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crs_R41477 | crs_R41477_0 | Introduction
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is the lead federal agency for increasing access to behavioral health services. SAMHSA's two largest programs are the $1.8 billion Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment (SAPT) block grant and the $421 million Community Mental Health Services (CMHS) block grant, which account for more than 60% of the agency's budget in FY2010. It also highlights some of the issues that may be addressed by Congress when it next considers legislation to reauthorize SAMHSA and its programs. SAMHSA Authorization and Organization
SAMHSA and most of its programs and activities are authorized under Title V of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The SAPT and CMHS block grants are separately authorized under PHSA Title XIX Part B. SAMHSA has authority to administer several specific formula and competitive grant programs to support mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services, as well as general authorities for activities in these areas. Appropriations for the agency were reauthorized in 2000, as part of the Children's Health Act. While the majority of SAMHSA programs provide funding through a competitive grant process, together these programs account for only one-third of the agency's budget. In real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) dollars, however, the funding increase over that period was only 6%. Substance abuse prevention PRNS grew much less, increasing by 37% from FY2000 to FY2010. The act amended SAMHSA's existing authorities under Title V, added several new authorities, and authorized appropriations through FY2003. The following key provisions were included in the 2000 reauthorization, which
increased flexibility for SAMHSA to direct mental health and substance abuse funding by rewriting and standardizing the general authority (i.e., PRNS) for each center and eliminating several existing categorical grant programs; increased flexibility for states to direct the use of block grant funds to treat mental health and substance abuse disorders; added new categorical grant programs, primarily with a focus on expanding and improving mental health and substance abuse services for children and adolescents; and added "charitable choice" provisions that allow religious organizations to receive funding from SAMHSA for the provision of substance abuse prevention and treatment services (see "Charitable Choice" text box below). The second report, delivered in 2005, discusses SAMHSA's efforts to improve the flexibility and accountability of the block grants. In addition, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA), contained new authorizations for SAMHSA, as well as additional provisions related to mental health and substance abuse, which are discussed in the next section of this report. Legislation to reauthorize SAMHSA was introduced in the 111 th Congress, but has not moved out of committee. Issues that may be of interest during reauthorization of SAMHSA include increased performance measurement and accountability for SAMHSA grants and programs, granting specific authority for the Access To Recovery program that provides vouchers for individuals to seek treatment services and that was created under SAMHSA's general authority, improving the ability of communities to provide behavioral health services during disaster response, requiring collaboration between SAMHSA and other federal agencies, increasing SAMHSA's level of emphasis on primary prevention, increasing SAMHSA's role in expanding the number and diversity of the behavioral health provider workforce, and ensuring fairness of the formula used to distribute SAMHSA's block grants. 99-319 1988: Anti-Drug Abuse Act, P.L. | The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provides federal funding to support community-based mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services. SAMHSA awards formula and competitive grants under its authorities in Title V of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The agency also administers the $1.8 billion Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment (SAPT) block grant and the $420 million Community Mental Health Services (CMHS) block grant, both of which are authorized in PHSA Title XIX. SAMHSA's funding totaled almost $3.6 billion in FY2010. The agency's budget increased by 34% from FY2000 to FY2010. In real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) dollars, however, the funding increase over that period was only 6%. Funding for SAMHSA's two block grants, which together account for 62% of the agency's budget, has grown at a much slower pace than funding for its competitive grant programs.
SAMHSA was reauthorized in 2000, as part of the Children's Health Act (P.L. 106-310). The act amended SAMHSA's existing authorities to give the agency more flexibility to direct mental health and substance abuse funding; increased state flexibility to direct the use of block grant funds, creating several new competitive grant programs to expand mental health and substance abuse services for children and adolescents; and authorized appropriations through FY2003. It also added charitable choice provisions that allow faith-based organizations to compete for SAMHSA substance abuse funding without impairing their religious character. P.L. 106-310 required SAMHSA to submit two reports to Congress, one on providing coordinated care to individuals with co-occurring mental illness and substance abuse, and the other on efforts to improve the flexibility and accountability of the block grants.
Comprehensive reauthorization has not occurred since 2000. However, several laws have further expanded the agency's programs and activities in suicide prevention, underage drinking, and prescription drug abuse. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-148) contained new authorizations for SAMHSA related to depression and behavioral health services for American Indians and Alaskan Natives, as well as additional provisions related to mental health and substance abuse.
While reauthorization has not moved out of committee, issues that may be of interest during the next reauthorization of SAMHSA include increased performance measurement and accountability for SAMHSA grants and programs, granting specific authority for the Access To Recovery program that provides vouchers for individuals to seek treatment services, improving the ability of communities to provide behavioral health services during disaster response, requiring collaboration between SAMHSA and other federal agencies, increasing SAMHSA's level of emphasis on primary prevention, increasing SAMHSA's role in expanding the number and diversity of the behavioral health provider workforce, and ensuring fairness of the formula used to distribute SAMHSA's block grants.
This report describes SAMHSA's history, organization, authority, and programs, and analyzes some of the issues that may be considered by Congress during a reauthorization of the agency. The appendixes include a table describing SAMHSA's authorizations and appropriations, a table with SAMHSA's funding from FY2000-FY2010, a matrix of SAMHSA's National Outcome Measures that aim to evaluate progress on substance abuse and mental health prevention and treatment indicators, and a list of SAMHSA resources. |
crs_R44343 | crs_R44343_0 | The program authorizes institutions of higher education (IHEs) to capitalize revolving loan funds for the purpose of making low-interest loa ns to students with exceptional financial need. For approximately two and one-half months thereafter, the operation of the Perkins Loan program was curtailed and loans could only be made to continuing students. Then, on December 18, 2015, Congress enacted the Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015 (the Extension Act; P.L. It extended the authorization of IHEs to make new Perkins Loans to eligible students through September 30, 2017, but prohibited additional appropriations beyond FY2015 for the purpose of making new Perkins Loans and prohibited an automatic extension of the program under GEPA. In addition, the Extension Act amended several key Perkins Loan program provisions relating to student eligibility to receive new Perkins Loans, institutional disclosures required to be made to students borrowing new Perkins Loans, and the distribution of Perkins Loan fund assets upon the program's conclusion. The Federal Perkins Loan Extension Act of 2015
On December 18, 2015, several months after the Perkins Loan program's authorization of appropriations had expired, Congress enacted the Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-105 ), which extends the program through September 30, 2017. The remainder of this report identifies changes made to the Perkins Loan program under the Extension Act. | Prior to December 18, 2015, the Federal Perkins Loan program authorized the allocation of federal funds to institutions of higher education to assist them in capitalizing revolving loan funds for the purpose of making low-interest loans to students with exceptional financial need.
The authorization of appropriations for federal capital contributions to institutions' revolving loan funds and the authority to make Perkins Loans to new students expired on September 30, 2015. For approximately two and one-half months thereafter, the operation of the Perkins Loan program was curtailed and loans could only be made to continuing students. Then, on December 18, 2015, Congress enacted the Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015 (the Extension Act; P.L. 114-105), which extended the authorization to make new Perkins Loans to eligible students through September 30, 2017. In addition to extending the authorization to award new Perkins Loans, the Extension Act also amended several key Perkins Loan program provisions relating to student eligibility to receive new Perkins Loans, institutional disclosures required to be made to students borrowing new Perkins Loans, and the distribution of Perkins Loan funds assets upon the program's end. Additionally, the Extension Act prohibits future appropriations for the program and prohibits an automatic extension of the program under the General Education Provisions Act.
This report describes the changes made to the Perkins Loan program by the Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015. |
crs_R40898 | crs_R40898_0 | 3962 contains numerous provisions affecting Medicare payments, payment rules, and covered benefits, and treats the Medicare program as both a funding source for health reform and a tool to shape future changes in the way that health services are delivered. Estimates from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the bill indicate that, absent interaction effects, net reductions in Medicare direct spending may approach $128.1 billion from 2010 to 2014 and $460.8 billion from 2010 to 2019. 3962 . Such a demonstration would test the use of bundled payments for hospitals and post-acute care providers for improving the coordination, quality, and efficiency of post-acute care services and for reducing the need for readmission to hospitals from providers, among other outcomes. 3962 would also require the Secretary to develop a detailed plan for a Post-Acute Care Demonstration expansion, which would include HHAs. Starting in 2011, H.R. Starting in 2011, H.R. The bill would also establish a new prescription drug rebate program under which drug manufacturers would provide Medicare with rebates for the cost of drugs dispensed to certain low-income beneficiaries. Efforts to Reform Medicare's Fee-for-Service Payment Methods
As noted by MedPAC, the Medicare program must overcome limitations with its existing fee-for-service payment systems, by addressing its strong incentives to increase service volume and broadening the scope of Medicare's payment to encompass services provided by different entities during a patient's episode of care. Certain provisions included in H.R. Changes to Address Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
H.R. 3962
This appendix contains the majority of provisions in H.R. 3962 , as passed by the House on November 7, 2009, that affect the Medicare program. Payments for Efficient Areas. Payment for Imaging Services. Reducing Potentially Preventable Hospital Readmissions. Application to Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs) . Physicians . This provision would also require the Secretary, by no later than January 1, 2011 to convert the acute care episode demonstration into a pilot program and expand it to include post-acute services and such other services the Secretary determines to be appropriate. Elimination of Coverage Gap. Extension of Section 508 Hospital Reclassifications. Extension of Geographic Floor for Work. Extension of Ambulance Add-Ons. Improving Assets Tests for Medicare Savings Program and Low-income Subsidy Program . Enhanced Oversight Relating to Reimbursements for Retroactive Low Income Subsidy Enrollment . Payment Incentive for Selected Primary Care Services. The provision would extend the increase payments for psychotherapy services for an additional two years (ending December 31, 2011). In addition to providers and suppliers participating in Medicare, entities such as Medicaid managed care organizations, Medicare Advantage (MA) organizations, and Part D Prescription Drug Plans (PDPs) would be subject to this provision. The purpose of the CMI would be to test innovative payment and service delivery models to improve the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care services provided to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries and to expand such models that are successful. | Containing scores of provisions affecting Medicare payments, payment rules, and covered benefits, H.R. 3962, as passed by the House on November 7, 2009, treats the Medicare program as both a funding source for health insurance reform and a tool to shape future changes in the way that health services are paid for and delivered. Estimates from CBO on the bill indicate that, absent interaction effects, net reductions in Medicare direct spending may approach $128.1 billion from 2010 to 2014 and $460.8 billion from 2010 to 2019. Major savings are expected from constraining Medicare's annual payment increases, linking payments for Medicare Advantage plans to fee-for-service payments, and requiring drug manufacturers to provide drug rebates for certain low-income Medicare beneficiaries. These savings would be offset by increases related to payment incentives for primary care services, expanded assistance for low-income beneficiaries enrolled in the Medicare prescription drug program, expanded coverage of preventive care services, and higher payments for various types of providers in rural areas.
With respect to reshaping health care delivery, H.R. 3962 would provide financial incentives to acute care and critical access hospitals to reduce potentially preventable readmissions and to improve care coordination starting in FY2012. These policies would be extended to post-acute care providers starting in FY2015. Another provision would require the Secretary to develop a detailed plan to bundle payments for post-acute care services within three years of enactment. Also, by January 1, 2011, the existing physician-hospital bundled payment demonstration would be converted to a pilot program and expanded to include post-acute services.
H.R. 3962 would also alter Medicare payments to a range of providers, physicians, practitioners, and suppliers. Certain provisions address more systemic issues, such as increasing physician payments for preventive services. Other provisions are time-limited extensions of existing payment policies, such as two-year extensions to Section 508 hospital reclassifications, the physician geographic floor, and rural ambulance add-ons. H.R. 3962 would also change the regulation of providers. For instance, Medicare providers would be subject to enhanced screening and oversight in areas designated as high risk for fraud and abuse. Additionally, the Stark whole hospital and rural exceptions for physician-owned hospitals would be eliminated, except for those existing physician-owned hospitals that qualify for an exception.
Finally, provisions in H.R. 3962 would improve Medicare benefits provided to individuals. For instance, the Medicare Part D coverage gap for prescription drugs (the "doughnut hole") would be eliminated, certain low-income subsidies would be amended by changing Medicare's asset test, and copayments would no longer be required for certain preventive care services. |
crs_R41005 | crs_R41005_0 | "Pay-as-you-go" (PAYGO) procedures play an important role in enforcing budget policies with respect to the consideration of revenue and direct spending legislation. Generally, the purpose of PAYGO procedures is to discourage or prevent the enactment of legislation that would cause, or increase, a deficit or reduce a surplus. PAYGO procedures are not a comprehensive means of budget enforcement because they do not apply to discretionary spending, which is provided in annual appropriations acts; such spending is subject to other budget enforcement procedures. Further, PAYGO rules deal only with the budgetary impact of legislation considered by Congress; they do not address changes in direct spending and revenue levels under current law stemming from changes in the economy, demographic trends, and other factors. Over the years, several different PAYGO procedures have been used for budget enforcement purposes. The PAYGO procedures have been based in statute as well as congressional rules. Statutory and rules-based PAYGO procedures have been in effect simultaneously at times, while at other times only one form of PAYGO procedures was in effect. This report examines the statutory PAYGO process that was in effect from 1991 through 2002, beginning with a discussion of the complex and evolving budget enforcement framework of which it was an important part. The report continues with an explanation of the origin, extension, and termination of the PAYGO process, a review of its regular operation and statutory interventions in that operation involving directed scorekeeping, and an identification of major direct spending and revenue legislation subject to the PAYGO process. It concludes with a brief discussion of proposals to restore the PAYGO process. In the case of the PAYGO process, the BEA of 1997 extended it to legislation enacted through the end of FY2002 (i.e., September 30, 2002), but it covered the effects of such legislation through FY2006. Final PAYGO Determinations Made by the OMB Director
Under Section 252 of the 1985 Balanced Budget Act, as amended, the OMB director was required to issue a final sequestration report each year after the end of the congressional session indicating whether a PAYGO sequester was required. As the table shows, the final combined balances on the PAYGO scorecard for all years either were negative amounts or zero. Accordingly, no PAYGO sequester was required for any fiscal year during this period. While the OMB director's final determinations indicated compliance with the PAYGO requirement in all years, in some cases the balances reflected adjustments due to emergency requirements or directed scorekeeping provisions in law that prevented a sequester from occurring, as discussed in subsequent sections of this report. The most significant emergency designation under the PAYGO process applied to the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act ( P.L. The seven measures containing directed scorekeeping provisions did not make adjustments in the FY1991-FY1993 balances on the PAYGO scorecard. 107-312 , the OMB director set the final balances for all fiscal years on the PAYGO scorecard to zero. | "Pay-as-you-go" (PAYGO) procedures play an important role in enforcing budget policies with respect to the consideration of revenue and direct spending legislation. Generally, the purpose of PAYGO procedures is to discourage or prevent the enactment of legislation that would cause, or increase, a deficit or reduce a surplus in the federal budget. PAYGO procedures are not a comprehensive means of budget enforcement because they do not apply to discretionary spending, which is provided in annual appropriations acts; such spending is subject to other enforcement procedures. Further, PAYGO rules deal only with the budgetary impact of legislation considered by Congress; they do not address changes in direct spending and revenue levels under current law stemming from changes in the economy, demographic trends, and other factors.
Over the years, several different PAYGO procedures have been used for budget enforcement purposes. The PAYGO procedures have been based in statute as well as congressional rules. Statutory and rules-based PAYGO procedures have been in effect simultaneously at times, while at other times only one form of PAYGO procedures was in effect.
This report examines the statutory PAYGO process that was in effect from 1991 through 2002, beginning with a discussion of the complex and evolving budget enforcement framework of which it was an important part. The report continues with an explanation of the origin, extension, and termination of the PAYGO process; a review of its regular operation and statutory interventions in that operation involving directed scorekeeping; and an identification of major direct spending and revenue legislation subject to the PAYGO process. It concludes with a brief discussion of proposals to restore the PAYGO process.
The statutory PAYGO process was established in 1990 as Section 252 of an underlying law, the 1985 Balanced Budget Act. As extended in 1993 and 1997, the PAYGO process applied to legislation enacted through the end of FY2002, but it covered the effects of such legislation through FY2006. The PAYGO process was effectively terminated in December 2002 by the enactment of P.L. 107-312, which set all remaining balances on the PAYGO scorecard to zero.
Under the PAYGO process, if the OMB director determined that there was a positive balance for a fiscal year on the PAYGO scorecard, then the President was required to issue a sequestration order implementing across-the-board cuts in nonexempt direct spending to eliminate the balance. The OMB director issued 12 final sequestration reports under the PAYGO process, for FY1992-FY2003. The final balances on the PAYGO scorecard for all years were either negative amounts (reflecting net savings) or zero. Accordingly, no PAYGO sequester was required for any fiscal year during this period. While the OMB director's final determinations indicated compliance with the PAYGO requirement in all years, in some cases the balances reflected adjustments due to emergency requirements, provided for under the process, or directed scorekeeping provisions in law that intervened in the normal operation of the process in order to prevent a sequester. Emergency designations and directed scorekeeping provisions sometimes involved amounts ranging from tens of billions to more than one hundred billion dollars for a year.
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_R44504 | crs_R44504_0 | Introduction
Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), as amended, the Department of the Interior (DOI) must prepare and maintain forward-looking five-year plans—referred to by DOI as "five-year programs"—that indicate proposed public oil and gas lease sales in U.S. waters over a five-year period. In preparing each program, DOI must balance national interests in energy supply and environmental protection. The lead agency within DOI responsible for the program is the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM). All available leasing areas are initially examined, and the selection may then be narrowed based on economic and environmental analysis to arrive at a final leasing schedule. At the end of the process, the Secretary of the Interior must submit each program to the President and to Congress for a period of at least 60 days, after which the proposal may be approved by the Secretary and may take effect with no further regulatory or legislative action. As required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the planning process includes a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS). The PEIS examines the potential environmental impacts from oil and gas exploration and development and considers a reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed plan. Because of the stages of review and comment required under both the OCSLA and NEPA, the Administration could not revise a finalized program—for example, to add new sales—without restarting the program development process. The final program schedules 11 lease sales on the OCS: 10 in the Gulf of Mexico region, 1 in the Alaska region, and none in the Atlantic or Pacific regions (see Table 3 ). Three sales proposed in earlier versions of the program—one in the Atlantic and two off of Alaska—were not ultimately included in the program. Accordingly, Congress has typically been actively involved in the planning process for the five-year programs. Under the OCSLA, Congress's review of BOEM's final program does not include approval or disapproval of the program. Members may convey their views on the Administration's proposals by submitting public comments on draft versions of the program during formal comment periods, and they may evaluate the program in committee oversight hearings. More directly, Members may introduce legislation to set or alter a program's terms. Five-Year Program Development Process51
BOEM's development of a five-year program typically takes place over two or three years, during which successive drafts of the program are published for review and comment. Former Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell issued a record of decision approving the final program for 2017-2022 on January 17, 2017. 2012-2017 Program. No lease sales are scheduled for the other two regions of the U.S. OCS, the Atlantic region and the Pacific region. Role of Congress
Congress can influence the Administration's development of a five-year program in a number of ways. The 114 th Congress pursued all these types of influence with respect to the proposed program for 2017-2022. The 115 th Congress could also address the 2017-2022 program—for example, through legislation to alter its terms—or could choose not to do so. H.R. 1487 and S. 791 would have required the Secretary of the Interior to use an earlier-proposed Bush Administration draft program for 2010-2015 (which was not adopted) as the final oil and gas leasing program for the years FY2015-FY2020. H.R. H.R. H.R. | The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), within the Department of the Interior (DOI), has prepared a five-year plan—referred to by BOEM as a "five-year program"—for offshore oil and gas leasing on the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS) from mid-2017 through mid-2022. Currently, BOEM is implementing a previous five-year program for the 2012-2017 period. BOEM develops the leasing programs under Section 18 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, as amended (OCSLA; 43 U.S.C. §§1331-1356b). The law requires the Secretary of the Interior to prepare and maintain forward-looking plans that indicate proposed public oil and gas lease sales in U.S. waters. In doing so, the Secretary must balance national interests in energy supply and environmental protection.
BOEM's development of a five-year program typically takes place over two or three years, during which successive drafts of the program are published for review and comment. All available leasing areas are initially examined, and the selection may then be narrowed based on economic and environmental analysis to arrive at a final leasing schedule. At the end of the process, the Secretary of the Interior must submit each program to the President and to Congress for a period of at least 60 days, after which the proposal may be approved by the Secretary and may take effect with no further regulatory or legislative action. BOEM also develops a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) for the leasing program, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. §4321). The PEIS examines the potential environmental impacts from oil and gas exploration and development and considers a reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed plan.
On January 17, 2017, former Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell issued a record of decision approving BOEM's final offshore oil and gas leasing program for 2017-2022. The final program schedules 11 OCS lease sales, including 10 in the Gulf of Mexico and 1 in the Alaska region. No sales are scheduled for the Atlantic or Pacific regions. Three sales proposed in earlier drafts of the program—one in the Atlantic and two off of Alaska—were not ultimately included in the program. An incoming Administration could not revise a finalized program—for example, to restore excluded sales or to add new sales—without restarting the program development process.
Congress has typically been actively involved during the planning phases of BOEM's five-year leasing programs. For example, Members of Congress have conveyed their views on the Administration's proposals by submitting public comments on draft versions of programs during formal comment periods and have evaluated programs in committee oversight hearings. The 114th Congress exercised both of these types of influence with respect to the program for 2017-2022. Further, although Congress's role under the OCSLA does not include approval or disapproval of the program, Members may directly influence the terms of a program through legislation. Some legislation in the 114th Congress, including H.R. 1487/S. 791, H.R. 1663, H.R. 3682, H.R. 4749, S. 1276, S. 1278, S. 1279, S. 2011, and S. 3203, would have altered the 2017-2022 program by adding certain lease sales or making other programmatic changes. Other bills, including H.R. 1895, H.R. 2630, H.R. 3927, H.R. 4535, S. 1430, S. 2155, and S. 2238, would have influenced the program by prohibiting leasing in various parts of the OCS. None of these bills was enacted. The 115th Congress could introduce legislation to alter the terms of the Administration's final program for 2017-2022, or it could choose not to do so. |
crs_RL32987 | crs_RL32987_0 | Introduction
The rate of long-term economic growth is the salient measure of the nation's ability to steadily advance its material living standard. The pace of long-term economic growth is likely to be a central focus of attention in the decades just ahead, as the U.S. economy must confront the need to undertake unprecedentedly large generational transfers of income to pay for the retirement of the huge baby-boom generation. Although the trend growth rates of mature industrial economies have historically not shown great variability, even relatively small differences in that growth rate steadily cumulate to have sizeable effects on the scale of improvement in future living standards. For the United States, the long-term growth of real GDP per capita over the last 125 years has revealed remarkable steadiness, advancing decade after decade with only modest and temporary variation from the observed 1.8% annual rate of increase. Overall, the limited variability of the rate of U.S. long-term growth over such a long time period, despite major changes in economic conditions, as well as economic and social polices, suggests that U.S. long-term growth may be governed by forces other than typical economic variables and may not be easy to deliberately alter with conventional economic policies. Nevertheless, the evidence of some degree of medium-term variability suggests the possibility of using economic policy to exert some influence. as well as cognitive skills. Given this supporting infrastructure, economic theory and evidence make it reasonably clear that countries that have achieved sustained long-term growth such as the United States are those that invest a sizable fraction of current income in the accumulation of physical and human capital and have accumulated large stocks of both. More importantly, they are also economies that have been able to steadily raise the productivity of these two inputs through a steady advance of technical knowledge. There are reasons to believe, despite its evident economic success, that the United States, due to varying degrees of market failure, may under invest in each of the three basic determinants of economic growth. In theory, correcting that under investment through some form of government intervention could lead to an optimal increase in the rate of accumulation of each determinant, and through that an acceleration of the economy's rate of economic growth. Knowing that there is the potential for improving on certain market outcomes is one thing. Designing economic policies that will efficiently induce these improvements is another thing. The information shortcoming about what, where, and how much to invest that the policymaker would have to contend with will often be substantial, and greatly raise the risk that the policy will be so blunt and misdirected that it generates more economic costs than benefits. | The rate of long-term economic growth is the salient measure of the nation's ability to steadily advance its material living standard. The pace of long-term economic growth is likely to be a center of attention in the decades just ahead, as the U.S. economy confronts the need to undertake unprecedentedly large generational transfers of income to pay for the retirement of the huge baby-boom generation as well as large transfers to the rest of the world to meet the debt service costs of the United States' large and still growing foreign debt.
For the United States, the long-term growth of real GDP per-capita over the last 125 years has revealed remarkable steadiness, advancing decade after decade with only modest and temporary variation from a trend annual average rate of growth of 1.8%. Overall, the limited variability of the rate of U.S. long-term growth, despite major changes in economic conditions, as well as economic and social policies, suggests that U.S. long-term growth may be governed by forces other than typical economic variables and may not be easy to alter with conventional economic policy. Nevertheless, the evidence of some degree of medium-term variability suggests the possibility of using economic policy to exert some influence. It is important to recognize that even relatively small differences in the rate of economic growth will steadily cumulate to have large effects on the scale of improvement in future living standards. Such an improvement would make the burden of future transfers on workers less onerous.
Given a supporting social infrastructure that encourages and enables production of goods and services, economic theory and evidence make it reasonably clear that countries that have achieved sustained long-term growth such as the United States are those that invest a sizable fraction of current income in the accumulation of physical and human capital and have and continue to accumulate large stocks of both. As importantly, they are also economies that have been able to steadily raise the productivity of these two inputs through a steady advance of technical knowledge. There are reasons to believe, despite its evident economic success, that the United States, due to varying degrees of market failure, may under invest in each of the three determinants of economic growth. In theory, correcting that under investment through some form of government intervention could lead to an optimal increase in the rate of accumulation of each determinant, and through that to an acceleration of the economy's rate of economic growth. Knowing that there is the potential for improving on certain market outcomes is one thing. Designing economic policies that will efficiently induce these improvements is another thing. The information shortcoming about what, where, and how much to invest with which the policymaker would have to contend will often be substantial, and greatly raises the risk that the policy will be so blunt and misdirected that it will generate more economic costs than benefits.
This report will be updated annually. |
crs_R40554 | crs_R40554_0 | Synopsis
On June 11, 2009, in response to the global spread of a new strain of H1N1 influenza ("flu"), the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak to be a flu pandemic, the first since 1968. The novel "H1N1 swine flu" virus was first identified in California in late April. Since then, cases have been reported around the world. HHS has established a government-wide informational website ( www.flu.gov ) with information for planners, health care providers, and the public. To address the H1N1 outbreak, the Obama Administration requested $2 billion in FY2009 emergency supplemental appropriations, and transfer authority for an additional amount of almost $7 billion from existing HHS accounts. On June 26, the President signed P.L. The President has twice requested portions of the contingent funding. A voluntary national pandemic vaccination campaign is underway. There have been a number of problems associated with shortfalls of actual (versus predicted) vaccine availability, and charges that vaccine would not be available for most of the individuals in designated priority groups until after the peak of pandemic virus transmission had passed. This report provides information about selected federal emergency management authorities and actions taken by DHS and HHS, and actions taken by state and local authorities, in response to the pandemic. It then lists congressional hearings held to date; provides information about appropriations and funding for pandemic flu preparedness and response activities; summarizes U.S. government pandemic flu planning documents; and lists sources for additional information about the pandemic. An Appendix describes the WHO process to determine the phase of a threatened or emerging flu pandemic, and touches on several related issues. Because a public health emergency declaration was already in effect, the declaration under the National Emergencies Act provided the authority for the Secretary of HHS to waive the Social Security Act requirements in order to make it easier for health care facilities to manage surges in patient volume during the pandemic. All of the government-purchased vaccines have been approved through the routine licensing process used for seasonal flu vaccines. The Emergency Use Authorization and other federal emergency management authorities that have been invoked or could be invoked for the response to the H1N1 flu pandemic are depicted in Figure 1 . However, requirements have been established by the Department of Defense, and by some states and private health systems, for the vaccination of health care workers. The PREP Act waives liability and establishes an injury compensation program for the use of certain "covered countermeasures." 111-32 ), signed on June 24, 2009, provided $1.9 billion in supplemental appropriations immediately, and an additional $5.8 billion contingent upon a presidential request documenting the need for additional funds. The U.S. | On June 11, 2009, in response to the global spread of a new strain of H1N1 influenza ("flu"), the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak to be an influenza pandemic, the first since 1968. The novel "H1N1 swine flu" was first identified in California in late April. Since then, cases have been reported around the world.
When the outbreak began, U.S. officials adopted a response posture under the overall coordination of the Secretary of Homeland Security. Among other things, officials established a government-wide informational website (http://www.flu.gov), released antiviral drugs from the national stockpile, developed new diagnostic tests for the H1N1 virus, and published guidance for the clinical management of patients and the management of community and school outbreaks.
Several federal emergency management authorities have been invoked for the response to the pandemic, including a presidential declaration of a national emergency, and a declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) of a public health emergency. Among other things, these authorities have allowed federal officials to make certain unapproved drugs available to patients with severe cases of influenza, and to ease certain requirements on hospitals to aid them in caring for surges in the volume of patients.
Federal health officials have purchased millions of doses of H1N1 pandemic flu vaccine, approved through the routine licensing process used for seasonal flu vaccines. A voluntary nationwide vaccination program is underway, largely coordinated by state and local health officials and carried out through public clinics, private health care providers, schools, and others. The Secretary of HHS has implemented waivers of liability and an injury compensation program in the event of unforeseen vaccine safety problems. Allocation schemes were developed to give priority for limited vaccine doses to those in high-risk groups. However, there have been a number of problems associated with shortfalls of actual (versus predicted) vaccine availability, and charges that vaccine would not be available for most of the individuals in designated priority groups until after the peak of pandemic virus transmission had passed. Some Members of Congress and others have questioned the adequacy of federal activities to improve the capacity for and timeliness of flu vaccine production.
To address the outbreak, the Obama Administration requested $2 billion in FY2009 emergency supplemental appropriations, and transfer authority for an additional amount of almost $7 billion from existing HHS accounts. On June 26, the President signed P.L. 111-32, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, which provided $1.9 billion immediately and an additional $5.8 billion contingent upon a presidential request documenting the need for, and proposed use of, additional funds. The President has subsequently asked for most of the contingent amount. A balance of almost $1.3 billion remains available.
This report provides a synopsis of key events in the H1N1 pandemic response, followed by information about selected federal emergency management authorities and actions taken by DHS, HHS, and state and local authorities. It then lists congressional hearings held to date; discusses appropriations and funding for pandemic flu preparedness and response activities; summarizes U.S. government pandemic flu planning documents; and lists sources for additional information. An Appendix describes the WHO process to determine the phase of an emerging flu pandemic. |
crs_RS21636 | crs_RS21636_0 | Concern that government documents obtained by WikiLeaks and disclosed to several newspapers could reveal the identities of United States intelligence agents or informants focused attention on whether the disclosure or publication of such information could give rise to criminal liability. This report provides background and summarizes the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA; P.L. 97-200 ), enacted by Congress in 1982 to address the unauthorized disclosure of information that identifies U.S. intelligence agents. The act, as amended, is codified at 50 U.S.C. The act also provides exceptions and defenses to prosecution, makes provision for extraterritorial application of the law if the offender is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien, includes reporting requirements to Congress, and sets forth definitions of the terms used in the act. Prosecutions under this act have been rare, despite some high-profile incidents involving the exposure of U.S. intelligence agents. Although some officials have expressed concern that the WikiLeaks disclosures could endanger the lives of persons who provided information to assist U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan or to embassy officials, no prosecutions appear to have resulted. There was, however, one prosecution brought related to the revelation of the identities of CIA interrogators. The 111 th Congress increased the penalties for violations by persons with access to classified information ( P.L. 111-259 ). The act prescribes punishments for disclosing the identities of covert agents with increasing severity according to the level of access to classified information the offender exploited. Offenders without authorized access to classified information are subject to punishment only if they participated in a pattern of activity designed to discover and reveal the identities of covert agents and have reason to believe that such disclosure will harm U.S. intelligence operations. (b) Disclosure of information by persons who learn identify of covert agents as result of having access to classified information
Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. | Concern that government documents obtained by WikiLeaks and disclosed to several newspapers could reveal the identities of United States intelligence agents or informants focused attention on whether the disclosure or publication of such information could give rise to criminal liability. This report summarizes the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (IIPA; P.L. 97-200), enacted by Congress in 1982 to address the unauthorized disclosure of information that exposes covert U.S. intelligence agents. The act, as amended, is codified at 50 U.S.C. Sections 421-426, and provides criminal penalties in certain circumstances for intentional, unauthorized disclosure of information identifying a covert agent, where those making such a disclosure know that the information disclosed identifies the covert agent as such and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent's foreign intelligence relationship to the United States. The act prescribes punishments for disclosing the identities of covert agents with increasing severity according to the level of access to classified information the offender exploited. Offenders without authorized access to classified information are subject to punishment only if they participated in a pattern of activity designed to discover and reveal the identities of covert agents and have reason to believe that such disclosure will harm U.S. intelligence operations.
The act also provides exceptions and defenses to prosecution, makes provision for extraterritorial application for offenders who are U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, includes reporting requirements to Congress, and sets forth definitions of the terms used in the act. Prosecutions are rare, despite some high-profile incidents involving the exposure of U.S. intelligence agents. Although some officials have expressed concern that the WikiLeaks disclosures could endanger the lives of persons who provided information to assist U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan or to embassy officials, no prosecutions appear to have occurred related to those disclosures. There was, however, one prosecution brought related to the revelation of the identities of CIA interrogators. The 111th Congress increased the penalties for violations by persons with access to classified information (P.L. 111-259). |
crs_RL33539 | crs_RL33539_0 | 108-458 was designed to address the findings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, that there has been inadequate coordination of the national intelligence effort and that the intelligence community, as then organized, could not serve as an agile information gathering network in the struggle against international terrorists. A key issue was the extent of the authorities of the DNI, especially with regard to management and budgeting for technical collection systems managed by Defense Department agencies. 401a(4)) consists of the following:
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State (INR)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
National Security Agency (NSA)
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
The National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Army Intelligence
Navy Intelligence
Air Force Intelligence
Marine Corps Intelligence
Coast Guard Intelligence
The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of the Treasury
The Office of Intelligence, Department of Energy
The Office of National Security Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security
Except for the CIA, intelligence offices or agencies are components of Cabinet departments with other roles and missions. The Treasury Department collects and processes information that may affect U.S. fiscal and monetary policies. Enduring Oversight Issues
Duplication of Effort
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 tasks the DNI with ensuring the elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the intelligence community. Some observers believe the DNI has focused more on other statutory requirements—specifically its mandate to facilitate information sharing—while neglecting this responsibility to eliminate waste, resulting in the proliferation of intelligence organizations, particularly in the areas of counterterrorism and analysis, that fulfill many of the same functions. A White House review of the 2009 Christmas day bombing attempt, for example, found that "Information sharing does not appear to have contributed to this intelligence failure," and that information about a pending attack had been shared with those in a position to disrupt the plot. A classified report prepared by the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) in 2012 allegedly found that, after a decade of counterterrorism and intelligence support to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CIA specifically and the intelligence community more generally has now become too focused on tactical operation and military. The ability to locate fixed installations and moving targets has become an integral component of U.S. military capabilities. These programs have substantial budgetary implications. Unauthorized disclosures of classified information will likely continue to be a concern, despite recent executive branch efforts to address this problem. Intelligence officials have maintained in congressional testimony that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort and that careful coordination is undertaken during the planning and implementing of such operations. That confirmation was held up while Members demanded to see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel opinions about the Administration's targeted killing program. It remains to be seen whether these actions will be effective or whether stronger action will be needed. Some of the initiatives relating to acquisition did not, however, meet their objectives. (Members of Congress have access to these annexes, but must make special arrangements to read them.) Other oversight committees are responsible for intelligence agencies that are part of departments over which they have jurisdiction. The President signed the legislation on December 17, 2004, and it became P.L. | To address the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community in the 21st century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial challenges. The needs of diverse intelligence "consumers" must all be met, using many of the same systems and personnel. The DNI has substantial statutory authorities to address these issues, but the organizational relationships remain complex, especially for intelligence agencies that are part of the Defense Department. Members of Congress in their oversight role may seek to observe the extent to which effective coordination is accomplished.
The intelligence community, which comprises 17 agencies, has experienced a decade of budgetary growth. That era was typified by (1) institution building with embryonic organization such as the Office of the DNI and other new or evolving intelligence components, (2) information sharing and collaboration across those institutions, and (3) a focus on counterterrorism.
While those issues will remain areas of congressional interest, Members will likely confronted by a new set of intelligence challenges resulting from budgetary realities and from second-order effects stemming from post-9/11 changes. These include:
Consolidation and redundancy. Intelligence collection systems are expensive and some critics suggest there have been elements of waste and unneeded duplication of effort. The Administration is considering long-term reductions with an emphasis on potentially redundant information technology systems. There is great concern, however, that any reductions be carefully made to avoid curtailing capabilities that have become integral to military operations and to policymaking in many areas. Information security and management. The WikiLeaks disclosures that began in 2010 and other recent incidents of unauthorized disclosure of classified information have drawn considerable attention to the risks that widespread information sharing entails. Investigations into the 2009 Christmas day bombing attempt and the Fort Hood shooting also suggest analysts are now challenged to synthesize the large volumes of information being shared. Intelligence support to counterterrorism and operations. The Administration's targeting killing program raises legal, jurisdictional, and efficacy issues. Broader questions have also been raised about whether intelligence agencies have become too focused on counterterrorism to the detriment of other national security priorities and whether some of those functions should be transitioned to U.S. military control, allowing intelligence agencies to focus on traditional collection and analysis. |
crs_R42112 | crs_R42112_0 | Piracy of the content created by movie, music, and software companies, and the sale of counterfeit goods that include inauthentic clothing, pharmaceutical drugs, and consumer electronics, negatively impacts the American economy. However, many websites trafficking in copyrighted content or counterfeit goods are registered and operate entirely in foreign countries. S. 968 , the Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act (PROTECT IP Act), and H.R. 3261 , the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), are legislative responses to the jurisdictional problem of holding foreign websites accountable for piracy and counterfeiting. The bills also authorize new enforcement mechanisms against domestic sites that facilitate infringing activities. These bills would create new obligations for U.S.-based domain name servers, Internet advertisers, search engines, and financial transaction providers to address such harm to intellectual property rights holders. There has been considerable public debate about the changes to existing law that are proposed by these two bills. 3782 ) has been introduced in response to the concerns raised about the PROTECT IP Act and SOPA. In the case of service providers that provide either (1) system caching, (2) storage of information on systems or networks at direction of users, or (3) information location tools, the court may grant injunctive relief with respect to a service provider in one or more of the following forms:
an order restraining the service provider from providing access to infringing material or activity residing at a particular online site on the provider's system or network; an order restraining the service provider from providing access to a subscriber or account holder of the service provider's system or network who is engaging in infringing activity and is identified in the order, by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder that are specified in the order; such other injunctive relief as the court may consider necessary to prevent or restrain infringement of copyrighted material specified in the order of the court at a particular online location, if such relief is the least burdensome to the service provider among the forms of relief comparably effective for that purpose. However, the global nature of the Internet presents problems to the civil forfeiture approach used by ICE. On May 12, 2011, Senator Leahy introduced S. 968 , the PROTECT IP Act. On October 26, 2011, Representative Lamar Smith, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced H.R. On January 20, 2012, Senator Reid announced that, "in light of recent events," he was postponing the cloture vote that had been scheduled for the PROTECT IP Act on January 24, although he expressed his hope that a compromise could be reached between supporters and opponents of the legislation "in the coming weeks." A federal law enforcement officer (with prior court approval) may serve a copy of such court order (to cease and desist from undertaking any further activity as an Internet site dedicated to infringing activities) to the following entities that would be required to take the specified actions:
Operators of non-authoritative domain name servers: Non-authoritative domain name servers are intermediary servers used to resolve a domain name to its Internet protocol address. Protecting U.S. Others claim that the legislation will give owners of copyrighted content "broad censorship powers." Foreign entities would be entitled to these same procedural safeguards as U.S.-based website operators. Furthermore, supporters believe the DNS blocking provisions of the legislation are key to preventing foreign sites from infringing American intellectual property rights:
Reaching sites originating outside the U.S. is critical to fighting a worldwide epidemic that is destroying the ability of the [content owners] to obtain the financing needed to produce future [content].... Internet sites that steal and distribute American intellectual property are often foreign-owned and operated, or reside at domain names that are not registered through a U.S.-based registry or registrar, setting them outside the scope of U.S. law enforcement. Supporters of SOPA observe that while the DMCA has worked well for copyright holders and service providers to address online infringement, the DMCA's "notice and takedown" procedures are ineffective against foreign rogue sites; furthermore, the DMCA does not apply to trademark infringement and does not address the use of financial intermediaries such as payment processors and Internet advertising services. Summary of the OPEN Act
On December 17, 2011, Senator Wyden, along with Senators Cantwell and Moran, introduced S. 2029 , the Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act (OPEN Act), to serve as an alternative to the PROTECT IP Act and SOPA. Additionally, the ITC may issue cease and desist orders against individuals determined to be violators of intellectual property rights. | The global nature of the Internet offers expanded commercial opportunities for intellectual property (IP) rights holders but also increases the potential for copyright and trademark infringement. Piracy of the content created by movie, music, and software companies and sales of counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs and consumer products negatively impact the American economy and can pose risks to the health and safety of U.S. citizens. Although rights holders and law enforcement agencies currently have some legal tools to pursue domestic infringers, they face difficult challenges in enforcing IP laws against actors located abroad. Many websites trafficking in pirated copyrighted content or counterfeit goods are registered and operate in foreign countries. These foreign "rogue sites" sell subject matter that infringes U.S. copyrights and trademarks to U.S. consumers, yet the website operators remain beyond the reach of U.S. courts and authorities.
Some believe that legislation is necessary to address the jurisdictional problem of holding foreign websites accountable for piracy and counterfeiting. On May 12, 2011, Senator Leahy introduced S. 968, the Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act (PROTECT IP Act), that would allow the Attorney General to seek an injunction from a federal court against a domain name used by a foreign website that engages in, enables, or facilitates infringement; such court order may then be served on U.S.-based domain name servers, Internet advertisers, search engines, and financial transaction providers, which would be required to take actions such as preventing access to the website or suspending business services to the site. IP rights holders may also sue to obtain a cease and desist order against the operator of an Internet site dedicated to infringement (whether domestic or foreign) or the domain name itself.
On October 26, 2011, Representative Lamar Smith introduced H.R. 3261, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). SOPA is similar to the PROTECT IP Act yet is broader in scope by including several provisions not found in S. 968, such as those that increase the criminal penalties for online streaming of copyrighted content, create criminal penalties for trafficking in counterfeit drugs, and require the appointment of dedicated IP personnel in U.S. embassies.
There has been considerable public debate about the PROTECT IP Act and SOPA. Critics claim these measures amount to "Internet censorship" and that they would impair free speech. There are also concerns that the legislation will disrupt the technical integrity of the Internet. Supporters of the bills argue that in order to reduce digital piracy and online counterfeiting, new enforcement mechanisms are vital for U.S. economic growth and needed to protect public health and safety. After intense lobbying against the legislation, Senator Reid on January 20, 2012, postponed a cloture vote that had been scheduled for the PROTECT IP Act, and Representative Smith announced that the House Judiciary Committee would similarly postpone consideration of SOPA, until a compromise could be reached between supporters and opponents of the legislation.
An alternative to these bills is the Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act (OPEN Act; S. 2029, H.R. 3782) that would authorize the International Trade Commission (ITC) to investigate foreign websites that allegedly engage in willful IP infringement. The ITC may issue a cease and desist order against the infringing foreign website; such an order may be used by the rights holder to oblige financial transaction providers or Internet advertising services to stop doing business with the website. Unlike the PROTECT IP Act and SOPA, the OPEN Act does not apply to domestic websites and also would not require search engines or domain name servers to block access or disable links to foreign websites. |
crs_RL33356 | crs_RL33356_0 | On one side, opposition to expanded foreign language use has led at least 30 states to enact statutes or amend state constitutions to declare English the official state language. Congressional proposals to install English as the official language of the United States reflect yet another aspect of the complicated ongoing national debate over federal immigration policy. The modern "Official English" movement in Congress is traceable to the mid-1980's, when various proposals to achieve linguistic uniformity by constitutional amendment were considered. When that approach failed, Congress renewed its efforts to codify English as the official language, proceeding on a statutory track. Federal Legislation to Make English the Official Language of Government
Standing alone, a legislative declaration of English as the "official" or "national" language of the United States would be a largely symbolic act of negligible legal effect. Constitutional Law Implications of Official English
Judicial decisions involving the constitutional implications of government language policies have arisen in a variety of legal contexts. State Laws
As noted, 30 states have adopted Official English laws in various forms. | Congressional proposals to install English as the official language of the United States reflect yet another aspect of the complicated ongoing national debate over immigration policy. The modern "Official English" movement may be traced to the mid-1980s, when various proposals to achieve linguistic uniformity by constitutional amendment were considered. While these earlier federal efforts failed, some legislation promoting official English laws at the state level was more successful. At least 30 states have laws declaring English to be the official state language.
In response, renewed congressional efforts to codify English as the "official" or "national" language by statute largely replaced the constitutional amendment approach of earlier years. For over a decade, legislation that would either declare English the official language of the United States government or that would oppose such declarations has been introduced in Congress. This report discusses the legal effect of some of these congressional proposals, as well as current federal policy on foreign language assistance, the constitutional law implications of official English proposals, and legal issues regarding state laws on official English. |
crs_R42401 | crs_R42401_0 | Post-acute care also includes skilled nursing facility (SNF) care—the most common source of post-acute care for beneficiaries. The following sections provide greater detail on Medicare SNF eligibility, SNF services, and the SNF prospective payment system (PPS). Eligibility for SNF Care
To be eligible to receive Medicare Part A SNF coverage, a beneficiary must have had an inpatient hospital stay of at least 3 consecutive calendar days (not including the day of discharge) and must be transferred to a participating SNF, usually within 30 days after discharge from the hospital. In addition, Medicare requires SNFs to provide services for a condition the beneficiary was receiving treatment for during his or her qualifying hospital stay (or for an additional condition that arose while in the SNF). Covered SNF Services and Providers
A Medicare beneficiary who qualifies for SNF coverage is entitled to up to 100 days of covered SNF care per spell of illness. Part A provides payment for daily skilled nursing, daily skilled rehabilitation, medical social services, drugs/biologicals, durable medical equipment, and bed and board when receiving such services, among other benefits. In general, nursing and rehabilitation services can be labeled skilled if they (1) require the skills of a health professional (e.g., registered nurse, physical therapist) and (2) are provided by or under the supervision of such personnel. SNFs are more commonly found within urban areas and within long-term care nursing facilities (referred to as freestanding SNFs ). 105-33 ) required most SNFs to be reimbursed under a prospective payment system (PPS) beginning on July 1, 1998. For the first 20 days of a Medicare-covered SNF stay, no beneficiary copayment is required. For the 21 st through the 100 th day, a daily copayment, indexed annually at one-eighth (12.5%) of the current Part A inpatient hospital deductible, is required. In 2016, the daily SNF copayment is $161. For each base rate, each RUG will have a noncase-mix component and a nursing component. For the most part, the global per diem rate and the beneficiary's length of stay in the SNF determine the total reimbursement amount to the SNF for the stay. SNF Value-Based Purchasing Program
Section 215 of the Protecting Access to Medicare Act (PAMA; P.L. | A Medicare skilled nursing facility (SNF) is an institution, or distinct part of an institution (e.g., building, floor, wing), that provides post-acute skilled nursing care and/or skilled rehabilitation services, has in effect a written agreement to transfer patients between one or more hospitals and the SNF, and is certified by Medicare. In general, skilled nursing and rehabilitative care are services ordered by a physician that require the skills of professional personnel (e.g., registered nurse, physical therapist) and are provided under the supervision of such personnel. Over 95% of SNFs are within long-term care facilities (or nursing homes).
A Medicare beneficiary is entitled to 100 days of SNF care for each Medicare-covered SNF stay. To be eligible for SNF coverage, a Medicare beneficiary must have been an inpatient of a hospital for at least 3 consecutive calendar days and transferred to a participating SNF usually within 30 days after discharge from the hospital. Beneficiaries must also receive treatment at the SNF for a condition they were receiving treatment for during their qualifying hospital stay (or for an additional condition that arose while in the SNF). For beneficiaries who meet these requirements, Medicare Part A may provide up to 100 days of coverage for the SNF stay.
Under Medicare Part A, SNFs are reimbursed under a prospective payment system (PPS), which began on July 1, 1998. The SNF PPS provides payment for bed and board, nursing care, therapy services, drugs, durable medical equipment, and certain ancillary services under a bundled per diem "per day" reimbursement amount, rather than Medicare paying for each item or service individually. For the first 20 days of SNF coverage, Medicare beneficiaries have no copayment. Medicare beneficiaries have a daily SNF copayment for the 21st through the 100th day indexed annually at one-eighth (12.5%) of the current Part A deductible. For 2016, the daily copayment is $161.
This report describes in further detail the Medicare SNF benefit and its resident population, covered SNF services and providers, and the SNF PPS. In addition, this report describes the Skilled Nursing Facility Value-Based Purchasing Program—a quality-based payment policy change included in the Protecting Access to Medicare Patients Act (PAMA; P.L. 113-93)—and other post-acute care reform efforts. |
crs_RL31798 | crs_RL31798_0 | What Is Data Mining? Data mining involves the use of sophisticated data analysis tools to discover previously unknown, valid patterns and relationships in large data sets. Data mining has become increasingly common in both the public and private sectors. To be successful, data mining requires skilled technical and analytical specialists who can structure the analysis and interpret the output that is created. Although data mining can help reveal patterns and relationships, it does not tell the user the value or significance of these patterns. These types of determinations must be made by the user. Another limitation of data mining is that while it can identify connections between behaviors and/or variables, it does not necessarily identify a causal relationship. Industries such as banking, insurance, medicine, and retailing commonly use data mining to reduce costs, enhance research, and increase sales. In the public sector, data mining applications were initially used as a means to detect fraud and waste, but they have grown also to be used for purposes such as measuring and improving program performance. Some observers suggest that data mining should be used as a means to identify terrorist activities, such as money transfers and communications, and to identify and track individual terrorists themselves, such as through travel and immigration records. Initiatives that have attracted significant attention include the now-discontinued Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) project conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the now-canceled Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II) that was being developed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Other initiatives that have been the subject of congressional interest include the Able Danger program and data collection and analysis projects being conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA). As with other aspects of data mining, while technological capabilities are important, other factors also influence the success of a project's outcome. Data quality refers to the accuracy and completeness of the data. Mission creep refers to the use of data for purposes other than that for which the data was originally collected. As data mining efforts move forward, Congress may consider a variety of questions including, the degree to which government agencies should use and mix commercial data with government data, whether data sources are being used for purposes other than those for which they were originally designed, and the possible application of the Privacy Act to these initiatives. 1502 , information regarding the technology and data being used; information on how the technology would be used and the target dates for deployment; an assessment of the likely efficacy of the data mining technology; an assessment of the likely impact of the activity on privacy and civil liberties; a list and analysis of the laws and regulations that would apply to the data mining activity and whether these laws and regulations would need to be modified to allow the data mining activity to be implemented; information on the policies, procedures, and guidelines that would be developed and applied to protect the privacy and due process rights of individuals, and ensure that only accurate information is collected and used; and information on how individuals whose information is being used in the data mining activity will be notified of the use of their information, and, if applicable, what options will be available for individual to opt-out of the activity. CRS Report RL32536, The Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) Pilot Project , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf). | Data mining has become one of the key features of many homeland security initiatives. Often used as a means for detecting fraud, assessing risk, and product retailing, data mining involves the use of data analysis tools to discover previously unknown, valid patterns and relationships in large data sets. In the context of homeland security, data mining can be a potential means to identify terrorist activities, such as money transfers and communications, and to identify and track individual terrorists themselves, such as through travel and immigration records.
While data mining represents a significant advance in the type of analytical tools currently available, there are limitations to its capability. One limitation is that although data mining can help reveal patterns and relationships, it does not tell the user the value or significance of these patterns. These types of determinations must be made by the user. A second limitation is that while data mining can identify connections between behaviors and/or variables, it does not necessarily identify a causal relationship. Successful data mining still requires skilled technical and analytical specialists who can structure the analysis and interpret the output.
Data mining is becoming increasingly common in both the private and public sectors. Industries such as banking, insurance, medicine, and retailing commonly use data mining to reduce costs, enhance research, and increase sales. In the public sector, data mining applications initially were used as a means to detect fraud and waste, but have grown to also be used for purposes such as measuring and improving program performance. However, some of the homeland security data mining applications represent a significant expansion in the quantity and scope of data to be analyzed. Some efforts that have attracted a higher level of congressional interest include the Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) project (now-discontinued) and the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II) project (now-canceled and replaced by Secure Flight). Other initiatives that have been the subject of congressional interest include the Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX), the Able Danger program, the Automated Targeting System (ATS), and data collection and analysis projects being conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA).
As with other aspects of data mining, while technological capabilities are important, there are other implementation and oversight issues that can influence the success of a project's outcome. One issue is data quality, which refers to the accuracy and completeness of the data being analyzed. A second issue is the interoperability of the data mining software and databases being used by different agencies. A third issue is mission creep, or the use of data for purposes other than for which the data were originally collected. A fourth issue is privacy. Questions that may be considered include the degree to which government agencies should use and mix commercial data with government data, whether data sources are being used for purposes other than those for which they were originally designed, and possible application of the Privacy Act to these initiatives. It is anticipated that congressional oversight of data mining projects will grow as data mining efforts continue to evolve. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL33229 | crs_RL33229_0 | No rights or privileges are forfeited under the Constitution, statutory law, or the Rules of the House merely upon an indictment for an offense, prior to an establishment of guilt under our judicial system. Internal party rules in the House, however, now require an indicted chairman or ranking Member of a House committee, or a member of the House party leadership, to temporarily step aside from his or her leadership or chairmanship position, although the Member's service in Congress would otherwise continue. It should be noted that Members of Congress do not automatically forfeit their offices upon conviction of a crime that constitutes a felony. There is no express constitutional disability or "disqualification" from Congress for the conviction of a crime, other than under the Fourteenth Amendment for certain treasonous conduct. Members of the House are, however, instructed by House Rule not to vote in committee or on the House floor once they have been convicted of a crime for which the punishment may be two or more years' imprisonment. Furthermore, under party rules, Members may lose their chairmanships of committees or ranking member status upon conviction of a felony. Conviction of certain crimes may subjectâand has subjected in the pastâMembers of the House to internal legislative disciplinary proceedings, including resolutions of reprimand or censure, as well as expulsion from the House upon approval of two-thirds of the Members. The Republican Conference Rules have also provided since 1993 that the "Chairman of a standing, select, joint or ad hoc committee of the Congress, or any subcommittee thereof, who is indicted for a felony for which a sentence of two or more years imprisonment may be imposed, shall step aside.... "
The Rules of the Democratic Caucus have had a similar provision since May of 1980 with regard to committee positions whereby a Democratic Member who is indicted for a felony for which a sentence of two or more years imprisonment may be imposed would "cease to exercise the powers of chairman or ranking minority member and shall step aside.... " In 2005, the Democratic Caucus adopted a provision requiring a member of the Democratic leadership of the House to step aside temporarily when they have been indicted for a felony for which a sentence of two or more years imprisonment may be imposed. Refraining from Voting in Congress After Conviction
Although the office of a Member of Congress is not automatically forfeited upon conviction of a felony, a sitting Member of the House of Representatives convicted of an offense that may result in two or more years imprisonment should, under House Rules XXIII (10), "refrain from participation in the business of each committee of which he is a member, and a Member should refrain from voting" on any question on the floor of the House until his or her presumption of innocence is restored, or until the individual is reelected to Congress. In a change mandated by the House, the House Ethics Committee is required generally to initiate an inquiry by an investigative subcommittee of that committee whenever a Member of the House has been indicted or otherwise charged with criminal conduct in any state or federal court. | There are no federal statutes or Rules of the House of Representatives that directly affect the status of a Member of Congress who has been indicted for a crime that constitutes a felony. No rights or privileges are forfeited under the Constitution, statutory law, or the Rules of the House merely upon an indictment for an offense, prior to an establishment of guilt under the judicial system. Under House Rules, therefore, an indicted Member may continue to participate in congressional proceedings and considerations. Under the Constitution, a person under indictment is not disqualified from being a Member of or a candidate for re-election to Congress. Internal party rules in the House, however, require an indicted chairman or ranking Member of a House committee, or a member of the House party leadership, to temporarily step aside from his or her leadership or chairmanship position. Additionally, a change in rules by the House requires the House Committee on Ethics to either initiate an inquiry by an investigative subcommittee of that Committee within 30 days of the time any Member of the House has been indicted or otherwise charged with criminal conduct in any state or federal court, or to report to the House the Committee's reasons for not moving forward.
As to a conviction of a crime, Members of Congress do not automatically forfeit their offices upon conviction of a crime that constitutes a felony. No express constitutional disability or "disqualification" from Congress exists for the conviction of a crime, other than under the Fourteenth Amendment for certain treasonous conduct by someone who has taken an oath of office to support the Constitution. Members of the House are, however, instructed by House Rules not to vote in committee or on the House floor once they have been convicted of a crime for which the punishment may be two or more years' imprisonment. Furthermore, under party rules, Members may lose their chairmanships of committees or ranking member status upon conviction of a felony. Conviction of certain crimes may subjectâand has subjected in the pastâMembers of the House to internal legislative disciplinary proceedings, including resolutions of reprimand or censure, as well as expulsion from the House upon approval of two-thirds of the Members. Conviction of certain crimes relating to national security offenses would result in the Member's forfeiture of his or her entire federal pension annuity under the provisions of the so-called "Hiss Act" and, under more recent provisions of law, conviction of particular crimes by Members relating to public corruption will result in the loss of the Member's entire "creditable service" as a Member for purposes of calculating their federal retirement annuities if the conduct underlying the conviction related to one's official duties. |
crs_R40712 | crs_R40712_0 | As discussed in more detail later in this report, the dealer franchise system emerged as a way for the automakers to market, finance, and service motor vehicles. Auto Dealers as an Economic Force
The nation's auto dealers are a significant economic force in the U.S. economy. First, the recession and the elimination of a large number of GM and Chrysler dealers are changing the balance of dealerships. This trend accelerated in 2009 and into 2010 with the closure of over 2,000 GM and Chrysler dealerships and the sale of GM's Hummer and Saab divisions and their corresponding dealerships. In June 2009, NADA estimated that the recession would have prompted the loss of about 1,200 dealers and that the GM and Chrysler reductions will double or triple the number of dealers who will have changed hands or gone out of business. These statistics are in sharp contrast to auto and auto parts manufacturing employment, which dropped by 21% between 1990 and 2008, declining from 1.1 million to an estimated 880,000. In return for the U.S. Government recapitalizing GMAC, the U.S. Treasury now owns approximately 56% of the company, while Cerberus owns 15%, third party investors own 12%, General Motors owns just under 7%, and a blind trust owns nearly an additional 7% of GMAC. This facility has had limited success. Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009 (CARS Act; P.L. U.S. GM and Chrysler have gone through bankruptcy; Chrysler is now managed and partially owned by Fiat, while 72.5% of GM is owned by the U.S. and Canadian governments. The viability plans submitted by GM and Chrysler in February 2009 were rejected by the Administration at the end of March 2009 as inadequate. The Chrysler and GM proceedings went swiftly. A new entity, formed in part by Fiat, purchased most of Chrysler's assets in mid-June and then changed its name to Chrysler Group LLC. The new automakers are smaller companies that have fewer plants, workers, and, in some cases, brands than did the former GM and Chrysler. Terms of Restructuring Affects Dealer Networks
As part of its restructuring plan, Chrysler terminated 789 of its 3,200 dealers in June 2009, and General Motors announced that it would reduce its dealerships from over 6,000 dealers to 3,600 when contracts expire in October 2010. Chrysler and GM have argued that reducing the size of their dealer networks will be a key ingredient in the success of the new automakers. Dealers presented their cases before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court judges who are adjudicating the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, asking the court to alter the dealer terminations planned by both companies. As part of its bankruptcy proceedings, Chrysler rejected contracts with 789 dealers. GM and Chrysler leadership faced off against auto dealers and the NADA. There are cost savings from the dealer reductions . A larger number of dealerships will lead to more sales of GM and Chrysler products. The dealers have been loyal partners with the automakers and many dealerships have been family-owned for generations. Therefore, few savings are likely to be generated from dealer reductions." Legislation in the 111th Congress
Congressional Hearings Held
After the mid-May 2009 announcement by GM and Chrysler that they planned to close approximately 2,000 dealers between them, many Members of Congress began to hear from dealers in their districts and states who were slated for termination. On July 7, 2009, the House Appropriations Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by Representative LaTourette that would require automobile companies that receive federal funds and are partially owned by the federal government to reinstate agreements with franchise dealerships to the extent that a valid dealer agreement existed prior to a Chapter 11 proceeding. GM and Chrysler opposed the amendment. The House passed the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2010 ( H.R. 111-117 ). Under this provision (Section 747 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act), GM and Chrysler must provide each terminated dealer by mid-January 2010 a letter explaining why it was terminated and a summary of this new arbitration process. Other legislation addressing dealer concerns includes:
H.R. Its companion bill is H.R. 2751 . H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. 2750 and H.R. H.R. | As Chrysler and General Motors (GM) moved toward and into bankruptcy, they received permission from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court to terminate about 2,000 contracts with auto dealers. Many of the dealers want their contracts reinstated and have sought relief from Congress. This report examines the changed economic landscape facing the auto sector, automaker arguments in favor of dealer reductions, and dealer counterpoints. It also highlights recent legislation introduced to address dealers' concerns.
Chrysler and GM have emerged from bankruptcy as significantly smaller companies, reflecting the end of a multiyear restructuring process for both companies. Chrysler is controlled by the Italian carmaker, Fiat, while GM's majority owner is the U.S. government. GM, which in 2008 operated 47 assembly, powertrain, and stamping facilities, will operate 34 plants by the end of 2010 and 33 by 2012. The number of hourly employees will have declined from 78,000 on December 31, 2007, to 62,200 at end-2008, to an estimated 40,000 in 2010. By way of contrast, GM had 304,000 hourly workers in 1991. GM also discontinued two brands (Pontiac and Saturn) and is to sell Hummer and Saab. The new Chrysler reduced its number of production facilities from 25 to 17 as part of its restructuring. The company employed 45,000 hourly U.S. employees in January 2008 and 27,000 in February 2009. For the first time, GM and Chrysler are not owned by private investors; rather, the UAW's retiree health trust owns 17.5% of GM and nearly 68% of Chrysler; the U.S. Treasury owns nearly 61% of GM and 10% of Chrysler and the Canadian and Ontario governments own nearly 12% of GM and about 10% of Chrysler. In addition, bondholders and creditors own 10% of GM. Fiat holds a 20% stake in Chrysler.
The auto dealership network, a critical intermediary between automakers and final consumers, has not escaped this turmoil. Auto dealers are independent businesses with contracts with the automakers. Most of the approximately 20,000 U.S. auto dealers are family-owned and have been in business in their hometowns for decades. As with all stakeholders in GM and Chrysler, the dealer owners are faced with stark choices as the automakers downsize and seek a more competitive business model. As part of their restructuring, Chrysler cut 789 dealers immediately and GM is to eliminate more than 1,300 when the dealer's contracts expire in October 2010.
While dealer reductions of this magnitude would not have been possible in the normal course of business, the bankruptcy court approved both the Chrysler and GM requests to terminate dealerships as part of larger processes that have allowed a new GM and a new Chrysler to emerge from bankruptcy with many fewer assets and liabilities. Of the roughly 2,000 affected dealers, many oppose the changes and took their battle against GM and Chrysler to Congress. Congressional hearings were held and a number of bills to restore the dealer terminations were introduced, including H.R. 2743, H.R. 2750, H.R. 2751, H.R. 2793, and H.R. 2796. In July 2009, the House passed the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 3170), which included a committee-approved amendment that would require automobile companies that receive federal funds and are partially owned by the federal government—that is, GM and Chrysler—to reinstate agreements with franchise dealerships that had a valid dealer agreement prior to Chapter 11 proceedings. This provision was modified significantly during a conference with the Senate and ultimately included in the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117). The new law provides a binding arbitration process for terminated GM and Chrysler dealers who would like to be reconsidered and reinstated. Other legislation affecting dealers includes H.R. 1606, H.R. 2224, H.R. 3088, S. 1253, S. 247, and S. 1135. This report will be updated as necessary. |
crs_R44066 | crs_R44066_0 | Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, state law and policy (or law and policy of local subdivisions of states, acting under state law) that conflicts with federal law must yield to the exercise of Congress's powers. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), which defines the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assess and regulate chemical substances in U.S. commerce, takes an intermediate approach. Overview of TSCA
An overview of TSCA as a whole is necessary to place TSCA's preemption provisions in context. TSCA establishes a chemical regulatory program allowing EPA to review new chemical substances before they enter U.S. commerce, as well as significant new uses of chemical substances as designated by EPA (§5); to regulate chemicals in commerce that EPA determines to present unreasonable risks of injury to human health or the environment, using the least burdensome requirements that adequately protect against such risks (§6); and to require testing on chemicals that may present an unreasonable risk, or that merit testing by virtue of certain high production volume or high exposure potential criteria (§4). TSCA's core provisions (Title I) have not been significantly amended since the law's enactment in 1976. So long as EPA has not specifically addressed a chemical under TSCA, there is no preemption of state regulation of that same chemical. EPA has issued testing rules for several hundred chemicals under Section 4. These few EPA rules have not preempted many state or local requirements. The proposals differ in various respects from one another, however, including with respect to preemption. In the 114 th Congress, S. 697 , the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21 st Century Act, was introduced on March 10, 2015. Following a markup, an amended version of S. 697 was ordered to be reported out of the committee on April 28, 2015, on a 15-5 vote with bipartisan support. S. 697 was reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute on June 17, 2015, and placed on the Senate legislative calendar. An alternate proposal, S. 725 , the Alan Reinstein and Trevor Schaefer Toxic Chemical Protection Act, has not been ordered to be reported out of committee. S. 725 would eliminate express preemption from TSCA entirely, and is not included in this report's comparison. In the House of Representatives, a discussion draft entitled the TSCA Modernization Act of 2015 was released in early April, and a hearing was held in the Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy of the Committee on Energy and Commerce on April 14, 2015. The TSCA Modernization Act of 2015 was formally introduced, with some amendments, on May 26, 2015, as H.R. The bill, as amended, was debated on the House floor and passed the House on June 23, 2015, on a 398-1 vote. S. 697 generally takes a more comprehensive and detailed approach to amending TSCA. H.R. H.R. While doing so in different ways, both bills would also generally expand EPA's testing authority; impose certain requirements pertaining to scientific standards; modify TSCA's confidentiality provisions; expand TSCA's fee provisions; and make certain other changes and additions to other sections of the law—although as noted above, S. 697 would make substantially more changes and additions. Table 1 below provides a side-by-side comparison of the preemption provisions and other provisions related to the state-federal relationship in these two bills. Table 1 first describes limits on the universe of state or local rules that would potentially be subject to preemption by EPA actions by comparing the bills' overall preemption scope, exceptions, and savings clauses. Table 1 then compares the scope and timing of preemption (subject to the exceptions) based on various EPA actions under each proposal. Here, there are somewhat larger structural differences between the bills: for example, S. 697 preempts new state restrictions while a chemical is undergoing assessment by EPA, while H.R. 2576 has somewhat broader preemption on the basis of EPA actions on new chemicals and significant new uses of chemicals. Both bills would preempt state requirements after EPA either imposed requirements on a chemical found to present an unreasonable risk, or after EPA determined that a chemical did not present an unreasonable risk. 2576 , which are retained from current TSCA. | The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was enacted in 1976 to govern the regulation of chemical substances in U.S. commerce. Its core provisions have not been significantly amended since that time. Under TSCA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has implemented a chemicals management program over the past four decades. EPA has issued a very limited number of risk management rules under TSCA to restrict chemicals it has found to present unreasonable risks of injury to human health or the environment. Meanwhile, states and, in a few cases, local subdivisions of states have enacted an increasing number of their own chemical programs and restrictions.
The federal preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that federal laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Congress can expressly preempt state and local laws by statute, and the scope of preemption is determined by Congress's intent. Because TSCA preemption is based on EPA's issuance of certain types of rules and orders targeting particular chemicals (subject to exceptions), state and local chemical programs and restrictions—for the most part targeting chemicals not subject to EPA risk management rules—generally have not faced preemption under TSCA. As legislative proposals to amend TSCA have been discussed in recent years, one major topic of debate has been the extent to which the scope of TSCA's preemption of state chemical regulations should be preserved, expanded, or reduced.
This report provides a brief background on preemption in current TSCA. The report then provides a side-by-side comparison of the preemption provisions of House and Senate bills in the 114th Congress to amend TSCA. S. 697, the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, was ordered to be reported out of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee on April 28, 2015, on a 15-5 vote. It was reported, as amended, on June 17, 2015, and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar. H.R. 2576, the TSCA Modernization Act of 2015, was first released as a discussion draft on April 7, 2015. It was introduced as H.R. 2576 on May 26, 2015, and passed the House as amended on June 23, 2015, on a 398-1 vote.
Both bills would expand EPA's authority to regulate chemicals in a number of ways, similar in some respects, although S. 697 is a longer and more detailed bill that would make more changes to TSCA's language than H.R. 2576. The preemption provisions of the two bills have many similarities as well, including in their overall structure, which retains TSCA's approach of only preempting state and local laws on a chemical-by-chemical basis after EPA action on a chemical. Both bills would also exclude from preemption state and some local chemical requirements in effect as of August 1, 2015, and any state or local requirements arising from long-standing state chemical laws such as California's Proposition 65. However, the bills have a number of differences with respect to preemption. For example, S. 697 would preempt new restrictions on a chemical while EPA prepared a safety assessment on that chemical, a period of up to several years; H.R. 2576 may impose somewhat broader preemption on the basis of EPA actions for new chemicals and new uses than S. 697. Various other similarities and differences between the two bills regarding preemptive EPA actions, exceptions, exemptions, and waivers are also compared.
A third proposal to amend TSCA, S. 725, the Alan Reinstein and Trevor Schaefer Toxic Chemical Protection Act, would eliminate express TSCA preemption entirely. S. 725 is not included in this report's comparison. |
crs_R43099 | crs_R43099_0 | For a number of years, some Members of Congress have favored "comprehensive immigration reform" (CIR), a label that commonly refers to omnibus legislation that includes increased border security and immigration enforcement, expanded employment eligibility verification, revision of nonimmigrant visas and legal permanent immigration, and legalization for some unauthorized aliens residing in the country. Leaders in both chambers have identified immigration as a legislative priority in the 113 th Congress. While the House Committee on the Judiciary has ordered reported several distinct pieces of legislation that aim to reform immigration law thus far in the 113 th Congress, the debate in the Senate has focused on a single CIR bill: the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act ( S. 744 ), which was reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee May 28, 2013, and was amended during three weeks of floor debate before being passed by the Senate on a yea-nay vote of 68-32 on June 27, 2013. This report succinctly summarizes major provisions of S. 744 , as passed by the Senate. CRS's analysis focuses on eight major policy areas that encompass the U.S. immigration debate: comprehensive reform "triggers" and funding; border security; interior enforcement; employment eligibility verification and worksite enforcement; legalization of unauthorized aliens; immigrant visas; nonimmigrant visas; and humanitarian provisions. For a more comprehensive discussion of legislation relating to these issues see CRS Report R43097, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113 th Congress: Major Provisions in Senate-Passed S. 744 , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. | For several years, some Members of Congress have favored "comprehensive immigration reform" (CIR), a label that commonly refers to omnibus legislation that includes increased border security and immigration enforcement, expanded employment eligibility verification, revision of nonimmigrant visas and legal permanent immigration, and legalization for some unauthorized aliens residing in the country. The omnibus legislative approach contrasts with incremental revisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and other immigration laws that would address some but not all of these elements, and with sequential reforms that would tackle border security and interior enforcement provisions prior to revising legal immigration or enacting legalization pathways.
Leaders in both chambers have identified immigration as a legislative priority in the 113th Congress. While the House Committee on the Judiciary has ordered reported several distinct pieces of legislation that aim to reform immigration law thus far in the 113th Congress, the debate in the Senate has focused on a single CIR bill: the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744). This report briefly summarizes major provisions of S. 744, which the Senate amended and passed by a yea-nay vote of 68-32 on June 27, 2013.
CRS's analysis focuses on eight major policy areas that encompass the U.S. immigration debate: comprehensive reform "triggers" and funding; border security; interior enforcement; employment eligibility verification and worksite enforcement; legalization of unauthorized aliens; immigrant visas; nonimmigrant visas; and humanitarian provisions.
This report provides a concise summary of S. 744 related to each of these issues. An accompanying report, CRS Report R43097, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress: Major Provisions in Senate-Passed S. 744, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], discusses the bill and policy areas in greater detail. |
crs_RL33967 | crs_RL33967_0 | The act serves four basic purposes. First, it reformulates the federal standards for sex offender registration in state, territorial and tribal sexual offender registries, and does so in a manner designed to make the system more uniform, more inclusive, more informative, and more readily available to the public online. Second, it introduces a fairly extensive and diverse set of amendments to federal criminal law and procedure, featuring, among other things, a federal procedure for the civil commitment of convicted sex offenders upon their release from prison, a random search authority over sex offenders on probation or supervised release, and a number of new mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for various new and existing federal sex offenses. The act arrived on the President's desk as H.R. Sex Offender Registration
One of the center pieces of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act is the revision of the nation-wide sex offender registration system. The earlier statute, the Jacob Wetterling Act, encouraged states to establish and maintain a registration system. Finally, jurisdictions must participate in the Megan Nicole Kanka and Alexandra Nicole Zapp Communication Notification Program under which they are obligated to provide updated registration information within five days to the Attorney General; to law enforcement, school and public housing officials in the area where the registrant lives, works, or studies; to other jurisdictions where the registrant lives, works, or studies or recently did so; to National Child Protection Act background check agencies; to child welfare agencies; to certain volunteer organizations; and to individuals and entities that request notification under a jurisdiction's law. Adjustments in Federal Criminal Law
The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act is focused, as its name implies, upon child protection and safety. murder in the course of a wider range of federal sex offenses, 18 U.S.C. 2245 Internet date rape drug trafficking, 21 U.S.C. There is no statute of limitations for federal capital offenses or for any of federal crimes of terrorism involving a risk of serious injury. State crime victims in federal habeas proceedings
The victims of federal crimes enjoy limited statutory rights to notice, attendance and participation in related federal judicial proceedings, 18 U.S.C. The National Police Athletic League Youth Enrichment Act established a grant program for the Police Athletic League, with an authorization of appropriations in the amount of $16 million a year through FY2005. Other Child Safety Initiatives
The act sets forth a wide assortment of other provisions designed to prevent, prosecute or punish the victimization of children. | The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, ( P.L. 109-248 , H.R. 4472 ), emerged from Congress following the passage of separate bills in the House and Senate ( H.R. 3132 and S. 1086 respectively). The act's provisions fall into four categories: a revised sex offender registration system, child and sex related amendments to federal criminal and procedure, child protective grant programs, and other initiatives designed to prevent and punish sex offenders and those who victimize children.
The sex offender registration provisions replace the Jacob Wetterling Act provisions with a statutory scheme under which states are required to modify their registration systems in accordance with federal requirements at the risk of losing 10% of their Byrne program law enforcement assistance funds. The act seeks to close gaps in the prior system, provide more information on a wider range of offenders, and make the information more readily available to the public and law enforcement officials.
In the area of federal criminal law and procedure, the act enlarges the kidnaping statute, increases the number of federal capital offenses, enhances the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment and other penalties that attend various federal sex offenses, establishes a civil commitment procedure for federal sex offenders, authorizes random searches as a condition for sex offender probation and supervised release, outlaws Internet date drug trafficking, permits the victims of state crimes to participate in related federal habeas corpus proceedings, and eliminates the statute of limitations for certain sex offenses and crimes committed against children.
The act revives the authorization of appropriations under the Police Athletic Youth Enrichment Act among its other grant provisions and requires the establishment of a national child abuse registry among its other child safety initiatives.
This report is available in an abridged version, without footnotes and most citations to authority, as CRS Report RS22646, Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act: A Sketch , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44110 | crs_R44110_0 | Departed, Returned, Inspired
The 57 homegrown IS-plots can be broken into three rough categories based on the courses of action that plotters pursued as they attempted to support the terrorist group. The first two categories focus on foreign fighters, the last on people willing to do harm in the United States:
The Departed — American foreign fighters who plan to leave or have left the United States to fight for the Islamic State. The Returned — American foreign fighters who trained with or fought in the ranks of the Islamic State and return to the United States, where they can potentially plan and execute attacks at home. The Inspired — Americans lured—in part—by IS propaganda to participate in terrorist plots within the United States. Beyond the Departed, Returned, and Inspired
Aside from the three categories based on the courses of action that IS supporters follow, at least two other sorts of IS foreign fighters pose some threat to U.S. interests. The Lost: unidentified Americans who fight in the ranks of the Islamic State. Such individuals may come home after fighting abroad and remain unknown to U.S. law enforcement. Some American IS fighters will never book a trip back to the United States. Finally, some American IS supporters will perish abroad. The Others: foreign IS adherents who radicalize in and originate from places outside of the United States or non-American foreign fighters active in the ranks of the Islamic State. These persons could try to enter the United States from abroad. The following discussion is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of federal law enforcement counterterrorism efforts in the homeland. Preempting Terrorists
Preemption of terrorist activity by U.S. law enforcement can be broadly described in terms of screening and interdiction (stopping a suspected terrorist from entering the United States, for example), law enforcement investigation, and government activities aimed at keeping radicalized individuals from morphing into terrorists . | Analysis of publicly available information on homegrown violent jihadist activity in the United States since September 11, 2001, suggests that the Islamic State (IS) and its acolytes may pose broad challenges to domestic law enforcement and homeland security efforts. Homegrown IS-inspired plots can be broken into three rough categories based on the goals of the individuals involved. The first two focus on foreign fighters, the last on people willing to do harm in the United States:
The Departed—Americans, often described as foreign fighters, who plan to leave or have left the United States to fight for the Islamic State. The Returned—American foreign fighters who trained with or fought in the ranks of the Islamic State and come back to the United States, where they can potentially plan and execute attacks at home. The Inspired—Americans lured—in part—by IS propaganda to participate in terrorist plots within the United States.
At least two other categories of IS foreign fighters pose some threat to U.S. interests:
The Lost—Unknown Americans who fight in the ranks of the Islamic State but do not plot terrorist attacks against the United States. Such individuals may come home after fighting abroad and remain unknown to U.S. law enforcement. Additionally, some American IS fighters will never book a trip back to the United States. Finally, some American IS supporters will perish abroad. The Others—Foreign IS adherents who radicalize in and originate from places outside of the United States or non-American foreign fighters active in the ranks of the Islamic State. These persons could try to enter the United States when done fighting abroad.
Federal law enforcement has numerous approaches to go after each of these categories of terrorist actors. These include the following:
Watchlisting—the federal counterterrorism watchlisting regimen effectively attempts to shrink "the lost" category described above. Preemption—efforts geared toward preemption of terrorist activity can be broadly described in terms of interdiction (stopping a suspected terrorist from entering the United States, for example), law enforcement investigation, and government activities aimed at keeping radicalized individuals from morphing into terrorists, also known as countering violent extremism. |
crs_R43422 | crs_R43422_0 | It will be updated as warranted. Background on the COM Role
"Chief of Mission," or COM, is the title conferred on the principal officer in charge of each U.S. diplomatic mission to a foreign country, foreign territory, or international organization. Usually the term refers to the U.S. ambassadors who lead U.S. embassies abroad, but the term also is used for ambassadors who head other official U.S. missions and to other diplomatic personnel who may step in when no ambassador is present. Appointed by the President, each COM serves as the President's personal representative, leading diplomatic efforts for a particular mission or in the country of assignment under the general supervision of the Secretary of State and with the support of the regional assistant secretary of state. Current Legal Authority of Chiefs of Mission
The authorities and responsibilities of COMs are explained primarily in the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended (FSA 1980; P.L. 96-465 ). COM authority is also shaped by executive branch directives, which include executive orders and other presidential directives and State Department regulations, some of which provide more extensive authority than FSA 1980. COM Responsibilities . Pursuant to Section 207(a)(2), the COM is also responsible for keeping " fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country, and shall insure that all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission." Common Questions
A number of questions are often raised regarding the scope and exercise of COM authority. Does COM authority extend to Department of Defense (DOD) personnel? Is COM authority in effect in countries where the United States is engaging in hostilities? Who Exercises COM Authority in Countries Without a U.S. Embassy or U.S. Diplomatic Presence? What Is the COM's Authority over Members of Congress, Legislative Branch Employees, and Congressional Foreign Travel? Current Concerns and Possible Options
Congress plays an important role in setting standards for the exercise of COM authority and providing COMs with the resources—training, personnel, monetary—to promote its effective exercise. Conclusion
U.S. ambassadors and others exercising COM authority are by law the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy coordination in their respective countries. Their jobs are highly complex, demanding a broad knowledge of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit and the ability to oversee the activities and manage the representatives of from many U.S. government entities, which in some embassies number about 40 U.S. departments and agencies. | "Chief of Mission," or COM, is the title conferred on the principal officer in charge of each U.S. diplomatic mission to a foreign country, foreign territory, or international organization. Usually the term refers to the U.S. ambassadors who lead U.S. embassies abroad, but the term also is used for ambassadors who head other official U.S. missions and to other diplomatic personnel who may step in when no ambassador is present. Appointed by the President, each COM serves as the President's personal representative, leading diplomatic efforts for a particular mission or in the country of assignment. U.S. ambassadors and others exercising COM authority are by law the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy coordination in their respective countries. Their jobs are highly complex, demanding a broad knowledge of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit and the ability to oversee the activities and manage the representatives of many U.S. government entities, with some exceptions for those under military command. Congress plays an important role in setting standards for the exercise of COM authority and providing COMs with the resources—training, personnel, monetary—to promote its effective exercise. A number of recent developments have increased congressional attention to issues associated with the roles and responsibilities of COMs.
The statutory basis for COM authority and responsibilities is the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as amended (FSA 1980; P.L. 96-465), which states that the COM has "full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that countries," with some exceptions; and for keeping "fully and currently informed" about all government activities and operations within that country. COM authority is also conferred by other sources of legal authority, which include executive orders and other presidential directives and State Department regulations, some of which provide more extensive authority than the FSA 1980. The Chief of Mission role in conducting and coordinating diplomacy abroad was also invoked in the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), released by the State Department in 2010.
The scope and exercise of COM authority, both generally and in specific instances, have been of ongoing interest and concern to Congress. This report summarizes the current legal authority of Chiefs of Mission to include relevant legislation and executive branch directives and regulations. It includes brief discussion of common questions related to COM authority such as:
Does COM authority extend to Department of Defense (DOD) personnel? Who exercises COM authority in countries without a U.S. embassy or diplomatic presence? Is COM authority in effect in countries where the United States is engaging in hostilities? What is the COM's authority over the legislative branch?
Finally, specific concerns, possible options, and reform proposals for improving COM authority and effectiveness are explored. This report may be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42431 | crs_R42431_0 | Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agencies for a variety of reasons, and in a variety of ways. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, as amended) is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified more than 40 provisions in ACA that explicitly require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation. The Unified Agenda
A potentially effective way for Congress to identify upcoming ACA rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda, which is published twice each year (usually in the spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration, for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The Unified Agenda lists upcoming activities, by agency, in three separate categories:
"active" actions, including rules in the prerule stage (e.g., advance notices of proposed rulemaking that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months); proposed rule stage (i.e., notices of proposed rulemaking that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months, or for which the closing date of the comment period is the next step); and final rule stage (i.e., final rules or other final actions that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months); "completed" actions (i.e., final rules or rules that have been withdrawn since the last edition of the Unified Agenda); and "long-term" actions (i.e., items under development that agencies do not expect to take action on in the next 12 months). All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date (sometimes just the projected month and year) for the next regulatory action. Each entry also contains an element indicating the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act). This report examines the January 20, 2012, edition of the Unified Agenda and identifies upcoming proposed and final rules and long-term actions that were expected to be issued pursuant to ACA in the next 12 months. The results of the search for proposed and final rules are provided in the Appendix to this report. Effects on Small Entities
Three of the upcoming final rules were expected to trigger the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act because of their effects on small businesses:
two HHS/FDA rules on "Food Labeling: Nutrition Labeling for Food Sold in Vending Machines" and "Food Labeling: Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and Similar Retail Food Establishments"; and a TREAS/IRS rule on "Indoor Tanning Services; Cosmetic Services Excise Taxes." Upcoming Proposed and Final Rules Pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act | Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agencies for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, as amended) is a particularly noteworthy example of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to federal agencies. A previous CRS report identified more than 40 provisions in ACA that explicitly require or permit the issuance of rules to implement the legislation.
One way for Congress to identify upcoming ACA rules is by reviewing the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, which is published twice each year (spring and fall) by the Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC), a component of the U.S. General Services Administration, for the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). The Unified Agenda lists upcoming activities, by agency, in three separate categories:
"active" actions, including rules in the prerule stage (e.g., advance notices of proposed rulemaking that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months); proposed rule stage (i.e., notices of proposed rulemaking that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months, or for which the closing date of the comment period is the next step); and final rule stage (i.e., final rules or other final actions that are expected to be issued in the next 12 months); "completed" actions (i.e., final rules or rules that have been withdrawn since the last edition of the Unified Agenda); and "long-term" actions (i.e., items under development that agencies do not expect to take action on in the next 12 months).
All entries in the Unified Agenda have uniform data elements, including the department and agency issuing the rule, the title of the rule, its Regulation Identifier Number (RIN), an abstract describing the nature of the action being taken, and a timetable showing the dates of past actions and a projected date for the next regulatory action. Each entry also indicates the priority of the regulation (e.g., whether it is considered "economically significant" under Executive Order 12866, or whether it is considered a "major" rule under the Congressional Review Act).
This report examines the most recent edition of the Unified Agenda (Fall 2011), published on January 20, 2012, the third edition since the enactment of ACA. The report identifies upcoming proposed rules that agencies identify as pursuant to ACA, such as an upcoming Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) proposed rule on "Medicaid Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act." Additionally, this report identifies upcoming final rules listed that are expected to be issued pursuant to ACA, such as a pair of upcoming Food and Drug Administration (FDA) final rules on "Nutrition Labeling for Food Sold in Vending Machines" and "Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and Similar Retail Food Establishments." The Appendix lists these upcoming proposed and final rules in a table.
This report also briefly identifies some long-term actions listed in the Unified Agenda, such as the upcoming Health and Human Services/Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (HHS/CMS) final rule on "Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act." Finally, this report briefly discusses some options for congressional oversight over the ACA rules, including the procedures contained within the Congressional Review Act. |
crs_R43120 | crs_R43120_0 | Presidential Announcement
On June 25, 2013, President Obama announced a national plan to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases (GHG), as well as to encourage adaptation to expected climate change. The President stated a willingness to work with Congress on a bipartisan, market-based scheme to reduce GHG emissions. Pledged Actions and Timing
The President affirmed his commitment to his 2009 policy pledge to reduce U.S. GHG emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 if all other major economies agreed to limit their emissions as well. In 2012, the United States' gross GHG emissions were approximately 10% below their 2005 levels, or about 5% above 1990 levels. U.S. GHG emissions peaked in 2007. These are outlined below in three broad categories from the President's plan, which describes his three "pillars" as
1. cut carbon pollution in America; 2. prepare the United States for the impacts of climate change; 3. lead international efforts to combat global climate change and prepare for its impacts. Few of the listed measures specify the timing of executive branch actions, or the quantitative GHG reductions that should be achieved. Cut Carbon Pollution
GHG Standards for Electricity Generation
The centerpiece of the President's Climate Action Plan arguably is the Presidential Memorandum setting deadlines for EPA to issue rules to curtail carbon dioxide emissions from new and existing power plants. Specifically, the Presidential Memorandum first instructs EPA to issue, as planned, a new proposal under the Clean Air Act (CAA), by September 20, 2013, for GHG emissions from newly constructed electric generating units (EGU), and to issue the final rule "in a timely fashion" after comments. This rule was proposed in the Federal Register on January 8, 2014, opening a 60-day comment period. Second, and more significantly, the Presidential Memorandum directs EPA also to issue standards, regulations, or guidelines for CO 2 emissions applicable to modified, reconstructed and existing power plants, building on states' efforts to reduce power plant emissions. EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy plans to announce the proposed guidelines for existing EGU emissions on June 2, 2014. The Memorandum directs EPA to finalize the guidelines by June 1, 2015, and notes that states should submit to EPA their implementation plans, required under Section 111(d) of the CAA, and their implementing regulations by June 30, 2016. The net effects of the pipeline's impact on our climate will be absolutely critical to determining whether this project can go forward . " Increasing Fuel Economy Standards for Heavy-Duty Vehicles for the post-2018 Model Years . Collaborat e to Reduce Methane Emissions . Related to measures to adapt to climate change, conservation and land management will seek to protect and restore forests, grasslands, wetlands, and other resources. Agencies will continue to enter into performance-based contracts that promote energy savings and take additional actions to promote energy efficiency. Following up, Executive Order 13653, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change , was issued November 1, 2013. It expounds upon efforts federal agencies should undertake to enhance climate preparedness and resilience. 13653 builds on previous executive orders and policies requiring agencies to develop climate change action plans and timelines. New in the President's announcement is a call to end U.S. support for public financing of new coal-fired power plants overseas. In cooperation under the UNFCCC, the Obama Administration pledged to help mobilize $30 billion of financing during 2010-2012 to assist developing countries mitigate GHG emissions and adapt to climate change. Some in Congress may seek to enact a more cohesive alternative to EPA regulation of GHG emissions and the assortment of Administration measures in the Obama plan. The Keystone XL pipeline, to transport Canadian oil sands crude across the U.S. border, requires a Presidential Permit from the President. | On June 25, 2013, President Obama announced a Climate Action Plan (CAP) to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHG), and to encourage adaptation to expected climate change. The President affirmed his 2009 pledge to reduce U.S. GHG emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 if all other major economies agreed to limit their emissions as well. In 2012, U.S. gross GHG emissions were approximately 10% below 2005 levels.
The President stated willingness to work with Congress toward enacting a bipartisan, market-based scheme to reduce GHG emissions. He also said that he would take executive branch actions in the absence of congressional support. His CAP identifies measures in three categories:
Cut carbon pollution in America. Prepare the United States for the impacts of climate change. Lead international efforts to address global climate change.
Many measures in the CAP have been under way. The plan specifies few timelines or metrics for evaluating progress of individual measures.
A Presidential Memorandum, also of June 25, 2014, directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to issue two rules to curtail CO2 emissions from new and existing power plants. First, it instructs EPA to re-propose standards under the Clean Air Act (CAA) for GHG emissions from newly constructed electric generating units (EGU), and to issue the final rule "in a timely fashion" after comments. This proposal was published in the Federal Register on January 8, 2014, opening a 60-day comment period.
Second, and more significantly, the Memorandum directs EPA to issue standards, regulations, or guidelines for CO2 emissions applicable to modified, reconstructed, and existing power plants, building on states' efforts to reduce power plant emissions. EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy plans to announce the proposed guidelines for existing EGU on June 2, 2014. The Memorandum requests rules to be finalized by June 1, 2015. Further, it requests that guidelines require states to submit to EPA their implementation plans, required under Section 111(d) of the CAA, and their implementing regulations by June 30, 2016. Many stakeholders have encouraged EPA to write the standards and guidelines to allow innovative, potentially cost-cutting flexibilities to states and regulated entities.
The CAP additionally announces regulatory actions to
reduce GHG emissions including fuel efficiency standards for heavy-duty vehicles post-2018; tighten efficiency standards for federal buildings; and require a transition away from chemicals that contribute to global climate change that were introduced as alternatives to stratospheric ozone-depleting chemicals.
President Obama referred to the pending Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL pipeline to carry Canadian oil sands across the U.S. border: "The net effects of the pipeline's impact on our climate will be absolutely critical to determining whether this project is allowed to go forward."
In early 2014, the White House announced a strategy to reduce methane, about 9% of U.S. GHG emissions. Additional administrative actions would promote energy efficiency and increased electricity generation by renewable energy in federal facilities, on federal lands, and by private, state, and local partners of federal agencies. The President's FY2015 budget proposed funding for some related actions.
To promote adaptation to climate change by the federal government and states and localities, the CAP mostly continues existing programs. Executive Order 13653, issued November 1, 2013, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, expounds on efforts federal agencies should undertake to enhance climate preparedness and resilience.
The CAP includes international initiatives to promote global reductions of GHG emissions and adaptation. One would end U.S. support for public financing of new coal-fired power plants overseas, except those employing advanced efficiency or carbon capture and sequestration technology.
Notably, the CAP does not quantify whether it would meet the President's commitment to reduce GHG emissions by 17% from 2005 levels by 2020. Nor does it say how the United States would produce its share of a 2009 international pledge of $100 billion annually to assist developing countries to mitigate GHG emissions and adapt to climate change. |
crs_RL30608 | crs_RL30608_0 | The bilateral economic relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) is the largest such relationship in the world—and it is growing. The modern U.S.-European economic relationship has evolved since World War II. It has broadened as the 6-member European Community expanded into the present 28-member European Union. The ties have also become more complex, covering a growing number and type of trade and financial activities that intertwine the economies on both sides of the Atlantic into an increasingly interdependent relationship. The United States and the EU have embarked on an effort to bind their economic relationship even more tightly with negotiations to form a free trade agreement—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). U.S.-EU Trade in Goods and Services
The EU as a unit is the largest merchandise trading partner of the United States. In 2012, the EU accounted for $265.1 billion of total U.S. exports (or 17.1%) and for $380.8 billion of total U.S. imports (or 16.7%) for a U.S. trade deficit of $115.7 billion. The EU is the largest U.S. trade partner when trade in services is added to trade in merchandise. In 2012 (latest data available), the EU accounted for $193.8 billion (or 30.7% of the total in U.S. services exports). Trade in goods and services, plus income receipts and payments, plus unilateral transfers, make up the U.S. current account , the most comprehensive measure of U.S. trade flows. In 2012 alone, a total of more than $1,500.5 billion flowed between the United States and the EU. In 2012, an estimated net $150.0 billion flowed from U.S. residents to EU countries into direct investments, while an estimated net $105.9 billion flowed from EU residents to direct investments in the United States. It is a relationship that is likely to grow in importance as advancements in technology and other forces of globalization, plus the future enlargement of the EU, force more trade and investment barriers to fall. The expanded relationship is widely seen as bringing economic benefits to both sides in the form of wider choices of goods and services and greater investment opportunities. But increasing economic interdependence brings challenges as well as benefits. Greater economic integration also challenges long-held notions of "sovereignty," as national or regional policies have extraterritorial impact. Similarly, accepted understandings of "competition," "markets," and other economic concepts are tested as national borders dissolve with closer integration of economies. U.S. and EU policy makers, therefore, continually face the task of how to manage the increasingly complex bilateral economic relationship in ways that maximize benefits and keep frictions to a minimum. For Members of Congress it means weighing the benefits and costs to constituents of greater economic integration and placing this calculation in the context of overall U.S. national interests. The debate over U.S.-EU economic relations will likely become more acute as the United States pursues the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership FTA with the EU. | The United States and the European Union (EU) economic relationship is the largest in the world—and it is growing. The modern U.S.-European economic relationship has evolved since World War II, broadening as the 6-member European Community expanded into the present 28-member European Union. The ties have also become more complex and interdependent, covering a growing number and type of trade and financial activities. The United States and the EU have embarked on negotiations to establish a free trade agreement—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
In 2012 (latest data available), $1,500.5 billion flowed between the United States and the EU on the current account, the most comprehensive measure of U.S. trade flows. The EU as a unit is the largest merchandise trading partner of the United States. In 2012, the EU accounted for $265.1 billion of total U.S. exports (or 17.1%) and for $380.8 billion of total U.S. imports (or 16.7%) for a U.S. trade deficit of $115.7 billion. The EU is also the largest U.S. trade partner when trade in services is added to trade in merchandise, accounting for $193.8 billion (or 30.7% of the total in U.S. services exports) and $149.7 billion (or 35.4% of total U.S. services imports) in 2012. In addition, in 2012, a net $150.0 billion flowed from U.S. residents to EU countries into direct investments, while a net $105.9 billion flowed from EU residents to direct investments in the United States.
Policy disputes arise between the United States and the EU, generating tensions which sometimes lead to bilateral trade disputes. Yet, in spite of these disputes, the U.S.-EU economic relationship remains dynamic. It is a relationship that is likely to grow in importance assuming the trends toward globalization and the enlargement of the EU continue, forcing more trade and investment barriers to fall. Economists indicate that an expanded relationship would bring economic benefits to both sides in the form of wider choices of goods and services and greater investment opportunities.
But increasing economic interdependence brings challenges as well as benefits. As the U.S. and EU economies continue to integrate, some sectors or firms will "lose out" to increased competition and will resist the forces of change. Greater economic integration also challenges long-held notions of "sovereignty," as national or regional policies have extraterritorial impact. Similarly, accepted understandings of "competition," "markets," and other economic concepts are tested as national borders dissolve with closer integration of economies.
U.S. and EU policy makers are likely to face the task of how to manage the increasingly complex bilateral economic relationship in ways that maximize benefits and keep frictions to a minimum, including developing new frameworks. For Members during the 113th Congress, it could mean weighing the benefits of greater economic integration against the costs to constituents in the context of overall U.S. national interests. The debate will likely become especially acute as the United States and the EU pursue negotiations to form a free trade agreement—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. |
crs_R40846 | crs_R40846_0 | Health Care Rights Under the U.S. Constitution
The health care reform debate raises many complex issues including those of coverage, accessibility, cost, accountability, and quality of health care. Underlying these policy considerations are issues regarding the status of health or health care as a moral, legal, or constitutional right. For purposes of this report, discussion will be limited to constitutional and legal issues pertaining to a right to health care. Explicit Rights in the U.S. Constitution
The United States Constitution does not explicitly address a right to health care. Health Care Legislation Under the U.S. Constitution
While the United States Constitution and Supreme Court interpretations do not identify a constitutional right to health care at the government's expense, Congress has enacted numerous statutes which establish and define statutory rights of individuals to receive medical services from the government. Congress' power to tax and spend for the general welfare and its power to regulate interstate commerce have been the primary sources of constitutional authority for most health care legislation. The Power to Tax and Spend for the General Welfare
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress's power to tax is extremely broad. Recently, the Supreme Court, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) , upheld a requirement in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act/ACA) beginning in 2014, that most individuals carry health insurance or pay a penalty for noncompliance as a valid exercise of Congress' authority to levy taxes. In addition, Congress has provided for health care services in many other contexts, including access to health care services for uninsured and underinsured persons through tax incentives to non-profit organizations such as hospitals for providing charitable care, and by grant programs that fund certain "safety net providers," such as community health centers, migrant health centers, and other health facilities that serve medically underserved populations. 111-148 , a comprehensive health care reform statute. Supreme Court Decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
Several lawsuits were filed shortly after enactment of the Affordable Care Act in various federal courts challenging the constitutionality of two key provisions of the Act: the requirement compelling certain individuals to have health insurance (i.e., the individual mandate), and the expansion of the Medicaid program, which requires that states provide coverage to most adults under the age 65 with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level. With regard to the Medicaid expansion provision, the Court held that Congress cannot threaten the states with the loss of all federal Medicaid funding if the states decline to expand Medicaid coverage as mandated by the Affordable Care Act. A direct conflict between federal and state laws raises constitutional issues which are likely to be resolved in favor of federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which states: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." State Constitutions and the Provision of Health Care Services
On the state level, governmental obligations to provide health care services either generally or for particular groups of persons may be found in a number of state constitutions. Thirteen state constitutions contain provisions which specifically refer to health. As a general matter, state constitutional rights may be more expansive than those found under the federal Bill of Rights, since federal rights set the minimum standards for the states. | The health care reform debate raises many complex issues including those of coverage, accessibility, cost, accountability, and quality of health care. Underlying these policy considerations are issues regarding the status of health care as a constitutional or legal right. This report analyzes constitutional and legal issues pertaining to a right to health care, as well as the power of Congress to enact and fund health care programs. The United States Supreme Court's decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, which upheld most of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act/ACA), is also discussed.
The United States Constitution does not set forth an explicit right to health care, and the Supreme Court has never interpreted the Constitution as guaranteeing a right to health care services from the government for those who cannot afford it. The Supreme Court has, however, held that the government has an obligation to provide medical care in certain limited circumstances, such as for prisoners.
Congress has enacted numerous statutes, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program, that establish and define specific statutory rights of individuals to receive health care services from the government. As a major component of many health care entitlement statutes, Congress has provided funding to pay for the health services provided under law. Most of these statutes have been enacted pursuant to Congress's authority to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to carry out its mandate "to … provide for the … general Welfare." Congress has also used other constitutional powers, such as its power to regulate interstate commerce and its power to levy taxes, to enact legislation relating to health insurance and health care.
In 2010, Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act, a comprehensive health care reform law which includes a requirement, effective in 2014, that most individuals purchase health insurance, and which significantly expands the Medicaid program. A number of lawsuits were filed challenging various provisions of this legislation, and, on June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the majority of ACA's provisions. Significantly, the Court upheld the requirement that individuals purchase health insurance as a valid exercise of Congress' taxing power, but the Court limited Congress' power to spend for the general welfare by holding that Congress cannot threaten the states with the loss of all federal Medicaid funds if the states decline to expand Medicaid coverage as mandated by ACA.
In addition, several states have passed laws, amended their state constitutions, or entered into interstate compacts to attempt to "nullify" or "opt out" of the federal individual health insurance mandate and other federal health care provisions. Direct conflicts between federal laws and state nullification statutes or state constitutional amendments would raise constitutional issues which are likely to be resolved in favor of federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
A number of state constitutions contain provisions relating to health and the provision of health care services. State constitutions may provide constitutional rights that are more expansive than those found under the federal Constitution since federal rights set the minimum standards for the states. |
crs_RL34650 | crs_RL34650_0 | Such projects often have at least some impact on the env ironment, and hence may be required to comply with any of a number of local, tribal, state, or federal environmental laws—including requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.). Exempted from NEPA's requirements are emergency response actions under provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. In the past, there has been congressional interest in the NEPA implementation process for disaster-related projects. This interest has been driven, in part, by federal grant applicants who have been confused about both their role in the NEPA process and what the law requires. To address these issues, this report discusses the NEPA process as it applies to projects for which federal funding to recover from or prepare for a disaster may be requested by local, tribal, or state grant applicants. Specifically, the report provides an overview of the NEPA process as it applies to such projects, identifies the types of projects (categorized by the federal funding source) likely to require environmental review, and delineates both the types of projects for which no or minimal environmental review is required (those for which statutory or categorical exclusions apply) and those that likely require more in-depth review. For example, the need to comply with another environmental law, such as the Clean Water Act, may be identified within the framework of the NEPA process, but NEPA itself is not the source of the obligation. Another example of the use of NEPA as an umbrella statute can be seen in the HUD Office of Community Planning and Development environmental review requirements applicable to Community Development Block Grants (CDBG). The environmental review process is intended simply to identify the compliance requirements that do apply and ensure that the applicant will be compliant, as appropriate. Still, this situation illustrates the difficulty some stakeholders have in distinguishing between what is required under NEPA and what may be required under other relevant environmental laws. To understand what is required of applicants, it is helpful to understand the types of disaster-related projects associated with various funding sources and the levels of environmental review that may be required for proposed projects. Agency and Applicant Roles
Generally, there are three entities that play a significant role in the NEPA process for disaster-related projects: the lead agency, which is responsible for preparing the NEPA documentation; cooperating agencies, which may include any local, tribal, state, or federal agencies that have jurisdiction by law or special expertise regarding any environmental impact involved in a proposal; and the project applicant (who may also be referred to as a responsible entity or grantee under different agency requirements), such as local, tribal, or state entities requesting federal funds. The U.S. Department of Agriculture—to ensure that impacts to farmlands are considered. For example, project applicants are required to provide information to support FEMA's Environmental and Historic Preservation compliance process. | In the aftermath of a major disaster, communities may need to rebuild, replace, or possibly even relocate a multitude of structures. When recovery activities take place on such a potentially large scale, compliance with any of a number of local, state, and federal laws or regulations may apply. For example, when federal funding is provided for disaster-related activities, the agency providing those funds is generally required to identify and consider the environmental impacts of the proposed activities in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.).
As commonly implemented, the process of identifying potential environmental impacts, as required under NEPA, serves as a framework to identify any other environmental requirements that may apply to that project as a result of those impacts. This use of NEPA as an "umbrella" statute can lead to confusion. For example, before the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) can grant an applicant request for Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds, that applicant must complete an environmental review of the proposed project. A required element of that review is the applicant's certification that compliance with any applicable requirements related to historic preservation, floodplain management, endangered species, air quality, and farmland protection have been considered. This review is required not only to meet NEPA obligations, but also to ensure that the project being funded does not violate other applicable laws. From the applicant's perspective, this may blur the distinction between what is required under NEPA and what is required under separate compliance requirements identified within the context of the NEPA process.
For many federal actions undertaken in response to emergencies or major disasters, NEPA's environmental review requirements are exempted under provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act). (The Stafford Act does not, however, exempt such projects from other applicable environmental requirements.) In the past, some Members of Congress have been interested in the NEPA process as it applies to disaster-related projects. This interest has been driven, in part, by federal grant applicants who have been confused about both their role in the NEPA process and what the law requires.
To address issues associated with the NEPA process, this report discusses NEPA as it applies to projects for which federal funding to recover from or prepare for a disaster has been requested by local, tribal, or state grant applicants. Specifically, the report provides an overview of the NEPA process as it applies to such projects, identifies the types of projects (categorized by federal funding source) likely to require environmental review, and delineates the types of projects for which no or minimal environmental review is required (i.e., those for which statutory or regulatory exemptions apply) and those likely to require more in-depth review. |
crs_RL31972 | crs_RL31972_0 | Since the creation of the SPR in 1975, debate has periodically focused on theoptimal size of the SPR, specifically whether it should be expanded to 700 million or 1 billionbarrels of oil. In the 108th Congress, legislation passed by the House ( H.R. 6 ) wouldrequire the SPR to be filled to its current capacity of 700 million barrels of crude oil and providesfunding of $1.5 billion to expand the capacity of the SPR to 1 billion barrels. Although debate on the size of the SPR is normally framed in terms of millions of barrels of crudeoil held, another measure, consistent with International Energy Agency (IEA) measurement, is thenumber of days of net imports for which the reserve can substitute. The benefit of maintaining the SPR lies in avoiding the effects of severe oil price spikes and shortages that might result from supply disruptions. The capital costof the reserve and/or expansion of the reserve, costs associated with providing for the draw of thereserve, the operations and management cost, and the cost of the oil stored in the reserve are all partof total cost. Role of Private Stocks
The implicit assumption underlying the SPR debate appears to be that the stock of private oilreserves held by the U.S. petroleum industry is known, unchanging, and available to reach the marketduring a supply disruption. In fact, the behavior of private levels of crude oil stocks have not been constant, they have been declining. oil stocks, measured as days of net imports. (7)
Figure 1 shows a decade long decline in the ability of industry stocks, alongwith the SPR, to replace imported oil. (10)
Finally, not only privately held stocks have declined, but the privately held capacity to hold stocks has also declined. It would be consistent with this trend for the petroleum sectorto follow a similar strategy. The IEA data arebased on total stocks of crude oil which ignores the lower operational inventoryconstraint for industry and, therefore, may overstate the ability of combined stocksto actually meet emergency needs. At those timesthere were no additional crude oil reserves in the private sector in a practical sense. Net stocks of privately held crude oil, in many ways the first buffer between an international oil supply disruption and U.S. consumer markets, were reduced to verylow levels during the recent disruptions to the oil markets. Industry holds less stockin 2003 than it did a decade ago, even though U.S. dependence on crude oil importshas risen. | Periodically, since the inception of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in 1975, debate has occurred concerning its optimal size. In the 108th Congress, the House has passed energy legislation( H.R. 6 ) which would require the SPR to be filled to its current capacity ofapproximately 700 million barrels and would authorize funds to further expand the capacity of thereserve to 1 billion barrels.
Analysis of the SPR issue has been carried out in a benefit/cost framework in which benefits, the avoided cost to the national economy of a supply disruption, are set against the real resourcecosts associated with investing in the SPR. The role of the privately held stock of crude oil has beenlargely static in these analyses. The data show, however, that private stock behavior has beenchanging. Industry holds less crude oil, and has less capacity to hold crude oil, than a decade ago.These changes reflect a decade long strategy of reducing operating costs to remain competitive.However, oil markets face greater exposure to supply disruption today because our dependence onimported crude oil has risen substantially since 1992. The effectiveness of the SPR in providingsecurity from crude oil supply disruptions may be primarily a function of its size, but may also bedependent on the underlying stocks of crude oil held by the private sector.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has studied the behavior of crude oil stocks in the U.S. since 1989. It finds that our total stocks, measured as days of net imports that can be replaced bystock draw-down, have been declining. This trend results from the interaction of increasing importdependency, the essentially constant size of the SPR over the period, and the declining size ofprivately held stocks. The IEA concludes that with no change in any of these factors, the U.S. willno longer be able to replace ninety days of net imports from domestic stocks in 2006.
Because the IEA focuses on total reserves, its analysis may overstate the ability of U.S. stocks to mitigate oil supply disruptions. This is because not all privately held oil stocks can be drawn uponwithout disrupting the functioning of the system itself. Once these lower operational inventory levelsare considered, the thinness of privately held stocks is apparent. As a result, the ability of privatelyheld stocks to provide a buffer to supply disruptions is reduced.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44126 | crs_R44126_0 | Any mass shootings and subsequent calls to amend gun control laws will likely generate requests for comprehensive data on the prevalence and deadliness of these incidents. To these ends, this report provides data and analysis on mass shootings, that is, mass murders committed entirely with firearms, for a 15-year period (1999-2013) and mass public shootings for the 44-year period (1970-2013). In the wake of tragedy in 2012 in Newtown, CT, Congress defined "mass killings" to mean "3 or more killings in a single incident" ( P.L. 112-265 ; January 14, 2013). A handful of criminologists, statisticians, sociologists, and other researchers have analyzed the principal source of national homicide statistics that is compiled by the Department of Justice (DOJ) annually, as part of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports and Supplementary Homicide Reports (UCR-SHR). Drawing on the work of James Alan Fox and Jack Levin, Grant Duwe, and Meghan Hoyer (and colleagues at USA Today ), CRS took the following steps:
analyzed the FBI SHR data, the nation's primary data source on murder and nonnegligent manslaughter in the United States; verified the mass murders reported to the FBI by checking press accounts and, when needed, consulted with the reporting police agencies themselves; cross-referenced this data with mass murders with firearms lists compiled by advocacy groups, media outlets, and law enforcement agencies; supplemented the SHR data with mass shootings reported in the press, but not reported to the FBI or previously compiled by other researchers; evaluated every incident based on victim-offender relationships, incident locations, and other pertinent event characteristics and circumstances; and found three broad patterns of mass shootings that could provide policymakers with improved vantage points from which to evaluate gun control proposals. Based on FBI guidance in part, Duwe, and others, CRS adopted the following parallel definitions for patterns of "mass murder" committed entirely with firearms:
"mass shooting" means a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms—not including the offender(s)—within one event, and in one or more locations in close geographical proximity; "mass public shooting" means a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms—not including the offender(s)—within one event, and at least some of the murders occurred in a public location or locations in close geographical proximity (e.g., a workplace, school, restaurant, or other public settings), and the murders are not attributable to any other underlying criminal activity or commonplace circumstance (armed robbery, criminal competition, insurance fraud, argument, or romantic triangle); "familicide mass shooting" means a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms—not including the offender(s)—within one event, and a majority of the victims were members of the offender's immediate or extended family, the majority of whom were murdered in one or more private residences or secluded, sparsely populated settings in close geographical proximity, and the murders are not attributable to any other underlying criminal activity or commonplace circumstance (e.g., armed robbery, criminal competition, insurance fraud, argument, or romantic triangle); and "other felony mass shooting" means a multiple victim homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms—not including the offender(s)—within one event, in one or more locations in close geographical proximity, and the murders are attributable to some other underlying criminal activity or commonplace circumstance (e.g., armed robbery, criminal competition, insurance fraud, argument, or romantic triangle). Mass Shootings Findings
As shown in Figure 1 , CRS analysis of the FBI SHR and other data sources indicates that offenders committed at least 317 mass shooting incidents in the United States, murdering 1,554 victims and non-fatally wounding another 441 victims, from 1999 through 2013. The 15-year dataset compiled by CRS indicates that the prevalence and deadliness of mass shootings overall fluctuated sporadically from year to year. Based on the CRS definition of "mass public shootings," the data show there were on average:
one (1.1) incident per year during the 1970s (5.5 victims murdered, 2.0 wounded per incident), nearly three (2.7) incidents per year during the 1980s (6.1 victims murdered, 5.3 wounded per incident), four (4.0) incidents per year during the 1990s (5.6 victims murdered, 5.5 wounded per incident), four (4.1) incidents per year during the 2000s (6.4 victims murdered, 4.0 wounded per incident), and four (4.5) incidents per year from 2010 through 2013 (7.4 victims murdered, 6.3 wounded per incident). These decade-long averages indicate that the prevalence, if not the deadliness, of mass public shootings has increased, but whether these increases constituted an "epidemic," as some have argued, would be a matter of perspective. The first four years of this decade saw an uptick in both the prevalence and deadliness of those incidents. Building upon Duwe's data and analysis, CRS compiled a 44-year dataset of firearms-related mass murders that could arguably be characterized as "mass public shootings." Possible Issues and Options for Congress
Mass shootings are arguably one of the worst manifestations of gun violence. Did the offenders have a history of violence and/or mental illness? Did the gun types lead to higher victim counts in terms of both killed and wounded? | In the wake of tragedy in Newtown, CT, Congress defined "mass killings" as "3 or more killings in a single incident" (P.L. 112-265). Any consideration of new or existing gun laws that follows mass shootings is likely to generate requests for comprehensive data on the prevalence and deadliness of these incidents. Despite the pathos of mass shootings, only a handful of researchers and journalists have analyzed the principal source of homicide data in the United States—the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—to determine whether those incidents have become more prevalent and deadly.
According to the FBI, the term "mass murder" has been defined generally as a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered, within one event, and in one or more locations in close geographical proximity. Based on this definition, for the purposes of this report, "mass shooting" is defined as a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms, within one event, and in one or more locations in close proximity. Similarly, a "mass public shooting" is defined to mean a multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms, within one event, in at least one or more public locations, such as a workplace, school, restaurant, house of worship, neighborhood, or other public setting.
This report analyzes mass shootings for a 15-year period (1999-2013). CRS analysis of the FBI SHR dataset and other research indicates that offenders committed at least 317 mass shootings, murdered 1,554 victims, and nonfatally wounded another 441 victims entirely with firearms during that 15-year period. The prevalence of mass shooting incidents and victim counts fluctuated sporadically from year to year. For the period 2007-2013, the annual averages for both incidents and victim counts were slightly higher than the years from 1999-2007.
With data provided by criminologist Grant Duwe, CRS also compiled a 44-year (1970-2013) dataset of firearms-related mass murders that could arguably be characterized as "mass public shootings." These data show that there were on average:
one (1.1) incident per year during the 1970s (5.5 victims murdered, 2.0 wounded per incident), nearly three (2.7) incidents per year during the 1980s (6.1 victims murdered, 5.3 wounded per incident), four (4.0) incidents per year during the 1990s (5.6 victims murdered, 5.5 wounded per incident), four (4.1) incidents per year during the 2000s (6.4 victims murdered, 4.0 wounded per incident), and four (4.5) incidents per year from 2010 through 2013 (7.4 victims murdered, 6.3 wounded per incident).
These decade-long averages suggest that the prevalence, if not the deadliness, of "mass public shootings" increased in the 1970s and 1980s, and continued to increase, but not as steeply, during the 1990s, 2000s, and first four years of the 2010s.
Mass shootings are arguably one of the worst manifestations of gun violence. As discussed in this report, statute, media outlets, gun control and rights advocates, law enforcement agencies, and researchers often adopt different definitions of "mass killing," "mass murder," and "mass shooting," contributing to a welter of claims and counter-claims about the prevalence and deadliness of mass shootings. With improved data, policymakers would arguably have additional vantage points from which to assess the legislative proposals that are inevitably made in the wake of these tragedies.
Toward these ends, Congress could consider directing one or several federal agencies, including but not limited to the FBI and BJS, to improve collection of data on multiple-victim homicides. Congress could also direct federal agencies, possibly the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, to report annually on firearms-related mass murders, including data on (1) offender acquisition of firearms, (2) types of firearms used, (3) amounts and types of ammunition carried and shots fired, (4) killed and wounded counts, (5) offender histories of mental illness and domestic violence, and (6) victim-offender relationships. |
crs_RL33232 | crs_RL33232_0 | Introduction
It has been proposed that Congress prohibit the sale or rental to minors of video games that are rated "M" (mature) or "AO" (adults-only) by the Entertainment Software Ratings Board. This board is a non-governmental entity established by the Interactive Digital Software Association, and its ratings currently have no legal effect. The Board's website sets forth the criteria for its "M" and "AO" ratings:
Titles rated M (Mature) have content that may be suitable for persons ages 17 and older. Titles in this category may contain intense violence, blood and gore, sexual content, and/or strong language. Titles rated AO (Adults Only) have content that should only be played by persons 18 years and older. Titles in this category may include prolonged scenes of intense violence and/or graphic sexual content and nudity. Conclusion
In conclusion, it appears that, for a prohibition of the sale or rental to minors of video games with violent content to be upheld, the government would have to present empirical evidence that these games harm minors or cause them to become violent. The prohibition of the sale or rental to minors of video games containing sexual content, however, would seem more likely to be upheld without empirical evidence that such games harm minors. Nevertheless, the apparent vagueness and potential overbreadth of the current criteria for "M" and "AO" ratings might cause a statutory prohibition on the sale or rental to minors of video games that incorporates those ratings to be found unconstitutional on its face, even if the sale or rental to minors of some of the video games to which the "M" or "AO" rating apply could constitutionally be prohibited by more narrowly tailored legislation. | It has been proposed that Congress prohibit the sale or rental to minors of video games that are rated "M" (mature) or "AO" (adults-only) by the Entertainment Software Ratings Board. This board is a non-governmental entity established by the Interactive Digital Software Association, and its ratings currently have no legal effect. The Board's website sets forth the criteria for its "M" and "AO" ratings:
Titles rated M (Mature) have content that may be suitable for persons ages 17 and older. Titles in this category may contain intense violence, blood and gore, sexual content, and/or strong language.
Titles rated AO (Adults Only) have content that should only be played by persons 18 years and older. Titles in this category may include prolonged scenes of intense violence and/or graphic sexual content and nudity.
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of a statute that restricted minors' access to violent or sexually oriented video games, but the lower federal courts that have ruled on such a statute have found it unconstitutional. Based on the holdings of these courts, it appears that, for a prohibition of the sale or rental to minors of video games with violent content to be upheld, the government would have to present empirical evidence that these games harm minors or cause them to become violent. The prohibition of the sale or rental to minors of video games containing sexual content, however, would seem more likely to be upheld without empirical evidence that such games harm minors.
Nevertheless, the apparent vagueness and broad scope of the current criteria for "M" and "AO" ratings might cause a statutory prohibition on the sale or rental to minors of video games that incorporates those ratings to be found unconstitutional on its face, even if the sale or rental to minors of some of the video games to which the "M" or "AO" rating apply could constitutionally be prohibited by more narrowly tailored legislation. |
crs_R43608 | crs_R43608_0 | Introduction
On May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), a broad stock index, fell by nearly 1,000 points over the course of several minutes and then quickly rebounded. Among them are whether (1) HTF plays a role in exacerbating market fragility; (2) it may heighten the market's systemic risk; (3) it enhances or harms the quality of the securities market; (4) certain kinds of HFT may constitute an illegal form of front-running; (5) HFT helps foster a system of two-tiered trading markets that benefits certain traders at the expense of others due to their access to faster trading data and advantageous trade infrastructure; and (6) the presence of HFT has been to the detriment of non-HFT investors and investor confidence in the securities market. Specifically, in the 113 th Congress, S. 410 (Harkin), H.R. 880 (DeFazio), and H.R. 1579 (Ellison) would levy taxes on various financial trades, including trades conducted by HFT traders. H.R. 2292 (Markey) would require the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to provide a regulatory definition of HFT in the derivatives markets that the agency oversees. The Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CFTC, SEC, New York Attorney General, and Massachusetts Secretary of Commerce are variously conducting investigations and probes into specific HFT firms, certain HFT strategies, and HFT in general. In addition, the FBI is reportedly probing (1) whether HFT firms are trading ahead of other investors based on information that other market participants cannot see, a possible form of front-running, a type of illegal insider trading; (2) practices in which a HFT trader submits trade orders and then cancels them to foster the illusion of market activity, a possible form of market manipulation that may prompt others to respond to illusory trade orders; and (3) the use of HFT to place orders to hide transactions that may be based on an illegal tip. In June 2014, SEC Chair Mary Jo White made what was arguably the first explicit agency discussion of prospective HFT-related regulatory initiatives. Referencing HFT, however, she said she had concerns with "aggressive, destabilizing trading strategies in vulnerable market conditions." This report provides an overview of equities HFT and its potential economic and regulatory implications. It examines (1) recent developments regarding probes and investigations of HFT, (2) what equities HFT is, (3) the nature of the general equities HFT landscape, (4) how equities HFT works and who conducts it, (5) equity HFT's perceived benefits and disadvantages, (6) the Flash Crash of 2010 and the alleged role of HFT, (7) SEC programmatic and regulation-related initiatives to potentially monitor HFT and address its potentially negative market impact, (8) European Union HFT regulatory developments,; and (9) various domestic HFT regulatory ideas under discussion. Defining High-Frequency Trading
HFT is an imprecise "catchall" term that currently has no legal or regulatory definition. It is used to describe what many characterize as a subset of algorithmic trading (AT) largely associated with the sell side of the financial industry. Volatility . A separate criticism of HFT is that the liquidity provided is often fleeting and has been alternatively dubbed "phantom liquidity" or "flickering quotes." Such challenges have led to concerns that HFT may have helped increase the total trading costs of institutional investors. Another criticism is that HFT firms may engage in potentially manipulative strategies that involve the use of quote cancellations. A potential concern here is that because of this correlation, shocks that hit a small number of very active HFT traders could detrimentally affect the entire market. The earlier 1,000 point decline was historical, representing the largest one-day decline in the history of the DJIA. Mini-Flash Crashes
In the aftermath of the Flash Crash, several observers, including officials from the CFTC and Nanex, a market data provider, have said that so-called mini-crashes, significant and precipitous drops in the prices of individual securities that do not reach the level of the 2010 crash, appear to be fairly common and an ongoing feature of the market. The Large Trader Reporting Rule was adopted by the SEC in 2011. As in the equities markets, proponents of HFT in the futures markets have argued that the rise of HFT has tended to increase market liquidity and narrow bid-ask spreads, thereby reducing transaction costs. Such concerns have percolated in the press and among market participants and regulators. | High-frequency trading (HFT) is a broad term without a precise legal or regulatory definition. It is used to describe what many characterize as a subset of algorithmic trading that involves very rapid placement of orders, in the realm of tiny fractions of a second. Regulators have been scrutinizing HFT practices for years, but public concern about this form of trading intensified following the April 2014 publication of a book by author Michael Lewis. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice (DOJ), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Office of the New York Attorney General, and Massachusetts Secretary of Commerce have begun HFT-related probes.
Critics of HFT have raised several concerns about its impact. One criticism relates to its generation of so-called phantom liquidity, in which market liquidity that appears to be provided by HFT may be fleeting and transient due to the posting and then almost immediate cancellation of trading orders. Another concern is that HFT firms may engage in manipulative strategies that involve the use of quote cancellations. In addition, some observers allege that HFT firms are often involved in front-running whereby the firms trade ahead of a large order to buy or sell stocks based on nonpublic market information about an imminent trade. Another criticism is that HFT has increased the level of potential market systemic risk whereby shocks to a small number of active HFT traders could then detrimentally affect the entire market. A related concern is whether HFT could exacerbate market volatility. These concerns have percolated since the "Flash Crash" of May 6, 2010, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell by roughly 1,000 points in intraday trading—the largest one-day decline in the history of the DJIA. The crash was analyzed in an investigative report by the SEC and CFTC which, among other factors, looked at the role HFT may have played. The report determined that HFT was not the cause but may have exacerbated the crash. Another area of criticism is that HFT often involves two-tiered markets in which HFT firms pay extra for the right to access data feeds or to collocate their servers within exchanges' servers—all of which is designed to give some traders an advantage over others.
HFT's supporters argue that the increased trading provided by HFT adds market liquidity and reduces market volatility. They contend that HFT is a technological innovation that is the latest evolutionary stage in a long history of securities market making and assert that HFT has reduced the bid-ask spreads in stock trading, thereby lowering trading costs.
Congressional interest in HFT and the Flash Crash has manifested itself in the 113th Congress both legislatively and in the congressional oversight of the SEC and CFTC. Legislatively, S. 410 (Harkin), H.R. 880 (DeFazio), and H.R. 1579 (Ellison) would levy taxes on various financial trades, including trades conducted by HFT traders. H.R. 2292 (Markey) would require the CFTC to provide a regulatory definition of HFT in the derivatives markets it oversees and require those who do HFT to register with the CFTC.
In June 2014, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White announced that in response to concerns over "aggressive, destabilizing trading strategies in vulnerable market conditions," the agency was pursuing several HFT-related reform proposals, including requiring unregistered HFT firms to register with the SEC.
This report provides an overview of HFT in the equities and derivatives markets regulated by the SEC and CFTC. It also examines the Flash Crash of 2010 and the role that HFT may have played as well as recent regulatory developments. |
crs_R41426 | crs_R41426_0 | Introduction
Background
Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), as authorized by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act ( P.L. 108-173 , MMA) of 2003, are tax-preferred savings accounts used to pay for unreimbursed qualified medical expenses such as health insurance deductibles, copayments, and services not covered by insurance. To open or contribute to an HSA, the insured must have a high-deductible health plan (HDHP), and generally no other health insurance coverage. One of a number of the stated goals of the HSA enabling legislation is to encourage workers to better save for their health care in retirement. Moreover, the HDHP/HSA combination is thought to provide incentives for consumers to be more active in their care, and purchase the best possible medical services for the lowest possible price. Also in this report, a preferred provider organization (PPO) not associated with an HDHP is used as the baseline to which an HDHP is compared. HSA Basics
The HSA is one type of savings account associated with consumerism in health care. HSAs are a particularly generous form of health-related savings account. Premiums, Deductibles, and Enrollment in HDHPs and HSAs
This section of the report discusses insurance premiums and deductibles for those with HDHPs and perhaps HSAs. The GAO report concluded that, between 2005 to 2007, between 51% and 58% of HDHP plan holders opened an HSA. To preview the results of the literature review:
HDHPs are designed to change consumer behavior by providing incentives for consumers to be more concerned with the cost and quality of their health care. HSAs could encourage individuals to save for their health expenses in retirement by increasing the balance in their HSAs. Because HDHPs have lower premiums than other policies, previously uninsured individuals might purchase these plans. There is little evidence, however, that the widespread adoption of HDHPs would lower the aggregate uninsurance rate or affect the operations of insurance markets. Aggregate health expenditures could fall if most policy holders moved from standard PPO plans to HDHP/HSA plans. A single-employer study compared individuals who switched into an HDHP with those who remained in a standard PPO. Conclusion
Enrollment in HDHPs, as measured by covered lives, has been increasing since HSAs were authorized in 2003, although the growth rate of this increase is slowing (see Figure 2 ). It is estimated that between 51% and 58% of HDHP holders go on to open an HSA. According to recent research, not all individuals seem to be saving for their health expenses in retirement because only about half of those who are eligible to open an HSA do so. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence backing many of these results is weak, and much remains unknown about the effects of HDHPs and HSAs on uninsurance, utilization of health care, and aggregate health expenditures. | Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), as authorized by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (P.L. 108-173, MMA) of 2003, are tax-preferred savings accounts used to pay for unreimbursed qualified medical expenses such as health insurance deductibles, copayments, and services not covered by insurance. To contribute to an HSA, the insured must have a high-deductible health plan (HDHP), and generally no other health insurance coverage. One of a number of the stated goals of the 2003 legislation is to encourage workers to better save for their health care in retirement. Moreover, the HDHP/HSA combination is thought to provide incentives for the consumers to be more active in their care, and purchase the best possible medical services for the lowest possible price. This report analyzes existing data and reviews the current literature to discuss whether HDHPs and HSAs have begun to meet some of these objectives.
Enrollment in HDHPs has been increasing since HSAs were introduced in 2004. Nevertheless, the HDHP enrollment growth rate is slowing. Individuals who have an HDHP may or may not open an HSA; it is estimated that between 51% and 58% of HDHP holders go on to open an HSA. Whether opening an HDHP/HSA is financially advantageous is a complicated issue. In fact, those at many levels of the health spending distribution might save money by opening an HDHP/HSA instead of enrolling in a standard preferred provider organization (PPO) plan (the most common type of health insurance plan).
A review of the literature on HDHPs and HSAs suggests the following:
HSAs are designed to change consumer behavior by providing incentives for consumers to be more concerned with the cost and quality of their health care. Although a few studies suggest this is happening, the literature in this area reports mixed and inconclusive results. HSAs could encourage individuals to save for their health expenses in retirement. However, because only about half of HDHP plan holders open an HSA, the remaining half are not saving for their health expenses in this tax-preferred account. Among those with HSAs, some may be using the account as a tax benefit and not saving for health care in retirement. The uninsurance rate could potentially decrease with the advent of HDHPs as previously uninsured individuals purchased these plans because of their relatively low premiums. There is little evidence, however, that the currently uninsured are transitioning into HDHPs. Some hoped that a change from standard PPO plans to HDHP/HSA plans would lower aggregate health expenditures. They maintain that expenditures would fall if most of those insured in a standard PPO plan actually moved to an HDHP/HSA.
The empirical evidence backing many of these results is weak or limited, and much remains unknown about the effects of HDHPs and HSAs on uninsurance, the utilization of health care, and aggregate health expenditures. |
crs_98-174 | crs_98-174_0 | In the mid-1980s, Congress -through the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 ( P.L.99-570 ) and 1988 ( P.L. This and related sections require the President to certify, subject to congressional review, thatdrug-producing or drug-transit countries have cooperatedfully with the United States in drug control efforts in the previous year in order to avoid a series of aid and tradesanctions. In 1987, theSenate Foreign Relations Committee reported out a resolution to disapprove the presidential certification, and in1988 the full Senate voted 63-27 to disapprovethe President's certification. As a result, whenthe President fully certified Mexico in lateFebruary 1997, congressional resolutions of disapproval were introduced by Representative Shaw ( H.J.Res. In early March 1998, resolutions of disapproval were introduced in both houses of Congress. S.J.Res. 42 was defeated by a vote of 45 to 54. Congressional Action in 1999: Resolutions of Disapproval Introduced in the House But Not Passed; Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act Passed
President Clinton certified, on February 26, 1999, that Mexico was fully cooperative in drug control efforts,citing the broad array of cooperation between thecountries, the arrest and conviction of some major traffickers, and the continuing eradication and interdictionprograms. The measure was referred to the House InternationalRelations Committee, but no further actionwas taken. However, by the endof the 30-day congressional review period, no resolution of disapproval had been introduced in either house ofCongress to overturn the President's certification. Following the election of Vicente Fox of the conservative Alliance for Change as President of Mexico in the July 2, 2000 election, ending 71 years of presidentialcontrol by the dominant party, bills were introduced to exempt Mexico from the drug certification requirement inFY2001 in order to avoid an early confrontationwith the new government. Noadditional action was taken on these measures. Congressional Action in 2001: Efforts to Modify Drug Certification Requirements End with One-Year Waiver and Modified Procedure
In the period leading up to the deadline of March 1, 2001, when President Bush would be required to certify thatMexico and other drug producing or drug transitcountries had cooperated fully with the United States in drug control efforts, there were a number of congressionalefforts to modify or suspend the longstandingdrug certification requirements. On October 24, 2001, the Senate passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2002 ( H.R. In congressional action on the Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2003, the conference report on H.R. 107-228 ) onSeptember 30, 2002. In short, Section 706 requires the President to designate and withhold assistance from the worst offending countries (those that have "failed demonstrably" tomake substantial counter-narcotics efforts). It also permits the President to use his discretion to maintain a higherstandard and to withhold assistance and applyother sanctions against countries that are failing to cooperate fully with the United States in counter-narcotics effortswhenever he determines that such actionswould be helpful. | Beginning in 1986, Congress required the President to certify annually, subject to congressional review, that drug producing or drug transit countries hadcooperated fully with the United States in drug control efforts to avoid a series of aid and trade sanctions. Mexicohas been fully certified each year, but Congressclosely monitored these certification decisions and submitted resolutions of disapproval in some years.
In 1987 and 1988, Congress took some initial steps on resolutions to disapprove the certification of Mexico, and, in 1989 and 1996, it passed some drug-relatedrestrictions on Mexico. In 1997, congressional efforts to overturn the President's certification of Mexico advancedthe furthest when both houses passed separateresolutions of disapproval, and President Clinton provided additional reports on Mexican and U.S. efforts inspecified areas in compliance with the Senate-passedversion. In 1998, resolutions of disapproval were introduced in both houses, but S.J.Res. 42 was defeatedby a vote of 45 to 54 in the Senate, and nofloor action was taken in the House. In 1999, resolutions of disapproval were introduced in the House, but no actionwas taken, and no resolutions of disapprovalwere introduced in the Senate.
In 2000, despite some congressional criticism, no resolutions of disapproval were introduced in either house to overturn the presidential certification of Mexico. Following the mid-year election of opposition candidate Vicente Fox as President of Mexico, measures wereintroduced but not passed to exempt Mexico fromthe drug certification requirements in FY2001.
In 2001, no resolutions of disapproval were introduced in either house, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out two measures ( S. 219 and S. 1401 ) that would have modified the certification requirements for three years. By the end of theyear, the only measure that passed wasthe Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2002 ( H.R. 2506 / P.L. 107-115 ) that waived the drugcertification requirements for FY2002 only, butrequired the President, with some waiver authority, to designate and withhold assistance from the worst offendingcountries that had failed demonstrably to adhereto international counter-narcotics agreements.
In 2002, both houses passed the Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2003 ( H.R. 1646 / P.L. 107-228 ) that permanently modified the drugcertification requirements. Section 706 requires the President, with some waiver authority, to designate andwithhold assistance from the worst offendingcountries that have "failed demonstrably" to make substantial counter-narcotics efforts. At the same time, it permitsthe President to use his discretion to withholdassistance and apply previous sanctions against countries that are failing to cooperate fully with the United Statesin counter-narcotics efforts whenever hedetermines that such actions would be helpful. |
crs_RL31032 | crs_RL31032_0 | Introduction
International trade continues to grow in importance for the world economy as well as for the U.S. economy, enhancing economic well-being generally, but also imposing costs on trade sensitive sectors of national economies. The Current Account Balance
The current account balance is the nation's most comprehensive measure of international transactions. It has three component balances: the goods and services balance, the investment income balance, and net unilateral transfers. The three types of transactions measured in the current account balance are thought by economists to be closely related to current production, consumption, and income. For the United States, the size of the current account deficit is largely the refection of a similarly sized goods and services deficit (i.e., trade deficit). In 2009, the United States had a current account deficit of $378.4 billion, composed of a goods and services deficit of $374.9 billion, an investment income surplus of $121.4 billion, and a net unilateral transfers deficit of $124.9 billion. The U.S. current account (trade) deficit, decreased to just above $378 billion in 2009, down substantially from $706 billion in 2008, and from a high of $803 billion in 2006. As a percentage of GDP, the 2009 trade deficit stands at 2.7%, down from 4.9% in 2008, and a record high of 6.1% in 2006. With economic recovery, more enduring economic forces are likely to determine the size of the trade deficit. Rather, trade imbalances occur because of underlying macroeconomic spending and saving behavior at home and abroad. Since the early 1980s, there is a strong tendency in the United States to spend beyond current output, with the excess of demand met by a net inflow of foreign goods and services that manifests itself as the U.S. current account deficit. Namely, that total domestic output, known as gross domestic product (GDP) equals the sum of consumption (C), government spending (G), investment spending (I), and exports (X) minus imports (M) or:
GDP = C+ I + G + (X-M)
This identity can be rewritten as:
(X-M) = (GDP – C - G) – I
Because exports minus imports (X-M) is equivalent to the current account balance (CA) and because GDP minus spending by consumers (C) and government (G) equals saving (S), the expression can be simplified to the internal balance identity:
CA = (S – I)
That is to say, a current account imbalance is always exactly matched by an imbalance between domestic saving and investment. With a net inflow of capital, the dollar's exchange value rises; the higher exchange rate causes the international price of U.S. exports to increase, dampening foreign sales; and causes the dollar price of imports to decrease, stimulating purchases of foreign goods. The added output would most likely be large enough to make debt-service payments to foreigners and boost the domestic living standard. The saving-investment imbalance that the U.S. economy has experienced for the last decade is not the result of domestic investment rising relative to the domestic saving rate as occurred in the 1990s; rather, it is the result of the domestic saving rate falling relative to the domestic investment rate. If the saving rate is raised, the trade deficit will decrease accordingly. A disorderly adjustment is possible, but not probable. Do Trade Deficits Cause Unemployment? (A more substantial improvement in the trade deficit in manufactures occurred in 2008. So long as domestic saving in the United States falls short of domestic investment and so long as an inflow of foreign saving is available to fill all or part of the gap, the United States will run a trade deficit. Macroeconomic Policy Responses: Domestic and Foreign
To efficiently reduce or eliminate the U.S. trade deficit most economists would argue that there needs to be a rebalancing of global spending: the United States would need to reduce domestic spending, and the economies with trade surpluses would need to increase domestic spending. The trade deficit could fall on its own without U.S. policy actions. On the other hand, if the relative rate of return from investment in U.S. assets grows more attractive, the net capital inflow could expand and bring the trade deficit up with it. | The current account balance is the nation's most comprehensive measure of international transactions. It has three component balances: the goods and services balance, the investment income balance, and net unilateral transfers. These are all transactions thought to be closely related to current production, consumption, and income. For the United States, the size of the current account deficit is largely the refection of a similarly sized goods and services deficit (i.e., trade deficit).
The U.S. current account (trade) deficit grew steadily from 1992 through 2006. In 2007, however, the trade imbalance decreased to $726.6 billion from $803.5 billion in 2006. In 2008 and 2009, the trade deficit continued to decrease, reaching $706.1 billion and $419.9 billion, respectively. These decreases reflected strong export sales and a steady weakening of import purchases. A sizable depreciation of the dollar from 2002 through 2007 made U.S. exports more attractive to foreign buyers and imports less attractive to American buyers. In addition, since 2006, economic growth in the United States slowed relative to that of its major trading partners. As a percentage of GDP, the trade deficit in 2009 decreased to 2.9%, down from a record 6.1% in 2006.
The size of the U.S. trade deficit is ultimately rooted in macroeconomic conditions at home and abroad. U.S. saving falls short of what is sought to finance U.S. investment. Many foreign economies are in the opposite circumstances, with domestic saving exceeding domestic opportunities for investment. This difference of wants will tend to be reconciled by international capital flows. The shortfall in domestic saving relative to investment tends to draw an inflow of relatively abundant foreign savings (capital), seeking to maximize returns and, in turn, the saving inflow makes a higher level of investment possible. For the United States, a net capital (savings) inflow also leads to a like-sized net inflow of foreign goods—a trade deficit. In 2007 and 2008, both saving and investment fell, but in a weakening economy investment fell more, causing the trade deficit to narrow.
The benefit of the trade deficit is that it allows the United States to spend now beyond current income. Since the 1980s, that added spending was largely for investment in real estate, durable goods, and capital equipment. In recent years, the added spending was for consumption. The cost of the trade deficit is a deterioration of the U.S. investment-income balance, as the payment on what the United States has borrowed from foreigners grows with rising indebtedness. Borrowing from abroad allows the United States to live better today, but the payback may cause some decrement to the rate of advance of U.S. living standards in the future. U.S. trade deficits do not now substantially raise the risk of economic instability, but trade deficits can impose adjustment burdens on some trade-sensitive sectors of the economy.
Policy action to reduce the overall trade deficit is problematic. Standard trade policy tools (e.g., tariffs, quotas, and subsidies) do not work. Macroeconomic policy tools can work, but recent and prospective government budget deficits will reduce domestic saving and most likely tend to increase the trade deficit. Most economists believe that, in time, the trade deficit will correct itself, without crisis, under the pressures of normal market forces. But the risk of a more disruptive adjustment cannot be completely discounted.
This report will be updated annually. |
crs_R41256 | crs_R41256_0 | Introduction
Justice Stevens has authored a number of important majority opinions and dissents expounding upon the limits of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. This report discusses Justice Stevens's opinions in these areas. This case has come to be known as the "Seven Dirty Words" case or the "Filthy Words" case. Many viewed this decision as increasing the constitutional protection for truthful and nonmisleading commercial speech. The majority found that the statute violated BSA's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. | Justice Stevens has authored a number of significant opinions expounding upon the constitutional right to freedom of speech. Among them are significant cases related to indecency and the rights of broadcasters ("Seven Dirty Words Case"), commercial speech, symbolic speech, and the freedom of association. This report will describe these cases with a view to their impact on free speech case law, and their continuing relevance in the future. This report will not discuss Justice Stevens's election law-related opinions. |
crs_RL34214 | crs_RL34214_0 | Introduction
The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) as amended, authorizes the federal government's major federal student aid programs (Title IV), as well as other programs which provide institutional aid and support (Titles II, III and V). In addition, the HEA authorizes services and support to less-advantaged students (select Title IV programs), and to students pursuing international education and certain graduate and professional degrees (Titles VI and VII). The programs authorized by the HEA are administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), and made available an estimated 70% ($94 billion) of all federal, state, and institutional aid awarded to postsecondary students in 2005-2006 (excluding tax benefits). This report provides a brief overview of major provisions of the HEA. It is organized by title and part of the act. This report will be updated following reauthorization of the HEA. The principal objective of the HEA is to expand postsecondary education opportunity, particularly for low-income individuals, and to increase affordability for moderate income families as well. The heart of the legislation is its student aid programs authorized under Title IV, which provide student aid in the form of grants, loans, and work-study assistance. There are seven titles of the HEA that authorize numerous programs and provisions designed to provide assistance to postsecondary students and institutions. | The Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) as amended, authorizes the federal government's major federal student aid programs (Title IV), as well as other programs which provide institutional aid and support (Titles II, III and V). In addition, the HEA authorizes services and support to less-advantaged students (select Title IV programs), and to students pursuing international education and certain graduate and professional degrees (Titles VI and VII). The programs authorized by the HEA are administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED), and made available an estimated 70% ($94 billion) of all federal, state, and institutional aid awarded to postsecondary students in 2005-2006 (excluding tax benefits).
The principal objective of the HEA is to expand postsecondary education opportunity, particularly for low-income individuals, and to increase affordability for moderate income families as well. The heart of the legislation is its student aid programs authorized under Title IV, which provide student aid in the form of grants, loans, and work-study assistance. There are seven titles of the HEA that authorize numerous programs and provisions designed to provide assistance to postsecondary students and institutions.
This report provides a brief overview of major provisions of the HEA. It is organized by title and part of the act. This report will be updated following reauthorization of the HEA. |
crs_R44622 | crs_R44622_0 | Introduction
This report pr ovides an overview and analysis of the two patent cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court during its October 2015 Term, Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. (regarding the award of enhanced damages in "egregious" patent infringement cases) and Cuozzo Speed Technologies , LLC v. Lee (assessing the claim construction standard applied by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in certain patent revocation proceedings). Once a patent is issued by the USPTO, it is presumed to be valid; however, members of the public may challenge the agency's decision to grant the patent either in litigation or in an administrative proceeding, as discussed in detail later in this report. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) is a specialized tribunal established by Congress that has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases. Willful Infringement and Enhanced Damages
Background
The Patent Act provides that a court "may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed" The Patent Act does not specify the circumstances in which "treble" damages are appropriate, and thus, an award of enhanced damages in patent infringement cases, as well as the amount by which the damages will be increased, falls within the district court's discretion. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit has limited enhanced damages awards to cases of "willful infringement." Seagate thus requires a two-prong analysis, involving both an objective and subjective inquiry, that must be satisfied before the district court can exercise its discretion to increase damages pursuant to Section 284 of the Patent Act. The final decision by the court to award enhanced damages is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Supreme Court's Opinion in Halo64
On June 13, 2016, in a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Circuit's Seagate test for enhanced damages was inconsistent with Section 284 of the Patent Act. In contrast, the Court found that the Seagate test "is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to the district courts." While the Halo opinion frees district courts from the constraints of the mechanical Seagate analysis in deciding whether to award enhanced damages (and in what amount), the Court cautioned district courts to exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with Supreme Court precedent that generally reserves such punishment for "egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical infringement." Such an interpretive standard is also referred to as the "broadest reasonable interpretation" (BRI). The BRI standard arguably makes it more likely that the PTAB finds a patent claim to be obvious or not novel (and thus subject to invalidation in an IPR), compared to in a judicial proceeding in which a court construes patent claims according to the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the claims' language (a narrower standard). First, the appellate court asserted that Section 314(d) of the Patent Act precludes its review of the USPTO's decision to institute IPR. Legislation in the 114 th Congress, the Innovation Act and the PATENT Act, would require that the PTAB, in IPR proceedings, use the same claim construction standard that is applied by federal courts; that is, the PTAB would need to construe a patent claim "in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent" rather than use the BRI standard. | This report examines the two patent law cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in its October 2015 Term. The first patent case, decided on June 13, 2016, Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., concerns the circumstances in which the awarding of enhanced damages in a patent infringement case are warranted and the discretion of the district courts to award them. Section 284 of the Patent Act provides that the court may increase damages up to three times the amount found by a jury or assessed by the court, but does not provide any guidance to the court, or any express limits or conditions, in how to exercise its discretion to do so. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), a specialized tribunal established by Congress that has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in patent cases, limited such awards to cases of "willful infringement." Specifically, in its 2007 opinion, In re Seagate Technology, the Federal Circuit established a two-part test that must be met before the district court can exercise its discretion to increase damages under Section 284. This strict standard arguably made such awards very difficult for patent holders to recover. In a unanimous opinion, the Halo Supreme Court rejected the Seagate test for enhanced damages, determining that it was unduly rigid and inconsistent with the statutory grant of discretion to courts to decide when to award punitive damages. In invalidating the strict Seagate test, the Halo opinion advised district courts to exercise their discretion to award enhanced damages in a manner consistent with Supreme Court precedent that generally reserves such punishment for "egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical infringement."
The Court's second patent opinion of its October 2015 Term, issued on June 20, 2016, involves the "claim construction" standard used by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) in an administrative proceeding called an inter partes review (IPR), where members of the public may challenge the validity of issued patents. In Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, the Court upheld a USPTO regulation that requires the PTAB, in IPR proceedings, to read a disputed patent claim according to its "broadest reasonable interpretation." Such an interpretive standard arguably makes it more likely that the PTAB finds a patent claim to be obvious or not novel (and thus subject to invalidation), compared to in a judicial proceeding in which a court construes patent claims according to the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the claims' language (a narrower standard). Furthermore, the Cuozzo Court held that a provision of the Patent Act precludes judicial review of the USPTO's decision whether to institute an IPR proceeding.
The Halo opinion arguably favors patent holders by improving the chances of receiving enhanced damages in patent infringement cases, while Cuozzo leaves in place a process that may help third parties seeking to challenge the validity of issued patents. However, the impact of these decisions could be affected in the future by Congress, as some Members have expressed their disagreement with the Halo decision, and legislation pending in the 114th Congress (the Innovation Act (H.R. 9)) and the Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship Act (PATENT Act (S. 1137)) would require that the PTAB use the same claim construction standard in IPR proceedings that is applied by federal courts. |
crs_R41266 | crs_R41266_0 | Background
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) establishes a framework that addresses the liability of responsible parties in connection with the discharge of oil into the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or the exclusive economic zone. Among other provisions, OPA limits certain liabilities of a responsible party in connection with discharges of oil into such areas. Additionally, OPA created categories of damages for which the responsible party would be liable, within specified limits, based on the type of vessel or facility involved in the oil spill incident. The following sections of this report will discuss liability under OPA for removal costs and damages, and the basic procedure for recovering removal costs and damages from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund in the event that the responsible party fails to pay such claims. A responsible party's liability for damages, however, is limited under OPA. Responsible Party Liability for Removal Costs
A responsible party in an oil spill incident is liable for removal costs under OPA:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject to the provisions of [OPA], each responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages … that result from such incident. In limited situations, however, certain claims for removal costs may be presented initially to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. In the event that a responsible party fails to settle a claim for damages for lost government revenues within 90 days, a claimant may present such a claim directly to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. Defenses to Liability
OPA provides limited defenses to liability. A responsible party is not liable for removal costs or the damages mentioned above if it can establish—by a preponderance of the evidence—that the discharge or substantial threat of discharge of oil and the resulting damages or removal costs were caused solely by
(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party, other than an employee or agent of the responsible party or a third party whose act or omission occurs in connection with any contractual relationship with the responsible party (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises in connection with carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the responsible party establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the responsible party—(A) exercised due care with respect to the oil concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of the oil and in light of all relevant facts and circumstances; and (B) took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the foreseeable consequences of those acts or omissions; or (4) any combination of paragraphs (1), (2), (3). | The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) establishes a framework that addresses the liability of responsible parties in connection with the discharge of oil into the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or the exclusive economic zone. Among other provisions, OPA limits certain liabilities of a responsible party in connection with discharges of oil into such areas. The liability limitations established by OPA are currently the subject of significant congressional interest in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
A responsible party is strictly liable for removal costs plus damages resulting from an oil spill incident under OPA. A responsible party's liability under OPA is confined to specific categories of damages. Pursuant to OPA, the total liability for damages in connection with an oil spill is limited based on the type of vessel or facility involved, and the amount of oil discharged. OPA provides limited defenses which, if applicable, allow a responsible party to discharge its liability to persons injured by a discharge of oil into the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or the exclusive economic zone.
Claims for removal costs and certain damages must, with limited exception, be presented directly to the responsible party. In the event that a claim for removal costs or certain damages is not paid by the responsible party within 90 days, a claimant may present such a claim directly to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund or file suit in court. OPA and its regulations establish procedures for recovering removal costs and damages against the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
This report addresses liability under OPA for removal costs and damages, and the basic procedure for recovering removal costs and damages from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund in the event that the responsible party fails to settle such claims. |
crs_RL30930 | crs_RL30930_0 | Background
The Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) of the National Science Foundation (NSF) was authorized by Congress in 1978, partly in response to concerns from Congress and from some of those in academia and the scientific community about the geographic distribution of federal research and development (R&D) funds. Historical data revealed that there was a concentration of federal R&D funds in large and wealthy states and universities, and that the continuation of such funding patterns might ensure a dichotomy between the "haves" and "have-nots." EPSCoR began in 1979 with five states and funding of approximately $1.0 million. Currently, EPSCoR operates in 29 jurisdictions, including 27 states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. To 2006, the NSF had invested approximately $920.0 million in EPSCoR programs and activities. When established, it operated solely in the NSF. Congressional action led to its expansion in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, and by 1998, seven other agencies had established EPSCoR or EPSCoR-like programs. The program is a partnership between the NSF and a state to improve the R&D competitiveness through the state's academic S&T infrastructure. Eventually, EPSCoR supporters hope those states receiving limited federal support would gain some level of equity in competing for federal and private sector funds through the regular grant system. It is anticipated that this study will be completed in August 2013. On November 18, 2011, the President signed into law the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, FY2012 ( P.L. 112-55 ). The law provided a total of $7,033.1 million for the NSF in FY2012, $120.5 million above the FY2011 enacted level of $6,912.6 million. EPSCoR is contained within the Integrative Activities account and was funded at $150.9 million in FY2012, $4.1 million above the FY2011 level. The FY2012 appropriation supported a portfolio of three complementary investment strategies—research infrastructure improvement ($110.0 million), co-funding ($39.4 million), and outreach and workshops ($1.2 million)—for the 29 EPSCoR jurisdictions. The NSF indicated that approximately 24.0% of the funding for EPSCoR is to be used for new research awards in FY2012, with the balance providing continuing support for ongoing grants. The Administration's FY2013 budget request for the NSF is $7,373.1 million, a 4.8% increase over the FY2012 estimate of $7,033.1 million. Included in the total is $158.2 million for EPSCoR, an increase of 4.8% over the FY2012 level. NSF estimates that approximately 40.0% of the FY2013 requested funding will be made available for new awards. The balance will be directed at supporting awards made in prior years. | The Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) of the National Science Foundation (NSF) was authorized by Congress in 1978, partly in response to concerns in Congress and the concerns of some in academia and the scientific community about the geographic distribution of federal research and development (R&D) funds. It was argued that there was a concentration of federal R&D funds in large and wealthy states and universities, and that the continuation of such funding patterns might ensure a dichotomy between the "haves" and "have-nots."
EPSCoR began in 1979 with five states and funding of approximately $1.0 million. Currently, EPSCoR operates in 29 jurisdictions, including 27 states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. To 2006, the NSF had invested approximately $920.0 million in EPSCoR programs and activities. When established, it operated solely in the NSF. EPSCoR was expanded in the mid-1980s and early 1990s; by 1998, seven other agencies had established EPSCoR or EPSCoR-like programs.
EPSCoR is a university-oriented program, with the goal of identifying, developing, and utilizing the academic science and technology resources in a state that will lead to increased R&D competitiveness. The program is a partnership between NSF and a state to improve the R&D competitiveness through the state's academic science and technology (S&T) infrastructure. Eventually, it is hoped that those states receiving limited federal support would improve their ability to compete successfully for federal and private sector funds through the regular grant system.
On November 18, 2011, President Barack Obama signed into law the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Appropriations Act, FY2012, P.L. 112-55. The law provides, among other things, funding for the NSF. The law provides a total of $7,033.1 million for the NSF in FY2012, $173.2 million above the FY2011 enacted level. Included in the total funding for NSF is $150.9 million for EPSCoR, approximately $5.5 million above the FY2011 level. The FY2012 appropriation for EPSCoR supports a portfolio of three complementary investment strategies—research infrastructure improvement ($110.0 million), co-funding ($39.4 million), and outreach and workshops ($1.5 million). It is anticipated that approximately 24.0% of the funding for EPSCoR in FY2012 will be used for new research awards. The remaining will be directed at providing support for grants made in previous years.
The Administration's FY2013 budget request for the NSF is $7,373.1 million, a 4.8% increase ($340.00 million) over the FY2012 estimate of $7,033.1 million. Included in the request total is $158.2 million for EPSCoR, an increase of 4.8% over the FY2012 estimate. Approximately 40.0% of the requested funding for EPSCoR in FY2013 will be directed toward new awards. The balance will support continuing awards made in prior years. This report will be updated periodically. |
crs_RS20210 | crs_RS20210_0 | T he Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs were first authorized by Congress in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, to help workers and firms adjust to import competition and dislocation caused by trade liberalization. Although overall economic welfare can be increased by trade liberalization, TAA has long been justified on grounds that the government has an obligation to help the "losers" of policy-driven trade openings that may cause adjustment problems for firms and workers adversely affected by import competition. This report discusses the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms (TAAF) program, which is administered by the Economic Development Administration (EDA) of the Department of Commerce. The Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ) expanded and extended the then-existing programs for workers, firms, and farmers, and added a fourth program for communities (later repealed). In terms of the TAAF program, the TGAAA
expanded eligibility to include firms in the services sector to reflect the larger role of services in the U.S. economy; provided greater flexibility for a firm to demonstrate eligibility for assistance through an "extended look-back period," giving firms longer time frames for calculating sales or production declines due to import competition; increased annual authorized funding levels from $16 million to $50 million; established new oversight and evaluation criteria; created a new position of Director of Adjustment Assistance for Firms; and required that EDA submit a detailed annual report to Congress. Overview of the TAAF Program8
The TAAF provides technical assistance to help trade-impacted firms make strategic adjustments that may allow them to remain competitive in a global economy. The TAAF program targets small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which is borne out in the firm data. Using its own methodology, GAO found a "small and statistically significant relationship between program participation and sales." GAO estimated that TAAF assistance, on average, resulted in a 5% to 6% increase in sales, which was particularly relevant to smaller firms, and a 4% increase in productivity, albeit also highly correlated with firms operating in industries that were experiencing growth. Employment effects were not found to be statistically significant. GAO also confirmed EDA's assessment that both manufacturing and services firms faced import competition that directly affected their sales, and that these firms, by and large, benefitted from specialized attention provided by TAACs. As part of the TAAF annual report, EDA is required to provide a comparison of sales, employment, and productivity for each firm at the time it was certified and both one and two years after the recovery plan was completed. With respect to the reported high "survival rate" for firms that completed the TAAF program, they represent only about half of all firms that had their adjustment proposals approved for assistance. Global Value Chains and the Digital Economy
In debates over trade liberalization, some observers may not appreciate the full impact that globalization and digitization trends are having on trade. The programs can help SMEs to improve their position by integrating into a GVC or using digital platforms to reach new markets, thus offsetting losses that may occur as a result of trade liberalization. GVCs are mainly organized and coordinated by large multinational companies (MNCs) and account for more than 70% of global trade in goods and services and in capital goods. A potential question is whether the EDA, through the TAAF program and the TAACs, could assist trade-impacted firms in developing more relationships with MNCs, as well as analyzing the necessary conditions that would allow TAAF-participating firms to have a realistic chance of doing so. Issues for Congress
As Congress considers trade liberalization agreements and ongoing trade negotiations, it may wish to further examine the TAAF in light of the current debate of its effectiveness and the impact of international trade on the U.S. economy. | As Congress considers potential legislation related to trade agreements, the potential impact on U.S. workers and firms is part of the debate. The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) programs were first authorized by Congress in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to help workers and firms adapt to import competition and dislocation caused by trade liberalization. While trade liberalization may increase the overall economic welfare of all the affected trade partners, it can also cause adjustment problems for firms and workers facing import competition, and adjustment assistance has long been justified on the grounds that it is the least disruptive option for offsetting policy-driven trade liberalization. The TAA programs for workers, firms, and farmers represent an alternative to policies that would restrict imports, providing assistance while bolstering freer trade and diminishing prospects for potentially costly tension (retaliation) among trade partners.
This report discusses the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms (TAAF) program, which is administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce Economic Development Administration (EDA), and related policy issues. Most recently, reauthorization of TAA was linked to renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Both TPA (P.L. 114-26 ) and TAA (P.L. 114-27) were signed into law in June 2015. The renewed TAA not only extended TAAF but reinstated certain expanded provisions and authorized annual funding.
TAAF provides technical assistance to help trade-impacted firms make strategic adjustments to improve their global competitiveness. Under TAAF, a firm first submits a petition to demonstrate its eligibility, then works with TAAF professionals to develop and submit, and finally implement, a business recovery plan.
As required by the Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act of 2009 (TGAAA) (Title II of P.L. 111-5), EDA publishes annual reports on the performance of the TAAF program. The reports have generally shown that two years after completion of the program, on average, participating firms have increased sales, employment, and productivity. The high success rate for firms that "completed" the TAAF program represents only about half of all firms certified as eligible for assistance. The rest left the program without completing an adjustment plan and were no longer monitored. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) completed a comprehensive evaluation of the TAAF program in 2012 and found marked improvement in EDA's administration and evaluation efforts and also confirmed EDA's assessment that trade-impacted firms benefitted from the specialized attention provided by TAAF assistance. GAO also found a "small and statistically significant relationship between program participation and sales," which was particularly relevant to smaller firms, albeit also highly correlated with firms operating in high-growth industries. Employment effects were not found to be statistically significant.
Since the 1990s, debates over trade liberalization have increasingly focused on the changing nature of trade in an era of globalization—especially the emergence of global value chains (GVCs) and the evolving digital economy. GVCs are organized and coordinated by multinational companies (MNCs) and now account for about 70% of global trade in goods and services and capital goods. GVCs offer the potential for small- and medium-size firms to become more integrated into international trade and produce higher-value-added products. One question is whether EDA, through the TAAF program, can help trade-impacted firms in developing stronger relationships with MNCs and GVCs. Another is how EDA can help small and medium enterprises take advantage of the digital economy to reach new markets, including those opened up by trade agreements. Congress may consider these questions as well as further reforms or amendments to TAAF as part of ongoing discussions on potential trade agreements. |
crs_RL32969 | crs_RL32969_0 | Despite occasional discussions, presidential succession was widely considered a settled issue prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These events demonstrated the potential for a mass "decapitation" of both the legislative and executive branches of government, and raised questions as to whether current arrangements were adequate to guarantee continuity in Congress and the presidency under such circumstances. Legislation proposed in the 109 th Congress fell into two basic categories: bills to expand the line of succession to incorporate the Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) into the order of succession, and those that sought a more extensive overhaul of succession policies and procedures. The 109 th Congress did not, however, pass a free standing presidential succession bill of either variety; instead, it incorporated the office of Secretary of Homeland Security into the line of succession in Title V of the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. Finally, this and both later succession acts required that designees meet the constitutional requirements of age, residence, and natural born citizenship. A bill incorporating the President's proposal, minus the special election provision, passed the House in 1945, but no action was taken in the Senate during the balance of the 79 th Congress. 380, 3 U.S.C.§19), if both the presidency and vice presidency are vacant, the Speaker succeeds (after resigning the speakership and his House seat). The succession acts of both 1792 and 1947 assumed that the language was sufficiently broad as to include officers of Congress, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Professor Howard Wasserman, of the Florida International University School of Law, introduced another argument in support of the Speaker's and President Pro Tempore's inclusion in the order of succession in his testimony before the 2003 joint hearing held by the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Committee on Rules and Administration:
The Succession Clause [of the Constitution] provides that "Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and the Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President and such Officer shall act accordingly." 109-177
Two bills to incorporate the Secretary of Homeland Security in the line of succession, S. 422 and H.R. S. 442 was received in the House on July 27; it was referred to the House Judiciary Committee and on September 19 further referred to the Subcommittee on the Constitution. On April 5, 2005, H.R. On October 20, the bill was considered in the Committee on Government Reform, and was reported favorably to the full House by voice vote. First, it would have incorporated the DHS Secretary in the line of succession, but directly following the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, rather than following the Attorney General. Representative Sherman and Senator Cornyn, sponsors of H.R. H.R. No further action was taken on either bill for the balance of the 109 th Congress. 109-177 , 120 Stat. | When the office of President of the United States becomes vacant due to "removal ... death or resignation" of the chief executive, the Constitution provides that "the Vice President shall become President." When the office of Vice President becomes vacant for any reason, the President nominates a successor, who must be confirmed by a majority vote of both houses of Congress. If both offices are vacant simultaneously, the Speaker of the House of Representatives becomes President, after resigning from the House and as Speaker. If the speakership is also vacant, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate becomes President, after resigning from the Senate and as President Pro Tempore. If both offices are vacant, then cabinet officers are eligible to succeed, in the order established by law. All potential successors must be duly sworn in their previous offices and meet the presidency's constitutional requirements of 35 years of age, "natural born" citizenship, and 14 years residence "within the United States." Presidential succession was widely considered a settled issue prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These events demonstrated the potential for a mass "decapitation" of both the legislative and executive branches of government, and raised the question of whether current arrangements are adequate to guarantee continuity in government under such circumstances.
Legislation proposed in the 109th Congress fell into two basic categories: bills to expand the line of succession to incorporate the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) into the order of succession, and those that proposed a more extensive overhaul of succession policies and procedures. The 109th Congress did not, however, pass a free-standing presidential succession bill of either variety; instead, it incorporated the Secretary of DHS as 18th in the line of succession, following the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. The legislative vehicle was Title V, Section 503, of the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (H.R. 3199, (Representative James Sensenbrenner), P.L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192).
Of proposed legislation that was not enacted, H.R. 1455, (Representative Tom Davis), and S. 442 (Senator Mike DeWine) fell into the first category, seeking to incorporate the Secretary of DHS into the line of succession, but as eighth in line, after the Attorney General. S. 442 passed in the Senate without amendment by unanimous consent on July 26, 2005; it was received in the House and referred on September 19 to the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution. H.R. 1455 was referred to the Committee on Government Operations, which reported it favorably to the full House on October 20, 2005. No further action was taken on either bill during the 109th Congress.
H.R. 1943, (Representative Brad Sherman), and S. 920, (Senator John Cornyn) were of the second variety, seeking not only to incorporate the Secretary of DHS in the line of succession, but also to include provisions to ensure presidential continuity in the event of a catastrophic attack on the U.S. Government. No action beyond committee referral was taken on either bill during the 109th Congress.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R44456 | crs_R44456_0 | After five years of drought, rain and snowstorms in Northern and Central California in the winter of 2016-2017 improved water supply conditions in the state in 2017. According to the U.S. Drought Monitor, as of April 18, 2017, less than 1% of the state was in severe drought conditions. This represents a drastic improvement from one year ago, when 73% of the state was in severe drought conditions, and two years ago, when 92% fell under this designation. The stress on water supplies due to the drought resulted in cutbacks in water deliveries to contractors receiving water from the CVP and SWP. In 2015, California Governor Jerry Brown mandated the first-ever 25% statewide reduction in water use for nonagricultural users. For the first time in years, water allocations for most CVP water contractors were 100%. Although some contractors south of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers' Delta (Bay Delta) received a lower allocation in the initial March 2017 announcement (65% for agricultural contractors and 90% for municipal and industrial contractors, respectively), Reclamation subsequently revised these allocations upward to 100% in April. Legislation enacted in the 114 th Congress (Subtitle J of S. 612 , the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation ([WIIN] Act) incorporated provisions from multiple California drought-related bills that had been considered dating to the 112 th Congress. These provisions directed pumping to "maximize" water supplies for the CVP (in accordance with applicable biological opinions), allowed for increased pumping during certain high water events, and authorized expedited reviews of water transfers. This report provides high-level summary information on recent hydrologic conditions in California and their impact on state and federal water management, with a focus on deliveries related to the federal CVP. Federal and State Water Project Deliveries
Proposals and debates related to water allocations in California typically revolve around the two major water projects that serve the state's agricultural and municipal water suppliers: the federal CVP and the state of California's SWP. 2017 Allocations
In a series of announcements in February, March, and April 2017, Reclamation provided its initial allocations for the 2017 water year (see Table 1 , below). Reclamation previously had noted that its lower initial allocation for SOD agricultural water service contractors was largely a result of two factors: (1) a conservative estimate of water supplies expected to be added to the system for the remainder of the year (thus, if the remainder of the year is not abnormally dry, the initial allocation might increase) and (2) limits to available water supplies in the federal half of San Luis Reservoir (an important provider of SOD water storage) due to rescheduled and carryover water from 2016. For 2016 and 2017, SWP water deliveries were significantly higher than they were in 2015 (when deliveries were limited to 20%). Some of these effects may linger for years. In many years, pumping restrictions to protect state-set water quality levels, particularly increases in salinity levels, are greater than restrictions to protect endangered species. Ongoing cutbacks to CVP contractor allocations during times of increased water supplies have caused continuing criticism of Reclamation's operation of the CVP. In recent years, debates have focused on the extent to which factors other than drought (e.g., endangered species and water quality requirements) have led to curtailments. Legislation in the 115th Congress
Similar to recent congresses, the 115 th Congress is expected to consider new legislation that proposes additional changes to CVP operations. H.R. 23 , the Gaining Responsibility on Water Act (GROW Act) incorporates a number of provisions that were included in previous legislation in the 112 th , 113 th , and 114 th Congresses but were not enacted in the final version of the WIIN Act. Congress may consider this and similar legislation, as well as oversight of CVP operations and implementation of WIIN Act CVP provisions. | After five years of drought, rain and snowstorms in Northern and Central California in the winter of 2016-2017 significantly improved water supply conditions in the state in 2017. According to the U.S. Drought Monitor, as of late April 2017, less than 1% of the state was in severe drought conditions. This represents an improvement from one year prior to that date, when 73% of the state was in severe drought conditions, and two years prior, when 92% fell under this designation.
Stress on water supplies due to drought resulted in cutbacks in water deliveries to districts receiving water from federal and state facilities, in particular the federal Central Valley Project (CVP, operated by the Bureau of Reclamation) and the State Water Project (SWP, operated by the State of California). In 2015, California mandated a 25% reduction in water use for nonagricultural water users, and overall SWP deliveries were limited to 20% of contractor requests. Some of these restrictions have since been relaxed.
Reclamation estimated its initial water allocations for CVP contractors for the 2017 water year in a series of announcements in February, March, and April 2017. For the first time in years, initial water allocations for most CVP water contractors were 100%. Contractors south of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers' Delta (Bay Delta) initially received lower allocations in March 2017 (65% for agricultural contractors and 90% for municipal and industrial contractors, respectively), but Reclamation subsequently revised these allocations upward to 100% in April. The allocations represented a drastic change from recent years, in which no supplies were made available to many of these contractors, who farm some of the most valuable irrigated agricultural land in the country.
Most expect that the historically wet conditions of 2016-2017 will not continue in future years and that future water years will continue to see deliveries limited to some extent. Previous cutbacks to CVP deliveries (in particular during periods of increased precipitation) have caused some to criticize Reclamation's management of the CVP and question the extent to which factors beyond limited water supplies (e.g., restrictions to protect endangered species and water quality) influence water management and the quantity of water delivered to contractors. They argue that congressionally directed changes in the operation of the CVP that would result in increases to water allocations are needed. Other stakeholders argue that some of these changes could undercut environmental regulations, harm fish and wildlife, and potentially lower water quality. They also worry that legislative proposals that would alter the implementation of the Endangered Species Act could harm species in the region and set a precedent that could be used to affect other listed species in the future.
Legislation enacted in the 114th Congress (Subtitle J of S. 612, the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation [WIIN] Act) incorporated provisions from multiple California drought-related bills that had been considered dating to the 112th Congress. Among other things, these provisions directed pumping to "maximize" water supplies for the CVP (in accordance with applicable biological opinions), allowed for increased pumping during certain high water events, and authorized expedited reviews of water transfers.
Similar to recent congresses, the 115th Congress is considering legislation that proposes additional changes to CVP operations. H.R. 23, the Gaining Responsibility on Water Act (GROW Act) incorporates a number of provisions that were included in previous legislation but were not in the final version of the WIIN Act. Congress may consider this and similar legislation, as well as oversight of CVP operations and implementation of WIIN Act CVP provisions.
This report provides an abbreviated background on the CVP and SWP. It also provides a summary of recent hydrologic conditions in California and their effect on water deliveries. |
crs_R41861 | crs_R41861_0 | The conference report on H.R. The President signed the bill on December 23, 2011 ( P.L. 112-74 ). The Senate Armed Services Committee's initial version of the FY2012 defense authorization bill ( S. 1253 ), reported on June 22, like the authorization bill passed by the House on May 26, 2011 ( H.R. Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2219 ), that would have reduced the President's requested base budget by $8.9 billion. However, the bill would have provided $842 million more than the President's $117.8 billion OCO request, resulting in an overall net reduction of $8.1 billion to the President's request. The first legislative action during the year that applied the BCA-mandated spending reduction to FY2012 defense budget was taken by the Senate Appropriations Committee on September 7, 2011, when it adopted discretionary spending ceilings for each of its 12 subcommittees that required the defense subcommittee to cut $25.9 billion from the President's request for programs funded by the defense appropriations bill. On September 15, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported a version H.R. The Senate never acted on that bill, but a House-Senate compromise on DOD funding, which largely tracked the Senate committee-reported bill, was enacted as Division A of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2012 ( H.R. The House agreed to the conference report on December 16 by a vote of 296-121. The Senate approved it December 17 by a vote of 67-32. The bill was signed by the President on December 23, 2011 ( P.L. On the other hand, the FY2012 request for so-called Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO, i.e., operations in Iraq and Afghanistan), which is $117.8 billion, would have amounted to an inflation-adjusted decrease of 27%. One of BCA's provisions sets a cap on discretionary appropriations for so-called "security agencies"—a category that includes the DOD base budget, the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security, and the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Agency, as well as the Department of State and various international activities funded by other federal agencies. FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540; S. 1253; S. 1867)
On May 26, 2011, by a vote of 322-96, the House passed its version of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. Viewed in the aggregate, the House version of the bill would have made only minor changes to President Obama's funding request for programs covered by the authorization bill: The DOD base budget request would have been trimmed by $1.7 million, while the $1.1 billion the bill would have added to the request for war costs was accounted for almost entirely by the House committee's addition to the DOD budget of $1.1 billion for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, a program which the Administration's budget had funded through the State Department. The Senate Armed Services Committee's initial version of the FY2012 authorization bill ( S. 1253 ), reported on June 22, 2011, would have authorized $6.4 billion less that the Administration requested for FY2012, of which $5.9 billion would have been cut from the base budget. On November 15, 2011, to match the BCA-mandated FY2012 spending cuts for DOD and other security agencies, the committee reported a second version of the bill, S. 1867 , that would have cut $27.3 billion from the President's request, and would have authorized $28.4 billion less than the House-passed bill (see Table 4 ). 1540 , which cuts the Administration's authorization request by a total of $26.6 billion, was adopted by the House December 14, 2011, by a vote of 283-136. 112-10 ) that was enacted on April 15, 2011, two months after the FY2012 budget request was published. On December 2, 2011—the day after the Senate passed its version of H.R. | President Obama's FY2012 budget request, sent to Congress on February 14, 2011, included $670.9 billion in discretionary budget authority for the Department of Defense (DOD), of which $553.1 billion was for the so-called "base budget" of the department (that is, the cost of routine, peacetime operations excluding the cost of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan). The remaining $117.8 billion in the DOD budget request was to cover the cost of so-called "overseas contingency operations (OCO)," including operations in those two countries.
However, the Budget Control Act (BCA) enacted in early August 2011 set ceilings on FY2012 discretionary budget authority that required a reduction of $35.7 billion from the total requested for so-called "security agencies"—a category that includes the DOD base budget, the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Homeland Security, and State as well as the Energy Department's Nuclear National Security Agency and the international activities of other agencies.
Before the BCA was enacted, the House had passed its version of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540), which would have authorized $1.8 billion more than was requested for DOD in February. The bill was passed on May 26, 2011, by a vote of 322-96. Also prior to the enactment of the BCA, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported on June 22, 2011, an initial version of the authorization act (S. 1253) which would have authorized $6.4 billion less that the Administration requested for FY2012.
To take account of the BCA-mandated reduction, the Senate Armed Services Committee approved on November 15, 2011, a second version of the FY2012 authorization bill (S. 1867) that would have reduced the FY2012 national defense authorization by a total of $27.3 billion. After debating that bill, the Senate passed the text of it on December 1, 2011, as an amended version of the House-passed H.R. 1540. The conference report on the FY2012 authorization bill, which cut the President's request by $26.6 billion, was adopted by the House on December 14 and then by Senate on December 15. The President signed H.R. 1540 on December 31, 2011 (P.L. 112-81).
The version of the FY2012 Defense appropriations act (H.R. 2219) passed by the House on June 14, 2011, would have reduced the President's requested base budget by $8.9 billion. However, the bill would have provided $842 million more than the President's $117.8 billion OCO request, resulting in an overall net reduction of $8.1 bill to the President's request.
The first legislative action during the year that applied the BCA-mandated spending reduction to the FY2012 defense budget was taken by the Senate Appropriations Committee on September 7, 2011, when it adopted discretionary spending ceilings for each of its 12 subcommittees that required the defense subcommittee to cut $25.9 billion from the President's request for programs funded by the defense appropriations bill. On September 15, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported a version of the House-passed defense appropriations bill (H.R. 2219) that would have cut $29.3 billion from the Administration request.
The Senate never acted on H.R. 2219, but a House-Senate compromise on DOD funding, which largely tracked the Senate committee-reported bill, was enacted as Division A of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2012 (H.R. 2055). The House agreed to the conference report on December 16 by a vote of 296-121. The Senate approved it December 17 by a vote of 67-32. The bill was signed by the President on December 23, 2011 (P.L. 112-74). |
crs_R43417 | crs_R43417_0 | Introduction
The Forest Service (FS) is responsible for managing 193 million acres of the National Forest System, as well as for conducting forestry research and providing assistance to state, local, private, and international forest owners. Funding to complete such work is provided through both discretionary and mandatory appropriations (see Figure 1 ). The budget authority for several of these mandatory spending accounts is dependent on revenue generated by activities on the national forests. This report presents and analyzes the discretionary and mandatory appropriations for the FS over the five years from FY2012 to FY2016. Forest Service Discretionary Appropriations
FS discretionary appropriations—which account for 88% of total agency appropriations on average—are primarily divided among six main accounts, described below and listed in the same order as they generally appear in appropriations laws. State and Private Forestry (S&PF). National Forest System (NFS). Capital Improvement and Maintenance (CI&M). Wildland Fire Management (WFM) and FLAME Wildfire Suppression Reserve Fund (FLAME) . The FLAME account was established under the Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act of 2009 for emergency wildfire suppression activities. The FS allocates the appropriations from these accounts among the nine FS regions, five research stations, two service centers and laboratories, and the national headquarters office in Washington, DC. Forest Service Mandatory Appropriations
The FS has more than 20 permanent appropriations accounts and 4 trust funds that constitute mandatory spending. Together, they account on average for about 12% of total agency appropriations. Budget authority for these accounts is provided in authorizing laws. In FY2016, FS estimates its mandatory spending will be approximately $700.8 million. The FY2016 appropriation of $1.509 billion (24% of FS discretionary appropriations) is a slight increase from the FY2015 appropriation of $1.494 billion. FY2017 Budget Request
For FY2017, the Administration is requesting $5.757 billion in discretionary appropriations for the FS (see Table 3 ). However, funds provided for wildfire management (supplemental and regular appropriations) are responsible for much of the observed differences. Furthermore, funding for wildfire management activities accounts for an increasing percentage of agency appropriations, which may raise questions about the amount of funding necessary to adequately address wildland fire management issues or about the extent to which wildfire management activities direct agency resources—financial and otherwise—away from other FS statutory obligations. | The Forest Service (FS) is responsible for managing 193 million acres of the National Forest System, as well as for conducting forestry research and providing assistance to state, local, private, and international forest owners. Funding to complete such work is provided through both discretionary and mandatory appropriations.
For FY2016, the FS received $7.065 billion in discretionary and mandatory appropriations. This figure includes funding provided under a $700 million emergency supplemental appropriation for wildfire suppression activities from FY2015. The FY2016 discretionary appropriation was $6.364 billion, more than $1 billion above the five-year average of $5.334 billion. Much of this increase is due to the wildfire supplemental, as well as additional funds provided for FY2016 wildland fire management activities. FS discretionary appropriations are primarily divided among six main accounts: Forest and Rangeland Research (FRR); State and Private Forestry (S&PF); National Forest System (NFS); Capital Improvement and Maintenance (CI&M); Wildland Fire Management (WFM); and the FLAME Wildfire Suppression Reserve account established under the Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-88). The agency then allocates the appropriations from these accounts among the nine FS regions, five research stations, two service stations and laboratories, and national headquarters. Discretionary appropriations account for an average of 88% of the agency's total FY2012-FY2016 appropriations.
The FS has more than 20 permanent appropriations accounts and 4 trust funds that are mandatory spending. Together, they account, on average, for about 12% of total agency appropriations. Budget authority for these accounts is provided for in authorizing statutes, and for several of the accounts it is dependent on the level of revenue generated by specific activities on the national forests. The FS estimates that FY2016 mandatory spending will be $700.8 million.
For FY2017, the Administration is requesting $5.757 billion in discretionary appropriations for the FS. The request continues a proposal from FY2015 to change wildfire suppression funding by providing access to nearly $1 billion outside of the statutory discretionary limits for emergency purposes. Funding for wildfire management activities in general and suppression activities specifically accounts for an increasing percentage of agency appropriations, which may raise questions about the amount of resources necessary to adequately address wildland fire management issues or about the extent to which wildfire management activities direct agency resources—financial and otherwise—away from other FS statutory obligations. |
crs_RL30004 | crs_RL30004_0 | Introduction
This selective list of events provides information on reported instances of North Korean provocations against South Korea, the United States, and Japan between June 1950 and 2007 and related actions. The term "provocation" is defined to include armed invasion; border violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism (including assassination and bombing); threat/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Information in this report was taken from South Korean and Western sources, but typically has been denied by the North Korean government. This can be seen in the following list of provocations. For information on current U.S. policy and relations with North Korea, see CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33590, North Korea ' s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS21391, North Korea ' s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments , by [author name scrubbed]; or CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions , by [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. The Korean War ended in July 1953 with an armistice. 39 of the crew and passengers were released. 08/1974 — South Korean President Park Chung Hee's wife was killed during another attempt on his life. According to the South Korean agency, North Korean agents had infiltrated through South Korea's coastlines. 12/1998 — At a Pyongyang rally, North Korean youths and students vowed to turn Washington into "a sea of fire and to crush Seoul and Tokyo." North Korea denied its involvement in the reported incident. Kim's kidnapping. In October 2000, South Korea's National Intelligence Service reportedly confirmed that Rev. 10/2000 — On October 19, North Korea claimed that any South Korean attempt to link the North with the 1983 terrorist bombing in Rangoon, Myanmar, would amount to a provocation against North Korea, "a criminal attempt to brand the North as a 'sponsor of terrorism.'" The reactor could produce enough material for a nuclear bomb in about a year. The missile was believed to have traveled about 100 kilometers, or 60 miles, into the sea between the two countries. They have defied their neighbors who urged them not to have a launch. | This selective list of events provides information on instances of North Korean provocative actions between June 1950 and 2007. The purpose of this report is to place current provocations in the context of past actions to better judge their significance and to determine changes in trends. The term "provocation" is defined to include armed invasion; border violations; infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism (including assassination and bombing); threats/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, and institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the South Korean government; actions undertaken to impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Information in this report was taken from South Korean and Western sources, but typically is denied by the North Korean government.
The most intense phase of the provocations was in the latter half of the 1960s, when North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) staged a series of limited armed actions against South Korean and U.S. security interests. Infiltration of armed agents into South Korea was the most frequently mentioned type of provocation, followed by kidnapping and terrorism (actual and threatened). From 1954 to 1992, North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3,693 armed agents into South Korea, with 1967 and 1968 accounting for 20% of the total. Instances of terrorism were far fewer in number, but they seemed to have had a continuing negative impact on relations between the two Koreas. Not counting North Korea's invasion of South Korea that triggered the Korean War (1950-1953), North Korea's major terrorist involvement includes attempted assassinations of President Park Chung Hee in 1968 and 1974; a 1983 attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan's life in a bombing incident in Rangoon, Burma (Myanmar); and a mid-air sabotage bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane in 1987. Reported provocations have continued intermittently in recent years, in the form of armed incursions, kidnappings, and occasional threats to turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into "a sea of fire" and to silence or tame South Korean critics of North Korea. Then, in July 2006, North Korea launched seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, and in October 2006, it tested a nuclear bomb.
For information on current U.S. policy and relations with North Korea, see CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33590, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS21391, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments, by [author name scrubbed]; or CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R42549 | crs_R42549_0 | 233), and according to the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), contractors have delivered mail to homes and businesses since 1900. The National Rural Letter Carriers Association (NRLCA), which represents rural delivery persons, also reached a collective bargaining agreement with the USPS in 2006. In 2007, representatives of both NALC and NRLCA alleged that the USPS was expanding its use of CDS carriers. John Potter, then-Postmaster General, declared that the USPS had "made a commitment for the life of this agreement [with the NALC] not to contract out any city delivery in big cities" and to work with both unions on the use of contractors in suburban and rural areas. After lengthy negotiations, the NALC and the USPS signed an MOU in October 2008. Recent Developments
In November 2010, the NRLCA-USPS collective bargaining agreement expired. The previous collective bargaining agreement's language regarding the hiring of private contractors to deliver mail was not altered, leaving it unclear whether the USPS and NRLCA have come to a working agreement on this particular issue. To this end, the PRA provides the USPS with considerable discretion over its operations. 39 U.S.C. 1003(a)). Hence, the PRA's provisions regarding the USPS's authority to contract and operate an "efficient" system of mail may be at tension with the statute's provision on USPS employee compensation. However, the law also sets a pay and compensation floor for USPS employees and requires the USPS to collectively bargain with its employees. Congress may continue this practice, reasoning that the USPS has legitimate grounds to pursue cost-savings via the use of contractors. Thus, Congress might either ban the practice of using contractors to deliver mail (or perform other mail-movement activities); or it could limit the amount of mail delivery work performed by contractors—perhaps by capping the percentage of routes served by non-USPS employees. | Recently, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has been in negotiations with the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) and National Rural Letter Carriers Association (NRLCA). One issue that may or may not be settled is the Postal Service's use of non-USPS employees (i.e., contractors) to deliver mail. If the parties cannot come to a satisfactory arrangement, Congress may be approached to consider the matter.
Contractors have delivered mail to homes and businesses since 1900. Controversy over this practice arose in 2007 when the NALC alleged that the USPS had expanded the use of contractors into city areas at the expense of unionized membership. Congress held hearings on the matter, and legislation was introduced in both houses. The USPS and NALC came to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in October 2008 to govern the practice, which appeared to quell the controversy.
However, the issue was reopened when USPS's collective bargaining agreements with the NRLCA and the NALC expired in 2010 and 2011, respectively. At present, it is unclear whether the parties have come to mutually agreeable arrangements concerning the use of contactors to deliver mail.
By law, the USPS is obliged to provide for an "efficient" system of mail delivery. Federal statute provides the USPS with considerable freedom to enter into contracts with private parties. Wage-earning contractors cost less to employ than wage- and benefits-earning USPS employees. However, federal law also requires the USPS to collectively bargain its employees' compensation. Thus, a conflict arises between these competing legal imperatives when the USPS employs a contractor to perform work that was or could be performed by a postal employee.
The USPS has increased its use of contractors in recent years, but USPS employees continue to serve 98% of all U.S. homes and businesses.
This report will be updated as developments warrant. |
crs_RS22767 | crs_RS22767_0 | Secretary Hu's report at the Congress made several references to these deficiencies, suggesting that problems of governance continue to preoccupy central leaders: "The Party's ability to govern has not been fully competent to deal with the new situation and tasks ..." and "... the democratic legal building is still unable to completely adapt to the requirements of expanding people's democracy and of economic and social development.... "
Despite these calls for greater political pluralism, the Party at its 17 th Party Congress endorsed no major political reforms and further made clear that its monopoly on power would continue. In addition, rather than the standard practice of designating an "heir apparent" to succeed Secretary Hu Jintao, the 17 th Party Congress appeared to field two potential candidates for this post. But the prospect of two rival candidates competing with one another for the next five years also could raise new uncertainties in the succession process. The Politburo
The Politburo sits at the top of the Chinese Communist Party's political structure. Of the latter, two—Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang—have been tipped as frontrunners to be Hu Jintao's successor as Party Secretary at the 18 th Party Congress in 2012. | The Chinese Communist Party's 17th Congress, held from October 15 to 21, 2007, demonstrated the Party's efforts to try to adapt and redefine itself in the face of emerging economic and social challenges while still trying to maintain its authoritarian one-Party rule. The Congress validated and re-emphasized the priority on continued economic development; expanded that concept to include more balanced and sustainable development; announced that the Party would seek to broaden political participation by expanding intra-Party democracy; and selected two potential rival candidates, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, with differing philosophies (rather than one designated successor-in-waiting) as possibilities to succeed to the top Party position in five years. More will be known about the Party's future prospects and the relative influence of its two potential successors once the National People's Congress meets in early 2008 to select key government ministers. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R41208 | crs_R41208_0 | The Next Generation: NG9-1-1
There is a general consensus that present and future digital communications for 911 services would be best supported by Next Generation 911 technology (NG9-1-1). Other benefits include better connections between 911 call centers, emergency responders, and alert and warning systems; more robust capacity; and the flexibility to receive calls for help in any format. Three major laws supporting improvements in the handling of 911 emergency calls have been enacted since 1999. The major bills enacted into law are
The Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999 ( P.L. The New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 2008 ( P.L. The 911 Act and Federal Communications Commission Regulations
To assist the effort to provide comprehensive 911 services nationwide, Congress in 1999 passed the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act ( P.L. 106-81 ), often referred to as the 911 Act. 108-494 ). In response to the Hatfield Report's call for a federal champion, the act created the E-911 Implementation Coordination Office (ICO) to be jointly administered by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the NHTSA. 110-283 ). Creating the Base for Change
Through the laws that it has enacted, Congress has established the principle that 911 calls should provide the same level of information and responsiveness no matter what the communications device, the location of the call, or the physical abilities of the caller. The plan was presented on September 25, 2009, leaving no time for the ICO to develop more detailed plans for action before its authority ended on September 30. NG9-1-1 Transition: FCC
The ARRA required the FCC to prepare a national broadband plan. The National Broadband Plan (NBP) was submitted to Congress on March 16, 2010. An IP-enabled network for emergency communications has been defined as an "emergency communications network or system based on a secured infrastructure that allows secured transmission of information, using Internet Protocol, among users of the network or system." In the NBP, the FCC has made recommendations that support the transition to NG9-1-1 but it has not provided a policy statement that captures the vision of shared capacity, with many applications riding on the same infrastructure. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is responsible for promulgating and enforcing regulations to assure that cell phone and VOIP calls, as well as those from wireline phones, convey required information to the appropriate Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP). PSAPs must also invest in technology in order to receive more detailed information. The Role of the E-911 Implementation Coordination Office
The keystone of the ENHANCE 911 Act of 2004 was the mandate to establish a program "to facilitate coordination and communications between Federal, State, and local emergency communications systems, emergency communications personnel, public safety organizations, telecommunications carriers, and telecommunications equipment manufacturers and vendors involved in the implementation of E-911 services." Transition to IP-Enabled 911 Systems: The NET 911 Improvement Act of 2008
The NET 911 Improvement Act of 2008 has required that the ICO "shall develop and report to Congress on a national plan for migrating to a national IP-enabled emergency network capable of receiving and responding to all citizen-activated emergency communications and improving information-sharing among all emergency response entities." The 211 dialing code is reserved by the FCC on a provisional basis as a universal number for community information and referral. Service levels and response times for all types of citizen-activated calls would benefit from a transition to IP-enabled networks and in many cases could share infrastructure with 911 networks
Call Centers and Post-Disaster Response
Call centers are identified as a pivotal link in an end-to-end network of emergency communications, information, response, and post-incident care. | Today's 911 system is built on an infrastructure of analog technology that does not support many of the features that most Americans expect to be part of an emergency response. Efforts to splice newer, digital technologies onto this aging infrastructure have created points of failure where a call can be dropped or misdirected, sometimes with tragic consequences. Callers to 911, however, generally assume that the newer technologies they are using to place a call are matched by the same level of technology at the 911 call centers, known as Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs). However, this is not always the case. To modernize the system to provide the quality of service that approaches the expectations of its users will require that the PSAPs, and state, local, and possibly federal emergency communications authorities invest in new technologies. As envisioned by most stakeholders, these new technologies—collectively referred to as Next Generation 911 or NG9-1-1—should incorporate Internet Protocol (IP) standards. An IP-enabled emergency communications network that supports 911 will facilitate interoperability and system resilience; improve connections between 911 call centers; provide more robust capacity; and offer flexibility in receiving and managing calls. The same network can also serve wireless broadband communications for public safety and other emergency personnel, as well as other purposes.
Recognizing the importance of providing effective 911 service, Congress has passed three major bills supporting improvements in the handling of 911 emergency calls. The Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-81) established 911 as the number to call for emergencies and gave the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authority to regulate many aspects of the service. The most recent of these laws, the NET 911 Improvement Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-283), required the preparation of a National Plan for migrating to an IP-enabled emergency network. Responsibility for the plan was assigned to the E-911 Implementation Coordination Office (ICO), created to meet requirements of an earlier law, the ENHANCE 911 Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-494). Authorization for the ICO terminated on September 30, 2009. ICO was jointly administered by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
The FCC has included recommendations for advancing NG9-1-1 as part of the National Broadband Plan it presented to Congress on March 16, 2010. It has proposed that the FCC take on an expanded role in assuring that NG9-1-1 services meet future consumer expectations for broadband-based communications. Congress may evaluate whether additional actions are needed on its part in order to support a cohesive policy for transitioning to NG9-1-1.
Other types of citizen-activated emergency calls are handled in call centers. Increasingly many calls for assistance are placed by dialing 211. The number has been provisionally designated for community information and referrals. Service levels and response times for 211 calls would benefit from a transition to IP-enabled networks and in many cases could share infrastructure with 911 networks. |
crs_R41865 | crs_R41865_0 | This report briefly describes the actions a piece of legislation might undergo during the legislative process and provides information on resources for retrieving legislative history materials. The Legislative Process
This report focuses on legislative history research, and therefore does not contain detailed information about the legislative process. The calendars provide a list of legislation. Reports. Prints and Documents . | This report provides an overview of federal legislative history research, the legislative process, and where to find congressional documents. The report also summarizes some of the reasons researchers are interested in legislative history, briefly describes the actions a piece of legislation might undergo during the legislative process, and provides a list of easily accessible print and electronic resources. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_R41232 | crs_R41232_0 | Rescissions and mandatory savings both offset or reduce the amount of new Budget Authority (BA) required to finance spending. Savings in mandatory programs reduce the amount needed for new direct spending. In the final version, Congress did not include additional domestic funding to prevent teacher layoffs, provide more Pell grants, fund summer jobs, or provide agricultural and energy grants funding that was not requested by the Administration, but which was included in an earlier version of the bill that the House passed on July 1, 2010, and then receded from (withdrew its support) on July 27, 2010. 4899 on March 24, 2010 (no House report) with $5.1 billion in spending for the Disaster Relief Fund in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and $600 million for the Department of Labor's summer jobs program, to be funded by $5.1 billion in new Budget Authority (BA) and $600 million in offsetting rescissions; The Senate passed H.R. 111-188 ) with $59.2 billion in spending, for disaster relief, war funding, war-related foreign assistance, Haiti relief and reconstruction, additional benefits for Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange; other disaster relief, other foreign assistance, and oil spill recovery funding, funded with $58.9 billion in new BA and $380 million in offsetting rescissions; The House adopted the Senate's May 25, 2010, version of H.R. 4899 and added funds for the Education Jobs Fund, Pell Grants, summer youth employment, funding for the Cobell and Pigford II court cases on July 1, 2010, with a total of $81.8 billion in spending, funded with $65.1 billion in new BA and $16.7 billion in rescissions and mandatory savings; The Senate failed to invoke cloture on the House's July 1, 2010, amended version, and sent a message of disagreement with that version to the House on July 22, 2010; The House receded from (withdrew its support of) the July 1, 2010, version of H.R. 4899 that it had passed, and adopted the Senate May 27 version by a vote of 308-114 (two-thirds of those present required under suspension of the rules) on July 27, 2010; and The President signed the bill on July 29, 2010, P.L. Specifically, the FY2010 supplemental requests included:
$5.1 billion to replenish the U.S. Disaster Relief Fund administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency; $33.0 billion for the Defense Department, primarily to deploy 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan; $4.5 billion in foreign assistance for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan; $2.8 billion for Haiti reconstruction and foreign aid in the wake of January's earthquake; $13.4 billion to compensate veterans exposed to Agent Orange; $243 million for appropriations-related responses to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill; $600 million primarily for additional border security personnel; and $3.4 billion to settle land trust claims of American Indians in the long-standing Cobell case and $1.2 billion to settle the discrimination claims of 70,000 black farmers in the Pigford II case (see Table 1 ). 4899 was the effect of this supplemental spending on the federal deficit. 4899 included $12.2 billion in rescissions and $4.5 billion in mandatory savings to offset the $81.8 billion in proposed spending (see Table 1 ). 4899 passed on May 27, 2010. The Administration requested that the remainder be designated as emergency requirements. 4899 by a vote of 67 to 28 H.R. 111-212 . | The Administration requested $64.3 billion in FY2010 supplemental appropriations:
$5.1 billion to replenish the U.S. Disaster Relief Fund administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); $33 billion for the Department of Defense (DOD) primarily for deploying 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan; $4.5 billion in war-related foreign aid; and $2.8 billion for Haiti earthquake-related relief and reconstruction aid; $243 million for activities related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill; $600 million for border security, and $129 million to reduce backlogs in patent requests; and $13.4 billion to compensate veterans exposed to Agent Orange, and $3.4 billion to settle court cases about trust claims of American Indians (Cobell) and $1.2 billion for discrimination claims of black farmers (Pigford II).
Much of the debate about this year's supplemental focused on the effect on the deficit of additional spending and, particularly, whether certain spending should be designated as emergency spending that Congress is not required to offset under congressional rules. Offsets can come from either rescissions, which cancel prior year budget authority (BA), and then apply that BA to new spending, thus reducing the amount of new budget authority required, or from savings in direct spending or mandatory programs.
On March 24, 2010, the House passed H.R. 4899, the Disaster Relief and Summer Jobs Act, by a vote of 239 to 175, with $5.7 billion in funding, including $5.1 billion to replenish FEMA's Disaster Assistance Fund and $600 million for a Labor Department summer jobs program. Taking the bill's $600 million in offsetting rescissions into account, the bill required $5.1 billion in new budget authority (BA). A House Appropriations Committee (HAC) markup of an $84.8 billion draft bill with additional domestic spending scheduled for May 26, 2010, was cancelled.
On May 27, the Senate passed its version of H.R. 4899 by a vote of 67-28, with $59.2 billion in funding for disaster assistance, war funding, Haiti relief, and new VA benefits, but without funding for the two court cases. Including its $380 million in rescissions, the Senate version required $58.8 billion in new budget authority.
On July 1, 2010, the House passed an amended version of H.R. 4899 totaling $81.8 billion for disaster assistance, wars, Haiti relief, and new VA benefits, and additional domestic spending to prevent teacher layoffs, provide agricultural and energy loans, and Pell Grants, in discretionary spending and funding to settle the two court cases. With its $12.2 billion in rescissions and $4.5 billion in 10-year mandatory savings from lower government drug prices, this bill would have required $65.1 billion in new BA. On July 22, 2010, the Senate sent a message to the House disagreeing with the earlier version passed by the House on July 1, 2010. On July 27th, the House passed the Senate's May 27 version, which was signed by the President on July 29, 2010, and became P.L. 111-212.
Part of the debate and timing of congressional action was driven by funding deadlines cited by the Department of Defense, FEMA, and the Coast Guard, some which proved to be somewhat flexible. |
crs_R43222 | crs_R43222_0 | Congress has chosen to make the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps or USACE) responsible for maintaining federal navigation channels. The Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) is the principal legislative vehicle for altering the Corps' Civil Works Program; its consideration offers Congress an opportunity to revisit harbor maintenance policy. Under existing law, the cost of harbor maintenance is supported by a harbor maintenance tax (HMT) on imported and domestic waterborne cargo and cruise passengers. Revenue from the tax flows into the harbor maintenance trust fund (HMTF), which is used to cover the Corps' cost of dredging channels, maintaining jetties and breakwaters, and operating locks along the coasts and in the Great Lakes. 335 , if enacted, would nearly double annual spending on harbor maintenance and related activities, requiring that HMT revenues be spent for harbor maintenance rather than accumulating in the trust fund account. These ports received approximately two-thirds of HMTF spending in FY2013. This table encapsulates an important part of the HMTF debate, also reflected in differences between S. 601 and H.R. 3080 specifically directs the Corps not to allocate harbor maintenance funds solely according to tonnage, while S. 601 appears to favor funding of large, commercial cargo ports. A great proportion of cargo and passengers traveled in small vessels, and maritime commerce was widely dispersed, utilizing many small harbors that today are bypassed by larger cargo vessels. Public Safety Harbors
For public safety reasons, the Corps maintains harbors or channels that may have little or no cargo activity. There is a need for an analysis of the need for continued maintenance of specific waterways and harbors. Only two of the projects still carry cargo. The unavailable information includes the following:
1. In 1992, Congress requested the Corps to issue annual reports on the status of the HMTF, to include a description of expenditures from the trust fund on a project-by-project basis. In July 2012, Congress requested that the Corps estimate the nationwide average availability, expressed as a percentage, of the authorized depth and width of all channels that are maintained from the HMTF that would result from the amount requested in the annual budget request, starting in FY2014. The HMT may be a more serious obstacle to transshipment of import and export cargo by sea. Harbors in a Competitive U.S. Supply Chain
The debate over WRDA is occurring in the context of heightened interest in the cost-effectiveness of industrial supply chains. The U.S. Departments of Transportation and Commerce have launched the Competitive Supply Chain Initiative, which seeks to strategically improve the nation's marine transportation system and its connecting infrastructure as part of a larger effort to improve America's overall national freight infrastructure and national competitiveness. | The federal government has assumed principal responsibility for maintenance of the nation's harbors and shipping channels. Harbor maintenance activities are overseen by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps or USACE) and largely funded through the harbor maintenance trust fund (HMTF), which receives revenue from taxes on waterborne cargo and on cruise ship passengers. The future of the HMTF is a major issue in consideration of the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA), which is now pending in Congress. Legislation passed in the Senate (S. 601) and under consideration in the House (H.R. 3080), if enacted, would significantly increase, but by differing amounts, annual spending from the HMTF. Each bill would make a variety of other changes in the way federal harbor maintenance funds are allocated and spent, but there are notable differences between the two bills.
The debate over harbor maintenance is occurring in the context of heightened interest in the cost-effectiveness of industrial supply chains. In 2010, the U.S. Departments of Transportation and Commerce launched the Competitive Supply Chain Initiative, which seeks to strategically improve the nation's marine transportation system and its connecting infrastructure. Most sea-borne imports and exports move through a relatively small number of ports, but a significant proportion of HMTF spending is used to cover the cost of dredging harbors that have relatively little or no cargo. One reason for this is that the Corps still maintains navigation channels and harbors authorized a century or more ago, when maritime commerce was carried by smaller vessels utilizing a larger number of harbors and coastal channels protected from the open ocean. One key issue for Congress is the extent to which the HMTF, which is funded mainly by a tax on cargo, should give priority to improvements that do not benefit commercial shipping.
Other key policy questions for Congress include the following:
Should the HMTF continue to finance dredging only of channels, which benefits mainly ports with shallow natural harbors, or should the scope of allowable activities be increased to benefit ports with deeper harbors, including some of the nation's largest cargo ports? Should there be a relationship between the amount of revenue collected from a port through harbor maintenance taxes and federal spending on that harbor? Does the harbor maintenance tax, as presently levied, pose an obstacle to domestic shipping, and particularly to transshipment of international freight aboard coastal vessels? Should the government be required to spend annual harbor maintenance tax collections when received rather than accumulating them in a trust fund, which would result in more spending for harbor maintenance but also increase the federal budget deficit? Is the Corps compiling the necessary information to further improve the efficiency of the nation's maritime supply chain and to ensure the efficient allocation of available resources? |
crs_R43694 | crs_R43694_0 | Under IPIA, an improper payment is defined as a payment that should not have been made or that was made in an incorrect amount, including both overpayments and underpayments. This definition includes payments made to ineligible recipients, duplicate payments, payments for a good or service not received, and payments that do not account for credit for applicable discounts. The increase in improper payments between FY2007 and FY2010 can be partially attributed to the inclusion of new programs. In addition, government expenditures for public assistance increased between FY2007 and FY2010 as the economy weakened, which further increased the amount of improper payments issued under many risk-susceptible programs. With this in mind, in November 2009, President Obama signed Executive Order 13520, which required the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to work with agencies to identify "high priority" programs (those which account for the "highest dollar value or majority of improper payments" across the government), establish annual targets for reducing improper payments under high priority programs, and submit a report to the agency's inspector general that detailed how the agency planned to meet those targets. In response to E.O. Under the revised circular, a program is deemed high priority if it has
reported more than $750 million in improper payments in the most recent fiscal year; not reported an improper payments amount for the most recent fiscal year, but has reported more than $750 million in improper payments in a previous fiscal year; or not yet reported on improper payments for the program as a whole, but has determined that the total amount of improper payments for program components that have been measured exceeds $750 million. In FY2013, those four programs accounted for $77 billion of the government's total improper payments of $106 billion. As Table 3 shows, high priority programs accounted for 85% to 96% of the improper payments reported by agencies annually from FY2004 through FY2013. While some high priority programs have seen a steady decline in their improper payments error rates, others have shown little or no improvement—and some have seen their error rates increase over time. The data also indicate, however, that several high priority programs have shown little or no improvement. In sum, while the government-wide error rate has fallen each of the past four fiscal years, there has been little progress made reducing the error rates for a number of high priority programs. | The Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA) of 2002 defines improper payments as payments that should not have been made or that were made in an incorrect amount, including both overpayments and underpayments. This definition includes payments made to ineligible recipients, duplicate payments, payments for a good or service not received, and payments that do not account for credit for applicable discounts. Since FY2004, federal agencies have been required to report on the amount of improper payments they issue each year and take steps to address the root causes of the problem. The data show a significant increase in improper payments from FY2007 ($42 billion) to FY2010 ($121 billion), followed by a slight decrease through FY2013 ($106 billion). The increase in improper payment amounts may be partially attributed to an increase in the number of programs reporting between FY2007 and FY2010, as well as increased federal expenditures for many programs during that same timeframe. The data also show that a small subset of programs has accounted for 85% to 96% of the government's total improper payments each year. With that in mind, President Obama signed E.O. 13520 in 2009, which requires agencies to take additional measures with regard to these "high priority" programs. Notably, the executive order requires agencies to identify high priority programs, develop detailed plans for reducing related improper payments, and establish annual goals against which progress could be measured. Agencies have identified 13 high priority programs and all but one of them have been reporting data for several years. The data on high priority programs present mixed results. Four high priority programs showed sustained improvement over time, as indicated by steadily decreasing error rates, while four others reported little or no improvement in their error rates. Of the four remaining high priority programs that have reported data, error rates increased for two and slightly decreased for two others. Without further progress in reducing the error rates among high priority programs the government's total amount of improper payments may continue to exceed $100 billion per fiscal year, as it has since FY2009. |
crs_RL34281 | crs_RL34281_0 | While one bill ( S. 197 ) would provide for a nominal 1.7% salary adjustment, the other three— S. 2353 , H.R. This report
reviews the most common arguments that have been advanced in recent years for and against raising federal judicial salaries; examines a large body of data relevant to the question of whether fluctuations in judicial pay levels have affected the federal judiciary's ability to recruit and retain judges; considers various time periods (between 1955 and 2006) over which the rise and fall of judicial salaries may be examined, taking into account, as well, changes that have occurred at various points in time in non-salary compensation that federal judges receive; identifies and analyzes options available to Congress in addressing the judicial pay issue in addition to increasing judicial salaries by a specific amount or percentage on a one-time basis—including "de-linking" congressional and judicial salaries, providing judges with salaries based on their cost of living, revising retirement benefits, and altering outside income limits; and provides a side-by-side comparison of the three bills noted above that would provide for a substantial judicial pay increase, showing how the levels provided for would compare with those of the benchmark year of 1969 (the year of highest real salaries for federal judges since at least 1913). The Constitution prohibits Congress from diminishing the salaries of Article III federal judges. First, they note that the salaries of federal judges are high relative to all workers in the United States. Effect of Judicial Salary on Recruitment and Retention of Federal Judges: An Examination of the Relevant Data
The difference of opinion on the necessity of a raise in judicial salary stems, in part, from disagreement on some of the consequences of what might be considered a low judicial salary. In particular, those who advocate and oppose increasing judicial salary disagree over the extent to which declines in judicial salary:
make it more difficult to recruit federal judges from private practice, depriving the federal judiciary of talented candidates; lead more federal judges, before becoming eligible for retirement, to leave the bench to work in private practice, increasing turnover in the federal judiciary; and lead more judges, after becoming eligible for retirement to leave the judiciary (often for jobs in the private sector or elsewhere), rather than remaining in the judiciary in semi-retired "senior status," depriving the federal judiciary of important resources of manpower and expertise. Since 1933, the percentage of federal judges whose immediate prior position was another judgeship, either at the state or federal level, has increased. Congress may also choose to consider several changes to the structure of salary and benefits for federal judges, including "de-linking" congressional and judicial salaries, paying judges different salaries based on the location of their chambers, revising retirement benefits for federal judges, altering survivor benefits for the spouses and dependents of federal judges, reconsidering limits on the outside income judges are permitted to earn, convening the Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation, and creating "automatic" adjustments for judicial salaries. "De-linking" Congressional and Judicial Salaries
Related to the issue of judicial salary is the relationship between the salaries of federal judges and Members of Congress. Current retirement provisions may be seen as generous from the perspective of judges who have qualified for them, but may be seen as difficult to attain for federal judges who face decisions about their financial futures before they are eligible for retirement or senior status. 3753 , as reported by the House Judiciary Committee, and S. 1638 , as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, would raise judicial salaries each year by the base rate increase given to General Schedule employees. S. 1638 also limits the acceptance of honorary memberships to those valued at no more than $50 per year and applies the regulations of the Judicial Conference on outside earned income to justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. | Several federal judges, including the Chief Justice of the United States, have expressed concern over the level of judicial salary. Chief Justice Roberts has called the current levels of judicial salary a "constitutional crisis" that threatens the independence of the federal courts. The most common arguments for raising judicial salary claim that low judicial salaries (1) limit the ability of the federal judiciary to draw on a diverse pool of candidates for positions on the federal bench; (2) force federal judges concerned about their financial futures to resign from the bench before they become eligible for retirement; and (3) drive other federal judges, upon becoming eligible for retirement, to retire completely (to earn extra income outside the judiciary), rather than remain to assist the courts as judges on "senior status." Opponents of raising judicial salary generally question whether variations in judicial salary affect recruitment and retention of federal judges.
Examination of the available evidence on the effect of judicial salary on judicial recruitment and retention suggests (1) trends away from appointing judges directly from private practice and toward appointing federal judges who are already in the judiciary (as state judges or federal bankruptcy or magistrate judges) date to before the most recent decline in judicial salaries, (2) federal judges are not resigning from the federal bench at rates much higher than historical averages, and (3) the percentage of federal judges who chose retirement in lieu of senior status has also not risen markedly in the last several years. From an examination of data on judicial departures, we are unable to identify a conclusive relationship between judicial salary and federal judges' decisions to resign or retire.
Should Congress wish to address the issue of judicial salary, it has several options. In addition to increasing the pay of federal judges on a one-time basis by a specific amount or percentage, Congress might consider "de-linking" congressional and judicial salaries, providing that judges receive salaries based on their cost of living, revising retirement benefits, adjusting survivor benefits for the spouses and dependents of federal judges, altering outside income limits, convening the Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation, or enacting automatic adjustments for judicial salary.
Four bills concerning judicial salary have been introduced in the 110th Congress: S. 197 would adjust the salaries of federal judges upward by 1.7%; S. 2353 would increase the salaries of federal judges by 16.5%; and S. 1638, as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and H.R. 3753, as ordered reported by the House Judiciary Committee, would increase the salaries of most federal judges by 28.7%, permit cost-of-living adjustments to judicial salaries to go into effect unless Congress passed legislation stopping them from doing so, change the eligibility for federal judges to retire, and change how the annuity they receive upon retirement is calculated. S. 1638 also imposes limits on reimbursable travel and honorary memberships for judges, as well as applying limits on outside earned income to U.S. Supreme Court justices. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44809 | crs_R44809_0 | §4246) supports international conservation efforts benefitting several species of animals. The MSCF has five sub-funds, which provide grants for activities to conserve tigers, rhinoceroses, Asian and African elephants, marine turtles, and great apes (gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and various species of gibbons). Each of the funds receives appropriations from Congress through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). This support is often in conjunction with efforts under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and local efforts in the countries in which these animals reside. The additional charge is recognized by the stamp purchaser as a voluntary contribution to a designated cause (for more information, see " Overview of Semipostal Stamps ," below). MSCF Semipostal Stamp
To boost funds for conservation programs under MSCF, Congress authorized the creation and distribution of the Multinational Species Conservation Funds Semipostal Stamp (MSCF stamp) under the Multinational Species Conservation Funds Semipostal Stamp Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-241 ). This law requires the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to issue and sell the MSCF stamp. A portion of the proceeds (11 cents, less USPS's administrative costs) from the stamp are transferred to the U.S. USPS introduced the MSCF stamp, entitled "Save Vanishing Species," in September 2011. Authorization for the MSCF stamp is set to expire in September 2017. As of November 2016, more than 36.6 million MSCF stamps had sold, generating more than $3.9 million for conservation. Overview of Semipostal Stamps
Semipostal stamps are first-class letter stamps that are sold with a surcharge over their postage value. For example, a first-class stamp may be purchased for 49 cents, but a first-class semipostal stamp costs 60 cents. Recent Changes to the USPS Semipostal Program
Recent changes to the USPS semipostal program could affect the MSCF stamp. Some bills would reauthorize the issuance of the MSCF stamp for an additional four years (e.g., S. 480 and H.R. 1247 ). Potential Issues for Congress
Overall, many people view semipostal stamps as an easy and inexpensive way to raise both funds from the public and awareness for a given organization or cause. Some contend that, apart from raising funds for conservation, MSCF stamps can be used to raise public awareness of wildlife trafficking. | The Multinational Species Conservation Fund (MSCF) supports international conservation efforts benefitting several species of animals, often in conjunction with efforts under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). MSCF receives annual appropriations under the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to fund five grant programs for conserving tigers, rhinoceroses, Asian and African elephants, marine turtles, and great apes (gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and various species of gibbons). To provide a convenient way for the public to contribute to these activities and to boost funds for these conservation programs, Congress authorized the Multinational Species Conservation Funds Semipostal Stamp Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-241). With the MSCF semipostal stamp (MSCF stamp) program set to expire in 2017, Congress is considering whether to reauthorize the MSCF stamp through pending legislation (e.g., S. 480 and H.R. 1247).
Semipostal stamps are postage stamps that are sold with a surcharge above the normal price for a 1-ounce first-class letter stamp. For example, the current price for a first-class stamp is 49 cents, whereas a first-class semipostal stamp costs 60 cents. The additional charge is recognized by the stamp purchaser as a voluntary contribution to a designated cause. Since 1997, Congress has authorized the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to sell four different semipostal stamps, including the MSCF stamp. The MSCF stamp, entitled "Save Vanishing Species," was first issued by USPS on September 22, 2011. A portion of the stamp's sale proceeds is transferred to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which administers the MSCF and provides grants to international organizations to help protect the species listed above. As of November 2016, proceeds from MSCF stamp sales had generated more than $3.9 million for the MSCF.
Many view semipostal stamps as an easy and inexpensive way to raise funds and awareness for a given organization or cause. Some contend that the MSCF stamp provides a significant amount of funding for MSCF conservation programs and raises awareness about the conservation of certain international threatened and endangered species. Others argue that semipostal stamps detract from the mission of the USPS and divert consumers away from other stamps the USPS has to offer. Additionally, some contend that other causes could benefit more than the MSCF from a semipostal stamp program. |
crs_R44748 | crs_R44748_0 | Introduction
Anti-poverty interventions that provide resources to local communities, based on the characteristics of those communities, have been of interest to Congress. One such policy, dubbed the "10-20-30 rule," was implemented in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ). Title I, Section 105 of ARRA required the Secretary of Agriculture to allocate at least 10% of funds from three rural development program accounts to persistent poverty counties; that is, to counties that have had poverty rates of 20% or more for the past 30 years, as measured by the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. One notable characteristic of this rule is that it did not increase spending for the rural development programs addressed in ARRA, but rather targeted existing funds differently. Motivation for Targeting Funds to Persistent Poverty Counties
Research has suggested that areas for which the poverty rate (the percentage of the population that is below poverty) reaches 20% experience systemic problems that are more acute than in lower-poverty areas. Therefore, policy interventions at the community level, and not only at the individual or family level, could be of interest to Congress. Data Sources Used in Identifying Persistent Poverty Counties
Poverty rates are computed using data from household surveys. Currently, the only data sources that provide poverty estimates for all U.S. counties are the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates program (SAIPE). Therefore, to determine whether an area is persistently poor in a time span that ends after 2000, it must first be decided whether ACS or SAIPE poverty estimates will be used for the later part of that time span. Characteristics of Interest: SAIPE for Poverty Alone; ACS for Other Topics in Addition to Poverty
SAIPE poverty estimates are recommended when estimates are needed at the county level, especially for counties with small populations, and when additional demographic and economic detail is not needed at that level. Reference Period of Estimate: SAIPE for One Year, ACS for a Five-Year Span
While the ACS has greater flexibility in the topics measured and the geographic areas provided, it can only provide estimates in five-year ranges for the smallest geographic areas. Poverty status also is not defined for persons living in college dormitories. Other interventions besides the 10-20-30 rule may be more appropriate for counties that have had a recent spike in the poverty rate. Poverty rates published by the Census Bureau are typically reported to one decimal place. Taking both the data source and the rounding method together, the list of persistent poverty counties could vary by roughly 80 to 100 counties in a given year depending on the method used. | Anti-poverty interventions that provide resources to local communities, based on the characteristics of those communities, have been of interest to Congress. One such policy, dubbed the "10-20-30 rule," was implemented in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). Title I, Section 105 of ARRA required the Secretary of Agriculture to allocate at least 10% of funds from three rural development program accounts to persistent poverty counties; that is, to counties that have had poverty rates of 20% or more for the past 30 years, as measured by the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. One notable characteristic of this rule is that it did not increase spending for the rural development programs addressed in ARRA, but rather targeted existing funds differently.
Research has suggested that areas for which the poverty rate (the percentage of the population that is below poverty) reaches 20% experience systemic problems that are more acute than in lower-poverty areas. Therefore, policy interventions at the community level (such as applying the 10-20-30 rule to other programs besides those cited in ARRA), and not only at the individual or family level, could continue to be of interest to Congress.
Poverty rates are computed using data from household surveys. Currently, the only data sources that provide poverty estimates for all U.S. counties are the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates program (SAIPE); before the mid-1990s, the decennial census was the only source of county poverty estimates. Therefore, to determine whether an area is "persistently" poor in a time span that ends after the year 2000, it must first be decided whether ACS or SAIPE poverty estimates will be used for the later part of that time span.
Lists of persistent poverty counties may differ by roughly 80 to 100 counties in a particular year, depending on the data source selected to compile the list and the rounding method used for the poverty rate estimates. When determining the method to be used to compile a list of persistent poverty counties, the following may be relevant to consider:
Characteristics of interest: SAIPE is suited for poverty or median income alone; ACS for other topics in addition to poverty and income. Geographic areas of interest: SAIPE is recommended for counties and school districts only; ACS produces estimates for other small geographic areas as well. Reference period of estimate: SAIPE for one year; ACS for a five-year span. Rounding method for poverty rates: rounding to 20.0% (one decimal place) yields a shorter list than rounding to 20% (whole number). Poverty status is not defined for all persons: foster children (unrelated individuals under age 15), institutionalized persons, and residents of college dormitories are excluded; the homeless are not targeted by household surveys; and areas with large numbers of students living off-campus may have high poverty rates. |
crs_RL34047 | crs_RL34047_0 | Background
Congress passed the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) in 1986, with several goals. The inquiry regarding the extent of protections under the ACAA is timely given public concern in 2007 about a man infected with XDR-TB who traveled on several passenger airplanes before he was placed in isolation and public concern in 2009 about the influenza A(H1N1) outbreak. This report discusses ACAA requirements and regulations, including regulations regarding airplane passengers with communicable diseases. The Nondiscrimination Requirement and Exceptions
The ACAA prohibits discrimination by air carriers against "otherwise qualified individual[s]" on the basis of disability. | The Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. § 41705, prohibits discrimination by air carriers against individuals with disabilities. Public attention regarding an airplane passenger who traveled while infected with Extensively Drug Resistant Tuberculosis (XDR-TB) in 2007 raised questions regarding the ACAA's requirements and guarantees. Additionally, public concern about the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) outbreak may increase congressional interest in air travel regulations. This report briefly discusses the ACAA's statutory provisions, accompanying regulations, relevant judicial opinions, and legislation in the 110th Congress. |
crs_R40859 | crs_R40859_0 | To achieve a higher standard of communications performance might require, among other elements, improvements in communications capacity and quality. Increasing the amount of radio frequencies available for public safety use is one solution for adding capacity. Three bills have been introduced that would require the FCC to assign additional spectrum, known as the D Block, for a public safety broadband network and take steps to ensure construction of an interoperable network. 5907 , Representative Harman) and its companion bill ( S. 3731 , Senator Warner) are more narrowly focused on a critical initial step on the long road to assuring that a nationwide, interoperable network is put in place for public safety communications: the radios. Legislation to Assign the D Block to Public Safety
The Broadband for First Responders Act of 2010 ( H.R. The First Responders Protection Act of 2010 ( S. 3625 , Lieberman) and the Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act ( S. 3756 , Rockefeller) would require similar rule-making procedures, and requirements. Legislation in Support of a Public Safety Network Without the D Block
The discussion draft of the Public Safety Broadband Act of 2010 includes the presumption that the D Block will be auctioned, in that it provides that proceeds from its auction be applied to the construction and operation costs of public safety broadband networks. Only one, from the San Francisco Bay Area, was accepted for review. Projects eligible for funding that are mentioned in the bills include "construction of a new public safety interoperable broadband network using commercial infrastructure or public safety infrastructure, or both, in the 700 MHz band" and "improvement of the existing commercial networks and construction of new infrastructure to meet public safety requirements...." There is no provision in any of the bills for funds to cover the cost of development and testing of new radio technologies that allow public safety broadband radios to operate on the new networks. LTE has been specified by the FCC as the network technology for these frequencies. A well-grounded but flexible governance structure is critical to the future of public safety communications if it is to be national in scope, interoperable, and cost-effective. Several states and urban areas have submitted detailed plans to the FCC for building the nation's first broadband networks that might serve as a practical framework for evaluating policy options. These plans, developed according to FCC requirements, share many common features. Notable from a policy point of view are several recommendations that provide a common theme in these early submissions. These may be summarized as: (1) sufficient funding is essential; (2) networks that either cover an area designated as eligible for Urban Area Security Initiative programs, or cover a regional area—that is, large and/or densely populated areas—are more efficient to build, operate, and govern; (3) several critical technologies and standards, such as for radios, must be developed before the networks can be fully effective; (4) some form of governing sur-structure must be in place to assure uniformity of core operations while allowing for local customization of public safety applications; and (5) collaboration with commercial partners is important for mustering all the skills and knowledge resources needed for developing the leading-edge broadband networks that are the goals of the submitted plans. Congress should support pending legislation which provides for the expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety purposes. Congress also required assessments of emergency communications capabilities, including an inventory that identified radio frequencies used by federal departments and agencies. Pooling spectrum licenses goes beyond sharing. | Effective emergency response is dependent on wireless communications. To minimize communications failures during and after a crisis requires ongoing improvements in emergency communications capacity and capability. The availability of radio frequency spectrum is considered essential to developing a modern, interoperable communications network for public safety. Also critical are (1) building the network to use this spectrum and (2) developing and deploying the radios to the new standards required for mobile broadband. Beyond recognition of these common needs and goals, opinions diverge on such issues as how much spectrum should be made available for public safety broadband communications, how communications networks should be configured, who should own them, who should build them, who should operate them, who should be allowed to use them, and how they might be paid for.
Three bills that would increase the amount of radio frequency spectrum assigned for public safety use have been introduced. The bills would require that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) transfer a spectrum license intended for commercial use, known as the D Block, to the license-holder for adjacent frequencies already assigned to public safety, known as the Public Safety Broadband License. The Broadband for First Responders Act of 2010 (H.R. 5081, Representative King) deals primarily with reassignment of the D Block. Two Senate bills contain similar provisions for spectrum assignment and would add a number of new provisions, including using the proceeds of future spectrum auctions to fund the needed network (S. 3625, Senator Lieberman and S. 3756, Senator Rockefeller). The development of public safety radios for broadband would be expedited by companion bills H.R. 5907 (Representative Harman) and S. 3731 (Senator Warner). Public safety operations would benefit from the radio-development initiative regardless of the eventual assignment of the D Block. Congress may consider additional legislation or oversight to meet desired levels of emergency communications performance.
Among the actions that Congress might take, those dealing with governance and funding are often cited by public safety officials and others as the areas most in need of its consideration. Many have recommended that, for the proposed broadband network projects to go forward on a sustainable footing, funding sources need to be identified for investment and operating expenses over the long term. To ensure the resources are wisely used, some analysts point to the primacy of putting in place a well-grounded but flexible governance structure. The debate on spectrum assignment has in recent months dominated the attention of Congress and other policy makers. Meanwhile, several states and urban areas including the San Francisco Bay Area, Boston, and the State of Mississippi have submitted detailed plans for building the nation's first broadband networks that might serve as a practical framework for evaluating policy options. These plans, developed according to FCC requirements, share many common features. Notable from a policy point of view are several recommendations that provide a common theme in these early submissions. These may be summarized as: (1) sufficient funding is essential; (2) networks that either cover an area designated as eligible for Urban Area Security Initiative programs, or cover a regional area—that is, large and/or densely populated areas—are more efficient to build, operate, and govern; (3) several critical technologies and standards, such as for radios, must be developed before the networks can be fully effective; (4) some form of governing sur-structure must be in place to assure uniformity of core operations while allowing for local customization of public safety applications; and (5) collaboration with commercial partners is important for mustering all the skills and knowledge resources needed for developing the leading-edge broadband networks that are the goals of the submitted plans. |
crs_RL33222 | crs_RL33222_0 | Qualitative Military Edge (QME)
Overview
Almost all current U.S. aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance. U.S. The Current 10-Year Security Assistance Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
At a signing ceremony at the State Department on September 14, 2016, representatives of the U.S. and Israeli governments signed a new 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of this MOU, the United States pledges to provide $38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in FMF grants, plus $5 billion in defense appropriations for missile defense programs) to Israel. The new MOU will replace the current $30 billion, 10-year agreement, which runs through FY2018. Missile Defense . Under the terms of the new MOU, the Administration pledges to request $500 million in annual combined funding for missile defense programs with joint U.S.-Israeli elements—such as Iron Dome, Arrow II and Arrow III, and David's Sling. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Arms Sales
Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. Foreign Military Financing. The FY2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Israel is the first international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Department of Defense's fifth-generation stealth aircraft considered to be the most technologically advanced fighter jet ever made. Since then, Israel has purchased 50 F-35s in three separate contracts (see table below) using FMF grants. Section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. The United States European Command (EUCOM) manages the War Reserves Stock Allies-Israel (WRSA-I) program. 114-92 , the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act, authorized the establishment of a U.S.-Israeli anti-tunnel cooperation program. Other Ongoing Assistance and Cooperative Programs
Migration & Refugee Assistance
Since 1973, Israel has received grants from the State Department's Migration and Refugee Assistance account (MRA) to assist in the resettlement of migrants to Israel. As of 2018, Israel has issued $4.1 billion in U.S.-backed bonds. The United States and Israel launched several programs to stimulate Israeli industrial and scientific research, and Congress has on several occasions authorized and appropriated funds for this purpose to the following organizations:
The BIRD Foundation (Israel-U.S. Binational Research & Development Foundation). To date, Congress and the Administration have provided a total of $15 .7 million for the grant program, known as BIRD Energy. | This report provides an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. It includes a review of past aid programs, data on annual assistance, and analysis of current issues. For general information on Israel, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].
Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. To date, the United States has provided Israel $134.7 billion (current, or noninflation-adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding. Almost all U.S. bilateral aid to Israel is in the form of military assistance, although in the past Israel also received significant economic assistance.
At a signing ceremony at the State Department on September 14, 2016, representatives of the U.S. and Israeli governments signed a new 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, the United States pledges to provide $38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in Foreign Military Financing grants plus $5 billion in missile defense appropriations) to Israel. This MOU replaces a previous $30 billion 10-year agreement, which runs through FY2018.
Israel is the first international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the Department of Defense's fifth-generation stealth aircraft, considered to be the most technologically advanced fighter jet ever made. To date, Israel has purchased 50 F-35s in three separate contracts.
P.L. 115-141, the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act, provides the following for Israel:
$3.1 billion in Foreign Military Financing, of which $815.3 million is for off-shore procurement; $705.8 million for joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense projects, including $92 million for Iron Dome, $221.5 million for David's Sling, $310 million for Arrow 3, and $82.3 million for Arrow 2; $47.5 million for the U.S.-Israeli anti-tunnel cooperation program; $7.5 million in Migration and Refugee Assistance; $4 million for the establishment of a U.S.-Israel Center of Excellence in energy and water technologies; $2 million for the Israel-U.S. Binational Research & Development Foundation (BIRD) Energy program; and The reauthorization of War Reserves Stock Allies-Israel (WRSA-I) program through fiscal year 2019.
For FY2019, the Trump Administration is requesting $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing for Israel and $500 million in missile defense aid to mark the first year of the new MOU. The Administration also is seeking $5.5 million in Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) funding for humanitarian migrants to Israel. |
crs_R41471 | crs_R41471_0 | Introduction
Each year, in October, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) publishes the Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook (STEWFO). Average annual heating fuels expenditures depend on the price of fuel used, with natural gas, heating oil, propane, and electricity constituting the main heating fuels in the United States. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides heating degree-day estimates to the EIA for the STEWFO. On average the household expenditure on heating fuels is projected to be $986 this winter, an increase of $24, or 2.5%, from last winter. Approximately 52% of all U.S. households heat with natural gas. Approximately 7% of U.S. households heat with oil, and most of these consumers are in the Northeast, where 80% of U.S. heating oil consumption occurs. The EIA projects the price of crude oil to rise to $85 per barrel during the 2010-2011 heating season. The EIA projects relatively low heating expenditure increases for those heating with electricity. In the Northeast a 4.1% increase is expected, while the South is projected to see a decline in expenditures of 3.9% and the West is projected to see a decline of 0.4%, while the Midwest will see a projected increase of 0.4%. Heating Expenditure Assistance
The Low Income Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) is the primary federal government program to supplement home heating expenditures. At the start of the winter heating season 2010-2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee has reported its version of the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education (LHE) appropriations bill ( S. 3686 ), which provides $3.3 billion for LIHEAP. A continuing resolution is currently funding the program at the FY2010 level ( H.R. 3081 , P.L. 111-242 ). CITGO has not announced whether the program will continue in the current year. The impact of the cost increases may be accentuated by continuing high levels of unemployment. Uncertainty as to the funding levels for LIHEAP, and concern as to whether the CITGO program will continue in 2010-2011, contribute to the burden of higher heating costs. | The Energy Information Administration (EIA) in its Short-Term Energy and Winter Fuels Outlook (STEWFO) for the 2010-2011 winter heating season projects that American consumers should expect to see heating expenditures rise by 2.5% on average compared to last winter. Average expenditures for those heating with natural gas are projected to see an increase of 3.6%, while those heating with electricity are projected to see a decline in expenditures of 1.9%. These two fuels account for the heating for approximately 88% of all U.S. households. Propane and home heating oil consumers are projected to see cost increases of 7.5% and 11.5%, respectively.
Within the U.S. average projections, differences exist with respect to region of the country and type of fuel.
Economic conditions of slow growth and high unemployment suggest that lower consumption of all fuels is likely, especially in the context of milder winter weather conditions that have been forecast by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The price of oil has been increasing in the months leading up to the 2010-2011 winter heating season. If the price of oil continues to increase beyond the projected level of $85 per barrel, heating costs might be expected to rise above projected levels for all consumers.
Uncertainty exists with respect to the status of funding for the Low Income Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), the key federal program assisting low-income households with heating expenditures. Funding levels for the program have not been determined because Congress has not passed the FY2011 appropriations for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education (S. 3686). A continuing resolution is currently funding the program at the FY2010 level (H.R. 3081, P.L. 111-242).
It has not been announced whether the CITGO/PDVSA program that assists some U.S. heating oil consumers will be continued. |
crs_R41424 | crs_R41424_0 | A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. The estimated 20 million people affected by flooding in Pakistan is more than the estimated number of people affected by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the 2005 tsunami in the Indian Ocean littoral region, and the 2005 South Asia earthquake combined. Some medium and long-term consequences of flooding have been projected. The effects of flooding on the stability of the Pakistani government and its ability to suppress and contain militants within their borders is an issue of concern for the United States and others. Congressional Interest
Congressional interest regarding the 2010 flooding in Pakistan stems from multiple factors, including the U.S. response to the humanitarian needs of flood victims, potential cost of reconstruction after the flood subsides, the composition of aid given by the United States to Pakistan to garner its support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, the disabling of Taliban inside Pakistan's borders, and the security concerns arising from a weakened Pakistan with a potentially disenfranchised and dissatisfied population. The United States, however, has an opportunity to improve its perception among Pakistanis. Some of those actions include
Additional U.S. emergency relief funding, equipment, and supplies U.S. efforts to promote contributions and cooperation from other nations for emergency response and reconstruction Actions intended to support the Pakistan economy and trade Debt relief Efforts to promote individual and corporate aid and contributions Measures to promote foreign-direct investment and public-private partnerships
Context of the 2010 Pakistan Flood
Heavy rains associated with monsoons began around July 22, 2010, and led to flash floods in the northwest and east of Pakistan. The runoff caused the Indus River and its tributaries to breach levees and overflow into floodplains housing both rural and urban populations. Flooding can increase the spread of water-borne diseases when access to clean drinking water is compromised. Earthquakes are instantaneous and cause large numbers of fatalities compared to floods. Potential lessons learned by the international community that could be applied to Pakistan include
Engaging more with civil society, local authorities, and displaced populations for greater understanding of the operating context and sustainable delivery of assistance; Understanding and working with various actors outside the immediate humanitarian context, not only the military, but also the private sector; Engaging better with the government of the affected country and civil society partners; Providing cash for relief and buying locally wherever possible; Creating transitional shelter that can be turned into permanent dwellings, rather than focusing on emergency shelter and neglecting permanent shelter; Starting recovery as soon as possible without negatively affecting the relief effort; and Preparing for land-ownership disputes and not expecting the disaster response to resolve underlying political problems such as corruption, poor governance, underdevelopment, and social inequality. Implications of Flooding on Selected Sectors of Pakistan
The floods are expected to have a long-term negative effect on the development prospects for Pakistan. For example, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank jointly estimate that the floods caused $9.7 billion of damages. That figure includes damage across several sectors, including loss of physical infrastructure and other economic losses. Approximately 80% of people in the flood-affected areas depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Wheat is an example of this issue. The broader short-term economic effects of the flooding are already being felt. Also, as discussed earlier, the World Bank and ADB have estimated $9.7 billion in damages in a preliminary report. Role and Standing of the Pakistani Military
Pakistan's military has always played a key role in the country's governance; the country has been ruled directly by the military for more than half of its existence as an independent state. Since early August, some 60,000 Pakistani army troops were diverted to disaster relief efforts. Some press reports have indicated that the main supply lines for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, which run from the Karachi port north to through Quetta or Islamabad, were significantly disrupted by the flooding. The current flooding in Pakistan is likely to prove the worst flooding disaster in the country's history, as far as the number of citizens affected, and the cumulative damage to the region's economy. One aspect is the humanitarian toll that is likely to emerge from displaced people, disease, food security, and an economic decline. The strategic implications involve U.S. interests in countering Islamic militancy in the region, strengthening democracy in Pakistan, and fighting the war in Afghanistan. | Pakistan experienced a catastrophic natural disaster that has precipitated a humanitarian crisis of major proportions. Widespread flooding affected about 20 million Pakistanis and inundated an area the size of Florida within the country. Congressional interest in the flooding stems from the significant humanitarian and economic implications for the country, and the security implications for U.S. interests in the region. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank have estimated that the flooding has caused $9.7 billion in damages. While this figure might still be preliminary, it is almost certain that the negative effects of this crisis will be felt for many years to come.
The floods stemmed from abnormally heavy rains during the monsoon season in July and August, 2010. This led to flooding in the Indus River Basin which traverses Pakistan from north to south. Excess water led the Indus River and its tributaries to breach their levees and inundate adjacent and downstream floodplains. Approximately 2000 people were believed to have been killed by the flooding. One fifth of the country was submerged, and an estimated eight million Pakistanis were displaced from their homes. The number of people affected were significantly greater than several major disasters around the world since 2000. Little clean drinking water was available for many of the people who were affected and remains a problem today. Many of those affected, particularly children, face potential disease outbreaks, particularly diarrhea and cholera. The catastrophic loss of livestock and crop lands and extensive damage to the country's infrastructure are projected to have long-term negative effects on Pakistan's food security and economic performance.
Pakistan is at the center of several crucial U.S. interests, including fighting terrorism and religious militancy, seeking stability in neighboring Afghanistan, and promoting nuclear non-proliferation, among others. The aftermath of the floods can affect broad political and strategic dynamics in Pakistan and the region in a number of ways. The crisis may undermine the already waning legitimacy of the civilian government by demonstrating its ineffectiveness to large numbers of Pakistanis in need of public services, while improving the status of Pakistan's powerful military by the more visible role it played in providing disaster relief. It may also provide militants an opportunity to garner favor with affected communities by giving militants an opportunity to demonstrate that they can provide assistance in areas where the government is absent. The crisis has also diverted attention and resources from other national priorities, at a time when Pakistan remains financially strapped.
U.S. interests are served by a stable Pakistan that can effectively rule all its territory. Any crisis on a scale of the present floods that undermines the Pakistani state's ability to control its territory has the potential to undermine U.S. interests. The inability of Pakistan to fully extend its authority into areas along its northwest frontier with Afghanistan has allowed Islamist militants hostile to the United States to find refuge. The flooding diverted Pakistani resources and focus away from its struggle with Islamist militants. This has the potential to indirectly affect U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan by taking pressure off militants on the Pakistani side of the international frontier. On a positive note, the crisis presents the United States with an opportunity to improve its poor image among Pakistanis through provision of humanitarian assistance. Congress will play an important role in overseeing such assistance in the near term, and broad foreign assistance strategies for rebuilding infrastructure and other development goals in the medium and long run. For more information on environmental issues and Pakistan, see CRS Report R41358, Security and the Environment in Pakistan. For broader discussion of U.S.-Pakistan relations, see CRS Report R41307, Pakistan: Key Current Issues and Developments. |
crs_R43557 | crs_R43557_0 | FY2015 Consideration: Overview of Actions
The first section of this report provides an overview of the consideration of FY2015 legislative branch appropriations, with subsections covering each action, including
the initial submission of the request on March 4, 2014; hearings held by the House and Senate Legislative Branch Subcommittees; markups held by the House Subcommittee on Legislative Branch, and House Committee on Appropriations; passage of H.R. 4487 by the Senate Appropriations Committee on June 19, 2014; the enactment of continuing appropriations resolutions providing funding for the legislative branch ( P.L. Status of FY2015 Appropriations: Dates of Action, Bill Numbers, and Reports
Submission of FY2015 Budget Request on March 4, 2014
The FY2015 U.S. Budget submitted on March 4, 2014, contains a request for $4.471 billion in new budget authority for legislative branch activities. By law, the legislative branch request is submitted to the President and included in the budget without change. The mark provided $3.3 billion (not including Senate items, which are determined by the Senate). No amendments were offered, and it was reported to the full committee by voice vote. House Appropriations Committee Markup
On April 9, 2014, the full House Appropriations Committee held a markup of the FY2015 bill. 4487 on May 1, 2014. H.R. 4487 , as amended, was passed by the House by a vote of 402-14. 4487
The Senate Appropriations Committee considered H.R. 113-164 and P.L. 113-203 ) provided funding for the legislative branch until the enactment of funding for the remainder of FY2015 in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, on December 16, 2014 ( P.L. 113-235 ). The act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), and less across-the-board rescissions required by Section 3004 of P.L. This level was $236.9 million (-5.2%) below the FY2011 enacted level. This level represented a $125.1 million decrease from the $4.668 billion provided in the FY2010 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act ( P.L. The House-passed bill would have provided $61.5 million (+3.4%), while the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended an increase of $499 from the FY2014 enacted level. The FY2015 act provided $19.2 million (-1.0%). Congressional Research Service—The FY2014 act provided $105.4 million. H.R. Table 4 through Table 8 provide information on funding levels for the legislative branch overall, the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Capitol Police, and the Architect of the Capitol. | The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance; Congressional Budget Office (CBO); Architect of the Capitol (AOC); Library of Congress (LOC), including the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Government Publishing Office (GPO); Government Accountability Office (GAO); and Open World Leadership Center.
The legislative branch FY2015 budget request of $4.471 billion was submitted on March 4, 2014. By law, the President includes the requests submitted from the legislative branch in the annual budget without change.
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees' Legislative Branch Subcommittees held hearings to consider the FY2015 legislative branch requests.
The House subcommittee held its markup on April 4, 2014, and the full committee held a markup on April 9. One amendment was offered in the full committee, but failed. The bill, which recommended $3.3 billion (not including Senate items), was reported on April 17 (H.R. 4487, H.Rept. 113-417).
The House passed H.R. 4487, the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2015, on May 1, 2014, by a vote of 402-14.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 4487, as amended, on June 19, 2014, by voice vote (S.Rept. 113-196). This version would have provided $4.3 billion.
No further action on H.R. 4487 was taken, and legislative branch activities were funded through continuing appropriations resolutions (P.L. 113-164 and P.L. 113-203) until the enactment of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235, enacted December 16, 2014). Division H of this act provides $4.3 billion dollars, an increase of $41.7 million (1.0%) from FY2014 and $164.9 million (-3.7%) less than the request.
Legislative branch funding, which peaked in FY2010, remains below the FY2009 level of $4.501 billion. In FY2014, the funding level was $4.259 billion. The FY2013 act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), less across-the-board rescissions that applied to all appropriations in the act, and not including sequestration reductions implemented on March 1. The FY2012 level represented a decrease of $236.9 million (-5.2%) from the FY2011 level, which itself represented a $125.1 million decrease (-2.7%) from FY2010.
The smallest of the appropriations bills, the legislative branch comprises approximately 0.4% of total discretionary budget authority. |
crs_RL33111 | crs_RL33111_0 | Current Legislative Developments
The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 wassigned into law on January 5, 2006 ( P.L. 109-162 ). The act reauthorizes many of the agencies andprograms under the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) jurisdiction. Introduction
Since 1999, Congress has expressed an interest in the organizational structure of the DOJ'sOJP. (4)
In addition, both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and DOJ's Office of InspectorGeneral (OIG) have reported on issues facing OJP and the management of its grant programs. Office of Justice Programs
In 1984, Congress created OJP by passing the Justice Assistance Act of 1984. (7) OJP is the main agency withinDOJ that awards grants to states, local government, and nonprofit organizations to help develop thecountry's capacity to prevent and control crime, improve criminal justice systems, increaseknowledge about crime and assist victims of crime. (8) (There are other offices within DOJ that also award grants,specifically the Violence Against Women Office and the Community Oriented Police Office.) Assessments of OJP Grant Management and Program Evaluations
Since the 1990s, both GAO and OIG have reported on the following issues facing OJP withrespect to the administration of its grant programs:
lack of monitoring and grantee compliance;
lack of outcome-based evaluations;
failure to adequately review grant applications; and
failure to undertake more aggressive and timely corrective action on auditfindings. The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005
The act authorizes appropriations for DOJ for FY2006 through FY2009. Among otherthings, the act authorizes appropriations for the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant(JAG) program and codifies the Community Capacity Development Office (CCDO). The act alsoreauthorizes and restructures grant programs under the COPS office as well as grant programs underthe VAWO. DOJ currently has twocomponents that are supposed to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of its programs: grantmanagers and the OIG. OJP grant managers, who are located in each of OJP's bureaus and programoffices, are charged with monitoring the grants made by their office and the OIG is charged withpromoting economy and efficiency within DOJ. National Institute of Justice. The GAO and the OIG reports raise questions about whether the current organizational structure ofOJP is capable of properly managing its grant programs. The actappears to give the Office of Audit, Assessment and Management many of the same oversightresponsibilities that OJP's grant managers, NIJ and the OIG are already charged with. How will the Office of Audit, Assessment and Management responsibilitiesbe separate from those of OJP, the OIG and NIJ? | Since 1999, Congress has expressed an interest in the organizational structure of theDepartment of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Justice Programs (OJP). The 109th Congress passedlegislation that restructures OJP and creates a new Office of Audit, Assessment and Managementto more closely monitor grantee compliance with grant programs, among other things. The ViolenceAgainst Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 was signed into law onJanuary 5, 2006 ( P.L. 109-162 ).
OJP is the main agency within DOJ that awards grants to states, local, and tribalgovernments, as well as nonprofit organizations to help develop the country's capacity to prevent andcontrol crime, improve criminal justice systems, increase knowledge about crime, and assist victimsof crime. Since the 1990s, both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and DOJ's Office ofInspector General (OIG) have reported on issues facing OJP with respect to managing andconducting sufficient evaluations of its grant programs. At issue is whether the currentorganizational structure of OJP is capable of properly managing its grant programs and monitoringgrantee compliance with program requirements.
The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005authorizes appropriations for DOJ for FY2006 through FY2009. The act also codifies the EdwardByrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program and the Community CapacityDevelopment Office (CCDO). Furthermore, the act reauthorizes and restructures grant programsunder the Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS) office as well as grant programs under theViolence Against Women Office (VAWO).
One of the more controversial provisions in the act is the creation of the Office of Audit,Assessment and Management within OJP, which will audit, exercise corrective actions with responseto, and manage information with respect to any OJP or COPS grant program. DOJ currently has twocomponents that are tasked with monitoring the effectiveness and efficiency of its grant programs: grant managers and OIG. OJP grant managers, who are located in each of its bureaus and programoffices, are charged with monitoring the grants made by their office; the OIG is charged withpromoting economy, efficiency and effectiveness within the department.
The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 seeksto address reported shortcomings at OJP; however, several questions are raised. For example, whilethe act does not restructure audit and performance measure activities under OJP's National Instituteof Justice (NIJ) or the OIG, how will the newly created audit and performance office complimentthe oversight functions of NIJ and OIG? Moreover, what will the role of OJP's grant managers beunder the newly created office? |
crs_R40539 | crs_R40539_0 | Introduction
The European Union (EU) is one of the United States' chief agricultural trading partners and also a major competitor in world food markets. Both the United States and the EU provide significant government support for their agricultural sectors. In the United States, a large share of support is concentrated on wheat, feed grains, cotton, oilseeds, sugar, and dairy. The EU provides more extensive support to a broader range of farm and food products, including grains, cotton, rice, oilseeds, peanuts, dairy, sugar, fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, and livestock products. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EU and the United States together account for more than 60% of all government support to agriculture among the major developed economies. To date, however, non-commodity support still constitutes a very small share of total farm-level support, compared to farm production support, for both the United States and the EU. Total EU agricultural support generally is much higher than in the United States. However, direct spending comparisons are complicated by significant structural differences between the U.S. and EU farm sectors. The United States has roughly twice the farmland base of the European Union, while the EU has six to seven times the number of farm operators spread across each of its 27 member countries. The EU program also supports a broader range of farm commodities as compared to the United States. Comparing Support Across Countries
Three general sources of quantitative data and information compare agricultural program support between the United States and the European Union:
1. the annual Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for agricultural programs by country, as calculated and compiled by the OECD; 2. annual estimates of the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) for agricultural programs, as calculated and compiled by individual World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries and notified to the WTO as part of their membership obligations; and 3. annual budget expenditures for agricultural programs, as reported by individual countries. Putting aside limitations of the data, these information sources are useful in comparing farm program support across countries. The data indicate that, since the mid-1980s, total farm support in the United States and EU has declined as a share of total gross farm receipts. In general, support for commodity programs has decreased, whereas the support for non-commodity programs, such a farmland conservation and certain types of rural development programs, has increased. However, support for non-commodity programs still accounts for a small share (less than 1%) of farm receipts. As a share of overall farm receipts, support for such programs is slightly greater in the United States, where support for non-commodity programs accounts for less than 0.7% of receipts, than in the EU, where it accounts for less than 0.3% of receipts annually. However, in terms of total spending, the data show that the EU provides more support, in aggregate, than the United States for both production-based programs and non-commodity programs, such a farmland conservation and agri-environmental programs. Both the EU and the United States heavily support their agricultural sectors. | The European Union (EU) is one of the United States' chief agricultural trading partners and also a major competitor in world food markets. Both the United States and the EU provide significant government support for their agricultural sectors. In the United States, a large share of support is concentrated on wheat, feed grains, cotton, oilseeds, sugar, and dairy. The EU provides more extensive support to a broader range of farm and food products, including grains, cotton, rice, oilseeds, peanuts, dairy, and sugar, but also fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, and livestock products. In addition, starting in the 1980s, both the United States and the EU introduced policies and programs expanding the type and amount of support for agricultural conservation and so-called "agri-environment" practices on-farm. Compared to support for commodity production, however, support for agricultural conservation still constitutes a very small share of total farm-level support within both the EU and the United States.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the EU and the United States together account for more than 60% of all government support to agriculture among the major developed economies. In terms of total spending, EU agricultural support generally is much higher than in the United States, and the EU alone accounts for 50% of the OECD's total estimate. However, comparisons are complicated by significant structural differences between the U.S. and EU farm sectors. The United States has roughly twice the farmland base of the European Union, while the EU has six to seven times the number of farm operators spread across each of its 27 member countries. The EU program also supports a broader range of farm commodities as compared to the United States.
Three general sources of quantitative data and information compare agricultural program support between the United States and the European Union. These include (1) the OECD's annual Producer Support Estimate (PSE); (2) estimates of the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) for agricultural programs, as compiled by individual World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries and notified to the WTO as part of their membership obligations; and (3) annual budget expenditures for agricultural programs, as reported by individual countries.
These data sources are useful in comparing farm program support across countries. The data indicate that, since the mid-1980s, total farm support in the United States and EU has declined as a share of total gross farm receipts. In general, support for commodity programs has decreased, whereas the support for non-commodity programs, such as farmland conservation and certain types of rural development programs, has increased. However, support for non-commodity programs still accounts for a small share (less than 1%) of farm receipts. As a share of overall farm receipts, support for such programs is slightly greater in the United States, where support for non-commodity programs accounts for less than 0.7% of receipts, than in the EU, where it accounts for less than 0.3% of receipts annually. In terms of total spending, however, the data show that the EU provides more support, in aggregate, than does the United States for both production-based programs and non-commodity programs, such as farmland conservation and agri-environmental programs. |
crs_RL33166 | crs_RL33166_0 | Introduction1
Many European countries, especially those in Western Europe, have experienced significant influxes of Muslim immigrants over the last half-century. While the growing presence of Muslims in Europe poses a wide range of social and economic policy questions for European governments, the realization that some segments of Europe's Muslim population may be susceptible to radicalization and terrorist recruitment has also sparked security concerns on both sides of the Atlantic in the decade since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involved in radical activities, and the July 2011 killing spree in Norway by a far-right extremist serves as a stark reminder that the perpetrators of violent extremism may be of any ethnicity, religion, or political ideology. In particular, such incidents have raised questions about whether European governments have done enough to promote the integration of Muslims into mainstream European society. Many experts believe that while far from the sole cause of radicalization and terrorism, past failures to fully integrate Muslims into European civic, political, and economic life may leave some European Muslims more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. European governments have responded with a mix of strategies aimed, on the one hand, at improving the integration of Muslims, and on the other hand, at strengthening security measures and tightening immigration and asylum policies to prevent radicalization and combat terrorism. This report examines policies aimed at promoting integration, combating terrorism, and countering violent extremism in five European countries with significant Muslim populations: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. All five countries are also members of the European Union. Europe's Muslim populations are ethnically and linguistically diverse, and Muslim immigrants hail from a variety of Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries, as well as Turkey. Such strategies include introducing new citizenship laws and language requirements in an attempt to instill a common identity, promoting dialogue with Muslim communities in an effort to generate greater Muslim political participation, developing "homegrown" imams more familiar with European culture and traditions, improving educational and economic opportunities, and tackling racism and discrimination. This has been a mistake in the past. Others point out that in addition to improving measures to counter Islamist extremists, European security services must pay more attention to the threats posed by domestic radicals on both the extreme right and left. Implications for the United States118
As noted previously, U.S. officials have expressed concerns since the 2001 terrorist attacks that Europe might be a launching point for future attacks on the United States and U.S. interests abroad. Successive U.S. administrations and Members of Congress have welcomed European initiatives to promote better integration of Muslims, curtail Islamist extremism, and improve U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation in the hopes that such efforts will ultimately help prevent future terrorist incidents and root out terrorist cells in Europe and beyond. U.S. interests in how European countries are managing their growing Muslim populations and European strategies to prevent radicalization have also been motivated by concerns about the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, especially given that terrorists with European citizenship have entered U.S. territory on the VWP. Over the last few years, U.S. and European policymakers have sought to deepen cooperation on measures aimed at countering violent extremism, and to share "best practices" on ways to stem radicalization and disrupt terrorist recruitment efforts. Islam, Muslims, and Islamists . | Many European countries have large and growing Muslim minorities. This is particularly true for the countries of Western Europe that have experienced influxes of Muslim immigrants over the last several decades from a variety of Middle Eastern, African, and Asian countries, as well as Turkey and the Balkans. Today, although some Muslims in Europe are recent immigrants, others are second- or third-generation Europeans. While expanding Muslim communities pose significant social and economic policy questions for European governments, the realization that some segments of Europe's Muslim populations may be susceptible to radicalization and terrorist recruitment has also sparked security concerns in the decade since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States.
The vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involved in radical activities. However, events such as the 2004 and 2005 terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, respectively, that were carried out by Muslim citizens or residents, have raised the question of whether European countries have done enough to integrate their Muslim communities and prevent feelings of social exclusion and marginalization. Although not the sole cause of radicalization and terrorism, some experts believe that past failures to fully integrate Muslims into mainstream European society may make some Muslims in Europe more vulnerable to extremist ideologies.
Over the last several years, European governments have stepped up their efforts to improve Muslim integration. These have included introducing new citizenship laws and language requirements, promoting dialogue with Muslim organizations, developing "homegrown" imams more familiar with European culture and traditions, improving educational and economic opportunities for Muslims, and tackling racism and discrimination. At the same time, European governments have also sought to strengthen security measures and tighten immigration and asylum policies to prevent radicalization and combat terrorism.
Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. officials have expressed concerns that Europe may be a potential recruiting ground for attacks on the United States or U.S. interests abroad. Successive U.S. administrations and Members of Congress have welcomed European initiatives to promote better integration of Muslims and curtail Islamist extremism in the hopes that such efforts will ultimately help prevent future terrorist incidents. U.S. interest in how European countries are managing their growing Muslim populations has also been motivated by worries about the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP), especially given that terrorists with European citizenship have entered U.S. territory on the VWP in the past. Recently, U.S. and European policymakers have also sought to enhance cooperation on measures aimed at countering violent extremism, especially the brand promoted by Al Qaeda. In light of the July 2011 killings in Norway by a right-wing extremist disturbed by what he viewed as Islam's growing influence in the West, some note that in addition to improving measures to counter Islamist extremists, U.S. and European security services should cooperate on combating threats posed by domestic radicals on both the extreme right and left.
This report examines policies aimed at promoting integration, combating terrorism, and countering violent extremism in five European countries with significant Muslim populations: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The report also evaluates the role of the 27-member European Union (EU) in shaping European laws and policies related to integration and counter-radicalization. |
crs_RS22742 | crs_RS22742_0 | Cuban Developments
Stable Succession
Fidel Castro ceded provisional control of the government and the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) to his brother Raúl on July 31, 2006, because of poor health. That proved true when on February 19, 2008, Fidel announced that he would not accept the position of President of the Council of State when Cuba's legislature, the National Assembly of People's Power, was scheduled to meet on February 24, 2008, to select from among its ranks the members of the 31-member Council. Even before Fidel provisionally stepped down from power in July 2006, a communist successor government under Raúl was viewed as the most likely political scenario. What is notable about Cuba's political succession from Fidel to Raúl is that it has been characterized by political stability. U.S. Policy Implications
Cuba's peaceful political succession from one communist leader to another raises questions about the future direction of U.S. policy. In the aftermath of Fidel's announcement that he would step down as head of government, U.S. officials maintained there would be no change in U.S. policy. | Cuba's political succession from Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl has been characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. On February 24, 2008, Cuba's legislature selected Raúl as President of the 31-member Council of State, a position that officially made him Cuba's head of government and state. Most observers expected this since Raúl already had been heading the Cuban government on a provisional basis since July 2006 when Fidel stepped down as President because of poor health. On February 19, 2008, Fidel had announced that he would not accept the position of President of the Council of State. Cuba's stable political succession from one communist leader to another raises questions about the future direction of U.S. policy, which currently can be described as a sanctions-based policy that ties the easing of sanctions to democratic change in Cuba. For developments in U.S. policy toward Cuba, see CRS Report RL33819, Cuba: Issues for the 110th Congress; and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. For background and analysis in the aftermath of Fidel Castro's stepping down from power in July 2006, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba's Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches. |
crs_R44899 | crs_R44899_0 | FY2018 Consideration: Overview of Actions
The first section of this report provides an overview of the consideration of FY2018 legislative branch appropriations, with subsections covering each action, including
the initial submission of the request on May 23, 2017; hearings held by the House and Senate Legislative Branch Subcommittees in May and June, 2017; the House subcommittee markup on June 23, 2017; the House full committee markup on June 29, 2017; the July 18, 2017, inclusion of the text of the legislative branch bill, H.R. 3162 , in a print issued by the House Rules Committee; the meeting of the House Rules Committee on July 24 and 25, 2017, to consider a special rule for consideration of H.R. 3219 , which included legislative branch funding as Division B; consideration of H.R. 3219 in the House on July 26 and passage on July 27; the markup and reporting by the Senate Appropriations Committee of its version of the legislative branch appropriations bill on July 27 ( S. 1648 ); the enactment on September 8, of a continuing resolution providing funding through December 8, 2017; the agreement in the House on September 14 to H.Res. H.R. 115-96 , through January 19, 2018; P.L. 115-120 , through February 8, 2018; and P.L. 115-123 , through March 23, 2018); and the enactment of the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. In general, FY2018 legislative branch budget requests had already been developed and submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) prior to the enactment of funding for FY2017, which occurred on May 5. The following amendments were considered:
a manager's amendment, offered by Chairman Yoder of Kansas, with technical changes, which was agreed to by voice vote; an amendment offered by Representative McCollum of Minnesota, related to the public release of CRS reports, which was not agreed to by voice vote; an amendment offered by Representative Lee of California, related to House staff diversity and addressing bias in hiring and promotion, which was agreed to by voice vote; an amendment offered by Representative Wasserman Schultz of Florida, related to the House historic buildings revitalization trust fund, which was withdrawn. The bill was reported out of committee by voice vote ( H.R. 3162 , H.Rept. 115-199 ). 3162 was included in a print issued by the House Rules Committee referred to as the Make America Secure Appropriations Act, 2018, and short titled the "Defense, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, Legislative Branch, and Energy and Water Development National Security Appropriations Act, 2018" (Committee Print 115-30). A total of 34 amendments were considered by the committee for Division B (including 7 the committee considered late or late revised). Ten amendments to Division B were made in order under the rule reported by the House Rules Committee ( H.Res. 115-259 ). 3219 on July 26. Of the 10 amendments to Division B made in order, 9 were offered. Three failed by roll call vote:
H.Amdt. 217 , which would have reduced funding for the Congressional Budget Office; and H.Amdt. H.R. 3219 was passed in the House the next day (235-192, Roll no. 115-137 ). S. 1648 would have provided $3.171 billion, not including House items, an increase of $122.4 million (+4.0%) from the comparable FY2017 enacted level. 115-56 ). Inclusion of Text of H.R. H.R. Enactment of Further Continuing Appropriations Resolutions and the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act
Additional continuing appropriations resolutions provided funding through
December 22, 2017 ( P.L. 115-141 ) provides $4.700 billion for legislative branch activities, an increase of $260.0 million (5.9%) from the FY2017 level. The $4.440 billion provided by the act represented a $77.0 million increase (+1.7%) from the FY2016 enacted level. The $4.300 billion provided by the act represented an increase of $41.7 million (+1.0%) from FY2014. The act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), not including across-the-board rescissions required by Section 3004 of P.L. 112-74 ) provided $4.307 billion for the legislative branch. This level was $236.9 million below (-5.2%) the FY2011 enacted level. This level represented a $125.1 million decrease from the $4.668 billion provided in the FY2010 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act ( P.L. 2. 3. 4. 1. 2. 3. The FY2013 House-reported bill would have provided $1.0 million, a decrease of $9.0 million (-90.0%), from the $10.0 million provided in FY2012 and requested for FY2013. The FY2012 act contained the Senate-reported level. | The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance; Congressional Budget Office (CBO); Architect of the Capitol (AOC); Library of Congress (LOC), including the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Government Publishing Office (GPO); Government Accountability Office (GAO); Open World Leadership Center; and the John C. Stennis Center.
The FY2018 legislative branch budget request of $4.865 billion was submitted on May 23, 2017. In general, FY2018 legislative branch budget requests were developed and submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) prior to the enactment of FY2017 funding. By law, the President includes the legislative branch request in the annual budget submission without change.
On June 23, 2017, the House Appropriations Committee Legislative Branch Subcommittee held a markup of the draft bill. The bill was ordered reported to the full committee by voice vote. On June 29, the House Appropriations Committee held a markup of the bill. The bill was ordered reported by voice vote. It would have provided $3.580 billion, not including Senate items (H.R. 3162, H.Rept. 115-199). On July 18, the text of H.R. 3162 was included in a print issued by the House Rules Committee entitled, "Text of the Defense, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, Legislative Branch, and Energy And Water Development National Security Appropriations Act, 2018" (Committee Print 115-30, which also contained the text of H.R. 3219, H.R. 2998, and H.R. 3266). On July 24 and 25, the House Rules Committee met to consider a special rule for the consideration of H.R. 3219, which included legislative branch funding as Division B. A total of 34 proposed amendments were considered by the committee (including 7 the committee considered late or late revised). Ten amendments to Division B were made in order. The rule for consideration (H.Res. 473, H.Rept. 115-259) was agreed to in the House on July 26, 2017. On July 26, the House proceeded to consideration of H.R. 3219. Of the 10 amendments to Division B made in order by H.Res. 473, 9 were offered (4 agreed to by voice vote, 2 failed by voice vote, and 3 failed by roll call vote). H.R. 3219 was passed in the House the next day.
On July 27, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported S. 1648 (S.Rept. 115-137), which would have provided $3.171 billion, not including House items.
On September 8, a continuing appropriations resolution providing funding for legislative branch activities through December 8, 2017, was enacted (P.L. 115-56). Additional continuing appropriations resolutions (P.L. 115-90, through December 22, 2017; P.L. 115-96, through January 19, 2018; P.L. 115-120, through February 8, 2018; and P.L. 115-123, through March 23, 2018) provided funding until the enactment of the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-141). The act provides $4.700 billion for FY2018, an increase of $260.0 million (5.9%) from FY2017.
The FY2017 level of $4.440 billion was an increase of $77.0 million (+1.7%) from FY2016. The FY2016 level of $4.363 billion represented an increase of $63 million (+1.5%) from the FY2015 level of $4.300 billion, and the FY2015 level represented an increase of $41.7 million (+1.0%) from the FY2014 funding level of $4.259 billion. The FY2013 act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as "anomalies"), less across-the-board rescissions that applied to all appropriations in the act, and not including sequestration reductions implemented on March 1. The FY2012 level of $4.307 billion represented a decrease of $236.9 million (-5.2%) from the FY2011 level, which itself represented a decrease of $125.1 million (-2.7%) from FY2010.
The smallest of the appropriations bills, the legislative branch comprises approximately 0.4% of total discretionary budget authority. |
crs_R43545 | crs_R43545_0 | In 1996, Congress established the Airport Privatization Pilot Program (APPP) to explore the prospect of privatizing publicly owned airports and using private capital to improve and develop them. In addition to reducing demand for government funds, privatization has been promoted as a way to make airports more efficient and financially viable. Participation in the APPP has been very limited. Only two airports have completed the privatization process, and one of them later reverted to public ownership. The Airport Privatization Pilot Program
The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (49 U.S.C. §47134; Section 149 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, P.L. 104-264 ) established the APPP. Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport
Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport, a medium hub airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico, is the only commercial service airport operating under private management after privatization under the APPP. Active Applicants
Hendry County Airglades Airport
Hendry County Airglades Airport in Clewiston, FL, a general aviation airport, received preliminary approval from FAA for privatization under the APPP in October 2010. St. Louis Lambert International Airport
The preliminary application from St. Louis Lambert International Airport was accepted by FAA in April 2017. They include the need for 65% of air carriers serving the airport to approve a lease or sale of the airport; restrictions on increases in airport rates and charges that exceed the rate of increase of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and a requirement that a private operator comply with grant assurances made by the previous public-sector operator to obtain AIP grants. Publicly owned airports have access to five major sources of funding. However, significantly increasing interest in airport privatization is likely to require structural change to the existing airport financing system. Reducing the obstacles for public-sector owners to use privatization revenue for non-airport purposes would stimulate local and state government interest in privatization. | In 1996, Congress established the Airport Privatization Pilot Program (APPP; 49 U.S.C. §47134; Section 149 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, P.L. 104-264) to increase access to sources of private capital for airport development and to make airports more efficient, competitive, and financially viable. Participation in the program has been very limited, in good part because major stakeholders have different, if not contradictory, objectives and interests.
Only two U.S. commercial service airports have completed the privatization process established under the APPP. One of those, Stewart International Airport in New York State, subsequently reverted to public ownership. Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport in San Juan, Puerto Rico, is now the only airport with a private operator under the provisions of the APPP.
As of August 2017, there are three active applicants in the APPP: Hendry County Airglades Airport in Clewiston, FL; Westchester County Airport in White Plains, NY; and St. Louis Lambert International Airport in St. Louis, MO.
Increasing interest in airport privatization is likely to require a number of significant policy changes, including the following:
Making privatization more attractive to public-sector owners by facilitating the use of privatization revenue for non-airport purposes. Providing similar tax treatment to bonds issued by public-sector and private-sector airport operators, as public-sector operators now have access to less costly long-term finance than private operators. Easing requirements for private owners to comply with assurances previously made by public-sector owners to obtain federal Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants. Accelerating the application and approval procedures for the APPP. |
crs_R44467 | crs_R44467_0 | Introduction
The United States has gradually shifted its formal drug policy from a punishment-focused model toward a more comprehensive approach—it is now one that focuses on prevention, treatment, and enforcement. The proliferation of drug courts in American criminal justice fits this new comprehensive model. Broadly, these specialized court programs are designed to divert some individuals away from traditional criminal justice sanctions such as incarceration. The term "drug courts" refers to specialized court programs that present an alternative to the traditional court process for certain criminal defendants and offenders. Traditionally, these individuals are first-time, nonviolent offenders who are known to abuse drugs and/or alcohol. While there are additional specialized goals for different types of drug courts (e.g., veterans drug courts, tribal drug courts, and family drug courts), the overall goals of adult and juvenile drug courts are to reduce recidivism and substance abuse. Drug court programs may exist at various points in the justice system, but they are often employed postarrest as an alternative to traditional criminal justice processing. Federal Support for Drug Courts
The federal government has demonstrated growing support for the drug court model primarily through financial support of drug court programs, research, and various drug court initiatives. Grants are distributed to state, local, and tribal governments as well as state and local courts themselves to establish and enhance drug courts for nonviolent offenders with substance abuse issues. Policymakers may debate whether drug courts are an effective tool in the package of federal efforts to address the opioid epidemic. Policy options include, but are not limited to, increasing federal funding for drug courts, expanding federal drug court programs, and amending the Drug Courts Program to possibly include a broader group of offenders, among other potential changes. Congress may wish to maintain the exclusion of violent offenders from the Drug Courts Program, or it may consider broadening the pool of eligible offenders that may participate in BJA-funded drug court programs to include certain violent offenders. | The United States has gradually shifted its formal drug policy from a punishment-focused model toward a more comprehensive approach—one that focuses on prevention, treatment, and enforcement. The proliferation of drug courts in American criminal justice fits this more comprehensive model. These specialized court programs are designed to divert certain defendants and offenders away from traditional criminal justice sanctions such as incarceration while reducing overall costs and helping these defendants and offenders with substance abuse issues.
Drug courts present an alternative to the traditional court process for some criminal defendants and offenders—namely those who are considered nonviolent and are known to abuse drugs and/or alcohol. While there are additional specialized goals for certain types of drug courts, the overall goals of adult and juvenile drug courts are to reduce recidivism and substance abuse among nonviolent offenders. Drug court programs may exist at various points in the justice system, but they are most often employed postarrest as an alternative to traditional criminal justice processing.
The federal government has demonstrated growing support for the drug court model primarily through financial support of drug court programs, federal drug courts, research, and various drug court initiatives. For example, each year, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration (SAMHSA) distribute grants to states and localities to support the creation and enhancement of drug courts. In FY2017, over $100 million in federal funding was appropriated for drug courts.
As the opioid epidemic continues, policymakers may debate whether drug courts could be an effective tool in efforts to address opioid abuse. Policy options include, but are not limited to, increasing federal funding for drug courts and reauthorizing (with or without amendments) the Drug Court Discretionary Grant Program (Drug Courts Program). Further, Congress may wish to maintain the exclusion of violent offenders from the Drug Courts Program, or, conversely, broaden the pool of eligible offenders that may participate in BJA-funded drug court programs to include some violent offenders. |
crs_RS20860 | crs_RS20860_0 | RS20860 -- The Supreme Court Upholds EPA Standard- Setting Under the Clean Air Act: Whitman v. AmericanTrucking Ass'ns
March 28, 2001
Background
NAAQSs lie at the very heart of the Clean Air Act. Circuit's majority opinion was its embrace of a long-moribund constitutional principle knownas the "nondelegation doctrine." The CAA imposes restrictions on nonattainment areas over and above those that the Act imposesgenerally. The Court found that EPA could not ignore Subpart 2 entirely, as it had done. Likewise, EPA had the better argument when it came to inclusion of costs in the setting of NAAQSs. Some commentatorshave noted the Court's refusal in American Trucking to defer to EPA's interpretation of the CAA onozone standard implementation, and speculated that thelegacy of the decision may lie in its signalling a desire by the Court to lessen the degree of judicial deference toagency decisionmaking. Developing an implementation plan that embodies a "reasonable interpretation"of the Act's nonattainment implementation provisions for the revised ozoneNAAQS, as the Court mandated, is not an easy task. | On February 27, 2001, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, achallenge to EPA's promulgation in 1997 of revised national ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulatesunder the Clean Air Act. On the broaderissues, the Court ruled that (1) the Act's provisions governing the setting of primary (health-protective) ambientstandards did not transgress the "nondelegationdoctrine," a moribund constitutional principle that the court below had resurrected, and (2) the Act bars EPA fromconsidering implementation costs when it setsprimary national ambient standards. On a narrow issue, the Court held that EPA had not been justified, inpromulgating its ozone implementation plan, inapplying only the Act's nonattainment-area subpart of general application, rather than a subpart specific to ozonenonattainment. As a result, the Court chargedthe agency with developing a "reasonable interpretation" accommodating both subparts. Such accommodation islikely to prove a difficult task, however, andalmost certainly once adopted will generate further legal challenges. |
crs_R44158 | crs_R44158_0 | A griculture is a major user of water in the United States. How the industry utilizes water resources through irrigation technologies and best management practices continues to be a focal point of agriculture policy. Given the increasing demands on water supplies for other users and uses, especially for the urbanizing West, there are pressures for the agricultural industry to reduce its water footprint. The use and significance of irrigated agriculture varies widely across the United States. In 2012, farms with irrigated land accounted for 50% ($106.3 billion) of the market value of crops sold in the United States, with roughly 71% of irrigated farms residing in the 17 western states. Drought and heat events, as well as agricultural market conditions, have raised agricultural producers' interest in investing in irrigation systems and improved irrigation practices; these producers often are weighing the benefits of irrigation-related investments with their costs. Agricultural water use and irrigation practices raise a number of policy questions. The report is intended to provide an overview of on-farm irrigation and does not cover storage and conveyance prior to the farm or how irrigation adoption may alter other farm practices, such as the use of fertilizers and pesticides or impacts off-farm (e.g., groundwater and surface water quality concerns). Growth in irrigated acres in the West is small when compared to increases in the East. This is determined by several factors, including irrigation system performance, uniformity of water application, and crop response to irrigation. Additionally, even if measures are taken to limit increased water consumption (e.g., limiting additional irrigated crop acreage after conversion to efficient irrigation systems), efficient irrigation technologies may encourage farmers to grow more profitable, water-intensive crops. While these two categories cover basic irrigation, precision technologies to increase irrigation efficiency and reduce costs complement these systems and are increasingly becoming a common part of modern irrigation systems. Best management practices (BMPs) for irrigation center around how water is managed on a farm, including improved conveyance, irrigation scheduling, and application methods. As shown in Table 1 , pressure irrigation systems make up roughly 58-65% of irrigation systems used in the United States. Microirrigation
Microirrigation consists of several types of low-pressure, highly efficient irrigation systems including surface drip, micro sprinkler, and sub-surface drip irrigation ( Figure 10 ). Gravity Systems
Gravity systems, which make up 35 to 42% of irrigation systems in the United States, divert water from a source to flood over a crop area via land-forming measures, including canals, ditches, basins, and furrows ( Figure 10 ). Precision technologies, such as satellite data, sensor networks, data analytics, and drones, increase irrigation efficiency and have been reported to reduce input costs and increase crop yield. In some cases, irrigation BMPs enhance production of higher-value specialty crops, including fruits, vegetables, and nuts, by allowing water to flow to crops only when needed. This can also reduce costs and provide more precise application. As a result, high-efficiency pressure systems are commonly found in areas where there is a heavy reliance on groundwater. Water quality can dictate the type of irrigation system that can be used. Federal Assistance
The federal government provides agricultural producers with financial assistance, technical assistance, research, and monitoring and reporting. Technical Assistance
USDA provides technical assistance for the adoption of irrigation technologies through a number of agencies and programs. Appendix A. Irrigation Technologies and Water Use
Appendix B. This method focuses on crop yield sustainability and water conservation. | Recent threats to water availability as a result of moderate to exceptional drought in several states have raised questions about agricultural water use and efficiencies across the United States. An understanding of common irrigation technologies and the impacts of best management practices in irrigation may be useful to Congress concerning potential policy responses to this issue. As a major user of water, the agricultural industry's use of water resources continues to be a focal point of agriculture policy. Additional demands on water supplies, extreme weather events (e.g., prolonged drought), and agricultural market conditions have raised producers' interest in investing in irrigation systems. Increased pressure on the industry to reduce its water use has also drawn interest in the adoption of irrigation technologies and best management practices (BMPs) as a means of achieving efficiency and potential water savings.
The federal government performs several roles in assisting agricultural producers with irrigation practices, including financial assistance, technical assistance, research, and monitoring and reporting. The majority of financial and technical assistance is offered through voluntary conservation programs that target increased irrigation efficiency. In some cases, improvements in irrigation efficiency can increase water consumption because farmers increase the number of irrigated acres or grow more profitable, water-intensive crops. This raises questions about how and where federal funds are allocated, particularly in areas where water shortages are a concern.
The use and significance of irrigated agriculture varies widely across the United States. Although policy discussions related to irrigation typically focus on western states—home to roughly 71% of irrigated farms—irrigation is practiced in all 50 states and is growing in the east. Over time, there has been a shift in water resources used for irrigation, with an increasing reliance on groundwater and less on the use of surface water.
The type of irrigation system used has also shifted over time—from a gravity, or flood-type of irrigation, to potentially more efficient pressurized sprinkler and drip irrigation systems. Pressure systems account for between 58 to 65% of irrigation systems used in the United States and include applicators such as center pivot, surface drip, slide roll or wheel move, and micro sprinkler. Gravity flow, which includes furrow, and controlled and uncontrolled flooding, accounts for approximately 35 to 42% of irrigation systems in the United States. Irrigation BMPs center around how water is managed on a farm and includes on-farm conveyance, irrigation scheduling, and application methods. Increasingly, precision technologies (e.g., drones, sensor networks, data analytics, etc.) are becoming a common part of many irrigation systems because of their potential to increase efficiencies and reduce costs.
The use of irrigation technology and BMPs bring both benefits and costs. The control of water application achieved through irrigation systems can create higher yields and allow the production of higher value crops, while potentially reducing some production costs. The additional cost of installing and maintaining these systems, however, can present a barrier to implementing BMPs. Accounting for variations in the local climate, soil type, water quality, and water availability may also challenge adoption of irrigation technologies and BMPs. |
crs_R42337 | crs_R42337_0 | The detainee provisions passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (2012 NDAA; P.L. 112-81 ), affirm that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, authorize the detention of persons captured in connection with hostilities. The act provides for the first time a statutory definition of covered persons whose detention is authorized pursuant to the AUMF. During consideration of the detention provision, much of the debate focused on the applicability of this detention authority to U.S. citizens and other persons within the United States. Congress ultimately adopted a Senate amendment to clarify that the provision is not intended to affect any existing law or authorities relating to the detention of U.S. citizens or lawful resident aliens, or any other persons captured or arrested in the United States. This report analyzes the existing law and authority to detain, as "enemy combatants," U.S. persons, which, for the purpose of this report means persons who are generally understood to be subject to U.S. territorial jurisdiction or otherwise entitled to constitutional protections; that is, American citizens, resident aliens, and other persons within the United States. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , a plurality of the Court held that a U.S. citizen allegedly captured during combat in Afghanistan and incarcerated at a Navy brig in South Carolina could be held as an enemy combatant as part of the necessary force authorized by Congress after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , but that he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision maker regarding the government's reasons for detaining him. On the same day, the Court in Rumsfeld v. Padilla overturned a lower court's grant of habeas corpus to another U.S. citizen in military custody in South Carolina on jurisdictional grounds, sending the case to a district court in the Fourth Circuit for a new trial. U.S. Practice—Detention of Enemies on U.S. Four of the judges on the panel would have retained the earlier decision, arguing that it was not within the court's power to expand the definition of "enemy combatant" beyond the law-of-war principles at the heart of the Supreme Court's Hamdi decision. The Obama Administration sought to deflect the lawsuit on the basis that Section 1021 of the NDAA does "nothing new," but merely reaffirms detention authority conferred by the AUMF as it has been practiced by the executive branch and affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. The government immediately appealed. In affirming the detention authority under the AUMF in the 2012 NDAA, Congress declined to clarify whether the detention authority extends to U.S. citizens and other persons within the United States, providing instead that the law and authority with respect to such persons remains unchanged. The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (2013 NDAA; H.R. The bills addressed the issue of detention of U.S. persons inside the United States in different ways. P.L. 3304 ( P.L. H.R. | The detainee provisions passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012, P.L. 112-81, affirm that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), P.L. 107-40, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, authorizes the detention of persons captured in connection with hostilities. The act provides for the first time a statutory definition of covered persons whose detention is authorized pursuant to the AUMF. During debate of the provision, significant attention focused on the applicability of this detention authority to U.S. citizens and other persons within the United States. The Senate adopted an amendment to clarify that the provision was not intended to affect any existing law or authorities relating to the detention of U.S. citizens or lawful resident aliens, or any other persons captured or arrested in the United States. This report analyzes the existing law and authority to detain U.S. persons, including American citizens and resident aliens, as well as other persons within the United States who are suspected of being members, agents, or associates of Al Qaeda or possibly other terrorist organizations as "enemy combatants."
The Supreme Court in 2004 affirmed the President's power to detain "enemy combatants," including those who are U.S. citizens, as part of the necessary force authorized by Congress after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality held that a U.S. citizen allegedly captured during combat in Afghanistan and incarcerated at a Navy brig in South Carolina is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision maker regarding the government's reasons for detaining him. On the same day, the Court in Rumsfeld v. Padilla overturned a lower court's grant of habeas corpus to another U.S. citizen in military custody in South Carolina on jurisdictional grounds, leaving undecided whether the authority to detain also applies to U.S. citizens arrested in the United States by civilian authorities. Lower courts that have addressed the issue of wartime detention within the United States have reached conflicting conclusions. While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ultimately confirmed the detention authority in principle in two separate cases (one of which was subsequently vacated), the government avoided taking the argument to the Supreme Court by indicting the accused detainees for federal crimes, making their habeas appeals moot and leaving the law generally unsettled. A federal judge enjoined the detention of persons on the basis of providing support to or associating with belligerent parties under one prong of the definition enacted as Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012, P.L. 112-81 (Hedges v. Obama), but the decision has been reversed on appeal on the basis of standing.
This report provides a background to the legal issues presented, followed by a brief introduction to the law of war pertinent to the detention of different categories of individuals. An overview of U.S. practice during wartime to detain persons deemed dangerous to the national security is presented. The report concludes by discussing Congress's role in prescribing rules for wartime detention, subsequent legislation in the 112th Congress that addresses the detention of U.S. persons, and legislative proposals in the 113th Congress to further address the issue (H.R. 1960, S. 1147, H.R. 2325, and H.R. 3304. |
crs_RL32312 | crs_RL32312_0 | The Senate Subcommittee on Legislative Branch did not hold a formal markup. A substantial part of the 12.5% increase requested is to meet (1)mandatory expenses, which includes funding for annual salary adjustments required by lawand related personnel expenses, such as increased government contributions to retirementbased on increased pay, and (2) expenses related to increases in the costs of goods andservices due to inflation. Senate Hearings on FY2005 Budget Requests. FY2005 302(b) Allocation for the House and Senate Subcommittees on Legislative Branch. Both houses agreed to a FY2005budget authority cap of $3.575 billion for discretionary agencies and programs under thejurisdiction of the Subcommittees on Legislative Branch. (9)
House Subcommittee Markup of FY2005 Bill. House Full Committee Markup of the FY2005 Bill. During its June 23 markup, the full committee approved thesubcommittee's recommendations after agreeing to the following six amendments:
manager's amendment (offered by Chairman Jack Kingston) containing seven provisions: (1) expressing gratitude to House employees for assistance during thefuneral of President Ronald Reagan; (2) directing changes in the administrative reorganizationof the U.S. Capitol Police force; (3) authorizing a review of the appointment process, salarydetermination, and retirement benefits for top personnel in legislative branch agencies; (4)directing the House Chief Administrative Officer to monitor compliance by vendors withHouse prepayment policies; (5) authorizing GAO to study overlap of research on economicissues by the Joint Economic Committee, CRS, CBO, and the Joint Committee on Taxation; (11) (6) encouraging the GAO to undertake additional technology assessment studies as Congressdirects; and (7) prohibiting use of funds in the bill to pay employees of the legislative branchmore than a Member of Congress. See discussion of theHouse markup in this report. House Passage of FY2005 Bill (H.R. 4755 , amended to contain the language of S. 2666 , leavingintact language in H.R. As agreed to in conference on November19, and subsequently by both houses the following day, legislative branch report languagecontained
an overall increase of 1.2%, to $3.571 billion from $3.527 billion, subject to a 0.80% rescission; (16)
an increase of 5.7% in budget authority for the Capitol Police, to $232.3 million (from $219.8 million), which enables the force to maintain 1,592 sworn staff;and
a decrease of 12.5% ($50.3 million) in budget authority for the Architect of the Capitol, to $352.7 million from $403 million. Capitol Complex Security -- Capitol Visitors' Center
Conferees on the FY2005 bill agreed to authorize the transfer of up to $10.6 million to the Capitol Visitors' Center (CVC) from the Capitol Building account of the Architect of theCapitol. 4755 , its version of the FY2005 legislative branch funding bill, without funds for the CVC. Senate Committee Funding. (22)
Government Accountability Office. The Senate determines funding levels of these twoaccounts. figures are subject to a 0.80% rescission)
Source: House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
a. FY2004 funds are contained in P.L. c. The House does not consider appropriations for Senate office buildings. a. Additional FY2004 provisions thatdid not contain appropriations were contained in P.L. | Congress agreed to a 1.2% increase in its budget authority for FY2005, appropriating $3.57 million, subject to a 0.80% rescission. Although legislative branch agencies requested an overall12.5% increase, the chairmen and some members of the House and Senate Subcommittees onLegislative Branch indicated early in budget discussions the probability of a fairly flat FY2005budget. Subsequently, during markup the House and Senate Committees on Appropriationsapproved a freeze on FY2005 legislative branch budget authority. The House bill ( H.R. 4755 ) contained a -0.1% change from FY2004, excluding Senate items; the Senate's version of H.R. 4755 , amended to contain the language of S. 2666 , contained a+0.33% change, excluding House items. Both bills fell below the 1.3% increase agreed to earlierthis year by the House and Senate for discretionary agencies and programs under jurisdictions of theHouse and Senate Subcommittees on Legislative Branch. Among elements under considerationduring discussions on the FY2005 budget were
impact of a flat budget funded at the FY2004 level with additional appropriations to pay for mandatory expenses (annual salary increases and related increasedpersonnel costs), and for costs of goods and services increased due toinflation;
impact of a budget funded at the FY2004 level with no additional funds formandatory expenses and inflationary increases;
impact of a tight budget on funding to equip and startup the Capitol Visitors'Center (CVC) (the House bill did not contain funds, while the Senate bill contained $7.6 million;conferees authorized a transfer up to $10.6 million to the CVC;
impact of funding restrictions on implementation of additional securityenhancements within and around the Capitol complex, including funding for the CapitolPolice;
elimination of the Joint Economic Committee (proposed but postponed inHouse Subcommittee markup; not considered in full committee markup);
authorization for the Government Accountability Office (GAO), formerlynamed the General Accounting Office, to study statutory jurisdictions of the joint economic andtaxation committees to determine possible overlap (included in the House bill, but specifically notsupported in the Senate bill);
elimination of the Capitol Hill mounted police force (adopted during HouseSubcommittee markup, but supported in Senate report language); and
extension of dental and vision benefits to Members and House employees(proposed for employees but postponed during House Subcommittee markup); considered and agreedto in full committee markup (applicable to both employees and Members).
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: GOV/FIN = Government and Finance |
crs_RS22552 | crs_RS22552_0 | Budget and Appropriations
The 110 th Congress will consider several measures that bear directly on funding for the programs and activities of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Farm Disaster Assistance
The 109 th Congress debated extensively whether a multi-billion dollar emergency disaster assistance package should be enacted to compensate farmers for 2005 and 2006 production losses caused by natural disasters. 2007 Farm Bill
Since most provisions of the current omnibus farm bill ( P.L. 107-171 , the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002) expire in 2007, the 110 th Congress will be making decisions about the content of a new farm bill. Commodity price and income support policy—namely, the methods, levels, and distribution of federal support to producers of farm commodities—is traditionally the most contentious component of a farm bill. However, other food and agricultural issues, notably those surrounding conservation, rural development, trade, domestic food assistance, and biofuels, also will be debated. Other ongoing trade issues of interest to Congress include barriers to agricultural trade (see CRS Report RL32809, Agricultural Biotechnology: Background and Recent Issues , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33472, Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Concerns in Agricultural Trade , by [author name scrubbed]); the scope of restrictions that should apply to agricultural sales to Cuba (see CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation , by [author name scrubbed]); and funding for U.S. agricultural export and food aid programs (see CRS Report RL33553, Agricultural Export and Food Aid Programs , by [author name scrubbed]). CFTC Reauthorization
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is an independent federal agency that regulates the futures trading industry. | A number of issues of interest to U.S. agriculture are expected to be addressed by the 110th Congress. At the top of the agenda, Congress will be considering the unfinished business of FY2007 funding levels for U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs and activities in the annual agriculture appropriations bill. Separately, attempts might be made to reconsider a multi-billion dollar emergency farm disaster assistance package that was debated but not passed in the 109th Congress. Since most provisions of the current omnibus farm bill expire in 2007, the 110th Congress will be making decisions about the content of a new farm bill. Commodity price and income support policy is usually the focus of a farm bill, but other agricultural issues, such as conservation, rural development, trade, and biofuels also will be debated. Other agricultural issues likely to be either considered or monitored by the 110th Congress include multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations; concerns about agroterrorism, food safety, and animal and plant diseases; federal energy policy; agricultural marketing matters; the reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; and farm labor issues. This report will be updated as significant developments ensue. |
crs_RS21421 | crs_RS21421_0 | This type of surface mining occurs in an area of approximately 12 million acres located in portions of Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. As its name suggests, mountaintop removal mining involves removing the top of a mountain in order to recover the coal seams contained in the mountain. Mountaintop removal creates an immense quantity of excess spoil, which is typically placed in valley fills on the sides of the former mountains. One consequence is that streams flowing through the valleys are buried. Regulatory Setting
Regulation of valley fills associated with mountaintop removal mining is primarily under the authority of two federal statutes, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. §1201) and the Clean Water Act (CWA, 33 U.S.C. Critics say that, as a result of valley fills, streams and the aquatic and wildlife habitat that they support are destroyed by tons of rocks and dirt. The mining industry argues that mountaintop removal mining is essential to conducting surface coal mining in Appalachia. Critics have been using litigation to challenge the practice. In a number of cases discussed here, environmental groups have been successful at the federal district court level in challenging issuance of permits for mountaintop removal mining projects, but each has been later overturned on appeal. Nonetheless, the criticisms also have prompted some regulatory changes, also discussed below. Other Litigation
In other litigation challenging authorization of a specific mountaintop removal mining operation in Kentucky (rather than the general practice), a federal district court ruled in 2002 that the disposal of waste from mountaintop removal mining into U.S. waters is not allowed under Section 404, and the court permanently enjoined the Corps from issuing Section 404 permits for the disposal of mountaintop removal mining overburden where the purpose is solely to dispose of waste. Environmental advocacy groups have continued to pursue legal challenges to permits for individual surface coal mining projects in Appalachia, especially for mines located in West Virginia and Kentucky. On June 11, 2009, officials of EPA, the Corps, and the Department of the Interior signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Interagency Action Plan (IAP) outlining a series of administrative actions to reduce the harmful environmental impacts of surface coal mining in Appalachia. The plan includes a series of near-term and longer-term actions that emphasize specific steps, improved coordination, and greater transparency of decisions. EPA and the Corps committed to issue guidance to strengthen environmental review of surface coal mining permits and operations and to clarify applicable criteria. Viewed broadly, the Obama Administration's combined actions on mountaintop removal mining displease both industry and environmental advocates. The additional scrutiny of permits, more stringent requirements, and EPA's veto of a previously authorized project have angered the coal industry and many of its supporters. At the same time, while environmental groups support the veto and EPA's steps to restrict the practice, many favor tougher requirements or even total rejection of mountaintop removal mining in Appalachia. EPA's veto of the Spruce No. 1 mine permit also was reversed by a court, but then was overturned on appeal. The Supreme Court declined to review that ruling, thus leaving the veto in place. Congressional Actions
Congressional interest in these issues also has been evident and has increased substantially recently. 1 mine in West Virginia has been very controversial, including in Congress. These bills were S. 55 / S. 234 , H.R. 896 , and H.R. 1203 . Similar legislation was introduced in the 113 th Congress. | Mountaintop removal mining involves removing the top of a mountain in order to recover the coal seams contained there. This practice occurs in six Appalachian states (Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, and Ohio). It creates an immense quantity of excess spoil (dirt and rock that previously composed the mountaintop), which is typically placed in valley fills on the sides of the former mountains, burying streams that flow through the valleys. Mountaintop removal mining is regulated under several laws, including the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA).
Critics say that, as a result of valley fills from mountaintop removal mining, stream water quality and the aquatic and wildlife habitat that streams support are destroyed by tons of rocks and dirt. The mining industry argues that mountaintop removal mining is essential to conducting surface coal mining in Appalachia and that it would not be economically feasible there if operators were barred from using valleys for the disposal of mining overburden. Critics have used litigation to challenge the practice. Environmental groups have been successful at the federal district court level in challenging some permits for mountaintop removal mining projects, only to be later overturned on appeal. Nonetheless, the criticisms have prompted some regulatory changes.
In 2009, officials of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), and the Department of the Interior signed a Memorandum of Understanding outlining a series of administrative actions under these laws to reduce the harmful environmental impacts of surface coal mining in Appalachia. The plan included a series of actions that emphasize specific steps, improved coordination, and greater transparency of decisions to be implemented through regulatory proposals, guidance documents, and review of applications for permits to authorize surface coal mining operations in Appalachia. Viewed broadly, the Administration's combined actions displease both industry and environmental advocates. The additional scrutiny of permits and more stringent requirements have angered the coal industry and many of its supporters. Controversy also was generated by EPA's 2011 veto of a CWA permit that had been issued by the Corps for a surface coal mining project in West Virginia. At the same time, while environmental groups support EPA's steps to restrict the practice, many favor tougher requirements or even total rejection of mountaintop removal mining in Appalachia. The enhanced permit review procedures and EPA guidance on factors used in evaluating water quality impacts of Appalachian surface mining permits were challenged in court, but they were upheld by a federal appellate court. EPA's veto of the West Virginia mine permit was overturned by a federal court, but that ruling was reversed on appeal and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. Several bills to clarify and restrict EPA's veto authority were introduced in the 113th Congress. Legislation to restrict EPA's veto authority also was introduced in the 114th Congress (S. 55/S. 234, H.R. 896, and H.R. 1203).
This report provides background on regulatory requirements, controversies and legal challenges to mountaintop removal mining, and recent Administration actions, including a Stream Protection Rule proposed by the Office of Surface Mining in July 2015. Attention to EPA's veto of the West Virginia mining permit and other federal agency actions has increased in Congress. Congressional interest in these issues is discussed, including legislation seeking to restrict the practice of mountaintop removal mining and other legislation intended to block the Obama Administration's regulatory actions. |
crs_R44648 | crs_R44648_0 | In the event there is neither a President nor a Vice President, the Presidential Succession Act provides that the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and duly-confirmed Cabinet officers, in order of the seniority of their departments, would be eligible to act as President. The three-to-four month period of the presidential general election campaign, from the national party conventions through election day, and the 10-week transition period, from election day to the January 20 inauguration, present a different range of succession issues concerning presidential and vice presidential nominees during the campaign and the President- and Vice President-elect during the transition. For the purposes of this report, "presidential election campaign" refers to the period between the national party nominating conventions, traditionally held in July or August of the election year, and election day, the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, which falls on November 8 in 2016. Republican Party Procedures
The Rules of the Republican Party provide that vacancies on the presidential ticket could be filled either by the Republican National Committee (RNC), or by the national convention, which could be reconvened at the call of the committee. Succession Between Election Day and the Meeting of the Electoral College: Party Rules Still Apply
Presidential transitions are generally considered to begin immediately after election day. The Democratic National Committee did not meet to name a replacement candidate—63 Greeley electors voted for other candidates, while three voted for Greeley. Succession Between the Electoral College Vote and the Electoral Vote Count by Congress
The second period during which succession procedures would be invoked in the event a President-elect or Vice President-elect were to die or leave the ticket occurs between the time the electors vote and Congress counts the electoral votes. The 20 th Amendment does not specifically address the question of vacancies created by situations other than death of the President- or Vice President-elect, including disability or their resignation, during this period. Succession Between the Electoral Vote Count and Inauguration
During this period, provisions of the 20 th Amendment would cover several aspects of succession. In the case of a President-elect, however, if the language of the amendment were interpreted so that the aforementioned circumstances constituted a "failure to qualify," then the Vice President-elect would act as President "until a President shall have qualified." 380, 3 U.S.C. The Inauguration Ceremony: A "Designated Survivor"
One safeguard for a situation such as that described above would be for some official or officials in the line of presidential succession not to attend the presidential inauguration ceremony. The Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate would arguably be the appropriate candidates for this role: they are, respectively, first and second in the order of succession following the Vice President, ahead of members of the President's Cabinet. First, one or more incumbent cabinet officers of the outgoing administration might be retained in office (and, away from the inaugural ceremonies) at least until after the President- and Vice-President elect have been safely installed. It was subsequently announced on January 19, 2009, that Secretary Gates would not attend the presidential inauguration ceremonies. The Obama Administration continued this practice in 2013, when Secretary of Veterans Affairs Eric Shinseki was assigned the role of designated survivor during the presidential inaugural ceremony in that year. One option to ensure executive continuity would be for either the Speaker of the House or the President pro tempore of the Senate to be absent from the ceremony. | What would happen in 2016 if a candidate for President or Vice President were to die or leave the ticket any time between the national party conventions and the November 8 election day? What would happen if this occurred during presidential transition, either between election day and the December 19, 2016, meeting of the electoral college; or between December 19 and the inauguration of the President and Vice President on January 20, 2017? Procedures to fill these vacancies differ depending on when they occur.
During the Election Campaign—Between the National Party Nominating Conventions and the Election. After the conventions, which are usually held in July or August, and election day, November 8 in 2016, political party rules apply. For the Democrats, the Democratic National Committee would select a replacement; for the Republicans, the Republican National Committee would select replacement, or it could reconvene the national convention to perform this task.
Between the Election and the Electoral College Meeting. On election day, voters choose members of the electoral college, which formally selects the President- and Vice President-elect several weeks later (December 19 in 2016). Although the transition has begun, party rules still apply: a replacement candidate would be chosen by the national committees of either party, or by a reassembled Republican National Convention.
Between the Electoral College Meeting and Inauguration. The balance of scholarly opinion holds that the President- and Vice President-elect are chosen once the electoral votes are cast. The electoral votes are counted and declared by a joint session of Congress, held January 6 of the year following the election, although Congress occasionally sets a different date for the joint session.
During this period, succession is covered by the 20th Amendment to the Constitution: if the President-elect dies, the Vice President-elect becomes President-elect. Although the amendment does not specifically address the issues of disability, disqualification, or resignation during this period, its language, "failure to qualify," could arguably be interpreted to cover such contingencies. Vacancies in the position of Vice President-elect are not mentioned in the 20th Amendment; they would be covered after the inauguration by the 25th Amendment.
If no person qualifies as President or Vice President by inauguration day, then the Succession Act (3 U.S.C. 19) applies: the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and duly confirmed Cabinet officers, in that order, would act as President.
Following the events of September 11, 2001, concern about the possibility of terrorist attacks at the inauguration led to proposals to safeguard the line of presidential succession during the swearing-in ceremony, especially during a change of administrations. Most involve a "designated survivor," a constitutionally eligible successor who would stay away from the ceremony in order to safeguard continuity in the office of the President. One option would be for an elected official in the line of succession, such as the Speaker of the House of Representatives or President pro-tempore of the Senate, to be absent from the ceremony. During a change of administrations, a Cabinet secretary of the new administration could be confirmed by the Senate and installed prior to the inauguration, or a Cabinet secretary from the outgoing administration could remain in office until after the inauguration. In either case, the designated survivor would be absent from the ceremony. Related precautions have been taken since the presidential inauguration of 2009. In that year, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, a George W. Bush appointee who remained in office in the Barrack H. Obama Administration, did not attend the inauguration ceremony. In 2013, Veterans Affairs Secretary Eric Shinseki stayed away from the swearing-in. |
crs_R42564 | crs_R42564_0 | Introduction
The Senate and the House have each passed bills whose provisions would affect a broad range of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) activities regarding drugs, biological products, and medical devices: S. 3187 , the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, passed on May 24, 2012; and H.R. 5651 , the Food and Drug Administration Reform Act of 2012, passed on May 30, 2012. The timing of these bills coincides with the October 1, 2012 expiration of FDA's authority under current law to collect fees under the Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments (PDUFA) of 2007 and the Medical Device User Fee Amendments (MDUFA) of 2007. Because revenue from those fees supports over 2,000 full-time equivalent FDA positions and accounts for more than half of the agency's drug and device review resources, Members of Congress have referred to the user fee reauthorizations as generally uncontroversial, must-pass legislation. The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce have, in addition to developing legislation that would reauthorize the drug and device user fees, crafted additional titles that would create new user fee authority for generic drugs and biosimilar biological products, permanently authorize programs to encourage or require studies of drugs for pediatric use, medical device regulation, drug regulation, and several areas, such as advisory committee conflict of interest, that cut across FDA product areas. This report provides a legislative analysis of the provisions in S. 3187 and H.R. Material is grouped by broad topics and presented in the general order of sections in the Senate bill, the first to be reported out of committee. The report begins each topic with a discussion of the overall issue to set the policy or legislative context of the bills' provisions and then uses a table to present the comparison of the bills and current law. 5651 . The following grid lists the tables that follow in this report; it also lists the section numbers of S. 3187 (as passed) and H.R. Their contribution to FDA's human drug program is larger at 51%. 5651 (as passed). Both S. 3187 and H.R. Medical device related provisions are presented in Table 6 , in the order in which they appear in the Senate bill. The agency continues its oversight of drug safety and effectiveness as long as the drug is on the market. Next Steps
The Senate voted 96-1 to pass S. 3187 on May 24, 2012. 5651 . | UPDATE: On June 18, 2012, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce distributed the text of an agreement that combined provisions of S. 3187 [ES], as passed by the Senate on May 24, 2012, and H.R. 5651 [EH], as passed by the House on May 30, 2012. The full House passed the new version by voice vote under suspension of the rules on June 20, 2012. On June 25, 2012, the Senate voted for cloture to limit debate on that bill, S. 3187 [EAH], the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 [hereinafter referred to as "the agreement"]. The Senate is expected to vote on the agreement sometime the week of June 25, 2012. For information on selected features of the agreement, see the Introduction of this report.
The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce have worked for more than a year developing Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-related legislation, versions of which both chambers passed in the last week of May 2012. S. 3187 (the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act) and H.R. 5651 (the Food and Drug Administration Reform Act of 2012) each include provisions that would affect the regulation of human drugs, biological products, and medical devices, along with several agency-wide administrative or miscellaneous items. Majority and minority committee leaders have expressed the desire to get a completed bill to the President before July 4, 2012.
The impetus to the timing of these bills is that current authority for FDA to collect fees under the Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments (PDUFA) of 2007 and the Medical Device User Fee Amendments (MDUFA) of 2007 will expire on October 1, 2012, unless reauthorizing legislation is enacted before then. Member statements at committee hearings indicated no opposition to reauthorization and very little comment about changes to the current user fee programs. Because Members of Congress generally consider the user fee reauthorizations to be must-pass legislation—for example, the user fee revenue accounts for more than half of the agency's human drug program budget—they have used these bills as vehicles for numerous additional measures.
The introduction to this report highlights selected features of S. 3187 [EAH], the agreement, relative to S. 3187 [ES] and H.R. 5651 [EH]. The remainder of this report provides, in a series of 14 tables, comparisons of the provisions in S. 3187 [ES] and H.R. 5651 [EH], presented generally in the order in which they appear in the Senate bill, the first to be reported by committee. Each table addresses a broad topic (e.g., human device regulation) and is preceded by narrative discussing the policy and legislative context of the table's provisions. |
crs_R44195 | crs_R44195_0 | To be sure, ideas and recommendations for legislation come from a wide variety of sources, such as individual Senators; committees and other Senate working groups; legislative staff; party and chamber leaders; executive branch agencies and the White House; states and localities; members of the media; citizens; and interest groups. Any or all of these individuals or entities may participate in drafting legislation, but only a Senator may formally introduce legislation in the Senate. An abundance of information is available to Senators in the form of reports, studies, and presentations offered by a wide range of individuals, groups, and organizations, including CRS. To what committee is it likely to be referred? Drafting Legislation
There is no Senate rule that introduced bills and resolutions must be prepared by the Office of the Legislative Counsel. Still, the office plays an important role by providing Senators and staff, at their request, with drafts of legislation. Use of the office by Senators and staff is nearly universal. Initial (or "original") cosponsors can be added until the measure is presented to the bill clerk in the Senate chamber. Cosponsors do not sign the bill, but the sponsor is required to. Introducing a Bill or Resolution
At the beginning of each new Congress, the Senate traditionally adopts a standing order allowing Senators to introduce measures at any time the chamber is in session by presenting them to the bill clerk seated at the desk on the Senate floor. There is no limit on the number of measures a Senator may introduce, and Senators may propose legislation for any reason. Statistics on introduced bills and resolutions are provided in Table 1 . These statements appear in the "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions" section. Committee Referral
Referral decisions are made by the Senate Parliamentarian acting on behalf of the presiding officer. Referral occurs primarily on the basis of committee jurisdictions set forth in Senate Rule XXV. Under the provisions of Senate Rule XVII, a measure is referred to the committee with "jurisdiction over the subject matter which predominates in such proposed legislation." | Authoring and introducing legislation is fundamental to the task of representing voters as a U.S. Senator. Part of what makes the American political process unique is that it affords all Senators an ability to propose their own ideas for chamber consideration. By comparison, most other democratic governments around the world rely on an executive official, often called a premier, chancellor, or prime minister, to originate and submit policy proposals for discussion and enactment by the legislature. Legislators serving in other countries generally lack the power to initiate legislative proposals of their own.
In the American political system, ideas and recommendations for legislation come from a wide variety of sources. Any number of individuals, groups, or entities may participate in drafting bills and resolutions, but only Senators may formally introduce legislation in the Senate, and they may do so for any reason.
When a Senator has determined that a bill or resolution is ready for introduction, it can be delivered to the bill clerk's desk on the chamber floor when the Senate is in session. The sponsor must sign the measure and attach the names of any original cosponsors on a separate form. Cosponsors do not sign the bill. There is no Senate rule that introduced bills and resolutions must be prepared by the Senate Office of the Legislative Counsel, but the office plays an important role by providing Senators and staff, at their request, with drafts of legislation. Use of the office by Senators and staff is nearly universal.
Once introduced, the Senate Parliamentarian, acting on behalf of the presiding officer, refers legislation to committee based primarily on how its contents align with the subject matter jurisdictions of committees established in Senate Rule XXV. Multiple referral is rare in the Senate due to Senate Rule XVII, which states that a measure is referred to the committee with "jurisdiction over the subject matter which predominates in such proposed legislation."
This report is intended to assist Senators and staff in preparing legislation for introduction. Its contents address essential elements of the process, including bill drafting, the mechanics of introduction, and the roles played by key Senate offices involved in the drafting, submission, and referral of legislation. Statistics on introduced bills and resolutions are presented in the final section to illustrate patterns of introduction in recent Congresses. |
crs_RS22743 | crs_RS22743_0 | The federal government has an array of statutes that it uses to fight health care fraud. This report provides a brief overview of some of the key federal statutes, including program-related civil and criminal penalties, the anti-kickback statute, the Stark law, and the False Claims Act, that are used to combat fraud and abuse in federal health care programs. Basic Civil and Criminal Penalties and Exclusions
Title XI of the Social Security Act contains Medicare and Medicaid program-related anti-fraud provisions, which impose penalties and exclusions from federal health care programs on persons who engage in certain types of misconduct. For example, penalties apply to services that were not provided as claimed, or claims that were part of a pattern of providing items or services that a person knows or should know are not medically necessary. Under this criminal statute, it is a felony for a person to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit, or receive anything of value (i.e., "remuneration") in return for a referral or to induce generation of business reimbursable under a federal health care program. The statute prohibits both the offer or payment of remuneration for patient referrals, as well as the offer or payment of anything of value in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for, or recommending the purchase, lease, or ordering of any item or service that is reimbursable by a federal health care program. The Stark law, as amended, and its implementing regulations prohibit certain physician self-referrals for designated health services (DHS) that may be paid for by Medicare or Medicaid. In its basic application, the Stark law provides that if (1) a physician (or an immediate family member of a physician) has a "financial relationship" with an entity, the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the furnishing of designated health services (DHS) for which payment may be made under Medicare or Medicaid, and (2) the entity may not present (or cause to be presented) a claim to the federal health care program or bill to any individual or entity for DHS furnished pursuant to a prohibited referral. In general, the FCA imposes civil liability on persons who knowingly submit a false or fraudulent claim or engage in various types of misconduct involving federal government money or property. Health care program false claims often arise in terms of billing, including billing for services not rendered, billing for unnecessary medical services, double billing for the same service or equipment, or billing for services at a higher rate than provided ("upcoding"). Civil actions may be brought in federal district court under the FCA by the Attorney General or by a person known as a relator (i.e., a "whistleblower"), for the person and for the U.S. government, in what is termed a qui tam action. | A number of federal statutes aim to combat fraud and abuse in federally funded health care programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. Using these statutes, the federal government has been able to recover billions of dollars lost due to fraudulent activities. This report provides an overview of some of the more commonly used federal statutes used to fight health care fraud and abuse.
Title XI of the Social Security Act contains Medicare and Medicaid program-related anti-fraud provisions, which impose civil penalties, criminal penalties, and exclusions from federal health care programs on persons who engage in certain types of misconduct. Penalties apply in circumstances where, among many other things, services were not provided as claimed, or claims were part of a pattern of providing items or services that a person knows or should know are not medically necessary.
Under the federal anti-kickback statute, it is a felony for a person to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit, or receive anything of value (i.e., "remuneration") in return for a referral or to induce generation of business reimbursable under a federal health care program. The statute prohibits both the offer or payment of remuneration for patient referrals, as well as the offer or payment of anything of value in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for, or recommending the purchase, lease, or ordering of any item or service that is reimbursable by a federal health care program.
The Stark law and its implementing regulations prohibit physician self-referrals for certain health services that may be paid for by Medicare or Medicaid. Under the Stark law, if (1) a physician (or an immediate family member of a physician) has a "financial relationship" with an entity, the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the furnishing of these health services for which payment may be made under Medicare or Medicaid, and (2) the entity may not bill the federal health care program or any individual or entity for services furnished pursuant to a prohibited referral.
The federal False Claims Act (FCA) imposes civil liability on persons who knowingly submit a false or fraudulent claim or engage in various types of misconduct involving federal government money or property. Health care program false claims often arise in billing, including billing for services not rendered, billing for unnecessary medical services, double billing for the same service or equipment, or billing for services at a higher rate than provided ("upcoding"). Civil actions may be brought in federal district court under the FCA by the Attorney General or by a person known as a relator (i.e., a "whistleblower"), for the person and for the U.S. government, in what is termed a qui tam action. |
crs_R42886 | crs_R42886_0 | Introduction
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is a bureau in the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). As the agency responsible for managing spectrum used by federal agencies, the NTIA often works in consultation with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on matters concerning spectrum access, technology, and policy. OPAD supports the NTIA's role as principal adviser to the executive branch and the Secretary of Commerce on telecommunications and information policies by conducting research and analysis and preparing policy recommendations. The Office of Public Safety Communications, which was created by the NTIA at the end of 2012 to administer some provisions of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Title VI, also known as the Spectrum Act. 112-96 ). Public Safety
The Spectrum Act has given the NTIA responsibilities support the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) in planning, building and managing a new, nationwide, broadband network for public safety communications. In managing proposals and contracts, it is to "take such other actions as may be necessary" to accomplish the network build-out. Improving the efficiency of federal spectrum use and management. Many of the NTIA's functions are performed in conjunction with other agencies. As an example, policy makers may wish to consider if some of the NTIA's shared obligations might be effectively and efficiently transferred to its partners, allowing the NTIA to focus on communications policies that are considered by many to be key to future economic growth and development. For purposes of oversight, Congress may—for example—choose to examine the efficacy of the NTIA's spectrum management activities, and to evaluate the agency's compliance with the Spectrum Act ( P.L. 112-96 , Title VI). Oversight might cover requirements of the act regarding the transfer of spectrum from federal to commercial use and the act's provisions for public safety. | The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), a bureau of the Department of Commerce, is the executive branch's principal advisory office on domestic and international telecommunications and information policies. Its mandate is to provide greater access for all Americans to telecommunications services, support U.S. efforts to open foreign markets, advise on international telecommunications negotiations, and fund research for new technologies and their applications. NTIA also manages the distribution of funds for several key grant programs. Its role in managing radio frequency spectrum allocated for federal use includes addressing policies for sharing, and monitoring and resolving questions regarding usage, including causes of interference. It is responsible for identifying federal spectrum that can be transferred to commercial use through the auction of spectrum licenses, conducted by the Federal Communications Commission. Many of the NTIA's responsibilities are shared with other agencies.
With the passage of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), in February 2012, Congress has given the NTIA new responsibilities in spectrum management and the support of public safety initiatives. The 113th Congress may wish to review the NTIA's performance in meeting its obligations under the act. Policy makers may also wish to consider if some of the NTIA's shared obligations might be effectively and efficiently transferred to its partners, allowing the NTIA to focus on communications policies that are considered by many to be key to future economic growth and development.
For purposes of oversight, Congress may—for example—choose to examine the efficacy of the NTIA's spectrum management activities, and to evaluate the agency's compliance with the Spectrum Act (P.L. 112-96, Title VI). Oversight might cover requirements of the act regarding the transfer of spectrum from federal to commercial use and the act's provisions for public safety. In particular, the NTIA may be impeding the progress of the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) by restricting access to funds appropriated by Congress in the Spectrum Act, as well as other actions that have delayed hiring and procurement. |
crs_R42637 | crs_R42637_0 | Introduction
Following several high-profile train incidents, Congress passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA08; P.L. After freight and commuter railroads raised concerns about their ability to meet the 2015 deadline, Congress extended the deadline by three years to December 31, 2018, or up to two years beyond that for certain qualifying railroads ( P.L. As of July 2018, it appears that all railroads will seek qualification for extending the deadline. This system is called automatic block signal (ABS), and is generally the most sophisticated signal system used by freight railroads where PTC has not been installed. Rail-Related Fatalities
Most rail-related fatalities are caused by pedestrians trespassing on railroad tracks or motor vehicles being hit at grade crossings. The bill also would have allowed railroads to implement alternative strategies on track that does not transport passengers where the "alternative risk reduction strategy that would reduce the risk of release of poison- or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials to the same extent the risk of a release of poison- or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials would be reduced if positive train control were installed on those tracks." 114-73 ), enacted October 29, 2015, extended the deadline for PTC implementation from December 31, 2015, to December 31, 2018. A more expansive variant of an overlay-type system is communications-based train control (CBTC). For example, the real-time, two-way communication of train locations combined with speed restrictions and moving authorities can lead to more efficient scheduling, increased capacity, and fuel savings. Implementation
Based on progress reports submitted by railroads to the FRA, the FRA surmises that only four railroads (BNSF and Union Pacific, and the Los Angeles and Philadelphia area commuter railroads) will likely have fully installed the necessary PTC equipment by the end of 2018, but even these railroads would likely need an extension because other railroads operating over their lines would not be fully PTC-compliant. Cost and Benefits
In 2009, the FRA estimated the total capital cost of wayside, on-board, radio, and office equipment necessary for full PTC deployment on all affected railroads to be in excess of $10 billion. However, the federal government has provided assistance. Although many serious incidents due to error by train engineers or dispatchers could be prevented by PTC, PTC is expected to prevent less than 2% of the approximately 2,000 railroad collisions and derailments that occur annually. This then may lead to social benefits such as reductions in fuel consumption and truck accidents. In addition to capital costs, operating and maintenance costs will increase as well. Another barrier to market entry could arise from the need for interoperability and spectrum compatibility. A February 2018 NTSB board meeting discussing this and a similar incident noted that PTC is not a technology well-suited to a terminal environment, due to the extremely short stopping distances and the inability for trains in tunnels to send and receive GPS signals. | The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA08) requires implementation of positive train control (PTC) on railroads which carry passengers or have high-volume freight traffic with toxic- or poisonous-by-inhalation hazardous materials. PTC is a communications and signaling system that has been identified by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as a technology capable of preventing incidents caused by train operator or dispatcher error. PTC is expected to reduce the number of incidents due to excessive speed, conflicting train movements, and engineer failure to obey wayside signals. It would not prevent incidents due to trespassing on railroads' right-of-way or at highway-rail grade crossings, where the vast majority of rail-related fatalities occur, and might not work well in some passenger terminal areas.
Under RSIA08, PTC is required on about 60,000 miles of railroad track. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) estimates full PTC implementation will cost approximately $14 billion. Progress among railroads in installing and operating PTC is mixed: a few large freight and commuter railroads show substantial progress while many others show much less progress. Federal funding provided thus far includes about $2 billion in loans and grants, mostly for commuter lines. After freight and commuter railroads raised concerns about their ability to meet the December 31, 2015, deadline in RSIA08, Congress extended the deadline by three years to December 31, 2018, or up to two years beyond that for certain qualifying railroads (P.L. 114-73). A July 2018 FRA report indicates that possibly all railroads will seek to qualify for an extension beyond the December 31, 2018, deadline, mostly for completing testing of their PTC systems.
PTC uses signals and sensors along the track to communicate train location, speed restrictions, and moving authority. If the locomotive is violating a speed restriction or moving authority, on-board equipment will automatically slow or stop the train. A more expansive version of PTC, called communications-based train control (CBTC), would bring additional safety benefits plus business benefits for railroad operators, such as increased capacity and reduced fuel consumption. However, CBTC is not currently being installed by any U.S. railroad, due to the additional cost and the challenge of meeting implementation deadlines.
In addition to funding requests for maintaining the PTC systems, Congress may be confronted with issues related to interoperability and barriers to market entry as railroads work toward implementing PTC. |
crs_R43146 | crs_R43146_0 | Introduction
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was last amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110 ). During the 113 th Congress, both the House and Senate have considered legislation to reauthorize the ESEA. On June 12, 2013, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee considered and ordered reported the Strengthening America's Schools Act ( S. 1094 ) by a strictly partisan vote of 12-10. The House Education and Workforce Committee also considered and ordered reported a bill that would reauthorize the ESEA. On June 19, 2013, on a strictly partisan vote of 23-16, the Success for All Students Act ( H.R. 5 ) was ordered reported. H.R. 5 was subsequently considered and amended on the House floor. The amended version of H.R. 5 was passed on July 19, 2013, by a vote of 221-207. It is unclear whether S. 1094 will be considered on the Senate floor. S. 1094 and H.R. 5 would take different approaches to reauthorizing the ESEA, most notably in three key areas: (1) accountability for student achievement, (2) teacher quality versus teacher effectiveness, and (3) targeted support for elementary and secondary education versus the use of a block grant. In addition, both S. 1094 and H.R. 5 . 5 would address the issues. Adequate yearly progress (AYP). S. 1094
S. 1094 would retain similar requirements related to standards and assessments; however, all states would be required to develop college and career ready standards in reading, mathematics, and science, and assessments would have to be aligned with these new standards. Each state's accountability system would have to include the subjects of reading and mathematics and could include science or any other subject selected by the state. Each state would also be required to establish "ambitious and achievable" annual performance targets for the state, LEAs, and public schools in the state for each subject area and grade level that is assessed for accountability purposes instead of AMOs. Performance targets would have to be developed for student proficiency, student growth, English language proficiency for English learners, and high school graduation rates. H.R. 5
Under H.R. Assessments would have to provide data on student academic proficiency. H.R. The state accountability system would be required to annually evaluate and identify the academic performance of each public school based on (1) student academic achievement against the state standards, which may include measures of growth toward meeting such standards, using the aforementioned required mathematics and reading assessments and other valid and reliable academic indicators related to student achievement as identified by the state; (2) the overall performance and achievement gaps as compared to the performance of all students in the school for each subgroup for which data are disaggregated for accountability purposes; and (3) other measures of school success. The bill would eliminate current outcome accountability requirements. First, to be deemed highly qualified, a teacher must possess a baccalaureate degree and full state teaching certification. Second, a teacher must demonstrate subject-matter knowledge in the areas that she or he teaches. The bill would only apply this requirement to new teachers for LEAs with approved teacher evaluation systems. S. 1094 would require states participating in Title II-A to ensure that all LEAs that receive Title II-A funds are implementing teacher and principal evaluation systems, known as professional growth and improvement systems. H.R. 5
H.R. 5 would eliminate current requirements regarding the equitable distribution of instructional quality and highly qualified teachers. The bill would not require states or LEAs to either develop or implement staff evaluation systems. LEAs would be allowed to use Title II-A funds for the development and implementation of teacher or school leader evaluation systems and may use student achievement data in such systems. H.R. S. 1094
S. 1094 would retain most of the current formula grant programs, while eliminating several competitive grant programs (see Table 1 ). The bill would not include a block grant program. H.R. 5
H.R. 5 . For example, while both S. 1094 and H.R. 5 . 5 . 5 . | The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was last amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110). During the 113th Congress, both the House and Senate have considered legislation to reauthorize the ESEA. On June 12, 2013, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee considered and ordered reported the Strengthening America's Schools Act (S. 1094) by a strictly partisan vote of 12-10. The House Education and Workforce Committee also considered and ordered reported a bill that would reauthorize the ESEA. On June 19, 2013, on a strictly partisan vote of 23-16, the Success for All Students Act (H.R. 5) was ordered reported. H.R. 5 was subsequently considered and amended on the House floor. The amended version of H.R. 5 was passed on July 19, 2013, by a vote of 221-207. It is unclear whether S. 1094 will be considered on the Senate floor.
S. 1094 and H.R. 5 would take different approaches to reauthorizing the ESEA, most notably in three key areas:
1. Accountability for student achievement: Both S. 1094 and H.R. 5 would modify current accountability requirements related to student achievement, including eliminating the requirement to determine adequate yearly progress (AYP) and the requirement to apply a specified set of outcome accountability provisions to all schools, regardless of the extent to which they failed to make AYP. Both bills would continue to require that states have standards and assessments for reading, mathematics, and science. Both bills would require that state assessments measure student academic proficiency, but only S. 1094 would require state assessments to measure student academic growth. Both bills would require that reading and mathematics be included in each state's accountability system, and would permit states to include science or other subjects in their accountability systems. S. 1094, but not H.R. 5, would require states to establish "ambitious and achievable" annual performance targets for the state, local educational agencies (LEAs), and public schools for each subject area and grade level that is assessed for accountability purposes. Performance targets would have to be established for student proficiency and student growth, as well as for English language proficiency for English learners and high school graduation rates. The secretary would have to approve all performance targets. S. 1094 would require various interventions to be implemented in certain low-achieving schools, while H.R. 5 would not require that specific actions be taken to address issues in low-performing schools. 2. Teacher quality versus teacher effectiveness: Both S. 1094 and H.R. 5 scale back (or, in the case of H.R. 5, eliminate) existing teacher quality requirements, and each bill introduces provisions pertaining to the evaluation of teacher and principal performance. H.R. 5 would eliminate current requirements related to "teacher quality," which focus largely on ensuring the equitable distribution of qualified teachers and that teachers possess a baccalaureate degree, full state teaching certification, and demonstrated subject-matter knowledge in the areas in which they teach. S. 1094 would retain these requirements for new teachers and for all teachers until approved teacher evaluation systems are in place. S. 1094 would require all LEAs that receive Title II-A funds to develop and implement teacher and principal evaluation systems, known as professional growth and improvement systems. H.R. 5 would make the development and implementation of teacher and school leader evaluation systems an optional use of Title II-A funds. Under S. 1094, staff being evaluated would have to be evaluated based, in part, on student achievement. Under H.R. 5, evaluation systems would not be required to include student achievement data. 3. Targeted support for elementary and secondary education versus the use of a block grant: Each bill would consolidate some existing competitive grant programs, but H.R. 5 would consolidate a greater number of programs than S. 1094. At the same time, S. 1094 would create several new targeted grant programs, while H.R. 5 would greatly expand the use of block grant funding. |
crs_RL31444 | crs_RL31444_0 | Introduction
News reports and articles in professional tax journals in the early 2000s drew the attention of policymakers and the public to a phenomenon sometimes called corporate "inversions" or "expatriations": instances where firms that consist of multiple corporations reorganize their structure so that the "parent" element of the group is a foreign corporation rather than a corporation chartered in the United States. The corporate inversions apparently involve little, if any, shifts in actual economic activity from the United States abroad, at least in the near term. (See, however, the section below on "Policy Issues" for a discussion of possible long-run effects.) This has also led some to draw conclusions about their impact on tax equity: unless federal spending is cut or the deficit is increased, the reduction in tax revenue must be made up by tax increases on other taxpayers. The U.S. Treasury Department views inversions as evidence of competitive problems with the U.S. tax system. U.S. Tax Consequences of Inversions
Given the U.S. tax structure, inversions potentially provide tax savings in two general ways: by reducing U.S. tax on foreign source income; and by reducing U.S. tax on U.S. income that is shifted outside the United States in "earnings stripping" or similar transactions. Under current law, as long as a firm has a dearth of foreign tax credits, at least some U.S. tax burden applies to the firm's foreign income. Thus, one source of tax saving is U.S. tax on foreign income. The ability of firms to defer U.S. tax on subsidiary earnings in low-tax countries reduces the tax burden on foreign investment as do certain U.S. foreign tax credit rules. For example, those that are chiefly concerned about the revenue and tax equity results of inversions make little distinction between inversions' loss of tax revenue from U.S. source-income, on the one hand, and foreign-source income, on the other. The 2002 Treasury Department report, for example, recommended more stringent treatment of U.S.-, but not foreign-source income—for example, more effective measures of limiting earnings-stripping—and called for a general reexamination of the U.S. system of taxing foreign income. 4520 was enacted as the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-357 ). The second regime would act as a type of toll tax on the shifting of the firm's foreign subsidiaries from the former U.S. parent to the new foreign parent. 4297)
Additional tax legislation aimed at restricting inversions was included as one of several revenue-raising "offsets" in the version of budget reconciliation legislation passed by the Senate in November, 2005. The Senate proposal was not contained in the final version of reconciliation legislation enacted in May 2006 (Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act; P.L. 109-222 ). 1591 , the supplemental appropriations bill approved by the Senate in March. The inversion measure was not, however, included in the conference agreement reached on H.R. 1591 , nor was it in the small business tax package that Congress ultimately passed as H.R. The May 2002 Treasury Report
The Treasury Department's May 2002 report voiced three principal concerns: that the earnings-stripping opportunities from inversion may erode the part of the U.S. tax base consisting of U.S.-source income; that the current tax system may give foreign-controlled firms a competitive advantage; and that inversions "reduce confidence in the fairness of the tax system." But inversions can be viewed in a broader context. Some observers and policymakers have suggested that the time is right to consider fundamental reform of the U.S. tax system; one approach might be to adopt a territorial tax system under which the United States would exempt foreign business income from tax. Inversions present many of the same policy issues as would be presented by adoption of a territorial system. | In the early 2000s, reports indicated that an increasing number of U.S. firms have altered their structure by substituting a foreign parent corporation for a domestic one. Such "inversions" typically involved the creation of a new foreign corporation in a country with low tax rates (a "tax haven") that becomes the parent of the firm's foreign and U.S. component corporations. A chief motive for inversions was apparently savings by firms on their U.S. corporate income tax. One source of savings was tax on a firm's foreign income: the United States taxes corporations chartered in the United States on both U.S. and foreign income but taxes foreign-chartered corporations only on their U.S.-source income. An inversion can thus potentially reduce a firm's U.S. taxes on foreign income. Other tax savings apparently result from "earnings stripping," or the shifting of U.S.-source income from taxable U.S. components of the firm to the tax-exempt foreign parts.
In the long run, inversions may be accompanied by some increased level of U.S. investment abroad; a firm that inverts reduces its tax burden on foreign investment. However, any such shift may be small, and the recent corporate inversions do not appear to be accompanied by substantive shifts of economic activity from the United States. This leaves the impact of inversions on tax revenues as probably the leading near-term economic effect. As a consequence, one policy issue inversions present is that of tax equity: unless offset by spending cuts or larger budget deficits, the lost revenue is made up with higher taxes on other U.S. taxpayers. Several bills introduced in the 108th Congress appear to have had the revenue losses and tax equity as their primary concern, and tax legislation aimed at restricting inversions was included in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-357), an omnibus tax bill addressing business and international tax issues. In 2006, additional tax restrictions were proposed in the Senate-passed version of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act (TIPRA; P.L. 109-222) but were not contained in the final act. In March 2007, the Senate passed a tax package that included inversion provisions as part of H.R. 1591, a supplemental appropriations bill. However, the measure was not included in the conference agreement on the bill. There are indications that the 111th Congress may again look to the corporate income tax as an area where revenue-raising measures might be found to offset tax cuts provided elsewhere.
Some have viewed inversions as symptomatic of a burden they believe the U.S. tax system places on the international competitiveness of U.S. firms. A May 2002 U.S. Treasury report saw inversions as just one result of competitive problems posed by U.S. taxes and called for a more general reexamination of the U.S. international tax system. The report's near-term recommendations for more stringent tax rules are confined to changes aimed at protecting the domestic tax base rather than U.S. tax revenue from foreign income. Recent policy discussions of the U.S. international tax system have included calls by some for adoption of a "territorial" tax system, under which U.S. taxes would no longer apply to foreign-source income. Inversions can be viewed in this larger context; they have been described as "do-it-yourself" territoriality and present many of the same policy issues. This report will be updated as events in Congress and elsewhere occur. |
crs_R44470 | crs_R44470_0 | At issue for Congress is d etermining the amount of funding for agencies and programs in the bill and the terms and conditions of such funding. 114-254 ). Title II contains appropriations for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Title III currently funds 20 agencies in other departments, such as the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service in the Department of Health and Human Services; arts and cultural agencies, such as the Smithsonian Institution; and various other entities. FY2017 Appropriations
Components of President Obama's Request
For FY2017, President Obama requested $33.18 billion for the approximately 30 agencies and entities typically funded in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. 5538 (114 th Congress) as passed the House, and the appropriations contained in S. 3068 (114 th Congress) as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee. FY2017 President Obama's Request Compared with FY2016 Enacted Appropriations
The President's request of $33.18 billion for FY2017 would have been an increase of $250.6 million (0.8%) over the total FY2016 enacted appropriations of $32.93 billion. This FY2016 total includes $700.0 million in emergency funding for Wildland Fire Management by the Forest Service ( P.L. The FY2016 appropriations included $452.0 million for the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program, whereas the President did not seek discretionary funding for PILT for FY2017. PILT compensates counties and local governments for nontaxable lands within their jurisdictions. This was largely because the FY2016 total reflects the enactment of additional emergency appropriations for Wildland Fire Management
Comparison of FY2017 Bills Passed by the House and Reported by the Senate Appropriations Committees
H.R. The bills differed in the amount and type of funding for addressing wildland fires. The House bill had higher appropriations for clinical services, among other Indian Health Service programs. 5538 as passed by the House and S. 3068 as reported from the Senate Appropriations Committee would provide lower appropriations than enacted for FY2016 ($32.93 billion). For both DOI and Forest Service wildfires, H.R. S. 3068 Compared with FY2016 Appropriations
With regard to the Senate bill, the $32.76 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies was $163.6 million (0.5%) less than FY2016 appropriations of $32.93 billion. The Senate bill also included increases over the FY2016 level of $62.7 million (2.2%) for the National Park Service and $58.5 million (2.1%) for Indian Affairs. This was the case although the President's request did not include discretionary appropriations for PILT, whereas the House and Senate bills contained $480.0 million for the program. The President and the House and Senate bills proposed somewhat different ways of funding wildland fires in FY2017. Neither the House nor the Senate legislation included funding for Wildland Fire Management through a new adjustment to the discretionary spending limits in law, as proposed by the President. Only the House bill provided a portion of wildland fire funding through the FLAME Wildfire Suppression Reserve Accounts, and only the Senate bill provided a portion of wildfire funding as emergency appropriations. FY2017 Continuing Appropriations
Continuing funds were provided for FY2017 through April 28, 2017, under the Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017 (CR; Division A, P.L. 114-254 ). Continuing appropriations were provided because no regular appropriations for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies were enacted before the start of the 2017 fiscal year on October 1, 2016. The CR generally provided funding at the FY2016 level (in Division G, P.L. 114-113 ), minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.1901% for the period covered. It also generally provided funds for continuing projects and activities, under the same authority and conditions and to the same extent and manner, as for FY2016. An earlier CR, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017 (Division C, P.L. | The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for approximately 30 agencies and entities. They include most of the Department of the Interior (DOI) as well as agencies within other departments, such as the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. The bill also provides funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), arts and cultural agencies, and other entities. At issue for Congress is determining the amount, terms, and conditions of funding for FY2017 for agencies and programs within the bill.
Because no regular appropriations were enacted before the start of FY2017, continuing funds were provided through April 28, 2017, under the Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017 (CR; Division A, P.L. 114-254). The CR generally provided funding at the FY2016 level (in Division G, P.L. 114-113), minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.1901% for the period covered. Funding was provided for continuing projects and activities, under the same authority and conditions, and to the same extent and manner, as for FY2016. An earlier CR (Division C, P.L. 114-223), and P.L. 114-254, contained a total of 10 exceptions for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. These "anomalies" pertained to recreation fees, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial, receipts from applications for permits to drill, presidential inaugural costs, certain EPA programs, the National Gallery of Art, the Smithsonian Institution, and the Indian Health Service.
In earlier action, for FY2017, President Obama had requested $33.18 billion for the agencies and entities typically funded in the annual bill. H.R. 5538 (114th Congress), as passed by the House on July 14, 2016, contained $32.15 billion for FY2017, whereas S. 3068 (114th Congress), as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on June 16, 2016, included $32.76 billion.
President Obama's request would have been an increase of $250.6 million (0.8%) over the FY2016 total of $32.93 billion, including $700.0 million in additional, emergency appropriations for wildland fires. By contrast, both H.R. 5538 as passed by the House and S. 3068 as reported from the Senate Appropriations Committee would have provided lower appropriations than enacted for FY2016. The House bill was $779.3 million (2.4%) less than FY2016, whereas the Senate bill contained $163.6 million (0.5%) less than FY2016.
The FY2016 appropriation, and FY2017 appropriations requested, approved by the House, and reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee, differed in a number of ways. For instance, only the President's request did not include discretionary appropriations for the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program, as the President proposed mandatory funds for this program. PILT compensates counties and local governments for nontaxable lands within their jurisdictions. The total amounts also represented different levels of funding for wildland fires on DOI and Forest Service lands, as well as varied approaches to providing funds. The President proposed a new adjustment to the discretionary spending limits in law for wildfire suppression, the House bill included funding for the FLAME Wildfire Suppression Reserve Accounts, and the Senate bill provided some wildfire funds as emergency appropriations. The FY2016 appropriation included FLAME and emergency funding, but not a discretionary cap adjustment.
Other differences related to the amount of funds proposed for particular agencies. For example, whereas the President sought an increase in funds over FY2016 for EPA, the House and Senate bills provided lower funding. In other cases, the President, House, and Senate Committee proposed increased funds of varying amounts over the FY2016 level, as for the National Park Service, Indian Affairs bureaus, Indian Health Service, and Smithsonian Institution, among other agencies. In still other cases, decreased funds relative to FY2016 were included in the President's, House, and Senate Committee proposals, as in the case of the Forest Service. |
crs_RL33534 | crs_RL33534_0 | According to the World Bank, China has "experienced the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history—and has lifted more th an 800 million people out of poverty." China has emerged as a major global economic power. For example, it ranks first in terms of economic size on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, value-added manufacturing, merchandise trade, and holder of foreign exchange reserves. China is currently the United States' largest merchandise trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its largest source of imports. China's large-scale purchases of U.S. Treasury securities (which totaled $1.2 trillion as of November 2017) have enabled the federal government to fund its budget deficits, which help keep U.S. interest rates relatively low. China's growing global economic influence has raised a number of questions, and in some cases, concerns, as to how China's rise will affect U.S. economic interests and influence on global economic policies. This report provides background on China's economic rise; describes its current economic structure; identifies the challenges China faces to maintain economic growth; and discusses the challenges, opportunities, and implications of China's economic rise for the United States. Such policies created distortions in the economy. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) projects that China's real GDP growth will slow considerably in the years ahead, eventually converging on U.S. growth rates by the year 2036 (U.S. and Chinese real GDP growth are both projected at 1.6%); for some years thereafter, U.S. GDP growth is projected to be greater than China's ( Figure 5 ). Such flows have been a major source of China's productivity gains and rapid economic and trade growth. China has sought to develop a new growth model ("the new normal") that promotes more sustainable (and less costly) economic growth that puts greater emphasis on private consumption and innovation as the new drivers of the Chinese economy. Many analysts warn that without such reforms, China could face a period of stagnant economic growth and living standards, a condition referred to by economists as the "middle-income trap" (see text box). China's Incomplete Transition to a Market Economy
Despite China's three-decade history of widespread economic reforms, Chinese officials contend that China is a "socialist-market economy." The Chinese government responded in part by sharply increasing spending on fixed investment. China's Belt and Road Initiative
China's Belt and Road initiative (BRI), also called "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR), was launched in 2013 to boost economic integration and connectivity (such as infrastructure, trade, and investment) with its neighbors and various trading partners in Asia, Africa, Europe, and beyond. This initiative is from China, but it belongs to the world. The new bank aims to fund infrastructure projects in developing countries. The methods the Chinese government plans to use to achieve its goals have raised concerns among U.S. firms and policymakers because they appear to involve large subsidies, protection of domestic industries, directed policies to purchase technology and IPR from abroad, increased pressure on foreign firms to transfer technology in order to do business in China, and what appears to be a goal of deliberately reducing foreign participation in China's markets. In an interview on November 3, 2017, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer stated that China's Made in China 2025 initiative was "a very, very serious challenge, not just to us, but to Europe, Japan and the global trading system." Many believe the key challenges for the United States are to convince China that (1) it has a stake in maintaining the international trading system, which is largely responsible for its economic rise, and should take a more active leadership role in maintaining that system; and (2) further economic and trade reforms are the surest way for China to grow and modernize its economy. Still others, who see China as a growing threat to the U.S. economy and the global trading system, advocate a policy of trying to contain China's economic power and using punitive measures (such as trade sanctions) to either counter the negative impact of China's industrial policies on U.S. firms or push China to modify distortive and discriminatory policies (such as the Made in China 2025 initiative). | Prior to the initiation of economic reforms and trade liberalization nearly 40 years ago, China maintained policies that kept the economy very poor, stagnant, centrally controlled, vastly inefficient, and relatively isolated from the global economy. Since opening up to foreign trade and investment and implementing free-market reforms in 1979, China has been among the world's fastest-growing economies, with real annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 9.5% through 2017, a pace described by the World Bank as "the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history." Such growth has enabled China, on average, to double its GDP every eight years and helped raise an estimated 800 million people out of poverty. China has become the world's largest economy (on a purchasing power parity basis), manufacturer, merchandise trader, and holder of foreign exchange reserves. This in turn has made China a major commercial partner of the United States. China is the largest U.S. merchandise trading partner, biggest source of imports, and third-largest U.S. export market. China is also the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities, which help fund the federal debt and keep U.S. interest rates low.
As China's economy has matured, its real GDP growth has slowed significantly, from 14.2% in 2007 to 6.9% in 2017, and that growth is projected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to fall to 5.8% by 2022. The Chinese government has embraced slower economic growth, referring to it as the "new normal" and acknowledging the need for China to embrace a new growth model that relies less on fixed investment and exporting, and more on private consumption, services, and innovation to drive economic growth. Such reforms are needed in order for China to avoid hitting the "middle-income trap," when countries achieve a certain economic level but begin to experience sharply diminishing economic growth rates because they are unable to adopt new sources of economic growth, such as innovation.
The Chinese government has made innovation a top priority in its economic planning through a number of high-profile initiatives, such as "Made in China 2025," a plan announced in 2015 to upgrade and modernize China's manufacturing in 10 key sectors through extensive government assistance in order to make China a major global player in these sectors. However, such measures have increasingly raised concerns that China intends to use industrial policies to decrease the country's reliance on foreign technology (including by locking out foreign firms in China) and eventually dominate global markets. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer has described the Made in China 2025 initiative as "a very, very serious challenge, not just to us, but to Europe, Japan and the global trading system."
China's efforts to expand its economic influence globally are another area of concern to U.S. policymakers, including China's Belt and Road initiative (BRI) to finance and help build infrastructure projects in Asia, Africa, Europe, and elsewhere. Many analysts contend that China could use the initiative to boost its industries facing overcapacity (such as steel), gain new overseas markets, influence other countries to adopt China's economic model, and expand China's "soft power" in the numerous countries that may participate in the initiative.
China's growing global economic influence and the economic and trade policies it maintains have significant implications for the United States and hence are of major interest to Congress. While China is a large and growing market for U.S. firms, its incomplete transition to a free-market economy has resulted in economic policies deemed harmful to U.S. economic interests, such as industrial policies and theft of U.S. intellectual property. This report provides background on China's economic rise; describes its current economic structure; identifies the challenges China faces to maintain economic growth; and discusses the challenges, opportunities, and implications of China's economic rise for the United States. |
crs_R43214 | crs_R43214_0 | The act allows employees to take up to 12 weeks of leave for reasons called "qualifying exigencies" when a family member who is in the Armed Forces or National Guard is deployed overseas. An employee may also take up to 26 weeks of leave during a single 12-month period to care for a military servicemember who has been seriously injured while on active duty. In recent Congresses, legislation has been introduced that would amend the FMLA to expand employee eligibility or employer coverage, allow eligible employees to take leave to care for additional family or household members, and expand the types of FMLA leave. Basic Provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
The FMLA was enacted in 1993. Regular FMLA Leave
An eligible employee may take up to 12 weeks of leave during any 12-month period for the birth and care of a child; to care for an adopted or foster child; to care for a spouse, child under the age of 18, or parent with a serious health condition; or if the employee is unable to work because of the employee's own serious health condition. To assist Congress in evaluating how these proposals may affect the availability of FMLA leave, this section analyzes data from two household surveys: The Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) supplement to the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) and a survey of employees conducted in 2012 by Abt Associates for the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). Data from the ASEC supplement are used to estimate the number of employees who may or may not be eligible for FMLA leave, while data from the 2012 DOL employee survey are used to examine the use of leave for FMLA-related reasons by employees who may or may not be eligible for leave. The Percentage of Employees Who Are Married and the Percentage of Employees Who Have Children Under the Age of 18
According to the 2012 DOL employee survey, among all employees who took medical leave in the previous year, the most common reason for taking leave was for the employee's own illness. Comparison of Employees Who May Be Eligible for FMLA Leave With Employees Who Are Likely Ineligible for Leave
To further understand the potential impact of proposals to expand or limit the availability of FMLA leave, this section uses data from the ASEC supplement for 2011 to compare employees who may or may not have been eligible for leave. Data from the 2012 DOL employee survey show that an estimated 15.9% of eligible employees took leave for FMLA-related reasons in the past year, compared to 10.2% of ineligible employees who took leave for FMLA-related reasons. Men were also more likely than women to be eligible for leave (57.2% compared to 55.6%). However, the DOL employee survey shows that women were more likely than men to take leave for FMLA-related reasons. Among employees eligible for leave, 17.9% of women and 14.1% of men took leave in the past year. Employees between the ages of 34 and 49 were more likely than younger or older workers to be eligible for FMLA leave. Based on the DOL employee survey, among workers likely eligible for FMLA leave, older workers were more likely than younger workers to have taken leave in the past year; 17.8% of workers 50 and over took leave, compared to 15.6% of workers ages 34 to 49 and 14.7% of workers ages 18 to 33. Among employees who were likely eligible for leave, married workers were more likely than unmarried workers to have taken leave in the past year: 16.8% and 14.9%, respectively. According to the DOL employee survey, in the past year, employees with children in the household were more likely than employees with no children to have taken leave for FMLA-related reasons. Among employees who were likely ineligible for leave, 11.0% of employees with a high school degree or less and 9.9% of employees with some college took leave, compared to 8.9% of employees with a Bachelor's or advanced degree. While 91.0% of federal, 80.5% of state, and 73.5% of local government employees may have been eligible for leave, 52.1% of private-sector employees may have been eligible for leave. The percentage of employees who may be eligible for FMLA leave increases with earnings. FMLA Policy Issues
The U.S. workforce and American family were changing in the years before the FMLA was enacted in 1993. The labor force participation rate of women had been rising steadily, more married women with children were working, and more families were headed by single parents. For employees who did not have job-protected family or medical leave, the FMLA was a response to these changes. Supporters of the FMLA have proposed amendments to the act that would expand employee coverage. On the other hand, others have proposed changes in the law that would narrow the definition of a serious health condition or curtail the use of intermittent leave for a chronic health condition. Some employers may oppose an expansion of employee eligibility for FMLA leave. Such an expansion could increase employer administrative and operating costs. Employers may need to make additional adjustments to work schedules if more employees become eligible for, and take, FMLA leave. To maintain the same level of output of goods and services, some employers may need to hire more workers or pay more workers for overtime. An expansion of FMLA coverage could create an incentive for employers to hire more part-time workers, who may not be eligible for FMLA leave. According to the report on the 2012 DOL employee survey, an estimated 59.2% of employees may be eligible for FMLA leave. Among all covered employers, 65.5% reported that it was "very" or "somewhat" easy to comply with the FMLA. A larger percentage, 75.3%, of employers with FMLA-eligible employees reported that it was very or somewhat easy to comply with the FMLA. The Definition of a Serious Health Condition
Currently, regulations define a serious health condition as an illness, impairment, injury, or mental or physical condition that involves:
inpatient care, which means an overnight stay in a hospital, hospice, or residential mental facility; or continuing treatment by a health care provider, which includes (1) a period of incapacity of more than three consecutive days and any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity due to the same condition; (2) any period of incapacity due to pregnancy or for prenatal care; (3) any period of incapacity or treatment due to a chronic serious health condition that requires visits at least twice a year for treatment by (or under the supervision of) a health care provider, continues over an extended period, and may cause episodic (rather than continuing) periods of incapacity (e.g., asthma or diabetes); (4) a period of incapacity that is permanent or long-term due to a condition for which treatment may not be effective (e.g., Alzheimer's disease or terminal stages of a disease); and (5) any period of absence to receive multiple treatments (including any period of recovery there from) by a health care provider for a condition that likely would result in incapacity of more than three consecutive days absent medical intervention (e.g., chemotherapy, physical therapy for severe arthritis, or dialysis for kidney disease). | The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) requires covered employers to allow eligible employees to take up to 12 weeks of leave during any 12-month period to care for a newborn, adopted, or foster child; to care for a family member with a serious health condition; or because of the employee's own serious health condition. The act allows eligible employees to take up to 12 weeks of leave because of "qualifying exigencies" when a family member who is in the Armed Forces or National Guard is deployed overseas. An employee may also take up to 26 weeks of leave during a single 12-month period to care for a servicemember who was seriously injured while on active duty.
To assist Congress in evaluating proposals to expand or limit the availability of FMLA leave, this report uses data from two household surveys. The Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) supplement to the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) is used to estimate the number of employees who may or may not be eligible for FMLA leave. Data from a 2012 survey conducted for the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) are used to compare the use of leave for FMLA-related reasons by employees who may or may not be eligible for leave.
An analysis of employees ages 18 and over shows that a majority of employees may be eligible for FMLA leave. Based on responses from 91,349 employees to the ASEC supplement, in 2011 an estimated 56.5% of employees were likely eligible for FMLA leave. According to the 2012 DOL survey of 2,852 employees, approximately 59.2% of employees may be eligible for FMLA leave. According to the 2012 DOL employee survey, an estimated 15.9% of employees who may have been eligible for FMLA leave used leave for FMLA-related reasons in the year before they were surveyed. By contrast, approximately 10.2% of employees who were likely ineligible for FMLA leave took leave for FMLA-related reasons. According to the ASEC supplement, in 2011 men were more likely than women to be eligible for FMLA leave (57.2% compared to 55.6%). However, according to the 2012 DOL employee survey, women were more likely than men to take leave for FMLA-related reasons. Among employees who were likely eligible for leave, 17.9% of women and 14.1% of men took leave in the past year. Employees between the ages of 34 and 49 were more likely (62.7%) than younger (48.5%) or older (57.9%) workers to be eligible for FMLA leave. But, workers ages 50 and over were more likely (17.9%) to have taken leave in the past year for FMLA-related reasons. Married employees were more likely (60.4%) than employees who were not married to be eligible for FMLA leave. Married workers were also more likely (16.8%) than unmarried workers to have taken FMLA-related leave in the past year. For a majority of employees (56.6%), the most recent medical reason for taking leave was for the employee's own illness. Employees with a Bachelor's or advanced degree were more likely than other employees to be eligible for FMLA leave. By contrast, employees with a high school degree or less were more likely than other employees to have taken FMLA-related leave in the past year. An estimated 91.0% of federal, 80.5% of state, and 73.5% of local government employees may be eligible for FMLA leave, compared to 52.1% of private-sector employees. The percentage of employees who may be eligible for FMLA leave increased with annual earnings. On the other hand, among employees who were likely ineligible for FMLA leave, the percentage who took leave for FMLA-related reasons in the past year was higher among employees with lower incomes. Approximately 75.3% of employers with FMLA-eligible employees report that it is "very" or "somewhat" easy to comply with the FMLA, while 14.6% report that it is "very" or "somewhat" difficult to comply with the FMLA.
In the years before 1993, when the FMLA was enacted, the U.S. workforce and American family had changed. The labor force participation rate for women had been rising steadily, more married women with children were working, and more families were headed by single parents. For employees who did not have job-protected family or medical leave, the FMLA was intended to address these changes. Since it was enacted, supporters of the FMLA have proposed different ways to expand the program. Among the changes are proposals to expand employee eligibility, cover more employers, allow eligible employees to take leave to care for more family or household members, or expand the types of FMLA leave. On the other hand, others have proposed changes that would narrow the definition of a serious health condition or curtail the use of intermittent leave for a chronic health condition.
In general, those who favor expanding the FMLA argue that these changes would further the objectives of the act. For a number of reasons, some employers and policymakers may oppose an expansion of FMLA leave. For instance, expansion could increase employer administrative and operating costs. If additional employees become eligible for, and take, FMLA leave, employers may have to make more adjustments to work schedules. In order to maintain the same level of output of goods or services, some employers may need to hire more workers or pay more workers for overtime. An expansion of FMLA leave could create an incentive for employers to hire more part-time workers. Extending FMLA coverage to smaller employers could impose greater costs on those employers than on larger employers. |
crs_R42774 | crs_R42774_0 | Overview
The United States Congress has a long history of engagement on U.S. policy toward Sudan—since the end of apartheid in South Africa, there is no country (now countries) in Africa on which Congress has focused greater attention. Fighting in these states is driven by local grievances against Khartoum and has severely affected more than half a million people. These conflicts and the ongoing hostilities in Sudan's western Darfur region complicate U.S. relations with both countries and have led the Obama Administration to defer efforts to begin normalizing relations with Sudan. U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Princeton Lyman outlined his view of the challenge in August 2012:
Sudan cannot deal with the ongoing troubles in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, the east, and elsewhere in the country with a system that does not meet the demands for greater political space, for greater sharing of wealth and opportunity and for greater democracy. As Appendix B indicates, population displacement and food insecurity are significant problems in both countries. As with the north-south war, casualty estimates in the Darfur conflict vary extensively. This came more than six years after the SPLM and the government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to bring an end to over two decades of civil war between north and south. Outstanding Issues and Disputes
Despite their formal separation, Sudan and South Sudan remain linked by—and divided over—a range of shared interests and outstanding disputes. Donors who had played a key role in the peace process, including the United States, offered incentives to encourage Khartoum to recognize the result of the south's referendum and ensure a peaceful transition. Sudan's military operations in the borderlands and related human rights violations have discouraged the delivery of support to Khartoum. The borderlands were the front lines of the civil war, and negotiations to conclusively define the precise location of the border have been complicated by grievances and distrust among the communities who live along it, and by the concentration of oil reserves in these areas. Throughout the current conflict, access by relief agencies to populations in both states has been extremely limited, and humanitarian conditions have deteriorated dramatically. Experts suggest that the condition of refugees arriving at camps across the border in South Sudan and Ethiopia is likely indicative of conditions inside the two states—refugees who fled in 2011 were primarily fleeing the violence and moving in anticipation of coming food shortages. Normalizing Relations Between the Sudans
The working relationship built between the NCP and the SPLM during the CPA period has deteriorated dramatically in the past year. They formally became two separate organizations on July 9, 2011, but remain tied by historic bonds and close relationships. Some, but not all, of those accused of serious abuses have faced military justice. Insecurity in parts of the country periodically impedes access to other populations that have been internally displaced. Within the NCP, reports of large-scale state corruption, including allegations directed at Bashir himself, have led to calls for internal party reform. The Administration has been publicly critical of both Sudan's aerial and artillery attacks against South Sudan and South Sudan's attack on Heglig, and has demanded that South Sudan cease any support for the SPLM-N. Administration officials also continue to register "grave concern" with the delayed implementation of agreements on humanitarian access in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, stressing Khartoum's responsibility to act with urgency. Further sanctions were imposed more recently—several relate specifically to the Darfur conflict. Should the Administration decide to ease certain sanctions against Sudan, possibly in exchange for concessions from Khartoum, changes to some restrictions would require congressional action. While the relationship between Washington and Juba, which has been characterized by President Obama and Secretary Clinton as a "partnership," is markedly warmer than that with Khartoum, it too is tempered by concerns about human rights abuses and corruption. After decades of war, distrust between the two governments is high. The Humanitarian Situation
Appendix C. U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Sudans
Appendix D. Acronyms
Acronyms
AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan
AUHIP: African Union High-Level Implementation Panel
CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDPD: Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DRA: Darfur Regional Authority
DUP: Democratic Unionist Party (an opposition party in Sudan)
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement (an insurgent group in Darfur)
LJM: Liberty and Justice Movement
NCF: National Consensus Forces (an alliance of opposition parties in Sudan)
NCP: National Congress Party (Sudan's ruling party)
NIF: National Islamic Front
PCP: Popular Congress Party (an opposition party in Sudan)
PDF: Popular Defense Forces (Sudanese government-backed militia)
SAF: Sudan Armed Forces (the Sudanese military)
SDBZ: Safe Demilitarized Border Zone
SLM/A: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (an insurgent group in Darfur)
SPLM/A: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (South Sudan's ruling party and its army, respectively)
SPLM/A-N: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army – North (formerly a recognized opposition party in Sudan, became an insurgent group in 2011)
SRF: Sudan Revolutionary Front (an alliance of insurgent groups in Sudan)
UNAMID: United Nations – African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur
UNISFA: United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMIS: United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan
Appendix E. Peacekeeping Operations | Congress has played an active role in U.S. policy toward Sudan for more than three decades. Efforts to support an end to the country's myriad conflicts and human rights abuses have dominated the agenda, as have counterterrorism concerns. When unified (1956-2011), Sudan was Africa's largest nation, bordering nine countries and stretching from the northern borders of Kenya and Uganda to the southern borders of Egypt and Libya. Strategically located along the Nile River and the Red Sea, Sudan was historically described as a crossroads between the Arab world and Africa. Domestic and international efforts to unite its ethnically, racially, religiously, and culturally diverse population under a common national identity fell short, however. In 2011, after decades of civil war and a 6.5 year transitional period, Sudan split in two. Mistrust between the two Sudans—Sudan and South Sudan—lingers, and unresolved disputes and related security issues still threaten to pull the two countries back to war.
The north-south split did not resolve other simmering conflicts, notably in Darfur, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan. Roughly 2.5 million people remain displaced as a result of these conflicts. Like the broader sub-region, the Sudans are susceptible to drought and food insecurity, despite significant agricultural potential in some areas. Civilians in the conflict zones are particularly vulnerable. Instability and Sudanese government restrictions have limited relief agencies' access to conflict-affected populations. Humanitarian conditions in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile have been at crisis levels for months, but an estimated half a million people remain largely beyond the reach of aid groups. Logistical challenges constrain the delivery of relief for those who have fled, primarily to remote refugee camps across the border in South Sudan. The harassment of aid workers is a problem in both Sudans, further hindering aid responses.
The peaceful separation of Sudan and South Sudan was seen by some players as an opportunity to repair relations between Sudan's Islamist government and the United States. Those ties have long been strained over Khartoum's human rights violations and history of support for international terrorist groups. Among the arguments in favor of normalizing relations with Sudan has been the notion that the United States has few additional unilateral "sticks" to apply against Khartoum, given robust sanctions already in place. Applying certain "carrots," such as easing sanctions, might encourage further political reforms, proponents say. The Obama Administration sought to improve the relationship with Khartoum in 2011, given South Sudan's successful referendum and separation from Sudan, and Sudan's cooperation on counterterrorism. The U.S. effort has been impeded by ongoing reports of abuses, including allegations that Khartoum continues to commit war crimes against civilians. Some observers argue that improving the relationship would reward bad behavior. Relations are also complicated by the fact that several government officials, notably President Omar al Bashir, have been accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide at the International Criminal Court in relation to the Darfur conflict.
U.S. relations with South Sudan, which are rooted in years of American activism and disaster relief to the south during the civil war, remain close, though there have been signs of strain in 2012. The United States is the country's largest bilateral donor, but the Administration has expressed concern over certain actions taken by leaders in Juba that have, in its view, further aggravated the relationship between the Sudans and the economic situation in both countries.
This report examines the shared interests and outstanding disputes between the Sudans after separation, and gives an overview of political, economic, and humanitarian conditions in the two countries, with a focus on possible implications for U.S. policy and congressional engagement. |
crs_R45165 | crs_R45165_0 | The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) implements the majority of the farm bill programs. The authority for USDA to operate farm commodity support programs comes from three permanent laws, as amended: the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (P.L. Many current farm bill provisions expire on September 30, 2018. This report focuses on three principal support programs in Title I of the 2014 farm bill: the Price Loss Coverage (PLC), Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC), and Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) programs. Affected commodities include corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, cotton, peanuts, oats, barley, grain sorghum, pulse crops (dry peas, lentils, small chickpeas, and large chickpeas), and other oilseeds (including sunflower seed, rapeseed, canola, safflower, flaxseed, mustard seed, crambe, and sesame seed). In addition, this report discusses potential issues for Congress—including expiration of the farm bill and the adjusted gross income eligibility threshold for commodity program payments—and presents a selection of legislation introduced in the 115 th Congress that could impact the farm commodity program payments under Title I. Dairy, livestock, tree crops, and sugar producers have separate programs within Title I that are outside the scope of this report. The 2014 farm bill repealed these direct payments but continues payments to producers of a broad array of "covered crops" when prices are low relative to statutory price support levels or when compared with historical crop revenue. USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) reported the percentage of base acres by commodity. In contrast, ARC and PLC payments are "decoupled" payments. PLC payments are triggered when the national marketing-year average farm price (MYAP) for a qualifying covered commodity (referred to as the effective price) is below its statutorily fixed reference price. If triggered, the PLC payment amount for a covered commodity is equal to the payment rate times the commodity's historical program yield times 85% of the commodity's base acres enrolled in PLC. ARC-CO payments are then equal to the per-acre payment rate times 85% of the base acres enrolled in ARC-CO for the respective program crop. The ARC-IC farm's guarantee equals 86% of the ARC-IC farm's individual benchmark guarantee, defined as the summation of the five-year average of an ARC-IC farm's annual ARC-IC benchmark revenue for each program crop (i.e., the farm's yield for each program crop, multiplied by the higher of the crop's reference price or the MYAP), excluding the high and low annual revenues. Coupled Price Protection: Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL)
MAL offers interim financing for the "covered" and "loan" commodities listed in Table 2 . If market prices fall below these statutory loan rates, additional benefits are available to producers with crops enrolled in MAL. Program Outlays Under the 2014 Farm Bill
The 2014 farm bill's PLC, ARC, and MAL programs cover the five crop years of 2014 through 2018; however, data on program outlays for ARC and PLC is available only for the first three years—2014-2016 ( Figure 5 ). Without congressional action, farm commodity program payments would revert to permanently authorized legislation from the 1930s and 1940s. Proposals in the 115th Congress for the Farm Commodity Programs
The upcoming farm bill discussions may address ARC, PLC, and MAL payments. | Federal efforts to bolster farm household incomes and the rural economy by providing support to producers of key crops has been a central pillar of U.S. farm policy since such programs were first introduced in the 1930s. Current farm support programs are counter-cyclical in design—that is payments are triggered when the annual market price for an eligible crop drops below a statutory minimum or when revenue is below a guaranteed level. The farm commodity program provisions in Title I of the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79, the 2014 farm bill) consists of three types of support for crop years 2014-2018:
1. Price Loss Coverage (PLC) payments. PLC payments occur if the national average marketing year price for a "covered commodity" (e.g., wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, and peanuts, among others) is below its "reference price." The difference between these two prices is the per-unit payment rate, which is multiplied by historical program yields and paid on 85% of historical program acres (i.e., base acres). 2. Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) payments. ARC payments occur when annual crop revenue for a county or an individual producer is below its guaranteed level based on a five-year moving average of historical crop revenue. The difference between these prices is the per-acre payment rate, which is paid on 85% of base acres. 3. Marketing Assistance Loans (MAL). MAL offers interim financing for a group of "loan" commodities (consisting of covered crops plus several others) that is equal to actual production multiplied by statutorily set loan rates. Additional benefits are available to producers if market prices fall below loan rates.
These three commodity support programs are in effect for the 2014-2018 crop years. The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Farm Service Agency (FSA) reported that ARC and PLC payments exceeded $5 billion in FY2014, and payments reached nearly $7 billion in both FY2015 and FY2016. Under current law, the Congressional Budget Office projects farm commodity program payments to exceed a combined total of $4 billion each fiscal year from 2016 to 2027.
The "covered commodities" that qualify for ARC and PLC include wheat, feed grains (corn, sorghum, barley, oats), seed cotton, rice, soybeans, other oilseeds (sunflower seed, rapeseed, canola, safflower, flaxseed, mustard seed, crambe, and sesame seed), and peanuts. Support under MAL is available for covered commodities plus refined beet and raw cane sugar, wool, mohair, honey, dry peas, lentils, and chickpeas.
The 2014 farm bill's Title I farm program payments are set to expire in September 2018. The upcoming farm bill discussions may address farm commodity program payments. Without a new farm bill or an extension of the current farm bill, the authority for some farm programs would expire, and some would cease to operate altogether. Accordingly, this report lists a selection of legislative proposals introduced in the 115th Congress that would impact the farm commodity program payments in Title I of the farm bill.
USDA administers these farm commodity programs. Dairy, livestock, tree crops, and sugar producers have separate programs within Title I that are outside the scope of this report. |
crs_RL33601 | crs_RL33601_0 | Background
The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act specified that military space activities be conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD and the intelligence community manage a broad array of space activities, including launch vehicle development, communications satellites, navigation satellites (the Global Positioning System—GPS), early warning satellites to alert the United States to foreign missile launches, weather satellites, reconnaissance satellites, and developing capabilities to protect U.S. satellite systems and to deny the use of space to adversaries (called "space control" or "counterspace systems"). The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War is dubbed by some as the first "space war" because support from space displayed great improvement over what was available during the previous major conflict, Vietnam. These systems continue to play significant roles in U.S. military operations. How to organize DOD and the intelligence community to work effectively on space programs has been an issue for many years. DOD sometimes releases only partial information or will release without explanation new figures for prior years that are quite different from what was previously reported. FY2008 Budget Request
A breakdown by program acquisition costs for individual weapon systems in the DOD budget request for FY2008 is available online at http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2008_weabook.pdf . FY2007 Authorization and Appropriations
The FY2007 authorization and appropriations bills contain the authority and funding for DOD space activities, but, as mentioned, do not specify figures for those activities. The House and Senate passed conference agreements on both the FY2007 national defense authorization bill, H.R. 5122 , and the FY2007 defense appropriations bill, H.R. 5631 . The President signed the appropriations bill into law, P.L. 109-289 , on September 29, 2006, and he signed the authorization bill into law, P.L. 109-364 , on October 17, 2006. | The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act specified that military space activities be conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD and the intelligence community manage a broad array of space activities, including launch vehicle development, communications satellites, navigation satellites (the Global Positioning System—GPS), early warning satellites to alert the United States to foreign missile launches, weather satellites, reconnaissance satellites, and developing capabilities to protect U.S. satellite systems and to deny the use of space to adversaries (called "space control" or "counterspace systems"). The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War is dubbed by some as the first "space war" because support from space displayed great improvement over what was available during the previous major conflict, Vietnam. These systems continue to play significant roles in U.S. military operations. How to organize DOD and the intelligence community to work effectively on space programs has been an issue for many years.
Tracking the DOD space budget is extremely difficult since space is not identified as a separate line item in the DOD budget. Additionally, DOD sometimes releases only partial information (omitting funding for classified programs) or will suddenly release without explanation new figures for prior years that are quite different from what was previously reported.
A breakdown by program acquisition costs for individual weapon systems in the DOD budget request for FY2008 is available online at http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2008_weabook.pdf. The FY2007 authorization and appropriations bills contain the authority and funding for DOD space activities, but, as mentioned, do not specify figures for those activities. The House and Senate passed conference agreements on both the FY2007 national defense authorization bill, H.R. 5122, and the FY2007 defense appropriations bill, H.R. 5631. The President signed the appropriations bill into law, P.L. 109-289, (H.Rept. 109-504; S.Rept. 109-292; H.Rept. 109-676: in Congressional Record H6996-7309) on September 29, 2006, and he signed the authorization bill into law, P.L. 109-364, (H.Rept. 109-452; H.Rept. 109-702: in Congressional Record H8061-8540) on October 17, 2006. Specific figures for the programs included in this report are contained in those sections. |
crs_R43768 | crs_R43768_0 | Background
The OSH Act obligated the Secretary of Labor to protect occupational safety and health as required by the act. However, the act also created the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, and thus the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), to whom the Secretary of Labor has delegated responsibility for his obligations under the act. The OSH Act also created the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSHRC") —an adjudicatory agency that is independent of the Department of Labor and therefore OSHA—that is tasked with reviewing OSHA enforcement actions (i.e., citations and penalties). First, Section 5(a)(1) of the act, the so-called "General Duty Clause," requires all employers, regardless of industry, to provide workplaces that are free of potentially harmful hazards. The General Duty Clause and OSHA's workplace safety standards are treated the same for purposes of complaints, inspections, and citations. Additionally, OSHA can seek appeal of an OSHRC order. | Through the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSH Act" or "act"), Congress sought a nationwide approach to regulating workplace accidents and injuries. The act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to create and enforce workplace safety standards. Additionally, the act contains a "General Duty Clause," also enforced by the Secretary of Labor, which generally requires employers to provide workplaces that are free of potentially harmful hazards. The act created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") and an Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, to whom the Secretary of Labor has delegated his enforcement rights and obligations under the act. The act also established the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSHRC"), an adjudicatory agency independent of the Department of Labor, and therefore OSHA, that is tasked with reviewing enforcement actions. OSHA enforces its standards and the General Duty Clause through inspections, citations, and penalties. Employers can seek review of OSHA enforcement actions first with OSHRC and then with U.S. Courts of Appeals. |
crs_RL32932 | crs_RL32932_0 | Introduction
This report provides a chronology of selected events leading up to and following thediscoveries of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or "mad cow disease") in North America. As of this writing, 10 native cases have been confirmed on this continent, seven in Canada and threein the United States. It is intended to be a timelinefor selected regulatory, legal, and congressional developments that are frequently referenced in theongoing policy debate. It does not contain entries for the introduction of the many BSE-related billsintroduced into this or previous Congresses, except for those in recent years where committee orfloor action has occurred or where markedly widespread attention has been focused. Other CRS reports may provide more background and context for this policy debate. Early BSE Developments (1986-2002)
When BSE was first identified in 1986 in a British laboratory, relatively little was knownabout its character, its cause, or how to contain it. As the UK and other countries were coping with BSE, the U.S. and Canadian governmentswere establishing panels to study the disease and instituting a series of safeguards aimed at keepingit out of North America or stopping any spread if it should occur here. 2003
The first native-born case of BSE in North America was confirmed in a cow in Alberta,Canada, in May 2003. Confirmatory testing affirmed BSE, and the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture reportedthe findings on December 23. However, an agreement on the terms for shippingbeef and cattle to Korea continued to elude negotiators during the first half of 2006. Postscript
At the time of this report, the Administration and many Members of Congress werecontinuing to focus on efforts to reopen more major foreign markets to U.S. beef, most notablyKorea. These officials have repeatedly attemptedto reassure consumers and foreign buyers that U.S. cattle and beef are safe and pose no risk to animalhealth or to human food safety (although research into the numerous unknown aspects of the diseaseand of the TSE family of diseases, and consideration of additional regulatory safeguards, continues). Meanwhile, Congress can be expected to play a continued role, holding oversighthearings, providing funding for BSE-related activities, and possibly considering legislative optionsto address one or more of the problems at hand. | This report provides a chronology of selected events leading up to and following thediscoveries of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or "mad cow disease") in North America. These are primarily regulatory, legal, and congressional developments that are frequently referencedin the ongoing policy debate. The chronology generally does not contain entries for the introductionof the many BSE-related bills introduced into this or previous Congresses, except for those in recentyears where committee or floor action has occurred. This report, which will be updated if significantdevelopments ensue, is intended to be used alongside other CRS reports that provide morebackground and context for the BSE policy debate, and that cover many specific legislativeproposals.
The chronology begins in 1986, when BSE was first identified by a British laboratory. Asthe United Kingdom and others attempted to understand and contain BSE, the U.S. and Canadiangovernments were establishing panels to study the disease and began instituting a series ofsafeguards aimed at keeping it out of North America or stopping any spread if it should occur here. The chronology proceeds into May 2003, when Canada reported the first native case in NorthAmerica; December 2003, when the United States reported finding a case in a U.S. herd; and mostof 2004, when both countries worked to reassure consumers of the safety of North American cattleand beef and to reopen foreign markets blocking these exports. U.S. and Canadian officials since2003 also have been strengthening various regulatory safeguards aimed at protecting the cattle herdand the food supply from BSE.
The chronology continues with major events of 2004, 2005, and the first half of 2006, whichhave revolved around efforts to re-establish more open cattle and beef trade within North America,even while a handful of new cases of BSE have emerged here, and the steps being taken to regainthe Japanese and Korean markets, which were until December 2003 two of the four leading foreignbuyers of U.S. beef. Both were closed as of mid-2006 (although Japan appeared on the verge ofreopening as of this writing). Congress can be expected to continue to play a role, holding oversighthearings, providing funding for BSE-related activities, and possibly considering legislative optionsto address one or more of the outstanding issues. |
crs_R43456 | crs_R43456_0 | These changes have been overseen by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the federal agency created in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks under provisions in the Aviation Transportation and Security Act (ATSA; P.L. TSA has responded to such criticisms by attempting to shift from an approach that assumes a uniform level of risk among all airline travelers to one that focuses on passengers thought to pose elevated security risks. What Is Risk? There is no perfect security." Risk-based passenger screening includes a number of initiatives that fit within this broader framework, but it focuses specifically on detecting and managing the threat element of risk. Risk-Based Approaches Applied to Airline Passengers
Risk-based approaches to airline passenger screening have been used since the early 1970s. As initially envisioned, CAPPS II was to integrate checks of passenger name records against the "no fly" list of individuals to be denied boarding and the "selectee" list of individuals of elevated risk requiring more thorough secondary screening. Pre-Screening International Passengers
Secure Flight development benefited from operational experience with the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) administered by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which predated Secure Flight and continues to collect passenger manifest data from airlines for all international flights inbound to the United States. CBP also relies on its Automated Targeting System-Passenger (ATS-P) to perform risk assessments on inbound and outbound international travelers. A separate TSA program, Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques (SPOT), attempts to identify passengers who could present threats by observing behavior at airports. The Pre-Check Program
While behavioral detection approaches have been sharply criticized, TSA's efforts to implement Pre-Check, a trusted traveler program designed to expedite processing of low-risk passengers, have garnered more favorable responses. New passenger screening canine teams, specially trained to work in crowded areas and sniff passengers to detect the scent of explosives, along with behavioral detection officers who screen individuals for behavioral indicators of potential threat, perform initial screening of passengers in the screening checkpoint queue. In summary, as TSA moves forward in its implementation of a risk-based approach to passenger screening, questions persist as to whether this approach
appropriately integrate s various programs and elements of the approach and interdependently and collectively exhibits the characteristics of a comprehensive risk-based strategy outlined in Table 1 ; adequately adapt s and evolve s to changes in the threat landscape, to potential changes in the availability of resources including personnel, and to the introduction of new procedures and technologies; can identify and analyze appropriate metrics for assessing the effectiveness of risk-based programs against specific mission goals tied to detecting and mitigating threats to civil aviation; adequately addresses potential impacts of false positives without compromising threat detection capabilities; and ensures appropriate privacy and data protections consistent with those detailed in the agency's SORNs and in a manner that appropriately balances security and intelligence needs with public expectations. | Until recently, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had applied relatively uniform methods to screen airline passengers, focusing primarily on advances in screening technology to improve security and efficiency. TSA has recently shifted away from this approach, which assumes a uniform level of risk among all airline travelers, to one that focuses more intently on passengers thought to pose elevated security risks. Risk-based passenger screening includes a number of initiatives that fit within a broader framework addressing security risks, but specifically emphasizes the detection and management of potential threats posed by passengers.
Various risk-based approaches to airline passenger screening have been used since the early 1970s, including the application of rudimentary behavioral profiles, security questions, and analysis of ticket-purchase data to look for indicators of heightened risk. Additionally, "no-fly" lists were developed to prevent known or suspected terrorists from boarding aircraft, but prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, these lists were not robust and proved ineffective.
Following the 9/11 attacks, TSA's initial risk-based efforts focused on integrating checks of passenger name records against the "no fly" list of individuals to be denied boarding and the "selectee" list of individuals of elevated risk requiring more thorough secondary screening. These efforts culminated in the deployment of Secure Flight, which screens each passenger's full name and date of birth against terrorist watchlists. Additionally, international passengers are screened by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which uses the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and the Automated Targeting System-Passenger (ATS-P) to conduct risk assessments.
At airports, TSA employs behavioral detection and analysis under the Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques (SPOT) program in an effort to identify suspicious passengers. Another risk-based security program is Pre-Check, a trusted traveler program designed to expedite processing of low-risk passengers. In addition to the Pre-Check participants, TSA is routing certain other passengers through expedited lanes using behavior detection officers and canine teams to screen for suspicious behavior and explosives under an initiative called managed inclusion.
Implementation of risk-based passenger screening raises numerous issues of congressional interest. These include the efficacy of the SPOT program; how the various elements and programs complement each other and integrate with TSA's other layers of security; the risk-based approach's ability to adapt and evolve over time; the ability to measure its effectiveness; the potential impacts of false positives on the traveling public; and implications for safeguarding data and maintaining privacy. |
crs_RL33470 | crs_RL33470_0 | Most Recent Developments
On September 29, 2006, Congress passed the Department of Defense FY2007 Appropriation bill ( H.R. 109-289 ), which included a continuing resolution (CR) providing funding for Science, State, Justice and Commerce (SSJC) and related agencies through November 17, 2006. On November 15, 2006, Congress passed a second CR ( H.J.Res. 100 ), which extended funding provided in the initial continuing resolution through December 8, 2006. On December 8, the House passed a third CR ( H.J.Res. 102 ) extending funding through February 15, 2007. The Senate passed the measure on December 9. 110-5 , which amended P.L. 109-289 ( H.J.Res. The House passed its SSJC appropriation bill ( H.R. The House funding level included $22.5 billion for the Department of Justice, $5.9 billion for the Department of Commerce and related agencies, $22.7 billion for the Science agencies, $9.7 billion for the Department of State and international broadcasting, and $2.3 billion for related agencies. The Administration submitted its FY2007 budget to Congress on February 6, 2006. The Administration requested $62.5 billion for the agencies under the jurisdiction of the Science, State, Justice, Commerce Appropriations (SSJC) subcommittee of the House and $52.3 billion for the Agencies under the Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS) Appropriations subcommittee in the Senate. The Administration requests for the major departments and their related agencies are Department of Justice, $21.3 billion; Department of Commerce, $6.3 billion; Department of State, $10.2 billion; Science, $22.8 billion; and Related Agencies, $2.3 billion. The law provided $62.1 billion ($63.1 billion including FY2006 supplementals) for the agencies under the jurisdiction of the Science, State, Justice, Commerce Appropriations subcommittee of the House. The estimated appropriations of the major departments and their related agencies (after rescissions and supplementals) were Department of Justice, $21.7 billion; Department of Commerce, $6.6 billion; Department of State, $9.5 billion; Science, $22.2 billion; and Related Agencies, $3.2 billion. Appropriations bills reflect the jurisdiction of the subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in which they are considered. Jurisdictions for the subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees were changed at the beginning of the 109 th Congress. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its bill ( H.R. 5672 on June 29, 2006. The final FY2006 appropriations, P.L. The total funding for related agencies in FY2007 was $108.6 million. FY2007 Appropriations
The 110 th Congress passed the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, and it was signed into law ( P.L. 110-5 ) on February 15, 2007. | This report monitors actions taken by the 109th Congress for the House's Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies (SSJC) and the Senate's Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) FY2007 appropriations bill. Appropriations bills reflect the jurisdiction of the subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in which they are considered. Jurisdictions for the subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees changed at the beginning of the 109th Congress.
On September 29, 2006, Congress passed the Defense Department Appropriation (H.R. 5631/P.L. 109-289), which included a continuing resolution (CR) to fund the most other agencies, including SSJC agencies, through November 17, 2006. On November 15, 2006, Congress passed a second CR (H.J.Res. 100) which extended funding provided in the initial continuing resolution through December 8, 2006. On December 8, the House passed a third CR (H.J.Res. 102), which extended funding through February 15, 2007. The Senate passed the measure on December 9. On February, 15, 2007, the President signed into law H.J.Res. 20 (P.L. 110-5), which amended P.L. 109-289, the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, extending continuing appropriations through FY2007.
For the FY2007 SSJC/CJS appropriations, the Administration requested $62.5 billion/$52.3 billion in the budget that it sent to Congress on February 6, 2006. The Administration request for the major departments and their related agencies are Department of Justice (DOJ), $21.3 billion; Department of Commerce (DOC), $6.3 billion; Department of State, $10.2 billion; Science, $22.8 billion; and Related Agencies, $2.3 billion. (The numbers may not add to the total due to rounding.)
The House passed its SSJC appropriation bill (H.R. 5672) on June 29, providing a total of $62.6 billion. The House funding level included $22.5 billion for DOJ, $5.9 billion for DOC and related agencies, $22.7 billion for the Science agencies, $9.7 billion for the Department of State and international broadcasting, and $2.3 billion for related agencies. The Senate committee reported its bill covering State Department funding (H.R. 5522) on July 10.
The enacted FY2006 appropriation provided $62.1 billion ($63.1 billion, including FY2006 supplemental funds) for the agencies under the jurisdiction of the Science, State, Justice, Commerce Appropriations subcommittee of the House. The appropriations enacted for the major departments and their related agencies were DOJ, $21.7 billion; DOC, $6.6 billion; Department of State, $9.5 billion; Science, $22.2 billion; and Related Agencies, $2.5 billion.
This report is the final update for the FY2007 SSJC report. Any future adjustments of the FY2007 numbers will be in the FY2008 appropriation report. |
crs_RL34523 | crs_RL34523_0 | Most Recent Developments
On March 11, 2009, President Obama signed the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-8 ), which provides $44.6 billion for FSGG programs and agencies, an increase of $385 million above the FY2009 requested amount and $58 million less than FY2008 enacted appropriations. The House Appropriations Committee had recommended $44.27 billion for FSGG agencies and programs for FY2009, while the Senate Appropriations Committee had recommended FY2009 appropriations of $44.75 billion. Overview of FY2009 Appropriations
On September 30, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 110-329 ). Division A of P.L. 110-329 provided continuing appropriations for most accounts in the Financial Services and General Government accounts through March 9, 2009. Funding was generally at the same rate appropriated in P.L. 110-161 , the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. Division B of P.L. 110-329 provided GSA with an additional $182 million for courthouse construction, and provided SBA with an additional $799 million, most of which was for the disaster loan program account. Department of the Treasury. The Judiciary. Executive Office of the President and Funds Appropriated to the President27
All but three offices in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) are funded in the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill. Small Business Administration (SBA)110
The SBA is an independent federal agency created by the Small Business Act of 1953. In addition, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ) appropriated $730 million for the SBA. United States Postal Service (USPS)113
The U.S. | The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and 26 independent agencies. Among the independent agencies funded by the bill are the General Services Administration (GSA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the United States Postal Service (USPS).
On September 30, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329). Division A of P.L. 110-329 provided continuing appropriations for most accounts in the Financial Services and General Government accounts through March 9, 2009. Funding was generally at the same rate appropriated in P.L. 110-161, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. Division B of P.L. 110-329 provided GSA with an additional $182 million for courthouse construction, and provided SBA with an additional $799 million, almost of all which was for the disaster loan program account.
On March 11, 2009, President Obama signed the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), which provides $44.6 billion for FSGG programs and agencies, an increase of $385 million above the FY2009 requested amount and $58 million less than FY2008 enacted appropriations. The House Appropriations Committee had recommended $44.27 billion for FSGG agencies and programs for FY2009, and the Senate Appropriations Committee had recommended $44.75 billion.
In addition, Title V of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) provided funding for three FSGG agencies: GSA received $5.85 billion, the Department of Treasury received $187 million, and SBA received $730 million. The newly established Recovery Act Accountability and Transparency Board was also funded through Title V of the ARRA, receiving $84 million.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS21598 | crs_RS21598_0 | The piggyback statutes are not themselves mandatory minimums but sentence offenders by reference to underlying statutes including those that impose mandatory minimums. The Guidelines denied judges sentencing discretion. Constitutional Boundaries
Defendants sentenced to mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment have challenged them on a number of constitutional grounds beginning with Congress's legislative authority and ranging from cruel and unusual punishment through ex post facto and double jeopardy to equal protection and due process. Mandatory minimums implicate considerations under the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause. The clause bars mandatory capital punishment statutes. The clause does bar imposition of a mandatory life term of imprisonment upon a juvenile. Thus, the lower federal courts have regularly upheld mandatory minimum statutes when challenged on separation of powers grounds, and the Supreme Court has denied any separation of powers infirmity in the federal sentencing guideline system which at the time might have been thought to produce its own form of mandatory minimums. Drug Crimes
Federal law regulates the cultivation, manufacture, distribution, export, import, and possession of certain plants, drugs, and chemicals, which it designates as controlled substances and classifies according to medicinal value and potential for abuse under the Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. It suggested that the escalator approach in some instances might be unduly severe. The mandatory minimums, imposed in addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking, vary depending upon the circumstances: (1) imprisonment for not less than 5 years, unless one of higher mandatory minimums below applies; (2) imprisonment for not less than 7 years, if a firearm is brandished; (3) imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is discharged; (4) imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is a short-barreled rifle or shotgun or is a semi-automatic weapon; (5) imprisonment for not less than 15 years, if the offense involves the armor piercing ammunition; (6) imprisonment for not less than 25 years, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of Section 924(c); (7) imprisonment for not less than 30 years, if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer; and (8) imprisonment for life, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of Section 924(c) and if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer. (4) "Congress should consider clarifying the statutory definitions of the underlying and predicate offenses that trigger mandatory minimum penalties under section 924(c) and the Armed Career Criminal Act to reduce the risk of inconsistent application and the litigation that those definitions have fostered." First, they argue that their sentences are disproportionate to their offenses. The current array includes the following:
A majority of the judges responding to a Sentencing Commission survey thought that the mandatory minimum sentences for production and distribution of child pornography and other child exploitation offenses were generally appropriate. Persons other than individuals may, however, incur criminal liability as conspirators. The federal conspiracy statute outlaws conspiracy to commit any federal crime, including aggravated identity theft. 851(a), if they elect to ask the court to sentence a defendant under the three strikes provision. Without such notice, the court may not impose an enhanced sentence. | Federal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes limit the discretion of a sentencing court to impose a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment or the death penalty. They have a long history and come in several varieties: the not-less-than, the flat sentence, and piggyback versions. Federal courts may refrain from imposing an otherwise required statutory mandatory minimum sentence when requested by the prosecution on the basis of substantial assistance toward the prosecution of others. First-time, low-level, non-violent offenders may be able to avoid the mandatory minimums under the Controlled Substances Acts, if they are completely forthcoming.
The most common imposed federal mandatory minimum sentences arise under the Controlled Substance and Controlled Substance Import and Export Acts, the provisions punishing the presence of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense, the Armed Career Criminal Act, various sex crimes including child pornography, and aggravated identity theft.
Critics argue that mandatory minimums undermine the rationale and operation of the federal sentencing guidelines which are designed to eliminate unwarranted sentencing disparity. Counter arguments suggest that the guidelines themselves operate to undermine individual sentencing discretion and that the ills attributed to other mandatory minimums are more appropriately assigned to prosecutorial discretion or other sources.
State and federal mandatory minimums have come under constitutional attack on several grounds over the years, and have generally survived. The Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause does bar mandatory capital punishment, and apparently bans any term of imprisonment that is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime for which it is imposed. The Supreme Court, however, has declined to overturn sentences imposed under the California three strikes law and challenged as cruel and unusual. Double jeopardy, ex post facto, due process, separation of powers, and equal protection challenges have been generally unavailing.
The United States Sentencing Commission's Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (2011) recommends consideration of amendments to several of the statutes under which federal mandatory minimum sentences are most often imposed.
This is an abbreviated version of CRS Report RL32040, Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes, stripped of its citations, footnotes, and appendixes. |
crs_R44996 | crs_R44996_0 | Introduction
Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), is an island democracy of 23 million people located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China and north of the Philippines. Since January 1, 1979, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan has been unofficial, a consequence of the Carter Administration's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and break formal diplomatic ties with self-ruled Taiwan, over which the PRC claims sovereignty. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8 ; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq. ), enacted on April 10, 1979, provides a legal basis for the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Long-standing issues for U.S. policy, including for Congress, include how to balance support for Taiwan's democracy, prosperity, and security with the U.S. interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the desire for constructive relations with the PRC, whose global influence continues to grow. With the landslide victory of President Tsai and her traditionally China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan's January 2016 elections, Taiwan's relations with the PRC entered a new, less stable, era. The PRC has suspended communications mechanisms across the Taiwan Strait, established diplomatic relations with three countries that previously recognized Taiwan, pressured host countries to force Taiwan's unofficial representative offices to change their names, blocked Taiwan's participation as an observer at international meetings, stepped up deployments of the PRC military near Taiwan, reduced the number of mainland Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan, demanded that other countries return Taiwan citizens accused of crimes to the PRC, rather than Taiwan, and, for the first time, tried a Taiwan activist on charges of attempted subversion of the PRC state. In its management of Taiwan policy, the executive branch has sought to assure the PRC that the United States is upholding its commitments to the PRC and is not conferring "officiality" on the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. At the same time, it has sought to demonstrate to Taiwan and Taiwan's supporters in the United States that it is honoring the Taiwan Relations Act, which includes security commitments related to Taiwan. H.R. The guidelines, which are updated periodically, are intended to distinguish the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship from the official relationships that the United States maintains with diplomatic partners. Initially, support was focused on arms sales; the Taiwan Relations Act states that " ... the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." Starting in 1997, after the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 (see box below), the security relationship broadened to include dialogues, training and military education opportunities for Taiwan military personnel, and assessments of Taiwan's military capabilities, defense bureaucracy, and procurement procedures. The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 ( H.R. H.R. 271 would call on the USTR to begin negotiations with Taiwan for a bilateral trade agreement. After eight years of relative stability in cross-Strait relations during the two presidential terms of the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou, from May 2008 to May 2016, tensions are on the rise under President Tsai. The main point of disagreement between the two sides is the long-standing issue of Taiwan's sovereignty, and specifically Beijing's insistence that President Tsai commit to the notion that Taiwan and mainland China are parts of "one China," and President Tsai's unwillingness to make such a commitment. The PRC has long threatened to use force, if necessary, to bring about Taiwan's unification with mainland China. The U.S. P.L. In the 115 th Congress, H.R. Among other bills, The Taiwan Travel Act ( S. 1051 (Rubio) and its companion, H.R. H.Res. | Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), is an island democracy of 23 million people located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. It is the United States' tenth-largest trading partner. Since January 1, 1979, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan has been unofficial, a consequence of the Carter Administration's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and break formal diplomatic ties with self-ruled Taiwan, over which the PRC claims sovereignty. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), enacted on April 10, 1979, provides a legal basis for the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship. It also includes commitments related to Taiwan's security.
The PRC considers unofficiality in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship to be the basis for the U.S.-PRC relationship. Some Members of Congress have urged the executive branch to re-visit rules intended to distinguish the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship from official U.S. relationships with diplomatic partners, in order to accord Taiwan greater dignity and respect.
The PRC continues to threaten the use of force to bring about Taiwan's unification with mainland China. Beijing codified that threat in 2005, in the form of an Anti-Secession Law. The United States terminated its Treaty of Mutual Defense with Taiwan as of January 1, 1980, but on the basis of the Taiwan Relations Act, it has remained involved in supporting Taiwan's military. Initially, support was focused on arms sales, which Taiwan Relations Act calls for "to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." Starting in 1997, the security relationship broadened to include dialogues, training and military education opportunities for Taiwan military personnel, and support for other "non-hardware aspects of military capability."
After eight years of relative stability in the cross-Strait relationship during the administration of former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016), tensions between Taiwan and the PRC leadership have risen under current President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The main point of disagreement is the long-standing issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. Beijing insists that President Tsai commit to the notion that Taiwan and mainland China are parts of "one China." President Tsai has been unwilling to make such a commitment.
Since President Tsai's election in January 2016, Beijing has progressively increased pressure on her government. Among other moves, it has established diplomatic relations with three countries that previously recognized Taiwan, pressured host countries to force Taiwan's unofficial representative offices to change their names, blocked Taiwan's participation as an observer at international meetings, stepped up deployments of the PRC military near Taiwan, reduced the number of mainland Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan, demanded that other countries return Taiwan citizens accused of crimes to the PRC, rather than Taiwan, and, for the first time, tried a Taiwan activist on charges of attempted subversion of the PRC state. Questions for Congress include whether the U.S. government should seek to support Taiwan in the face of mounting pressure from the PRC, and if so, how to balance such support with the U.S. interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and the desire for constructive relations with the PRC
The 115th Congress passed FY2017 appropriations legislation (P.L. 115-31) to fund the American Institute in Taiwan, through which the United States conducts relations with Taiwan. FY2018 appropriations legislation (H.R. 3354 and S. 1780) is pending. Other pending legislation includes the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2018 (H.R. 2810 and S. 1519), the Taiwan Security Act of 2017 (S. 1620), the Strengthening Security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Act (H.R. 2621), the Taiwan Travel Act (S. 1051 and H.R. 535), a bill "To direct the Secretary of State to regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization" (H.R. 3320), and a resolution calling for negotiations to enter into a bilateral trade agreement with Taiwan (H.Res. 271). |
crs_R43667 | crs_R43667_0 | Introduction
In the United States, births to unmarried women (i.e., nonmarital births) are widespread, including families of varying income class, race, ethnicity, and geographic area. Many analysts attribute this to changed attitudes over many years about fertility and marriage. They find that many adult women and teenage girls no longer feel obliged to marry before, or as a consequence of, having children. Although nonmarital childbearing is not a new phenomenon, the relatively recent factors associated with historically high levels of nonmarital childbearing are that women are marrying later in life and more couples are cohabiting. Other factors include decreased childbearing of married couples, increased marital dissolution, increased sexual activity outside of marriage, participation in risky behaviors that often lead to sex, improper use of contraceptive methods, and lack of marriageable partners. Most children who grow up in mother-only families, father-only families, step-parent families, or families in which the mother is cohabiting with a male partner become well-adjusted, productive adults. However, a large body of research indicates that children who grow up with only one biological parent in the home are more likely to be financially worse off and have worse socioeconomic outcomes (even after income differences are taken into account) compared to children who grow up with both biological parents in the home. This report analyzes the trends in nonmarital childbearing in the United States, discusses some of the characteristics of unwed mothers, addresses some issues involving the fathers of children born outside of marriage, and offers some concluding remarks. Recent data indicate that the notion that unmarried births equal mother-only families is no longer fully correct. In 2013, there were 1.6 million nonmarital births. Moreover, the age and nonmarital birth data for 1990 and 2013 displayed in Figure 5 show that for all age groups a growing share of women are having nonmarital births. Some of the highlights include the following:
black women are more likely to have children outside of marriage than other racial or ethnic groups; it is not teenagers but rather women in their early twenties who have the highest percentage of births outside of marriage; single motherhood is more common among women with less education than among well-educated women; a substantial share of nonmarital births (44%) were to women who had already given birth to one or more children; a significant number of unwed mothers are in cohabiting relationships; and women who have a nonmarital birth are less likely than other women to eventually marry. It appears that one result of the so-called sexual revolution was that many men increasingly believed that women could and should control their fertility via contraception and abortion. As a result, many men have become less willing to marry the women they impregnate. One of the trends that this report highlights is that although there has been a rise in nonmarital births, it does not mean that there has been a subsequent rise in mother-only families. Instead, it reflects the rise in the number of couples who are in cohabiting relationships. Because the number of women living in a cohabiting situation has increased substantially over the last several decades, many children start off in households in which both of their biological parents reside. Nonetheless, cohabiting family situations are disrupted or dissolved much more frequently than married-couple families. The large number of nonmarital births has added to the complexity of families. | Although nonmarital births (i.e., births to unmarried women) are not a new phenomenon, their impact on families has not diminished and there is much agreement that the complexity of modern family relationships and living arrangements may further complicate the well-being of children born to unwed mothers.
For the past six years (2008-2013), the percentage of all U.S. births that were nonmarital births remained unchanged at about 41% (1.6 million births per year), compared with 28% of all births in 1990 and about 11% of all births in 1970. Many of these children grow up in mother-only families. Although most children who grow up in mother-only families or step-parent families become well-adjusted, productive adults, the bulk of empirical research indicates that children who grow up with only one biological parent in the home are more likely to be financially worse off and have worse socioeconomic outcomes (even after income differences are taken into account) compared to children who grow up with both biological parents in the home.
In the United States, nonmarital births are widespread, touching families of varying income class, race, ethnicity, and geographic area. Many analysts attribute this to changed attitudes over the past few decades about fertility and marriage. They find that many adult women and teenage girls no longer feel obliged to marry before, or as a consequence of, having children. With respect to men, it appears that one result of the so-called sexual revolution is that many men now believe that women can and should control their fertility via contraception or abortion and have become less willing to marry the women they impregnate.
Factors that are associated with the historically high levels of nonmarital childbearing include an increase in the median age of first marriage (i.e., marriage postponement), decreased childbearing of married couples, increased marital dissolution, an increase in the number of cohabiting couples, increased sexual activity outside of marriage, participation in risky behaviors that often lead to sex, improper use of contraceptive methods, and lack of marriageable partners.
The data indicate that for all age groups, a growing share of women are having nonmarital births. Women ages 20 through 24 currently have the largest share of nonmarital births.
Although there has been a rise in nonmarital births, it does not mean that there has been a subsequent rise in mother-only families. Instead, it reflects the rise in the number of couples who are in cohabiting relationships; in fact, recent data indicate that more than half of nonmarital births are to cohabiting parents. Because the number of women living in a cohabiting situation has increased substantially over the last several decades, many children start off in households in which both of their biological parents reside. Nonetheless, cohabiting family situations are disrupted or dissolved much more frequently than married-couple families. Moreover, the family complexity that sometime starts with a nonmarital birth may require different public policy strategies than those used in the past for mother-only families.
This report analyzes the trends in nonmarital childbearing, discusses some of the characteristics of unwed mothers, addresses some issues involving the fathers of children born outside of marriage, and offers some concluding remarks. |
crs_RL32483 | crs_RL32483_0 | Background to the Regional Haze Rule
When amending the Clean Air Act in 1977, Congress added provisions focused on protecting the quality of clean air areas, and especially of national parks and other important national sites. Along with the PSD program for new sources, the Congress also added a new Section 169A, setting "as a national goal the prevention of any future, and the remedying of any existing , impairment to visibility in mandatory class I Federal areas...." PSD and Section 169A act in tandem, with PSD controlling new sources of impairment and Section 169A reducing emissions from existing sources of impairment. Under Section 169A, 26 categories of major stationary sources of pollution in existence on the date of enactment (1977), but not more than 15 years old as of that date, must install "best available retrofit technology" (BART) if the state determines the source may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to any impairment of visibility in a class I area. Second, EPA had to promulgate regulations within 24 months of enactment to assure that State Implementation Plans (SIPs) required (1) reasonable progress toward meeting the national goal mentioned earlier, and (2) compliance with several very specific provisions, including the Best Available Retrofit Technology (BART) requirements for existing sources. The final regional haze rule was published on July 1, 1999. The Regional Haze Rule and the Clean Air Interstate Rule
The regional haze and PM 2.5 programs interact with other air quality programs as well—notably EPA's finalized Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR). The 1999 regional haze rule also allowed for a trading program for implementing BART if the state requesting a trading program submitted analyses demonstrating "that the emissions trading program or other alternative measure will achieve greater reasonable progress than would have resulted from the installation and operation of BART at all sources subject to BART in the State." This demonstration must be based on analysis of the visibility improvement that would be achieved in class I areas. Inserted a renumbered Section 308(e)(3) providing that a state's BART-eligible electric generating units that participate in the CAIR trading program would not have to install and operate BART. CAIR-affected States are not required to accept our determination that CAIR may substitute for BART." As discussed, this effort to meld Section 169A (visibility) and Section 109 (NAAQS) implementation strategies based on their common characteristic of controlling sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides raises numerous issues. It appears the Administration's goal is to redirect CAA compliance strategies toward a market-oriented cap-and-trade program—viewed by many observers as a more cost-effective approach to pollution control than direct regulation (such as the BART program). EPA's combining of CAIR and BART represents a regulatory initiative to achieve at least a partial step in coordinating regulatory programs under a market-oriented approach. It is possible, however, that a statutory solution could be necessary. | Section 169A of the Clean Air Act (CAA) sets "as a national goal the prevention of any future, and the remedying of any existing, impairment to visibility" in designated "class I areas" (e.g., national parks and wilderness areas). It requires 26 categories of major stationary sources of pollution—including electric generating units (EGUs)—in existence on the date of enactment (1977), but not more than 15 years old as of that date, to install "best available retrofit technology" (BART) if the state determines the source may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to any impairment of visibility in any class I area. A key contributor to regional haze is very fine particles (PM2.5), to which sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) are important contributors. EGUs are major emitters of SO2 and NOx.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was directed to issue regulations to assure that State Implementation Plans (SIPs) required (1) reasonable progress toward meeting the national goal and (2) compliance with specific provisions, including the BART requirements. However, EPA delayed issuing regional haze rules, and in 1990 Congress amended the CAA's visibility requirements. EPA issued the final regional haze rule on July 1, 1999. Among its provisions, the rule required "reasonable progress" toward visibility improvement and a state BART implementation plan. For BART, states could alternatively propose a trading program—but only if it achieved greater progress in improving visibility.
The BART requirement's interaction with other air pollution control programs has become an issue—most notably its relation to the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) designed to reduce emissions crossing state lines and hindering compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). CAIR involves controls on SO2 and NOx, focuses on EGUs as the most cost-effective source to control, and proposes using a trading mechanism to accomplish reductions. At issue is how the model CAIR trading program for EGUs interacts with the BART requirement for EGUs. In 2005, EPA made a final determination to exempt EGUs subject to the CAIR trading program from the Section 169A visibility BART program. Critics of EPA's proposal point out that Section 169A specifies protection of individual class I areas and that BART requirements would be more stringent than CAIR for individual sources; and they claim that overall, visibility improvements attributable to CAIR would not be adequate to meet CAA goals.
EPA's effort to meld the visibility program with CAIR is consistent with its expressed desire to redirect CAA compliance strategies toward a market-oriented, cap-and-trade program, viewed by many as more cost-effective than direct regulation (such as BART). The Administration has proposed "Clear Skies" legislation to create a more integrated trading process for addressing SO2 and NOx emissions from EGUs, but it failed to be reported out of committee in the Senate. CAIR represents a regulatory initiative to achieve a step in coordinating certain CAA programs, but it may be that a statutory solution will be necessary.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40135 | crs_R40135_0 | Introduction
Escalating drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico and the increasing presence of Mexican drug traffickers and Central American gangs in the United States have focused congressional concern on the pace of implementation of the Mérida Initiative. To date, Congress has appropriated some $1.3 billion to support Mérida programs in Mexico, $248 million for Mérida and a new Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) in Central America, and $42 million for Caribbean countries, including funds for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). Detailed strategy documents for CARSI and CBSI are not yet available. However, the Obama Administration included a new four-pillar strategy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation in its FY2011 budget request, which was more clearly defined after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton led a Cabinet-level delegation to Mexico on March 23, 2010. The four pillars of the new bilateral strategy will focus on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21 st -century border; and (4) building strong and resilient communities While the first two pillars largely build upon efforts that began under the Bush Administration, pillars three and four broaden the scope of bilateral cooperation to include efforts to facilitate "secure flows" of people and goods through the U.S.-Mexico border and to promote social and economic development in violence-prone communities (see " Beyond the Mérida Initiative " section below). The 111 th Congress is likely to continue overseeing how Mérida and related funds have been used, any planned adjustments in the uses of funds appropriated during the FY2008-FY2010 budget cycles, and the degree to which the Obama Administration's new strategies for Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean complement each other and U.S. domestic counterdrug and border security efforts. In response to the Mexican government's request for increased cooperation and assistance, in October 2007 the United States and Mexico proposed the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance to Mexico and Central America. In P.L. As with Mexico, P.L. 111-8 , Congress provided $105 million in funding for Central America subject to similar human rights conditions as in P.L. The Act placed Central America funding into a new Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which split Central America from the Merida Initiative. 110-252 and again in P.L. The FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. 111-117 ) provided $37 million for CBSI, of which "not less than" $21 million is to be used for social justice and education programs. On December 3, 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a preliminary report for Congress on the status of funding for the Mérida Initiative. By the end of September 2009, GAO found that $830 million of the $1.3 billion in Mérida funds appropriated for Mexico and Central America had been obligated by the State Department, but only $26 million of the funds had actually been spent. The 111 th Congress has held numerous hearings on the heightened drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico and how to combat the DTOs. The 111 th Congress is closely monitoring the efficacy of assistance provided through the Mérida Initiative and compliance with Mérida's human rights conditions. Mérida supporters described the initiative as a security cooperation partnership against drug traffickers and organized criminal groups, rather than a foreign assistance program. The Administration did not formally announce the new strategy until the Mérida High-Level Consultative Group meeting in Mexico City on March 23, 2010. The Obama Administration has asked for just $8 million in FMF for FY2011. Cooperation with Central America and the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)
A number of policy issues have emerged involving the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative, which, as of FY2010, has been split away from the Mérida Initiative into a new Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). Demining and Related programs (NADR) funds. Conditions on FY2008 Supplemental Assistance for Mérida
Mexico
The FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act ( P.L. | Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups is threatening citizen security in Mexico and Central America. Drug trafficking-related violence claimed more than 6,500 lives in Mexico in 2009, and several Central American countries have among the world's highest homicide rates. Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) dominate the illicit drug market in the United States and are expanding their operations by forming partnerships with U.S. gangs.
On October 22, 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug and anticrime assistance for Mexico and Central America that would begin in FY2008 and last through FY2010. Congress has appropriated some $1.3 billion for Mérida programs in Mexico, $248 million for Mérida and related programs in Central America, and $42 million for Caribbean countries in P.L. 110-252, P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-32, and, most recently, in the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-117. Each of these acts contains human rights conditions on 15% of certain law enforcement and military assistance provided to Mexico and Central America. P.L. 111-117 places Central America funding into a new Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which splits Central America from the Mérida Initiative. The act also provides $37 million for a new Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
Throughout 2009, drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico and the potential threat of spillover along the Southwest border focused congressional concern on the pace of implementation of the Mérida Initiative. On December 3, 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a preliminary report for Congress on the status of funding for the Mérida Initiative. By the end of September 2009, GAO found that $830 million of the $1.3 billion in Mérida funds appropriated for Mexico and Central America as of that time had been obligated by the State Department, but only $26 million of the funds had actually been spent. The pace of implementation has accelerated since that time, with at least $113 million worth of equipment having arrived in Mexico by March 2010, but implementation challenges remain.
The 111th Congress is maintaining a strong interest in how well U.S. agencies and their foreign counterparts are implementing the Mérida Initiative and the degree to which the nations involved are fulfilling their domestic obligations under Mérida. Congress has also monitored enforcement of Mérida's human rights conditions, particularly with respect to Mexico. Congress is playing a role in the design of post-Mérida security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin during its consideration of the Obama Administration's FY2011 budget request. For FY2011, the Administration has asked for $310 million in assistance for Mérida programs in Mexico, $100 million for CARSI, and $79 million for CBSI. Detailed strategy documents for CARSI and CBSI are not yet available, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a new strategy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation after a high-level meeting in Mexico City on March 23, 2010. The plan focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st-century border; and (4) building strong and resilient communities.
This report provides an overview of the funding provided for the Mérida Initiative and related assistance programs in Central America and the Caribbean, the status of Mérida implementation, and a discussion of some policy issues that Congress may consider as it oversees the initiative and related programs. |
crs_RL31425 | crs_RL31425_0 | Sources
Another shorthand commonly used by the military services and the intelligence community refers to the source of any given piece of intelligence. Changed Environment
Most of today's military equipment and organization was originally designed to fight the Soviet Union. (7)
Outside observers, including other members of the national intelligence community, generally agree with DOD's characterization of the threat. In addition to the changed threat, the U.S. military along with the rest of society also has experienced major changes in the technologies available. Theseofficials point to examples such as the change in the military's ability to attack targets from the air,comparing Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991 to Operation Enduring Freedom againstAfghanistan in 2001. (12)
Transformation Criteria
Regardless of how transformation may be defined, retired Vice Admiral (USN) Arthur Cebrowski, the chief of the Defense Department's Office of Force Transformation, has identifiedsome criteria by which military programs may be judged for their transformational qualities. Somecommonly recognized characteristics include a world-wide perspective, fusion, detail, andpersistent surveillance . Some experts express caution about these characteristics. DOD Plans for Future Forces
To assess the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aspects of military transformation, it is useful to have a basic understanding of the military forces which the future ISR structure willbe expected to support. All of the services are planning their forces in light of thechanged threat and new information technologies. Taken together, they do appear to be helping improveinteroperability while supporting changes in the way warfare is conducted against a wide range ofthreats. How this will be manifested is not yet determined. One of these mission capability packages is dedicated to ISR. As noted earlier, many observers believe significant transformation of ISR has already occurredand has been practiced in Afghanistan. The military's ability to move data from the reconnaissanceplatform to the weapon system able to take action, the so-called "sensor to shooter" sequence,generally required at least a full day in Operation Desert Storm, as imagery from a satellite orreconnaissance aircraft had to be analyzed, identified as a target, turned into hard-copy, andintensively studied by the aircrew before a weapon could be dropped accurately. Some outside observers, however, believe that in addition to these changes, the military intelligence community needs to establish a whole new method for analysis. (91) In addition,several other issues involving the cost and qualityof intelligence, as well as leadership, military intelligence's role in homeland defense and the impactof potential intelligence community reform may be considered. HUMINT Deficiencies
Congress also sees a national security imperative to improve HUMINT. All of the services report that analysis requires more attention. (101) Congress will then have the opportunity todetermine whether the programs still make sense. Appendix: Acronyms
AC2ISRC Aerospace Command and Control and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center
ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
ASD/C3I Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
ASDS Advanced SEAL Delivery System
BDA Bomb Damage Assessment
C2ISR Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Project Agency
DCGS Distributed Common Ground System
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD Department of Defense
GPS Global Positioning System
HUMINT Human Intelligence
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFCOM Joint Forces Command
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council
MASINT Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NMCI Navy and Marine Corps Intranet
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NSA National Security Agency
OFT Office of Force Transformation
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
RSTA Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition
SEAL Sea-Air-Land forces
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIPRNET Secure Internet Protocol Network
SOCOM Special Operations Command
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle | The Department of Defense (DOD) indicates it is undertaking a major alteration in its capabilities, from a force designed to fight the Soviet Union to one tailored to 21st centuryadversaries including terrorism. This shift has been prompted by the perception of a changing threatand improved technology, especially information technology. As the military services attempt toincrease the agility and versatility of their weapon systems, they also see a need to increase thecapabilities of military intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to support the newweapon systems and operating methods against these new threats.
To judge whether service activities are likely to help the military "transform," the head of DOD's Office of Force Transformation, retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (U.S. Navy) hasproposed three criteria-whether the proposed capability can communicate and operate easily inconjunction with the other services, whether it helps the military develop new methods ofwarfighting, and whether it will be useful against a wide range of threats. In addition, ISR activitiesshould, in the aggregate, provide a world-wide perspective of the threat, "fuse" all types ofintelligence into one picture, access extensive details about the enemy, and monitor specific targetsfor long periods of time.
All of the services are planning ISR programs which exhibit at least some attributes of transformation. Many observers believe military ISR has already achieved some transformation, asshown in the war in Afghanistan by the military's ability to detect a target and destroy it withinminutes. The military's ability to move intelligence quickly has improved dramatically. However,many observers are concerned that analysis may be lagging behind. Proposals to make revolutionarychanges in analysis include using contractors to produce competing unclassified analyses, developingartificial intelligence capabilities for database work, and establishing more operations analysiscenters.
The military intelligence community is supported by the national intelligence community, which even before the September 11 attacks was under intense scrutiny. Therefore, the aspects ofthe national intelligence community's operations in which Congress has expressed interest directlyaffect the quality of military intelligence. In addition, DOD's plans for improving its ISRcapabilities raise potential issues for Congress with regard to cost, the balancing of potentiallycompeting efforts to improve the flow of intelligence and the quality of the data, and the support ofmilitary leadership. Finally, the consequences of the military's role in homeland defense, andintelligence community reform may generate concern. Discussion of these issues is provided asbackground as Congress considers ISR programs as part of defense and intelligence authorizationand appropriations legislation. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL32615 | crs_RL32615_0 | Pakistan's National Assembly passed a resolution condemning the alleged desecration. Pakistan, a strategically importantcountry that is home to one of the world's largest Muslim populations, has been a key cooperatingnation in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in South Asia. (7) On October 12, 1999, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen.Pervez Musharraf replaced Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup. In the wake of themilitary overthrow of the elected government, Islamabad faced considerable internationalopprobrium and was subjected to automatic coup-related U.S. sanctions under section 508 of theannual foreign assistance appropriations act. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the UnitedStates and Musharraf's ensuing withdrawal of support for the Afghan Taliban regime, however, hadthe effect of greatly reducing Pakistan's international isolation. While top-tier U.S. emphases in theregion after September 2001 have remained combating religious extremism and ending illicit nuclearweapons proliferation, the United States expresses a strong interest in the improvement of Pakistan'shuman rights situation, especially as regards the restoration and strengthening of the country'scivilian democratic institutions. There exists a debate among analysts over the exigency of thisissue. Some observers urge patience, contending that a "true" democratic system will require timeand that "military-guided" governance is required in an unstable setting and to deter extremistpolitical influences. Others argue that Pakistan's underdeveloped democracy and rule of law arethemselves a central cause of the country's instability. The United States now considers Pakistan to be a vital ally in the international anti-terrorismcoalition. The Bush Administration has refrained from expressing any strong public criticisms ofPakistan's internal political practices, while still asserting that the strengthening of civilian politicalinstitutions in Islamabad is "a requirement for the development of a stable, moderate Islamic state." The 9/11 Commission Report (released in July 2004) claims that -- evenafter acknowledging problems in U.S.-Pakistan relations and President Musharraf's role in them -- "Musharraf's government is the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan." 108-458 ), the 108thCongress broadly endorsed this recommendation by calling for long-term and comprehensive U.S.support for the government of Pakistan in an effort to ensure a "stable and secure future" for thatcountry. "Enlightened Moderation". Pakistan People's Party. While maintaining his promise to hold national elections in October 2002, Musharraf spent ensuingyears taking actions that bolstered his ruling position and that of the military. In December 2004, Congress extended the President's waiver authoritythrough FY2006 with the passage the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004( P.L. | Pakistan is a strategically important country and home to one of the world's largest Muslimpopulations. In October 1999, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff Gen. Pervez Musharraf replaced PrimeMinister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup. Following the military overthrow of an electedgovernment, Islamabad faced considerable international opprobrium and was subjected to automaticcoup-related U.S. sanctions. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States andMusharraf's ensuing withdrawal of support for the Afghan Taliban regime, however, had the effectof greatly reducing Pakistan's international isolation. Congress temporarily removed restrictions,and large-scale U.S. aid to the country resumed, in late 2001. The United States views Pakistan asa vital ally in the international anti-terrorism coalition. The Bush Administration refrains fromexpressing any significant public criticisms of Pakistan's internal political practices, while stillasserting that the strengthening of civilian political institutions in Islamabad is "a requirement forthe development of a stable, moderate Islamic state."
While top-tier U.S. emphases in the region after September 2001 remain combating religiousextremism and ending illicit weapons proliferation, the United States expresses a strong interest inthe improvement of Pakistan's human rights situation, especially as regards the restoration andstrengthening of democratic institutions. There is a debate among analysts over the exigency of thisissue. Some observers urge patience, contending that a "true" democratic system will require timeand that "military-guided" governance is required in an unstable setting and to deter extremistpolitical influences. Others argue that Pakistan's underdeveloped democracy and rule of law arethemselves a central cause of the country's instability.
October 2002 general elections nominally fulfilled President Musharraf's promise to restorethe National Assembly that was dissolved after his extra-constitutional seizure of power. Apro-military alliance won a plurality of seats while a coalition of Islamist parties made a surprisinglystrong showing. Yet subsequent developments -- including an agreement between Musharraf andthe Islamist opposition to bring controversial constitutional changes before Parliament, a brokenpromise from Musharraf to resign his military commission before 2005, and widespread accusationsof rigging in August 2005 municipal elections -- have fueled concerns that Pakistan's civiliandemocratic institutions are being weakened. National and provincial level elections are to take placein 2007.
The 9/11 Commission Report called Musharraf's government the "best hope" for stability inPakistan and Afghanistan, and recommended the provision of long-term and comprehensive supportto Pakistan so long as its government remains committed to combating extremism and to a policyof "enlightened moderation." In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ), Congress broadly endorsed this recommendation and sought to encouragePakistan's transition to full democracy. The act also extended the President's authority to waivecoup-related sanctions on Pakistan through FY2006. See also CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations and CRS Report RL32259 , Terrorism in South Asia . This report will beupdated periodically. |
crs_R43264 | crs_R43264_0 | Introduction
The recent enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) demonstrates congressional interest in the patent system. Most of the provisions of the AIA apply to any type of patented invention. However, other AIA provisions are specific to particular types of inventions. That statute limited the availability of patents on tax strategies, prohibits the issuance of patents claiming human organisms, and creates "transitional proceedings" that apply exclusively to patents pertaining to business methods. All patentable inventions are generally subject to the same statutory provisions. A number of exceptions exist to this concept of technological neutrality, however. This blended architecture has for many years prompted inquiry into whether the patent system operates best as a uniform system that applies neutrally to all inventions, or whether it could or should be tailored to meet the specific needs of different industries. One component of the WTO agreements, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), requires patents to be available and enforceable "without discrimination as to ... the field of technology.... " Although the TRIPS Agreement allows for some limited exceptions to this rule of technological neutrality, one consequence of U.S. membership in the WTO may be a restricted ability to tailor the patent statute to particular inventions and industries. After providing a brief review of the patent system, the report identifies different industrial traits, such as the pace of innovation, product cycle, and the cost of research and development, which potentially suggest the desirability of tailored patent rights. The number of patents that cover a particular product also varies widely among industry. Some possible points of adjustment include
The speed with which the USPTO reviews patent applications could be adjusted to meet the needs of industries with varying product cycles. In addition to these practical concerns, U.S. membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) may restrict congressional ability to tailor the patent system to account for different industries and inventions, to the extent that compliance with WTO standards is desired. Concluding Observations
The patent system involves numerous parameters, including the requirements to obtain a patent, the scope of proprietary rights, and the term of protection. Should Congress consider current circumstances with respect to the patent system to be appropriate, then no action need be taken. As noted, the TRIPS Agreement provides for a number of limited exceptions to the general rule of technological neutrality. In contrast to patents, regulatory exclusivities are not subject to extensive regulation by the TRIPS Agreement. | Congressional interest in the patent system has been demonstrated by the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) in the 112th Congress. Most of the provisions of the AIA apply to any type of patented invention, whether it consists of a chemical compound, mechanical device, electrical circuit, or other technology. However, other AIA provisions are specific to particular types of inventions, including business methods, tax strategies, and human organisms. The AIA reflects the principle that, for the most part, patentable inventions are generally subject to the same statutory provisions. However, a number of exceptions exist to this concept of technological neutrality.
This blended architecture has for many years prompted inquiry into whether the patent system operates best as a uniform system that applies neutrally to all inventions, or whether it could or should be tailored to meet the specific needs of different industries. Technologies and industrial sectors arguably differ in ways salient to the patent system. Among these distinctions are the costs and risks of research and development, the availability of trade secret protection as an effective alternative to patenting, the number of patents that cover a particular product, and the patterns of patent acquisition and enforcement of firms within that sector. The patent system involves a number of parameters that could potentially be adjusted to meet the needs of individual sectors, including the speed with which applications are reviewed, the scope of exclusive rights afforded by a patent, and the term of the patent.
While some observers suggest the desirability of sector-specific patent principles, others believe them to be infeasible and unwise. They observe that legislative efforts to define particular industries may prove difficult, that attorneys may sometimes be able to draft patents artfully so as to fall within a favored category, and that U.S. industry is dynamic and resistive to a static statutory definition. In addition, U.S. membership within the World Trade Organization (WTO) may limit the ability to tailor the patent system to account for different industries and inventions, to the extent that compliance with WTO standards is desired. The WTO-administered Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, or TRIPS Agreement, in part requires WTO member states to make patent rights available without discrimination as to the field of technology. The TRIPS Agreement admits some exceptions exist to this principle of technological neutrality, however.
Should Congress believe current circumstances to be appropriate, then no action need be taken. To the degree WTO compliance is desired, Congress could also legislate along the lines permitted by the TRIPS Agreement. Notably, although the TRIPS Agreement generally disallows discrimination with respect to technological fields, it permits distinctions on other grounds. Congress could also make use of regulatory exclusivities and other complementary intellectual property rights that the TRIPS Agreement regulates less heavily. |
crs_R41143 | crs_R41143_0 | Introduction
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) comprise a variety of unilateral, bilateral, or regional arrangements which favor member parties over nonmembers by extending tariff and other nontariff preferences. In the post-war period, the European Union (EU) has been central to the proliferation of PTAs. Accession negotiations with both countries have been going on since 2005. Progress in negotiating a comprehensive agreement was limited. Until completion of its recent FTA with South Korea, Europe's PTAs have been characterized by differentiation, flexibility, and relatively modest ambition in terms of market-opening. The EU has differentiated among its partners in terms of provisions and commitments. These numbers can be used to evaluate two arguments that are commonly made about the proliferation of U.S. and EU PTAs: (1) that U.S. firms may face more discrimination and possibly reduced sales than EU firms due to the EU's larger participation in PTAs, and (2) that the EU's larger participation in PTAs may allow it to gain more control over the international trade agenda via extension of its own regulatory regime and standards to its PTA partners. Thus, it is possible to maintain that the EU's PTAs cover nearly twice as much exports in percentage terms (70% versus 40%) and seven times as much in value terms ($3.4 trillion versus $0.52 trillion) than U.S. PTAs. At the same time, this argument may be overstated because the data are upwardly biased due to the fact that the amount of trade covered by preferential agreements is not the same as the amount of trade that is conducted on a preferential basis. Trade Competition
Concerns about falling behind and avoiding trade diversion have arguably been a factor in the two trading partners efforts to negotiate and implement separate but similar PTAs with five trading partners (Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Chile, and Jordan). This does not mean individual companies and workers have not benefitted or that exports have not risen at faster rates as a result of these PTAs, but that in the aggregate many other factors other than PTAs may be determining how well each side does overall in supplying a trading partner with its imports. U.S. FTA Policy
In the past, Europe's preferential trade agreements have had only a small impact on the direction of U.S. trade policy, particularly U.S. FTA policy. An important concern that the EU-Korea FTA raises is that U.S. exporters, particularly manufacturers, will be put at risk due to the duty-free price advantage European-based producers will gain in the Korean market. EU negotiations with Canada over an ambitious and comprehensive FTA could also affect the U.S. FTA debate. Assuming a robust EU-Canada FTA was agreed to, the EU and the United States would then both have a FTA with Canada and Mexico, making the absence of an FTA between the United States and Europe all the more glaring after many years of discussion. Conclusion
It is not clear what direction Europe's PTA policy will head in the future. These would be the handful of remaining countries that fall outside the EU's network of PTAs, namely the United States, China, Japan, and Australia. PTA negotiations with these countries, it is argued, could yield significant economic benefits and provide the biggest impact (for good or ill) on the world trading system. Bigger trade partners such as the United States and China, however, would likely demand openings in agriculture and services, sectors where there is widespread opposition to liberalization. | Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) comprise a variety of arrangements that favor member parties over nonmembers by extending tariff and other nontariff preferences. PTAs, particularly free trade agreements (FTAs), have proliferated in recent years. In the post-war period, the European Union (EU), which is a PTA itself, has developed the largest network of PTAs in the world. The main findings of this report are as follows.
Historically, Europe's PTAs have differed among its partners in terms of provisions and commitments and they have been characterized by relatively modest ambition in terms of market-opening. In comparison, the U.S. approach has been more standardized in terms of its provisions and more focused on achieving reciprocal market access. These differences in approaches, however, have significantly narrowed since the EU adopted its more commercially oriented Global Europe strategy in 2006. EU PTAs cover nearly twice as much trade (exports) in percentage terms (70% versus 40%) and seven times as much in value terms ($3.4 trillion versus $0.52 trillion) than U.S. PTAs. These numbers can be used to support the argument that U.S. firms may face more discrimination and possibly reduced sales than EU firms. At the same time, the data may overstate the degree of discrimination because the amount of trade covered by PTAs is not the same as the amount of trade conducted on a preferential (duty-free) basis. Concerns about trade discrimination have been a factor in U.S. and EU efforts to negotiate and implement separate but similar PTAs with five trading partners (Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Chile, and Jordan). Based on market share data analyzed, neither side appears to have gained a competitive advantage from having negotiated a PTA. This, however, does not mean that individual firms and workers have not benefitted or that exports have not risen at faster rates after the PTA became effective. In the past, Europe's PTA program has not been a major factor affecting U.S. FTA policy, which currently is in flux. However, Europe's recently completed FTA with South Korea raises the concern that U.S. exports will be disadvantaged due to the duty-free price advantage European-based producers will gain in the Korean market. The United States has also negotiated an FTA with Korea, which awaits approval in Korea parliament (Congress approved the agreement in 2011). Ongoing negotiations between the EU and Canada over a comprehensive FTA could also affect the U.S. FTA debate. If a robust agreement is reached, the EU and the United States would then both have FTAs with Canada and Mexico, making the absence of a FTA between the United States and EU all the more glaring after years of discussion.
It is not clear where Europe's PTA policy is headed. There are only a few remaining major developed countries that fall outside the EU's network of PTAs, including the United States, China, Japan, Russia and Australia. While PTA negotiations with these countries could yield large economic benefits and provide a big impact (for good or ill) on the world trading system, some of these countries would likely demand liberalization of European agriculture and services, areas where there is widespread opposition in Europe. |
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