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crs_R44274 | crs_R44274_0 | Introduction
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3 , as amended) entitles eligible employees to unpaid, job-protected leave for certain family and medical needs, with continuation of group health plan benefits. FMLA applies to covered employers and eligible employees in the private and public sectors. This report describes the major provision of Title I of the FMLA as administered by the Secretary of Labor. FMLA-Qualifying Uses of Leave
The act requires that covered employers grant up to 12 workweeks (total) in a 12-month period to eligible employees for one or more of the following reasons:
the birth and care of the employee's newborn child, provided that leave is taken within 12 months of the child's birth; the placement of an adopted or fostered child with the employee, provided that leave is taken within 12 months of the child's placement; to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious health condition; the employee's own serious health condition that renders the employee unable to perform at least one essential functions of his or her job; and qualified military exigencies related to the covered active duty status of the employee's spouse, son, daughter, or parent who is a covered military member. In addition, the act provides up to 26 workweeks of leave in a single 12-month period to eligible employees for the care of a covered military servicemember (including certain veterans) with a serious injury or illness that was sustained or aggravated in the line of duty while on active duty, if the eligible employee is the covered servicemember's spouse, child, parent, or next of kin. 1. 2. 3. 4. Key Characteristics of FMLA Leave
FMLA leave has four fundamental characteristics. An Entitlement to Leave
FMLA leave is an entitlement , which means it must be granted to eligible employees with a FMLA-qualifying need for leave. Unpaid Leave with the Option to Substitute Accrued Paid Leave
FMLA guarantees unpaid leave . Job-Protected Leave
FMLA leave is job-protected , which means—with some exceptions—an employer must return the employee to the same job or to one that is equivalent in terms of pay, benefits, working conditions, and responsibilities to the one held prior to taking leave. Continuation of Health Benefits
Employers are required to maintain coverage under pre-existing group health benefit plans during the employee's absence under the same conditions that were in place prior to taking leave. Title I provisions and accompanying DOL regulations apply to covered employers in the private sector, state and local governments, and some federal government agencies. Most federal civil service employees are covered by Title II of the act, which is administered by OPM. Employee Eligibility
FMLA eligibility is defined in terms of an employee's work history with a specific employer, and the size of the employer's workforce employed in or around the employee's worksite. | The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3, as amended) entitles eligible employees to unpaid, job-protected leave for certain family and medical reasons, with continued group health plan coverage.
FMLA requires that covered employers grant up to 12 workweeks in a 12-month period to eligible employees for one or more of the following reasons:
the birth and care of the employee's newborn child, provided that leave is taken within 12 months of the child's birth; the placement of an adopted or fostered child with the employee, provided that leave is taken within 12 months of the child's placement; to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious health condition; the employee's own serious health condition that renders the employee unable to perform the essential functions of his or her job; and qualified military exigencies arising from the covered activity duty status of a covered military member who is the employee's spouse, child, or parent.
In addition, the act provides up to 26 workweeks of leave in a single 12-month period to eligible employees to care for a covered military servicemember (including certain veterans) with a serious injury or illness that was sustained or aggravated in the line of duty while on active duty, if the eligible employee is the covered servicemember's spouse, child, parent, or next of kin.
FMLA leave has four fundamental characteristics:
1. It is an entitlement, which means that, unlike other forms of leave (like vacation days), it must be granted to an eligible employee with an FMLA-qualifying need for leave who meet the act's notification and documentation requirements. 2. FMLA guarantees unpaid leave, but provides that employees may elect to substitute or employers may require the substitution of certain types of accrued paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave, within the constraints of employer policy. 3. FMLA leave is job-protected, which means that—with few exceptions—an employer must return the employee to the same job or to one that is equivalent in terms of pay, benefits, working conditions, and responsibilities to the one held prior to taking leave. 4. Pre-existing group health benefits must be maintained during the employee's absence under the same conditions that were in place prior to taking leave.
FMLA applies to covered employers and eligible employees in both the private and public sectors. Some provisions for federal civil service employees differ from those that apply to private-sector and state and local government employees.
Employer coverage and employee eligibility for FMLA leave are not universal. In general, employers engaged in commerce with 50 or more employees are covered. Employee eligibility is defined in terms of an employee's work history with a specific employer, and the size of the employer's workforce in or around the employee's worksite.
This report describes the major provisions of Title I of the act—which apply to the private sector, state and local governments, and certain federal agencies—as administered by the Secretary of Labor. |
crs_R45393 | crs_R45393_0 | Introduction
In August 2018, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed the "Affordable Clean Energy" (ACE) rule. ACE would also modify an applicability determination for New Source Review (NSR), which is a CAA preconstruction permitting program intended to ensure that new and modified stationary sources of air pollution do not significantly degrade air quality. The ACE Proposal
Proposed Emission Guidelines to Replace the CPP
EPA proposed to replace the CPP with revised emission guidelines for existing fossil fuel steam generating units, which are largely coal-fired units. Specifically, EPA proposed a new BSER for these electric generating units (EGUs) based on heat rate improvement (HRI) measures, discussed below. EPA did not propose a BSER for other types of EGUs, such as stationary combustion turbines, which includes NGCC units. Under the proposal, states would establish unit-specific performance standards based on the list of candidate technologies identified by EPA and other considerations, such as the remaining useful life of the unit. EPA based the proposal on its finding that the BSER set in the CPP exceeded EPA's statutory authority by using measures that applied to the power sector rather than measures carried out within an individual facility. Instead, EPA proposed a list of "candidate technologies" of HRI measures that constitute the BSER. Proposed Revisions to Regulations That Implement Section 111(d) Emission Guidelines
The second action that EPA proposed in ACE would revise the "general implementing" regulations (40 C.F.R. In particular, EPA seeks to codify its current legal interpretation that states have "broad discretion in establishing and applying emissions standards consistent with the BSER." EPA therefore proposed changes that would, among other things, revise some definitions, lengthen the time for development and review of state plans, add a step for EPA to determine whether state plan submissions are complete, and modify a variance provision. Under ACE, NSR would not be triggered if the modification to an existing EGU does not increase emissions on an hourly basis. These EGUs would not be required to install additional pollution controls, even if the modification leads to an increase in the annual emissions. For example, EGUs that adopt HRI measures may operate more efficiently, which in turn may lower their operating costs. Projected Emission Impacts Under ACE
EPA projected that power sector emissions of CO 2 , SO 2 , and NO x would increase under the ACE proposal compared to the CPP. EPA also projected that ACE would, in most scenarios, decrease CO 2 , SO 2 , and NO x emissions compared to a baseline without the CPP. CPP . In contrast, the ACE proposal would not establish a numeric performance standard for coal-fired EGUs. The emission reduction differences between CPP and non-CPP scenarios are greater in the studies from earlier years. For example, a comparison between CPP and non-CPP scenarios from the past three EIA analyses shows the percentage difference has decreased from 16% (in 2016) to 8% (in 2018). This reflects the fact that many of the changes EPA expected to result from the CPP (e.g., natural gas and renewables replacing coal-fired units) have already happened as the result of market forces in the electric power sector. Comparisons between the projections in Table 1 should be made with caution for several reasons. Models from different organizations may include different assumptions about future economic conditions and underlying energy inputs (e.g., natural gas prices). Comparison of Monetized Benefits and Costs
Compared to the current regulation—which is the CPP—the ACE proposal would reduce compliance costs but would also yield lower emission reductions, thereby increasing the climate-related damages (forgone benefits) and human health damages (forgone benefits). EPA's analysis shows that the estimated value of the forgone benefits would outweigh the compliance cost savings when replacing the CPP with ACE, yielding net costs. Specifically, EPA estimated that the net costs of replacing the CPP with ACE range from $12.8 billion to $72.0 billion (2016 dollars) over a 15-year period (2023-2037). When EPA excludes the forgone human health co-benefits, these comparisons yield present value estimates that range from a net cost of $6.6 billion to a net benefit of $2.0 billion (2016$) over a 15-year period (2023-2037). | In August 2018, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed three actions in the "Affordable Clean Energy Rule" (ACE). First, EPA proposed to replace the Obama Administration's 2015 Clean Power Plan (CPP) with revised emission guidelines for existing fossil fuel steam electric generating units (EGUs), which are largely coal-fired units. Second, EPA proposed revised regulations to implement emission guidelines under Clean Air Act (CAA) Section 111(d). Third, EPA proposed to modify an applicability determination for New Source Review (NSR), a CAA preconstruction permitting program for new and modified stationary sources.
The first action stems from EPA's finding that the CPP exceeded EPA's statutory authority by using measures that applied to the power sector rather than measures carried out within an individual facility. In the ACE rule, EPA proposed to base the "best system of emission reduction" (BSER) for existing coal-fired EGUs on heat rate improvement (HRI) measures. EPA did not propose a BSER for other types of EGUs, such as natural gas combined cycle units. In addition, EPA did not establish a numeric performance standard as the agency did in the CPP. Instead, EPA proposed a list of "candidate technologies" of HRI measures that constitute the BSER. States would establish unit-specific performance standards based on this list and other unit-specific considerations.
Second, EPA proposed to revise the general implementing regulations to clarify EPA's and states' roles under Section 111(d) based on the agency's current legal interpretation that states have broad discretion to establish emissions standards consistent with the BSER. The proposed changes would, among other things, revise definitions and lengthen the time for development and review of state plans.
Third, EPA proposed to revise the NSR applicability test for EGUs. According to EPA, this would prevent NSR from discouraging the installation of energy efficiency measures. EGUs that adopt HRI measures and operate more efficiently may be used for longer time periods, thereby increasing annual emissions and potentially triggering NSR. Under ACE, NSR would not be triggered if the EGU modification did not increase emissions on an hourly basis, even if the modification increases annual emissions.
EPA estimated emission changes under multiple scenarios. EPA projected that power sector emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen oxides (NOx) would increase under the ACE proposal compared to the CPP. EPA also projected that ACE would, in most scenarios, decrease CO2, SO2, and NOx emissions compared to a baseline without the CPP.
Power sector emissions projections, comparing CPP and non-CPP scenarios, provide context for evaluating the potential impacts of the ACE proposal. The CO2 emission reduction differences between CPP and non-CPP scenarios are greater in the studies from earlier years. For example, a comparison between CPP and non-CPP scenarios from the past three Energy Information Administration analyses shows that the percentage difference has decreased from 16% (in 2016) to 8% (in 2018), reflecting the fact that many of the changes EPA expected to result from the CPP (i.e., natural gas and renewables replacing coal-fired units) have happened already due to market forces and other factors. Comparisons between modeling projections of electricity sector CO2 emissions should be made with caution, however, given potential differences in modeling assumptions about future economic conditions and underlying energy inputs (e.g., natural gas prices).
EPA estimated that compared to the CPP, ACE would reduce compliance costs and yield lower emission reductions, thereby increasing climate-related damages and human health damages ("forgone benefits"). According to EPA, the estimated value of the forgone benefits would outweigh the compliance cost savings when replacing the CPP with ACE, yielding net costs. Specifically, EPA estimated that this replacement would yield net costs ranging from $12.8 billion to $72.0 billion (2016$) over a 15-year period (2023-2037). Excluding forgone human health co-benefits from these comparisons yields estimates that range from a net cost of $5.4 billion to a net benefit of $3.4 billion over a 15-year period (2023-2037). |
crs_RL34045 | crs_RL34045_0 | On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health care reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148 ). PPACA establishes a new regulatory authority within the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) by creating a licensure pathway for follow-on biologics. This pathway is analogous to that which allowed for the approval of generic chemical drugs via passage of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 ( P.L. 98-417 ), often referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act. This report provides a brief introduction to the relevant law, the regulatory framework at the FDA, the scientific challenges for the FDA in considering the approval of follow-on biologics, and a brief description of the biologics provisions in PPACA. Most biologics require special handling (such as refrigeration) and are usually administered to patients via injection or infused directly into the bloodstream. However, with no equivalent to the generic alternatives for chemical drugs, the cost of therapeutic biologics is often prohibitively high for individual patients. For example, the costs per year (in 2009) of some commonly used biologic drugs: Enbrel for rheumatoid arthritis, $26,000; Herceptin for breast cancer, $37,000; Rebif for multiple sclerosis, $40,000; Humira for Crohn's disease, $51,000; and Cerezyme for Gaucher's disease, $200,000. The generic drug industry achieves these cost savings by avoiding the expense of clinical trials, as well as the initial drug research and development costs that were incurred by the brand-name manufacturer. Economic Studies on Potential Savings
Economic studies on potential savings to the federal government over 10 years due to the use of follow-on biologics have ranged "between nothing and $14 billion." In the ANDA, the generic company establishes that its drug product is chemically the same as the already approved innovator drug, and thereby relies on the FDA's previous finding of safety and effectiveness for the approved drug. The FDA's position is that additional legislation is required to provide such a pathway under the PHS Act. Scientific Challenges
Comparing a follow-on protein with the brand-name product is more scientifically challenging than comparing generic and brand-name chemical drugs. For chemically synthesized drugs, which are relatively small molecules, the equivalence of chemical composition between the generic drug and innovator drug is relatively easy to determine. In many cases, current technology will not allow complete characterization of biological products. Another challenge for the FDA is determining whether the follow-on biologic is sufficiently similar to the brand-name biologic that the two products are interchangeable. Biologics Provisions in PPACA, P.L. | On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law a comprehensive health care reform bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148). PPACA establishes a new regulatory authority within the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) by creating a licensure pathway for follow-on biologics, also called biosimilars, and authorizing the agency to collect associated fees.
A biologic is a preparation, such as a drug or a vaccine, that is made from living organisms. A follow-on biologic, or biosimilar, is similar to the brand-name (innovator) product made by the pharmaceutical or biotechnology industry. In contrast to a biologic, most commonly used drugs are synthesized via a chemical process. Biologics often require special handling (such as refrigeration) and are usually administered to patients via injection or infused directly into the bloodstream.
The new regulatory pathway is analogous to the FDA's authority for approving generic chemical drugs under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-417). Often referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act, this law allows the generic company to establish that its drug product is chemically the same as the already approved innovator drug, and thereby relies on the FDA's previous finding of safety and effectiveness for the approved drug. The generic drug industry achieves cost savings by avoiding the expense of clinical trials, as well as the initial drug research and development costs that were incurred by the brand-name manufacturer.
The cost of specialty drug products, such as biologics, is often prohibitively high. For example, the costs per year (in 2009) of some commonly used biologic drugs: Enbrel for rheumatoid arthritis, $26,000; Herceptin for breast cancer, $37,000; Rebif for multiple sclerosis, $40,000; Humira for Crohn's disease, $51,000; and Cerezyme for Gaucher's disease, $200,000. A pathway enabling the FDA approval of follow-on biologics will allow for market competition and reduction in prices, though perhaps not to the same extent as that which occurred with generic chemical drugs under Hatch-Waxman (P.L. 98-417).
In contrast to chemical drugs, which are small molecules and for which the equivalence of chemical composition between the generic drug and innovator drug is relatively easy to determine, a biologic, such as a protein, is much larger in size and much more complex in structure. Therefore, comparing a follow-on protein with the brand-name product is more scientifically challenging than comparing chemical drugs. In many cases, current technology will not allow complete characterization of biological products. Additional clinical trials may be necessary before the FDA would approve a follow-on biologic.
This report provides a brief introduction to the relevant law, the regulatory framework at the FDA, the scientific challenges for the FDA in considering the approval of follow-on biologics, and a brief description of the biologics provisions in PPACA. Economic studies on potential savings to the federal government over 10 years due to the use of follow-on biologics have ranged between nothing and $14 billion. |
crs_RL31674 | crs_RL31674_0 | Atthat time, the Bush administration voiced initial opposition to the concept of arming pilots withlethal weapons. 107-296 . Debate over the issue of arming pilots focused on the benefits, risks, and costs associated with implementing the program. Proponents, principally pilots and pilot unions, argued that the potentialbenefits of deterring or thwarting terrorist and criminal acts against passenger aircraft outweighedthe inherent risks associated with arming pilots. Opponents of policy allowing pilots to be armedwith lethal weapons, including the airlines and several prominent aviation safety experts, argued thatsuch a program's safety risks and monetary costs outweighed these potential benefits. Key riskscited by critics of the program include:
Added workload and responsibilities associated with participation in the program that may distract pilots from primary flying duties and safety-relatedfunctions;
Risks of a firearm discharge to innocent passengers or aircraft structure andsystems; and
A proliferation of firearms on aircraft and in secured areas of the aviationsystem that is counter to other security objectives. All-cargo pilots were initiallyexcluded from the program in the final wording of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L.107-296 ). This provision expands the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program to includeother flight crew members such as flight engineers and to flight crew members flying for all-cargoair carriers. Implementation Issues
Implementation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program requires assessments of thestandards and guidelines for: 1) pilot selection and screening; 2) equipment; 3) training; 4)operational procedures; and 5) costs. The Act specifies that the training of a Federal flight deck officer shall include:
Training to ensure that the Federal flight deck officer attains a level of proficiency with a firearm comparable to the level of proficiency required of Federal airmarshals;
Training to ensure that the officer maintains exclusive control over the officer'sfirearm at all times, including training in defensive maneuvers; and
Training to assist the officer in determining when it is appropriate to use theofficer's firearm and when it is appropriate to use less than lethal force. Simple designs may be easily approved and implemented. This will includeinitial training and qualification as well as recurrent training and re-qualification of pilots in theprogram. The Homeland Security Appropriations for FY 2004 ( P.L.108-90 , 117 Stat. Proponents for arming pilots voiced concerns that the legislative language of the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act did not include all air carrier pilots. However, aprovision in the FAA reauthorization legislation ( P.L. There is little we can do to defend the aircraft against a terroristattack. | The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 , 116 Stat. 2135) contains provisions to arm pilots of passenger aircraft and gives deputized pilots the authority to use force,including lethal force, to defend the flight deck against criminal and terrorist threats. Participationin the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, established under the Arming Pilots Against TerrorismAct contained in P.L. 107-296 , was initially limited to pilots of passenger aircraft. However, aprovision in the FAA reauthorization act (Vision 100; P.L. 108-176 , 117 Stat. 2490) expanded theprogram to include flight engineers as well as flight crews of all-cargo aircraft.
During debate over legislation to arm pilots, proponents argued that the potential benefits of deterring or thwarting terrorist and criminal acts against passenger aircraft outweighed the inherentrisks associated with arming pilots. However, opponents of policy allowing pilots to be armed withlethal weapons argued that such a program's safety risks and monetary costs significantlyoutweighed these potential benefits. Risks cited included potential distraction to the flight crew,dangers that a weapon discharge could pose to the aircraft or its occupants, and security concernsassociated with carrying firearms in secured areas of the aviation system. Proponents countered thatthese risks could be effectively mitigated, but recognized that these are important issues to beaddressed for successful implementation of the policy to arm pilots.
With enactment of this legislation, focus on the issue of arming pilots has turned to implementation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. These implementation issues fall intofour broad categories: 1) pilot selection and screening; 2) equipment (i.e., firearms and ammunitionand the risks they may pose to aircraft and passengers); 3) training; and 4) operational procedures. This report describes several implementation issues within each of these areas that may requirecontinued legislative oversight and possible clarification regarding the intent of the legislation. TheTSA has fully implemented the program over the last year. However, continued concerns voiced bypilot groups over the implementation of the program include: the extensive background checksrequired of applicants; the requirement to transport issued firearms in lock boxes; and theinconvenient location of training facilities. These issues, along with the possibility of using privatecontractors to provide recurrent training for deputized pilots may be the topics of continuedcongressional oversight.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL30006 | crs_RL30006_0 | Background
In April 2003, the sequence of the human genome was deposited into public databases. As Collins stated, with completion of the human genome sequence, scientists will now focus on understanding the clinical and public health implications of the sequence information. These scientific advances in genetics, while promising, are not without potential problems. The ethical, social and legal implications of genetic research have been the subject of significant scrutiny and a portion of the funds for the Human Genome Project are set aside to support the analysis and research of these issues. Legal cases of genetic discrimination have been few. There are, however, a few laws that address parts of these issues but the only federal law that directly addresses the issue of discrimination based on genetic information is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 493 , the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007 (GINA), was introduced by Representative Slaughter and 143 cosponsors on January 16, 2007. After being reported out of the House Education and Labor Committee, the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and the House Ways and Means Committee, the bill passed the House on April 25, 2007, by a vote of 420 to 3. On March 5, 2008, the text of H.R. 493 as passed by the House was added to the end of the Paul Wellstone Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act of 2007 ( H.R. 1424 ) in the engrossment of H.R. 1424 . On April 24, 2008, the Senate took up H.R. 493 , replaced the existing language with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and passed the measure, as amended, by a vote of 95-0. The House is expected to pass H.R. 493 (as amended) during the week of April 28, 2008. Senator Snowe, joined by 22 cosponsors, introduced S. 358 , a companion bill to H.R. 493 , on January 22, 2007. Legislation in the 109th Congress
In the 109 th Congress, S. 306 , the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005, was introduced by Senator Snowe on February 7, 2005. The bill was passed, with an amendment, on February 17, 2005 by a vote of 98-0. A companion bill, H.R. 1227 , was introduced in the House on March 10, 2005 by Representative Biggert. Another bill, H.R. 6125 , 109 th Congress, was introduced in the House on September 20, 2006 by Representative Paul. Legislation in the 108th Congress
Several bills were introduced in the 108 th Congress to address genetic discrimination and privacy. On October 14, 2003, the Senate passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003 ( S. 1053 ). Legislation in the 106th Congress
Although legislation specifically relating to genetic discrimination and privacy was not enacted during the 106 th Congress, a provision relating to health insurance was considered in the conference on H.R. | In April 2003, the sequence of the human genome was deposited into public databases. This milestone, which has been compared to the discoveries of Galileo, and other advances in genetics have created novel legal issues relating to genetic information. The Human Genome Project produced detailed maps of the 23 pairs of human chromosomes and sequenced 99% of the three billion nucleotide bases that make up the human genome. The sequence information should aid in the identification of genes underlying disease, raising hope for genetic therapies to cure disease, but this scientific accomplishment is not without potential problems. For instance, the presence of a specific genetic variation may indicate a predisposition to disease but does not guarantee that the person will manifest the disease: How should an employer or insurer respond? The ethical, social and legal implications of these technological advances have been the subject of significant scrutiny and concern.
The legal implications of such information have been addressed in various ways largely by states, but also by Congress. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, P.L. 104-191, is the first federal law to specifically address discrimination and insurance issues relating to genetic discrimination. Congress is currently considering genetic discrimination legislation. H.R. 493, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007 (GINA), was introduced in the 110th Congress by Representative Slaughter and 143 cosponsors on January 16, 2007. It passed the House on April 25, 2007. A companion bill, S. 358, 110th Congress, was introduced by Senator Snowe and 22 cosponsors on January 22, 2007, and has been reported out of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee. On March 5, 2008, the text of H.R. 493 as passed by the House was added to the end of the Paul Wellstone Mental Health and Addiction Equity Act of 2007 (H.R. 1424) in the engrossment of H.R. 1424. On April 24, 2008, the Senate took up H.R. 493, replaced the existing language with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, and passed the measure, as amended, by a vote of 95-0. The House is expected to pass H.R. 493 (as amended) during the week of April 28, 2008.
In the 109th Congress, S. 306, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005, was passed on February 17, 2005, by a vote of 98-0. A companion bill, H.R. 1227, was introduced on March 10, 2005, and another bill, H.R. 6125 was introduced on September 20, 2006. In the 108th Congress, the Senate passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, S. 1053. H.R. 1910 was introduced in the House and hearings were held, but the bill was not passed in the 108th Congress. This report discusses current federal law, state statutes, and legislation. It will be updated as needed. |
crs_R45017 | crs_R45017_0 | Introduction
Recent flood disasters have raised congressional and public interest in not only reducing flood risks, but also improving flood resilience, which is the ability to adapt to, withstand, and rapidly recover from floods. Congress has established various federal programs that may be available to assist U.S. state, local, and territorial entities and tribes in reducing flood risks. Among the most significant current federal programs assisting communities with improvements to reduce their flood risks and improve their flood resilience are (1) programs that assist with infrastructure to reduce flood risks and other flood mitigation activities, and (2) programs of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) that provide incentives to reduce flood risks. In the United States, flood-related responsibilities are shared. States and local governments have significant discretion in land use and development decisions (e.g., building codes, subdivision ordinances), which can be factors in determining the vulnerability to and consequence of hurricanes, storms, extreme rainfall, and other flood events. Flood events, particularly Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and subsequent events, have generated concern about the nation's and the federal government's financial exposure to flood losses, as well as the economic, social, and public health impacts on individuals and communities. Federal Flood-Related Activities
Flood Control
Although U.S. local, state, and territorial entities and tribes maintain significant flood management responsibilities, the federal role has expanded over the decades in response to catastrophic and regional flood events. Some flood control infrastructure owned by local and state entities also has received support from hazard mitigation assistance programs administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) programs of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). For example, some programs are triggered only after certain declarations or actions; others are part of regular agency operations. Selected Federal Programs That Support Flood Resilience and Risk Reduction Improvements
Federal Emergency Management Agency18
FEMA administers three mitigation grant programs that relate to flood resilience and risk reduction:
Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grant program; Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP); and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers22
USACE is the primary federal agency involved in construction projects to provide flood damage reduction; it conducts this work through both project-specific and programmatic authorities. Flood Maps and State and Local Land-Use Control
The NFIP accomplishes the goal of reducing comprehensive flood risk primarily by requiring participating communities to collaborate with FEMA to develop and adopt flood maps called Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) and enact minimum floodplain standards based on those flood maps. The NFIP encourages communities to adopt and enforce floodplain management regulations such as zoning codes, subdivision ordinances, building codes, and rebuilding restrictions. NFIP Flood Mitigation
The NFIP offers three programs that encourage communities to reduce flood risk: the Community Rating System, the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant program, and Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) coverage. Potential questions for the 115 th Congress and other policymakers include the following:
Do federal programs provide incentives or disincentives for U.S. states, local governments, territories, and tribes to prepare for flood and manage their flood risks? Are there changes to how federal flood-related assistance programs and the NFIP are implemented or funded that could result in long-term net benefits in avoided federal disaster assistance, lives lost, and economic disruption? | Recent flood disasters have raised congressional and public interest in not only reducing flood risks, but also improving flood resilience, which is the ability to adapt to, withstand, and rapidly recover from floods. In the United States, flood-related responsibilities are shared. States and local governments have significant discretion in land use and development decisions, which can be major factors in determining the vulnerability to and consequence of hurricanes, storms, extreme rainfall, and other flood events. Congress has established various federal programs that may be available to assist U.S. state, local, and territorial entities and tribes in reducing flood risks. Among the most significant federal activities to reduce communities' flood risks and improve flood resilience are
assistance with infrastructure projects (e.g., levees, shore protection) and other flood mitigation activities that save lives and reduce property damage; and mitigation incentives for communities that participate in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).
Assistance Programs
Each federal program that provides flood-related assistance has its own focus, statutory limitations, and way of operating. Some programs are triggered by certain declarations or actions and may be available only to areas or states subject to recent disasters. These programs include
the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is triggered by a Stafford Act disaster declaration; and Community Development Block Grant−Disaster Recovery (CDBG−DR) assistance administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which may be available if Congress provides supplemental appropriations.
Although subject to available appropriations, other federal assistance may be more broadly accessible when funded through annual appropriations or more targeted when also funded through supplemental appropriations. These assistance programs include
FEMA's Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grant program and the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant program; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) flood risk reduction studies and construction projects; U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) acquisition of floodplain easements and grants for flood risk reduction projects; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) grants for oceans, coasts, and Great Lakes, and other coastal zone restoration and management-related opportunities; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) support for state-administered loan programs and direct credit assistance for stormwater management; and HUD's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) programs.
Flood Insurance
In order for federal flood insurance to be available to homeowners and business owners in a community, the NFIP requires participating communities to develop and adopt flood maps and enact minimum floodplain standards based on those flood maps. The NFIP encourages communities to adopt and enforce floodplain management regulations such as zoning codes, building codes, subdivision ordinances, and rebuilding restrictions. The NFIP also encourages communities to reduce flood risk through three programs: the FMA, Community Rating System, and Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) coverage.
Context for Federal Activities and Policy Considerations
Since the 1960s, the federal role in responding to catastrophic and regional flooding has expanded both through the NFIP and federal disaster response and recovery efforts. Hurricane Katrina and subsequent events have generated concern about the nation's and the federal government's financial exposure to flood losses and floods' economic, social, and public health impacts on individuals and communities. Members of Congress and other decisionmakers are faced with numerous policy questions, including whether federal programs provide incentives or disincentives for state and local entities to prepare for floods and manage their flood risks, and whether changes to how federal assistance programs and the NFIP are implemented and funded could result in long-term resilience benefits. |
crs_RL30635 | crs_RL30635_0 | The Meltzer Commission Report
In appropriating funding in the fall of 1998 to increase the U.S. quota in the IMF, Congress required that anindependentcommission be created to evaluate the international financial institutions, giving particular attention to the IMF. First, the Commission proposed that the IMF restrict its lending to only short-term liquidity needs of membercountries and eliminate its role as a long-term lender, particularly for purposes of reducing poverty or promotingdevelopment. (7)
Meltzer Commission Recommendations
The Meltzer Commission makes the case for restructuring the IMF to as part of a more targeted and much reduced mission,with redefined obligations for members of the Fund, as well. At the heart of the proposal is a strong conviction thatdeepstructural reforms, particularly of developing country financial systems, would go a long way toward reducing thepotentialfor currency crises and the related need for large, costly IMF bailouts. Participation in IMF Programs. Rules (preconditions) for Lending. Debt Issues. Meltzer Commission Dissenting Opinions
Four members of the Meltzer Commission dissented from the report and three formally voted against it,although they wereagreed on the need for IMF reform. They supported the report's call to differentiate clearly the responsibilities ofthe IMFand development banks and its conclusions that stronger banking systems in developing countries are imperative,thatgreater transparency mitigates abuse by all parties, and that the poorest countries need debt forgiveness and grantsfromindustrial countries to help cover basic public goods. The dissenting commissioners argue that the Commissionrecommendations,if implemented, might actually worsen rather than improve the prospect for global financial stability and therebypotentiallyundermine the fight against poverty and underdevelopment. (10)
The Treasury finds fault with this approach suggesting that: 1) it would potentially restrict the IMF from responding tofinancial emergencies in many large countries that did not prequalify, including the weaker countries that needassistancemost, perhaps aggravating broader systemic problems; 2) prequalification criteria are too narrow, focusing onfinancialsector issues, which alone are not sufficient to "significantly reduce" risk of crisis; 3) prequalified lending couldincreaserather than decrease moral hazard if countries targeted policy reform for the express purpose of meeting only IMFguidelines; 4) eliminating conditions for lending would reduce leverage for policy change, as well as increase thepossibility of financial assistance being misused; 5) very short loan maturities and excessive interest penalties wouldforcerepayment prematurely at excessive cost, worsening borrowing countries already tenuous financial position; and6)eliminating poverty assistance lending would remove IMF and its macroeconomic expertise from the developmentadjustment process involving the international financial institutions. There is also broad agreement that the IMF should operate as a monetary institution focusing on fiscal, exchange rate, andmonetary policies and leave long-term structural reform to the development banks. These reservations have been reiterated by both the U.S. Treasury and the Council on Foreign Relations. The U.S. Treasury argues that changes are needed in the IMF to meet new challenges of the global economy, but that theIMF is in the process of addressing many of the concerns that have been raised by the Meltzer Commission. Continued oversight surely will be necessary to keep the reform process moving, but more time may be needed tosort outprecisely which policy options will suit the collective, but competing needs of the IMF member countries and otherconstituents of the global economy. | In the fall of 1998, financial crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil were unfolding, though in different stages, as the 105thCongress was in the process of passing the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental AppropriationsAct forFY1999 ( H.R. 4328 , P.L. 105-277 ). This legislation increased the U.S. quota of the International MonetaryFund (IMF), but attached a number of conditions to dispersal of the funds. Among them was creation of theInternationalFinancial Institutions Advisory Commission (the Meltzer Commission), which Congress chartered to evaluate andrecommend future U.S. policy toward the global financial institutions, particularly the IMF.
The Commission released its report on March 8, 2000, calling for changes in the mission and operations of the IMF and thedevelopment banks. The 11 commissioners were unanimous only in generally recommending that: 1)the IMF restrict itslending to short-term liquidity needs, and 2) that it forgive debt to the poorest developing countries. The reportmakes thecase for restructuring the IMF to reduce and define clearly its mission, and clarify obligations for members of theFund, aswell. At the heart of the proposal is a strong conviction that deep structural reforms, particularly of developingcountryfinancial systems, would go a long way toward reducing the potential for currency crises and the related need forlarge,costly IMF bailouts. It also focuses heavily on the role of moral hazard. These concerns led to specific policyprescriptions, not unanimously embraced, including requiring financial sector reforms as a precondition for IMFassistance,lending for no longer than 120 days (with one rollover period) and at "penalty" rates, and eliminating any long-termlendingfor structural adjustment or poverty reduction.
Four members of the Meltzer Commission dissented from the report. They supported the call to differentiate clearly theresponsibilities of the IMF and development banks, the need for stricter banking systems in developing countries,greatertransparency to mitigate abuse by all parties, and debt forgiveness for the poorest countries. They disagreed withthe detailslisted above, arguing that they would conceivably worsen rather than improve the prospect for global financialstability andthereby undermine the fight against poverty and slow development.
A number of respondents to the Commission report also disagreed with what some consider its "narrow" prescriptions,including the U.S. Treasury and the Council on Foreign Relations, which offer alternative reform programs. Inaddition,financial crises have been a part of the international economic landscape long before the IMF was established,suggestingthat too much emphasis on this one institution may not bring the desired stability to the international financialsystem. Still, the IMF is responsible for addressing the concerns raised by Congress and other government institutionsaround theworld, which have served as a critical impetus for change. Continued oversight will be necessary to keep the reformprocess moving and more time may be needed to sort out precisely which policy options will suit the collective, butcompeting, needs of IMF member countries and the broader participants of the global economy. |
crs_RL33860 | crs_RL33860_0 | The motion is in order in the House, but not in the Committee of the Whole (formally, Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union). A motion to recommit must be offered after the previous question is ordered on a measure, but before the vote on final passage takes place. Only one valid motion can be offered, and it can take one of two forms: a simple (or "straight") motion, or a motion with instructions . The report emphasizes motions to recommit bills and conference reports because they represent the overwhelming majority of all recommittal motions each Congress. A simple motion to recommit a bill gives the minority a final opportunity to reject that measure. When the House adopts a simple recommittal motion, the underlying bill goes back to committee and is considered to have been rejected by the House. By contrast, a motion to recommit with instructions provides the minority a last chance to amend a bill. The amendment was agreed to. A simple motion to recommit a conference report proposes only to send the report back to conference for further negotiation; adopting this motion does not necessarily "kill" the bill. When the House adopts a motion to recommit a conference report (simple or with instructions), the House conferees "carry the original papers back to conference" and the "same conferees remain appointed." Table 3 provides data on motions to recommit conference reports from the 101 st Congress through the 109 th Congress. The overwhelming majority (85%) of motions offered to recommit conference reports contained instructions. Rule XIII, clause 6(c)(2), as amended in 1995, states that the Committee on Rules shall not "report a rule or order which would prevent the motion to recommit a bill or joint resolution from being made as provided in clause 2(b) of rule XIX, including a motion to recommit with instructions to report back an amendment otherwise in order, if offered by the Minority Leader or a designee, except with respect to a Senate bill or resolution for which the text of a House-passed measure has been substituted." Offering the Motion to Recommit: The Minority's Prerogative
In modern House practice, offering the motion to recommit is the prerogative of a member of the minority party. This rules change added the following new language to the last sentence of Rule XIII, clause 6(c)(2), concerning motions to recommit bills and joint resolutions:
... including a motion to recommit with instructions to report back an amendment otherwise in order, if offered by the Minority Leader or a designee, except with respect to a Senate bill or resolution for which the text of a House-passed measure has been substituted
With the addition of this language, the House's rules explicitly recognize the minority's prerogative to offer a motion to recommit, with or without instructions, to bills and joint resolutions . Consideration of the Motion to Recommit
Debate on the Motion
Debate is not allowed on a simple motion to recommit, except by unanimous consent. If the House rejects that motion, House precedents provide that "a Member who in the Speaker's determination led the opposition to the previous question on the motion to recommit, such as the chairman of the committee reporting the bill, is entitled to offer an amendment to the motion regardless of party affiliation." The House must approve an amendment to a recommittal motion by a simple majority vote. Motions to Recommit Adopted by the House: 101st Congress - 109th Congress | Recommittal motions can take one of two forms: a simple (or "straight") motion to recommit or a motion to recommit with instructions. Bills and conference reports can be recommitted, but the motion to recommit does not have the same effect on measures at both stages of the legislative process.
A simple motion to recommit a bill gives the minority party a final opportunity to "kill" a measure before the House votes on whether to pass it. When the House adopts a simple motion, the underlying bill goes back to committee and is considered to have been rejected by the House. A simple motion to recommit a conference report proposes to return the report to conference, but does not necessarily "kill" the bill in question.
A motion to recommit a bill with instructions provides the minority a last chance to amend a bill before the House votes on its passage. When the House recommits a bill with instructions, the measure goes back to committee, but typically with binding directions that the committee report the bill back to the House instantaneously with an amendment that is included in the instructions. The recommittal of a conference report with instructions returns the report to conference with non-binding directions to the House conferees only (e.g., to insist on disagreeing to a specific Senate amendment). Most motions to recommit bills and conference reports contain instructions.
The motion to recommit is in order in the House, but not in the Committee of the Whole. The motion must be offered after the previous question has been ordered, but before the vote on passing a bill or agreeing to a conference report. Debate is allowed only on motions to recommit with instructions that are offered to bills and joint resolutions. Debate is not permitted on simple motions or on any motions to recommit conference reports, except by unanimous consent. The House must approve the motion by a simple majority vote. From the 101st Congress through the 109th Congress, the House adopted 7.6% of all motions to recommit.
In modern House practice, the right to offer the motion to recommit is the prerogative of a minority party Representative who is opposed to the underlying measure. Until the 104th Congress, however, House precedents only guaranteed the minority's right to offer a simple motion to recommit. The House Rules Committee was allowed to report "special rules" that limited or prohibited instructions in motions to recommit.
Since the beginning of the 104th Congress, the Rules Committee has been prohibited from reporting any special rules that restrict or preclude instructions in motions to recommit offered to bills and joint resolutions, provided the motion is "offered by the minority leader or his designee."
This report will be updated at the end of each Congress. |
crs_R45172 | crs_R45172_0 | Since signing the TIFA, Vietnam has indicated a desire to foster closer trade relations. According to U.S. trade statistics, U.S. exports to Vietnam declined by nearly $2 billion in 2017, but Vietnamese trade statistics show an increase in imports from the United States of almost $500 million. In May 2016, President Obama announced that he would lift the remaining restrictions on arms sales to Vietnam. Bilateral Trade Balance
The Trump Administration has indicated that reducing U.S. bilateral trade deficits will be a priority in its trade policy. The $32 billion bilateral merchandise trade deficit with Vietnam in 2016 was reportedly a major issue during President Trump's May 2017 meeting at the White House with Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc. The measures included:
Both nations "creating favorable conditions for the businesses of both sides, particularly through the effective use of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement to address issues in United States-Vietnam relations in a constructive manner"; Vietnam pursuing "a consistent policy of economic reform and international integration, creating favorable conditions for foreign companies, including those of the United States, to do business and invest in Vietnam"; Vietnam protecting and enforcing intellectual property; Vietnam "bringing its labor laws in line with Vietnam's international commitments"; and Both nations pledging "to continue to work together constructively to seek resolution of other priority issues of each country, including those related to intellectual property, advertising and financial services, information-security products, white offal, distiller's dried grains, siluriformes , shrimp, mangos, and other issues." In addition, Vietnam's Minister of Trade and Investment Tran Tuan Anh met with U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer on May 30, 2017, and asked that the United States recognize Vietnam as a market economy, lift the new catfish inspection regulations, and accelerate the licensing of Vietnamese fruit exports to the United States. In the 2008 Farm Bill ( P.L. 110-246 ), Congress transferred catfish inspection (including basa , swai , and tra ) from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); Congress confirmed that transfer in the Agriculture Act of 2014 ( P.L. The inspection program was implemented as scheduled. Arms Sales
In 1975, U.S. military sales to Vietnam were banned as part of the larger U.S. ban on bilateral trade. The Trump Administration has indicated that it sees increased U.S. arms sales to Vietnam as one means of reducing the bilateral merchandise trade deficit, as well as strengthening the security partnership with Vietnam. For over 20 years, Vietnam has been transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. The United States currently is a party to 40 BITs; Vietnam has signed over 50. Action on the part of Congress as a whole may be required if the terms of the BIT require changes in U.S. law. Possible Regional Trade Agreements
Although the United States has withdrawn from the TPP, the remaining 11 nations, including Vietnam, signed a proposed regional trade agreement, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), on March 8, 2018. In addition, Vietnam is among 16 nations negotiating another proposed RTA, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). According to the USITC, U.S. imports from Vietnam were up 5.2% year-on-year for the first two months of 2018, while U.S. exports to Vietnam were down 2.4%, possibly indicating that the U.S. bilateral merchandise trade deficit with Vietnam will continue to grow. On April 29, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13796, "Addressing Trade Agreement Violations and Abuses," which, among other things, requires the Secretary of Commerce, and the U.S. Trade Representative to "conduct comprehensive performance reviews" of "all trade relations with countries governed by the rules of the World Trade Organization with which the United States does not have free trade agreements but with which the United States runs significant trade deficits in goods." Vietnam is one such country. The Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018 ( H.R. | President Trump's decision in January 2017 to withdraw the United States from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement removed a major focus of trade relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam) since 2008. As a result, trade relations are likely to refocus onto various bilateral trade issues such as the rising U.S. bilateral merchandise trade deficit with Vietnam, Vietnam's desire to be recognized as a market economy, and various elements of each nation's trade policies and regulations. Congress may play a role in each of these trade issues.
Over the last 20 years, the U.S. merchandise trade balance with Vietnam has gone from a surplus of $110 million in 1997 to a deficit of more than $38 billion in 2017. The 2017 bilateral merchandise trade deficit with Vietnam was the 5th largest for the United States. U.S. exports declined in 2017 by nearly $2 billion compared to 2016, while U.S. imports from Vietnam increased by more than $4 billion. Given President Trump's focus on nations with which the United States has a bilateral merchandise trade deficit, Vietnam's trade policies and practices may face increased scrutiny from his Administration in the months ahead.
One issue that was prominent during the TPP negotiations, and will likely remain an issue during the 115th Congress, were changes in U.S. laws regulating catfish imports that the Vietnamese government saw as protectionist, including the 2008 Farm Bill (P.L. 110-246) which shifted the inspection of catfish from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Given the views expressed by some Senators, catfish import regulation may be addressed if the Senate considers the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018 (H.R. 2).
A new trade issue that may arise is U.S. arms sales to Vietnam. In May 2016, President Obama ended the remaining restrictions on lethal arms sales to Vietnam that had been in place since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. President Trump has indicated that he sees U.S. arms sales to Vietnam as an important method of reducing the bilateral merchandise trade deficit. While Vietnam has made few purchases of U.S. military equipment and materials since the removal of the restrictions, Vietnamese officials indicate that more requests may be submitted. In certain circumstances, Congress can play a role in the approval or disapproval of such arms sales.
Each nation has raised other concerns about the other's trade policy. Vietnam would like the United States officially to recognize it as a market economy and sign a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). The United States would like Vietnam to increase U.S. imports, reduce certain technical barriers to trade, and implement various labor reforms.
The importance of Vietnam's trade relations with the United States may be influenced by two proposed regional trade agreements. Vietnam is a party to the 11-member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which was signed in March 2018, as well as the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP); the United States is not. The implementation of either trade agreement is likely to increase Vietnam's trade flows to the other nations in the trade agreements, and decrease its trade with the United States.
The 115th Congress may play an important role in one or more of these issues, as have past Congresses. No legislation has been introduced regarding trade relations with Vietnam, but other legislation, such as H.R. 2, may contain relevant provisions. |
crs_R42665 | crs_R42665_0 | On May 10, 2012, Jamie Dimon, the bank's chairman and chief executive officer (CEO), held an unplanned conference call. As reflected in the firm's first quarter 2012 filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Mr. Dimon reported that, during the early part of the second quarter, a London-based office of the bank (insured depository) unit, the Chief Investment Office (CIO), sought "to hedge the firm's overall credit exposure" and incurred "slightly more than [a] $2 billion trading [paper] loss on … synthetic credit positions." Several bank analysts have indicated that the report of the losses raised concerns about the quality of JP Morgan's risk management. Various agencies, including the United Kingdom's financial services regulator (the Financial Services Administration), the SEC, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the OCC, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), have launched probes of various aspects of the trades. These issues include
potential regulatory lapses and shortcomings in the regulatory reach; risk management at JP Morgan's CIO; Section 619 of the DFA, also known as the Volcker Rule; systemic significance of the losses; potential broader implications of the losses for other large banks; and the doctrine of "too big to fail" in the context of the JP Morgan trade losses. The instruments chosen by the bank to execute the strategy were not identical to the instruments used in the original position, which introduced basis, liquidity, and other risks. Figure 1 illustrates how different financial regulatory agencies are responsible for prudential regulation of the units of JP Morgan that are believed to have carried out the derivatives trades, and the way that financial regulatory agencies regulate derivatives trading activities and venues. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
The OCC is the primary prudential regulator for federally chartered insured depositories, including the relevant subsidiary of JP Morgan. The OCC has a targeted large bank supervision program for complex firms such as JP Morgan. Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve is the primary prudential regulator of JP Morgan's holding company. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FDIC-insured depositories must comply with FDIC regulations. Instead, it is the enforcement of existing regulations. However, because JP Morgan's losses did not occur in the investment banking part of the firm, but rather occurred in a unit connected to the depository banking part, citing the bank's trading losses may not effectively advance the argument. According to at least one regulatory official, FSOC discussed the JP Morgan trading losses, but did not believe that the losses were large enough to be a threat to JP Morgan's solvency or a threat to financial stability. Among the qualifications are that the banking entity must already be exposed to the risk being hedged, that the hedge not earn appreciably more profits than the firm would lose on the hedged position, and that the hedge be reasonably correlated to the risk being hedged. In general, interest rate risk is usually correlated with general economic conditions and partially offsets default risk. because … [the firm] missed a bunch of these things. Augmenting these observations, JP Morgan's July 2012 CIO Task Force Update , also found that
during the first quarter of 2012, the CIO's management "did not set clear objectives, properly vet the trading strategy or sufficiently examine underlying positions and correlations"; during the first quarter of 2012, CIO traders and managers of the problematic synthetic securities portfolio "did not adequately highlight issues or seek support from broader CIO or [JP Morgan] firm [level] management"; the CIO's mandate and [its successful] historical performance may have "contributed to the less than rigorous scrutiny of the unit"; during the first quarter of 2012, the CIO's review and analysis of the problematic synthetic securities portfolio "was too optimistic"; the effectiveness of the CIO's risk management group was "challenged" by lack of a "robust risk committee structure"; "transitions in key roles"; and "lack of adequate resources"; the CIO risk management group failed to "meet expectations" in various areas, including using inadequate risk limit levels, being insufficiently forceful in challenging the CIO's front office, and being insufficiently willing to communicate potential concerns over CIO risk-taking to top JP Morgan management; and the synthetic credit portfolio securities traded by the CIO problematically lacked "specific risk limits" and were subject to no limits on "size, asset type, or risk factor." In reports that some current JP Morgan officials dispute, some former JP Morgan officials have said that risk managers charged with overseeing the CIO's trades tended to be marginalized by Mr. Macris, the head of the CIO's London office. Value at Risk (VaR) models are a standard means by which financial institutions like JP Morgan make such projections. Such disclosures inform investors seeking to assess a firm's financial health and the risks that it may confront. SEC Chair Mary Schapiro has emphasized that "when there are changes to the VaR model … those changes have to be disclosed." | On May 10, 2012, JP Morgan disclosed that it had lost more than $2 billion by trading financial derivatives. Jamie Dimon, CEO and chairman of JP Morgan, reported that the bank's Chief Investment Office (CIO) executed the trades to hedge the firm's overall credit exposure as part of the bank's asset liability management program (ALM). The CIO operated within the depository subsidiary of JP Morgan, although its offices were in London. The funding for the trades came from what JP Morgan characterized as excess deposits, which are the difference between deposits held by the bank and its commercial loans.
The trading losses resulted from an attempt to unwind a previous hedge investment, although the precise details remain unconfirmed. The losses occurred in part because the CIO chose to place a new counter-hedge position, rather than simply unwind the original position. In 2007 and 2008, JP Morgan had bought an index tied to credit default swaps on a broad index of high-grade corporate bonds. In general, this index would tend to protect JP Morgan if general economic conditions worsened (or systemic risk increased) because the perceived health of high-grade firms would tend to deteriorate with the economy. In 2011, the CIO decided to change the firm's position by implementing a new counter trade. Because this new trade was not identical to the earlier trades, it introduced basis risk and market risk, among other potential problems. It is this second "hedge on a hedge" that is responsible for the losses in 2012.
Several financial regulators are responsible for overseeing elements of the JP Morgan trading losses. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is the primary prudential regulator of federally chartered depository banks and their ALM activities, including the CIO of JP Morgan, even though it is located in London. The Federal Reserve is the prudential regulator of JP Morgan's holding company, although it would tend to defer to the primary prudential regulators of the firm's subsidiaries for significant regulation of those entities. The Federal Reserve also regulates systemic risk aspects of large financial firms such as JP Morgan. The CIO must comply with Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulations because it is part of the insured depository. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversees JP Morgan's required disclosures to the firm's stockholders regarding material risks and losses such as the trades. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulates trading in swaps and financial derivatives. The heads of these agencies coordinate through the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which is chaired by the Secretary of Treasury.
The trading losses may have implications for a number of financial regulatory issues. For example, should the exemption to the Volcker Rule for hedging be interpreted broadly enough to encompass general portfolio hedges like the JP Morgan trades, or should hedging be limited to more specific risks? Are current regulations of large financial firms the appropriate balance to address perceptions that some firms are too-big-to-fail?
The trading losses raise concerns about the calculation and reporting of risk by large financial firms. JP Morgan changed its value at risk (VaR) model during the time of the trading losses. Some are concerned that VaR models may not adequately address potential risks. Some are concerned that the change in reporting of the VaR at JP Morgan's CIO may not have provided adequate disclosures of the potential risks that JP Morgan faced. Such disclosures are governed by securities laws. |
crs_RL32086 | crs_RL32086_0 | These statutes do not apply to the private sector except when it is engaged in contract work for the federal government. The first of these statutes, the Davis-Bacon Act (1931), set certain wage and related standards for federal contract construction work. In 1936, Congress added the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, setting basic labor standards in the production of goods under contract for the federal government. The third of these statutes, the McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act (1965), mandates minimum labor standards where services are provided, under contract, to the federal government. This report sketches the history of these statutes: what they provide, how they are similar, and how they differ. And, it notes certain areas of controversy that have developed with respect to the several enactments. Introduction
Early in the 19 th century, the federal government began development of a special body of labor standards protections applicable to its own direct workforce. In part, the federal construction program was intended to spur the economy of depressed areas by providing jobs for local workers and contracts for their employers. 99-145 ), Congress amended both Walsh-Healey and the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act (which supplements the Davis-Bacon Act) by eliminating the 8-hour daily pre-overtime pay requirements as they applied to federal contract work. Among these were:
... that not less than a specified minimum wage, "determined by the Secretary" to be "in accordance with prevailing rates" for comparable work "in the locality," be paid to workers employed under the said contract—but in no case less than the minimum wage provided for in the FLSA, that workers under the contract be provided the fringe benefits (or the cash equivalent thereof) found by the Secretary to be prevailing for such workers engaged in comparable work in the locality; that the workplace be safe and sanitary; and that the Secretary was permitted to adjust the terms of the statute as he might deem proper "in the public interest or to avoid serious impairment of the conduct of Government business." The original McNamara-O'Hara Act (P.L. Now freer to deal directly with labor standards in the private sector, Congress was able to move beyond both Davis-Bacon and Walsh-Healey in crafting wage/hour legislation. The provisions of the various statutes have been modified through the years by acts of Congress. Prevailing wage rates, however, have been quite a different matter. There is the body of laws enacted to protect persons engaged in federal contract work: Davis-Bacon, Walsh-Healey and McNamara-O'Hara. Separate from the federal contract labor standards statutes (but applicable to the same bodies of workers), there is the FLSA setting minimum wages, overtime pay rates, restraining child labor and industrial homework, etc. Concluding Comment
Each of these protective legal structures—the federal contract labor standards statutes, the FLSA, and the state and local protective legislation—was enacted to protect workers and to assist, in some measure, in stabilizing industry and the workplace. | In the late 1920s, following action taken in a number of states in dealing with state contracts, the federal government began development of a body of labor standards protections for workers employed by private contractors in federal contract work. The first of these statutes, the Davis-Bacon Act (1931), set basic labor standards (primarily, prevailing wage rates) for workers engaged in construction work, under contract, for the federal government. Two other major contract labor standards statutes followed: the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act (1936) and the McNamara-O'Hara Service Contract Act (1965)—respectively dealing with labor standards for workers engaged in contracts for production of goods and the provision of services.
These statutes, amended from time to time and supplemented by other enactments, deal only with federal contract work. They do not directly impact work performed for private sector entities. Clearly, however, there are economic implications from these primary federally contracting statutes for private sector work. In part, the thrust of the statutes was to establish the federal government as a model employer to be emulated by the private sector. More directly, they were intended to provide economic protections to the targeted groups of workers and to assist, in some measure, in stabilizing the industries directly involved.
Both Davis-Bacon and Walsh-Healey were enacted prior to the more general Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA, 1938) which has come to provide a structure of minimum wages, overtime pay requirements, restraints upon child labor and industrial homework, among other things, both for public and private workers. Indeed, the McNamara-O'Hara Act was shaped and, finally, adopted while FLSA amendments (those of 1961 and 1966) were being developed to bring wage/hour protections to service workers.
Through the years, these statutes have been the focus of numerous hearings and an extensive literature. Their provisions have been added to various federal program statutes, usually by reference. And, they have sparked substantial debate, pro and con.
This report presents a brief historical introduction to the three federal contract labor standards statutes—Davis-Bacon, Walsh-Healey, and McNamara-O'Hara—and suggests how the several enactments (with the FLSA) are similar and different. It will be updated from time to time as conditions warrant. |
crs_RL32604 | crs_RL32604_0 | It shouldalso be noted that several assistance programs are exempted from strict adherence to the sanctionsregime. In the same vein, the current foreign operations appropriations, in funding nonproliferation,anti-terrorism, demining and related programs, includes a "Notwithstanding" clause that could allowfor assistance despite the sanctions regime currently in place against Libya (title II of P.L. On November 15, 1985, thePresident, citing this provision, issued Executive Order 12538 (50 F.R. 47527; 19 U.S.C. | This report discusses U.S. laws and executive orders that impose economic sanctionscurrently in place against Libya, including whether they can be changed by executive action, andexemptions to the sanctions that could make foreign assistance available. This report will be updatedas events warrant. |
crs_R40649 | crs_R40649_0 | Introduction
On May 26, 2009, President Obama nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to fill the Supreme Court seat that was vacated by retiring Justice David Souter. On August 6, the Senate confirmed Justice Sotomayor by a vote of 68-31, and she was sworn in on August 8. Judge Sotomayor had served on the Second Circuit since 1998. This report analyzes selected cases authored by Judge Sotomayor during her tenure on the Second Circuit, including majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in areas of legal significance. Overall, Judge Sotomayor's opinions defy easy categorization along ideological lines. Perhaps the most consistent characteristic of Judge Sotomayor's approach as an appellate judge could be described as an adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis (i.e., the upholding of past judicial precedents). Another characteristic of Judge Sotomayor's opinions could be described as a meticulous evaluation of the particular facts at issue in a case, which may inform whether past judicial precedents from the circuit are applicable. Judge Sotomayor's opinions also display her apparent dislike for situations in which the court oversteps the role called for by the procedural posture of a case. While many of her judicial approaches may be enduring, some shifts in her legal conclusions may naturally arise because of the difference in the roles of a circuit court judge versus a Supreme Court justice. However, it is difficult to glean any strong evidence of such an inclination from her appellate court opinions. Based on these few cases, it is difficult to determine what approach Judge Sotomayor will take to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as a Supreme Court justice. | In May 2009, Supreme Court Justice David Souter announced his intention to retire from the Supreme Court. Several weeks later, President Obama nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor, who served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to fill his seat. To fulfill its constitutional "advice and consent" function, the Senate considered Judge Sotomayor's extensive record—compiled from years as a lawyer, prosecutor, district court judge, and appellate court judge—to better understand her legal approaches and judicial philosophy. On August 6, the Senate confirmed Justice Sotomayor by a vote of 68-31, and she was sworn in on August 8.
This report provides an analysis of selected opinions authored by Judge Sotomayor during her tenure as a judge on the Second Circuit. Discussions of the selected opinions are grouped according to various topics of legal significance. As a group, the opinions belie easy categorization along any ideological spectrum. However, it is possible to draw some conclusions regarding Judge Sotomayor's judicial approach, both within some specific issue areas and in general.
Perhaps the most consistent characteristic of Judge Sotomayor's approach as an appellate judge has been an adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis (i.e., the upholding of past judicial precedents). Other characteristics appear to include what many would describe as a careful application of particular facts at issue in a case and a dislike for situations in which the court might be seen as overstepping its judicial role.
It is difficult to determine the extent to which Judge Sotomayor's style as a judge on the Second Circuit will predict her style as a Supreme Court justice. However, as has been the case historically with other nominees, some of her approaches may be enduring characteristics. |
crs_R43391 | crs_R43391_0 | The financial regulators were created between 1863 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency [OCC]) and 2010 (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau [CFPB]). Financial regulators set policy, conduct rulemaking to implement law, and supervise financial institutions. For example, the Federal Reserve System (Fed) is responsible for monetary policy and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) provide deposit insurance. Recent Congresses have considered legislation that would alter the structure and design of some of the federal financial regulators. This could be desirable if there is a presumption that the agency's work is relatively more technical and less political in nature. Congressional oversight of independent agencies takes the form of statutory requirements to submit semi-annual or annual reports to Congress; testimony before Congress by agency officials (some are statutorily required to do so periodically); GAO audits and investigations, subject to some statutory limitations; and Senate confirmation of presidential nominees for top agency leadership. Many of these structural elements influence the agency's independence from the President and Congress. Term in Office
Statutes specify term length, succession, and renewability. Statute typically does not rule out the reappointment of incumbents for financial regulators, with the exception of Fed governors and NCUA board members (for both, members are allowed one full term and can be reappointed only if initially appointed to an expiring term). In the case of an agency with a single head, the term might or might not coincide with the President's term. Grounds for Removal
Although not always specified in statute, it appears that the heads of financial regulators, in contrast with Cabinet Secretaries, typically do not serve at the pleasure of the President ("at will"). OMB/Executive Oversight
Legislative proposals and congressional testimony by executive agencies are typically subject to the approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is part of the Executive Office of the President. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Independent agencies that are not subject to E.O. Different funding structures across regulators with similar missions have led to congressional proposals to make funding structures more uniform. For example, the OCC: "may collect an assessment, fee, or other charge ... as the Comptroller determines is necessary or appropriate to carry out the responsibilities of the Office," whereas the CFPB is allowed funding in "the amount determined by the Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out the authorities of the Bureau under Federal consumer financial law." The two financial regulators that do not largely raise their own revenues are the CFTC and the CFPB. Congress has granted federal financial regulators independence in ways obvious ("for cause" removal, self-financing) and subtle (exemption of agency testimony and budget requests from OMB review). Federal financial regulators that are relatively more independent in some areas are relatively less independent in others. | Conventional wisdom regarding regulators is that the structure and design of the organization matters for policy outcomes. Financial regulators conduct rulemaking and enforcement to implement law and supervise financial institutions. These agencies have been given certain characteristics that enhance their day-to-day independence from the President and Congress, which may make policymaking more technical and less "political" or "partisan," for better or worse. Independence may also make regulators less accountable to elected officials and can reduce congressional influence, at least in the short term.
Although independent agencies share many characteristics, there are notable differences. Some federal financial regulators are relatively more independent in some areas but relatively less so in others. Major structural characteristics of federal financial regulators that influence independence include
agency head: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Reserve (Fed), National Credit Union Association (NCUA), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have multi-member boards or commissions led by a chair, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) are led by single directors. party affiliation: for multi-member boards or commissions, statute sets a party balance among members for all except the Fed. term in office: terms in office are fixed in length, varying among the regulators from 5 years to 14 years, and do not coincide with the President's term. Terms for Fed governors and NCUA board members are not renewable. grounds for removal: although not always specified in statute, it appears that the regulator heads can only be removed "for cause" (e.g., malfeasance or neglect of duty), with the exception of the Comptroller of the Currency. executive oversight: rulemaking, testimony, legislative proposals, and budget requests are not subject to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review. congressional oversight: agencies are statutorily required to submit periodic reports to Congress. Agency officials testify before Congress upon request; some are also statutorily required to do so periodically. Agencies are subject to Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits and investigations. Top leadership is subject to Senate confirmation. Agency rulemaking can be overturned under the Congressional Review Act. funding: the SEC's and CFTC's budgets are set through congressional authorization and appropriations, whereas other regulators set their own budgets. These budgets are funded through the collection of fees or other revenues, with the exception of the CFTC and CFPB.
From time to time, Congress has considered legislation that would alter the structure and design of some of the federal financial regulators, including changes to their leadership and funding structure, the Congressional Review Act, and cost-benefit analysis requirements. |
crs_R41913 | crs_R41913_0 | Introduction
The United States has seen continued growth of electronic card payments (and a simultaneous decrease in check payments). From 2009 through 2012, debit card transactions have outpaced other payment forms. When a consumer uses a debit card in a transaction, the merchant pays a "swipe" fee, also known as the interchange fee. The interchange fee is paid to the consumer's bank that issued the debit card, covering the bank's costs to facilitate the transaction. Section 1075 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (Title X of P.L. 111-203 , the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act), known as the Durbin Amendment, authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to mandate regulations to ensure that any interchange transaction fee received by a debit card issuer is reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer. The Durbin Amendment allows the Federal Reserve to consider the authorization, clearance, and settlement costs of each transaction when setting the interchange fee. The Durbin Amendment allows the interchange fee to be adjusted for costs incurred by debit card issuers to prevent fraud. By statute, debit card issuers with less than $10 billion in assets are exempt from the regulation, which means that smaller financial institutions may receive a larger interchange fee than larger issuers. The Durbin Amendment also prohibits network providers (Visa, MasterCard, etc.) and debit card issuers from imposing restrictions that would override a merchant's choice of the network provider through which to route transactions. On June 29, 2011, the Federal Reserve issued a final rule implementing the Durbin Amendment by Regulation II, which includes a cap on the interchange fee for large issuers. The final rule went into effect on October 1, 2011. H.R. 10 , the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, would repeal the Durbin Amendment. Specifically, Section 735 of the Financial CHOICE Act would repeal Section 1075 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010. On May 4, 2017, H.R. 10 was ordered to be reported by the House Financial Services Committee. Implementation of Regulation II
On June 29, 2011, the Federal Reserve issued Regulation II, a final rule, which capped the interchange fee received by large issuers (with $10 billion or more in assets) to 21 cents plus 0.05% of the transaction. Implications and Recent Observations
Economists have questioned the sustainability of a two-tiered interchange pricing system over time. Debit card issuers covered by Regulation II had expected to lose interchange fee income under the regulated cap, but the evidence has been uneven particularly for those institutions that process large volumes of debit card operations. Merchants that were paying fees above the regu lated interchange fee had expected to benefit from the rule. | The United States has seen continued growth of electronic card payments (and a simultaneous decrease in check payments). From 2009 through 2012, debit card transactions have outpaced other payment forms. When a consumer uses a debit card in a transaction, the merchant pays a "swipe" fee, which is also known as the interchange fee. The interchange fee is paid to the card-issuing bank (i.e., the consumer's bank that issued the debit card) as compensation for facilitating the transaction. Section 1075 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (or Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, P.L. 111-203), also known as the Durbin Amendment, authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe regulations to ensure that the amount of any interchange transaction fee received by a debit card issuer is reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer.
The Federal Reserve may consider the authorization, clearance, and settlement costs of each transaction when it sets the interchange fee. The Durbin Amendment allows the interchange fee to be adjusted for costs incurred by debit card issuers to prevent fraud. Debit card issuers with less than $10 billion in assets are exempt by statute from the regulation, which means that smaller financial institutions may receive a larger interchange fee than larger issuers. The legislation also prohibits network providers (e.g., Visa and MasterCard) and debit card issuers from imposing restrictions that would override a merchant's choice of the network provider through which to route transactions.
On June 29, 2011, the Federal Reserve issued a final rule implementing the Durbin Amendment by Regulation II, which includes a cap of 21 cents plus 0.05% of the transaction (and an additional 1 cent to account for fraud protection costs) on the interchange fee for large issuers. The rule went into effect on October 1, 2011. Merchants expected to benefit from the Durbin Amendment by having to pay a lower swipe fee. Large debit card issuers expected to lose revenue under the regulated cap. Many small debit card issuers that were exempt from the rule had also opposed the Durbin Amendment given concerns about the feasibility of a sustainable two-tiered interchange pricing system. Since implementation of the rule, merchants have seen a limited and unequal impact on the amount they pay in swipe fees. Likewise, the impact of Regulation II has been uneven for covered institutions. Institutions not covered by the Regulation II have reportedly observed minimal change in revenues generated by debit transactions.
H.R. 10, the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, would repeal the Durbin Amendment. Specifically, Section 735 of the Financial CHOICE Act would repeal Section 1075 of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010. On May 4, 2017, H.R. 10 was ordered to be reported by the House Financial Services Committee. |
crs_RS20139 | crs_RS20139_0 | U.S. trade officials insisted that China's entry into the WTO had to be based on "commercially meaningfulterms" that would require China to significantlyreduce trade and investment barriers within a relatively short period of time. As a result, China officiallyjoined the WTO on December 11, 2001. Under the WTO accession agreement, China agreed to:
Bind all tariffs. WTO Implementation Issues
China's implementation of its WTO commitments has been closely followed by U.S. officials and various business groups. | After many years of difficult negotiations, China, on December 11, 2001, become amember of the World TradeOrganization (WTO), the international agency that administers multilateral trade rules. Under the terms of its WTOmembership, China agreed to significantlyliberalize its trade and investment regimes. A main concern for Congress is to ensure that China fully complies withits WTO commitments. According to U.S.government officials and many business representatives, China's WTO compliance record has been mixed.. Thisreport will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44229 | crs_R44229_0 | Why This Issue Is Important to Congress
The M-1 Abrams Tank, the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), and the M-1126 Stryker Combat Vehicle are the centerpieces of the Army's Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs). ABCTs and SBCTs constitute the Army's "heavy" ground forces; they provide varying degrees of armored protection and mobility that the Army's light, airborne (parachute), and air assault (helicopter transported) infantry units that constitute Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) do not possess. These three combat vehicles have a long history of service in the Army. The first M-1 Abrams Tank entered service with the Army in 1980; the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle in 1981; and the Stryker Combat Vehicle in 2001. Under current Army modernization plans, the Army envisions all three vehicles in service with Active and National Guard forces beyond FY2028. Congress is concerned with the long-term military effectiveness of these vehicles. It is also sensitive to the economic aspect of Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker modernization and recapitalization which are necessary to keep these vehicles operationally effective and in service. The majority of the M-1s were the M-1A1 model. Why the Active Component and National Guard Have Different Versions of the M-1 Abrams14
Many, including some in Congress, have expressed concern that there are different versions of the M-1 Abrams in service with the Active Component (AC) and the Army National Guard (ARNG). FY2015 M-2/M-3 Allocation by Component
M-1126 Stryker22
There are currently eight Stryker variants in service with SBCTs as discussed below. Active Protection Systems (APS) for the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker
The Army reportedly intends to begin testing Active Protective Systems (APS) on a number of its combat vehicles, including the Abrams, Bradleys, and Strykers, before FY2019. The Army, however, is planning for a successor to the Bradley—the Future Fighting Vehicle (FFV). Potential Issues for Congress
"Up-Gunning" the Entire Stryker Fleet
As previously noted, the Army reportedly is considering upgrading the lethality of the entire Stryker fleet. | The M-1 Abrams Tank, the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), and the M-1126 Stryker Combat Vehicle are the centerpieces of the Army's Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs).
In addition to the military effectiveness of these vehicles, Congress is also concerned with the economic aspect of Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker recapitalization and modernization. Due to force structure cuts and lack of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) opportunities, Congress has expressed a great deal of concern with the health of the domestic armored combat vehicle industrial base.
ABCTs and SBCTs constitute the Army's "heavy" ground forces; they provide varying degrees of armored protection and mobility that the Army's light, airborne (parachute), and air assault (helicopter transported) infantry units that constitute Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) do not possess.
These three combat vehicles have a long history of service in the Army. The first M-1 Abrams Tank entered service with the Army in 1980; the M-2/M-3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle in 1981; and the Stryker Combat Vehicle in 2001. Under current Army modernization plans, the Army envisions all three vehicles in service with Active and National Guard forces beyond FY2028.
There are several different versions of these vehicles in service. The Marines, for example, have an older version of the M-1 Abrams tank and the Active Component of the Army has the most modern version of the Abrams while some Army National Guard units have an older version of the M-1. There are also different M-2/M-3 Bradley versions in the Active and Reserve Components and some have called for "pure fleeting" (i.e., all components using the same variant) in both the Active and Reserves so they have the same models.
There are plans to upgrade and modernize these weapon systems but currently only the M-2/M-3 Bradley is scheduled to be replaced by the Future Fighting Vehicle (FFV) sometime after FY2029. The Army has not said much publicly about eventual successors for the M-1 and M-1126.
Potential issues for Congress include "up-gunning" the entire Stryker fleet and the Active Protection Systems (APS) for the Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker. |
crs_R42042 | crs_R42042_0 | IEs include explicit calls for election or defeat of federal candidates but are not considered campaign contributions. In campaign finance parlance, this means IEs cannot be coordinated with candidates or parties. Table 1 below provides an overview of how super PACs compare with other political committees and politically active organizations. Also known as independent-expenditure-only committees (IEOCs) , the media and other observers called these new political committees simply super PACs . Super PACs emerged quickly after the Citizens United and SpeechNow decisions and have become a powerful spending force in federal elections. Although the FEC amended its rules in 2014 to recognize super PACs, those who are concerned about the role of these groups in federal elections generally contend that more stringent regulations, or a statutory change from Congress, is necessary. Discussion
Several policy issues and questions surrounding super PACs might be relevant as Congress considers how or whether to pursue legislation or oversight. For those advocating their use, super PACs represent newfound (or restored) freedom for individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute as much as they wish for independent expenditures that advocate election or defeat of federal candidates. Opponents of super PACs contend that they represent a threat to the spirit of modern limits on campaign contributions designed to minimize potential corruption. These rules recognized the presence of super PACs and reflected the Citizens United and SpeechNow precedents permitting corporations (and, implicitly, unions) to make IEs and super PAC contributions. To the extent that the CCF request is relevant for super PACs, it suggests that leadership PACs or other committees affiliated with federal candidates may not behave as super PACs. Super PACs also have to report their IEs. section discusses later in this report, the original source of some contributions to super PACs can be concealed (either intentionally or coincidentally) by routing the funds through an intermediary. Brief Answer
Since their inception in the middle of the 2010 election cycle, super PACs have raised and spent more than $2 billion. Super PAC financial activity also has increased rapidly. In some cases, super PACs are the primary "outside" spenders in campaigns. Policy Approaches
As noted previously, despite Citizens United and SpeechNow , Congress has not amended federal election law to reflect the rise of super PACs or otherwise regulate the groups, although the FEC has issued regulations and advisory opinions based on court decisions. Relatively little legislation has been devoted specifically to super PACs. | Super PACs emerged after the U.S. Supreme Court permitted unlimited corporate and union spending on elections in January 2010 (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission). Although not directly addressed in that case, related, subsequent litigation (SpeechNow v. Federal Election Commission) and Federal Election Commission (FEC) activity gave rise to a new form of political committee. These entities, known as super PACs or independent-expenditure-only committees (IEOCs), may accept unlimited contributions and make unlimited expenditures aimed at electing or defeating federal candidates. Super PACs may not contribute funds directly to federal candidates or parties. Super PACs must report their donors to the FEC, although the original source of contributed funds—for super PACs and other entities—is not necessarily disclosed.
This report provides an overview of policy issues surrounding super PAC activity in federal elections. Congress has not amended the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) to recognize formally the role of super PACs. The FEC issued rules in 2014 to reflect their presence. The most substantial policy guidance about super PACs occurred through advisory opinions that the agency issued in 2010 and 2011 after the Citizens United and SpeechNow decisions.
Various issues related to super PACs may be relevant as Congress considers how or whether to pursue legislation or oversight on the topic. These include relationships with other political committees and organizations, transparency, and independence from campaigns. Throughout the post-Citizens United period, relatively few bills have been devoted specifically to super PACs, although some bills would address aspects of super PAC disclosure requirements or coordination with campaigns or other groups. As of this writing, relevant legislation in the 114th Congress includes H.R. 424, H.R. 425, H.R. 430, H.R. 5494, S. 6, S. 229, S. 1838, and S. 3250.
Since their inception during the 2010 election cycle, super PACs have raised and spent more than $2 billion. Although the number of these groups has increased rapidly, only a few groups typically dominate most super PAC spending. Super PACs can emerge and disappear intermittently; groups that are active one election cycle may be diminished or absent in the next. In some cases, super PACs have formed to support single candidates and have featured few donors.
For those advocating their use, super PACs represent freedom for individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute as much as they wish for independent expenditures that advocate election or defeat of federal candidates. Opponents of super PACs contend that they represent a threat to the spirit of modern limits on campaign contributions designed to minimize potential corruption.
This report will be updated periodically to reflect major policy developments. |
crs_R42493 | crs_R42493_0 | Importance to Congress
The Administration's proposal to reduce the size of the Army as well as restructure units and headquarters has national security implications that Congress will need to consider as part of its oversight and authorizations and appropriations role. January 26, 2012, Administration Major Budget Decision Briefing2
On January 26, 2012, senior DOD leaders unveiled a new defense strategy, based on a review of the defense strategy at the time and budgetary constraints. This new strategy envisioned
a smaller, leaner military that is agile, flexible, rapidly deployable, and technologically advanced; rebalancing global posture and presence, emphasizing where potential problems are likely to arise, such as the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East; maintaining presence elsewhere in the world (Europe, Africa, and Latin America), using innovative partnerships, strengthening key alliances, and developing new partnerships; being able to quickly confront and defeat aggression from any adversary anytime, anyplace; and protecting and prioritizing key investments in technology and new capabilities as well as the capacity to grow, adapt, mobilize, and surge when needed. DOD announced the Army would reduce the size of the Active Army starting in 2012 from a post-9/11 peak in 2010 of about 570,000 soldiers to 490,000 soldiers by the end of 2017. Press reports at the time suggested the Army might cut more than eight BCTs Army-wide. Units to Be Realigned and Restructured15
In terms of realigning and restructuring the Active Army, DOD and the Army announced in January 2012 that
active forces would no longer be sized to conduct large and protracted stability operations; Army force structure would be sustained in the Pacific, and a persistent presence would be maintained in the Middle East; Army forces will rotate through Europe and other regions on a more frequent basis; a U.S.-based heavy brigade would be allocated to the NATO Response Force; a brigade combat team (BCT) would be aligned with each geographic combatant command to provide cultural and language training to support engagement operations; and BCTs and enabling units would be examined for optimum design, which could lead to further BCT reductions if the Army decides to increase the capability of BCTs. As part of this announcement, the Army also noted that it would reduce and reorganize numerous non-BCT units—often referred to as enablers—as part of the drawdown. Under the reorganization, each armored and infantry BCT will receive a third maneuver battalion. The BCTs will receive additional engineer and fires capabilities. These personnel cuts are not just limited to soldiers but also to Army civilians and contractors and would occur over the course of five years. Active Army Endstrength Reduction to 420,000 Soldiers
In January 2014, it was reported the Administration's FY2015 Budget Guidance will direct the Army to reduce its active duty force to 420,000 soldiers, the Army National Guard from 354,000 to 315,000 and the Army Reserve from 205,000 to 185,000 by FY2019. To achieve this, the Army must accelerate the pace and increase the scale of its post-war drawdown. Voluntary separations were emphasized, and some of the tools had robust financial incentives. Potential Issues for Congress
What Is the Appropriate Size of the Active Component Force? On February 24, 2014, Secretary of Defense Hagel stated that he would recommend the following to the President:
DOD will further reduce active-duty Army end-strength to a range of 440-450,000 soldiers; "If sequestration-level cuts are re-imposed in 2016, the active-duty Army would have to draw down to an end strength of 420,000 soldiers;" and "The Army National Guard and Reserves will also draw down in order to maintain a balanced force. Active Component/Reserve Component Force Mix
Army leadership is currently on record stating that a minimum of 52 BCTs (28 active and 24 Army National Guard) under the 450,000 active duty plan is the "smallest acceptable force to implement the defense strategy." Voluntary Early Release/Retirement Program (VEERP)
This voluntary program targeted the most junior and the most senior ends of the officer spectrum, with the incentive being a reduction in service obligation. | On January 26, 2012, senior DOD leadership unveiled a new defense strategy based on a review of potential future security challenges, current defense strategy, and budgetary constraints. This new strategy envisions a smaller, leaner Army that is agile, flexible, rapidly deployable, and technologically advanced. This strategy will rebalance the Army's global posture and presence, emphasizing where potential problems are likely to arise, such as the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East.
As part of the Administration's original proposal, two armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) in Europe were to be eliminated out of a total of eight BCTs that would be cut from Active Army force structure. The Army had originally stated that it might cut more than eight BCTs from the Army's current 44 Active BCTs. Army endstrength would go from 570,000 in 2010 to 490,000 by the end of 2017. As part of this reduction, the Army would no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, protracted stability operations but would continue to be a full-spectrum force capable of addressing a wide range of national security challenges. The Army National Guard and Army Reserves were not targeted for significant cuts.
On June 25, 2013, the Army announced it would cut 12 BCTs from the Active Army as well as a number of unspecified support and headquarters units. As part of this initiative, infantry and armored BCTs would receive a third maneuver battalion plus additional engineering and fires capabilities. In addition, National Guard BCTs would also be restructured in a similar fashion. Due to the impact of sequestration, the Army also decided to accelerate the Active Army drawdown to 490,000 soldiers by two years—these cuts would now need to be completed by the end of 2015. In an effort to reduce costs, the Army also announced that it would examine cutting all two-star and higher headquarters staffs by 25%—a figure that includes soldiers, Army civilians, and contractors.
In January 2014, it was reported that the Administration's FY2015 Budget Guidance will direct the Army to reduce its Active Component end strength to 420,000 soldiers—a level that Army leadership has stated will not permit it to implement the nation's defense strategy. The Army is also proposing reducing and restructuring its Aviation brigades, and there are concerns about the Army National Guard losing all of its AH-64 Apache attack helicopters under this proposal.
On February 24, 2014, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced that he would recommend reducing Army active endstrength to between 450,000 to 440,000 soldiers, and if sequestration-level cuts were imposed in 2016, the Army would be required to drawdown to a 420,000 soldier active force.
The Army drawdown will likely be achieved in large degree by controlling accessions (i.e., the number of people allowed to join the Army). If limiting accessions is not enough to achieve the desired endstrength targets, the Army can employ a variety of involuntary and voluntary drawdown tools authorized by Congress, such as Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERBs) and Reduction-in-Force (RIF). Voluntary tools that the Army might use include the Voluntary Retirement Incentive, the Voluntary Separation Incentive, Special Separation Bonuses, Temporary Early Retirement Authority, the Voluntary Early Release/Retirement Program, and Early Outs.
Potential issues for Congress include what is the appropriate size of the active component force and the balance between active and reserve components. This report will be updated. |
crs_R42521 | crs_R42521_0 | PBGC was created to protect the pension benefits of participants and beneficiaries in private-sector, defined benefit (DB) pension plans. Single-employer plans are operated by one employer for the benefit of eligible employees of that company. In FY2013, the single-employer program insured 31.9 million participants in 23,400 pension plans and the multiemployer program covered 10.4 million participants in about 1,450 pension plans. The financial condition of PBGC may be of interest to Congress for several reasons: (1) Congress has demonstrated a clear interest in the retirement income security of American workers, for example, by providing a variety of tax incentives to encourage employer and employee contributions to retirement plans (Congress established PBGC as a pillar of retirement income security); (2) the insolvency of PBGC could require decreases in retirees' promised benefits or U.S. financial assistance; and (3) increases in PBGC premiums are scored by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) as increases in government revenue. The remainder of this report details the financial position and sources of revenue of the PBGC's single-employer pension program, describes the premiums that the sponsors of single-employer pension plans pay to PBGC, and discusses recent policy proposals to alter the structure of the premiums that single-employer pension plans pay to PBGC. PBGC reported total liabilities of $110.6 billion, of which $105.0 billion were the present value of future benefit payments. The total deficit of the single-employer program at the end of FY2013 was $27.4 billion. Since FY2002, PBGC has reported yearly deficits at the end of the fiscal year. Since its creation in 1974, PBGC has become the trustee of 4,557 single-employer pension plans and in FY2013 paid $5.4 billion in benefits to 799,210 end-of-FY2013 participants in these plans. PBGC is funded by cash flows from the premiums that pension plan sponsors pay, the assets of pension plans that are trusteed by PBGC, and dividends and interest from investments. PBGC Premiums
Each sponsor of a pension plan that is insured by PBGC pays annual premiums. Three Types of PBGC Premiums
PBGC collects three types of premiums: (1) a flat-rate, per- participant premium, (2) a variable-rate premium based on the dollar amount of a plan's underfunding, and (3) a per-participant premium payable for three years after a DB pension plan terminates. Plans that do not have enough assets set aside to pay 100% of the promised benefits are considered underfunded. The sponsors of underfunded DB plans pay an annual premium of $14 per $1,000 of underfunding. Plans that terminate under certain distress terminations or in a PBGC initiated termination are liable for a termination premium of $1,250 per plan participant per year for three years. In the 112 th Congress, The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. In the 113 th Congress, H.J.Res. 59 , which became P.L. 113-67 and was the vehicle for the December 2013 bipartisan budget agreement, increased PBGC premiums that the sponsors of single-employer DB pension plans pay but did not alter the structure of premiums. House FY2012 and FY2013 Budget Proposal s. The reports to H.Con.Res. 34 , the Concurrent Resolution of the Budget for Fiscal Year 2012, which was passed by the House on April 15, 2011, and H.Con.Res. 112 , the Concurrent Resolution of the Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, which was passed by the House on March 29, 2012, contained identical language that stated they did not assume the President's proposal but "recognized the need to reform PBGC to ensure that a future taxpayer funded bailout does not occur." The proposal would have replaced the variable-rate premium that is based on the amount of plan underfunding with a risk-based premium that would have been determined by the following factors: the risk of losses to PBGC; a plan's assets and liabilities; the financial condition of the plan's sponsor; PBGC estimated investment income; and any other factor PBGC's Board would have determined to be appropriate. | This report provides background and analysis of the premiums charged by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which is a government-owned corporation that was created in 1974 to protect the retirement income of participants in private-sector, defined benefit (DB) pension plans. When a company terminates a DB pension plan that does not have enough assets to pay 100% of the promised benefits, PBGC pays, in accordance with statute and up to a maximum yearly dollar amount, the benefits to participants in the terminated plan. In FY2013, 901,000 individuals received $5.4 billion in benefit payments from PBGC. An additional 617,000 workers will receive benefits when they retire.
PBGC consists of two insurance programs: (1) a multiemployer pension program, which protects the benefits of 10.4 million participants in collectively bargained DB pensions in which several employers make contributions, and (2) a larger single-employer pension program, which protects the benefits of 31.9 million participants in DB pensions operated by one employer for its eligible employees. Since FY2002, PBGC has ended each fiscal year with a deficit. The total deficit for the PBGC at the end of FY2013 was $35.6 billion. Most of this deficit is attributable to the single-employer program, which ended FY2013 with a deficit of $27.4 billion. At the end of FY2013, PBGC's single-employer program reported assets of $83.0 billion and liabilities of $110.6 billion. Most of PBGC's liabilities are future benefit obligations.
Although PBGC receives no congressional appropriations, its financial condition may be of interest to Congress. If PBGC's deficit persists, then cuts to benefits or U.S. government financial assistance could be necessary. PBGC is funded by a combination of insurance premiums paid by employers who sponsor DB pension plans, the assets of DB pension plans that are trusteed by PBGC, and income earned on the investment of the trusteed plan assets.
Some policymakers who are concerned by PBGC's financial position have renewed the calls for changes to the structure of the premiums that PBGC collects from employers. The suggested changes include increasing current premium levels or adding a premium that would better reflect a pension plan's potential liability to PBGC. PBGC collects three premiums from DB plan sponsors: (1) an annual flat-rate premium of $49 per participant; (2) an annual variable-rate premium of $14 per $1,000 of underfunding; or (3) a termination premium of $1,250 per plan participant per year for three years for pension plans that terminate under certain conditions.
Changes to PBGC's premium structure were included in the Department of Labor's FY2012 and FY2013 proposed budgets. In the 112th Congress, H.Con.Res. 34, the Concurrent Resolution of the Budget for Fiscal Year 2012, and H.Con.Res. 112, the Concurrent Resolution of the Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, recognized a need to reform PBGC but did not adopt the President's budget recommendations. In the 112th Congress, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141) increased the premiums levels but did not change the structure of the premiums that DB plan sponsors pay. In the 113th Congress, H.J.Res. 59 (P.L. 113-67), the vehicle for the December 2013 bipartisan budget agreement, increased PBGC premiums that the sponsors of single-employer DB pension plans pay. Proponents of changes to PBGC's premium structure argue that the current premium structure does not adequately reflect the risk to PBGC of some underfunded pension plans. Some have proposed that PBGC charge premiums based on the financial health of a DB plan sponsor. Although risk-based premiums would better allocate the risk of termination among DB plan sponsors, their implementation would raise additional concerns. |
crs_R43945 | crs_R43945_0 | New federal tax credits were authorized in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended), to help certain individuals pay for health insurance coverage, beginning in 2014. The tax credits apply toward premiums for private health plans offered through exchanges (also referred to as health insurance marketplaces ). The ACA also authorized subsidies to reduce cost-sharing expenses. Exchanges and Premium Credits
Health insurance exchanges operate in every state and the District of Columbia (DC), per the ACA statute. Exchanges may be established and administered by states, the federal government (administered through the Department of Health and Human Services [HHS]), or a combination of both. Generally, exchange plans provide a comprehensive set of health services and meet all of the ACA's insurance market reforms, as applicable. Certain enrollees in the individual exchanges are eligible for premium assistance in the form of federal tax credits. The premium credit is an advanceable, refundable tax credit, meaning tax filers need not wait until the end of the tax year to benefit from the credit and may claim the full credit amount even if they have little or no federal income tax liability. Enrolled in an Individual Exchange
Premium credits are available only to individuals and families enrolled in a plan offered through an individual exchange; premium credits are not available through the small business (SHOP) exchanges. (The ACA does not change noncitizens' eligibility for Medicaid. ) Required Premium Contributions and Premium Credit Calculations
The amount of the premium tax credit varies from person to person; the credit is based on the household income of the tax filer (and dependents), the premium for the exchange plan in which the tax filer (and dependents) is (are) enrolled, and other factors. Reconciliation of Premium Credits
Under the ACA, the amount received in premium credits is based on the prior year's income tax returns. These amounts are reconciled when individuals file tax returns for the actual year in which they receive premium credits. Cost-Sharing Subsidies
In addition to the premium credits, the ACA established subsidies that are applicable to cost-sharing expenses. | New federal tax credits, authorized under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended), first became available in 2014 to help certain individuals pay for health insurance. The tax credits apply toward premiums for private health plans offered through exchanges (also referred to as health insurance marketplaces). The ACA also established subsidies to reduce cost-sharing expenses.
Health insurance exchanges operate in every state and the District of Columbia (DC), per the ACA statute. Exchanges may be established and administered by states, the federal government, or a combination of both. Exchanges are not insurers, but they provide eligible individuals and small businesses with access to private health insurance plans. Generally, plans offered through the exchanges provide a comprehensive set of health services and meet all of the ACA's insurance market reforms, as applicable.
The new premium credits established under the ACA are advanceable and refundable, meaning tax filers need not wait until the end of the tax year to benefit from the credit and may claim the full credit amount even if they have little or no federal income tax liability. Premium tax credits generally are available to individuals who enroll in an exchange plan; are part of a tax-filing unit; have household income between specified amounts; are not eligible for other forms of comprehensive health coverage; and are U.S. citizens or lawfully present residents. This report provides examples of hypothetical individuals and families that qualify for the premium credits. The examples use actual 2015 exchange premiums.
The amounts received in premium credits are based on federal income tax returns. These amounts are reconciled after individuals file their returns and can result in overpayment of premium credits if income increases, which must be repaid to the federal government. The ACA limits the amount of required repayments for lower-income enrollees.
In addition to premium credits, the ACA authorized new cost-sharing subsidies. Certain premium credit recipients also are eligible for reductions in their annual cost-sharing limits. Moreover, certain low-income individuals receive additional subsidies in the form of reduced cost-sharing requirements (e.g., lower deductibles). |
crs_RL30030 | crs_RL30030_0 | Introduction
The principal law governing pollution of the nation's surface waters is the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or Clean Water Act. Originally enacted in 1948, it was totally revised by amendments in 1972 that gave the act its current shape. The 1972 legislation spelled out ambitious programs for water quality improvement that have since been expanded and are still being implemented by industries, municipalities, and others. This report presents a summary of the law, describing the statute. Overview
The Clean Water Act (CWA) today consists of two parts, broadly speaking, one being the Title II and Title VI provisions, which authorize federal financial assistance for municipal sewage treatment plant construction. The other is regulatory requirements, found throughout the act, that apply to industrial and municipal dischargers. The act has been termed a technology-forcing statute because of the rigorous demands placed on those who are regulated by it to achieve higher and higher levels of pollution abatement. Control of toxic pollutant discharges has been a key focus of water quality programs. Prior to the 1987 amendments, programs in the Clean Water Act were primarily directed at point source pollution, wastes discharged from discrete and identifiable industrial and municipal sources, such as pipes and other outfalls. In contrast, except for general planning activities, little attention had been given to nonpoint source pollution (runoff of stormwater or snowmelt from agricultural lands, forests, construction sites, and urban areas), despite estimates that it represents more than 50% of the nation's remaining water pollution problems. Section 311 prohibits the discharge of oil or hazardous substances into U.S. waters. Federal and State Responsibilities
Under this act, federal jurisdiction is broad, particularly regarding establishment of national standards or effluent limitations. Certain responsibilities can be assumed by qualified states, in lieu of EPA, and this act, like other environmental laws, embodies a philosophy of federal-state partnership in which the federal government sets the agenda and standards for pollution abatement, while states carry out day-to-day activities of implementation and enforcement. Under Title VI of the act, grants to capitalize State Water Pollution Control Revolving Funds, or loan programs, were authorized beginning in FY1989 to replace the Title II grants. States contribute matching funds, and under the revolving loan fund concept, monies used for wastewater treatment construction are repaid to the state, to be available for project loans to other communities. Permits, Regulations, and Enforcement
To achieve its objectives, the CWA embodies the concept that all discharges into the nation's waters are unlawful, unless specifically authorized by a permit. The NPDES permit, containing effluent limitations on what may be discharged by a source, is the act's principal enforcement tool. | The principal law governing pollution of the nation's surface waters is the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or Clean Water Act. Originally enacted in 1948, it was totally revised by amendments in 1972 that gave the act its current dimensions. The 1972 legislation spelled out ambitious programs for water quality improvement that have since been expanded and are still being implemented by industries and municipalities.
This report presents a summary of the law, describing the statute without discussing its implementation. Other CRS reports discuss implementation, including CRS Report R42883, Water Quality Issues in the 113th Congress: An Overview, and numerous products cited in that report.
The Clean Water Act consists of two major parts, one being the provisions which authorize federal financial assistance for municipal sewage treatment plant construction. The other is the regulatory requirements that apply to industrial and municipal dischargers. The act has been termed a technology-forcing statute because of the rigorous demands placed on those who are regulated by it to achieve higher and higher levels of pollution abatement under deadlines specified in the law. Early on, emphasis was on controlling discharges of conventional pollutants (e.g., suspended solids or bacteria that are biodegradable and occur naturally in the aquatic environment), while control of toxic pollutant discharges has been a key focus of water quality programs more recently.
Prior to 1987, programs were primarily directed at point source pollution, that is, wastes discharged by industrial and municipal facilities from discrete sources such as pipes and outfalls. Amendments to the law in that year authorized measures to address nonpoint source pollution (runoff from farm lands, forests, construction sites, and urban areas), which is estimated to represent more than 50% of the nation's remaining water pollution problems. The act also prohibits discharge of oil and hazardous substances into U.S. waters.
Under this act, federal jurisdiction is broad, particularly regarding establishment of national standards or effluent limitations. Certain responsibilities are delegated to the states, and the act embodies a philosophy of federal-state partnership in which the federal government sets the agenda and standards for pollution abatement, while states carry out day-to-day activities of implementation and enforcement.
To achieve its objectives, the act is based on the concept that all discharges into the nation's waters are unlawful, unless specifically authorized by a permit, which is the act's principal enforcement tool. The law has civil, criminal, and administrative enforcement provisions and also permits citizen suit enforcement.
Financial assistance for constructing municipal sewage treatment plants and certain other types of water quality improvements projects is authorized under Title VI. It authorizes grants to capitalize State Water Pollution Control Revolving Funds, or loan programs. States contribute matching funds, and under the revolving loan fund concept, monies used for wastewater treatment construction are repaid to states, to be available for future construction in other communities. |
crs_RL33188 | crs_RL33188_0 | Although most of the levee breaches in coastal Louisiana were the result of the storm's surge flowing over levees, preliminary evidence suggests that three major breaches in downtown New Orleans occurred prior to the floodwalls being overtopped; that is, the floodwalls failed before their design was exceeded. The findings are likely to shape not only the future design of the hurricane protection system but also plans for rebuilding sections of the city and perspectives on the federal role and responsibility in the city's rebuilding efforts. One of the causes of failure being discussed is a poor or inadequate design for protecting the city from a Category 3 hurricane. The original project design was to control storm surge flowing into water bodies near downtown by building inlet barriers and canal floodgates. During the project's construction which began with authorization in 1965 and was ongoing when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, numerous factors contributed to changing the design of how to protect the city (e.g., including local environmental concerns, changing cost estimates, local flood protection preferences, and litigation); the final design attempted to reduce hurricane-related flooding in the city by increasing the height of levees and floodwalls, in lieu of the barriers and floodgates. The Corps' decision in the mid-1980s to recommend higher levees instead of the inlet barriers it had recommended in 1965 was shaped by multiple factors, including environmental litigation, project economics, and local preferences. The decision to not build floodgates, and instead build floodwalls along the canals, was made by the local project sponsors. The original design and the final design were intended to provide the same level of protection, i.e., protection from the rough equivalent of a Category 3 storm surge. This report discusses the evolution in the project's design, with specific reference to how and by whom design decisions were made. The focus is on two major design developments relevant to the current investigations into the floodwall failures in downtown New Orleans' during Hurricane Katrina: (1) the shift from the barriers at the inlets to Lake Pontchartrain to higher levees along the lake; and (2) the shift from floodgates at the mouth of the city's stormwater outfall canals that drain into Lake Pontchartrain to higher floodwalls along the length of the canals. Lake Pontchartrain Project
Congress authorized the Corps to protect New Orleans from the rough equivalent of a Category 3 storm when it authorized the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project in October1965. The Corps preferred floodgates to floodwalls along the Orleans Avenue and London Avenue canals. | Breached floodwalls in downtown New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina caused significant flooding. Unlike most of the flooding in coastal Louisiana which resulted from water flowing over levees and floodwalls as the storm's surge exceeded the structures' height, preliminary evidence suggests that three downtown New Orleans breaches occurred before their design was exceeded. That is, these downtown breaches resulted not from structures weakened by overtopping, but from the failure of the floodwalls and their foundations. Findings of ongoing investigations into the causes of the floodwall failures have implications for analyzing both the reliability of the existing system of levees and floodwalls and its repairs, and options for greater structural protection of New Orleans. Moreover, these findings may shape plans for rebuilding sections of the city and perspectives on the federal role and responsibility in the city's rebuilding efforts.
One possible cause of the failure is a poor or inadequate design. Following Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Congress authorized the Corps to construct with local levee districts the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project to protect the city from the rough equivalent of a Category 3 storm. The project's original design was to control storm surge flowing into water bodies near downtown by building inlet barriers and canal floodgates. During the project's construction which was ongoing when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, numerous factors (e.g., including local environmental concerns, changing cost estimates, local flood protection preferences, and litigation) contributed to changing how the city was to be protected; the final design attempted to reduce hurricane-related flooding in the city by increasing the height of levees and floodwalls, in lieu of the inlet barriers and canal floodgates.
This report documents the evolution in the design of the Lake Pontchartrain project, with specific reference to how and by whom design decisions were made. The focus is on two major design developments relevant to the current investigations into floodwall failures in downtown New Orleans: (1) the shift from barriers at Lake Pontchartrain's inlets to higher levees along the lakeshore; and (2) the shift from floodgates at the mouth of the city's stormwater outfall canals that drain into Lake Pontchartrain to higher floodwalls along the length of the canals.
The Corps' decision in the mid-1980s to recommend higher levees instead of the inlet barriers it had recommended in 1965 was shaped by multiple factors, including environmental litigation, project economics, and local preferences. The Corps preferred floodgates to floodwalls along the Orleans Avenue and London Avenue canals. The decision to not build floodgates, and instead build floodwalls along the canals, was made by local project sponsors. The original design and the final design were intended to provide the same level of protection, i.e., protection from the rough equivalent of a Category 3 storm surge. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22506 | crs_RS22506_0 | Regulation of Surplus Lines Insurance
Surplus lines insurance regulation differs from other insurance regulation both in substance and in the primary focus. In regulating regular insurance transactions, much of the state's focus is on the insurer itself. To operate as a surplus lines broker, most states require an additional license on top of the license required for insurance brokers in general. At this point, while the consumer is outside of the regular insurance market, the states generally continue to establish standards to protect consumers against surplus lines insurers who might be unable to pay claims that are made. In addition, the National Insurance Act would have preempted state laws requiring product and price approvals for federally chartered insurers. The bill's first two sections would have given preeminent regulatory and tax authority to the home state of the insured, preempting the tax and regulatory laws of other states who might have a claim on the insurance transaction such as the home state of the broker or the location of some of the insured risk. H.R. The bill was considered under Suspension of the Rules on June 25, 2007, and passed the House by voice vote. S. 929 also entitled the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2007, was introduced in the Senate on March 20, 2007, by Senators Mel Martinez and Bill Nelson. 5637 as passed by the House during the 109 th Congress. It was referred to the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee as was H.R. Neither bill was acted on by the Senate in the 110 th Congress. 111th Congress
The Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2009 (H.R. H.R. 1065 , which passed the House in the 110 th Congress. 2571 as a floor amendment to the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 ( H.R. 4173 ). This language was included in an en bloc amendment by Representative Barney Frank ( H.Amdt. 4173 passed the House on a vote of 223-202 on December 11, 2009, with the language included as Title IX. The committee did, however, markup and order reported the Restoring America's Financial Stability Act of 2010 on March 22, 2010. Title V, Subtitle B of this bill is entitled the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 and contains language nearly identical to S. 1363 . The bill was reported as S. 3217 on April 15, 2010; after various floor amendments, none of which altered Title V, Subtitle B, the Senate inserted the language of S. 3217 into H.R. The House agreed to the conference report on June 30, 2010, by a vote of 237-192 and the Senate agreed to the conference report on July 15, 2010, by a vote of 60-39. President Obama signed the legislation into law as P.L. 111-203 on July 21, 2010. The National Insurance Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 1880)
H.R. This bill includes language similar to the previous National Insurance Act of 2007 that would (1) include surplus lines insurance under the definition of an "insurance producer" and allow a national agency to sell surplus lines insurance and (2) allow only the state in which an insured party resides or maintains its principal place of business to tax a surplus lines transaction. 1880 allows for the federal chartering of insurers and insurance producers and loosens some restrictions on insurance rate and form regulation, so it might have an impact on surplus lines insurance as some insurers and producers may choose to become federally chartered, rather than remaining state-chartered surplus lines insurers. | In general, insurance is a highly regulated financial product. Every state requires licenses for insurance companies, and most states closely regulate both company conduct and the details of the particular insurance products sold in the state. This regulation is usually seen as important for consumer protection; however, it also creates barriers to entry in the insurance market and typically reduces to some degree the supply of insurance that is available to consumers. Rather than requiring consumers who may be unable to find insurance from a licensed insurer to simply go without insurance, states have allowed consumers to purchase insurance from non-licensed insurers, commonly called nonadmitted or surplus lines insurers. Although any sort of insurance could be sold by a surplus lines insurer, most such transactions tend to be for rarer and more exceptional property and casualty risks, such as art and antiques, hazardous materials, natural disasters, amusement parks, and environmental or pollution risks.
Although surplus lines insurance is sold by insurers who do not hold a regular state insurance license, it is not unregulated. The sale of this insurance is regulated and taxed by the states largely through requirements placed on the brokers who usually facilitate the insurance transactions. The varying state requirements for surplus lines insurance have led to calls for greater harmonization between the states' laws and for federal intervention to promote uniformity. Such federal intervention is the central focus of the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2009 (H.R. 2571/S. 1363), which passed the House by voice vote on September 9, 2009. This act was also added as an amendment to the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 (H.R. 4173) when it was considered on the House floor. H.R. 4173 passed the House on December 11, 2009. The Restoring America's Financial Stability Act of 2010 (S. 3217) included nearly identical language as well. This legislation was reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on April 15, 2010, and subsequently brought to the Senate floor for consideration. On May 20, 2010, the Senate finished consideration, inserting the amended text of S. 3217 into H.R. 4173 and passing the amended H.R. 4173. The Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act language was included in the H.R. 4173 conference report, which was agreed to by the House on June 30, 2010, and by the Senate on July 15, 2010. President Obama signed the legislation, now P.L. 111-203, on July 21, 2010.
Provisions aimed at harmonizing state laws regarding surplus lines insurance were also included in the National Insurance Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 1880), whose central focus is the creation of a federal charter for the insurance industry when this bill was introduced on April 2, 2009.
Past Congresses have also taken up legislation on surplus lines insurance. Versions of the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act were passed by the House in both the 109th and 110th Congresses, but the Senate did not act on surplus lines legislation in either case. Provisions on surplus lines insurance similar to those in H.R. 1880 were included in the National Insurance Act of 2007, but that bill was not acted on in the 110th Congress.
This report will be updated as warranted by legislative events. |
crs_RS22882 | crs_RS22882_0 | Supreme Court Ruling
Voting 6 to 3, in April 2008, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 7 th Circuit, persuaded that both lower courts had correctly determined that the evidence in the record was insufficient to support a facial attack on the constitutionality of Indiana's Voter ID Law. On the basis of the record before the Court, the lead opinion determines that it "cannot conclude that the Voter ID Law imposes 'excessively burdensome requirements' on any class of voters" and that it "'imposes only a limited burden on voters' rights,'" which are justified by the interests advanced by the State of Indiana. | In a splintered decision issued in April 2008, the Supreme Court upheld an Indiana statute requiring photo identification for voting, determining that lower courts had correctly decided that the evidence in the record was insufficient to support a facial attack on the constitutionality of the law. Written by Justice Stevens, the lead opinion in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board finds that the law imposes only "a limited burden on voters' rights," which is justified by state interests. |
crs_R42857 | crs_R42857_0 | However, for rank-and-file federal employees the concept of "conflicts of interest" generally controls the restriction on or permissibility of outside, compensated activity, and would bar such "moonlighting" when (1) a statute or a specific agency regulation expressly prohibits that particular kind of outside employment activity, or (2) an outside activity, because of the particular official duties of the employee, would require that the employee "recuse" or disqualify himself or herself from official duties to such an extent as to impair the effectiveness of his or her employment for the government. Conflicting Outside Employment
The conflict of interest limitations on outside, additional private employment of federal employees, which are set out in provisions of federal law, regulation, and executive order, establish the general principle that employees may not receive compensation from certain private parties where a potential "conflict of interest" may arise, that is, where the outside private activity may conflict with one's federal, public position and duties. This standard must be observed by federal employees in the conduct of any outside business and financial activities and relationships. Statutory and Regulatory Restrictions
There are certain specific statutory restrictions which might apply in some circumstances to restrict or prohibit the receipt of outside compensation by executive branch personnel, or to limit certain types of outside activities for private parties. In addition to the general conflict of interest rules and standards discussed above, the Office of Government Ethics has issued regulations on outside lecturing and writing, limiting such compensated activity where particular ethics issues related to an employee's governmental responsibilities may arise. Numerous other agencies and departments in the executive branch have also promulgated regulations which provide specific restrictions on particular types or areas of outside, compensated private employment. High-Ranking Government Officials
There are other, broad prohibitions and restrictions for higher-ranking government officials which may not generally apply to rank-and-file government employees. 78d(a). | Most federal employees in the executive branch of government are not subject to a broad, overall prohibition on so-called "moonlighting." Rank-and-file employees of the government are generally free to take an additional, compensated job outside of their federal work, subject to certain specific "conflict of interest" limitations.
High-ranking officials of the government, on the other hand, may be prohibited from taking any outside compensated private job if they are presidential appointees, and may otherwise be limited in the type of outside employment and the amount of private compensation they may receive if they are non-career officials receiving compensation from the federal government over a particular amount.
For most employees of the federal government, other than high-level appointees and non-career officials, outside employment opportunities and activities are prohibited when they create a "conflict of interest" for the employee with respect to his or her official duties and responsibilities for the government. The Office of Government Ethics expressly provides in regulation that such a "conflict of interest" will arise in two circumstances: (1) when the activity is expressly prohibited either by statute or by a specific agency regulation concerning such conduct; and (2) when general "conflict of interest" principles and rules would require that an employee recuse or disqualify himself or herself from participating in governmental matters to such an extent as to "materially impair" the employee's ability to do his or her duty.
This report examines general statutory restrictions on certain types and categories of outside, compensated employment activities by federal employees, and surveys specific agency and departmental regulations prohibiting particular types and areas of outside, compensated employment activities for employees of that agency or department. |
crs_RL33650 | crs_RL33650_0 | Introduction
In the wake of disclosures related to the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, congressional attention has been focused on issues regarding authorization, review, and oversight of electronic surveillance programs designed to acquire foreign intelligence information or to address international terrorism. Three related bills have been introduced to date in the 110 th Congress: H.R. 11 , S. 187 , and S. 139 . § 1801 et seq. In a January 17, 2007, letter to Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Gonzales advised them that, on January 10, 2007, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) judge "issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization." The Attorney General stated that, in light of these orders, which "will allow the necessary speed and agility," all surveillance previously occurring under the TSP will now be conducted subject to the approval of the FISC. He indicated further that, under these circumstances, the President has determined not to reauthorize the TSP when the current authorization expires. The NSA program has been challenged on legal and constitutional grounds. 06-CV-10204 (E.D. The decision has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On October 4, 2006, the Sixth Circuit stayed Judge Taylor's August 17, 2006, judgment and permanent injunction pending appeal, American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency , Docket Nos. One of the bills considered in the 109 th Congress, S. 3886 , the Terrorist Tracking, Identification, and Prosecution Act of 2006, was introduced by Senator William H. Frist on September 11, 2006. Title II of S. 3886 , the National Security Surveillance Act of 2006, is substantively identical to S. 2453 as reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee. This report summarizes Title II of S. 3886 ( S. 2453 , as reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee), and compares its language with the existing provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1805, in a number of respects. | In the wake of disclosures related to the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, congressional attention has been focused on issues regarding authorization, review, and oversight of electronic surveillance programs designed to acquire foreign intelligence information or to address international terrorism. A number of legislative approaches were considered in the 109th Congress, and three related bills have been introduced in the 110th Congress: H.R. 11, S. 187, and S. 139.
In a January 17, 2007, letter to Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Gonzales advised them that, on January 10, 2007, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) judge "issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization." In light of these orders, which "will allow the necessary speed and agility," he stated that all surveillance previously occurring under the TSP will now be conducted subject to the approval of the FISC. He indicated further that the President has determined not to reauthorize the TSP when the current authorization expires.
The NSA program has been challenged on legal and constitutional grounds. On August 17, 2006, in American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, Case No. 06-CV-10204 (E.D. Mich. August 17, 2006), Judge Taylor held the program unconstitutional and granted a permanent injunction of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. The decision has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On October 4, 2006, the Sixth Circuit granted a motion staying Judge Taylor's judgment and permanent injunction pending appeal.
One of the bills considered in the 109th Congress, S. 3886, the Terrorist Tracking, Identification, and Prosecution Act of 2006, was introduced by Senator William H. Frist on September 11, 2006. Title II of S. 3886, the National Security Surveillance Act of 2006, substantively parallels S. 2453 as reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee without a written report. This report summarizes Title II of S. 3886/S. 2453, as reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and compares its language with the existing provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. The 110th Congress may wish to contemplate similar or different legislative approaches to these issues, or may choose to forego legislation in light of the new FISC orders and the anticipated termination of the TSP, while continuing congressional oversight. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RS22711 | crs_RS22711_0 | Introduction
By long tradition, most regular appropriations bills are considered by the House of Representatives under the terms of an open rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House (or under terms similar to an open rule). To provide scheduling predictability and to facilitate progress in a busy chamber, it has become common for the House, following a period of initial consideration of a regular appropriations bill under an open rule, to adopt a UC agreement negotiated by the Appropriations Committee, party leaders, and interested Members that comprehensively regulates further debate and amendment of the legislation. Structuring the UC agreement in this way puts control of debate time almost exclusively in the hands of committee leaders instead of rank-and-file Members. | Regular appropriations bills have traditionally been considered in the House of Representatives under the terms of open rules, which provide substantial freedom of debate and amendment. It has become common, however, for the House to begin considering a spending bill under such an open rule, then quickly negotiate a comprehensive unanimous consent (UC) agreement establishing more structured terms for debating and amending the measure. Such UC agreements seek to strike a balance between the needs of party and committee leaders for efficiency and scheduling predictability, and the desires of rank-and-file Members to debate and freely amend legislation funding the operations of the federal government. |
crs_98-253 | crs_98-253_0 | U.S. Agricultural Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance
According to USDA, FY2012 agricultural exports are forecast to reach $131 billion, slightly below the fiscal 2011 record level of $137 billion. Cotton is the United States' most export-dependent field crop. Beef exports, which grew from around 4% of production in 1990 to almost 10% by 2003, have slowly recovered from export bans on U.S. beef following the 2003 discovery of a BSE-infected cow in the United States. In FY2011, high-value exports accounted for 56.3% of total U.S. agricultural exports and bulk exports for 43.6%. Agricultural Exports
Canada , with Mexico a U.S. partner in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), is the largest market for U.S. agricultural exports, with exports valued at $19 billion. Lingering effects of mad cow disease continue to affect demand for U.S. beef in world markets; the U.S. share of world beef exports had reached 18.9% in 2000. Dairy Products: For 2012, New Zealand (29.3%) and the EU (27.3%) are forecast to be the leading suppliers of nonfat dry milk to world markets (see Figure 15 and Table 15 ). Agricultural Imports
High-value horticultural products (fruits, nuts, vegetables, and preparations; wine and malt beverages; nursery stock and flowers; and others) are the largest category of U.S. agricultural imports, and are forecast to be $43.3 billion in FY2012. U.S. Agricultural Imports by Country of Origin
NAFTA partners Canada ($20.7 billion) and Mexico ($17.3 billion) and the EU-27 ($16.8 billion) are forecast to be the source of more than 50% of total U.S. agricultural imports ($106.5 billion) in FY2012. Indonesia is expected to ship $4.7 billion of farm products to the United States in FY2012; agricultural imports from Brazil are expected to reach $4.4 billion in FY2012. Agricultural exports to Latin America, including Mexico, and to Canada have grown rapidly since the early 1990s, due in part to geographic proximity and NAFTA, among other factors. Agricultural Exports to Asian Markets
Like the EU, Japan also has been a relatively stable and slow-growing market for U.S. agricultural exports. U.S. By one widely used measure, the producer support estimate (PSE) calculated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United States provided an estimated $25.6 billion in agricultural support to producers in 2010 (provisional estimate). As a percent of gross farm receipts, the PSE for the United States is 7% in 2010, the third-lowest among OECD countries ( Figure 24 , Table 24 ). Trade Measures
With agricultural exports totaling $137 billion in FY2011, the United States is the world's largest exporter of agricultural products. The United States applies tariffs and tariff quotas to products entering the United States from abroad. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States' average applied tariff for agricultural products is 8.9%, which is above the average applied U.S. tariff for non-agricultural products (4%), but relatively low compared to other WTO member countries. Food Aid
The United States is the world's leading supplier of food aid. It provides more than half of the global total. Wheat and wheat flour are the main commodities provided as food aid, but rice and vegetable oils are also important in P.L. | U.S. agricultural exports, imports, and the agricultural trade surplus are expected by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to reach record levels in FY2011. FY2011 U.S. farm exports are forecast by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to reach $137 billion, while agricultural imports are expected to reach $93 billion. The agricultural trade surplus is projected to be $44 billion. Exports of high-value products (e.g., fruits, vegetables, meats, wine and beer) have increased since the early 1990s and now account for 60% of total U.S. agricultural exports. Exports of bulk commodities (e.g., soybeans, wheat, and feed grains) remain significant.
Leading markets for U.S. agricultural exports are China, Canada, Mexico, Japan, the European Union (EU), South Korea, and Taiwan. The United States in 2011 is forecast to be the world's leading exporter of corn, wheat, soybeans, and cotton. The U.S. share of world beef exports, which declined after the 2003 discovery of a case of "mad cow disease" in the United States, is recovering as more countries have re-opened their markets to U.S. product. The United States, European Union, Australia, and New Zealand are dominant suppliers of dairy products in global agricultural trade. New Zealand and the United States are the main suppliers of nonfat dry milk to world markets, while the EU is the leading supplier of cheeses.
China has been among the fastest-growing markets for U.S. agricultural exports. Agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico, both partners of the United States in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have also grown rapidly.
Most U.S. agricultural imports are high-value products, including fruits, nuts, vegetables, wine, and beer. The biggest import suppliers are NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico, and the EU. Together these three are forecast to provide more than 50% of total U.S. agricultural imports in FY2011. Brazil, Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, and Colombia are also important suppliers of agricultural imports to the United States.
According to estimates by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United States provides the third-lowest amount of government policy-generated support to its agricultural sector among OECD countries. The United States' average applied tariff for agricultural products is estimated by the World Trade Organization to be 8.9%, a little more than twice the average applied tariff for non-agricultural products. Export subsidies, export credit guarantees, and market development programs are among the programs used by the United States to promote U.S. agricultural exports. The United States also provides U.S. agricultural commodities to developing countries as food aid for emergency relief or use in nonemergency development activities. |
crs_RL30804 | crs_RL30804_0 | Introduction: The Electoral College System in Brief
The President and the Vice President of the United States are elected indirectly by an institution known as the electoral college. It provides for the election of the President and Vice President by electors appointed by each state in a manner determined by its legislature. Electoral College Criticisms and Controversies
Proponents of presidential election reform cite several shortcomings in the electoral college as justifications for reform or abolition of the current system. Under the district system, two electors are chosen on a statewide, at-large basis, and one is elected in each congressional district. The Faithless Elector
Although presidential electors are generally expected to support the candidates in whose name they are chosen, 26 states plus the District of Columbia go one step further and attempt to bind their electors by one of several means: (1) requiring an oath or pledge or requiring the elector to cast a vote for the candidates of the political party he or she represents, all under penalty of law; (2) requiring a pledge or affirmation of support, without any penalty of law; (3) directing electors to support the winning ticket; and (4) directing electors to vote for the candidates of the party they represent. This contingency has been the subject of concerned speculation and unsettled debate. Proposals to reform the electoral college in recent Congresses generally fall into two categories: those that would eliminate the electoral college system entirely, replacing it with direct popular election, and those that seek to repair perceived defects in the existing arrangement. They assert that the founders of the Constitution intended the states to play an important role in the presidential elections and that the electoral college system provides for a federal election of the President that is no less legitimate than the system of allocating equal state representation in the Senate. Electoral College Reform
In contrast to direct popular election, the three proposals described in this section would retain the electoral college, but would repair perceived defects in the existing system. Under most proposals advocating the proportional plan, the presidential and vice presidential candidates receiving a simple majority of the electoral vote, or a plurality of at least 40% of the electoral votes, would be elected. Nader/LaDuke and other minor party and independent candidates would not have gained sufficient popular votes to qualify for electoral votes under this plan. The Automatic Plan
The automatic plan would amend the present system by abolishing the office of presidential elector and by allocating state electoral votes on an automatic winner-take-all basis to the candidates receiving the highest number of popular votes in a state. Furthermore, the automatic plan would preserve the present two-major party system under a state-by-state, winner-take-all method of allotting electoral votes. Reform Proposals Following the 2000 Presidential Election
In the presidential election of 2000, the electoral college system resulted in a President and Vice President who received more electoral votes, but fewer popular votes, than the electoral vote runners-up for the first time in 112 years, a classic case of what some observers identify as an electoral college "misfire." It has delivered the presidency to the popular and electoral vote winners in 46 out of 51 elections since it became operational in 1804, and even in the case of "misfires," that is, cases in which a candidate was elected with a majority of electoral votes but a minority of popular votes, the results it has delivered have been widely, if not universally, accepted as legitimate. | American voters elect the President and Vice President of the United States indirectly, through an arrangement known as the electoral college system. The electoral college system comprises a complex mosaic of constitutional provisions, state and federal laws, and political party rules and practices.
Although the electoral college system has delivered uncontested results in 46 out of 50 presidential elections since it assumed its present constitutional form in 1804, it has been the subject of persistent criticism and frequent proposals for reform. Reform advocates cite several problems with the current system, including a close or multi-candidate election can result in no electoral college majority, leading to a contingent election in Congress; the current system can result in the election of a President and Vice President who received a majority of electoral votes, but fewer popular votes, than their opponents; the formula for assignment of electoral votes is claimed to provide an unfair advantage for less populous states and does not account for population changes between censuses; and the winner-take-all system used by most states does not recognize the proportional strength of the losing major party, minor party, and independent candidates. On the other hand, defenders assert that the electoral college system is an integral and vital component of federalism, that it has a 92% record of non-controversial results, and that it promotes an ideologically and geographically broad two-party system. They maintain that repair of the electoral college system, rather than abolition, would eliminate any perceived defects while retaining its overall strengths.
Proponents of presidential election reform generally advocate either completely eliminating the electoral college system, replacing it with direct popular election, or repairing perceived defects in the existing system. The direct election alternative would replace the electoral college with a single, nationwide count of popular votes. That is, the candidates winning a plurality of votes would be elected; most proposals provide for a runoff election if no candidates received a minimum of 40% of the popular vote. Electoral college reform proposals include (1) the district plan, awarding each state's two at-large electoral votes to the statewide popular vote winners, and one electoral vote to the winning candidates in each congressional district; (2) the proportional plan, awarding electoral votes in states in direct proportion to the popular vote gained in the state by each candidate; and (3) the automatic plan, awarding all of each state's electoral votes directly on a winner-take-all basis to the statewide vote winners. Major reforms of the system can be effected only by constitutional amendment, a process that requires two-thirds approval by both houses of Congress, followed by ratification by three-fourths (38) of the states, usually within a period of seven years. This report will be updated as events warrant. For further information, please consult CRS Report RL32611, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL32612, The Electoral College: Reform Proposals in the 108th Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34247 | crs_RL34247_0 | Introduction
The use of carbon monoxide (CO) in the packaging of meat and fish has generated considerable debate. The presence of CO results in the meat turning a bright red color that lasts longer than the color in untreated meat. Additionally, fish treated with CO (for example, as part of a gas mixture called "tasteless smoke") gain a fresher appearance and a red tint. The meat industry, consumer groups, scientists, and policy makers disagree as to whether the use of CO in meat and fish packaging should be regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), through labeling or otherwise, and whether CO should be a substance Generally Recognized As Safe (GRAS) under current and proposed FDA rules. This section will focus on the FDA's regulation of food additives and GRAS substances, which the agency is responsible for under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) and parts of Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations. In 2000, the roles of FDA and FSIS in this joint review process of substances used in meat and poultry products were laid out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). GRAS Notices Regarding Intended Uses of Carbon Monoxide
Under the process outlined in the FDA's 1997 proposed rule, manufacturers have submitted GRAS notifications to the FDA that state their view that carbon monoxide is a GRAS substance. Proposed Legislation in the 110th Congress
Two bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives regarding the use of carbon monoxide in meat and poultry products: H.R. Additionally, the discussion draft of the Food and Drug Administration Globalization Act of 2008, issued by Representatives Dingell, Pallone, and Stupak, similarly addresses the issue. Other bills also address GRAS substances: H.R. 2633 , H.R. 3290 , H.R. 3580 , H.R. 6635 , and S. 1342 . 3115 , H.R. 3610 , and the discussion draft propose to amend FFDCA § 201. Under the proposals, if carbon monoxide is used to treat meat, poultry or seafood that is intended for human consumption and if the conditions of that use would affect the color of the products, carbon monoxide must be treated as a color additive under FFDCA, unless the product's label includes a statement that is "prominently and conspicuously" placed to notify the consumer of the use of carbon monoxide and to warn the consumer of proper factors to judge the safety of the product. The bills and the discussion draft would allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish alternative labeling requirements five years after the effective date of the labeling requirement, if the Secretary finds that the labeling requirement is no longer necessary to prevent consumer deception. The discussion draft contains an additional provision related to GRAS determinations that would require the Secretary to publish, in the Federal Register , notice of receipt of a request for a substance to be determined by the Secretary to be GRAS. The Secretary would then have 90 days after publication of the notice to determine whether the substance is GRAS; the Secretary's determination would also be published in the Federal Register . | The use of carbon monoxide (CO) in the packaging of meat and fish has generated considerable debate. The presence of CO results in the meat turning a bright red color that lasts longer than the color in untreated meat. Additionally, fish treated with CO gain a fresher appearance and a red tint. The meat industry, consumer groups, scientists, and policy makers disagree as to whether the use of CO in meat and fish packaging should be regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), through labeling or otherwise, and whether CO should be a substance Generally Recognized As Safe (GRAS) under current and proposed FDA rules.
Two bills have been introduced in the 110 th Congress regarding the use of carbon monoxide in meat, poultry products, and seafood: H.R. 3115 and H.R. 3610 . The discussion draft of the Food and Drug Administration Globalization Act of 2008, issued by Representatives Dingell, Pallone, and Stupak, similarly addresses the issue. The bills and the discussion draft propose to amend section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). Under the proposals, if CO is used to treat meat, poultry, or seafood that is intended for human consumption, and if the conditions of that use would affect the color of the products, CO must be treated as a color additive under FFDCA, unless the product's label includes a statement that is prominently and conspicuously placed to notify the consumer of the use of CO and to warn the consumer of proper factors to judge the safety of the product. The bills and the discussion draft would allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish alternative labeling requirements five years after the effective date of the labeling requirement, if the Secretary finds that the labeling requirement is no longer necessary to prevent consumer deception. The discussion draft contains an additional provision related to GRAS determinations that would require the Secretary to publish, in the Federal Register , notice of receipt of a request for a substance to be determined by the Secretary to be GRAS. The Secretary would then have 90 days after publication of the notice to determine whether the substance is GRAS; the Secretary's determination would also be published in the lain Federal Register . Other bills also address GRAS substances: H.R. 2633 , H.R. 3290 , H.R. 3580 , H.R. 6635 , and S. 1342 .
This report provides an overview of the FDA's regulation of GRAS substances, which are exempt from the premarket approval process for food additives. The report next discusses the FDA's 1997 proposed rule, which would create a notification procedure for GRAS substances through which manufacturers can notify the FDA of their "determination that a particular use of a substance is GRAS." The FDA has been using this GRAS notification procedure since the publication of the proposed rule on an "interim policy" basis. The roles of the USDA and FDA are also discussed, including the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding regarding review of substances used in the production of meat and poultry products. Finally, the report examines GRAS notices regarding intended uses of carbon monoxide. |
crs_RL34451 | crs_RL34451_0 | Most Recent Developments
On June 30, 2008, President Bush signed H.R. 2642 ( P.L. The bill also extends unemployment payments, and expands veterans' educational benefits. As enacted, the bill would cost an estimated $202 billion in FY2008 and FY2009 and almost $60 billion more through FY2018, of which
$183.5 billion is supplemental appropriations for defense, international affairs, disaster relief, and some other domestic programs, including $2.65 billion of newly added funds to respond to Midwest flooding earlier in the month; $14 billion in FY2008 and FY2009 is for extended unemployment benefits, with a net cost, following savings in future years, of $10 billion over eleven years through FY2018; $796 million in FY2008 and FY2009 and $63 billion through FY2018 is for expanded veterans educational benefits; and $1.2 billion in FY2008 and FY2009 is due to Medicaid rules changes. The final bill reflects compromises with the White House on several issues. Earlier Congressional Action
In earlier action, on May 15, 2008, the House approved an initial version of the bill that provided $21 billion for military construction, international affairs, and domestic programs, but did not include $162.5 billion that the House leadership had proposed for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By a vote of 141-149 with 132 voting present, the House rejected the first amendment to provide $96.6 billion in FY2008 and $65.9 billion in FY2009 funding for military operations. A week later, on May 22, 2008, the Senate approved an amended version of H.R. 2642 , providing $194 billion in supplemental appropriations for FY2008 and FY2009, and also approving extended unemployment payments, expanded veterans' educational benefits, Medicaid rules changes, and adding a limit on Medicare payments to new specialty hospitals. On key roll call votes, all of which required 60 votes for approval, the Senate
rejected by a vote of 34-63 an amendment to the House bill to provide funding for defense programs and to establish various Iraq policy provisions; approved by a vote of 75-22 an amendment providing defense funding without policy restrictions; and approved by a vote of 70-26 an amendment providing funding for domestic programs, international affairs, and military construction. adds $2.65 billion to replenish accounts expected to be used for Midwest flood relief—the White House had reportedly requested $1.8 billion; delays implementation of six of seven Administration changes in Medicaid regulations that would reduce Federal payments to the states, rather than of all seven as in the House and Senate bills; drops most Iraq-related policy provisions that were in the House-passed version of the bill, including a provision requiring withdrawal of combat troops within 18 months and others requiring that troops meet targets for readiness and for dwell time at home between deployments—the bill includes measures requiring the Iraqi government to match amounts of some reconstruction assistance and prohibiting the use of funds to establish permanent bases in Iraq, and it extends mandatory fraud reporting requirements to contractors working abroad; provides $5.8 billion for Gulf Coast hurricane protection levees, as the Administration requested, and deletes $4.6 billion in additional flood-relief funding in the Senate bill, though the final bill also adds $73 million for housing vouchers; provides $4.2 billion for military construction, which is $2.2 billion above the Administration request, $1.2 billion above the Senate level, and $0.4 billion below the House May 15-passed bill; provides $400 million in unrequested funds for science programs rather than $1.2 billion as in the Senate bill; provides $150 million to bolster Food and Drug Administration safety programs, compared to $275 million in the Senate bill; and provides $178 million for the Bureau of Prisons and $210 million for the Bureau of the Census, as requested by the agencies, though not formally included in the Administration's May 2, 2008, supplemental request, and as included in both the House and Senate bills. Key Issues in the Bill
Expanded GI Bill Veterans' Education Benefits
The initial House- and the Senate-passed versions of the FY2008 supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. 2642 , as passed by the House on June 19 and the Senate on June 26, includes a version of the initial Webb/Mitchell expansion of veterans educational benefits, with a provision added to allow benefits to be transferred to spouses or other dependents, as the White House had urged. Of the President's total emergency request, $102.5 billion for defense and $5.4 billion for international affairs remained outstanding. Congressional Action on FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Through December 2007
Administration Requests
Between February and October of 2007, the Administration submitted requests for FY2008 emergency supplemental appropriations in three blocks. 110-161 , on December 26. | On June 30, 2008, President Bush signed into law a bill, H.R. 2642 (P.L. 110-252), that makes supplemental appropriations for FY2008 and FY2009, extends unemployment payments, and expands veterans' educational benefits. The House approved the measure on June 19 and the Senate on June 26. As enacted, the bill reflects compromises with the White House on several key issues. It extends unemployment benefits for 13 weeks but not 26, allows veterans' educational benefits to be transferred to dependents, does not include an offsetting tax increase, limits other domestic spending, and delays implementation of six, rather than seven, new Medicaid rules. The amended bill also drops most Iraq-related policy provisions that had been in earlier versions. In all, the bill provides $183.5 billion in supplemental appropriations, including $2.65 billion of newly added funds to respond to Midwest floods. Extended unemployment benefits are estimated to cost a net of $10 billion over ten years and enhanced veterans educational benefits $63 billion.
Earlier, the House approved an initial version of the bill on May 15, 2008. Procedurally, the House took up H.R. 2642, a bill on a different topic, and considered three amendments. By a vote of 141-149, with 132 Republicans voting "present," the House rejected an amendment providing $162.5 billion in FY2008 and FY2009 for military operations. It adopted a second amendment setting out Iraq-related policies, including a requirement that combat forces be withdrawn from Iraq within 18 months. And it approved a third amendment to expand veterans' educational benefits offset by a tax surcharge; extend unemployment compensation; delay new Medicaid regulations; and provide $21 billion in supplemental appropriations.
On May 22, 2008, the Senate approved an amended version of the bill providing $194 billion in supplemental funding. The Senate-passed bill included $162.5 billion for defense and about $8 billion more than the House bill for domestic programs. The bill expanded veterans' educational benefits without an offset and limited Medicare payments to new specialty hospitals. On key roll calls, the Senate rejected by 34-63 an amendment to provide defense funding and to establish Iraq-related policies; approved by 75-22 an amendment to provide defense funding without policy restrictions; and approved by 70-26 an amendment to fund domestic, international affairs, and military construction programs.
During its first session, the 110th Congress approved FY2008 emergency supplemental appropriations of $86.8 billion for the Department of Defense and $2.4 billion for international affairs. This left unresolved Administration requests for $102.5 billion for defense and $5.4 billion for international affairs. For congressional action on FY2008 supplemental funding through December 2007, see CRS Report RL34278, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations for Global War on Terror Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes, which will not be updated further. This CRS report, RL34451, reviews congressional action on remaining FY2008 and additional FY2009 supplemental funding. |
crs_R44425 | crs_R44425_0 | Background
Certain individuals and families without access to subsidized health insurance coverage may be eligible for premium tax credits. These premium credits, authorized under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended), apply toward the cost of purchasing specific types of health plans offered by private health insurance companies. Individuals who receive premium credits also may be eligible for subsidies that reduce cost-sharing expenses. Exchanges operate in every state and the District of Columbia (DC). Premium Tax Credits
The dollar amount of the premium tax credit is based on a statutory formula and varies from individual to individual. Individuals who are eligible for the premium credits generally are required to contribute some amount toward the purchase of their health insurance. The premium credit is refundable, so individuals may claim the full credit amount when filing their taxes, even if they have little or no federal income tax liability. The credit also is advanceable, so individuals may choose to receive the credit in advance of filing taxes on a monthly basis to coincide with the payment of insurance premiums (technically, advance payments go directly to insurers). Eligibility
In order to be eligible to receive premium tax credits, individuals must meet the following criteria:
file federal income tax returns; enroll in a plan through an individual exchange; have annual household income at or above 100% of the federal poverty level (FPL) but not more than 400% FPL; and not be eligible for minimum essential coverage (see " Not Eligible for Minimum Essential Coverage " section in this report), with exceptions. Individuals who are eligible for cost-sharing assistance may receive both types of subsidies, as long as they meet the applicable eligibility requirements. The ACA requires the HHS Secretary to provide full reimbursements to insurers that provide cost-sharing subsidies. One type of cost-sharing assistance reduces such limits (see Table 5 ). | Certain individuals without access to subsidized health insurance coverage may be eligible for premium tax credits, as established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended). The dollar amount of the premium credit varies from individual to individual, based on a formula specified in statute. Individuals who are eligible for the premium credit, however, generally are still required to contribute some amount toward the purchase of health insurance.
In order to be eligible to receive premium tax credits, individuals must have annual household income at or above 100% of the federal poverty level (FPL) but not more than 400% FPL; not be eligible for certain types of health insurance coverage, with exceptions; file federal income tax returns; and enroll in a plan through an individual exchange. Exchanges are not insurance companies; rather, exchanges serve as marketplaces for the purchase of health insurance. They operate in every state and the District of Columbia (DC).
The premium credit is refundable, so individuals may claim the full credit amount when filing their taxes, even if they have little or no federal income tax liability. The credit also is advanceable, so individuals may choose to receive the credit on a monthly basis to coincide with the payment of insurance premiums. The ACA premium credit is financed through permanent appropriations authorized under the federal tax code.
Individuals who receive premium credits also may be eligible for subsidies that reduce cost-sharing expenses. The ACA established two types of cost-sharing subsidies (or cost-sharing reductions). One type of subsidy reduces annual cost-sharing limits; the other directly reduces cost-sharing requirements (e.g., lowers a deductible). Individuals who are eligible for cost-sharing reductions may receive both types. Although applicable health plans must provide these cost-sharing reductions, such plans are no longer receiving payments to reimburse them for the cost of providing the subsidies. |
crs_RL33714 | crs_RL33714_0 | The Energy Information Administration (EIA), in its October 2006 Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook (STEWFO), provided encouraging news for residential natural gas consumers. The current environment of declining prices is compared to last year, as well as near-term future projections that continue to show a tight market and high prices. Electric power generators consume large quantities, and pay the lowest per unit price. The primary use of natural gas by residential consumers, home heating, tends to be quite price inelastic; consequently, the onset of cold temperatures causes demand peaks largely independent of the level of prices. Market Conditions 2006
Consumption
Aggregate consumption of natural gas in the United States for the first seven months of 2006 was 4.1%, or 551 billion cubic feet (bcf), lower than the comparable period in 2005. Consumption by electric power generators is a derived demand in the sense that their demand for natural gas is dependent on, and derived from, consumers' demand for electric power, which has been growing. Although these two factors affect all market segments, their relative effects vary across the market segments. As a result of this inability to remain competitive in the face of increased natural gas prices in the United States, some firms have either ceased domestic production, or moved their facilities overseas, accounting for the decrease in U.S. industrial natural gas consumption. As such, this sector's consumption might be expected to be relatively insensitive to the price of natural gas as well as weather conditions. Residential prices continued to increase in June and July 2006, even as wellhead prices were beginning to moderate. Risk Factors
Analyses in this report are consistent with the EIA base case in the STEWFO, that consumers might expect to see lower natural gas prices and heating costs during the winter 2006-2007 heating season. However, the EIA's projection is dependent on conditions which may, or may not, materialize. By September 2006, the price had declined to $63.80 per barrel, a decline of over 14%. This decline in oil prices likely contributed to the declining prices in the natural gas market. The market fundamentals of consumption, production and storage reserves are likely to be consistent with a weakening market price. Because the natural gas price has been so volatile in recent years there is a chance that the STEWFO has over or underestimated the natural gas price for the winter heating season. | The Energy Information Administration (EIA) in its Short Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook (STEWFO) provided good news for residential natural gas consumers. EIA projected that natural gas winter home heating costs might decline by as much as 13% from last year's record-setting levels, even though consumption is expected to increase this winter. The STEWFO sees prices for natural gas lower than last year as a result of weak market fundamentals.
Analyses of natural gas market demand and supply conditions seem to be consistent with the EIA STEWFO. Aggregate consumption of natural gas over the first seven months of 2006 has declined compared to 2005. U.S. production, as well as imports, have also declined over the same time period, likely in response to the decrease in consumption. On a sectoral level, the decline in consumption has included all consumer groups except electric power generators, whose consumption rose. Storage of natural gas, the factor that balances yearly demand and supply, is at an all time record high level, and is approaching the maximum physical capacity of the system. There does not appear to be any fundamental imbalance between demand and supply in the 2006 natural gas market, making a stable, or even declining, price level likely.
The price of natural gas is actually many prices. Small, residential, consumers typically pay the highest prices per unit of natural gas, and large industrial and electric power consumers pay the lowest prices per unit. Taken in this context, the 2006 price outlook may be less favorable than the EIA suggests, across different sectors. Residential prices had not responded to falling wellhead prices as of July 2006. The past several years of high gas prices have yielded a 14% decline in industrial consumption, and that demand may not return to the market.
Risk factors, including weather conditions, movements in the price of crude oil, and developments in the futures markets all could affect the market balance in the natural gas market. Because these factors have caused price volatility in the past, the EIA outlook may best be considered as conditional on outcomes in these areas.
This report will be updated. |
crs_RL33515 | crs_RL33515_0 | Introduction
On June 28, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its proposal to sell 36 F-16 C/D Block50/52 Falcon combat aircraft to Pakistan at an estimated case value of $3 billion. Three other F-16related sales to Pakistan were also proposed on June 28. (1) Some believe that these salesare partly an effort to reward the Pakistani Government for the role it has played in support ofU.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts, and this consideration is noted in the text of the formal notificationof the F-16 sales. U.S. Combat Aircraft
The F-16 Falcon is a single engine multi-role aircraft manufactured by Lockheed MartinCorp. Its relatively low cost and high versatility make the F-16 one of the most exported fighteraircraft in the world. The F-16 was first fielded in 1979 and has been upgraded significantly. Thecapabilities of the F-16 vary greatly depending on the upgrade or modification fielded. The mostmodern F-16 flown by the United States is the Block 50/52. Potential Implications
Political Implications
It is currently unclear what long-term effects a potential sale of combat aircraft to South Asiamight have on U.S. political relations with Pakistan and India, or the political relationship betweenthem. (10)
Some analysts see the decision to resume F-16 sales to Pakistan as disruptive of regionalstability and efforts to resolve disputes there. (15)
Military Implications
The importance of the proposed transfer of new F-16s and the upgrade of Pakistan's legacyF-16s can be viewed in the context of Pakistan's conventional military confrontation with India, itsnuclear confrontation with that country, and its struggle with terrorists and insurgents. (21)
Combat Aircraft Proliferation
Combat aircraft are considered "essential for conducting surprise attacks or initiatinglarge-scale offensive operations." (22) Therefore, the transfer of combat aircraft can be a significantpolicy decision, especially to a region with known tensions and territorial disputes. (23)
The reported U.S. willingness to sell F-16s or F/A-18s to India may mitigate that country'sdisappointment with any renewed U.S. arms sales to Pakistan and neutralize any increase inPakistan's military capability. (24)
U.S. Industrial Base
Much of the commentary following the June 28th announcement centered on how a potentialsale of aircraft to Pakistan, and possibly to India, would be beneficial to industry. The potentialbenefits most frequently mentioned were extending the production life of U.S. aircraft with limiteddomestic prospects and improving U.S. industry's position vis-a-vis other rivals in an increasinglycompetitive military export market. | On June 28, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its proposal to sell 36 F-16 C/D Block50/52 Falcon combat aircraft to Pakistan at an estimated case value of $3 billion. The F-16 Falcon is a single engine multi-role aircraft manufactured by Lockheed Martin Corp. Its relatively low costand high versatility make the F-16 one of the most exported fighter aircraft in the world. The F-16was first fielded in 1979 and has been upgraded significantly. The capabilities of the F-16 varygreatly depending on the upgrade or modification fielded. The most modern F-16 flown by theUnited States is the Block 50/52. Three other F-16 related sales to Pakistan were also proposed.
Some believe that these sales are partly an effort to reward the Pakistani Government for therole it has played in support of U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts, and this consideration is noted in thetext of the formal notification of the F-16 sales. Some analysts, however, see the decision to resumeF-16 sales to Pakistan as disruptive of regional stability and efforts to resolve disputes there.
Combat aircraft are considered "essential for conducting surprise attacks or initiatinglarge-scale offensive operations." Therefore, the transfer of combat aircraft can be a significantpolicy decision, especially to a region with known tensions and territorial disputes. Generallyspeaking, arguments for foreign military sales tend to focus on advancing U.S. industry, supportingallied countries, and promoting interoperability with those countries. Arguments against arms salestend to focus on the negative aspects of military technology proliferation and the potential forcausing regional instability. The federal government approves arms sales on a case-by case basis.
It is currently unclear what long-term effects a potential sale of combat aircraft to South Asiamight have on U.S. political relations with Pakistan and India, or the political relationship betweenthem. The reported U.S. willingness to sell F-16s or F/A-18s to India may mitigate that country'sdisappointment with any renewed U.S. arms sales to Pakistan and neutralize any increase inPakistan's military capability.
Militarily, the importance of the proposed transfer of new F-16s and the upgrade of Pakistan's legacyF-16s can be viewed in the context of Pakistan's conventional military confrontation with India, itsnuclear confrontation with that country, and its struggle with terrorists and insurgents.
Much of the commentary following the June 28th announcement centered on how a potentialsale of aircraft to Pakistan, and possibly to India, would be beneficial to industry. The potentialbenefits most frequently mentioned were extending the production life of U.S. aircraft with limiteddomestic prospects and improving U.S. industry's position vis-a-vis other rivals in an increasinglycompetitive military export market. For broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498 , Pakistan-U.S. Relations , and CRS Issue Brief IB93097, India-U.S.-Relations .This report willbe updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41845 | crs_R41845_0 | The Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI)—one of the three main pillars to the 2010 directive —aims to integrate climate change considerations into relevant foreign assistance through a range of bilateral, multilateral, and private mechanisms to promote sustainable and resilient societies, foster low-carbon economic growth, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and land degradation. The recently launched United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Green Climate Fund, when capitalized, would support programming in all three programmatic initiatives. Funds for these programs are appropriated in the Administration's Executive Budget, the International Affairs Function 150 account, for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. Recent budget authority for the GCCI was reported as $945 million in FY2010, $819 million in FY2011, $857 million in FY2012, $840 million in FY2013, and $834 million in FY2014. Funding for FY2015 has yet to be fully reported by agencies. The Administration's FY2016 GCCI budget request is for $1,290 million, including $500 million for the UNFCCC Green Climate Fund. Congress is responsible for several activities in regard to the GCCI, including (1) authorizing periodic appropriations for federal agency programs and multilateral fund contributions, (2) enacting those appropriations, (3) providing guidance to the agencies, and (4) overseeing U.S. interests in the programs. Congressional committees of jurisdiction for international climate change programs at the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and USAID include the following:
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations. 3288 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, was enacted December 16, 2009, as P.L. 111-117 . 4899 ; P.L. 1473 , the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, was enacted April 15, 2011, as P.L. 112-10 . 2055 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, was enacted December 23, 2011, as P.L. 112-74 . 933 , the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, was enacted March 26, 2013, as P.L. 113-6 . 3547 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, was enacted January 17, 2014, as P.L. 113-76 . 83 , the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, was enacted December 16, 2014, as P.L. 113-235 . FY2016 Budget Request
The President's FY2016 budget request for the Global Climate Change Initiative is $1,289.6 million, including the following:
$348.5 million for international climate change programming at USAID; $459.8 million for international climate change programming at the Department of State, including $350.0 million for the Green Climate Fund, $11.7 million for the UNFCCC/IPCC, and $25.5 million for the Montreal Protocol; and $481.3 million for international climate change programming at the Department of the Treasury, including $150.0 million for the Green Climate Fund, $168.3 million for the Global Environment Facility (of which approximately 60% is considered GCCI funding), $170.7 million for the Clean Technology Fund, and $59.6 million for the Strategic Climate Fund. Key Issues for Congress
As Congress considers potential authorizations and/or appropriations for initiatives administered through the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, USAID, and other agencies with international programs, it may have questions concerning the purpose, direction, efficiency, and effectiveness of U.S. agency initiatives and current bilateral and multilateral programs that address global climate change. National Security. | The United States supports international financial assistance for global climate change initiatives in developing countries. Under the Obama Administration, this assistance has been articulated primarily as the Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI), a platform within the President's 2010 Policy Directive on Global Development. The GCCI aims to integrate climate change considerations into U.S. foreign assistance through a range of bilateral, multilateral, and private sector mechanisms to promote sustainable and climate-resilient societies, foster low-carbon economic growth, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and land degradation. The GCCI is implemented through programs at three "core" agencies: the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Most GCCI activities at USAID are implemented through the agency's bilateral development assistance programs. Many of the GCCI activities at the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury are implemented through international organizations, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's Least Developed Country Fund and Special Climate Change Fund, as well as multilateral financial institutions such as the Global Environment Facility, the Clean Technology Fund, and the Strategic Climate Fund. The GCCI is funded through the Administration's Executive Budget, Function 150 account, for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs.
Congress is responsible for several activities in regard to the GCCI, including (1) authorizing periodic appropriations for federal agency programs and multilateral fund contributions, (2) enacting those appropriations, (3) providing guidance to the agencies, and (4) overseeing U.S. interests in the programs and the multilateral funds. Recent budget authority for the GCCI was $945 million in FY2010, $819 million in FY2011, $857 million in FY2012, $840 million in FY2013, and $834 million in FY2014. Funding for FY2015 has yet to be fully reported by agencies. Funding has been enacted through legislation including the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3288; P.L. 111-117); the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 4899; P.L. 111-212); the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1473; P.L. 112-10); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.R. 2055; P.L. 112-74); the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (H.R. 933; P.L. 113-6); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (H.R. 3547; P.L. 113-76); and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (H.R. 83; P.L. 113-235). The Administration's FY2016 GCCI budget request is for $1,290 million, including $500 million for the recently launched United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Green Climate Fund.
Congressional committees of jurisdiction over the GCCI include the U.S. House of Representatives Committees on Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, and Appropriations, and the U.S. Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations. As Congress considers potential authorizations and/or appropriations for activities administered through the GCCI, it may have questions concerning U.S. agency initiatives and current bilateral and multilateral programs that address global climate change. Some potential concerns may include cost, purpose, direction, efficiency, and effectiveness, as well as the GCCI's relationship to industry, investment, humanitarian efforts, national security, and international leadership. This report serves as a brief overview of the GCCI and its structure, intents, and funding history. |
crs_R41733 | crs_R41733_0 | Introduction
This is an outline of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). It also outlaws such installation or use except for law enforcement and foreign intelligence investigations. Each of these cases focused upon whether a warrantless trespass onto private property had occurred, that is, whether the means of conducting a search and seizure had been so unreasonable as to offend the Fourth Amendment. The FISA provides a procedure for judicial review and authorization of electronic surveillance and other forms of information gathering for foreign intelligence purposes. Two other Supreme Court cases influenced the development of federal law in the area. Congress has adjusted the components of ECPA and FISA, over the years. Title III: Prohibitions
In Title III, ECPA begins the proposition that unless provided otherwise, it is a federal crime to engage in wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping; to possess wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping equipment; to use or disclose information obtained through illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping; or to disclose information secured through court-ordered wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, in order to obstruct justice. It is a federal crime to disclose, with an intent to obstruct criminal justice, any information derived from lawful police wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, i.e . Law Enforcement Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping
Title III exempts federal and state law enforcement officials from its prohibitions on the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications under three circumstances: (1) pursuant to or in anticipation of a court order, (2) with the consent of one of the parties to the communication; and (3) with respect to the communications of an intruder within an electronic communications system. Title III: Consequences of a Violation
Criminal Penalties
Interception, use, or disclosure in violation of Title III is generally punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000 for individuals and not more than $500,000 for organizations. Civil Liability of the United States
The USA PATRIOT Act authorizes a cause of action against the United States for willful violations of Title III, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or the provisions governing stored communications in 18 U.S.C. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Text). Counterintelligence access to telephone toll and transactional records. As used in this chapter—
(1) the terms "wire communication", "electronic communication", "electronic communication service" and "contents" have the meanings set forth for such terms in section 2510 of this title;
(2) the term "court of competent jurisdiction" means—
(A) any district court of the United States (including a magistrate judge of such a court) or any
United States court of appeals that -
(i) has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated;
(ii) is in or for a district in which the provider of a wire or electronic communication service is
located;
(iii) is in or for a district in which a landlord, custodian, or other person subject to subsections (a) or
(b) of section 3124 of this title is located; or
(iv) is acting on a request for foreign assistance pursuant to section 3512 of this title; or
(B) a court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State authorized by the law of that State to enter orders authorizing the use of a pen register or a trap and trace device;
(3) the term "pen register" means a device or process which records or decodes or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication, but such term does not include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by such provider or any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business;
(4) the term "trap and trace device" means a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any communication;
(5) the term "attorney for the Government" has the meaning given such term for the purposes of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and
(6) the term "State" means a State, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and any other possession or territory of the United States. | This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). It also appends citations to state law in the area and the text of ECPA.
It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given his prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); civil liability for damages, attorneys' fees and possibly punitive damages; disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate, but comparable, protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., email) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices.
Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches, and install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under ECPA and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
This report appears as a part of a larger piece, which includes a discussion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and is entitled CRS Report 98-326, Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Each of the two is available in an abridged form without footnotes, quotations, attributions of authority, or appendices, i.e., CRS Report R41734, Privacy: An Abridged Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report 98-327, Privacy: An Abbreviated Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33488 | crs_RL33488_0 | Constituents often turn to members of Congress for assistance in securing changes to ZIP Code boundaries, usually because their mailing addresses do not correspond to the geographic and political boundaries of their municipalities' jurisdictions. This report explains why ZIP Code boundaries often are not aligned with geographic political jurisdiction boundaries, describes some problems that may occur because of the misalignment, and discusses efforts by the U.S. ZIP Codes Are Widely Used Outside USPS
The Postal Service has contended that the ZIP Code system's only purpose is to facilitate the efficient and orderly delivery of the mail. Because ZIP Codes are based on the location of delivery post offices, they often do not correspond to political jurisdiction boundaries. The following is a sample of the problems that have been brought to congressional attention:
higher automobile insurance rates for drivers who live in the suburbs but are charged city rates based on their ZIP Codes; residents who are confused about where to vote in municipal elections because they do not distinguish between their voting and mailing addresses; sales tax revenues rebated by states to the cities where they are collected often being misdirected because they are collected by merchants with ZIP Codes in different jurisdictions, or by merchants who mail their products to customers knowing only their ZIP Codes; individuals being sent jury duty notices when they are not eligible to serve based on their actual residences; emergency service vehicles being misdirected by confusion over what town a call has come from, based on mailing address information; and homeowners in expensive neighborhoods complaining that their housing values are diminished because their mailing addresses place them in less prestigious communities. In addition, a community may lack a delivery post office and complain that the need to use mailing addresses from neighboring towns robs them of their community identity. 4827 ) that would have allowed local governments, rather than the Postal Service, to determine local addresses or ZIP Code boundaries as a solution to the widespread problems. The Government Accountability Office (GAO, then the General Accounting Office) examined postal case files on 26 municipal requests for ZIP Code changes, only 2 of which were approved by USPS. Postal Service Attempts to Resolve Problems
Current USPS Process for Realigning ZIP Codes
In the years since the 1990 hearing and GAO's investigation, USPS has made a concerted effort to develop a process for the regular review of ZIP Code boundaries. ZIP Code changes are invariably sensitive locally, and often involve considerable coordination and investment, so USPS requires approval from the district manager, the manager of operations programs support, the manager of processing and distribution, and the district manager of customer service and sales before a proposal can be sent to the Area (regional) Office for approval. Requests can be denied, but only based on appropriate, objective reasons that are consistent with the Review Process....
(P)ostal policy is to offer any reasonable administrative or operational accommodation that can correct, or alleviate, the municipal identity concerns. Others will make requests.... What the Process Requires
The boundary review process requires any municipality and community group seeking a ZIP Code change to submit the request in writing to the manager of the district, with any rationale and justification. If the request is approved at the area level, "the proposal is sent to Headquarters Address Management System (AMS) for review and approval." Within delivery operations at headquarters, an operations specialist who works full time on boundary review appeals determines whether the district provided "reasonable accommodation" to the proposed change. The manager of delivery operations must make a final decision on the appeal within 60 days. A compromise solution that does not involve changing USPS delivery structure is to allow customers to use an alternative city name in the last line of their addresses, while not changing the ZIP Code. What Can a Member of Congress Do? Constituents are frequently unaware of the boundary review process. | The 112th Congress may address issues related to the application and modification of ZIP Codes. This report assists members in addressing concerns about the use of ZIP Codes as well as offers an overview of the boundary review process that can lead to changes in ZIP Code assignment.
Since the ZIP Code system for identifying address locations was devised in the 1960s, some citizens have wanted to change the ZIP Codes to which their addresses have been assigned. Because ZIP Codes are often not aligned with municipal boundaries, millions of Americans have mailing addresses in neighboring jurisdictions. The result can be higher insurance rates, confusion in voter registration, misdirected property and sales tax revenues for municipalities, and changes in property values. Some communities that lack delivery post offices complain that the need to use mailing addresses of adjacent areas robs them of a community identity.
Because ZIP Codes are the cornerstone of the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS's) mail distribution system, USPS has long resisted changing them for any reason other than to improve the efficiency of delivery. Frustrated citizens frequently have turned to members of Congress for assistance in altering ZIP Code boundaries. In the 101st Congress, a House subcommittee heard testimony from members, city officials, and the General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government Accountability Office) that USPS routinely denied local requests for adjusting ZIP Code boundaries.
Since then, USPS has developed a "ZIP Code Boundary Review Process" that promises "every reasonable effort" to consider and, if possible, accommodate municipal requests to modify the last lines of an acceptable address or modify ZIP Code boundaries. The process places responsibility on district managers, rather than local postmasters, to review requests for boundary adjustments, to evaluate costs and benefits of alternative solutions to identified problems, and to provide decisions within 60 days. If a district manager rejects the request, the process provides for an appeal to the manager of delivery at USPS headquarters, where a review based on whether or not a "reasonable accommodation" was made is to be provided within 60 days.
The boundary review process enhances the possibility of accommodating communities that desire ZIP Code changes. One accommodation that can often be made is to allow the use of more than one city name in the last line of an address, while retaining the ZIP Code number of the delivery post office. This can help with community identity problems, though not with problems such as insurance rates or tax remittances that are determined by ZIP Code.
A congressional constituent desiring a ZIP Code accommodation may not be aware of the boundary review process requirements. Any proposal for change must be submitted in writing to the district manager. The district manager is to work with the local postal managers, headquarters delivery, and headquarters Address Management System to evaluate the request and determine if an accommodation can be made. |
crs_R43851 | crs_R43851_0 | EPA's regulations on greenhouse gas emissions from both mobile and stationary sources and on emissions of all kinds from electric power plants have been of particular interest, as have the agency's efforts to revise ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter. EPA's Greenhouse Gas Regulations
A continuing focus of congressional interest under the Clean Air Act (CAA) has been EPA regulatory actions to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions using existing CAA authority. GHG Emission Standards for Motor Vehicles
Unlike its critics, EPA has concluded that the Clean Air Act requires action to control GHG emissions, without the need for additional congressional authorization: a 2007 Supreme Court decision interpreting EPA's existing CAA authority, Massachusetts v. EPA , found that the agency must weigh whether GHG emissions from new motor vehicles endanger public health and welfare (or present valid reasons why it is unable to make that determination) and, if it concludes that there is endangerment, proceed with regulation of such vehicles. In his 2014 State of the Union message and a subsequent directive to EPA and DOT, the President directed the agencies to develop a second round of these standards, to be proposed in 2015 and finalized a year later. EPA did not meet the deadlines of the two consent agreements, but it did finalize emission standards for new, existing, and modified power plants in August 2015. The rule for existing units, the Clean Power Plan (CPP), has received the most attention. Legislative and Judicial Actions
Following publication of the NSPS and the Clean Power Plan in the Federal Register , Congress considered and passed joint resolutions of disapproval of both rules ( S.J.Res. 24 ) under the Congressional Review Act (CRA). The President vetoed both of the joint resolutions that Congress passed on December 18, 2015. On June 24, 2015, the House passed H.R. 2042 , which would have delayed the compliance date of GHG emission standards for existing EGUs (including the date by which states must submit implementation plans) until after the completion of judicial review of any aspect of the rule, and would have allowed a state to opt out of compliance if the governor determines that the rule would have significant adverse effects on rate-payers or on the reliability of the state's electricity system. The Senate did not consider the bill. In the 113 th , the House passed H.R. 3826 , which would have prohibited EPA from promulgating or implementing GHG emission standards for fossil-fueled power plants until at least six power plants representative of the operating characteristics of electric generation units at different locations across the United States had demonstrated compliance with proposed emission limits for a continuous period of 12 months on a commercial basis. 3826 in H.R. Emissions of Other Pollutants from Power Plants
Issues related to emissions other than GHGs from electric power plants—principally sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury—have been another focus of interest in recent years. Two rules affecting these emissions—the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR, pronounced "Casper") and the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) —have taken effect, in January and April 2015 respectively. As a result, under the Obama Administration, EPA developed new regulations to address the court's concerns:
CSAPR, promulgated on August 8, 2011, established a cap-and-trade system for SO 2 and NOx emissions; MATS, promulgated on February 16, 2012, set Maximum Achievable Control Technology standards for power plant emissions of mercury and other hazardous air pollutants. Both bills passed the House, but the Senate did not consider either. Air Quality Standards
The Obama Administration's EPA has reviewed several national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), as it is required to do at five-year intervals by Section 109 of the Clean Air Act. In January 2010, EPA proposed a revision to the ozone NAAQS. The final standards were released on October 1, 2015, and appeared in the Federal Register , October 26, 2015. At least 13 bills were introduced in the 114 th Congress to modify EPA's authority or prohibit or delay the agency's proposed strengthening of the ozone NAAQS: H.R. 1044 ; H.R. 1327 / S. 640 ; H.R. 1388 / S. 751 ; H.R. 2111 ; H.R. 2822 (Section 438); H.R. 4000 ; H.R. 4265 ; H.R. 4775 / S. 2882 ; H.R. 5538 (Section 438); and S. 2072 . In addition, joint resolutions of disapproval of the ozone NAAQS revision were introduced in both the House and Senate, under the Congressional Review Act. | Oversight of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory actions received significant attention in the 114th Congress. Of particular interest were two air quality issues: EPA's Clean Power Plan (CPP) and related rules to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new and existing power plants, promulgated on August 3, 2015; and a revision of the ambient air quality standard for ozone, promulgated on October 1, 2015.
Reducing GHG emissions to address climate change was a major goal of President Obama, but many in Congress have been less enthusiastic about it. In the absence of congressional action to reduce emissions, the President directed EPA to promulgate GHG standards using existing authority under the Clean Air Act. This authority has been upheld on three occasions by the Supreme Court, but it remains controversial in Congress.
In 2014, EPA proposed regulations to reduce GHG emissions from fossil-fueled (coal, oil, and natural gas) power plants, which EPA refers to as electric generating units (EGUs). The agency proposed standards for new EGUs in January 2014 and for existing and modified units five months later. It finalized these rules August 3, 2015. EGUs are the source of 30% of the nation's GHG emissions, so it is difficult to envision a regulatory scheme that reduces the nation's GHG emissions without addressing their contribution. At the same time, affordable and reliable electric power is central to the nation's economy and to the health and well-being of the population. Thus, the potential effects of the rules on the electric power system have been of considerable interest.
Even before proposal of the Clean Power Plan, the House had passed legislation (H.R. 3826 in the 113th Congress) that would effectively have prohibited EPA from promulgating or implementing power plant GHG emission standards. In September 2014, the House passed the same language a second time, in H.R. 2. The Senate did not consider either bill.
Following promulgation of the CPP, however, in December 2015 Congress passed and sent to the President S.J.Res. 24, a joint resolution disapproving the CPP under the Congressional Review Act. The President vetoed the resolution on December 18, 2015. Earlier, the House passed H.R. 2042, which would have delayed the compliance date of GHG emission standards for EGUs and would have allowed a state to opt out of compliance if the governor determined that the rule would have significant adverse effects on rate-payers or on the reliability of the state's electricity system. The Senate did not act on the bill.
Besides addressing climate change, EPA took action on a number of other air pollution regulations affecting power plants and other sources, often in response to court actions remanding previous rules or setting deadlines for actions that are non-discretionary under the Clean Air Act. Remanded rules included the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) and Clean Air Mercury Rule—rules designed to control the long-range transport of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury from power plants through cap-and-trade programs. New rules—the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) and the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS)—have replaced those the court remanded. Both CSAPR and MATS went into effect in 2015.
EPA also completed a review of the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone in 2015. NAAQS serve as EPA's definition of clean air for six widespread pollutants, and drive a range of regulatory controls. The ozone NAAQS review, completed October 1, 2015, resulted in tightening the ozone NAAQS from 75 ppb to 70 ppb. At least 13 bills were introduced to modify EPA's authority or prohibit or delay the agency's proposed strengthening of the ozone NAAQS: H.R. 1044, H.R. 1327/S. 640, H.R. 1388/S. 751, H.R. 2111, H.R. 2822 (Section 438), H.R. 4000, H.R. 4265, H.R. 4775/S. 2882, H.R. 5538 (Section 438), and S. 2072. In addition, joint resolutions of disapproval of the ozone NAAQS revision were introduced in both the House and Senate, under the Congressional Review Act, but not acted on. |
crs_R43077 | crs_R43077_0 | This figure was the largest acreage burned on record and is larger than the acreage burned in the previous two years combined (4.3 million acres in 2013 and 3.6 million acres in 2014). The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Forest Service (FS) carries out wildfire response and management across the 193 million acres of national forests and national grasslands. Wildfire Management Appropriations
Both DOI and FS receive annual discretionary appropriations for wildfire management activities through the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bills. The majority of wildfire management appropriations go to FS. Figure 2 reflects the proportion of FS discretionary funding between wildfire and non-wildfire activities over the past 10 years. Wildland Fire Management Account
Of the two programs funded by both agencies' WFM accounts, Fire Operations receives the largest share of the funding, accounting for 78% of the combined WFM appropriation on average over the last five years. Bill or report language typically specifies how the additional funds are to be used (e.g., for wildfire suppression, for fire transfer reimbursement, for emergency rehabilitation), although for record-keeping purposes, these funds are generally reported in the agencies' WFM suppression activity. In FY2016, the total combined suppression appropriation was $2,802.7 million, including a $700.0 million supplemental appropriation. 5538 would not adopt the Administration's proposal to eliminate the FLAME account or provide a budgetary adjustment mechanism to fund a portion of the wildfire suppression appropriation. S. 3068 would provide a total of $4.4 billion for wildland fire management for FY2017 ($3.3 billion for FS and $1.1 billion for DOI), $16.1 million above the requested amount, although $661.3 million would be designated as emergency spending for wildfire suppression purposes and not subject to certain discretionary spending limits. Congress did not adopt the proposal in FY2015 or FY2016. Similar legislative proposals have been introduced in the 114 th Congress. Issues
Congress is debating several issues related to federal funding for wildfire management. Issues under debate include the level and direction of federal spending on wildfire management as well as the effectiveness of that spending (e.g., whether the funding is allowing agencies to meet wildfire management targets and the adequacy of those targets). Wildfire spending has more than tripled since the 1990s, increasing from $1.6 billion in FY1995 in constant dollars to $4.9 billion in FY2016. Congress also is debating the level of appropriations dedicated for certain wildfire management activities, such as whether the rising cost of suppression should come at the expense of funding other activities or whether investing more funds in hazardous fuel reduction activities now may help reduce wildfire costs in the future. Congress has provided funding for wildfire management in addition to what was provided in the Interior appropriations bill—usually for wildfire suppression—for 6 of the last 10 years, including FY2013, FY2014, and FY2016. This fact may lead to questions regarding the structure of wildfire funding and wildfire suppression funding estimation methods, among other things. Wildfire suppression is complicated, and both the efficiency of resources used for wildfire suppression and the federal protocol for wildfire management have an impact on wildfire suppression costs. | The Forest Service (FS, in the U.S. Department of Agriculture) and the Department of the Interior (DOI) are the two primary federal entities tasked with wildland fire management activities. Federal wildland fire management includes activities such as preparedness, suppression, fuel reduction, and site rehabilitation, among others. Approximately 10.1 million acres burned during the 2015 wildfire season, which was more than the acreage burned in 2014 (3.6 million acres) and 2013 (4.3 million acres) combined and represents the largest acreage burned since modern record-keeping began in 1960.
There are several ongoing concerns regarding wildfire management. These concerns include the total federal costs of wildfire management, the strategies and resources used for wildfire management, and the impact of wildfire on both the quality of life and the economy of communities surrounding wildfire activity. Many of these issues are of perennial interest to Congress, with annual wildfire management appropriations being one indicator of how Congress prioritizes and addresses certain wildfire management concerns.
Annual federal funding for wildland fire management is provided in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. Congress appropriated $4.9 billion combined to both FS and DOI in FY2016, which included a $700 million appropriation for FS to reimburse transfers that occurred in FY2015 to pay for wildfire costs. The combined FY2015 appropriation was $3.5 billion. Federal wildfire spending has increased significantly over the last two decades, driven largely by the rising cost to suppress wildfires. In FY1995, FS spent just over $500 million in constant dollars to suppress wildfires; in FY2001, FS spent $898 million. In FY2015, FS spent $1.7 billion on suppression operations. Appropriations for wildfire management have similarly increased. In FY1995, appropriations for wildland fire management were $1.6 billion in constant dollars, $3 billion less than the FY2016 appropriation.
Congress is debating several issues related to federal funding for wildfire management. Issues under debate include the level and direction of federal spending on wildland fire management as well as the effectiveness of that spending (e.g., whether the funding is allowing agencies to meet wildfire management targets and the adequacy of those targets). Congress also faces requests from the agencies for additional appropriations during severe fire activity (e.g., justification for additional funding and the impact on non-fire programs without the additional funding). Congress has provided additional funding for wildfire management above the level provided in the Interior appropriations bill—usually for wildfire suppression—for 6 of the last 10 years, including FY2013, FY2014, and FY2016. The additional funding is typically provided through a supplemental appropriation. The frequent need for additional funds raises questions about the structure of wildfire funding and how the agencies estimate wildfire suppression funding requirements, among other things.
Proposals to create alternative mechanisms for funding wildfire suppression have been introduced in the 114th Congress and proposed by the Administration. The proposals generally would create a budgetary adjustment mechanism to fund a portion of the wildfire suppression appropriation outside of statutory discretionary spending limits.
This report provides wildfire management appropriations data over the past 10 years, information on the President's FY2017 budget request, and information on FY2017 appropriations for wildland fire management. |
crs_R42334 | crs_R42334_0 | Introduction
After several years of rapid growth in defense budgets, measures to reduce federal budget deficits have led to projections of a substantial decline in military spending over the next decade. As a result of limits on discretionary spending in the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-25 ), the Department of Defense (DOD) is considering how to absorb a reduction of about $490 billion in planned programs through FY2021. Senior defense officials have said that such reductions can be managed, but they also warn that that trade-offs among defense programs will require a strategically grounded re-assessment of priorities, and deeper cuts would weaken critical capabilities. A common theme is, unless reductions are managed prudently, budget cuts of the magnitude required, let alone larger cuts, would risk creating a hollow force As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it:
I am determined that we not repeat the mistakes of the past, where the budget targets were met mostly by taking a percentage off the top of everything, the simplest and most politically expedient approach both inside the Pentagon and outside of it. Significance for Congress
The Administration has invoked the specter of a hollow force to describe what could happen to the U.S. Armed Forces if significant cuts to the defense budget are enacted. While some Members and staff might be familiar with the hollow force and its causes, newer Members and staff might not have a similar understanding of the conditions that led to the hollow force in the past and what actions were taken to improve the situation. Given the Administration's plan to reduce troop strength in response to budgetary limitations and a new strategic direction, Congress—in its oversight, authorization, and appropriations role—will likely encounter Administration officials who claim that the U.S. military faces the prospect of once again becoming a hollow force As Congress will play a major role in shaping the Armed Forces both in terms of size, capabilities, and how it is equipped and trained, a nuanced understanding of how the military once became "hollow" could provide a useful context for current and anticipated legislative action. Background
Origins of the Hollow Force
Recent warnings about the need to avoid creating a hollow force evoke two periods in history in which the term was commonly used to characterize the state of the U.S. military—post-Vietnam and the 1990s. New concerns about recruiting and retention also began to emerge. Service in the U.S. Armed Forces during this period was not particularly attractive for a variety of reasons. Reserve forces suffered from the same personnel shortages as did their active duty counterparts, but equipment and training deficiencies were even more pronounced. In this regard, some suggest that DOD and the Army itself also bear a degree of culpability in creating General Meyer's hollow divisions. The use of the term hollow force to describe the effects of the defense budget decline of the 1990s does not appear apt, and certainly not if it is taken to reflect a parallel with the personnel and other readiness-related shortfalls of the 1970s. Current References to Hollow Forces
Return to a Hollow Force? While the services have suggested that future budget cuts might endanger reset, it should be noted that the services have a great deal of discretion on how operation and maintenance (O&M) funds are allocated and therefore have great influence on how the reset of equipment is conducted. It also is unlikely that even in the case of drastically reduced military funding and a smaller military, recruit quality would decline, pay and benefits would be drastically cut, or U.S. public support for the military would significantly decline. | Senior Department of Defense (DOD) leaders have invoked the specter of a "hollow force" to describe what could happen to the U.S. Armed Forces if significant cuts to the defense budget are enacted. While some Members and staff might be familiar with the hollow force and its causes, newer Members and staff might not have a similar understanding of the conditions that led to the hollow force and what actions were taken to improve the condition of the U.S. Armed Forces.
After several years of rapid growth in defense budgets, measures to reduce federal budget deficits have led to projections of a substantial decline in military spending over the next decade. As a result of limits on discretionary spending in the Budget Control Act of 2011, DOD is considering how to absorb a reduction of $450 billion to $500 billion in planned programs through FY2021. Senior defense officials have said that such reductions can be managed, but they also warn that that trade-offs among defense programs will require a reassessment of priorities, and that deeper cuts would weaken critical capabilities. A common theme is that, unless reductions are managed prudently, budget cuts of the magnitude required, let alone larger cuts, would risk creating a hollow force The term hollow force refers to military forces that appear mission-ready but, upon examination, suffer from shortages of personnel and equipment and from deficiencies in training.
Historically, there were two periods—post-Vietnam and again in the 1990s—when the term hollow force was used to describe the U.S. Armed Forces. In the case of post-Vietnam, a variety of socioeconomic factors as well as funding decisions played a large role in the overall decline in readiness, particularly the decision to develop new weapon systems rather than funding other requirements. The 1990s hollow force, however, did not suffer from the socioeconomic problems that characterized the post-Vietnam force. Instead, the military of the early and mid-1990s was being deployed on a frequent basis for a variety of contingency operations and was viewed by some as being "overcommitted" relative to its size and resources. This overcommitment was further exacerbated by recruiting and retention concerns and a lack of funds to finance new weapon systems due to DOD decisions to emphasize readiness-related funding.
A number of current defense officials have warned about the return to a hollow force if the DOD budget is cut significantly. Other senior officers instead suggest that in the aftermath of two wars, a reduction in the defense budget and the force is not unprecedented and the services will be able to make the necessary adjustments to ensure readiness. Therefore, the question arises if it is fair to suggest that the military could become a hollow force if DOD funding was drastically reduced and if force structure and weapon systems programs were cut. Some believe this is a mischaracterization, as it is considered unlikely the quality of the force will decline, that pay and benefits will be cut to the point that service in the military becomes unattractive, and public support for the military will erode—all factors that lead to General Meyer's description of the post-Vietnam Army as a hollow force It is also noted that DOD has a great deal of discretion on how its funds are spent and how units are organized, manned, equipped, and trained, which is also a factor that contributes to readiness of the force.
As Congress will play a major role in shaping the Armed Forces in terms of size, capabilities, and how it is equipped and trained, a nuanced understanding of how the military once became "hollow" could provide a useful context for current and anticipated legislative action. |
crs_R42759 | crs_R42759_0 | Introduction
The farm commodity provisions of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, as amended ( P.L. 110-246 , the 2008 farm bill) expire with the 2013 crop year. Consequently, the 113 th Congress has been considering an omnibus farm bill that would establish the direction of agricultural policy. On May 14, 2013, the Senate Agriculture Committee reported its version of the bill ( S. 954 , the Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2013), which was approved by the full Senate on June 10, 2013 (vote of 66-27). On July 11, the full House approved a revised bill, H.R. 2642 , which excluded a nutrition title, and on September 19 approved a nutrition title ( H.R. The House adopted a resolution ( H.Res. 361 ) on September 28 that combined the texts of H.R. 2642 and H.R. 3102 into one bill ( H.R. 2642 ) for purposes of resolving differences with the Senate. Conference on the two measures is pending. The broader farming community uses the term farm safety net to refer to the combination of (1) farm commodity price and income support programs in the 2008 farm bill, (2) federal crop insurance (permanently authorized) under the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 as amended, and (3) five disaster assistance programs in the 2008 farm bill, which are currently unfunded. Both bills would reshape the structure of farm commodity support, reauthorize several disaster programs, and expand crop insurance coverage. Direct payments—made to producers and landowners based on historical production and fixed payment rates for corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, rice, peanuts, and other "covered" crops—have accounted for most farm program spending in recent years. In both bills, approximately three-fourths of the 10-year, $46 billion-$47 billion in savings (as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office) associated with the proposed elimination of current farm programs would be used to offset the cost of updating farm programs (Title I), enhancing crop insurance (Title XI), and retroactively reauthorizing four disaster programs (beginning FY2012). These titles address the issue of "shallow losses" (losses incurred by crop producers that are not covered currently by crop insurance) and provide disaster assistance for livestock producers. 3102) Bills with Current Law . Proposed Farm Commodity Program Revisions
Both S. 954 and H.R. Importantly, the Senate bill covers only crop years 2014-2018. It also suspends permanent price support authority under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1949, which would increase price supports well above current market levels and create substantial government outlays. This provision is designed to motivate Congress to reexamine agricultural and related policy (not just farm programs) when program authority in S. 954 expires in 2018. In contrast, the House bill covers crop year 2014 and each succeeding crop year (i.e., no program expiration date) and repeals permanent law. 2642 ) 2013 farm bills, farm support for traditional program crops is restructured by eliminating direct payments, the counter-cyclical price (CCP) program, and the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program. Authority is continued for marketing assistance loans, which provide additional low-price protection at "loan rates" specified in current law (with an adjustment made to the cotton loan rate). The program is permanently authorized by the Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 U.S.C. Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO)
Under both bills, a new crop insurance policy is authorized to address the issue of "shallow losses," or losses incurred by producers but not covered currently by crop insurance. | The farm commodity provisions of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, as amended (P.L. 110-246, the 2008 farm bill) expire with the 2013 crop year. Consequently, the 113th Congress has been considering an omnibus farm bill that would establish the direction of agricultural policy for the next five years. On June 10, 2013, the Senate approved its version of the farm bill, S. 954, the Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2013. The House approved a farm bill (H.R. 2642) without a nutrition title on July 11, 2013, and a nutrition title (H.R. 3102) on September 19, 2013. The House adopted a resolution (H.Res. 361) on September 28 that combined the texts of H.R. 2642 and H.R. 3102 into one bill (H.R. 2642) for purposes of resolving differences with the Senate. Conference on the two measures is pending.
Among the many provisions, both bills would reshape the structure of farm commodity support, retroactively reauthorize several disaster programs, and expand coverage under the federal crop insurance program. These three areas of federal support for farmers are often collectively called the "farm safety net." Commodity programs under the original 2008 farm bill cover only crops harvested in 2008 through 2012, and were extended for an additional crop year in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240, the fiscal cliff bill). Unlike farm commodity programs, the federal crop insurance program, which provides subsidized insurance policies for producers, is permanently authorized under the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. Five disaster assistance programs under the 2008 farm bill expired on September 30, 2011, and under the farm bill extension, Congress provided authority to appropriate funds (but no actual funding) for three livestock programs and a tree assistance program.
Under both S. 954 and H.R. 2642, farm support for traditional program crops is restructured by eliminating direct payments. Direct payments—made to producers and landowners based on historical production and fixed payment rates for corn, wheat, soybeans, cotton, rice, peanuts, and other "covered" crops—have accounted for most farm program spending in recent years. As under current law, both bills authorize farm programs (with new program names) that would make payments when crop prices (or revenue) fall below a reference price (or historical average revenue). Authority is continued for marketing assistance loans, which provide additional low-price protection at "loan rates" specified in current law (with an adjustment made to cotton). The Senate bill covers only crop years 2014-2018, and it suspends permanent price support authority under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1949 until program authority in S. 954 expires in 2018. In contrast, the House bill covers crop year 2014 and each succeeding crop year (i.e., no program expiration date) and repeals permanent law.
In both bills, approximately three-fourths of the 10-year, $46 billion-$47 billion in savings (as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office) associated with the proposed elimination of current farm programs would be used to offset the cost of revising farm programs (Title I), enhancing crop insurance (Title XI), and retroactively reauthorizing four disaster programs (beginning FY2012). The two bills provide programs for covered crops, except cotton, which would have its own program (a crop insurance product called Stacked Income Protection Plan or STAX). Proponents of farm programs and federal crop insurance are attempting to address the issue of "shallow losses"—crop losses not covered currently by crop insurance—as well as provide disaster assistance for livestock producers. Critics contend that the proposals contain overly generous farm and crop insurance subsidies and shift additional commodity market risk to the federal government. |
crs_RS22796 | crs_RS22796_0 | The Medicare Trigger
Because of concerns over the potential for growth in general revenue spending for Medicare over time, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA; P.L. Specifically, Section 801 of the MMA requires the Medicare trustees, beginning with their 2005 report, to examine and make a determination each year of whether general revenue funding is expected to exceed 45% of Medicare outlays for the current fiscal year or any of the following six fiscal years. If such a warning is issued, the MMA (Sections 802-804) specifies certain requirements and procedures for the President and Congress to follow related to the introduction and consideration of legislation designed to respond to the warning. A Medicare funding warning is triggered when two consecutive Medicare trustees' reports contain projections that general revenue Medicare funding will exceed 45% of total Medicare outlays at some point during the next seven years (this includes the current and six subsequent fiscal years). Issuance of Funding Warnings
The Medicare trustees first made a determination of excess general revenue Medicare funding in their 2006 report and did so in each report through 2013. Therefore, the trustees issued a determination of excess general revenue Medicare funding. Because such a determination was made in two consecutive years, a funding warning has been triggered and a legislative response by the President will be required subsequent to the release of his FY2020 budget (in 2019). Although the precise contents of the proposal remain within the President's discretion, Section 802 of the MMA requires that the proposal be submitted within 15 days of submitting a budget for the succeeding year. The requirement that the President submit proposed legislation in response to a funding warning does not apply, however, if, "during the year in which the warning is made," Congress enacts legislation to eliminate excess general revenue Medicare funding for the seven-fiscal year reporting period, as certified by the Medicare trustees within 30 days of the legislation's enactment. Since the Medicare trustees did not issue funding warnings in their 2014, 2015, 2016, or 2017 reports, the President was not required to submit related legislation subsequent to the submission of his FY2015 through FY2019 budgets. However, as the Medicare trustees issued a funding warning in their 2018 report, the MMA provides that the President will be required to submit a responsive legislative proposal after the release of his FY2020 budget. Proponents of the 45% threshold measurement believe that it can serve as an effective early warning system of the impact of Medicare spending on the federal budget, and that it forces fiscal responsibility. Opponents of the measure suggest that it does not adequately recognize a shift toward the provision of more services on an outpatient basis (thus shifting spending from Medicare Part A to Part B) or the impact of the Part D program on general revenue increases, and that other measures such as Medicare spending as a portion of total federal spending, are better ways to determine the health of the Medicare program. | The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA; P.L. 108-173) requires the Medicare Board of Trustees to provide in its annual reports an expanded analysis of Medicare expenditures and revenues (Section 801 of the MMA). If the Medicare trustees determine that general revenue funding for Medicare is expected to exceed 45% of Medicare outlays for the current fiscal year or any of the next six fiscal years, a determination of excess general revenue Medicare funding is made. If the determination is issued for two consecutive years, a funding warning is issued which triggers certain presidential and congressional actions (Sections 802-804 of the MMA). Specifically, in the event of a funding warning, the President would be required to submit to Congress proposed legislation to respond to the funding warning within 15 days of submitting a budget for the succeeding year, and Congress would then be required to consider that legislation on an expedited basis.
Because a determination of excess general revenue Medicare funding was issued in both the 2006 and the 2007 Medicare trustees' reports, the President was required to submit a legislative proposal to Congress within 15 days of submitting his FY2009 budget (in 2008) that would lower the ratio to the 45% level. Similarly, each of the subsequent annual reports of the Boards of Trustees through 2013 included an estimate that general revenue funding would exceed 45% at some point during the current or six subsequent fiscal years, thus triggering a response from the President and Congress. President George W. Bush submitted such a proposal in 2008, but no related legislation has been enacted.
In each of their 2014 through 2016 reports, the Medicare trustees projected that general revenue Medicare funding would not exceed 45% of total Medicare outlays within seven fiscal years. Therefore, the Medicare trustees did not issue funding warnings in those years, and the President was not required to submit related legislative proposals subsequent to the release of the FY2015 through FY2019 budgets. However, in both their 2017 and 2018 reports, the Medicare trustees issued a determination of projected excess general revenue Medicare funding. Because such a determination was made in two consecutive years, a funding warning has been triggered and the MMA provides that the President will be required to submit a responsive legislative proposal after the release of his FY2020 budget (in 2019).
The Medicare funding warning focuses attention on the impact of program spending on the federal budget, and it provides one measure of the financial health of the program. However, some options for reducing general revenue spending below the 45% level would have a greater impact than others. Proponents of the trigger maintain that it forces fiscal responsibility, whereas critics of the trigger suggest that other measures of Medicare spending, such as total Medicare spending as a portion of federal spending, would be more useful indicators. |
crs_RL34219 | crs_RL34219_0 | Introduction
Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, insurance covering terrorism losses was normally included in general insurance policies without a specific premium being paid for this coverage. In response to the new appreciation of the threat and the perceived inability to calculate the probability of loss and gather the loss data critical for pricing insurance, both primary insurers and reinsurers pulled back from offering terrorism coverage. Because insurance is required for a variety of economic transactions, many feared that a lack of insurance against terrorism loss would have wider economic impact, particularly on large-scale developments in urban areas that would be tempting targets for terrorism. Congress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) , which was signed by the President in November 2002. TRIA created the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, which was enacted as a temporary program, expiring at the end of 2005, to calm the insurance markets through a government backstop for terrorism losses and give the private industry time to gather the data and create the structures and capacity necessary for private insurance to cover terrorism risk. Terrorism insurance became widely available under TRIA, and the insurance industry greatly expanded its financial capacity in the three years from 2002 to 2005. Again fearing economic disruption from the absence of terrorism insurance, Congress passed, and the President signed, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 (TRIEA) in December 2005. TRIEA extended the program for two years while increasing the private sector exposure under the program. There was, however, little concrete movement towards adopting such proposals. As was the case in the TRIA extension debate in 2005, the House bills were more significant revisions and expansions of the TRIA program, whereas the Senate bill had a narrower focus—extending the program while making more limited changes. H.R. 2761 as passed by the House included provisions that would have made the following changes to the current Terrorism Risk Insurance Program:
extended the TRIA program for 15 years, until the end of 2022; made spending by the program contingent on passage of a future joint resolution; added coverage for domestic terrorist acts in the program; added the Secretary of Homeland Security to the certification process; added group life insurance to the program with a separate set of retentions and deductibles; returned farmowners multiple peril as a covered line; reduced the general trigger to $50 million; required insurers to cover nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NCBR) terrorist attacks starting in 2009; lowered insurer deductible for NCBR attacks to 3.5% immediately and then raised that number by 0.5% per year in the future; increased the federal share of NCBR losses from 85% to as high as 100% for attacks causing over $100 billion in losses; temporarily preempted state laws on rate and form filing for NCBR coverages; provided the possibility of relief from NBCR requirement to smaller insurers; reset individual insurer deductibles to 5% and the program trigger to $5 million in the aftermath of a future terrorist attack (or series of attacks) that causes more than $1 billion in damage. On November 16, 2006, the Senate took up the House-passed version of H.R. 2761 , and amended it by unanimous consent with S.Amdt. At this time, however, the Senate did not request a conference with the House to reconcile the differences between the two versions of H.R. 2761 . Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 4299 consisted of the language of H.R. 2761 as passed by the Senate, plus the text of the amendment to H.R. The House considered H.R. 4299 under the provisions of H.Res. 2761 was signed by the President on December 26, 2007, becoming P.L. P.L. | Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, insurance covering terrorism losses was normally included in general insurance policies without additional cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, both primary insurers and reinsurers pulled back from offering terrorism coverage. Because insurance is required for a variety of economic transactions, it was feared that a lack of insurance against terrorism loss would have a wider economic impact.
Congress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA, P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322). TRIA created a temporary program, expiring at the end of 2005, to calm the insurance markets through a government backstop for terrorism losses, and to give the industry time to gather the data and create the structures and capacity necessary for private insurance to cover terrorism risk. From 2002 to 2005, terrorism insurance became widely available and largely affordable, and the insurance industry greatly expanded its financial capacity. There was, however, little apparent success on a longer term private solution and fears persisted about wider economic consequences if insurance were not available. Congress responded to the expiration of TRIA with the passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act (TRIEA, P.L. 109-144, 119 Stat. 2660). TRIEA extended the TRIA program until the end of 2007 while increasing the private sector exposure to terrorism risk.
The two years under the extended TRIA program were very similar to the three years under the first act. The market for terrorism insurance improved, but doubts remained as to capacity of the private sector to finance large-scale terrorism risk in the United States, as well as whether terrorism risk can be considered an insurable event at all. In response, the House passed H.R. 2761 in the 110th Congress, which would have extended the TRIA program 15 years and made substantial other changes. The Senate also passed H.R. 2761, after amending it with language from S. 2285, which would have extended TRIA seven years while making more limited changes to the underlying law. The House then passed H.R. 4299, which contained the language of the Senate-passed H.R. 2761 plus some of the provisions from the previous version of H.R. 2761. The differences between the House and Senate bills included the inclusion of group life insurance, restrictions on life insurers' use of travel in underwriting, lowering the deductible and trigger after a large terrorist attack, and the reduction of the program trigger to $50 million. The Senate, however, did not act on H.R. 4299, and the House ultimately agreed to the amended version of H.R. 2761 that was previously passed by the Senate. The President signed this bill into law on December 26, 2007.
This report briefly outlines the issues involved with terrorism insurance and includes a side-by-side of the previous TRIA law, the two House TRIA-extension bills, and the Senate bill that was ultimately signed by the President. It will not be updated. For more complete information on the issue, please see CRS Report RL34025, Terrorism Risk Insurance: Issue Analysis and Legislation, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34241 | crs_RL34241_0 | A carbon offset is a measurable avoidance, reduction, or sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) or other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Offsets generally fall within the following four categories (discussed in greater detail later in the report): biological sequestration, renewable energy, energy efficiency, and reduction of non-CO 2 emissions. It is generally agreed that a credible offset should equate to an emission reduction from a direct emission source, such as a smokestack or exhaust pipe. The quality of the retail offsets in the voluntary market varies considerably, largely because there are no commonly accepted standards. Assessment of Carbon Offset Sellers
Numerous companies and organizations sell carbon offsets to individuals or groups in the international, voluntary carbon market. Offset prices show a correlation with offset quality. In terms of global climate change mitigation, an emission reduction, avoidance, or sequestration is beneficial regardless of where or how it occurs. The core issue for carbon offset projects is: do they actually offset emissions generated elsewhere? If the credibility of the voluntary offsets is uncertain, claims of carbon neutrality may lack merit. Evidence suggests that not all offset projects are of equal quality, because they are developed through a range of standards. Although some standards are considered stringent, others are less so. Due to the lack of common standards, some observers have referred to the current voluntary market as the "wild west." This does not suggest that all carbon offsets are low quality, but that the consumer is forced to adopt a buyer-beware mentality when purchasing carbon offsets. This places the responsibility on consumers to judge the quality of carbon offsets. The viability—both actual and perceived—of the offset market may influence future policy decisions regarding climate change. For instance, some people are concerned that the range in the quality of voluntary market offsets may damage the overall credibility of carbon offsets. If this occurs, it may affect policy decisions concerning whether or not to include offsets as an option in a mandatory reduction program. | Businesses and individuals are buying carbon offsets to reduce their "carbon footprint" or to categorize an activity as "carbon neutral." A carbon offset is a measurable avoidance, reduction, or sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO2) or other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Offsets generally fall within the following four categories: biological sequestration, renewable energy, energy efficiency, and reduction of non-CO2 emissions.
In terms of the carbon concentration in the atmosphere, an emission reduction, avoidance, or sequestration is beneficial regardless of where or how it occurs. A credible offset equates to an emission reduction from a direct emission source, such as a smokestack or exhaust pipe. The core issue for carbon offset projects is: do they actually offset emissions generated elsewhere? If the credibility of the voluntary offsets is uncertain, claims of carbon neutrality may be challenged.
Evidence suggests that not all offset projects are of equal quality, because they are developed through a range of standards. In the voluntary market, there are no commonly accepted standards. Although some standards are considered stringent, others are less so. Numerous companies and organizations (domestic and international) sell carbon offsets to individuals or groups in the international, voluntary carbon market. Recent studies have found a general correlation between offset price and offset quality.
Due to the lack of common standards, some observers have referred to the market as the "wild west." This does not suggest that all carbon offsets are low quality, but that the consumer must necessarily adopt a buyer-beware mentality when purchasing carbon offsets. This places the responsibility on consumers to judge the quality of carbon offsets.
The viability of the voluntary offset market may influence future policy decisions regarding climate change mitigation. For example, credible offsets could play an important role, particularly in terms of cost-effectiveness, in an emissions control regime. There is some concern that the range in the quality of voluntary market offsets may damage the overall credibility of carbon offsets. If this occurs, it may affect policy decisions concerning whether or not to include offsets as an option in a mandatory reduction program. |
crs_R45039 | crs_R45039_0 | Introduction
Broadband—whether delivered via fiber, cable modem, copper wire, satellite, or mobile wireless—is increasingly the technology underlying telecommunications services such as voice, video, and data. Since the initial deployment of high-speed internet in the late 1990s, broadband technologies have been deployed throughout the United States primarily by the private sector. These providers include telephone, cable, wireless, and satellite companies as well as other entities that provide commercial telecommunications services to residential, business, and institutional customers. How broadband is defined and characterized in statute and in regulation can have a significant impact on federal broadband policies and how federal resources are allocated to promote broadband deployment in unserved and underserved areas. Another way broadband can be defined is by setting a minimum threshold speed for what constitutes "broadband service." Section 706 and the FCC's Definition of Minimum Broadband Speed
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires the FCC to regularly initiate an inquiry concerning the availability of broadband to all Americans and to determine whether broadband is "being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion." If the determination is negative, the act directs the FCC to "take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market." Starting in 1999, there have been 11 Section 706 reports, each providing a snapshot and assessment of broadband deployment. As part of this assessment, and to help determine whether broadband is being deployed in "a reasonable and timely fashion," the FCC has set a minimum broadband speed that essentially serves as the benchmark it uses to determine what constitutes broadband service for the purposes of its Section 706 determination. In 2015, the FCC, citing changing broadband usage patterns and multiple devices using broadband within single households, raised its minimum broadband benchmark speed from 4 Mbps/1 Mbps to 25 Mbps/3 Mbps. On February 2, 2018, the FCC adopted and released its latest 706 report, the 2018 Broadband Deployment Report . The FCC concluded that advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion. Thirteenth Section 706 Report Notice of Inquiry
On August 8, 2017, the FCC adopted and released its T hirteenth Section 706 Notice of Inquiry ( NOI ). Among their arguments were that LTE 4G mobile broadband deployment and usage is ubiquitous, with private sector investment continuing to grow for future deployments such as 5G; that the FCC should consider whether progress in broadband deployment is reasonable and timely, as opposed to whether deployment already is complete and ubiquitous; that consumers increasingly use mobile devices in fixed locations for many voice, data, graphics, and video applications, and that mobile broadband need not be a perfect or complete economic substitute for fixed broadband for the FCC to determine that both meet the definition of "advanced telecommunications capability"; and that many consumers in fact do view mobile and fixed broadband as interchangeable substitutes and that the two services provide a competitive constraint on each other and should be considered to be in the same market. As broadband technology advances, commercially available download and upload speeds will likely increase, and the level at which broadband benchmark threshold speeds should be set is likely to remain controversial. Accordingly, the FCC's annual Section 706 determination is likely to remain contentious as long as it is seen by stakeholders as providing a justification for current or future FCC regulatory or deregulatory policies. Stakeholders who supported an FCC determination that broadband is not being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion generally opposed lowering the broadband benchmark by considering the presence of either fixed (at 25 Mbps/3 Mbps) or mobile (at 10 Mbps/1 Mbps) broadband as an indication that an area has adequate broadband service. On the other hand, stakeholders who supported an FCC determination that broadband is being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion generally supported changing the FCC's broadband benchmark methodology to include the presence of either fixed or mobile broadband as an indication that an area is receiving adequate broadband service. | Broadband—whether delivered via fiber, cable modem, copper wire, satellite, or mobile wireless—is increasingly the technology underlying telecommunications services such as voice, video, and data. Since the initial deployment of high-speed internet in the late 1990s, broadband technologies have been deployed throughout the United States primarily by the private sector. These providers include telephone, cable, wireless, and satellite companies as well as other entities that provide commercial telecommunications services to residential, business, and institutional customers.
How broadband is defined and characterized in statute and in regulation can have a significant impact on federal broadband policies and how federal resources are allocated to promote broadband deployment in unserved and underserved areas. One way broadband can be defined is by setting a minimum threshold speed for what constitutes "broadband service." Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regularly initiate an inquiry concerning the availability of broadband to all Americans and to determine whether broadband is "being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion." If the determination is negative, the act directs the FCC to "take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the telecommunications market."
Starting in 1999, there have been 11 Section 706 reports, each providing a snapshot and assessment of broadband deployment. As part of this assessment, and to help determine whether broadband is being deployed in "a reasonable and timely fashion," the FCC has set a minimum broadband speed that essentially serves as the benchmark the FCC uses to determine what it considers broadband service for the purposes of its Section 706 determination. In 2015 the FCC, citing changing broadband usage patterns and multiple devices using broadband within single households, raised its minimum fixed broadband benchmark speed from 4 Mbps (download)/1 Mbps (upload) to 25 Mbps/3 Mbps.
On August 8, 2017, the FCC adopted and released its Thirteenth Section 706 Notice of Inquiry (NOI). One proposal under consideration was establishing a lower benchmark speed specifically for mobile broadband. Stakeholders who supported an FCC determination that broadband is not being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion generally opposed lowering the broadband benchmark by considering the presence of either fixed (at 25 Mbps/3 Mbps) or mobile (at 10 Mbps/1 Mbps) broadband as an indication that an area has adequate broadband service. On the other hand, stakeholders who supported an FCC determination that broadband is being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion generally supported changing the FCC's broadband benchmark methodology to include the presence of either fixed or mobile broadband as an indication that an area is receiving adequate broadband service.
On February 2, 2018, the FCC adopted and released its latest 706 report, the 2018 Broadband Deployment Report. While the FCC concluded that advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion, it concluded that adoption of a single mobile benchmark is currently unworkable and that mobile broadband service is not a full substitute for fixed service at this time.
As broadband technology advances, commercially available download and upload speeds will likely increase, and the level at which broadband benchmark threshold speeds should be set is likely to remain controversial. Accordingly, the FCC's annual Section 706 determination is likely to be an issue in Congress as long as it is seen by stakeholders as providing a justification for current or future FCC regulatory or deregulatory policies. |
crs_RL33717 | crs_RL33717_0 | Although brand-name pharmaceutical companies commonly procure patents on their innovative products and processes, such rights are not self-enforcing. If a brand-name drug company wishes to enforce its patents against generic competitors, it must pursue litigation in the federal courts. Such litigation ordinarily terminates in either a judgment of infringement, which typically blocks generic competition until such time as the patent expires, or a judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed, which typically opens the market to generic entry. As with other sorts of commercial litigation, however, the parties to pharmaceutical patent litigation may choose to settle their case. Certain of these settlements call for the generic firm to neither challenge the brand-name company's patents nor sell a generic version of the patented drug. This compensation has been termed an "exclusion" or "exit" payment or, because the payment flows counterintuitively, from the patent proprietor to the accused infringer, a "reverse" payment." Commentators differ markedly in their views of reverse payment settlements. Some observers believe that they result from the specialized patent litigation procedures established by the Hatch-Waxman Act. Others conclude that when one competitor pays another not to market its product, such a settlement is anti-competitive and a violation of the antitrust laws. Since 2003, Congress has required that litigants notify federal antitrust authorities of their pharmaceutical patent settlements. To date, Congress has not stipulated substantive standards for assessing the validity of these agreements under the antitrust law, however. That determination was left to judicial application of general antitrust principles. Facing different factual patterns, some courts have concluded that a particular reverse payment settlement constituted an antitrust violation, while others have upheld the agreement. The Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act ( S. 27 ) would create a presumption that certain reverse payment settlements are unlawful. S. 27 then establishes relevant factors to be weighed in deciding whether that presumption has been overcome through a showing that the procompetitive benefits of the settlement outweigh its anticompetitive effects. Another bill, S. 1882 , the FAIR Generics Act, would disqualify any generic firm from entering into a reverse payment settlement (as defined in the legislation) from enjoying the 180-day exclusivity. Neither bill has yet been enacted. In exchange, the NDA holder would agree to compensate the ANDA applicant, often with substantial monetary payments over a number of years. One possibility is to await further judicial developments. Another option is to regulate the settlement of pharmaceutical patent litigation in some manner. Another bill, S. 1882 , the Fair and Immediate Release of Generic Drugs Act (FAIR Generics Act), would allow any generic firm that prevails in a patent challenge in district court, or is not sued for infringement by a brand-name firm, to share most of the 180-day generic exclusivity that is currently enjoyed by first paragraph IV ANDA applicants. | Although brand-name pharmaceutical companies routinely procure patents on their innovative medications, such rights are not self-enforcing. Brand-name firms that wish to enforce their patents against generic competitors must commence litigation in the federal courts. Such litigation ordinarily terminates in either a judgment of infringement, which typically blocks generic competition until such time as the patent expires, or a judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed, which typically opens the market to generic entry.
As with other sorts of commercial litigation, however, the parties to pharmaceutical patent litigation may choose to settle their case. Certain of these settlements have called for the generic firm to neither challenge the brand-name company's patents nor sell a generic version of the patented drug for a period of time. In exchange, the brand-name drug company agrees to compensate the generic firm, often with substantial monetary payments over a number of years. Because the payment flows counterintuitively, from the patent proprietor to the accused infringer, this compensation has been termed a "reverse" payment.
Commentators have differed markedly in their views of reverse payment settlements. Some observers believe that they are a consequence of the specialized patent litigation procedures established by the Hatch-Waxman Act. Others have concluded that when one competitor pays another not to market its product, such a settlement is anti-competitive and a violation of the antitrust laws.
Since 2003, Congress has required that litigants notify federal antitrust authorities of their pharmaceutical patent settlements. That legislation did not dictate substantive standards for assessing the validity of these agreements under the antitrust law, however. That determination was left to judicial application of general antitrust principles. Facing different factual patterns, some courts have concluded that a particular reverse payment settlement constituted an antitrust violation, while others have upheld the agreement.
Congress possesses a number of alternatives for addressing reverse payment settlements. One possibility is to await further judicial developments. Another option is to regulate the settlement of pharmaceutical patent litigation in some manner. In the 112th Congress, S. 27, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, would establish a presumption that certain reverse payment settlements are unlawful. S. 27 also identifies relevant factors to be weighed in deciding whether that presumption has been overcome through a showing that the procompetitive benefits of the settlement outweigh its anticompetitive effects. Another bill, S. 1882, the FAIR Generics Act, would disqualify any generic firm from entering into a reverse payment settlement (as defined in the legislation) from enjoying the 180-day exclusivity. S. 1882 would also allow any generic firm that prevails in a patent challenge in district court, or is not sued for infringement by a brand-name firm, to share most of the 180-day generic exclusivity that is currently enjoyed by first paragraph IV ANDA applicants. Neither bill has yet been enacted.
This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R41946 | crs_R41946_0 | Senator or Representative to Congress are established and set out within the U.S. Constitution. There are only three "positive" standing qualifications for the office of U.S. Senator and Representative:
Age—a Representative to Congress must be at least 25 years old; a Senator must be at least 30 years old. Exclusivity of Constitutional Qualifications
Although there may have been some credible minority argument concerning the ability of Congress or the states individually to set additional or different qualifications for federal office from those set out in the Constitution, it is now well-settled that the qualifications established in the U.S. Constitution are the exclusive qualifications for federal office (and are not merely "minimum" qualifications). State laws which have attempted to place requirements on candidacies to Congress that have been deemed to constitute "additional qualifications" to be elected to federal office, such as, for example, requirements of residency in the congressional district from which one is running (for the House of Representatives), disqualification from office of certain convicted felons, additional residency requirements for one to be an "elector" qualified to run for congressional office (or other durational residency requirements), or the disqualification for certain long-term incumbents (term limits), have been found to be unconstitutional when challenged. Judging Qualifications to Office
The U.S. Constitution, at Article I, Section 5, clause 1, expressly delegates to each house of Congress the authority to judge the qualifications for office of its own Members: "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members.... " As noted by authorities on parliamentary democracies and the Constitution, since Congress is an independent, separate, and co-equal branch of government, it would not be consistent with its status or functions, nor with the separation of powers principles generally, for a different branch of the government, such as the judiciary, to determine the legislature's make-up:
The propriety of each House being the judge of these matters is very obvious. Article I, Section 2, clause 2, and Article I, Section 3, clause 3 of the Constitution expressly require one to be an "inhabitant" of the state "when elected." Constitutional Disqualifications
In addition to the three standing "positive" qualifications for congressional office in the U.S. Constitution—age, citizenship, and inhabitancy in the state when elected—there are certain "disqualifications" that are based on constitutional provisions. Holding Other Federal Office
The Constitution provides at Article I, Section 6, clause 2, that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his continuance in Office." This procedural and administrative authority extends to such things as the form of the ballots, voting procedures, counting votes and certifying winners, the nominating process, and may extend to reasonable requirements for a candidate's name to appear on the ballot, that is, so-called "ballot access" requirements for major party, new party, and independent candidates. Legitimate "ballot access" rules are generally promulgated by states to prevent the proliferation of frivolous candidates, ballot overcrowding and voter confusion, election fraud, and to facilitate generally proper election administration. Various "ballot access" procedures, including filing requirements, filing deadlines, a show of qualifying support by new or minor party or independent candidates, "sore loser" laws and other restrictions on cross-filing, have been found generally to be within the state's purview to "regulate[ ] election procedures " to serve the state interest of "protecting the integrity and regularity of the election process ... ," and when they are found to be within the state's administrative authority over elections, they would be deemed to be not impermissible additional qualifications for federal office even though they create certain procedural hurdles or requirements which a candidate must overcome. The petition-signature requirements for congressional candidates to appear on the ballot in various states have been challenged on both First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. 5 U.S.C. | There are three, and only three, standing qualifications for U.S. Senator or Representative in Congress which are expressly set out in the U.S. Constitution: age (25 for the House, 30 for the Senate); citizenship (at least seven years for the House, nine years for the Senate); and inhabitancy in the state at the time elected. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2, cl. 2 (House); and Article I, Section 3, cl. 3 (Senate). The Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed the historical understanding that the Constitution provides the exclusive qualifications to be a Member of Congress, and that neither a state nor Congress itself may add to or change such qualifications to federal office, absent a constitutional amendment. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 800-801 (1995); Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
The Constitution expressly delegates to each house of Congress the authority to be the final judge of the qualifications of its own Members (Article I, Section 5, cl. 1). In judging the qualifications of their Members, and deciding by majority vote, the House and Senate are limited to judging only the qualifications set out in the Constitution. Powell v. McCormack, supra.
Although the states have no authority to add to the constitutional qualifications for congressional office, the states have the responsibility under the "Times, Places, and Manner" clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 4, cl. 1) for administering elections for federal office, including regulating such subjects as ballot design, candidate placement on the ballot, ballot security measures, nomination procedures to appear as a party's nominee on the ballot, and ballot access requirements for independent and new or minor political party candidates. Legitimate "ballot access" rules and regulations, even though they may pose certain administrative requirements on federal candidates, have been upheld when they have been found to be within a state's constitutional authority to regulate the election process, to ensure orderly elections, and to prevent fraud and voter confusion. The states have been allowed to implement rules which, for example, prevent over-crowding and confusion on the ballot by requiring a minimum show of public support to appear on the ballot, by prohibiting such things as dual candidacies on the ballot, and by implementing "sore loser" laws that bar a candidate on the general election ballot from appearing as an independent if that candidate had lost a party primary. Such administrative requirements have not been deemed to be additional "qualifications" to run for office. However, requirements that are more than merely administrative and procedural or measures to protect ballot integrity have been found to be unconstitutional as additional qualifications for office. Examples include requirements for congressional candidates to live in the congressional district (and not just the state), durational residency requirements, ineligibility of convicted felons, and disqualification of incumbents (term limits).
This report updates an earlier CRS report, and will be revised as decisions, rulings, and/or events warrant. |
crs_R43696 | crs_R43696_0 | According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Economic Research Service (ERS), agricultural exports have exceeded agricultural imports in every year since 1960 ( Table A-1 ). The value of agricultural exports has exceeded imports by a wide margin in recent years, but this trend reversed course in FY2015, with the positive balance expected to narrow further in FY2016 ( Figure 1 ). The agency expects U.S. exports to recede to $125 billion while imports climb to $118.5 billion, resulting in a substantially smaller farm trade surplus of $6.5 billion in FY2016 and marking what would be the smallest surplus since FY2006. Foreign markets represent the largest outlet for a number of U.S. farm commodities while providing a substantial market for many other agricultural products. Another factor influencing U.S. agricultural trade is the value of the U.S. dollar relative to foreign currencies. To this end, FAS administers several export programs designed to improve the competitive position of U.S. agricultural goods in the world marketplace with the objective of facilitating export sales and improving foreign market access for U.S. farm products. The trade title of the 2014 farm bill, the Agricultural Act of 2014 (Title III of P.L. Export market development programs, 2. Export credit guarantee programs, and 3. The 2014 farm bill made several changes to Title III but left intact most programs that facilitate overseas market development and sales. Key changes include alterations to the Export Credit Guarantee Program to align it with WTO rulings concerning its use in facilitating exports of U.S. cotton and the elimination of the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), which effectively curtailed the use of direct export subsidies. The bill also directs the Secretary of Agriculture to establish the position of Under Secretary of Agriculture for Trade and International Affairs as part of a reorganization of the agency's trade functions. Market Development Programs
FAS supports U.S. industry efforts to build, maintain, and expand overseas markets for U.S. food and agricultural products. FAS administers five market development programs:
1. Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP), 3. Quality Samples Program (QSP), and 5. Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops Program (TASC). Emerging Markets Program (EMP)25
EMP assists U.S. entities in developing, maintaining, and expanding the exports of U.S. agricultural commodities and products by providing partial funding for technical assistance activities that promote U.S. agricultural exports to emerging markets. Export Credit Guarantees
For FY2014 through FY2018, the 2014 farm bill reauthorized USDA-operated export credit guarantee programs, which were first established in the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 ( P.L. Under these programs, private U.S. financial institutions extend financing at prevailing market interest rates to countries that want to purchase U.S. agricultural exports with a CCC guarantee that the loans will be repaid. Under the 2014 farm bill, funding for the GSM-102 program is reauthorized. Issues for Congress
U.S. Thereafter, U.S. farm exports receded to $139 billion in FY2015, and USDA projects that exports will decline further to $125 billion in FY2016, which would mark the lowest ebb for farm exports since FY2010 ( Table A-1 ). Considering the sharp fall in net cash farm income in recent years—to a forecast $91 billion in 2016 from a peak of $135 billion in 2012 and 2013—Congress might consider the possible advantages and potential downsides of addressing opportunities and market circumstances that could contribute to an increase in U.S. agricultural exports, which could include the following three. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)
TPP, a regional FTA that the U.S. government has concluded with 11 other Pacific-facing countries, would, in part, provide improved access to these markets for agricultural products—through a reduction in tariff rates and expanded tariff-rate quotas—for a broad range of U.S. agricultural products (see "U.S. In a March 2016 report, the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded that U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba could post significant gains if U.S. restrictions on trade were removed. Considering that both of these functions currently fall within the purview of the Under Secretary for Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services—and in view of the importance of these program activities to the agricultural sector—Congress might have a keen interest in considering the Secretary's plan and in overseeing the subsequent reorganization effort. An amendment to repeal MAP ( H.Amdt. | U.S. agricultural exports have long been a bright spot in the U.S. balance of trade, with exports exceeding imports in every year since 1960. But the trend of recent years—increasing export sales and a wider agricultural trade surplus—was reversed in FY2015, and the reversal is expected to be more pronounced in FY2016. After climbing to a record $152.3 billion in FY2014, U.S. farm exports declined to $139.7 billion in FY2015, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) projects a further reduction to $125 billion in FY2016. Meanwhile, the value of U.S. agricultural imports has continued to climb: In consequence, the U.S. agricultural trade surplus fell to $25.7 billion in FY2015 from a peak of $43.1 billion in FY2014, and it is projected to narrow further to $6.5 billion in FY2016. Exports are a major outlet for many farm commodities, representing about 20% of the value of farm production, making exports an important contributor to farm income.
Among the key variables affecting the value of U.S. agricultural exports are commodity prices, the value of the U.S. dollar vis-a-vis currencies of trading partners, and the pace of economic growth—particularly in developing and emerging countries. According to USDA, factors contributing to a continued downturn in U.S. farm exports in FY2016 include low commodity prices, a strong U.S. dollar, relatively weak importer demand, and strong foreign competition.
The United States operates a number of programs aimed at developing overseas markets for U.S. agricultural products and facilitating exports. The Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79, extended most programs from FY2014 through FY2018. The trade title (Title III) of the 2014 farm bill authorized, amended, and repealed three main types of agricultural export programs:
1. Export market development programs. The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of USDA administers five market development programs that aim to assist U.S. industry efforts to build, maintain, and expand overseas markets for U.S. agricultural products. The five are the Market Access Program (MAP), the Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP), the Emerging Markets Program (EMP), the Quality Samples Program (QSP), and the Technical Assistance for Specialty Crops Program (TASC). 2. Export credit guarantee programs. Through the GSM-102 Program and the Facility Guarantee Program, USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) guarantees loans so that private U.S. financial institutions will extend financing to buyers in emerging markets that want to purchase U.S. agricultural products. The 2014 farm bill shortened the loan term on which export credit guarantees would be made available to conform to U.S. commitments in the World Trade Organization (WTO). 3. Direct export subsidy programs. The 2014 farm bill terminated the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP), which had been inactive for several years.
The 2014 farm bill also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to reorganize USDA's export and import activities and create a new Under Secretary of Agriculture position to oversee trade-related sanitary and phytosanitary issues affecting agriculture, as well as non-tariff trade barriers.
In view of the more challenging market environment for U.S. farm exports, Congress could weigh possible opportunities to expand foreign markets and remove impediments to farm exports. For example, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), if implemented, would lower many tariffs that Japan and other TPP nations impose on U.S. farm and food exports. Also, numerous U.S. agricultural interests assert that U.S. farm exports to Cuba could increase if Congress were to repeal statutory restrictions on this trade. In addition, U.S. farm groups and lawmakers have identified foreign subsidies as distorting trade and displacing U.S. farm exports. Another possible issue for Congress involves overseeing plans to reorganize USDA's trade functions. |
crs_RL30344 | crs_RL30344_0 | Introduction
Inflation—the general rise in the prices of goods and services—is one of the differentiating characteristics of the U.S. economy in the post-World War II era. The cumulative effect of this inflation is staggering: the price level has risen more than 1,000% since the end of World War II. During the last two recessions (2001 and 2007 to 2009), policymakers have been more concerned about the threat of deflation (falling prices) than inflation. On the eve of that war, in 1941, the U.S. price level was virtually the same as in 1807. The high U.S.-inflation rate of the late 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s caused economists to rethink the costs of inflation to an economy. In the United States, indexation is incomplete. That is, producers and workers mistake changes in nominal prices and wages for changes in corresponding real magnitudes and act accordingly. Third, contracts tend to be shortened. Although economic theory does not prescribe an optimal rate of inflation, many economists would support the goal of price stability, which former chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan once defined as existing when inflation is not considered in household and business decisions. The reason that it could be hard to escape deflation is related to the "zero bound" on monetary policy. Evidence suggests that this may not have been a problem for the United States in the post-World War II era. In general, the cost of inflation to an economy will be larger the higher the rate of inflation, the more variable the rate, the less it is anticipated, the greater is the uncertainty it causes, and the less indexed is the economy. The rise in the general level of prices, the essence of inflation, is measured by using a price index that aggregates the price of different goods and services. Inflation rates according to the two measures are usually similar. The Underlying or Core Rate of Inflation
When comparing purchasing power over two time periods, the overall (referred to as "headline") inflation rate is the relevant measure. Some policymakers prefer to use core inflation to predict future overall inflation because food and energy price volatility makes it difficult to discern trends from the overall inflation rate. Changes in Labor Costs
Because labor costs comprise nearly two-thirds of the value of final output, some economists believe that they are an important determinant of the rate of inflation. During the last two recessions (2001 and 2007 to 2009), policymakers have been more concerned about the threat of deflation (falling prices) than inflation, and they have pursued unconventional policies to prevent it. Prices fell in 2009, but have risen at a low and stable rate since. Given the relationship between inflation and the money supply, some economists are concerned that the rapid growth in the portion of the money supply controlled by the Fed since 2008 could cause rapid inflation. To date, those concerns have not been realized, primarily because of the large slack in the economy. | Since the end of World War II, the United States has experienced almost continuous inflation—the general rise in the price of goods and services. It would be difficult to find a similar period in American history before that war. Indeed, prior to World War II, the United States often experienced long periods of deflation. Note that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in 1941 was virtually at the same level as in 1807.
For more than two decades, the inflation rate has remained low, in contrast to the 1970s and early 1980s. This is true regardless of which of the many available official price indices is used to calculate the rate at which the price of goods and services rose. A low inflation rate is especially significant since the U.S. economy was fully employed, if not over fully employed, according to many estimates for the last three years of the 1991-2001 expansion and during 2006-2007. Yet, contrary to expectations, the inflation rate accelerated only modestly. Keeping an economy moving along a full-employment path without sparking higher inflation is a difficult policy task.
During the last two recessions (2001 and 2007 to 2009), policymakers have been more concerned about the threat of deflation (falling prices) than inflation, and they have pursued unconventional policies to prevent it. Prices fell in 2009, but have risen at a low and stable rate since. Given the relationship between inflation and the money supply, some economists are concerned that the rapid growth in the portion of the money supply controlled by the Fed since 2008 could cause rapid inflation. To date, those concerns have not been realized, primarily because of the large slack in the economy.
Because labor costs make up nearly two-thirds of total production costs, the rate at which they rise is often regarded as an indication of future inflation at the retail level. They tended to rise in the latter stage of the 1991-2001 expansion and to moderate during the subsequent contraction, recovery, and expansion that ended in December 2007.
Rather than measure inflation by using the rate at which prices overall are rising, some economists prefer a measure that reflects primarily the systematic factors that raise prices. This yields the "underlying" or "core" rate of inflation. The overall inflation rate exceeded the core rate in eight years during the 2000s.
Although economic theory does not prescribe an optimal rate of inflation, many economists would support the goal of price stability, which former chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan once defined as existing when inflation is not considered in household and business decisions. Why should the United States be concerned about inflation? This study reports the distilled knowledge of economists on the real cost to an economy from inflation. These are remarkably more varied than the outlays for "shoe leather," long reported to be the major cost of inflation ("shoe leather" being a shorthand term for the resources that have to be expended on less efficient methods of exchanges).
The costs of inflation are related to its rate, the uncertainty it engenders, whether it is anticipated, and the degree to which contracts and the tax system are indexed. A major cost is related to the inefficient utilization of resources because economic agents mistake changes in nominal variables for changes in real variables and act accordingly (the so-called signal problem). Inflation in the United States during the post-World War II era may not have been high enough for this cost to be significant. |
crs_RL34153 | crs_RL34153_0 | Those whose fully loaded weight is more than 10,000 pounds are not, though some states and individual school districts require seat belts in those vehicles. This produces an estimated 5.5 billion student trips annually. The largest school buses (Types C and D) have GVWRs of 24,000 pounds or more. Compartmentalization has been found to be effective in protecting school bus passengers in head-on collisions. It is less effective at protecting passengers in side-collisions or roll-over accidents, when occupants may be thrown out of their compartments, or at protecting passengers when they are not properly seated. NHTSA has announced that it is planning to propose: standardized test procedures for voluntary installed lap/shoulder belts; an increase in the required school bus seat back height (from the current standard of 20 inches above the level of the seat to 24 inches, to reduce the risk of a passenger striking the passenger in the seat ahead); and that smaller (Type II) school buses, currently required to have lap belts, be required to have lap/shoulder belts. Potential Safety Benefits of Seat Belts in Large School Buses
Several studies have examined the potential safety benefits of seat belts in large school buses. Potential Impacts of Requiring Seat Belts on Large School Buses
Proponents of requiring seat belts on large school buses include the American Academy of Pediatrics, the National Coalition for School Bus Safety, the National PTA, and others. They note that compartmentalization is designed primarily to protect occupants in front- and rear-end collisions, and provides limited protection in side-impact collisions and rollover accidents, as well as limited protection even in front- and rear-end collisions to students who are not properly seated. Others, including the National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services and the National School Transportation Association, caution against requiring that school buses be equipped with seat belts. At the same time, the resulting reduction in school bus seating capacity might increase the risk to students who were displaced from school buses to more dangerous forms of transportation, unless significant additional resources were made available to maintain the overall bus fleet seating capacity. Proponents of requiring seat belts on school buses contend that estimates of the cost of adding seat belts to school buses should take into account the costs of not having seat belts on school buses. The federal government does not generally provide funding for school transportation. Usage
For lap/shoulder belts to reduce the already small number of deaths of school bus occupants each year, they would need to be widely used and used correctly. Between the federal mandate for seat belts on Type II school buses and the actions of individual school districts and some states, already as much as 35% of the nation's total school bus fleet is required to have some form of seat belt (though the percentage actually equipped with seat belts is less than that, since California and Florida have not fully equipped their fleets yet). NHTSA has estimated that such a requirement could potentially save an average of one life, and prevent some proportion of serious injuries, each year in frontal crashes, assuming 100% proper usage, and could also reduce fatalities and injuries in non-frontal crashes. Encourage the Purchase of Large School Buses with Lap/Shoulder Belts
Since 1999 several states have required that large school buses be equipped with seat belts. | It is estimated that 25% of student trips to schoolâ5.5 billion trips each yearâare made on school buses. Nationwide, an average of seven school bus passengers die each year in crashes. Buses have the lowest death rate of any mode of transporting children to school in the United States.
Federal safety standards for school buses, established in 1977, require seat belts only on buses whose fully loaded weight is less than 10,000 pounds (Type II), but not on buses whose fully loaded weight is more than 10,000 pounds (Type I). The vast majority of Type I school buses weigh 24,000 pounds or more when fully loaded. In addition to their greater mass and structural safety features, these large school buses employ compartmentalizationâa passive protection system that uses padded, high-backed seats spaced closely together in rowsâto protect passengers. Compartmentalization has been found to be an effective system in protecting passengers in front- and rear-end crashes, provided the passengers are properly seated, but it is less effective in protecting them in side-impact and rollover crashes, when they may be thrown out of the compartments.
The occupant protection value of seat belts on large school buses has been debated for decades. Advocates contend that seat belts would reduce injuries to and deaths of passengers, in part through keeping them within their compartments in side-impact and rollover crashes. These advocates, who include the American Academy of Pediatrics, the National Coalition for School Bus Safety, and the National PTA, also contend that seat belts would provide other benefits, including improving student behavior on buses and reducing distractions to drivers, as well as reinforcing use of seat belts that might increase seat belt use in other vehicles. Others, including the National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services and the National Association of School Transportation, caution against requiring that seat belts be installed on large school buses. They note that studies have found that adding seat belts to large school buses is not a cost-effective safety improvement. These studies indicate that lap belts may provide no net safety benefit, and lap/shoulder belts might save one or two lives and prevent several serious injuries each year, at an annual cost of hundreds of millions of dollars for adding the belts. Also, since adding lap/shoulder belts can reduce the seating capacity of large school buses, some students might be displaced from school buses to more dangerous forms of transportation unless additional buses have been purchased to maintain existing seating capacity, further increasing the cost of the requirement. Given the relatively small number of deaths to school bus passengers, these observers contend that other measures could have greater safety benefits for school children.
Several states have passed laws requiring that large school buses be equipped with lap belts, with the result that perhaps as much as 35% of the nation's school bus fleet is already required to have some form of seat belts; only California currently requires the safer and more expensive lap/shoulder belts. Federal funding is generally not available to help communities purchase school buses. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R42443 | crs_R42443_0 | As with other parts of the report, this section has many elements that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim that it has confirmed independently any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to Israeli, U.S., or other officials. The remainder of this report is unchanged from the version published on March 28, 2012. Twice in its history, Israel has conducted air strikes aimed at preventing a regional actor from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability—destroying Iraq's Tammuz-Osirak reactor in 1981 and a presumed reactor under construction at Al Kibar near Deir al Zur in Syria in 2007. For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. What effect might an attack have on a potential Iranian decision to weaponize its nuclear program? Yet, even some Israeli officials who generally avoid characterizing the threat of a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran as existential describe it as still presenting unacceptably high risks. The Israeli Decisionmaking Process108
Several factors may influence any Israeli political decision relating to a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views and interactions of Israeli decisionmakers; the public debate in Israel, the stances and anticipated responses of U.S., regional, and international actors; estimates of the effects of a possible strike; and the anticipated Iranian response regionally and internationally. It is unclear how influential security officials' views would be in a decision on a strike. Israeli leaders' perspectives about the possible effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance to Israel, possible negative security consequences for the United States from a potential Iranian retaliation, and the probability of future U.S. military action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process
An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that "the [Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now." Not all Israeli assessments agree, however. Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Estimated Effects of a Possible Strike
Effect on Iran's Nuclear Program204
Another major consideration for Israeli decisionmakers is the ultimate impact of an Israeli military strike on Iran's existing nuclear program. An Israeli strike on Iran could raise significant questions for Members of Congress, both short- and long-term. These include, but are not limited to, the following:
How might a strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to, Israel and other regional countries? Would an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would be the legal and policy implications either way? How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject? How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide oversight with respect to various political and military options? | Several published reports indicate that top Israeli decisionmakers are seriously considering whether to order a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, and if so, when. Twice in Israel's history, it has conducted air strikes aimed at halting or delaying what Israeli policymakers believed to be efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern state—destroying Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 and a facility the Israelis identified as a reactor under construction in Syria in 2007. Today, Israeli officials generally view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an unacceptable threat to Israeli security—with some describing it as an existential threat. This report analyzes key factors that may influence Israeli political decisions relating to a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views of and relationships among Israeli leaders; the views of the Israeli public; U.S., regional, and international stances and responses as perceived and anticipated by Israel; Israeli estimates of the potential effectiveness and risks of a possible strike; and responses Israeli leaders anticipate from Iran and Iranian-allied actors—including Hezbollah and Hamas—regionally and internationally.
For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. By all accounts, such an attack could have considerable regional and global security, political, and economic repercussions, not least for the United States, Israel, and their bilateral relationship. It is unclear what the ultimate effect of a strike would be on the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The current Israeli government, President Barack Obama, and many Members of Congress have similar concerns about Iran's nuclear program. They appear to have a range of views on how best to address those shared concerns. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy and research purposes, and U.S. intelligence assessments say that Iran has not made a decision to build nuclear weapons. However, Iran continues to enrich uranium in militarily hardened sites and questions remain about its nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions.
Short- and long-term questions for Members of Congress to consider regarding a possible Israeli decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities militarily might include, but are not limited to, the following:
How might an Israeli strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to, Israel and other regional countries? Would an Israeli strike be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would be the legal and policy implications either way? How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject? How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide oversight with respect to various political and military options?
This report has many aspects that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim to independently confirm any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to various Israeli, U.S., or other officials.
This is an update of a report dated March 28, 2012. However, the only updated material is the initial section entitled "Developments from Late March to September 2012." |
crs_RS20549 | crs_RS20549_0 | DLA Disposition Services is responsible for property reuse (including the disposal and sale of surplus and excess defense equipment and supplies), precious metal recovery, recycling, hazardous property disposal, and the demilitarization of military equipment. Major New Developments10
Congressional Concerns over the 1033 Program
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern over the 1033 Program and the types of military equipment made available to state and local law enforcement agencies, particularly in the in the aftermath of clashes between protesters and police. The concerns of these Members were elevated in the aftermath of the August 2014 shooting death incident in Ferguson, MO, and the widely circulated photographs of heavily armed police using equipment believed to be transferred from the federal government through the 1033 Law Enforcement Support Program, as well as from other sources. (See section on the Law Enforcement Support Office)
On September 9, 2014, the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee will hold a hearing titled "Oversight of Federal Programs Equipping State and Law Enforcement." DLA Disposition Services
DLA Disposition Services manages the reutilization, transfer, donation and sale of surplus military property. The Reutilization/Transfer/Donation Program through DLA Disposition Services establishes a process for property considered no longer needed by DOD to be redistributed among various groups. Property considered surplus can be reused, transferred, donated, or sold; potential recipients may include law enforcement agencies, school systems, medical institutions, civic and community organizations, libraries, homeless assistance providers, state and local government agencies, veteran's organizations, and the public. Property that is no longer needed by the government may be acquired through public sales, if the property is appropriate and safe for sale to the general public. This property is considered excess to the needs of the Department of Defense. These are drawn from Department of Defense (DOD) stocks deemed excess to military needs. 101-189 ), which temporarily authorized transfers of defense equipment to law enforcement agencies for counter-drug enforcement use. DLA states that all of the equipment requisitioned under the 1033 Program has either a commercial similarity or can be requested through a grant. | The effort to dispose of surplus military equipment dates back to the end of World War II when the federal government sought to reduce a massive inventory of surplus military equipment by making such equipment available to civilians. (The disposal of surplus real property, including land, buildings, commercial facilities, and equipment situated thereon, is assigned to the General Services Administration, Office of Property Disposal.)
The Department of Defense (DOD) through a Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) component called DLA Disposition Services has a policy for disposing of government equipment and supplies considered surplus or deemed unnecessary, or excess to the agency's currently designated mission. DLA Disposition Services is responsible for property reuse (including resale), precious metal recovery, recycling, hazardous property disposal, and the demilitarization of military equipment.
DLA Disposition Services manages the reutilization, transfer, donation and sale of surplus military property. The Reutilization/Transfer/Donation Program through DLA Disposition Services establishes a process for property considered no longer needed by DOD to be redistributed among various groups. Property considered surplus can be reused, transferred, donated, or sold; potential recipients may include law enforcement agencies, school systems, medical institutions, civic and community organizations, libraries, homeless assistance providers, state and local government agencies, veteran's organizations, and the public. Property that is no longer needed by the government may be acquired through public sales, if the property is appropriate and safe for sale to the general public.
Recently, the Law Enforcement Support Program (LESO), also referred to as the 1033 Program, has been the subject of media reports. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern over the transfer of surplus weapons from federal programs including the 1033 Program, and the types of military equipment that can be made available to state and local law enforcement agencies, particularly in the aftermath of clashes between protesters and police over the August 2014 shooting death incident in Ferguson, MO. On September 9, 2014, the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee will hold a hearing titled "Oversight of Federal Programs Equipping State and Law Enforcement."
This report focuses on the disposal of defense surplus property that is delegated to DOD from the General Services Administration. Law enforcement agencies are a recipient of defense surplus property, along with many other recipients. For further information on the 1033 Program, see CRS Report R43701, The "1033 Program," Department of Defense Support to Law Enforcement, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33658 | crs_RL33658_0 | Introduction
Subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal offense is usually a matter of the law of the place where the offense occurs. A number of federal criminal statutes, however, enjoy extraterritorial application. The trend continued in the 109 th Congress. And yet others would have expand existing statements of extraterritorial jurisdiction for existing crimes to enlarge the circumstances under which they apply. Several proposals in the 109 th Congress followed this model. The bills in question were:
- Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act ( S. 2611 as agreed to by the Senate);
- Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act ( H.R. Even in the absence of a statement of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the courts seem likely to conclude that the statute was intended to have extraterritorial application and that such application constitutes no affront to the principles of international law. A general statement of extraterritorial jurisdiction also appears in the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act, P.L. 109-476 ( H.R. A general statement proposal appeared as well in two bills that would have condemned certain forms of fraud by government contractors, the War Profiteering Prevention Act ( S. 2356 ), proposed 18 U.S.C. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act ( S. 2611 as agreed to by the Senate), the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act ( S. 2612 ), and the Securing America's Borders Act ( S. 2454 ) would have rewritten 18 U.S.C. It provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction if:
(1) the prohibited drug activity or the terrorist offense is in violation of the criminal laws of the United States;
(2) the offense, the prohibited drug activity, or the terrorist offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce;
(3) an offender provides anything of pecuniary value for a terrorist offense that causes or is designed to cause death or serious bodily injury to a national of the United States while that national is outside the United States, or substantial damage to the property of a legal entity organized under the laws of the United States (including any of its States, districts, commonwealths, territories, or possessions) while that property is outside of the United States;
(4) the offense or the prohibited drug activity occurs in whole or in part outside of the United States (including on the high seas), and a perpetrator of the offense or the prohibited drug activity is a national of the United States or a legal entity organized under the laws of the United States (including any of its States, districts, commonwealths, territories, or possessions); or
(5) after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, P.L. ch. 77 (relating to peonage) or 18 U.S.C. ( H.R. Rather than create a new crime but to much the same effect, the Federal Contractor Extraterritorial Jurisdiction for Human Trafficking Offenses Act ( S. 1226 ) would have added a jurisdictional statement to end of chapter 77 that would have prohibited government contractors from engaging in conduct that would violate 18 U.S.C. ch. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act supplies samples of this type of statute as well. | Crime is usually territorial. It is ordinarily a matter of the law of the place where it occurs. Nevertheless, a surprising number of American criminal laws apply outside of the United States. Application is generally a question of legislative intent, expressed or implied.
Three statutes enacted in the 109 th Congress have sections that enjoy extraterritorial application. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, P.L. 109-177 , includes a handful of crimes that feature explicit extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, P.L. 109-164 , carries the Mann Act (18 U.S.C. ch. 117) and the peonage laws (18 U.S.C. ch. 77) overseas under certain circumstances. The Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act, P.L. 109-476 outlaws various forms of fraud associated with the acquisition of telephone and e-mail records and states that extraterritorial jurisdiction exists over such offenses.
Comparable legislation pending at adjournment of the 109 th Congress included:
Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act ( H.R. 4437 )(House passed); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act ( S. 2611 )(Senate passed); H.R. 5212 (relating to sexual offenses under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act); S. 1226 (relating to human trafficking by federal contractors); S. 2402 (relating to money laundering); S. 12 (relating to war profiteering); S. 2356 (relating to war profiteering); S. 2361 (relating to war profiteering); H.R. 4682 (relating to war profiteering); S. 2368 (relating to alien smuggling); S. 2377 (relating to alien smuggling); S. 2454 (relating to alien smuggling).
In some instances the explicit statements of extraterritorial jurisdiction would have replicated the coverage the courts would have otherwise recognized. In some instances they would have expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond that which the courts would have recognize in the absence of a statement; in still others they apparently would have curtailed it by mentioning some of the traditional grounds implicitly recognized and failing to mention others. |
crs_R42573 | crs_R42573_0 | Overview
The United Nations (U.N.) Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD or "Rio+20") will convene June 20-22, 2012, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This conference marks the 20 th anniversary of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 1992 and the 10 th anniversary of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa. As many as 115 heads of state may attend, with up to 50,000 other participants. No legally binding agreements are expected to be made at the meeting. In 1992, governments attending the "Rio" conference (formally called the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development or UNCED) politically endorsed the objective of "sustainable development"—achieving economic, environmental, and social development that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs ." Nonetheless, it is possible that some elements of any communique may serve U.S. national interests and foreign policy. Rio+20 is premised on analysis showing that the objectives of sustainable development of the 1992 Rio conference have not been achieved. The fifth Global Environmental Outlook (GEO-5, see section below) concluded in early June 2012 that significant progress has been made on only 4 of 90 assessed, internationally agreed goals associated with sustainable development. Nonetheless, the Rio+20 website indicates that "[g]overnments are expected to adopt clear and focused practical measures for implementing sustainable development, based on the many examples of success we have seen over the last 20 years." Framework Agreement on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a set of eight internationally agreed-to development goals created in 2000. Many participants and observers hope that Rio+20 outcomes will address the Rio+20 objectives in a Communique from high level officials, which may contain agreement to a process to produce new Sustainable Development Goals, and affirmation of—and a Framework for Action to implement—internationally agreed goals. Many stakeholders would like to strengthen the U.N. Others suggest that SDGs and post-2015 MDGs would be complementary. Priorities : While delegations appear to generally agree that priorities should be set among emergent SDGs, they diverge on what the priority areas should be. Many of these problems are most acute in rapidly developing but low-income countries that may lack adequate financial, institutional, and technical capacity to address them. Still, some views may be distilled from statements. As examples, the United States
agrees with strengthening international environmental institutions, but opposes adding a Council on Sustainable Development to the U.N. architecture or making UNEP a specialized agency of the United Nations; views the transfer of technology as outside the scope of sustainable development commitments; opposes discussion of intellectual property rights; opposes a call for a new agreement to protect biodiversity in the marine environment in the high seas (i.e., outside of national jurisdictions); opposes proposals for significant new funding for sustainable development; encourages actions toward sustainable development by stakeholders, especially women and youth; seeks greater emphasis globally on transparency and public awareness of corporate and governmental performance on environmental responsibilities, facilitated by new communication technologies; and resists commitments related to climate change or other issues addressed in other fora. | The United Nations (U.N.) Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD or "Rio+20") convenes June 20-22, 2012, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This conference marks the 20th anniversary of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio in 1992. Governments participating in the 1992 meeting politically endorsed the objective of "sustainable development" as achieving economic, environmental, and social development that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."
Rio+20 begins from the premise and findings that the objectives of the 1992 Rio conference have not been achieved. The U.N.'s fifth Global Environmental Outlook, published in June 2012, found significant progress toward only 4 of 90 internationally agreed goals associated with sustainable development. It found back-tracking on 8 goals. Stakeholders widely agree that changes in policies and institutions are desirable to improve implementation, but do not agree on means. It seems unlikely that Rio+20 will produce any agreements that would require congressional action or be legally binding. Some proceedings, however, may engender congressional interest in concepts proposed for simultaneously achieving economic, social, and environmental objectives. Rio+20 could influence views and actions internationally on development paths and practices, thereby affecting regional and global economies, demand for development aid, transnational environmental issues, and conflict incidence and resolution. Therefore, Congress may take interest in the conference. In addition, proceedings may reference the non-binding Agenda 21 produced at UNCED in 1992; media coverage could raise questions from constituents that Members may wish to address.
The Rio+20 organizers indicate that "[g]overnments are expected to adopt clear and focused practical measures for implementing sustainable development, based on the many examples of success we have seen over the last 20 years." However, with strongly divergent views among the expected 115 Heads of State and up to 50,000 participants, Rio+20 may be more like a trade show than political negotiations. Indeed, some observers suggest that the conference may yield many deals among private participants. It is not expected to produce a treaty or any other binding commitments of national governments. Some observers wonder whether a meaningful communique can be successfully negotiated. High-level participants will be prompted to address issues that include
the definition of "green economy," and whether a definition gives adequate emphasis to social aspects (e.g., "fairness") of sustainable development; whether "Sustainable Development Goals" (SDGs) should replace or supplement the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), agreed by the U.N. General Assembly in 2000 and expected to end in 2015, as well as how SDGs might be negotiated, and what priorities might be set among them; how to reform international environmental institutions, particularly whether the United Nations Environmental Program should be strengthened; what actions, if any, might lead to improved implementation of existing sustainable development goals, given slow progress so far; whether governments may commit to greater financial and technological assistance to low-income countries to support their sustainable development. |
crs_R43036 | crs_R43036_0 | Under the authorization of the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA), the federal government has made grants to states to provide services to improve these skills among adults who are not enrolled in school. Commonly called "adult education" efforts, these investments provide educational services to adults at the secondary level and below, as well as English language training. Adult education services are typically provided by local entities using a combination of federal and non-federal funds. Curricula vary based on student needs and objectives. According to the most recent annual data, the average adult education student received 124 hours of instruction. In FY2013, appropriations under the act were $575 million. Of this appropriation, $554 million was distributed to the states via formula grants. AEFLA Statutory Provisions
AEFLA was enacted as Title II of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA; P.L. Since the expiration of this extension, the program has continued to be funded through the annual appropriations process. AEFLA reauthorization has been debated in the context of broader efforts to reauthorize WIA. To fulfill this purpose, statute authorizes funds for adult education activities, which it defines as services or instruction below the postsecondary level for individuals who are at least 16 years old, are not enrolled in school nor required to be enrolled in school under state law, and either
(i) lack sufficient mastery of basic educational skills to enable the individuals to function effectively in society;
(ii) do not have a secondary school diploma or its recognized equivalent, and have not achieved an equivalent level of education; or
(iii) are unable to speak, read, or write the English language. The act also sets criteria for how state grant funds must be subgranted to local service providers. States must match their grants so that 25% of the state's total adult education resources are from non-federal sources. Non-federal matches may be cash or in-kind. Entities eligible to receive local subgrants include local educational agencies, community and faith-based organizations, institutions of higher education, and other nonprofit organizations. State plans must contain
an assessment of adult education needs in the state, including high-need and hard-to-serve individuals; a description of the adult education activities that will be funded by AEFLA; a description of how the state will annually evaluate and improve its activities using standardized reporting measures (see " Performance Accountability and Reporting Requirements " subsection later in this report); a description of the process that the state will use for public participation and comment in the development of its state plan; a description of how the state will develop program strategies for certain populations such as individuals with disabilities and single parents; a description of how AEFLA-funded activities in the state will be integrated with other adult education, career development, and employment training services; and a description of steps the state will take to ensure equitable access to funds among local adult education providers. The lesser of 1.5% of the appropriation or $8 million for the National Institute for Literacy (NIFL). Adult Basic Education (ABE) includes instruction for adults whose literacy skills are below the high school level. Adult Secondary Education (ASE) includes instruction for adults whose literacy skills are approximately at the high school level. This includes adults who are seeking to pass the General Education Development (GED) test or obtain a high school credential. English literacy (EL) is instruction for adults who are not proficient in the English language. Data on educational gains are available for all participants. | Enacted in 1998, the Adult Education and Family Literacy Act (AEFLA) is the primary federal legislation that supports basic education for out-of-school adults. Commonly called "adult education," the programs funded by AEFLA typically support educational services at the secondary level and below, as well as English language training. Actual services are typically provided by local entities using a combination of federal and non-federal funds. Specific curricula vary based on the needs and objectives of the local student population.
In FY2013, approximately $575 million was appropriated for AEFLA. Of this sum, approximately $21 million was set aside for national activities and incentive grants. The remaining $554 million was allocated to the states via formula grants. To receive a federal grant, states are required to provide a match so that non-federal resources account for at least 25% of the total resources dedicated to adult education. Many states contribute well beyond their required match, though there is substantial variation among the states.
The statute specifies that 82.5% of each state's grant must be subgranted to local providers of educational services. These local providers are most commonly local education agencies (typically school districts) or institutions of higher education (typically community, junior, or technical colleges). Nonprofit agencies, correctional institutions, and other entities may also receive grants.
Adult education activities provided at the local level are divided into three broad categories:
Adult Basic Education (ABE), which includes instruction for adults whose literacy and numeracy skills are below the high school level; Adult Secondary Education (ASE), which includes instruction for adults whose literacy skills are approximately at the high school level, including adults who are seeking to pass the General Education Development (GED) test; and English literacy (EL), which includes instruction for adults who are not proficient in the English language.
In program year 2011-2012 (the most recent year for which complete data are available), approximately 1.8 million individuals participated in state adult education activities for an average of 124 hours each. A plurality of the students (47%) participated in ABE while a smaller share (40%) participated in EL activities. The remaining share of adult education students (13%) participated in ASE activities. Non-federal funds accounted for the majority of spending on these activities.
The authorization of appropriations for AEFLA expired at the end of FY2003, though the programs it supports have continued to be funded through the annual appropriations process. AEFLA was enacted as Title II of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) and AEFLA reauthorization debate has also been part of broader efforts to reauthorize WIA. |
crs_R42488 | crs_R42488_0 | This fact creates a jurisdictional problem because tribal courts do not have criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed within the tribe's jurisdiction by non-Indians. S. 47 and H.R. 11 , the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (VAWA Reauthorization) are nearly identical to S. 1925 and have been introduced in the 113 th Congress. The following chart sets forth which governments have jurisdiction over crimes in Indian country. Therefore, the tribes' special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction would be limited to domestic and dating violence occurring within a tribe's jurisdiction by a non-Indian against an Indian when the non-Indian lives or works in the tribe's Indian country or the non-Indian is married to, or in an intimate relationship with, a tribal member or other Indian residing within the tribe's jurisdiction. Required Rights for Non-Indian Defendants
Additionally, the VAWA Reauthorization would purport to give tribes criminal jurisdiction over domestic violence committed by non-Indians if the tribes provide to the defendant "all other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United States in order for Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant." For example, in Duro v. Reina , the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes had lost the inherent authority to try nonmember Indians. Congress passed an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act to provide tribes with jurisdiction to try nonmember Indians. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe , the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that prior to "submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States" Indian tribes possessed the power to try non-Indians. It could be argued that because nonmember Indians and non-Indians are both outsiders to the tribe, there appears to be no reason to distinguish Congress's authority to relax restrictions on the tribes' inherent sovereignty to try nonmember Indians from its authority to relax restrictions on the tribes' authority to try non-Indians. Although the Supreme Court stated in Lara that Congress has authority to relax restrictions on the tribes' inherent authority so that they may try nonmember Indians, it is not clear whether today's Court would reach the same result. Therefore, it is not clear whether the Court considering a tribal court conviction under the VAWA Reauthorization would find that Congress has the authority to expand the inherent sovereignty of tribes to try non-Indian defendants. If Congress does not have authority to subject citizens to inherent tribal criminal authority, it is possible that the courts would uphold tribal authority to try defendants involved in non-Indian on Indian domestic and dating violence as a delegation of federal authority. Implications of Delegated versus Inherent Tribal Sovereignty
The dichotomy between delegated and inherent power of tribes has important constitutional implications. If Congress is deemed to have delegated to the tribes Congress's own power to prosecute crimes, the whole panoply of protections accorded criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights will apply. If, on the other hand, Congress is permitted to recognize the tribes' inherent sovereignty, so that the tribes are exercising their own powers, the Constitution will not apply. Instead, criminal defendants must rely on statutory protections under the Indian Civil Rights Act or those protected under tribal law. Although the protections found in federal statutory and constitutional sources are similar, there are several important distinctions between them. S. 47 and H.R. Usually, the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to try such non-Indian perpetrators. Through a series of cases and federal statutes, Indian tribes exercise their inherent sovereignty over member Indians and nonmember Indians. | Domestic and dating violence in Indian country are reportedly at epidemic proportions. However, there is a practical jurisdictional issue when the violence involves a non-Indian perpetrator and an Indian victim. Indian tribes only have criminal jurisdiction over crimes involving Indian perpetrators and victims within their jurisdictions. Most states only have jurisdiction over crimes involving a non-Indian perpetrator and a non-Indian victim within Indian country located in the state. Although the federal government has jurisdiction over crime committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country, offenses such as domestic and dating violence tend to be prosecuted with less frequency than other crimes. This creates a practical jurisdictional problem.
S. 47 and H.R. 11, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act, would recognize and affirm participating tribes' inherent sovereign authority to exercise special domestic violence jurisdiction over domestic violence involving non-Indian perpetrators and Indian victims occurring within the tribe's jurisdiction. It is not clear whether Congress has the authority to restore the tribes' inherent sovereignty over nonmembers, or whether such authority would have to be a delegation of federal authority. The tribal jurisdiction provisions of S. 47 and H.R. 11 are nearly identical to the tribal jurisdiction provisions of S. 1925, which passed the Senate in the 112th Congress.
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court outlined the contours of tribal criminal jurisdiction. In United States v. Wheeler, the Court held that tribes have inherent sovereign authority to try their own members. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court held the tribes had lost inherent sovereignty to try non-Indians. The Court in Duro v. Reina determined that the tribes had also lost the inherent authority to try nonmember Indians. In response to Duro, Congress passed an amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act that recognized the inherent tribal power (not federal delegated power) to try nonmember Indians. S. 47 and H.R. 11 would apparently supersede the Oliphant ruling and "recognize and affirm the inherent power" of the tribes to try non-Indians for domestic violence offenses.
The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Lara that Congress has authority to relax the restrictions on a tribe's inherent sovereignty to allow it to exercise inherent authority to try nonmember Indians. However, given changes on the Court, and, as Justice Thomas stated, the "schizophrenic" nature of Indian policy and the confused state of Indian law, it is not clear that today's Supreme Court would hold that Congress has authority to expand the tribes' inherent sovereignty. It may be that Congress can only delegate federal power to the tribes to try non-Indians.
The dichotomy between delegated and inherent power of tribes has important constitutional implications. If Congress is deemed to delegate its own power to the tribes to prosecute crimes, all the protections accorded criminal defendants in the Bill of Rights will apply. If, on the other hand, Congress is permitted to recognize the tribes' inherent sovereignty, criminal defendants would have to rely on statutory protections under the Indian Civil Rights Act or tribal law. Although the protections found in these statutory and constitutional sources are similar, there are several important distinctions between them. |
crs_R41895 | crs_R41895_0 | Introduction
From the time of Vannevar Bush and World War II, academic research has played a role in the nation's economy. Vannevar Bush, national science advisor to both Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, stated that major investments in research should be made to the nation's universities. His position was that the research capacity of colleges and universities was significantly important to long-term national interests. Currently, some Members of Congress have expressed concern about the health and competitiveness of U.S. colleges and universities, specifically research institutions. There are those who contend that the long-term competitiveness of the nation is linked to the strength of the academic research infrastructure. It has been reported that academic research is integrated in the local economy, contributes to industrial applications, and provides benefits at both a local and national level. In FY2008, the federal government provided approximately 60% of an estimated $51.9 billion of R&D funds expended by academic institutions. In current dollars, federal support for academic research increased by 2.5% between FY2007 and FY2008. When inflation is taken into account, federal funding increased 0.2% from FY2007 to FY2008 following two years of decline in constant dollars since FY2005. As previously stated, some research indicates that approximately 80.0% of leading industries result from research conducted at academic institutions. A primary question before the 112 th Congress is that with further budget reductions expected, how does the nation best reduce the deficit, balance the budget, strengthen the economy, and create jobs, while maintaining a strong national science and technology enterprise that promotes economic growth and job creation? | From the time of Vannevar Bush and his 1945 report on U.S. science policy, academic research has played a role in the nation's economy. Vannevar Bush's report, Science the Endless Frontier, maintained that major investments in research should be made to the nation's universities. He stated that the research capacity of the colleges and universities was significantly important to long-term national interests. Currently, some Members of Congress have expressed concern about the health and competitiveness of the nation's colleges and universities. There are those who continue to maintain that the long-term competitiveness of the nation is linked to the strength of the academic research infrastructure. It has been shown that academic research is integrated into the economy and impacts at both the local and national level. By one estimate, approximately 80% of leading industries have resulted from research conducted at colleges and universities.
Colleges and universities are the primary performers of basic research, with the federal government being the largest funding source. In FY2008, the federal government provided approximately 60% of an estimated $51.9 billion of research and development funds expended by academic institutions. When measured in current dollars, federal academic support increased by 2.5% between FY2007 and FY2008. When inflation is taken into account, it equates to an increase of 0.2% from FY2007 to FY2008 following two years of decline in constant dollars since FY2005. An issue before the 112th Congress is that with further budget reductions expected, how does the nation best reduce the budget while adjusting the support for research conducted at colleges and universities? |
crs_R40772 | crs_R40772_0 | Introduction
The 111 th Congress has made health reform a priority. As health reform is debated, one possible issue that may surface is the rights and requirements of noncitizens (aliens) under health reform. Because some of the proposals to address health reform in the United States would create a mechanism to provide health insurance to the overwhelming majority of individuals in the nation, this report explores the health insurance coverage of noncitizens in the United States, as well as noncitizen usage of selected safety-net providers and the impact of unauthorized aliens on the health care system. Overview of Noncitizen Eligibility for Health Insurance
Noncitizens are not barred from having health insurance or from paying for health care on their own. Indeed, due to the quality of health care in the United States, some noncitizens come to the United States to receive health care from world-renowned doctors and hospitals. Furthermore, U.S. law mandates that Medicare-participating hospitals provide emergency medical services for all patients who seek care, regardless of their ability to pay; this includes services to all noncitizens, regardless of their immigration status. Nonetheless, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) established comprehensive new restrictions on the eligibility of noncitizens for federal, state, and local public benefits—with significant exceptions for those with a substantial U.S. work history or military connection—setting specific eligibility requirements and exceptions for many health care services. In summary, noncitizens have specific eligibility requirements under law for public benefits, including means-tested public benefits such as Medicaid and CHIP, which can, however, pay for emergency medical services of certain noncitizens who are otherwise eligible. In addition, due to the exemptions and the fact that under regulation federally funded health centers are not defined as federal public benefits, there does not appear to be specified eligibility requirements or prohibitions related to noncitizens' use of Federally Qualified Health Centers, including community health centers and migrant health centers. Analysis: Overview
Overview of Health Insurance Coverage
As shown in Figure 1 , noncitizens are more than three times as likely as native-born U.S. citizens, and more than two times as likely as naturalized U.S. citizens, to be uninsured: 43.8% of noncitizens lacked any type of health insurance, compared with 12.7% of native-born and 17.6% of naturalized populations. Similarly, noncitizens have a lower rate of private insurance coverage, while native-born and naturalized U.S. citizens have similar rates of private health insurance. The noncitizen population also has the lowest rate of Medicare coverage, while naturalized citizens, who tend to be older than native-born citizens and noncitizens, have the highest rate of Medicare coverage. Lastly, the noncitizen population has much lower rates of military/veterans coverage than the naturalized and native-born populations. The rates and types of health insurance coverage are affected by variables such as occupation, industry, education, and region of birth; however, other socio-economic variables, such as age, do not seem to have an effect. During that time period, the percentage of noncitizens in the uninsured population increased from 19.6% in 2000 to a high of 21.5% in 2006, and then decreased slightly to 21.1% in 2007 (see Table 9 ). Conversely, in 2000, native-born citizens comprised their largest percentage of the uninsured population (75.5%) and the percentage decreased, though not uniformly, to a low of 73.1% in 2007. As with the noncitizen population, the percentage of naturalized citizens in the uninsured population increased from a low of 4.6% in 2000 to a high of 5.8% in 2007, but the increase was not steady during the period. In FY2006, $2.6 billion was spent on emergency Medicaid, which constituted 1.1% of the total Medicaid spending. Ascertaining the cost of unauthorized aliens to the health care system presents complex fiscal questions. | The 111th Congress has made health reform a priority. As health reform is debated, one possible issue that may surface is the rights and requirements of noncitizens (aliens) under health reform. Because some of the proposals to address health reform in the United States would create a mechanism to provide health insurance to the overwhelming majority of individuals in the nation, this report explores the health insurance coverage of noncitizens, as well as noncitizen use of selected safety-net providers and the impact of unauthorized aliens on the health care system.
Noncitizens are not barred from having health insurance or from paying for health care on their own. Indeed, due to the quality of health care in the United States, some noncitizens come to the United States to receive health care from world-renowned doctors and hospitals. Furthermore, U.S. law mandates that Medicare-participating hospitals provide emergency medical services for all patients who seek care, regardless of their ability to pay, including services to noncitizens, regardless of their immigration status.
Nonetheless, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (P.L. 104-193) established comprehensive new restrictions on the eligibility of noncitizens for federal, state, and local public benefits, setting specific eligibility requirements and exceptions for many health care services. In general, noncitizens have specific eligibility requirements under law for public benefits, including means-tested public benefits such as Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program, but are eligible for emergency medical services. In addition, due to the exemptions and the fact that federally funded health centers are not defined as federal public benefits under regulation, there do not appear to be specified eligibility requirements related to noncitizens' use of Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs).
In terms of insurance coverage, noncitizens are more than three times as likely as native-born U.S. citizens and more than two times as likely as naturalized U.S. citizens to be uninsured. Similarly, noncitizens have a lower rate of private insurance coverage, while native-born and naturalized U.S. citizens have similar rates of private health insurance. The noncitizen population also has the lowest rate of Medicare coverage, while naturalized citizens, who tend to be older than native-born citizens and noncitizens, have the highest rate of Medicare coverage. Lastly, the noncitizen population has much lower rates of military/veterans coverage than the naturalized and native-born citizen populations. The rates and types of health insurance coverage are affected by variables such as occupation, industry, education, and region of birth; however, other socio-economic variables, such as age, do not seem to have an effect.
Between 2000 and 2006, the percentage of noncitizens in the uninsured population increased from 19.6% to 21.5% and then decreased slightly (to 21.1%) in 2007. Conversely, in 2000, native-born citizens made up the largest percentage of the uninsured population (75.5%), and the percentage decreased, though not uniformly, to a low of 73.1% in 2007. As with the noncitizen population, the naturalized citizens percentage of the uninsured population increased from a low of 4.6% in 2000 to a high of 5.8% in 2007. In FY2006, 1.5% of the total Medicaid recipients received emergency Medicaid, and $2.6 billion was spent on emergency Medicaid, constituting 1.1% of the total Medicaid spending. The impact of noncitizen usage on emergency departments and FQHCs is unclear. Finally, several studies have attempted to quantify the health care costs of unauthorized aliens to certain states or geographic areas. The studies do not tend to be comparable because of differences in timeframes, methodology, and the types of costs studied. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33686 | crs_RL33686_0 | Beyond voting requirements, there is no formal set of expectations or official explanation of what roles or duties are required, or what different Members might emphasize as they carry out their work. In the absence of such formal authorities, many of the responsibilities that Members of Congress have assumed over the years have evolved from the expectations of Members and their constituencies. Today, the roles and duties carried out by a Member of Congress are understood to include representation, legislation, and constituent service and education, as well as political and electoral activities. Given that no precise definition exists for the role of a Member, upon election to Congress, each new Member is responsible for developing an approach to his or her job that serves a wide range of roles and responsibilities. Given the dynamics of the congressional environment, the priorities that Members place on various roles may change as their seniority increases, or in response to changes in committee assignments, policy focus, district or state priorities, institutional leadership, or electoral pressures. These congressional roles may be described by focusing on some of the underlying tasks typically required to carry them out. Conclusion
With no formal or definitive requirements, each Member of Congress is free to define his or her own job and set his or her own priorities. Although elements of each of the roles described can be found among the duties performed by any Senator or Representative, the degree to which each is carried out differs among Members as they pursue the common goals of seeking reelection, building influence in Congress, and making good public policy. Each Member may also emphasize different duties during different stages of his or her career as other conditions of the Member's situation change. | The duties carried out by a Member of Congress are understood to include representation, legislation, and constituent service and education, as well as political and electoral activities. The expectations and duties of a Member of Congress are extensive, encompassing several roles that could be full-time jobs by themselves. Despite the acceptance of these roles and other activities as facets of the Member's job, there is no formal set of requirements or official explanation of what roles might be played as Members carry out the duties of their offices. In the absence of formal authorities, many of the responsibilities that Members of Congress have assumed over the years have evolved from the expectations of Members and their constituents.
Upon election to Congress, Members typically develop approaches to their jobs that serve a wide range of roles and responsibilities. Given the dynamic nature of the congressional experience, priorities placed on various Member roles tend to shift in response to changes in seniority, committee assignment, policy focus, district or state priorities, institutional leadership, and electoral pressures. In response, the roles and specific duties a Member carries out are often highlighted or de-emphasized accordingly.
Although elements of all the roles described can be found among the duties performed by any Senator or Representative, the degree to which each is carried out differs among Members. Each Member may also emphasize different duties during different stages of his or her career. With no written requirements, each Member is free to define his or her own job and set his or her own priorities.
This report is one of several CRS reports that focus on congressional operations. Others include CRS Report RL34545, Congressional Staff: Duties and Functions of Selected Positions, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33209, Casework in a Congressional Office: Background, Rules, Laws, and Resources, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44578 | crs_R44578_0 | Background
Congress and the executive branch have long been frustrated with perceived waste, mismanagement, and fraud in defense acquisitions and have spent significant resources attempting to reform and improve the process. Broadly speaking, the acquisition workforce are those uniformed and civilian government personnel, working across the Department of Defense and in more than a dozen functional communities (including technology, logistics, and contracting), who are responsible for identifying, developing, buying, and managing goods and services to support the military. §1705, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF), states that, only for the purpose s of the s ection , the term acquisition workforce includes personnel who are not serving in a designated position, but
(A) contribute significantly to the acquisition process by virtue of their assigned duties ; and
(B) are designated as temporary members of the acquisition workforce by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, or by the senior acquisition executive of a military department, for the limited purpose of receiving training for the performance of acquisition-related functions and duties . According to DOD, as of December 31, 2015, the defense acquisition workforce consisted of 156,457 personnel, of which approximately 90% (141,089) were civilian and 10% (15,368) were uniformed (see Figure 1 ). Trends in Acquisition Workforce Size
Between FY1989 and FY1999, the acquisition workforce decreased nearly 50% to a low of 124,000 employees. The declines are attributable in large part to a series of congressionally mandated reductions between FY1996 and FY1999, which ranged in reductions from 15,000 to 25,000 employees each fiscal year. These cuts reflected Congress's then-view that the acquisition workforce size was not properly aligned with the acquisition budget and the size of the uniformed force. A number of DOD officials and researchers have asserted that the workforce downsizing in the 1990s led to shortages in the number of properly trained, sufficiently talented, and experienced personnel, which in turn has had a long-term negative effect on defense acquisitions. Between FY2008 and the first quarter of FY2016, the acquisition workforce grew by 24% (30,434 employees) (see Figure 1 ). According to DOD, the Department accomplished its strategic objective to rebuild the acquisition workforce (from 126,000 in 2011 to over 150,000) despite major barriers such as sequestration, furloughs, and hiring freezes. Officials also stated that DOD certification and education levels have improved significantly: currently, over 96 percent of the workforce meet position certification requirements and 83 percent of the workforce have a bachelor's degree or higher. In addition, DOD "has reshaped and positioned the workforce for future success by strengthening early and mid-career workforce year groups." Acquisition Workforce Size and Defense Contract Spending
According to DOD, from 2001 to 2015, the size of the acquisition workforce increased by approximately 21%. Over the same period, DOD contract obligations (adjusted for inflation) increased at approximately 43% (see Figure 3 ). Congressional Efforts to Improve the Acquisition Workforce
Congress has pursued numerous efforts to improve the capability and performance of the acquisition workforce, including (but not limited to) the following:
1. the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act ( P.L. 101-510 ), 2. hiring and pay flexibilities (e.g., P.L. 110-181 ), and 4. strategic planning for the acquisition workforce ( P.L. 111-84 ). These four tools aim to enhance the training, recruitment, and retention of acquisition personnel by, respectively, establishing (1) professional development requirements, (2) monetary incentives and accelerated hiring, (3) dedicated funding for workforce improvement efforts, and (4) formal strategies to shape and improve the acquisition workforce. | Congress and the executive branch have long been frustrated with waste, mismanagement, and fraud in defense acquisitions and have spent significant resources seeking to reform and improve the process. Efforts to address wasteful spending, cost overruns, schedule slips, and performance shortfalls have continued unabated, with more than 150 major studies on acquisition reform since the end of World War II. Many of the most influential of these reports have articulated improving the acquisition workforce as the key to acquisition reform. In recent years, Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) have sought to increase the size and improve the capability of this workforce.
The acquisition workforce is generally defined as uniformed and civilian government personnel, who are responsible for identifying, developing, buying, and managing goods and services to support the military. According to DOD, as of December 31, 2015, the defense acquisition workforce consisted of 156,457 personnel, of which approximately 90% (141,089) were civilian and 10% (15,368) were uniformed.
Between FY1989 and FY1999, the acquisition workforce decreased nearly 50% to a low of 124,000 employees. This decline is attributable in large part to a series of congressionally mandated reductions between FY1996 and FY1999. These cuts reflected Congress's then-view that the acquisition workforce size was not properly aligned with the acquisition budget and the size of the uniformed force. A number of analysts believe that these cuts led to shortages in the number of properly trained, sufficiently talented, and experienced personnel, which in turn has had a negative effect on acquisitions.
In an effort to rebuild the workforce, between FY2008 and the first quarter of FY2016, the acquisition workforce grew by 24% (30,434 employees). According to DOD, the Department accomplished its strategic objective to rebuild the workforce. Officials stated that certification and education levels have improved significantly: currently, over 96% of the workforce meet position certification requirements and 83% have a bachelor's degree or higher. In addition, DOD officials stated that they have positioned the workforce for long-term success by strengthening early and mid-career workforce cohorts.
The increase in the size of the workforce has not kept pace with increased acquisition spending. According to DOD, from 2001 to 2015, the acquisition workforce increased by some 21%. Over the same period, contract obligations (adjusted for inflation) increased approximately 43%. While this increase in spending does not necessarily argue for increasing the size of the workforce, according to DOD officials, the increased spending has also corresponded to an increase in the workload and complexity of contracting. Four congressional efforts to improve the acquisition workforce are:
the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (P.L. 101-510), hiring and pay flexibilities enshrined in numerous sections of law, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (P.L. 110-181), and strategic planning for the acquisition workforce (P.L. 111-84).
These four efforts seek to enhance the training, recruitment, and retention of acquisition personnel by, respectively, establishing (1) professional development requirements, (2) monetary incentives and accelerated hiring, (3) dedicated funding for workforce improvement efforts, and (4) formal strategies to shape and improve the acquisition workforce. |
crs_R44635 | crs_R44635_0 | Introduction
This report presents background information and potential issues for Congress on the question of whether to increase the Navy's force-level goal (i.e., the planned size of the Navy) to something more than the current goal of 308 ships. The Navy is currently conducting a new FSA, and some observers anticipate that this FSA will lead to a new Navy force-level goal for a fleet of more than 308 ships, although not necessarily 350 ships. The Navy's actual size in recent years has generally been in the range of 270 to 290 ships. Those who advocate increasing the planned size of the Navy to something more than 308 ships generally point to China's naval modernization effort; resurgent Russian naval activity, particularly in the Mediterranean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean; and challenges that the Navy has sometimes faced, given the current total number of ships in the Navy, in meeting requests from the various regional U.S. military commanders for day-to-day in-region presence of forward-deployed Navy ships. A key potential reason for increasing the planned size of the Navy to something more than 308 ships would be to reestablish a larger U.S. Navy forward-deployed presence in the European theater, and particularly the Mediterranean, so as to respond to resurgent Russian naval activity in that area and increase U.S. capacity for responding to events in North Africa and the Middle East. The figure of 350 ships is by no means the only possibility for a Navy of more than 308 ships; fleets of more than 350 ships, or of fewer than 350 ships (but still more than 308), are also possible. In addition to proposals for a fleet of about 350 ships (or some other number higher than 308), there have also been proposals in recent years from other observers for fleets of less than 308 ships. Table 2 below presents a notional force structure for a Navy of about 350 ships. (It happens to total 349 ships.) The 349-ship fleet shown in Table 2 may be of value as one possible point of departure for discussing Navy force structure plans for fleets of more than 308 ships, and for understanding how proposals for future fleets of about 350 ships might depart from a proportional scaling up of the current 308-ship force-structure goal. Many combinations of about 350 ships other than the notional one shown in Table 2 are possible. As shown in the table, although the notional fleet of 349 ships includes 41 more ships than the current 308-ship force-structure goal, achieving this notional 349-ship fleet might require adding a total of 45 to 58 ships to the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan, or an average of about 1.5 to 1.9 additional ships per year over the 30-year period. Given current constraints on defense spending under the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( S. 365 / P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011) as amended, as well as the Navy's current share of the defense budget, the Navy faces challenges in achieving its currently planned 308-ship fleet, let alone a fleet of more than 308 ships. Using current procurement costs for Navy ships, procuring the additional 45 to 58 ships shown in Table 3 might require an average of roughly $3.5 billion to $4.0 billion per year in additional shipbuilding funding over the 30-year period. If current constraints on defense spending are not lifted or relaxed, achieving and maintaining a fleet of more than 308 ships could require reducing funding for other defense programs. Forward homeporting additional Navy ships in the Mediterranean could substantially reduce the number of additional ships the Navy would need to support a larger forward-deployed presence there. Although it can substantially reduce the number of ships needed to support a given level of forward-deployed presence, forward homeporting does not substantially change the number of ships needed for warfighting. | Current Navy plans call for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 308 ships of certain types and numbers. Some observers have advocated increasing the Navy's force-level goal to about 350 ships. The Navy is currently conducting a force structure assessment (FSA), and some observers anticipate that this FSA will lead to a new Navy force-level goal of more than 308 ships, although not necessarily 350 ships. The Navy's actual size in recent years has generally been in the range of 270 to 290 ships.
Those who advocate increasing the planned size of the Navy to something more than 308 ships generally point to China's naval modernization effort, resurgent Russian naval activity, and challenges that the Navy has sometimes faced in meeting requests from the various regional U.S. military commanders for day-to-day, in-region presence of forward-deployed Navy ships.
The figure of 350 ships is by no means the only possibility for a Navy of more than 308 ships; fleets of more than 350 ships, or of fewer than 350 ships (but still more than 308), are also possible. There have also been proposals in recent years from other observers for fleets of less than 308 ships.
For purposes of illustration, this CRS report presents a notional force structure for a Navy of about 350 ships. (It happens to total 349 ships.) This notional 349-ship fleet may be of value as one possible point of departure for discussing Navy force structure plans for fleets of more than 308 ships, and for understanding how proposals for future fleets of about 350 ships might depart from a proportional scaling up of the current 308-ship force-structure goal. Many combinations of about 350 ships other than the notional 349-ship force structure are possible.
Achieving and maintaining the notional 349-ship force structure might require adding a total of 45 to 58 ships to the Navy's FY2017 30-year shipbuilding plan, or an average of about 1.5 to 1.9 additional ships per year over the 30-year period. Using current procurement costs for Navy ships, procuring these additional 45 to 58 ships might require an average of roughly $3.5 billion to $4.0 billion per year in additional shipbuilding funding over the 30-year period.
Given current constraints on defense spending under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011) as amended, as well as the Navy's current share of the defense budget, the Navy faces challenges in achieving its currently planned 308-ship fleet, let alone a fleet of more than 308 ships. If current constraints on defense spending are not lifted or relaxed, achieving and maintaining a fleet of more than 308 ships could require reducing funding for other defense programs.
A key potential reason for increasing the planned size of the Navy to something more than 308 ships would be to reestablish a larger U.S. Navy forward-deployed presence in the European theater, and particularly the Mediterranean. Forward homeporting additional Navy ships in the Mediterranean could substantially reduce the number of additional ships that the Navy would need to support a larger forward-deployed presence there. Forward homeporting, however, does not substantially change the number of ships needed for warfighting, and it poses certain challenges, costs, and risks.
The question of whether to increase the planned size of the Navy to something more than 308 ships poses a number of potential oversight issues for Congress concerning factors such as
mission needs; the potential impacts on future required Navy force levels of unmanned vehicles, potential new fleet architectures, expanded use of forward homeporting, and contributions from allies and partner states; the potential costs of achieving and maintaining a fleet of more than 308 ships; and the potential impact of those costs on funding available for other defense programs. |
crs_R44667 | crs_R44667_0 | In 1938, the FLSA established a minimum wage of $0.25 per hour. The minimum wage provisions of the FLSA have been amended numerous times since then, typically for the purpose of expanding coverage or raising the wage rate. Since its establishment, the minimum wage rate has been raised 22 separate times, through 10 separate amendments to the FLSA. The most recent change was enacted in 2007 ( P.L. 110-28 ) and increased the minimum wage from $5.15 per hour to its current rate of $7.25 per hour in three steps. Despite numerous proposals in the past, the federal minimum wage rate is not indexed and changes only when Congress amends the FLSA. Indexation is used in some federal entitlement programs, such as Social Security and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits, as well as in other federal wage regulations, such as the minimum wage for employees on certain federal contracts. As noted previously, the minimum wage rate has increased 22 times since 1938, with periods between rate increases ranging from 1 to 10 years. On the other hand, requiring congressional action to change the minimum wage rate allows for the role of the minimum wage in the larger context of the economy (e.g., its relationship to poverty) to be considered with each rate change. Indexation of the minimum wage would generally decouple rate setting from other policy considerations related to wage setting. Index. That is, should an indexed minimum wage reflect changes in consumer prices, productivity, earnings, economic growth, or some other variable? Periodicity . Different consumer price indices reflect spending patterns for different populations. Data from Figure 3 show that of the 23 possible starting points for indexation to the CPI-U:
For 6 of the 23 enacted minimum wage rates, if the rate had been tied to CPI-U and not adjusted further, the minimum wage would be below $7.25 today, ranging from $0.02 below (1996) to $3.02 below (1938); For 17 of the 23 enacted minimum wage rates, if the rate had been tied to CPI-U and not adjusted further, the minimum wage would be above $7.25 today, ranging from $0.01 above (2008) to $3.73 above (1968); and Had indexation to the CPI-U started at any of the 13 increases occurring between 1950 and 1981, the 2016 value of the federal minimum wage would be between $0.18 (1950) and $3.73 (1968) higher than the current rate of $7.25 per hour. If the federal minimum wage had been indexed to average hourly earnings in manufacturing at each point a new statutorily established minimum wage level was enacted since 1938, the minimum wage in 2016 would have been higher in all but two cases—1990 and 2007. Indexation of the federal minimum wage to average hourly earnings in manufacturing would have resulted in the highest minimum wage rates compared to any of the other indices. Of the 29 states and DC that have minimum wage rates above the federal rate, a total of 17 states and DC currently, or will in a future year, index state minimum wage rates to a measure of inflation (see Table A-1 for additional information on state indexation policies). | In 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) established a federal minimum wage of $0.25 per hour. The minimum wage provisions of the FLSA have been amended numerous times since then, typically for the purpose of expanding coverage or raising the wage rate. Since its establishment, the minimum wage rate has been raised 22 separate times, most recently in 2007-2009 when it was increased from $5.15 per hour to its current rate of $7.25 per hour in three steps.
The federal minimum wage changes only when Congress amends the FLSA. Since 1938, Congress has amended the FLSA to raise the minimum wage 10 times for a total of 22 rate increases, with periods between increases ranging from 1 to 10 years. An alternative to periodically amending the FLSA to increase the minimum wage would be to index, or link, the federal minimum wage to another variable so that the minimum wage changes automatically when the other variable changes. Indexing the minimum wage provides regular adjustments to and reduces the volatility of minimum wage rates, maintains the relative value of the minimum wage to other economic indicators (e.g., prices), and decouples rate changes from other policy considerations. On the other hand, indexation may also reduce regular oversight of minimum wage changes because it automatically adjusts the rate and changes one part of the FLSA while leaving other parts of the act unchanged subject to congressional action. Although Congress has considered indexing the federal minimum wage at various points, it has not done so.
The most common proposed indices for the minimum wage include different versions of the Consumer Price Index, personal consumption expenditures, employment costs, and hourly earnings. Based on a review of seven possible indices and a simulation of federal minimum wage rates under different indices, the minimum wage in 2016 would have been highest had it been indexed to average hourly earnings and lowest had it been indexed to personal consumption expenditures. Linking the value of the federal minimum wage to consumer prices would have generally resulted in minimum wages higher than the current rate, depending on the starting point.
Currently, 17 states and the District of Columbia index (or have enacted laws that will in the future) their state minimum wages to some economic measure. In addition, indexation is used in some federal entitlement programs, such as Social Security and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits, as well as in other federal wage regulations, such as the minimum wage for employees on certain federal contracts. Most of the numerous proposals in recent Congresses to increase the minimum wage would combine a series of nominal rate increases, followed by indexation to a consumer price index. |
crs_R43056 | crs_R43056_0 | Introduction
Federal rulemaking is an important mechanism through which the federal government implements policy. Federal agencies issue regulations pursuant to statutory authority granted by Congress. Therefore, Congress may have an interest in performing oversight of those regulations, and measuring federal regulatory activity can be a useful way for Congress to conduct that oversight. The number of federal rules issued annually and the total number of pages in the Federal Register are often referred to as measures of the total federal regulatory burden. Certain methods of quantifying regulatory activity, however, may provide an imperfect portrayal of the total federal rulemaking burden. For example, the number of final rules published each year is generally in the range of 2,500-4,500, according to the Office of the Federal Register. While some of those rules may have substantial economic, legal, or policy effects, many of them are routine in nature and impose minimal regulatory burden, if any. The Federal Register provides documentation of the government's regulatory and other actions, and some scholars, commentators, and public officials have used the total number of Federal Register pages each year as a measure for the total amount of regulatory activity. Because the Federal Register has been in print since the 1930s, the number of pages can be useful for cross-time comparisons. However, the total number of Federal Register pages may not be an accurate way to measure regulatory activity for several reasons. This report serves to inform the congressional debate over rulemaking by analyzing different ways to measure federal rulemaking activity. The report then provides data on and analysis of the total number of rules issued each year, as well as information on other types of rules, such as "major" rules, "significant" rules, and "economically significant" rules. These categories have been created by various statutes and executive orders containing requirements that may be triggered if a regulation falls into one of the categories. When available, data are provided on each type of rule. Finally, the report presents data on the number of pages and documents in the Federal Register each year and analyzes the content of the Federal Register . Number of Pages and Documents in the Federal Register
Under the APA, agencies are required to publish proposed and final rules in the Federal Register . Agencies also publish other items related to regulations in the Federal Register , such as notices of meetings and the extension of comment periods, as well as many other items related to non-regulatory governmental activities. For example, in 2015, approximately 30% of the total pages were in the "Rules and Regulations" section, which is where final rules are published. | Federal rulemaking is an important mechanism through which the federal government implements policy. Federal agencies issue regulations pursuant to statutory authority granted by Congress. Therefore, Congress may have an interest in performing oversight of those regulations, and measuring federal regulatory activity can be a useful way for Congress to conduct that oversight. The number of federal rules issued annually and the total number of pages in the Federal Register are often referred to as measures of the total federal regulatory burden.
Certain methods of quantifying regulatory activity, however, may provide an imperfect portrayal of the total federal rulemaking burden. For example, the number of final rules published each year is generally in the range of 2,500-4,500, according to the Office of the Federal Register. Some of those rules have a large effect on the economy, and others have a significant legal and/or policy effect, even if the costs and benefits are minimal. On the other hand, many federal rules are routine in nature and impose minimal regulatory burden, if any. In addition, rules that are deregulatory in nature and those that repeal existing rules are still defined as "rules" under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA, 5 U.S.C. §§551 et seq.) and are therefore included in that total.
The Federal Register provides documentation of the government's regulatory and other actions, and some scholars, commentators, and public officials have used the total number of Federal Register pages each year as a measure for the total amount of regulatory activity. Because the Federal Register has been in print since the 1930s, the number of pages can be useful for cross-time comparisons. However, the total number of Federal Register pages may not be an accurate way to measure regulatory activity for several reasons. In addition to publishing proposed and final rules in the Federal Register, agencies publish other items that may be related to regulations, such as notices of public meetings and extensions of comment periods. The Federal Register also contains many other items related to non-regulatory activities, including presidential documents, notices, and corrections. In 2015, approximately 30% of the total pages in the Federal Register were in the "Rules and Regulations" section, the section in which final rules are published.
This report serves to inform the congressional debate over rulemaking by analyzing different ways to measure federal rulemaking activity. The report provides data on and analysis of the total number of rules issued each year, as well as information on other types of rules, such as "major" rules, "significant" rules, and "economically significant" rules. These categories have been created by various statutes and executive orders containing requirements that may be triggered if a regulation falls into one of the categories. When available, data are provided on each type of rule. Finally, the report provides data on the number of pages and documents in the Federal Register each year and analyzes the content of the Federal Register. |
crs_R40770 | crs_R40770_0 | This was the highest the debt has been relative to GDP since World War II, when it peaked at 109% of GDP. The current policy debate on the "fiscal cliff" occurring at the end of 2012 has raised the question of whether a deficit of the current magnitude is manageable and what risks it poses to the economy. Since deficit reduction could have a contractionary effect on the economy in the short run at a time when the economy is still fragile, restoring fiscal sustainability poses another set of risks that must be balanced against the risks of continuing an unsustainably large deficit. This report will evaluate sustainability issues. At What Point Does the Public Debt Become Unsustainable? The decision by some investors to flee the debt will make it more onerous for the government to finance the debt, because it will now have to offer higher yields to attract new buyers, and higher yields will result in a larger deficit and more borrowing. There is nothing preventing investors from re-evaluating their views at any time, however. These countries that have required assistance to finance their deficits have some commonalities with the United States—projections of unsustainably large budget deficits under current policy, a large net foreign debt (with the exception of Italy), asset price bubbles that led to large losses in the financial sector, and large subsequent government outlays to cope with financial sector turmoil. Deficits of this size would cause a persistent increase in the debt as a share of GDP; therefore, policy changes are required to put the projected budget deficit on a sustainable path. Sustainability and Foreign Holders of the Debt
Some economists believe the government's reliance on foreign investors to finance the federal debt makes the United States more vulnerable to sudden shifts in investors' willingness to hold federal debt. Foreigners currently hold $5.3 trillion (more than half) of the total privately held federal debt. The current account deficit has fallen significantly relative to GDP since 2007, but it remains to be seen whether this change is cyclical or longer lasting. If a failure to raise the debt limit led to a debt spiral, the economic effects would be expected to be as described above (see " Economic Effects of a "Debt Spiral" ). Future downgrades could alter the safe haven role of Treasury securities, although the last downgrade did not. It does not necessarily follow that a lower credit rating for the federal government would automatically lead to broad rating downgrades for U.S. companies, but in 2011 Standard & Poor's downgraded the debt of several government sponsored enterprises and U.S. insurers from AAA to AA+ as a result of the federal debt downgrade. Instead, a ratings downgrade could be triggered by some financial market disturbance. Assuming that the government is able to continue to finance the deficit smoothly, do large deficits have any effect on the economy? By increasing the demands on that pool of national saving, government borrowing pushes up the cost of all borrowing through higher interest rates, causing businesses to finance less capital spending than they otherwise would. This greatly reduced the potential for large government deficits to crowd out private investment spending. By accounting identity, domestic investment must equal national saving plus net borrowing from abroad. Although investment was low in 2009-2011 because of the recession and subsequent sluggish recovery, it can be expected to rebound when the economy recovers. At that point, even if the deficit were to fall by half as a share of GDP, either private saving would need to rise significantly above its average over the past 10 years or net borrowing from abroad would have to be significantly higher than the 2000 to 2007 average, which was already at a historical high. In other words, even before the rise in the budget deficit, the combination of low rates of national saving and high rates of borrowing from abroad to finance domestic investment spending was unsustainable in the long run. | The budget deficit has exceeded $1 trillion since 2009. Combined with a shrinking economy, deficits increased the publicly held federal debt by over 30 percentage points of GDP between 2008 and 2012. Deficits of this size are not sustainable in the long run because the federal debt cannot indefinitely grow faster than output. Over time, a greater and greater share of national income would be devoted to servicing the debt, until eventually the government would be forced to finance the debt through money creation or default.
The current policy debate on the "fiscal cliff" occurring at the end of 2012 has raised the question of whether a deficit of the current magnitude is manageable and what risks it poses to the economy. Since deficit reduction could have a contractionary effect on the economy in the short run at a time when the economy is still fragile, restoring fiscal sustainability poses another set of risks that must be balanced against the risks of continuing an unsustainably large deficit. This report will evaluate sustainability issues.
Although the debt cannot persistently rise relative to GDP, it can rise for a time. It is hard to predict at what point bond holders would deem it to be unsustainable. A few other advanced economies have debt-to-GDP ratios higher than that of the United States. Some of those countries in Europe have recently seen their financing costs rise to the point that they are unable to finance their deficits solely through private markets. But Japan has the highest debt-to-GDP ratio of any advanced economy, and it has continued to be able to finance its debt at extremely low costs.
If investors on balance deemed the debt to be unsustainable, the yields and the cost of credit default swaps on Treasury securities would be expected to rise. Instead, both are currently low. This may seem surprising, given that the debt is currently growing more rapidly than output and is projected to continue to do so under current policy. The willingness of bond holders to finance the federal debt at low interest rates in light of these projections suggests that they believe that policy changes will eventually be made to place the federal debt on a sustainable path. This belief could change at any time; if it did, the experience of foreign countries suggests that the effects on the economy and financial markets could be severe. A failure to raise the debt limit or a ratings downgrade of U.S. debt by a credit rating agency are two events that have been seen as potential catalysts for a change in investor sentiment, although the downgrade when the debt nearly reached its statutory limit in 2011 did not result in higher yields.
According to standard macroeconomic theory, large deficits have temporarily boosted overall spending at a time when there is significant slack in the economy. Once private investment demand recovers, a large deficit would be expected to "crowd out" private investment spending. By accounting identity, domestic investment spending equals national saving plus net borrowing from abroad. The budget deficit has been equal to about half of private saving over the last three years. Even before the increase in the deficit, national saving was insufficient to finance domestic investment spending, and the United States was borrowing from abroad at unprecedented rates, peaking at about 6% of GDP. (Borrowing from abroad has since fallen by half, but remains relatively high.) To sustain large deficits, the economy will require some combination of higher private saving, lower investment, and higher borrowing from abroad. Some economists have argued that borrowing much more than 6% of GDP from abroad is unrealistic, and the already heavy U.S. reliance on borrowing from abroad makes the maintenance of a large budget deficit even less sustainable. |
crs_R40550 | crs_R40550_0 | Post offices throughout the country accept mail and packages for military personnel and deliver these items to military installations in the United States. For mailers, then, the postage is subsidized—they pay only the domestic portion of the cost. When the Armed Forces are engaged in combat or other dangerous activities, the President has the authority to permit service members to send personal correspondence, free of charge, to places within the delivery limits of a U.S. post office (39 U.S.C. However, citizens of the United States have never been authorized to send mail to service members, whether overseas or not, without paying postage. The USPS offers "free Military kits" to military families who want to send packages overseas. Legislation in the 112th Congress
Representative Peter King introduced H.R. 1935 would
establish a postage benefit for members of the armed services on active duty in Iraq or Afghanistan, and for individuals who are "hospitalized at a facility under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of the United States as a result of a disease or injury incurred as a result of service in Iraq or Afghanistan," provide a beneficiary with one coupon or voucher per month, which he or she could give to anyone who wished to send a letter of no more than 13 ounces or a parcel of no more than 15 pounds; and authorize an appropriation to the DOD to cover the cost of this program to the USPS. Legislation in Previous Congresses
Legislation to establish a free-mail-to-troops postage benefit has been introduced in the 109 th , 110 th , and 111 th Congresses. This bill was very similar to H.R. 704 did not define who may use a postage voucher. 3326 , the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010. | Members of the Armed Forces on duty in designated combat areas can send personal correspondence, free of postage, to addresses in the United States. However, there is not a comparable policy to permit individuals in the United States to send letters and packages to troops serving overseas free of charge.
H.R. 1935 has been introduced in the 112th Congress to establish a new, free postage benefit. Military personnel who are deployed in Afghanistan or Iraq, or who are hospitalized as a result of such deployment, would receive one postage voucher or coupon per month. The recipient may then give this voucher to a person in the United States, who could use it to send a letter or a parcel to a deployed member of the Armed Forces. Similar legislation was introduced but not enacted in the previous three Congresses.
The federal government does subsidize the postage an individual pays to send mail to troops. A sender is charged only for the cost of the domestic portion of the delivery—the Department of Defense pays the cost to move the mail from the United States to troops overseas. Additionally, since October 2008 the U.S. Postal Service has offered a discounted package service to families wishing to send packages to members of the Armed Services stationed overseas.
This report will be updated to reflect significant legislative action. |
crs_R44156 | crs_R44156_0 | Introduction
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the United States is expected to be the fourth-largest producer and third-largest exporter of peanuts in the world in 2016. In addition to its prominent role in international markets, U.S. peanut production and marketing is an important activity in several states located in the southeastern and southwestern United States. Peanuts have participated in federal farm support programs since the 1930s—initially under a quota system, and since 2002 under the income support programs available for other covered commodities like corn, wheat, soybeans, and rice. The current farm commodity program provisions in Title I of the 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014; P.L. 113-79 ) include three types of support for covered commodities for crop years 2014-2018:
Marketing Assistance Loan benefits , which offer interim (up to nine months) financing for loan commodities (covered crops plus several others) at statutory loan rates and, if prices fall below loan rates, additional low-price protection in the form of marketing loan gains, loan deficiency payments, or forfeiture; Price Loss Coverage (PLC) payments, which are triggered when the national season average farm price for a covered commodity is below its statutorily fixed "reference price"; and Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) payments, as an alternative to PLC, which are triggered when annual crop revenue is below its guaranteed level based on a multiyear moving average of historical crop revenue. For peanuts, almost all producers (99.7%) selected PLC because they expected it to provide higher payments and greater risk protection than would be available under ARC. A Separate Program Payment Limit for Peanuts
Under current peanut program provisions, the primary advantage that peanuts have over other program crops is that peanut producers participating in government support programs have a separate program payment limit—a consequence of the peanut quota buyout ( P.L. 107-171 ; §1603(c)). As a result of this feature, a farmer that grows multiple program crops including peanuts has essentially two different program payment limits:
the first payment limit of $125,000 per person is for an aggregation of program payments made to all program crops other than peanuts; the second payment limit of $125,000 per person is for program payments made exclusively to peanuts. Thus, under an extreme scenario involving large payments for both peanuts and other program crops, this could potentially double a farmer's payment limits to as much as $250,000. PLC and ARC payments are made after October 1 following the end of the marketing year. (In contrast, marketing loan benefits are available immediately upon harvest for crop years 2014-2018.) Generic base acres are the renamed cotton base acres from the 2008 farm bill. Instead, the former cotton base, now "generic base," is added to a producer's total base for potential payments, but only if a covered crop is planted on the generic base. In other words, PLC payments on generic base acres are fully coupled to actual plantings (although payments remain subject to the 85% factor applied to eligible acres). Farm policy economists have noted that peanuts (and rice) have a statutory reference price that is set disproportionately above historical market prices, particularly when compared to the reference prices for other major program crops. Some contend that this potential advantage favors peanut production (relative to other program crops) on generic base acres. However, the extent to which this scenario might play out is unclear, and both agronomic and market circumstances suggest that it might be limited. Table 6 summarizes peanut base acres and total generic base under the 2014 farm bill. This revised outlook significantly reduced both the likelihood of any forfeitures and the expected level of peanut-related program outlays in 2015/16. In February 2016, USDA projected peanut program costs of $503.6 million in FY2016, $870 million in FY2017, and at least $910 million through FY2025. As a point of reference, the annual market value of U.S. peanut production has traditionally been in the range of $1.1 billion to $1.4 billion, depending on crop size. | According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the United States is expected to be the fourth-largest producer and third-largest exporter of peanuts in the world in 2016. In addition to its prominent role in international markets, U.S. peanut production and marketing is an important activity in several states located in the southeastern and southwestern United States. The U.S. peanut crop has been eligible for certain federal farm support programs since the 1930s—initially under a quota system and, since 2002, under the income support programs available for other major program crops like corn, wheat, soybeans, and rice.
Today, under the 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79), the major income support programs are marketing loan benefits and either the price loss coverage (PLC) or agriculture risk coverage (ARC) program (as determined by a one-time producer choice). For peanuts, almost all producers (99.7%) chose PLC because they expected it to provide higher payments and greater risk protection than would be available under ARC.
Marketing loan benefits are available immediately after harvest and are coupled directly to planting and production. In contrast, PLC and ARC payments are made to 85% of historical base acres and thus decoupled from producer crop choices. Also, PLC and ARC payments are not available until nearly a full year after harvest—October 1 following the end of the marketing year when full information on farm prices is available. The 2014 farm bill also created "generic" base acres—former cotton base acres from the 2008 farm bill. Generic base is added to a producer's total base for potential payments, but only if a covered crop is planted on the generic base. In other words, PLC payments on generic base acres are coupled to actual plantings (although payments remain subject to the 85% factor applied to eligible acres).
Under current peanut program provisions, peanuts have a separate program payment limit—a consequence of the quota buyout (P.L. 107-171; §1603). As a result of this feature, a farmer that grows multiple program crops including peanuts has in effect two different program payment limits: the first payment limit (of $125,000) is for an aggregation of program payments made to all program crops other than peanuts; and the second (also of $125,000) is for program payments made exclusively to peanuts. Thus, under an extreme scenario involving large payments for both peanuts and other program crops, this could potentially double a farmer's payment limits.
Farm policy economists have noted that peanuts have a statutory reference price that is set disproportionately above historical market prices, particularly when compared to other major program crops. Some contend that this potential advantage favors peanut production on generic base acres. However, the extent to which this scenario might play out is unclear, and both agronomic and market circumstances suggest that it might be somewhat limited.
USDA estimates of peanut program outlays for FY2015 were modest at $74 million. However, most analysts expect substantial peanut program outlays in the future under both the PLC program and the marketing assistance loan program, as well as from storage and handling costs associated with peanut loan forfeitures. In February 2016, USDA projected annual average peanut program costs at $800 million for FY2016-FY2019. However, record U.S. peanut exports during the 2015/16 crop year, coupled with record domestic usage, have substantially reduced domestic peanut stocks and have likely dampened the outlook for program costs in FY2016. Going forward (FY2017-FY2019), outlays will depend on producer behavior and market conditions. As a point of reference, the annual market value of U.S. peanut production over the past 30 years has been primarily in the range of $0.8 billion to $1.2 billion. |
crs_RL32888 | crs_RL32888_0 | Introduction
The Future Combat System (FCS) was a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It was to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program and was to consist of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. FCS was intended to replace current systems such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The primary issues for congressional concern are how the Army plans to transition from the FCS program to a BCT Modernization Program, incorporating selected remaining FCS technologies in a series of spin-outs—capabilities from the FCS program aimed at the current force. Congress's decisions on these and other related issues could have significant implications for Army capabilities and funding requirements, as well as the ground combat portion of the defense industrial base. DOD's April 2009 FCS Restructuring Decision
On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that he intended to significantly restructure the FCS program. The Department of Defense (DOD), Gates said, now planned to accelerate the spin out of selected FCS technologies to all brigade combat teams (BCTs). Gates also recommended cancelling the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of the program. The MGV program was intended to field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a common chassis that would eventually replace combat vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the M-109 Paladin self-propelled artillery system. Some of the key tenets of this strategy are as follows:
Deliver capability packages consisting of key technologies and warfighter urgent requirements in two year increments that would enable the Army Force Generation model (ARFORGEN) beginning in FY2011. The Army plans to expand the fielding of these capability packages to all BCTs by 2025. Upgrade select core Army systems. Fully integrate MRAPs into formations. Develop a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) concept focused on building a versatile platform incorporating combat lessons learns, to be fielded by 2017. The Army Capabilities Integration Center, the office in charge of developing the CGV concept, states that a "new Ground Combat Vehicle, synchronized with upgrades, reset and divestiture of current vehicles is the most effective and affordable way to improve capability in the mid-term, mitigate risk associated with identified operational shortfalls and provide our Army the agility to adapt and versatility to meet the challenges of an ever-changing operational environment." | The Future Combat System (FCS) was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It was to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program, consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. FCS was intended to replace current systems such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture because of the advanced technologies involved and the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-equipped units could function as intended.
On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that he intended to significantly restructure the FCS program. The Department of Defense (DOD) would then plan to accelerate the spin out of selected FCS technologies to all brigade combat teams (BCTs). Gates also recommended cancelling the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of the program, which was intended to field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a common chassis that would eventually replace combat vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the M-109 Paladin self-propelled artillery system.
In October 2009, the Army announced a new BCT modernization strategy to implement Gates's restructuring announcement. Some of the key tenets of this strategy are as follows:
Deliver capability packages consisting of key FCS technologies and warfighter urgent requirements in two year increments. The Army plans to expand the fielding of these capability packages to all BCTs by 2025. Get some FCS spin-outs—capabilities from the FCS program aimed at the current force—to the field in the FY2011-FY2012 capabilities package. Upgrade select core Army systems. Fully integrate Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles into formations. Develop a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) concept focused on building a versatile platform incorporating combat lessons learned, and field the system by 2017.
The Army states that a "new Ground Combat Vehicle, synchronized with upgrades, reset and divestiture of current vehicles is the most effective and affordable way to improve capability in the mid-term, mitigate risk associated with identified operational shortfalls and provide our Army the agility to adapt and versatility to meet the challenges of an ever-changing operational environment."
The Army's restructured FCS program and the new plan for modernizing BCTs pose several oversight issues for Congress. Congressional decisions regarding these new plans may significantly affect Army capabilities and funding requirements, and the ground combat portion of the defense industrial base.
. |
crs_R44356 | crs_R44356_0 | The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally requires agencies to follow certain procedures when promulgating rules. The statute's "good cause" exception, however, permits age ncies to forgo Section 553's notice and comment requirement if "the agency for good cause finds" that compliance would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" and to bypass its requirement that rules be published 30 days before implementation if good cause exists. However, federal courts reviewing this agency practice have varied in their analysis—as to the proper standard of review, whether there are actually two good cause provisions, and what factors justify the exception—resulting in confusion as to precisely what constitutes "good cause." Some courts have indicated that these are two distinct standards; others do not always distinguish between the two. What Constitutes Good Cause? Consequently, leaving aside minor or technical rules where compliance with Section 553 is unnecessary, it may be helpful to divide good cause cases into several categories: (1) emergencies; (2) contexts where prior notice would subvert the underlying statutory scheme; and (3) situations where Congress intends to w aive Section 553's requirements. Standard of Review When Agencies Invoke the Good Cause Exception
As mentioned above, courts differ as to the proper standard of review when agencies invoke the good cause exception. One pitfall is the proper characterization of the agency's action—is an agency determination that good cause exists to bypass Section 553 a discretionary decision or a legal conclusion? Challenges to agency discretionary decisions are governed by Section 706(2)(A)'s arbitrary and capricious standard, while procedural challenges pursuant to Section 706(2)(D) that an agency failed to comply with the provisions of the APA are often reviewed de novo . Some courts have applied the former standard when reviewing good cause determinations, others the latter. Complicating matters, however, is the practice of some courts to not clearly adopt either standard, but focus instead on simply "narrowly constru[ing]" the provision. Recent judicial analysis of the Attorney General's actions pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) illustrates the divergence respecting interpretations of the good cause exception. The Attorney General issued an interim rule applying SORNA's requirements retroactively and relied on the good cause exception to bypass the notice and comment rulemaking requirements as well as the 30-day publication rule. Presidential Transitions
Agency use of the good cause exception can also be important in the context of presidential transitions. Recent outgoing presidential administrations have engaged in "midnight rulemaking," whereby federal agencies increase the number of regulations issued during the final months of a presidential administration. A subsequent presidential administration of a different party, however, may have different policy priorities. Nonetheless, once a rule is finalized by an agency, repeal of a rule requires compliance with Section 553's notice and comment procedures. Consequently, in order to gain control of the rulemaking process, some Presidents have sought to impose a moratorium on new regulations at the beginning of their administration. | While the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally requires agencies to follow certain procedures when promulgating rules, the statute's "good cause" exception permits agencies to forgo Section 553's notice and comment requirement if "the agency for good cause finds" that compliance would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest" and bypass its 30-day publication requirement if good cause exists. Federal courts reviewing this agency practice have varied in their analysis, resulting in confusion as to precisely what constitutes "good cause." In addition, some courts have indicated that these are two distinct standards; others do not always distinguish between the two.
What precisely constitutes good cause is not explicit from the APA's text. In order to understand the operation of the good cause exception, it may be helpful to divide good cause cases into several categories: (1) emergencies; (2) contexts where prior notice would subvert the underlying statutory scheme; and (3) situations where Congress intends to waive Section 553's requirements.
Courts differ as to the proper standard of review when agencies invoke the good cause exception. One pitfall is the proper characterization of the agency's action—is an agency determination that good cause exists to bypass Section 553 a discretionary decision or a legal conclusion? Challenges to agency discretionary decisions are governed by Section 706(2)(A)'s arbitrary and capricious standard, while procedural challenges pursuant to Section 706(2)(D) that an agency failed to comply with the provisions of the APA are often reviewed de novo. Some courts have applied the former standard when reviewing good cause determinations, others the latter. Still other courts appear to not clearly adopt either standard, but focus instead on simply "narrowly construing" the provision. Recent judicial analysis of the Attorney General's actions pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) illustrates this divergence. The Attorney General issued an interim rule applying SORNA retroactively and relied on the good cause exception to bypass Section 553's requirements. Federal courts split as to the legality of the Attorney General's actions as well as to the appropriate standard of review when examining good cause invocations.
Agency use of the good cause exception can also be important in the context of presidential transitions. Recent outgoing presidential administrations have engaged in "midnight rulemaking," whereby federal agencies increase the number of regulations issued during the final months of a presidential administration. A subsequent presidential administration of a different party, however, may have different policy priorities. Nonetheless, once a rule is finalized by an agency, repeal of a rule requires compliance with Section 553's notice and comment procedures. In order to gain control of the rulemaking process, some Presidents have sought to impose a moratorium on new regulations at the beginning of their administration. Agencies implementing such moratorium directives have often relied on use of the good cause exception to justify their actions. |
crs_RL31447 | crs_RL31447_0 | Congress has since added approximately 100 million more acres to the Wilderness System (see Table 1 ) among some 608.9 million acres of land managed by the federal land management agencies—the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture, and the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior. In response, Congress enacted the Wilderness Act in 1964. The act reserves to Congress the authority to designate areas as part of the National Wilderness Preservation System. The Wilderness Act directed the Secretary of Agriculture to review the agency's 5.5 million acres of primitive areas, and the Secretary of the Interior to evaluate the wilderness potential of National Park System and National Wildlife Refuge System lands. The 90 th Congress began expanding the Wilderness System in 1968, as shown in Table 1 . The Wilderness System now contains 765 wilderness areas, with approximately 109.9 million acres in 44 states and Puerto Rico, managed by the four federal land-management agencies, as shown in Table 2 . An area of wilderness is further defined to mean ... an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value. These imprecise criteria stem in part from differing perceptions of what constitutes wilderness. Thus, there are contrasting views about what constitutes wilderness and how wilderness should be managed. However, in response to concern that designating wilderness areas would restrict management of adjoining federal lands, language in many subsequent wilderness bills has prohibited buffer zones that would limit uses and activities on federal lands around the wilderness areas. Many of the wilderness statutes have directed the agencies to review the wilderness potential of certain lands and present recommendations regarding wilderness designations to the President and to Congress. Prohibited Uses
The Wilderness Act, directly and by cross-reference in virtually all subsequent wilderness statutes, generally prohibits commercial activities; motorized uses; and roads, structures, and facilities in designated wilderness areas. Continued motorized access and livestock grazing have also generally been permitted where they had been occurring prior to the area's designation as wilderness, as discussed above. Questions and discussions persist over the protection and management of these areas, which some believe should be designated as wilderness and others believe should be available for development. Just over half (52%) of this land—57.4 million acres—is in Alaska, and includes most of the wilderness areas managed by NPS (75%), FWS (90%), and FS (16%). | Congress enacted the Wilderness Act in 1964. This act created the National Wilderness Preservation System, reserved to Congress the authority to designate wilderness areas, and directed the Secretaries of Agriculture and of the Interior to review certain lands for their wilderness potential. The act also designated 54 wilderness areas with 9 million acres of federal land. Congress began expanding the Wilderness System in 1968, and today, there are 765 wilderness areas, totaling nearly 110 million acres, in 44 states. Numerous bills to designate additional areas and to expand existing ones have been introduced and considered in every Congress.
The Wilderness Act defined wilderness as an area of undeveloped federal land, among other criteria, but due to differing perceptions of wilderness and its purpose, it did not establish criteria or standards to determine whether an area should be designated. In general, wilderness areas are undeveloped, and commercial activities, motorized access, and roads, structures, and facilities are prohibited in wilderness areas. In response to conflicting demands, however, Congress has granted both general exemptions and specific exceptions to the general standards and prohibitions. Questions also persist over the frequency and extent to which federal agencies must review the wilderness potential of their lands, and how those lands should be managed.
Wilderness designation can be controversial. Because the designation generally prohibits commercial activities, motorized access, and human infrastructure from wilderness areas, opponents see such designations as preventing certain uses and potential economic development in rural areas where such opportunities are relatively limited. Advocates propose wilderness designations to preserve the generally undeveloped conditions of the areas.
The federal government owns about 28% of the land in the United States, although the proportion in each state varies widely. Four federal agencies—the Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior; and the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture—manage most of the 110 million acres of designated wilderness, as well as many other lands. They also protect certain other lands as possible additions to the Wilderness System, and review the wilderness potential of lands.
In total, nearly 18% of federal land administered by the four major federal land management agencies, and nearly 5% of all land in the United States, has been designated as wilderness, largely in Alaska. Alaska, because of its size and relatively pristine condition, dominates wilderness statistics—more than 52% of designated wilderness is in Alaska (57.4 million acres). In total, nearly 16% of the entire state of Alaska has been designated as wilderness. In contrast, 3% of all land in the United States outside Alaska has been designated as wilderness. |
crs_98-733 | crs_98-733_0 | 98-733 -- Terrorism: U. S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: A New Policy Direction? On August 20,1998, the United Stateslaunched missile strikes against training bases in Afghanistan used by groups affiliated with radical extremist andterrorist financier Usama bin Laden. A pharmaceutical plant inSudan, identified by U.S. intelligence as aprecursor chemical weapons facility with connections to bin Laden, was hit as well. However, this is the first time the U.S. has given such primaryand public prominence to the preemptive , notjust retaliatory, nature and motive of a military strike against a terrorist organization or network. This may besignaling a more proactive and globalcounter-terrorism policy, less constrained when targeting terrorists, their bases, or infrastructure. (1)
Is There a Policy Shift and What Are Its Key Elements? What Other Policy Options Exist? Issues for Congress
Issues of special concern to Congress include: (1) U.S. domestic and overseas preparedness for terrorist attacks and retaliatory strikes, (2) the need for consultationwith Congress over policy shifts which might result in an undeclared type of war, and (3) sustaining public supportfor a long-term policy which may prove costlyin: (a) dollars; (b) initial clearly seen loss of human lives, as well as (c) potential restrictions on civil liberties. Whether the Presidential ban on assassinationsshould be changed and whether Afghanistan should be placed on the "terrorism" list warrants consideration aswell. | On August 20,1998, the United States launched retaliatory and preemptive missile strikes against training bases andinfrastructure in Afghanistan used by groups affiliated with radical extremist and terrorist financier Usama binLaden. A "pharmaceutical" plant in Sudan, makinga critical nerve gas component, was destroyed as well. This is the first time the U.S. has unreservedly acknowledgeda preemptive military strike against a terroristorganization or network. This has led to speculation that faced with a growing number of major attacks on U.S.persons and property and mounting casualties,U.S. policymakers may be setting a new direction in counter-terrorism-- a more proactive and global policy, lessconstrained when targeting terrorists, their bases, or infrastructure. Questions raised include: What is the nature and extent of any actual policy shift; what are its prosand cons; and what other policy optionsexist? Issues of special concern to Congress include: (1) U.S. domestic and overseas preparedness for terroristattacks and retaliatory strikes; (2) the need forconsultation with Congress over policy shifts which might result in an undeclared type of war; and (3) sustainingpublic and Congressional support for a long termpolicy which may prove costly in: (a) dollars; (b) initial up-front loss of human lives, and (c) potential restrictionson civil liberties. Whether to change thepresidential ban on assassinations and whether to place Afghanistan on the "terrorism" list warrants attention as well.This short report is intended for Membersand staffers who cover terrorism, as well as U.S. foreign and defense policy. It will be updated as events warrant.For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB95112, Terrorism, the Future and U..S. Foreign Policy and CRS Report 98-722(pdf), Terrorism:Middle East Groups and State Sponsors. |
crs_R40729 | crs_R40729_0 | Introduction
Premium conversion allows employees to pay their share of employment-based health insurance premiums on a pre-tax basis. It is difficult for people who are not tax experts to follow the calculations or understand the rationale. Rules limiting its use strike some as arbitrary and unfair. Premium conversion is sometimes referred to as premium only or section 125 plans, causing further confusion. Premium Conversion Basics
Premium conversion is authorized by section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code, a section entitled "cafeteria plans." In general, the section allows taxpayers to choose among taxable and nontaxable benefits offered by an employer without paying taxes if they select the latter. As a rule under tax law, when taxpayers are offered a choice between taxable and normally nontaxable income they will be taxed on whichever they choose; they will be deemed to be in "constructive receipt" of the taxable income whether or not they take it. Section 125 makes an exception to the constructive receipt rule for benefits such as health insurance that meet the section's requirements. Some cafeteria plans offer employees choices among a number of benefits (hence the name), whereas others limit the choice to cash and one specific nontaxable benefit. Like all cafeteria plans, premium conversion plans must be in writing. Premium conversion probably became more common after the 1970s when, in the face of rising costs, employers sought to limit health plan contributions and help employees manage their own. Employers might obtain results similar to premium conversion by restricting wage growth and using the savings to increase what they pay for premiums. Retirees
Retirees sometimes complain that they cannot take advantage of premium conversion. The barrier is not section 125, for as indicated above cafeteria plans may include former employees provided the plan is not maintained predominantly for them. Instead, the restriction is due to an IRS determination that distributions from qualified retirement plans are always subject to taxes, aside from several minor exceptions. In the 111 th Congress, H.R. 1203 (Van Hollen) and S. 491 (Webb) would allow federal retirees to pay their share of Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) premiums on a pre-tax basis. Among other things, the law requires employers with 11 or more full-time equivalent (FTE) workers to establish premium conversion plans, which it calls section 125 plans. A similar requirement for premium conversion might be considered in the reform legislation now before Congress. In addition, some in Congress are considering limiting the tax exclusion for employer-provided coverage, not expanding it. If Congress were to require or encourage employers to adopt premium conversion, consideration may be given to enabling more small businesses to take advantage of it. If premium conversion were included in health care reform, consideration may also be given to modifying the statutory and regulatory nondiscrimination rules. Congress may consider establishing separate nondiscrimination rules for premium conversion that takes account of the new proposed subsidies. | Premium conversion allows employees to pay their share of employment-based health insurance premiums on a pre-tax basis. The tax treatment is difficult for people who are not tax experts to understand, as are the rules that limit its use in a manner some consider arbitrary and unfair. Premium conversion is sometimes referred to as "premium only" or "section 125 plans," causing further confusion.
Premium conversion is authorized by section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code, a section entitled "cafeteria plans." In general, the section allows taxpayers to choose among taxable and nontaxable benefits offered by an employer without paying taxes if they select the latter. As a rule under tax law, when taxpayers are offered a choice between taxable and normally nontaxable income they will be taxed on whichever they choose. Section 125 makes an exception to this rule for benefits such as health insurance that meet the section's requirements.
Some cafeteria plans allow workers to choose among a number of benefits (hence the name), though others allow only a choice between cash and one nontaxable benefit. Premium conversion is restricted in this manner, with cash being in the form of wages that are not given up and health insurance being the one nontaxable benefit. Employers that offer premium conversion may also offer separate cafeteria plans with other choices.
All cafeteria plans must be in writing and meet a number of nondiscrimination rules regarding highly compensated employees and company officers and owners. The rules are complex, and some make it difficult for small businesses to have the plans.
Section 125 was included in the tax code in 1978, but it is not clear when employers began adopting premium conversion. It likely became more common as rising health care costs led employers to limit their insurance contributions and to help employees manage their own. Employers might obtain results similar to premium conversion by restricting wage growth and using the savings to increase what they pay for premiums. However, only premium conversion allows workers the flexibility to individually choose this outcome.
Retirees sometimes complain that they cannot take advantage of premium conversion. The barrier is not section 125 but an IRS determination that distributions from qualified retirement plans are always subject to taxes, aside from several minor exceptions. Legislation, H.R. 1203 (Van Hollen) and S. 491 (Webb), has been introduced in the 1111th Congress to allow premium conversion for federal retirees.
In its 2006 health care reform legislation, Massachusetts required all employers with 11 or more full-time equivalent workers to adopt premium conversion. Consideration might be given to whether a similar requirement might be included in health care reform legislation now before Congress. If it is included, Congress might also consider making it easier for small businesses to establish premium conversion, as it might establishing separate nondiscrimination rules for it. However, some in Congress are considering limiting the tax exclusion for employer-provided coverage, not expanding it; presumably they would not favor extending premium conversion to more employees. |
crs_R44786 | crs_R44786_0 | Advances in science and technology can help drive economic growth, improve human health, increase agricultural productivity, and meet national priorities. Federal policies affect scientific and technological advancement on several levels. The federal government establishes and maintains the legal and regulatory framework that affects S&T activities in the private sector. This report serves as a brief introduction to many of the science and technology policy issues that may come before the 115 th Congress. Each issue section provides background information and outlines selected policy issues that may be considered. Overarching S&T Policy Issues
Several issues of potential congressional interest apply to federal science and technology policy in general. Many House and Senate committees have jurisdiction over important elements of S&T policy. In addition, there are dozens of informal congressional caucuses in areas of S&T policy such as research and development, specific S&T disciplines, and STEM education. For Further Information
[author name scrubbed], Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
[author name scrubbed], Analyst in Science and Technology Policy
CRS Report R44711, Department of Defense Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E): Appropriations Structure , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R45110, Defense Science and Technology Funding , by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R45150, Federal Research and Development (R&D) Funding: FY2019 , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]
CRS Report R44888, Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2018 , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]
Energy
Energy-related science and technology issues that may come before the 115 th Congress include those related to reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, advances in nuclear energy technology, the development of biofuels and ocean energy technology, and international fusion research. For Further Information
[author name scrubbed], Specialist in Internet and Telecommunications Policy
CRS Report RL33586, The Federal Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Program: Background, Funding, and Activities , by [author name scrubbed]
Physical and Material Sciences
Some of the policy issues in the physical and material sciences that the 115 th Congress may address include funding and oversight of the National Science Foundation and the multiagency initiative supporting research and development in the emerging field of nanotechnology. 115-10 ). | Science and technology (S&T) have a pervasive influence over a wide range of issues confronting the nation. Public and private research and development spur scientific and technological advancement. Such advances can drive economic growth, help address national priorities, and improve health and quality of life. The constantly changing nature and ubiquity of science and technology frequently create public policy issues of congressional interest.
The federal government supports scientific and technological advancement directly by funding and performing research and development and indirectly by creating and maintaining policies that encourage private sector efforts. Additionally, the federal government establishes and enforces regulatory frameworks governing many aspects of S&T activities.
This report briefly outlines an array of science and technology policy issues that may come before the 115th Congress. Given the rapid pace of S&T advancement and its importance in many diverse public policy issues, S&T-related issues not discussed in this report may come before the 115th Congress. The selected issues are grouped into 10 categories:
Overarching S&T Policy Issues, Agriculture, Biomedical Research and Development, Defense, Energy, Environment and Natural Resources, Homeland Security, Information Technology, Physical and Material Sciences, and Space.
Each of these categories includes concise analysis of multiple policy issues. The material presented in this report should be viewed as illustrative rather than comprehensive. Each section identifies CRS reports, when available, and the appropriate CRS experts to contact for further information and analysis. |
crs_R42817 | crs_R42817_0 | Introduction
From the inception of the American federal government, Congress has required executive branch agencies to make certain information and records publicly available to make the actions and information of the government transparent to the public. Some scholars and statesmen, including James Madison, described information access as an essential cornerstone of democratic governance. Access to government actions and information is often in tension with information protection. Among the congressional powers available to enforce federal transparency and to protect certain other materials from public release are the powers to legislate, hold hearings, issue subpoenas, and control the federal budget. Among these laws are the Federal Register Act, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), the Government In the Sunshine Act, and the Privacy Act. Transparency , however, may be defined as not only the disclosure of government information, but the access, comprehension, and use of it by the public. Accordingly, this report assesses scholarly and practical definitions of transparency and provides an analysis of the concept of transparency, with a focus on transparency in the executive branch of the federal government. It also examines how the release of large amounts of public data may make the operations of government more or, counter-intuitively, less transparent. This report examines statutes, initiatives, and other items that seek to make information more available to the public as well as those that seek to protect certain information from release to the public. This report examines transparency and secrecy from the standpoint of how the public historically has and can currently access government information. Finally, this report analyzes whether existing transparency initiatives are effective in reaching their stated goals. What Is Transparency? Transparency, as such, requires a public that can acquire, understand, and use the information that it receives from the federal government. Private watchdog organizations have had mixed reviews of this initiative. The American republic, therefore, has to balance access to government information with protection of personal and national security interests. These exemptions allow agencies to close meetings when an agency properly determines that such a portion or portions of its meeting or the disclosure of such information is likely to
1. disclose matters that are specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or foreign policy and are properly classified pursuant to such an executive order; 2. relate solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; 3. disclose matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than FOIA), provided that such statute leaves no discretion on the issue, establishes particular criteria for withholding, or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; 4. disclose trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person; 5. involve accusing any person of a crime, or the formal censuring any person; 6. disclose information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 7. disclose investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, or information which, if written, would be contained in such records; 8. disclose information contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; 9. disclose information which, if prematurely disclosed, would in the case of an agency which regulates currencies, securities, commodities, or financial institutions, be likely to lead to significant financial speculation in currencies, securities, or commodities, or significantly endanger the stability of any financial institution; or in the case of any agency, be likely to significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action; or 10. specifically concern the agency's issuance of a subpoena, or the agency's participation in a civil action or proceeding, an action in a foreign court or international tribunal, or an arbitration, or the initiation, conduct, or disposition by the agency of a particular case of formal agency adjudication. The Evolution of Transparency in the Federal Government and Its Potential Effects on Access and Participation
Public access to government information and operations has changed over time. | From the beginnings of the American federal government, Congress has required executive branch agencies to release or otherwise make available government information and records. Some scholars and statesmen, including James Madison, thought access to information—commonly referred to in contemporary vernacular as "transparency"—was an essential cornerstone of democratic governance. Today, the federal government attempts to balance access to information with the need to protect certain information (including national security information and trade secrets) in order to achieve transparency. As a consequence, access and protection are often in tension with one another.
Congress has the authority to determine what information can and should be publicly available as well as what should be protected. Congressional powers that may be used to address federal transparency include the powers to legislate, hold hearings, issue subpoenas, and control the federal budget. Statutes that grant access to government information include the Federal Register Act, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Among the laws enacted to protect information are the Privacy Act and FOIA. Agencies also use security classifications, which are governed largely by executive orders, to protect certain records from public release. Records may be protected for national security purposes, personal privacy concerns, or other reasons.
The Obama Administration has undertaken its own transparency initiative, known as the Open Government Initiative, to make executive branch agencies more transparent, publicly accessible, and collaborative than they have historically been. Watchdog organizations have offered mixed reviews of the initiative's ability to promote and institute government transparency.
Transparency may be defined as the disclosure of government information and its use by the public. Transparency, under this definition, requires a public that can access, understand, and use the information it receives from the federal government. This report first assesses the meaning of transparency and discusses its scholarly and practical definitions. It also provides an analysis of the concept of transparency, with a focus on federal government transparency in the executive branch.
This report subsequently examines the statutes, initiatives, requirements, and other actions that make information more available to the public or protect it from public release. It also examines transparency and secrecy from the standpoint of how the public accesses government information, and whether the release of government data and information may make operation of the federal government more or, counter-intuitively, less transparent. Finally, this report analyzes whether existing transparency initiatives are effective in reaching their stated goals. |
crs_R40561 | crs_R40561_0 | Over the past five years, Part B costs have increased an average of 8.3% per year, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Office of the Actuary (OACT) projects an annual increase of 4.8% over the next five years based on current law. These subsidies are paid by the federal-state Medicaid program. Social Security beneficiaries who do not pay Medicare Part B premiums include those who are under the age of 65, receive low-income assistance from Medicaid to pay the Part B premium, have started to receive Social Security disability insurance (SSDI) but are not eligible for Medicare Part B because they have not received SSDI for 24 months, or chose not to enroll in Medicare Part B. Hold Harmless Provision for Increases in Part B Premiums
A hold harmless provision reduces the Part B premium for most beneficiaries whose Social Security COLAs are not sufficient to cover the standard Part B premium increase. If, in a given year, the increase in the standard Part B premium would cause a beneficiary's Social Security check to be less than it was the year before, the premium is reduced to ensure that the amount of the individual's Social Security check does not decline. Whether a beneficiary is held harmless also depends on whether the beneficiary has a previous history of paying Part B premiums and receiving Social Security: to be held harmless in a given year, a Social Security beneficiary must have received Social Security benefit checks in both December of the previous year and January of the current year, and must also have had Part B premiums deducted from both checks. The following groups are not affected by the hold harmless provision. In 2009, 17.5% of Part B enrollees received full Part B subsidies, but this number was expected to increase because of the economic downturn. About 5% of Part B enrollees are subject to income-related premiums. Part D premiums are not covered by the hold harmless provision, although beneficiaries with low-income subsidies will not be affected. Typically, the hold harmless provision has affected a relatively small number of beneficiaries and has had minimal impact on Part B financing. However, there was no Social Security COLA in 2010 and SSA announced on October 15, 2010, that there will be no Social Security COLA in 2011. Impact on Beneficiaries
Most Beneficiaries Will Be Held Harmless
Although Part B premiums have increased but Social Security benefits have not, about three-quarters of Part B enrollees are held harmless for the increase in Part B premiums. As described above, about 27% of Part B enrollees are not held harmless in 2010 under current law. Persons who are not held harmless include lower-income beneficiaries whose premiums are paid by Medicaid, higher-income beneficiaries who pay income-related Part B premiums, new enrollees to either Medicare Part B or Social Security, and persons who do not receive Social Security checks. Because roughly three-quarters of Part B enrollees were held harmless in 2010, the entire increase in beneficiary costs was borne by the remaining one-quarter. As a consequence of the introduction of an income-related premium and the hold-harmless provision combined with no COLA in 2010, the number of different amounts that beneficiaries paid for the monthly Medicare Part B premiums increased from one in 2006 (when everyone paid the same amount, regardless of when he or she became eligible for Medicare or what his or her income was) to six in 2010: one for beneficiaries held harmless at the 2009 level, one for new beneficiaries and those without hold-harmless protection in 2010, and four levels of income-related premiums. 1832 , the Medicare Prescription Drug Affordability Act of 2009, which would amend the Social Security Act to limit the increase in premium costs for beneficiaries under the Medicare prescription drug program to no more than the Social Security cost-of-living adjustment, among other provisions. Most of these bills do not directly address the issue of Part B premiums but rather focus on payments to Social Security beneficiaries, veterans, and retired railroad workers. The Social Security Administration (SSA) scored H.R. In October 2010, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced their support for consideration of a one-time, $250 payment to Social Security and certain other beneficiaries when Congress returns after the November elections. On October 15, 2010, the White House press office announced that the President supports efforts to provide a $250 payment to seniors, veterans, and people with disabilities. | On October 15, 2010, the Social Security Administration announced there will be no Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) in 2011. In addition, there was no Social Security COLA in 2010. The last positive Social Security COLA took effect in January 2009 and was 5.8% for all of 2009. Meanwhile, over the past five years, Medicare Part B program costs have increased an average of 8.3% per year and are expected to continue to grow. By statute, Part B premiums, which are automatically deducted from Social Security checks for those who receive Social Security, must cover 25% of projected Part B costs for aged beneficiaries. The Social Security Act includes a provision that holds most Social Security beneficiaries harmless for increases in the Medicare Part B premium: affected beneficiaries' Part B premiums are reduced to ensure that their Social Security checks do not decline from one year to the next. In a typical year, the hold harmless provision affects a small fraction of beneficiaries and has a limited impact on program finances. However, in a year when Medicare Part B premiums increase but Social Security benefits do not, the effects of the hold harmless provision are larger and more complex.
The absence of a Social Security COLA affects Medicare Part B premiums in two ways under current law. For about three-quarters of Part B participants, the hold harmless provision prevents their Part B premiums from increasing and so the amount of their Social Security checks remains flat, all other things being equal. Under current law, the only way to collect the 25% of Part B costs that are required to be covered by beneficiary premiums is to increase Part B premiums on beneficiaries who are not protected by the hold harmless provision. The one-quarter of beneficiaries who are not held harmless therefore shoulder the entire beneficiary share of the increase in Part B costs. In other words, their collective premium increase can be nearly four times greater than if there were no hold harmless provision.
The one-quarter of Part B enrollees to whom the hold harmless provision does not apply can be divided into three groups: (1) low-income beneficiaries whose Part B premiums are not withheld from their Social Security benefits but instead are fully paid by the Medicaid program (currently about 17.5% of Part B enrollees, expected to increase); (2) high-income beneficiaries who are subject to income-related Part B premiums (about 5% of Part B enrollees); and (3) beneficiaries for whom there is insufficient history of Social Security payments with corresponding deductions for the Part B premium (about 5% of Part B enrollees), which would include both new enrollees to either Social Security or Medicare and Part B enrollees who do not participate in Social Security. The substantial majority of Part B enrollees (17.5%) not held harmless in 2010 were low-income beneficiaries whose Part B premiums are paid by Medicaid. As a result, in the absence of any intervention by Congress, most of the cost of the increase in Part B premiums in 2010 and 2011 will be paid by the federal-state Medicaid program, not directly by beneficiaries.
As of the date of this report, Congress has not passed legislation to address this issue. Speaker of the House Pelosi has announced that she will ask the House to consider H.R. 5987, which would provide a one-time, $250 payment to Social Security beneficiaries (including persons on Social Security disability) and retired veterans and railroad workers, when Congress returns after the November elections. Senate Majority Leader Reid has announced he will ask the Senate to consider legislation to provide a one-time, $250 payment when Congress returns after the elections. On October 15, 2010, the White House press office announced that the President supports efforts to provide a $250 payment to seniors, veterans, and people with disabilities. |
crs_RL30253 | crs_RL30253_0 | I n its sex discrimination decisions, the United States Supreme Court not only has defined the applicability of the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution and the nondiscriminatory policies of federal statutes, but also has rejected the use of gender stereotypes and has continued to recognize the discriminatory effect of gender hostility in the workplace and in schools. This report focuses on sex discrimination challenges based on the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments; the prohibition against employment discrimination contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and the prohibition against sex discrimination in education contained in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Although this report focuses on recent legal developments in each of these areas, this report also provides historical context by discussing selected landmark sex discrimination cases. Pregnancy Discrimination
In general, the Court has addressed Title VII and sex discrimination most frequently in the context of sexual harassment. In 2015, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Young v. United Parcel S ervice . In the case, a United Parcel Service (UPS) worker named Peggy Young challenged her employer's refusal to grant her a light-duty work assignment while she was pregnant, claiming that UPS's actions violated the PDA. Based on this reasoning, the Court vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case so that the court could determine "whether the nature of the employer's policy and the way in which it burdens pregnant women shows that the employer has engaged in intentional discrimination." Ultimately, the Court's ruling preserves the ability of pregnant workers to sue under the PDA when an employer refuses to accommodate pregnancy-related disabilities, but it does not require employers to automatically provide accommodations under all circumstances. A federal district court certified the class. §1983 for violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. | In its sex discrimination decisions, the United States Supreme Court not only has defined the applicability of the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution and the nondiscriminatory policies of federal statutes, but also has rejected the use of gender stereotypes and has continued to recognize the discriminatory effect of gender hostility in the workplace and in schools. This report focuses on sex discrimination challenges based on: the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments; the prohibition against employment discrimination contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and the prohibition against sex discrimination in education contained in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Although this report focuses on recent legal developments in each of these areas, this report also provides historical context by discussing selected landmark sex discrimination cases.
Despite the fact that the Court's analysis of sex discrimination challenges under the Constitution differs from its analysis of sex discrimination under the two federal statutes discussed in this report, it is apparent that the Court is willing to refine its standards of review under both schemes to accommodate the novel claims presented by these cases. The Court's decisions in cases involving Title VII and Title IX are particularly noteworthy because they illustrate the Court's recognition of sexual harassment in both the workplace and the classroom.
During the 2015 term, the Court issued a ruling in a high-profile case involving a claim of pregnancy discrimination in employment. In Young v. United Parcel Service, an employee challenged her employer's refusal to grant her a light-duty work assignment while she was pregnant, claiming that the employer's actions violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), a federal law that prohibits pregnancy discrimination in employment. In a highly anticipated ruling, the Justices fashioned a new test for determining when an employer's refusal to provide accommodations for a pregnant worker constitutes a violation of the PDA, and the Court sent the case back to the lower court for reconsideration in light of these new standards. |
crs_R43535 | crs_R43535_0 | This report provides an explanation of the provisions of The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-67 ) included as Title I, Subtitle B, a section titled, "Establishing a Congressional Budget" designed to serve as a substitute for a traditional congressional budget resolution for FY2014 and potentially for FY2015. The report also highlights how those provisions compare with a traditional budget resolution and places them within the context of the budget process for FY2014 and FY2015. | The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-67) included as Title I, Subtitle B, a section titled, "Establishing a Congressional Budget" designed to serve as a substitute for a traditional congressional budget resolution for FY2014 and potentially for FY2015. This report provides an explanation of such provisions, highlights how those provisions compare with a traditional budget resolution, and places them within the context of the budget process for FY2014 and FY2015.This report assumes a general understanding of the congressional budget process. For more information on the budget resolution and the congressional budget process generally, see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process, coordinated by [author name scrubbed] |
crs_RL33887 | crs_RL33887_0 | This report describes the statutory basis for the exemptions, the triennial rulemaking proceeding that results in them, and the exemptions granted in 2006. Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ( P.L. 105-304 ) in 1998, in part, to help copyright owners protect their exclusive rights against infringement facilitated by digital technologies, including the Internet. Section 1201 of the DMCA outlaws circumvention of any access control devices, such as password codes, encryption, and scrambling, that copyright owners may use to protect copyrighted works. The DMCA's prohibition on circumvention is not absolute, however. Second, the DMCA establishes a rulemaking proceeding, wherein the Librarian of Congress, acting upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, may exempt for three years a "particular class of copyrighted works" from the DMCA's prohibition on circumvention. On October 6, 2008, the Copyright Office initiated a fourth § 1201 rulemaking, in order to determine the 2009 exemptions. Once the proposals for exempted classes of works are received, the Copyright Office will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking and then hold a series of hearings in the spring of 2009 in which proponents and opponents of the proposed exemptions may present their views. 1201 , the Freedom and Innovation Revitalizing U.S. Entrepreneurship Act of 2007 (FAIR USE Act of 2007), in the 110 th Congress; the bill was later referred to the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property. 1201 would have codified the Librarian of Congress's 2006 exemptions and made them permanent (rather than have them be subject to renewal, revision, or rejection in 2009). In addition, Section 3(b) of the bill would have authorized six additional exemptions, for the following circumstances in which technological protection measures may be circumvented:
(1) instructors wishing to make a compilation of portions of audiovisual works for educational use in a classroom (and therefore not limited solely to college-level media studies courses, as in the Librarian's first exemption);
(2) consumers wanting to skip past or avoid commercials or personally objectionable content in an audiovisual work (however, the sponsor of the bill cautions that this provision "does not authorize consumers to make back up DVDs for archival or any other purpose");
(3) consumers interested in transmitting a work over a home or personal network, but not in order to upload that work to the Internet for mass, indiscriminate redistribution;
(4) individuals wishing to gain access to one or more public domain works that are included in a compilation consisting primarily of works in the public domain;
(5) reporters, teachers, and others wanting to gain access to a work of substantial public interest solely for purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, scholarship, or research; and
(6) a library or an archive satisfying the requirements of 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(2), needing to preserve or secure a copy or to replace a copy in its collections that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen. Conclusion
The 2006 exemptions to the DMCA's prohibition on circumvention of technological measures controlling access to copyrighted works allows users, under certain circumstances, to circumvent those access controls in order to (1) make compilations of video clips for film and media studies courses; (2) archive obsolete computer programs or games; (3) bypass "dongles," or hardware locks, that are obsolete; (4) use read-aloud functions or screen readers with e-books; (5) connect wireless telephone handsets to communication networks; and (6) test for or correct security flaws in works distributed on CD. These exemptions are effective until October 27, 2009, at which time they will be superseded by new exemptions issued by the Librarian of Congress, on the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, following a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding conducted pursuant to 17 U.S.C. H.R. §§ 1201(a)(1)(B)-(C) in 2000, 2003, and 2006 | Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998, in part, to help copyright owners protect their exclusive rights against infringement facilitated by digital technologies, including the Internet. Section 1201 of the DMCA outlaws circumvention of any access control devices, such as password codes, encryption, and scrambling, that copyright owners may use to protect access to copyrighted works. The DMCA's prohibition on circumvention is not absolute, however. In addition to several statutory exceptions to the general anti-circumvention provision, the DMCA authorizes the Librarian of Congress, upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, to grant temporary exemptions in order to ensure that the public may be able to use certain copyrighted works in non-infringing ways, including engaging in "fair use" of such works.
Exemptions to the prohibition on circumvention of access controls are granted every three years, following a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding that the Register of Copyrights conducts. There have been three determinations made by the Librarian of Congress to date, in 2000, 2003, and 2006. At the conclusion of the Copyright Office's third "§ 1201 rulemaking" proceeding, the Librarian of Congress recognized six exemptions that are currently in effect. These exemptions, which expire on October 28, 2009, permit the circumvention of access control devices, under specified circumstances, in order to (1) make compilations of video clips for film and media studies courses; (2) archive obsolete computer programs or games; (3) bypass "dongles," or hardware locks, that are obsolete; (4) use read-aloud functions or screen readers with e-books; (5) connect wireless telephone handsets to communication networks; and (6) test for or correct security flaws in works distributed on compact discs. On October 6, 2008, the Copyright Office initiated a fourth § 1201 rulemaking by publishing a notice in the Federal Register that sought written comments from all interested parties concerning evidence of adverse effects of the DMCA's circumvention prohibition on noninfringing uses of certain classes of works. Once these proposals for exempted classes of works are received, the Copyright Office will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking and then hold a series of hearings in the spring of 2009 in which proponents and opponents of the proposed exemptions may present their views.
This report reviews the statutory basis for the triennial exemptions, explains the Copyright Office's rulemaking process pursuant to § 1201 of the DMCA, summarizes the exemptions granted and rejected in 2006, and describes public reactions to the 2006 exemptions. In addition, it examines provisions of a bill from the 110th Congress, H.R. 1201, the Freedom and Innovation Revitalizing U.S. Entrepreneurship Act of 2007 (FAIR USE Act of 2007), that would have codified the 2006 exemptions and thus made them permanent. The bill would also have authorized six additional exemptions, in which technological protection measures may be circumvented to accomplish the following purposes: (1) instructors wishing to make a compilation of portions of audiovisual works for educational use in a classroom; (2) consumers wanting to skip past or avoid commercials or personally objectionable content in an audiovisual work; (3) consumers interested in transmitting a work over a home network, but not in order to upload that work to the Internet for mass, indiscriminate redistribution; (4) individuals wishing to gain access to one or more public domain works that are included in a compilation consisting primarily of works in the public domain; (5) reporters, teachers, and others wanting to gain access to a work of substantial public interest solely for purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, scholarship, or research; and (6) a library or an archive needing to preserve or secure a copy or to replace a copy in its collections that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen. |
crs_R44597 | crs_R44597_0 | 96-517 , Amendments to the Patent and Trademark Act. This 1980 legislation awards title to inventions that government contractors make with federal government support, if the contractor consists of a small business, a university, or other nonprofit institution. A subsequent presidential memorandum extended this policy to all federal government contractors. As a result, the contractor may obtain a patent on its invention, providing it with an exclusive right in the invention during the patent's term. The legislation is intended to use patent ownership as an incentive for private sector development and commercialization of federally funded research and development (R&D). The federal government retains certain rights in inventions produced with its financial assistance under the Bayh-Dole Act. The government retains a "nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license" for its own benefit. The Bayh-Dole Act also provides federal agencies with "march-in rights." In particular, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has received six march-in petitions and has denied each one. A 2016 exchange of correspondence between some Members of Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services has suggested a potential difference of views about the appropriate use of march-in rights. March-In Rights
The Mechanics of March-In Rights
The Bayh-Dole Act provides the government with the ability to "march in" and grant licenses for patents that resulted from publicly funded R&D. In particular, march-in rights allow the federal government, in specified circumstances, to require the contractor or successors in title to the patent to grant a "nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license" to a "responsible applicant or applicants." If the patent owner refuses to do so, the government may grant the license itself. The Bayh-Dole Act specifies four circumstances under which march-in rights may be exercised. The federal agency that provided the funding arrangement under which the patented invention was made must reach one of the following determinations:
(1) action is necessary because the contractor or assignee has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention in such field of use;
(2) action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees;
(3) action is necessary to meet requirements for public use specified by Federal regulations and such requirements are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees; or
(4) action is necessary because the agreement required by section 204 [generally requiring that patented products be manufactured substantially in the United States unless domestic manufacture is not commercially feasible] has not been obtained or waived or because a licensee of the exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States is in breach of its agreement obtained pursuant to section 204. March-in rights should be distinguished from the "nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license" that the Bayh-Dole Act grants the U.S. government elsewhere. 28 U.S.C. First, march-in rights apply only to patented inventions that were developed with the support of public funding. Therefore, if Congress deems the current situation to be acceptable, then no action need be taken. Some commentators have also suggested that Congress should establish a centralized database of inventions subject to the Bayh-Dole Act. Another option might be an open-bidding auction that might better ensure that patents on inventions developed through government funding are licensed to the most capable enterprise. | Congress approved the Bayh-Dole Act, P.L. 96-517, in order to address concerns about the commercialization of technology developed with public funds. This 1980 legislation awards title to inventions made with federal government support if the contractor consists of a small business, a university, or other nonprofit institution. A subsequent presidential memorandum extended this policy to all federal government contractors. As a result, the contractor may obtain a patent on its invention, providing it an exclusive right in the invention during the patent's term. The Bayh-Dole Act endeavors to use patent ownership as an incentive for private sector development and commercialization of federally funded research and development (R&D).
The federal government retains certain rights in inventions produced with its financial assistance under the Bayh-Dole Act. The government retains a "nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license" for its own benefit. The Bayh-Dole Act also provides federal agencies with "march-in rights," codified at 35 U.S.C. §203. March-in rights allow the government, in specified circumstances, to require the contractor or successors in title to the patent to grant a "nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license" to a "responsible applicant or applicants." If the patent owner refuses to do so, the government may grant the license itself.
No federal agency has ever exercised its power to march in and license patent rights to others. In particular, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has received six march-in petitions and has denied each one. A 2016 exchange of correspondence between Members of Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services suggests a difference of views related to agency authority under the march-in provision. Supporters of the use of march-in rights assert that they provide an unused mechanism for combatting high drug prices and ensuring that U.S. citizens enjoy the benefits of public R&D funding. Others assert that march-in rights do not provide such a broad authority, but rather are limited to four circumstances identified in the statute. They are also concerned that use of march-in rights might discourage private investment in the often considerable effort needed to bring early-stage technologies to the marketplace.
Congress possesses a number of options with respect to march-in rights. If the current situation is deemed acceptable, then no action need be taken. Congress could also consider amending the Bayh-Dole Act by specifying in greater detail the precise circumstances in which march-in rights should be exercised. Congress may also take such steps as transferring authority over the administration of march-in rights, requiring government contractors to submit periodic reports regarding the commercialization of inventions achieved through public funding, creating a centralized database of inventions subject to the Bayh-Dole Act, and taking steps to ensure that patents on inventions developed through government funding are licensed to the most capable enterprise. |
crs_R44613 | crs_R44613_0 | In part as a consequence, Moscow appears to be stepping up efforts to develop closer ties with countries in East Asia, consistent with Vladimir Putin's 2012 presidential campaign promise to "turn to the East." At the same time, Russia's flirting with a partnership with China provides a retort to the U.S. "rebalance" to Asia strategy. Already tense, U.S. relations with Moscow have frayed further since Russia's intervention in Ukraine in February-March 2014 and its initiation of military activities in Syria in 2015. Under President Putin, Russia's outreach to Asia has been inconsistent, and at times contradictory. In addition to their impact on regional dynamics, they have implications for general foreign policy oversight, as well as for more specific issues such as the efficacy of sanctions policy, the developing security competition in the Arctic region, and alternative blocs of influence in international fora like the United Nations Security Council. Interests
Potential for a China-Russia Bloc
A Chinese-Russian coalition almost inherently embodies a challenge to the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific and could hamper U.S. leadership in the region, as well as globally. Washington has adjusted its approach since, and Obama has met directly with Putin.) Impact on U.S. Strategy Toward North Korea
Diplomatic and economic support for North Korea from Russia could undermine U.S. and Chinese efforts to pressure North Korea to change its behavior and re-engage in denuclearization talks. Russia, however, appears to remain concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the uptick in relations seems to have been arrested by North Korea's provocations. Both are wary of the U.S. military presence in Asia and often criticize U.S. efforts to upgrade the United States' defense capabilities with its treaty allies, Japan and South Korea. While Russia is driven closer to China by economic necessity, China has more options. The Russia-China relationship appears to be characterized by a degree of strategic mistrust. Commercial interests in China are also increasingly wary of investment in Russian projects. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
A similar dynamic has played out in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Russia seeks to assert its traditional role as a guarantor of security to the Central Asian region while China looks to establish its centrality as an economic powerhouse. Despite joining Japan's G7 partners in imposing sanctions on Russia, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has aggressively pursued better relations with Moscow. Putin appears to view the world and Russia's role in it through a sharply anti-American lens, while Japan continues to identify the U.S.-Japan alliance as the centerpiece of its security strategy. Since Abe's return to office and his initiative to rebuild relations with Russia, his government has restarted efforts to resolve the lingering territorial issue. The SEZ may represent the most promising area for further development of economic relations, but could also be an arena of competition with Chinese investors. Although this suggests that Japan and Russia could view the Arctic as a cooperative arena for energy trade, the proximity of the disputed Northern Territories to the Arctic northern route, particularly given Russia's continued military buildup on the islands, points to an area of potential tension in the relationship. Some Asian customers see the potential for availability of large quantities of natural gas imports from the United States, and the dramatic decline in energy prices has reduced the appetite for costly new development projects in Russia's Far East. Moreover, private firms are reluctant to invest in Russia's market because of the Kremlin's assertion of control over energy companies in Russia and a history of failed deals. China-Russia Energy Ties80
Energy deals have formed the centerpiece of Russia and China's recent partnership, particularly after Moscow's relations with the West soured after the crisis in Ukraine. In considering issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem, maritime challenges in the Pacific, global energy policy and politics, or the U.S. rebalance to Asia, Congress may give additional weight to how Russian involvement affects U.S. interests. Russia's "Turn to the East" could impact several other areas that are of interest to Congress. One is the efficacy of U.S. sanctions policy on Russia given the lighter sanctions imposed on Russia by Japan and South Korea and China's attempt to broaden its economic cooperation with Russia. The Kim regime also stated that Russia's annexation of Crimea was "fully justified." | Since Russia's aggression in Ukraine and its annexation of the Crimea in March 2014, Moscow's already tense relationship with the United States and Europe has grown more fraught. After the imposition of sanctions on Russia by much of the West, Russian President Vladimir Putin has turned to East Asia, seeking new partnerships to counter diplomatic isolation and secure new markets to help Russia's struggling economy. His outreach to Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Pyongyang has met varying degrees of success. The most high-profile outreach was a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in May 2014, when the leaders announced dozens of economic cooperation agreements. Putin has met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe over a dozen times in an effort to resolve a territorial dispute and improve bilateral relations. Putin has also reached out to both Koreas in his bid to step up engagement with Northeast Asian countries.
Russian engagement in Northeast Asia challenges the U.S. strategic presence in the region in a number of ways and represents a new arena of potential concern for Congress. If Moscow's engagement efforts succeed, it could undermine U.S. efforts to impose sanctions on Russia and isolate Putin diplomatically for his intervention in Ukraine. It could also create mistrust between the United States and its allies Japan and South Korea if those countries' leaders are drawn closer to Russia. Diplomatic initiatives in the region to deal with the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs could suffer if Moscow disrupts international efforts to rein in North Korean provocations. Perhaps most importantly, China and Russia could form a regional bloc whose primary purpose could be to reduce U.S. economic leverage and challenge the U.S. security presence in the region.
The Chinese-Russian relationship is driven in large part by the perceived threat of the U.S. rebalance to Asia and their shared perspective of American unilateralism. Concrete progress on bilateral projects, however, is marked by inconsistency and faltering implementation of agreements. With Russia's economy devastated by falling energy prices since 2014, China appears to view Russia as a junior partner. Although Russia-China military relations have increased rapidly, so too has an element of competition, particularly in the Arctic region. Chinese firms are wary of investing in Russia, seeing it as politically risky and commercially unattractive. In multilateral fora like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and new Silk Road initiatives, China wants to expand its economic clout while Russia looks to assert its military dominance in Central Asia. These tensions may prevent a full-fledged strategic partnership, but relations continue to grow stronger through regular bilateral summits and global cooperation.
Japan appears enthusiastic about improving relations with Russia and resolving their territorial dispute over four islands at the northern edge of Japan. Even as U.S.-Japan security links grow stronger, Abe continues to respond to Putin's overtures with an eye on balancing China. Russia's economic engagement of Pyongyang has chilled since the Kim regime resumed testing nuclear weapons and missiles. The stalemate in inter-Korean relations and the abandonment of cross-border projects also limit Russia's potential role in facilitating infrastructure and trade links on the Peninsula. Seoul's increasingly close U.S. alliance contracts the space for Moscow's diplomatic maneuver.
Japan, South Korea, and China all have interest in Russia's supply of oil and gas from its resource-rich Far East. Although several partnerships already exist, dealing with Russia's government-controlled energy companies has proved difficult. Private firms are reluctant to invest in a politically risky environment, and the availability of cheap energy from elsewhere has dampened commercial enthusiasm for investing heavily in Russia's energy industry.
Despite obstacles, Russia's pursuit of better relations with countries in East Asia remains a complicating and potentially destabilizing factor for the U.S. policy of rebalancing its security and economic interests to the region. Russia could become a larger factor for Congress to consider when assessing progress on the rebalance to Asia strategy. Russia's "Turn to the East" could also affect areas of congressional concern such as the efficacy of U.S. sanctions policy, U.S. North Korean policy, U.S. strategy in the Arctic region, U.S. priorities at the United Nations, and global energy politics. |
crs_RS22044 | crs_RS22044_0 | Background
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a grants and civil rights statute which provides federal funding to the states to help provide education for children with disabilities. More changes to these provisions were made by the 2004 reauthorization. 108-446
Types of Private School Placements
A child with a disability may be placed in a private school by the LEA or the State Educational Agency (SEA) as a means of fulfilling the FAPE requirement for the child. Children with Disabilities Placed in Private Schools by their Parents
Generally, children with disabilities enrolled by their parents in private schools are to be provided special education and related services to the extent consistent with the number and location of such children in the school district served by a LEA pursuant to several requirements (§612(a)(10)(A)(I)). Second, a new provision relating to the calculation of the proportionate amount is added. P.L. Consultation Between the Local Educational Agency and Private School Officials
P.L. Compliance procedures also are added by P.L. 108-446 . | The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), as amended by P.L. 108-446, provides for services for children with disabilities in private schools. A child with a disability may be placed in a private school by the local educational agency (LEA) or the State Educational Agency (SEA) and costs are paid by the agency. Children with disabilities enrolled by their parents in private schools are treated differently; generally, they are to be provided special education and related services to the extent consistent with the number and location of such children in the school district served by a LEA pursuant to several requirements. These requirements include provisions relating to direct services to parentally placed private school children with disabilities, the calculation of the proportionate amount of funds, and a requirement for record keeping. Compliance procedures for these requirements were added by the 2004 reauthorization. For a general discussion of the changes made by P.L. 108-446, see CRS Report RL32716, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Analysis of Changes Made by P.L. 108-446, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R42050 | crs_R42050_0 | Introduction
"Sequestration" is a process of automatic, largely across-the-board spending reductions to meet or enforce certain budget policy goals. It was first established by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA, Title II of P.L. Readers also may wish to consult the following CRS reports:
CRS Report R41965, The Budget Control Act of 2011 , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R42949, The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012: Modifications to the Budget Enforcement Procedures in the Budget Control Act , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R42972, Sequestration as a Budget Enforcement Process: Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R42675, The Budget Control Act of 2011: Budgetary Effects of Proposals to Replace the FY2013 Sequester , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R42051, Budget Control Act: Potential Impact of Sequestration on Health Reform Spending , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R42994, The Budget Control Act, Sequestration, and the Foreign Affairs Budget: Background and Possible Impacts , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43021, Proposed Cuts to Air Traffic Control Towers Under Budget Sequestration: Background and Considerations for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43065, Sequestration at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): Air Traffic Controller Furloughs and Congressional Response , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R42506, The Budget Control Act of 2011: The Effects on Spending and the Budget Deficit , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R41157, The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010: Summary and Legislative History , by [author name scrubbed]
Sequestration Triggers Under the Budget Control Act (BCA)
The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) was enacted on August 2, 2011. The BCA has two primary components that can trigger a sequestration of discretionary and/or mandatory (or direct) spending:
Title I of the BCA established discretionary spending limits, or caps, for each of FY2012-FY2021. If Congress appropriates more than allowed under these spending limits in any given year, the automatic reduction process of sequestration would cancel the excess amount. Failure by Congress to enact legislation by January 15, 2012, developed by the Joint Committee and reducing the deficit by at least $1.2 trillion, would trigger a series of automatic spending reductions intended to achieve that level of savings over the FY2013-FY2021 period. These automatic reductions include sequestration of mandatory spending for each of FY2013-FY2021, a one-year sequestration of discretionary spending for FY2013, and lower discretionary spending limits for each of FY2014-FY2021. Because the Joint Committee did not, in fact, develop legislation to achieve the specified level of deficit reduction ($1.2 trillion) by the deadline set in the BCA, and Congress did not subsequently enact such legislation by January 15, 2012, the automatic budget enforcement procedures provided by the law were triggered. 112-240 ). Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Calculation of March 2013 Sequestration
On March 1, 2013, President Obama signed the sequestration order triggered by failure of the Joint Committee process under the BCA, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a report containing the percentages by which budgetary resources must be reduced in order to achieve the necessary spending reductions in FY2013. 111-139 . The act requires various scorekeeping procedures, including 5-year and 10-year scorecards that track costs and savings associated with enacted legislation. At the end of each congressional session, OMB generally must determine whether the net effect of direct spending and revenue legislation enacted during the session has increased the deficit, and if so, a sequestration will be triggered. Program Exemptions and Special Rules for Sequestration
Certain programs are exempt from sequestration, and special rules govern the sequestration of others. For the most part, these provisions are found in Sections 255 and 256 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (BBEDCA), as amended. These provisions apply to sequestration orders that occur under either the BCA or the Statutory PAYGO Act. Most are mandatory, although a few are discretionary, most notably programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Payments to individuals in the form of refundable tax credits. At the President's discretion (subject to notification to Congress), military personnel accounts may be exempt entirely, or a lower sequestration percentage may apply. Most Section 256 special rules apply to mandatory programs, although some discretionary programs are included (e.g., certain health programs). However, Section 255 of BBEDCA, as amended in 2010 ( P.L. As an example, while Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is exempt from sequestration, the federal administrative expenses associated with this program would generally not be exempt. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (12–3505–0–1–605). Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (75–1552–0–1–609). 256. | "Sequestration" is a process of automatic, largely across-the-board spending reductions under which budgetary resources are permanently canceled to enforce certain budget policy goals. It was first authorized by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA, Title II of P.L. 99-177, commonly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).
Sequestration is of current interest because it has been triggered as an enforcement tool under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA, P.L. 112-25). Sequestration can also occur under the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Statutory PAYGO, Title I of P.L. 111-139). In either case, certain programs are exempt from sequestration, and special rules govern the effects of sequestration on others. Most of these provisions are found in Sections 255 and 256 of BBEDCA, as amended.
Two provisions were included in the BCA that can result in automatic sequestration:
Establishment of discretionary spending limits, or caps, for each of FY2012-FY2021. If Congress appropriates more than allowed under these limits in any given year, sequestration would cancel the excess amount. Failure of Congress to enact legislation developed by a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, by January 15, 2012, to reduce the deficit by at least $1.2 trillion. The BCA provided that such failure would trigger a series of automatic spending reductions, including sequestration of mandatory spending in each of FY2013-FY2021, a one-year sequestration of discretionary spending for FY2013, and lower discretionary spending limits for each of FY2014-FY2021.
In fact, the Joint Committee did not develop the necessary legislation and Congress did not meet the January 15, 2012, deadline. Thus, automatic spending cuts under the BCA were triggered, with the first originally scheduled for January 2, 2013. P.L. 112-240 subsequently delayed this until March 1, 2013, and President Obama signed a sequestration order on that date.
Under the Statutory PAYGO Act, sequestration is part of a budget enforcement mechanism that is intended to prevent enactment of mandatory spending and revenue legislation that would increase the federal deficit. This act requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to track costs and savings associated with enacted legislation and to determine at the end of each congressional session if net total costs exceed net total savings. If so, a sequestration will be triggered.
Under sequestration—triggered either by the BCA or Statutory PAYGO Act—the exemptions and special rules of Sections 255 and 256 of BBEDCA apply. Most exempt programs are mandatory, and include Social Security and Medicaid; refundable tax credits to individuals; and low-income programs such as the Children's Health Insurance Program, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and Supplemental Security Income. Some discretionary programs also are exempt, notably all programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs. Also, subject to notification of Congress by the President, military personnel accounts may either be exempt or reduced by a lower percentage.
Special rules also apply to several, primarily mandatory, programs. For example, under Section 256 of BBEDCA, Medicare may not be sequestered by more than 4%. However, under a BCA- triggered sequester, reduction of Medicare is limited to no more than 2%. |
crs_R42506 | crs_R42506_0 | F ollowing a lengthy debate over raising the debt limit, the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25 ) was signed into law by President Obama on August 2, 2011. In addition to including a mechanism to increase the debt limit, the BCA contained measures intended to reduce the budget deficit through spending restrictions. Combined, these measures were projected to reduce the deficit by roughly $2 trillion over the FY2012-FY2021 period. The spending reductions in the BCA are achieved mainly through two mechanisms: (1) statutory discretionary spending caps covering 10 years that came into effect in 2012 and (2) a $1.2 trillion automatic spending reduction process (sometimes referred to as the "sequester") covering nine years that was initially scheduled to come into effect on January 2, 2013. 112-240 ) postponed the start of the FY2013 spending reductions, commonly known as the sequester, until March 1, 2013, and canceled the first two months of spending cuts. 113-67 ) raised the caps under the BCA on defense and non-defense discretionary spending in FY2014 and FY2015, and extended BCA mandatory sequestration through FY2023. 114-74 ) raised the discretionary spending caps in FY2016 and FY2017, and further extended mandatory sequestration. This report discusses the effects of the BCA on spending and the deficit, assuming that the automatic spending reductions proceed as scheduled from FY2016 to FY2021 and the discretionary spending caps remain in place. In FY2015, the deficit totaled 2.4% of GDP, or 7.4 percentage points below its peak in 2009. Legislative Changes to the BCA
Since the enactment of the BCA, its spending reductions have been modified by three pieces of legislation, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013), and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015). BCA Spending Cuts Relative to a Baseline Projection
For FY2012 to FY2021, discretionary and mandatory spending under the BCA as amended by ATRA, BBA 2013, and BBA2015 is projected to be reduced relative to baseline levels. The amount of the cuts to mandatory spending is lower than those to discretionary spending because much of mandatory spending is exempt from the BCA's automatic cuts and mandatory spending is not subject to caps similar to those implemented for discretionary spending. Because those categories of spending are effectively exempt from the caps, it is possible that the trend of growth in overall discretionary spending (spending subject to the cap plus exempt spending) could turn out to be higher than growth in discretionary spending subject to the BCA caps in future years, even if there is strict compliance with the caps. From FY2011 to FY2015, discretionary budget authority subject to the caps fell in real terms each year. Discretionary spending is forecasted to rise by 5.1% on a nominal basis and 3.7% in real terms in FY2016, and fall by 1.4% in real terms (though rise by 0.5% on nominal terms) in FY2017. Since the BCA caps nominal spending, whether real spending increases or decreases from FY2016 to FY2021 will be highly sensitive to the inflation rate. The decline in spending subject to the caps in FY2013 follows a nominal decline in FY2011 and a nominal increase in FY2012 that was less than the rate of inflation (resulting in a decline in real terms). Discretionary spending over the FY1962-FY2011 period averaged 9.1% of GDP. In 2018, discretionary spending under the baseline would reach its lowest share of GDP since data were first available, at 5.9% of GDP, and would continue to decline thereafter. It is projected to increase from $2.0 trillion (12.9% of GDP) in FY2015 to $3.9 trillion (14.1% of GDP) in FY2021. In FY2021, total spending is projected to equal 21.3% of GDP. The legislation that increased the deficit the most relative to current law was ATRA. | Following a lengthy debate over raising the debt limit, the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) was signed into law by President Obama on August 2, 2011. In addition to including a mechanism to increase the debt limit, the BCA contained a variety of measures intended to reduce the budget deficit through spending restrictions. There are two main components to the spending reductions in the BCA: (1) discretionary spending caps that came into effect in FY2012 and (2) a $1.2 trillion automatic spending reduction process that was initially scheduled to come into effect on January 2, 2013. Combined, these measures were projected to reduce the deficit by roughly $2 trillion over the FY2012-FY2021 period. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240) reduced and postponed the start of the FY2013 spending reductions, commonly known as the sequester, until March 1, 2013. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P.L. 113-67) increased the discretionary spending caps in FY2014 and FY2015 and extended mandatory sequestration through FY2023. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74) raised the discretionary spending caps in FY2016 and FY2017, and further extended mandatory sequestration.
Congress has debated whether to maintain scheduled spending cuts in future years. To inform that debate, this report discusses the effects of the BCA as amended on spending and the deficit, assuming that the discretionary spending caps remain in place. From FY2012 to FY2021, the BCA is projected to cut discretionary spending by $1.5 trillion. Discretionary spending subject to the caps was 4.3% lower on a nominal basis and 9.7% lower on a real (inflation-adjusted) basis than in FY2011, the year before BCA discretionary caps were established. Real discretionary spending subject to the caps is projected to remain relatively constant from FY2016 to FY2021, with real growth projected to be 1.0% in that time period. Total discretionary spending (which includes discretionary outlays not subject to the BCA caps) under the BCA was 13.7% lower on a nominal basis and 18.6% lower on a real basis in FY2015 than it was in FY2011. The current budget outlook projects that real spending in FY2021 will be 3.9% lower than that in FY2015.
The BCA imposes smaller reductions to mandatory outlays. Mandatory spending under the BCA is cut by less than $0.2 trillion from FY2012 to FY2021, with most non-Medicare mandatory spending exempted from spending cuts. Mandatory spending accounted for 66% of spending in FY2015, but received only 16% of the sequester cuts. Total mandatory spending from FY2011 to FY2015 increased by 13.4% on a nominal basis and 7.0% in real terms. The rise in mandatory spending is projected to accelerate in the latest budget outlook, as mandatory spending in FY2021 is forecasted to be 49.9% higher in FY2021 (67.7% on a real basis) than it was in FY2015.
Under the BCA, discretionary spending is projected to average 6.4% of GDP from FY2012 to FY2021, a notable decline from the 9.1% of GDP average from FY1962 to FY2011. From FY2018 on, overall discretionary spending would be below its lowest share of GDP since data were first collected in 1962 (6.0% of GDP), assuming current levels of uncapped discretionary spending. However, because projected growth in mandatory spending, total federal spending from FY2012 to FY2021 is projected to average 21.0% of GDP, which is lower than its peak of 24.4% in FY2012 but above the post-World War II average.
Although the BCA reduced projected deficits, its savings has been mitigated by subsequent legislation that has increased current law deficits since the BCA was enacted. Altogether, legislative changes since August 2011 have increased the deficit by $1.5 trillion from FY2012 to FY2021. As a result, the federal debt is projected to continue to increase relative to GDP in future years. |
crs_R40787 | crs_R40787_0 | Introduction
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) provides for the listing and protection of species that are endangered or threatened with extinction. Listing a species results in limitations on activities that could affect that species and in penalties for the taking (as defined in the ESA) of individuals of a listed species. The exemption process and its history are the subject of this report. Federal agencies are required to consult with either the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (together, the Services ) to determine whether an agency project might jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or destroy or adversely modify a species' critical habitat. This process is known as consultation . When a federal action cannot be conducted without jeopardizing species, and the federal agency believes that the RPAs would thwart the project, the federal agency, the governor of the state where the project would occur, or the licensees or permittees involved in the project may seek an exemption. Very rarely, the Service(s) may find that jeopardy would occur and that there is no RPA that would avoid jeopardy. However, an exemption is for a federal project, license, or action, rather than for a species—a key distinction. In addition, in the controversy over California water projects, there were proposals in the mid - and late-2000s to seek an exemption from the ESA. Tellico Dam and the Creation of the Exemption Process
The controversy over Tellico Dam in Tennessee in the 1970s set the stage for Congress's creation of the exemption process. The term permit or license applicant is defined in the ESA as a person whose application to a federal agency for a permit or license has been denied primarily because of the application of the prohibitions in Section 7(a), which requires that federal agency actions avoid jeopardy or destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat. It also allows a project to be halted before any harm to listed species or their habitats occurs. By law, the Secretary's report must discuss the following:
the availability of reasonable and prudent alternatives; the nature and extent of the benefits of the agency action; the nature and extent of alternative actions consistent with conserving the species or the critical habitat; a summary of whether the action is in the public interest and is nationally or regionally significant; appropriate reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures that should be considered by the ESC; and whether the applicant has made any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources. The ESC shall grant an exemption if, based on the evidence, it determines that
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat, and such action is in the public interest;
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance; and
(iv) neither the Federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant made any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources prohibited in subsection (d) of this section. The ESA expressly states that the penalties that would normally apply to the taking of an endangered or threatened species do not apply to takings resulting from actions that are exempted. These cautions may help explain why the exemption process has rarely been invoked in any recent case. Second, it applied for an exemption under ESA for its discharge permit. | The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is designed to protect species from extinction, but it includes an exemption process for those unusual cases where the public benefit from an action is determined to outweigh the harm to the species. This process was created by a 1978 amendment to the ESA, but it is rarely used. This report will discuss the exemption process for an agency action, with examples from past controversies, and its potential for application to actions that may affect current controversies, such as water supply.
The ESA mandates listing and protecting species that are endangered or threatened with extinction. Listing a species limits activities that could affect that species and provides penalties for taking individuals of that species. The ESA also requires federal agencies to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service (together, the Services) to determine whether a federal action may jeopardize the continued existence of a species or harm its critical habitat. The consultation process may lead to an opinion by one of the Services that the action will jeopardize listed species or harm their critical habitats unless certain reasonable and prudent alternatives are included in the action.
Rarely, the federal action agency may hold that those alternatives are inconsistent with the agency action. In other extremely rare cases, the Services may find that no alternatives are available that would allow the project to proceed and still prevent jeopardy. In either case, the following are the categories of potential applicants that can apply for an exemption for a federal action despite its effects on listed species or their critical habitat:
the federal action agency interested in proceeding with the action, an applicant for a federal license or permit whose application was denied primarily because of the prohibitions of ESA requiring that federal agency actions avoid jeopardy to threatened or endangered species or harm to their critical habitats, or the governor of the state where the action was to have occurred.
An exemption application is considered by a specially convened committee which may exempt the federal agency's action from the prohibitions of the ESA. The exemption process allows major economic factors to be judged to outweigh the ESA's mandate to recover a species when the federal action is found to be in the public interest and is nationally or regionally significant.
The exemption process has been invoked with a dam on the Tellico River (TN), a water project in the Platt River (WY and NE), and timber sales (OR). In three other instances, the process was begun but was aborted before a decision was reached. In addition, there has been interest over the years in invoking the process in light of controversies over management of federal and state water resource projects in California, although no application has ever been filed. When a project achieves such levels of controversy, Congress is sometimes asked to intervene in the outcome, as it did in the case of the Tellico Dam and an endangered fish in the late 1970s. |
crs_R42930 | crs_R42930_0 | These issues raise a series of challenges for Congress, including broad oversight of the Obama Administration's policies in Asia, decisions about military priorities and resources in and around disputed areas, how deeply to support the development of military capabilities of disputant nations, and how to manage relations with parties involved in the disputes, particularly China, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, which have been involved in increasingly frequent maritime incidents in the East China Sea and South China Sea. Although the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not the only nation that has sought to press its maritime territorial claims, actions taken by PRC actors, including China's maritime law enforcement authorities and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), have been a particular concern. The former include the competing claims by China, Japan, and Taiwan over a set of Japanese-controlled islets called the Senkakus by Japan, the Diaoyu Islands by China, and the Diaoyutai Islands by Taiwan. Other disputes involve Japan and South Korea in the Sea of Japan, and China and South Korea in the Yellow Sea. However, U.S. government officials regularly voice U.S. opposition to the use of force, threat, or coercion by nations seeking to strengthen sovereignty claims over landmasses, and support for the use of customary international law and available arbitration mechanisms to resolve disputes peacefully. They have become one of the most challenging aspects of U.S. policy in Asia, touching on the management of treaty alliances, particularly those with Japan and the Philippines, where treaty obligations could be invoked if either country becomes involved in an active conflict with another of the claimants (for more, see the " Treaty Obligations " section below), and on the Obama Administration's efforts to help Asian nations build regional "rules and norms" that foster stability. Long-standing U.S. policy holds that the United States has no territorial claims in the region and does not take a position on any of the specific sovereignty disputes, but that it supports freedom of navigation in these waters and opposes the use of coercion, intimidation, threats, or force by claimants trying to assert their territorial claims. It has voiced particular support for discussions between China and ASEAN over a Code of Conduct for disputants in the region. Congress may choose to examine the rebalancing towards Asia and its implications for relations between China and other claimant nations. For example, Congress inserted in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 167 ("Reaffirming the strong support of the United States for the peaceful resolution of territorial, sovereignty, and jurisdictional disputes in the Asia-Pacific maritime domains. "), which has been referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. H.R. It has been referred to both the House Armed Services Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee. The Senate also could offer its advice and consent to U.S. adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which went into force in 1994 and is widely considered the governing regime for oceans and the primary (though not the only) venue for making maritime territorial claims and adjudicating maritime territorial disputes. In March 2012, the commander of a PLA Navy submarine base discussed the South China Sea as China's "maritime national territory" and called the nine-dash line China's "intermittent national boundary in the South China Sea," while stating that actions to assert China's jurisdiction were needed to support the marking of the national boundary. There are, however, some examples of exploration and development that have taken place in disputed areas. The frequency of Chinese maritime patrols in these waters has increased. U.S. Indonesian Ambassador to the United States Dino Djalal, for instance, said at a 2011 conference in Washington, DC, that given the priority the United States has placed on maritime security in East Asia, becoming a party to UNCLOS "has become a matter of strategic necessity—I repeat, strategic necessity, for the United States…"
On the broadest level, becoming a party to the Convention would give the United States a seat at the table at UNCLOS bodies, and give it the opportunity to influence experts from other nations in consideration of issues before the Convention. Selected Legislation on Asian Maritime Disputes in the 112th and 113th Congresses
In the 113 th Congress, on July 27, 2013, the Senate passed one resolution ( S.Res. Senator Menendez introduced another resolution ( S.Res. In November 2012, the Senate unanimously accepted an amendment introduced by Senator Webb to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 ( S. 1253 ) that expressed the sense of the Senate regarding the East China Sea disputes, calling for parties to refrain from coercion and stating that the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers areas under Japanese administration, such as the Senkakus. 4310 / P.L. 112-239 ). | Rising tensions stemming from maritime territorial disputes in East Asia have become a pressing challenge for U.S. policy makers, and pose one of the most complicated issues for the Obama Administration's policy of strategic "rebalancing" towards the Asia-Pacific.
Since around 2005-2006, long-disputed waters and land features in the South China Sea and, more recently, the East China Sea have seen increasingly aggressive behavior from nations trying to strengthen claims to disputed areas. Although China is not the only nation that has sought to press its maritime territorial claims, actions taken by People's Republic of China (PRC) actors, including its maritime law enforcement authorities and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), have been a particular concern. Chinese maritime authorities have taken actions include harassing vessels, destroying equipment, and blockading islets and shoals. Observers are concerned that the increasing frequency of such events raises the possibility of miscalculations that could lead to overt conflict at sea.
In the South China Sea, the PRC makes extensive claims, including marking on its maps an ambiguous "nine dash line" that covers approximately 80% of the sea, including the Spratly and Paracel island groups and other features such as Scarborough Shoal. These claims overlap with those of four Southeast Asian nations—Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, which themselves have claims that conflict with each other. Taiwan also makes extensive claims mirroring those of the PRC. In the East China Sea, China, Japan, and Taiwan all claim a Japan-administered island group that Japan calls the Senkakus, China the Diaoyu Islands, and Taiwan the Diaoyutai Islands. Other territorial disputes exist between Japan and South Korea in the Sea of Japan, and between China and South Korea in the Yellow Sea.
Although the United States has no territorial claim in these waters and does not take a position on the various sovereignty disputes, it is long-standing U.S. policy to oppose the use of force, threat, or coercion to promote sovereignty claims, and to support the use of international law, including arbitration mechanisms, to resolve disputes peacefully.
The ability of the disputing countries, and of the United States and other parties, to manage tensions touches on numerous U.S. interests including
maintaining peace and stability among maritime nations in the Asia-Pacific; protecting free and unimpeded lawful commerce along some of the world's busiest maritime trade routes; protecting the U.S. Navy's ability to operate in these areas; managing U.S. treaty alliances with nations involved in the disputes; encouraging rules-based regional norms that discourage coercion or the use of force; and avoiding intimidation of U.S. companies that may seek to operate in the region.
The 113th Congress has held several hearings on the issues surrounding maritime disputes in East Asia. In 2013, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution (S.Res. 167) which expressed strong support of the United States for the peaceful resolution of territorial, sovereignty, and jurisdictional disputes in the Asia-Pacific maritime domains. In the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310/P.L. 112-239), Congress stated its position that the Senkakus are administered by Japan, and that no acts of other nations will change their status. Another resolution, S.Res. 412, has been referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the House, H.R. 4495 has been referred to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
There are other issues relating to East Asian maritime disputes that the 113th Congress may choose to address. The Senate may consider offering its advice and consent on the United States becoming a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Congress also may choose to examine the economic and security implications of a greater U.S. military presence in disputed areas, or the merits of providing additional resources to Southeast Asian nations to monitor and police their maritime domains. It also may choose to support efforts to lower tensions, including discussions between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on a Code of Conduct for parties in the South China Sea. |
crs_RL33830 | crs_RL33830_0 | Constitutional Amendment
The most often-introduced proposal for voting rights has taken the form of a constitutional amendment. 56) granting voting representation in Congress to District residents, but did not vote on the measures. (See discussion of Virginia retrocession later in this report.) Also, in 1965, the House District of Columbia Committee reported H.R. It would have made the following changes:
treat District residents as Maryland voters for the purpose of federal elections, thus allowing District voters to participate in the election of Maryland's delegation to the House and Senate; allow District residents to run for congressional and senatorial seats in Maryland; increased the size of the House by two additional members until reapportionment following the 2010 decennial census; classify the District as a unit of local government for the purpose of federal elections and subject to Maryland election laws; give one House seat to Maryland and require most, if not all, of the city to be designated a single congressional district, as population permits; direct the clerk of the House to notify the governor of the other state, mostly likely Utah, that it is entitled to a seat based on the apportionment report submitted to the Congress by the President in 2001; repeal the 23 rd Amendment, which allows the District to cast three electoral votes in presidential elections; and allow citizens in the District to vote as Maryland residents in elections for President and Vice President. 4208 , a bill providing full voting representation in Congress for the District of Columbia. The measure suggested that Congress might provide voting representation by statute, a constitutionally untested proposition. 2043 ) that would have provided voting representation to the citizens of the District of Columbia by eschewing methods used in the past such as a constitutional amendment, retrocession, semi-retrocession and statehood. 157
On January 6, 2009, Delegate Norton introduced H.R. 157 , the District of Columbia Voting Rights Act of 2009, a measure identical to a bill, H.R. 157 , as introduced, would:
permanently increase the number of Members in the House of Representatives from 435 to 437 starting with the 111 th Congress (provision was changed to 112 th Congress during Committee consideration of the bill); designate the District of Columbia a congressional district for purposes of voting representation in the House; limit the District to no more than one representative in the House, (this provision was eliminated during Committee consideration of the bill); and require that one of the two additional seats be occupied by a Representative of the District of Columbia; the other would be temporarily elected at large from the state of Utah based on the 2000 decennial census and would remain in place until the 2012 apportionment process. By a vote of 20-12, the House Judiciary Committee marked up and approved an amended version of H.R. 157 on February 25, 2009. S. 160
The Senate bill, S. 160 , which was introduced on January 6, 2009, was reported by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on February 12, 2009 and approved by the full Senate on February 26, 2009. In addition, the bill includes amendments unrelated to voting rights for the District. The second, and more controversial provision would repeal provisions of the District's gun control law. 1, Sec. 2, of the Constitution which conveys voting rights to representatives of the several states. 1, Sec. A full analysis of these legal arguments can be found at CRS Report RL33824, The Constitutionality of Awarding the Delegate for the District of Columbia a Vote in the House of Representatives or the Committee of the Whole , by [author name scrubbed]. | This report provides a summary and analysis of legislative proposals that would provide voting representation in Congress to residents of the District of Columbia. Since the issue of voting representation for District residents was first broached in 1801, Congress has considered five legislative options: (1) seek voting rights in Congress by constitutional amendment, (2) retrocede the District to Maryland (retrocession), (3) allow District residents to vote in Maryland for their representatives to the House and Senate (semi-retrocession), (4) grant the District statehood, and (5) define the District as a congressional district for the purpose of voting representation in the House of Representatives.
On January 6, 2009, the non-voting delegate for the District of Columbia, Eleanor Holmes Norton, introduced H.R. 157, the District of Columbia Voting Rights Act of 2009, a bill that would permanently increase the size of the House from 435 to 437 Members and provide voting representation to the District and the state most likely to gain an additional representative, Utah. Weeks later, on January 23, 2009, Representative Dana Rohrabacher introduced H.R. 665, a bill that would provide voting rights to District citizens by retroceding the District of Columbia to Maryland. Also on January 6, Senator Lieberman introduced S. 160, a related bill of the same title as H.R. 157. The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee reported S. 160 on February 12, 2009. The House Judiciary Committee reported an amended version of H.R. 157 on February 25, 2009, by a vote of 20-12. A provision amending the city's gun control laws was introduced during Committee markup of the bill, but was withdrawn before a vote. The full Senate passed the bill on February 26, 2009, by a vote of 61-37. The Senate bill includes a controversial provision unrelated to voting rights that would amend the District's gun control laws.
These proposals would grant voting representation by statute, eschewing the constitutional amendment process and statehood option. Any proposal considered by Congress faces three distinct challenges. It must (1) address issues raised by Article 1, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, which limits voting representation to states; (2) provide for the continued existence of the District of Columbia as the "Seat of Government of the United States" (Article 1, Sec. 8); and (3) consider its impact on the 23rd Amendment to the Constitution, which grants three electoral votes to the District of Columbia. For a discussion of constitutional issues of proposed legislation, see CRS Report RL33824, The Constitutionality of Awarding the Delegate for the District of Columbia a Vote in the House of Representatives or the Committee of the Whole, by [author name scrubbed].
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44514 | crs_R44514_0 | Introduction
The issue of whether or not to allow video cameras into the courtroom has been discussed and debated by Members of Congress, the legal community, journalists, and the public since the introduction of newsreel films in the early 20 th century. Most state courts, and several international supreme courts, allow video cameras to record and televise, or otherwise broadcast, their proceedings under certain circumstances. Although the U.S. Supreme Court does not allow cameras of any sort in its chamber, a few federal circuit and district courts do allow video recording of their proceedings, and the Judicial Conference of the United States continues to consider expanding the use of cameras in the lower federal courts. In this context, Members of Congress have introduced measures to enable, or expand, the use of video cameras in the federal courts. The following sections of this report provide
information about the current judicial policies and attitudes related to video camera use in the U.S. Supreme Court, federal circuit courts, and federal district courts; summaries of the major debates and considerations for policymakers on the subject of courtroom cameras, including the appropriateness of congressional action, standards for public and media access to the courts, and potential effects on courtroom proceedings; descriptions of the four legislative proposals currently before the 114 th Congress, including the Cameras in the Courtroom Act ( H.R. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits photography in and radio broadcasting from lower federal courtrooms during criminal cases, and, in 1948, Congress passed legislation that applied its provisions to the federal courts. The use of video cameras in civil proceedings has increased since the 1990s, but most of the lower federal courts still do not allow cameras to record or broadcast from the courtroom, nor have they expanded camera coverage of criminal proceedings. In September 2010, the Judicial Conference authorized a second pilot program to study cameras in the courtroom. This pilot program began in July 2011 and concluded in July 2015, with fourteen federal district courts participating. In turn, all courts may become more consistent in their interpretations of past case precedents and become more uniform in how subsequent decisions are made. Although they are public figures, many federal judges and even Supreme Court Justices are not widely recognized. As a result of the concerns addressed above, some believe that adding cameras to the courtroom might change the way in which cases are argued and decided. 1381 ) was introduced in the House on March 16, 2015. Recent actions taken by the courts, such as the Supreme Court's measures to improve the timely release of audio recordings and the Judicial Conference's 2011-2015 pilot program on cameras in the courtroom, may suggest that the courts themselves may be inclined to take measures to improve access to their proceedings. Concluding Observations
International, state, and local courts have expanded the use of video cameras to record and/or broadcast their proceedings over the last 20 years, and the federal judiciary has experimented with video cameras in the federal circuit and district courts as well. | Members of Congress, along with the legal community, journalists, and the public, have long considered the potential merits and drawbacks of using video cameras to record and/or broadcast courtroom proceedings. The first bill to propose video camera use in the federal courts was introduced in the House of Representatives in 1937, and since the mid-1990s, Members of Congress in both chambers have regularly introduced bills to expand the use of cameras in the federal courts and have sometimes held hearings on the subject.
Video cameras are commonly used in state and local courtrooms throughout the United States to record and broadcast proceedings. All 50 state supreme courts in the United States allow video cameras under certain conditions, and cameras are allowed in many states for trial and appellate proceedings. Yet video cameras are not widely used in federal circuit and district courts, and they are not used at all in the Supreme Court. While Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has banned photography and broadcasting of any federal criminal proceedings since 1946, the Judicial Conference of the United States conducted pilot programs from 1991 to 1994 and from 2011 to 2015 to study the use of video cameras in federal courtrooms in civil proceedings. As a result of their participation in these pilot programs, two federal circuit courts and 14 federal district courts presently allow video cameras in their courtrooms under certain circumstances.
Yet even as the use of cameras in courts has become more widespread during the past few decades, many of the fundamental questions about the use of video cameras in the courts remain relatively unchanged.
The debate regarding video cameras in federal courtrooms revolves around these and other issues:
the appropriate degree of congressional involvement in matters related to the operation of the federal judiciary; the degree of access the public and media should have to the federal courts; the advantages and disadvantages of additional judicial transparency; the potential effects of cameras in the courtroom on ensuring a fair trial and protecting participants' privacy; and the possible ways in which cameras may alter the way courts conduct business and affect judicial integrity.
Addressing these issues often involves balancing one consideration against another. For example, protections to make sure the accused receives a fair trial might lead to more restricted public or media access to the courts.
Generally, while Congress may legislate in this area, to date, considerable deference has been given to the Supreme Court Justices and other officials within the federal judiciary in determining if and how video recording and broadcasting should be implemented in the federal courts. A study based on the Judicial Conference's 2011-2015 pilot program is expected later this year and may alter considerations in this policy debate. |
crs_R41242 | crs_R41242_0 | Introduction
Social Security benefits received before a person attains full retirement age (FRA) are subject to an actuarial reduction for early retirement and also may be reduced by the Social Security Retirement Earnings Test (RET) if the beneficiary has earnings that exceed an annual threshold. Under the RET, a beneficiary who is below FRA and will not attain FRA during the calendar year is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $2 of earnings above an annual exempt amount, which is $14,640 in 2012. This report explains how the RET is applied under current law and provides detailed benefit examples to show how the RET affects both the worker beneficiary and any family members (auxiliary beneficiaries) who receive benefits based on the worker beneficiary's record. Finally, the report discusses policy issues related to the RET, including recent research on the effect of the RET on work effort and the decision to claim Social Security benefits. Key points discussed in the report include the following:
Benefits may be reduced in part or in full for one or more months as a result of the RET. The RET annual exempt amounts in 2012 are $14,640 for beneficiaries who are below FRA and will not attain FRA in 2012, and $38,880 for beneficiaries who will attain FRA in 2012. First, benefits paid to spouses and dependents are affected by the RET when the benefits are based on the record of a worker beneficiary who is subject to the RET (i.e., the worker beneficiary is below FRA and has earnings above the exempt amount). For a spouse who has already attained FRA, there is no subsequent adjustment to benefits to take into account months for which no benefit or a partial benefit was paid as a result of the RET. Application of the Retirement Earnings Test
Table 2 illustrates the application of the RET to a single person who receives benefits based on his or her own work record. Because this worker beneficiary will attain FRA during the calendar year, he or she is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $3 of earnings above the annual exempt amount of $38,880 in 2012. If a partial benefit is payable for a given month, reflecting a reduction under the RET for that month that is less than the total family benefit, the partial benefit is pro-rated among family members. Claiming Social Security benefits before the FRA can reduce a worker's Social Security benefit amount in two ways, as noted earlier: (1) through the RET, although when the worker attains FRA his or her benefits are recomputed and a higher monthly benefit amount is payable starting at FRA; and (2) through the actuarial reduction for early retirement which, although it is intended to be actuarially fair to the individual over his or her expected lifetime, causes a permanent reduction to the worker's monthly Social Security benefit amount. Spousal benefits are not restored, however, when the RET is applied to the benefits of a spouse who is already at or above FRA. If a worker has benefits withheld under the RET and he or she dies before attaining FRA (when the worker's benefit would have been recomputed), for purposes of determining the limit on the widow(er)'s benefit, the worker's benefit is recomputed at the time of the worker's death to take into account months for which no benefit or a partial benefit was paid as a result of the RET. Therefore, the Social Security Administration's Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) estimates that elimination of the RET for individuals aged 62 or older would have no major effect on Social Security's projected long-range financial outlook. In the short run, however, OCACT estimates that elimination of the RET would have a negative effect on the Social Security trust fund in the amount of $81 billion from 2012 to 2018. | Under the Social Security Retirement Earnings Test (RET), the monthly benefit of a Social Security beneficiary who is below full retirement age (FRA) is reduced if he or she has earnings that exceed an annual threshold. In 2012, a beneficiary who is below FRA and will not attain FRA during the year is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $2 of earnings above $14,640. A beneficiary who will attain FRA in 2012 is subject to a $1 reduction in benefits for each $3 of earnings above $38,880. The annual exempt amounts ($14,640 and $38,880 in 2012) generally are adjusted each year according to average wage growth.
If a beneficiary is affected by the RET, his or her monthly benefit may be reduced in part or in full, depending on the total applicable reduction. For example, if the total applicable reduction is greater than the beneficiary's monthly benefit amount, no monthly benefit is payable for one or more months. If family members also receive auxiliary benefits based on the beneficiary's work record, the reduction is pro-rated and applied to all benefits payable on that work record (including benefits paid to spouses who are above FRA). For example, in the case of a family consisting of a worker beneficiary who has earnings above the annual exempt amount and a spouse and child who receive benefits based on his or her work record, the benefit reduction that applies under the RET is charged against the total family benefit.
The RET has been part of the Social Security program in some form throughout the program's history. The original rationale for the RET was that, as a social insurance system, Social Security protects workers from certain risks, including the loss of earnings due to retirement. Therefore, benefits should be withheld from workers who show by their earnings that they have not "retired." The RET does not apply to Social Security disability beneficiaries who are subject to separate limitations on earnings.
If a beneficiary is affected by the RET, his or her monthly benefit is recomputed, and the dollar amount of the monthly benefit is increased, when he or she attains FRA. This feature of the RET, which allows beneficiaries to recoup benefits "lost" as a result of the RET, is not widely known or understood. The benefit recomputation at FRA is done by adjusting (lessening) the actuarial reduction for retirement before FRA that was applied in the initial benefit computation to take into account months for which benefits were reduced in part or in full under the RET. Any spousal benefits that were reduced because of the RET are recomputed when the spouse attains FRA. For a spouse who has already attained FRA, however, there is no subsequent adjustment to benefits to take into account months for which no benefit or a partial benefit was paid as a result of the RET.
The Social Security Administration estimates that elimination of the RET for individuals aged 62 or older would have a negative effect on the Social Security trust fund in the amount of $81 billion from 2012 to 2018, although it would have no major effect on Social Security's projected long-range financial outlook.
This report explains how the RET works under current law. In addition, it provides benefit examples to illustrate the effect of the RET on Social Security beneficiaries who are below FRA and family members who receive benefits based on their work records. It also briefly discusses policy issues, including recent research on the effect of the RET on work effort and the decision to claim Social Security benefits. This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_RL33708 | crs_RL33708_0 | Introduction
Antitrust doctrine holds that robust competition will best protect consumers; it is concerned with the viability of individual competitors only insofar as their fates affect marketplace competitiveness. Although there are general prohibitions against monopolization and attempted monopolization in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, and a prohibition against "unfair acts" in commerce in section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, "monopoly" and "monopolist" are merely descriptive terms, used to illustrate a situation in which a single entity possesses effective control of the market in which it operates. Neither term implies anything about the lawfulness of the monopoly possessed: there is no concept of "no fault" monopolization in United States antitrust law. Monopoly and Monopolization
Although monopoly and monopolization are fundamental, and related, concepts in antitrust law, they are not synonymous. The Concept and Importance of "Relevant Market"
Whether a market entity is considered a monopolist, or whether it can be successfully charged with either having attempted to monopolize a market or actively monopolizing a market depends on the definition of the market in which it operates. Duty of Monopolist to Deal
In general
The basic antitrust truth, expressed in 1919 by the Supreme Court in United States v. Colgate & Co. , notwithstanding certain exceptions and attempts to circumscribe it, remains that an entity—even a monopolist—is free to deal or not deal with any other entity unless its actions constitute either "guilty behavior" or an attempt to expand its monopoly into a market adjacent to the one in which it may hold a lawful monopoly:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal; and, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell. "Essential facilities" doctrine
From almost the beginning of statutory antitrust law (the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890), the concept of the so-called "essential facilities" doctrine has been developing; courts have rather consistently held that a monopolist who controls an instrumentality that is crucial to the ability of a potential competitor to compete and which cannot be reasonably duplicated by the potential competitor must make that facility available to him. Verizon v. Trinko
Curtis Trinko challenged, as a violation of the antitrust laws, Verizon's failure to adequately share its network facilities with his provider of telecommunications service, as required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The duty to deal with actual or potential competitors of a lawful monopolist who has not been found to have engaged in some "guilty behavior" is generally governed by the Colgate doctrine, which gives market participants the right to choose their commercial relationships. In Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Trinko , however, the Supreme Court questioned the validity of the "essential facilities" doctrine in antitrust law—at least in the context of regulated entities. | Antitrust law does not mandate either that markets be competitive, or that they contain some predetermined number of participants/competitors; it is concerned, rather, with the operation of markets, on the assumption that a properly functioning market (i.e., one in which there is an opportunity for viable competition, and is not skewed by the predatory actions of participants), will best protect consumers. "Monopoly" and "monopolist" are, therefore, merely descriptive terms, used to illustrate situations in which a single entity (or group of entities) possesses effective control of the market in which it operates; neither term implies anything about the lawfulness of the monopoly possessed. "Monopolization," on the other hand, is the term used in antitrust law to characterize as unlawful a situation in which a monopolist—irrespective of whether his monopoly has been lawfully achieved—couples his monopoly status with behavior designed to unfairly exploit, maintain, or enhance his market position. Similarly, "attempted monopolization"connotes a situation in which an entity unlawfully or unfairly attempts to secure a market monopoly. The long-standing, judicially created Rule of Reason, which involves balancing an anticompetitive action with any procompetitive results, underscores those facts.
Whether a market participant who is a monopolist must deal with anyone who desires to deal with it continues to be largely governed by the so-called Colgate doctrine. In 1919, in United States v. Colgate & Co. (250 U.S. 300), the Supreme Court recognized the unfettered "right" of a private vendor "to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal ...." Colgate notwithstanding, the existence of an "essential facility" (i.e., a necessary component of a potential competitor's business and which is both unavailable from any source other than the alleged monopolist and cannot be reasonably duplicated), once established, has generally been thought to impose a duty to deal with the actual or potential competitors of even a lawful monopolist. The continuing viability of the so-called "essential facilities" doctrine, however, was called into question by the Supreme Court's 2004 ruling in Verizon v. Trinko (540 U.S. 398).
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) each operate on the assumption that the monopoly status of competitors is antitrust-relevant only insofar as their actions may impact the operation or competitiveness of markets.
This report—which explores the difference between monopoly and monopolization as those terms are used in antitrust law, and the differing enforcement consequences of each—will be updated if case law or legislation alters the concepts it discusses. It is based on several existing documents by the same author, including CRS Report RS20241, Monopoly and Monopolization - Fundamental But Separate Concepts in U.S. Antitrust Law; CRS Report RS21723, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Trinko: Telecommunications Consumers Cannot Use Antitrust Laws to Remedy Access Violations of Telecommunications Act; and Duty of a Monopolist to Deal, a general distribution memorandum. |
crs_R44617 | crs_R44617_0 | At its most basic level, corporate inversions are transactions in which a U.S. company changes its ownership structure so it now has a foreign parent. There are various ways in which this can be achieved. For more information on the types of inversions and potential tax savings, see CRS Report R43568, Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. In the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Congress added Section 7874 to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). In addition to limiting the tax benefits for the inverted company, Congress has also imposed an excise tax on certain corporate insiders who benefit from an inversion and limited the ability of inverted companies to be federal contractors (see Questions 13 and 14). In light of Section 7874, what is the current controversy about inversions? While Section 7874 shut down those types of inversions, recent media reports have brought attention to U.S. companies using inversions to relocate to Europe and Canada. Some argue that this treatment is appropriate because these inversions can be genuine cross-border mergers that are not solely motivated by tax reasons, but others disagree and see them as evidence that Section 7874 did not go far enough. In 2015, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) finalized regulations that primarily address the threshold for determining whether a company has "substantial business activities" in its home country when compared to its total business activities. Has legislation affecting inversions been introduced in the 114th Congress? For example, multiple bills have been introduced to (1) decrease Section 7874's 80% ownership threshold to 50% so that, if after the acquisition, at least 50% of the foreign parent's stock is held by former shareholders of the U.S. company, the foreign parent would be treated as a domestic corporation for U.S. tax purposes and subject to tax on its worldwide income; and (2) set a minimum floor of 25% for the "substantial business activity" standard in Section 7874 (the IRS would be authorized to increase the percentage). IRS's Authority to Regulate Corporate Inversions
9. As of the date of this report, there are no court decisions interpreting the scope of these authorities. How does Section 7874 interact with U.S. income tax treaties? Are there other tax consequences for corporate inversions? For more information, see CRS Report R43780, Contracting with Inverted Domestic Corporations: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. | In general, corporate inversions are transactions in which a U.S. corporation "inverts" its ownership structure so that it now has a foreign parent. There are various ways in which this can be achieved. Corporate inversions have been controversial because it appears, in at least some cases, the primary motivation is the reduction of U.S. income tax liability.
In 2004, Congress added Section 7874 to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), which significantly limits the tax benefits associated with corporate inversions. While Section 7874 appeared to slow the rate of inversions in the years immediately after its enactment, there have been reports of numerous high-profile inversions (or plans to invert) in recent years. In light of these reports, some have questioned whether Section 7874 should be amended to further limit the ability of inverted corporations to reduce their U.S. tax liability. Others, meanwhile, have argued that these recent inversions are fundamentally different than those that led Congress to enact Section 7874 because the recent inversions are more likely to have legitimate, non-tax business reasons associated with them. As such, some argue that Section 7874 has effectively shut down the types of inversions motivated solely by tax reasons and that to amend the law would risk affecting legitimate, cross-border mergers.
This report answers frequently asked legal questions about corporate inversions. It answers questions relating to the scope and operation of Section 7874, including how key statutory terms have been interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). It discusses important Department of Treasury regulations that were finalized in 2015 and 2016, and answers questions about the IRS's authority to issue these regulations. Other questions that are answered relate to legislation introduced in the 114th Congress, the interaction of Section 7874 with tax treaties, and the imposition of an excise tax on corporate insiders who benefit from an inversion.
This report only examines the federal tax consequences of corporate inversions. For a discussion of the federal contracting implications, see CRS Report R43780, Contracting with Inverted Domestic Corporations: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. For a discussion of the policy issues surrounding inversions, see CRS Report R43568, Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43324 | crs_R43324_0 | However, Indian tribes lost some of that authority by "ceding their lands to the United States and announcing their dependence on the Federal Government." Accordingly, in Oliphant v. Suquamish , the Supreme Court held that Indian tribes do not have inherent sovereign authority to try non-Indian criminal defendants, and in Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court announced the general rule for civil jurisdiction that "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe." Tribes may also exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers when Congress authorizes them to do so. Tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is more difficult to discern. Thus, it is not enough that the nonmember have a consensual relationship with a tribe or a tribal member. Threat to the Tribe's Integrity
The second Montana exception provides that tribes may exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers when the nonmember's conduct "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." It is not clear, however, if the power to exclude is independent of the Montana exceptions. Statutory Exceptions
In addition to exercising authority over nonmembers pursuant to their inherent sovereign authority, Indian tribes may exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers within reservations when Congress authorizes them to do so. Nonmembers Must First Challenge Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Tribal Court
Although tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers is quite limited, a nonmember defendant in tribal court who believes the court lacks jurisdiction must first challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction in tribal court. However, there are exceptions. First, Congress re-vested Indian tribes with inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, as well as non-Indians who commit dating and domestic violence against Indians within the tribes' jurisdictions, provided the non-Indian has certain enumerated ties to the tribes. Second, under the first Montana exception, tribes may exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers when the nonmembers have entered private consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, provided the conduct at issue relates to the consensual relationship. Fourth, tribes may exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers when Congress authorizes them to do so. | Indian tribes are quasi-sovereign entities that enjoy all the sovereign powers that are not divested by Congress or inconsistent with the tribes' dependence on the United States. As a general rule, this means that Indian tribes cannot exercise criminal or civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. There are two exceptions to this rule for criminal jurisdiction. First, tribes may exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Second, tribes may try non-Indians who commit dating and domestic violence crimes against Indians within the tribes' jurisdictions provided the non-Indians have sufficient ties to the tribes. There are three exceptions to this rule for civil jurisdiction. First, tribes may exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members. Second, tribes may exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers within a reservation when the nonmember's conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. These first two exceptions, enunciated in the case of Montana v. United States, are based on the tribes' inherent sovereignty, and exercises of jurisdiction under them must relate to a tribe's right to self-government. Third, Indian tribes may exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers when Congress authorizes them to do so. Congress may delegate federal authority to the tribes, or re-vest the tribes with inherent sovereign authority that they had lost previously. Indian tribes may also exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers under their power to exclude persons from tribal property. However, it is not clear whether the power to exclude is independent of the Montana exceptions.
The question of a tribe's jurisdiction over nonmembers can be very complex. It is fair to say, however, that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is quite limited. Tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is more extensive. Federal courts, however, consistently require nonmember defendants to challenge tribal court jurisdiction in tribal court before pursuing relief in federal court. |
crs_RL33780 | crs_RL33780_0 | Election recounts or challenges to congressional election results are thus initially conducted at the state level, including in the state courts, under the states' constitutional authority to administer federal elections, and are presented to the House of Representatives as the final judge of such elections. In Roudebush v. Hartke , the U.S. Supreme Court held that under this provision of the Constitution, the final determination of the right to a seat in Congress in an elections case is not reviewable by the courts because it is "a non-justiciable political question," and that each House of Congress in judging the elections of its own Members has the right under the Constitution to make "an unconditional and final judgment." In addition, the House has in the past, upon a challenge to the seating of a Member-elect, referred the question of the right to a seat in the House to the committee of jurisdiction (now the Committee on House Administration) for the committee to investigate and to report to the House for disposition. The FCEA, codified at 2 U.S.C. The contest under the FCEA is heard by the Committee on House Administration upon the record provided and established by the parties to the contest. After the contest is heard by the committee, the committee reports the results. Sections 381-396, sets forth procedures for contesting a seat in the House. Contents and Form of Notice
The FCEA requires that the notice of intention to contest "shall state with particularity the grounds upon which contestant contests the election," and shall state that an answer to the notice must be served upon the contestant within 30 days after service of the notice. Upon application by any party, a subpoena for attendance at a deposition and for the production of documents shall be issued by judges or clerks of the federal, state, and local courts of record. The record of the contested election case shall be composed of the papers, depositions, and exhibits filed with the Clerk of the House. A contested election procedure under the FCEA is directed at the question of who won the most votes and is "duly elected." It is not the proper vehicle to challenge the qualifications or eligibility of a Member-elect. An election contest brought under the FCEA to challenge a Member-elect's "qualifications" would most likely be subject to a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the contestant "to state grounds sufficient to change result of election," or a failure of contestant "to claim a right to contestee's seat." Challenges In the House Other than Under the Federal Contested Elections Act
Procedures To Bring Matter Before Committee
As noted earlier, although in modern practice the Federal Contested Elections Act is the primary and (according to the Committee on House Administration) the preferred procedure to challenge an election in the House of Representatives, the committee of jurisdiction—now the Committee on House Administration—may obtain jurisdiction of an election challenge by way of a referral to the committee by the House upon a challenge by any Member or Member-elect of the House to the taking of the oath of office by another Member-elect. Motions adopted in the committee may direct an examination and recount of disputed ballots. Remedies Available to the Committee on House Administration Under the FCEA and Otherwise
In the course of its investigation, the Committee on House Administration has a number of remedies available, including
a recommendation of dismissal upon a motion to dismiss by the contestee, a recommendation on the seating of a certain candidate on the grounds that he or she received a majority of the valid votes cast, a recommendation to seek a recount and to investigate any fraud or irregularities in the voting process in various precincts, a recommendation to order the seating of a certain candidate after the committee has conducted a recount and investigation, and a recommendation that the returns from the election be rejected and that the seat be declared vacant and a new election be held. | Under the U.S. Constitution, each House of Congress has the express authority to be the judge of the "elections and returns" of its own Members (Article I, Section 5, clause 1). Although initial challenges and recounts for House elections are conducted at the state level under the state's authority to administer federal elections (Article I, Section 4, cl. 1), continuing contests may be presented to the House, which may make a conclusive determination of a claim to the seat.
In modern practice, the primary way for an election challenge to be heard by the House is by a candidate-initiated contest under the Federal Contested Elections Act, (FCEA, codified at 2 U.S.C. §§381-396). Under the FCEA, the candidate challenging an election (the "contestant"), must file a notice of an intention to contest within 30 days of state certification of the election results, stating "with particularity" the grounds for contesting the election. The contestee then has 30 days after service of the notice to answer, admitting or denying the allegations, and setting forth any affirmative defenses. Before answering a notice, the contestee may make a motion to the Committee on House Administration for a "more definite statement," pointing out the "defects" and the "details desired." If this motion is granted by the committee, the contestant would have 10 days to comply. Under the FCEA, the "burden of proof" is on the contestant, who must overcome the presumption of the regularity of an election, and its results, evidenced by the certificate of election presented by the contestee. The FCEA's contested election procedure is directed at the question of who won the most votes and is "duly elected." It is not the proper vehicle to challenge the qualifications or eligibility of a Member-elect. Indeed, an election contest brought under the FCEA challenging a Member-elect's qualifications would likely be subject to a motion to dismiss based on the failure of the contestant "to state grounds sufficient to change result of election," or a failure of contestant "to claim a right to contestee's seat." In the FCEA's adversarial proceeding, either party may take sworn depositions, seek subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and production of documents, and file briefs to include any material they wish to put on the record. The FCEA specifies that the actual election contest "case" is heard by the committee, "on the papers, depositions and exhibits" filed by the parties, which "shall constitute the record of the case."
On less frequent occasions, the House may refer the question of the right to a House seat to the committee for it to investigate and report to the full House for disposition. In lieu of a record created by opposing parties, the committee may conduct its own investigation, take depositions, and issue subpoenas for witnesses and documents. Jurisdiction may be obtained in this manner from a challenge to the taking of the oath of office by a Member-elect, when the question of the final right to the seat is referred to the committee. In the past, committees investigating such questions have employed several investigative procedures, including impounding election records and ballots, conducting a recount, performing a physical examination of disputed ballots and registration documents, and interviewing and examining various election personnel in the state and locality.
Under either procedure, the committee will generally issue a report and file a resolution concerning the disposition of the case, to be approved by the full House. Specifically, the committee may recommend—and the House may approve by a simple majority vote—to affirm the right of the contestee to the seat, to seat the contestant, or to find that neither is entitled to be seated and declare a vacancy. |
crs_R42560 | crs_R42560_0 | What does Mexico's prominence in the U.S. migration system mean for U.S. immigration policy? On one hand, it means that U.S. immigration policy, to varying degrees, primarily affects Mexicans and Mexico. Today's Mexico-U.S. migration flows and the Mexico-born population in the United States are the product of previous immigration policy decisions, as well as of the long and complex history of the U.S. and Mexican economies, labor markets, and demographics. On the other hand, it also means that Mexico remains at the center of today's immigration debate, even if sometimes only implicitly. Recognizing Mexico's status within the U.S. migration system focuses attention on how the U.S. immigration debate affects Mexico, and on how Mexico may affect certain migration outcomes. This report begins with an overview of Mexico-U.S. migration flows, and reviews the history of migration policies in both countries. The last section of the report discusses four major issues in the U.S. immigration debate: migration control and border security, the lawful permanent resident (LPR) visa system, temporary worker programs, and potential legalization programs for certain unauthorized aliens. Does Mexico support U.S. immigration policy goals? Thus, legislative and administrative action during the last decade mainly has focused on new enforcement measures at the U.S.-Mexican border and within the United States; and a record number of unauthorized aliens have been removed in each year since 2003, with Mexicans accounting for almost three-quarters of all removals (see " Immigration Enforcement and Border Security "). History of Mexico-U.S. Migration and Policies
This section describes how social, economic, and demographic factors in Mexico and the United States along with migration-related policies in both countries have produced four phases in the regional migration system: limited seasonal flows prior to World War II, the Bracero temporary worker program from 1942 to 1964, the emergence of a predominantly illegal system from 1965 through the 1980s, and the consolidation of that system along with increased family-based immigration since the 1990s. Congress examined the issue for 15 years and then passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA, P.L. At the same time, immigration reforms sought to reduce low-skilled employment-based inflows. Beginning in the late 1990s, however, increasing migrant deaths along the U.S.-Mexico border, the precarious situation of unauthorized Mexican migrants in the United States, and attention to human rights abuses of Central Americans in Mexico led the Mexican government to take a more active approach to migration issues, including by reforming its own migration policy and by engaging with the United States about U.S. immigration policy. On average, the Mexican born in the United States are more likely than other foreign born to be unauthorized; and compared to other foreign-born and native-born populations in the United States, Mexicans are younger, have lower education levels, are more likely to work in lower-skilled occupations, and have lower measures of economic well-being. Mexico's status as the largest source of U.S. migrants and as a continental neighbor means that many U.S. policies primarily affect Mexicans. Under the agreement, announced on September 6, 2001, the two presidents outlined a bilateral approach to migration reform that would combine a new Mexico-U.S. guest worker program, legalization for most unauthorized Mexican migrants in the United States, enhanced border enforcement including steps by Mexico to discourage illegal outflows, and increased U.S. investment to create alternatives to emigration in Mexican migrant-sending communities. Immigration Enforcement and Border Security
Immigration enforcement and border security are at the heart of the immigration debate, including questions about how to prevent or deter illegal migration across the U.S.-Mexican border and the removal of unauthorized migrants and certain other aliens from within the United States. Mexico's Role in Migration Control
Given the large number of unauthorized Mexicans in the United States, some people believe that Mexico bears some responsibility for illegal flows and should play a greater role in migration control. One way to increase Mexico's role in migration enforcement may be for Congress to consider additional investments in these programs. Long waiting lists for people with approved petitions divide families, and may be a factor in the decision by some family members to migrate illegally. Mexicans were exempted from certain grounds for inadmissibility during World War I; Mexicans (and other Western Hemisphere immigrants) were not subject to numeric limits like Europeans and other Eastern Hemisphere immigrants after 1921; and Mexicans had privileged status under the Bracero program. Reducing Unauthorized Emigration from Mexico
Poverty and a lack of economic opportunities have been major drivers of Mexico-U.S. migration, and scholars have long suggested that fostering development in Mexico could reduce unauthorized migration flows. The size of the Mexican population in the United States, its demographic characteristics, and its increasing dispersion to new U.S. destinations all place Mexico at the center of the U.S. immigration debate; and the proportion of Mexicans who migrate to the United States also places migration issues at the center of the bilateral relationship. Many of the core issues in the U.S. immigration debate—including efforts to strengthen migration control and border security, possible reforms to the lawful permanent resident and nonimmigrant visa systems, and proposals to legalize certain unauthorized migrants—have important implications for both countries. In the long run, the future of the U.S.-Mexican migration relationship depends in great part on economic and demographic trends in both countries, and their impact on regional migration flows. | History and geography have given Mexico a unique status in the U.S. immigration system, and have made the Mexico-U.S. migration flow the largest in the world. Mexicans are the largest group of U.S. migrants across most types of immigration statuses—a fact that may have important implications for how Congress makes U.S. immigration policy. This report reviews the history of immigration policy and migration flows between the countries and the demographics of Mexicans within the United States. It also analyzes contemporary issues in U.S. immigration policy and the impact Mexico may have on U.S. immigration outcomes.
The U.S.-Mexican migration system has passed through four main phases since the early 20th century. Migration flows were limited and mainly short-term prior to the 1920s, and Mexicans were exempted from certain immigration restrictions and admitted as the first U.S. guest workers during World War I. The bilateral "Bracero" temporary worker program marked a second phase, with 4.6 million temporary visas issued to Mexican workers between 1942 and 1964. With the end of the Bracero program and other immigration reforms in 1965, along with social and economic changes in the United States and Mexico, the third stage was marked by growing illegal inflows, eventually leading Congress to pass the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Finally, despite a series of additional enforcement measures, the Mexican population in the United States doubled during each decade since 1970, with unauthorized migrants accounting for a majority of the growth, followed by legal family-based immigration.
Today, the Mexico-born population in the United States stands at about 11.7 million people. Compared to other migrants, the Mexican born in the United States are more likely to be unauthorized, be younger, have lower education levels, work in lower-skilled occupations, and have lower measures of economic well-being. In contrast with earlier periods and virtually all other migrants, Mexicans are now dispersed throughout all 50 U.S. states.
Given the size of the Mexico-born population in the United States and the 2,000-mile border shared between the two countries, Mexicans and Mexico are uniquely affected by U.S. immigration policies. Mexicans are the largest group of aliens subject to U.S. immigration control and border security policies, the largest group of lawful immigrants within permanent and temporary visa categories, and the majority of unauthorized migrants within the United States.
On one hand, Mexico's prominence in the U.S. migration system means that U.S. immigration policy, to varying degrees, primarily affects Mexicans and Mexico. Today's Mexico-U.S. migration flows and the Mexico-born population in the United States are the product of previous immigration policy decisions, as well as of the long and complex history of the U.S. and Mexican economies, labor markets, and demographics. On the other hand, Mexico also remains at the center of today's immigration debate, though often only implicitly. Recognizing Mexico's status within the U.S. migration system focuses attention on how the U.S. immigration debate affects Mexico, and on how Mexico may affect certain migration outcomes.
Mexico's role in the U.S. immigration system, along with the importance of the bilateral relationship to both countries, creates a number of opportunities, and challenges, as Congress weighs changes to U.S. immigration policy. First, Mexico already plays a key role in U.S. immigration enforcement and border security. The United States and Mexico share information about transnational threats, Mexico combats illegal migration by third country nationals, and Mexico supports certain U.S. enforcement efforts related to the repatriation of Mexican nationals. This report explores possibilities for additional bilateralism in these areas, including strategies to reduce recidivism among illegal migrants and to better manage U.S.-Mexican ports of entry.
Second, with respect to lawful permanent immigration, Mexico benefits from rules that favor family-based flows, but still dominates the waiting lists of people with approved immigration petitions for whom visas have not yet been made available. The analysis here focuses attention on recent proposals to reduce visa backlogs and on other reforms that could affect the number of immigrant visas for Mexico.
Third, Mexico dominates temporary visa categories for low-skilled workers, and an increasing number of Mexicans could also qualify for high-skilled worker visas. The report reviews previous experience with Mexico-specific temporary worker programs, which offer mixed lessons about managing flows this way.
Additional policy considerations concern potential legalization proposals and efforts to reduce unauthorized emigration from Mexico. Given the large number of unauthorized Mexican migrants in the United States, Mexico could play a role in a potential legalization program, including by providing information to verify migrants' identities and by facilitating proposed "touch-back" requirements. Finally, in the long run, economic development and employment creation in Mexico are widely viewed as being among the best tools to reduce unauthorized emigration. While demographic and economic trends in Mexico likely have already contributed to reduced illegal outflows, the relationship between international trade and financial flows, U.S. economic assistance, and economic opportunities in Mexico may represent promising areas for policies to reduce illegal migration in the future.
This report supplements other CRS research on Mexico (such as CRS Report RL32724, Mexico: Issues for Congress; and CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond ) and on immigration (such as CRS Report R42036, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 112th Congress; and CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry). |
crs_RL31867 | crs_RL31867_0 | Earnings Data for Male and Female Workers
Federal data show that full-time female workers have lower earnings than full-time male workers. Examination of some of the characteristics of female and male workers suggests that at least a portion of the differences in earnings are due to observable (nondiscriminatory) factors. Interpretations of these data vary. Some suggest that these patterns illustrate that the pay gap between male and female workers is negligible and no further policy interventions are necessary. In contrast, proponents of further action note that some of the data that "explain" the pay gap, while not directly discriminatory, may be the result of discrimination. Further, even among rigorous studies, no widely accepted methodology has been able to attribute the entirety of the pay gap to factors other than the sex of the worker, making it difficult to eliminate the possibility of discrimination. Legal and Legislative Background
Laws That Combat Sex-Based Wage Discrimination
As noted above, there are currently two federal laws that may provide a remedy to employees who believe that unlawful sex-based wage discrimination has occurred: the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EPA is a 1963 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act that makes it illegal to pay different wages to employees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires "equal skill, effort, and responsibility," and which are "performed under similar working conditions." The Wal-Mart Case
In 2004, a federal district court permitted to proceed a class action on behalf of more than 1.5 million current and former female employees of Wal-Mart retail stores nationwide. A number of measures have been introduced in the 114 th Congress. Other bills in the 114 th Congress include the End Pay Discrimination Through Information Act, the Workplace Advancement Act, and the Gender Advancement in Pay Act, or GAP Act. Paycheck Fairness Act
Introduced in each of the last several congressional sessions, the Paycheck Fairness Act ( H.R. 1619 / S. 862 ) would increase penalties for employers who pay different wages to men and women for "equal work," and would add programs for training, research, technical assistance, and pay equity employer recognition awards. Fair Pay Act
The Fair Pay Act ( H.R. Although they differ slightly, both the End Pay Discrimination Through Information Act ( S. 83 ) and the Workplace Advancement Act ( S. 2200 ) would expand the EPA's antiretaliation provisions to prohibit an employer from retaliating against an employee who has discussed salary information with other employees. Broader in scope, the Gender Advancement in Pay Act (GAP Act; S. 2773 ) would not only adopt similar prohibitions against retaliation based on the sharing of wage information, but also would alter the employer defenses available under the EPA. | According to some federal data, on average, full-time female workers earn approximately 20% less than full-time male workers. At least a portion of this gap is due to observable factors such as hours worked and the concentration of female workers in lower-paid occupations. Some interpret these data as evidence that discrimination, if present at all, is a minor factor in the pay differentials and conclude that no policy changes are necessary. Conversely, advocates for further policy interventions note that some of the explanatory factors of the pay gap (such as occupation and hours worked) could be the result of discrimination and that no broadly accepted methodology is able to attribute the entirety of the pay gap to non-gender factors.
Currently, there are two federal laws that may provide a remedy to employees who believe that unlawful sex-based wage discrimination has occurred: the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under the EPA, employers are prohibited from paying lower wages to female employees than male employees for "equal work" on jobs requiring "equal skill, effort, and responsibility" and performed "under similar working conditions" at the same location. Thus, the EPA is narrowly focused on the factual question of whether an employer has, on the basis of sex, paid unequal wages for equal work. In contrast, Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex, is far broader in scope than the EPA and focuses on determining whether an employer had a discriminatory motive for paying workers differently on the basis of sex.
Meanwhile, the issue of pay equity has attracted substantial attention in recent congressional sessions. For example, a number of measures, including bills that would provide additional remedies, mandate "equal pay for equivalent jobs," or require studies on pay inequity, have been introduced in the 114th Congress. These bills include the Paycheck Fairness Act (H.R. 1619/S. 862), the Fair Pay Act (H.R. 1787), the End Pay Discrimination Through Information Act (S. 83), the Workplace Advancement Act (S. 2200), and the Gender Advancement in Pay Act (GAP Act; S. 2773). This report also discusses pay equity litigation, including Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, a case in which the Supreme Court rejected class action status for current and former female Wal-Mart employees who allege that the company has engaged in pay discrimination. |
crs_RS21842 | crs_RS21842_0 | Overview
Nearly 105,000 horses were slaughtered for human food in 2006, all in two foreign-owned Texas plants and a third foreign plant in Illinois, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). However, U.S. horse slaughter plants were long subject to the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) of 1906, as amended (21 U.S.C. Legislation in the 113th Congress
The recently enacted continuing resolution for FY2013 ( H.R. 933 ) continues the policy of P.L. 112-55 , the FY2012 appropriations bill, by permitting FSIS to inspect horse slaughtering facilities through FY2013. The Safeguard American Food Exports (SAFE) Act ( S. 541 / H.R. 1094 ) was also introduced in the 113 th Congress. The bill would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to prohibit the sale or transport of equines and equine parts in interstate or foreign commerce for human consumption. The House bill was referred on March 12, 2013, to the both the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Committee on Agriculture. The Senate bill was referred on the same day to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. Legislation in the 112th Congress
Companion bills entitled the American Horse Slaughter Prevention Act of 2011 ( S. 1176 / H.R. The bills would have amended the Horse Protection Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-540) to prohibit shipping, transporting, possessing, purchasing, selling, or donating horses and other equines to be slaughtered for human consumption. A general provision in the House-passed FY2012 Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 2112 , §739) would have continued to prohibit any funds to pay salaries or expenses of Food Safety Inspection Service personnel to inspect horse meat. This general provision was not included in the Senate-passed version of H.R. 2112 , nor was it included in the final bill ( P.L. A facility in New Mexico—Valley Meats, Inc.—was granted a permit by USDA on June 28, 2013, to begin horse slaughter. USDA has stated that it would grant similar operating permits to plants in Iowa and Missouri in early July 2013. The New Mexico plant had sued USDA in February 2013, accusing it of intentionally delaying the approval process. Both the House ( H.R. 2410 ) and Senate ( S. 1244 ) 2014 Agriculture appropriations bills would again prohibit FSIS from inspecting horses under the Federal Meat Inspection Act. The Administration and USDA have also requested that the ban on horse slaughter continue. As discussed above, the provision had been included in Agriculture appropriations bills since 2008. 112-55 may have reflected a June 2011 Government Accountability Office report that recommended action on the unintended consequences of ending horse slaughter in 2007. Some opponents of the horse slaughter ban, including the American Veterinary Medical Association, argued that humane slaughter in the United States is preferable to less regulated slaughter in Mexican abattoirs, or more humane than abandoning unwanted horses to starve because owners can no longer afford to feed and care for the animals. Legislation in the 111th Congress
H.R. 503 , introduced by House Judiciary Committee Chairman Conyers, and S. 727 , introduced by Senator Landrieu, were companion bills to amend the criminal portion (Title 18) of the U.S. Code to make it illegal to knowingly possess, ship, transport, purchase, sell, deliver, or receive any horse, horseflesh, or carcass intended for human consumption. The bill was referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works and no further action was taken. 2966 / S. 1176 ) would have prohibited the slaughter of other equines as well as horses. In 2010, nearly 138,000 were transported to Mexico and Canada for slaughter. In a June 2011 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) provided evidence of a rise in state and local investigations for horse neglect and more abandoned horses since 2007. | In 2006, two Texas plants and one in Illinois slaughtered nearly 105,000 horses for human food, mainly for European and Asian consumers. In 2007, court action effectively closed the Texas plants, and a ban in Illinois closed the plant in that state. However, U.S. horses continue to be shipped to Mexico and Canada for slaughter. Several states have explored opening horse slaughtering facilities, and Oklahoma enacted to lift the state's 50-year-old ban on processing horsemeat. Animal welfare activists and advocates for horses have continued to press Congress for a federal ban. The Prevention of Equine Cruelty Act of 2009 (H.R. 503/S. 727) in the 111th Congress would have made it a crime to knowingly possess, ship, transport, sell, deliver, or receive any horse, carcass, or horse flesh intended for human consumption. No further action on the bills was taken. Companion bills entitled the American Horse Slaughter Prevention Act of 2011 (S. 1176 and H.R. 2966) were introduced in the 112th Congress. The bills would have amended the Horse Protection Act (P.L. 91-540) to prohibit shipping, transporting, possessing, purchasing, selling, or donating horses and other equines to be slaughtered for human consumption. No further action was taken on these bills.
A general provision in the House-passed FY2012 Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 2112, §739) would have continued to prohibit funds to pay salaries or expenses of Food Safety Inspection Service personnel to inspect horses under the Federal Meat Inspection Act (21 U.S.C. 603). This provision was not included in the Senate-passed version of H.R. 2112 or in the final bill (P.L. 112-55). Although an amendment by Senator Landrieu to the FY2013 continuing resolution (H.R. 933) would have prohibited FSIS inspection, the CR continues the policy of P.L. 112-55, permitting FSIS to inspect horse meat through FY2013. On June 28, 2013, a facility in Roswell, New Mexico—Valley Meats, Inc.—became the first horse processing plant approved by USDA since 2007. USDA has indicated that they would grant similar permits to companies in Iowa and Missouri in early July 2013. The New Mexico plant had sued USDA in February 2013, accusing it of intentionally delaying the approval process. Both the House (H.R. 2410) and Senate (S. 1244) 2014 Agriculture appropriations bills would again prohibit FSIS from inspecting horses under the Federal Meat Inspection Act. The Administration and USDA have also requested that the ban on horse slaughter continue.
The provision prohibiting FSIS inspection had been included in Agriculture appropriations bills since 2008. The ban does not prohibit the transport of U.S. horses to Canada or Mexico for slaughter. The ban's absence in the FY2012 appropriations bill may have reflected a June 2011 Government Accountability Office report that recommended action on the unintended consequences of ending horse slaughter in 2007. That report provided evidence of a rise in state and local investigations for horse neglect and more abandoned horses since 2007. Some opponents of the horse slaughter ban, including the American Veterinary Medical Association, have argued that humane slaughter in the United States is preferable to less-regulated slaughter in Mexican abattoirs, and more humane than abandoning unwanted horses to starve because owners can no longer afford to feed and care for the animals. Animal welfare groups have countered the argument that large numbers of unwanted horses are being abandoned.
Recent news from the EU that horse meat was found in various processed foods has raised the profile of the horse slaughter issue in the United States. The Safeguard American Food Exports (SAFE) Act (S. 541/H.R. 1094) was introduced in the 113th Congress. The bill would amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to prohibit the sale or transport of equines and equine parts in interstate or foreign commerce for human consumption. The House bill was referred to the both the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Committee on Agriculture. The Senate bill was referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. |
crs_RS22601 | crs_RS22601_0 | However, the global economic crisis dealt a setback to Serbia's economy. Serbia has set integration in the European Union as its key foreign policy goal, but its prospects have been clouded by concerns of some EU countries that it has not done enough to normalize relations with its former Kosovo province, which declared independence in 2008. U.S.-Serbian relations, although positive in many respects, have also been negatively affected by the leading role played by the United States in promoting Kosovo's independence. Negotiations on forming a new government were difficult. Unusually, despite having secured many more seats that the Socialists, the Progressives ceded the position of Prime Minister to Socialist leader Ivica Dacic. After the ICJ ruling, under strong EU pressure, Serbia agreed to hold talks with Kosovo under EU mediation. Foreign Policy
Since 2008, Serbia's foreign policy has focused on two main objectives—integration into the European Union and hindering international recognition of the independence of Serbia's former Kosovo province by legal and diplomatic means. Although the United States has offered to "agree to disagree" with Serbia over Kosovo, the issue may continue to affect relations, particularly as the United States remains Kosovo's most powerful international supporter. Serbia submitted its application for EU membership in December 2009. Noting the progress made in the EU-brokered talks with Kosovo, the Commission recommended that Serbia be given the status of a membership candidate if it re-engages in the dialogue with Kosovo and implements in good faith agreements already reached. The deal will permit Kosovo to participate in the institutions under the name "Kosovo*," with the asterisk referring to both U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (which Serbia says recognizes Kosovo as part of its territory) and a 2010 International Court of Justice ruling that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not contravene international law. In response to the conclusion of these agreements, in March 2012 the EU accepted Serbia as a membership candidate. On April 22, 2013, in part as a result of the signing of the April 19 normalization agreement with Kosovo, the European Commission recommended that the EU grant Serbia a starting date for its EU membership talks. NATO
In December 2006, Serbia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. PFP is aimed at helping countries come closer to NATO standards and at promoting their cooperation with NATO. Due in part to memories of NATO's 1999 bombing of Serbia and anger at the U.S. role in Kosovo's independence, public support for NATO membership is low. U.S. Policy
Serbia has played a key role in U.S. policy toward the Balkans since the collapse of the former Yugoslavia in 1991. In April 2013, 12 persons went on trial in Belgrade for the attack. In May 2009, Vice President Joseph Biden set the tone for the Obama Administration's policy toward Serbia, in a trip to the region that also included Kosovo and Bosnia, in addition to Serbia. He expressed the belief that the United States and Serbia could "agree to disagree" on Kosovo. Biden stressed that the United States did not expect Serbia to recognize Kosovo's independence, and would not condition U.S.-Serbian ties on the issue. However, he added that the United States expects Serbia to cooperate with the United States, the European Union, and other key international actors "to look for pragmatic solutions that will improve the lives of all the people of Kosovo," including the Serbian minority. | Serbia faces an important crossroads in its development. It is seeking to integrate into the European Union (EU), but its progress has been hindered by tensions with the United States and many EU countries over the independence of Serbia's former Kosovo province. The global economic crisis poses serious challenges for Serbia. Painful austerity measures have been required for Serbia by the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions.
Serbia held parliamentary and presidential elections in May 2012. One party in the former government, the Socialist Party, did much better than anticipated in the parliamentary vote. In another surprise, in the presidential vote the incumbent president Boris Tadic was defeated by Tomislav Nikolic of the nationalist Progressive Party. After protracted negotiations, in July 2012 the Progressives formed a new government with the Socialists and another group, the United Regions of Serbia. Socialist leader Ivica Dacic was elected as Prime Minister.
Serbia has vowed to take all legal and diplomatic measures to preserve its former province of Kosovo as legally part of Serbia. Nevertheless, nearly 100 countries, including the United States and 22 of 27 EU countries, have recognized Kosovo's independence. Russia, Serbia's ally on the issue, has used the threat of its Security Council veto to block U.N. membership for Kosovo. After the International Court of Justice ruled in July 2010 that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not contravene international law, the EU pressured Serbia to hold talks with Kosovo starting in March 2011.
Serbia's other key foreign policy objective is to secure membership in the European Union. In March 2012, the EU accepted Serbia as a candidate for membership after having judged that Belgrade has made sufficient progress in reaching and implementing agreements with Kosovo on a series of practical issues. In April 2013, the EU Commission recommended that the EU give Serbia a date for the start of the talks. Even if talks formally begin late this year, many years of negotiations will be required before Serbia can join the EU.
In December 2006, Serbia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. PFP is aimed at helping countries come closer to NATO standards and at promoting their cooperation with NATO. Although it supports NATO membership for its neighbors, Serbia is not itself seeking NATO membership. This may be due to such factors as memories of NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999, U.S. support for Kosovo's independence, and a desire to maintain close ties with Russia.
U.S.-Serbian relations have improved since the United States recognized Kosovo's independence in February 2008, when Serbia sharply condemned the U.S. move and demonstrators sacked a portion of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. During a 2009 visit to Belgrade, Vice President Joseph Biden stressed strong U.S. support for close ties with Serbia. He said the countries could "agree to disagree" on Kosovo's independence. He called on Serbia to transfer the remaining war criminals to the former Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal (since accomplished), promote reform in neighboring Bosnia, and cooperate with international bodies in Kosovo. The United States has strongly supported the EU-led talks between Kosovo and Serbia, while making clear that it plays no direct role in them. The United States has applauded the agreements reached by the two sides, including a key one on normalizing relations in April 2013. |
crs_RS22678 | crs_RS22678_0 | Origins of the Notch
The 1972 Amendments
Congress approved legislation in 1972 to adjust Social Security benefits for inflation automatically (P.L. However, the formula for calculating the new cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) was flawed. The formula assumed that wages would continue to rise faster than prices, as they had in the past. Beneficiaries Born from 1917 to 1921
The 1977 Amendments corrected the error in the Social Security benefit formula, starting with individuals born in 1917. As a result, the benefits of people who were born during the notch years are lower than those of the beneficiaries who came just before them. To ease the transition to the new, corrected formula, Congress phased in the change for people born from 1917 through 1921—the notch babies. For many who retired during in this phase-in period, however, the transition formula did not lessen the differential between their benefits and the windfall benefits received by people born in earlier cohorts. This report calculates replacement rates in the same way as the Social Security Administration (SSA) actuaries, which is to show the proportion of beneficiaries' average indexed earnings replaced by their initial Social Security benefits. Commission on the Social Security Notch Issue
In 1992, Congress voted to establish a 12-member commission to study the notch issue. Its principal conclusion was that the "benefits paid to those in the 'Notch' years are equitable, and no remedial legislation is in order." Potential for Future Notches
One lesson from the experience of the notch babies is that almost any change to Social Security benefits can create a notch. | Some Social Security beneficiaries who were born from 1917 to 1921—the so-called notch babies—believe they are not receiving fair Social Security benefits. (The Social Security Administration (SSA) and a 1994 commission on the notch issue define the notch period as 1917 to 1921, though some advocates define the period as 1917 to 1926.) The notch issue resulted from legislative changes to Social Security during the 1970s. The 1972 Amendments to the Social Security Act first established cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for Social Security. This change was intended to adjust benefits for inflation automatically, but an error caused benefits to rise substantially faster than inflation.
Congress corrected the error in the 1977 Amendments. However, benefits for those born from 1910 to 1916 were calculated using the flawed formula, giving them unintended windfall benefits. The notch babies, born from 1917 to 1921, became eligible for benefits during the period in which the corrected formula was phased in. For many who retired during in this phase-in period, however, the transition formula did not lessen the differential between their benefits and the windfall benefits received by people born in earlier cohorts. Some notch babies feel it is unfair that their benefits are lower than those received by the older individuals who received the windfall, and also that the transition formula did not do enough to make up the difference.
A number of legislative attempts have been made over the years to give notch babies additional benefits, but none have been successful. A congressionally mandated commission studied the issue and concluded in its 1994 report that "benefits paid to those in the 'Notch' years are equitable, and no remedial legislation is in order."
Any future change to the Social Security benefit formula has the potential to create a notch. This is an important consideration as lawmakers consider changes to ensure long-term system solvency. |
crs_R44151 | crs_R44151_0 | Passed in 1982, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) was intended to establish an explicit statutory basis for the Department of Energy (DOE) to dispose of the nation's most highly radioactive nuclear waste. The NWPA requires DOE to take title to commercial nuclear power plants' SNF and, in exchange for a fee, remove and transport it to a permanent geologic repository or an interim storage facility before permanent disposal. Defense-related HLW was to go into the same repository, unless the President determined separate storage was required. In an effort to mitigate the political difficulties of imposing a federal nuclear waste facility on a single community, Congress attempted to establish an objective, scientifically based, multi-stage statutory process for selecting the eventual site of the nation's new permanent geologic repository. The Secretary's recommendations were met with significant opposition from the affected states; however, and as a result, Congress amended the NWPA's site selection process in 1987 and designated Yucca Mountain as the sole candidate site for the repository by terminating "all site specific activities (other than reclamation activities) at all candidate sites, other than the Yucca Mountain site." The Nevada State Engineer denied DOE's applications for permanent water rights in 2000, finding that granting the water rights would not be in the public interest. Second, the President and former Secretary Chu established a commission to consider alternative solutions to the nation's nuclear waste challenge. Third, and perhaps most controversial, DOE attempted to terminate the NRC's Yucca Mountain licensing proceeding by seeking withdrawal of its application for a construction authorization (license application) for the Yucca Mountain facility. While acknowledging that "the future of the Yucca Mountain project remains uncertain," the commission did make specific findings that may have significant influence over the future of nuclear waste disposal. At the time of DOE's decision to withdraw its license application, NRC's review of the application was proceeding on two tracks: technical review by NRC staff, to be documented in a safety evaluation report, and preliminary phases of adjudication before the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board), to resolve challenges by a number of parties to technical and legal aspects of the DOE application. Washington, South Carolina, and Aiken County, along with a group of private plaintiffs from Washington State, also filed statutory claims in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit challenging NRC's authority to terminate its review of DOE's license application. Circuit issued a writ of mandamus ordering the NRC to resume processing DOE's license application. However, the NRC's publication of the SER, described above, may have resolved some questions relating to "whether the proposed repository is, in fact, licensable" by determining that the application met regulatory requirements except for those relating to land ownership and water rights. In June 2008, DOE issued a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the Yucca Mountain repository, as well as Environmental Impact Statements for the related Nevada Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment. Circuit upheld the NRC's Continued Storage rule. To the extent that the petitioners disagree with the NRC's current policy for the continued storage of spent nuclear fuel, their concerns should be directed to Congress. Challenge to Nuclear Waste Fund Fee
A series of decisions in the D.C. Congressional Action on Yucca Mountain Facility and Nuclear Waste Storage and Disposal
Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations
The Obama Administration's FY2017 budget request included an increase in funding for disposal of SNF, including funding to expand DOE's efforts to develop a "consent-based" nuclear waste disposal system in lieu of a repository at Yucca Mountain. | The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) was an effort to establish an explicit statutory basis for the Department of Energy (DOE) to dispose of the nation's most highly radioactive nuclear waste. The NWPA requires DOE to remove spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power plants, in exchange for a fee, and transport it to a permanent geologic repository or an interim storage facility before permanent disposal. Defense-related high-level waste is to go into the same repository. In an effort to mitigate the political difficulties of imposing a federal nuclear waste facility on a single community, Congress attempted to establish a scientifically based, multi-stage statutory process for selecting the eventual site of the nation's new permanent geologic repository. Congress amended the NWPA's site selection process in 1987, however, and designated Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the sole candidate site for the repository by terminating site-specific activities at all other sites.
Since 2009, the Obama Administration and DOE have taken a number of steps directed toward terminating the Yucca Mountain project. First, the Administration's budget proposals have eliminated all funding for the project. Second, the President established a Blue Ribbon Commission to consider alternative solutions to the nation's nuclear waste challenges; in response to its recommendations, DOE is designing a consent-based siting process. Third, DOE attempted to terminate the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Yucca Mountain licensing proceeding by seeking to withdraw its 2008 license application. Although DOE's motion to withdraw the application was denied by the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, the NRC suspended the Yucca Mountain licensing proceeding in 2011, claiming budgetary limitations. In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) directed the NRC to resume its review of DOE's license application using what remained of previously appropriated funds, although it acknowledged that such funds were insufficient for the NRC to complete the review.
Following the D.C. Circuit's decision, NRC staff completed work on a Yucca Mountain Safety Evaluation Report (SER) in 2015. The SER concluded that DOE's license application met regulatory requirements, except for requirements related to ownership of land and certain water rights. Litigation challenging the Nevada State Engineer's denials of DOE's applications for permanent water rights has been stayed for more than a decade pending resolution of other issues relating to the future of Yucca Mountain. In May 2016, NRC staff also completed work on a supplement to DOE's environmental impact statement to address groundwater impacts.
Various other related nuclear waste issues also have been litigated, including safety standards for disposal, Nuclear Waste Fund fees (no longer being collected), and the federal government's contract liability for failure to take title to and dispose of nuclear waste. In June 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected a challenge to the NRC's rule and environmental impact statement supporting the continued, and possibly indefinite, storage of nuclear waste, saying "[t]o the extent that the petitioners disagree with the NRC's current policy for the continued storage of spent nuclear fuel, their concerns should be directed to Congress." Meanwhile, in the absence of a permanent repository, private companies have sought to establish consolidated interim storage facilities, which would require legislative authorization as well as agency approvals.
While the result of the ongoing disputes over the Yucca Mountain program remains uncertain, congressional action could have a significant impact on nuclear waste storage and disposal. Bills have been introduced that would promote either the Yucca Mountain repository or alternatives, and would modify management and storage of nuclear waste in the meantime. |
crs_RS22103 | crs_RS22103_0 | Introduction
The VH-71 program is intended to provide 23 new presidential helicopters to replace the current fleet of 19 aging presidential helicopters. As part of its proposed FY2010 Department of Defense (DOD) budget, the Administration proposed terminating the VH-71 program in response to substantial cost growth and schedule delays in the program. As a successor to the VH-71 program, the Administration proposed beginning a new presidential helicopter program in FY2010 called the VXX Presidential Helicopter Program. The issue for Congress is whether to approve the Administration's proposal to terminate the VH-71 program and initiate a successor VXX program, or pursue another course, such as continuing the VH-71 program in some restructured form. Congress's decision on the issue could affect DOD funding requirements, the schedule for replacing the 19 older helicopters, and the helicopter industrial base. Of this total, $55.2 million is for Increment I, for use in terminating the program, none is for Increment II, and $30 million is for initial studies on the proposed successor VXX program. FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 111-84)
Conference
The conference report ( H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on H.R. 2647 / P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009, approves the Administration's FY2010 funding request for the VH-71 program (page 1003). Therefore, given that level of possible investment, the conferees strongly encourage the Department of Defense and the Executive Branch to consider a complete range of alternatives for meeting requirements. The conferees believe that such consideration must include evaluating both single- and multi-platform solutions to meet the complete transportation requirements of the President, and [in] evaluating costs, consider the investment already made in the VH–71 program for possible use for some portion of the mission within a multi-platform solution. 2647 , recommends approving the Administration's request for $85.2 million in FY2010 RDT&E funding for the VH-71 program (page 167). FY2010 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)
Final Version
In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118 . The explanatory statement provided $130.0 million for VHXX Executive Helo Development, an increase of $44.8 million from the Administration's request. This includes a $100.0 million increase for technology capture and a decrease of $55.2 million for "termination costs funded ahead of estimate." | The VH-71 program is intended to provide 23 new presidential helicopters to replace the current fleet of 19 aging presidential helicopters. As part of its proposed FY2010 Department of Defense (DOD) budget, the Administration proposed terminating the VH-71 program in response to substantial cost growth and schedule delays in the program. As a successor to the VH-71 program, the Administration proposed beginning a new presidential helicopter program in FY2010 called the VXX Presidential Helicopter Program.
The Administration's proposed FY2010 budget requested $85.2 million in Navy research and development funding for the VH-71 program. Of this total, $55.2 million is for terminating the VH-71 program and $30 million is for initial studies on the proposed successor VXX program.
The issue for Congress is whether to approve the Administration's proposal to terminate the VH-71 program and initiate a successor VXX program, or pursue another course, such as continuing the VH-71 program in some restructured form. Congress's decision on the issue could affect DOD funding requirements, the schedule for replacing the 19 older helicopters, and the helicopter industrial base. This report will be updated as events warrant.
FY2010 defense authorization act: The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) approves the Administration's FY2010 funding request for the VH-71 program. The conference report states that "the conferees strongly encourage the Department of Defense and the Executive Branch to consider a complete range of alternatives for meeting requirements. The conferees believe that such consideration must include evaluating both single- and multi-platform solutions to meet the complete transportation requirements of the President, and [in] evaluating costs, consider the investment already made in the VH–71 program for possible use for some portion of the mission within a multi-platform solution."
FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. 3326. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118.
The explanatory statement includes $130.0 million for VHXX Executive Helo Development in 2010, an increase of $44.8 million from the Administration's request. This includes a $100.0 million increase for technology capture and a decrease of $55.2 million for "termination costs funded ahead of estimate." |
crs_R43982 | crs_R43982_0 | In July 2014, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") announced that he had authorized complaints against McDonald's, USA, LLC ("McDonald's USA"), for alleged violations of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "the Act") by the company and its franchisees. This report examines the Board's existing joint employer standard. The report also reviews Browning-Ferris Industries of California , the case that prompted the General Counsel's amicus brief, and the unfair labor practice allegations involving McDonald's USA. The NLRA and the Board's Joint Employer Standard
The NLRA recognizes the right of employees to engage in collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing. The General Counsel encouraged the Board to adopt a new standard that considers the totality of the circumstances, including how the alleged joint employers have structured their commercial relationship. Whether the Board will adopt a new joint employer standard is not clear. | This report examines the standard used currently by the National Labor Relations Board ("Board") to determine whether two businesses may be considered joint employers for purposes of the rights and protections afforded by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). In a June 2014 amicus brief filed with the Board, the Board's General Counsel encouraged the adoption of a new joint employer standard that would consider the totality of the circumstances, including how the alleged joint employers have structured their commercial relationship. Following the filing of the amicus brief, the General Counsel also authorized complaints to be filed against McDonald's, USA, LLC ("McDonald's USA"), and its franchisees, as joint employers, for alleged violations of the NLRA. These activities may arguably suggest that a change in the Board's joint employer standard may be imminent.
In addition to reviewing the Board's joint employer standard, the report also discusses Browning-Ferris Industries of California, the case that prompted the General Counsel's amicus brief, and the unfair labor practice allegations involving McDonald's USA. |
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