and implement policies for students eitherexperiencing or who are perpetrators of such violence; to provide support services for students andschool staff for developing and enhancing effective prevention and intervention methods for studentsand personnel experiencing such violence; to provide students with developmentally appropriateeducation programs regarding such violence and the effects of experiencing those forms of violenceby adjusting the existing curricula activities to the relevant student population; to work with existingmentoring programs and develop strong mentoring programs to assist students in understandingviolence and recognizing violent behavior and how to prevent it, and how to address their feelingsappropriately; and to conduct evaluations assessing the effects of such programs and policies so thatdeveloping the programs can be enhanced. | Violence between domestic partners is not a new phenomenon. Children who witness suchviolence, however, have increasingly become a concern of policymakers. Since 1999, several federalprograms and initiatives have been created to address the problems of children who witness domesticviolence, and several new initiatives were enacted in the 109th Congress.
The Safe Start Initiative was authorized by legislation in 1999 ( P.L. 105-277 ) to prevent andreduce the effects of family and community violence on young children from birth to age six. In2000, Congress reauthorized the Violence Against Women Act and created the Safe Havens forChildren Pilot Program to provide supervised and safe visitation exchange of children by andbetween parents in situations involving domestic violence. In 2001, the Stop Family Violencepostage stamp was created, directing the U.S. Postal Service to issue a semi-postal stamp to allowthe public an opportunity to contribute toward domestic violence funding. Proceeds from the saleswere transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for domestic violenceprevention programs, specifically the Safe and Bright Futures for Children Program, and theDemonstration of Enhanced Services to Children and Youth Who Have Been Exposed to DomesticViolence. To date, proceeds from the stamp have generated $3.0 million. Furthermore, funds havebeen authorized under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act to assist children exposedto domestic violence, if appropriations exceed $130 million in a fiscal year. To date, appropriationshave not exceeded that amount.
The Greenbook Initiative is a federal multi-agency demonstration project that implementsthe suggested guidelines for policy and practice of the National Council of Juvenile and FamilyCourt Judges, and is designed to assist child welfare, domestic violence agencies, and family courtsin responding more effectively when domestic violence and child maltreatment occursimultaneously. Since FY2001, six communities have been funded through the federal GreenbookDemonstration Initiative.
The impact on children of exposure to domestic violence was an issue in the 109th Congress. At the end of the first session, Congress passed the Violence Against Women and Department ofJustice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ), which contained a series of new initiatives. New programs would provide services to assist youth who have been victims of domestic and datingviolence, sexual assault, and stalking; support training and collaborative efforts of service providerswho assist families in which domestic violence and child maltreatment occur simultaneously; enablemiddle and high schools to train relevant school personnel to assist student victims of such violence,holding perpetrators accountable; and combat such violence on college campuses. |
crs_RL34533 | crs_RL34533_0 | During the 110 th Congress, several House and Senate committees have engaged in oversight activities, including hearings and requests for expeditious production of documents and information regarding the Administration's warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance programs, as possible changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, were explored. In July 2007, an unclassified summary of the National Intelligence Estimate on "The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland" was released. It expressed the judgment, in part, that the U.S. Homeland will face a persistent and evolving threat over the next three years, the main threat coming from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, particularly Al Qaeda. On August 2, 2007, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) released a statement on "Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act." In his statement, Admiral McConnell viewed such modernization as necessary to respond to technological changes and to meet the Nation's current intelligence collection needs. He deemed it essential for the intelligence community to provide warning of threats to the United States. He perceived two critically needed changes. Second, he contended that liability protection was needed for those who furnished aid to the government in carrying out its foreign intelligence collection efforts. On February 13, 2008, the House rejected H.R. On November 15, 2007, the House passed H.R. After debate, the Senate passed S. 2248 , as amended, by a vote of 68-29. 3773 was taken up, all but the enacting clause was stricken and the text of S. 2248 , as amended, was inserted in lieu thereof. On March 12, 2008, the House Rules Committee reported H.Res. 3773 and the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment
Both the Senate amendment to H.R. For example, the Senate amendment to H.R. While both the House and the Senate provide prospective limitations of liability for those who furnish aid to the government in connection with acquisitions authorized under their respective bills, they differ in their treatment of electronic communication service providers who assisted the government with warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes between September 11, 2001 and January 17, 2007. Title II of the House amendment provides a procedure by which a court, while taking steps to protect classified information, could examine submissions, arguments and information with respect to which state secrets privilege has been asserted in covered civil actions against such electronic communications service providers and other persons who may have furnished such aid to the government. The Senate bill has no similar provision. 3773 does not address this issue. In the following table, this report provides a detailed side-by-side comparison of the provisions of these two measures, using H.R. (h) "Minimization procedures," with respect to electronic surveillance, means—
(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information;
(2) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information, which is not foreign intelligence information, as defined in subsection (e)(1) of this section, shall not be disseminated in a manner that identifies any United States person, without such person's consent, unless such person's identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance;
(3) notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), procedures that allow for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes; and
(4) notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), with respect to any electronic surveillance approved pursuant to section 1802(a) of this title, procedures that require that no contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party shall be disclosed, disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer than 72 hours unless a court order under section 1805 of this title is obtained or unless the Attorney General determines that the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. | During the 110th Congress, several House and Senate committees have engaged in oversight activities, including hearings and requests for expeditious production of documents and information regarding the Administration's warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance programs, as possible changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, (FISA) were explored. In July 2007, an unclassified summary of the National Intelligence Estimate on "The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland" was released. It expressed the judgment, in part, that the U/S. Homeland will face a persistent and evolving threat over the next three years, the main threat coming from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, particularly Al Qaeda. On August 2, 2007, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) released a statement on "Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act." In his statement, Admiral McConnell viewed such modernization as necessary to respond to technological changes and to meet the Nation's current intelligence collection needs. He deemed it essential for the intelligence community to provide warning of threats to the United States. In his view, there were two critically needed changes: that a court order should not be required for gathering foreign intelligence from foreign targets located overseas; and that liability protection was needed for those who furnished aid to the government in carrying out its foreign intelligence collection efforts.
Both the House and the Senate have taken action on proposals to address these concerns, but the measures differ somewhat in content and approach. On November 15, 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007. On February 12, 2008, the Senate passed S. 2248, as amended, then struck all but the enacting clause of H.R. 3773, and inserted the text of S. 2248, as amended, in its stead. On March 14, 2008, the House passed an amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3773. Both the House amendment and the Senate amendment include significant changes to FISA, including provisions on the acquisition of communications of non-U.S. persons and of U.S. persons abroad. The two bills take different approaches to some issues that have played a significant role in the ongoing debate. For example, the Senate amendment would provide retroactive immunity for electronic communications service providers who assisted the government in intelligence activities between September 11, 2001 and January 17, 2007. The House amendment would provide for presentation to a court, with certain safeguards, of evidence and arguments with respect to which state secrets privilege has been asserted in covered civil actions against such electronic communications service providers and other persons who furnished such aid to the government. The House bill also provides for an audit of the Terrorist Surveillance Program and any other wireless electronic surveillance programs, with reporting requirements, while the Senate bill does not. This report provides an overview, a review of legislative activity, and a detailed side-by-side comparison of the provisions of these two bills. |
crs_R41235 | crs_R41235_0 | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. Temporary Federal High Risk Pool Program
The temporary HRP program, or the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP ) as it is commonly referred to, is intended to provide transitional coverage for uninsured individuals with preexisting conditions until January 1, 2014, when group health plans and health insurance issuers of group or individual health insurance coverage will be prohibited from having preexisting condition exclusions. A PCIP can be administered either by a state or by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). As illustrated in Figure 1 , slightly more than half of the states (27) have accepted responsibility for administering their own PCIP plan, while 23 states and the District of Columbia (DC) requested that HHS run the program on their behalf. Within OCIIO, the Office of Insurance Programs (OIP) was established to be responsible for administering the temporary high risk pool program and associated funding to states. PPACA appropriated $5 billion to pay claims and the administrative costs of the temporary HRP that are in excess of the amount of premiums collected from enrollees beginning on July 1 2010, until the program ends on January 1, 2014. Eligibility Criteria
The PCIP program is intended to supplement existing state HRPs. To be a qualified PCIP, the health insurance coverage must have an actuarial value of at least 65% of the total allowed costs. This means the total annual cost-sharing requirements, including deductibles, cannot exceed $5,950. By law, premium rates for the PCIP must be established at a standard rate for a standard population and age rating cannot exceed a factor of 4 to 1. PCIP Program Tables | This report briefly describes the temporary federal high risk pool (HRP) program, more commonly known as the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (PCIP) program. The PCIP program was established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended). Under PPACA, the PCIP program is intended to help individuals with preexisting conditions who have been uninsured for six or more months to obtain health insurance coverage before 2014. In 2014, coverage will be available on a guaranteed issue basis and preexisting condition exclusions will be prohibited.
To be a qualified PCIP, the insurance coverage must have an actuarial value (the average percentage of expenses that the plan covers) at least equal to 65% of total allowed costs, and out-of-pocket costs cannot exceed $5,950 for an individual in 2011. The premiums must be established at a standard rate for a standard population, and age rating cannot exceed a factor of 4 to 1. Claims and administrative costs will be subsidized by the federal government.
States can run the program or elect to have the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) operate the program in their states. Slightly more than half of states (27 states) contracted to operate their own PCIPs. HHS administers the PCIPs in 23 states and the District of Columbia. PPACA appropriates $5 billion of federal funds to support the program, available from July 1, 2010, until the program ends on January 1, 2014. Originally projected to have 200,000 or more enrollees, the PCIPs had 21,454 enrollees as of April 30, 2011. This is a 168.65% increase from the first enrollment statistics released on November 1, 2010.
This report provides an overview of the temporary federal high risk pool program and will be periodically updated to reflect any legislative or regulatory changes. |
crs_R44487 | crs_R44487_0 | The federal Lifeline program, established in 1985 by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), assists qualifying low-income consumers to gain access to and remain on the telecommunications network. The program assists eligible individuals in paying the reoccurring monthly service charges associated with telecommunications usage. While initially designed to support traditional landline service, in 2005 the FCC expanded the program to cover either a landline or a wireless/mobile option. On March 31, 2016, the FCC adopted an Order (2016 Order or Order) to once again expand the program to make broadband an eligible service. The Lifeline program is available to eligible low-income consumers in every state, territory, commonwealth, and on tribal lands. What Is Covered Under the Program? The Lifeline program provides a discount in most cases of up to $9.25 per month, for eligible households to help offset the costs associated with use of the telecommunications network. The Order provides support for stand-alone mobile or fixed broadband, as well as combined bundles of voice and broadband, and sets minimum broadband and mobile voice standards for service offerings. The one line per eligible household limitation and the prohibition on support for devices remain. The cost of this device is not covered under the Lifeline program but is borne by the designated provider. Who Certifies Service Providers? | The Federal Lifeline Program, established by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1985, is one of four programs supported under the Universal Service Fund. The Program was originally designed to assist eligible low-income households to subsidize the monthly service charges incurred for voice telephone usage and was limited to one fixed line per household. In 2005 the Program was modified to cover the choice between either a fixed line or a mobile/wireless option. Concern over the division between those who use and have access to broadband versus those who do not, known as the digital divide, prompted the FCC to once again modify the Lifeline program to cover access to broadband. On March 31, 2016, the FCC adopted an Order to expand the Lifeline Program to support mobile and fixed broadband Internet access services on a stand-alone basis, or with a bundled voice service. Households must meet a needs-based criteria for eligibility. The program provides assistance to only one line per household in the form of a monthly subsidy of, in most cases, $9.25. This subsidy solely covers costs associated with network access (minutes of use), not the costs associated with devices, and is given not to the subscriber, but to the household-selected service provider. This subsidy is then in turn passed on to the subscriber. The Lifeline program is available to eligible low-income consumers in every state, territory, commonwealth, and on tribal lands. |
crs_R43361 | crs_R43361_0 | Introduction
The increasing Department of Defense (DOD) emphasis on expanding U.S. partnerships and building partnership capacity with foreign military and other security forces has refocused congressional attention on two long-standing human rights provisions affecting U.S. security assistance policy. Sponsored in the late 1990s by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and often referred to as the "Leahy amendments" or the "Leahy laws," one is Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA, P.L. 2378d) and the other is a recurring provision in annual defense appropriations. FAA Section 620M prohibits the furnishing of assistance authorized by the FAA and the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (AECA, P.L. As two of the many laws that Congress has enacted in recent decades to promote respect for human rights, which has become widely recognized as a core U.S. national interest, the Leahy laws have been the subject of long-standing debate. In 1998, for FY1999, Congress placed a similar condition in the DOD appropriations bill. In 2011, Congress amended the FAA provision (and renumbered it as Section 620M of the FAA) with three word changes to align it more closely with the DOD language. 113-76), contains a provision extending the FY2013 (and earlier) prohibition on any support for training where a gross violation of human rights occurred to "any training, equipment, or other assistance for the members of a unit of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights." Comparison of Current Laws
The FAA and DOD appropriations Leahy laws both prohibit assistance to foreign military and other security units credibly believed to be involved in a gross violation of human rights. After the FY2014 change, three differences remain. For DOD and State Department-funded training (and in some cases the provision of equipment related to training), the process has evolved from a "cable-based" system when the State Department began to vet foreign security forces in 1997 to a computerized process through the International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) system. In FY2012, the State Department reported vetting nearly 165,000 individuals and units. U.S. Embassy Procedures
U.S. embassy staff initiates each vetting request. assistance.) In general, vetting results are used to determine who will receive U.S. assistance or training. Vetting Funding
In recent years, Congress has supported Leahy vetting operations through a directed allocation of funds to DRL in the Diplomacy and Consular Programs (D&CP) account. Over time, Congress has aligned the State Department and DOD Leahy language for greater consistency, most recently by extending the scope of the DOD law in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014. What Level of Resources Are Adequate to Conduct Vetting? Should Implementation Practices and Procedures Be Standardized? In addressing the overarching issues of utility and desirability, Congress may wish to question the Obama Administration about the laws' effectiveness. | Congressional interest in the laws and processes involved in conditioning U.S. assistance to foreign security forces on human rights grounds has grown in recent years, especially as U.S. Administrations have increased emphasis on expanding U.S. partnerships and building partnership capacity with foreign military and other security forces. Congress has played an especially prominent role in initiating, amending, supporting with resources, and overseeing implementation of long-standing laws on human rights provisions affecting U.S. security assistance.
First sponsored in the late 1990s by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the "Leahy laws" (sometimes referred to as the "Leahy amendments") are currently manifest in two places. One is Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, which prohibits the furnishing of assistance authorized by the FAA and the Arms Export Control Act to any foreign security force unit where there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. The second is a recurring provision in annual defense appropriations, newly expanded by the FY2014 Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations bill as contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), to align its scope with that of the FAA provision. (Prior DOD appropriations measures had applied the prohibition to support for any training program, as defined by DOD, but not to other forms of DOD assistance.) As they currently stand, the FAA and DOD provisions are similar but not identical. Over the years, they have been subject to changes to more closely align their language, most recently with the expansion of scope enacted in the FY2014 DOD appropriations law. Nevertheless, some differences remain.
Implementation of Leahy vetting involves a complex process in the State Department and U.S. embassies overseas that determines which foreign security individuals and units are eligible to receive U.S. assistance or training. Beginning in 2010, the State Department has utilized a computerized system called the International Vetting and Security Tracking (INVEST) system, which has facilitated a major increase in the number of individuals and units vetted (some 160,000 in FY2012). Congress supports Leahy vetting operations through a directed allocation of funds in State Department appropriations.
The Leahy laws touch upon many issues of interest to Congress. These range from current vetting practices and implementation (involving human rights standards, relations and policy objectives with specific countries, remediation mechanisms, and inter-office and inter-agency coordination, among other issues), to legislative efforts to increase alignment between the Foreign Assistance Act and DOD restrictions, to levels and forms of resources dedicated to conduct vetting. More broadly, overarching policy questions persist about the utility and desirability of applying the Leahy laws, and whether there is sometimes a conflict between promoting respect for human rights and furthering other national interests. |
crs_R44340 | crs_R44340_0 | Overview of this Report
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 led to major changes in officer training and career development through the establishment of a joint management system. This report focuses mainly on JPME requirements in the context of the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. The goals of the GNA in terms of personnel management were threefold: improving the (1) quality, (2) experience, and (3) education of joint officers (see Table 1 ). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 required DOD to initiate an independent study of Joint Officer Management (JOM) and Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) to assess the ability of the existing practice, policy, and law to meet the demands of the future. The legislation also removed the requirement that officers complete JPME I and II prior to a joint duty assignment. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 amended 10 U.S.C. "Joint matters," by statute, are currently defined as:
matters related to the achievement of unified action by multiple military forces in operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the information environment, including matters relating to –
National military strategy;
Strategic planning and contingency planning;
Command and control of operations under unified command;
National security planning with other departments and agencies of the United States; and
Combined operations with military forces of allied nations. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced in December 2015 that the Department of Defense (DOD) would be launching a review of the department's structure and efficiency in the context of the GNA reforms. A DOD memorandum dated January 4, 2016, outlined the key questions that would be addressed in this review. With respect to the joint officer management system, DOD plans to consider,
Do current law and policy governing joint duty qualifications provide the right human capital development to meet our joint warfighting requirements? Are there adjustments that can be made to balance the often competing demands of joint professional development and other specialized expertise or other career development considerations? A spokesman for DOD indicated that this review might result in internal policy changes and/or legislative proposals. Should the curriculum be expanded? Congress may consider these and other questions with regard to JPME and the joint officer management system as part of the GNA review and in future legislative initiatives. | In November 2015, the Senate Armed Services Committee initiated a review of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). This piece of legislation, enacted in 1986 and amended in subsequent years, led to major reforms in defense organization. The year 2016 will mark the 30th anniversary of this landmark legislation, and lawmakers have expressed interest in whether the changes, as implemented, are achieving the goals of the reform, and whether further reforms are needed to achieve current and future national security goals.
One of Congress's main goals of the legislation was to improve joint interoperability among the military services through a series of structural changes and incentives for participation in joint matters. Joint matters, by statute (10 U.S.C. §661), are currently defined as,
…matters related to the achievement of unified action by multiple military forces in operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the information environment…
Modifications of the officer management system under the GNA reforms were intended to enhance the quality, experience, and education of joint officers. The law required, for the first time, that officers complete Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) in order to be eligible for certain joint assignments and promotion categories. Some have questioned the extent to which these statutory JPME requirements are achieving the goals of the reform and whether they should be amended or repealed. Others have questioned whether the JPME curriculum, method of delivery and instruction, course structure, and career timing are appropriate in the context of today's strategic environment and force structure needs.
In parallel to congressional efforts, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced in December 2015 that the Department of Defense (DOD) would be launching a review of the department's structure and efficiency in the context of the GNA reforms. A DOD memorandum dated January 4, 2016, outlined the key questions that would be addressed in this review. With respect to the joint officer management system, DOD plans to consider,
Do current law and policy governing joint duty qualifications provide the right human capital development to meet our joint warfighting requirements?
Are there adjustments that can be made to balance the often competing demands of joint professional development and other specialized expertise or other career development considerations?
A spokesman for DOD indicated that this review might result in internal policy changes and/or legislative proposals. Any reforms to the military personnel management system might also be considered in conjunction with DOD's "Force of the Future" initiative, the first phase of which was launched by Secretary Carter on November 18, 2015. The purpose of this initiative is to improve the department's ability to recruit and retain the talent it needs to adapt to future mission requirements. |
crs_RL31649 | crs_RL31649_0 | The Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 , contains the following provisions that limit tort liability, and this report examines each of them. Section 304 immunizes manufacturers and administrators of smallpox vaccines from tort liability. Sections 863 and 864 limit the tort liability of sellers of anti-terrorism technologies. Section 1201 limits the tort liability of air carriers for acts of terrorism committed on or to an air carrier. Section 1402 immunizes air carriers from liability arising out of a Federal flight deck officer's use or failure to use a firearm, and immunizes Federal flight deck officers from liability, except for gross negligence or willful misconduct, for acts or omissions in defending the flight deck of an aircraft. Sections 1714-1717 limit the tort liability of manufacturers and administrators of the components and ingredients of various vaccines; these sections reportedly were designed to benefit pharmaceutical manufacturer Eli Lilly in suits against it concerning Thimerosal. Section 863 prohibits joint and several liability for noneconomic damages. Section 863 eliminates the collateral source rule. It limits their liability to the amount of liability insurance they had on that date. Section 890 limits the liability of such persons (i.e., air transportation security companies and their affiliates) only for claims "arising from the terrorist-related crashes of September 11, 2001," and it limits it to the "amount of liability insurance coverage maintained by that ... It provides that,
[f]or acts of terrorism committed on or to an air carrier during the 180-day period following the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation may certify that the air carrier was a victim of an act of terrorism and ... shall not be responsible for losses suffered by third parties (as referred to in section 205.5(b)(1) of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations) that exceed $100,000,000, in the aggregate, for all claims by such parties arising out of such act. If the Secretary so certifies, making the air carrier not liable for an amount that exceeds $100 million, then "the Government shall be responsible for any liability above such amount. Note: sections 1714-1717 were repealed by P.L. 108-7 (2003), Division L, § 102 ; see the end of this report for details. A petitioner dissatisfied with his recovery under the Program may sue a vaccine manufacturer or administrator under state tort law, with some limitations. | The Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 ( H.R. 5005 ), contains the following provisions that limit tort liability, and this report examines each of them.
Section 304 immunizes manufacturers and administrators of smallpox vaccines from tort liability. It makes the United States liable, but not strictly liable, as manufacturers and administrators would be under state law. Rather, the United States will be liable only for the negligence of vaccine manufacturers and administrators. Section 863 limits the tort liability of sellers of anti-terrorism technologies. It prohibits punitive damages, joint and several liability for noneconomic damages, and application of the collateral source rule; in addition, it permits the government contractor defense. Section 864 limits the tort liability of sellers of anti-terrorism technologies to the amount of liability insurance required by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Section 890 limits the tort liability of air transportation security companies and their affiliates for claims arising from the September 11, 2001 air crashes. It limits it to the amount of their liability insurance coverage on that date. Section 1201 limits the tort liability of air carriers for acts of terrorism committed on or to an air carrier. If the Secretary of Homeland Security certifies that an act of terrorism occurred, then air carriers shall not be liable for losses that exceed $100 million for all claims, but the government shall be liable for losses above that amount. Section 1402 immunizes air carriers from liability arising out of a Federal flight deck officer's use or failure to use a firearm, and immunizes Federal flight deck officers from liability, except for gross negligence or willful misconduct, for acts or omissions in defending the flight deck of an aircraft. Sections 1714-1717 limit the tort liability of manufacturers and administrators of the components and ingredients of various vaccines. They require victims to file a petition for limited no-fault recovery under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program before they may sue. These sections reportedly were designed to benefit pharmaceutical manufacturer Eli Lilly in suits against it concerning Thimerosal. Sections 1714-1717 were repealed by P.L. 108-7 (2003), Division L, §102. |
crs_R43565 | crs_R43565_0 | governs the management and conservation of commercial and recreational fisheries in U.S. federal waters (3-200 nautical miles from shore). The MSFCMA also has evolved with changes to fishery resources, the U.S. fishing industry, recreational fishing, and seafood markets. The MSFCMA was last reauthorized and extensively amended in 2006 ( P.L. Although the authorization of appropriations under the MSFCMA expired at the end of FY2013, the act's requirements continue in effect and Congress has continued to appropriate funds to administer the act. Historically, reauthorization has also provided the opportunity to introduce significant amendments to the act. During the last three Congresses, a number of bills have been introduced to address these issues and other concerns related to fisheries management. Oversight and reauthorization hearings have been held by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on Natural Resources. In December 2013, the Chairman of the House Committee on Natural Resources released a reauthorization discussion draft. In early April 2014, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation also released a draft to stakeholder groups. Several interrelated issues have emerged during the ongoing debate over requirements to use annual catch limits (ACLs) and to rebuild fish populations. Flexibility in Ending Overfishing and Rebuilding Overfished Fisheries
Flexibility in rebuilding overfished fisheries has become one of the main issues of the current MSFCMA reauthorization debate. Distributional issues may exist among different commercial gear types, commercial and recreational fishermen, and ports or communities. Catch shares may shift landings and affect specific fishing ports disproportionately. Bills Introduced During the 112th Congress
Several bills would have changed RFMC management processes and decision making. House and Senate Committee Proposals
The House Committee on Natural Resources and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation have been pursuing efforts to reauthorize the MSFCMA during the 113 th Congress by holding hearings and by releasing discussion drafts composed of potential amendments to the act. 97-191 ) and more recently the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA, 109-479), it created a new system of federal fishery management. Constituencies
A variety of groups are involved in managing and utilizing marine fisheries. Regional Fishery Management Councils
Section 103 of the legislation increased the role of science in decision-making through a number of provisions focused on the RFMCs' Scientific and Statistical Committees (SSCs) by:
specifying that the SSCs are to provide their councils with scientific advice needed for management decisions; requiring the regional councils to develop five-year research priorities for fisheries, fisheries interactions, habitats, and other areas of research necessary for management; modifying regional council fishery management plan procedures, including a requirement to improve coordination of the MSFCMA regulatory process and environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. Features of LAPPs, as provided in the act, include the following:
allows for allocation of harvesting privileges to individuals, corporations, fishing communities, or regional fishery associations; allows only fisheries that have been operating under a limited access system to be eligible for management under a LAPP system; directs the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to develop criteria for eligibility by considering several factors, such as traditional fishing practices, the cultural and social elements of the fishery, and the severity of projected economic and social impacts of LAPPs; allows processors to hold LAPPs and participate in the normal allocation process (but not by allocation of a separate processor quota); and requires a formal and detailed review five years after implementation of each program, and thereafter review within every seven years. | The 113th Congress is actively considering reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA). The MSFCMA governs the management and conservation of commercial and recreational fisheries in U.S. federal waters (3-200 nautical miles from shore). The MSFCMA was last reauthorized and extensively amended in 2006 (P.L. 109-479). Although the authorization of appropriations under the MSFCMA expired at the end of FY2013, the act's requirements continue in effect and Congress has continued to appropriate funds to administer the act. Historically, reauthorization has also provided the opportunity to introduce significant amendments to the act.
During the first decade after the act was passed in 1976, fishery policy focused on controlling and replacing foreign fishing and developing U.S. fisheries in the newly declared 200-mile Fishery Conservation Zone. After that time, new issues emerged, including recognition of the need to sustain fish populations and respond to overfishing while attempting to satisfy the economic and social needs of recreational and commercial fishermen and fishing communities. Achieving this balance is closely related to allocating federal fishery resources among different users, developing and supporting existing management institutions, and investing in management and research.
This report covers issues that have been identified during congressional hearings and in legislation introduced during the last three Congresses. Although most issues are not new, they have evolved with changes to the statute, regulations, and fishery management plans. Major issues include (1) flexibility in rebuilding overfished fisheries, (2) annual catch limits, (3) uncertainty and data needs; (4) catch shares (limited access privilege programs), (5) management process and decision making, (6) bycatch, and (7) environmental quality. A variety of other issues are also covered in this report.
Most of these issues are part of a system of linked elements including ecosystems (fish populations and biophysical elements of the environment), fishing (commercial and recreational fishermen, processors, and other related fishing businesses), management (managers, scientists, and the regulatory system), fishing communities (other related businesses and coastal residents), and markets (wholesale, retail, restaurants, and consumers). Often a change in one element affects other elements. For example, requirements to stop overfishing that use restrictive catch limits may rebuild fish populations, but may also result in short-run harm to fishing businesses and coastal communities.
During the last three Congresses, over 30 different bills have been introduced to amend portions of the MSFCMA. These bills have covered a wide variety of topics, ranging from proposals to change management for specific fisheries or regions, to general changes to the management process such as requirements of fishery management plans. Oversight hearings concerning MSFCMA reauthorization have been held by the House Committee on Natural Resources and by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. On December 18, 2013, the chairman of the House Committee on Natural Resources released a draft that included many elements of previously introduced bills. In early April 2014, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation also released a reauthorization draft. |
crs_R41544 | crs_R41544_0 | Pursuant to that authority, the Executive entered into several trade agreements, including the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which was signed by officials for the two countries on June 30, 2007. The KORUS FTA is one of three agreements that were negotiated under the terms of the Trade Act of 2002 but have yet to be submitted to Congress for approval and implementation. 2010 Changes to the KORUS FTA
In the summer of 2010, the Obama Administration announced plans to reengage in talks with South Korea over aspects of the KORUS FTA, particularly its provisions involving market access for U.S. autos. The media has referred to these changes collectively as a "supplementary agreement" or "supplementary deal" to the KORUS FTA. That act mandates that legislation approving and implementing a free trade agreement that is entitled to consideration under the fast track procedures receive an up-or-down vote in Congress without amendment and with limited debate. In particular, the President must submit the implementing bill to Congress, and the implementing bill must contain three components:
a provision approving a trade agreement "entered into" in conformity with the Trade Act of 2002; a provision approving a statement of administrative action, if any, proposed to implement that agreement; and if changes to U.S. law are required to implement the trade agreement, provisions "repealing or amending existing laws or providing new statutory authority" that are "necessary or appropriate to implement" the agreement. Two requirements that may have negative implications for the fast track consideration of the KORUS FTA and its implementing bill are: (1) the requirement that the bill approve an agreement that was "entered into" before the July 1, 2007 deadline for fast track consideration; and (2) the requirement that any bill provisions repealing, amending, or enacting U.S. law be "necessary or appropriate" for the implementation of the 2007 agreement. There is historical precedent for treating supplemental agreements to a trade agreement as executive agreements when the supplemental agreements were signed after the expiration of TPA. As described below, if a Member objects to considering the KORUS FTA implementing bill under the fast track procedures, the bill's eligibility for TPA will be determined under the chamber's procedural rules and not by the Executive Branch. If a Member in either chamber raises an objection to the fast track consideration of the KORUS FTA and the bill is deemed ineligible for TPA under the Trade Act of 2002, then the bill will be considered under the regular procedures of that chamber. Under these procedures, the bill, like other pieces of legislation, might not be brought up for a vote or it might be amended. In particular, the implementing bill must: (1) approve the agreement that was "entered into" in 2007; and (2) include provisions enacting, amending, or repealing existing U.S. laws to the extent "necessary or appropriate" for the implementation of the agreement that was "entered into" in 2007. The NAFTA implementing bill did, however, include a provision authorizing U.S. participation in those side agreements. Although Members expressed concern about the use of the fast track procedures to consider the NAFTA implementing bill, no Member formally challenged the bill's eligibility for fast track consideration. To challenge the use of the fast track procedures in the consideration of the KORUS FTA implementing bill, a Member must raise an objection. At that point, the bill's eligibility for fast track consideration will be resolved by the chamber in which the objection was raised. Each chamber may waive, suspend, or repeal fast track authority for legislation implementing the KORUS FTA. | On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean officials signed the Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. It is one of three free trade agreements currently awaiting submission to Congress for approval and implementing legislation. In June 2010, the Obama Administration announced plans to seek Congress's approval for the KORUS FTA after first engaging in talks with South Korea over U.S. concerns with the agreement as signed, particularly over its provisions involving market access for U.S. autos. The results of these talks are memorialized in three February 10, 2011, documents, which have been collectively referred to as the "supplemental agreement" or "supplementary deal" to the 2007 KORUS FTA.
The Executive, in consultation with Congress, is expected to draft legislation approving and implementing the KORUS FTA and submit the resulting "implementing bill" to Congress during the first session of the 112th Congress. This legislation will be entitled to consideration in Congress under expedited ("fast track") legislative procedures if it satisfies the requirements of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (Trade Act of 2002). In particular, the implementing bill must: (1) approve the agreement "entered into" in 2007; and (2) include provisions enacting, amending, or repealing existing U.S. laws only to the extent that the provisions are "necessary or appropriate" for the implementation of the agreement "entered into" in 2007. Each chamber of Congress, acting independently of the other, has the authority to determine for itself whether the KORUS FTA implementing bill conforms with these requirements. To the extent either the House or the Senate finds that the bill satisfies the terms of the Trade Act of 2002, the bill will be entitled to receive an up-or-down vote without amendment and with limited debate in that chamber.
It is difficult to predict with certainty how the 2010 changes might affect Congress's decision to consider the KORUS FTA implementing bill under the fast track procedures. However, the effect of side agreements on the fast track eligibility of the implementing legislation for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may be instructive. In that case, the Executive concluded supplemental agreements to the trade agreement after the agreement was signed and trade promotion authority had expired. These agreements were treated as executive agreements, circumventing the need for their express approval by Congress, but the implementing bill nevertheless authorized U.S. participation in the two agreements. Arguably, the NAFTA supplemental agreements may be characterized as having received congressional approval.
Although Members expressed concern about the use of the fast track procedures to consider the NAFTA implementing bill, no Member formally challenged the bill's eligibility for fast track consideration. To challenge the use of the fast track procedures to consider the KORUS FTA implementing bill, a Member must raise an objection. The bill's eligibility for fast track consideration will then be resolved by the chamber in which the objection was raised. Either chamber may also decide, as an exercise of its rulemaking power, to waive, suspend, or repeal its grant of fast track authority.
If the KORUS FTA implementing bill is deemed ineligible for—or otherwise denied—fast track consideration, the bill, in its entirety, may be considered under the regular procedures of each chamber. Under these procedures, the bill, like other pieces of legislation, might not be brought up for a vote or might be passed with amendments. The Jordan Free Trade Agreement was statutorily implemented under regular procedures. |
crs_RL32310 | crs_RL32310_0 | 4837 , the Military Construction Appropriations andEmergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 , into law on October 13, 2004 ( P.L.108-324 ). The President signed H.R. 108-375 ). 4837 on July 15,2004 ( H.Rept. H.R. A separate bill, H.R. H.R. The subcommittee completed theinformal markup of its bill on July 14, and the full committee reported its mark on S. 2674 on July 15 ( S.Rept. The Senate passed the amendedH.R. The conferees added Division B, the Emergency SupplementalAppropriations for Hurricane Disasters Assistance Act, 2005 , and Division C, the Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline Act , to the basic bill. TheFY2005 budget submitted by the President on February 2, 2004, as subsequentlyamended, requested $9.6 billion in new budget authority, an amount $112.7 millionbelow the 2004 enactment. (29) The Senate version of the bill ( S. 2400 , incorporated into H.R. Because the language raising thebudget authority cap was struck from the House bill on a point of order, the principaleffect of this amendment is to allow the issue to be raised in conference. The Senatepassed the amended bill on September 20, 2004. The Office of Management and Budget devoted a significant portion of itsStatement of Administration Policy on S. 2674 , the Senate version ofthe Military Construction Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005, issued onSeptember 20, 2004, to an explanation of its position on the issue of the housingprivatization cap, stating:
The President's Budget included arequest that would increase the military housing privatization cap from $850 millionto $1.85 billion. (35)
Legislation
Military Construction Appropriations
H.R. Making appropriations for militaryconstruction, family housing, and base realignment and closure for the Departmentof Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005, and for other purposes.The House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Military Construction,held nine hearings between February 25 and June 22, 2004. Section 129 of itsreported bill, H.R. On October 8, the House agreed without objection to disagree with the Senateamendment and appointed its conferees. The Senate sent a message on its action tothe House on September 30, and the bill was presented to the President, who signedit into law the same day ( P.L. 501) on October 6and wasreceived in the Senate on October 7, 2004. (41) The bill'slanguage was incorporated into H.R. Defense Authorization
H.R. To authorize appropriationsfor FY2005 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for militaryconstruction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribepersonnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.Introduced on April 22, 2004, and referred to the House Committee on ArmedServices, it was further referred to the Subcommittees on Strategic Forces, TacticalAir and Land Forces, Readiness, Projection Forces, Total Force, and Terrorism,Unconventional Threats and Capabilities (several subcommittees held hearings priorto the introduction of the bill). H.R. The bill was received in the Senate on May 21, 2004, read twice, and placedon the Legislative Calendar under General Orders (Calendar No. CRS Report RL32305 . Authorization and Appropriations for FY2005: Defense , by[author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. | The military construction (MilCon) appropriations bill provides funding for (1) militaryconstruction projects in the United States and overseas; (2) military family housing operations andconstruction; (3) U.S. contributions to the NATO Security Investment Program; and (4) the bulk ofbase realignment and closure (BRAC)costs.
The President forwarded his FY2005 budget request of $9.6 billion to the Congress onFebruary 2, 2004.
Military construction subcommittees held hearings between February 25 and June 22, 2004. The House Appropriations Committee its bill ( H.R. 4837 ) on July 15, 2004. The SenateAppropriations Committee reported its bill ( S. 2674 ) on the same day. Both billsrecommended $10.0 billion in new budget authority.
Floor action on H.R. 4837 began on July 21. A procedural dispute regardingSection 129 of the bill (adjusting the cap on new budget authority available for the military housingprivatization program) precipitated the drafting of a separate bill ( H.R. 4879 )incorporating a portion of the section, which was struck on a point of order. The House passed anamended H.R. 4837 on July 22, which was received in the Senate on September 7. OnSeptember 15, the Senate incorporated the text of S. 2674 into H.R. 4837,passing the amended bill on September 20 and appointing its conferees. The House appointedconferees on October 8.
On October 5, the President submitted a hurricane disaster assistance emergencysupplemental appropriation bill ( H.R. 5212 ) that included $148.9 million in DODconstruction and repair appropriations. The bill's language was incorporated into Division B of H.R. 4837 , whose short title was changed to the Military Construction Appropriationsand Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 .
Division C of H.R. 4837 , titled the Alaska Natural Gas Pipeline Act ,incorporates some portions of H.R. 6 ., the Energy Policy Act of 2003 . The Housepassed H.R. 4837 on October 9, as did the Senate on October 11. The President signedthe bill into law on October 13, 2004 ( P.L. 108-324 ).
Authorization of military construction is included within the defense authorization bill. TheHouse passed its version of the bill ( H.R. 4200 ) on May 19. The Senate substituted thetext of S. 2400 , passing the amended bill on June 24. The conference began onSeptember 29, 2004, and ended on October 8. The House and the Senate passed the bill on October9. The President signed the bill into law on October 18, 2004 ( P.L. 108-375 ). For a comprehensivereport on defense authorization legislation, see CRS Report RL32305 , Authorization andAppropriations for FY2005: Defense , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
Key Policy Staff
* FDT = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division; RSI = Resources, Science, and IndustryDivision; ALD = American Law Division; G&F = Government and Finance Division; INF =Information Research Division. |
crs_R40415 | crs_R40415_0 | In addition, the longer it takes to regain economic growth, the greater are the prospects that international pressure will mount against those governments that are perceived as not carrying their share of the responsibility for stimulating their economies to an extent that is commensurate with the size of their economy. Various EU governments expended public resources to rescue failing banks, in addition to protecting depositors and utilizing monetary and fiscal tools to support banks, to unfreeze credit markets, and to stimulate economic growth. The economic recession and the financial crisis had become reinforcing events, which were forcing EU governments to forge policy responses to both crises. The differential effects of the economic downturn, however, have divided the wealthier countries of the Eurozone from the poorer countries within the EU and in East Europe and has compounded efforts to respond to the financial crisis and the economic recession. Over the long run, they likely will search for a regulatory scheme that provides for greater stability while not inadvertently offering advantages to any one country. Governments that expended considerable resources utilizing fiscal and monetary policy tools to stabilize the financial system and to provide a boost to their economies may yet be required to be more inventive in providing more stimulus to their economies and face political unrest in domestic populations. Unlike the United States, where the Federal government can implement policies that are applied systematically across all 50 States, EU-wide actions reflect compromise among national authorities. This and other issues have exposed sharp differences among the EU members over the best approach to deal with financial market reforms and economic stimulus measures. This has been especially true as the financial crisis has deepened over time and as the economic downturn and the financial crisis have become reinforcing events, compounding efforts to resolve either crisis. In this stage, EU governments generally responded on a case-by-case basis, without a role for the broader Community. The basis of this architecture involves implementing measures that EU members have announced as well as providing for: (1) continued support for the financial system from the European Central Bank and other central banks; (2) rapid and consistent implementation on the bank rescue plan that has been established by the member states; and (3) decisive measures that are designed to contain the crisis from spreading to all of the member states. The financial interdependence between the United States and the European Union means that the EU and the United States share common concerns over the global impact of the financial crisis and the economic downturn. In addition to these concerns, the United States and the EU members share common concerns over the organization of financial markets domestically and abroad and seek to improve supervision and regulation of individual institutions and of international markets. The financial crisis also has revealed extensive interdependency across financial market segments both within many of the advanced national financial markets and across national borders. | The European Union (EU) and the United States have taken unusual and extraordinary steps to resolve the financial crisis while stimulating domestic demand to stem the economic downturn. These efforts appear to have been successful, although the economic recovery remains tepid. The economic recession and the financial crisis became reinforcing events, causing EU governments to forge policy responses to both crises. In addition, both the United States and the EU have confronted the prospect of growing economic and political instability in Eastern Europe, Greece, and elsewhere over the impact of the economic recession on restive populations. In the long run, the United States and the EU likely will search for a financial regulatory scheme that provides for greater stability while not inadvertently offering advantages to any one country or group. Throughout the crisis, the European Central Bank and other central banks assumed a critical role as the primary institutions with the necessary political and economic clout to respond effectively. Within Europe, national governments, private firms, and international organizations varied their responses to the financial crisis, reflecting differing views over the proper policy course to pursue and the unequal effects of the financial crisis and the economic downturn. Initially, some EU members preferred to address the crisis on a case-by-case basis. As the crisis has ebbed, coordination among European capitals and between Europe and the United States has become more elusive and growing differences threaten the adoption of a coordinated long-term solution to regulatory reform and coordination of financial policies.
Within the United States, Congress appropriated funds to help recapitalize financial institutions, and adopted several economic stimulus measures. In addition, Congress has been involved in efforts to reshape institutions and frameworks for international cooperation and coordination in financial markets. European governments also adopted fiscal measures to stimulate their economies and wrestled with failing banks. The financial crisis has demonstrated that financial markets are highly interdependent and that extensive networks link financial markets across national borders, which has pressed EU governments to work together to find a mutually reinforcing solution. Unlike the United States, however, where the federal government can legislate policies that are consistent across all 50 states, the EU process gives each EU member a great deal of discretion to decide how they will regulate and supervise financial markets within their borders. The limits of this system have been tested as the EU and others have searched for a regulatory framework that spans a broad number of national markets. Governments that have expended considerable resources utilizing fiscal and monetary policy tools to stabilize the financial system and to provided a boost to their economies may be required to be increasingly more inventive in providing yet more stimulus to their economies and face political unrest in domestic populations. Attention likely will also focus on those governments that are viewed as not expending economic resources commensurate with the size of their economies to stimulate economic growth. |
crs_RL33678 | crs_RL33678_0 | Background
On July 6, 2006, a United States District Court ruled that former Representative Tom DeLay, who had earlier won the Republican primary nomination for Congress from the 22 nd District of Texas, could not have his name substituted on the general election ballot by the Republican party even if Mr. DeLay had changed his legal residence and voluntarily withdrew from the race. In Ohio, a different result ensued a month later when Representative Robert Ney, who had won the Republican party nomination in an earlier May primary, formally announced his withdrawal from the race on August 14, 2006. In Connecticut, the defeated candidate for the Democratic party nomination in the August 2006 primary, incumbent Senator Joseph Lieberman, appears to be able to be on the ballot either as an "independent" or nominee of a minor party in the general election in November, although a similar ballot position for the general election for one who had lost a party nominating primary would be barred in numerous states (including Ohio) because of the application of their so-called "sore loser" laws. Several years earlier, on September 30, 2002, former Senator Robert Torrecelli, the Democratic nominee for the United States Senate from New Jersey, voluntarily withdrew from the Senate race and, even at that late date, a new candidate was allowed to be chosen by the Democratic party in New Jersey and to have his name appear on the November ballot. Meanwhile in Missouri, the Democratic nominee for the United States Senate in the 2000 election, former Governor Mel Carnahan, died in a plane crash on October 16, 2000, three weeks before the general election, was not able to be substituted for, and continued to have his name on the ballot in the November general election. In discussing the breadth of the legislative authority in the states over the conduct of federal elections, the Supreme Court explained as follows:
The subject matter is the "times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives." It is this authority of the states over the ballot, the structure of the ballot, and concerning so-called "ballot access" requirements for political party nominees, new party nominees, and independent candidates, that has led to the varying and different treatment and requirements for placement, removal and/or substitution of a candidate's name on the ballot, depending on the state in which the congressional election is to be held. In Ohio, all political parties are required by the Ohio Constitution to nominate their candidates by a primary election. | In July of 2006 federal courts ruled that former Representative Tom DeLay, who had earlier won the Republican primary nomination for Congress from the 22nd District of Texas, could not have his name substituted on the general election ballot by the Republican party even if Mr. DeLay had changed his legal residence and voluntarily withdrew from the race. In Ohio, however, a different result ensued a month later when Representative Robert Ney, who had won the Republican party nomination in an earlier May primary, formally announced his withdrawal from the race on August 14, 2006, but was permitted to be replaced through a "special primary" to nominate another candidate. In Connecticut, the defeated candidate for the Democratic party nomination in the August 2006 primary, incumbent Senator Joseph Lieberman, appears to be able to be on the ballot either as an "independent" or nominee of a minor party in the general election in November, although a similar ballot position for the general election for one who had lost a party nominating primary would be barred in numerous states (including Ohio) because of the application of their so-called "sore loser" laws. Several years earlier, on September 30, 2002, former Senator Robert Torrecelli, the Democratic nominee for the United States Senate from New Jersey, voluntarily withdrew from the Senate race and, even at that late date, a new candidate was allowed to be chosen by the Democratic party in New Jersey and to have his name appear on the November ballot. Meanwhile in Missouri, the Democratic nominee for the United States Senate in the 2000 election, former Governor Mel Carnahan, died in a plane crash on October 16, 2000, three weeks before the general election, was not able to be replaced on the ballot, received the most votes in the ensuing election, and the "vacancy" created was filled by a temporary replacement named by the Governor.
It is the constitutional authority of the states in the United States Constitution, at Article I, Section 4, clause 1, concerning the "times, places, and manner" of federal elections, which allows the states to promulgate their own laws, rules and regulations regarding the ballot, the structure of the ballot, and concerning so-called "ballot access" requirements for political party nominees, new party nominees, and independent candidates, that has led to the varying and different treatment and requirements for placement, removal and/or substitution of a candidate's name on the ballot, depending on the state in which the congressional election is to be held.
This report discusses the extent of the states' authority over the procedures of federal elections, examines the limitations placed by the courts on the ability of the states to limit or regulate "ballot access," that is, the requirements of minor or new party candidates, or independent candidates, to have their names printed on the ballot and programmed into voting machines, and analyzes the new cases on ballot access that have been handed down by the Federal courts in recent months. |
crs_R41043 | crs_R41043_0 | The Issue and Interests1
The People's Republic of China (PRC) plays a key role in U.S. policy toward North Korea. The PRC is North Korea's closest ally, largest provider of food, fuel, and industrial machinery, and arguably the country most able to wield influence in Pyongyang. This close bilateral relationship is of interest to U.S. policymakers because China plays a pivotal role in the success of U.S. efforts to halt the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, to prevent nuclear proliferation, to enforce economic sanctions, to keep the peace on the Korean Peninsula, and to ensure that North Korean refugees that cross into China receive humane treatment. In general, the Obama Administration—as was true of the Bush Administration—has emphasized common interests rather than differences in its policy toward China regarding North Korea. China's primary interest of stability on the Korean peninsula is often at odds with U.S. interest in denuclearization and the provision of basic human rights for the North Korean people. In 2010, Beijing and Pyongyang were going through a period of fairly amicable diplomatic and economic relations following the negative response by Beijing to the DPRK's nuclear and missile tests in 2009 and China's support of new United Nations Security Council sanctions directed at North Korea. China's enforcement of the U.N. sanctions, however, is still unclear. China has implemented some aspects of the sanctions that relate directly to North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear programs, but Beijing has been less strict on controlling exports of dual use products. Chinese shipments of banned luxury goods to the DPRK continue to increase. However, U.N. and U.S. sanctions arising from the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs have banned shipments of luxury goods to North Korea, and trade with South Korea, Japan, and the United States has virtually stopped. For Beijing, diplomacy, or the prospect thereof, is the preferred solution to every provocation by the DPRK. While Beijing still maintains its military alliance and continues its substantial economic assistance to Pyongyang, in recent years many PRC and North Korean interests and goals appear to have grown increasingly incompatible. However, from Beijing's perspective, its shared interest with Pyongyang in preserving North Korean stability generally has trumped these other considerations. Since the late 1990s, as long as North Korea has been able to convince Beijing's senior leadership that regime stability is synonymous with North Korea's overall stability, the Kim government has been able to count on a minimum level of China's economic and diplomatic support. Indeed, North Korean leaders appear to have used this shared interest to neutralize its growing economic dependence on China, as the greater North Korea's dependency, the more fearful Chinese leaders may be that a sharp withdrawal of PRC economic support could destabilize North Korea. China also often has cooperated with North Korea along their border region to ensure that the number and activities of North Korean border-crossers do not spiral out of control. Indeed, since late 2008 the degree to which China has emerged as North Korea's dominant trade and aid partner is unusual. China provides more than half of North Korea's imports. | The People's Republic of China (PRC) plays a key role in U.S. policy toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). The PRC is North Korea's closest ally, largest provider of food, fuel, and industrial machinery, and arguably the country most able to wield influence in Pyongyang. China also is the host of the Six-Party Talks (involving the United States, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia) over North Korea's nuclear program. The close PRC-DPRK relationship is of interest to U.S. policymakers because China plays a pivotal role in the success of U.S. efforts to halt the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, to prevent nuclear proliferation, to enforce economic sanctions, and to ensure that North Korean refugees that cross into China receive humane treatment. Since late 2008, China has been not just the largest, but also the dominant, provider of aid and partner in trade with North Korea.
This report provides a brief survey of China-North Korea relations, assesses PRC objectives and actions, and raises policy issues for the United States. While Beijing still maintains its military alliance and continues its substantial economic assistance to Pyongyang, in recent years many PRC and North Korean interests and goals appear to have grown increasingly incompatible. Increasingly, many Chinese officials and scholars appear to regard North Korea as more of a burden than a benefit. However, Beijing's shared interest with Pyongyang in preserving North Korean stability generally has trumped these other considerations.
The Obama Administration's public statements have emphasized common interests rather than differences in its policy toward China regarding North Korea. The United States also has been encouraging China to use its influence in Pyongyang to rein in the more provocative actions by North Korea. China's interests both overlap and coincide with those of the United States, but China's primary interest of stability on the Korean peninsula is often at odds with U.S. interest in denuclearization and the provision of basic human rights for the North Korean people. Moreover, North Korean leaders appear to have used this interest to neutralize their country's growing economic dependence on China; the greater North Korea's dependency, the more fearful Chinese leaders may be that a sharp withdrawal of PRC economic support could destabilize North Korea. Since the late 1990s, as long as North Korea has been able to convince Beijing's senior leadership that regime stability is synonymous with North Korea's overall stability, the Kim government has been able to count on a minimum level of China's economic and diplomatic support, as well as some cooperation along their border region to ensure that the number and activities of North Korean border-crossers do not spiral out of control.
Beijing and Pyongyang are currently going through a period of amicable but strained diplomatic and economic relations following the negative response by Beijing to the DPRK's nuclear and missile tests in 2009 and China's support of new United Nations Security Council sanctions directed at North Korea. China also has been concerned that military provocations by the DPRK could trigger a shooting war on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing's proposed solution to DPRK provocations has been more diplomacy and talks. China's enforcement of U.N. sanctions against North Korea is unclear. China has implemented some aspects of the sanctions that relate directly to North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear programs, but Beijing has been less strict on controlling exports of dual use products. Chinese shipments of banned luxury goods to the DPRK continue to increase. |
crs_RL33846 | crs_RL33846_0 | A number of congressional proposals to advance programs designed to reduce greenhouse gases have been introduced in the 110 th Congress. The second is to enact a market-oriented greenhouse gas reduction program along the lines of the trading provisions of the current acid rain reduction program established by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. The major provisions of the seven Senate bills are compared in Appendix A . As introduced, the cap is estimated by the sponsors to reduce emissions to 15% below 2005 levels in 2020, declining steadily to 63% below 2005 levels in 2050. S. 3036 , introduced by Senator Boxer on May 20, 2008, is identical to the reported version of S. 2191 , except that S. 3036 contains a budget amendment aimed at making the bill revenue-neutral. This bill was considered by the Senate the week of June 2, 2008. S. 280 , introduced January 12, 2007, by Senator Lieberman, would cap emissions of the six greenhouse gases specified in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change at reduced levels from the electric generation, transportation, industrial, and commercial sectors—sectors that account for about 85% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The bill also contains an extensive new infrastructure to encourage innovation and new technologies. Beginning in 2020, the country's emissions would be capped at their 1990 levels, and then proceed to decline steadily until they were reduced to 20% of their 1990 levels in the year 2050. The bill would establish a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) and a new low-carbon generation requirement and trading program. Beginning in 2012, covered entities would have emissions targets set at their 2006 levels in 2020. H.R. Using the same basic structure as S. 280 , the emission caps under H.R. Although H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. 620 . Using the same basic structure as H.R. H.R. H.R. The bill would direct EPA to develop emission performance standards for non-covered entities, which may include coal mines, landfills, wastewater treatment operations, and animal feeding operations. H.R. H.R. Legislative Action in the 110th Congress
On May 20, 2008, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works' Subcommittee on Private Sector and Consumer Solutions to Global Warming and Wildlife Protection reported out a revised version of S. 2191 . As ordered reported, S. 2191 's emissions cap is estimated by its sponsors to require a 71% reduction from 2005 levels by 2050 from covered entities (estimated by the sponsors to account for 87% of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions). Comparison of Key Provisions of House Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bills
Appendix C. Common Terms
Allocation schemes (upstream and downstream). Cap-and-trade program. In contrast to a cap-and-trade program, in which the quantity of emissions is limited and the price is determined by an allowance marketplace, with a carbon tax, the price is limited and the quantity of emissions is determined by the participants based on the cost of control versus the cost of the tax. Emissions cap. Generally a greenhouse gas reduction program that allows emitters to choose between complying with the reduction requirement of a cap-and-trade program or paying a set price (safety valve price) to the government in lieu of making reductions. | Multiple proposals to advance programs that reduce greenhouse gases have been introduced in the 110th Congress. S. 2191 was reported May 20, 2008, from the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. An amended version of S. 2191 S. 3036, was considered by the Senate in June 2008, but a vote to invoke cloture failed. In general, these proposals would create market-based greenhouse gas reduction programs along the lines of the trading provisions of the current acid rain reduction program established by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. This report presents a side-by-side comparison of the major provisions of those bills and includes a glossary of common terms (Appendix C).
Although the purpose of these bills is to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs), the specifics of each differ greatly. Five bills (S. 280, S. 309, S. 485, H.R. 620 and H.R. 1590) cap greenhouse gas emissions from covered entities at 1990 levels in the year 2020. S. 317 places its first emissions cap at 2001 levels in 2015; S. 1766 targets reductions at 2006 levels in 2020; S. 2191 as reported would cap GHGs at about 19% below 2005 levels in 2020; H.R. 4226 would limit 2020 emissions to 85% of their 2006 levels; H.R. 6186 would reduce emissions to 20% below 2005 levels by 2020, and H.R. 6316 would reduce emission to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020. Ten bills (S. 280, S. 317, S. 485, S. 2191, S. 3036, H.R. 620, H.R. 1590, H.R. 4226, H.R. 6186, and H.R. 6316) would establish cap-and-trade systems to implement their emission caps. In contrast, S. 1766 provides for two compliance systems—a cap-and-trade program and an alternative safety valve payment—and allows the covered entities to choose one or employ a combination of both. Finally, S. 309 provides discretionary authority to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish a cap-and-trade program to implement its emission cap.
The differences continue with respect to entities covered under the programs. Three bills (S. 309, S. 485, H.R. 1590) provide discretionary authority to EPA to determine covered entities by applying cost-effective criteria to reduction options. In contrast, S. 317's emission cap is imposed solely on the electric generating sector. The other bills (S. 280, S. 1766, S. 2191, S. 3036, H.R. 620, H.R. 4226, H.R. 6186, and H.R. 6316) cover most economic sectors but not all (e.g., they exclude the agricultural sector). Thus, the overall reductions achieved by the bills depend partly on the breadth of entities covered.
Beyond the basics of these bills, each contains other important provisions. For example, S. 280 creates a new innovation infrastructure, while several—S. 1766, S. 2191, S. 3036, H.R. 4226, H.R. 6186, and H.R. 6316—encourage foreign countries to undertake comparable control actions and specify potential consequences for inaction. Other provisions include mandatory greenhouse gas standards for vehicles (S. 309, S. 485, H.R. 1590), and a renewable portfolio standard for the electric generating sector (S. 309, S. 485, H.R. 1590). This comparison should be considered a guide to the basic provisions contained in each bill. It is not a substitute for careful examination of each bill's language and provisions. |
crs_RL31865 | crs_RL31865_0 | Introduction
The Low Income Home Energy Assistance program (LIHEAP), established by Title XXVI of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 ( P.L. 97-35 ), is a program through which the federal government gives states, tribes, and territories annual grants to operate home energy assistance programs for low-income households. The LIHEAP statute provides for two primary types of program funding: regular funds (sometimes referred to as block grant or formula funds) and emergency contingency funds. Regular funds are allotted to states according to a formula prescribed by the LIHEAP statute. Funds may be used for program administration , limited to 10% of the allotment. Eligibility Based on Income: Grantees have the option of setting LIHEAP eligibility for households at or below 150% of the federal poverty income guidelines or, if greater, 60% of the state median income. In FY2014, an estimated 6.3 million households received heating and/or winter crisis assistance (the bulk of LIHEAP assistance that is provided). FY2010 through FY2012 saw the highest number of households receiving cooling and/or summer crisis assistance—1.1 million households in each year, compared to 900,000 in FY2009 and 800,000 in FY2014. The LIHEAP statute also authorizes emergency contingency funds, which may be distributed to one or more states, tribes, or territories at the discretion of the Administration. Recent LIHEAP Funding
FY2019 LIHEAP Funding
For FY2019, as in FY2018, the President's budget proposed no funding for LIHEAP. The House Appropriations Committee released a draft bill to fund the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education (LHHS) in FY2019 on June 14, 2018. The bill would provide the same level of funding for LIHEAP as in FY2018—$3.640 billion in regular funds. As of the date of this report, the Senate Appropriations Committee had not yet released an LHHS bill. FY2018 LIHEAP Funding
In FY2018, the appropriation for LIHEAP was $3.640 billion, provided as part of the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 115-141 ), enacted on March 23, 2018. The appropriation exceeded the FY2017 level of $3.390 billion by $250 million. Before enactment of P.L. 115-141 , LIHEAP funding for FY2018 was provided through a series of continuing resolutions (CRs) that funded most federal programs at their FY2017 appropriations levels, less an across-the-board reduction of 0.6791%. 115-141 , HHS announced the distribution of the remainder of appropriated funds on April 23, 2018. For funds distributed to states, tribes, and territories, see Table B-1 . Utility companies and state and local governments provide significant heating and cooling assistance. See Table B-3 . In FY1977, as part of a supplemental appropriations act ( P.L. P.L. States could use funds to help low-income households pay home energy costs. On October 20, 2017, HHS announced the first distribution of FY2018 funds to states, tribes, and territories, totaling more than $3 billion. | The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), established in 1981 as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (P.L. 97-35), is a program through which the federal government makes annual grants to states, tribes, and territories to operate home energy assistance programs for low-income households. The LIHEAP statute authorizes two types of funds: regular funds (sometimes referred to as formula or block grant funds), which are allocated to all states using a statutory formula, and emergency contingency funds, which are allocated to one or more states at the discretion of the Administration in cases of emergency as defined by the LIHEAP statute.
States may use LIHEAP funds to help low-income households pay for heating and cooling costs, for crisis assistance, weatherization assistance, and services (such as counseling) to reduce the need for energy assistance. The LIHEAP statute establishes federal eligibility for households with incomes at or below 150% of poverty or 60% of state median income, whichever is higher, although states may set lower limits.
The largest share of LIHEAP funding goes to pay for heating assistance. In FY2014, the most recent year for which data are available, approximately 49% of funds went to pay for heating assistance, 7% was used for cooling aid, 21% went to crisis assistance, and 9% was used for weatherization. Funds are also used for administration (9% in FY2014) and up to 10% of a state's allotment can be carried over for use in the next fiscal year (4% in FY2014). In FY2014, approximately 6.3 million households received heating and/or winter crisis assistance, and 800,000 received cooling and/or summer crisis assistance.
For FY2018, the LIHEAP appropriation was $3.640 billion in regular funds, enacted as part of the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-141), an increase of $250 million over the FY2017 funding level. Before enactment of P.L. 115-141, on March 23, 2018, LIHEAP had been funded through a series of continuing resolutions (CRs) at the FY2017 appropriations level of $3.390 billion in regular funds, less an across-the-board reduction of 0.6791% (P.L. 115-56). On October 20, 2017, HHS announced the first distribution of FY2018 LIHEAP funds under the CR, and on April 23, 2018, HHS announced the distribution of the remainder of funds appropriated pursuant to P.L. 115-141. For FY2018 funds distributed to states, tribes, and territories, see Table B-1.
For FY2019, as in FY2018, the President's budget proposed to eliminate funding for LIHEAP (see Table B-3). As of the date of this report, the House Appropriations Committee had released its draft FY2019 funding bill for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education (LHHS), which proposed funding LIHEAP at its FY2018 level of $3.640 billion. The Senate Appropriations Committee had not yet released an FY2019 LHHS funding bill. |
crs_R44496 | crs_R44496_0 | Introduction
In the past several years, senior policymakers in both Congress and the executive branch have proposed various changes to the way in which officers in the armed forces are managed, most notably with respect to assignment and promotion. Some of these proposed changes would require changes to law, including provisions enacted by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). This report provides an overview of selected concepts and statutory provisions that define and shape important aspects of active duty officer personnel management along with a set of questions that policymakers may wish to consider when discussing proposed changes to current law. If so, how much variation is acceptable, and in what areas? Some argue that this requirement is essential to integrating the efforts of the military services, as it channels the most capable and ambitious officers into joint assignments, where they gain greater knowledge of other services' capabilities and the skills necessary to plan for and conduct joint operations. Will the assignments adequately prepare them for expected operational environments of the future? How does this balance change over the course of an officer's career? Attracting and retaining such individuals, some argue, requires that there be more opportunity to rise to the higher levels of the officer corps; hence a higher ratio of mid-grade and senior officers to the total officer corps is necessary. For promotion to O-3 and above, promotions are made on a best qualified basis. The House Armed Services Committee considered this to be the "fundamental concept for the management of officer personnel" within DOPMA:
As can be seen from the foregoing, the revised grade table, together with the selective continuation procedures and mandatory retirement and separation points in the bill, contemplates the continuation of the up-or-out system as the fundamental concept for the management of officer personnel. Should the grade limits be raised to allow for greater promotion opportunity and career progression for military officers, or certain categories of military officers? | Congress and the executive branch are currently considering changes to the officer personnel management system. Some of these proposed changes would require changes to the laws, including provision enacted by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA).
Contemporary debates over officer personnel management policy often revolve around the fundamental questions of "what type of officers do we need to win the next war?" and "what skills does the officer corps need to enable the military services to perform their missions?" These questions are implicitly oriented towards future events. Their answers are therefore somewhat speculative. Still, contemporary trends and military history can provide valuable insight. Additionally, a set of broader questions can help focus the analysis:
What will be the key security interests and priorities of the United States in the future? What conflicts will likely arise in the pursuit of these interests? What opponents will we face in these conflicts? How will they fight? What military strategy will the United States employ to secure its interests? How will we fight? What knowledge, skills, and abilities must the officer corps possess to effectively carry out these roles and missions? How do we attract and retain individuals with the necessary potential for service as officers? How should the officer corps be prepared so it can effectively adapt to unforeseen crises and contingencies? Given limited resources, what are the most critical areas for improvement? Where should the nation accept risk?
Policymakers often have divergent answers to these questions and thus come to different conclusions about the most appropriate officer personnel management policies. Examples of diverging views can be found in debates on the criteria for accepting or rejecting people for military service; required training and education over the course of a career; assignments to be emphasized; distribution of officers by grade; retention of experienced and talented individuals; and the criteria for selecting individuals for promotion and for separation.
In the exercise of its constitutional authority over the armed forces, Congress has enacted an array of laws governing military officer personnel management and periodically changes these laws as it deems appropriate. This report provides an overview of selected concepts and statutory provisions that shape and define officer appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. It also provides a set of questions that policymakers may wish to consider when discussing proposed changes to current law. |
crs_RS22749 | crs_RS22749_0 | UIGEA prohibits anyone "engaged in the business of betting or wagering" from knowingly accepting checks, credit card charges, electronic transfers, and similar payments in connection with unlawful Internet gambling. On October 4, 2007, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Treasury Department (the Agencies) issued proposed regulations implementing UIGEA. After taking into consideration the public comments on the proposed rule and consulting with the Department of Justice (as required by the UIGEA), the Agencies adopted a final rule implementing the provisions of the UIGEA; the rule was effective January 19, 2009, with a compliance date of June 1, 2010 (originally December 1, 2009). Designated Payment Systems & Due Diligence
The final rule identifies five relevant payment systems that could be used in connection with, or to facilitate, the "restricted transactions" used for Internet gambling: Automated Clearing House System (ACH), card systems, check collection systems, money transmitting business, and wire transfer systems. While the Agencies expect that card systems will find that using a merchant and transaction coding system is "the method of choice" to identify and block restricted transactions, the Agencies felt that the most efficient way for other designated payment systems to comply with the UIGEA is through "adequate due diligence by participants when opening accounts for commercial customers to reduce the risk that a commercial customer will introduce restricted transactions into the payment system in the first place." The rule directs participants in the designated systems, unless exempted, to "establish and implement written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and block or otherwise prevent or prohibit restricted transactions," and then provides non-exclusive examples of reasonably compliant policies and procedures for each system. If the commercial customer does engage in an Internet gambling business, the participant must obtain: (1) documentation that provides evidence of the customer's legal authority to engage in the Internet gambling business and a written commitment by the commercial customer to notify the participant of any changes in its legal authority to engage in its Internet gambling business, and (2) a third-party certification that the commercial customer's systems for engaging in the Internet gambling business are reasonably designed to ensure that the commercial customer's Internet gambling business will remain within the licensed or otherwise lawful limits, including with respect to age and location verification. There are no card system exemptions from the regulations' requirements. In essence, because of the difficulties of identifying tainted transactions, they limit requirements to those who may deal directly with the unlawful Internet gambling businesses. Several bills have been introduced in the 112 th Congress that would allow for lawful, government-regulated Internet gambling activities. Such legislative proposals have been supported by Members of Congress who have criticized the current Internet gambling restrictions for being, in their view, ineffective at stopping Internet gambling by millions of Americans, an infringement on individual liberty, and a lost opportunity to collect billions of dollars in tax revenue, among other things. Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act
The Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act ( H.R. 1174 would establish a licensing regime under which Internet gambling operators may lawfully accept bets or wagers from individuals located in the United States. H.R. 2230 ). This bill would establish a licensing fee regime within the Internal Revenue Code for Internet gambling operators; it essentially creates a tax on online gambling deposits. Internet Gambling Prohibition, Poker Consumer Protection, and Strengthening UIGEA Act of 2011
Introduced by Representative Joe Barton, the Internet Gambling Prohibition, Poker Consumer Protection, and Strengthening UIGEA Act of 2011 ( H.R. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel's Recent Opinion on the Wire Act
The federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. However, in light of growing state budget deficits and state legislators' desire to find ways of raising revenue without increasing taxes, several states are considering measures that would legalize, license, and tax Internet gambling within their borders. | The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) seeks to cut off the flow of revenue to unlawful Internet gambling businesses. It outlaws receipt of checks, credit card charges, electronic funds transfers, and the like by such businesses. It also enlists the assistance of banks, credit card issuers and other payment system participants to help stem the flow of funds to unlawful Internet gambling businesses. To that end, it authorizes the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve System (the Agencies), in consultation with the Justice Department, to promulgate implementing regulations. The Agencies adopted a final rule implementing the provisions of the UIGEA, 73 Federal Register 69382 (November 18, 2008); the rule was effective January 19, 2009, with a compliance date of June 1, 2010.
The final rule addresses the feasibility of identifying and interdicting the flow of illicit Internet gambling proceeds in five payment systems: card systems, money transmission systems, wire transfer systems, check collection systems, and the Automated Clearing House (ACH) system. It suggests that, except for financial institutions that deal directly with illegal Internet gambling operators, tracking the flow of revenue within the wire transfer, check collection, and ACH systems is not feasible at this point. It therefore exempts them from the regulations' requirements. It charges those with whom illegal Internet gambling operators may deal directly within those three systems, and participants in the card and money transmission systems, to adopt policies and procedures to enable them to identify the nature of their customers' business, to employ customer agreements barring tainted transactions, and to establish and maintain remedial steps to deal with tainted transactions when they are identified. The final rule provides non-exclusive examples of reasonably designed policies and procedures to prevent restricted transactions. The Agencies argued that flexible, risk-based due diligence procedures conducted by participants in the payment systems, in establishing and maintaining commercial customer relationships, is the most effective method to prevent or prohibit the restricted transactions.
Some Members of Congress have criticized the current Internet gambling restrictions for being, in their view, ineffective at stopping Internet gambling, an infringement on individual liberty, and a lost opportunity to collect tax revenue, among other things. The 112th Congress has held several hearings concerning Internet gambling and related issues, and several bills have been introduced that would allow for lawful, government-regulated Internet gambling activities. The legislation includes H.R. 1174 (Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act), which would establish a licensing program administered by the U.S. Treasury Secretary under which Internet gambling companies may legitimately operate and accept bets or wagers from individuals located in the United States; H.R. 2230 (Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act of 2011), which would establish a licensing fee regime within the Internal Revenue Code for Internet gambling operators; and H.R. 2366 (Internet Gambling Prohibition, Poker Consumer Protection, and Strengthening UIGEA Act of 2011), which would create an office within the U.S. Department of Commerce responsible for overseeing qualified state agencies that issue licenses to persons seeking to operate an Internet poker facility.
Several state legislatures are also considering measures that would legalize, license, and tax Internet gambling within their borders, taking advantage of a UIGEA provision that exempts intrastate Internet gambling from its applicable scope. A recent change in the U.S. Department of Justice's position regarding the federal Wire Act that now interprets that statute as prohibiting sports betting only (and not interstate transmission of other types of gambling) has also helped encourage state initiatives to legalize intrastate, and possibly even interstate, online gambling. |
crs_R41532 | crs_R41532_0 | Implemented nationwide in 2005 and 2006, the ACS currently collects data from a representative sample of about 295,000 housing units a month, totaling about 3.54 million a year (an increase from the 2005 to 2011 sample size of approximately 250,000 housing units monthly, totaling about 3 million annually). The data are aggregated over time to produce large enough samples for reliable estimates, with longer cumulations of data necessary in less populous areas. The Bureau issues one-year estimates for the most populous areas, those with at least 65,000 people; three-year estimates for areas with 20,000 or more people; and five-year estimates for areas from the most populous to those having fewer than 20,000 residents. Although conducted separately from the once-a-decade count of the whole U.S. population, the ACS is considered a part of the decennial census program because it replaced the census long form, which covered a representative sample of housing units every 10 years from 1940 through 2000. The data served myriad governmental, business, and research purposes and were used in program formulas that determined the annual allocation of various federal funds to states and localities. ACS data, which serve the same purposes but are much more current than the long-form estimates were, are used to distribute more than $450 billion a year in funding. The first three-year period estimates, for areas with at least 20,000 people, became available in 2008. The first five-year estimates, of data gathered from 2005 through 2009, were issued in 2010. A 2006 policy statement by the Bureau pointed out that the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) and its implementing regulations require federal agencies to obtain Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval before collecting information from the public. On the long form, the Bureau could ask only for data that were
mandatory: "a current federal law ... explicitly called for the use of decennial census data for a particular federal program"; required: "it was unequivocally clear that a federal law (or implementing regulation) required the use of specific data and the decennial census was the historical or only source of data"; or programmatic: "the data were necessary for Census Bureau operational needs." Because the Bureau "did not receive a budget for a sample similar to that of the long form ... the 5-year data products cannot be as detailed for smaller geographic areas as they were in 2000." The correspondent called for the Bureau to acknowledge "openly" that, "given the smaller sample size, some ACS 5-year products cannot meet some user needs for detailed census tract and block group data." As noted previously, the ACS can ask only "necessary questions," and responses are mandatory. The decennial census is conducted under the authority of Title 13, United States Code , Sections 141 and 193. Lower mail cooperation in the 2003 voluntary survey meant a heavier workload of nonresponse follow-up by telephone. If the survey became voluntary, the Bureau concluded, maintaining the same data reliability as under the 2002 mandatory ACS would necessitate increasing the planned annual sample size from about 3 million to an estimated 3.7 million housing units, at an additional cost of at least $59.2 million per year in FY2005 dollars. The Bureau subsequently, as of FY2011, re-estimated the annual cost of a voluntary ACS at $66.5 million. They received no action beyond committee and subcommittee referrals. In the 112 th Congress, two bills would have made almost all ACS responses optional. 117 , P.L. S. 530 , the same as H.R. 1638 would have repealed the authority of the Commerce Secretary and the Census Bureau to conduct the ACS and any other surveys or censuses except the decennial census. 4660 , the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015, passed the House on May 30, 2014, with an amendment offered by Representative Poe that would have prohibited the use of funds to enforce Title 13, United States Code , Section 221, "with respect to the American Community Survey." CJS entities, along with most other federal entities, are funded through September 30, 2015, under H.R. 113-235 , the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, which did not adopt Section 545 of H.R. ACS Topics
The topics covered by the ACS are summarized below. ; whether the person was married, divorced, or widowed within the past 12 months; how many times the person has been married; and the year when he or she last married Place of birth: either the U.S. state or the place outside the 50 states Relationship: the relationship of each person listed on the ACS form to the person filling out the form; examples are husband or wife, roomer or boarder, and foster child School enrollment: whether a person attended public or private school or college in the last three months; if so, the grade or level Residence one year ago and migration: whether a person moved from one residence to another in the past year; if so, what his or her previous address was Veterans: whether and when a person served on active duty in the U.S. military, whether the person has a service-connected disability rating; if so, what it is Year of entry: the year when a person born outside the United States came to live in this country
Economic Characteristics
Class of worker: whether a person employed during the past 12 months worked for a private for-profit company, a private nonprofit organization, or federal, state, or local government; was self-employed; or was an unpaid worker for a family business or farm Labor force status: whether a person worked for pay during the past week or was on layoff from a job, whether the person was actively looking for work in the past four weeks, and when the person last worked Health insurance coverage: whether a person currently is covered by any health insurance plan, such as through a current or former employer, Medicaid, or Medicare Income: income in the past 12 months from various sources, including wages and salary, interest and dividends, and public assistance Industry: the type of activity that occurred where a person was employed during the past 12 months, such as manufacturing, retail trade, or construction Occupation: the kind of work a person did during the past 12 months, such as nursing, personnel management, or accounting Place of work and journey to work: the location where a person worked in the past week; what mode of transportation the person used to commute to work; whether the person commuted with other people in an automobile, a truck, or a van; when the person usually left home to go to work; and how many minutes the commute took Poverty: determined from income data Work status: the number of weeks a person worked during the past year, and the number of hours he or she usually worked each week
Housing Characteristics
Home heating fuel: the fuel that is used most for heating the house, apartment, or mobile home Kitchen and plumbing facilities: whether the housing unit has a sink with a faucet, hot and cold running water, a stove or range, a refrigerator, a flush toilet, and a bathtub or shower Owner statistics: the owner's mortgage payments; condominium fees; real estate taxes; payments for utilities; and payments for fire, hazard, or flood insurance Ownership and use of computers and use of the Internet by household members; how they access the Internet Renter statistics: the renter's payments for rent and utilities Rooms and bedrooms: the number of rooms in the housing unit, excluding bathrooms; the number of bedrooms Sales of agricultural products from the property in the past 12 months Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program): whether, in the past 12 months, anyone in the household received benefits from the program Telephone service available: whether the housing unit has telephone, including cell-phone, service Tenure: whether the housing unit is rented or owned, with or without a mortgage, by someone in the household Units in structure: whether the housing structure is a mobile home, a single-family detached house, a building with two apartments, etc. | The American Community Survey (ACS), implemented nationwide in 2005 and 2006, is the U.S. Bureau of the Census's (Census Bureau's) replacement for the decennial census long form, which, from 1940 to 2000, gathered detailed socioeconomic and housing data from a representative population sample in conjunction with the once-a-decade count of all U.S. residents. Unlike the long form, with its approximately 17% sample of U.S. housing units in 2000, the ACS is a "rolling sample" or "continuous measurement" survey of about 295,000 housing units a month, totaling about 3.54 million a year (an increase from the 2005 to 2011 sample size of about 250,000 housing units monthly, totaling about 3 million annually). The data are aggregated to produce one-year, three-year, and five-year estimates. As were the long-form data, ACS estimates are used in program formulas that determine the annual allocation of certain federal funds, currently more than $450 billion, to states and localities.
The ACS has several other features in common with the long form: the topics covered are largely the same; responses are required; and the Bureau may follow up, by telephone or in-person visits, with households that do not submit completed questionnaires. The ACS is conducted under the authority of Title 13, United States Code, Sections 141 and 193; so was the long form. Title 44, Section 3501, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, and its implementing regulations require federal agencies to obtain Office of Management and Budget approval before collecting information from the public. On the long form, the Bureau could gather only data that were mandatory for particular programs, required by federal law or regulations, or needed for the Bureau's operations. Likewise, the ACS can collect only necessary information.
The limited ACS sample size makes longer cumulations of data necessary to generate reliable estimates for less populous areas. Yearly estimates have been available since 2006, but only for geographic areas with 65,000 or more people. The first three-year period estimates were released in 2008 for areas with at least 20,000 people. The first five-year estimates became available in 2010 for areas from the most populous to those with fewer than 20,000 people. A concern noted by some data users is that the ACS sample size results in less detailed five-year data products for smaller geographic areas—census tracts and block groups—than were available every 10 years from the long form. A related issue is data quality, especially for small areas.
Mandatory ACS responses are an ongoing concern for some Members of Congress and their constituents. A 2003 test showed a 20.7-percentage-point drop in the overall ACS mail cooperation rate when answers were optional. The Bureau estimated in 2003 and 2004 that maintaining data reliability if the survey were voluntary would necessitate increasing the planned annual sample size from about 3 million to 3.7 million housing units, for an extra $59.2 million a year in FY2005 dollars (re-estimated at $66.5 million per year, as of FY2011). In the 113th Congress, H.R. 1078 and S. 530 would have made almost all ACS responses optional. H.R. 1638 would have repealed the authority of the Department of Commerce Secretary and the Census Bureau, a Commerce Department agency, to conduct the ACS and any other surveys or censuses except the decennial census. The bills saw no action beyond referrals. H.R. 4660, to fund the Departments of Commerce and Justice, science agencies, and related agencies (CJS) in FY2015, passed the House with an amendment (Section 545) to prevent, for example, the enforcement of any penalty for ACS nonresponse. The bill did not become law. Instead, CJS entities are funded through September 30, 2015, by P.L. 113-235, which did not adopt Section 545. |
crs_RL32211 | crs_RL32211_0 | The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement
Overview
The United States' WTO obligations with respect to government procurement are containedin the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP). (76)
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as approved and implemented byCongress, entered into force on January 1, 1994. (78) Since Mexico is not currently a party to the WTO AGP, its procurement obligations with the UnitedStates are governed solely by NAFTA. | This report contains an overview of the major procurement agreements to which the UnitedStates is a party, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on GovernmentProcurement, the procurement chapter of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) andprovisions from other free trade agreements. In addition, this report highlights major federal lawsthat relate to the government-procurement obligations of the United States. |
crs_RL33404 | crs_RL33404_0 | T he development of offshore oil, gas, and other mineral resources in the United States is shaped by a number of interrelated legal regimes, including international, federal, and state laws. International law provides a framework for establishing national ownership or control of offshore areas, and U.S. domestic law has, in substance, adopted these internationally recognized principles. It also describes state and federal laws governing development of offshore oil and gas and litigation under these legal regimes. Nations may also claim an area, termed the contiguous zone, which extends 24 nautical miles from the coast (or baseline). State Jurisdiction
In accordance with the federal Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (SLA), coastal states are generally entitled to an area extending three geographical miles from their officially recognized coast (or baseline). Federal Resources
The primary federal law governing development of oil and gas in federal waters is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). More than simply declaring federal control, the OCSLA has as its primary purpose "expeditious and orderly development [of OCS resources], subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of competition and other national needs...." To effectuate this purpose, the OCSLA extends application of federal laws to certain structures and devices located on the OCS; provides that the law of adjacent states will apply to the OCS when it does not conflict with federal law; and, significantly, provides a comprehensive leasing process for certain OCS mineral resources and a system for collecting and distributing royalties from the sale of these federal mineral resources. The Trump Administration has proposed a superseding Five-Year Program, and published a Draft Proposed Program for 2019-2024 in January 2018. For leases located in "the Western and Central Planning Areas of the Gulf of Mexico and the portion of the Eastern Planning Area of the Gulf of Mexico encompassing whole lease blocks lying west of 87 degrees, 30 minutes West longitude and in the Planning Areas offshore Alaska," a broader authority is also provided, allowing the Secretary, with the lessee's consent, to make "other modifications" to royalty or profit share requirements to encourage increased production. The terms of the lease itself create obligations for offshore oil and natural gas exploration and production lessees. The standards for review outlined in Watt have been upheld in subsequent litigation related to the five-year program. | The development of offshore oil, gas, and other mineral resources in the United States is impacted by a number of interrelated legal regimes, including international, federal, and state laws. International law provides a framework for establishing national ownership or control of offshore areas, and domestic federal law mirrors and supplements these standards.
Governance of offshore minerals and regulation of development activities are bifurcated between state and federal law. Generally, states have primary authority in the area extending three geographical miles from their coasts. The federal government and its comprehensive regulatory regime govern minerals located under federal waters, which extend from the states' offshore boundaries to at least 200 nautical miles from the shore. The basis for most federal regulation is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which provides a system for offshore oil and gas exploration, leasing, and ultimate development. Regulations run the gamut from health, safety, resource conservation, and environmental standards to requirements for production-based royalties and, in some cases, royalty relief and other development incentives.
The five-year program for offshore leasing for 2017-2022 adopted by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management focuses only on new exploration and production in the Gulf of Mexico and the Cook Inlet off the coast of Alaska. However, the Trump Administration has published a 2019-2024 Draft Proposed Plan that would supersede the 2017-2022 Program. Congress is also free to alter the scope of offshore oil and gas exploration and production contemplated by the 2017-2022 Program via new legislation.
In addition to legislative and regulatory efforts, there has also been significant litigation related to offshore oil and gas development. Over a number of years, courts have clarified the extent of the Secretary of the Interior's discretion over how leasing and development are conducted. |
crs_RS22462 | crs_RS22462_0 | The three major candidates were populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), conservative Felipe Calderón Hinojosa of the PAN, and Roberto Madrazo of the PRI. Presidential Election Results and Aftermath
After a highly contested election, PAN candidate Felipe Calderón was named president-elect of Mexico on September 5, 2006, and is due to be sworn into office on December 1, 2006. The Tribunal also found that commercials paid for by business groups at the end of the campaign were illegal but that the impact of the ads was insufficient to warrant the annulment of the presidential election. López Obrador rejected the election tribunal's September 5 ruling and was named the "legitimate president" of Mexico at a democratic convention held on September 16 at the Zocalo, Mexico City's main square. Mexican voters elected a completely new congress on July 2, 2006. Implications for U.S.-Mexico Relations
The United States and Mexico have a multifaceted relationship, with recent emphasis on migration, border security, drug trafficking, trade, and energy policy. | Mexico held national elections for a new president and congress on July 2, 2006. Conservative Felipe Calderón of the National Action Party (PAN) narrowly defeated Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in a highly contested election. Final results of the presidential election were only announced after all legal challenges had been settled. On September 5, 2006, the Elections Tribunal found that although business groups illegally interfered in the election, the effect of the interference was insufficient to warrant an annulment of the vote, and the tribunal declared PAN-candidate Felipe Calderón president-elect. PRD candidate López Obrador, who rejected the Tribunal's decision, was named the "legitimate president" of Mexico by a National Democratic Convention on September 16. The electoral campaign touched on issues of interest to the United States including migration, border security, drug trafficking, energy policy, and the future of Mexican relations with Venezuela and Cuba. This report will not be updated. See also CRS Report RL32724, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL32735, Mexico-United States Dialogue on Migration and Border Issues, 2001-2006 , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL31946 | crs_RL31946_0 | military operation since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and may have implications for variousdefense programs of interest to Congress. It will beupdated periodically as new information becomes available. Deriving "Lessons" of the War: Some Cautionary Notes
Although the Department of Defense (DoD) and other organizations customarily produce "lessons learned" reports following the conclusion of a major military operation like the Iraq war,this report for the most part avoids using the term "lessons" because it can imply the making ofrecommendations - something that CRS reports do not do. These include the following:
Information is imperfect; early lessons are subject to change. Public information about the Iraq war is currently incomplete, and will likely remain so for some time. Each war is unique; avoid "overlearning" the lessons of this war. In evaluating purported lessons offered by various sources, one factor to consider is whether thosesources have a potential financial, institutional, or ideological stake in the issue. These conclusions and speculations, if correct - and not all observers agree with them (6) - are potentially ofgreat significance to Congress, for at least two reasons:
Implementing the Administration's vision for defense transformation could substantially affect the composition of U.S. defense spending, shifting defense funding towarddefense programs that are judged to be transformational and away from defense programs that arejudged to be non-transformational or "legacy." The Administration may be encouraged to invoke the theme of transformation to help justify or seek rapid congressional consideration of legislative proposals affecting DoD thatmay or may not be transformational, depending on one's definition of transformation, includingproposals which could, if implemented, affect Congress' role in conducting oversight of U.S. defenseactivities. The administration's military strategy is sometimes called the 1-4-2-1 strategy because it calls formaintaining U.S. military forces sufficient for:
[1] "protect[ing] the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S.borders,"
[4] "maintaining regionally tailored forces forward stationed and deployed in[the four regions of] Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/SouthwestAsia to assure allies and friends, counter coercion, and deter aggression against the United States,its forces, allies, and friends,"
[2] "swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two theatersof operation in overlapping timeframes," and
[1] "decisively defeating an adversary in one of the two theaters in which U.S.forces are conducting major combat operations by imposing America's will and removing any futurethreat it could pose. Prior to the Iraq war, those who were concerned about whether U.S. forces were sufficiently sized to carry out this strategy pointedto the high operational tempo that certain parts of the military have maintained in recent years, thelarge number of reserve forces that have been activated since the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001 (and the extended length of certain reserve-unit tours of duty since that time), the interestamong certain Army officers for increasing the Army's active-duty end strength so as to bettersupport ongoing commitments in various locations, gaps in forward deployments of Navy ships tocertain overseas regions, and the relationship of the total number of active air wings, divisions, andships to the potential requirements of fighting two regional wars in overlapping time frames. (26)
Post-War Debate. forces than currently planned. Iraq War. (32)
Some observers believe the experience with base access during the Iraq war may lead to increased interest in a new operational concept (i.e., a new approach to warfighting) referred to assea basing, or more formally as enhanced networked sea basing. One of the most significant defense-program debates going into the Iraq war - and potentially one of those mostsignificantly influenced by the war - concerns the future size and composition of the active-dutyArmy. Number of Active-Duty Army Divisions. Plan to Shift to Lighter Forces. Combat Aircraft Operations in the Iraq War. Bomber supporters could argue that the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan demonstrated that the value of bombers in combat operations has been significantly enhanced by the advent ofprecision-guided weapons. Combat-Support Aircraft. (122)
Urban Combat in the Iraq War. (131)
Types of Friendly Fire Incidents. The Iraq war appears to have highlighted certain questions about the analytical effectiveness of U.S.intelligence agencies. The Iraq war may have implications for specific air mobility program issues, including the following. Future Airlift Technologies. | The recent war against Iraq may have implications for various defense programs of interest to Congress. This report surveys some of those potential implications, and will be updated periodicallyas new information becomes available. Three cautionary notes associated with post-conflict"lessons-learned" reports apply to this report: Information about the Iraq war is incomplete andimperfect, so early lessons are subject to change. Each war is unique in some ways, so observersshould avoid "overlearning" the lessons of the Iraq war. And potential U.S. adversaries can derivelessons from the Iraq war and apply them in future conflicts against U.S. forces, possibly devaluingU.S.-perceived lessons. It can also be noted that some persons or organizations offering purported lessons of the Iraq war may have a financial, institutional, or ideological stake in the issue.
Many observers have concluded that the Iraq war validated the Administration's vision for defense transformation, or major parts of it. Other observers disagree. The issue is potentiallysignificant because implementing the Administration's vision could affect the composition of U.S.defense spending, and because the Administration may invoke the theme of transformation to helpjustify or seek rapid congressional consideration of legislative proposals, including proposals thatcould affect Congress' role in conducting oversight of defense programs. The Iraq war mayinfluence debate on whether active-duty U.S. military forces are sufficiently large to carry out currentU.S. military strategy, and on whether greater emphasis should be placed on forces that are lessdependent on access to in-theater bases.
One of the most significant defense-program debates going into the Iraq war - and potentially one of those most significantly influenced by the war - concerns the future size and composition ofthe active-duty Army. Both supporters and opponents of maintaining at least 10 active-duty Armydivisions may find support in the Iraq war for their positions, as may both supporters and opponentsof the current Army plan to shift toward a mix of fewer heavy armored units and a larger number oflighter and more mobile units.
The Iraq war validated the effectiveness of combat-aircraft armed with precision-guided weapons, and may influence discussions about current plans for investing in specific aircraft andmunitions programs. The Iraq war may reinforce support generated by the war in Afghanistan forincreased investment in U.S. special operations forces. It may also highlight questions concerningreserve combat divisions and the potential consequences of extended callups of large numbers ofreserve forces.
The war appears to have demonstrated the value of network-centric operations and timely battlefield intelligence, and the potential value of psychological operations. It appears to haveconfirmed the importance of preparing for urban combat. The war offered a limited real-world testof the Patriot missile defense system. The war may lead to renewed discussions about strategies forreducing friendly fire incidents. It may reinforce support for investing in aerial refueling capabilities,and increase interest in potential new airlift and sealift technologies. |
crs_R44999 | crs_R44999_0 | As a consequence of shifting space needs, federal agencies hold thousands of properties—particularly buildings—that they no longer need. Agencies are required to dispose of unneeded space and have a range of options for disposal, including transfer to another federal agency, demolition, sale, and conveyance to a state or local government or qualified nonprofit. GAO reports have consistently noted that efforts to dispose of unneeded and underutilized properties are hindered by statutory disposal requirements, the cost of preparing properties for disposal, conflicts with stakeholders, and a lack of accurate real property data. Identifying Unneeded Space
Agencies are required to continuously survey property under their control to identify any property that they no longer need to carry out their missions—excess property—and to "promptly" report that property as excess to the General Services Administration (GSA). Statutes pertaining to environmental remediation or historic preservation also add time to the process. Real Property Management and Oversight
In addition to the obstacles mentioned above, data about agency real property portfolios—which might be useful for congressional oversight—appear to be potentially inaccurate, and some government-wide data are accessible only to GSA. The quality of the FRPP data has also been questioned. Another GAO report reexamined weaknesses in FRPP data collection practices, noting that key data elements—such as buildings' maintenance needs and utilization rates—are not consistently and accurately captured in the database. Overreliance on Leasing
The government's ongoing "overreliance on costly leased space" is one of the primary reasons federal real property continues to be designated as a "high risk" issue by GAO. According to GAO, leasing space is typically more expensive than owning space over the same time period. The Federal Assets Sale and Transfer Act of 2016 (FASTA, P.L. 114-287 ), by contrast, requires a more centralized process, whereby disposal decisions will be based on the recommendations of a newly created board rather than individual agencies. FASTA specifies nine principles that must be taken into account when establishing the criteria:
1. the extent to which a property could be sold, redeveloped, or outleased in a manner that would produce the best value; 2. the extent to which the operating and maintenance costs would be reduced through the consolidation, colocation, and reconfiguration of space; 3. the extent to which a property aligns with the current mission of the agency; 4. the extent to which the utilization rate is being maximized and is consistent with nongovernment standards; 5. the potential costs and savings over time; 6. the extent to which leasing long-term space would be reduced; 7. the extent to which there are opportunities to consolidate similar operations across or within agencies; 8. the economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of the property; and 9. the extent to which energy consumption specifically would be reduced. A third perspective is added by the Public Buildings Reform Board, an independent body whose members may have expertise different than that of executive branch employees involved in developing the list of recommendations. If the OMB Director's philosophy emphasizes certain methods of disposition over others, for example, and a majority of the board favors a different approach, then that disagreement could potentially result in the OMB Director rejecting some of the board's recommendations and terminating the FASTA disposal process for a given year. The OMB Director works with GSA to develop an initial list of recommendations to the board and has the authority to approve or disapprove of the board's recommendations. At no time is Congress able to vote on any recommendations under FASTA. These exemptions may not necessarily result in fewer properties being conveyed to state and local governments and nonprofits. Disposal Costs
Federal agencies have argued that they are unable to dispose of many of their unneeded properties because they lack sufficient funding. It is not clear how these properties will be identified. Real Property Data
FASTA requires GSA to establish a publicly accessible real property database that may enhance oversight and policymaking. Given that repair needs are an obstacle to disposing of some properties, Congress may find it useful to have agency repair estimates reported for each building to help inform funding decisions. Concluding Observations
FASTA primarily addresses the disposal of unneeded properties, but its objectives include reducing the government's reliance on leased space. | Real property disposal is the process by which federal agencies identify and then transfer, donate, or sell real property they no longer need. Disposition is an important asset management function because the costs of maintaining unneeded properties can be substantial. Moreover, properties the government no longer needs may be used by state or local governments, nonprofits, or businesses to provide benefits to the public. Finally, the government loses potential revenue when it holds onto certain unneeded properties that might be sold for a profit.
Despite these drawbacks, federal agencies hold thousands of unneeded and underutilized properties. Agencies have argued that they are unable to dispose of these properties for several reasons. First, there are statutorily prescribed steps in the disposal process that can take months to complete. Second, properties may not be appealing to potential buyers or lessees if they require major repairs or environmental remediation—steps for which agencies lack funding to complete before bringing a property to market. Third, key stakeholders in the disposal process—including local governments, nonprofit organizations, and businesses—are often at odds over how to dispose of properties.
In addition, Congress may be limited in its capacity to conduct oversight of the disposal process because it currently lacks access to reliable, comprehensive real property data. The General Services Administration (GSA) maintains a database with information on most federal buildings, but those data are provided to Congress on a limited basis. Moreover, the quality of the information in the database has been questioned, in part because of inconsistent reporting of key data elements, such as how much space within a given building is unneeded. The lack of data may also hinder congressional oversight on the extent to which agencies enter into leases rather than purchase space. Leasing space is typically more expensive than owning, and the government's "overreliance on costly leased space" is one of the primary reasons federal real property is designated as a "high risk" issue by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
The Federal Assets Sale and Transfer Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-287) established a new, centralized process for disposing of unneeded space. Under FASTA, agencies are required to develop a list of disposal recommendations, which could include the sale, transfer, conveyance, consolidation, or outlease of any unneeded space, among other options. These recommendations are then to be submitted to the GSA Administrator and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and revision. The revised list of recommendations is then vetted by a newly established Public Buildings Reform Board, and returned to the OMB Director for final approval or disapproval.
FASTA may address some of the obstacles agencies face when disposing of unneeded space. Properties on the recommendation list are exempt from certain statutory requirements, such as screening for public benefit, and FASTA provides funding for agencies to implement the board's recommendations. The use of a board to make disposal decisions may also reduce the impact of stakeholder conflict. In addition, FASTA requires GSA to create a public database with information that may enhance congressional oversight.
There may be drawbacks to FASTA. The law does not provide Congress with an opportunity to vote for or against the list of recommendations, nor is Congress directly involved in the creation of the list. It is possible that philosophical differences between the board and the OMB Director could lead to an impasse that would effectively shut down the FASTA disposal process. The required database may not include some information that could be useful to Congress, such as the repair needs and condition of each building. |
crs_R41923 | crs_R41923_0 | Given declining state revenues and increased demand for public programs like Medicaid, states have been faced with difficult choices about how to allocate limited funds. To address budget shortfalls, many states have sought to trim down their Medicaid costs in various ways, including reducing the rates at which Medicaid health care providers are reimbursed. In several instances, providers and others have argued that these reductions make reimbursement rates inadequate and have turned to the courts to challenge these reductions. When challenging these reimbursement rates, plaintiffs have often claimed that the rates violate the requirements of Section 1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security Act, often referred to as Medicaid's "equal access provision," which requires a state Medicaid plan to
provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and services available under the plan…as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area....
Medicaid beneficiaries and others have claimed that because of inadequate Medicaid reimbursement rates, the requirements of the equal access provision are not met (e.g., the state did not consider, or the state plan's methods or procedures do not assure, that Medicaid payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, quality of care, or are sufficient to enlist providers to provide Medicaid services). In determining whether a state's provider reimbursement rates violate the equal access provision, a significant question arises in these cases: whether private parties can sue to enforce these requirements. Because the Medicaid Act contains no express language that allows private parties to challenge reimbursement rate cuts, plaintiffs desiring to challenge cuts in Medicaid payment rates under the equal access provision have sought out other legal vehicles to bring their claims. Based on this section, plaintiffs have alleged that state officials violated their rights because the reimbursement rates did not comply with the requirements of the equal access provision. Nevertheless, the Court granted certiorari on one of the two issues presented to the Court—whether Medicaid recipients and providers can bring an action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce the equal access provision by asserting that the federal provision preempts a state law reducing reimbursement rates. Observations
Some commentators have noted that the Court's decision in Douglas may be important, as the case could determine whether the Supremacy Clause provides a basis for court review of various issues related to a state's Medicaid program—issues that may have been immune from review because, for example, there appeared to be no private right of action. In addition, it has been observed that the potential significance of Douglas goes beyond the Medicaid program, as the Court's decision could determine whether a private party may bring a preemption challenge under other federal statutes that these parties could not otherwise enforce. On April 29, 2011, CMS issued proposed regulations that address the equal access provision. | Given declining state revenues and increased demand for public programs like Medicaid, states have been faced with difficult choices about how to allocate limited funds. To address budget shortfalls, many states have sought to shrink their Medicaid costs in various ways, including reducing the rates at which health care providers are reimbursed for the services they provide to Medicaid beneficiaries. In several instances, providers and others have argued that the reduced rates do not comply with federal Medicaid requirements and have turned to the courts to challenge these reductions.
When challenging these reimbursement rates, Medicaid providers have often claimed that the rates violate the requirements of Section 1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security Act, commonly referred to as Medicaid's "equal access provision." This provision compels state Medicaid programs to assure that Medicaid payments "are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care," and are "sufficient to enlist enough providers" so that care and services are available at least to the extent that they are available to an area's general population. Based on this provision, Medicare providers have argued that because of cuts in reimbursement rates, the state Medicaid program does not provide the level of care or services to beneficiaries that is required under federal law.
However, an important question arises in these cases: whether Medicaid beneficiaries and health care providers can sue state officials to enforce the equal access provision. Because the Medicaid Act contains no express language that allows private parties to challenge reimbursement rate cuts, plaintiffs desiring to challenge cuts in Medicaid payment rates under the equal access provision have sought out other legal vehicles to bring their claims. Since 2002, courts have often barred these suits when based on "section 1983." But on January 18, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Douglas v. Independent Living Center of California, a set of consolidated cases in which plaintiffs took a different approach to challenging provider reimbursement rates. In Douglas, health care providers and Medicaid beneficiaries challenged cutbacks in reimbursement rates for certain health care providers, arguing that since the reduced reimbursement rates do not comply with Medicaid's equal access provision, they are preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit agreed, and blocked implementation of the reduced rates, explaining that the Supremacy Clause provides a basis for challenging a state's purported failure to abide by Medicaid's equal access provision.
Some commentators have noted that the Court's decision in Douglas may be significant, as the case could determine whether the Supremacy Clause provides a basis for judicial review of various issues related to a state's Medicaid program—issues that may have been immune from review because, for example, there appeared to be no private right of action. It has also been observed that the possible implications of Douglas go beyond the Medicaid program, as the Supreme Court's decision could determine whether a private party may bring a preemption challenge with respect to federal statutes that these parties could not otherwise enforce. This report provides relevant background on the Medicaid program and an overview of the Douglas case.
In addition, it may be noted that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) recently issued proposed regulations that address the equal access provision. Although proposed regulations do not address whether a private party may bring an enforcement action under the equal access provision, the regulations do provide guidance on how states can comply with it. |
crs_RL34038 | crs_RL34038_0 | 110-161 ). A detailed description of the legislative path for the appropriations bill, the accompanying national defense authorization bills, and several interim continuing resolutions can be found in section of this report entitled " Enactment of the Regular FY2008 Appropriations ." This supplemental request asked to add $1.38 billion to the FY2007 Army military construction account, $412.5 million to the FY2007 Navy and Marine Corps military construction account, and $60.2 million to the FY2007 Air Force military construction account. The Senate passed an amended bill on May 17. Enactment of the Regular FY2008 Appropriations
The House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies marked its draft of the appropriations bill on May 22, 2007, recommending a total Fiscal Year 2008 appropriation of $109.2 billion. 2764 ) on December 17, 2007, to form Division I of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Base Realignment and Closure/Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (Global Defense Posture Realignment)
Cost of Implementation
In its appropriations request for Fiscal Year 2007, DOD estimated that the total one-time implementation between 2006 and 2011 of the 2005 BRAC round (the realignment and closure of a number of military installations on United States territory) and the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (the redeployment of 60,000 - 70,000 troops and their families from overseas garrisons to bases within the United States) would cost $17.9 billion. This would be an increase of $4.4 billion, or 5.5%, over the FY2007 appropriation (including the supplemental). One of the key issues for VA non-medical benefits has been the size of the disability claims workload and the average time (177 days in FY2006) to process claims. 110-28 funding, and providing funding for the additional claims processing personnel proposed in the FY2008 budget request; and funds for a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for certain VA benefits including compensation benefits—i.e., disability compensation and dependency and indemnity compensation (the COLA is equal to the COLA applied to Social Security benefits). The House-passed appropriation bill, H.R. The Senate Committee appropriation bill, S. 1645 , provided an increase (above the FY2007 enacted level with the additional funding provided by P.L. The total amount requested by the Administration for VHA for FY2008 is $34.6 billion, a 1.7% increase in funding compared to the FY2007 enacted amount. For FY2008, the Administration is requesting $27.2 billion for medical services, a $1.2 billion, or 4.6%, increase in funding over the FY2007 enacted amount. As in FY2003, FY2004, FY2005, FY2006, and FY2007, the Administration has included several cost sharing proposals. On June 15, 2007, the House passed its version of the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations bill for FY2008 ( H.R. 2642 also includes $3.5 billion for medical administration, $69 million above the Administration's request of $3.4 billion; $4.1 billion for medical facilities, a 14% increase over the President's request; and $480 million for medical and prosthetic research, a 17% increase over the President's request of $411 million. 2642 did not include any bill language authorizing fee increases as requested by the Administration's budget proposal for VHA for FY2008. S. 1645 , as reported, provides a total of $37.0 billion for VHA. 3043 would have provided $37.2 billion for VHA for FY2008, this is, $2.6 billion above the Administration's request for FY2008. | The President submitted his FY2008 appropriations request to Congress on February 5, 2007, including $105.2 billion for programs covered in this appropriations bill: $21.2 billion for Title I (military construction and family housing); $83.9 billion for Title II (veterans affairs); and $163 million for Title III (related agencies). With no regular appropriation passed or enacted for FY2007, this must be compared with the combined totals of the subsequent continuing resolutions and emergency supplemental appropriations: $17.9 billion for Title I; $79.6 billion for Title II; and $149 million for Title III. The request represented an increase of $3.2 billion (18.0%) in Title I, $4.4 billion (5.5%) in Title II, and $14 thousand (9.2%) in Title III above the FY2007 enacted appropriations. The overall FY2008 request exceeded the FY2007 appropriations by $7.6 billion, an increase of 7.8%.
The House passed its version of the FY2008 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill, H.R. 2642, on June 15, 2007. The Senate passed an amended version on September 6. H.R. 2764, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, enacted on December 27, 2007 as P.L. 110–161, included FY2008 funding for Military Construction and Veterans Affairs as Division I. The bill's legislative path is laid out in detail in the "Enactment of the Regular FY2008 Appropriations" section of this report.
While appropriations for Title I activities has increased above FY2007, this is not true across all appropriations accounts. Funds for military family housing in FY2008 are less than those for FY2007, while construction for the active and reserve military components and appropriations for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) actions exceed 2007-enacted amounts. Much of this addition can be attributed to the recently authorized increase in end-strength of military ground forces and the onset of construction required by the 2005 BRAC round.
In veterans' non-medical benefits, mandatory spending for disability compensation, pension, and readjustment benefits is increasing due to the aging of the veterans population and the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result of the increase in the number of claims, the average processing time for a disability claim in FY2006 was 177 days. To reduce the pending claims workload and improve the claims processing time, funds were provided in the FY2007 supplemental and in the FY2008 appropriation for hiring and training additional claims processing staff. While mandatory spending has increased by 19.6% between FY2006 and FY2008 (from $37.2 billion to $44.5 billion), mandatory spending has declined as a share of the total VA appropriation (from 52.1% in FY2006 to 50.7% in FY2008).
In terms of medical care afforded to veterans, similar to the past five years, the Administration has included several cost sharing proposals including increase in pharmacy copayments and enrollment fees for lower priority veterans. The House Appropriations Committee draft bill provides $37.1 billion for VHA for FY2008, a 9.1% increase over the FY2007 enacted amount of $34.0 billion, and 7.3% above the President's request of $34.6 billion. The draft bill does not include any provisions that would give VA the authority to implement fee increases. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44838 | crs_R44838_0 | Introduction
The Weather Research and Forecasting Innovation Act of 2017 ( P.L. 115-25 ) addresses a broad range of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) activities in five titles: Titles I through IV primarily address weather-related programs, policies, and activities, and Title V amends the Tsunami Warning and Education Act (Title VIII of P.L. 109-479 ). 115-25 is addressed in CRS Report R44834, The U.S. Tsunami Program Reauthorization in P.L. 115-25: Section-by-Section Comparison to P.L. In P.L. 115-25 , Congress provides direction to NOAA regarding the agency's research and development (R&D) activities, with the broad goal of improving weather forecasting, warnings, and communication to recipients and users of weather information. Congress has held hearings and introduced legislation in the past two Congresses on topics that are incorporated into P.L. 115-25 . Thus the law reflects many of the priorities and issues of interest to Members of Congress regarding improving forecasts, coordination, and communication in the weather enterprise; incorporating commercially available weather data into forecasts and warnings; and enhancing the research-to-operations pathway so that new scientific and technological advances can be incorporated more rapidly into forecasts and warnings, among other topics. In addition to emphasizing the transfer of R&D advances to operations at the National Weather Service (NWS), Title I of P.L. 115-25 includes a sense of Congress that not less than 30% of funding for weather R&D at NOAA's Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR) should be made available to the nonfederal weather research community, which includes academia, private-sector entities, and nongovernmental organizations. Title IV directs NOAA to coordinate weather data and observations; improve the exchange of expertise between R&D and operational activities; enhance communication of watches and warnings of hazardous weather events; improve outreach to the weather enterprise; and study gaps in the national NEXRAD coverage, among other topics. 115-25 . Section 101 states that the priorities for the R&D efforts shall be the protection of life and property and the enhancement of the national economy. Title II: Subseasonal and Seasonal Forecasting Innovation
Section 201 of Title II of P.L. 115-25 amends P.L. 115-25 addresses two main issues: (1) weather satellites and (2) commercial weather data. Title III provides direction for NOAA regarding current and future weather satellite data needs and authorizes NOAA to consider how commercially provided weather satellite data could enhance and improve observations, leading to better forecasts and warnings in the future. Title IV: Federal Weather Coordination
Title IV of P.L. Section 410 requires NOAA to submit a report to Congress within 180 days of enactment (October 2017) on the use of contractors at NWS for the FY2017 fiscal year. 115-25 . Throughout P.L. The reports will allow Congress to track NOAA's progress in implementing the specific requirements outlined in the law over the short term. In addition, congressional interest in the use of commercially provided weather data has spurred NOAA to examine the viability of commercial data sources. Title IV of P.L. | Congress provides direction on a broad range of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) weather-related activities in Titles I through IV of P.L. 115-25, the Weather Research and Forecasting Innovation Act of 2017, signed into law on April 18, 2017. The legislation aims to improve NOAA's weather forecasts and warnings, both for the protection of lives and property and for the enhancement of the national economy. The act also covers topics such as future weather satellite data needs, gaps in the Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD) coverage, and improvements in the transfer of advances in research and development to National Weather Service (NWS) operations. Title V of P.L. 115-25 covers NOAA's tsunami program activities and is addressed in CRS Report R44834, The U.S. Tsunami Program Reauthorization in P.L. 115-25: Section-by-Section Comparison to P.L. 109-479, Title VIII.
Congress began holding hearings on many of the issues addressed in P.L. 115-25 nearly four years ago, and the final law incorporates components of various bills introduced in the House and Senate since the 113th Congress. For example, the issue of improving seasonal forecasts, reflected in Title II of P.L. 115-25, was introduced in S. 1331 in the 114th Congress. Congress also has held hearings on how NOAA could use commercially provided satellite weather data, and NOAA has responded by initiating a preliminary program on the use of commercial data. P.L. 115-25 codifies NOAA's authority to purchase commercial weather data and requires the agency to deliver a strategic plan for commercial data acquisition within 180 days of enactment. Members also have expressed interest in improving coordination and communication throughout the weather enterprise, topics both addressed in Title IV of P.L. 115-25.
This report provides an overview of each title in P.L. 115-25.
Among other topics, Title I addresses the transfer of research and development (R&D) advances from NOAA's Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research (OAR) to operations at NWS. Title I also includes a sense of Congress that not less than 30% of the funding for weather R&D at NOAA should be made available to the nonfederal weather research community; Title II focuses on improving forecasts at NWS; Title III addresses the future of weather satellites and NOAA's use of commercially provided weather data ; and Title IV provides congressional direction to NOAA on coordinating weather data and observations; improving the exchange of expertise among NOAA entities; enhancing communication of watches and warnings of hazardous weather events; and conducting outreach to the nonfederal and federal entities in the broader weather enterprise, among other topics.
P.L. 115-25 also includes requirements for various reports to Congress and other goals and deliverables, many of which are due during the 115th Congress. As a result, Congress is expected to have many opportunities to track NOAA's progress in implementing P.L. 115-25. Ongoing questions include if appropriated amounts will be sufficient to meet authorized activities and priorities expressed in the law and to what degree NOAA will implement the activities and priorities provided in P.L. 115-25. |
crs_R42979 | crs_R42979_0 | No further states added their approval during the extension, however, and the proposed ERA appeared to expire in 1982. Since the proposed ERA's extended ratification period expired in 1982, Senators and Representatives have continued to introduce new versions of the amendment, beginning in the 97 th Congress. These include "fresh start" proposals that proposed a new constitutional amendment, separate from the amendment proposed by Congress in 1972 (H.J. 33
H.J.Res. Removing the ERA Ratification Deadline: The "Three-State Strategy"
Two resolutions introduced in the 115 th Congress, one each in the House and Senate, are designed to reopen the ratification process for H.J. S.J.Res. 5
This resolution, designed to reopen the ERA ratification process, was introduced by Senator Ben Cardin of Maryland on January 17, 2017. 53
This resolution was introduced by Representative Jackie Speier of California on January 31, 2017. 53 is identical to that of S.J.Res. Discussion
Many ERA proponents claim that because the amendment as originally proposed by Congress in 1972 did not include a ratification deadline within the amendment text , it remains potentially viable and eligible for ratification indefinitely. They maintain that Congress possesses the authority both to remove the original 1979 ratification deadline and its 1982 extension, and to restart the ratification clock at the then-current 36-state level, with or without a future ratification deadline. In support, they assert that Article V of the Constitution gives Congress uniquely broad authority over the amendment process. They further cite the Supreme Court's decisions in Dillon v. Glo ss and Coleman v. Miller in support of their position. They also note the precedent of the Twenty-Seventh "Madison" Amendment, which was ratified in 1992, 203 years after Congress proposed it to the states. Recent Activity in the State Legislatures: Nevada and Illinois
Although the ratification deadline for the proposed ERA expired in 1982, its proponents have continued to press for action in the legislatures of states that either failed to ratify it, or had previously rejected the amendment. Nevada and Illinois Ratify the Equal Rights Amendment
The most widely-publicized recent ERA developments in the states occurred in March 2017, and May 2018, when Nevada and Illinois ratified the proposed amendment. An Equal Rights Amendment: Legislative and Ratification History, 1923-1972
Despite the efforts of women's rights advocates in every Congress, nearly 50 years passed between the time when the Mott Amendment was first introduced in 1923 and the Equal Rights Amendment was approved by Congress and proposed to the states in 1972. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex. Fresh start amendments introduced in the 115 th Congress, S.J.Res. "Three-State" Proposals
In addition to "fresh start" proposals, alternative approaches to the ratification question have also emerged over the years. In the 112 th Congress, for the first time since the proposed ERA's deadline expired, resolutions were introduced in both the House and Senate that sought specifically to (1) repeal, or eliminate entirely, the deadlines set in 1972 and 1978; (2) reopen the proposed ERA for state ratification at the then-current count of 35 states; and (3) extend the period for state ratification indefinitely. Congress considered these issues but proceeded to declare the ratification process complete. By extending the original ERA deadline, Congress based its action on the broad authority over the amendment process conferred on it by Article V.
Finally, the authors asserted, relying on the precedent of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, that "even if the seven-year limit was a reasonable legislative procedure, a ratification after the time limit expired can still be reviewed and accepted by the current Congress.... " In their view, even if one Congress failed to extend or remove the ratification deadline, states could still ratify, and a later Congress could ultimately validate their ratifications. Ultimately, however, the Court concluded that proposal of an amendment by Congress and ratification in the states are both steps in a single process, and that amendments
... are to be considered and disposed of presently.... [A] ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people and is to be effective when had in three-fourths of the states, there is a fair implication that it must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of states to reflect the will of the people in all sections at relatively the same period, which of course ratification scattered through a long series of years would not do. The Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals from the decision, but after the extended ERA ratification deadline expired on June 30, 1982, the High Court in its autumn term vacated the lower court decision and remanded the decision to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the case. The resolution, as introduced, comprised the following text:
Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states within seven years of the date of its submission by the Congress:
Article—
Section 1. This approach might avoid the controversies that have been associated with repeal of the deadlines for the 1972 ERA, but starting over would present a fresh constitutional amendment with the stringent requirements provided in Article V: approval by two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress, and ratification by three-fourths of the states. | The proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (ERA), which declares that "equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex," was approved by Congress for ratification by the states in 1972. The proposal included a seven-year deadline for ratification. Between 1972 and 1977, 35 state legislatures, of the 38 required by the Constitution, voted to ratify the ERA. Despite a congressional extension of the deadline from 1979 to 1982, no additional states approved the amendment during the extended period, at which time the amendment was widely considered to have expired.
Since 1982, Senators and Representatives who support the amendment have continued to introduce new versions of the ERA, generally referred to as "fresh start" amendments. In addition, some Members of Congress have also introduced resolutions designed to reopen ratification for the ERA as proposed in 1972, restarting the process where it ended in 1982. This was known as the "three-state strategy," for the number of additional ratifications then needed to complete the process, until Nevada and Illinois ratified the amendment in March 2017 and May 2018, respectively, becoming the 36th and 37th states to do so. The ERA supporters' intention here is to repeal or remove the deadlines set for the proposed ERA, reactivate support for the amendment, and complete the ratification process by gaining approval from the one additional state needed to meet the constitutional requirement, assuming the Nevada and Illinois ratifications are valid.
As the 115th Congress convened, resolutions were introduced in the House of Representatives and the Senate that embraced both approaches. H.J.Res. 33, introduced by Representative Carolyn Maloney, and S.J.Res. 6, introduced by Senator Robert Menendez, propose "fresh start" equal rights amendments. H.J.Res. 53, introduced by Representative Jackie Speier, and S.J.Res. 5, introduced by Senator Benjamin Cardin, would remove the deadline for ratification of the ERA proposed by Congress in 1972.
First introduced in Congress in 1923, the ERA proposed to the states in 1972 by the 92nd Congress included the customary seven-year ratification time limit. Although through 1977 the ERA was approved by 35 states, various controversies brought the ratification process to a halt as the deadline approached. In 1978, Congress extended the deadline through 1982. Opponents claimed this violated the spirit, if not the letter of the amendment process; supporters insisted the amendment needed more time for state consideration. Further, they justified extension because the deadline was placed not in the amendment, but in its preamble. Despite the extension, no further states ratified during the extension period, and the amendment was presumed to have expired in 1982. During this period, the ratification question was further complicated when five state legislatures passed resolutions rescinding their earlier ratifications. The Supreme Court agreed to hear cases on the rescission question, but the ERA's ratification time limit expired before they could be argued, and the Court dismissed the cases as moot.
Many ERA proponents claim that because the amendment did not include a ratification deadline within the amendment text, it remains potentially viable and eligible for ratification indefinitely. They maintain that Congress possesses the authority both to repeal the original 1979 ratification deadline and its 1982 extension, and to restart the ratification clock at the current 37-state level—including the Nevada and Illinois ratifications—with or without a future ratification deadline. In support, they assert that Article V of the Constitution gives Congress broad authority over the amendment process. They further cite the Supreme Court's decisions in Dillon v. Gloss and Coleman v. Miller in support of their position. They also note the precedent of the Twenty-Seventh "Madison" Amendment, which was ratified in 1992, 203 years after Congress proposed it to the states.
Opponents of reopening the amendment process may argue that attempting to revive the ERA would be politically divisive, and that providing it with a "third bite of the apple" would be contrary to the spirit and perhaps the letter of Article V and Congress's earlier intentions. They might also reject the example of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which, unlike the proposed ERA, never had a ratification time limit. Further, they might claim that efforts to revive the ERA ignore the possibility that state ratifications may have expired with the 1982 deadline, and that amendment proponents fail to consider the issue of state rescission, which has never been specifically decided in any U.S. court.
The "fresh start" approach provides an alternative means to revive the ERA. It consists of starting over by introducing a new amendment, similar or identical to, but distinct from, the original. A fresh start would avoid potential controversies associated with reopening the ratification process, but would face the stringent constitutional requirements of two-thirds support in both chambers of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the states. |
crs_R42374 | crs_R42374_0 | Background
The Obama Administration, in the FY2014 budget proposal, has proposed eliminating a variety of federal tax deductions and credits available to the oil and natural gas industries. Many of these proposed tax changes have the effect of equalizing the tax treatment of independent oil producers to that of the major oil companies. In the current law, the full expensing of intangible drilling costs is available to independent oil producers. Repeal Passive Loss Exception for Working Interests in Oil Properties
Repeal of the passive loss exception for working interests in oil and natural gas properties is a relatively small item in terms of tax revenues, estimated at $74 million from FY2014 to FY2023. The Administration projects that the repeal of the percentage depletion allowance would yield tax revenues of approximately $10.7 billion over the period FY2014 through FY2023. Repeal Manufacturing Tax Deduction (§199)
A provision in the proposed budget for FY2014 that affects both independent and the major companies' oil and natural gas tax liability is the repeal of the domestic manufacturing tax deduction for those industries. Increase Geological and Geophysical Amortization Period
Geological and geophysical expenses are incurred during the process of oil and natural gas resource development. Using FY2014 Budget Proposal estimates, changing the LIFO provision for all industries could raise $80.8 billion over the period FY2014 to FY2023, with the API estimating that $28.3 billion of the total over the period would come from the oil and natural gas industries. Department of the Interior Budget
The Department of the Interior (DOI) budget proposal contains several changes in fees and other revenue-generating items that would affect the oil and natural gas industries. Although these fees and charges would increase the cost of exploring, developing, and operating oil and natural gas facilities under DOI's management, and are likely to reduce those activities as suggested by opponents of the proposals, the effects are likely to be small, as these fees represent only a fraction of the revenues, profits, or other taxes and fees paid to the government. | The Obama Administration, in the FY2014 budget proposal, seeks to eliminate a set of tax expenditures that benefit the oil and natural gas industries. Supporters of these tax provisions see them as comparable to those affecting other industries and supporting the production of domestic oil and natural gas resources. Opponents of the provisions see these tax expenditures as subsidies to a profitable industry the government can ill afford, and impediments to the development of clean energy alternatives.
The FY2014 budget proposal outlines a set of proposals, framed as the termination of tax preferences, that would potentially increase the taxes paid by the oil and natural gas industries, especially those of the independent producers. These proposals include repeal of the enhanced oil recovery and marginal well tax credits, repeal of the current expensing of intangible drilling costs provision, repeal of the deduction for tertiary injectants, repeal of the passive loss exception for working interests in oil and natural gas properties, elimination of the manufacturing tax deduction for oil and natural gas companies, increasing the amortization period for certain exploration expenses, and repeal of the percentage depletion allowance for independent oil and natural gas producers. In addition, a variety of increased inspection fees and other charges that would generate more revenue for the Department of the Interior (DOI) are included in the budget proposal.
The Administration estimates that the tax changes outlined in the budget proposal would provide $24.2 billion in additional revenues over the period FY2014 through FY2018, and $40.7 billion from FY2014 to FY2023. These changes, if enacted by Congress, would reduce the tax advantage of independent oil and natural gas companies over the major oil companies. They would also likely raise the cost of exploration and production, with the possible result of higher consumer prices and more slowly increasing domestic production; however, the measurement of these effects is beyond the scope of this report. |
crs_R42568 | crs_R42568_0 | Introduction
During the spring of 2011, the Secretaries of Energy, Agriculture, and the Navy entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to "assist the development and support of a sustainable commercial biofuels industry." In accordance with the MOU, the Navy proposes to use some of the authorities of the Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950 (50 U.S.C. ), as amended, to develop a domestic industrial capacity and supply of biofuel. In the early 20 th century, Congress set aside the (now depleted) Naval Oil Reserves and Oil Shale Reserves. Synthetic Liquid Fuels Development
Congress began promoting alternative fuel from coal through the U.S. Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act of 1944. The act intended to aid the execution of World War II and conserve and increase national oil resources by authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to construct, maintain, and operate plants producing synthetic liquid fuel from coal, oil shale, and agricultural and forestry products. 978) authorized the President to have liquid fuels processed and refined for government use or resale, and to make improvements to government- or privately-owned facilities engaged in processing and refining liquid fuels when it would aid the national defense. 96-294 , Energy Security Act) to authorize the President's purchase of synthetic fuels for national defense. 109-58 , Section 369, Oil Shale, Tar Sand and Other Strategic Unconventional Fuels) directed the Secretary of Energy, in cooperation with the Secretaries of the Interior and Defense, to jointly develop a program to accelerate the commercial development of strategic unconventional fuels, including but not limited to oil shale and tar sands resources within the United States. In other words, under the DPA's declaration of policy, Congress has found that it is in the interest of national defense preparedness that the government assures that some level of capacity exists in the domestic industrial base to produce and provide both traditional and renewable energy sources, including from biomass sources. Three months after the challenge was issued, the Department of the Navy (Navy), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) issued a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to, in part, "assist the development and support of a sustainable commercial biofuels industry." The objective of the MOU is the construction or retrofit of multiple domestic commercial or pre-commercial scale advanced drop-in biofuel plants and refineries. Up to $40 million may be spent on the pilot-scale demonstration projects to support DOE's ongoing technology maturation program and eventually lead to larger-scale production to support the Navy. The Navy requested $70 million in the FY2013 President's budget request. Proponents of advanced biofuels argue that it will add to the United States' energy security. The policy question writ large is whether a biofuel industry is necessary for national defense. However, domestic crude oil production has increased over the past few years, reversing a decline that began in 1986. The United States is now a net exporter of refined petroleum products. Over the next 10 years, EIA sees continued development of tight oil, in combination with the ongoing development of offshore resources in the Gulf of Mexico, pushing domestic crude oil production in the EIA Reference Case to 6.7 million barrels per day by 2020, a level not seen since 1994. With the exception of the Navy's nuclear power program, policies designed to replace petroleum-based fuels with fuels derived from alternative resources in the past have given way when newly discovered petroleum resources presented clear economic advantages. | The Secretaries of Energy, Agriculture, and the Navy have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to "assist the development and support of a sustainable commercial biofuels industry." The objective of the MOU is the construction or retrofitting of multiple domestic commercial or pre-commercial scale advanced drop-in biofuel plants and refineries. The MOU would support the Navy's goal of deploying a "Green Strike Group" by the end of 2012, and "Great Green Fleet" by 2016 fueled in part with a 50/50 blend of hydrotreated renewable jet fuel (biofuel). The Navy proposes to use authority under the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA) to develop a domestic industrial capacity to supply biofuel. In its FY2013 Congressional Budget Request, the Department of Energy (DOE) requested authority to transfer funds to the DPA Fund, offering the justification that it will support the MOU with the technical expertise to move pilot-scale demonstration projects to larger-scale production in support of the Navy's Green Fleet Goal. Agriculture, Energy, and the Navy expect to fund this initiative at $510 million in aggregate over three years.
In the past, Congress has found it in the interest of national defense preparedness for government to assure that a domestic industrial capacity exists to produce fuel. Congress set aside the (now depleted) Naval Oil Reserves and Oil Shale Reserves to provide for the Navy's fuel requirements. Congress later promoted alternative fuel from coal through the U.S. Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act of 1944 to aid the execution of World War II, and to conserve and increase national oil resources. The act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to construct, maintain, and operate plants producing synthetic liquid fuel from coal, oil shale, and agricultural and forestry products. During the Korean War, the DPA authorized the President to have liquid fuels processed and refined for government use or resale, and to make improvements to government- or privately-owned facilities engaged in processing and refining liquid fuels when it would aid the national defense. In 1980, Congress amended the DPA to authorize the President's purchase of synthetic fuels for national defense. Most recently, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Secretary of Energy, in cooperation with the Secretaries of the Interior and Defense, to develop a program to accelerate the commercial development of strategic unconventional fuels, including but not limited to oil shale and tar sands resources within the United States. Except for exploiting the Naval Oil Reserve, policies that directed alternative fuel development for national defense interests have had to challenge newly discovered petroleum resources that presented clear economic advantages over alternative fuels.
Domestic crude oil production in the United States has increased over the past few years, reversing a decline that began in 1986. The United States is now a net exporter of refined petroleum products. Over the next 10 years, continued development of unconventional oil resources, in combination with the ongoing development of offshore resources in the Gulf of Mexico may push domestic crude oil production to a level not seen since 1994, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
An important policy question for Congress may be whether a domestic biofuel industry is necessary for national defense, and whether proceeding under the authority of the DPA offers the necessary stimulus. A domestic biofuel industry may satisfy concerns for a secure, domestic, alternative fuel source independent of unstable foreign petroleum suppliers. However, adding biofuel to the military's supply chain does not relieve logistical issues with delivering fuel to forward operating areas, where fuel supply issues have been more about vulnerability than availability. |
crs_R44022 | crs_R44022_0 | However, while all governments have access to membership in the GAC, the U.S. government arguably has had more influence over ICANN and the DNS than other governments by virtue of the IANA functions contract with ICANN. NTIA Intent to Transition Stewardship of the DNS
On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced its intention to transition its stewardship role and procedural authority over key domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder community. With NTIA having the option of extending the contract for up to two two-year periods through September 30, 2019, NTIA announced on August 17, 2015, that it will extend the IANA functions contract through September 30, 2016. As a first step, NTIA asked ICANN to convene interested global Internet stakeholders to develop a proposal to achieve the transition. NTIA has stated that it will not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution. On March 10, 2016, the ICANN Board formally accepted the IANA Stewardship Transition proposal and the Enhancing ICANN Accountability report. The Board formally transmitted the transition and accountability plans to NTIA for approval. On June 9, 2016, NTIA issued its IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal Assessment Report . Having received the August 12, 2016, notification from ICANN that it had completed the implementation tasks associated with the IANA transition plan, NTIA notified ICANN on August 16, 2016 that "barring any significant impediment, NTIA intends to allow the IANA functions contract to expire as of October 1." While the U.S. government has no statutory authority over ICANN or the DNS, Congress does have legislative and budgetary authority over NTIA, which is seeking to relinquish its contractual authority over the IANA functions. 113-176 ), the committee urged DOD to
seek an agreement through the IANA transition process, or in parallel to it, between the United States and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the rest of the global Internet stakeholders that the .mil domain will continue to be afforded the same generic top level domain status after the transition that it has always enjoyed, on a par with all other country-specific domains. Specifically, the report must contain the final transition proposal and a certification by NTIA that the proposal:
supports and enhances the multistakeholder model of Internet governance; maintains the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet domain name system; meets the needs and expectations of the global customers and partners of IANA services; maintains the openness of the Internet; and does not replace the role of NTIA with a government-led or intergovernmental organization solution. On May 24, 2016, the House Appropriations Committee approved the FY2017 Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS) Appropriations act ( H.R. 5393 ). The committee continued seeking to prohibit NTIA from relinquishing authority over IANA in FY2017. Should the NTIA Relinquish Its Authority? Congress is assessing NTIA's evaluation of the transition plan and evaluating the transition plan itself. As the Internet expands and becomes more pervasive throughout the world in all aspects of modern society, the question of how it should be governed becomes more pressing, with national governments recognizing an increasing stake in ICANN policy decisions, especially in cases where Internet DNS policy intersects with national laws and interests. While ICANN does not "control" the Internet, how it is ultimately governed may set an important precedent in future policy debates—both domestically and internationally—over how the Internet might be governed, and what role governments and intergovernmental organizations should play. | Currently, the U.S. government retains limited authority over the Internet's domain name system, primarily through the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions contract between the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). By virtue of the IANA functions contract, the NTIA exerts a legacy authority and stewardship over ICANN, and arguably has more influence over ICANN and the domain name system (DNS) than other national governments. Currently the IANA functions contract with NTIA expires on September 30, 2016. However, NTIA has the flexibility to extend the contract for any period through September 2019.
On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced the intention to transition its stewardship role and procedural authority over key Internet domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder community. To accomplish this transition, NTIA asked ICANN to convene interested global Internet stakeholders to develop a transition proposal. NTIA stated that it would not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution.
For two years, Internet stakeholders were engaged in a process to develop a transition proposal that will meet NTIA's criteria. On March 10, 2016, the ICANN Board formally accepted the multistakeholder community's transition plan and transmitted that plan to NTIA for approval. On June 9, 2016, NTIA announced its determination that the transition plan meets NTIA's criteria, that the plan is approved, and that the transition process can proceed. Having received notification from ICANN that it had completed implementation tasks associated with the transition plan, NTIA notified ICANN on August 16, 2016, that barring any significant impediment, NTIA intends to allow the IANA functions contract to expire as of October 1, 2016.
Since NTIA's announcement of its intention to relinquish its authority over IANA, concerns have risen in Congress over the proposed transition. Critics worry that relinquishing U.S. authority over Internet domain names may offer opportunities for either hostile foreign governments or intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, to gain undue influence over the Internet. On the other hand, supporters argue that this transition completes the necessary evolution of Internet domain name governance toward the private sector, and will ultimately support and strengthen the multistakeholder model of Internet governance.
Meanwhile, legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congresses which seeks to prevent, delay, or impose conditions or additional scrutiny on the transition. Of particular note, Section 534 of H.R. 5393, the FY2017 Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS) Appropriations Act, would continue to prohibit NTIA from using funds to relinquish its authority over IANA in FY2017.
The proposed transition could have a significant impact on the future of Internet governance. National governments are recognizing an increasing stake in ICANN and DNS policy decisions, especially in cases where Internet DNS policy intersects with national laws and interests related to issues such as intellectual property, cybersecurity, privacy, and Internet freedom. How ICANN and the Internet domain name system are ultimately governed may set an important precedent in future policy debates—both domestically and internationally—over how the Internet should be governed, and what role governments and intergovernmental organizations should play. |
crs_R45284 | crs_R45284_0 | Introduction
The Title X Family Planning Program (Title X), enacted in 1970, is the only domestic federal program devoted solely to family planning and related preventive health services. According to HHS, family planning projects that receive Title X funds are closely monitored to ensure that federal funds are used appropriately and are not used for prohibited activities, such as for performing surgical abortion procedures. The 115 th Congress is debating the scope of the program to determine whether providing an abortion-related service such as an abortion referral should be a family planning service under Title X. According to some Members of Congress, the proposed rule is a gag rule that "would bar patients from receiving information to support their ability to make informed decisions about their own reproductive health." To assist Congress as it considers issues related to Title X, this report
provides a brief overview of the Title X program; discusses the proposed rule's major elements and explains how the proposed rule differs from current Title X rules and guidance; provides HHS' rationale for the components of the proposed rule, as well as selected commentary from key stakeholders in reaction to the proposed rule; and summarizes HHS's regulatory impact analysis. The Title X Family Planning Program
All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories and Freely Associated States (collectively referred to as states ) are eligible to apply for Title X grants, as are other public agencies and nonprofit organizations. In 2016, Title X grantees provided services through 3,898 clinics. That same year, Title X-funded clinics served 4.008 million clients, primarily low-income women and adolescents. Proposed Rule on Statutory Requirements
On June 1, 2018, HHS published a proposed rule in the Federal Register to revise the regulations that implement the Title X Family Planning Program. Proposed Rule
The proposed rule would remove the requirement that Title X projects must provide pregnant clients with the opportunity to receive abortion-related information, counseling, and referrals upon request. Therefore, if the rule is finalized, a Title X provider would be prohibited from knowingly referring a pregnant client to an abortion provider. 300a-6 (Section 1008 of the Public Health Service Act), Title X funds may not be used "in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." Under current program guidelines, a grantee's abortion activities must be "separate and distinct" from the Title X project activities; however, in some cases, a grantee's Title X project activities and its abortion activities may have a common facility, a common waiting room, common staff, and a common records system:
Non-Title X abortion activities must be separate and distinct from Title X project activities. In addition, the proposed rule would prohibit the use of Title X funds to build infrastructure for prohibited abortion-related activities. For example, Title X funds enable PPFA-affiliated health centers to provide reproductive health services to an estimated 41% of Title X clients. Title X grantees are subject to several reporting requirements, but they are not laid out in the Title X regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations (42 C.F.R. Respondents included 535 Title X clinics. A core set of family planning services is defined in program guidance, "Providing Quality Family Planning Services: Recommendations of CDC and the U.S. Office of Population Affairs," which states,
Family planning services include the following:
--providing contraception to help women and men plan and space births, prevent unintended pregnancies, and reduce the number of abortions;
--offering pregnancy testing and counseling;
--helping clients who want to conceive;
--providing basic infertility services;
--providing preconception health services to improve infant and maternal outcomes and improve women's and men's health; and
--providing sexually transmitted disease (STD) screening and treatment services to prevent tubal infertility and improve the health of women, men, and infants. | The Title X Family Planning Program (Title X), enacted in 1970, is the only domestic federal program devoted solely to family planning and related preventive health services. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories and Freely Associated States (collectively referred to as states) are eligible to apply for Title X grants, as are other public agencies and nonprofit organizations. Title X grants enable grantees to establish and operate family planning projects. A family planning project refers to a set of activities that a Title X grantee undertakes under its grant agreement to provide a broad range of family planning methods and services to Title X clients. (In 2016, Title X-funded clinics served 4 million clients.) Examples of Title X activities include provider-to-patient counseling, dissemination of educational materials, and the delivery of clinical services. Clinical services provided through Title X projects include contraceptive services and supplies, sexually transmitted disease testing and treatment, and preconception health care services. All services are confidential.
Title X is administered through the Office of Population Affairs (OPA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The program was appropriated $286.5 million for FY2018. Federal law (42 U.S.C. §300a-6) prohibits the use of Title X funds in projects "where abortion is a method of family planning." According to OPA, family planning projects that receive Title X funds are closely monitored to ensure that federal funds are used appropriately and that funds are not used for prohibited activities such as for performing surgical abortion procedures. Under current program guidance, the abortion prohibition does not apply to all Title X grantees' activities; instead, the prohibition applies only to activities that are part of the Title X project. A grantee's abortion activities must be "separate and distinct" from the Title X project activities.
On June 1, 2018, OPA published a proposed rule in the Federal Register, "Compliance with Statutory Program Integrity Requirements," that would make several changes to federal Title X family planning regulations, including the following:
Title X projects would no longer be required to offer pregnant clients the opportunity to receive abortion information, counseling, and referral upon request. Title X projects would be prohibited from referring patients to abortion services. Title X projects would be required to maintain physical and financial separation between their Title X projects and abortion-related activities. Several terms, including "family planning" and "low-income family," would have new definitions. Criteria for awarding Title X Family Planning Services grants would be revised. Title X grant applicants and grantees would be subject to new reporting requirements.
This proposed rule has sparked a congressional debate about the scope of Title X. The 115th Congress is debating the scope of Title X to determine whether providing an abortion-related service, such as referring a pregnant client to an abortion provider, should be a family planning service under Title X. In addition, Members of Congress are debating whether this proposed rule is a "gag rule": an attempt to prevent some Title X clients from receiving adequate information that would permit them to make an informed decision about their health care treatment.
This report summarizes the proposed rule's major elements and explains how the proposed rule differs from current Title X rules and guidance. In addition, CRS provides HHS's rationale for the components of the proposed rule, as well as selected commentary from key stakeholders in reaction to the proposed rule. |
crs_RL33826 | crs_RL33826_0 | Introduction and Overview1
Responding to concerns that human activities are increasing concentrations of "greenhouse gases" (such as carbon dioxide and methane) in the atmosphere and causing potentially damaging climate change and global warming, nearly all nations of the world joined together in 1992 to sign the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The United States was one of the first nations to ratify this treaty. It included a legally non-binding, voluntary pledge that the major industrialized/developed nations would establish national action plans aiming to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, and that all nations would undertake voluntary actions to measure and report greenhouse gas emissions to the UNFCCC Secretariat. As scientific consensus grew that human activities are having a discernible impact on global climate systems, contributing to a warming of the Earth that could result in major impacts such as sea level rise, changes in weather patterns, and health effects—and as it became apparent that many major nations such as the United States and Japan would not be able to reduce their emissions to 1990 levels by 2000—parties to the treaty decided in 1995 that it would be necessary to move beyond voluntary measures and to enter into legally binding commitments. The protocol establishes legally binding, mandatory emissions reductions for the six major greenhouse gases . These negotiations were continued through two subsidiary bodies that address technical issues, and then decisions were made at the annual conferences of the parties (COPs) to the UNFCCC until February 2005 when the Kyoto Protocol had achieved the necessary ratifications to enter into force; the annual meeting is now a UNFCCC COP, combined with a "meeting of the parties (MOP)" to the Protocol. In December 2007, COP-13/MOP-3 convened in Bali, Indonesia, and began the process of formulating an agreement that would succeed the Kyoto Protocol when its commitment period ends in 2012. (As noted above, only nations that ratify the Protocol are subject to its terms; the United States later rejected participation, and thus is not bound by it.) Both of these processes involve workshops and meetings with reports to the COP/MOP meetings in 2006 and 2007. However, the challenge at the COP/MOP meeting in Bali and the negotiations to follow remains how to find agreement on the nature of commitments, if any, that would be acceptable to all the major players—including Kyoto Protocol parties with existing obligations, developing countries that are major GHG emitters, and the United States, whose role is regarded as critical by all potential participants in the post-2012 period. Key elements and issues of the Bali Action Plan concerning mitigation include:
— Need for " deep cuts in global emissions " : the decision at Bali recognized "that deep cuts in global emissions will be required to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention [avoiding dangerous climate change] and emphasiz[ed] the urgency to address climate change as indicated in the Fourth Assessment Report" of the IPCC. The first sessions of the UNFCCC working groups met March 31 – April 4, 2008 in Bangkok, Thailand. In March 2001, President George W. Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol, and the United States has not formally participated in further negotiations on the Protocol. In February 2002, President Bush announced a U.S. policy of reducing the net "greenhouse gas intensity" of the U.S. economy by 18% over the next 10 years. Greenhouse gas intensity measures the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to economic output. "Major Economies" Initiative by President Bush on Climate Change
Just prior to the G-8 meeting, President Bush announced May 31, 2007, that the United States would convene a meeting in Washington in late September of "major economies"—those that are "major emitters" of GHG—on "Energy Security and Climate Change." Framework Convention on Climate Change by 2009." Other International Meetings
In addition to the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol processes, and the initiatives by the United States discussed above, several major international meetings focused on climate change took place in 2007. | Concerns over climate change, often termed "global warming," have emerged both in the United States and internationally as major policy issues. Reports in 2007 by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provided scientific underpinnings for these concerns, and the number of proposals and international meetings devoted to these issues has grown, as discussed in this report. In December 2007, the meeting of parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) convened in Bali, Indonesia, and agreed on the "Bali Action Plan" to guide negotiations over the next two years, with the goal of formulating by 2009 a decision that would identify the next round of commitments by the nations of the world to address climate change. Several "Working Group" meetings are scheduled to work on these issues during 2008, beginning with a meeting in Bangkok, Thailand, in April that formulated a work plan for negotiations.
The first treaty to address climate change, the UNFCCC was completed and opened for signature in 1992. It includes voluntary commitments to establish national action plans for measures that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The United States was one of the first nations to sign and ratify this treaty, and it entered into force in 1994. However, it was soon concluded by parties to the treaty that mandatory reductions in emissions of the six major greenhouse gases (of which carbon dioxide, mainly from burning of fossil fuels, is the most prevalent) would be required. The resulting Kyoto Protocol, which was completed in 1997 and entered into force in February 2005, committed industrialized nations that ratify it to specified, legally binding reductions in emissions of the six major greenhouse gases. The United States has not ratified the Protocol, and thus is not bound by its provisions. In March 2001, the Bush Administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol, and subsequently announced a U.S. policy for climate change that relies on voluntary actions to reduce the "greenhouse gas intensity" (ratio of emissions to economic output) of the U.S. economy by 18% over the next 10 years.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the collective commitments of the industrialized nations are to reduce the Parties' emissions by at least 5% below their 1990 levels, averaged over the "commitment period" 2008 to 2012. Over the past year, several high-level meetings have focused on the need to deal with climate change, including the G-8 meeting in June 2007 and meetings at the United Nations. President Bush announced on May 31, 2007, that the United States would convene a meeting of major economies to begin a series of meetings in Washington, D.C. through 2008 to find a voluntary framework for dealing with energy security and climate change.
As of November 2007, the UNFCCC Secretariat listed 174 nations and the European Union as parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Australia announced its ratification at the December meeting in Bali. Annual meetings of the parties are to continue, using the Bali "roadmap" agreed on in December 2007. Major challenges involve finding agreement on the nature of legally binding commitments, if any, that would prove acceptable to all major players: current parties, developing countries that are major emitters, and the United States. |
crs_R40983 | crs_R40983_0 | Background: The Pursuit of Postal Reform
Legislatively, the pursuit of reform of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) began during the 104 th Congress. 6407 , the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA). President George W. Bush signed it into law on December 20, 2006 (PAEA; P.L. 109-435 ; 120 Stat. 3198). A number of factors encouraged the movement for postal reform. Perhaps foremost were the financial challenges of the USPS. Yet the USPS's costs—about 76% of which were labor-related—rose with the addition of 2 million new addresses each year and mounting obligations for USPS future retiree health benefits. The act reduced the USPS's pension outlays. Alteration of the USPS's budget submission p rocess. Establishment of the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund . Possible PAEA Oversight Issues for Congress
The inherent complexity of lawmaking and the execution thereof invites disagreement and confusion over what a law means. As described earlier, the PAEA made numerous significant changes to U.S. postal law. However, his predecessor, President George W. Bush, did issue a signing statement that addressed a number of sections of PAEA, often in the context of the separation of powers. The Role and Performance of the Postal Regulatory Commission
PAEA replaced the Postal Rate Commission with the Postal Regulatory Commission. Congress has held many hearings on the USPS since enactment of the PAEA during which it has examined the implementation of PAEA and the role of the PRC. The law states:
Congress finds that—
(A) the Postal Service has more than 400 logistics facilities, separate from its post office network;
(B) ... the Postal Service has more facilities than it needs and the streamlining of this distribution network can pave the way for the potential consolidation of sorting facilities and the elimination of excess costs;
(C) the Postal Service has always revised its distribution network to meet changing conditions and is best suited to address its operational needs; and
(D) Congress strongly encourages the Postal Service to—
(i) expeditiously move forward in its streamlining efforts; and
(ii) keep unions, management associations, and local elected officials informed as an essential part of this effort and abide by any procedural requirements contained in the national bargaining agreements. The USPS's Authority to Provide Nonpostal Products and Services and the Viability of the USPS's Business Model
As noted above, Section 101 of the PAEA defined "postal service" to mean "the delivery of letters, printed matter, or mailable packages, including acceptance, collection, sorting, transportation, or other functions ancillary thereto." | President George W. Bush signed the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA; P.L. 109-435; 120 Stat. 3198) on December 20, 2006. The PAEA was the first broad revision of the 1970 statute that replaced the U.S. Post Office with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), a self-supporting, independent agency of the executive branch.
This report describes Congress's pursuit of postal reform and summarizes the major provisions of the new postal reform law. The report also suggests possible PAEA-related oversight issues for Congress.
Legislatively, the pursuit of reform of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) began during the 104th Congress, in 1996. A number of factors encouraged the movement for postal reform. Perhaps foremost were the financial challenges of the USPS.
A decade later, Congress enacted the PAEA, which made over 150 changes to postal law. Some of the more significant alterations are defining the term "postal service"; restricting the USPS's authority to provide nonpostal services; altering the USPS's budget submission process; requiring the USPS to prefund its future retiree health benefits by establishing the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund; and replacing the USPS's regulator, the Postal Rate Commission, with the more powerful Postal Regulatory Commission.
The inherent complexity of lawmaking and the execution thereof invites disagreement and confusion over what a law means and how it should be implemented. In the six years since the enactment of the PAEA, some issues and questions concerning the law's provisions have arisen. These include, but are not limited to, possible executive branch concerns about the PAEA and the separation of powers; the cost of prefunding USPS future retiree health benefits; the role of the public in the closure of nonretail postal facilities; the USPS's authority to provide nonpostal products and services, and the viability of the USPS's business model.
This report will be updated should events warrant. |
crs_R44529 | crs_R44529_0 | T he Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB, commonly referred to as the Terrorist Watchlist) lies at the heart of federal efforts to identify and share information about identified people who may pose terrorism-related threats to the United States. It is managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and includes biographic identifiers for those known to have or those suspected of having ties to terrorism. It stores hundreds of thousands of unique identities. Portions of the TSDB are exported to data systems in federal agencies that perform screening activities such as background checks, reviewing the records of passport and visa applicants, and official encounters with travelers at U.S. border crossings. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, the Bureau) has acknowledged that it had been investigating the shooter who killed 49 people at an Orlando nightclub on June 12, 2016. The gunman has been identified as Omar Mateen, a 29-year-old security guard in Florida who was born in New York. Reportedly, Mateen was watchlisted while under FBI investigation. This report provides background information on the watchlisting process. The Terrorist Screening Center, the Hub of Watchlisting
The TSC, a multi-agency organization administered by the FBI, maintains the TSDB. The TSC was created by Presidential Directive in 2003 in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Before the TSC consolidated federal watchlisting efforts, numerous separate watchlists were maintained by different federal agencies. The information in these lists was not necessarily shared or compared. The efforts that surround the federal watchlisting regimen can be divided into three broad processes centered on the TSDB:
Nomination, which involves the identification of known or suspected terrorists via intelligence collection or law enforcement investigations. The U.S. government has a formal watchlist nomination process. Verification of identities for the TSDB and export of data to screening systems, which involves the creation and maintenance of the TSDB, as well as the compiling and export of special TSDB subsets for various intelligence or law enforcement end users (screeners). Screening, which involves end users—screeners—checking individuals or identities they encounter against information from the TSDB that is exported to screening databases. | The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, the Bureau) has acknowledged that it had been investigating the shooter who killed 49 people at an Orlando nightclub on June 12, 2016. The gunman has been identified as Omar Mateen, a 29-year-old security guard in Florida who was born in New York. Reportedly, Mateen was watchlisted while under FBI investigation. This report provides background information on the watchlisting process.
The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB, commonly referred to as the Terrorist Watchlist) lies at the heart of federal efforts to identify and share information about identified people who may pose terrorism-related threats to the United States. It is managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and includes biographic identifiers for those known to have or those suspected of having ties to terrorism. It stores hundreds of thousands of unique identities. Portions of the TSDB are exported to data systems in federal agencies that perform screening activities such as background checks, reviewing the records of passport and visa applicants, and official encounters with travelers at U.S. border crossings.
The TSC, a multi-agency organization administered by the FBI, maintains the TSDB. The TSC was created by Presidential Directive in 2003 in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Before the TSC consolidated federal watchlisting efforts, numerous separate watchlists were maintained by different federal agencies. The information in these lists was not necessarily shared or compared.
The efforts that surround the federal watchlisting regimen can be divided into three broad processes centered on the TSDB:
Nomination, which involves the identification of known or suspected terrorists via intelligence collection or law enforcement investigations. The U.S. government has a formal watchlist nomination process. Verification of identities for the TSDB and export of data to screening systems, which involves the creation and maintenance of the TSDB, as well as the compiling and export of special TSDB subsets for various intelligence or law enforcement end users (screeners). Screening, which involves end users—screeners—checking individuals or identities they encounter against information from the TSDB that is exported to screening databases. |
crs_R40681 | crs_R40681_0 | Introduction
Recent congressional discussion of patent system reform has included consideration of provisions that would restrict the sorts of inventions for which patents may be obtained. Legislation introduced in previous sessions of Congress would have banned patents relating to genetic materials as well. None of this legislation has been enacted. The courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) have understood this language to allow an expansive range of patentable subject matter. The current controversy concerning patents on genetic materials is then reviewed. The range of patentable subject matter under this statute has been characterized as "extremely broad." The courts and USPTO have nonetheless concluded that certain subject matter, including abstract ideas and laws of nature, is not patentable under section 101. The first of these, business method patents, have been defined to include "a method of administering, managing, or otherwise operating a business or organization, including a technique used in doing or conducting business." In the 111 th Congress, three bills have been introduced that would stipulate that patents may not be obtained on methods of tax planning. Bilski v. Kappos
Increasing public scrutiny of business and tax strategy patents in recent years has corresponded with heightened attention to patent eligibility issues by the USPTO and the courts. Justice Breyer identified four points on which all nine justices agreed: (1) the range of patentable subject matter is broad but not without limit; (2) the machine-or-transformation test has proven to be of use in determining whether a process is patentable or not; (3) the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole standard for assessing the patentability of processes; and (4) not everything that merely achieves a "useful, concrete, and tangible result" qualifies as patentable subject matter. Patents claiming the products of biotechnology, and in particular genetic materials, have also led to considerable debate. Other patents claim related technologies, including individual mutations known to cause disease, testing kits for detecting genetic mutations, amino acid sequences (proteins), and the use of these proteins as medicines. The availability of patents pertaining to genetic technologies may be traced to the well-known decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty . The March 29, 2010, decision of the District Court for the Southern District of New York in Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO cast serious doubt upon this reasoning, however. Some observers have expressed concerns that these sorts of inventions should not be patented, no matter how innovative they might be. Others believe that these concerns are overstated. Proponents of a broad notion of patentable subject matter assert that the patent system has traditionally offered a powerful incentive for innovation across many industries. Some commentators believe that innovation in areas such as business methods, tax planning methods, and genetic materials has flourished even though the availability of patent rights has been uncertain. This extent of proprietary rights may limit the ability of others to design around the patented invention and ultimately discourage competition. Patents on genetic materials have also been said to lead to possible deleterious effects on healthcare and research related to healthcare. Congressional Issues and Options
If Congress decides that the current rules with respect to patent eligibility are satisfactory, then no action need be taken. If legislation is contemplated, one international agreement that deserves consideration is the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, commonly known as the TRIPS Agreement. | Congressional interest in the patent system has grown in recent years, tracking increasing recognition of the importance of intellectual property to innovative U.S. industries. One of the areas of interest is the topic of patentable subject matter—that is, the sorts of inventions for which patents may be obtained. In particular, patents on business methods, tax planning methods, and genetic materials have proven controversial. Legislation introduced in recent sessions of Congress would restrict the availability of patents in these fields. None of these bills has been enacted.
The patent statute currently provides that patents may be obtained on any invention that is a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. The range of patentable subject matter under this provision has been characterized as extremely broad. The courts have nonetheless concluded that certain subject matter, including abstract ideas, mathematical algorithms, laws of nature, and mental processes may not be patented no matter how innovative they might be. They have reasoned that these inventions comprise the fundamental tools of scientific research, and that allowing them to be privately appropriated might interfere with future advancement.
Business method patents relate to a method of administering, managing, or conducting a business or organization. Tax planning method patents concern a method of reducing or deferring taxes. The 2010 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos addressed whether particular methods are patentable, although opinions vary as to the conclusiveness of the Courts' ruling.
Patents claiming the products of biotechnology, and in particular genetic materials, have also led to considerable debate. Genetic material patents cover such technologies as DNA sequences, amino acid sequences, individual mutations known to cause disease, and testing kits for detecting genetic mutations. Since the 1980 decision of the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has viewed genetic materials and related technologies as patentable. However, the March 29, 2010, district court opinion in Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO cast doubt upon the patentability of isolated DNA. Proceedings in the so-called "Myriad" litigation were pending as of the date this report issued.
Numerous arguments have been advanced in opposition to patents on business methods, tax planning methods, and genetic materials. Some commentators believe that business method patents ultimately discourage competition, that tax strategy patents provide undesirable innovation incentives, and that patents on genetic materials lead to deleterious effects on healthcare and medical research. Other experts assert that these concerns are overstated, and further contend that the patent system provides a powerful incentive for innovation, investment, and public disclosure of technology across many fields of endeavor.
Several legislative options present themselves. If Congress decides the current rules with respect to patent eligibility are appropriate, then no action need be taken. Other possibilities include amendments to the Patent Act either to bar the issuance of patents in particular disciplines, or to limit the ability to enforce certain kinds of patents. The desire to comply with certain international agreements, in particular the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), may restrict certain legislative alternatives. |
crs_R44187 | crs_R44187_0 | The Technology Boundary: A Perennial Issue
Technology as a boundary for law enforcement is by no means a new issue in U.S. policing. In the 1990s, for instance, there were concerns that increasing adoption of technologies such as digital communications and encryption could hamper law enforcement's ability to investigate crime. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)
In the 1990s, there were "concerns that emerging technologies such as digital and wireless communications were making it increasingly difficult for law enforcement agencies to execute authorized surveillance." Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA; P.L. Among other things, CALEA requires that telecommunications carriers assist law enforcement in executing authorized electronic surveillance. There have been concerns that malicious actors, from savvy criminals to terrorists to nation states, may rely on this very encryption to help conceal their illicit activities. If companies like Apple and Google provide for encryption of data on locked mobile devices—and do not maintain the keys to unlock these devices—the companies may be unable to assist law enforcement in carrying out court-authorized searches of content stored on the device—even if the police possess a warrant. As these companies have noted, because they cannot break the encryption of a locked device, they also cannot provide decrypted information to authorities. Originally, the "going dark" debate centered on law enforcement's ability to intercept real-time communications. More recent technology changes have potentially impacted law enforcement capabilities to access not only communications, but stored data. Following the December 2, 2015, terrorist attack in San Bernardino, CA, investigators recovered a cell phone belonging to one of the suspected shooters. FBI Director Comey testified before Congress two months later and indicated that the bureau was still unable to unlock the device. On February 16, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ordered Apple to provide "reasonable technical assistance to assist law enforcement agents in obtaining access to the data" on the cell phone. The outcome of this case may have implications for how law enforcement and policymakers respond to the broader conversation on enhanced encryption. Policymakers may weigh whether aiding federal law enforcement will involve incentives or requirements for communications and technology companies to provide specified information to law enforcement, enhanced investigative tools, bolstered financial and manpower resources to help law enforcement better leverage existing authorities, or combinations of these and other options. Even if policymakers believe there is a significant problem with law enforcement's ability to carry out authorized activities, they may debate whether expanding requirements for certain technology companies and communications services or adding to law enforcement's toolbox of authorities may be the more appropriate options. Some have argued that another option may be to enhance law enforcement's financial resources and manpower. This could involve enhancing training for existing officers or hiring individuals with bolstered technology expertise. | Because modern-day criminals are constantly developing new tools and techniques to facilitate their illicit activities, law enforcement is challenged with leveraging its tools and authorities to keep pace. For instance, interconnectivity and technological innovation have not only fostered international business and communication, they have also helped criminals carry out their operations. At times, these same technological advances have presented unique hurdles for law enforcement and officials charged with combating malicious actors.
Technology as a barrier for law enforcement is by no means a new issue in U.S. policing. In the 1990s, for instance, there were concerns about digital and wireless communications potentially hampering law enforcement in carrying out court-authorized surveillance. To help combat these challenges, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA; P.L. 103-414), which, among other things, required telecommunications carriers to assist law enforcement in executing authorized electronic surveillance.
The technology boundary has received renewed attention as companies have implemented advanced security for their products—particularly their mobile devices. In some cases, enhanced encryption measures have been put in place resulting in the fact that companies such as Apple and Google cannot unlock devices for anyone under any circumstances, not even law enforcement.
Law enforcement has concerns over certain technological changes, and there are fears that officials may be unable to keep pace with technological advances and conduct electronic surveillance if they cannot access certain information. Originally, the going dark debate centered on law enforcement's ability to intercept real-time communications. More recent technology changes have potentially impacted law enforcement capabilities to access not only communications, but stored data as well.
There are concerns that enhanced encryption may affect law enforcement investigations. For instance, following the December 2, 2015, terrorist attack in San Bernardino, CA, investigators recovered a cell phone belonging to one of the suspected shooters. FBI Director Comey testified before Congress two months later and indicated that the bureau was still unable to unlock the device. On February 16, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ordered Apple to provide "reasonable technical assistance to assist law enforcement agents in obtaining access to the data" on the cell phone. The outcome of this case may have implications for how law enforcement and policymakers respond to the broader conversation on enhanced encryption.
If evidence arises that investigations are hampered, policymakers may question what, if any, actions they should take. One option is that Congress could update electronic surveillance laws to cover data stored on smartphones. Congress could also prohibit the encryption of data unless law enforcement could still access the encrypted data. They may also consider enhancing law enforcement's financial resources and manpower, which could involve enhancing training for existing officers or hiring more personnel with strong technology expertise.
Some of these options may involve the application of a "back door" or "golden key" that can allow for access to smartphones. However, as has been noted, "when you build a back door ... for the good guys, you can be assured that the bad guys will figure out how to use it as well." This is often maintained to be an inevitable tradeoff. Policymakers may debate which—if either—may be more advantageous for the nation on the whole: increased security coupled with potentially fewer data breaches and possibly greater impediments to law enforcement investigations, or increased access to data paired with potentially greater vulnerability to malicious actors. |
crs_R44545 | crs_R44545_0 | Introduction
As of June 16, 2016, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that 60 countries worldwide had experienced mosquito-borne transmission of Zika, 46 of which had never had Zika cases before (see Figure 1 ). The United States will likely experience an increase in travel-associated cases and possibly local transmission. Although U.S. health assistance (bilateral and regional) to Latin America in general has declined, U.S. support for the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) has increased. Regional a pportionment and components of global health budget . In recent years, Aedes mosquitoes have caused three disease outbreaks (dengue, chikungunya, and Zika) in Latin America and the Caribbean, all of which have been imported into the United States, with the latter being only travel-associated at the time of this report. This report provides background information on the Zika virus, discusses challenges faced by governments and implementing partners in the Latin America and Caribbean region that are attempting to control the ongoing outbreak, and analyzes the above issues in the context of the U.S. Zika response. Zika in Latin America and the Caribbean
Scientists are unsure how many people have been infected by Zika in the Western Hemisphere, but as many as 4 million people may be at risk of infection, and nearly all countries have recorded cases. Territories
As of June 16, 2016, all Zika cases detected in the continental United States (755) had been either acquired abroad or sexually transmitted, although the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and Puerto Rico have experienced local transmission by mosquito. International Zika Responses in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country Efforts
The number of Zika cases, the capacity of health systems to address them and related complications, and the plans to do so vary widely across Latin America and the Caribbean. Some observers have expressed concerns about the adequacy of Brazil's efforts, particularly in low-income areas. Reprogrammed Funds for USAID and CDC Programs
On April 6, 2016, the Administration announced that it would reprogram $589 million in unspent Ebola funds to address the Zika outbreak. USAID is reprogramming $215 million of that funding to support short-term efforts in Latin America, including a transfer of $78 million to CDC for Zika activities in the region and a $4 million transfer to the Department of State for a contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Congressional Action on the Budget Request63
In mid-May 2016, both the House and the Senate passed supplemental appropriations measures for Zika response. The House bill, H.R. 5243 , would provide $622.1 million in Zika funding and rescind an equal amount of budget authority. The Senate measure ( S.Amdt. 3900 to H.R. 2577 , the combined FY2017 Military Construction-Veterans Affairs and Transportation-Housing and Urban Development appropriations bills) would provide $1.1 billion in Zika response funding without rescissions. On June 23, 2016, the House agreed to a conference agreement (see H.Rept. 114-640 ) that would provide $1.1 billion for Zika response, including $175.1 million for State Department and USAID activities. On June 28, 2016, the Senate voted not to invoke cloture on the conference agreement. In the international context, Congress may consider how to balance support for U.S. bilateral and multilateral Zika responses. Discussions about controlling the Zika outbreak may also focus on U.S. support for global pandemic preparedness efforts, as well as research and development for diagnostics, treatments, and prevention measures for certain neglected diseases. The WHO has not reported voluntary contributions from the U.S. government for the plan, although the Administration's February 2016 Zika budget request includes $10 million for the WHO/PAHO response and the Administration reprogrammed $14 million of Ebola funds for voluntary contributions to WHO, PAHO, and UNICEF for Zika activities in April 2016. U.S. | Congress is debating how to respond to an ongoing outbreak of Zika virus, a mosquito-borne illness that has no treatment or vaccine and can cause microcephaly—a severe birth defect—and other neurological complications. As of June 16, 2016, 60 countries and territories had reported mosquito-borne transmission of the virus, 39 of which are in Latin America and the Caribbean and are reporting cases of Zika for the first time. Brazil, which has registered the most confirmed cases of Zika in Latin America, will host the summer Olympics in August 2016. Scientists expect that travel destinations in the Caribbean will see more cases as the summer's warm, rainy season continues. More than 750 U.S. citizens, including pregnant women, have become infected through either travel or sexual transmission.
Frequent business and tourist travel, combined with the close proximity and similar climates of Latin America and the southern United States, means that mosquito-borne Zika infections are likely in the United States. Zika is primarily spread by Aedes mosquitoes—primarily Aedes aegypti but also Aedes albopictus, the latter of which is present in a majority of U.S. states. Local (or mosquito-borne) transmission has not yet occurred in the continental United States but is occurring in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
On February 8, 2016, the Obama Administration submitted an emergency request for almost $1.9 billion in supplemental funding to respond to the Zika outbreak, including $526 million for international efforts. On April 6, 2016, the Administration announced that it would reprogram $589 million in unobligated funds, including $510 million in Ebola supplemental funds, for efforts to address the Zika outbreak. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is reprogramming $215 million of that funding—including a $78 million transfer to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—for international efforts. In mid-May 2016, both the House and the Senate passed supplemental appropriations measures for Zika response. The House bill, H.R. 5243, would provide $622.1 million in Zika funding and rescind an equal amount of budget authority. The Senate measure (S.Amdt. 3900 to H.R. 2577, the combined FY2017 Military Construction-Veterans Affairs and Transportation-Housing and Urban Development appropriations bills) would provide $1.1 billion in Zika response funding without rescissions. On June 23, 2016, the House agreed to a conference agreement (see H.Rept. 114-640) that would provide $1.1 billion for Zika response, including $175.1 million for State Department and USAID activities. On June 28, 2016, the Senate voted not to invoke cloture on the conference agreement.
The number of people in the Western Hemisphere affected by Zika is unknown, but as many as 4 million people may be at risk of infection in 2016, and nearly all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have recorded cases of the virus. Zika responses in the region have been led by Brazil and Colombia, multilateral organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO)/Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), and the U.S. government. Health experts have expressed concerns about the capacity of health systems—particularly in Central America and the Caribbean—to prevent, diagnose, and care for Zika cases and associated complications, particularly among pregnant women. Related issues of interest to Congress include how to balance support for U.S. initiatives and multilateral approaches, the proper scope and components of U.S. health assistance to the region, and funding for pandemic preparedness and research on neglected tropical illnesses in Latin America.
This report focuses on the Latin American dimensions of the Zika virus. For more information, see CRS Report R44549, Supplemental Appropriations for Zika Response: The FY2016 Conference Agreement in Brief, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_RL32808 | crs_RL32808_0 | The major sources of federal tax revenue are individual income taxes, Social Security and other payroll taxes, corporate income taxes, excise taxes, and estate and gift taxes. This report describes the federal tax structure, provides some statistics on the tax system as a whole, and presents analysis of selected tax concepts. This step of the process produces adjusted gross income (AGI), which is the basic measure of income under the federal income tax. Federal income taxes are assessed on a taxpayer's taxable income. There are four main filing categories: married filing jointly, married filing separately, head of household, and single individual. After a taxpayer's tax liability has been calculated, tax credits are subtracted from gross tax liability to arrive at a final tax liability. Various tax provisions are available to individuals depending on their level of income. Higher-income individuals with a high ratio of exemptions and deductions to income may be subject to the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Over time, tax credits have become an increasingly popular method of providing tax relief and social benefits. Wages are tax deductible, so labor's contribution to corporate revenue is excluded from the corporate tax base. Neither form of income is generally deductible. Payroll Taxes
Payroll taxes are used to fund specific programs, largely Social Security and Medicare. In 2014, the Social Security part of the tax (6.2% for both employees and employers) was only levied on the first $118,500 of wages, with the cap adjusted annually for increases in average wages in the economy. The Medicare portion (2.9%) is applied to all wages. Federal excise taxes are levied on a variety of products. Tax Statistics
Composition and Size of the Federal Tax System
The federal tax system relies on several different revenue sources. In FY2013 the individual income tax accounted for 47% of total federal revenue, the social insurance and retirement receipts for just over 34% of total revenue, the corporate income tax for 10% of the total, and excise taxes for approximately 3% of the total. Revenues as a percentage of GDP remained at 15% in 2010. Excise taxes and estate and gift taxes have also decreased in relative importance over time. Using aggregate budget data for all levels of government relative to economic output (budget aggregates as a percentage GDP) as one measure of the size of public sectors, several observations can be made:
Compared with the other major industrialized nations, the public sector (including all levels of government) in the United States is relatively small. Or the tax burden could be distributed progressively such that taxes as a percentage of income increase as incomes increase. As a result, higher income groups paid a larger share of federal tax liabilities in 2011 than in 2001. Selected Tax Concepts
The final sections of this report review a number of important tax concepts. While marriage tax penalties have been reduced (and bonuses increased) in recent years, the possibility that marriage can change a couple's tax liability still exists. Tax Expenditures
Tax expenditures are revenue losses from special tax deductions, credits, and other tax benefits. Capital gains on short-term assets are taxed at regular income tax rates. Tax deferral not only affects the taxation of assets producing capital gains income, but also is of concern in other areas of tax policy, such as the taxation of contributions to retirement accounts, depreciation allowances, and the taxation of foreign source income of U.S. multinational corporations. | The major sources of federal tax revenue are individual income taxes, Social Security and other payroll taxes, corporate income taxes, excise taxes, and estate and gift taxes. This report describes the federal tax structure, provides some statistics on the tax system as a whole, and presents analysis of selected tax concepts.
The federal income tax is levied on an individual's taxable income, which is adjusted gross income (AGI) less deductions and exemptions. Tax rates, based on filing status (e.g., married filing jointly or single individual) determine the level of tax liability. Tax rates in the United States are progressive, such that higher levels of income are taxed at higher rates. Once tax liability is calculated, tax credits can be used to reduce tax liability. Tax deductions and tax credits are tools available to policy makers to increase or decrease the after-tax price of undertaking specific activities. Individuals with high levels of exemptions, deductions, and credits relative to income may be required to file under the alternative minimum tax (AMT).
Corporate taxable income is also subject to varying rates, where those with higher levels of income pay higher levels of taxes. Social Security and Medicare tax rates are, respectively, 12.4% and 2.9%. In 2014, Social Security taxes are levied on the first $117,000 of wages. In 2015, the Social Security wage base is inflation-adjusted to $118,500, reflecting increases in average wages in the economy. Medicare taxes are assessed against all wage income. Federal excise taxes are levied on specific goods, such as transportation fuels, alcohol, tobacco, and telephones.
In FY2013, individual income taxes accounted for 47% of total federal revenue. Social Security taxes accounted for 34%. Corporate income taxes accounted for 10% while excise taxes accounted for 3%. Estate and gift, customs, and miscellaneous taxes accounted for the remaining 6% of total revenue. Over time, the corporate income tax has become much less important as a revenue source while Social Security taxes have provided a larger share of total revenues.
Analysis of tax statistics from the federal tax system as a whole leads to three conclusions: (1) federal revenue as a percentage of GDP is in line with historical trends; (2) the U.S. fiscal position is in line with the fiscal position of other industrialized nations (revenues and expenditures as a percentage of GDP are relatively low); and (3) over the past decade, average tax rates have fallen for individuals at all income levels, but have fallen more for lower-income individuals, reducing their share of overall tax liabilities.
The final sections of this report analyze a number of tax concepts. Tax expenditures are revenue losses from special tax deductions, credits, and other benefits. Capital gains warrant special attention, as there is debate about their being taxed at a lower rate. Marriage tax penalties and bonuses, while reduced following legislation enacted in 2001 and 2003, still pose an inequity in the tax system. Tax deferral, or the timing of taxes, poses problems related to the timing of taxation, specifically with respect to capital gains. Depreciation is important, as accelerated depreciation schemes or expensing can influence firm behavior. Tax liability also depends on form of business organization. Finally, the issue of whether taxes can influence firms' competitiveness is reviewed.
This report will be updated on enactment of major changes in the federal tax system. |
crs_R41155 | crs_R41155_0 | Introduction
The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill funds agencies and programs in three federal departments, as well as numerous related agencies and bureaus. Among the more controversial agencies represented in the bill is the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior (DOI). This report analyzes FY2011 appropriations and gives a brief review of the agency's appropriation enacted for FY2010 ( P.L. 111-88 ). For FWS in FY2011, the Administration requests $1.64 billion, down 0.3% from the FY2010 level of $1.65 billion. Endangered Species Funding
Funding for the endangered species program is part of the Resource Management account, and is one of the perennially controversial portions of the FWS budget. The Senate Appropriations Committee's FY2010 report urged improvement in the consultation program to address past deficiencies. In total, the two endangered species programs would increase by 1%. Under the Migratory Bird Conservation Account (MBCA), FWS (in contrast to the other three federal lands agencies) has a source of mandatory spending for land acquisition. The MBCA does not receive funding in annual Interior appropriations bills. The program was created in the FY2001 Interior appropriations law ( P.L. For general information on the Fish and Wildlife Service , see its website at http://www.fws.gov/ . | For Fish and Wildlife Service appropriations in FY2011, the Administration requests $1.64 billion, down 0.3% from the FY2010 level of $1.65 billion. Climate change and land acquisition programs would receive notable increases; construction and funds for wetlands, neotropical migratory birds, and selected foreign species would decrease.
The annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill funds agencies and programs in three federal departments, as well as numerous related agencies and bureaus. Among the more controversial agencies represented in the bill is the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior. This report analyzes FY2011 appropriations and gives a brief review of the agency's appropriation enacted for FY2010 (P.L. 111-88). Emphasis is on FWS funding for programs of interest to Congress, now or in recent years. These include the endangered species program, global climate change, wildlife refuges, land acquisition, international conservation, and state and tribal wildlife grants. In addition, related policy issues are also considered in the funding context. Each of the related policy issues is explained in more detail in the report.
For FY2010, the House passed H.R. 2996, the Interior appropriations bill, containing FWS appropriations, on June 26, 2009 (H.Rept. 111-180). The Senate passed its version of H.R. 2996 on September 24, 2009 (S.Rept. 111-38). The conference report (H.Rept. 111-316) included a Division B, providing continuing appropriations for other federal agencies and programs whose FY2010 appropriations had not yet been passed. The House and Senate both approved the conference report on October 29, 2009; the President signed the bill the following day (P.L. 111-88). |
crs_R44400 | crs_R44400_0 | Introduction
On February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia unexpectedly passed away at the age of 79, vacating a seat on the Supreme Court that he had held for nearly 30 years. Given this history and with suggestions that Justice Scalia's successor may not be confirmed for several months, let alone before the fall election, the possibility exists that Justice Scalia's seat on the High Court may remain open for an extended period of time, including throughout the remainder of the 2015 Supreme Court term. This report provides an overview of the Supreme Court's procedural rules and requirements when the Court is staffed with less than nine members. Included in this discussion is an overview of the Supreme Court's quorum requirements, rehearing procedures, and vote count practices, with a focus on how the Court has traditionally responded to a change of composition during a term. The report concludes by highlighting over a dozen cases from the current term that could result in an evenly divided Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court consists of nine Justices, it does not need nine Justices to decide a case. Instead, Congress has established quorum requirements for the Court, providing that any six Justices "shall constitute a quorum." By tradition, the agreement of a majority of the quorum is necessary to act for the Court. Nonetheless, recusals are a rare occurrence on the Court. In the absence of a full Court, when the quorum of Justices is evenly divided (four to four or three to three), the Supreme Court generally has taken one of two approaches. First, if the participating Justices are equally divided on the merits of a case, the Court's practice has, at times, been not to write an opinion, but to enter a judgment that tersely affirms the lower court judgment without any indication of the Court's voting alignment. Second, in lieu of issuing a summary affirmance of the lower court opinion, the Court could instead order reargument of the case. The Court possesses inherent authority to order the reargument of a case sua sponte or on its own volition. The Court has, in the past, exercised such authority to have a case be reargued after identifying additional issues for consideration or determining that more time is needed to resolve a case. As such, while an unsuccessful petitioner could theoretically petition the Court for a rehearing in anticipation of a Court with a changed composition, the "more likely" vehicle for rehearing, where the Court is equally divided among its members, is for the Court to order a rehearing sua sponte . | On February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia unexpectedly passed away at the age of 79, vacating a seat on the Supreme Court that he had held for nearly 30 years. Supreme Court vacancies that arise in presidential election years rarely occur, and have in the past led to a seat on the Court staying open for extended periods of time. With suggestions that Justice Scalia's successor may not be confirmed for several months, let alone before the fall election, a possibility exists that Justice Scalia's seat on the High Court may remain open for an extended period of time, including throughout the remainder of the 2015 Supreme Court term.
While the Supreme Court consists of nine Justices, it does not need nine Justices to decide a case. Instead, Congress has established quorum requirements for the Court, providing that any six Justices "shall constitute a quorum." By tradition, the agreement of a majority of the quorum is necessary to act for the Court. As a consequence, with an eight-member Court, there is the possibility of split votes, where a majority cannot agree on the outcome in a given case. With several high-profile cases pending on the Court's docket, including cases on public employee unions, abortion, and immigration, it appears that the Court could become equally divided on a number of matters in the near future.
In the absence of a full Court, when the quorum of Justices is evenly divided (four to four or three to three), the Supreme Court has empirically adopted one of two approaches. First, if the participating Justices are equally divided on the merits of a case, the Court's practice has, at times, been not to write an opinion, but to enter a judgment that tersely affirms the lower court judgment without any indication of the Court's voting alignment. Such an order has no precedential value. Second, in lieu of issuing a summary affirmance of the lower court opinion, the Court could instead order reargument of the case. The Court possesses inherent authority to order reargument of a case sua sponte or on its own volition, and has exercised such authority in the past when there was an open seat on the Court. In addition, an unsuccessful petitioner could petition the Court for a rehearing in anticipation of a Court with a changed composition. Nonetheless, the "more likely" vehicle for rehearing, where the Court is equally divided among its members, is for the Court to order a rehearing sua sponte prior to issuing a decision on the merits.
This report provides an overview of the Supreme Court's procedural rules and requirements when the Court is staffed with less than nine members. Included in this discussion is an overview of the Court's quorum requirements, rehearing procedures, and vote count practices, with a focus on how the Court has traditionally responded to a change of composition during a term. The report concludes by highlighting over a dozen cases from the current term that could result in an evenly divided Supreme Court. |
crs_R42773 | crs_R42773_0 | A prospective presidential transition period—ranging from candidate's campaign-related activities through placement of new Administration personnel—is a unique time in American politics and holds the promise of opportunity as well as a real or perceived vulnerability to the nation's security interests. Presidential transitions during times of global uncertainty, U.S. involvement in military operations, and risks to national security-related activities are not unique to the 2012-2013 presidential election period (see Appendix A ). Whether the enemies of the United States choose to undertake action that may harm national security interests during this prospective period of transition or the new President experiences a relative peaceful period shortly after entering office, many national security issues will be awaiting a new Administration. Other activities that the current and incoming Administrations and Congress may wish to consider undertaking during the presidential transition period include
pursuing public outreach efforts to discuss possible risks to the nation, involving the national security representatives of presidential candidates in all transition-related discussions, establishing joint advisory councils responsible for addressing all transition-related risks, requiring the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to undertake efforts to support the nation's awareness of risks, reflecting the national security priorities of the newly elected Administration in the upcoming budget, passing fiscal year appropriations without undue delay, quickly assigning newly elected and existing Members of Congress to committees focused on national security, holding hearings comprised of national security experts to gather ideas on prospective U.S. national security policies and goals, and holding hearings soon after the inauguration of the new President to determine the Administration's national security-related priorities. Considerations and Options Unique to Each Phase of the Presidential Transition Period
Modern presidential transition activities are no longer constrained to the time between election day and the inauguration. The transition-related actions or inactions of the outgoing and incoming Administration may have a long-lasting affect on a new President's ability to effectively safeguard U.S. interests and may also affect the legacy of the outgoing President. | A presidential election period is a unique time in America and holds the promise of opportunity, as well as a possible risk to the nation's security interests. While possible changes in Administration during U.S. involvement in national security-related activities are not unique to the 2012-2013 election period, many observers suggest that the current security environment may portend a time of increased risk to the current presidential election period. Whether the enemies of the United States choose to undertake action that may harm the nation's security interests during the 2012-2013 election period, or the existing or new President experiences a relatively peaceful period during the transition, many foreign policy and security challenges will await the Administration. Collaboration and coordination during the presidential election period between the current Administration and that of a potentially new one may have a long-lasting effect on the new President's ability to effectively safeguard U.S. interests and may affect the legacy of the outgoing President.
This report discusses historical national security-related presidential transition activities, provides a representative sampling of national security issues a new Administration may encounter, and offers considerations and options relevant to each of the five phases of the presidential election period. Each phase has distinct challenges and opportunities for the incoming Administration, the outgoing Administration, and Congress. This report is intended to provide a framework for national security considerations during the current election period and will be updated to reflect the election outcome. |
crs_R45011 | crs_R45011_0 | T he statutory debt limit, currently suspended through December 8, 2017, provides Congress a means of controlling federal borrowing. As the date when that suspension will lapse approaches, discussions about the role of the debt limit among the media, researchers, and Members of Congress promise to become a more frequent. In recent discussions, misleading or less than fully accurate claims have at times surfaced. This report provides clarifications on five common debt limit contentions. The debt limit represents one way that Congress exerts control over fiscal policy, which stems from closely related constitutional provisions. Point of Clarification 1: The United States Had Debt Limits Before 1917
Federal debt has been subject to limits since the beginning of the U.S. government. Before 1917, Congress typically specified the interest rates, maturities, call options, and other aspects of debt issuances. Enactment of the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917 (P.L. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288) on September 24, 1917, marked a turning point in federal debt policy, but maintained substantial constraints on Treasury debt operations. Thus, the modern debt limit—meaning an overall limit on federal debt without sublimits—might more properly be said to have been established in 1939. Some contend that the federal government suffered technical defaults in the late 1970s. In certain past episodes, breaches caused by lapsed temporary debt limit increases resulted in no payment delays, and thus were not defaults in the ordinary sense of that term. The previous debt limit measure ( P.L. Others have pointed to a 1979 episode when some interest and principal payments to some small investors holding Treasury securities were delayed. Market interest rate movements on the date of the first payment delay—April 26, 1979—were more plausibly affected by significant Federal Reserve announcements made that day rather than payment delays that were not reported until a week and a half later. Point of Clarification 3: Were "Clean" Debt Limit Increases Once the Norm? Debt policy, however, has been a divisive issue since the beginning of American government. Debt, by its nature, allows government to shift the fiscal burden of current expenditures or lessen the burden of current taxes by transferring obligations to future taxpayers. Debt limit measures have been informally or formally linked with other issues for many decades. Some commentators have pointed to a statutory provision that allows minting of platinum coins as a purported solution to the prospect of a binding debt limit. Instead, proponents of the platinum coin strategy have encouraged the U.S. Treasury to consider minting a high-denomination coin, which—according to proponents—could be deposited at the Federal Reserve and exchanged for cash for the U.S. Treasury's general fund. Officials of both the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve System therefore would have to approve the strategy. Apart from various legal, accounting, and practical uncertainties, the platinum coin strategy would present several major policy issues. Such disruptions could raise federal borrowing costs. The failure of the government to pay its debts would also appear to violate the Public Debt Clause. Others argue that control over debt is a critical third leg of the power of the purse. | The statutory debt limit, currently suspended through December 8, 2017, provides Congress a means of controlling federal borrowing. As the date when that suspension will lapse approaches, discussions about the role of the debt limit among the media, researchers, and Members of Congress promise to become more frequent. In recent discussions, misleading or less than fully accurate claims have, at times, surfaced. This report provides clarifications on five common debt limit contentions.
Some of those points in need of clarification relate to the congressional power of the purse, which stems from three closely related constitutional provisions that charge Congress with deciding how the federal government spends, taxes, and borrows.
The statutory debt limit represents one way that Congress exerts control over federal borrowing and debt, as it has since the beginning of the U.S. government—despite claims that limits on debt began in 1917. Before 1917, Congress typically specified the interest rates, maturities, call options, and other aspects of debt issuances. While the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917 (P.L. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288) marked a turning point in federal debt policy, the modern debt limit—meaning an overall limit on federal debt without sublimits—might be more properly said to have been established in 1939.
Another claim is that the federal government suffered technical defaults in the late 1970s, which raised federal borrowing costs. In certain past episodes, lapses in temporary debt limit increases caused breaches of the limit, although no payment delays resulted and thus no default occurred in the ordinary sense of that term. In another 1979 episode some interest and principal payments to some small investors holding Treasury securities were delayed. Those delays appeared to stem from problems in updating the U.S. Treasury's computer and accounting systems, rather than the debt limit. Market interest rate movements on the date of the first payment delay were more plausibly affected by significant Federal Reserve announcements made that day rather than payment delays that were not reported until a week and a half later.
Others have claimed that debt limit increases were once less contentious or that debt limit modifications were typically "clean"—that is, not attached to other legislative provisions. Debt policy, however, has often been a divisive issue since the beginning of American government. Many of the debt limit measures enacted in past decades engendered substantial division and debate. Debt, by its nature, allows government to shift the fiscal burden of current expenditures or lessen the burden of current taxes by transferring obligations to future taxpayers. Moreover, debt limit measures have been informally or formally linked with other issues for many decades.
Some commentators have pointed to a statutory provision that allows minting of platinum coins as a purported solution to the prospect of a binding debt limit. Proponents of the platinum coin strategy have encouraged the U.S. Treasury to consider minting a high denomination coin, which—according to proponents—could be deposited at the Federal Reserve and exchanged for cash for the U.S. Treasury's general fund. The platinum coin strategy, however, would present several major policy challenges. Other commentators have claimed that the Public Debt Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would allow the executive branch to take actions to address debt policy that would bypass Congress. Although predicting how Justices might weigh different factors in interpreting legislative and executive powers is difficult, were the issue to come before the Supreme Court, neither case law associated with this clause, nor the text, structure, or operation of the clause, support this contention. |
crs_RL32068 | crs_RL32068_0 | The BushAdministration wishes NATO countries to send forces to Iraq to reduce the demands on U.S. forces,and to spread the costs of stabilization and reconstruction. Some other allies appear to reject involvement in a U.S.-led force,as a NATO force would be, and prefer a force with a substantial U.N. role. A Role for European Forces? Before the conflict in Iraq, some Administration officials made a case for NATO involvement in post-war Iraq. Theseexperiences have led the allies to demand a greater share of decision-making and more authority forthe U.N. in Iraq before committing military forces to that country, issues that will be discussed ina later section of this report. He added that by bringing in military forces from other countries,U.S. forces could be drawn down. Current operational costs for U.S. forces in Iraq are approximately $4 billion per month. Key Europeangovernments, such as France and Germany, want a strong U.N. role in Iraq, and a new U.N.resolution to outline that role. The German government has said that it might send troops to Iraq, but that they would not serve under UNSC 1483 because the resolution embodiesthe idea of an "occupying power." Some Bush Administration officials, including DeputyDefense Secretary Wolfowitz, sharply criticized Turkey as a result. These forces are underTurkish, and not U.S., command. At the same time, in France, Germany, and other allied states, there are influential voices that do not wish to see the United States fail to bring stability and at least a measure of representativegovernment to Iraq. Failure of theU.S. Such a compromise could free U.S.forces for availability elsewhere; provide European (and other) governments with a voice in Iraq'sfuture, and legitimacy through a U.N. imprimatur; and shift part of the financial burden forreconstruction from the U.S. government to other governments and to the international privatesector. | Bush Administration officials have said that they wish to see NATO countries contribute forces to bring stability to Iraq, possibly as part of a U.S.-led NATO or U.N. force. Key European alliessuch as France and Germany would first like to see a new U.N. mandate that would includeobjectives, such as a timetable for turnover of authority to Iraqis and a transparent process forimproving Iraq's petroleum industry, that the Administration now opposes. Some European alliesdo not wish to serve under a U.S. command in Iraq; other European allies already have troops in Iraq.
Administration officials are concerned that greater international involvement in governing Iraq could deflect the United States from achieving some of its stated goals for that country's future. Such goals include establishing a democracy there that would influence other Middle Easterngovernments to follow a similar course, and easing of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some Europeansargue that these goals are unattainable in the framework established by the U.S.-led occupation. Atthe same time, involvement of European forces, if a common outlook could be worked out, couldfree some U.S. forces for other missions, dampen international criticism of U.S. management of Iraq,and spread costs for reconstructing Iraq to other countries and the private sector.
See also CRS Report RL31339 , Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-War Governance , CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, and CRS Report RL31843(pdf) , Iraq: ForeignContributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Peacekeeping Operations, and Reconstruction .
This report will be periodically updated. |
crs_R42469 | crs_R42469_0 | Introduction
The federal procurement process (i.e., the process whereby agencies obtain goods and services from the private sector) requires funding. The use of appropriated funds to finance contract performance and/or administration means that federal contracts may be affected by actual or potential funding gaps or shortfalls, such as could arise from a failure to raise the debt limit, budget cuts, or sequestration, all of which have been topics of wide-spread congressional and public interest during recent years. However, as the report concludes, the effects of the exercise of these rights upon contractors and, particularly, upon federal spending on procurement contracts are less clear and generally would depend upon the facts and circumstances of individual cases. Certain standard terms of federal procurement contracts, discussed below, do permit the government to take certain actions that could potentially give rise to liability for breach under the common law of contracts. Prospective Obligations
The government's rights are broadest where prospective contracts, or prospective obligations (i.e., definite commitments to spend appropriated funds) under existing contracts, are concerned. Specifically, these clauses state that
Except as required by other provisions of this contract, specifically citing and stated to be an exception to this clause—
(1) The Government is not obligated to reimburse the Contractor for costs incurred in excess of (i) the estimated cost specified in the [contract] or, (ii) if this is a cost-sharing contract, the estimated cost to the Government specified in the [contract]; and
(2) The Contractor is not obligated to continue performance under this contract … or otherwise incur costs in excess of the estimated cost specified in the Schedule, until the Contracting Officer (i) notifies the Contractor in writing that the estimated cost has been increased and (ii) provides a revised estimated total cost of performing this contract. This is true even if the contractor and the agency anticipated increasing the amount of funds allotted, or the contractor's incurred costs exceed those originally anticipated. While this general rule would seem to suggest that the government's options to reduce procurement spending are significantly more circumscribed with existing obligations under contracts than with prospective obligations, the government has broad contractual and inherent rights that give it some flexibility in responding to funding gaps, funding shortfalls, and budget cuts (e.g., by reducing the scope of the contract when there are budget cuts, or delaying performance in anticipation of a potential funding gap). In some cases, these rights reflect the type of contract used. In other cases, the contract expressly or impliedly includes terms allowing the government to (1) change the scope of the contract, including the quantity of goods or services purchased under it, (2) delay or accelerate performance of a contract, or (3) terminate a contract, all without incurring liability for breach. In either case, the government may need to compensate the contractor for the changed work, although the basis for and extent of such compensation could vary. Reductions in Scope
Federal procurement contracts generally include changes clauses, which would permit the government to make certain reductions in the scope of the contract (e.g., purchase fewer goods or services than contracted for). However, all variants of the changes clause provide that "[t]he Contracting Officer may, at any time, by written order, … make changes within the general scope of this contract" to certain terms of the contract, such as
the contract specifications, the method or manner of performing the work, any government-furnished property or services to be used in performing the contract, the method of shipping or packing, the place of delivery, the time of performance, for services, and the place of performance, for services. An equitable adjustment is a fair adjustment intended to cover the contractor's costs, as well as profit on the work performed. While one board of contract appeals (i.e., an administrative tribunal established to hear disputes between contractors and the government ) has found that, in the absence of a clause giving government the right to order a suspension of work, the government has the inherent right to do so, the general rule appears to be that in the absence of a contract clause dealing with the suspension of work, the contractor is generally not entitled to compensation for delays unless they are the fault of the government. In addition, the government could potentially avoid liability for certain costs because it acted in its sovereign capacity. Government contracts grant the government the right to terminate its contracts for either default or convenience, but the government has also been found to have an inherent right to terminate contracts for its convenience, regardless of whether the contract provides for this right. When the government does properly exercise its right to cancel a multi-year contract, the contractor is generally paid a "cancellation charge." | When confronted with actual or potential funding gaps, funding shortfalls, or budget cuts, the federal government has a number of options as to prospective and existing procurement contracts. Many of these options arise from contract law and, in particular, certain standard clauses included in federal procurement contracts. Among other things, these clauses may allow the government to (1) unilaterally change certain terms of the contract, such as the specifications or the method and manner of performing the work; (2) delay, suspend, or "stop work" on the contract; and (3) terminate the contract for the government's convenience. However, courts have also found that the government has certain rights because it is the government, regardless of whether the contract provides for these rights. Such rights are commonly described as "inherent rights," and include the right to terminate the contract for convenience and, according to one tribunal, the right to suspend work.
The government's rights are broadest where prospective contracts are concerned. Prospective contractors generally do not have a right to a government contract, and the government, like private persons, is generally free to determine whether to enter a contract to procure goods or services. This is true even if the agency has issued a solicitation for a proposed procurement, and prospective contractors have expended time and money in responding to that solicitation. Agencies have broad discretion in canceling solicitations prior to contract award, and contractors must generally show that cancellation was in bad faith or otherwise unreasonable in order to recover the costs of preparing bids or proposals for canceled solicitations. The exercise of an option is, similarly, a unilateral right of the government.
The extent of the government's rights where existing contracts are concerned depends upon the type of contract (e.g., indefinite-quantity), the nature of the goods or services being procured (e.g., construction), and the facts and circumstances of the case. For example, the terms of indefinite-quantity contracts would generally permit the government to cease ordering goods or services from the contractor once the guaranteed minimum has been ordered. Various changes clauses would similarly permit the government to make certain unilateral reductions, or increases, in the work to be performed under the contract, including the quantity of goods and services provided. Other clauses provide for suspension or delay of work by the government, or permit the government to order the contractor to stop work. In addition, the government may terminate all or part of a contract for its convenience, as well as cancel multi-year contracts. When the government exercises these rights, the contractor could potentially be entitled to an equitable or other adjustment, other compensation, or an extension of time in which to perform. The nature of such recourse varies significantly, however, and in some cases, the government could potentially avoid liability for actions that delayed or increased the costs of the contractor's performance because it acted in its sovereign capacity.
Recent events have prompted significant congressional and public interest in how the government may go about reducing spending on procurement contracts. The prospect of a funding gap and government shutdown in April 2011 was followed by the enactment of legislation (P.L. 112-25) that called for mandatory cuts in federal spending, effective January 2, 2013, if legislation cutting the deficit was not enacted by January 15, 2012. Such legislation was not enacted, and although the mandatory cuts were briefly delayed, sequestration took effect on March 1, 2013. It remains in effect as of this writing. There have also been debates in each of the calendar years 2011, 2012, and 2013 over whether to raise the debt limit. |
crs_R45159 | crs_R45159_0 | This report serves as a primer on class action law and analyzes areas that have been the focus of congressional discussions concerning class actions. A class action is a procedure by which a large group of entities—that is, a "class" —may challenge a defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct in a single lawsuit, rather than through numerous, separate suits initiated by individual plaintiffs. Under the modern version of the class action, a plaintiff (known as the "class representative," the "named representative," or the "named plaintiff") may sue the defendant not only on his own behalf, but also on behalf of other entities (the "class members") who are similarly situated to the class representative in order to resolve legal or factual questions that are common to the entire class. The Purpose of the Class Action Device
The Supreme Court has recognized that the class action device serves several purposes. However, as explained in greater detail below, a court's decision to not allow a particular lawsuit to proceed as a class action can effectively "sound the 'death knell' of the litigation on the part of the plaintiffs" because the individual plaintiff's claim will often be "too small to justify the expense of" prosecuting a non-class action lawsuit. Abusive and Costly Litigation
First, because a class action permits thousands or millions of class members to aggregate their claims, a defendant who opts to defend rather than settle a class action may face "potentially ruinous liability." For this reason, courts and commentators have expressed concern that plaintiffs' attorneys may not always act in the best interests of class members, particularly when negotiating a settlement with the defendant. A reference chart illustrating the prerequisites for class certification is available in the Appendix of this report. . . satisfies Rule 23(b)(1)(A)." Just as a final judgment entered in a certified class action that proceeds to trial generally binds the absent class members, a class action settlement typically binds absent class members who do not (or cannot) opt out of the class. Legislative Proposals for Changing Class Action Law
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the federal courts interpreting those rules have attempted to balance the interests inherent in the class action device. Further, this section would forbid a federal court from granting class certification to any proposed class action in which the class representative is a "relative or employee of class counsel." | A class action is a procedure by which a large group of entities (known as a "class") may challenge a defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct in a single lawsuit, rather than through numerous, separate suits initiated by individual plaintiffs. In a class action, a plaintiff (known as the "class representative," the "named representative," or the "named plaintiff") may sue the defendant not only on his own behalf, but also on behalf of other entities (the "class members") who are similarly situated to the class representative in order to resolve any legal or factual questions that are common to the entire class.
Courts and commentators have recognized that class actions can serve several beneficial purposes, including economizing litigation and incentivizing plaintiffs to pursue socially desirable lawsuits. At the same time, however, class actions can occasionally subject defendants to costly or abusive litigation. Moreover, because the class members generally do not actively participate in a class action lawsuit, class actions pose a risk that the class representative and his counsel will not always act in accordance with the class members' best interests. In an attempt to balance the benefits of class actions against the risks to defendants and class members, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 establishes a rigorous series of prerequisites that a federal class action must satisfy. For similar reasons, Rule 23 also subjects proposed class action settlements to the scrutiny of the federal courts.
This report serves as a primer on class action litigation in the federal courts. It begins by discussing the purpose of class actions, as well as the risks class actions may pose to defendants, class members, and society at large. The report also discusses the prerequisites that a class action must satisfy before a court may "certify" it—that is, before a federal court may allow a case to proceed as a class action. An Appendix to the report also contains a reference chart that graphically illustrates those prerequisites for class certification. The report then discusses Rule 23's restrictions on the parties' ability to settle a certified class action. The report concludes by identifying ways in which Congress could modify the legal framework governing class actions if it were so inclined, with a particular focus on a bill currently pending in the 115th Congress that would effectuate a variety of changes to the class action system. |
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